

# africa INSIGHT

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## Western aid to Africa

The deepening international economic recession casts a lengthening shadow over Africa and other poor regions. The Western industrial nations, which in 1979 jointly provided 76 percent of development aid worldwide (as against 18 percent from OPEC and 6 percent from the Soviet Bloc), find it increasingly difficult financially and politically to maintain, let alone raise, their assistance to the so-called Third World.

Most black African states' lack-lustre management of their economic affairs and the region's bleak prospects for stability leave more and more Western decision-makers wondering how far development aid really serves to promote development, let alone strengthen bonds between donor and recipient countries. The discussion of this issue in the USA is of particular significance for Africa, including South Africa, because the Reagan administration's search for an African policy has thrown up the issue of greater American involvement in South Africa. While the USA clearly does not want to be used to topple the present order in South Africa, it is being pressurised to do so by black Africa. At the same time strong conservative groups in America believe that South Africa is a more important and above all more reliable partner for the USA than black Africa.

Even if this viewpoint does not prevail but merely succeeds in strongly fashioning Reagan's African policy, e.g. by influencing the allocation and conditions of aid, this would have far-reaching consequences for the African countries concerned. With a global contribution of 4.68-billion dollars in 1979, the USA is the greatest single source (15.9 percent) of aid to the Third World.

Whereas 0.7 percent of donor countries' GDP is accepted as the target, the USA achieved a figure of only 0.20 percent in 1979, compared with 0.59 percent for France, 0.52 percent for Britain, 0.44 percent for Germany, 0.26 percent for Japan and 0.35 percent for all OECD countries combined (0.43 percent if the USA is excluded). Expressed in absolute amounts, total Western aid rose from 13.8-billion dollars in

1975 to 20-billion dollars in 1978 and 22.4-billion dollars in 1979. But in terms of needs, notably external debts continually pushed upwards by the mounting costs of petroleum imports and increasing imports of basic foodstuffs, the value of aid is decreasing.

According to the World Bank's World Development Report of 1980, there has been little increase in total aid to poor countries between 1975 and 1980 if expressed in constant 1978 prices. From 17.9-billion dollars in 1975 total aid fell to 17.3-billion dollars in 1976 and rose to 18-billion dollars in 1977, 20-billion dollars in 1978, 20.1-billion dollars in 1979 and 20.2-billion dollars in 1980. The development of aid from all sources (including OPEC) to *sub-Saharan Africa* is reflected in Table 1.

Table 1: Western aid to Africa  
(million US dollars)

Year	At current prices	At constant 1978 prices
1970	1767.6	3760.9
1975	5952.0	9929.9
1976	5979.8	7474.8
1977	7557.5	8686.8
1978	8951.0	8951.0
1979	9324.7	8400.6

Although taken from World Bank and OECD publications, these are figures which are subject to continual revision and must be interpreted with due caution. However, they support the prevailing impression that after its substantial growth in the early 1970s, aid to sub-Saharan Africa has tended to stagnate and even fall later in the decade. If OPEC's share

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## Comment

could be eliminated (which at present is not possible because of lack of data), the fall in the Western countries' aid at constant prices might well prove to be appreciable.

At a time when an increasing number of African countries — and their overseas creditors — are worried by mounting balance of payments difficulties, this is certainly a disquieting development. External public debt expressed as a percentage of GNP has increased as follows between 1970 and 1978: Ethiopia from 9,5 to 15,4 percent; Somalia from 41,1 to 101,7 percent; Chad from 11,8 to 23,4 percent; Zaire from 17,1 to 33,4 percent; Tanzania from 19,4 to 25,1 percent; Mauritania from 16,8 to 138,1 percent; Senegal from 12,2 to 19,8 percent; Zambia from 34,5 to 51,6 percent; and so on. Even though the comparable figures show an improvement for countries such as Malawi, Uganda, Lesotho, Kenya and Liberia, there is no doubt that the basic tendency is highly unfavourable.

Viewed against this background, the surprisingly candid views expressed by the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, John P Lewis, in the organisation's 1980 review of development aid have particular significance for Africa. Consider e.g the following:

The dynamics of African development appear to be headed downhill. This is true of the interplay between population and projected food production. More comprehensively, it is true of income per capita...

In Lewis's view the basic reason for "these perverse dynamics" lies in agriculture and especially the productivity of food producers. Asking why African agriculture has fared distinctly worse than that of South Asia, where conditions are not easier, he concludes that there are many factors involved but that lack of political will and administrative capability lie at the core:

What has been lacking...have been sufficient implementation and, in particular, sufficient political and bureaucratic energy and grasp of the composite problem to build the partial answers into effective strategies.

Lewis castigates African political leaders for excessive concern over "racial confrontation with the white settlers" which "often has been a distraction from workaday development matters," while they tend to turn a blind eye to violence and repression within African states. He is sceptical about their proclaimed goal of regional self-reliance and cooperation "which deserves a careful non-emotional response from the international community and especially from aid donors. Plainly, it has chauvinistic overtones, and its near and medium-term economic logic is strained."

Using unflattering terms such as "do-it-yourself African manifestos" and "escape mechanism" in dealing with African efforts at rationalising their development policies, he makes it plain that the aid-giving community has lost confidence in Africa's ability to deal effectively with its development problems and will need convincing proof of a change of heart among African leaders if they want meaningful Western participation in the development of the continent:

Psychologically, if a fresh push in Africa is to help rebuild the international community's confidence in its capacity to cope *collectively*, a new concerting of effort would need to be more than rhetoric or cosmetic.

He emphasises that the West today does not view aid as a movement towards a system of global redistribution of wealth but rather as a means to facilitate those indigenous adjustments which African countries themselves have to make and which no amount of foreign money can spare them.

It is perhaps still early to predict the further course of Western policies towards Africa generally and with respect to aid in particular. However, it is clear that the era when appeals to the Westerners' bad consciences over their colonial past and easy talk of global solidarity, human rights and so on were an unflinching key to Western treasuries has come to an end. Future relations between Africa and the West will depend on unemotional assessments in the West of its own fundamental interests, on world economic conditions, and on black Africa's performance rather than its words. (G M E Leistner)

# South Africa and economic sanctions

Although Third World countries have been clamouring for sanctions against South Africa for many years, the enforcement of a trade embargo against the Republic will have a serious effect on the economies of its neighbouring states. Theo Malan, Researcher at the Africa Institute, looks at the possible consequences of sanctions on South Africa, southern Africa and the RSA's major Western trading partners.

**D**uring 1964 an international conference with "Sanctions against South Africa" as the main theme was held in London. The gathering was attended by representatives of at least 40 countries, including 30 government delegates. In the meantime the Organisation of African Unity has left no stone unturned in efforts to exert political and economic pressure on South Africa and its main trading partners.

With this in mind, the OAU passed a resolution in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1964, according to which all aircraft and ships travelling to and from South Africa were refused landing and transit facilities in African states; at the same time it appealed for strict economic, military, political and diplomatic sanctions against the RSA. A resolution calling on the countries of the European Community (EC) to break off all trade relations with the RSA was passed in 1972 in Rabat, Morocco. At that time, the campaign had been limited to requests directed at South Africa's trading partners such as the USA, Britain, Japan and the European countries, who were pressured to suspend trade with South Africa. Afro-Asian countries as well as Communist Bloc states which reacted to these requests either had no trade relations with the RSA or these were so insignificant that sudden termination posed no problems for the South African economy.

In November 1973, however, OPEC imposed a total oil embargo against South Africa at the request of the OAU. Exactly four years later the Security Council of the United Nations with the three permanent members, the USA, Britain and France, concurring, agreed to a total arms embargo against the RSA. A proposal that mandatory economic sanctions be implemented against South Africa was however vetoed by the major Western powers in 1975. South Africa's dependence on oil imports and the fact that the principal Western countries were prepared to support a complete arms embargo have made it clear that the prospect of punitive economic measures against the RSA is not as remote as was originally thought. The threat that economic sanctions may be considered should South Africa fail to cooperate with the UN in promoting the independence of SWA/Namibia has again given prominence to the question of economic sanctions.

To what extent does South Africa depend on the international economy? In other words, what do imports and exports of goods and services contribute to the country's GDP? In 1979 imports and exports as a percentage of GDP amounted to 53,3 percent as against 45,1 percent in 1972 and 50,1 percent in 1960. This is indisputable proof that the RSA is dependent on international trade, and that this

dependence has not decreased significantly over the past 20 years. The average comparable ratio for Europe is 57 percent, Latin America 57 percent, and Asia 47 percent, while in some African countries it is as high as 102 percent. The only exception is the USA where international trade constitutes only 16,9 percent of the GDP, in contrast with a ratio of 87,8 percent in the Netherlands (Table 1).

**Table 1: Imports and exports as percentage of GDP**

Country	Percentage
USA	16,9
Britain	48,5
Germany	40,9
Japan	19,5
France	33,5
Italy	43,2
The Netherlands	87,8
South Africa	53,3
Tanzania	42,5
Europe	57,0
Latin America	57,0
Asia	47,0

It is virtually impossible in the context of this article to analyse the many reasons for South Africa's economic dependence on foreign trade, but it stands to reason that the extent of economic sanctions should not be underestimated. According to Prof A

Spandau, formerly of the University of the Witwatersrand, an economic boycott against South Africa will result in considerable import replacement. This will hold substantial advantages for the South African economy over the short and medium term, although serious problems are bound to emerge in the long run. Import replacement has been definite South African policy for several decades, and represented an important growth factor in the 1950s. Estimates indicate that import replacement contributed approximately 52 percent to economic growth from 1926-56 compared to 16 percent between 1956-63.

### Effect of trade sanctions

In the event of economic sanctions against South Africa a wave of import replacement is bound to follow, primarily in the consumer goods sector, but also in the heavy intermediary and capital goods industry where there is greater import replacement capacity. The latter sectors, however, depend on major markets to manufacture goods competitively. If sanctions are imposed, new industrial production is bound to increase considerably, especially in the wake of artificial stimulation by the government.

Optimum economic growth appears to be obtained in phases where the economy has been closed to international markets and subsequently reopened. Cases in point are Rhodesia, Latin America and West Germany. The West German economy e.g. derived immense benefits from the sanctions campaign during World War II and again when it was reopened to international trade. Despite the economic advantages that could result from a trade boycott, sanctions would also prove injurious to certain sectors of the economy. As regards imports, a possible oil embargo is essentially the most critical feature. Local oil-from-coal projects are geared to approximately 50 percent of present oil consumption, but this will be realised only after the mid-1980s.

An effective boycott of the country's exports could hold serious consequences for the South African economy. According to Prof Spandau,

a 50 percent effective embargo on exports can do considerable damage to the South African economy. Taking 1976 as basis, estimates indicate that white unemployment could increase by 225 000, the figure for black unemployment being approximately 860 000. At the same time, personal income of whites would drop by about R1 500-million compared to a decrease in income of R1 200-million for blacks. The combined decline in personal income will therefore be some 13 percent, while the unemployment figure will be three times higher than in 1976. Calculations indicate that the balance of payments could be adversely affected in the region of R3 700-million.

It should be remembered, however, that imports will be subject to drastic reduction in the event of an effective export embargo. Prof Spandau also maintains that a 20 percent effective export embargo may well have the following consequences:

- balance of payments deterioration in the region of R1 500-million;
- increase in white and black unemployment by some 90 000 and 340 000 respectively; and
- a drop of R520-million in white and R470-million in black personal income.


Although the grave effect of a possible boycott against South Africa's exports should by no means be underestimated, it is doubtful whether an embargo would ever be completely effective, especially in view of the country's gold, uranium, diamond, platinum, chrome, asbestos and similar strategic mineral exports. A successful embargo on agricultural products in a world facing continuous food shortages is likewise dubious. Mozambique and Zambia come to mind specifically. Both countries have for some time experienced severe food shortages, and had to import agricultural products like maize and wheat from South Africa. As of late even countries such as Kenya and Tanzania are reported to have imported maize and other foodstuffs from the RSA.

The impact of sanctions will probably

be gradual, and it will increase over months, even years, thereby enabling the economy to adapt to changed circumstances. According to Dr G de Kock, President of the Reserve Bank, the balance of payments can be expected to adapt to sanctions within a reasonable period. He maintains that South Africa's balance of payments is basically sound when the entire period since World War II is taken into account. The past few years have clearly shown that the country is capable of withstanding considerable political and economic setbacks in this area.

Regarding foreign investment, South Africa could be adversely affected. If 50 percent of long-term foreign investment is cut off, estimates indicate that the GDP would decline by about R286-million. This amounts to only 1,3 percent of the total GDP of R29 000-million in 1976. Gross personal income would be reduced by R247-million, i.e. by 1,2 percent. The country's whites are likely to be those mainly affected. The expected impact on unemployment is more serious. A 50 percent boycott, based on 1976 figures, could increase unemployment by 90 000 (approximately 52 000 blacks, 27 000 whites, 10 000 Coloureds and 2 000 Asians). With the present buoyant gold price South Africa's dependence on foreign capital has however been greatly reduced.

Foreign investment has the added significance of an accompanying inflow of highly developed technology and certain sophisticated skills and an embargo would therefore seriously impede industries such as electronics. A study project on foreign investment in South Africa conducted by a group of research institutes in Europe indicates that technology, accompanied by foreign investment, is far more important to South Africa than actual capital. The report adds that the larger part of foreign investment constitutes profits that cannot be expatriated, but are rather used to develop or expand existing activities in the RSA. The inflow of new investment is at any rate relatively small. In the case of Britain, new investments in South Africa constituted less than 20 percent of the total investment from 1967-71. According to the *Economic Review of the Standard Bank*, the problem is not so much a



*Cape Town harbour. The effect of an economic boycott against South Africa will not be confined to the Republic and will unavoidably spread to other states in southern Africa.*

shortage of investment as the most effective and productive utilisation of such investment.

A trade embargo is bound to have widespread consequences in respect of the South African national economy, depending on how effectively the boycott is maintained. While trade sanctions may hold substantial economic advantages in the short and medium term due to increased local production, in the long run adverse effects appear more likely. An effective oil boycott over a reasonable period will undoubtedly have serious economic consequences for the South African economy.

As South Africa has no natural oil resources, its enemies have long since realised that the country is dependent on imported oil. Consequently there is growing political pressure to terminate oil supplies to South Africa. In contrast with Japan, Europe, and even the USA, South Africa's economy does not run primarily on oil. Only some 25 percent of the country's total energy requirements are based on oil. Coal is the

most important source of power in South Africa's mining and industrial network. On the other hand, it is wrong to consider South Africa largely independent of foreign supplies. The country requires approximately 320 000 barrels of oil each day, or 15,4-million t a year, particularly in the transport sector.

Local production from Sasol I (oil-from-coal project) amounts to approximately five percent of the country's total requirements. A larger project, Sasol II, came into operation in 1980 and will enable South Africa to provide about 28 percent of its present oil requirements once it is in full production. When Sasol III comes into operation in 1984/85, South Africa will be able to supply approximately 50 percent of its current oil consumption. In the meantime most people are well aware that South Africa has been using old mines and other storage facilities for a considerable time to hoard reserve oil supplies. Indications are that the country has crude oil reserves totalling 42-million t — i e sufficient for 30-36

months at the present rate of consumption.

In the event of sanctions, present reserves may be extended by various methods, e g restrictions on private motor transport, encouragement to use public transport, etc. This could stretch the oil reserves to last four years or more. The South African government is also investigating the possibility of using ethanol and methanol additives, and has already authorised the erection of an R18-million ethanol industry in KwaZulu. It is estimated that some 20 percent of South Africa's fuel needs can be supplied from renewable resources such as maize, sugar-cane, cassava, etc. Soekor, the government-backed prospecting company, may yet find viable oil as the recent discovery of gas deposits at Mossel Bay and Plettenberg Bay have proved. Contrary to five years ago, oil is freely marketable at present and no longer subject to control by the world's seven major oil companies. In the event of oil sanctions there is bound to be someone prepared to supply oil on the black market —

though inevitably at a price.

## Effect on southern Africa

The effect of an economic boycott against South Africa will not be confined to the economy of the Republic and will unavoidably spread to other states in southern Africa such as Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi and in particular Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries). The economies of the latter group are bound to be most severely affected. It is also widely known that South Africa's trade with black Africa (with the exception of the BLS countries and SWA/Namibia) has increased from R140-million in 1964 to R453-million in 1976 and just more than R1 000-million in 1980. This constitutes approximately eight percent of the RSA's present international trade. Total trade with Africa, including re-exports, is unofficially estimated at far more than one billion rand. If South Africa's exports are effectively prohibited, most of the states concerned would be forced to purchase their requirements (mainly vehicles, machinery and equipment, chemical products, paper and pulp products and foodstuffs) much more expensively from Europe and elsewhere. This will not only increase their import bills, but may very well delay deliveries due to longer distances involved.

It will also result in the loss of an important export market for black Africa's agricultural products. Certain goods could prove difficult to dispose of elsewhere as primary products are subject to considerable international competition. Of all the countries in southern Africa Lesotho, Botswana and to a lesser extent Swaziland will be the most seriously affected, as they are more dependent on the South African economy.

The largest percentage of BLS imports comes from South Africa (Lesotho and Swaziland approximately 90 percent, Botswana about 60 percent). In the event of a trade boycott these states would have to import goods from elsewhere at great expense. Landlocked Lesotho could even find itself compelled to bring goods in by air. Considering that it is regarded as

one of the poorest states in the world, the effect sanctions against the RSA would have on Lesotho's economy is self-evident. Apart from the fact that the BLS countries would lose a valuable market, it is important to remember that substantial quantities of citrus products from Swaziland, wool and mohair from Lesotho as well as cattle from Botswana reach local and overseas markets through well-established channels in the Republic.

BLS countries derive considerable benefits from their mutual Customs Union Agreement with South Africa. Lesotho as well as Swaziland have free access to money and capital markets in the RSA, and deficits on this balance of payments are backed and secured by South Africa's gold and foreign exchange reserves. They will forfeit these benefits in the event of a complete trade and investment embargo, and will have to depend on foreign aid to balance their accounts with the rest of the world.

Approximately 400 000 — 500 000 foreign labourers, mainly male workers, are employed in South Africa at any given time. During June 1978 e.g. approximately 35 000 workers from Botswana, 155 000 from Lesotho, 14 000 from Swaziland, 27 000 from Zimbabwe and 50 000 from Mozambique worked in the South African mining, industrial and agricultural sectors.

The income of these migrant or guest labourers is remitted to their families and not only earns their countries of origin foreign exchange, but has become essential to their dependents. As previously indicated, a wide-ranging economic boycott could result in increased unemployment among South African workers, and will therefore compel authorities to give preference to South African blacks. This will have catastrophic consequences on neighbouring countries and will undoubtedly affect their internal political stability. Assuming that all foreign blacks are sent home and that each worker has on average five dependents, it stands to reason that at least two million inhabitants of southern African states will be exposed to unemployment and starvation.

Most southern African states are totally landlocked, and most necessary


imports and exports have to go through South Africa. Prevailing political conditions in Angola compel even Zaire to transport part of its copper through South African ports which are well equipped to handle most of the freight. In the event of a sanctions campaign harbour and transportation routes will be closed, and goods will have to be exported at great expense along other routes. It is a well-known fact that the harbours of Dar es Salaam, Beira, and Maputo are at the moment unable to handle imports and exports destined for Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zaire at present cannot export copper through the harbour of Lobito because of the guerrilla activities of the Unita resistance movement.

As regards power and electricity, extensive losses are bound to follow. Lesotho and Swaziland e.g. will have to replace their present inexpensive supply from the RSA with more expensive power. Mozambique will find itself compelled to cut off electricity at present transmitted from Cabora Bassa to South Africa, which will doom the project to become a white elephant as no other country has the funds or demand to replace South Africa as purchaser.

## Effect on the West

South Africa's main trading partners cannot escape the adverse effects of economic sanctions. Britain is likely to be most seriously affected by a trade embargo, and its unemployed could increase by at least 70 000. It would also have to forfeit its South African export market of some R1 000-million, possibly disrupting a port such as Southampton. America and West Germany export goods to South Africa totalling at least R2 000-million annually. France's trade with South Africa has increased fivefold since 1966, climbing from R76-million to R471-million in 1979. The RSA is likewise the fifth-largest buyer of French goods in Africa. Until the recent arms embargo France had outstanding contracts to the value of R700-million with South Africa. France is furthermore involved in the construction of the Koeberg nuclear power station, a project expected to cost more than R800-million. Commercial interests of this magnitude are not sur-

**Fig 1: South Africa's<sup>1</sup> role in world mineral reserves as a percentage of Western and world reserves 1978**



Source: *South Africa 1980/81*, Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, Pretoria.

*This diagram strikingly illustrates the importance of some of South Africa's strategic mineral reserves to the West. A fuller list of South Africa's reserves is given in Table 2.*

rendered lightly. It must be remembered, however, that the West will always balance its South African trade relations against those with the rest of Africa, significantly against a country like Nigeria which has oil and presents a potential market of more than 90-million inhabitants.

Europe, the UK and the US continue to depend on the importation of strategic minerals from South Africa (Fig 1). The EC countries buy from South Africa 52 percent of their manganese ore needs, 78 percent of their manganese metal, 29 percent of their ferro-manganese, 9 percent of their antimony ore, 28 percent of their chromium ore, 46 percent of their ferro-chrome, 40 percent of their platinum and alloys unwrought, 18 percent of their platinum group and alloys unwrought, and 42 percent of their vanadium. Furthermore, the import dependence of the community

upon these metals ranges between 95 and 100 percent. For other minerals like asbestos, nickel, copper and lead South Africa is a significant but not a vital supplier. South Africa's exports to Britain alone include chrome (45 percent), manganese (35 percent) and vanadium (50 percent).

It is also important to note that 65 percent of all Middle Eastern oil, i.e. 42 percent of world consumption, is transported along the Cape sea route. In addition 16 000 — 20 000 ships call at South African ports annually for supplies and repairs. South African ports would therefore have to be blockaded to make sanctions completely effective. Apart from the phenomenal costs this will entail, the practicability of an effective blockade is doubtful. According to estimates it would have cost R150-million in 1965 to sustain a total blockade for six months. To implement such an operation 15 years later

would cost considerably more and it would have to be enforced by those countries most adversely affected by an economic embargo.

Foreign investment in South Africa amounted to approximately R25 000-million at the end of 1980 and the West is unlikely to stand idle while its interests are threatened by economic boycotts. An oil boycott will probably be opposed for the same reason.

Although a detailed account of the consequences of economic sanctions against Rhodesia is impossible within the scope of this article, some aspects will be mentioned in view of a possible trade boycott against the RSA. It is generally acknowledged that trade sanctions greatly stimulated the Rhodesian economy as import replacing industries were established. Sanction breakers in other countries cooperated by seeing to it that sufficient foreign currency was available. Although cer-

tain strategic sectors such as tobacco were originally hard hit, the agricultural sector systematically adapted as diversification in maize and cattle took place. The same degree of diversification was evident in industry, with subsequent general economic growth benefits.

It is, however, dangerous to compare Rhodesia, which withstood sanctions for 15 years, with the more resilient economy of South Africa and then conclude that South Africa is capable of holding out infinitely longer. Rhodesia had a lifeline to the RSA throughout, and was therefore spared the full impact of the economic embargo. South Africa is without a rich and influential friend across its border, and will stand alone in the event of sanctions. The danger of large numbers of whites leaving the country must also be taken into ac-

count as sanctions highlight the demand for skilled workers to man new import replacing industries.

The effect of the Rhodesian border closure on Zambia and Mozambique should also be noted. Estimates show that Zambia lost some R800 — R900-million and Mozambique at least R140-million annually as a result of the closed border, while at least 10 000 Mozambicans lost their jobs. Economic sanctions against South Africa would demand a far higher price.

Those who assume that economic sanctions against South Africa or, for that matter, any other country will have little impact, are mistaken. A total trade embargo will result in increased unemployment and a drop in the living standard with widespread consequences for both black and white.

However, economic sanctions have seldom, if ever, been successful. South Africa is 14th on the list of the world's most important trading countries. Its borders touch two oceans. It supplies strategic minerals and exports food. Sanctions are therefore obviously of political rather than practical value, and threats of a boycott are mainly used to apply psychological pressure to the country.

What is more, sanctions will affect those least able to afford it, and Western countries are thoroughly aware of this. The West may possibly support selective economic sanctions, but this could be the limit of its cooperation. Such measures will at most present the South African economy with thorny problems and by no means topple the existing order.

**Table 2: Mineral reserves (1975)**

Mineral	SA mineral reserves (000 t)	SA mineral reserves as % of world reserves	SA mineral reserves as % of African reserves	SA mineral reserves as % of Western reserves
Platinum group metals	30	86	99	99
Chrome ore	3 000 000	83	85	84
Vanadium	14 000	64	99	96
Gold	15	49	94	61
Manganese ore	3 000 000	48	94	84
Fluorspar	200 000	46	98	50
Uranium	250	17	72	17
Nickel	5 000	10	86	12
Asbestos	9 000	10	77	14
Zinc	12 000	9	63	9
Phosphate (ore)	1 400 000	8	10	8
Diamonds	10	7	8	8
Titanium	8 000	5	93	40
Antimony	200	4	99	10
Lead	5 000	4	54	5
Iron ore	10 000 000	4	66	6
Coal	32 000 000	2	40	4
Copper	8 000	2	10	2

# Perspectives on US — RSA relations

The Reagan administration promises a new approach to southern African issues. Ken Owen, former Washington correspondent and Managing Editor of the Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail*, reviews the African policies of past administrations and discusses possible southern African policy directives under a new administration.

**T**he American political system is designed more to protect the civil liberties of its citizens than to conduct foreign policy; it is inimical to secret diplomacy and ever vulnerable to crude intervention by — or on behalf of — the common man.

For these reasons and more, American foreign policies are unusually subject to shifts in domestic affairs. It is impossible to assess the likely course of foreign policy in isolation from domestic politics, and foolish to try to do so.

This point is worth emphasising in the wake of the extraordinary election last November which has put President Ronald Reagan in the White House with a Republican — indeed, a conservative Republican — majority in the Senate and a conservative “ideological” majority in the House of Representatives. The shift has been so fundamental and such a long time in the making that it is also worth recalling the exultant cry of President Richard Nixon after the 1972 election landslide: “I’ve shifted their allegiances.”

He meant that many lifelong Democrats had voted Republican for the first time in their lives, and that they would do so more readily in the future. The Roosevelt coalition of labour unions, ethnic minorities (especially blacks and Jews) and Southern whites was finally broken. Nixon’s assessment was accurate although Watergate, laying the basis of an anti-Washington campaign by Jimmy Carter, deprived

the Republicans of immediate reward for his victory.

The underlying trend has now reasserted itself. A glance at the ideological complexion of the 15 new Republican Senators tells the story — even the official US International Communication Agency uses descriptions like “conservative,” “hardline conservative,” “tough,” and “supporter of increased defence spending” to summarise their views. The same point emerges with greater force from some of President Reagan’s early appointments: Richard Allen, who replaces Zbigniew Brzezinski at the National Security Council (NSC), holds conservative views which made him a target, and a casualty, in the Nixon NSC headed by Dr Henry Kissinger. Anne Armstrong, the wealthy Texan appointed to Reagan’s Foreign Policy Advisory Board immediately after the election, shocked South Africans with her ultra-conservatism during her visit to this country. The subsequent appointments of Alexander Haig at the State Department, Caspar Weinberger (known as “Cap the Knife” for his tough budget-cutting in the Nixon administration), and especially David Stockman at the Office of Management and Budget have merely confirmed the message. To extend the list is to belabour the point.

None of this is accidental. It is the culmination of a variety of forces which have been given intellectual shape by a loose grouping known as the neo-

conservatives, men and women who perceive in the decline of American power a threat not only to their own country but to the survival of liberty everywhere. Ideologically, they do not follow Mrs Thatcher so much as precede her. Their concern is power and the instruments of power. They intend to restore not only the primacy of American arms but also that of American currency, and they believe they have a mandate to do so. In any event, they now have the levers in their hands.

## The Carter era

**M**ore than a shift of emphasis is occurring from the policies of President Carter and Mr Brzezinski whose concern was the supposed inevitability of “globalism” and whose instinct was to escape the burdens and dilemmas of the Cold War by denying the validity of the sovereign nation state. Globalism, in Brzezinski’s optimistic view, was destined to cause the withering of the nation state and the emergence of a new international polity, centred on the UN, which would place restraints on mere nationalism. It was to be democracy on a global scale, and it gave an extraordinary importance to the Third World which was seen as a kind of populous electorate, to be wooed as though America and the Soviet Union were the leaders of rival international political parties.



Dr Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs — an advocate of creative involvement rather than escape in disengagement.

Beyond its intellectual shortcomings, the Carter policy tapped a strain of guilt in the American national character which in turn derived from a variety of sources, among them great wealth allied to a puritan ethic, the dispossession and eradication of the indigenous Indians, the heritage of slavery and racial discrimination, and a strong missionary tradition that was thwarted in China. Brought acutely to life by the civil rights struggle of the American blacks, this guilt found expression in politics by a process of self-abasement towards Third World countries,

especially in Africa, and by a never-ending process of "identification" with the aspirations of the poor of the world, however much those aspirations might conflict with American national interests.

The consequences were bizarre: Patricia Derian, the State Department's custodian of international human rights, lectured Argentinian rulers as though they were errant schoolboys, and held disdainful court from her sickbed in Cape Town; she also passed summary judgement on the political systems of other countries of which she

knew almost nothing, using as her standard the politics of the Deep South where she grew up in an atmosphere of civil rights campaigns and to the tune of "We shall overcome" — somehow.

Andrew Young, a product of the same era in the same part of the United States, proclaimed the Cubans in Angola to be a "stabilising force," came to South Africa to launch a new exercise in "creative tension" which was designed to touch the conscience of local whites as Martin Luther King had touched the conscience of the Deep South, and preached redemptive capitalism to a business elite at the Carlton so fervently that he probably never understood why he was blamed for the National Party's sweeping 1977 electoral victory.

Donald McHenry, his assistant and successor at the UN, began the search for a SWA/Namibian settlement with all the confidence of a black American dealing — at last — with Africa, and ended his term in office pleading with an audience of white South Africans to "tell me what I can say to persuade South Africa not to miss this opportunity."

Similar anecdotes from all quarters of the globe, combined with the visible humiliation of the United States in Afghanistan and especially Iran, prompted Prof Jeane Kirkpatrick to write bitterly in *Commentary* in late 1979 that the crowning achievement of Carter foreign policy was "to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent."

### Southern African options

In African policy, the lines became more sharply drawn as the Carter administration blundered from one tragi-comic error to the next; but the roots of the dispute reached far back — at least to the independence of Ghana in 1957 when Americans began to perceive the anomalies of their domestic and international racism at a time when a succession of new black nation states were stepping onto the stage. The need to cultivate new relationships with emergent Africa conflicted, at least for some time, with the

perceived interests of the European colonial powers and, especially, with vested Western interests in southern Africa.

In policy terms, the conflict over southern Africa expressed itself most clearly in the two main options (out of five) placed before the Nixon administration by Dr Henry Kissinger in 1969. Of these, the State Department and its political and academic allies favoured the third: "Limited association with the white states (South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories) and continuing association with the blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific, and strategic interest in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept, though opposing violent solutions to the problems of the region."

Option Three was at heart an attempt to shift American alignment in Africa from white to black in the conviction that white Africa was in any event doomed. It ran into difficulties in that the preponderance of American interests remained in white Africa (or, conversely, that black Africa found little common interest with the United States). The policy degenerated into a constant process of trying to span the horns of the dilemma by striking a posture that would mollify the Africans sufficiently to permit the United States to retain such interests as it chose in white Africa. Several years later, indeed, Anthony Lake told a press conference in Washington shortly before he became chief of the State Department's policy planning staff: "I care only that our posture (on South Africa) should be impeccable."

Many of the men (and women) who proposed this policy displayed an astonishing inability to perceive the racial condescension implicit in their striking of postures, but some at least (for example, Mrs Goler Butcher, former aide to Congressman Charles Diggs) knew that while an unfriendly posture might alienate South Africa, it would fall short of satisfying African opinion in a conflict which had already resorted on a large scale to violence, not only in the Portuguese territories but in Rhodesia and even, in a limited sense, South Africa. Mrs Butcher did not care; she saw Option Three simply

as a stepping-stone to a more radical policy. She put her considerable talents in the service of radical African factions, and when she was put in charge of the Carter administration's aid programme in Africa she argued bluntly for a policy of detaching South Africa's neighbours from its sphere of influence. The logical culmination of her approach was to make those neighbours the launching pad for an ANC-led armed struggle against South Africa's rulers, a cause in which she had worked for many years in concert with the more hawkish academic and congressional groups, the anti-apartheid activists in New York and Washington, and some church-based allies.

The Nixon administration, however, rejected Option Three for Option Two, which Lake and other opponents dubbed the "Tar Baby Option" because they thought it would embroil the United States in a sticky, nasty mess. Option Two, sometimes called "creative involvement" by its champions, was: "Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in the area."

### Foreign policy alternatives

**T**he options marked the poles of the policy dispute that persisted from the mid-1950s until the Reagan election (and which, indeed, is apt to persist beyond the Reagan presidency): disengagement from white Africa, or an attempt to encourage evolutionary reform in such a way that the United States, not the Soviet Union, would in the end be the dominant super power in the region. Both options assumed that change was inevitable in South Africa but "Tar Baby" assumed that the whites were recalcitrant, doomed and dispensable; "creative involvement" assumed that constructive change (the alternative to a debilitating war of unpredictable outcome) could be achieved only with the cooperation of the whites.

This last assumption, in so far as it was applied to Rhodesia and the Por-

tuguese territories, remains to haunt American policy: if it was wrong in part of white minority-ruled Africa, why not in another part?

The American perception of the answer to this question remains crucial to policy, the more so because of the unhappy American experience of guerrilla warfare, first in China, then in Indochina. The shadow which falls over American policy-making for the Third World (not only Africa) is that of Mao Tse-Tung, or perhaps Genl Giap. When Lake says South Africa is destined to change he really means that hegemony cannot be maintained anywhere in the world against guerrillas representing a majority of the population. The only perceived answer is to alter the shape of a threatened society in such a way as to win the "hearts and minds" of the populace, so as to "drain away the sea" of support in which the guerrillas "swim like fishes." Every American schoolboy knows the formula by heart.

The pattern that has flowed from this assumption of guerrilla (usually Communist-supported) invincibility was devastatingly described by Prof Kirkpatrick: "Hurried efforts to force complex and unfamiliar political practices on societies lacking the requisite political culture, traditions, and social structures not only fail to produce desired outcomes; if they are undertaken at a time when the traditional regime is under attack, they actually facilitate the job of the insurgents." Hence the emergence of a guerrilla force becomes a virtual death sentence to the regime as American power intervenes to tilt the balance of the conflict against the *status quo*. It is a variation, ironically, of the notorious remark by an American officer in Vietnam that a village had to be destroyed in order to save it.

### New perspectives

**T**his is not the place to outline the reversal in perceptions which has been taking place among American intellectuals and foreign policy specialists, led by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution and other neo-conservative centres. The rape of

Cambodia, the brutality of the new regime in Vietnam, the boat people, the debunking of Mao, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Cuban presence in Africa, the Soviet intervention in Angola via the staging post established in Congo-Brazzaville a decade earlier, the overthrow of the Samozia regime in Nicaragua, the deposition of the Shah, and the establishment of a clear strategic superiority by the Soviet Union are all factors which contributed to the new perception. However, it was the seizure of the hostages by Iran that brought home the lesson to the American man in the street. American impotence in dealing with Third World religious fanatics emphasised American vulnerability elsewhere; suddenly, arguments vainly put forward for a decade or more — for example, the importance of the Cape sea route, the value of South African strategic minerals, and the need for military force close to the Persian Gulf — acquired a momentum of their own.

It is worth recalling in this respect that Dr Chester Crocker, now much quoted as an authority on the prediction of American policies, was the principal author of the NSC study of Indian Ocean policy that led to the establishment of the Diego Garcia base in the early 1970s, and it is fair to assume that Genl Alexander Haig had an important hand in the same exercise. Even then the counter-strategy was taking shape both in the minds of men who have now come to power and in institutional forms. What needs to be emphasised, however, is that the essence of the counter-strategy was to doubt the inevitability of guerrilla victories, even in South Africa, and to begin the task of defining the actions required to thwart the Marxist export of revolution.

South Africa, now as ever, presents serious dilemmas for American policy makers as they seek an alternative to a Marxist triumph in the future of this region. "In political terms," Crocker has written, "South Africa is not embraceable without our incurring massive diplomatic damage and risking severe domestic polarization." The threat that interracial violence in South Africa might reverberate in the American political system, pitting blacks against whites, is real and for-



*Andrew Young, former US Ambassador to the UN. He proclaimed the Cubans in Africa to be a "stabilising force."*

midable. But instead of seeking escape in disengagement leading to an alignment with the forces of revolution, neo-conservatives like Crocker revert to Nixon's Option Two, creative involvement. For the West to write off South Africa prematurely, he argues, would be an action of "the highest moral cowardice." Instead, he defines the long-term objective of American policy as "the emergence of a domestic order in South Africa that will permit the US to pursue a full and normal relationship with it." The extent of this relationship is well known. It encompasses nuclear cooperation and control; scientific cooperation; access to resources; trade; strategic cooperation under stress; and the overriding need to deny the Soviet Union physical or proxy control of South African territory and resources.

Crocker argues for the extension, rather than the restriction, of this relationship and he has arrived at this conclusion, at least in part, by contemplation of South Africa's durability in its present form. Like David Albright (editor of *Problems of Communism*), Gann and Duignan (authors of *Why South Africa will Survive* — see book review p 50) and others, he finds South Africa to be a more formidable economic and military power than it is fashionable to think in Western countries or, indeed, in South Africa itself. In other words, it will be no light task to

dislodge the whites by violence, and the process will be so extensively destabilising that it will create opportunities throughout the region for the Soviet Union.

Crocker can be taken seriously on this point; no other outsider is, probably, better informed on the depth of South African military and strategic resources. His conclusion is that no military force on the continent poses a serious threat, not even the Cubans and East Germans, unless the Soviet Union is moved to intervene directly; in that case, South Africa will quite quickly be compelled to consume irreplaceable stockpiled resources. In other words, South Africa is powerful but not invulnerable and in the last analysis must rely on the United States and its allies to restrain the Soviet Union. In this equation he sees an opportunity for American policy to influence the direction, and perhaps the pace, of change. (Albright doubts the availability of Soviet mobile forces to engage South Africa in direct conflict in which case, of course, Crocker's thesis on American leverage is weakened. It is a piquant but valid reflection that the best means for South Africa to neutralise American influence is to maximise its strategic defences against Soviet intervention; in any circumstances the extension of South African armaments capability is a political as well as a strategic im-

perative.)

Nor does he accept the argument that the “intransigence” of white South African society precludes evolutionary development. On the contrary, he has argued in *Foreign Affairs* (winter 1980/81) that the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a non-racial order in South Africa cannot take place through a sudden dramatic act.

“Hundreds of decisions, drawn-out negotiations, and quite probably a combination of violence and politics will precede the dawn of a new age for South Africans,” he wrote; and while for South Africans this may appear self-evident, for foreign policy makers it is a new perspective. It leads, almost inevitably, to the proposal to support the *verligte* (liberal) tendencies in the South African government against the *verkrampte* (reactionary) ones; to greater industrial and commercial involvement rather than disengagement; to increased support for African education and advancement; and to encouragement of normal investment in order to overcome unemployment and other social ills that are the lot of semi-developed countries.

Most importantly, it implies a firm rejection of demands for trade and other sanctions. Dr Michael Samuels, former ambassador to West Africa and a long-standing member of the Georgetown group, has already made this point explicit in recent weeks. There is no reason to doubt him.

Of the unfriendly acts undertaken by previous administrations, only the arms embargo is sure to remain, in part because access to Western arms would have the perverse effect of heightening South African independence. Only the pressure on South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is likely to remain a source of deliberate provocation (because, obviously, the United States has an overriding interest in maintaining a near-monopoly of both uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weaponry).

What effect a policy on these lines would have on the rest of Africa and on American interests at the UN or elsewhere in the Third World remains to be seen. Prof Kirkpatrick can be relied upon to make no less vigorous a defence of American policy at the UN

*Prof Jeane Kirkpatrick — expected to make a vigorous defence of US policy at the UN.*



than did Ambassador Daniel Moynihan, but she may well do so with greater consequence since the climate of opinion in the United States has moved sharply against the UN and its membership. Besides, economic stringency is bound to accompany President Reagan’s efforts to restore the standing of the dollar, and a Congress faced with ruthless cuts in its favourite give-away domestic programmes is surely bound to want to slash foreign aid in all forms. Foreign aid stringency is likely, too, to fall heaviest on Third World countries that have in the past been most disdainful of the United States and least considerate of its interests — Tanzania, for example, whose ambassador to the UN has never taken much trouble to hide his hostility towards America, is unlikely to remain the trendy favourite that it has so long been. Indeed, with Dr Ernest Lefever now in place of Patricia Derian, Tanzania’s forced mass population removals are in some danger of ranking with apartheid and Soviet prison camps as a target of American moral opprobrium.

It does not require much imagination to foresee elements of competition between Third World countries for American favour; it is in any event a central tenet of the new administration that courtship of the Third World has in general been a thankless pursuit. Countries which cry, “Love us or leave us” are apt to find that America takes its hat and heads for the door.

By the same token, however, South Africa will need to be sensitive to the risks of flouting the new administration too blatantly. Less than a dozen years ago South Africa failed to respond to Option Two (or even, it can be shown, to perceive the inherent opportunities of the policy), and this failure contributed to the demoralisation of those who put forward the policy, to the defection of important congressional and bureaucratic allies, and to the eventual discrediting of the entire concept. To that degree, South Africa itself contributed to the triumph of the Lake-McHenry-Young-Butcher school which, under President Carter, held unfettered sway over American policies towards South Africa. This time the South African response will be less important, since the new American policies are more deeply rooted in a conservative view of the world, but insensitivity and a lack of discrimination remain the besetting sins of South African diplomacy.

Finally, it is hardly necessary to say that South African racialism places absolute limits on relations with the Western powers, and with the United States in particular, and South Africans — whatever their convictions on the matter — need to be sensitive to these restraints. Indeed, a general relaxation in bilateral relations seems certain, if only South Africans do not misperceive the Reagan election, and the policies which flow from it, as an endorsement of fascism around the world.

# Uranium — the world situation

The annual symposium of the Uranium Institute in 1980 examined the position of uranium in global energy needs. In this article Herwig Rudolph reviews the findings of the symposium and looks at the position of Africa — and in particular that of South Africa and SWA/Namibia — in the international uranium trade.

The fifth annual symposium of the Uranium Institute held in London in mid-September 1980 was particularly significant. It brought together representatives of most major producers and consumers as well as official representatives from producer countries and provided an in-depth exposition of global energy needs up to the turn of the century, the required production volume and the available reserves.

In most of the keynote speeches a world shortage of uranium was anticipated for the late 1980s and a general energy crisis by the end of the century. According to figures released by the International Energy Agency (IEA), there will be an energy shortfall equal to 28-million barrels of oil a day by the year 2000. This is equivalent to the present combined oil production of all OPEC nations.

The reasons for this were spelt out in some detail. According to a low estimate by the American Hugh Douglas Corporation, world demand for uranium metal, presently standing at around 40 000 tons, will rise to about 60 000 tons annually in 1995 and to about 67 000 tons in the year 2000.<sup>1</sup> Mr Douglas told the delegates: "While these estimates are considerably lower than those published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), further requirements will nevertheless outstrip currently available uranium supplies after the late 1980s." In a study carried out by the OECD the world's reasonably assured resources (RAR), which can be produced at less than 130 dollars per kg, are estimated

at 2 590 000 tons. Total Western resources recoverable at less than 130 dollars per kg amount to approximately five million tons.

Aggravating the growing demand situation is the fact that a considerable number of known uranium deposits are located in politically unstable areas. Certain producer countries also impose stringent constraints on the export of uranium while in many other countries the mining of the metal remains socially unacceptable.

According to IEA estimates, economic growth in the OECD countries until the year 2000 will average 3,4 percent. Consequently oil production of the OPEC states will rise to 38-million barrels a day and that of non-OPEC developing countries to 13-million. During the same period coal production, natural gas output, hydro-electricity and geothermal energy are all expected to double.

In addition to these increases in conventional energy supply and consumption, nuclear power is expected to increase tenfold to around 800 megawatts installed capacity. Should oil production of the OPEC states fall short of the estimated 38-million barrels per day, "the gap will have to be filled in some other way," according to Atshuhiko Yatabe, Director-General for scientific and technological affairs of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This would mean that the estimated energy shortfall given as 28-million barrels a day by the turn of the century would be exceeded.


Mr Yatabe called on OECD countries as a group "irrespective of their individual positions with regard to in-

digenous energy resources" to try collectively to expand their nuclear capabilities. The Japanese expert lamented the fact that for environmental, siting and public acceptance reasons, nuclear power programmes in Western industrialised nations had suffered a considerable slow-down in recent years. There was in fact an excess of uranium supply capacity and consequently a lack of incentive for producers to expand their exploration. He reminded delegates that if insufficient effort is made now, in the year 2000 producers would not be able to satisfy demand because of the long lead time required for uranium production. (It takes an average of eight to twelve years to bring a mine into full production.) While the present relatively low demand for uranium in the industrialised countries made it appear as though production capability would be sufficient until 1985 at least, producers would have to gear themselves now for the rapidly increasing demand expected for the second half of the present decade.

The conference also discussed the controversy surrounding the supply of uranium and the use of nuclear power. Anthony Gray, Chairman of the institute's committee on international trade in uranium, pointed to the lack of international consensus on acceptable standards for nuclear non-proliferation. He reviewed the situation since a 66-nation study began last February to consider whether nuclear materials or technology might be misused to build atomic weapons. He made a firm call for a standardisation of rules by supplier countries, particularly as regards the transfer and exchange of nuclear

1. All tonnages refer to uranium metal (t U).


WORLD URANIUM RESERVES



(Tonnes U x 1 000)

USA	27% (708)
RSA	15% (391)
SWA/Namibia	5% (133)
Canada	9% (235)
Niger	6% (160)
France	2% (55)
Australia	12% (299)
Other	23% (609)

WORLD URANIUM PRODUCTION 1978



(Tonnes U x 1 000)

Cost category (RAR)  
(£130/kg U)

USA	42% (14,5)
RSA	12% (3,9)
SWA/Namibia	8% (2,6)
Canada	20% (6,8)
Niger	6% (2)
France	6% (2,1)
Australia	1% (0,5)
Other	5% (1,4)



materials among consuming nations. Mr Gray said that major producer nations insisted on a provision for prior consent, meaning that permission was required from the supplier for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels, its enrichment beyond 20 percent, and the retransfer of uranium from the consumer to another nation. He pointed to the fact that consumers, many of them Third World countries with a growing nuclear potential, were becoming "increasingly resistant" to such clauses and that this continued to be a major stumbling-block to agreements now under consideration.

An additional factor of uncertainty lay in the pursuit of national economic objectives by African governments who were likely to reserve adequate uranium resources for future domestic needs while assuring a fair price by controlling production and limiting the level of foreign ownership in their uranium industry.

How well the concern of Western producers is justified was sketched by Stanford Anderson, Vice-President of the American Nuclear Exchange Corporation, who spoke of "unconventional uranium transactions" where the "parties want to record or report dif-

ferent prices for the transactions for their own individual reasons, where the parties do not want to name each other in their contracts, and where they have substantially different cash-flow priorities and cost of funds and where the parties have special financial accounting and tax accounting needs."

Even the most careful wording could not detract from the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the international uranium market, particularly where prestige-conscious Third World countries, who have come to regard a nuclear capacity as a political necessity, are concerned.

"Increased assurance of continuity of their supplies and the existence of a more predictable market are prerequisites for the orderly development of an international uranium trading environment," said Pierre Wyat, Managing Director of the Organisation of Nuclear Energy Producers (OPEN). He went on to offer guidelines on political issues such as non-proliferation, government approval and waste material transfer, as well as commercial issues involving prices, guarantee of supply, disputes and conditions governing fuel processing. The symposium went a long way towards the identification of present-day ills in


the uranium trade. Remedies and their application will be the urgent task of future gatherings of the Uranium Institute.

### Africa's role in world uranium trade

The generally expected rapid rise in the demand for uranium will have an important bearing on present and future uranium-producing nations. The projected production figures for 1979 indicate that a little under 35 percent of total world production outside the Communist Bloc will have been produced on the African continent. The free world's leading producers are the United States with a projected production for 1979 of 14 800 tons followed by Canada with 6 900 tons, South Africa with an actual production of 4 797 tons and SWA/Namibia with 4 220 tons (actual) followed by Niger, France, Gabon, Australia, Spain and Mexico with projected productions of 3 300 tons, 2 200 tons, 1 000 tons, 600 tons, 340 tons and 100 tons respectively.

According to figures released by the Uranium Institute, the free world's production reached 41 000 tons in 1979.

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By the year 1990 this picture is expected to have undergone considerable change. According to estimates of the Uranium Institute, South Africa's production capability will increase to around 12 000 tons and could possibly reach 16 000 tons by 1990. In a recent press statement the South African Atomic Energy Board said that South Africa is in a position to produce 10 000 tons a year well into the next century. Should the demand arise, SWA/Namibia's production could also be stepped up considerably, possibly doubling its present annual production of 4 200 tons.

For the USA the low estimate for 1990 is 24 000 tons and the high estimate 35 000 tons. Most other uranium-producing states will more

than double their production over the next decade, except Australia where a twentyfold increase from the present 500 tons to over 12 000 tons is expected. It is likely that Niger's production will more than double from 3 300 tons last year to as much as 11 000 tons in 1990.

In 1979 Africa's four main producers, South Africa, SWA/Namibia, Niger and Gabon, planned to produce 13 800 tons. This figure is expected to rise to 28 500 tons by 1990, but not all will come from the four present-day producers. Possibly viable deposits have been discovered in Mauritania, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Zambia and Togo. Furthermore the Aozou strip in northern Chad, which was occupied by Libya in the early 1970s, is said to contain rich

uranium deposits although reliable estimates for the region are not available.

## Southern Africa

**B**y far the richest uranium province in Africa is presently situated in southern Africa. In 1979 South Africa produced 4 797 tons as against 3 961 tons in the previous year. Total resources recoverable at less than 130 dollars per kg stand at 530 000 tons, of which 391 000 tons are reasonably assured resources. A further 76 000 tons of RAR and 139 000 tons of estimated additional resources (EAR) are recoverable at a production cost of over 130 dollars per kg. In 1979 a total of 21 mines sent their ore to 18 uranium treatment

*The Rössing uranium mine in SWA/Namibia, which produces some 4 220 tons of uranium per year. The rated capacity of the mine is 5 000 tons per year.*



plants. The production of just under 4 800 tons represented an increase of 21 percent over 1978 and amounted to 11,4 percent of the free world's uranium production. According to the annual report of the South African Atomic Energy Board, "total receipts for 1979 amounted to R493-million as compared with the 1978 figure of R335-million. Planned production is expected to reach 8 200 tons per annum by 1984." In 1978 alone no fewer than 19 major mining companies were prospecting for uranium in the Republic at a total outlay of R21-million.

## SWA/Namibia

SWA/Namibia's recoverable resources at less than 130 dollars per kg are estimated at 133 000 tons in the RAR category and a further 53 000 tons in the EAR category, giving a total of 186 000 tons. To this may be added a further 24 000 tons recoverable at above 130 dollars per kg.

SWA/Namibia's entire uranium production of 4 220 tons came from the Rössing mine which, with a rated maximum capacity of 5 000 tons per year, is by far the free world's largest single uranium producer. Its uranium energy potential is said to equal that of the entire oil-energy potential of Saudi Arabia. According to *Agence France-Presse*, the shareholders of Rössing Uranium Limited include Rio Tinto Zinc (Britain) 41,3 percent, the Industrial Development Corporation (South Africa) 13,5 percent, Rio Algom Mines (Canada) 10 percent, Minatome (France) 10 percent, General Mining and Finance Corporation (South Africa) 2,3 percent, while 13,88 percent of the shares are in the hands of anonymous holders. Of the approximately 3 000 employees about 900 are whites, 600 Coloureds and the rest consist of 800 Ovambo, 470 Damara and 200 Herero.

In 1978 a total of 26 companies held prospecting rights for SWA/Namibian source material. These include a number of multinational corporations. Serious attention is being given to potentially viable deposits, among them those at Langer Heinrich.

As indicated above, within a few years SWA/Namibia's production

could be double that of Rössing's present production, while South Africa's production, too, could be stepped up considerably should international demands so require. This means that even if Niger reaches its full attainable production capability of 10 500 tons in 1985 and 12 000 tons in 1988, southern Africa could still produce more than the combined output of all African states. There is little doubt that, despite the increases in production in such countries as Niger, South Africa is likely to remain Africa's largest single producer for some time to come.

Niger has produced uranium since 1971 at its first mine at Arlit. The country's largest deposits at Akouta have been worked since 1978 and the next largest deposit at Imouragen will come on stream this year. Together they are expected to boost Niger's production to at least 8 000 tons (and possibly as high as 11 000 tons) by 1990. The state holding company Onarem has holdings of between 25 and 50 percent in the foreign exploration consortia which include such giants as Cogema (France), Agip (Italy), Urangesellschaft (Germany), Exxon (USA), Somair (France), Ourd (Japan), and several others. The country's total uranium resources are currently estimated at 215 000 tons.

Cogema is also involved in Gabon together with the French *Compagnie des Mines d'Uranium de Franceville* (Comuf). The two main deposits at Mounana and Oklo both fall within the concession area of Comuf. The company expects to boost present output of just over 1 000 tons to 1 500 tons in 1982. Cogema is prospecting in the Bououé Lastoursville region, at Kaya-Kaya and in the N'Djole area. Cogema is presently also investigating uranium deposits in the Ghallaman region of northern Mauritania in conjunction with PUK, the Japanese Uranium Development Corporation. The West German company Uranerzbau is exploring deposits at Naimtougou in Togo and these too are expected to be viable. In Botswana the Falconbridge Co of Canada is exploring in the Kgalagadi region. Uranerzbau is prospecting in south-eastern Botswana and the American Union Carbide Corporation at Ghanzi.

As in the case of Botswana developments in Zambia have so far not progressed beyond the drilling and exploration stage. In Zambia a number

of companies have joined in the search for the important mineral, among them Agip, Uranerzbau and several Japanese companies. Even where viable quantities are in evidence, production in Botswana and Zambia is not likely to commence in the foreseeable future.

The Soviet Union and certain other East European countries are showing an increasing interest in Africa's mineral wealth and it is rumoured that advance geological parties are active in a number of African states, as for instance in Angola and Mozambique. There can be little doubt that the Communist Bloc's political interest, particularly with regard to SWA/Namibia and South Africa, is motivated by the mineral wealth of the region.

The London uranium symposium heard that, having become an important if not vital link in the total energy chain, the uranium supply must be assured if the nuclear industry of the industrialised nations is to remain viable. In view of the unsettled political situation in countries such as the Central African Republic and Mauritania they remain high-risk areas where sudden changes of government can disrupt the supply of raw materials, including uranium, to the expanding and increasingly uranium-dependent energy sector of the Western industrialised nations.

Both high and low production estimates reveal that by the year 1990 Africa's contribution to the free world's uranium market will decrease somewhat from the present 35 percent to around 30 percent. However, South Africa and SWA/Namibia will continue to maintain a dominant role in the free world's energy needs and it should be remembered that South Africa is a potential exporter of enriched uranium. In fact, the predicted global shortfall of energy needs by the year 2000 could to a large extent be met by southern Africa alone.

The need for safe supply sources will be significantly more critical in a decade from now in view of the industrialised world's greater energy requirements and the subsequent dependence on uranium. As South Africa and SWA/Namibia together will continue to make up more than half of Africa's total uranium production, the loss of uranium from these two countries to the West would bear disastrous consequences for the delicately balanced supply and procurement situation.

# Review : Africa 1980

This article compiled by the Africa Institute highlights developments in Africa during the past year and evaluates trends manifesting themselves at present. Clearly the next decade will be decisive in determining the continent's future.

Is Africa heading for catastrophic food shortages and economic disasters? The next decade will supply the answer to this question, for the continent's future has never looked bleaker than it did at the end of 1980. During the year mounting difficulties which have characterised developments in the post-colonial era continued and were considerably aggravated by famine, the outcome of drought and war.

Drought left a wake of hunger stretching from the west coast to the Horn and down the east coast to South Africa. Together with the drought, wars, notably those in former Western Sahara, the Horn, Chad, Uganda and Angola, swelled the number of refugees to some four million. This is half of the world's displaced and the biggest refugee problem since World War II.

Nothing illustrates the extent of deterioration better than the gruesome TV reports from refugee camps where children are weighed like livestock to decide who should be fed and who should be left to die.

While the famine is the direct outcome of drought and war, its underlying causes can be traced back to two decades of neglect to come to grips with the problems of providing employment, food, housing, education and development opportunities to the continent's exploding population.

According to the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa, the average economic growth rate of African states in 1978 was only 4,5 percent per annum, while a target growth rate of 6 percent was envisaged for the 1970s. Should the current population increase of 2,64 percent on average be taken into account, it becomes clear that the average individual's economic progress in real terms was even less, as *per capita* in-

comes in the 1970s increased by only 1,5 percent per annum compared with about 3 percent in the 1960s.

Thirty of the 50 black African states have experienced an economic *decline* since 1974 in the sense that real *per capita* incomes have not only declined annually but also that many of these 30 countries number among the poorest in the world, i.e. with a *per capita* national income of R240 or less.

Twenty of the world's 31 poorest nations are in Africa; the continent contributes only 2,7 percent of the world's production; and the average *per capita* national product of R317 is the lowest of all the continents while its infant mortality rate of 155 per 1 000 is the world's highest.

Africa's rapid population growth is responsible for serious economic and social problems, especially in regard to unemployment. Of a potential workforce of 140-million, 10-million living in urban areas are unemployed, and there are a further 50-million underemployed in rural areas. Should unemployment continue to grow at the present rate, there will be an estimated 60-million unemployed by the year 2000. Consequently the pressure on African governments to provide more employment opportunities will increase and existing social problems — such as the growth of slums around the cities where there are inadequate services — can be expected to increase. Squatters around many African cities such as Addis Ababa, Yaounde, etc already make up more than 60 percent of the urban population.

Although two-thirds of Africa's population is engaged in agriculture, *per capita* food production has declined since 1960. Compared with the rapid population increase agricultural production has increased by only 1,9 percent and food production by only 1,2

percent. In 1978 African countries were obliged to import about 11-million tons of grain and according to estimates this figure will increase to the order of 80-million tons by 1990. About 60-million people in Africa are suffering from hunger and in at least 32 countries the calorie intake is lower than the minimum requirement determined by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation. In many African states *per capita* food production is much lower than prior to independence.

Besides the deteriorating economic situation, the stark reality is that Africa has not yet reached the end of political instability. Africa experienced a *coup* which not only plunged its oldest republic, Liberia, into chaos, but also claimed the life of the serving Organisation of African Unity Chairman, President Tolbert. An ever widening gap between a small privileged group and the oppressed masses as well as animosity between ethnic groups were some of the factors which led to the tragic events in Liberia. The existence of comparable conditions in most African states heightens the possibility that the almost monotonous frequency of *coups* and unsettling government changes to which Africa has become accustomed during the past two decades will be continued. This instability certainly does not encourage foreign investors or aid organisations, except where political motives are involved.

The inability to deal with these problems has resulted in their reaching critical proportions. While this may not mean that Africa is imminently close to collapse, it indicates that a process of disintegration of administrative, economic, social and political structures is under way, and that, unless checked, it could lead to the demise of



The late Pres William Tolbert of Liberia, who was serving Chairman of the OAU when his life was claimed during a coup.

degree.

## Regional and internal security

**D**uring its 18-year existence the OAU has not chalked up a single success in its efforts to resolve regional conflicts, and during 1980 it again demonstrated its impotence to do so.

At Freetown, the body failed to make any headway in the search for solutions to the wars in former Western Sahara and the Horn. In fact, the Western Saharan issue came dangerously close to splitting the organisation when at least eight states and possibly as many as 11 threatened a total walkout over the issue. The threat demonstrated their disenchantment with the body's ineffectualness and also that they were prepared to contemplate an existence outside the organisation. This underlines the OAU's fragile cohesion.

Since Freetown, the Libyan occupation of Chad has added another explosive issue to those that will have to be dealt with in Nairobi this year. Some observers go as far as to forecast that the Chadian issue could sound the death-knell of the organisation.

At least three armed conflicts, those in Zimbabwe, Uganda and Chad, seem to be over for the time being. In each case it was the intervention of outside powers which brought matters to a head and left the OAU with little choice other than to accept a *fait accompli*, demonstrating its weakness.

During 1980 the internal security situation in most African states declined because of their failure to cope with critical problems. Two successful *coups* — in Liberia in April and Guinea Bissau in November — were staged during the year, while a number of attempted *coups* were put down.

## Soviet influence

**T**he Russians and the Soviet Bloc countries maintained a low profile in Africa throughout 1980. In the Horn and Angola they remained bogged down in seemingly endless and costly military operations, at a time when their hands were also tied by the invasion of

states.

Conceivably, Chad, which has merged with Libya in what is nothing other than a Libyan take-over, is the first of a number of African states which will not see out the end of the century.

Against this background, the well-publicised warning by OAU Secretary-General Edem Kodjo that Africa was dying, sounded at the Lagos economic summit in April last year, was not far-fetched.

Many observers see the Lagos summit as the single most positive event in Africa during 1980, for if the goal of economic recovery outlined there is pursued it will mark a shift in emphasis from political to economic policies and signify a break with the Nkrumah doctrine of the primacy of politics over economics which Africa has adhered to for some 20 years.

At Lagos African leaders committed themselves to make a greater effort to bring about an economic recovery through, among others, a real will to divert more resources to agriculture, greater control over the exploitation of natural resources, a lessening of

Africa's massive dependency on imports and greater self-reliance through regional economic cooperation and the creation of an African common market within two decades.

While the goals set at Lagos may be over-ambitious considering the situation in Africa at present, a new willingness to cooperate, which is forcing ideological differences into the background, does seem to be emerging. In recent months hopes, however tentative at this time, have been raised for the re-emergence of an enlarged East African economic community by the direct contacts between the long-estranged states in East Africa, notably Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. In West Africa the Economic Organisation of West African States (Ecowas) is showing signs of renewed vitality and nine states in southern Africa have formed the nucleus of a regional grouping, although their efforts at present are directed against South Africa, the most important economic power in the region and also the state on which they are all dependent economically to a greater or lesser



Pres Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, the current Chairman of the OAU.

## South Africa

**I**n both South Africa and SWA/Namibia 1980 has raised further expectations of change. The Botha government continued its relaxation of segregationist policies and implemented major constitutional changes in a move away from the Westminster model of government towards a federal or confederal structure.

In SWA/Namibia, where discriminatory legislation has been scrapped, the movement towards wiping out historical inequalities continued and is to be stepped up in the 1980s.

The Republic continued its efforts to strengthen links with Africa on both diplomatic and economic fronts. Besides an improvement in relations with Lesotho, low-key talks were also held with a number of other states, and in fact the Geneva talks of January 1981 were in part the outcome of direct negotiations between South Africa and Angola.

Economically, despite Africa's refusal to consort openly with the Republic, South Africa's links with black Africa have strengthened considerably. Exports to black Africa increased to well over R1 000-million and for the immediate future this trend seems set to continue. Much of this trade consists of foodstuffs and it has helped to prevent starvation in a number of African states.

South Africa's economy entered a boom period and the standard of living, particularly that of the non-white population groups, continued to improve despite an inflation rate of around 14 percent.

The political and economic decline in Africa could possibly afford South Africa the period of respite needed to implement those changes which could lead to the establishment of more cordial relations with Africa and allow South Africa to play a greater role in the development and promotion of stability in southern Africa. However, there is also a real danger that instability could degenerate into chaos, inviting massive foreign intervention and making the continent the focal point of East-West rivalry, thus heightening the possibility of war.

Afghanistan and troubles in Poland.

Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe was a decided setback for the Kremlin after its many years of support for guerrilla movements such as ZAPU, Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola.

In Ethiopia the government seems to be coming round to thinking that no amount of Soviet and Cuban backing can bring the Eritrean and Ogaden wars to a successful close and Head of State, Colonel Mengistu, has now embarked on a diplomatic offensive involving Khartoum, Djibouti and Nairobi in the hope of ending the drawn-out conflict. A successful conclusion to the war resulting from these efforts would undoubtedly lessen Soviet influence in the Horn and significantly affect the balance of power in the region.

The Soviet influence in Africa has also waned because of the poor showing of the economies of the avowedly Marxist states in Africa. Without exception, they are among the nations that have made the poorest economic showing and they are increasingly turning towards the West for assistance to rescue their ailing economies. While this has not resulted in any major shift towards capitalism, which is still equal-

led with exploitation, it has given the West greater political leverage at the cost of the Soviets.

Mugabe's attempt in Zimbabwe to combine the economic dynamism of free enterprise with the "social justice" of socialism is an interesting experiment. If he succeeds, his style of government could well induce other African states to rethink their development strategies.

## France in Africa

**F**rench prestige in Africa suffered a setback with the Libyan annexation of Chad, but this led to strengthening of ties with other Francophone states. The most important event concerning French policy *vis-à-vis* Africa was the economic summit in May 1980 between French-speaking African states and France in Nice. At the summit hopes of trilateral aid involving Europe, the Arabs and Africa were revived. However, since 1979 the Arab world has been rocked by war and strife which would not seem to augur well for massive Arab aid to Africa at this time, especially when viewed against their reluctance to pour petrodollars into African development in the past.

# Is South Africa exploiting SWA/Namibia economically?

The Geneva conference in January 1981 once more occasioned allegations that South Africa is reluctant to relinquish control of SWA/Namibia so that it can continue to earn profits and foreign exchange at the expense of the territory's economy. In this article Dr G M E Leistner, Director of the Africa Institute, examines the economic ties between the Republic and SWA/Namibia.

**T**he question of economic ties with South Africa will obviously be crucial for the government of an independent SWA/Namibia, irrespective of political persuasion. Consideration of three basic points may help to put the issue in perspective.

First, *the small size of SWA/Namibia's economy* compared to that of South Africa would result in rather limited benefits from "exploitation." SWA/Namibia's GDP in 1978 amounted to a mere 2,6 percent of that of the Republic. The value of its mineral production in 1978 was 6,7 percent of that of South Africa. The country's estimated 1977 imports from South Africa were equal to about 5 percent of South Africa's total exports, and not all South African sales to SWA/Namibia are of South African origin — some were first imported into South Africa.

Since detailed statistics on the country's external trade and payments have not yet been calculated, one cannot determine the amount of dividends, profits and similar net benefits accruing to South Africa from its ties with the country. Nor is it possible to calculate how much foreign currency it contributed to South Africa's exchange

reserves by the territory's overseas exports. However, a committee of experts has estimated that a total of R58-million, i.e. 6,7 percent of GDP, was transferred abroad in 1974 in respect of profits, dividends, royalties, wages, etc to recipients in South Africa as well as other countries. Unless that estimate is wildly inaccurate, it serves to show that South Africa's gain from "exploitation" would be minute compared to its own favourable balance of payments of R2 052-million with the rest of the world in 1979 and R1 442-million during the previous year.

Second, the magnitude of *current financial transfers as well as capital spending by South Africa's public sector* is out of proportion to any conceivable economic gains South Africa could hope to reap from hanging on to the territory against the wishes of its inhabitants. The cost of the border war alone far exceeds the financial benefits that South Africa might derive from the territory.

The country's economic base is narrow and its prosperity depends on the exportation of a few minerals and agricultural commodities subject to wide and unpredictable fluctuations in

world demand and prices. For a considerable time to come, SWA/Namibia will remain dependent on substantial inflows of outside funds to meet the growing social and economic needs of its population.

Total South African capital investment in the country to date has been tentatively put at R3 200-million. In 1977 it was estimated that SWA/Namibia will have to be subsidised from outside sources by an average of R120-million a year or R960-million in total for the period 1978/79 to 1985/86. In addition, loan capital amounting to R1 176-million would have to be found for that period. Having regard to the deteriorating world economic situation, it is difficult to visualise international organisations or groupings such as the European Community (EC) committing themselves to provide funds of that magnitude.

Thanks to South Africa's resources the country's infrastructure of roads, railways, power and water supplies as well as social services such as education, training and health are far more developed than would have been possible on the strength of its own limited resources. In fact, according to a UN



*A cattle ranch in SWA/Namibia. The economy is liable to wide and highly damaging fluctuations due to economic and natural causes (such as drought and animal diseases). However, these are cushioned by compensatory finance, food and marketing aid and other special assistance from South Africa.*

(UNGP /UNEP) report: "In proportion to its population Namibia has by far the most extensive transport network of any country in Africa." The South African taxpayer is meeting the considerable annual financial deficits incurred in running the territory's railways, road motor services, international air traffic, and postal and telecommunications services.

Third, the territory derives undoubted and distinct benefits from its *close economic ties with the RSA*. Increasingly close economic links between the countries of Africa is a foremost objective in the OAU's development policy for the continent. SWA/Namibia's development since World War II serves as an illustration : being part of the South African customs and monetary areas, and above all having been administered as an integral part of by far the strongest and most diversified economy south of the Sahara, it enjoys many benefits that would be unattainable in isolation or in a union with less developed economies. Whereas by itself its economy is liable to wide and highly damaging fluctuations due to economic and natural causes (such as drought and animal diseases), these swings are cushioned by compensatory finance, food and marketing aid and other

special assistance from South Africa. Being thus, as it were, underwritten by South Africa, the territory engenders correspondingly greater confidence among foreign investors. Thanks to the comparatively vast resources of the RSA, the territory has not only received a remarkably well-developed physical infrastructure, but is also ensured of finances and skilled manpower to keep this infrastructure in operation. The full range of technical skills and experience from South African research and training institutions, financial, commercial, technical and engineering firms, and so forth is being readily shared and allow many activities to be undertaken which would be beyond SWA/Namibia's reach if they had to be established separately on the basis of its relatively small local demand for specialised facilities. The costs would be prohibitive. Even at high cost, many of these skills simply are not available from overseas.

Being part of the Rand monetary zone, the territory's ability to meet its foreign currency obligations is not doubted by investors and sources of loan and credit funds. Being a member of the South African customs union area means that the territory can confidently reckon on ready supplies of foodstuffs, consumer goods,

machinery, spare parts and so forth. The RSA, in turn, provides a stable and convenient market for the territory's slaughter-stock. In short, its ties with the South African economy ensure the territory of greater stability and better development prospects than it could hope for in isolation. This conclusion is shared, often reluctantly, by most serious outside observers, including some not particularly well disposed towards the RSA.

The present lack of detailed national accounting data makes it difficult to prove scientifically whether South Africa is exploiting the country economically. The above strongly indicates that the charge of exploitation is politically motivated rather than based on careful economic analysis. Generally, many people naively regard the very presence of foreign companies and other economic interests in a developing country as proof of exploitation. Similar attitudes towards foreign capital prevailed in South Africa not long ago. Today it is commonly grasped that without foreign involvement South Africa's economy would have grown at a far slower rate than that which it actually achieved. Without any doubt similar considerations hold true for South Africa's role in SWA/Namibian economic development.

# SWA/Namibia : 1980 review

This article by André du Pisani, senior lecturer in political science and public administration at the University of South Africa, is a survey of the diplomatic efforts to reach an internationally acceptable solution to the SWA/Namibian problem in 1980.

**A**t the beginning of 1980 the scene was set for "detailed technical discussions" between the South African government and the United Nations on the proposed demilitarised zone (DMZ). These discussions followed earlier talks in Geneva at the beginning of November 1979 under the chairmanship of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr Brian Urquhart. Following these discussions in Geneva in which the internal parties, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the Namibia National Front (NNF), the Federal Party, the SWAPO Democrats (SWAPO-D) and other minor factions participated as part of the South African delegation, Angola, Zambia, Botswana and SWAPO formally accepted the DMZ proposals in principle.

On the eve of a special UN General Assembly debate on SWA/Namibia in December 1979, South Africa indicated provisional acceptance of the DMZ proposals, provided that agreement was reached on the following issues:

- the number of South African bases to remain in the DMZ;
- acceptable arrangements regarding the disarming of SWAPO guerrillas

on the closure of bases after the election;

- the deployment of an acceptable percentage of UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) forces inside the DMZ in the light of practical requirements;
- agreement on practical arrangements between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities;
- confirmation that the settlement proposals as accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978 remained unchanged; and
- confirmation that the claim by SWAPO for bases inside SWA/Namibia, which was in any case not provided for in the original settlement proposals, would not be revived.

## South Africa and the DMZ proposals

**I**n January 1980 Lt-Genl Prem Chand, Commander-Designate of the UNTAG military component, paid a 10-day visit to the SWA/Namibian operational area and also journeyed to Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Liberia and Nigeria to discuss the implementa-

tion of the proposed DMZ.

Lt-Genl Prem Chand's exploratory visit was followed by that of a high-powered UN team to Cape Town which included two Under-Secretaries-General, Mr Brian Urquhart and Mr Abdulrahim Farah, as well as Mr Ahtisaari and Lt-Genl Prem Chand. Following these discussions in which no real progress was recorded on the notion of a DMZ, the South African government acted on an earlier request by the DTA to grant more power to the National Assembly. In the beginning of May Dr Viljoen, Administrator-General of SWA/Namibia, announced that the National Assembly would be granted executive powers by creating a Council of Ministers and that ethnic elections for second-tier representative authorities were planned for later in the year.

This statement by Dr Viljoen seemed to confirm earlier suspicions of the Western intermediaries and the UN that Pretoria had in fact written off the prospect of an international settlement within the parameters of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), and that it regarded an internal solution as an alternative to the UN plan. Significantly, at the same time Dr Viljoen hinted at the possibility of negotiating with the Frontline states in a

bid to reach an internationally recognised solution to the SWA/Namibian problem.

South Africa's insistence on clearing up the technicalities surrounding the proposed DMZ and on the UN relinquishing its support for SWAPO and its recognition of SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia" stalled the negotiations and bought time for the internal parties, notably the DTA, to establish their legitimacy.

Pretoria also stepped up its military operations against SWAPO in the hope of setting it back politically and, by so doing, assisting the internal parties to gain the initiative.

Internal developments in 1980 clearly underscored this approach. On 1 July 1980 a Council of Ministers with executive powers was instituted. SWA/Namibia was given control over its own territory force as from 1 August 1980, while the transfer of control over the police followed on 1 September 1980.

As could be expected, the preference for the politics of internal consolidation slowed down negotiations considerably.

After a series of informal discussions the South African government made it known on 12 May 1980 that it still "seeks an international settlement of the conflict," while the DMZ was accepted as a "possible substitute" for the monitoring of SWAPO restriction to bases as provided for in the original Western proposal accepted on 25 April 1978. The South African government also agreed to the following:

- Walvis Bay could be used by UNTAG for logistic supply;
- the air component of UNTAG could be militarised;
- South Africa would retain 20 bases in the DMZ during the first 12 weeks of the transitional period; and
- the full UNTAG authorised military component (7 500 men) could be deployed.

South Africa also reiterated its concern about the impartiality of the UN and demanded that all parties, particularly the internal parties, should be placed "on an equal footing." At the same time South Africa complicated

the notion of a DMZ by hinting that the Angolan resistance movement UNITA should be involved as well. The South African government concluded its reply of 12 May 1980 by saying that it would cooperate in implementing Resolution 435 "as soon as the issues raised herein have been resolved."

### Further clarifications

After studying the South African reply, UN Secretary-General Dr Kurt Waldheim clarified the UN's position in a letter dated 20 June 1980, addressed to the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary-General accepted virtually all South Africa's reservations raised in its letter of May. SWAPO would be allowed seven "selected locations" in Angola and Zambia. Pretoria's proposal for 20 bases in the DMZ was accepted. The governments of Angola and Zambia gave the assurance that there would be no infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas from their territories after the cease-fire.

Five of UNTAG's seven battalions, together with substantial elements of its monitoring, air, communications, transport and other units, would be deployed in the DMZ. The UN promised that it would meet the principles of impartiality and of fair and equal treatment of all the parties. Because of South Africa's acceptance of the DMZ proposal, the earlier demand for internal SWAPO bases fell away.

These clarifications and assurances by the Secretary-General, although welcomed by Pretoria, failed to satisfy both Pretoria's and the internal parties' insistence on UN impartiality and equal treatment of all the parties. In a letter dated 30 August 1980 addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr R F Botha, South Africa's Foreign Minister, reiterated South Africa's insistence on equal treatment of all the parties. Coupled with this was the demand that the internal parties should be included in "all future consultations" on the setting in motion of the implementation of Resolution 435. Pretoria indicated that it was ready to discuss the composition of UNTAG and the status of forces agreement the moment the UN agreed to meet these demands.

SWAPO responded by organising a

conference in solidarity with the people of SWA/Namibia in Paris (using a UN venue), where it demanded the termination of the mediating role of the Western five (Britain, the United States, West Germany, France and Canada). The conference decided that the Five had failed to bring about a speedy transfer of power to the people of SWA/Namibia in terms of Resolution 435. Supported by the non-aligned countries, SWAPO indicated that it would request a special session of the Security Council in mid-October on SWA/Namibian issues.

### Further talks in Pretoria

Amidst a hardening of attitudes on both sides, Dr Waldheim requested further urgent talks with the South African government. The latter indicated on 22 September 1980 to Dr Waldheim that the proposed UN delegation could visit South Africa from 20 October onwards. This was followed by a visit to South Africa and southern Africa by British Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Mr Richard Luce. Mr Luce said that the road to final agreement may be a "hard slog," but that people throughout southern Africa would benefit by a resolution of the SWA/Namibian conflict and that everything was working in favour of the urgent need to continue negotiations.

After consultations between Dr Waldheim and member states of the Security Council on 15 October 1980, the UN mission departed for Pretoria. The mission, led by Mr Urquhart, consisted also of Mr Abdulrahim Farah, Mr Ahtisaari, Lt-Genl Prem Chand and a group of senior political and military experts from the secretariat. This mission had discussions with the South African government and the internal parties from 20 to 25 October 1980.

Negotiations in Pretoria bogged down when the UN insisted that the question of impartiality, raised by South Africa on various previous occasions, could be dealt with only in the context of a firm time-frame for a cease-fire and the emplacement of UNTAG in SWA/Namibia. In the opinion of the UN the matters raised by South Africa in its comments upon the impartiality of the organisation were inextricably link-

ed to the need for an implementation time-frame.

The South African government, while acknowledging the need for a time-frame, believed that this could not be achieved without resolving the remaining issues raised in its letter of 29 August 1980, particularly the question of impartiality and the equal treatment of all the parties.

During the concluding phase of this round of negotiations discussion focused upon the question and means of facilitating the implementation of Resolution 435 within a specified time-frame and in a context which would deal with any outstanding issues. In this regard views were exchanged on the subject of a possible pre-implementation meeting.

Both the UN and the Western intermediaries had in mind to start with the implementation of Resolution 435 in March 1981 and to secure independence by the end of 1981. The UN understood that a pre-implementation meeting would be held in the context of this time-frame and accordingly planned the meeting for 7 to 14 January 1981 under the auspices and chairmanship of the UN.

### New diplomatic activity

After the Pretoria talks of October, increased diplomatic activity in various world capitals gave credence to reports that Pretoria was seeking an alternative to the UN plan. The visit by the South African Foreign Minister to Britain and France at the beginning of November when he also met former US Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, added support to this speculation. In addition a series of secret South African-Angolan meetings, where the MPLA government in Luanda had reportedly offered to withdraw its military backing from SWAPO if Pretoria ceased supporting the rebel UNITA guerrilla movement, took place.

Prior to the Geneva conference the South African government made it known that talks had in fact taken place between itself and the Angolan government. However, the nature or venue of the talks were not made public.

The salience of the talks between Mr R F Botha and the British Foreign

Secretary, Lord Carrington, was that the British government was warming to the idea of an all-party conference on SWA/Namibia, with the express purpose of implementing the UN settlement proposals. Whitehall reiterated its view that such a conference should be seen as a way of implementing the elements contained in Resolution 435 and not circumventing them. The British view was shared by the other two West European powers involved in the negotiations, France and West Germany.

### The Geneva conference (7-14 January 1981)

The prospects for a successful pre-implementation conference were not encouraging. Before the start of the conference it was evident that the South African government and the internal parties, notably the DTA and the Action Front for the preservation of Turnhalle Principles (Aktur), were seriously considering alternatives to the UN plan. Creating mutual trust between Mr Nujoma, Mr R F Botha, Mr Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the DTA, and a variety of SWA/Namibian ethnic-cum-party leaders seemed remote, even if Mr Urquhart adopted the hectoring role so adroitly carried out by Lord Carrington in the Lancaster House talks on Zimbabwe.

Moreover, neither South Africa nor the DTA entered the conference with a firm commitment to adhere to the UN's proposal for a 1981 transition, as both felt that crucial issues such as the status of the internal parties and UN backing for SWAPO first had to be satisfactorily resolved.

The pre-implementation conference, held under the auspices of the UN in Geneva, was attended by various internal parties; a contingent of the Administrator-General of SWA/-Namibia and a South African delegation led by the Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Dr Brand Fourie, which attended mainly as advisers and observers; SWAPO; representatives from the Frontline states; and representatives from the Organisation of African Unity.

The DTA delegation in particular emphasised that it was attending the conference in its own right and not as

part of the South African delegation, and threatened to withdraw from the conference unless its independent status was accepted. SWAPO reiterated that in terms of Dr Waldheim's report of 24 November 1979 (paragraph 24) there were only two principal parties involved in the conference — SWAPO and South Africa. The internal parties had no independent status of their own but attended the conference as part of the South African delegation. Understandably this view was unacceptable to both the internal parties and the South African government, especially as the latter had hoped that the Geneva conference would in fact enhance and formally establish the independent status of the internal parties. Hence Pretoria's observer role at the conference.

Apart from the issue of the status of the internal parties, that of UN impartiality dominated the Geneva conference. In line with earlier pronouncements, notably during the Pretoria meeting of October 1980, the Chairman of the conference, Mr Brian Urquhart, reiterated the UN view on this matter, namely that this issue could definitively be dealt with only in the context of a firm time-frame for a ceasefire and the emplacement of UNTAG in SWA/Namibia.

The South African government and the internal parties opposed such a view, arguing that the UN first had to demonstrate its impartiality before they would agree to the implementation of Resolution 435. At the same time no firm commitment on the proposed 1981 transition schedule was forthcoming.

Breakdown was imminent when the DTA presented the UN with a list of seven demands relating to its alleged bias towards SWAPO. These were that:

- the UN had to rescind General Assembly Resolutions 3111 of 1973 and 31/146 of 1976 which stipulate that SWAPO is the "sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia;"
- all financial assistance to SWAPO through the office of the Commissioner for SWA/Namibia be stopped immediately;
- SWAPO's permanent observer status in the General Assembly be

- withdrawn immediately;
- the Security Council should desist from consulting only SWAPO on matters affecting SWA/Namibia;
- the Namibia Institute in Lusaka be restored to its original purpose of serving all SWA/Namibians;
- the SWAPO representative in New York and his cohorts be removed from direct participation in matters of the Office of the Commissioner for SWA/Namibia; and
- all aid channelled through UN specialised agencies to SWAPO be terminated immediately.

The DTA insisted that these demands first had to be met before the implementation of the UN plan.

### Post-Geneva

Returning home from the Geneva conference, the Administrator-General of SWA/Namibia, Mr Danie Hough, said that in his opinion the impasse over trust and confidence which the Geneva conference had failed to resolve may force the internal parties to a full rethink of the stalled UN plan. Similar opinions were expressed by the DTA when it said in a statement issued in Windhoek on 19 January 1981 that "... the inhabitants of SWA/Namibia will have to find solutions to the problems themselves." The statement went on to say that what was needed "... is a unity based on a common striving and political ideology with a loyalty to the common Fatherland." The DTA urged all political parties to support the interim government, which it dominates, as a unifying factor and as the effective government.

Following these statements, representatives of the internal parties which had attended the Geneva conference travelled to Cape Town for talks with the South African Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, and other senior ministers and military personnel. These talks took place on 5 and 6 February 1981. Although their precise nature was not publicly disclosed, some conclusions can be drawn from the talks. These are that:

- The hope for achieving SWA/Namibian independence in terms of the UN plan by the end of 1981 is unat-

tainable.

- The politics of internal consolidation and the quest for legitimacy provided for in terms of the internal option will be continued for some time to come.
- The international community in general, and the Five in particular, have limited leverage to force Pretoria to accept the UN plan, especially within a specified time-frame.
- Diplomatic efforts to find alternatives to the UN plan, especially on a more bilateral basis, will be continued.
- Every effort will be made to keep SWAPO's military profile as low as possible (because it is essential for the legitimacy of the internal parties to do so). This means among other things that the war in the territory will increasingly be "Namibianised," and that across-the-border raids against SWAPO bases in southern Angola will continue.

- Attempts to establish a "government of national unity," involving some of the internal opposition parties like the NNF and SWAPO-D, may be considered.
- In the event the powers of the Administrator-General will in all probability be scaled down and he would then become a symbolic representative of South Africa's interests in SWA/Namibia.
- If the new Reagan administration regards the resolution of the SWA/Namibian problem as a foreign policy priority, efforts may be launched to compose a new diplomatic package, which may try to link SWA/Namibia to the domestic situation in Angola. The resolution of the SWA/Namibian problem could then be tied in with some kind of political accommodation between the ruling MPLA and the UNITA movement. This may involve the issue of the presence of Cubans in Angola.

## Internal developments

### Introduction

Internal constitutional and political developments in 1980 largely reflected earlier decisions to increase the autonomy of the National Assembly and to localise institutions. These developments also have to be viewed against the backdrop of the lack of progress in the negotiations.

### Party formation and realignment

After months of negotiations between the NNF and SWAPO-D with a view to forming a consolidated radical internal opposition to the DTA, it was announced on 21 January that agreement had been reached on a policy programme for such a movement. However, on 6 April 1980 the NNF failed to reach agreement on the leadership and internal structure of the proposed new opposition party. The Namibia Independence Party (NIP) under the leadership of Mr Charlie Hartung then decided to leave the NNF and to continue as an independent party. Subsequent talks between SWAPO-

D and the NNF also broke down.

In 1980 party formation and realignment reflected the fragmentary nature of the Namibian body politic. On 23 January 1980 the Tswana Alliance within the DTA formed the Seoposengwe Party under the leadership of Chief Constance Kgosiemang. Apart from the fragmentation of the NNF following the decision of the NIP to disaffiliate, two executive members of SWAPO-D were suspended and subsequently joined the NIP.

On 5 February 1980 two executive members of the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO), a Herero party within the DTA, were suspended from NUDO and the National Assembly. Their suspension led to the formation of the NUDO Progressive Party of Namibia (NPPN) under the leadership of Mr Johannes Karuaihe.

SWAPO also experienced its share of fragmentation when Mr Mishek Muyongo, a Caprivian who was appointed Acting Vice-President of SWAPO in 1969, and some of his

former Caprivi African National Union (CANU) members were suspended from the organisation. Indications are that Mr Muyongo, who is still in Zambia, plans to return to the Caprivi to reactivate CANU. CANU joined forces with SWAPO in 1964.


Politically the most significant implication of this process of party formation and fragmentation has been to undermine the position of the left of centre NNF and SWAPO-D.

### **Internal constitutional and bureaucratic developments**

**I**n 1980 the process of internal political consolidation, which in effect started with the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 1975, was perpetuated and accelerated. The most significant developments in this regard were the promulgation of the *Government Service Act*, No 2 of 1980, by the National Assembly, which provided for the establishment of a localised bureaucracy; the transfer of executive authority to the 12-member Council of Ministers; the establishment of SWA/Namibia's own territory force and the transfer of control over it; the transfer of control over the territory's own police force; the transfer of budgetary powers from the all-white second-tier Legislative Assembly to the National Assembly and the inauguration of second-tier ethnic representative authorities for the Tswana and Herero.

Various legislative programmes were also introduced by the DTA-dominated National Assembly to enhance the legitimacy of the internal transitional process. In this respect the following legislation was of special importance: *The Statutory Institutions Pensions Act*, No 3 of 1980; the promulgation of the *Academy for Tertiary Education Act*, No 13 of 1980; *The National Educational Act*, No 30 of 1980 (which provides for uniform and compulsory education, among other things); the *First National Development Corporation of South West Africa Amendment Act*, No 27 of 1980; and the *Land Bank Amendment Act*, 1980.

In conclusion the establishment of a Directorate for Transport and the appointment of Advocate J Kozonguizi as head of the Directorate for Constitutional Development can also be cited as



*Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the DTA.*

examples of internal action with the express purpose of enhancing the legitimacy of the internal government. The holding of a series of second-tier ethnic elections during November 1980, although intended to consolidate the DTA, might in fact be interpreted as a setback for this organisation.

#### **Ethnic elections, November 1980**

**T**he holding of ethnic elections to elect second-tier representative authorities, which took place from 11 to 13 November 1980, marked another phase in the quest for internal legitimation. Ethnic second-tier elections were held among the whites, the Herero, the Damara, the Coloureds and the Kavango. Among the Tswana only the Seoposengwe Party (DTA) and among the Caprivians only the Caprivi Alliance Party (DTA) put up candidates. Consequently no elections

were held. The Bushmen did not go to the polls, and neither did the Nama. The Rehobothers (Basters) did not go to the the polls, but in 1979 the *Rehoboth Baster Vereniging* (Rehoboth Baster Society (DTA)) of Dr Ben Africa lost the election for a *Kaptein* (Captain) to the Rehoboth Liberation Front of Mr Hans Diergaardt.

Significantly the Wambo (460 000 or 47 percent of the total population) also did not have elections. The official reason for this was given as the war in Owambo. The results of the various ethnic elections are given below.

#### *Herero*

**I**n the case of the Herero (population 73 200) two parties, NUDO, a constituent party to the DTA under the leadership of Mr Kwame Riruako, and the breakaway NPPN faction took part in the election. With



Windhoek preparing for the December 1978 election, which was won by the DTA which received some 82 percent of the votes.

some 40 452 registered voters the Herero went to the polls to elect 35 members to the Herero Representative Authority which was instituted in terms of Proclamation No AG 50 of 5 September 1980. The Herero polled the highest percentage vote (53,1 percent of all the black ethnic groups). The NUDO (DTA) received 21 036 or 50,9 percent of the total votes and the NPPN polled a meagre 444 or 1,1 percent of the popular vote. The NUDO (DTA) won 34 seats and the NPPN one seat in the Herero Representative Authority.

#### Damara

Part from the white ethnic election, the Damara election was critical to the DTA, especially because of the participation of the Damara Council of Mr Justus Garoeb, a constituent party to the NNF. Among the Damara 41 246 voters registered. Three parties contested to win their support — the Damara Council of Mr Garoeb, the South West Africa People's Democratic United Front (SWAPDUF) of Mr Engelhardt Christy, a constituent party of the DTA, and the Damara Executive Committee of Mr Kefas Conradie.

Of the 41 246 Damara who registered, 11 677 (28,3 percent) voted in favour of the Damara Council; 8 291 (20,1 percent) for SWAPDUF (DTA) and 449 (1,1 percent) for the Damara Executive Committee. Only 49,5 percent of the Damara voted.

The Damara Council of Mr Garoeb obtained 23 seats, the Damara Executive Committee one seat and SWAPDUF 16 seats in the Damara Representative Authority. The DTA thus lost control of this second-tier ethnic body.

#### Coloureds

Out of a total of 22 540 registered Coloured voters, 5 292 voted for the Labour Party of Mr Joey Junius. The Labour Party is affiliated to the DTA. Mr Andrew Kloppers' Liberal Party polled 2 101 votes. Only 32,8 percent of the Coloureds went to the polls. The Labour Party (DTA) won 11 and the Liberal Party four seats in the 15-member body.

#### Kavango

In Kavango the DTA polled 16 452 votes (87,5 percent) of the total registered votes, while the *Namibië Christelike Demokratiese Party* (Namibia Christian Democratic Party — NCDP), headed by Mr Faustinus Sikongo in the Kavango, polled 918 votes or 12,4 percent of the popular vote. The DTA won all four seats in the Kavango Legislative Assembly.

#### Whites

Three political parties contested to win the support of the more than 52 000 registered white voters. The National Party (NP) of Mr Abraham du

Plessis maintained its 30-year majority in the white Legislative Assembly by winning 11 of the 18 seats contested. The Republican Party of Mr Dirk Mudge won seven, while the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (HNP) failed to take a seat.

The NP polled 21 202 votes (48,2 percent), the Republican Party 18 219 votes (41,5 percent) and the HNP 4 532 votes (10,4 percent).

Although it seems that the DTA enjoys majority support among the Herero and the Kavango, and sizeable support among the Caprivi, Tswana, Bushmen and whites, opposition parties have in relative terms since the internal elections of December 1978 increased their support at the cost of the DTA. The total number of blacks and whites who abstained in these elections showed a marked increase from 20,82 percent in 1978 to 42,79 percent in 1980.


#### Security developments

Various security contacts took place between SWAPO guerrillas and South African and SWA/Namibian forces, while the latter launched a series of successful military operations across the border into Angola. Operation *Smokeshell* was perhaps the most successful in this respect.

In 1980 SWAPO lost an estimated 1 500 to 2 000 men, with about the same number wounded. The South African and SWA/Namibian forces lost about 80 men.

The governmental structure in SWA/Namibia

Executive authority



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## Appendix B

### Political parties (February 1981)

Name of party or alliance	Leadership	Main support
ACTION FRONT FOR THE RETENTION OF TURNHALLE PRINCIPLES (AKTUR)	A H du Plessis (Chairman)	
Damara Action Group	G Conteb	Damara
National Party (NP)	A H du Plessis <sup>1</sup>	Whites
Rehoboth Action Group	Pieter Diergaardt	Rehoboth Basters
SWA Action Group (SWAAG)	Percy Niehaus	Whites
Kavango Action Group	Alex Kudumo	Kavango
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (CDP)	Ben Pillay/Hans Röhr	Mixed mainly Coloureds
DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLE ALLIANCE (DTA)	Peter Kalangula (President) Dirk Mudge (Chairman)	
Bushman Alliance (BA)	Geelbooi Kashe <sup>1</sup>	Bushmen
Caprivi Alliance (CA)	Richard Mamili <sup>1</sup>	Caprivians
Kavango Alliance (KA)	Alfons Mayavero <sup>1</sup>	Kavango
Labour Party (LP)	Joey Junius <sup>1</sup>	Coloureds
Namibia Democratic Turnhalle Party (NDTP)	Daniel Luipert <sup>1</sup>	Nama
Namibia Young Pioneers (NYP)	M Narib	Nama/Damara
National Democratic Party (NDP)	Cornelius Ndjoba <sup>1</sup>	Wambo
National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO)	Kuaima Riruako <sup>1</sup>	Herero
Rehoboth Baster Association (RBA)	Ben Africa	Rehoboth Basters
Republican Party (RP)	Dirk Mudge	Whites
SWA People's Democratic United Front (SWAPDUF)	Engelhardt Christy	Damara
Seoposengwe Party (SP)	Chief Constance Kgosiemang <sup>1</sup>	Tswana
FEDERAL PARTY (FP)	Gregor Tibanyane	
HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY (HNP)	Bryan O'Linn	Whites
INTERESSENGEMEINSCHAFT DEUTSCH=SPRACHIGER SÜDWESTER (IG)	Sarel Becker	Whites
LIBERAL PARTY (LP)	J Halenke (President)	Germans
NAMIBIA NATIONAL FRONT (NNF)	Konrad Lilienthal (Chairman) Andrew Kloppers	Coloureds
Damara Council (DC)	Justus Garoeb (President) Gerson Veii (Chairman)	
Mbanderu Council	Justus Garoeb <sup>1</sup> Chief Nguvauha	Damara
Namibia Progressive Party (NPP)	Munjuku	Herero
SWA National Union (SWANU)	A Vries	Nama
NAMIBIA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT (NPLF)	G Veii	Herero
Bondelswarts Group	Kefas Conradie (President)	
Damara Executive Council (DEC)	Anna Christiaans	Nama
Voice of the People (VP)	Oscar Kharuchab	Damara
REHOBOTH LIBERATION FRONT (RLF)	Kefas Conradie	Nama
SWAPO DEMOCRATS (SWAPO-D)	Hans Diergaardt <sup>1</sup>	Rehoboth Basters
SWA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION (SWAPO)	Andreas Shipanga	Wambo
FEDERAL PARTY (REHOBOTH) <sup>2</sup>	Sam Nujoma	Wambo
NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE PARTY (NIP) <sup>2</sup>	Hendrik Buys	Rehoboth Basters
NUDO PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF NAMIBIA (NPPN)	Charlie Hartung	Coloureds
	Johannes Karuaihe	Herero

1. Leaders of ruling/dominant parties in legislative/advisory bodies.

2. These parties disaffiliated from the NNF, but are legally still regarded to belong to this alliance.

# Kaunda's Zambia

The steady decline of the economy and the worsening internal political situation are causes of widespread popular discontent in Zambia. B J Olivier, an MA student in international politics at the University of Pretoria, analyses President Kaunda's philosophy of humanism, the effect it has had on the development of the Zambian state and economy and the failures of Kaunda's regime.

In October 1980 President Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian head of state, alleged that an attempted *coup* had been foiled. At first it seemed like another diversionary tactic to draw attention away from the country's problems and the government's failure to deal with them. However, after a dusk to dawn curfew had been imposed on Zambia's main towns on 23 October, it became clear that a *coup* attempt had in fact been exposed with the discovery of a gang of well-armed men working under cover on a farm at Chilanga.

In the country's biggest security crackdown for years, dozens of Zambians, including several prominent businessmen and middle-ranking officers in the armed forces, were detained. Kaunda, clearly unsettled, claimed a South African involvement, which Western diplomatic sources in both Lusaka and Pretoria thought highly unlikely. Kaunda also implicated the trade unions which were a complicating factor in internal politics, especially during 1980.

It seems that the motive of those participating in the *coup* attempt was an increasing disenchantment with the

direction of Zambia's political and economic policies. The attempted *coup* raised some important questions, such as whether it has brought home the level of popular discontent and whether Kaunda will act to remove its causes. It is thus only appropriate to discuss the general aspects of the political and economic situation which affects the Zambian way of life.

## Kaunda's humanism

A basic understanding of Zambian society has its starting point in Kaunda's philosophy of humanism which governs the principal activities of Zambia. To Kaunda humanism is both a philosophy and a way of life. Although the United National Independence Party (UNIP) constitution laid down as its first objective the achievement of African socialism, Kaunda chose to give his philosophy the name *humanism*, which has its roots in an African society that has always been man-centred, rather than *socialism*.

Kaunda contends that the vast majority of the peoples of Africa live in

close contact with nature and will so keep alive this element of their culture and that humanism stems from the structure of traditional society and its effects upon African psychology. Three key factors reinforce his humanist outlook:

- The tribal society was a *mutual* society organised to satisfy basic human needs of all members. Thus, individualism was discouraged.
- The tribal community was an *accepting* community in which social qualities weighed more than individual achievement.
- The tribal community was also an *inclusive* society in which relationships involved some degree of mutual responsibility on a widely spread basis.

The extended family system constitutes a social security system following the natural pattern of personal relationships rather than being the responsibility of an institution. Kaunda, profoundly influenced by the life and work

of Mahatma Gandhi, believes that humanism has been firmly planted within the religious ethic and that political activity is inspired by spiritual values which include tolerance, mutual respect and the non-exploitation of man by man.

### One-party participatory democracy

**B**earing the principles of humanism in mind, the Zambian form of government can also be related to African nationalism which, according to Kaunda, has achieved its primary purpose by liberating the Zambian peoples from colonialism and by generating a certain momentum for the task of building a sovereign nation. Kaunda's perception of nationalism is that of people organised for given purposes, motivated towards certain goals and sharing certain common emotions.

Although Britain, the outgoing colonial power, tried to install a Westminster-style government (including the party system) in Zambia at the time of independence, Zambia, like the rest of black Africa, has become increasingly monolithic. Kaunda contends that throughout the 20th century the evolution of democracy has been away from the Westminster model towards strong centralised government and that three factors have been mainly responsible for this. First, most liberation or nationalist movements have enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people, resulting in one-party states. Second, continuity of government can hardly be achieved through a change of the party in power. And third, Kaunda believes that opposition is foreign to the African tradition where societies operated by consensus and he points out that in terms of human development it would be unfair to expect Africa to follow pure, modern democratic principles, a process that took Europe centuries to realise.

Kaunda believes that the soundest way to achieve a one-party state is to destroy the opposition through the ballot box, but that a government freely elected may find it necessary to hold a more rigorous view of personal liberty than is the case in Western states. He is nevertheless opposed to military

government which, although able to achieve a unity across tribal and regional divisions, is in most cases based on force while lacking the means, skill and mandate to achieve significant and detailed political reform. Although Kaunda has often stated that humanism should be viewed from a point of scientific socialism, he draws a distinction between Marxism-Leninism and humanism. Humanism accepts God as the supreme scientific socialist in contrast with the completely materialistic contentions of Marxism-Leninism.

Zambia gained its independence from Britain on 24 October 1964. UNIP held a clear majority in the multi-party system and Kaunda became President of the republic. Although Kaunda frequently declared his intention of upholding reasonable opposition, the tolerance of the rank and file of UNIP was not so obvious. Zambia became a one-party state on 13 December 1972 when Kaunda signed the Constitution Amendment Bill, which formally outlawed opposition parties and recognised the ruling UNIP as the only political party. UNIP adopted Kaunda's new code of conduct which aims to prevent the acquisition of private wealth by those in public life, including civil servants and political, military and industrial leaders — an effort to prevent the rise of a privileged class.

Zambia's government became what Kaunda calls a one-party participatory democracy. To introduce participatory democracy in industrial fields, workers were to be educated to become responsible and make real and meaningful development possible in a system designed from the more equal distribution of wealth. Leadership, including local authority councillors, local and junior supervisors in industry, committee members of cooperatives, political leaders, leaders in youth groups and women's organisations, were to be encouraged. Leadership education would concentrate mainly on socio-economic matters. The mass media would help cultivate a spirit of patriotism rather than indulging in destructive reporting which tended to weaken the system being moulded by UNIP. Kaunda also indicated a determination to take socialism one step further by emphasising

the supremacy of the party through the central committee which is the highest policy-making body in Zambia.

Although the centralisation of power in the state is not problematic in principle, the question remains *who benefits?*

### Zambia's state capitalism

**D**uring the independence struggle great expectations were raised among the Zambian people. The capacity to satisfy these expectations was limited by a populist party without a clear ideology or economic programme, thus the first years of independence were marked by pressing along the well-worn path of a typical export-orientated mono-economy based on copper. Economic reforms were carried out within the existing capitalist framework with the profit motive still the overriding principle. The economic reforms during the 1960s achieved no more than a major adjustment in the ownership of the means of production, resulting in the state becoming a prominent participant in the Zambian economy. Participation is the correct term since the method chosen was to acquire shares instead of outright nationalisation, thus a majority shareholding ensured state control of the boards of the companies concerned.

Zambia's state capitalism derived from three principal factors: it was a national response to foreign exploitation by multinational corporations; it was caused by the weakness of a national bourgeoisie; and it was the result of persistent pressure by organised labour.

The key to an understanding of Zambia's state capitalism lies in the parastatal institutions within which the relationship between the African ruling class and the multinational corporations occurs. Africanisation of management, but not real ownership, was first achieved and this collaboration was compatible with the emergence of state capitalism. Parastatal institutions have been identified as the commercial type (mines and other enterprises of the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (Zimco) group), the semi-commercial type (public service on a



*President Kaunda.*

corporations in the world outside the USA. The state sector dominates the economic activities of Zambia, while the private sector mainly constitutes construction and engineering industries, and retail and wholesale activities.

On 19 April 1968 Kaunda announced at Mulungushi that the government was to take control of 24 large companies (including one Zambian company) on a 51:49 percent shareholding basis. The subsidiary parastatal would be Indeco. In August 1969 Kaunda announced that the same procedure was to be implemented in the mining industry, resulting in the establishment of Mindeco. Control was to be taken of the two main copper mining companies, the Roan Selection Trust, a subsidiary of American Metal Climax, and the Zambian Anglo-American Corporation, controlled by the South African Anglo-American Corporation, by compensation at book value of assets at the end of 1969, to be paid out in current earnings. The actual take-over of controlling interest was negotiated with caution and major concessions, while all the shares acquired by the state were fully paid off.

Insurance companies and the banking sector were treated in the same fashion in the early 1970s. In August 1973 it was announced that all outstanding Zimco bonds (relating to the copper industry) would be redeemed; an alteration in tax and exchange control regulations governing the copper mines resulting in greater Zambian control was also announced. The Zambian state has proved to be highly interventionist. Land reforms and other measures announced on 30 June 1975 constituted a large intervention, severely restricting the scope of private enterprise. One should, however, recognise the welfare functions performed by parastatals, especially of the statutory variety.

### Foreign policy

**T**o understand Kaunda's approach towards Zambia's foreign policy it is necessary to examine his views on African unity or pan-Africanism, regionalism and Zambia's role in international institutions and movements.

business basis) and the non-commercial type (public service). The features of commercial parastatals arise from their manner of acquisition, which excluded outright nationalisation, and the fact that the state did not establish total control, direction, planning or discipline over them. Parastatals can thus be categorised as falling somewhere between private and public enterprises.

State capitalism in Zambia is distinguished by:

- majority state shareholding in all major enterprises;
- largely unplanned, competitive commodity markets governed by profit-making;
- a class structure which subordinates workers and peasants;
- an emergent quasi-bourgeoisie which straddles the public and

private sectors of the economy; and

- the continuity and persistence of the system which is ensured by the mediation of state power.

Today a state holding company, Zimco, controls a series of main subsidiaries which, in turn, control a network of companies, some of which have foreign partners on a 51:49 percent shareholding formula. These subsidiaries include the Industrial Development Corporation (Indeco), the Mining Development Corporation (Mindeco), the State Finance Development Corporation (Findeco), the National Transport Corporation (NTC) and the National Hotels Corporation (NHC). Zimco has President Kaunda as its chairman, assisted by Cabinet and central committee members as well as managing directors of the main subsidiaries. By 1977 Zimco ranked 123rd in size among the 300 largest

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The boundaries drawn by the colonial powers have left Africa with a heritage which will take long to adjust to. Kaunda nevertheless believes that there is more internationalist thinking in Africa than on any other continent, while the desire to avoid balkanisation is widely shared. The psychological reason for this drive towards some measure of unity is that rigid attitudes towards "foreigners," eg as in Europe, have not developed, nor has Africa developed a high measure of oversensitivity regarding national pride. Kaunda does not consider pan-Africanism a semi-mystical concept but an economic necessity, whether on a regional or subregional basis.

Kaunda's view is that whatever small units exist, a gradual movement towards bigger entities and cooperation is necessary. This view is shared by several states in the southern African subregional context, and correlates positively with the idea of African unity and a policy of peaceful coexistence which, however, acknowledges the right to freedom and independence and the principles of humanism. Kaunda believes that Zambia and other states will achieve maturity through membership of international groupings and institutions such as the British Commonwealth and the United Nations.

Before independence, Zambia was forced into the Central African Federation against the will of its African population. After independence and the dissolution of the federation Zambia, a land-locked country, depended for its lifelines on Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola and South Africa. Prospects were rendered worse by Rhodesia's UDI less than 13 months after Zambia's own independence day. The future of Zambia was to be marked by increasing conflict in southern Africa, with Zambia in a particularly unenviable position, both politically and geographically.

The British government took no decisive action against UDI apart from sanctions, which were also supported by the UN. Kaunda did not believe that sanctions could defeat Rhodesia as no moves were contemplated against South Africa and Portugal, who had no intention of acting against Rhodesia. Sanctions had a detrimental effect on

the Zambian economy while Zambia harboured an increasing number of banned nationalist movements, which caused security dangers in and around Lusaka. A pattern for future action in which Zambia was willing to sacrifice extensively in its support of liberation movements while continuing to be dependent on its southern African economic lifelines in which South Africa in particular featured prominently was thus set. To Zambia the resolution of the Rhodesian conflict became a national priority and an economic necessity. Zambia's policy in the continuing southern African conflict consists of political and logistic support as well as rear base facilities for the liberation movements in the region.

Another important factor responsible for Zambia's active role in the diplomatic efforts to secure a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe was the Lusaka Manifesto, formulated in 1969 by several East and Central African heads of state on the initiative of Zambia and Tanzania. Both Nyerere and Kaunda stated their definite preference for the peaceful settlement of the conflict situations in southern Africa, but stressed the possibility of violent action if all other efforts failed. The Lusaka Manifesto thus contained a set of principles which would govern the foreign policies and actions of Frontline states in southern Africa, a region marked by protracted confrontation. It was to be five years before this initiative bore fruit with the decolonisation of Mozambique in 1974, followed by the Angolan independence and protracted conflict since 1976 and more recently the Frontline initiative in Zimbabwean independence.

The Tazara (Tanzam) railway project, built by the Chinese People's Republic, was widely criticised for possible political implications, but Kaunda's (and Nyerere's) respect for and trust in the CPR stayed intact, while the railway held some promise of relieving the pressure and economic burdens of Zambia. Much more dangerous, according to Kaunda, is the precedent created by the USSR and Cuba in Angola which could have adverse effects on intra-African relations.

Zambia's relationship with South Africa is well known in terms of the

RSA's internal politics and its position in the SWA/Namibian conflict. The contradiction of prolonged economic dependence on the RSA in many fields also remains. Kaunda contends that the Organisation of African Unity and the UN recognise the RSA as a sovereign state, thus making its position in Africa much more problematic than states in a colonial context. Through diplomatic efforts a highlight was achieved in 1975 when there was a now-forgotten possibility of détente. On a regional level an historic conference took place in April 1980 between the nine southern African Frontline states in Lusaka to mark the start of economic cooperation in an effort to become independent of South Africa.

### **Tribalism, trade unions and general discontent**

**T**he first major challenge to Kaunda's social objectives came from the copper miners who established what was probably the strongest black-led trade union on the continent after 1964. It has played a vital, although sometimes disruptive, part in Zambian internal affairs since independence. Independence brought an end to racial discrimination in the mining sector, but did not erase the sense of injustice. The lack of qualified Africans ensured the preservation of the *de facto* racial differentials. During the campaigns against federation and colonial government the Zambian people had been led to believe that self-rule would bring about instant material improvements, an expectation which has been constantly frustrated since independence. This pattern of subtle confrontation between government and trade unions has been complicated by the position of expatriates, especially where it concerned competition in the labour market.

Industrial unrest has not been uncommon in Zambia, but it has shown an increase during the 1970s, an era of unfulfilled promises, harsh measures and the detrimental effects of continued economic decline. There is no evidence to suggest that the unions are being manipulated for overtly political purposes, but industrial unrest has nevertheless posed a serious threat to government. In the period

1979/1980 there were 120 strikes and go-slows for better wages which involved a tenth of the labour force, costing the country nearly 600 000 man-hours — a serious situation in a country which lacks sufficient manpower. The unions have been involved in moves to curb the regime's power, particularly that of the party's central committee, which is the foremost policy-making body in a system where Parliament's role has diminished in importance since independence. Government's increasing inability to handle the strikes has strengthened the unions. The powerful Zambia Congress of Trade Unions has been backed by Parliament which is perturbed at the party's continued refusal to allow it any real policy-making powers.

A traumatic experience in Kaunda's career was his short-lived resignation in 1968 due to intertribal factionalism. The damage caused by constant tribal

conflict has had many consequences in the post-independence era, namely:

- it has diverted the President, the party and the government from vital tasks;
- it has influenced appointments, especially at government level;
- it has offered opportunities to subvert the regime from within;
- it has prevented the party from growing into a truly national movement able to concentrate on economic development;
- it has dislocated national policy by elevating factional demands above the national interest; and
- it has also prevented Kaunda from following the strict principles in which he believes.

Kaunda believed that his policies needed a single-party system but he felt that instead of legislating for it, it should come about naturally through interparty elections. The problems of tribalism and industrial unrest instead forced him to introduce the one-party state in order to contain factionalism and the ineptitude of opposition parties. In this context Simon Kapwepwe, former Vice-President, an old friend of Kaunda and later the leader of the banned United Progressive Party (UPP), played a vital role before his death in 1979. Many of the Bemba tribe, the biggest in Zambia, acknowledged Kapwepwe as their leader. Kaunda made him Minister of Finance to introduce an unpopular budget and left Kapwepwe to face the wrath of the Bemba miners. After the nationalisation of the copper mines, Kapwepwe resigned as Vice-President, accusing the government of persecuting the Bemba. He became progressively more estranged from

*A Zambian copper mine. The copper miners established a strong black-led trade union which has played a vital part in internal affairs.*



Kaunda's policies and objectives and in 1971 formed an opposition party which was banned in 1972 when Kapwepwe was detained. It was a logical result of flirting with tribal politics, but this action did not contain tribalism.

By the early 1970s it was evident that Kaunda no longer enjoyed widespread support and he increasingly became the subject of public criticism. His policy of humanism was unique in Africa and not particularly popular with his intellectual and economic elite. Questions of intraparty conflicts and party discipline mounted during the difficult 1970s.

In Zambia the behaviour of party officials is the key to any progress in the rural areas. There have been a number of anonymous circulars criticising ministers, and party officials have been responsible for organising illegal demonstrations against government policy or organisation along tribal lines. Members of Parliament have often alleged that widespread indiscipline, corruption, nepotism and tribalism exist among members of the central committee and other party officials. The number of card-carrying members of UNIP has been a source of consistent concern for the party. Membership is as low as 10 to 15 percent of the potential voters. The low turn-outs in the presidential and general elections in 1973 and 1978 already signalled that complacency was creeping into the party organisation.

Within UNIP and the Zambian political arena Kaunda has shown increasing intolerance towards opposition and criticism. His reaction has ranged from harsh measures against factionalism to the denunciation and disqualification of other presidential candidates.

One of the major causes of discontent was the hosting in Zambia of more than 10 000 guerrillas opposing the Rhodesian government. The guerrillas had the pick of essential commodities available in Zambia, while Rhodesian raids into Zambia caused additional security problems. Another source of friction was the fact that socialist policies have done little either to create wealth or to distribute it evenly and have resulted in the creation of a self-perpetuating urban elite whose access

to social services is well known. This tendency has led to the failure of rural schemes and an incompetency to satisfy the increasing demands of a neglected rural population. The real threat to the government is nevertheless rooted not so much in a peasant revolt as in the educated urban population, where political power is concentrated.

The end of Zambia's long and costly commitment in the Rhodesian conflict has turned attention from external threats to internal problems and caused Zambians to demand instant improvement in their socio-economic position which has been devastated during a decade of conflict. The war as a rational excuse for the country's problems is no longer valid and it is an open question whether Zambians will be willing to continue making sacrifices the way they did during the 1970s. Thus, the watershed in terms of Kaunda's popularity came with the end of the Rhodesian war.

### Socio-economic disaster

Zambia's prolonged economic crisis is rooted mainly in ineffective socialist policies, its geopolitical position, its involvement in the conflicts of southern Africa, the failure to diversify a single commodity economy, and its continued reliance on other countries in southern Africa and international institutions for its economic survival.

Copper is the mainstay of the economy, providing 90 percent of export earnings. Since 1970 copper prices internationally have fallen very low, at times below the 750 kwacha (K) or R713 per ton necessary to maintain compensation payments for nationalisation. Since 1976 the government received no revenue from the copper industry, which used to provide around 50 percent of government revenue.

Aggravating the copper dilemma were the serious transport problems which arose after the closure of the Rhodesian border in 1973 and the Benguela railway, which links Zambia and Angola, in 1976. The difficulty and expense of exporting and importing were vast and the Tazara railway, due to mismanagement and sporadic

Rhodesian attacks, was rendered grossly inefficient.

The Zambian mining industry has to a high degree always been dependent on expatriate miners and technical skills, which has made the Zambianisation in the mines a difficult process. In recent years the mines have experienced a steady loss of skilled labour vital to the industry, while higher wages for expatriates have frequently antagonised Zambian workers.

The World Bank estimates that the 40 percent of the Zambian population now living in the cities will rise to more than 50 percent by 1990 due to the current availability of services and goods in these centres. Urbanisation harbours problems related to unemployment and social stress. Zambia, like other states, was hit by the oil crisis. Immediately after UDI, Zambia had to introduce petrol rationing and entered into partnership with leading companies, namely Shell, BP and Agip in Zambia, but even then the oil crisis had a serious effect on the Zambian economy. The nationalisation of fuel stocks in 1980 was a political act in retaliation for the companies' alleged supply of oil to Rhodesia rather than an economic consideration.

The failure, despite intense government rhetoric and development plans, to promote agriculture as the major alternative to the copper industry represents Zambia's greatest weakness since independence. This situation has led to sporadic food shortages and by 1980 it was estimated that Zambia needed more than 200 000 tons of maize to survive in the short term, with its most likely supplier being South Africa on which it has been dependent for essential goods for years. Famine was averted by spending more than R64-million on maize from the RSA.

Zambia is probably the most extreme case of a country forced to depend increasingly on a regime it abhors for its supplies. In several key areas Zambia and other black states in southern Africa are today more dependent on the RSA for economic survival than they were in the past. Transport is the most glaring example. According to a 1979 estimate, the rail route through South Africa carried almost 46 percent of Shaba province (Zaire) and Zambia's external trade. Even after Zimbabwe's

## Kaunda — the unexpected one

**K**aunda was born in April 1924 in Lubwa, the heart of the Bemba country, from parents of Malawian origin. His father was a missionary and Kaunda was never introduced to tribal customs or ritual. Against great odds, Kaunda (nicknamed *Bucizya* — unexpected one) finished his primary schooling and was chosen as one of 30 students from all over Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) to attend the first African secondary school at Munalu in Lusaka.

He was admitted to a teachers' training course and became a schoolmaster after successfully completing the course. Kaunda also tried, unsuccessfully, to farm and in quest for better employment walked to Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) with his boyhood friend, Simon Kapwepwe, a future Vice-President of Zambia.

When Kaunda entered Zambian politics, there was only one effective local political party, the African National Congress (ANC), later the opposition party, of which Kaunda became the Secretary-General in 1953 under Nkumbula. In 1958 Kaunda broke away from the ANC and founded the Zambian National Congress, which was banned. During this period Kaunda and Kapwepwe were jailed several times. In jail, Kaunda met Mainza Chona (Vice-President of Zambia after Kapwepwe). Chona founded UNIP, the present ruling party, and helped Kaunda to take over the leadership. UNIP agitated against the Central African Federation, which finally broke up in 1963. Kaunda gradually established himself as the popular leader of his people under the banner of non-violence and anti-racialism. UNIP won the 1964 general election and Kaunda was sworn in as Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia before becoming President of Zambia after independence, a position he has held ever since.

independence the Tazara railway has been crippled by shortages of spares and repair skills, while the internal conflict in Angola still renders the Benguela railway inoperable. It seems that Zambia will have to continue to rely on the southern route in the short term.

Zambia has also experienced foreign trade problems. Apart from a galloping inflation rate of about 20 percent in 1978, capital requirements for 1980/1981 were estimated at US dollars 2,1-billion and external debt had already reached US dollars 1,3-billion by the end of 1977. The balance of payments position has deteriorated sharply since mid-1970, and foreign exchange reserves have plunged from K382-million (R363-million) in 1969 to K100-million (R95-million) in July 1972 and deteriorated further to a balance of payments deficit of K247-million (R235-million) in 1978. In March 1978 the IMF decided to provide a financial programme of K322,6-million (R307-million) to be drawn over a two-year period to help curb economic problems. This rescue operation also demanded austerity on the part of the Zambian economy and

an increase in the efficiency of the parastatals, which control approximately 80 percent of industry and commerce.

### Conclusion

**T**he source of Zambian instability has been self-inflicted failures of the economy — the failure to diversify away from relying on a single commodity for economic survival when prices were high after independence; the failure to create a sound agricultural sector and a failure in direction and efficiency among UNIP officials and middle management in the economy. Large-scale plants are heavily dependent on high cost, imported capital-intensive machinery and raw materials while the shortage in skilled manpower remains a problem. The economy is unable to offer employment to those who are forced to the cities by the failure of Zambia's subsistence economy. All these factors have retarded the economy. Zambia further exhibits a strange paradox in that international capital for aid purposes is bound to strengthen the public sector, thus a bolstering of Zambia's state capitalism. In this context the International Monetary Fund has shown a will-

ingness to invest in parastatals rather than a private sector which lacks expertise.

A more equitable distribution of wealth and the narrowing of the gap in class structures have not been achieved under Zambia's state capitalism. Despite leadership codes and political rhetoric, the quasi-bourgeoisie has become more numerous and powerful, strengthening the forces of political reaction which seek to expel socialist elements from the state, party and most economic areas. Zambia has failed to stimulate production for mass consumption in a subsistence economy.

Zambia does not represent a political homogeneity such as Tanzania and Kaunda has never been free to choose his leaders according to their abilities, or to use UNIP as a national unit for political education according to accepted policies. After independence Zambia moved into the position of a Frontline state against the white south, but was almost entirely dependent on the south for its survival. The political malaise has fed on economic failure, and in neither politics nor business is there much vitality left. It is thus true to say that Kaunda is presently going through the most traumatic period of his political career.

# African women in rural development

Although women played an important role in the traditional African rural economy, they now occupy a subservient position. Dr O N Agusiobo of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, at present a visiting professor in agricultural education at the University of Illinois, examines the position of women in contemporary rural development and looks at projects aiming to restore the status of women and ensure their meaningful participation in the rural economy.

The quickening pace of social and economic development in the past decade has accentuated the need for fuller participation of women in all aspects of national life. There are significant differences in the status and level of participation of women in different countries and even regions within countries. These differences are rooted in the political, economic, social and cultural structures of each country as well as the level of development. There are, however, basic similarities and problems which unite women of all countries, the most notable being the persistent gap between the economic and social status of men and women.

No country can afford to neglect the potential contribution of rural women from either an economic or a social point of view. However, the traditional role of women in the economy is neither evident nor acknowledged in the modern sectors of agriculture, industry, commerce and government. The persistence of this situation seriously impedes the realisation of the expressed intentions of governments to make full use of all human resources available for the development process.

The economic contribution women make in their societies is probably the single most important determinant of their status and is a constant and salient

theme in literature. Historically women were the backbone of the rural economy. They were responsible for growing the subsistence crops and therefore providing all the family food. These women were usually economically independent as traditionally the sex that grows a crop has at least some right to trade with it and control the resulting income.

Development and modernisation have had a strong impact on the traditional economic role of women. In the past quarter century development has been viewed as the panacea for all the ills of Third World countries — *pour money into a country to create an infrastructure and the economy will take off à la Rostrow*. While this may increase the overall GNP and benefit a country as a whole, it may have a negative impact on major subgroups such as women for several reasons.

The changes introduced in the name of development have made it more difficult for women to function as fully as previously in the economic system. Colonialisation and the subsequent introduction of cash crops weakened women's traditional autonomy and power. Westerners, particularly missionaries, did not see or understand the role of women and their degree of participation in traditional society, and

consequently made no attempt to include them in modern institutions. Project planners saw women in Western terms, i.e. essentially as domestic workers whose primary responsibility should be in the home and not in the fields. As a result, women's earning power has been reduced and at the same time their burdens have increased. Many authors assert that agricultural development projects lead to an increased work-load for women while reducing that of men.

The argument goes something like this: agricultural development projects introduce improved farming practices, better seeds, fertilisers, machinery and irrigation — for cash crops; all research, training and extension are aimed at cash crops. These improved agricultural inputs are usually introduced by men, saving men's labour while women must increase their labour input in order to weed and plant the expanded acreage and harvest and process the expanded outputs. Men subsequently monopolise the new equipment and modern methods while women continue with traditional methods which result in an increase in men's productivity and a decrease in that of women. Consequently, women's productivity is far from commensurate with their labour input since

their activities continue to remain tradition-bound. With little assistance from official sources on how to improve women's agricultural production, the transformation of rural areas will continue to lag behind the potential for development.

Often the introduction of cash crops adversely affected women who lost control of their land or were required to give up the best acreage for cash crops. This frequently resulted in a change for a woman from independent cultivator to dependent assistant for her husband which meant that men had access to income while women remained in the subsistence economy. This lack of training and available cash as well as the loss of control over the land has given women little incentive or means to improve either their land or their food crops.

Women have to contend with a kind of coalition between Western and native men who decide what their role should be. How much input has come from women in development planning, and how many international experts have been women or concerned with women's problems? Usually one finds men talking to men about problems they conceive as important. Consequently, too little attention has been focused on women's potential contribution to development and they have had far fewer opportunities to share in its benefits. It seems clear that we must try to evaluate the roles and status of

women in each culture to interpret the impact of development. Development can improve the position and status of women. To date that has generally not happened because women have not been a factor in development planning.

The errors that have repeatedly been made are those of:

**Omission:**

failure to realise the traditional productive role women play is due mainly to a lack of knowledge or understanding of the role of women in developing countries.

**Reinforcement:**

of values already in existence in a society which restricts women's activities to the household. This calls for development programmes orientated to a change of attitude.

**Addition:**

by superimposing Western values of what is appropriate work and roles for women. This can be reduced by a better understanding of a particular culture and women's traditional role in it.

The need for a realistic approach in the recognition of women's participation in the rural economy is emphasised by the world food crisis as this statement illustrates:

...if one could single out the main factor that has precipitated interest in

the education and training of women, it is probably the critical shortage of food supplies. Labor force statistics are beginning to show the significant extent to which women are actively responsible for food production in different parts of the world. (UNICEF, 1970.)


**Interrelated problems**

The problems of women and development are critically interrelated. Far from women's problems being "luxury" matters as considered by many policy makers, women's rights are central to the wider human problems of malnutrition, maternal and child mortality and mass poverty. Nutrition cannot be improved without educating women who are the producers, processors and preparers of food. Health care cannot be improved without the active training of women who bear, nurture and socialise the children. For women to have equality and freedom of occupation, mobility and better health, it is imperative that they have fewer children. As Fig 1 shows, health, nutrition, mortality, fertility and economic development are inextricably linked.

One way for this cycle to be broken is through better educational opportunities for women. An African proverb states: "Educate a man and you educate one person, educate a woman

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**Fig 1**



Source: Tinker, 1976, p 168.

and you educate a nation.” However, women have had few opportunities to acquire the skills necessary to share in the benefits of modernisation. Recognition of their traditional roles in the home and in the economy should mean that they have equal access to all training facilities and should lead to their full participation in the economic life of their respective countries. So far this has not happened. Nine out of 10 women in Africa are illiterate. While there has been an overall increase in school enrolments as many countries strive for universal primary education, there has been a greater increase in the number of boys entering all levels. Several factors explain the paucity of female enrolments and the number of female school leavers:

- a historical precedent was set for the favouring of males;
- traditional emphasis on early marriages and lack of alternative roles for women;
- fewer educational facilities existed for girls and many parents were opposed to coeducation;
- drop-out rates for girls are higher because of financial strain, early marriages or pregnancy; and
- the dual role of girls who had many

more domestic tasks which interfered with their school work.

The great influence women have on education and attitudes is therefore not reflected in their educational opportunities. Studies have shown that the performance of children in school correlates positively with the education of their mothers but bears little or no relationship to that of their fathers. Thus, women’s educational levels have a direct effect on the next generation as well as the present.

Too often women’s education has been exclusively orientated towards domestic science and home economies. This may serve to reinforce existing patterns of discrimination. It is unrealistic to neglect the training of girls in more efficient and better ways of household management and child care, yet education in a broader sense could better prepare women for the realities of employment status, agricultural production and participation in development. In addition to household management skills, rural women need training such as:

- extension and community programmes which take into account women’s contributions and problems;
- equal educational opportunities in non-formal and formal program-

mes;

- paraprofessional training programmes for vocational skills, farm management, crafts, health care, and teaching; and
- access to and training in the use of credit and marketing facilities.

## Negative male attitudes

**D**evelopment programmes cannot be directed only at women. It has been found that men must be included in the programmes or they will not encourage their wives to take part. Integration of women into the rural economy will proceed more quickly if that integration takes place within the context of a development project rather than by means of a programme for women only.

A better understanding of the development process and its impact on women is needed. Increasing the integration of women poses major problems. Negative attitudes on the part of both men and women must be overcome concerning the education and employment of women. Even if women did have equal access, there is a lack of educational facilities which offer relevant education. Because women have been neglected for so long, there are

*A produce market in Bophuthatswana. Too often women’s education has been exclusively orientated towards domestic science and home economies.*



no role models to serve as examples to younger women. Efforts to change the situation of women in any society touch upon sensitive domain concerning the cherished values of that society and consequently elicit deep-rooted opposition. The economies of most developing countries are expanding slowly. The majority of women will be forced to remain in the rural areas which is all the more reason to include them fully in agricultural training programmes. A final point is that data for planning are collected with varying degrees of efficiency and completeness. Cultural assumptions result in distorted data and often give a secondary importance to everything women do, which may result in women being excluded when projects are planned.

The development policies pursued by both national governments and donor agencies often have an adverse effect on women by failing to take into account their traditional roles and contributions, the introduction of and emphasis on cash crops, land tenure and lack of training opportunities. It might help to ask questions such as the following when planning programmes:

- In what ways might women be more effectively utilised as an economic resource in the development process?
- What obstacles prevent the participation of women and how can they be removed most easily?
- What are the specific learning needs that would enhance the contribution of women to economic and social development, and in what manner can they most effectively be taught?

What are women seeking? Betty Kaunda, wife of the President of Zambia, stated:

We are not seeking to overthrow tradition ... on the contrary, we are concerned with the preservation of traditional values. It is the mother in the home who teaches the children about their heritage ... on the other hand, we recognize certain traditional practices which are no longer appropriate .... We (women) do not

want to take away your authority and power. We talk about "women power" but we do not want to replace you men, we are in search of a role which will support and supplement your efforts.

## Two case studies

There is a great need for research on projects that appear to be successful in integrating women in rural development. The programmes that do exist have seldom been analysed to find practical solutions to questions such as those posed above. It is essential to learn what has been attempted in the past few years and to analyse and compare these plans in order to improve future efforts. Two examples of current programmes are the Rural Training Centre for Women (RTC) in Senegal and the Community Development Project in Upper Volta. They will be discussed briefly.

The RTC was established 15 years ago with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme with the object of training women in skills needed in rural areas and helping them to assume a more active role in rural development. The major aims are to:

- improve family life and health, including child care, medical and social hygiene;
- increase the production and participation of women in agriculture;
- expand the role of rural women in the development of their countries; and
- to improve general literacy.

Practical work and training occupy the major part of the programme, including supervised work in villages. Upon completion, trainees return either to their villages to organise similar training for other women or to serve as instructors in other rural development training programmes.

The UNESCO project in Upper Volta was started in 1968. The plan provided for implementation of the programme in three pilot regions at dif-

ferent stages of economic development with eventual expansion throughout the country. The major underlying goal was to change attitudes towards the role of women and it consisted of four phases:

- a sociological study of each pilot region was conducted to determine the present position of women and to identify obstacles to education and greater participation;
- an adult literacy programme adapted to the needs and interests of rural women was to be developed and appropriate materials designed and produced;
- community development programmes to provide basic technical skills were to be implemented; and
- provision was made for teacher training programmes to provide future staff.

It was found that the entire community had to be included in the programmes in order to change attitudes and to enable women to participate. Second, even if women received the necessary training, many employers were still unwilling to hire them which suggests that training programmes need to be coordinated with potential employers in order to change their attitudes towards women.

Both programmes included a literacy component, and technical skill, training relevant to each specific region and appropriate materials had to be provided. These are important points. A similar effort should be made in all development programmes to discover the obstacles that prevent the participation of women. This might prevent the imposing of Western values of what is appropriate.

As for the manner of instruction, both programmes used a combination of non-formal and formal training. A teacher training component was an important factor in allowing the programmes to become self-sufficient.

# Resettlement and development in Transkei

Betterment programmes — aimed at economic upliftment — have seriously dislocated traditional tribal life and values in Transkei. In this article Prof M C O'Connell, Head of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Transkei, traces the history of Nzongisa village since the introduction of betterment two decades ago. He highlights the objections to betterment expressed by the people of Nzongisa, and asks the question whether the benefits have been worth the long-term social problems they have created.

**B**etterment is a general term for agricultural development in the Republic of Transkei. It is a programme designed to arrest and reverse the destruction of the natural resources, improve agricultural production and raise the standard of living in the rural areas. It is said that betterment will reduce the rate of labour migration and that it will allow a man to feed his family and earn an income through agricultural production. This is one of the development dreams which generated and continues to sustain the betterment programme in Transkei. It cannot be said whether betterment goals will be realised in the long term or not.

What one does know is that betterment has had a tremendous impact on the social and cultural lives of those

people who live in areas where the scheme has been implemented. Some of the immediate changes have been beneficial. Young boys, for example, have been relieved of their stock herding responsibilities by the introduction of cattle camps, and may now attend school. On the other hand, betterment has wrought what appear to be harmful changes in the lives of some Transkeians. One might say that at least for the moment betterment has reduced the standard of living in some areas. If the harmful effects of betterment appear to be emphasised in the following account it is because the people themselves stress this side of the matter, and we wish to discuss their views and experiences in terms of the goals of the scheme.

The term betterment refers to three distinguishable aspects of agricultural development. It refers first to resettlement or 'stabilisation' (terms we find unacceptable from the human perspective) which is the creation of small compact villages surrounded by clearly defined grazing and arable lands. In the pre-stabilised situation, homesteads and people are widely distributed over the country, while in the so-called stabilised situation homesteads are con-

structed close together. Betterment also refers to reclamation or the systematic attempt to reclaim resources which have been destroyed by natural processes or by human abuse. Finally, betterment refers to rehabilitation or the development attempt to introduce Western economic institutions, values and beliefs into a non-Western economic system.

All aspects of the betterment programme affect socio-cultural life. Here we focus on resettlement because it had the greatest impact on the people and because it has aroused more bitterness than any other aspect of the scheme. Since the ultimate success of betterment depends on a sympathetic understanding of the human problems it creates we wish to view resettlement from the people's perspective and not from the more common development point of view.

The material for this article was collected in the Mount Ayliff district which lies in the north-eastern corner of Transkei. Comprising an area of 88 000 ha of rugged, mountainous land, the district supports an estimated population of 50 000 people. Mount Ayliff is divided into 26 administrative areas or locations and each location is

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This paper was originally read at the Biennial Conference of the Transkei and Ciskei Research Society held in Umtata, 1980. I have changed the title and made minor alterations to the text. I wish to thank the Nzongisa people for their help and to extend a special word of thanks to Mayeza and Chalmas Fikeni and Enos Xotyeni for their constant friendship, loyalty and enthusiasm throughout my stay. I also wish to thank the East London Museum for sponsoring the research.



*Pondo gathering socially. Neighbourhood residents shared a unique history and common traditions which tended to generate a powerful spirit of unity.*

in turn divided into wards or neighbourhoods (*izithebe*). Data on betterment were collected in several administrative areas at various times between 1976 and 1980. Here, however, we concentrate on Nzongisa, a resettled neighbourhood roughly 8 km north-west of Mount Ayliff village. Nzongisa was resettled 19 years ago and therefore provides us with the kind of evidence required for accurate evaluation of the betterment scheme. Moreover, the author lived in Nzongisa for 13 months between February 1978 and March 1979 and had ample opportunity to examine the influence of betterment at first hand.

### Neighbourhoods

**P**rior to resettlement the Nzongiseni administrative area was divided into five neighbourhoods — Lugalweni, Bonga, Qabeni, Nzongisa and Bequhqi. Homesteads in each neighbourhood were scattered. Life was space and distance — the echo of a

barking dog, the minuscule figures of neighbours fetching water in a far-off stream. Despite the scattered homestead pattern people were inter-related by an intricate network of ties which had been established and maintained over the years. A neighbourhood — and its inhabitants — was in fact autonomous in several respects. Living in a spatially discrete area, neighbours cultivated land and herded cattle on communally owned pastures. Neighbourhood residents shared a unique history and common traditions which tended to generate a powerful spirit of unity *vis-à-vis* people in other neighbourhoods. Though often dominated by a single kinship group, neighbourhood residents were not necessarily related and the spirit of unity was not sustained by kinship only. When people in adjacent neighbourhoods fought, neighbourhood residents were expected to stand together, even against relatives in the enemy camp. Equally, neighbours sat together at inter-neighbourhood feasts and beer drinks and not with

kinsmen or friends from other areas.

From the human perspective resettlement threatens to disrupt these alliances, distort spatial-aesthetic experiences, and replace something old and acceptable with something new and undesirable. Thus, in 1971, residents in Pepene neighbourhood in Brooksnek administrative area formed an association called the Anti-Soil Conservation Scheme Section of Brooksnek (ACSS) which, in the same year, threatened to kill officials or local residents who supported the government's betterment scheme. According to the official view, the ACSS represented a small minority. "A large number of residents," reads the official report, "were in favour of the ... Scheme ... but were too afraid to voice any opinions for fear of the Pepene locality group ... who threatened to kill all those residents where any fencing material was off-loaded."

Armed with this piece of information the government decided to implement the scheme by force and in 1972, backed by a contingent of South

African police, officials arrived and began to demarcate the area. Developers encountered similar resistance in Gugwini administrative area and were again forced to use punitive measures. Residents of Hala neighbourhood, in Mombeni administrative area, also refused to move, and in February 1980 the people of Debaso in Betshwana were tenaciously clinging to what they called their ancestral home. Debaso people also referred objectively to areas in which the betterment scheme had been implemented without noticeable improvement in agriculture, arguing from the evidence that the scheme had been an economic failure and that it had created a host of social problems in the process.

Are these conclusions justified? Is Mount Ayliff betterment an economic failure? What are the social problems, and do these social problems lower the standard of living in the spiritual sense? Turning to Nzongisa as one of the areas mentioned by resisting Debaso people, I will attempt to answer some of these questions.

## Nzongisa

In 1961, as the location population was "stabilised," Nzongisa received an influx of immigrants from Qabeni and Bequqhi and was transformed into a small but densely populated village. Nzongisa is a kind of "instant" village similar to many one might see in Transkei today. It has a small shop, a credit society (now defunct) and a maze of rocky, rutted roads which connect various parts of the settlement. The school, which was built before the population was stabilised, stands an inconvenient 3 km from the nearest homes, a visual anomaly which residents attribute to bad planning. The homesteads, all surrounded by barbed wire fences and equipped with ramshackle home-made toilets, are a combination of traditionally shaped rondavels and small, square houses with corrugated iron roofs.

From the beginning the new Nzongisa population suffered from what one extension officer called teething problems. The original inhabitants resented the intrusion of

strangers and the consequent loss of land, and they still refer to the immigrants as aliens. The so-called aliens, in turn, "hated to be uprooted from the ancestral lands" and claim that the land they received was inferior to their original holdings or that they were not allocated land which they had been promised and to which they were entitled.

The aliens, then, brought their own bitterness to the new settlement, a bitterness which was accentuated by the sudden loss of space and privacy, and by the fact that despite official efforts, kinsmen and neighbours could not always settle next to one another. Kinsmen, neighbours and friends were in some instances separated and forced to live next to strangers and "people they did not like at all." The erection of fences restored some consciousness of privacy and personal space but did not effectively prevent criminal trespass and small stock theft which generated feelings of suspicion and animosity.

In the pre-betterment context such problems as trespass and theft were minimal and were solved through an established system of controls. For example, the powerful belief that the ancestors gather around their living descendants and punish unresolved quarrels tends to inhibit long-term disagreements. "Relatives fight," conceded one informant, "but when people are related they resolve their differences. We believe that if collected together all our ancestors are present and would dislike and punish quarrels." Such ritual sanctions were combined with the secular control of the community — appointed headmen who commanded the respect and trust of neighbourhood members.

When Nzongisa was stabilised these sanctions against continuous hostility were weakened by dividing neighbourhood and kinship units, and by replacing well-known headmen with strangers. They were weakened by the fact that the immigrants did not know the sub-headman of Nzongisa and were reluctant to take their problems (e.g. land disputes, theft, trespass) to his court. Without effective local means of resolution, persistent conflicts often terminated in assault and subsequently police intervention.

During the early days of resettlement,

then, the people were bitter about land allocation, loss of privacy and personal space and, finally, about the disruption of pre-betterment kinship and neighbourhood alliances. Owing to an increase in adultery, a topic to which we will return, people became and remain suspicious of neighbours, and through fear of being accused themselves have grown reluctant to offer assistance with agricultural work. The social importance of communal work has consequently waned despite the developer's insistence that such cooperative efforts should be maintained. The entire pre-settlement ethos therefore changed and still remains basically different from the ethos of non-betterment areas.

With the erection of fences, people have erected social barriers which did not exist in the past. They have become more sensitive to intrusions into their personal space, more suspicious of the strangers or aliens who live around them, more conscious of theft and trespass. In broader terms the kinsmen and neighbours who managed to settle together have tended to maintain pre-betterment ethnic boundaries. The original inhabitants still call the immigrants aliens and the aliens still do not recognise the sub-headmen. The community remains disjointed.

## Moral norms

The alteration in space has been linked with changes in pre-betterment social structure and morality. How have spatial arrangements affected the kinship structure and associated moral norms?

Resettlement tends to divide members of a family. A father, e.g., is no longer able to secure land adjacent to his own for a maturing son. Equally, pressure on available land can prevent brothers from living close to one another, and in Nzongisa this tends to undermine mutual support and cooperation among them. In pre-betterment areas a man could leave his wife and children in the care of his brothers and migrate to the urban centres of South Africa for employment. Adultery, highly disapproved of among eastern Transkeian people in general, was minimised by such fraternal

guardianship. Today in Nzongisa brothers cannot always monitor the movements and behaviour of a brother's wife who lives far away from them.

A typical comment is: "When some men are working a neighbour offers to use his oxen to plough the fields but it does not stop there. He becomes a lover and a child is born. Because kinsmen cannot supervise, a woman can see a lover any time during the night. She knows that her husband's brothers are not likely to leave their (distant) homes so late. This has made many homes empty."

In pre-betterment areas adultery is curbed by several factors. As indicated here, it is inhibited by the fact that

brothers, living in the same vicinity, can maintain a watch on an absent brother's wife. The spatial arrangement allows people to monitor the movements of everyone so that it becomes difficult for a couple to meet during the day or at night without being seen by someone. In a betterment area such as Nzongisa the distribution of the brothers' homes, the close-knit housing arrangement and the proximity of strangers all facilitate adultery. When, in addition, a woman's husband is absent for 11 months out of every year the rate of adultery increases automatically. Returning migrants have adjusted to a rise in marital infidelity by refraining from sexual intercourse until they are certain that a wife is not preg-

nant, but adultery is still common and, as our informant indicates, has contributed to a spate of broken marriages in Nzongisa.

While alterations in space have affected aspects of social structure they have had an equally significant effect on the incidence of crimes such as rape and burglary. In non-betterment areas rape and burglary are difficult crimes to commit because the potential rapist or burglar is constrained by the near certainty of detection and the fact that his movements are easily monitored. He cannot approach a homestead without someone identifying him as a friend, relative or potential criminal and, if he is a member of the community, he cannot escape punishment.

*Women hoeing a field in Transkei. In pre-betterment areas a man could leave his wife and children in the care of his brothers and migrate to the urban centres of South Africa for employment.*



The spatial arrangement of the homesteads inhibits rape and burglary. Houses are left unlocked and women may travel about with impunity. The simple nucleation of homesteads in betterment areas transforms the character of the settlement, contributing to a marked and well-known increase in these crimes. Nzongisa is inhabited by a large number of people who do not know each other well. These "semi-strangers" have friends and relatives who visit them from other parts of the country and are therefore total strangers to the community. People come and go in Nzongisa at such a rate that the appearance of a stranger does not merit the same kind of attention that it demands in the non-betterment area. Nzongisa people do not monitor the movements of strangers as intensely, and therefore strangers are given more licence in betterment areas.

They can loiter near a hut without being suspected of evil intentions simply because the homes are all pushed together and people seek shelter from the sun, rain and wind. Since they are not members of the community they can escape the ignominy of detection and the sting of a fine. It is also claimed that when people are pushed together into one area the few mischief-makers who have been separated are thrown together and therefore given an opportunity to organise, i.e. they influence each other and some people who, in non-betterment circumstances, might remain respectable members of the community. And while the mischievous elements are thrown together in a nucleated settlement large tracts of land are opened up as haunts for the criminal elements. Nzongisa people do not travel from one nucleated neighbourhood to the next by night without fear of assault. Changes in the settlement patterns therefore generate internal shifts in behaviour.

But there is an external influence too — the returning migrant. Migrant workers visit or live in urban locations which, in terms of spatial structure, resemble the resettled rural village. Urban norms are therefore transferred to the rural areas as long as migration remains the economic *status quo*. A number of young Nzongisa migrants who live within or close to tsotsi society

(the fringe of the underworld) in Johannesburg and other centres are transporting a kind of urban gangsterism to the rural neighbourhood. Nzongisa residents never leave their homes unlocked or unguarded and Nzongisa women cannot wander around the location with impunity.

Spatial alterations have also influenced house design which, in turn, has had some effect on expenditure and agricultural investment. In response to a general shortage of space, the number of square houses with corrugated iron roofs is increasing. People find that square houses take less space than the string of separate huts which characterised the more traditional homestead. It is also evident that when people build square, Western houses they are more inclined to spend their earnings on Western furniture, and such expenditure reduces the amount an individual can invest in the agricultural enterprise.

## Migration

In discussing some of the changes nucleation has created in Nzongisa social and cultural life, we have mentioned migration several times. Resettlement and migration together often create changes. But we have also mentioned that betterment was intended to reduce migration. In fact, over the past 19 years migration has increased steadily. Between May and June 1977 over half (54,5 percent) of all men between the ages of 18 and 65 were absent from Nzongisa. The migratory rate for certain age groups was higher — 58,8 percent for men between 18 and 24, 70,4 percent for men between 26 and 35, and 59,6 percent for men in the 36 to 45 year age group. Most Nzongisa home owners have land to cultivate but very few are able to produce more than a five-month supply of food for a family of five each year.

It is not just the increase in migration and the corresponding drop in agricultural production that force one to rethink betterment. It is also the general discontent, decline in morality, and other social problems which indicate a decline in the quality of life — both in the economic and in the spiritual sense.

Are the sacrifices which people are expected to make worth the cost of

social health? Even if betterment had produced some identifiable signs of economic progress (and it has not), are the long-term social problems it creates worth the price of such elusive economic returns?

Betterment has failed for numerous reasons. First, it has failed because it was designed and later implemented by development 'experts' who were unable or unwilling to familiarise themselves with the socio-cultural system they were theoretically trying to improve. Betterment, then, was development from above, not from below. It failed, in fact, because it was forced onto the people against their will. Some have argued that betterment was designed to fail, that it was a disguised plan to increase control over the black population and ensure a reservoir of labour for white-owned industry in the process.

If this is true, it is pointless to make suggestions for 'bettering' betterment. If it is not true, improvements could be made as soon as 'armchair' development is abandoned and experts begin to look closely at social and cultural life in the reserves. In this way development specialists could avoid mistakes which in fact destabilise social life and cause resentment among the people.

Betterment might conceivably work if it is implemented only with the peoples' consent. Forcing betterment on Nzongisa has caused resentment and a sullen, passive resistance to cooperate with agricultural officials. The people of Nzongisa, like people everywhere, should have a right to choose their life-style. Apart from these measures, the chances of betterment success could be improved by money. One agricultural official estimated that an area does not become economically self-sufficient (theoretically) until about 20 years after stabilisation. In the meantime, of course, the inhabitants of the stabilised area must rely on migration which, in turn, becomes an established 'tradition.' Betterment tends to promote dependence on migrant labour rather than reduce it. Money to establish small industries (e.g. dairies) or to subsidise the agricultural effort during the first years of betterment might help to keep essential agricultural manpower in homeland areas.

# Black urbanisation — process, pattern and strategy

SMIT, P and J J Booysen. 1981. *Swart verstedeliking — proses, patroon en strategie* (Black urbanisation — process, pattern and strategy). Cape Town. Tafelberg Publishers (for the Institute for Plural Societies, University of Pretoria). 126 p. R31,20.

As stated in the introductory chapter, the subject of the book is the physical rather than the socio-economic aspects of the migration of the South African black population from the rural areas to the towns and cities in search of employment.

The text is amply supplemented with 58 maps and diagrams as well as statistical tables and photographs portraying a vivid picture of the scope of black urbanisation (Chapter three) and the spatial patterns and structures (Chapter four) that evolved over centuries, e.g. the uniquely South African phenomenon of twin white and black cities with large squatter populations, the restructuring of black urban settlement in recent times, the provision of massive housing schemes in vast townships without industrial bases, the creation of sizeable commuting populations requiring transport facilities, etc.

The dimensions of the trend are indicated by the fact that the 1980 total of about six million urban blacks represented a mere 38 percent of the total black population. Should this figure rise to 75 percent by the year 2000 — a realistic estimate — it would imply the provision of housing and services for about 27-million urban blacks. Taking into consideration the backlog with regard to the provision of

these services as well as the slow pace of improvement in general living conditions in black townships, the effectiveness of existing policies and approaches to cope with the growing dimensions of the problem could be questioned.

Substantial parts of the study (Chapters two and four) trace the effects of various governments' policies and legislation on the pattern and structure of black urban settlement, followed by the authors' conclusion that South Africa urgently needs a comprehensive national urbanisation strategy. Such a strategy would require, *inter alia*, adaptation of hitherto Western notions of urban planning to African standards of housing and services as well as a radical review of the authorities' present attitudes towards squatting.

The study is an important scholarly contribution to the sparse literature on a subject which has a crucial bearing on the future of South Africa. Written by geographers, its interest goes well beyond students of that discipline. It should be prescribed reading for all South African politicians and in fact everyone participating in the debate on the fundamentals of political and economic development in this country.

(Pieter Esterhuysen)

# Why South Africa will survive

Gann, L H and Peter Duignan. 1980. *Why South Africa will survive*. Cape Town. Tafelberg Publishers. 299 p. R20,00.

The prospects for armed overthrow of the present South African system — whether by foreign invasion, internal rebellion or external guerrilla assault — are so remote as to “belong in the realm of military fantasy,” according to Dr Lewis Gann and Dr Peter Duignan of the American-based Hoover Institution.

Gann and Duignan, two academics who have specialised in the decline and fall of European colonialism in Africa, consider these three scenarios for the violent end of the current South African order in their newly-published book *Why South Africa Will Survive*.

The title of their book, which seems to be a calculated riposte to R W Johnson’s study, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?*, gives their answer to the recurring question on the strength and durability of South Africa as the last white-ruled state in Africa.

The pivot on which their assessment is based is that South Africa is not as riddled by insoluble internal contradictions as Pretoria’s enemies believe and that the underlying reality is strength rather than weakness.

In rejecting the sharper criticisms of exiled South Africans, Third World ideologues and Western liberals and radicals, the authors come close at times to being apologists for South Africa’s rulers.

But to reject their study as a mere apologia would be a mistake: their assessment of South Africa’s chances of survival against attack from without and revolt from within is based for the most part on sober argument and sustained analysis.

Gann and Duignan consider the ability of the South African establishment to withstand violent attempts to overthrow it under various headings. For purposes of convenience their assessment is summarised under the same headings.

## Conventional war against South Africa

Although the Organisation of African Unity can put together a formidable force on paper, the authors estimate its chances of mounting an invasion of South Africa as negligible.

The members of the OAU ... lack a common military organisation, military doctrine, leadership, training methods, deployment plan and general staff ...

(Member) nations could supply weapons, training and military bases on the borders of South Africa. But the African states could hardly send their own armies against South Africa.

Such an operation would endanger the stability of armed centred states such as Zaire and Nigeria, whose armed forces are essential to the strength of the existing governments.

Zaire and Nigeria, Gann and Duignan point out, have two of the biggest armies in black-ruled Africa: Zaire had 34 400 men in 1977 and Nigeria 221 000 in the same year.

Moving on to the theoretical option of a Soviet-backed invasion by Cuban and East German “proxy armies,” the authors reject it as highly unlikely.

Cuba itself is not in a position to launch another large military campaign overseas. Its total armed strength in 1978 was only 189 000 men and more than a fifth of them were (already) heavily engaged in Africa.

Even a more powerful state such as East Germany, whose armed peacetime forces number 201 000 men including security units, could not contemplate a major effort outside Europe (although minor ventures may be possible).

These difficulties aside, there is the problem of finding a viable base for a land invasion of South Africa.

Mozambique is still dependent on South Africa as an employer of its

labourers, a buyer of its hydro-electricity and a provider of technical and administrative aid.

Mozambique, moreover, is deficient in communications, especially traffic links from north to south. Only one bridge crosses the Zambesi ...

“Angola is even less likely than Mozambique to menace South Africa.” The prevailing civil war and economic crisis apart, north-south communications are “totally inadequate.”

Zimbabwe would be better suited as a land base because its extensive communications and substantial industries would be of vast potential importance to an invading army.

But Zimbabwe is heavily dependent on South Africa economically, a fact which explains Mr Robert Mugabe’s “conciliatory line” regarding Pretoria.

A sea-borne invasion by the United Nations is a theoretical possibility. In 1965 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace prepared a contingency plan for a UN invasion as a prelude to an internal rising.

But, according to Gann and Duignan, a South African “D-Day”

would be a more difficult undertaking than the Allied invasion of North Africa or even Normandy during the Second World War.

An invading force would also have to reckon with the possibility that South Africa, in desperation, might employ a few nuclear weapons (which would) make a “D-Day” landing of the kind practiced in Normandy in 1944 as obsolete as a charge of armoured knights at the battle of Agincourt.

### Prospects for a violent revolution

**T**he potential revolutionary leadership lacks a strong industrial base. It is drawn mainly from the ranks of professional people, from the “industrial periphery” and is “ill-suited” to wreck an industrial economy.

Gann and Duignan concede that the increasing role of blacks in skilled and sub-managerial positions has improved the potential of revolutionaries, but in their view the improvement is marginal.

Managerial positions in industry have not been infiltrated, nor have leading posts in the civil service, the fighting

forces and the police.

Revolutionaries cannot aspire to key positions in the vital industries — including the arms, petro-chemical, iron and steel, telecommunications and aviation industries — and cannot for that reason disrupt or take over these industries.

In the authors’ estimation the main revolutionary vehicle is the South African Communist Party (SACP), as the African National Congress is “indistinguishable in outlook from the SACP.”

While the SACP benefits from the support of “gifted intellectuals” — the authors name Ruth First, wife of the SACP leader Joe Slovo, and Brian Bunting, author of *The South African Reich* — the party is not as strong in South Africa as its image abroad suggests.

Besides being largely out of touch with their own country, subject to severe internal quarrels and fearful of South African agents in their midst, the SACP suffers from a “major deficiency:” its exiled leaders are mainly white intellectuals who constitute “an army of officers without soldiers.”

South African Mirage fighters. The authors contend that mounting an invasion against South Africa would be more difficult than the Normandy landing of 1944.



It is alienated from the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Unity Movement. Nor does its largely white leadership commend itself to the newer black consciousness movement.

Moreover, Gann and Duignan add, by ignoring the black homelands the SACP forgets the “Leninist principle that revolutionaries should operate through any institution that actually commands some degree of power.”

### Non-violent and semi-violent ways to revolution

**G**ann and Duignan consider the potential of industrial strikes, civil disobedience, protest marches, riots and sabotage for bringing down the present white-controlled structure to be minimal.

At present the black labour force in South Africa is too isolated politically, too heterogeneous in character, too poorly organised and too unstable to stage the equivalent of the British general strike of 1926.

The former British High Commission territories, the countries along South Africa’s northern rim and the (black) homelands within ... provide (South Africa) with a great reserve army of migrant labour.

Until this army has been “demobilised,” the strike organiser’s task will remain immensely difficult.

The series of school boycotts in recent years and the unrest which was often associated with them have, in the opinion of the authors, had little revolutionary potential.

School boycotts, however impressive, do not affect the basic power structure. In the long run they merely limit the education obtained by the students, thus making their struggle for a good job even harder than it was in the first place ...

The riots threw into sharp relief the internal conflicts between young people and their elders, between men with jobs and the unemployed, between workers and students.

Observers who expected white morale to collapse seem to be

“oblivious to the fact that similar predictions had been made for a generation” — that earlier riots supposedly presaged similar consequences.

Taking a broader view, Gann and Duignan state: “Unarmed or poorly armed rioters cannot seize the means of production or of governance, as the widespread but wholly unsuccessful outbreaks in 1953 in East Germany showed.”

Turning back to South Africa, they add: “Violent outbreaks may in fact strengthen government control by cementing white unity across class lines.”

### The future of guerrilla warfare

**T**he authors preface their appraisal with the observation that guerrilla warfare has been sheathed in an “aura of romance” but that its history is “full of failures as well as successes.”

They identify four situations in which guerrillas have succeeded in toppling the established authorities. These are:

- Where the incumbent power, weakened by war and disillusioned in its mission, gives up the battle for a *trans-maritime* possession rather than face international disapproval and escalating expenditures. Examples include Britain in Ireland after World War I, France in Indo-China, Algeria after World War II and, with qualification, Portugal in Africa.
- Where local guerrilla or partisan forces are supported by a powerful regular army. Examples embrace Spanish guerrillas in cooperation with Wellington’s British army against Napoleon, support of the Red Army for Tito’s partisans against the Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia, and reinforcement of Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam by North Vietnamese soldiers.
- Societies in which the ruling class is “divided, dispirited or corrupt,” as appeared to be the case in

South Vietnam. Here penetration of the “coercive machinery of the state” by revolutionaries is of vital importance.

- Situations where the ruling class, though militarily efficient and politically resolute, is “excessively weak” numerically. UDI-Rhodesia, which survived for 14 years despite international sanctions, is the obvious example.

None of these situations, including the apparently analogous Rhodesian case, apply to South Africa, the authors contend.

The South Africans are in a much stronger position (than the Rhodesians). South Africa’s white population outnumbers Zimbabwe’s nearly 20 times. South Africa’s frontiers are defensible much more easily than Rhodesia’s ...

The country’s physical size would pose enormous logistic problems for the guerrillas, while government forces could rely on an excellent system of roads and airfields.

In spite of these advantages, however, South Africa should brace itself for urban terror, including assassinations, attacks on whites at random and detonation of bombs in crowded public places.

But experience in Kenya, Ulster, Lebanon and Israel suggests that “terror pays only temporary dividends and that ordinary men and women can adjust to perils with astonishing resilience.”

The authors do not rule out the possibility of convergent guerrilla raids from neighbouring states, but counter that Israel has shown that similar raids from neighbouring Arab states are of limited efficacy.

South African resources are much greater than Israel’s and its geographical size is almost 60 times greater. Hence South Africa can rely up on defence in depth in a manner unthinkable to the Israelis.

(This review by Patrick Laurence appeared in the Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail* on 10 March 1981.)