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Towards a more dynamic and stable economic relationship between Mozambique and South Africa

Dr Prakash Ratilal, Co-ordinator of Mozambique's National Executive Commission for the Emergency, comments on the possibilities for greater co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique.

A wind of change is blowing through every continent. The ending of the Cold War and of regional conflicts, and the beginning of a new era of bilateral and multilateral contact and co-operation are manifestations of a climate in which tension is easing and dialogue and understanding between the super-powers and the military blocs are becoming ever more prominent.

The values of peace, democracy and development are spreading throughout domestic and international societies and economies. Today the world is characterized increasingly by globalization and interdependence in economic and financial relations and by the continuing expansion of technology and of information and communications systems on a worldwide scale. Co-operation is consistently replacing confrontation.

The winds of progress are also blowing towards peace and democratization in Southern Africa. These are times of great hope — the end of colonialism in Namibia is at hand, there are prospects for broad democratization in South Africa, there is progress in various processes of reconciliation and national harmonization, especially in Angola and Mozambique, and there is a growing awareness of the need to respect the norms of peaceful coexistence among the states of the region.

Experience of international relations bears out the fact that differences in political, ideological, economic and social ideas do not nullify links, geographic continuity or contiguity, nor do they impose conditions on relationships or upon the enlargement of economic and commercial ties.

Each of the region's economies is facing its own particular difficulties. They are affected by the instability prevailing in the whole region and by the negative effects of deteriorating international terms of trade, rising interest rates, diminishing international credit, spiralling inflation and growing external debt. In the face of modest economic performance, solutions must be found to promote higher rates of economic growth and development and stable and varied economic cooperation.

Southern Africa's potential is well known. All the countries of the subcontinent possess immense resources of interest not only to the region but also to the world economy. There is a major contradiction, however, between the scale of those fabulous natural resources and the condition of regional under-development which has prevailed for centuries.

Southern Africa as a whole occupies an important geostrategic position and enjoys potential access to a vast market for exports vital to the world economy. The viable exploitation of its resources is of interest to many countries.

The immense mineral resources and the strategic sea route round the southern tip of the African continent could contribute even more towards stimulating international economic relations and making them more balanced. The capacities and resources available in each country could be applied to great advantage in a variety of viable economic activities in association with resources available in third countries.

Changes in the geopolitics of the region which occurred after the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe brought about profound changes in economic and commercial relations in the region. The establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) provides a broad economic framework for the extension of regional co-operation to benefit its nine member

countries. The SADCC promotes effective and realistic interdependence among the region's economies. The successes achieved are already visible, particularly in the rehabilitation and operation of its rail and port systems, three of which are in Mozambican territory — the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala Corridors. There has been broad participation and investment in the Mozambican corridors by a number of countries, notably Canada, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, Holland and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as other European Community countries, the United States and Japan. These investments are contributing towards the growing interdependence of the economies of the SADCC's members. A fourth corridor, which could be called the "Nkomati Corridor", linking Komatipoort and Ressano Garcia to Maputo is arousing enormous interest in business circles and on the part of the authorities in Mozambique and South Africa.

Mozambique and South Africa have had economic and commercial relations for several decades. These relations were seriously strained by the prevailing climate of instability in the region resulting from destabilization. This policy caused death and the destruction of infrastructure on a massive scale in Mozambique and other SADCC countries. The promotion of economic, trade and investment relations among the countries of Southern Africa, and particularly with South Africa, demands the indispensable prerequisites for stable, long term relations — good neighbourliness, security and stability in interstate relations.

Full implementation of the Nkomati Accord is, without a doubt, the only adequate alternative. This would constitute a strategic contribution to further improvement in trade and the promotion of investment among economic agencies in Mozambique and South Africa, based on equality, long-term prospects and the reciprocity of benefits.

In order to overcome its underdevelopment, Mozambique is co-operating with all the countries of the region and with those of other continents, regardless of their economic and social systems, on the basis of respect and noninterference in the internal affairs of each country and of mutual benefits,

The leader of the National Party, now President of South Africa, F W de Klerk, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, in Maputo, July 1989

taking into account the different levels of economic development.

The promotion of bilateral and regional co-operation implies the definition of projects and programmes for the correct use and exploitation of existing resources and a clear and consistent strategy aimed at complementary economic interdependence among the various countries.

The Mozambican government's promotion of economic, technical and scientific exchange and its encouragement of foreign investment and trade with other parts of the world is well known.

Mozambique itself has enormous potential, which has been exploited through bilateral agreements or with third countries, particularly in agriculture, cattle farming, fisheries, forestry, prospecting and production of gold, coal, oil, gas and other minerals, and the development of tourism.

The country's varied climate provides agriculture with the opportunity to produce both for export and the domestic market throughout the year. This is the case with cotton, sisal, sugar, rice, maize, soya beans, oil seeds and tobacco. Two new dams recently completed in Maputo province, close to the border with South Africa, provide excellent opportunities for investment in

agriculture, since the area to be irrigated covers 70 thousand hectares.

In this context, the development of farming enterprises, cattle ranching, agribusinesses and other light industries has also been regarded as a priority by foreign corporations, through direct investment or in association with local companies.

Projects in the chemical, engineering, metallurgical and construction industries are under study or are at the implementation phase in order to utilize the resources that exist, including iron, bauxite, coal, hydroelectric power, natural gas and construction materials.

Several foreign firms have established enterprises in the service sector, particularly in fields related to international trade and to port and other shipping activities.

There are several other areas in which concrete action has taken place both in terms of private investment and of joint ventures in association with Mozambican firms. Direct investment, participation in joint ventures or financing for productive enterprises have come from firms in many countries, notably Japan, Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, the USA, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, under the terms of an attractive investment law passed by the Mozambican Government.

In this context, the undertakings must be viable, they must generate wealth, transfer technology, train Mozambicans, produce enough to break even and earn sufficient foreign exchange to allow for the repayment of external borrowing and the transfer of profits and dividends.

In order to promote economic recovery and development, Mozambique's economic relations with countries throughout the world are growing in a variety of ways. These relations also play an important role in bringing benefits to the countries of Southern Africa. Among its most important economic partners are the Scandinavian countries, Italy, France, Holland, Great Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union. In the context of its Economic Recovery Programme being implemented with support from the IMF and the World Bank, Mozambique is receiving substantial foreign aid, with contributions from different countries and international and non-governmental organizations in the form of grants, concessionary loans and bank credit. Despite continuing destabilization and other exogenous factors, Mozambique's GDP grew by 4 per cent in 1987 and by 4,6 per cent in 1988, a trend that is forecast to continue this year.

South Africa could participate in this growth and in the economic recovery and development of Mozambique. This was one of the aims of the Nkomati Accord. Stability, tranquillity and co-operation are as important to Mozambique as they are to South Africa. Financial, material and technological resources could be channelled into production in the sectors already mentioned, which are being developed to the mutual benefit of various countries and several international organizations such as the World Bank, the IDA, the Lomé Convention and the banking community.

The development of activities aimed at ensuring complementary economic relations should consolidate peace, promote development, increase trade relations and provide incentives for investment. One of the aims of the Nkomati Accord is precisely to increase the complementary nature of relations between neighbouring states, seek economic interdependence and provide mutual benefits. This interdependence would also help towards strengthening good neighbourliness between the two countries.

Despite some critical moments, representatives of the two governments remain open and ready for the chance to seek secure paths that will facilitate economic and technical co-operation to serve both their countries and the Southern African region as a whole.

The Songo meeting between the presidents of South Africa and Mozambique in September last year marks this new phase. The spirit of the Nkomati Accord was revived. In order to strengthen it through practical action, the Security Commission was revitalized and a Commission on Economic Co-operation was created, both of which have been meeting regularly, with exciting prospects for the future.

Among work already undertaken, the recent agreement on preferential customs tariffs between the two countries, an agreement on fisheries and the implementation of plans to rehabilitate the transmission lines from Cahora Bassa are notable. Several South African companies — such as Anglo American, Manica Freight Services, South African Transport Services, Eskom, Premier Milling and Barlow Rand — are in contact with Mozambican bodies with the aim of restarting or expanding their activities in Mozambique. At the same time, a growing number of Mozambicans is being recruited to work in the mines, farms and factories in South Africa. Contacts are growing for greater use of Maputo port and to stabilize the road and rail links between Komatipoort and Maputo.

In this context, the business community, intellectuals, politicians, diplomats and academics should play an active part to bring an effective end to terrorism in Mozambique, with the aim of consolidating and broadening understanding and strengthening economic and trade relations, in order to share in the benefits of Mozambique's economic potential and the prospective opening towards greater bilateral co-operation across the whole of Southern Africa.

By helping to remove destabilization activities effectively, the business community will help to make co-operation viable, and will be able to draw benefit and advantage from it.

By establishing a democracy that respects the principle of equal rights for all South Africans and acting within the principles of the coexistence of states, South Africa could play an active role in further developing interdependence and complementary economies in the whole of Southern Africa.

The scenario that we would like to see in our region in the future depends in the last analysis on South Africans, on Mozambicans, it depends on each country and on the decisions of each of the peoples of the region. The future of the region depends above all on the decisions of all the states in the region.

The promotion of development, stable co-operation and harmonious progress is possible with peace, tranquillity and interdependence. Economic relations should be conceived to promote equality among nations and among people and should at the same time build and consolidate peace among countries.

Peace and understanding in the region necessarily go hand in hand with the balanced, just and equitable development of all its constituent states.

South Africa and black Africa

On 10 August 1989 the Africa Institute presented a seminar in Pretoria, to coincide with its Annual General Meeting, on the theme "South Africa, black Africa and the West". The Chairman of the Institute's Council, Prof P Smit, presented a paper sketching the evolution of South Africa's relations with Black Africa and the new pattern of intra-regional relations emerging in Southern Africa, and outlining a strategy to promote constructive interaction between South Africa and the rest of the continent.

An opportune time for pondering South Africa's stance

South Africa is today undergoing change both at home and in its relations with the outside world. New vistas on relations with the rest of Africa in particular have been opened up by the tripartite accord on southwestern Africa signed in New York last December. Most analyses of major trends in Southern Africa made prior to that event look somewhat off-beam and dated today.[1]

A multitude of political, economic, military and other factors, both domestic and international, are responsible for the fluid situation facing South Africa at present. However, underlying everything is a new sense of realism. This applies to South Africa's perception of the threat to its security posed by the Soviet Union, as well as to the latter's realization that it has overextended itself in Africa. Likewise, South Africa, no less than other African states, has become painfully aware of the constraints which limited resources impose on any country's freedom of choice. Africa and the outside world, in turn, have begun to appreciate South Africa's resourcefulness and resilience.

If South Africans are to make the most of the opportunities proffered by this new situation, they must dispassionately assess the internal and external forces affecting their country, no less than the available means and the options realistically open to them.

South Africa coming to terms with Africa

It is not by chance that the dismantling of the apartheid policy at home coincides with the emergence of a new relationship between South Africa and the rest of the continent. While apartheid had been white South Africa's attempt to shield itself against the African reality within its own borders, its Africa policies were aimed at establishing a regional environment consonant with its perceived security requirements — "making Africa safe for apartheid", as Sam Nolutshungu bitingly called it.[2]

During the 1950s, Dr D F Malan had expressed a widely held South African viewpoint when he opposed as premature Britain's decision to grant independence to its African territories. His African Charter (conceived in the 1940s) essentially sought to prolong Western control over Africa through the colonial powers acting in conjunction with South Africa.[3]

However, the principle of ultimate independence for the peoples of Africa was never at issue for South Africa, and successive governments emphasized the country's desire to promote Africa's development. Nevertheless, the attitude of the independent African countries was generally hostile and confrontational. Many South Africans ascribe this hostility to their country's racial policies only. It is important, however, to understand that the external manifestations of South African domestic policy, too, have significantly fomented this hostility. South Africa's behaviour convinced African leaders that it was motivated by racist arrogance and the desire to perpetuate white rule in Africa at any cost. Thus:

- South Africa turned down the invitation to the first Conference of Independent African States in Accra in 1958 on the grounds that colonial powers like Britain and France should also have been invited;[4]
- South Africa decided not to participate in the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 1959;[5]
- in 1962, when the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa offered to visit South Africa and exchange ambassadors, he was considered "presumptuous";[6]
- when just prior to Zambia's independence in 1964 Dr Kaunda indicated his willingness to establish diplomatic links with South Africa, the response was negative;[7]
- in 1967 Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller stated that Lesotho's wish for diplomatic relations could not be

granted and that modern air and telephone links provided adequate means of communication;[8]
- South Africa missed an important opportunity when it failed to respond to the positive messages contained in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969;[9]
- by actively assisting Portugal and Rhodesia against African liberation movements, South Africa confirmed African leaders in their conviction that it was "supporting White supremacy outside its own borders purely on the grounds of race."[10]

The enumeration of these unfortunate decisions serves, firstly, to explain Africa's hostility towards South Africa and, secondly, to highlight the extent to which South African thinking about Africa has changed in the recent past. It also helps us to understand why African hostility became so intense that Prime Minister Vorster's so-called outward movement (1967–1970) and détente policy (1974–1975) failed to achieve meaningful results other than the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi in 1967.

In recent years, however, South Africa, no less than the rest of Africa, has found itself compelled to revise firmly entrenched viewpoints. To name but a few:
- The African states came to realize that neither international isolation and punitive economic measures nor domestic black unrest would lead to the collapse of South Africa's established order.
- At the same time, most of these states became increasingly distracted by their own growing economic and social predicament, while simultaneously acknowledging the failure of SADCC to diminish the economic dependence of neighbouring states on South Africa.
- Harsh experience has increasingly disillusioned African countries with socialism as a guide to economic progress, and is compelling ever more of them to implement the market-oriented, though politically hazardous, remedies prescribed by the IMF and World Bank.
- In view of their growing predicament, more and more African leaders have swallowed their principles and ignored the OAU's injunctions by establishing trade and aid relationships with South Africa.

South Africa's position is not entirely dissimilar:
- Pressing socio-economic and socio-political demands at home, accompanied by growing financial stringency and international pressures, have compelled the country to reconsider many entrenched positions. The following are cases in point:
  ● South Africa's agreement to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 (1978) providing for Namibian independence;
  ● the acknowledged urgency of entering into talks with all relevant internal groupings about South Africa's future political order;
  ● the awareness that it is not in South Africa's interest if it is universally believed to be pursuing a policy of deliberately destabilizing and impoverishing its neighbours.

- Also in recent years, more and more South Africans have come to accept:
  ● that relations with neighbouring countries are a crucial factor bearing on South Africa's international standing;
  ● that harmonious relations with the SADCC are preferable to a hostile stance;
  ● that black Africa is important as a trading partner and — in view of international trade boycotts — as a conduit for South Africa's overseas trade;
  ● that the ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism on the part of states like Mozambique, Angola or Congo is not nearly as strong as had been assumed and is, in any event, being whittled away by economic realities.

The economic pressures exerted by Western countries, together with the opportunism and duplicity often displayed by representatives of these countries *vis-à-vis* South Africa, have no doubt played a major role in orientating South Africa towards Africa.

The upshot of all these developments is that South Africans are increasingly realizing how closely their own destinies are linked to those of black Africa. Paternalism and unconcern are increasingly being superseded by empathy for the people of Africa in general and a sense of responsibility and commitment with regard to the destiny of Southern Africa in particular.

A new pattern of intra-regional relations in Southern Africa

The negotiations between South Africa, Angola and Cuba on southwestern Africa and their culmination in the New York agreement of 22 December 1988 were a watershed in South Africa's relations with its neighbours. Not only these neighbours but also serious observers elsewhere began to reassess the accepted view of South Africa as the unscrupulous regional bully.

In the eyes of the world the signing of the Nkomati Accord of March 1984 had strengthened rather than changed that unpleasant image because Mozambique was generally perceived as a defenceless country giving in to the machinations of a ruthless and militarily superior power.

In a recent talk, South African Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Mr Neil van Heerden has stated that, "For various reasons our credibility had been all but destroyed resulting in a great deal of mutual suspicion between our neighbours and ourselves on the subcontinent."[11] It had been almost universally assumed that South Africa was determined to maintain its control over South West Africa at practically any price. The overturning of this long established assumption was bound to enhance South Africa's credibility. In the eyes of its neighbours in particular, South African declarations of goodwill and its readiness to promote peace and prosperity in the region suddenly appeared in a new light.

This new perception was strengthened by South Africa's scrupulous observance of the New York agreement, which was further highlighted by Swapo's generally censured breach of its undertakings in the form of an armed invasion on 1 April this year.

The New York agreement on the implementation of Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola has notably improved the circumstances for seeking a settlement between the MPLA government in Luanda and the Unita movement. Efforts in this direction initiated in 1988, culminated in the Gbadolite meeting of 18 African heads of state on 22 June 1989, when President Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi shook hands and undertook to negotiate for peace.

It is still early days in the quest for an end to the Angolan civil war. What gives

hope, however, is that many outside forces have a strong interest in a successful and speedy outcome. Foremost among these are Zaire and Zambia, who are anxious to have the Benguela railway line reopened. For both countries, and also for the Congo and Gabon as well as more distant African countries, peace in the region is a precondition for foreign investment and economic progress. Powerful Western mining interests envisage major projects in Angola and Zaire once stability returns. South Africa as well as the two superpowers have already demonstrated their earnest desire for a settlement.

Whereas South Africa has given proof of its *bona fides* over the SWA/Namibia issue, the world has yet to be convinced that South Africa is no longer aiding or at least abetting Renamo. In the eyes of the world, Mozambique is the critical outstanding test of South Africa's credibility in regional affairs. To quote Van Heerden once more:

> As a regional power South Africa must be seen to be constructively assisting the finding of a peaceful solution to the human tragedy on its Eastern flank. If we are not actively engaged in this process we will be viewed as giving our tacit consent to the ongoing turmoil and strife ... once again our credibility is at stake.[12]

There have been increasing signs in recent weeks that the Frelimo government and Renamo are inching towards negotiations and it is clear that South Africa as well as the United States and Portugal are actively promoting this process. The visit of Ministers F W de Klerk and Pik Botha to Maputo on 19 July this year obviously was part of South Africa's efforts in this regard.

For South Africa, not only its credibility but also its morality and sense of decency are at stake in Mozambique. Substantial actual and potential economic interests are at issue as well.

Maputo is the natural outlet to the sea for the southern and northern Transvaal. As yet, Mozambique's mineral and other natural resources are barely explored, and offer a natural field of activity for South African business and financial interests. Given the three major transit routes to Maputo, Beira and Nacala, peace and stability in Mozambique would immediately have a beneficial impact on the economies of Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia and

Mr F W de Klerk's meeting with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in August this year precipitated a political drama in South Africa and the resignation of President P W Botha

Malawi. Prospects for attracting overseas investors to the region would improve. And all this would create greater opportunities not only for the sale of South African goods and services but would generally stimulate intra- as well as extra-regional exchange.

With the partial exception of Botswana, South Africa's neighbours are also afflicted by the same economic and other predicaments as the rest of black Africa — explosive population growth, mounting unemployment, falling per capita incomes and food production, declining standards of health and other social services, growing foreign indebtedness and lack of foreign exchange, and so forth.

Increasingly, it is being acknowledged that the countries of the SADCC — except Angola and Tanzania — have no chance to reduce significantly their economic linkage with South Africa. As a recent publication by *The Economist Intelligence Unit* observes on the SADCC, "Essentially it does little more than coordinate the presentation to donors of projects, most of them national, a few serving a group of member countries."[13] The study concludes that, "There are no low cost, short term options beyond mere exhortation to promote reduced trade or migrant labour interdependence with South Africa."[14]

The neighbouring countries tacitly acknowledge this vital interdependence by either warning against sanctions on South Africa or at least not seeking them, with the exception of Zimbabwe and Zambia whose advocacy is, however, patently only rhetorical. Whatever misgivings they might harbour against South Africa, all the governments of neighbouring countries, again excluding Zimbabwe, are maintaining open lines of communication with the South African authorities. Yet even Mr Mugabe may be mellowing slightly, because in an interview given in Paris on 12 July this year, he conceded for the first time ever that South Africa's domestic policy had changed in the recent past.[15] He had also reacted favourably to the meeting between President Botha and Mr Nelson Mandela a few days earlier.

A clear indication of African states' growing readiness to associate more openly with South Africa, was the visit of the Zairean foreign minister, Mr Karl-i-Bond, to Pretoria early in June 1989; the meeting of Presidents Chissano and P W Botha at Songo in September 1988; the visits of P W Botha to Côte d'Ivoire and Zaire a few weeks later; and his amiable exchanges with the heads of state of Togo and Niger when they met at the funeral of Bavarian Prime Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss in

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October 1988. South African Airways is landing in Abidjan, Cairo and Kinshasa; South Africa has trade missions in seven African countries and representatives in several others.

At the time of writing, there is speculation that only Zimbabwe is still resisting South Africa's proposal for a regional conference of Southern African states.[16] Such a conference, with South African participation, would herald the beginning of a new era in the history of the region and, indeed, of modern Africa.

Mr Herman Cohen, the Bush Administration's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, alluded to these possibilities in the course of his interview on *Worldnet* on 22 June 1989, when he referred to "some interesting conversations with southern African leaders such as President Chissano" who told him that "if South Africa fulfills its responsibilities under U.N. Resolution 435, and brings Namibia to independence, . . . then all sorts of agreements with South Africa are possible, in the area of regional cooperation."[17] Mr Cohen added: "I think things are coming together very nicely and South Africa's expertise is needed in the region."[18] He went on to instance the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the Sua Pan soda ash project in Botswana, and joint transport projects in Mozambique.

It is becoming a truism that Southern Africa has no chance of a stable and prosperous future unless stability and prosperity prevail in South Africa and there is harmonious intra-regional interchange at all levels. No doubt, the time has come, or is at least close at hand, for South Africans to give more substance to the responsible role of the leading regional power which they have claimed for more than four decades.

South Africa's strategy for regional development

Regional economic groupings have for long been viewed as an essential precondition for the development of Africa's generally small and fragile economies. The almost endless list of African regional schemes that have failed, or never even got off the ground, leaves no doubt that groupings which entail a notable curtailment of national sovereignty

cannot possibly function in Africa at the present stage of economic and political development. Yet even today the concept of a common market, modelled on the European Community, and encompassing South Africa and its neighbours, is still favoured by many in South Africa.

The reasons why this is unrealistic cannot be elaborated in the present context. However, a brief glance at the serious — and still growing — economic imbalance between the RSA on the one hand and the former homelands on the other, suffices to indicate the immense difficulties facing underdeveloped and unsophisticated economies which have to compete for investments and skills with a vastly more advanced economy. Even today, South Africa is often accused of hampering the economic development of its neighbours. In a fully integrated regional market, this would in fact be inevitable given these countries' present unequal stages of development.

It should be obvious that instead of striving for an integrated regional market, Southern Africa should first concentrate on ways and means of dealing with common problems and on efforts to economize on human, financial and other resources. The workings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development should be carefully studied, and there is a great deal in the original conception of the SADCC which could be utilized for a more comprehensive regional design for Southern Africa.

Much pertinent experience has, of course, already been gained through bodies such as Sarccus (The Southern African Regional Council for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil), the Southern African Tourism Council (Sartoc) and especially Secosaf — the Secretariat for Multilateral Cooperation in Southern Africa, in which the RSA and the TBVC countries are joined.

Given South Africa's enormous socio-economic and socio-political tasks at home and the limited resources at its disposal, it clearly cannot spare for the rest of the region anything like the vast resources of finance and manpower being dispensed by the World Bank or the European Community. Its contribution must principally lie in the promotion of commercial exchanges between itself and African countries. Trade,

investment, loan capital, tourism, intra-regional power, transport and telecommunications schemes, joint research and training projects are in operation even now, but could be expanded, especially projects which rely on exchanges of technology rather than on large amounts of money or man-hours.

Naturally, this does not preclude aid schemes such as those already being provided by South Africa in several African countries in respect of health, housing, training, and animal husbandry.

South Africa cannot be realistically expected to uplift the whole region singlehanded. It can merely help to create a favourable "climate" and opportunities which, however, must be utilized first of all by the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries themselves, but also by outside business and public organizations.

Given the long-standing interests in Southern Africa of powers such as Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal, as well as the more recent involvement of Italy, France, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, and given also the generally disappointing results of Western aid efforts throughout Africa, sound economic considerations clearly demand that the European Community reconsider its approach to South and Southern Africa if it seriously seeks to promote the material well-being of the region.

First of all this would entail that the EC recognizes the crucial role of South Africa as the regional engine of growth, and, secondly, that instead of boycotting South Africa and actively discouraging economic interaction between South Africa and its neighbours, the EC should encourage such interaction.

South African government spokesmen have, accordingly, begun to propagate the concept of positive Western participation in the form of trilateral regional cooperation, that is, joint endeavours by European countries, South Africa and the other countries of Southern Africa in order to stabilize and develop the economies of the region.

Needless to say, such a far-reaching re-orientation on the part of Western European countries is unlikely, at least until such time as South Africa can convince them that it is irrevocably moving towards a non-racial and democratic political order.

In the meantime, South Africans must strive to formulate imaginative concepts to guide them in planning for their country's growing participation in regional affairs.

Approached in the right spirit, their active participation in uplifting the countries of Southern Africa will help to restore to South Africans a sense of direction and a feeling of security which so many of them are lacking at present.

References

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4 Ariston Chambati, "South Africa in African politics", in Denis Venter (ed), *South Africa and the world: political and strategic realities*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1976, pp 10–11.

5 Sam C Nolutshungu, *op cit*, p 79.

6 Ariston Chambati, *op cit*, p 11.

7 *Ibid*.

8 G C Olivier, *op cit*, pp 147–148.

9 See Denis Venter, "Black Africa and the apartheid issue: A South African response", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol 1, no 1, October 1981, pp 89 *et seq*.

10 Ariston Chambati, *op cit*, p 23.

11 N P van Heerden, "Address at the Business Achievement Award Banquet", Sandton, 19 June 1989, (roneo) p 8.

12 *Ibid*, pp 8–9.

13 Roger Martin, *op cit*, p 118.

14 *Ibid*, p 125.

15 *The Star*, 13 July 1989, p 6.

16 *Business Day*, 13 July 1989, p 1.

17 US Information Service, "Cohen discusses U.S. Southern Africa policy", undated press release, p 3.

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British policies towards South Africa: The regional context

Dr Simon Baynham, Senior Researcher at the Africa Institute, presented this paper at the Institute's Annual General Meeting on 10 August 1989. He places relations between Britain and South Africa in their regional context and speculates on the options open to both parties in the wake of the general election.

Introduction: the international setting

It is axiomatic that a nation's foreign policy will be influenced in part by domestic political considerations and trends. The Republic of South Africa, however, is confronted with the dilemma that its own internal arrangements are invariably viewed as the crucial determinant in the foreign policy responses of international state and non-state actors. Such a perspective has been crystal clear in the virtually universal condemnation of apartheid dating from the early 1960s and in the exchange of well-established but increasingly sterile arguments about the merits and demerits of economic and other sanctions. Thus, in the wake of decolonization, the seemingly intractable problems of South Africa and the subcontinent are high on the agenda of national and world debate, dividing legislatures and intergovernmental organizations and alliances alike.

Yet for some observers the question of why a region of apparently second-rank importance (Southern Africa) should attract as much or more attention as a region of first-rank interest (the Middle East) remains both a puzzle and a fascinating subject for speculation. As a recent report published by the *Economist Intelligence Unit* notes, the subcontinent is of some, though limited,

significance in economic and geopolitical terms:[1]
- its total area is roughly that of Australia;
- its population of 100 million puts it in the same league as Bangladesh or Nigeria;
- the value of the region's international trade is about $40–45 billion (ranking with Brazil, China or Singapore) in a global total of $5 000 billion;
- its total GDP is roughly on a par with that of Argentina, Belgium or Sweden, about half that of Brazil and only 3,5 percent of the USA's;
- and, finally, the combined active armed forces of the region marginally outnumber those of Thailand and in number are equal to only a quarter of Vietnam's.

But for all of the above, the subcontinent "consistently attracts a higher level of attention from the international community than any other Third World area except the Middle East. The reasons are complex, and owe more to politics than to economics."[2]

The politics of course, are rooted in the RSA's domestic condition and constitution and in the "spill-over" effect of internal developments in the region. Thus, while South Africa's 470 000 square miles of territory may appear at first glance to merit merely second-tier status in world terms, in fact the country

has had a profound and abiding impact on the continent it occupies with fifty or so other states — especially those in Southern Africa.

Both economically and in military terms, South Africa is the giant — and to many the ogre — of Africa, its heartbeat and footsteps reverberating across the continent's land-mass. It is not my intention now to provide an exhaustive profile of this dominance; for the present a few facts and figures will suffice.

Militarily, the Republic's Defence Force is by far the most powerful in the region, not so much numerically but in terms of effectiveness, experience and operational serviceability. And this is despite the UN arms embargo which has had the unintentional consequence of making South Africa largely self-reliant in armaments procurement — an impressive, though costly, achievement from a technological and logistical standpoint.

South Africa's regional dominance, *economically*, is illustrated by a few choice statistics:
- Botswana is dependent upon South Africa for 90 per cent of its transportation requirements, 40 per cent of its electricity and all of its oil;
- Malawi relies on South Africa for 40 per cent of its imports;
- Zaire ships more than two-fifths of its mineral exports through the Republic;

- some two-thirds of Zambia's imports and a third of its exports are routed through South Africa;
- Lesotho is completely dependent on South Africa for transport, marketing and electricity, and remittances from Basotho miners in South Africa account for half of its GNP;
- South Africa is Zimbabwe's major trading partner; and
- 90 per cent of Swaziland's imports and 20 per cent of its exports are shipped via South Africa.

More widely, South Africa produces 40 per cent of Africa's manufactured exports, generates 70 per cent of the continent's electricity and transports three-quarters of Africa's railed goods.

For all these reasons — and because the RSA's influence has been intimately associated with the security situation in especially Angola, Namibia and Mozambique — South Africa has warranted more than casual attention in the chanceries of the West and, mainly for historical reasons, nowhere more so than in Britain.

British interests in Southern Africa

By virtue of its long-standing association with South Africa, the United Kingdom has interests in, and connections with, the Republic and the subcontinent which exceed those of any other state in the international community. These links can be traced back to the colonial era and to the imperial and Commonwealth ties which continued after South Africa effectively gained its independence from Britain in 1910. At that time, the UK's interests included: firstly, those Britons who remained in South Africa (together with the "kith and kin" blood ties associated with those families); secondly, Britain's trade and investment in the territory — which began with commitments forged during the development of the gold and diamond mining industries in the nineteenth century; and thirdly, the value of the Union as an ally in the First and Second World Wars.

Relations with South Africa did not immediately alter with the National Party's electoral victory in 1948 but rather after international opposition to apartheid gathered momentum following Macmillan's "Winds of change"

Mr F W de Klerk's visit to 10 Downing Street led to a great deal of speculation about the future relationship between the British and South African governments

speech in Cape Town and the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, and South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961.

More recently — and especially since the September 1984 inauguration of a tricameral legislature (which, by incorporating coloureds and Indians whilst excluding blacks, precipitated an explosion of violence in the Vaal Triangle and an unprecedented security clampdown culminating in the national Sate of Emergency since 12 June 1986)[3] — the threat and reality of sanctions against Pretoria has placed Britain under considerable pressure to follow suit.

Throughout these years the policy options open to Whitehall have been narrow and unpalatable. They have also been complicated by competing interests and objectives elsewhere in Africa and further afield. As a leading member of a 49-member multiracial Commonwealth, which embraces a quarter of the

world's population, and one of the big four in the European Community, the United Kingdom is constantly and unavoidably in the international firing line. Before dealing with London's current response to this dilemma, however, a more detailed assessment of British concerns in the region is required.

British interests in South Africa and the subcontinent have not, of course, remained static. They have been shaped by a changing cocktail of domestic, trading and strategic ingredients. The relative salience of these components have changed over time. Nevertheless, these can be distilled into four overlapping elements:

- firstly, where it concerns British passport holders;
- secondly, in the fields of investment and trade;
- thirdly, with regard to South Africa's military importance to Britain and her allies; and

– fourthly, with reference to the Republic's strategic — as opposed to purely economic — mineral significance to the United Kingdom.

I intend to deal with each of these four issues in turn.

UK passport holders

The first of these issues is relatively easy to explain. There are roughly 750 000 South Africans who hold, or who are entitled to hold, UK passports. There are also approximately 80 000 British citizens in Zimbabwe and another 30 000 in Zambia. In one major sense, these passport holders constitute the biggest single issue confronting any British government. To put it bluntly, Whitehall has a nightmare vision that one day these people could arrive at Heathrow airport on a one-way ticket, with a suitcase in one hand and precious little in the other. When one remembers that on 1 July this year Sir Geoffrey Howe was handed a petition which urged Britain to grant over 3 million Hong Kong people the right of residence in the UK as 1997 looms on the horizon, the immensity of this issue is not difficult to understand. "The South African Britons do not directly influence British policy towards South Africa, but do so indirectly by contributing, through their contacts in the UK, both to a pro-white South African lobby, and to a high level of popular and media interest in South Africa (which cuts both ways)."[4] The impact of these passport holders on current British policy (and the same goes for Portugal) has been summarized by one British diplomat who served in Harare as follows: ". . . in South Africa the major British and Portuguese interest in respect of their citizens is that political change should not take so traumatic a form as to provoke a massive influx of possibly destitute and almost certainly indigestible refugees."[5]

Investment and trade

With regard to the second of the UK's broad interests in South Africa — investment and trade — the first point to stress is that South Africa is far more dependent on Britain than Britain is on the Republic. South Africa traditionally looked to London as its chief market and source of supply, whereas for Britain South Africa was, and is, only one market for its goods and investments.

Before the Second World War, the UK provided almost half of South Africa's imports. In 1964, Britain's exports to South Africa constituted only a twentieth of her total exports, while representing a third of the total value of the RSA's imports. By 1976, the UK's market share of South African imports had declined to 17,6 per cent.[6]

Today, the Republic is only the seventeenth largest market for British exports, although Britain is South Africa's third largest supplier of imports after the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA.[7] This decline in market share is fairly easily explained, but it has arisen largely because of Britain's membership of the European Community, which has diverted goods away from the RSA into Europe and led to concerted efforts on the part of South Africa to widen the pattern of its supply of goods and services, particularly with West Germany and the USA.[8] Pretoria has also diversified its trade outlets. Thus, in 1970, 29 per cent of South Africa's non-gold exports went to the UK whereas by 1985 this had declined to 6 per cent.

British investments in South Africa have also declined as a proportion of total foreign investment. In 1965, over 60 per cent of foreign investment came from Britain; by 1975, this had fallen to around 40 per cent. However, direct British investment in the Republic only generated some 5 per cent of the UK's total invisible earnings in 1978. Given the decline of the South African economy during the past decade, both these figures are likely to be smaller today. Nevertheless, most estimates put the current value of British investments in South Africa at around £6 billion (R27 billion).

While Britain's trading relations with South Africa have declined in relative terms, in the rest of Africa trade has been on the increase, with exports to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) countries exceeding those to South Africa. However last year (1988), the RSA was far and away the UK's biggest trading partner in Africa, with exports and imports up in spite of the sanctions climate.

In its recently released report for 1988, the London Chamber of Commerce reveals that UK exports to South Africa rose 13,2 per cent to £1,07 billion (R4,8 billion). That put South Africa in the top slot with a figure of more than 2,5

times that of its nearest rival, Nigeria (£391 million). UK imports from the RSA were also higher, up 22,7 per cent to £808 million, producing a trade surplus for London of £262 million.[9] Nevertheless, the danger for Britain of black African retaliation for too close an association with the Republic is ever present. For instance, in 1979 Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum, ostensibly because a tanker chartered by the company, but South African-owned, had called at a Nigerian port. British policy towards the RSA can not, therefore, be divorced from London's other international trading commitments — especially those with the Commonwealth countries. However, it should be said that Nigeria's economic position has weakened appreciably in the past decade, not to mention that of the rest of Africa.

Military and strategic considerations

During the 1950s and the 1960s, South Africa was viewed by Britain as an important link in its chain of defence for the East of Suez role and as a bastion for the defence of the sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope. Without the use of South African port facilities, British capacity to deploy effectively East of Suez was seen as likely to be undermined. These perceptions were given expression in the Simonstown Agreement of 1955 — which was not, of course, a formal defensive alliance and ruled out any obligation by Britain to support South Africa should it be involved in defending itself from external military attack.

However the growing clamour of international hostility to naval co-operation,[10] together with London's virtual abandonment of an East of Suez role and growing doubts about the value of defending the Cape Route, led to Harold Wilson's Labour government unilaterally terminating the Agreement in 1975, four years before Mrs Thatcher came to office. And two years later, in October 1977, the UN Security Council passed a mandatory arms embargo on the RSA. This effectively prevented any future British Conservative administration — all of them in the event headed by Margaret Thatcher — from resuming arms supplies to the country.

In the past at least, Pretoria placed great emphasis on its value to the free world as a shipping route, stressing that

65 per cent of Western Europe's oil comes around the Cape of Good Hope. Until the mid-1970s this particular argument reinforced those who upheld the value of defending the Cape Route against possible Soviet attack (2 300 vessels pass around the Cape every month). However, the discovery of North Sea oil and growing doubts that the USSR could either choose South African waters rather than the Straits of Hormuz or another point off the African coast for an interdiction of shipping, or launch what would amount to a naval attack on the West at such a distance from the Soviet Union, undermined the British case for defending the Cape Route.

Pretoria, for its part, emphasized the threat posed to African governments and Western shipping by an increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean. Military chiefs in London, however, remain sceptical that a naval accord with South Africa would effectively counter such a presence. Indeed, the very nature of such an agreement with the Republic could confer on the Soviets a considerable propaganda weapon. This in turn, it is argued, might increase Moscow's influence with African and other Third World regimes.

To summarize this section on British military interests: whereas immediately after the Second World War South Africa was valued not only for its geopolitical position but also as a respected member of the Western Alliance — and here I am thinking of Pretoria's contribution to the Berlin Airlift of 1948–49 and the despatch soon afterwards of a fighter squadron to Korea — today South Africa is a relatively low area of priority for UK defence policy, a policy which remains rooted in Europe's central front and in Britain's contribution to the Nato alliance.

One military footnote that deserves mention at least, relates to Pretoria's nuclear status. South Africa's uranium enrichment programme is sufficiently advanced to merit serious British and Western concern. The Republic may possess tactical nuclear warheads already; if it does not, most informed observers have little doubt that South Africa could assemble a thermonuclear device in a relatively short space of time — especially given recent reports that a medium-range ballistic missile may soon be test-fired at the Arniston range in the Cape Province.[11]

Strategic minerals

The strategic value of South Africa's mineral wealth poses a much tougher problem than the geostrategic issue for British and other Western policymakers. The Republic's strategic mineral significance to the UK rests essentially on four commodities and their alloys: chromium, manganese, vanadium and the platinum group of metals. South Africa argues, with some considerable statistical backing, that in this respect at least it is more important to the UK than vice versa.[12] Moreover, this vulnerability is enhanced by the fact that the USSR is often the main alternative supplier. Within the wider context of the West's dependence on South Africa, Britain's own vulnerability to any cut-off in supply requires a brief assessment here.

– Britain imports about two-thirds of its chromium requirements from South Africa. (Chromium's principal use is in the manufacture of stainless steel, essential to the aerospace industry.) And with the RSA and Zimbabwe together holding more than 94 per cent of known resources and Harare still highly dependent on South African transport, the degree of long-term dependence on South African supplies is self-evident.

– Again, Britain receives roughly half of its manganese imports from the Republic. (The mineral in alloy form as ferromanganese is an essential non-substitutable ingredient in steel-making.) Unlike chrome, however, there are alternative suppliers outside Southern Africa: Australia, Brazil and Gabon, for example, are major producers.

– About one-third of Britain's platinum supplies come direct from South Africa. (The metal's principal industrial use is as a catalyst in the car-making, chemical, electronics and petroleum-refining industries.) But, both in its production and as a proportion of global reserves, the Soviet Union is the only significant alternative supplier.

– However, it must be said that in contrast to the minerals noted already, the UK's dependence on vanadium is slight. (Vanadium is used in its alloy form to manufacture light-weight high-strength steels, especially important in civil and military aircraft

engines.) Besides the USSR, which holds 46 per cent of global reserves, alternative sources exist in Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Japan and Norway.

Finally in this brief statistical overview, it should be noted that the 12-member European Community is also highly dependent as a body on South Africa. In 1986, the last year for which full figures are available, the RSA supplied one-third of the Community's manganese and zirconium, more than half of its chromium and nearly 70 per cent of its vanadium.[13]

It is evident from the above that South Africa's mineral resources are of considerable strategic value to the UK and to the European Community. Any interruption of supply, for whatever reason, might be remedied in the short term by alternative supplies (where available), by different uses of the product (platinum, for instance, could be wholly diverted to industrial use), or by stockpiling and recycling.

However, a political judgement on the security of supply, and an assessment of other British interests and responses, must rest essentially on the predicted future of South Africa. Increasingly, the wider question of the direction of the Republic's domestic policies, and the role of the West in effecting change, has become intimately connected with international and bilateral sanctions. And it is to this area — and more especially to the British response under Prime Minister Thatcher — that the next part of this paper will be addressed.

British regional policy: A twin-track strategy

It is far too simplistic to conclude that Western policy-makers have moved towards sanctions solely because of ethical antipathy to apartheid. And it is naive to accept that such measures are necessarily adopted because states believe that they are the only or the best method of attaining desirable objectives. The West's links with the RSA provide an acute dilemma for the governments involved. For, on the one hand, the countries concerned operate "on the reasonable assumption that a major political transformation in South Africa cannot be postponed indefinitely",[14]

and that in the long term they have little to gain by supporting Pretoria unconditionally. On the other hand, however, the West has legitimate strategic, political and economic interests "in preserving a high degree of stability in Southern Africa, and there exists great uncertainty as to which course of action would best achieve this objective."[15] Because of these uncertainties, Western policy has often appeared to be indecisive, directionless and equivocal.

Thus, by way of illustration, the present British administration has remained profoundly sceptical about the efficacy of sanctions in promoting fundamental change in South Africa, yet — largely as a result of international pressures — it has introduced a number of limited economic sanctions. But because London's interests in the region are greater than those of any other industrialized state, and because of the Commonwealth connection, the United Kingdom is uniquely susceptible to attacks at home and abroad for supporting Pretoria. Indeed, the British government has gained a reputation — and in my view one thoroughly undeserved — as the appeaser of apartheid.

It can be argued, however, that British policy towards South Africa and the region is the most consistent and coherent in the subcontinent, in contradistinction to the policies of the other major players. It has not been sufficiently recognized that London's refusal to apply comprehensive mandatory sanctions has a "flip-side". Mrs Thatcher's steadfast, and sometimes abrasive, opposition to economic sanctions gives her a leverage over Pretoria which no other country can muster, and is also countered by Britain's leading role in providing substantial economic and military support for the Frontline States and their near neighbours. Before examining the extent of this support in more detail, however, an outline of Mrs Thatcher's anti-sanctions position would be in order.

Very briefly the argument from Downing Street goes as follows:
- Firstly, given the power of the South African state and the improbability of a successful revolutionary transfer of power (an assessment now supported by Moscow), sanctions and disinvestment are a prescription for extensive black unemployment and impoverishment. If, instead, the economy is

encouraged to expand, the black majority would be in a position to seek opportunities for self-improvement. In short, economic growth and black economic empowerment are seen as indivisible from political empowerment.

As the Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded in 1986, "The Government have long held the view that demographic trends, the increasing dependence of the South African economy on the black workforce and the growing economic power of the black population are major levers for political change."[16] Thus, a ban on coal imports was averted after the strong opposition of the West German Chancellor, supported by Mrs Thatcher, who stated: "I don't believe sanctions will help bring Apartheid to an end. They may, however, bring starvation and poverty to many thousands of black South Africans."
- In the second and third place, sanctions are also opposed because of the difficulty of enforcement, the possibilities of evasion and the financial, strategic and employment damage that would result for the UK.
- At the same time, and fourthly, it is argued that turning the screws on Pretoria would stiffen, rather than weaken, the resolve of the South African authorities to resist outside interference.
- Finally, in opposing comprehensive sanctions, London argues that it is, in fact, serving the interests of the Frontline States. The dependency on South Africa of these countries in trade and transport terms means that the RSA would be able to transmit the costs of sanctions to its neighbours, who are extremely vulnerable to the damage that would be caused by South African counter-retaliation.

The fact is, of course, that the FLS's routine calls for sanctions are a rhetorical and meaningless distraction — a point privately accepted by the Frontline leaders, who are fully aware of the disaster sanctions would bring to the region in terms of South African retaliation. Thus, as *The Spectator* put it quite recently, "The game now is to pitch higher and higher, to ask for universal mandatory sanctions, so that you are not obliged to impose any sanctions at all — until everyone agrees."[17]

As noted earlier, the anti-sanctions track of Mrs Thatcher's dual policy goes hand in hand with a parallel policy of financial and security assistance to Pretoria's neighbours. To her many critics, this dimension of Mrs Thatcher's delicate high-wire act — in which the objective is to keep seemingly irreconcilable regional interests and responsibilities in some sort of equilibrium — is viewed as a blatant attempt to buy *de facto* acquiescence from black Africa and the Commonwealth.

But as the former Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mrs Lynda Chalker, said last year: "Britain has long been involved in working to strengthen the economies of SADCC states, to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa and, through the SADCC organisation, to restore the natural pattern of transport in the region by rehabilitation of regional routes through Mozambique."[18] She went on to say that from 1980 to 1986 the UK gave over £800 million (more than R3,5 billion) in bilateral aid to these countries.

And at another venue soon afterwards, the Minister added that "because of the grave security situation in Mozambique the effort to rehabilitate the transport routes requires parallel measures of military assistance . . . . We are therefore making a considerable effort to provide targetted military training, and we are now supplementing this with a related package of non-lethal defence equipment for those countries directly involved in protecting the transport routes . . . ."[19]

As I noted last year, in a lecture at the Africa Institute on Western and Eastern bloc security assistance to the region,[20] the UK is currently providing professional military training for eight of the nine SADCC states.
- In the former colony of Rhodesia, a large British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) has been operating in the country since Independence in 1980. The team helps to run the Staff College but much more important is the training given to the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) at the Nyanga Battle School. Most of the ZNA troops are subsequently deployed in operations against the MNR in neighbouring Mozambique.
- Since 1986, Mozambican troops have also been trained at a separate wing

within the Nyanga complex. It is interesting to note that Mozambique is the only non-Commonwealth African country receiving such training on the continent. However, the agreement between London and Maputo (as well as the one between the UK and Zimbabwe) prohibits British military personnel from being deployed operationally. It is also significant that when Margaret Thatcher met President Chissano at Nyanga this March, it was agreed that the Mozambican intake would be doubled, from 400 to 800 per annum — an increase in British military assistance which I anticipated at my November lecture last year.

– There are also small British training teams in all three BLS (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) states. As with the teams training the Zimbabweans and Mozambicans, the costs reflect foreign policy initiatives rather than British defence interests. For this reason, it is the Foreign Office and not the Ministry of Defence which foots the bill.

– Finally, military personnel from all five states mentioned already, but also from Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, regularly attend officer cadet and staff training courses in the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile it is significant that Botswana has recently (early 1988) acquired nine warplanes from Britain. The jet fighters — each capable of carrying scores of rockets and eight bombs — are the Botswana Defence Force's (BDFs) first combat aircraft, apparently acquired to strengthen Botswana's defences against South African cross-border raids. At the same time, rumours persist that Zimbabwe may be on the verge of acquiring either Harrier jump-jet fighters from Britain or a sophisticated MiG and ground-based air defence system from Soviet Russia or communist China. The acquisition of such high-performance equipment would further tilt the regional military balance against the RSA.

To summarize the above: these levels of military, technical and economic aid are seen by London — and by the Front-line States — as a more practical and realistic option than sanctions for helping South Africa's neighbours, seven of which are Commonwealth members. Similar scales of assistance can be

expected for Namibia when the territory achieves independence, almost certainly under Swapo leadership, sometime in 1990.

However, before moving to the final part of my paper, I would like to slot in some additional thoughts about a number of bilateral relationships and developments influencing British foreign policy in the region. These refer not only to individual countries in the subcontinent but also to non-state actors, and chiefly to the ANC.

Zimbabwe: Because of its relative economic and military strengths, and because Margaret Thatcher's first major foreign policy success was in the role of midwife to Zimbabwe's independence, Harare is pivotal to Britain's regional strategy. Anglo-Zimbabwean relations are viewed by both sides as special, and links between the two states have proved rather stronger than the threats to them. The demolition of UDI remains an indisputable success in Mrs Thatcher's record and she has established a suprising rapport with President Mugabe over the years.

Mozambique: British relations with Mozambique have steadily improved as Maputo switches from socialist to free market policies and lessens its dependence on the Eastern bloc. Apart from the reasons already explained, especially the country's position as the geographical focus for the SADCC's transport aspirations, British interest and assistance is linked to Mozambique's help in bringing Zimbabwe to independence. Today London is the foremost Western supporter of Frelimo's war against Renamo, a state of affairs greatly appreciated by President Chissano's government. It is quite possible that Mozambique — which already regards itself as the cousin of the Commonwealth — could become a member of that organization in time.

Angola and Namibia: The December 22 New York peace accords, and subsequent developments in southwestern Africa, are naturally viewed very favourably in the United Kingdom. Mrs Thatcher's regional strategy is cautiously optimistic that the implementation of Resolution 435 will have a domino effect in Angola and Mozambique, and that this, in turn, will create a favourable regional climate as a backdrop for negotiations between the South African government and its domestic opponents.

Such developments would permit the UK to push for a greater South African role in promoting peace in the subcontinent — a state of affairs which, if realized, would win considerable international kudos for both London as the facilitator and for Pretoria as the lynchpin for constructive cooperation.

Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi: The former British High Commission Territories, the so-called BLS states — as well as Malawi (a long-standing advocate of dialogue) — have remained on exceptionally friendly terms with London since Independence in the 1960s. Malawi, and especially Botswana, remain two of Africa's economic success stories, from which British business has done well. While these four states have little clout individually, together they represent nearly half of the SADCC membership. As such, Whitehall assiduously cultivates their support for British initiatives in the subcontinent.

Zambia and Tanzania: Relations between London and both Lusaka and Dar es Salaam have been somewhat mercurial throughout this decade. The relationship between Britain and Zambia in particular was unhinged by the public dressing-down Sir Geoffrey Howe received at the hands of President Kaunda in 1986. As a consequence, Zambia was unambiguously excluded from Mrs Thatcher's Southern Africa safari earlier this year. However Kaunda's apparently new-found conciliatory approach to Pretoria suggests that British-Zambian relations may become warmer.

South African extra-parliamentary groups: Finally, London's evolving relationship with South Africa's extra-parliamentary groupings, especially the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front, calls for more than passing attention. At the Vancouver Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) two years ago in 1987, Mrs Thatcher labelled the ANC as a "terrorist organization". But this nomenclature does not reflect the British government's current position. In fact, London has for long maintained contacts with a broad spectrum of South African political opinion; and the Foreign Office has a stated policy of "hearing all sides of the story". However, the growing increase in the stature and prestige of Pretoria's opponents

within the Republic — as exemplified in the stream of delegations to ANC headquarters in Lusaka; President Botha's historic and highly symbolic Tuynhuys meeting with Mr Mandela; and, more recently, the reception accorded to UDF leaders by heads of government in Europe and the United States — has enhanced the legitimacy of the extra-parliamentary opposition. In turn, these events have had international repercussions, not least in the United Kingdom.

Indeed, as the prospects for a negotiated settlement on South Africa's future loom ever larger on the domestic and international agenda, the ANC and other extra-parliamentary parties are likely to find themselves being courted by the West (but also by Moscow) in a manner and with a frequency unthinkable only two years ago.

The question remains, however, — and it is, *par excellence*, the critical issue in the minds of British policy-makers with regard to South Africa — will the Nationalist administration, expected to take office after next month's election, be able to fulfil the international hopes that have been raised by Frederick de Klerk's promises of "drastic reforms"? It is to this large question mark, and to some of the consequences for Britain and South Africa if these heady expectations are not fulfilled, that the last part of my paper will be addressed.

Conclusions

Four weeks from today, the result of the tricameral parliamentary elections will be known. That the Nationalists will emerge as the largest party in the White House of Assembly is not in my view in doubt. But the decreased size of its overall majority — especially if seats are lost mainly to the CP — could act as a leg-iron on F W de Klerk's room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless it is the President-in-waiting himself — admittedly under great pressure from London and Washington — who has raised the spectre of a quantum leap forward by his promise of "drastic and speedy changes". But promissory notes are no longer sufficient to satisfy an international community accustomed to "Pretoriaspeak". If Mrs Thatcher is not to stand isolated as the world closes ranks against her on sanctions, Mr de Klerk will have to prove that he is a risk

worth taking. Unless substantial moves are initiated towards fundamental change within the next 12–15 months, London's ability to fight off the clamour for comprehensive sanctions will rapidly diminish.

Although there is little public clarity among Western administrations as to what, precisely, Mr de Klerk is expected to do, most analysts agree that the incoming government in Pretoria would have to introduce at least some of the following measures, and within months rather than years:

- the end of detentions without trial;
- restoration of the right of peaceful protest;
- concrete moves to begin negotiations with extra-parliamentary organizations and acknowledged black leaders on a new constitution for representative government;
- lifting the state of emergency;
- the unconditional release of Mr Mandela to participate in the political process.

Of course Whitehall does not expect unilateral or one-sided action from the South African government. If Mrs Thatcher is able to deploy her persuasive powers on Pretoria, then London believes that the Soviets are now willing to put pressure on the ANC. This would involve the ANC suspending, but not at first renouncing, its stated commitment to "armed struggle". It is now generally accepted that Mrs Thatcher — who is perhaps the one major international politician of stature respected by Pretoria — does have some influence with the South African authorities. If she is successful in pushing Pretoria into making concessions, Moscow would be better placed to press the ANC towards a negotiated settlement. Today the Soviet Union — which has been the ANC's foremost patron and arms supplier — does not regard the armed struggle as a central plank of the strategy to undermine the political system. In fact, armed struggle is now viewed by Moscow as historically obsolete.

This means that the foreign policy of Britain and its Western allies on the one side and the Soviets on the other have to some extent converged. The major powers now have a common interest and commitment in pushing their respective clients into negotiations. And for the moment at least, Washington is content to let London make most of the running.

For, as Herman Cohen, the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recently stated: "We welcome British leadership in this problem".

Meanwhile British policy-makers are fully aware of the limits of their leverage on Pretoria. While pushing for concessions that will pave the way for talks, London is not so feather-brained as to believe that the South African authorities are on the verge of handing over office to a majority government. This is why some observers believe "that Whitehall could be envisaging a negotiated 'solution' which falls short of one-person-one-vote in a unitary non-racial democracy".[21] Indeed it is currently being alleged that Mrs Thatcher accepts Pretoria's concept of "group protection" — and, for the moment at least, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr de Klerk has jettisoned groups (including the emergence of a "non-racial" group) as the cornerstone and non-negotiable bottom-line for South Africa's political future.[22]

After next month's election, the West will allow the new administration time to settle into its new job and take stock. But Western leaders will want to see concrete action rather than hear ambiguous words and they want to see that action sooner rather than later. Earlier I referred to a time-frame of some 12–15 months in which action is expected. That make-or-break time-scale is not offered arbitrarily. It is simply London's calibrated assessment of how long Mrs Thatcher will be able to withstand being labelled the appeaser of apartheid.

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur this coming October, Mrs Thatcher will point to Pretoria's meticulous adherence to the Namibian agreement as a tangible fruit of dialogue as an alternative to sanctions. Also, a desire by the international community not to take actions which could derail the Namibian Independence process has provided Pretoria with a breathing-space.

After that, however, the time-frame begins to shorten. By the middle of 1990 — and possibly even sooner — the anti-apartheid movements and the sanctioneers will be crying for action against South Africa. Initially, their focus will be on South Africa's Achilles' heel, its foreign debt, a large part of which (some $12 billion) Pretoria hopes to reschedule in a year's time. But, if the West's

expectations are disappointed and dashed, Margaret Thatcher will no longer be able, or willing, to shield South Africa. The European election result in June — which saw a marked swing to the left — has put Mrs Thatcher on the defensive abroad. Meanwhile at home, Conservative by-election setbacks, and opinion polls that have put the Labour Party up to 14 points ahead of the Tories, have placed Mrs Thatcher in an exposed position. That vulnerability also extends to the moderate government of West Germany's Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who faces the prospect of defeat from an SDP-Green alliance in early 1990. Thus, unless Mr de Klerk can satisfy the expectations which he himself has raised "American pressure on Europe and European pressure on Mrs Thatcher to show a united front on South Africa will mount — and will meet with decreasing resistance. For while she will remain opposed to sanctions in principle, her opposition will no longer be as loud or as resolute. Simply put, in terms of her own political interests, South Africa will no longer be worth the candle".[23]

In short, if F W de Klerk has sold himself too high — and if Mrs Thatcher's increasingly urgent entreaties for reform fall on deaf ears — Pretoria's credit with London will run out. If that happens, Mrs Thatcher will be rendered defenceless against her domestic and overseas critics. Then there will be no Canute to stem the rising tide of sanctions, no British Boadicea to fight Pretoria's

rearguard battles. In any case, in two years time, Margaret Thatcher may have vacated 10 Downing Street to make way for a Labour administration under Mr Neil Kinnock.

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Waiting for a negotiated settlement: South Africans in a changing world

Mark Swilling, of the Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, and Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, of the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand, provide an analysis of the changing international context within which the participants in the South African political arena will have to search for a negotiated settlement.

The election of President Bush, the settlement of the Namibian conflict, the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola and the "New Thinking" in the Soviet Union are some of the developments already leading to a substantial foreign policy rethink about relations between South Africa and the world. Significantly, this rethink coincides with tensions and pressures within the South African ruling elite that could result in the long run in a process of dismantling the white political power structure.

It is our contention that the realignment of international forces will directly affect the way current tensions within the white political system play themselves out. The convergence of international approaches to the South African question will contribute significantly to the creation of a positive environment for the negotiated resolution of the South African conflict. If, however, this results in an approach based on a "negotiation formula" imposed on the South African parties, then the result will be counter-productive. The transition formulae for the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and South West Africa-Namibia settlements were externally designed because the domestic states in these countries enjoyed an ambiguous international legal status. In contrast,

the South African state has, since 1909, been regarded internationally as legal and sovereign. Yet this does not mean that external parties no longer have a role to play in facilitating a negotiated settlement to the South African conflict.

We believe that for South Africa the most constructive international policy would be an international convergence based on an acceptance of the following "negotiation principles":

* South Africans must take the lead in resolving their own problems within internationally acceptable parameters;
* These parameters must be premised on the "release, unban, dismantle, negotiate" framework — *release* political prisoners, *unban* banned organizations, *dismantle* repressive apartheid laws, and *negotiations* between all parties.

The major superpowers will need to converge on a foreign policy approach that derives from the internal dynamics of the South African situation. Here lies the significance of the "release, unban, dismantle, negotiate" framework, for this has emerged as a basic cornerstone of policy for a range of organizations stretching from banned organizations on the left, through to the legal extra-parliamentary movement, moderate

black leaders, certain sectors of business, and the liberal opposition.

The National Party: On the edge of the constitutional precipice

The introduction of the 1983 Constitution marked a decisive turning point for the National Party (NP). Prior to this, the NP had subscribed to the Verwoerdian doctrine that defined the state purely in terms of the hegemony of the white nation. But the 1983 Constitution redefined the relationship between the white minority and the state: the new "nation" thus created comprised a community of cultural groups bound together by a "consociational contract" that defined the state as the arbiter of "group rights" in a "power-sharing" framework. Notwithstanding talk at the time of a fourth chamber, the African majority were excluded on the grounds that they had their "own states".

In 1986 the NP convened a Federal Congress to pass a motion that in essence committed the government to a constitutional policy premised on the view that the 1983 Constitution had been a failure because it excluded the

African majority. From this point on, the NP committed itself to extending the "consociational contract". And to achieve this objective, it committed itself to negotiating the nature of this new constitutional dispensation.

Since 1986, the NP has been unable to implement this policy. Uncovering the reason for this failure will reveal the dilemma at the heart of NP policy.

During the period 1986–89, state strategy was based on a political contradiction. On one hand the NP government committed itself to the objective of a new constitution which would include all groups and be created via negotiation. On the other hand the security establishment responded to black resistance by declaring a State of Emergency and activating a set of policies that defined most of the representatives of the black majority as enemies of the state. In other words, the state committed itself to security-designed means that contradicted government-inspired ends.

Although the security establishment argued that repression was designed to facilitate negotiations, this was not, in reality, what happened, the inner contradiction inflamed the festering crises which lay at the root of the South African conflict. As repression intensified in order to "eliminate the revolutionaries", the more radical and moderate black leaders refused to enter into national constitutional negotiations; and as the chances of constitutional negotiations became more remote, so did repression again intensify.

The government is under enormous international and internal pressure from all quarters to agree to a negotiation process that includes the African National Congress (ANC). As far as the Soviets are concerned, the bogey of a "total onslaught" engineered by a diabolical coterie of agitators in Moscow has virtually disappeared from South African government rhetoric. The Deputy Minister of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Anatoly Adamishin, recently visited Cape Town, and he has discussed, at length, the prospects of negotiations with Pik Botha in various parts of the world over the past twelve months. Pik Botha himself said during a BBC interview in March that he believes the Soviets are now "part of the solution".

The prospects of a joint superpower

approach to the South African conflict, plus Margaret Thatcher's interventionist diplomacy, have all contributed to a mounting sense of urgency in government circles.

The starting point must be the South African government's accepting that reform will not work. Professor Willie Esterhuyse, an Afrikaner academic who is still linked to those wielding power in the executive, came to the following conclusion in Bermuda: "It is a personal conviction that reform, as understood by the authorities, will not save the day for South Africa . . . . On South Africa's present political agenda is not the abolition of racially discriminatory measures *per se*, but the abolition of white domination and the initiation of a bargaining process to that end."

The first hurdle the government must get over concerns the question of violence. Since the scuttling of the EPG Mission in May 1986, the government has insisted on the principle that the ANC must "renounce violence". During the first three months of 1989 three significant signs pointed to a movement away from this principle. In January the Transvaal branch of the NP held a weekend "*dinkskrum*" chaired by Gerrit Viljoen and F W de Klerk. On the following Monday the newspaper *Beeld* ran an editorial which said: "Are talks between the government and an African National Congress delegation under the leadership of free Nelson Mandela really so unthinkable? . . . We should begin to think of giving the ANC a chance to show whether they are serious when they say they want a political solution."

In early March, Johan Heyns, Moderator of the NG Kerk, reiterated the position he articulated in a 1988 article which suggested that "a rejection of violence should be the result of negotiations, not a pre-condition for negotiations". The significance of this statement is that it came after a meeting between Heyns and the NP caucus.

At the Bermuda Conference, a National Party MP told a plenary session that "there are ways around the question of renunciation of violence". He later confirmed that the caucus no longer sees this as a non-negotiable precondition for talks. Significantly, the NP "Action Plan" revealed at the Federal Congress in June this year does not contain the "renunciation of violence" pre-condition.

These moves away from the "renunciation of violence" principle reflect shifts in the Afrikaner establishment that would have been unthinkable even a year ago. It is in this sense that the significance of the Law Commission's findings should be understood. The National Party MP in Bermuda openly suggested that the findings of this Commission could be a useful starting point for deliberations on a new constitutional dispensation. These findings may well go down in history as marking the start of a qualitative break in the collective mind-set of the Afrikaner intellectual establishment. It is the first intellectually rigorous proposal emanating from quarters very close to the government and with significant support in NP ranks that contains elements of a constitutional framework not fundamentally different from those contained in the ANC's Constitutional Guidelines.

These shifts and signs of movement within the white political system must not be misinterpreted. They do not reflect a fundamental re-orientation of the political framework of the NP. Nor do they imply that the State Security Council (SSC) and the cabinet officially agree with these viewpoints. They do, however, reflect how key think-tanks and opinion-makers in the white establishment are beginning to bend their minds around a contradiction that lies at the heart of the white political system. This contradiction consists of the following: the NP has, in the face of massive black resistance to white minority rule, conceded the principle of "one state". But it has yet to concede the principle of "one nation" in all its manifestations, including a renunciation of the "general affairs"/"own affairs" distinction. The most that can be said is that the NP has now adopted the notion of a multi-group nation in a single state.

The Conservative Party is correct when it argues that if it is accepted that South Africa comprises a multiplicity of "nations", then it follows that each "nation" must constitute its "own" state. The NP recently floated the notion of "concurrent majorities" as a possible constitutional method for organizing a marriage between a single state and a multiplicity of constitutionally entrenched "groups". The internal inconsistency on which this view rests is that the NP believes such a marriage can be achieved through apartheid structures

systematically designed to create *separate* "nation states".

It must be noted that the NP, at least judging by its rhetoric, is committed to "negotiating" with black leadership the final constitutional form this "multigroup" state will take. This does not mean, however, that it has in mind the full spectrum of black leadership, particularly those leaders located in extra-constitutional politics. Nor is there any evidence, as we write, that the NP intends abandoning the notion that "group rights" are an innate sociological reality which must, by its very nature, be the basis for a new constitutional dispensation.

Interviewed by one of the authors in August 1987, Minister Heunis said: "You only negotiate when you have no options left, and there are still people in my government who think we have options." It is for this reason that the NP still has a long way to go before it accepts in full the "release, unban, dismantle, negotiate" framework. The most we can expect for the moment is the release of Mandela, the unbanning of the organizations banned in terms of the State of Emergency in 1988, the dismantling of certain aspects of apartheid (such as Group Areas) and negotiations with "moderate" leaders.

Although these steps fall short of the pre-conditions for a genuine negotiated settlement, they may trigger far-reaching unintended consequences which the government may well be unable to control. And it is here that the international factor becomes important. It is our view that the international community with influence on South Africa should ensure that only one internationally acceptable option is encouraged, a negotiated settlement that includes all parties — with the NP and African National Congress (ANC) as the two principal protagonists. Any steps designed to thwart, stall or distort this process should be roundly denounced.

African National Congress: Towards negotiations?

The journals and publications of the ANC have reflected a wide-ranging debate on the nature of the current balance of conflicting forces. In the August 1988 edition of *Sechaba* it was argued by one

contributor to the debate that it should be accepted that the position might be described as "a stalemate". The writer's sophisticated analysis echoed the words of the late Moses Mabhida, sometime general secretary of the SACP. Mabhida was quoted in the *African Communist* in 1985 as saying that "the revolution cannot topple Pretoria, but Pretoria cannot eliminate the revolution."

The *Sechaba* article argued that the concept of a "negotiated settlement" has been introduced as "a new element" by the ANC and that "in any closed system, once a new element is introduced, we must assume a changed relationship within the elements of this system." One consequence of this, the author argues, may be the need to "review the strategy of people's war".

There are, however, positions within the ANC opposed to this view. In the April 1989 edition of *Sechaba*, a contributor rejects the viewpoint set out above and forcefully argues that:

> . . . the mass democratic movement has not been crushed, and we have no reason to surrender or settle for partial victories. Our people are striving to act in unity through organisation and to organise through united action, for people's power, and not for partial victories. Our people's army, Umkhonto We Sizwe, is growing in quality, and our military operations reflect this fact. Our army is transforming its military operations into a generalised people's war for an armed seizure of power.

In reality, the ANC's formal position is an amalgam of these two positions. On 9 October 1987 the ANC published a document entitled "Statement of the National Executive of the African National Congress on the question of negotiations". This document expresses a position enjoying wide support across the black political spectrum and which is not substantially different from the positions articulated by Inkatha, UMSA and various bantustan leaders, for example, Enos Mabuza. This position was reiterated at both the Leverkusen and Bermuda conferences by Thabo Mbeki, the current director of the ANC's International Department.

The October 1987 Statement insists at the outset that "the ANC has never been opposed to a negotiated settlement". It goes on to argue that the "ANC and the masses of our people as a whole are ready and willing to enter into genuine negotiations". It is important to note the

formulation here: the ANC is saying that it and its supporters are not just "willing" but also "ready" for negotiations.

In previous statements on the subject, ANC leaders have argued that negotiations should be entered into only if they are aimed at "transferring power to the people" or to the "representatives of the majority". This has been interpreted by detractors as a pre-condition implying the wholesale capitulation of the NP government and the transfer of power to the ANC. In the October 1987 statement, the ANC argued that negotiations should be "aimed at the transformation of our country into a united and non-racial democracy".

To give content to what it has in mind when it talks about a "united and non-racial democracy", in 1988 the ANC issued its Constitutional Guidelines which commit the ANC to, among other things, a unitary state, one person one vote, a Bill of Rights, a multi-party system, mixed economy, land reform, extensive rights for workers and women, and the protection of the family and other private formations in civil society.

On the question of violence, the Statement rejects out of hand the demand that it "unilaterally" renounce or suspend violence. Instead, with a clear reference to the need for "pre-negotiations" on conditions for negotiations, the ANC suggests that "[a]ny cessation of hostilities would have to be negotiated and entail agreed action by both sides as part of the process of the creation of a democratic South Africa."

The ANC has been accused of insisting that it be regarded as the "sole representative" of the black majority and that a negotiated settlement would involve itself and the government and no-one else. The Statement refutes this by first defining the conflict in terms of a struggle between the "forces of national liberation and democracy on the one hand and those of racism and reaction on the other." It then proposes that a plurality of parties be present at the negotiations: "[a]ny negotiations would have to be conducted by these two forces as represented by their *various organisational formations.*"

The Statement then sets out specific steps the government would have to take in order to "demonstrate its seriousness" and "create a climate conducive for such negotiations". These

steps are:

(1) all political prisoners and detainees must be released and all treason trials halted;

(2) the State of Emergency must be lifted, police and troops withdrawn from the townships and confined to barracks;

(3) all "repressive legislation" must be repealed, i.e. laws that limit freedom of assembly, speech, association and the press must be scrapped.

It is significant to note that the statement does not call specifically for the unbanning of banned organizations. Presumably this is because this is subsumed in point 3 above; the repeal of the Internal Security Act would *ipso facto* lift the ban on organizations such as the ANC and PAC.

The ANC's response to changing international conditions has been to welcome suggestions of a joint US-Soviet approach. However, arising from the Leverkusen Conference, and confirmed at Bermuda, the ANC has mounted a strategy designed to prevent its being a mere pawn with no control over the evolution of this approach. This strategy has as its goal the passing of a UN Security Council Resolution that will become for South Africa what 435 was to Namibia, an international benchmark.

The ANC has also committed itself to a diplomatic strategy aimed at reaching out to the white community. The ANC's assessment of the white community changed after the Dakar meeting. Realizing that negotiations would be impossible until a critical mass of white supporters of transformation has been created, the ANC initiated dozens of meetings with white groups. This has contributed significantly to the creation of a "negotiation climate", since these meetings help to de-demonize the ANC in the white community. More importantly, however, this strategy effectively means that the ANC has begun to negotiate the future with significant sectors of the white community *without the NP government.*

Converging international trends

We will show in this section that there are emerging international tendencies leading all the major world powers towards a convergence of policy positions *vis-à-vis* South Africa. The basic indicators are the following:

● withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and moves towards national reconciliation in that country;

● independence for Namibia;

● the new Soviet foreign policy approach;

● a new US administration with pragmatists, not ideologues, at the helm;

● an assertive British thrust centred around Margaret Thatcher;

● Soviet-US co-operation towards Southern Africa;

● a new role for the Frontline States and the OAU;

● a possible Japanese entry into the international political debate about South Africa;

● a possible social democratic election victory in Germany in 1990.

The United States of America

The US Administration's policy on South Africa is in the process of being drawn up. Congress will only settle upon its own policy once the Administration has revealed its cards. The chances of a significant shift from the Reagan Administration's approach are generally regarded as high. There are a number of pointers:

● the new Secretary of State, James Baker, has emphasized the necessity for a "bilateral" approach between the Administration and Congress to South Africa;

● the replacement of Chester Crocker with Herman Cohen as Assistant Secretary for Africa — Cohen is regarded as a pragmatist and rejects the old Cold War approach to Southern Africa;

● James Baker has phased out many State Department personnel and replaced them with a group that includes significant liberal Democrats and others who have been involved in the building of US-Soviet relations in recent years;

● the Democratic Party has significantly increased its majority in both the House and the Senate;

● the current Administration has inherited the legitimacy generated by the previous Administration's role in ensuring the success of peace settlements in Namibia and Angola;

● there is moderate support in Washington for a joint US-Soviet position on South Africa.

During the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration adopted Chester Crocker's "Constructive Engagement" policy. This was based on the assumption that change in South Africa could proceed in a gradual unilinear direction, managed by enlightened reformers in control of the state. Using various pressures and incentives, the Administration believed that the South African government would agree to gradually dismantle apartheid from above — leading ultimately to some sort of multi-racial plural democracy. A negotiated settlement was not specifically excluded from this conception; but it was by no means the centrepiece of the envisaged process of change.

The "Constructive Engagement" policy broke down primarily because it failed to realize that a series of *quantitative* shifts away from apartheid could not have resulted in a *qualitatively* permanent resolution of the problem. The reasons for this are simply that the shifts in question were implemented on terms dictated by the white minority. Without a fundamental *qualitative* break from the old political order by negotiated settlement with the representatives of the black majority located *outside* the system, real change could not have been achieved.

It was in response to this contradiction that US policy changed direction: Congress overrode a Presidential veto and passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act that called for sanctions; and the 1987 report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa rejected reform from above in favour of the complete abolition of apartheid. This could only be achieved, the committee concluded, through genuine negotiations with legitimate black leaders — and with the ANC in particular because this organization enjoyed "widespread and undeniable popular support". Any attempts to exclude it "will be perceived as efforts to avoid fundamental change", the report argued.

In certain black political circles this shift in US policy has been interpreted as a cynical attempt by the USA to avoid the further radicalization of an already radical mass-resistance movement. In this view, US policy-makers

have calculated that a negotiated settlement with built-in compromises is clearly preferable to a prolonged armed struggle followed by an "armed seizure of power" that installs a radical revolutionary movement.

The Administration will put together its South Africa policy with four assumptions in mind:

(1) Sanctions are there to stay. The debate is no longer whether sanctions should be imposed or not, but whether they should be made more severe or left at their present level.

(2) There are pressures in Congress, in the UN and from the Soviet Union calling for a joint US-Soviet approach — an idea to which Herman Cohen is not averse (when he is talking to liberals or radicals).

(3) An all-party negotiated settlement which includes the ANC is the primary objective.

(4) UN Security Council Resolution 435 must run its course in Namibia before action on South Africa can be taken (a view shared by the key movers in the House and Senate).

Secretary Baker's commitment to a "bilateral" approach with Congress is a reflection of the relative political weakness of the Bush Administration compared to the strength Reagan enjoyed after his first landslide election victory. More importantly, Congress has a perspective on South Africa shaped by grassroots views of the American people and in particular the mobilized black lobby. The Bush Administration simply cannot ignore this, especially in view of the incumbent's need for more black and liberal votes if he wants to be a second-term President.

There are no clear indications what the final outcome of the Administration's policy review will be. There are two issues at stake: sanctions, and the Administration's relationship with Pretoria. On sanctions, we agree with the conclusion reached by Stephen Davis of the Investor Responsibility Research Center in a talk he gave to the Centre for Policy Studies in February: "Contrary to the reports I have read that assert that US policy-makers are becoming disillusioned with sanctions, I believe that the inauguration of George Bush marks in Washington a new acceptance of sanctions as a legitimate and necessary tool of American foreign policy toward South Africa." This was confirmed repeatedly

by American delegates to the Bermuda Conference.

On relations with Pretoria, there is evidence of significant support in Washington as a whole for the ANC's proposal at Bermuda that the Administration adopt a policy of "equidistance" from all the major players. This would entail the Administration's acting, in Thabo Mbeki's words, as an "honest broker" by, for example, meeting all the players at top level on a regular basis in order to pressurize and cajole them into accepting the need for a negotiated settlement.

As an alternative to outright alignment with either side, this "equidistance" proposal has the greatest chance of success. It was, in effect, the unspoken policy approach adopted by the Administration during the settlement negotiations on southwestern Africa. It is also perfectly consistent with the requirements of a joint US-Soviet strategy.

It is unclear, however, how the policy of "equidistance" can be coupled to a sanctions policy, since support for the latter automatically defines it as hostile to the South African government. The unintended way out may well lie in Congress tightening the screws, while the Administration gives the appearance of being reluctantly pressurized into a policy it opposes — a very effective way of increasing the pain level without losing credibility in Pretoria.

In the final analysis, South Africa is a low priority for the Bush Administration. What is more, the stakes get lower as American interests in the region decline — a tendency strengthened by sanctions. A counter-tendency may result from the fact that South Africa's priority rating may increase a few notches if it is seen as a useful issue around which to strengthen US-Soviet relations and/or mobilize the sympathies of liberal and black voters. It follows, therefore, that the USA has an interest in a low-cost approach that has high moral appeal within the USA and is not inconsistent with the approaches adopted by the other world powers.

Britain

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher enjoys a special status in the emerging international realignments. Her government is conspicuously opposed to

sanctions; she is regarded as an ally by the National Party; and she has become increasingly interventionist over the last ten months. Out of step with the Commonwealth, the USA and the Soviet Union, she is determined to hold on to the diplomatic initiative in Southern Africa. This is reflected in the views of her advisors and was a strong theme at meetings between Thatcher and the Frontline States and at the last Wilton Park Conference.

Before going further, it is essential to point out that, in comparison to the USA, the British Executive has extensive control of foreign policy positions. The British parliament does not have nearly as much influence over foreign policy as does the US Congress. Even the influence of the Foreign Office has declined from the high level it enjoyed during the Lancaster House negotiation processes which resulted in independence for Zimbabwe. London's policy on South Africa today is shaped by non-government think-tanks and individuals. Three people are now the crucial decision-makers: Charles Powell, Thatcher's foreign policy advisor; Ambassador Renwick; and Margaret Thatcher. (Patrick Fairweather, the Middle-East and African desk officer in the Foreign Office is not insignificant, but is very much the junior partner.)

Thatcher is faced with a range of pressures:

- The Commonwealth Conference this October will be the forum where Commonwealth countries will bring to bear unprecedented pressures on Britain to accept sanctions. The Commonwealth secretariat has completed the most thorough sanctions study to date and its conclusions support the pro-sanctions lobby.

- If a joint US-Soviet position materializes, based on a policy with which Britain disagrees, this might leave Britain, internationally, in a difficult position.

- The German general election in 1990 may result in a Social Democratic victory which may, in turn, bring Germany round to accepting a Scandinavian approach to South Africa. And if this were to carry France along with it, then Britain could be outmanoeuvred in the European Community.

- The swing to the left in the elections for the European Parliament in June

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1989 underscores the weakness of Britain's Tories in a rapidly changing Europe.

- Japan's Foreign Ministry has signalled its sensitivity to the black caucus and trade union lobbies in the USA. These could use Japan's ties with South Africa to support their anti-Japanese protectionist policy. (The Japanese trade representatives in South Africa do not share these sensitivities.)
- If the OAU succeeds in tabling a "435-type" resolution on South Africa at the UN, this could also out-manoeuvre Britain, especially if such a resolution were backed by the Commonwealth, OAU, Japan and significant European Community countries.

Thatcher's trump card is the enormous leverage she has in Pretoria because of her anti-sanctions stand. The Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth office admitted to one of the authors recently that the extent of this leverage increases as the international sanctions campaign gathers momentum. Without international sanctions, British leverage on Pretoria would be weakened.

Thatcher's weakest suit is the character of her contact with and respect for the black opposition. Her remarks in Canada that the ANC is a terrorist organization, British opposition to sanctions, Howe's hostile reception of the Canaan Banana delegation in February, and Britain's serious image problems in the eyes of the extra-parliamentary movement, all contribute to the general view in black political circles that Britain is not tough enough on the NP government. (Defenders of Thatcher's policy respond to this view by pointing out that Britain is the only Western country to have committed military support to Frelimo's fight against South African-backed rebels in Mozambique.)

The off-the-cuff dismissal of the ANC in Canada by Thatcher did not reflect British policy. Britain is a signatory to the 1985 Nassau Declaration of the Commonwealth which echoed the Shultz report by clearly stating that no solution in South Africa was possible without a negotiated settlement that includes the ANC. (When an Afrikaans newspaper put it to her during an interview that she should not insist that Pretoria talk with the ANC because this

contradicted her refusal to talk to the IRA, she responded by saying the two cannot be compared because Irish Catholics have the vote whereas black South Africans do not.)

Thatcher's acceptance of the centrality of a negotiated settlement means that British policy is not simply the "Crocker Doctrine" revived. It may be "Constructive Engagement", but it does not rest on the premise that apartheid can be dismantled incrementally, from above, by the state. There have been suggestions that this means the British have a "Lancaster House" model in mind. In our view this interpretation is excluded by South Africa's position — the model could only work when all the parties to the Zimbabwean settlement recognized, or were forced to recognize, Britain as the "colonial power". This, in turn, made it possible for Britain to design a "negotiation formula" which all the parties were persuaded in various ways to accept.

Britain's policy in South Africa, then, will amount to a general insistence that all parties must negotiate a settlement. In particular, Thatcher intends using her prestige to influence the new NP leader and urge him into accepting this. During her African visit, Thatcher insisted that the political stabilization of the region was conducive to a negotiated settlement in South Africa. She argued for two pre-conditions to prepare the way: the South African government must release Mandela; and the ANC must suspend, not renounce, violence (a revival of the EPG distinction). Thatcher has also argued that Mandela must be released "into a negotiation process" and not into a vacuum — a view which Ambassador Renwick strongly shares.

Although some African leaders seem willing to accept Thatcher's minimalist programme, Mugabe remains sceptical, suspecting that regional destabilization by South Africa is not over yet. Chissano and the Mozambican Foreign Ministry are far more optimistic because they operate on the assumption that Thatcher's strategy will exacerbate divisions within the South African state between the "hard-liners" and "soft-liners".

Thatcher's ability to retain the diplomatic initiative depends on how quickly the South African government moves towards accepting the principle of a negotiated settlement. To strengthen

her hand, Thatcher and her advisors have already held discussions with the new Bush Administration on how the two superpowers will relate on this matter. It is clear that although the two governments disagree on sanctions, they agree on the necessity for a negotiated settlement. The question, now, is how their different strategies will converge and complement one another. If the USA introduces harsher sanctions and the British oppose sanctions to increase their leverage on Pretoria, then it is arguable that the best combination of pressures will result: the USA carries the stick and the British dangle the carrot. There is, however, no guarantee that this will move the South African government. If it fails, then Thatcher may well need to re-evaluate her strategy. The month between the South African general election in September and the Commonwealth Conference in October will be when the most important signals will emerge, including the possible release of Mandela.

Much here will depend on how the Soviet Union intends working with the other influential powers. The USA and the Soviets have already co-operated successfully at the highest level to secure the Angola-Namibian settlements. The British are only in the early stages of building an understanding on Southern African issues with the Soviets. According to one Foreign Office source, the highest level contact between the British and the Soviets on South Africa took place during the Wilton Park Conference in March, when Patrick Fairweather met Yuri Yukalev, head of the Africa desk in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Some Soviet officials have indicated that what is attractive about Thatcher is her leverage on Pretoria.

There is no evidence at this point, however, that the Soviets will move closer to the British, given the latter's poor image in the eyes of black political organizations. That is why the Soviets feel more comfortable with the Americans. Nor is there any reliable evidence that the Bush Administration intends using Southern Africa as another test case of giving the Russians too much credit for resolving a high-profile political conflict.

It is in this context that Thatcher's attempt to win the support of the Frontline States should be understood. Rather than go for a superpower alliance,

Thatcher may well go for a joint approach with sub-Saharan Africa. Her message to these states boils down to the proposal that they must support the British initiative and in return she will deliver Pretoria. In her meetings with South African cabinet members no doubt her message was blunt: if they do not make clear progress towards negotiations, she will not be able to hold back the more hostile international coalition pressing for sanctions. At the Bermuda Conference, the NP said they were well aware that they needed to give Thatcher something to use to strengthen her position at the Commonwealth meeting in October. This was the subject of the discussion held between Thatcher and Pik Botha in March. Interviewed that night on British television, Pik Botha said: "The season of violence is over". His views on Mandela were later described by Thatcher during a radio interview in the following terms: "He himself wished to see the release of Mr Mandela and he too thought it would open the way to negotiations".

British strategy essentially boils down to threats and actions aimed at increasing the political (and maybe later the material) costs to the South African government of not moving towards negotiations. This anti-sanctions stand has less to do with promoting economic growth in order to ease reform than it has to do with ensuring that Britain maintains its leverage on Pretoria. (Another factor may be a belief that it has a special responsibility for those African states which South Africa can hold economic hostage.) The release of Mandela and the lifting of the State of Emergency are Britain's immediate demands. Predictions of what happens after that are, at this stage, premature.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet representatives at the Leverkusen Conference started their exposition of the Soviet Union's policy towards South Africa (as they saw it) with an elaboration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) general rethink on foreign policy after Mikhail Gorbachev's re-election as General-Secretary. The Soviet representatives' paper quoted from Gorbachev's key November 1987 speech on foreign policy:

The new concept of foreign policy was presented in detail at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. As you know, this concept proceeds from the idea that for all the profound contradictions of the contemporary world, for all the radical differences among the countries that comprise it, it is inter-related, interdependent and integral. The reasons for this include the internationalisation of the world's economic ties, the comprehensive scope of the scientific and technological revolution, the essentially novel role played by the mass media, the state of the Earth's resources, the common environmental danger, and the crying social problems of the developing world which affect us all. The main reason, however, is the problem of human survival. This problem is now with us, because the development of nuclear weapons and the threatening prospect for their use have called into question the very existence of the human race . . . . The most important thing is that our concept and our firm dedication to peace are reflected in practical action, in all our internationalist moves, and in the very style of our foreign policy and diplomacy, which are *permeated with a commitment to dialogue*.

This starting point has redical implications for the way in which the Soviet Union relates to regional conflicts and how it co-operates with other superpowers. In this sense *"perestroika"* is of enormous importance to all South Africans.

More importantly, however, the Soviets insist that, to quote a Leverkusen delegate, "[t]he root cause of the changing character of Soviet actions regarding South Africa does not lie in the thorough revision of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as some peple attempt to present it, but above all in the changing situation inside South Africa."

It is in this sense that the Soviet analysis of the prospects for change in South Africa is important. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that there is one single Soviet analysis. Different interests within and without the state have developed different analyses. The key actors are: the Foreign Ministry; the academics located in and outside the Africa Institute; and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which is probably closest to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

There is wide agreement among Soviet experts that the settlements in southwestern Africa signal a major step towards a complete settlement of the

conflict in the region as a whole. This is a view strongly shared by the Cubans and East Germans. Full attention can now be given, they believe, to resolving the South African problem. They are, however, under no illusions about the complexities of the South African situation.

As far as the elimination of apartheid in South Africa is concerned, three options are under discussion: (1) reform from above; (2) the violent revolutionary overthrow of the regime; or (3) a political compromise reached by the principal parties. Assessments of the likelihood of each of these outcomes, of the post-apartheid consequences of each and of how the Soviet Union and the non-Soviet world can influence the course of events, are the substance of current discussions among Soviet policymakers and experts.

A recent influential paper by A A Makarov, a senior Foreign Ministry official, provided a well-informed review of the enormously complex reform policies introduced by the P W Botha administration and of the subsequent patterns of rebellion and resistance that challenged these policies. Makarov concludes that apartheid will not be easily removed either by reforms from above or revolution from below. He states this as follows:

Today the balance of forces in the country is characterised by relative stability: organisationally, politically and militarily the anti-racist resistance movement is not yet ready to topple the regime and capture power, while the regime is no longer capable of curbing the growth of resistance.

Makarov then proceeds to examine four possible future scenarios: "reforms", "consolidation of reaction", "revolutionary overthrow of the regime" and "talks". In the matter of reforms, he accepts that the NP government will go ahead with its repressive reform programme. However, he concludes his assessment by saying that these reforms will at most "rationalize" the existing system of political power. They will not eliminate apartheid's political power structure.

Makarov argues that the prospects for a violent revolutionary seizure of power are slim because the state's coercive power is too great, black opposition is not sufficiently cohesive and organized, incidents of mass action are too spontaneous and limited, and there is no single

united leadership centre. Furthermore the ANC's underground is too weak, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* is no match for the SADF, and the ANC's programme for a post-apartheid South Africa has not been clearly spelt out.

In conclusion Makarov states that, given "the existing balance of forces, talks about the political set-up of a future South Africa are regarded as the most probable alternative solution of the conflict." However, he has no illusions about the prospects of this happening in the near future. He is well aware of the fact that the "ruling elite is clearly reluctant to give in or even share power" and the "ANC and its allies do not have yet enough force to compel the regime to begin meaningful talks."

The Soviets usually guard against premature talks that might result in an unstable and short-lived compromise. They would, then, prefer to see the South African regime come under greater international and domestic political pressures in order to exacerbate the "internal contradictions" to a point at which the representatives of the white establishment agree to participate in meaningful negotiations on the country's constitutional future.

This analysis reflects an important strand in the current Soviet debate on change in South Africa. There are other views that express much less confidence in the prospects of the mass democratic movement's (MDM) mounting sufficient pressure to force the government to the bargaining table. It is from these quarters that talk of guarantees for white minority rights and capitalism have come. They do not, however, carry more weight than the Makarov view.

The most that can be said is that Soviet analysts have now accepted that, *at some point in the future*, there will be a negotiated settlement to the South African problem. There is no serious position that advocates the armed seizure of power. And this means two things: that there is no need for an escalation in the Soviet Union's military commitments to the region; and that an alliance with the NP government in the hope of accelerating reform from above is futile.

It is in this context that Soviet policy-makers are seriously assessing the issue of international co-operation in order to increase pressure on the South African government to accept the need for a

political solution via a negotiated settlement. According to V I Tikhomirov, an Africa Institute scholar, "[t]he only alternative [to a settlement] is the fanning of internal contradictions and their development into a large-scale war, which will and already does affect both the RSA and neighbouring countries. Such developments will jeopardise universal peace and security and, objectively, run counter to the interests of the USSR and USA."

A convergence of approaches towards South Africa does not, however, imply that short of comprehensive mandatory sanctions the superpowers can do very much to influence the course of events. The Soviets (and the Cubans) accept that South Africa is a sovereign state — not one the legal status of which can be internationalized (as was Namibia's), or re-colonialized (as was Zimbabwe). The settlement, therefore, will have to be internally structured and possibly even brokered. There is, however, in the minds of some Soviet analysts, the possibility of a joint approach that could express more formally the convergence of interests. Tikhomirov has suggested a joint US-Soviet declaration:

> The declaration could identify the following principles and objectives, repeatedly and publicly supported by the leaders of the two:
> - Apartheid must be eliminated;
> - Africans should be granted political rights;
> - Neither the USSR nor the USA intend to establish their domination in Southern Africa;
> - South Africans themselves should determine the character and structure of the future state;
> - Neither the USSR nor the USA intend to interfere with the process of settling this conflict with the RSA and they believe that this settlement should be of a peaceful nature. The two powers are prepared to do their utmost for the achievement of this settlement if so required by the South Africans;
> - The USSR and the USA reject all attempts to establish priority of an external force in Southern Africa and express their readiness to recognise the future democratic South Africa as a non-aligned nation and to maintain broad political, economic, cultural and other relations with it;
> - The USSR and the USA declare the inadmissibility of interference by any country and, therefore, express their readiness to act as guarantors of the security system in Southern Africa.

It remains to be seen whether the Bush Administration will be prepared to go this far. It is our opinion that this is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, the USA seems more interested in exploring the benefits of an Anglo-American alliance that excludes the Soviets as direct and active partners. Secondly, there is a view in ANC circles that the Soviets should stay out of a formal joint approach because this will make it easier to discredit the Anglo-American initiative if it goes in the wrong direction.

For some months now there has been world-wide speculation that the Soviet Union is abandoning the ANC and the armed struggle. This conclusion is arrived at deductively and is based on a serious misunderstanding. The argument rests on the assumption that the ANC conceives of change in terms of an "armed seizure of power", that is, the armed struggle taken to its logical conclusion. It follows, on this view, that if the Soviet Union starts talking about the limits of the armed struggle and the need for a negotiated settlement, it must mean that it is distancing itself from the ANC. This argument has not taken into account two things: firstly, the ANC statement in October 1987 which stated its commitment to a negotiated settlement. Since then, ANC spokespersons have repeatedly reiterated their support for a "political solution". Armed struggle is just one of many strategies to reach this goal and not the *method* of transferring power. Secondly, the Soviets have never given any attention to the particular mechanisms for transforming South Africa. When they did, they simply adopted the ANC position — a political solution via a negotiated settlement. This was the message communicated by Yuri Yikalov in a recent edition of *Moscow News* when he said: "The Soviet Union prefers a political solution to the question of dismantling apartheid. The ANC leadership adheres to the same opinion".

The ANC leadership was in Moscow early in March to lodge its most recent request for military assistance. This was granted in full. This is further evidence of continued Soviet support for the ANC, and it calls into question reports that the Soviets are jettisoning the armed struggle. Nor does this contradict the Soviet and ANC commitment to a political solution; the small-scale armaments granted to the ANC in March

cannot be regarded by any stretch of the imagination as part of a grand plan to launch a major insurgency offensive.

There is no *fundamental* difference between Soviet policy and ANC strategy. In the final analysis, the Soviets are well aware of the fact that, given their limited economic and military assets in South Africa, their only long-term guarantee of a role in Southern Africa lies in strengthening their alliance with the ANC. The chances of the Soviets abandoning the ANC are, at most, very slim indeed.

Conclusion

The ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) were banned nearly thirty years ago. Since then, South Africans and the world they live in have changed fundamentally. White supremacy reached its apogee and began its decline; a new generation of black movements emerged to articulate black resistance; Africa went through its "independence" era; and the international balance of power was transformed by new global forces. Now, at the turn of another decade, South Africans are facing head-on what it will take to negotiate a settlement to their world-famous conflict.

This article has argued that the international community has a role to play in creating a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement between the internal South African parties. Their role, however, must be limited to setting the parameters for a settlement rather than intervening to force the opposing parties to accept any one cut and dried "negotiation formula".

Internally, we argued, both the NP and the ANC find themselves in situations where, for different reasons, they are having to formulate negotiation positions. The NP has given up the principle of a divided state and conceded that a new constitutional dispensation must be negotiated with "black leaders". It has not, however, accepted the framework of a non-racial democracy, nor is it prepared to formally consider at this stage the legitimacy of the ANC as a negotiating partner.

The ANC, on the other hand, is prepared to enter into a negotiated settlement subject to certain pre-conditions being met. These pre-conditions, how-

ever, may be too all-encompassing; and not specific enough, either, on what, for example, should be dismantled and how a negotiation process should be organized. How the ANC positions itself in future will depend on which interpretation of the utility of negotiations gains the upper hand. The debate on this issue inside the country, within the ranks of the MDM, will be the most powerful influence on the final policy adopted.

In designing its policy approaches to South Africa, the international community is going to have to take note and reckon with the internal developments we have mapped out. If this is achieved through the acceptance of the "release, unban, dismantle, negotiate" framework, then the emerging international convergence of approaches to South Africa will help facilitate rather than hinder a negotiated settlement to the South African conflict.

Although the actual details of this framework will be refined and change in emphasis over time in response to changing conditions, the four fundamental elements of the framework we have indicated should remain the cornerstone of all international approaches. Different powers may find it necessary of course to deploy different strategies to pressurize different parties (and in particular the South African government) into negotiation. It would, however, be extremely destructive should any foreign power choose to endorse a programme pursued by the NP that deviated from the "release, unban, dismantle, negotiate" framework. In our view some of the most negative courses of action the government is most likely to ask the world to endorse would be:

• Releasing political prisoners into a vacuum rather than into a negotiation process.
• Releasing Mandela and not the other political prisoners.
• Retaining the State of Emergency; or lifting it, but simultaneously achieving the same level of control through existing or new legislation.
• Diplomatic involvement in sub-continental "peace initiatives" and "development work" as a way of winning Western sympathy.
• New rhetorical commitments designed to help the NP buy time and hence delay the negotiation process.
• The setting up of "moderate" black negotiation partners in order to exclude the

ANC, MDM and other groups to the left of the Charterist camp.
• The *de facto* rather than *de jure* unbanning of the ANC.

In conclusion, it is no longer a question of *whether* a negotiated settlement will take place or not, but rather *when* and *on what terms*. In our view, the optimists are incorrect when they talk about a problem-free unravelling of a negotiating process following upon the release of Nelson Mandela. More internal conflict rooted in communities and workplaces, much greater international pressure and a deepening awareness within the NP of the need for a settlement will have to make themselves felt before we move from the current pre-negotiation, position-bargaining phase into a genuine negotiation process that leads to a settlement. The choice of how long this takes and what damage it causes to our economy lies firmly in the hands of the National Party government.

Endnote

1 The authors wrote this paper on the basis of discussions held with representatives of different organizations and governments in the course of a number of conferences and meetings inside South Africa, in various parts of Africa, and in Europe, North America and the Soviet Union. The international conferences and meetings that were attended include:

Europe
• Numerous conferences in West Germany organized by the Friederich Naumann Foundation, the Friederich Ebert Stiftung and the Foundation for Science and Politics.
• Wilton Park conferences organized by the British Foreign Office.
• A conference at Leverkusen, West Germany, of Soviet experts, South African academics and the African National Congress.

United States of America
• Numerous meetings and conferences organized by the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations.
• Various meetings organized by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Other
• A visit to the Soviet Union hosted by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.
• A multi-party conference held in Bermuda hosted by the USA-based Aspen Institute.
• The Dakar meeting.
• The Harare Lawyers' Conference.
• A conference in Harare with academics from ten African countries and ANC representatives entitled "Dynamics of Change in Southern Africa".

Zimbabwe's economy: Problems and prospects

Dr Erich Leistner, Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, discusses the outlook for Zimbabwe's economy.

Zimbabwe's socialist dispensation is often held up as a model for an independent Namibia and a "post-apartheid" South Africa. Since April 1980 Zimbabwe has marched under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, and the experiences of that country are evidently of more than academic interest to South Africans and Namibians.

Naturally it would be unreasonable to expect Mugabe's government to transform the capitalist economy of Rhodesia into a functioning socialist dispensation within nine years — in any event, there is no such thing as a functioning socialist economy.

The problems experienced by Zimbabwe and other socialist states in Africa basically arise from their inability to establish a "humane" economic system with a "just distribution of wealth" without sinking the economy. In other words, they are attempting in vain to reconcile economic progress with their ideas on economic justice.

Mugabe's dilemma: The state cannot create prosperity

One may accept that President Mugabe is serious in professing his belief in socialism and that he is trying to bring it to realization for ideological as well as practical, political reasons.

He aims to establish a Marxist-Leninist dispensation where decision-making on all crucial economic matters will be under political control in order to bring about a drastic redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks; to raise standards of living; to become independent of capitalists — especially foreign capitalists; to put an end to Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa; and last, but not least, to consolidate and strengthen his own position.

After the long and bloody war against the Rhodesian government, the supporters of Zanu (and Zapu) naturally expected concrete rewards, such as land, profitable employment and a better life in general. The substantial increase in the number of pupils; the extension of rural health services; the programme for the resettlement of 162 000 families on farms previously occupied by whites; the considerable growth in public sector employment and government control over wages, prices, etc, must all be viewed in the light of these expectations. Mugabe has reason to fear the political consequences that would result from a significant reduction in current benefits and a failure to meet expectations in general.

True to his Marxist convictions, Mugabe tends to search for the answer to his increasing economic problems in stricter, more comprehensive control by government, rather than in market-oriented policies. Mugabe and his co-ideologues condemn the profit motive and competition, and harbour a paranoic suspicion towards private enterprise and, especially, multi-national companies. Unless re-invested and/or given to employees, all profit is regarded as evil, and payment of dividends to foreign shareholders is viewed in a very negative light.

On the other hand, Zimbabwe is under pressure from businessmen, economists and international bodies, such as the World Bank, to create a more positive private investment climate; to abolish highly irritating measures, such as control over wages, prices, conditions of service, etc, to do away with subsidies to loss-making government corporations; to balance its budget and to rely more on market forces in general.

However, hesitant steps taken by Mugabe in this direction immediately evoke practical and ideological protests. In December 1988, for example, the Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Mr Morgan Tsvangirayi, strongly criticized the government for its alleged desertion of socialism. According to him, 1988 showed an alarming reversal towards capitalism, and the alliance between "reactionary blacks" and "former colonial capitalists" is the source of current corruption, regionalism, tribalism and the revival of racism. He believes that workers are increasingly being sold out to oppression and exploitation by capitalists.

One suspects that ideological objections to capitalist deviations often come from leaders who abuse their position of power to their own material benefit and are therefore especially

anxious to exhibit ideological purity.

In addition to all this, the basic ignorance of most of the political leaders with regard to fundamental economic facts must be borne in mind. To quote a few examples:

- In July 1987, Dr Elisha Mushayakarara, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, announced that Zimbabwe was capable of establishing high-technology industry without foreign assistance, but that problems might arise if Zimbabwe decided to manufacture nuclear bombs.
- Mr Christopher Ushewokunze, a leading advisor on sanctions and the severing of commercial ties with South Africa, in July 1988 reaffirmed the official opinion that international corporations are sabotaging progress in Zimbabwe. On the same occasion a senior party leader of Zanu (PF), Mr Nelson Mawema, declared that appointments in the civil service would in future be made on the grounds of candidates' political background and not on merit.
- President Mugabe rejects a basic truth it took the Soviet Union 70 years to learn: decisions by government on wages, prices and the supply of goods and services can by no means increase wealth and production, even if drastic punishments and an army of bureaucrats are employed.

Only by taking these political, social and personal backgrounds into account, is it possible to comprehend, to some extent, the immense obstacles preventing a country like Zimbabwe from following the economic policy which non-socialists regard as indispensable or, at least, realistic.

Because of his inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of economic progress and socialist ideals, Mugabe's economic policy is unsatisfactory and lacking in direction. The facts presented below leave little doubt that a continuation of current trends will plunge Zimbabwe ever deeper into trouble.

Positive and negative aspects — Quantitative increases and bottlenecks

Zimbabwe has of course not yet reached the catastrophic position of, for example, Mozambique or Zambia, and

hope still exists that President Mugabe will heed the serious warnings of economists, businessmen and institutions such as the World Bank.

In some respects, the country certainly has done well in the recent past: the 1987/88 export values of agriculture and mining rose considerably as against the previous year — the former by about 35 per cent to an estimated Z$1 250 million,[1] and the latter by 25 per cent to Z$814 million; in 1987, exports of manufactured goods rose by an estimated 40 per cent as against 1986; from 1983 to at least 1987 the economy showed a surplus on its foreign trade balance; early in 1988 inflation was down to 8 per cent after standing at 12 per cent in 1987; the service on foreign debt amounted to an estimated 35 per cent of the GNP in 1987, but is likely to drop to 23 per cent in 1989; the annual population growth is officially quoted at "just under 3 per cent" compared with 3,6 per cent a few years ago; in 1988 there were 2,22 million primary school pupils — 35,8 per cent more than in 1980 — and 0,65 million secondary school pupils — nearly eight times more than in 1980.

Closer inspection, however, reveals a less rosy picture. Mugabe attempted to achieve too much in too short a time, with inappropriate means and insufficient manpower and other resources. This has plunged the economy into a structural crisis: practically uncontrolled current government spending and a serious shortage of foreign exchange compound one another. But, as already indicated, the obvious economic course to be followed entails a political and a social price Mugabe is not prepared to pay.

The economy is indeed deteriorating. After the short-lived boom of 1980/81, the mean real economic growth rate was only 1,7 per cent per year whereas the annual population growth rate was approximately 3 per cent.

Government finance — A vicious circle

It was unavoidable that the faith of Zanu (PF) in the state as sole guarantor of social justice and economic progress would bring about a significant increase in government spending. Between 1979/80 and 1988/89 total government

expenditure increased more than five times, from Z$1 049,8 million to an estimated Z$5 361 million. In 1979/80 government expenditure amounted to 34 per cent of the GDP; by 1986/87 it amounted to 43 per cent.

An increase in taxation was unavoidable. Total income, including loans and grants, increased six-fold from Z$674,8 million in 1979/80 to an estimated Z$4 211 million in 1988/89. In 1980 taxes amounted to 22 per cent of the GDP; by 1986/87 this figure had risen to 31 per cent.

The gap between income and expenditure widened from one year to the next — from Z$375 million in 1979/80 to Z$896 million in 1987/88 and an estimated Z$1 150 million in 1988/89 — an increase of 28 per cent as against the previous year. Expressed as a percentage of the GDP, the shortage was 9 per cent in 1987/88. At present it is put at 10 per cent, which is generally considered to be excessive.

Shortages mainly resulted from expenditure on education, defence, subsidies and debt service. In 1988/89 these four items were responsible for an estimated 72 per cent of total current expenditure. The military force kept in Mozambique for the protection of the Beira Corridor alone is alleged to cost Zimbabwe between Z$0,5 and Z$1,0 million per day. High current expenditure is accompanied by exceptionally low capital expenditure by central government, namely 2 to 3 per cent of the GDP.

National debt increased four-fold, from Z$1 843,3 million in 1979/80 to Z$6 999,3 million in June 1988. At present it amounts to 25 per cent of the GDP. This increase brought about a drastic rise in interest payments — from Z$140 million in 1981/82 to Z$764 million in 1988/89, a growth of 446 per cent within seven years. Foreign debt increased nearly seven-fold between 1979/80 and June 1988: from Z$414,8 million to Z$2 825 million.

Zimbabwe's budget deficits and, more particularly, the way in which current expenditure is financed by means of loans, contribute substantially to inflation. Debts thus incurred do not increase the country's productive assets and are consequently not self-redeeming. As a result, debts have to be serviced from current income and export revenues — to the detriment of the

productive sectors of the economy whose revenue-generating capacity is seriously impaired by this devolution of scarce resources.

The shortages of goods and services created in this way, lead to an inflationary rise in prices and weaken the exchange rate of the Zimbabwean dollar. The consequent rise in import costs also fuels inflation. Zimbabwe is therefore caught in a vicious circle of budget deficits, inflation and a lack of foreign exchange. An inflation rate of at least 15 per cent is expected for 1989.

Investment — Ideological aversion to free enterprise

Already during the UDI period, Zimbabwe's infrastructure of roads, railways, telecommunications, etc, as well as machinery and equipment in the agricultural, mining, manufacturing and construction sectors had steadily deteriorated because, due to the shortage of foreign exchange, no spares could be purchased and outdated equipment could not be replaced.

After 1980 foreign exchange was in even shorter supply and this, together with numerous other factors, has substantially contributed to the decline of gross investment in fixed assets from 20 per cent of the GDP in the early 1980s to the current 15 per cent. These are, however, mainly investments to replace obsolete assets. In the mid-1980s net, which is to say new, investment was estimated at only 4 per cent of the GDP.

In order to achieve a satisfactory growth of the national product, net capital formation should equal at least 25 per cent of the GDP. Without economic growth there can be no increase in employment.

Numerous other factors, apart from foreign exchange shortages, deter investors. Firstly, the official attitude towards private and especially foreign investments is negative. The tortuous and indifferent bureaucratic process, together with the hostility towards private investments often expressed in official statements, suffice to deter interested parties.

Secondly, the broad spectrum of government regulation of prices, wages and employment conditions entail great and incalculable risks for producers. By

prohibiting a rise in prices regardless of increasing costs, government often causes enterprises to suffer extensive losses. The fact that even totally unsatisfactory employees may only be dismissed with ministerial approval naturally also dampens employers' enthusiasm.

Thirdly, present investment conditions appear most unattractive to foreign business. These conditions include, _inter alia_, regulations governing the repatriation of capital, transfer of dividends, tax on dividends, limitations on loans, draconian control over foreign exchange, the absence of tax incentives and Zimbabwe's firm refusal to become a member of OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation). (Ironically, Zimbabwe requires Mozambique to sign guarantee agreements before Zimbabweans are allowed to invest in Mozambique.)

Because of the fear that a class of black capitalists may be created, even small businessmen come up against a negative attitude.

As a result of all this, new investments are rare and, on balance, disinvestment is actually taking place. For example, it has been calculated that the assets of the mining sector have decreased at an average real rate of 3 per cent per year since 1981, and that, if this trend continues, the mining industry will disappear within 20 years. Foreign exchange problems in particular play an important role in this regard. The production losses consequently suffered by this industry in 1987 are estimated at Z$50 million.

In addition, there is a constant outflow of private capital. For the past two years this is estimated at Z$100 million, compared with a _total_ inflow of private capital of Z$50 million since 1980. It is expected that the drastic measures announced by the government early in 1989 to curb this outflow will have the desired effect, but will also make the prospect of investing in Zimbabwe even less attractive.

Foreign investors who owned assets in the country prior to September 1979, especially, suffer great losses when they withdraw. If they want to pull out over a period of six years, they have to sell their assets at a discount of between 33⅓ and 80 per cent of the net value and invest the proceeds in special bonds at 4 per cent per annum. In case of shorter withdrawal periods, the discount is between

80 and 90 per cent, depending on the value of the assets.

Local as well as foreign businessmen have for a long time urged the government to revise the conditions governing foreign investment and generally to improve the climate for private enterprise. Promises in this regard had already been made for quite some time by Dr Bernard Chidzero, Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. However, the government's ideological aversion to private enterprise, together with resistance from trade unions, students and ideologues delayed any action up to May 1989, when an important investment conference compelled the government to take a stand. That conference, under the auspices of the British Confederation of Industries, had already been postponed once on account of the government's wavering attitude.

The new Zimbabwean investment guidelines released just prior to the conference, were welcomed by business but condemned by the country's trade unions and others. The London _Financial Times_ described them as "a modest step in the right direction, though one that will achieve little on its own." Businessmen in general were agreed that the measures are an improvement on the 1982 investment code but that the government still had to prove its earnest by the way it implemented both the measures and its promises to revise the current price, wage, trade and other controls.

The Students' Representative Council of the University of Zimbabwe described the new code as "an entrenchment of capitalism, a sell-out move that has heavily compromised the ideological standpoint of the government and hence signalling the complete shelving of the socialist agenda."

Three significant improvements in the new guidelines may be noted. These are the decision to establish a one-stop Investment Centre designed to streamline the process of investment approvals; the decision to join the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Miga) and negotiate bilateral investment protection agreements with foreign governments; and a range of minor measures aimed at relaxing financial constraints.

The Zimbabwean government seeks to reassure investors that their investments

will be secure and profitable. Thus, Dr Chidzero has stated that "There is no inherent contradiction between socialism and market forces", or that the announcement of the new investment guidelines "is not an event but the beginning of a process". Mr Mugabe himself has publicly acknowledged that his incomes and prices policy had contributed to the slow economic growth and high levels of unemployment, and that his government recognized "the need for a more rational and market-oriented method of determining prices and incomes."

However, all this fails to dispel the aura of ambivalence surrounding Zimbabwe's economic policy, not least because the government is still clearly anxious to control the economy and continues to create new and overlapping state enterprises and institutions.

Economic relations with the outside world — Curtailment of imports results in an acute shortage of commodities

The economic well-being of Zimbabwe is largely dependent on foreign trade, which amounts to about 50 per cent of its GDP. The country's major exports are primary products, especially tobacco, sugar, cotton, gold, asbestos, ferro-alloys, nickel, iron and steel. Gold plays a leading role and represented Z$439,9 million, or 18,6 per cent, of total exports in 1987. Manufactured articles are also exported on a relatively large scale and amounted to 39 per cent of the total exports for 1987.

Total exports in 1987 amounted to Z$2,37 billion, an increase of 9,3 per cent as against the previous year. In 1988 exports increased by approximately 20 per cent, but this was largely the result of an 80 per cent increase in the price of tobacco and better prices for metals. In real terms there was no significant increase in exports since 1980.

With its contribution of 20,8 per cent to Zimbabwe's total imports in 1987, the RSA was by far the most important supplier, compared with the 11,5 per cent of Britain, the 9,4 per cent of the USA and the 8,7 per cent of the German Federal Republic. With regard to Zimbabwe's exports, the RSA came third with 8 per cent, after Britain (10,5 per

cent) and West Germany (8,3 per cent).

The coincidence of stagnant exports and particularly large payments on foreign debt from 1986 to 1988 led to an acute shortage of foreign exchange and forced the government to cut back drastically on imports. This had a negative influence especially on imported equipment, spare parts and other materials required by the manufacturing industry.

In addition to those referred to above, a few other consequences of foreign exchange shortages can be mentioned. In 1988 there was a 25 per cent shortage of essential medicines countrywide, which in the rural areas was as high as 48 per cent and contributed substantially to a serious malaria epidemic. (In July 1988 alone the epidemic resulted in more than 200 deaths.) These shortages were a major contributing factor in the unprecedented strike of about 300 hospital doctors in June 1989.

A general shortage of sugar in shops was caused by insufficient importation of packaging material. The inability of factories to import spare parts leads to shortages of bricks, cement and other building materials. In 1988 the insufficient importation of calcium carbide resulted in a shortage of acetylene.

All Zimbabweans who are able to visit South Africa or Botswana do their shopping in these countries. In 1988, 140 008 persons spent Z$63,2 million on these shopping trips, compared with the Z$36,4 million spent by 80 807 persons in 1987. The majority of the shoppers were women.

All sectors of the economy are directly influenced by the shortage of locomotives and goods carriages, of which a big percentage is out of order because of a lack of spare parts and qualified mechanics. Tobacco exports are expected to decline in 1989 as a result of the inability of the railways to deliver the coal required for the tobacco drying-kilns.

Agriculture — The rise of the small farmer

The contribution of agriculture and forestry to the GDP dropped from 15,2 per cent in 1985 to 10,9 per cent in 1987. However, apart from the manufacturing industry (which contributed 31,2 per cent of the GDP in 1987), it remains the

mainstay of the economy, accounting for about 28 per cent of exports and providing a livelihood for the majority of the population. Nearly 25 per cent of the work force in a modern economy finds employment in this sector.

More than 40 per cent of arable land is worked by 4 500 commercial farmers, of whom all but a few hundred are whites. More than half the population — 800 000 families or approximately 5 million people — find a livelihood in the so-called communal sector. This sector compares poorly with the commercial sector in respect of soil quality, rainfall and communication links.

The gross value of production in the commercial sector was Z$1 313 million in 1985 as against the Z$614 million of the communal sector, which produces mainly for own use. Sales from the communal sector's cattle herd of 3,66 million animals in 1986 amounted to only Z$24,4 million — about a tenth of the Z$224,3 million yielded by commercial farmers' sales from a herd of 1,91 million animals.

The extent to which black commercial farmers contribute a growing share of total output is one of the success stories of Zimbabwe. These farmers now supply more than half the cotton crop and sales of maize, and are also producing increasing amounts of tobacco. This is mainly the result of attractive producer prices and a substantial increase in credit facilities and extension services.

In contrast, the growing number of people and animals in the communal sector leads to progressive depletion and overgrazing of the soil, and hence to serious soil erosion and deforestation. Attempts to ease the pressure by relocating 162 000 families on farms previously owned by whites, have until now led to the resettlement of only some 50 000 families, but have been responsible for spreading subsistence farming over a greater area.

In normal rainfall years Zimbabwe is self-sufficient with regard to foodstuffs and is able to export food. It is, however, prone to the same problems as South Africa: droughts, insect and other pests, fickle markets, and so forth.

Mining — A dwindling asset

Mining contributes about one-third of total exports, but its share in the GDP is

only 5,5 per cent (1987 figure). Since independence, production has stagnated or declined, largely as a result of production problems caused by shortages of foreign exchange as well as the unfavourable investment climate which discourages prospecting and new developments.

If the output volume of 1980 is taken as 100, the production of asbestos in the first quarter of 1988 equalled 75,9; that of gold 123,6; chrome ore 94,2; coal 160,1; copper 55,3; nickel 56,8; and the total for all minerals 96,0. Rising world market prices and the declining exchange rate of the Zimbabwean dollar did, however, result in an increase in the value of mineral production (of which 90 per cent is exported), from Z$414,8 million in 1980 to Z$699,4 million in 1986. During 1987/88 sales of the official Mineral Marketing Corporation amounted to Z$814 million — an increase of 25,2 per cent compared with the previous year.

Manufacturing industry — Operating below capacity

Apart from South Africa, Zimbabwe has the biggest, most advanced and diversified manufacturing sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1970 this sector has been responsible for more than a quarter of the GDP. The UDI era, especially, led to a spectacular extension of local manufacturing. Thanks to drastic protective measures the number of locally manufactured industrial products increased from 600 in 1965 to about 6 000 in 1982.

In 1984 it was estimated that local products accounted for 96 per cent of the country's total consumption, whereas consumption goods constituted on average 20 per cent and investment goods 50 per cent of imported products. A wide range of goods is exported, including textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture, machinery, radios, television sets, batteries, electric cables, cement, iron, steel and pharmaceutical products.

This sector is particularly hard hit by foreign exchange shortages and the unfavourable investment climate. Because of the serious shortage of imported spares, inputs and machinery, but also as a result of the shortage of skilled manpower, the sector is operating at an

average capacity of between 60 and 70 per cent. In the packaging industry, which imports 72 per cent of its inputs, capacity utilization is as low as 50 per cent. State controls on some 7 000 different products often squeeze the profit margins of manufacturers.

This state of affairs creates uncertainty, undermines confidence among employers and employees, leads to inefficiency, poor quality products, waste, increased production costs and diminished profits. A publication of a Zimbabwean bank recently warned that the country's reputation on the international market will be under an increasing threat unless production capacity is brought to a satisfactory level by means of considerable investments.

It is understandable — but also ironic — that numerous industrialists resist a reduction of protective measures which would expose them to foreign competition. In this regard they are therefore well in step with the socialist policy of the government.

Employment and standard of living — Long-term retrogression

Socialists claim that the capitalist system benefits only a small minority, to the detriment of the majority of the population, and that only socialism can ensure prosperity and a decent existence by assuring a just distribution of wealth.

Whatever the reasons — and there are and have been many problems — the fact remains that today, after nine years of socialism, the average Zimbabwean is economically worse off than during the Smith administration. Real average wages have fallen and unemployment exceeds 20 per cent.

In 1986 (the most recent available figures) the real GNP per capita, expressed in constant 1980 prices was Z$476, Z$10 less than ten years previously, when it was Z$486. This drop was the result of a 31 per cent population increase (6,49 million in 1976; 8,5 million in 1986) as against a 28 per cent increase in real GNP (Z$3 159 million in 1976; Z$4 046 million in 1986).

Expressed in absolute terms, the total real consumer spending of private individuals even dropped between 1976 and 1986, from Z$2 046,9 million to

Z$1 906,2 million. Expressed per capita it was a drop of nearly 29 per cent, from Z$315 to Z$224. It is interesting that the consumer price index for urban families in the lower income groups showed a greater increase since 1980 than that for more affluent urbanites in the same period, that is, 284,4 (1980 = 100) as against 266,2, in July 1988.

The inability of the economy to provide paid employment for the growing population is one of Zimbabwe's most pressing problems. Apart from an estimated one million communal farmers, between 900 000 and one million persons out of a total work-force of more than 3 million are unemployed. Whereas only eight to ten thousand new job opportunities are created each year, the number of school leavers increase substantially. In 1988 there were 100 000 school leavers, a figure set to rise to 300 000 per annum in the early 1990s, including 156 000 persons in possession of a Higher or Lower Cambridge Certificate.

In September 1985 (most recent published figures), 1 036 400 people were employed in all sectors, compared with 1 050 200 in 1975. However, this virtually unchanged figure conceals a decrease of about 99 000 in agriculture, 7 000 in mining and 24 000 in domestic service. The same period saw the following increases: 44 000 in public administration, 55 000 in education and 17 000 in the manufacturing industry. Total employment figures for sectors other than agriculture were 818 200 in March 1987 compared with an average of 682 900 in 1980, which indicates an average increase of about 19 300 per annum.

Prospects for job creation are of course closely related to the rate of investment in productive assets. It has already been indicated how the unfavourable investment climate has led to the almost complete cessation of new investments.

On the positive side, the significant increases in the number of pupils attending school or other educational institutions, should be mentioned. Between 1980 and 1988, registrations at primary schools increased by 35,8 per cent to 2,22 million, at secondary schools by 771,5 per cent to 653 000, at colleges of education by 457,7 per cent to 15 750, at technical colleges by 623,7 per cent to 25 104, and at the University of

Zimbabwe by 311,0 per cent to 7 699. Teachers' training, however, has not kept pace with the increase in pupils, with the result that the number of pupils per teacher has increased significantly whereas the standard of education has dropped.

Although health services have seen considerable physical extension since 1980, standards have seriously declined and it is still largely the urban population that does benefit. Services are provided free of charge for those with a monthly income of Z$150 or less. (In 1988 the general statutory wages were Z$182 per month and those for domestic workers were Z$100.) In 1988/89, Z$293,3 million or 5,8 per cent of the budget was allocated to health services, compared with the Z$984,8 million or 19,6 per cent allocated to education.

According to the Zimbabwean Medical Association, there has been a massive loss of doctors since independence, and nearly all who graduated between 1980 and 1987 have left the country. This, together with maladministration and inefficiency in the administration of hospitals, as well as the shortage of foreign exchange, have created a deteriorating situation.

Life expectancy rose from 51 years in 1970 to 57 years in 1985, whereas the infant mortality rate of 103 per 1 000 live births in 1965 dropped to 77 per 1 000 in 1985. Until recently, population growth for the period 1985–1990 was estimated at 3,5 per cent per annum, but it is now officially put at 2,8 per cent per annum for 1987 and 1988 although some observers give 3 per cent.

However, the progress made with regard to education and health does not compensate for the deteriorating economic position of the population at large. Increasing discontent prevails among the unemployed youth, former guerilla fighters and students experiencing financial problems, leading to anti-government demonstrations and open criticism. According to recent estimates five out of every seven former guerilla fighters are unemployed.

In addition, there are more and more revelations of leading personalities enriching themselves through bribery and other unethical practices. The so-called Willowgate scandal, which involved ministers and other prominent figures who obtained new motorcars at a favourable price and sold them illegally at a much inflated price, was the most recent manifestation of increasing arrogance and abuse of power. Add to this the government's inability to meet its promise to resettle 162 000 families and it becomes clear that Mugabe has reason to be concerned.

Prospects — A change in official orientation is needed

The Zimbabwean economy probably holds the best development potential of all black African countries. But if the current unfavourable investment climate persists there is no hope of significantly exploiting this potential. On the contrary, indications are that if current trends continue, the vast majority of the population will be facing increased poverty — with unpredictable social and political consequences. The main economic problems can be summarized as follows:

High population growth and increasing unemployment, a political climate discouraging private investment, deteriorating physical infrastructure, an obsolete manufacturing industry, inauspicious long-term prospects for raw material exports, a shortage of highly skilled manpower, the limited market for manufactured articles in other African countries, an inert and increasingly inefficient civil service, serious shortages of foreign exchange and built-in inflationary pressure. The fact that Zimbabwe is landlocked and is furthermore experiencing serious problems with its transport routes through Mozambique complicates matters yet further.

Against this must be viewed the relatively large variety and scope of Zimbabwe's agricultural and mineral products, its comparatively diversified manufacturing sector, and its small but competent numbers of commercial farmers, entrepreneurs, technicians and professionals. Ultimately the significant expansion of education and training is bound to contribute towards alleviating the shortage of trained manpower.

Much depends on government policy and, more specifically, on whether or not sober economic insight will gain the upper hand over socialist ideology. If this were to happen, the problems outlined above would not simply vanish, but they would be addressed much more effectively than at present.

However, the prospect of economic realism cannot be viewed too optimistically because, as Mr Jaycox, the World Bank's Vice-President for Africa, has recently remarked, it is extremely difficult to get African countries to identify the likely course of events well in advance and to act accordingly. Meaningful measures are usually only taken once the country has hit a crisis. To quote his words: "In almost every case, a country has gone right to the edge, or even fallen over the edge, before it has taken an adequate structural adjustment program."

It will certainly be to the advantage of South Africa too if a neighbouring country and valuable trading partner such as Zimbabwe approaches its problems realistically, instead of destroying its economy through misplaced ideological fervour.

In this respect, Zimbabwe's announcement earlier in 1989 that it intends to buy a sophisticated air control system with missiles, fighter planes and radar equipment valued well in excess of Z$200 million from Red China, is not encouraging.

1 The mean rand equivalent of Z$1 was as follows: 1986: R,3144; 1987: R1,1611; September 1988: R1,2805.

The ports and oil terminals of Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon

Denis Fair, Senior Research Fellow at the Africa Institute, describes the ports and oil terminals of the west coast of Africa.

The story of oil in the fortunes of those countries along the west coast of Africa from Angola to Nigeria has been a remarkable but fickle one — raising hopes excessively at one time and bringing disappointment at another. Moreover, a new dualism has entered into the pattern of maritime traffic in these countries. The older general cargo seaports are now matched by a new set of oil terminals, both onshore and offshore, which handle export volumes far surpassing the traffic passing through the older ports. Of the three countries dealt with here, Nigeria ranks first as sub-Saharan Africa's chief oil producer, with Gabon and Cameroon third and fourth, respectively, after Angola. In terms of population, Nigeria is the giant with an estimated 108 million people in 1988 compared with Cameroon's 11 million and Gabon's 1,25 million.

Gabon and Cameroon were both part of the former French Equatorial Africa and gained their independence in 1960. In 1961 the southern part of neighbouring British Cameroon was added to the French territory, which is now the Republic of Cameroon. Politically, both Gabon and Cameroon have been relatively stable. They still maintain close economic links with France and are members of the French franc zone. They have, however, widened their contacts with other western countries and, as signatories to the Lomé Convention, with the European Economic Community (EEC).

Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. Its political history since then has been marked by five coups, a civil war (1967–70) and both civil and military governments. Its international trade links are wide-ranging. For all three countries crude oil is the major source of both their export earnings and government revenue, both rising to unprecedented levels when the world price of oil reached $35 a barrel in 1982, but suffering severe economic setbacks when it fell to $14 and less in 1986 and 1987. By early 1989 the price had recovered somewhat, with Nigeria's well-known Bonny Light crude fetching $18 a barrel.

Nigeria

Oil was first produced in Nigeria in 1958, and by 1974 foreign export earnings had nearly doubled with oil accounting for 92 per cent of the total. Oil prices on world markets quadrupled in the early 1970s and real growth in the Nigerian economy reached 29 per cent per year in the period 1974–1978. Oil export earnings reached a peak of $25,7 billion in 1980 following a peak output of 2,3 million barrels per day (b/d), or about 115 million tons per year, in 1979. Since then, however, with increasing competition from other sources, notably North Sea oil, and the dramatic fall in oil prices, production has declined more recently to a steady 1,2 million to 1,5 million b/d, or about 60 million to 75 million tons per year. Foreign earnings accordingly

slumped in 1986 to $6,6 billion, or to one-quarter of what they were in 1980. Nevertheless, in 1987 oil still accounted for 94 per cent of Nigeria's export earnings and for 75 per cent of federal revenue. Consequently, comments *Abecor*, the domestic economy is "under severe pressure .... and the international oil market will continue to dominate economic prospects".

Oil production

Nigeria's 158 oil fields and some 600 oil wells are scattered throughout the Niger delta and immediately offshore. Of 73,2 million tons of crude produced in 1985, 22,5 million, or 31 per cent, came from offshore fields. Development of these resources has been difficult and costly, partly due to the complex geology and the relatively low productivity per well. Moreover, the civil war seriously retarded both exploration and output. However, the oil is of high quality, Bonny Light being particularly well known, and has a competitive advantage over many other producing areas in its comparative proximity to its main markets in Europe and North America.

Present oil reserves and those anticipated from new exploration give a total of about 20 billion barrels, or approximately 2,5 billion tons, meaning a life of some 30 years at current rates of production. Natural gas also occurs in vast quantities, but apart from some domestic use and a new pipeline supplying the gas turbines of the Egbin power station near Lagos, most of this goes to

waste. However, other uses are contemplated, notably a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Bonny near Port Harcourt. The state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) oversees the country's hydrocarbon sector and has equity sharing arrangements with numerous foreign oil companies, which assist both in oil production and exploration. The Shell company accounts for about half of output while the American companies Chevron, Mobil, Gulf, Phillips and Texaco as well as the French Elf and Italian Agip companies are well represented.

The oil terminals

Before the oil boom Nigeria's economy and international trade were primarily agriculturally based, with its traditional commodities, cocoa, palm produce, groundnut produce, cotton and rubber constituting the bulk of exports. Exports and imports passed through Lagos and Port Harcourt and five minor ports, Sapele, Burutu, Warri, Degema and Calabar. After 1958, however, it was the rise of the oil terminals which came to dominate as outlets of maritime trade.

Numerous pipelines carry the oil from both the onshore and offshore fields to refineries, storage areas and to export terminals. In 1985 out of a total production of 73,2 million tons of crude, 56,2 million tons, or 77 per cent, were exported. There are seven terminals where tankers load. Like other Nigerian ports, all are controlled by the Nigerian Ports Authority. From west to east, the first terminal is off the mouth of the Escravos river and is operated by the Gulf Oil Company. One mooring point in shallower water accommodates tankers of up to 20 000 dwt while a second in deeper water takes vessels of up to 350 000 dwt. The second terminal is Forcados, operated by Shell Petroleum and Development Company of Nigeria. A 22-km pipeline extends out to sea from the coast to a production platform and thence to two moorings from which vessels of between 45 000 dwt and 254 000 can load. The third terminal is Pennington, located some 30 km off the mouth of the Fishtown river, one of the Niger distributaries. It is operated by the Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Company. Tankers of up to 250 000 dwt load by hose from a floating storage

vessel, the Olibiri of 272 535 dwt.

The fourth is the Brass terminal, 22 km off the coast from the town of that name. It takes tankers of up to 300 000 dwt loading from floating hoses. It is operated by the Nigeria Agip Oil Company and was opened in 1973. The fifth and sixth terminals are the Bonny inshore and offshore points. The largest volumes of Nigerian crude are loaded here from tank farms connected by pipeline to the oilfields and operated by Shell. The inshore terminal, originally opened in 1961, is close to the port of Bonny on the east side of the river of that name. A 32-km submarine line from the shore connects to two offshore loading points which take tankers of up to 300 000 dwt. The Qua Iboe (or Kwa Ibo) terminal was completed in 1971 and enabled six new offshore fields to be opened up. It is operated by the Mobil Producing Nigeria Company. The loading point lies 36 km offshore of a storage tank farm.

Since drilling rigs and production platforms also occur offshore, particularly in the neighbourhood of the Escravos, Bonny and Qua Iboe terminals, tankers have to proceed with caution and require pilots to board them as they approach the loading terminals. Interesting is the fact that some of the old "oil rivers" ports such as Bonny, Brass and Forcados which derive their name from exporting palm oil in the early days are now Nigeria's main mineral oil exporting centres.

Two oil refineries in the delta are situated at the waterside. The one at Okrika near Port Harcourt was completed in 1965 and damaged during the civil war. A second was built at Warri in 1978 and a third at Kaduna in northern Nigeria was commissioned in 1983. All the refineries are owned by the NNPC. At the two delta refineries coastal and small ocean-going tankers are able to come alongside for loading. About 9 per cent (6,5 million tons in 1986) of crude oil production is retained at these plants for domestic use but, since they are operating below capacity, substantial amounts of crude are refined abroad in order to meet domestic needs. In view of this shortfall, extensions to the Warri refinery are in progress. In addition, a fourth refinery opened near Port Harcourt in early 1989 for the local supply as well as the export of petroleum products.

General cargo ports

Lagos and Port Harcourt established an early dominance over their hinterlands in the history of port development in Nigeria. The building of the western railway line, now reaching beyond Kano in the north, was commenced from Lagos in 1895. The original breakwaters at the entrance to the harbour were constructed between 1907 and 1916. In 1916 the eastern line was started from Port Harcourt, itself established in 1912, and joined to the western line in 1927. In more recent times roads have come to play a much greater part in the transport of Nigeria's goods and passengers — so much so that 95 per cent of this traffic goes by road, with the focus mainly on the two major ports.

Like Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire, Lagos harbour is situated on a lagoon sheltered behind an offshore sandbar. Access to the sea is through a narrow gap in the bar and the entrance is protected by two breakwaters or moles. The port comprises two main dock areas. The first, Apapa, lies adjacent to the Apapa industrial estate and has direct rail and road connections with the rest of the country. Some cargo in transit to and from neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon passes through the port. The Apapa quays have been expanded over time and now have a total length of over 4 000 metres. They are capable of accommodating up to 20 general cargo vessels at one time and in addition have substantial berthing and handling facilities for container and roll-on roll-off ships. Tanker terminals and a new oil jetty provide facilities for bunkering and the distribution of petroleum products while coal, gypsum, clinker and fertilizers are handled at ore and bulk cargo berths. In the 1970s the expansion of the economy necessitated a major extension of the port to Tin Can Island, situated immediately west of Apapa on one of the many creeks associated with the lagoon system. Ten berths are available here for ocean-going vessels, three of which handle container and roll-on roll-off cargoes. Lagos harbour also has a large dockyard and a modern floating dock with a lifting capacity of 4 000 tons available for ship repairs. Expansion of these facilities is envisaged.

Port Harcourt is situated on the Bonny river estuary 65 km from the sea. Passage to the harbour is kept dredged and is well marked with buoys and

⊙ Offshore oil terminals

beacons. The quays with 13 berths have a total length of some 1 800 metres and include berths for general cargo, for loading coal and palm oil and for petroleum products and bunkering. Transit traffic to and from Chad and Niger passes through the port. Port Harcourt was originally established to handle coal from the Enugu field 200 km to the north but the oil era transformed it into a modern general cargo port and Nigeria's third largest industrial centre.

In 1950 the dominance of Lagos and Port Harcourt was such that they handled 63 and 17 per cent, respectively, of all Nigeria's incoming and outgoing maritime tonnage. By 1960 Lagos was handling 72 per cent of all import traffic and 34 per cent of exports, the latter being mainly cocoa, groundnuts, palm kernels and cotton. However, as the Nigerian economy came to depend more and more on oil, the export of agricultural commodities declined absolutely and all non-oil exports fell to only 671 000 tons in 1986 compared with an oil export of 56 million tons. Lagos's contribution fell to less than one per cent of all oil and non-oil exports. In fact, in one month export cargo through the Apapa docks at Lagos fell from 340 000 tons in February 1988 to only 21 000 in March.

By contrast, as the economy strengthened in the oil era Nigeria's imports swelled from 2,7 million tons in 1960 to 15,4 million in 1983, with Lagos accounting for 80 per cent of that total. Since then, collapsing oil prices have so depressed the economy that total imports fell by 40 per cent to 9,2 million tons in 1986. Of this reduced total some 75 per cent continue to enter through the port of Lagos.

Of Nigeria's smaller ports, Sapele is the site of the African Timber and Plywood company's plant; Warri handles much of the import needs of the oil industry and is close to the Aladja steel-works; and a new port was built in 1979 at Calabar, on the river of that name 67 km from the sea. The new port serves the local area and has six berths totalling 860 metres capable of handling ocean-going vessels. The Niger river and its tributary the Benue are navigable as far as the Kainji dam and the town of Makurdi, respectively, and a river fleet serves those towns and districts accessible to the river ports.

Resulting from the oil boom, congestion at Nigeria's ports reached critical proportions in the mid-1970s. In 1975–76, over a period of seven months, no less than 200 ships daily were waiting for berths at Lagos. Riding on that boom, government invested heavily in the late 1970s and early 1980s in its roads, railways, airports and seaports, seen for example in the Apapa and Tin Can Island extensions to Lagos harbour and new projects at Port Harcourt, Warri, Sapele and Calabar. However, after 1980 government began to cut down on imports and controlled more rigidly the number of ships calling at its ports and, especially after 1983, when the economy began to deteriorate, activity at the ports subsided further. The number of foreign ships calling fell from 3 664 in 1983 to 1 949 in 1986. Moreover, there have recently been no major additions to the capacity of the ports and rehabilitation work and some major projects have been postponed or abandoned. A proposal for a new federal seaport east of Lagos has been dropped. A new ocean terminal was commenced at Onne near Port Harcourt but construction has been halted. New dry docks envisaged at Port Harcourt and Burutu have been postponed. It is to be expected that economic fortunes will change when dependence on a commodity as volatile as oil becomes excessive, but also in Nigeria's case, the *Economist Intelligence Unit* comments, many opportunities created by the surge in oil wealth in the 1970s have been wasted.

Cameroon

Cameroon's oil output in a peak year such as 1985 was only one-eighth that of Nigeria's. But its importance to the country's economy, nevertheless, is such that export earnings from oil reached $1,43 million, or 67 per cent of the total, in that year. Unfortunately, with the slump in oil prices, earnings fell heavily to $783 million, or to 52 per cent of the total, in 1986. Cameroon's other main exports are coffee, cocoa, timber and aluminium. To its government's credit it has used its income from oil, representing 23 per cent of government receipts in 1987, to maintain and to develop other sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, unlike Nigeria and Gabon which have tended to neglect this sector since the advent of the oil era.

Oil production and export

Oil production commenced only in 1977, after the French Elf Serepca company discovered a payable deposit in the offshore Kole field in the Rio del Rey basin near the Nigerian border. By 1982 output reached 4,7 million tons and when further fields were opened up by Elf and other companies it reached a peak of 9,2 million tons in 1985. A fall to 8,4 million tons was registered in 1987 with production little changed in 1988. Identified unexploited reserves are estimated at about 74 million tons, which at current and projected levels of exploitation will last ten years at most. The state hydrocarbons corporation (SNH) offers foreign oil companies incentives much less attractive than those offered by Cameroon's neighbours. Elf, for instance, receives only 18 per cent of the output from its production-sharing agreement with SNH compared with 92 and 77 per cent, respectively, received in Gabon and Congo. Until a more favourable incentive from the Cameroon government is forthcoming, exploration and development by foreign oil companies is likely to remain minimal.

The Kole loading terminal for Cameroon's oil is about 50 km offshore. Single buoy mooring in a depth of 30 metres is available to tankers of up to 250 000 dwt, although the more usual size is 120 000 dwt. Loading is done from two floating storage tankers by a floating hose line. Cameroon exports 80–85 per cent of the oil produced, so that export volumes have steadily increased from 4,9 million tons in 1982/83 to over 7 million in 1987. The remaining output, 1,5 million tons in 1987, is taken by the national oil refinery (SONARA) located at Cape Lomboh, near Limbe. It commenced production in 1981, runs at about 75 per cent of its capacity and meets most of Cameroon's domestic requirements for petroleum products, with spare output available for export to the neighbouring states of Chad and the Central African Republic.

Oil has also been discovered onshore to the south at Edea, while gas has been found in the north and in the south offshore of Douala and of Kribi. Plans were prepared some years ago to establish a plant for the manufacture of liquefied

natural gas (LNG) at Kribi, but the project has been shelved since reserves are not as large as previously thought and the cost is unjustified in the present economic climate.

Douala

Douala is Central Africa's largest and busiest port. It accounts for 97 per cent of Cameroon's seaborne traffic, with a number of small secondary ports accounting for the remainder. It is situated on the estuary of the Wouri river and is joined by bridge to the adjacent banana port of Bonaberi. Douala can accommodate the largest cargo vessels used in the West African trade. The port is well equipped. It has a quay frontage of 4 000 metres, including 9 general cargo berths, a coastwise shipping berth, and a berth for handling aluminium and coke. There is also a timber dock and substantial fish-loading and refrigeration facilities. It is the only Central African Atlantic port between Luanda and Port Harcourt with full container and roll-on roll-off facilities, allowing three vessels to be accommodated. It has a two-berth tanker terminal for the off-loading and storage of petroleum products and a berth for companies involved in offshore oil research and drilling.

Recent developments at the port include a new ship repair yeard and a floating dock with a capacity of 10 000 tons. West Germany assisted in the funding of the dock, which came into operation at the end of 1988. There are only limited facilities for ship repair between Dakar in Senegal and Cape Town in South Africa, so this new development will be of considerable importance to West African shipping. A major expansion programme was commenced at the port in 1980, aimed at raising its capacity to 7 million tons per year.

Traffic through Douala doubled in the period 1975 to 1985 to 4,4 million tons. In 1985 part of the upsurge in traffic was caused by the importation of large quantities of food destined for Cameroon's drought-stricken neighbours, Chad and the Central African Republic. Since 1985 traffic through the port has stagnated due to the termination of the food aid programme and to the government's restriction on imports following the downturn in the economy as a result of falling oil revenues. Thus in 1986 tonnage handled was 4,23 million tons and in 1987 3,7 million. Of this traffic only 25 per cent was exports (0,983 million tons), nearly half of which was logs and sawn timber and the rest mainly cocoa, coffee, cotton and aluminium, reflecting with other commodities Cameroon's fairly diversified export economy. Imports comprised 75 per cent of the total traffic and included a wide variety of commodities including petroleum products and clinker.

Douala is served by two main railway lines. One is a short line of 172 km which taps the coffee and banana growing areas of West Cameroon. The other is the central line, or Transcameroon, running through Yaoundé, the capital, and on to Ngaoundéré 886 km from Douala. Until 1964 the line ran only to Yaoundé, and the 623 km extension to the present terminus was constructed in the ten years to 1974. More recently the difficult escarpment section between Douala and Yaoundé was realigned and much of it rebuilt. This has cut travel time between the two towns to three hours and has facilitated the transport of heavy goods — cotton and other commodities from the pastoral north, timber and cocoa from southern Cameroon, imported bauxite to, and aluminium from, the smelter at Edea situated a little inland from Douala, and fuel for distribution to the interior. In addition to the improvements to the railway, a new bitumenized highway between the port and the capital was completed in 1985. These developments have been complemented by the opening in 1987 of a new railway station at Douala capable of handling 12 000 passengers a day and meeting freight demands up to the year 2000.

Secondary ports

Cameroon's two small seaports handled only 134 300 tons, or 3,5 per cent of the country's seaborne trade, in 1987. Of the total, the overwhelming bulk was timber exported from Kribi, 150 km south of Douala. Limbe, west of Douala, handled mainly the Cameroon Development Corporation's export of palm oil, but this traffic has fallen off heavily in recent years. Of the 1 750 tons handled in 1987 most was fish. However, the development of a deepwater port at Limbe has been talked about for some years, although of immediate interest has been the establishment there of an industrial fishing project with Italian financial backing. The port is to be improved, the fishing fleet expanded and a canning and processing factory built. The work should be completed in three years and most of the output will be for the domestic market.

Cameroon has one river port, Garoua on the Benue river, in the north of the country. Being on a tributary of the Niger, the port's traffic is entirely with Nigeria. Between 1980 and 1985 traffic came to a halt as a result of drought and the closure of the border with Nigeria, but it picked up again to 3 500 tons in 1987. The port operates only during the rainy season.

Ambitious plans were put forward in recent years to develop a new deepwater harbour at Grand Batanga just south of Kribi. The idea was to exploit iron ore reserves in the vicinity and to establish the LNG plant. In addition, a 1 100 km railway from the new harbour to the neighbouring landlocked Central African Republic was also envisaged. However, these projects have little chance of implementation in view of the current economic climate and their questionable economic viability, although the government continues with feasibility studies on the harbour project and with a possible rail link from Grand Batanga and Kribi to the Douala-Yaoundé line. For the foreseeable future recent and present improvements and expansion at Douala should be able to cope with the bulk of Cameroon's seaborne trade.

Gabon

Gabon's dependence on oil as its chief source of revenue is as great as that of Cameroon. In 1984 export earnings from oil reached $1,7 million, or 84 per cent of the total, but fell by half to $0,87 million in 1987, or 69 per cent of the total, even though output remained constant at around 8 million tons per year. This fall in the oil price had a serious effect on government earnings, with its receipts from oil falling from 57 per cent of its total income in 1985 to only 30 per cent in 1987.

Oil production

Oil was first exported from Gabon in 1957. Offshore fields account for 95 per cent of output. Production reached a peak of 11,3 million tons in 1973 but has

since remained at the more modest level of 7,5–9,0 million tons per year, of which 90–95 per cent is exported. Continuing exploration both offshore and onshore and the opening of new fields should raise output to more than 10 million tons in the 1990s. Fields recently discovered now place Gabon's proven recoverable reserves at between a conservative 60 million tons and a more optimistic 140 million, giving the oil industry a life of at least ten years.

In 1982 Gabon instituted equity sharing agreements with foreign oil companies and at present production is concentrated in four main areas. The first is the Port Gentil region, operated by Elf Gabon, comprising the French Elf Aquitane company with 54 per cent of the equity and the state of Gabon with 25 per cent. This area accounted for 76 per cent of the country's crude oil production in 1987. Company profits fell by more than 60 per cent in 1986 as the price of oil sank. The second area is centred on Setté Cama and Gamba where Shell Gabon is the main operator producing 8 per cent of output in 1987. The third, also Shell Gabon, at Mayumba produces 7 per cent and the fourth area, operated by Amoco Gabon, is at Oguendjo producing 9 per cent.

Exploration by numerous foreign companies continues in both onshore and offshore locations. A large new onshore area bounded by the coastal towns of Omboue and Setté Cama and the inland town of Mandji has yielded promising results. One section, the Rabi-Echira-Kounga field, commenced production in early 1989. It is the largest deposit ever discovered in Gabon and will be worked jointly by Elf Gabon and Shell Gabon. It will not only raise Gabon's recoverable reserves substantially but it will also compensate for steadily falling reserves at Gamba and Mayumba. Moreover, onshore exploration is also proceeding in the north of the country southwards from the border with Equatorial Guinea to a line through Port Gentil and Lambarene.

The oil terminals

Gabon's main loading terminal for oil is at Cap Lopez at the tip of the peninsula of that name and a few kilometres north of the town and commercial harbour of Port Gentil which overlooks Cap Lopez bay. In 1986 some 6 million tons of oil was loaded at Cap Lopez, where tankers

Lighters unloading cargo at Libreville, Gabon

of up to 250 000 dwt can be accommodated. A network of pipelines feeds to the terminal from the offshore fields. Two other terminals at Gamba and Lucina (Mayumba) are situated 270 and 290 km south, respectively, of Cap Lopez. At Gamba a submarine pipeline connects the terminal to an offshore mooring, where tankers of up to 130 000 dwt can load. At Lucina tankers of unlimited draft are loaded via a submarine pipeline from a 75 000 dwt floating storage tanker. When in production, oil from the newly discovered field inland of Omboue and Setté Cama will be pumped by pipelines, on the one hand, 210 km northwards to Elf Gabon's Cap Lopez terminal and, on the other, 130 km southwards to Shell Gabon's Gamba terminal. The Cap Lopez pipeline is now completed and the terminal is being enlarged.

Port Gentil and Owendo

Port Gentil, Gabon's oldest port, now has a population of some 60 000. It was previously a shallow-water lighterage harbour, but new deepwater berths have since been built which can take vessels of up to 20 000 dwt. A main function of the port is the servicing of the oil industry. An oil refinery is also located here, processing 515 000 tons of crude in 1986 and supplying petroleum products to the domestic market as well as limited amounts to neighbouring African markets. The port has long been important also as a timber loading centre, logs

being floated down the Ogooue river and either exported or manufactured into veneer and plywood. Cargo handled by Port Gentil is small compared with the tonnage exported through Cap Lopez. In 1986 only 145 000 tons was loaded for export and 165 000 tons unloaded.

Libreville, the capital, with a population of 250 000, is situated on the northern shore of the Gabon river estuary. Its harbour is small and used only for coastwise trade, river barges and trawlers. Ocean-going ships are accommodated at Owendo, 16 km upstream. Construction of a deepwater port at Owendo commenced only in 1969 and foreign cargo ships used the new port for the first time in 1974. However, the volume of cargo handled at Owendo has been modest. In 1985 only 448 000 tons of exports were loaded, mainly timber and timber products, and only 704 000 tons of imports unloaded. But Owendo has taken on a new significance as the port for the new Transgabon railway, which was opened in 1986. The railway links Owendo to the Moanda manganese mines near Franceville in eastern Gabon. The total export of the mineral of some 250 000 tons per year is at present transported by aerial cableway, 76 km in length, across the border to Mbinda in neighbouring Congo Republic. From there it goes via the Congo-Ocean railway to the port of Pointe Noire for shipment overseas.

However, a minerals loading facility

has now been built at Owendo for handling Gabon's manganese exports. The project has been underwritten by Gabonese and international interests. This development will transform the port significantly and in time will raise the total traffic handled to over 3 million tons annually. In the immediate future, however, it is unlikely that the export of manganese via Pointe Noire will summarily cease. Agreement has been reached between the two governments to continue routing possibly half of the manganese via that port, at least for the time being. Owendo will become increasingly important also as a timber loading port since the building of the railway has opened up new areas of forest in eastern Gabon.

A project which could have a considerable impact on the growth of Owendo is the development of the Belinga iron ore deposit in the northeast. The Chinese have shown an interest in building a branch line to Belinga from the Transgabon railway at Booue. The project, however, is unlikely to be economically feasible for some years in view of the cost and the unattractive prices at present for iron ore on world markets. In fact, 15 years ago Gabon considered building an entirely new minerals port at Santa Clara on the coast northwest of Libreville to handle the ore from Belinga. But the rail link from Booue to Belinga was never built and the development of the port and the mine was abandoned.

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Tenancy and black freehold: Dimensions of history and authority in Natal

C R Cross, Lecturer in the Department of Development Administration and Poli-
tics at the University of South Africa, and Prof E M Preston-Whyte, of the Centre
for Applied Social Sciences: Department of African Studies University of Natal,
Durban, examine the historical background to black freehold and tenancy in Natal
and speculate on the extent to which tenant-landlord relations and expectations
may have contributed to the 1985 violence in Durban's shack communities.

Discussion of land reform in South Africa[1] has begun to sharpen its focus as the prospect of abolishing the Group Areas Act draws increasing debate. One issue clearly within its field of view is that of tenancy, the practice of renting land or accommodation from a landlord. Historically, tenancy played a major role in the brief ascendancy of the black agricultural sector in South Africa, but landlord-tenant relations today are overwhelmingly residential rather than agrarian. In his thought-provoking discussion of future prospects for the restructuring of land access in South Africa, Alan Mabin comments,

> The prospect is before South Africa of large areas of land both in and outside the bantustans being brought into new patterns of private ownership. . . . That prospect probably means the spread of tenancy at rent, kind, and labour over a substantial area . . .".[2]

Mabin further notes that despite the widespread assumption that labour and rent tenancy is dead, it is in fact reappearing in the Transvaal; while in Natal it seems never to have wholly disappeared. At the same time, present tenancy on white farms is probably insignificant when compared to the extent of the

black landlord/black tenant residential tenancy in both urban and rural communities in many parts of the country. In addition to the huge informal settlements of the Transvaal which partly determine the outlines of Mabin's discussion, a vast horseshoe of informal black settlements surrounds Durban, with a dense population now rising to a million or more. Others are found in the Cape. A high percentage of these peri-urban people are site-renting or room-renting tenants of black or Indian landlords. Numerous other black South Africans live as tenants in so-called "black spots", rural properties now or formerly in black ownership that are usually densely occupied.

Mabin comments that the pattern of ownership most likely to emerge from any repeal of the Land Acts in present conditions of land ownership could well result in a widespread reversion to tenancy as large numbers of black citizens regain access on this basis to what is presently "white" land.[3] He adds,

> From the point of view of the low-waged, un- and underemployed, the possibility exists that tenancy on private-owned land will provide the only relief

for members of families presently existing on over-crowded reserve semi-urban settlements.[4]

Tenancy arrangements in Third World contexts are usually seen as potentially or actually unjust, and rural tenancy structures have often provided the occasion for land reform. In South Africa landlord-tenant relations have often been tense, and in the last five years have contributed to violent unrest in the shack communities around Durban. Set against this, the principle of freehold land reform is popular with both black and white interests, and is widely seen as carrying the potential for justice in any resolution of the land question.

This argument is likely to prove oversimplified. Freehold and tenancy are closely connected; their relationship therefore needs to be fully debated in its local significance, and the entire process of tenancy as a type of settlement system needs analysis. Past accounts have laid stress on the role of the state and its white constituencies — acting through the notorious Land Acts and other legislation — in creating and promoting tenancy by restricting independent

black access to land and agricultural markets. On the other hand, it is possible that if the system is closely studied it may turn out to contain other elements. Tenancy, even of the residential, black landlord/black tenant variety, is probably not entirely a product of population pressure on the limited land available to blacks: likewise, more may be involved in the transaction between tenant and landowner than the rental contract and profits from rent.

Tenancy of the residential type also appears as a part of the total pattern of black settlement systems in South Africa, and it is suggested here that tenancy between black tenants and black landowners assumes an unspoken social contract. For the landlord, the acceptance of tenants can establish a personal following and create micropolitical questions of authority relations. But to the tenant, the pre-existing understandings that cluster around land and settlement in black South African society may imply that he, the tenant, is entitled to make certain claims on the landlord. And as some or all of these social understandings are disallowed by either side as the tenancy relation moves further into the modern sphere and becomes formally contractual, new contradictions can reveal hidden tensions and the potential for violence.

Focussing on black/black residential tenancy, this article examines some of the historical data on landlord-tenant relations and attempts to relate this material to the prevailing expectations held under different settlement systems. By looking at two case studies of tenancy systems under severe stress — Roosboom at the time the community was removed, and Inanda during the violent disorders of 1985 — it may be possible to locate more exactly tenancy's inherent points of conflict. From this analysis, authority relations and tenant expectations emerge as possible contributory causes of the 1985 unrest in Durban's shack communities.

Historical insights: The roots of tenancy

The Natal data suggest that there is a significant link between black freehold land and the widespread appearance of the landlord-tenant relationship. This

connection has its roots in the past, in historic patterns of land distribution and agrarian enterprise. It is here that residential tenancy has its roots, in private black land originally bought for agricultural production, but now almost entirely rented to tenants who support their families by wage work.

Any consideration of how this transition took place needs to begin by asking why landowners began to take on tenants in the first place, and also why they continued to do so beyond the point at which it began to interfere with their own agricultural operations.

Black freehold land in South Africa came into being when the black peasantry, the class of market-oriented small producers originally described by Bundy,[5] took on depth. As such peasant farmers, whose output served the white population of colonial Natal in particular, took over a share of the produce market and accumulated money and assets, the opportunities associated with full control of the means of production seem to have led an entrepreneurial few to move out of tenant status, or off traditional land, into the property market. A small percentage emerged as landowners, often with the support of missionaries who enabled their communicants to take up mission land on a freehold basis.[6]

According to the _Surplus People's Project_, some 0,24 per cent of the freehold land allocated in Natal was in African ownership by 1870. The _SPP_ authors comment that this land, minutely small in area, was the basis for a "radically different form of land tenure within African society". It was this land that became the asset base of a new African landowning class.[7]

Black landowners and peasants in the 19th Century

The trend to African land purchase could not continue. As white farmers and the colonial government moved against this new and successful black farming class, the land-buying process was first slowed and then stopped. Natal's white settlers ". . . finally achieved responsible government in 1893 and immediately began to use their new political clout to restrict Africans' access to land . . . . In the 1890s the mission reserves were closed to individual ownership and in 1903 the Lands

Department was instructed to refuse all African bids at sales of Crown Land . . .".[8]

The results were inevitable. The _SPP_ continues:

> From the 1890s the pace of purchases began to slacken and then fall off, with foreclosures on sales of African-owned lands to whites beginning to equal new purchases. This relative decline in African land ownership coincides with the decline in the fortunes of the African peasantry of which it was a part.[9]

From this situation, however, there emerged the black landowning class, a highly dynamic element in the unfolding history of African settlement. At the same time, with the African peasantry collapsing, the landlord-tenant relation quickly became dominant on black freehold farms.

> On the freehold lands a new kind of landlord-tenant relationship was developing within African society. It seems that already by the early 20th Century African landowners were taking on rent-paying tenants in lieu of producing agricultural goods for an elusive market. There were two inter-related factors at work — the inability of black farmers to compete on the market . . . and the growing pressure on land within the reserves, which was driving more and more landless people to look for alternatives elsewhere . . . .[10]

The authors of the _SPP_ report calculate, on the basis of 1916 Beaumont Commission figures, that tenants and their families made up roughly two-thirds of the people living on black freehold land at that time, and note that the "extreme subdivision that characterizes many black spots today" had not yet appeared, so that agricultural production for sale and for subsistence was probably still the main activity of these farms. They doubt that by 1916 this still held true.

In addition, _SPP_ comment draws attention to the increasing pace and scale of evictions of black tenants from white farms which began during the last part of the 19th Century and continued with irregularly rising fervour into the 20th — and to the growing population density in the inadequate black reserves. The _SPP_ interpretation suggests that acting as a "catchment" for the increasing numbers of the black dispossessed was becoming one of the chief roles of black freehold land.

Beinart, and also Beinart and Delius

writing jointly in their recent compilation *Putting a plough to the ground*,[11] also comment on black landlord-tenant relations on black freehold land. Discussing the origins of black freehold, Beinart and Delius do not specifically link tenancy to the collapse of the African peasant venture:

> African land purchase was a highly varied phenomenon. There were few who could purchase whole farms, or sizeable portions, outright, although . . . there is evidence of investment in farms by the wealthier salaried members of the African population. More often, land was purchased through chiefs, who raised money from their people and held the land in trust, or through a missionary. Alternatively, a group of wealthier families would combine resources to purchase land and distribute it in unsurveyed, undivided shares. Whatever the method of purchase, the tendency was for African landowners to let their land to tenants and claim rent, rather than to farm extensive tracts themselves.[12]

Speaking of East Griqualand, Beinart also comments that whether freehold land was bought by individuals or small groups, the landowning position was linked to political authority and standing. Some farms were bought by small groups of immigrants, who usually had or acquired followers or dependants, and others by chiefs or "headmen" for their followers.

But Beinart also defines a third major category of land buyer: private buyers who purchased land either as individuals or individual families, or in a partnership arrangement with a small number of associates. Some of these men, Beinart observes, were "established headmen" as well as landowner-farmers. In the examples he quotes, these men were well in with the colonial administration, which paid them for official duties, and had also involved themselves in a number of profitable activities including both farming and transport. Drawing on an official communication by the Umzimkulu magistrate, Beinart notes that the magistrate implies that such landowners ". . . were keen to maintain their positions as headmen, no doubt because this gave them political authority as well as additional income from trying petty offenses and claiming settlement fees . . .".[13]

Beinart further observes that the Mount Currie magistrate referred to the

Table 1
POPULATION DENSITY ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF AFRICAN LAND, 1916

	Reserves	Mission lands	Native-owned	Crown land
Population per sq. mile	50,08	88,3	67,11	32,89
Morgen per unit occupied	6	3,4	4,5	9,1

Source: *Beaumont Commission Report*, p 5, reproduced in Surplus People's Project *op cit*, p 35.

small number of black landowner-farmers in the district as "an aristocracy among the other Natives", and adds that the magistrate ". . . was probably applying the term for its connotations of class rather than blood" because, while some of these headmen came from chiefly families, many were self-made men — and very wealthy.[14] Here class in its economic connotation may not have been the magistrate's only meaning; power relations in an almost feudal sense would be consistent with the picture he draws. Land ownership and residence rights were evidently elements in the total context of authority arising from black/black tenancy. Beinart's discussion of East Griqualand suggests that such landowners probably enjoyed substantial personal followings among the families under their official and unofficial control.

Beinart comments on the economic processes that gave rise to the landlord/tenant situation in a light somewhat different from that in which it is seen by the *Surplus People's Project* authors; and his information on the settlement process also illuminates the relations between settlement and power. While farms held by chiefs "were communalized fairly rapidly", effectively passing into traditional indigenous tenure, those held,

> . . . by a small number of individuals soon became quite densely populated. Such land was usually parcelled into 'undivided shares' — that is, shares that did not involve a full subdivision registered at the deeds office, but made by private agreement which might at least later be noted and surveyed by a local surveyor. These shares could initially be large, covering some hundreds of morgen, with very much more land available to the owners than to the occupiers of communal tenure locations. But room had to be found for sons, and African landowners also sought to raise cash for mortgage repayments by selling further land as undivided shares. Moreover, at the same time as ownership became

more dispersed, landowners also took on rent tenants — a secure means of income with which to pay interest even in bad years. Some of the wealthier African landowners did retain considerable areas for their own use and operated as large-scale peasant producers or small labour-employing farmers. But pressure on them to give sites for new settlers, as well as pressure to pay back mortgages, began to change the nature of their enterprise. Immigrants were allowed in because they had to pay a settlement fee.[15]

In other words, Beinart sees tenancy as a strategy on the part of black landowners to obtain a source of income more consistently reliable than farming, and relates it particularly to the demand and risk created by freehold mortgages: "The total number of farms purchased by Africans through these years is difficult to assess and some had to forfeit property when they failed to meet mortgage repayments."[16]

Beinart's analysis, however, opens up further possibilities.

Inside the black peasantry: Tenancy dynamics

Beinart's discussion, taken together with the data collected by the *Surplus People's Project*, sets the stage for a consideration of the structural dynamics of tenancy under South African conditions past and present. Structural-historical determinants, both economic and social, but perhaps broader in scope than some prior accounts have suggested, may be coming into focus. There is little question that the evictions and removals documented by the *Surplus People's Project*, dating from a time when more than half of Natal's black population lived on "white" land in the mid-19th Century, were the immediate driving force behind the very dense occupation of black freehold land. But analytically distinct questions concerning the underlying determinants of the

tenancy phenomenon also emerge.

The data reviewed here seem to suggest that tenancy did not wait for the peasantry to enter decline before making its appearance. Beinart's account of East Griqualand in particular would appear to open up the possibility of there being other contributing factors in tenancy's spread on black freehold land.

Over-generalizing for the purposes of analysis, the points made by these authors suggest that black South Africans were buying land on one of two general systems:
- *For residential purposes chiefly*, as tribes, groups, or syndicates, when the resulting form of tenure quickly came to resemble the traditional system of indigenous settlement and occupation.
- *For farming primarily*, as individuals and/or small groups operating as independent family units, when successful farming operations often resulted — but when, at the same time, residential tenancy (or at least clientship arrangements) may also have occurred in some form or other from an early stage.

On private freehold land, underlying conditions appear to have been present for creating a settlement system different from that under the traditional form of tenure. It is possible that economic factors may have encouraged some tenancy from the outset. From early on, successful landowner-farmers may have tended to become local "big men" in the sociological sense, able to dispense patronage and perhaps employment, and use these resources to build up clientships or followings which might in some ways become economically productive. Starting from a totally different base but facing the same population pressures, and operating on the edge of the older land ethic, the system which emerged was in some respects the shadow opposite of the white version of "farming with people". Where on white farms black tenants were taken on to do the actual work of production, on black freehold farms tenants may have been admitted in order to serve as an economic balance wheel compensating against the risks of the arable farming carried on by the landowner as the family enterprise: that is, as an alternative regular cash source helping to offset the risks of mortgage demands and of crop failure by bringing in settlement fees and rent.

Tenancy of the sort we have described on black freehold farms in the 19th Century may at the time have been economically effective and rational in terms of current arable farming risks. But the residential tenancy system which emerged carried the seeds of arable farming's destruction. As black farms became increasingly dominated by residential tenancy, arable production was crowded out. White farmers taking on black tenants boosted production; but black farmers doing the same thing were in the long run cutting down their productive opportunities.

Tenancy as a solution to agricultural risk was therefore rational for black peasant farmers only up to a point. That it persisted and increased past this point seems to have been only partly because of agrarian problems. It suggests that tenancy also had internal dynamics of its own.

Over time, this second system of black private landholding also moved closer to the principles of traditional settlement, finally becoming a residential settlement system run on informal lines. But it remained different at base: it continued to depend mainly on private cash relations rather than on alliance or fealty.

Many of the historical reasons for this having happened are clear from some of the excellent discussions of the period now available.[17] For the most part, such accounts seem to relate the increase of residential tenancy on black freehold farms to the action taken by the South African government of the day to counter the success of black farming and the competitive threat it posed to the attempts of white farmers to enter and dominate arable production, and to the economic decline of black production for the market which resulted. But it can also be suggested that, white farmer protection aside, conditions were clearly ripe for the development of a rental market in residential land for blacks. Black freehold was virtually the only land available to support such a market, so rental uses would inevitably come into conflict with arable farming demands. The eventual victory of residential uses would then be almost inescapable in terms of land use economics — the relative returns from renting and from farming.

Of course, the issue may not be so clear in actual fact. Additional questions arise concerning the expectations of the black population of the time in relation

to systems of land use and control: that is, the land ethic. It is possible that landholders may not have been able to make purely economic decisions on whether or not to accept ever more would-be tenants. Beinart, for one, mentions "pressure" on landowners to give land for new settlers.[18] And the existence of a large floating population of the dispossessed is clear from all sources.

The nature of this pressure deserves further consideration. We need to know more of the tacit understandings under which it was exerted. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, such pressure from society may have given the move to tenancy an urgency of its own. And this in turn raises questions of how completely even the richer freehold farmers or peasants were able to separate themselves from the societal roots of the pre-industrial land system. Further detailed work will certainly be needed to illuminate more fully the extent to which tenancy took hold only on peasant farms which were already losing their economic viability; and to set this against the possibility of tenancy's having itself contributed to the black peasantry's decline — and alternatively, in its earlier stages, to the black peasantry's survival.

The question is potentially important in the light of Mabin's argument that tenancy systems may dominate South African production in a post-apartheid context. If he is right, the black/black tenancy systems which had their origins in the later 19th Century appear likely to have a very significant bearing on the future destiny of the South African land system. In particular, the relation of tenancy to questions of social institutionalization and authority relations looms significantly somewhere in the not too distant future. The following section begins to examine the proposition that residential tenancy systems may be both attractive and inherently unstable in terms of authority relations. And, likewise, that future appraisals of black tenancy need to take into account not only economic and demographic but also sociological factors rooted in the lifeworlds of landlords and tenants alike.

Tenancy on black freehold in modern Natal: Power relations

Leaving the historic origins of the landlord-tenant situation and coming to the

problems of the present day, certain questions arise. What characteristics mark the relationship between black landlords and tenants, and what are its implications?

It needs to be remembered that this type of tenure is demonstrably very widespread today in black freehold areas, and particularly, but not exclusively, in densely-settled modernizing areas. Bundy quotes estimates of some 350 "black spots" in South Africa in the 1960s: 250 of them, covering some half million acres, were in Natal. Bundy confirms the tendency of title-holders to subdivide their land and lease to tenants, citing figures showing that nine "black spots" in Natal in 1958 ". . . carried about 30 000 people, of whom some 1 100 were title-holders, and the majority tenants".[19] In 1982, the *SPP* counted 231 surviving black freehold properties, but did not note the number of tenants. Indian-owned land also has many tenants, and church-owned lands in Natal carry considerable numbers. Daphne and Davidson report that something like 30 per cent of church-owned land is utilized by tenants — altogether about 4 000 people.[20]

In written evidence laid before the Buthelezi Commission in 1981, C R Cross discussed an unpublished CASS study of a freehold community in the Shongweni area:

> What is reported . . . . is that the actual title deeds to plots of freehold land only rarely changed hands through sale. Instead, freed of any concern over possible expropriation or any other form of effective community pressure, landowners leased out their land to tenants in such a way as to produce a profit-yielding model of the classical neighbourhood cluster, while bequeathing their landholdings to their heirs in much the same way as under 'communal' tenure. Interviews carried out in connection with our own project, with respondents who were born and raised on privately-owned black farms confirm the trend of the Shongweni data.[21]

Similarly, the Interim Report of the Select committee on Land Tenure in KwaZulu remarks generally of private black farms held in freehold, ". . . many have degenerated into overpopulated squatter camps . . . . It has been argued by most owners that due to the lack of funds to invest . . . he finds himself forced to take on a few squatters in order to make ends meet . . . until his original

wish to return to the land to work it is sometimes not realized."[22]

Whether this is in fact the chief reason for the spread of tenancy, or merely the most presentable reason when dealing with an investigating committee, is an open question. Turning to areas close to Durban, Jenkins and his associates found tenancy dominating the freehold areas investigated: at Amawoti 70 per cent of respondents were renting, and at Georgedale 88 per cent. Of Amawoti, they explain, ". . . landlords who have illegally subdivided their land enhance their position and status in relation to residential power which is measured by the number of people who owe allegiance or fall into a patron-client relationship."[23]

Further, "Land in Amawoti is thus primarily used for shack-farming, and has been a source of wealth generation for both legal and illegal landowners."[24] For Georgedale, they trace shack-farming back at least to the early 1940s, and add, "The apparent reason for encouraging the growth of shack dwellers in the area was in order to supply a market for the local stores owned by the freehold landlords."[25] On the landlord-tenant relationship at Georgedale, they state again:

> The same trends regarding landlords acquiring power are observed here as in Amawoti. The landlord has replaced the induna and is consulted by his tenants for help in solving various problems. The importance of the landlord is enhanced by the number of people he controls. The more land he owns, the more tenants will be occupying the land, thus the more rent, the greater power acquired.[26]

Drawing on data from the 1983 Inkatha Institute survey, Fourie reports that for the entire region of shack settlement covered by the sample (which included both freehold and traditional tenure areas) site-rental tenancy, technically "tenancy at will", is the most common of the prevailing informal tenures (Table 2).[27]

On these figures, the outright purchase of a residential site, even as an informal transaction, is not the rule in densely-settled areas; it is relatively uncommon at 15 per cent overall. Outright purchase is less frequently encountered than some form of traditional land right (27 per cent) and is far less frequent than tenancy of the site-rental type, which appears as the more or less dominant form of tenure in these areas today. The

Table 2
TENURE FORMS ENCOUNTERED IN SHACK AREAS

Church-allocated freehold land	5%
Informal purchase of house and land	2%
Informal purchase of land only	13%
'Squatting'	5%
Traditional tenure	27%
Site-rental tenancy (tenancy-at-will)	47%
	n=669%

study also shows that tenancy-at-will is so uncommon in areas under "tribal" or traditional tenure as to be "insignificant". In other words, site-rental tenancy only occurs on freehold land, and not to any major degree on land under the modernizing forms of indigenous tenure.

While this situation is undoubtedly related to population pressure in the freehold dense-settlement areas, McCarthy also notes the sizeable profit potential of urban tenancy,[28] and Preston-Whyte reports that rents on freehold land at Indaleni are rising sharply, and are now well above the costs of obtaining "communal" land.[29] At the same time, the fact that this landlord-tenant relation was not normally found in the densely-settled areas under modernizing indigenous tenure also suggests that population pressure is not the entire picture — that the underlying form of legal tenure is a major factor in defining the way informal tenures develop.

Both in urban shack areas and the rural context, landlords seem to function in an authority role, but the implications of this situation are not simple. As McCarthy notes, the authority role of landlords did not maintain order or suppress outbreaks of violence and intimidation in the recent unrest in Durban's shack communities.[30] The effectiveness of authority relations between tenants and landowners may be contingent on a number of factors; and it appears that considerable tension and strain also enter into the relationship.

A case study in tenancy under stress: Landlords and tenants in the Roosboom removals

Elliot Mngadi, an upright man, a long-time opponent of removals and injustice

and himself a landowner, throws some light on the landlord-tenant relationship when he writes of the removal of his own freehold community at Roosboom near Ladysmith, and the internal tensions that were part of the process:

> As a result of what happened, because of the Local Health Commission, a rift was caused between landowners and tenants. Seeing that the tenants had no stake in the land, as far as they were concerned it was better to go than to stay at a place where they could not make extensions for their children. For them — the quicker they went, the better: the sooner they were removed, the better.

> For the sake of those who are not clear about tenants, let me explain how that comes about. In fact, you will find that on any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. The reason is this: for instance, I am Mngadi and I own, let's say, 50 acres of land. I have my house and my fields, I plough the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farmworker . . . he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: "Please brother, if you can just give me an acre at the corner of your farm". Out of sympathy I do that.

> Instead of looking for an alternative farmer to take him on, this man goes to Johannesburg to work . . . and I have no way of kicking him out. This man is just there — and that's how these people get on to our farms. They are not invited to come. A question of making business from them does not come into it at all. For instance, the rent at Roosboom was R12 a year. This continues until you find yourself on this 50-acre farm with 20 tenants, each paying you R12 a year. You are not making any money out of them: they have deprived you of your land. You can't make a living there, so in turn, you also go to Johannesburg to work.

> That's why on any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. For instance, at a meeting I attended at Jononoskop last year, I was surprised to find that there are about 300 to 400 households in the area, but only 17 of them are landowners. When the government removes the people, they use this division. The authorities call a meeting without differentiating between tenants and landlords. They simply ask: "Are you happy here?" If the tenants have had trouble with their landlord: "No, no, we're not happy". "All right, we've come to offer you a good farm elsewhere. Now, those who would like to go there raise your hands". I've already explained, 300 against 17. The 17 landowners, since they don't want to

leave their lands, won't raise their hands. But the rest — the majority — do, and in a democracy they say, majority rules. So then the authorities start to go ahead with the removals.[31]

Mngadi's account in effect puts the case from the landlord's standpoint. From their viewpoint, landlords are extending help to the tenants out of sympathy, and receiving little in return. When a crisis arises and tenants respond in terms of their own interests just at the point when the landlords feel in need of support and a united front, the landlords feel betrayed. But seen through the eyes of the tenants the situation is very different. The comments of one of Cross's respondents on the landowner on whose farm she had been born expressed resentment (to put it mildly) at being so completely in his power: "Our landowner! We respected that man the same as God! We went on our knees to him and had to do whatever he said."[32] This tenant's remarks, and those of others from the same freehold area, suggested that the behaviour of the entire land-owning family had appeared to the tenants as authoritarian and extreme.

In addition to asserting that profit as such was a relatively minor factor in rural black/black tenancy, Mngadi's account also implies that such rifts between landlords and tenants of the type described were a regular occurrence. The *SPP* supplies specific confirmation on this point.[33]

Cross comments that in a tenancy context on freehold land a landowner may be able to:

> . . . operate in the authority role of a chief, rather than a neighbourhood-cluster head . . . he is also able to behave more arbitrarily and obtain extreme forms of respect, should he wish to do so, as a function of his absolute title to the land he rents to his clients and followers. At the same time these clients do not enjoy the same independence and security under private leasehold that land holders do under 'communal' tenure: some families were reported to have lived on these farms for three generations without obtaining private land of their own.[34]

This problem of ultimately acquiring ownership does not seem to be serious under indigenous tenure regimes. In the indigenous system, ". . . continued occupation of a leased or rented plot tends to gradually transfer control to the occupier under traditional tenure . . . a

continuing mutual obligation is established, and if not cancelled the transfer of rights slowly jells into permanency", thus automatically providing a client family with independent land rights after an understood lapse of time.[35] The implication would appear to be that tenants may resent not only their subordinate position, but also that on freehold land this situation will be continued permanently, across generations. As Mngadi's account confirms, the point about not obtaining sovereign land rights is important: it helps to locate potential landlord-tenant tension in the issue of expectations and entitlements, as well as in authority relations. This issue will reappear later in our analysis. At this point, it would seem to lead the discussion to another issue raised by McCarthy, that concerning the possible establishment and perpetuation of an inequitable class structure under urban freehold.

The authors of the *Surplus People's Project* concur implicitly with Mngadi, attributing the spread of tenancy on black freehold land to the historic role of black freehold in South Africa as a "catchment" for dispossessed people; as noted above, they describe this function as "one of the most significant characteristics of contemporary black spots". By implication, however, Beinart, Cross, McCarthy, and Jenkins *et al* might not wholly agree, as they cite additional economic and micro-political reasons why tenancy may also have taken hold on privately-owned black land. These issues of authority and patron-client relations, in relation to the expectations of the tenants, may turn out to be significant in determining the subjective content of landlord-tenant relations. By extension, they may also underlie some of the stress that seems to occur.

Tenancy and violence in modern Natal: Social attitudes in Inanda

The question of authority relations again introduces the 1985 violence in Durban's shack communities. These informal communities have been studied twice: first by Schlemmer and his associates two years before the disturbances,[36] and again by Sutcliffe and

Wellings, who were requested by local landlords to look specifically at landlord-tenant relations in the six weeks immediately before unrest broke out.[37] The disagreements between the two studies are puzzling, largely because they are not much greater than they in fact appear to be.

Schlemmer found the shack communities very deeply frustrated at matters such as housing and their environment, but not militant, and not issue-focussed in a political context. Schlemmer interpreted this response as suggesting a somewhat passive shack population possibly seeing themselves as better off than they might be, and argued from this that shack communities could be seen as "safety valves" in the rural-urban nexus. Sutcliffe and Wellings' later inquiry found frustration — presumably the same frustration — at living conditions, and finally attributed the intervening unrest to this frustration. Although unemployment had worsened in the period between the two studies and may have contributed to a higher crime rate, the data do not seem to have pointed to any one particular factor foreshadowing the explosion that ended the study.

The main difference between these studies may have been in interpretation: Schlemmer saw the mood in the shack areas as one of patience, while Sutcliffe and Wellings' interpretation, written after the violence, drew attention to evident dissatisfaction and potential anger. Neither study pinpointed any particular cause for the violence other than unemployment, harsh conditions on the urban fringe, and the general blight of South African politics. Even with hindsight, without further direct study it is clearly impossible to explain the disturbances as a whole. On the other hand, there must be other contributing factors, especially in connection with the otherwise unexplained violence directed against landlords.

Schlemmer reports that landlords were resented,[38] while Sutcliffe and Wellings specifically report that tenants liked them, and had few problems with them.[39] These findings appear to contradict each other: if people liked their landlords, then why turn on them? It is difficult to quarrel with Sutcliffe and Wellings' major conclusion — that the main cause of the unrest was urban-fringe frustration, deprivation, and disenfranchisement. These factors must

account for most of the force of anger and desperation fuelling the violence. Yet McCarthy makes it clear that violence was in fact directed against landlords, and Beinart, Delius, Cross, and Jenkins *et al* all present data indicating strongly that landlords may actually operate in a power context as authority figures — sometimes competitively, in terms of the numbers of tenants acquired as followers. Foreshadowed perhaps in Beinart's data from the 1880s, such a relationship takes a fairly classical patron-client form, with landlords likely to be asked to help tenants solve their problems.

The Inanda disturbances, then, offer a very striking test case for the tenancy relationship, and by implication for the connection between freehold and landlord-tenant relations. Likewise, Sutcliffe and Wellings' important study of the situation in the period directly before the violence offers an opportunity of looking more closely at other factors that might be behind the frustration.

From here, the analysis can proceed along two lines to explore other sources of frustration in Inanda besides bad material and economic conditions. The first line is to investigate the structure of expectations among the tenants, and the second approach, in the light of these expectations, is to take another look at Sutcliffe and Wellings' meticulously reported results — not in any attempt to try to answer the question of what might have led to the violence, but for what directed violence against the landlords whom people said they liked.

Japan, the USA, and points East: Rural settlement models in the urban context

If it is true that there was more to the desperation that lay behind the 1985 violence than the usual deprivation of poverty and the frustration of the urban shack environment, then it is worth taking a closer look at the gap between people's expectations and what they were actually receiving.

One way to investigate frustration would be to consider at what point or points tenants' pre-existing expectations may have been violated. This would entail looking at what people expected their local neighbourhood structure to be like, and what they expected or wanted from it. And what they had

previously been accustomed to, in their rural situation, may still have structured their expectations as to what would be or should be present in their new urban situation.

Evidence from Japan suggests that this may be true not only of people who have fairly recently arrived in an urban environment, but even after many generations of urban life. In Japan, modern neighbourhood-level urban organization is derived from village organization. Primordial village-type organization even in the modern city was still so strong in 1968 that houses usually had no number or street addresses: members of the close urban-village community are supposed to know who and where their neighbours are, and those who do not know must be outsiders with no legitimate claim to this information.

At ground level, Japanese cities are divided up into urban wards, bounded, inward-looking, self-contained communities which are, functionally speaking, analogues of villages, with their own authority structure and services.[40] In some cases at least, the urban wards may represent the gradual migration of rural villages, in whole or in part, to the urban environment. In other instances, they seem to derive directly from actual villages which were swallowed up by some expanding urban area. Either way, they are stable structures, manifesting great solidarity, based on residence by birth, multiple social ties, and face-to-face relations. These urban-village sub-communities are organized into *chonaikai*, ward associations, which have a number of functions in preserving and promoting the welfare of their citizens.

This pattern of the persistence of primordial attitudes in structuring modern-sector perceptions occurs more often in the industrial world than is generally realized. As Nakamura points out, similar primordial structures persist significantly in the ethnic neighbourhoods of the United States.[41] Neighbourhood organization in the older British cities is even more strongly localized and rooted. European cities in the Middle Ages were often divided into separate residential quarters based on association through guild, occupation, religion, area of origin, or language group; and the same holds true for China, India, and other Far Eastern nations in the past, and to some extent

today. In many cities such local residential groupings had their own recognized heads and internal civil organization.

Similarly, West African cities in pre-industrial times based their organization on a residential pattern shaped around clusters of related people; and many of the attitudes then involved appear to persist today. Finding a continuum in attitudes to settlement running from the rural to the urban context in modern black South Africa should therefore come as no surprise.

This introduces the question of perceptual models of primordial settlement in this country. Having previously tracked the transformations of settlement models from their pre-industrial origins to the edge of town,[42] we can now suggest, as a hypothesis for further research, that some of the settlement attitudes may have persisted as well — and may in fact have been affecting the landlord-tenant question in 1985. Modernized versions of classical settlement organization may have defined the basic character of the neighbourhood anticipated, and/or have determined the forms of organization wanted or expected as people moved from rural settlement forms into urban. If the Japanese model applies in Natal, then the settlement cluster, the core unit of rural local organization, may provide the conceptual model that people apply to the localized, land-based patron-client grouping formed by a given landlord's rent tenants. If so, there are implications for rental tenancy on freehold land.

South Africa's reserves: Cognitive models of rural settlement

In rural black districts, people's idea of the neighbourhood level of community has three core elements: external relations with the outside world, horizontal relations with neighbours, and vertical authority relations. These last establish the conventions for patterns of authority at the local level. They may then also establish the framework for the way in which residential tenancy is likely to be perceived even in the modern urbanite settlement.

Under primordial rural organization, the local, named neighbourhood or settlement cluster is a highly cohesive unit. Horizontally, such a neighbourhood-level group provides for mutual aid; vertically it provides for authority

relations. Factor analysis of attitudes to settlement in peri-urban KwaZulu indicates that the key to its cohesion and persistence is the sense of internal safety and trust experienced against what are seen as the uncontrolled dangers of the world outside.[43] People thus see their settlement cluster as a haven of safety, and as a storehouse of the social and economic resources upon which its residents rely to survive. The neighbourhood-cluster closes out outsiders, or lets them in as residents only after very careful vetting. Internally, neighbours should feel able to relax and trust each other; and stress is laid on a strong ethic of mutual aid. Partially structured on patron-client lines, this primordial sub-community is the basic model for legitimate local-level authority relations.

In classical land-based organization, a settlement cluster comes into being when empty land is claimed and settled by several individual families related in the male line. These first-settler families assume authority through seniority, and proceed to grant land to other families related to them by marriage. In the cluster which then forms, the later-arriving families defer, and the senior man of the first-settling family exercises authority.

In consultation with the local assembly of household heads, he oversees new land grants, adjusts boundaries, mediates quarrels, arranges help for those who cannot secure it for themselves, and generally sees that the group's affairs run smoothly. The cluster head also represents his group collectively in the larger political arena, and in rural districts today still usually ranks as a tribal councillor. His role, then, forms the focus of authority in this close local community; tribal councillors are seen as men who protect the people against arbitrary or unfair action by chiefs or *indunas*.

In rural districts, authority thus enjoys legitimacy because it grows from the ground up, attaching to whoever holds pre-existing land rights. Leadership is supposed to operate in consultation with all resident families, with their consent and active support. These expectations are possible because both authority figures and subordinates have a permanent common interest in protecting the integrity of their territory against the outside world. Finally, client families can eventually expect to see their subordinate standing rectified,

though it may take more than one generation. Settlement clusters work on a queuing model: each time the neighbourhood cluster becomes too large to operate it splits internally, with the next most senior family automatically advancing to sovereign status at the head of the new cluster alongside the old one.[44]

This kind of settlement structure is clearly based on inequality of the patron-client type. But it is an inequality with strict limits: first, it is not permanent; and second, in principle at least, it guarantees certain basic rights to subordinate families. Land once allocated cannot be taken away except for serious misconduct, nor used by others without permission. More, the land ethic puts strong pressure on families with unused land to agree to accommodate those in need. All families are supposed to be able to claim their basic rights to enough land to support themselves, and also to enough land to settle their children so that they can establish and protect themselves as a family line. Under classical organization, no social contract can exist without these rights: if the neighbourhood cluster cannot satisfy these claims, the deprived family would normally leave and join another group which can provide for them.

As Mngadi's account indicated, it is at this point that the tenancy relation breaks apart.[45] For tenants, by the very nature of their rent-paying relationship to freehold land, never obtain rights to settle their children, and never obtain sovereign equality of standing with the landowner. As Mngadi put it, they have no stake in the land — though by right of long residence they may, in accordance with the land ethic, feel entitled to lay claim to it. It follows simply that both landlords and tenants are frustrated in their attempts to work out a new system of mutual loyalties, and Mngadi's story, confirmed by *SPP* data, suggests that their relationship breaks up time and again in hostility.

Natal's urban fringe: Tenants' expectations and the landlord

Freehold rent tenancies, then, may resemble rural neighbourhood organizations closely enough for people to be able to move into them easily. But the resemblance is probably false and deceptive. Once in, the new tenant

seems to find few, if any, of the internal conditions of settlement that he/she expected to acquire along with the right to reside. The interests of landlord and tenant are basically in opposition, since the landlord's freehold rights preclude the tenants from ever obtaining control of land resources. Likewise, the First World landlord-tenant relation is not designed to provide trustworthy leadership. The patron/leadership role of the landowner — which, as Mngadi indicates, may be genuinely felt — is essentially rooted in private self-interest flavoured with a profit motive, not in mutual protection. By its legal charter, freehold land is safe from theft or encroachment by neighbours, and the landlord's position does not depend on the tenants' support. Marginalized by the rental relation, tenants by the nature of tenancy can never find the safety, the support, the loyalty or the equality which they may have expected residential affiliation to give them.

Any or all of these contradictions between the rural land ethic and the modern landlord-tenant relation are likely to generate friction and anxiety. This tension may normally be suppressed: tenants are aware of and bound to accept the overt conditions of their rental contract. But if contradictions persist beneath the surface, then cognitive and social strain may lead to suppressed anger. In particular, the evidence of both history and the shack surveys suggests that landlords may be seen by today's tenants as exercising more power, or claiming more authority than the heads of classical settlement clusters, while at the same time giving less in return and continually feathering their own nests at the tenants' expense.

At the other end of the rural-urban continuum, classical settlement organization spontaneously transforms itself by stages into urbanite patterns along at least three routes.[46] In transitional peri-urban areas, there seems to emerge an open-modern form of tenure organization which allows people to move in and out of it much more easily than under classical tenure, but appears to suffer from a gap in authority and leadership as the older neighbourhood-cluster becomes too weak to administer local affairs. In the black urban areas themselves, local administration through appointed, intermediately-modern leadership in the form of *izibonda* seems to be

giving way to emergent informal institutions with strong political structure. And in the vast circum-urban informal shack communities, landlords seem to form the focus of authority in many areas.

The Inanda violence: Conflicting expectations?

This construction of tenants' expectations returns the analysis to the 1985 violence in the Durban shack areas. Sutcliffe and Wellings introduce the situation and the violence that ended their Inanda study:

> On Tuesday 6 August 1985 a number of black peri-urban areas in the greater Durban metropolitan region literally exploded . . . . During the unrest Inanda was one of the areas hit earliest and hardest. Normally very quiet, the settlements in Inanda were transformed into places where looting, violence, and intimidation had become the order of the day. The transformation was extremely rapid and almost beyond comprehension . . . . Within a few days there were over 70 reported deaths, thousands were left homeless, thousands were wounded in the raging battles, and untold damage was done to shops, cars, and the like . . . .[47]

Sutcliffe and Wellings add that unrest and intimidation were still continuing at their time of writing two months later. Though the authors do not particularly mention attacks against landlords in so many words, among the "worst affected groups" listed by Sutcliffe and Wellings were "traders, Indians living the Inanda area" and "countless persons in leadership positions".[48]

In 1985, just prior to the unrest, 327 Inanda people (an overwhelming majority) in the Sutcliffe and Wellings sample claimed to "like" their landlords, and denied bad relations, problems or bitterness with them. Noting that the Durban shack communities were very heterogeneous, with great differences in attitudes prevailing from one locality to the next, the authors finally concluded that ". . . the desperate socio-economic, infrastructural, and housing conditions found in Inanda must have played some part in forcing usually law-abiding people to loot shops and homes".[49] But this summing

up leaves open the question of why violence should have been directed against the landowners. If nearly everyone in the sample at Inanda felt as positively toward their landlords as they insisted they did, why should the familiar hardship, frustration and uncertainty of black urban life in South Africa suddenly be taken out upon the landowners when a political spark — the brutal killing of Victoria Mxenge — lit the tinder of discontent?

Against this backdrop of burning settlements and smoky, unclear motivation on the part of the Inanda people involved, the apparent contradiction of research findings on the landlord question stands out sharply and may carry considerable significance for our interpretation of the tenancy option. But by backing off a little and taking popular attitudes and expectations into account, it is at least possible to theorize that *both* interpretations — Schlemmer's earlier attribution of resentment to the tenants, and Sutcliffe and Wellings' reporting of positive feelings toward landlords — were simultaneously correct.

Tracing attitude change: Differences between Inanda sub-samples

Looking at the question this way, a possible key may be found in the differences between named local-area subsamples to which the authors correctly draw attention. Between these subsamples some anomalies occur which may suggest contradictions in the underlying dynamics in the landlord-tenant relationship at Inanda. Sutcliffe and Wellings remark on these contradictions, but do not interpret them.[50]

What might be taken as the model pattern for most of the Inanda squatter communities in the 1985 sample runs as follows (compare Table 3):
* The great majority — 92 per cent of tenant families sampled — were black (African), while the landlord grouping was somewhat more mixed at 79 per cent African and included a significant number of Indians.
* People on average "liked" their landlords (83 per cent), and the great majority did not report having problems with, or feeling "bitterness" towards, their landlords (16 per cent, 10 per cent).
* Landlords "were generally seen as sympathetic in allowing tenants to fall

Table 3
ATTITUDES TOWARDS LANDLORDS[51]

	SDB	MIS	CON	AFR	HLU	MAM	AMA	UAH	Total
Do you have any problems with your landlord? % YES	26	19	13	13	3	31	12	6	16
Do you like your landlord? % YES	70	79	96	92	65	78	88	100	83
Do you have any bitterness towards your landlord? % YES	15	5	6	13	13	9	8	6	10
Do you think that landlords are interested in improving your living conditions? % YES	28	46	31	21	16	22	18	40	28

behind in rent payments without evicting them", and reported evictions were not very common at 17 per cent of the sample as a whole.

These attitudes can certainly be taken as favourable to landlords in the Inanda area, and to the landlord-tenant relationship generally. On the other hand, there were also several negative findings from the sample as a whole:
* Most respondents denied that their landlords were interested in improving tenants' living conditions (72 per cent).
* A sizeable minority of tenants were dissatisfied with the rent they paid (43 per cent overall).

Against this general profile, some patterns in the separate profiles for some of the area subsamples might be interpreted as suggesting that not all the favourable findings can be taken at face value. Areas of particular interest are Hlungwane, a comparatively cosmopolitan area where most tenants were African and the majority of landlords appeared to be Indian, and Umzinyati/Amatikwe, the most outlying area, where both landlords and tenants were nearly all African and which Sutcliffe and Wellings identify as relatively rural in its general outlook.

As might be anticipated, the subsample for Umzinyati/Amatikwe appears to preserve many of the attitudes associated with rural tenure and the rural land ethic. As it would be with rural settlement-cluster heads, the pattern of response for different items seems to indicate a generally positive and consistent attitude in relation to landlords. In contrast, the highly urbanized Hlungwane subsample displayed a pattern of response which seemed relatively inconsistent, with wider than

usual swings between positive and negative responses on questions relating directly to landlord-tenant relations. Such inconsistency of attitude may suggest underlying contradictions giving rise to ambivalence and tension. If this is so, Hlungwane may represent the opposite (negative or alienated) pole in regard to tenure and tenancy attitudes. Under the social consensus of the land ethic, positive feeling towards the cluster head is the socially correct attitude. But if this socially stipulated relationship is called into question by other, inconsistent replies, a possibility of contradiction and conflict arises.

At the outset, both the Hlungwane and the Umzinyati/Amatikwe subsamples reported almost no problems with landlords — only 3 per cent and 6 per cent respectively admitted that anything was wrong. The overall mean for the whole Inanda sample was only 16 per cent — still so low on the eve of landlord-directed violence that with benefit of hindsight it might give rise to suspicion.

With hardly any reported landlord-tenant problems, a very positive attitude should be adopted towards landlords. At conservative Umzinyati/Amatikwe, this was actually the reading: 100 per cent of this conservative-thinking sample of rural tenants said they liked their landlords. The general liking for landlords at Inanda was lower, but still overwhelming at 83 per cent. But the Hlungwane urbanites went the other way, and produced the lowest recorded positive response (65 per cent) to the question: "Do you like your landlord?"

The comparatively cool landlord-tenant relations reflected in the figures collected for Hlungwane contrast with the area's strong denial of actual landlord-tenant problems. In the Hlung-wane

area, then, the more people denied having problems with their landlords, the less they seemed to like them. Though it is not possible to be sure without an item analysis, the discrepancy might suggest that respondents were ducking when asked if they had problems; and ducking a question about landlord problems might be anticipated particularly if landlord-tenant relations were important, but very tense or in some way contradictory.

This interpretation has some surface plausibility. With hindsight, and seeing it as emanating from the period directly before violence broke out against landlords, the tendency to deny problems may actually indicate desperation, or represent an attempt to achieve cognitive distance from suppressed tension or anxiety. That is, it may reflect a highly ambivalent attitude, or even a fear of conflict. If so, this one anomalous response may call the rest into question: more particularly, taking the Inanda tenants' responses to the questions "Do you like your landlord? — yes/no" and "Do you have any problems with your landlord — yes/no" at face value may be unwise. What these responses may really mean is that people felt they should be loyal to their landlords as quasi-cluster heads and/or rally round them if challenged. Inanda tenants at the time may actually have been torn both ways and under significant strain.

In possible confirmation of our argument, other item responses at Hlungwane also appear peppered with contradictions. In addition to liking landlords least, the Hlungwane group had the lowest percentage of agreement that landlords wished to help tenants improve their living conditions — 16 per cent, against a mean of 28 per cent for the entire enquiry. In contrast, the outlying semi-rural area Umzinyati/Amatikwe showed a very high reading on this item, 40 per cent imputing helpful intentions to landlords, a figure consistent with their expressed liking for them.

In the matter of the landlords' actual behaviour, Hlungwane people also reported being treated more strictly when in arrears with their rent than did tenants in other areas. While it appears usual for Inanda landlords to allow their tenants very reasonable leeway with problems in paying rent on time — a mean of 52 per cent said the landlord did allow them to fall behind — the Hlungwane subsample

came in with only 24 per cent. There may also have been other minor discrepancies in Hlungwane responses related to the period of grace allowed before eviction might follow — apparently shorter for Hlungwane than for other areas; and yet others in responses related to ever having been evicted or knowing anyone who had — generally denied by the Hlungwane respondents, but sometimes admitted for unspecified acquaintances.

Finally, 43 per cent of Inanda tenants astonished Sutcliffe and Wellings somewhat — they would not, presumably, have astonished Mngadi, for whom a lack of ties was the hallmark of the tenant group — by claiming to be willing to move to another area to make way for development. However, for the Hlungwane subsample, 74 per cent were unwilling to take a position "yes" or "no" on this item. On this question the overall percentage falling into this category of "don't know non-response" was only 28 per cent, so that the very high 74 per cent non-response at Hlungwane may in fact reflect a highly ambivalent attitude towards going or staying.

While most of them minor in themselves, these repeated small contradictions to the overall pattern of responses coming from urbanite Hlungwane seem to suggest a greater underlying contradiction. This subsample may have been labouring under more ambivalence than the others, and, conversely, the rural-oriented Umzinyati/Amatikwe sub-sample may have had more positive relations with landlords than the average for Inanda. If so, it is perhaps significant that this group, with its rural background, seemed to have preserved more of the positive, mutual feelings of the settlement cluster for its internal authority figures. If this is true, then Hlungwane forms the opposite side of the equation — positive feelings have either declined or become a subject of internal conflict. The Hlungwane subsample was apparently not dissatisfied over rent. In fact reported rents for this area averaged well below the mean for the Inanda sample as a whole.

It now needs to be asked whether this apparently stressed and conflicting view of landlord-tenant relations may not be related to the combination of African tenants and Indian landlords.

Explanatory factors: Ethnic antagonism and tenants' expectations

Although Sutcliffe and Wellings' data seem to reflect a negative preference on the part of Inanda tenants for Indian landowners (Indian landlords were ranked last in preference for all subsamples) it would certainly appear that Sutcliffe and Wellings are correct in arguing that ethnic antagonism was not the root factor here. For instance, the Hlungwane respondents, who lived close to two Indian settlement areas and most often had Indian landlords, were at least as willing as any other subsample to have Indians as neighbours, apparently preferring Indians to whites or coloureds. They were also the most tolerant towards people of other race groups being allowed to remain at Inanda. It was Umzinyati/Amatikwe that reported the greatest resistance to living next door to cultural strangers and was least willing to allow non-Africans to stay at Inanda.

Looking elsewhere, a major cause of the high apparent ambivalence in the area of tenant-landlord relations at Hlungwane might be found in the greater tendency of Indian landlords to depart from the land ethic of rural Natal/KwaZulu and apply First World conditions to the landlord-tenant relationship. The relatively short period of grace for late payment reported for Hlungwane suggests that this group of Hlungwane landlords may have been conducting relations with their tenants within a relatively impersonal framework.

If so, then it would be consistent with the proposition that the landlord-tenant authority-dependence relation is seen favourably as far as it conforms to the mutual-support ethic of primordial local organization, but runs into stress and conflict whenever circumstances make it obvious that landlords and tenants are structurally unable to have enduring common interests or permanent relations. The analysis so far has indicated

Table 4
RURAL VS URBAN ASSESSMENTS OF LANDLORDS AT INANDA PRIOR TO VIOLENCE, 1985
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES FOR TWO SUBSAMPLES

Question Area	Rural-Oriented Umzinyati/Amatikwe	Cosmopolitan, Hlungwane	Interpretations
1. Reported problems with landlords	Very low problems with landlords (warm, positive)	Very low problems with landlords (warm, positive)	in agreement with social ethic of mutual commitment
2. Attitude towards landlords	Highest liking for landlords (warm, consistent with 1)	Lowest reported liking for landlords (cool, inconsistent w/1)	contradiction in tenants attitudes
3. Perception of landlords attitude	High agreement landlords want to help (mutalist new consistent w/1)	Lowest agreement landlords want to help (alienated view, inconsistent w/1)	contradiction in perceptions of landlords commitment to tenants
4. Reported landlord treatment of tenants (arrears)	Average lenienry with arrears (reciprocol relations)	Very strict with arrears (impersonal context)	differential in landlords reported behaviour to tenants
5. Tenants attitude towards moving	Average willingness to move (relative satisfaction, no ties)	Highest percent unable to reply (high conflict, ambivalence)	accumulated contradictions block response
Agreement between questions	Positive and consistent	Inconsistent, apparent conflict	contradictions between mutualist social expectations and landlords perceived impersonal response. Generate potential anger

Source: Sutcliffe and Wellings, *op cit*

that a residential cluster run by a landlord has a permanently unequal power structure and permanently antagonistic interior interests. As Mngadi's account suggests, the chief source of submerged friction may be the permanent advantage of the landlords. Their freehold claim to retain control of the land and continue charging rent comes at the permanent expense of the tenants' long-term interests.

If the East Griqualand reports of the 1880s are looked at in the light of Mngadi's story, a strong possibility emerges that landlords operating as "headmen" would have been under pressure from the land ethic to take in more and more tenants. As heads of communities and also as rich men who had relatively vast individual holdings of unoccupied land, they could easily have been subject to continual niggling reminders from society to validate their authority by granting more and more land to descendants of clients and to homeless families. While pity for the dispossessed may have played a strong role in many cases, and is certainly the "correct" attitude in terms of the land ethic, repeated grants that cut into the landowner's own chances of making even a subsistence living may actually have been promoted or even forced on landowners by the weight of the land ethic in the rural black life-world. While income from rent may be a major inducement in the modern context of very dense peri-urban occupation, Mngadi's story — and other accounts of relatively low rural tenant rents in the early and middle 20th Century — may create some doubt that either direct profit or even the lure of a steady reliable income were the only factors involved once the property was secure.

If there is potential for conflict here, it may easily tie in with Sutcliffe and Wellings' explanation that the Durban shack violence was traceable to the stress of competition for scarce urban resources. This kind of urban stress between individuals or communities may normally remain dormant. If, however, it channels more of its energy through the tense landlord-tenant relationship with its conflicting expectations, the level of tenant-landlord hostility may ratchet up several notches. And whether or not this tension is then attracted to ethnic differences as the most convenient and salient explanatory

variable, it may well reach a point at which it can feed violence and/or turn to victimization. Any rise in anxiety may then break the entire contradictory situation apart, forcing people to confront the underlying structural inequalities.

Conclusions: Residential tenancy and the urbanization process

The rise and expansion of black landlord-tenant relations on freehold land appear to constitute an enormously widespread and significant tenurial event, so much so that an adequate investigation of the real determinants of tenancy is likely to be integral to the whole issue of tenure reform. Tenancy's association with black freehold at present is so strong as to be undeniable. It is possible that means may need to be found to break this link before freehold reform can be safely recommended. Alternatively, it may be that tenancy can be acceptable, even under marginal Third World conditions, if the associated conditions are tolerable.

Whether or not a general conversion of black land to freehold can then be expected to reduce the pressure on urban land resources — and ease the position of people who are presently tenants and unable to get land of their own — then becomes an important question. Much may then depend on whether landlord-tenant relations are wholly determined by the severe restrictions placed on black landowning by the 1913 Land Act and its successors, or whether in fact other social and economic processes as well may make a major contribution to establishing the institution of tenancy.

The evidence we have reviewed here suggests that the institution of residential tenancy is not determined entirely by black population pressure and the scarcity of living sites created by apartheid legislation. Tenancy is an economic enterprise. But it seems to be something more as well: it can be read as an attempt to create organization. As the *Surplus People's Project* has noted, rural areas under tenancy have always given refuge to people who have lost their homes and have nowhere else to go. Similarly, urban-fringe shack communities accommodate, as Schlemmer

remarks, "the marginal or emergent working class, the lower working class, and a socio-economic underclass of lumpenproletariat",[52] people without the resources and connections needed to enter the formal townships. For people on the move without alternatives, joining a rent-tenancy clientship grouping may partly represent an attempt to find a community.

If this is so, it is important to understand what it is that people expect to get when they agree to their rental contract. And if tenancy arrangements are part of an effort by both landlords and tenants to create a new form of organization to serve the needs of a marginal population, and if there is a basic contradiction designed into existing informal tenancies, the relationship is likely to remain potentially explosive even where it is not directly exploitative. One lesson of the 1985 violence may be that rental-tenancy areas themselves may need some kind of safety valve.

The classical safety valve in primordial organization is the act of moving out. A number of authors have drawn attention to the importance of the principle of choice, and the need to provide a range of different types of accommodation. Unfortunately, unlike share-tenancy farming contracts, which have often allowed sharecroppers to accumulate enough capital to build their own ladder out of poverty, residential tenancies in themselves offer no route to economic advancement. What choice already exists among the different shack communities may be all that is realistically available — and this has clearly not been enough to resolve tenant anger. Residential tenancies may carry within themselves a continuing crisis of expectations.

Living under urban-fringe tenancy conditions today violates deeply-held values concerning settlement and safety in other ways as well. Under disorderly conditions of settlement, people find themselves unable to trust their neighbours. In addition, the characteristically chaotic household structure of shack communities noted by Sutcliffe and Wellings makes it problematic even for people within the home to rely on each other.[53] In this kind of environment, people find themselves not knowing where to turn, unable to depend on real mutual support either within their residential neighbourhood or within their

residential family. This kind of atomistic society can be tolerated for freedom and/or economic advantage, but it is bound to be a source of tension and insecurity, existing as it does in violation of the principles of legitimate social order. The anxiety generated is likely to be an unrecognized source of frustration, contributing to the generalized demonstrations of anger that shocked and disturbed the investigators during the shack-settlement unrest.

While Sutcliffe and Wellings are clearly correct in drawing attention to the hard and dangerous environmental conditions endured by the urban shack communities, finding a way to provide improved physical conditions in available areas is probably addressing only part of the problem. There is also a need to enable people to get settlement going for them as a resource — that is, to provide settlement conditions such that people can sort out their own residential affiliation, and build stable forms of organization back up from ground level. One of the most destructive aspects of South Africa's management of the urbanization process through the late 20th century has been the extent to which people entering the urban environment have been prevented, by endless restrictions and centralized administrative procedures, from doing this. To what extent it can be done at all under a tenancy regime is not clear at present.

In addition, the urbanization process does not necessarily have to take this form. The point of Japan's urban-neighbourhood settlement system is that it seems to have transferred rural villagers into town with least dislocation and preserved great stability through the transition, while the South African system has guaranteed the most possible disruption. The marginal tenancy regimes of the urban fringe and impoverished rural districts may be part of the pain of urbanization in this country.

Attention needs to be given to urban residential tenancy not only in terms of physical structures and political empowerment, but at the middle level, in terms of the settlement process itself, which creates either stable or chaotic communities. We need to know more about different types of tenancy and the kind of community they create. Urban or rural, the system needs to be geared to allow tenancy and ownership to

develop together in such a way that settlement can recreate a stable, liveable social order as well as a physically adequate environment.

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47 M Sutcliffe and P Wellings, *op cit*, p 1.

48 *Ibid*, p 3.

49 *Ibid*, p 41.

50 *Ibid*, p 22.

51 Sutcliffe and Wellings' 1985 survey divided Inanda into eight regions, based on named and localized communities, for the purpose of sampling. The abbreviations used in Table 3 refer to these sampling localities, as follows:
   1 Shembe's Village/ Dube's Village/ Bambayi (SDB) N = 43
   2 Mtshebeni/ Inanda Seminary (MIS) N = 43
   3 Congo Village (CON) N = 53
   4 Africa Village (AFR) N = 63
   5 Hlungwane (HLU) N = 31
   6 Mamba (MAM) N = 37
   7 Amawoti (AMA) N = 25
   8 Umzinyati/ Amatikwe (UAH) N = 32.
   A more complete breakdown of the statistical data presented in this initial 1985 report was to appear in the second survey report for the Inanda investigation. Unfortunately, at the time of writing it has not proved possible to obtain a copy of this second report. Some of the conclusions tentatively offered here clearly might have to be revised in the light of this more detailed statistical treatment.

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53 Cf C R Cross and E M Preston-Whyte, *op cit*.

The Bushmen of Botswana — From desert dwellers to world citizens

A J G M Sanders, Principal Researcher in the Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law, and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law of the University of South Africa, looks at the traditional Bushmen, their position in Botswana and their position in the international law and comes to the conclusion that only through consultation will it be possible to ascertain and provide for the Bushmen's particular needs.

Introduction

When, in the seventeenth century of the European calendar, the Dutch colonists of the Cape of Good Hope first met the hunter-gatherers who lived on the savannah or *bosveld*, they called these people *Bosjesmannen*. By that time Bantu-speaking pastoralists and cultivators had already penetrated the central Southern African savannah from the North, and the Tswana among them called the hunter-gatherers *Sarwa*, an adaptation from the Hottentot word *San*. It was, in fact, the Khoi-Khoi (pronounced khwe-khwe) or *Hottentotten* as the Dutch called them (because of the stuttering sound of the Khoi-Khoi language), who had been the first outsiders to come into contact with the hunter-gatherers of Southern Africa, whom they collectively called San, meaning "food-gatherers". San is also the appellation currently in vogue among the handful of academics who dedicate themselves to the study of the hunter-gatherers of Southern Africa. They feel that the term Bushmen has acquired too much of a pejorative connotation. However, the same now holds true of the terms San and Sarwa.

Unfortunately, a derogatory association is often the fate of any appellation of a marginal group, even when in its original form it was merely descriptive and meant no harm.

In this article the hunter-gatherers of Southern Africa will be referred to as Bushmen. This term need not carry any stigma of contempt and, despite academic attempts to popularize the word San, has remained the one most widely used.

The Bushmen have inhabited Southern Africa for longer than any other surviving group. At present they number about 50 000, of whom 30 000 live in Botswana and 20 000 in Namibia. They are the last remnants of a Stone Age people who were once scattered all over East, Central and Southern Africa and, according to recent archeological data, were this region's sole inhabitants for at least 30 000 years.

Their history, life-style, language and physical appearance distinguish the Bushmen sufficiently, in their own minds as well as the minds of others, as a recognizable ethnic group.

Traditionally, the Bushmen operate in small bands, and subsist on game hunted with bow and poisoned arrow and on gathered wild foods. Their present habitat is confined to the most arid part of the central Southern African savannah: the Kalahari Desert.

The Bushman languages, characterized by the frequent use of click-consonants, constitute yet another feature which sets the Bushmen apart from their neighbours, with the exception of the Khoi-Khoi.

Bushman rock paintings bear authentic witness to Bushman physiognomy. These multicoloured, realistic miniatures, painted on the walls of rock shelters overlooking the plains of traditional Bushman lands, relate in a most fascinating way the Bushmen's traditional life-style, their encounters with foreign invaders, and their own distinctive physique. In these paintings the Bushmen depicted themselves as wiry and, in comparison with their Negroid and Caucasoid invaders, small in stature. However, since then, the genetic line between the Bushmen and their neighbours has become blurred as a result of intermixing, and in most regions the physical Bushman type has disappeared to such an extent that only

language and life-style remain as clearly distinguishing Bushman features.

What is left of authentic Bushman society operates under severe alien pressure. Only the Bushmen in Botswana's Central Kalahari Reserve — which is a game reserve, not a "Bushmanstan" — still subsist exclusively on game and wild plants. The overwhelming majority of the Bushman population of Botswana, however, live a sedentary life on land that is no longer theirs, and commercialization is turning more and more of them into squatters. Interestingly, there has been little acculturation between these sedentary Bushmen and their commercial overlords. Hence the central government's "Bushman problem".

In order to grasp the nature and size of the "Bushman problem", which has recently also assumed an international dimension, it is imperative first to have a closer look at the cultural traits of traditional Kalahari Bushman society.

Traditional Kalahari Bushman society

Archeological and linguistic evidence indicates that today's Kalahari Bushmen are the descendants of local Bushmen rather than of Bushmen refugees driven from other parts of Southern Africa into the Kalahari by European and Bantu-speaking African settlers. It is therefore possible to speak of an *aboriginal* Kalahari Bushman culture.

The Bushmen of the central Kalahari Desert are present-oriented, and live a thoroughly pragmatic life in their quest for survival as hunter-gatherers.

Subsistence hunting and gathering requires mobility and group formation. In a habitat as barren as the central Kalahari Desert, the groups or bands, as they are known in the literature, are necessarily small in size and highly mobile, seldom numbering more than fifty people.

Each band consists of several inter-related families. The band constitutes the largest social unit, but the family is the most cohesive and enduring social unit. The family is also the basic unit of inter-band migration and the formation of new bands.

The formation of a new band is a comparatively rare event, but inter-band migration is a common occurrence. No band forms a closed community. In fact, the average band is a rather fluid group which fragments and realigns continuously, and it is often difficult to distinguish between migrants and visitors. Major factors inducing migration or protracted visits are food supply, marriage, and the alleviation of tense social relationships.

Despite frequent social interaction between individual members and households of the various band societies, and the total absence of inter-band warfare, no society embracing the individual bands exists. Each band considers itself to be complete and autonomous, and the separate bands do not interact through organized economic, ritual or other social activities.

Each band has its own rather ill-defined area within which it moves. It is not the area itself that the members of the band think of as theirs, but the right to use its resources. People from neighbouring bands will need permission to hunt and gather in the area or to draw water there. Permission will usually have to be obtained from the founder-members of the band, their eldest descendants or long-standing members who act as spokesmen for the band.

The band has no chief or leader. Traditional Bushman society simply does not lend itself to a centralized,

Distribution of rock paintings and engravings in Southern Africa (Source: Thomas Tlou & Alec Campbell, *History of Botswana*, Gaborone: Macmillan, 1984)

hierarchical structure with specialized personnel and roles. Decisions affecting the social life of the band are reached through discussion, in which all adult and near-adult members of the band may participate, and in which women have an equal say. Discussion is informal, is not conducted in any special place, and seldom takes the form of a single, set-piece debate.

Although status plays a role within the family and there is a division of labour according to sex — women doing the foraging and men the hunting — there are no classes within the band. Band society is basically egalitarian.

This egalitarian character finds expression in, and is preserved by, the sociability of its members. Bushmen attach great value to giving and receiving, borrowing and lending, and entertainment in the form of visiting, talking and dancing. Their sociability is more than just a valued end in itself; it also plays a pragmatic role. Sharing possessions, for example, not only strengthens the sense of fellowship, but also promotes the mobility of the band. Talking keeps them in touch with one another's feelings, releases tensions, and is

instrumental in settling disputes and formulating decisions. With regard to dancing, the Bushmen's trance dance deserves special mention, for it is their major ritual and involves the entire band. With the support of the women, who sit in a circle around the fire, clapping and singing, the male dancers work themselves into a state of transcendence and enter the realm of the supernatural to plead for the health of individuals and the community. The trance dance is performed at night, may last for hours on end and is the focus of religious life among the Bushmen.

Not only is there a minimum of religion, as Europeans know it, in Bushman society, there is also a minimum of law.

Family law: The parent-child relationship is the only relationship in Bushman society in which authority is inherent. Parental duties, however, are considered to be more important than parental rights.

A man's familial duties extend beyond the parental sphere and include a duty to support his own and his wife's parents, siblings, and other dependent close relatives. Should a man decide to migrate, he takes with him those among

the above-mentioned relatives who need or want to accompany him. In this way, whole segments of bands join other bands.

Marriages are generally arranged by the couples themselves, but parental approval is required in respect of young people. Bushmen do not conclude matrimonial property settlements. A person may marry either within or outside the band, but because of the strict taboo on incest, marriage partners are often selected from other bands. Although polygamy occurs, it is not common. Levirate and sororate are also practised. Divorce is accomplished by the unilateral decision of either spouse or by mutual consent — the only semblance of formality is the act of parting. Incompatibility and adultery are the main causes of marital break-up. After divorce the father takes custody of the children, but as long as a child is still breast-fed it remains with the mother. The band regrets divorce but attaches no social stigma or legal impediments. Divorce is not uncommon among young couples, but overall marriages are notably stable.

Property law: In a society where personal belongings are few, property law revolves around the use of the common wealth. In Bushman society it is rainwater, waterholes, patches of wild plant food and wild animals which constitute common wealth.

Rainwater belongs to no one, but the permanent and semi-permanent waterholes are band property.

Wild plant foods, which constitute 60 to 80 per cent of the Bushmen's subsistence base, are also considered to be the property of the band, but once collected belong to the collector. The women daily collect wild plants to feed family and visitors.

Game belongs to no-one until it is killed. Small animals become the property of the man who killed them, and are consumed by his family. Large animals are hunted by a party and belong to the owner of the first arrow to penetrate the animal sufficiently for its poison to take effect. As a result of the common practice of borrowing and lending, the owner of the arrow need not be one of the hunters and, indeed, may be male or female. The owner has to distribute the meat, as large animals are shared with everyone in the band, visitors included, according to definite rules. Whoever

receives, later gives in turn, so that everybody gets some meat.

Hunting parties seldom consist of more than four or five men and have no formal leader. Once an animal has been wounded, the hunters may follow it into the territory of a neighbouring band. Should neighbours cross the hunters' track, they will be given a present of meat, but no tribute is obligatory.

Law of succession: As personal property is extremely scarce in Bushman society, and of neither great nor lasting value, succession to interests in gift-giving partnerships is the only important issue. In order to ensure the continuation of major partnerships, older Bushmen, on becoming less mobile and less productive, will gradually pass their partnerships on to their children or younger siblings. If a partnership has not been disposed of by the deceased, his children or siblings may ask the remaining partners to continue the relationship by offering them his possessions.

Contract law: Without a _social_ contract, there would be no band society. However, the need for _private_ contracts — contracts between individual band members on individual matters, is less apparent. Certain forms of contract are frowned upon, notably commercial contracts, as bargaining is seen as likely to create social tension.

Social wrongdoing: The small, face-to-face and indeed "footprint-to-footprint" community of the Bushman band is generally at peace, as there is little inclination or scope for antisocial action. The wrongdoings which are most feared, occur least — namely physical violence, incest, flagrant adultery, and theft. Most disputes concern the distribution of food.

Settlement of disputes: Disputes among individual members of the band are judged by band opinion and controlled by band action, rather than being settled by the parties concerned. As violence is greatly feared, the band will make every effort to solve a dispute through discussion which, in appropriate cases, may take the form of public shaming and ridicule. If a dispute cannot be resolved in this manner and the offender is unwilling to leave the band, he will be "eased out". However, an offender's departure could be more harmful to the band than his original offence. Every effort, therefore, is made to avoid conflict.

Distribution of Bushmen and Khoi-speaking peoples, 1960 (Source: Thomas Tlou & Alec Campbell, _History of Botswana_, Gaborone: Macmillan, 1984)

Alien inroads on Kalahari Bushman society

Traditional Kalahari Bushman society lacked the resources to resist the incursions of the Khoi-Khoi, Bantu-speakers and Europeans.

The Khoi-Khoi emerged in Southern African some 4 000 years ago. Entering from the West they gradually spread over a wide area, the core of which today is the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa. The Khoi-Khoi were Stone Age nomads who kept herds of cattle and sheep in addition to being hunter-gatherers. They moved around in groups, each with its own leader.

For a long time the Khoi-Khoi and the Bushmen lived in peace, so much so that their contact resulted in the emergence of remarkable physical and linguistic resemblances. But as the herds of the Khoi-Khoi increased, the resources of the Bushmen came under pressure, with the result that the Bushmen sometimes preyed upon the Khoi-Khoi's domesticated animals. Historical records show that when the Dutch settled at the Cape

of Good Hope in 1652, considerable hostility existed between the Khoi-Khoi and the Bushmen.

It was approximately 2 000 years ago that Bantu-speakers first appeared in Southern Africa. They were an Iron Age people who lived a sedentary life as farmers-cum-pastoralists, and were grouped in chiefdoms, and later even kingdoms headed by a paramount chief.

The first Bantu-speakers to arrive in Southern Africa entered via the east coast, and settled in what is today Swaziland, Natal, Transkei and Ciskei. These migrants were given the name of Nguni, after their particular Bantu dialect. The second wave of Bantu-speaking settlers consisted of people using the Sotho dialect, of which Tswana forms a subgroup. They entered inland and concentrated in present-day Botswana, Transvaal, Orange Free State and Lesotho.

The Bantu-speaking tribes and the Bushmen certainly did not clash when they first met. In fact, all the evidence points towards considerable intermixing over a long period. Early rock paintings depict scenes of peaceful coexistence;

Bushman features, such as a light skin colour, almond-shaped eyes, thin lips and high cheekbones, are common among the Bantu-speakers of Southern Africa; and "click" phonemes were incorporated by the Swazi, the Zulu, the Xhosa and the Southern Sotho into their languages.

However, as the Bantu-speaking tribes claimed more land for their herds and crops, their relations with the Bushmen became less cordial. In the eastern and central parts of Southern Africa conflict came to a head during the nineteenth century, when these tribes and newly arrived groups of European settlers declared war on the Bushmen. European weaponry ensured that by the beginning of the twentieth century the Bushmen in the central and eastern parts of Southern Africa had been annihilated — the Cape Bushmen having been exterminated earlier by European frontier farmers. The last of the Bushman rock paintings bear witness to this shameful chapter in the history of Southern Africa.

Although contact between Bantu-speakers and Bushmen in the sparsely populated western part of Southern Africa has generally been peaceful, it has turned many Bushmen into the serfs of Bantu-speaking masters. Living on the fringes of Bantu village society, the Bushman serfs would hunt for skins, look after stock, clear agricultural fields, and do domestic work in return for protection and a constant supply of food. Among the Bantu-speakers in the western part of Southern Africa, the Tswana in particular have made, and still make, use of Bushman labour in this fashion.

These days, the Bushmen in Tswana society are treated humanely, but they are still denied tribal membership and can therefore not lay claim to the use of tribal land or access to the tribal courts. Intermarriage is rare, especially between Bantu women and Bushman men.

It used to be the tribal chiefs and other prominent members of the tribe who owned Bushman serfs. Serfs and their descendants were permanently attached to the households of their masters. In terms of Tswana tribal law they could be inherited, and could be sold, lent or given away. In 1936, under the British administration, the Bushman serfs were formally freed, in the sense that they

Distribution of Bushmen in Botswana (Source: Jiro Tanaka, *The San — Hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari*, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980)

could no longer be legally held in "slavery". Nothing, however, was done to alleviate the economic plight of the Bushmen concerned. They were left in the hands of their masters, who not only continued to exploit their labour but also attracted additional Bushman tributary labour as they extended the permanent grazing area for their herds further into the Kalahari. This extension was made possible by drilling boreholes — a technique introduced by the Europeans — which made it possible for livestock to stay in the Kalahari throughout the year.

Whereas hitherto Botswana's leading tribal cattle-owners have accommodated the local Bushmen, they are now increasingly regarding their arrangement with the Bushmen as a liability, in that the Bushmen's consumption is said to outweigh their productivity. Botswana's

post-independence élite of prominent cattle-owners has become rather sophisticated and ranks among its members the country's leading politicians, civil servants, entrepreneurs, and other leading wage-earners. Certainly, commercial beef production along capitalist lines is uppermost in their minds.

Indeed, it was in order to promote commercial beef production that the Botswana government launched its "National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land" in 1975. This policy brought about fundamental changes in the existing system of tribal land tenure. Implemented by Land Boards, the policy divides the country's tribal land into three different types: traditional communal zones, in respect of which the customary system of land tenure is retained; new commercial zones to be leased to and be fenced by individual

owners of large herds, for commercial ranching; and additional reserves to be set aside for the future as a safeguard for the "poorer members of the population".

However, it soon became apparent that the policy had been based on a mirage. Botswana simply does not have the vast tracts of land promised for commercial ranching or as a future safeguard for the poor. The pressure on overgrazed communal lands has not been alleviated, and the change from cattle-herding around cattle-posts to commercial cattle-ranching within fenced lands is bound to hurt the Bushmen in particular. Apart from the detrimental effect of fences on the hunting and gathering economy of the Bushmen, leaseholders may resort to an "exclusive" mode of land tenure, easing out, if not ordering off the land, all unwanted people. Literally thousands of Bushmen, among others, could be dispossessed in this way, and their fate will be similar to that of the Bushman squatters in the Ghanzi district.

Ghanzi lies in the central-western Kalahari, not far from Botswana's border with Namibia. Until the turn of this century, Ghanzi was Bushman country. Today, the Bushmen of Ghanzi, of whom there are approximately 5 000, are merely squatters on a block of freehold ranches. The Ghanzi farm block is a relic of the infamous European "Scramble for Africa". In 1898, in order to prevent German expansion from South West Africa (Namibia) eastwards, Cecil John Rhodes' British South African Company settled some twenty impoverished Boer families — mostly from the defunct Republic of Goshen in the western Transvaal — as leasehold ranchers in the Ghanzi area.

These early European settlers sank wells but did not fence their lands, using Bushman labour to herd their cattle. The mode of land tenure of the early settlers was "inclusive" in the sense that over and above the rations the Bushmen received in return for farm and domestic labour, they were allowed, albeit grudgingly, to hunt and gather on the farms. Gradually, a class of "farm Bushmen" developed, consisting of numerous small groups, more or less permanently attached to the European ranches. However, this arrangement between ranchers and Bushmen was not to last.

In 1959, the country's central administration, which was still under British

control, converted the system of land tenure in respect of the Ghanzi farming block from leasehold to freehold. New ranches were proclaimed and put up for sale. Many were acquired by outsiders. One condition of sale was that the purchaser must erect boundary fences. As cattle-breeding became increasingly sophisticated, more and more "farm Bushmen" were reduced to the status of squatters. The days of casual, intermittent, unskilled labour interspersed with periods of hunting and gathering were gone. With the ranches fenced in, modern ranching techniques were introduced and trucks were used to transport cattle to the abattoir in Lobatse instead of trekking cattle across the Kalahari.

Many Bushman herdsmen became re-dundant. Cash wages were introduced and attracted Bantu-speakers, who are regarded by the ranchers as more skilled farm labourers and are employed more readily than Bushmen. This is true parti-cularly of the big ranches, most of which are now run by companies in order to gain tax benefits and comply with government policy that the ranches be Botswana-owned.

At present, an estimated 90 per cent of the Bushmen in the Ghanzi district are unemployed squatters on the ranches and the Ghanzi commonage. They beg for food and resort to stock theft as game and wild plant foods are suddenly no longer found in the area. Economic deprivation has been accom-panied by serious social disruption. Commercial competition among these "squatter Bushmen" has replaced the custom of open-handed sharing, and alcoholism, promiscuity and prostitu-tion are rife.

The plight of the Ghanzi Bushmen raises the question of the acculturation of Bushman society in Ghanzi and in Botswana as a whole.

It is indeed striking that all over Bot-swana, even among the most sedentary Bushmen, the organizational model of Bushman society has remained close to that of the traditional, mobile band society. Until now, alien cultures have had but a marginal effect on traditional Bushman culture. Although contact with alien cultures resulted in the majority of Bushmen leading a sen-dentary life around boreholes, tribal villages and ranches, and sometimes even in the disappearance of the band structure, band values have survived. Some areas have acquired hereditary headmen, but their status is not the same as that of the African tribal chief. Alien beliefs — Bantu as well as European — have also had an impact on Bushman culture by bringing a new content to the traditional trance dance and giving rise to a group of professional traditional healers.

So far, the acculturation process has been slow and gradual, but post-independence educational and other development programmes have brought about a different pattern. Young Bush-men are losing interest in their traditions and culture. This should come as little surprise in view of the disregard of other sectors of the population for Bushman

culture, and their own inherited lack of self-esteem.

The position of the Bushmen under the national law of Botswana

The colonial government (1885–1966) regarded the Tswana tribes as its prin-cipal concern, for Britain had extended its jurisdiction to "Bechuanaland" at the request of the Tswana chiefs, who de-sired protection against Boer incursions. Committed to a policy of preserving tribal political organization in principle, the colonial government set up a system of indirect rule, with tribal Tswana chiefs acting as its agents within defined tribal territories.

The colonial administration made no special provision for the Bushmen, who were assigned neither land nor a role in government. A measure of protection was offered to their laws, however, albeit on paper rather than in practice. Section 4 of the Bechuanaland Protec-torate General Administration Order in Council of 9 May 1891 is relevant in this regard. It enjoined the High Commis-sioner to "respect any native laws and customs by which the civil relations of any native chiefs, tribes or *populations* under Her Majesty's protection are now regulated, except so far as the same may be incompatible with the due exercise of Her Majesty's power and jurisdiction" (my emphasis) when issuing proclama-tions for the protectorate.

Acknowledging the existence of a "Bushman problem", the colonial administration declined to make a deci-sion in favour of either integration or segregation. In fact, its concern for the Bushmen never extended beyond offer-ing protection against ill-treatment by others, and even this limited form of concern was rather ambiguous.

Informed by concerned European missionaries of the ill-treatment of Bushmen by Tswana tribesmen, the colonial administration initially denied the missionaries' allegations that Bush-men were held in slavery, choosing to describe the position of those Bushmen who were permanently attached to Tswana tribesmen, as a form of "heredi-tary service".

In 1926, however, under pressure from the League of Nations which had

embarked upon an international inquiry into slavery, the British government, through its High Commissioner in South Africa, issued a declaration to the effect that it was opposed to the practice of compulsory labour in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In 1936, upon further pressure from the International Labour Organization, the High Commissioner issued two proclamations: the Native Labourers' (Protection) Proclamation and the Affirmation of the Abolition of Slavery Proclamation. The first of these regulated the conditions under which "natives" could be employed as ser-vants; the second "affirmed" that "the legal status of slavery does not exist, and that slavery in any form whatsoever is unlawful".

In 1966, the Bechuanaland Protecto-rate became the independent Republic of Botswana. The new government con-tinued to recognize tribal chiefs, tribal courts, tribal law and tribal land. The Bushmen, however, remained a land-less class with no institutions of their own, although they are recognized in terms of the Independence Constitution and its enforceable Bill of Rights as full and equal citizens.

A remarkable illustration of the Bush-men's full and equal citizenship is pro-vided by the Boake case — criminal trial 32 of 1978 (23 November 1978) in the High Court of Botswana. The accused, a 23-year-old Bushman herdsman, had been charged with the murder of a tribal policeman in the Kalahari. Counsel for the defence endeavoured to introduce the customary ideas and practices of the area in order to show that the accused's behaviour was perfectly reasonable within his frame of reference. Chief Jus-tice Hayfron-Benjamin, who heard the case, was unconvinced. "Underdeve-lopment", he said, "is a misfortune, and no useful purpose would be served by treating it as a privilege. The standard of conduct required by law of all persons is that of a reasonable man." Having said this, he proceeded to analyse the evi-dence and concluded that the accused had been the victim of an unlawful arrest and wrongful imprisonment by the de-ceased policeman, with prospects of subsequent improper prosecution. As a matter of law he had been entitled to use reasonable force to extricate himself from the position in which he had been placed. The question was whether the prosecution had established that the

force used by the accused had in the circumstances been unreasonable. In the opinion of the Chief Justice the answer to this question lay, at least partially, in the country's Constitution: "The right to liberty is enshrined in the Constitution, and to subject its enjoyment to conditions of humiliation would be demanding and unreasonable. To fight to be free cannot be regarded as unreasonable conduct." After scrutinizing the circumstances which had led the accused to attack the deceased with a knife, the Chief Justice acquitted him, as the use of the knife in the circumstances could not be said to have been so excessive as to have been unreasonable.

Whereas the court's interpretation of the right to freedom must have caused unease in executive quarters, the court's remark that no useful purpose is served by treating underdevelopment as a privilege was undoubtedly welcomed by government. Any scheme which is "for Bushmen only" is felt by the government to compromise its ideology of nationalism.

The government of Botswana has stated as its policy the integration of all the country's 30 000 Bushmen with the rest of the country's population, which now stands at approximately one million. The following quotation from the *Botswana Daily News* of 8 February 1988 is indicative of the government's determination:

> For many years, the government has been persuading Basarwa [Bushmen] who live in the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve that outside the reserve lies a better life. The reasons the government puts before them are that the game reserve should be secured for animals as it is in the interest of the nation. The government has reserved a place for them outside the game reserve where they will be provided with social facilities such as clinics, schools and water, where they can settle and build permanent homes.

This quotation is from a report on an address by the Ghanzi District Commissioner explaining to Bushmen living in the game reserve why they have been asked to leave the reserve. The government's development policy for the Bushmen clearly concentrates on the provision of major social services, the three primary areas being health, education and domestic water supply.

For about five years the government had a "Bushman Development

Programme", which began as an American private initiative. In 1975, however, this special programme was incorporated in a new "Remote Area Development Programme" (RADP), applicable to "all those living outside organized village settlements". Remote Area Development Officers are now attached to the District Councils, but may run their own projects using central government funds. International aid donors make available additional funds for specific projects, and local welfare organizations, churches and concerned individuals also give assistance.

The RADP is in line with the Botswana government's reluctance to run separate development schemes for the benefit of ethnic groups. It is also an attempt to divert international attention away from the plight of the much-publicized Bushmen and towards the government's national social welfare programme. The truth is that the RADP faces some very serious problems with regard to the Bushmen.

Central government encourages Bushmen to congregate in villages, but individual Bushman bands often prefer to have their own development scheme or to be left alone. On the other hand, what hope is there of having Bushmen who are long-term residents in the tribal areas admitted to tribal membership, should they want it? As a matter of interest, the country's statute law contains no definition of "tribesmen". The Customary Law Act of 1969 distinguishes between two categories of "tribesmen". The first category consists of members of a "particular tribe", but the Act is silent about the criteria of such membership. The second category is composed of members of a "tribal community" which is defined in the Act as a community living outside a tribal territory, but organized in a tribal manner. Most likely, it was the intention to include the Bushman bands in this category. In terms of the Tribal Land Act of 1968, Bushmen — provided they can prove established tribal residence — ought to qualify as "tribesmen" so that tribal land may be allocated to them. With regard to the tribal courts, the Customary Courts Act of 1961 enables "non-tribesmen", upon their consent in writing, to be defendants in a civil trial or the accused in a criminal trial, before a tribal court.

As full and equal citizens of the

Republic of Botswana, Bushmen naturally have the right to vote, access to the general law courts, and — if they have the necessary capital — the chance of acquiring freehold land in the freehold areas. In practice, however, the Bushmen are a marginal people. Now they are being told by the central government to integrate with the rest of the population. The fact that the Bushmen have the least say in how this integration should take place is a fatal flaw in the government's policy.

The position of the Bushmen in international law

The last few years have witnessed increased international attention on the rights of indigenous or aboriginal peoples, as special minority groups. In 1971, the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights' Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities initiated a study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations. This was completed in 1983 and now serves as a guideline for the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, appointed by the Sub-Commission in 1982 to prepare a "Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights" for approval by the UN General Assembly.

The first problem the Working Group was called upon to resolve, concerned the definition of the term "indigenous". Whereas most UN member states agree that indigenous or aboriginal minority groups deserve special state protection and that their position is a matter of legitimate concern to the UN, some member states prefer the view that problems concerning indigenous populations arise only where there are imported populations of Europeans, as in the Americas and Australasia. In recent years this attempt to associate indigenousness with historic European colonialism has begun to break down.

The next item on the agenda of the Working Group was to define the content of indigenous or aboriginal rights. In this respect one may observe increasing support among UN member states for a "bottom-up" policy which allows an indigenous population to determine its own place in the national society, rather than for a "top-down" policy of integration and assimilation. There is a

growing recognition of the need for affirmative action — action which extends beyond mere non-discrimination. The focus is on cultural rights, land rights and collective political rights, all within the framework of the national state. UN member states are agreed that the right to secede should not form part of the aboriginal rights presently being formulated. However, this does not deny an aboriginal people the right to what may be described as "internal" — as distinct from "external" — self-determination.

Conclusion

Growing international recognition of aboriginal rights ought to help the Botswana government to overcome its unease towards a special development programme for its Bushman population, as well as to overcome its qualms that to allocate certain areas to the Bushmen for their exclusive use would be to set up South African-type "homelands". In fact, it is hard to see how national principles could be compromised by a development scheme for Bushmen providing for Bushman land, in a country which, in its very core, is structurally plural and acknowledges the institution of tribal land.

People need a land base if they are to develop in their own right. In view of the individualistic nature of Bushman bands, various territories will have to be set aside for them. Nevertheless, Bushman band structure perhaps provides more of a solution to economic problems than to socio-political ones, and may well be dispensable where the Bushmen's economy is no longer based primarily on subsistence hunting and gathering. Only through consultation

will it be possible to ascertain and provide for the Bushmen's particular needs within the broader framework of the nation state. Such an approach would be in line with the Botswana government's declared policy of "*therisanyo*", which means "consultation".

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B·O·O·K·S·H·E·L·F

The military and politics in Nkrumah's Ghana by Simon Baynham. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988, 294 pp. ISBN 0 8133 7063 9.

Since the 1966 _coup d'etat_ against Nkrumah, Ghana has had four more military interventions and has experienced less than five years of civilian rule. In order to identify the reasons that first led the armed forces to intervene in politics, Dr Baynham assesses the impact of British colonial withdrawal and officer Africanization on Ghana's pattern of civil-military relations. The book is based on documents from the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence and on interviews with 96 Ghanaian and British army officers, civil servants and politicians.

Women and the state in Africa edited by Jane L Parpart and Kathleen A Staudt. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989, 229 pp. ISBN 1 55587 082 1.

In this book the authors assert the particularity of women's relation to the state in Africa and, accordingly, the need to study gender-state relations in order to understand both the nature of the state and women's place in it. Exploring women's degree of access to the apparatus of the state, the consequences of their under-representation, and the mechanisms they have evolved to cope with their slender hold on the levers of power, the book includes discussions of general theoretical debates followed by case studies from Nigeria, Zaïre, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. An analytical conclusion places the material in a global context.

The precarious balance: State and society in Africa edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Westview, 1988, 157 pp. ISBN 0 86531 738 0.

Since independence, the political institutions of many African states have undergone a process of consolidation and subsequent deterioration. Constrained by external economic dependency and an acute scarcity of economic and technical resources, state officials have demonstrated a diminished capacity to regulate their societies. Public policies are agreed upon but ineffectively implemented by the weak institutions of the state. Although scholars have analysed the various facets of state-building in detail, little systematic attention has been given to the issues of the decline of the state and mechanisms to cope with state ineffectiveness in Africa.

This book focuses especially on the character of the post-colonial state in Africa, the nature of and reasons for state deterioration, and the mechanisms and policies for coping with state malfunction. Scholars from Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East combine a broad understanding of African political processes with expertise on specific regions. Their analytical and comparative perspective provides a comprehensive and timely treatment of this vital and hitherto neglected theme in African politics.

Satisfying Africa's food needs: Food production and commercialisation in African agriculture edited by Ronald Cohen. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988, 243 pp. ISBN 1 555 87116 X.

Outside Africa, especially in the Western capitalist nations, the dramatic news coverage of starving and disabled peoples has stimulated increased aid from both public and private sources. The problem of developing food self-sufficiency is still the truly pressing issue. Christopher Delgado points out that, despite the good rains of the mid-1980s, long-term vulnerability remains. He discusses the setting of priorities for promoting African food production. In his chapter on breaking the spell of mono-culture, Goran Hyden concludes that Africa's crisis is less a matter of the inability of the peasant producers to feed the continent than an institutional and policy problem that has to be resolved through a redirection not only of African governments but also of the official donor agencies, whether bilateral or multilateral. The Nigerian case is discussed in much detail, with contributions from Akin L Mabogunje and Ronald Cohen.

Thomas Sankara speaks: The Burkina Faso revolution 1983–87 translated by Samantha Anderson. New York: Pathfinder, 1988. 206 pp. ISBN 0 87348 526 2 paper.

The collection of speeches and interviews of Thomas Sankara spans the period from March 1983 to October 1987, just before he was assasinated. The book's purpose is to make Sankara's political legacy available in English for the first time. Sankara practised internationalism, an internationalism completely intertwined with his commitment to defend the interests of the Burkinabè workers. He fought for various causes in the world, from South Africa to Nicaragua to Cuba to Third World debt.

The long struggle of Eritrea *edited by Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1988, 215 pp. ISBN 0 85124 463 7 Pbk.*

The area known as the "Horn of Africa" is facing the very real prospect of major political change. In Africa's longest war of national liberation we are seeing what may well be a significant shift in the military balance in favour of the Eritrean resistance movement. This could herald the final defeat of Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea, especially if the ruling Dergue loses Soviet support. This book provides background to the struggle, Lionel Cliffe puts the liberation struggle in comparative perspective, Mary Dines and Roy Pateman look at the effects of the war, and Basil Davidson concludes with conditions for peace in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the role of the outside world.

The Horn of Africa: A strategic survey *International Security Council. Washington, D.C. 1989. 68 pp.*

Public awareness of this region, and of its many problems, has tended to be fitful and superficial. Most recently, horrendous drought and famine in Ethiopia and Somalia have captured the interest of the West and evoked some response, but even so, yesterday's headlines are soon forgotten. In this study that was undertaken by Lij Imru Zelleke at the request of the International Security Council, Ambassador Zelleke looks at the historical background, economic conditions and military role and status in the strategic context of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.

Recently the region of the Horn has taken on new geo-political and strategic dimensions, in view of its importance to African politics generally; its position towards the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf, where more than a third of the world's energy sources is situated and lastly the outreach of the Soviet Union into South Yemen and Ethiopia itself.

The fuelwood trap: A study of the SADCC region *by Barry Munslow with Yemi Katerere, Adriaan Ferf and Phil O'Keefe. London: Earthscan in association with ETC Foundation. 1988. 181 pp. ISBN 1 85383 007 0.*

The more than 60 million people in the SADCC countries will increase to over 100 million by the year 2000. Both the city-dwellers and the farmers rely on wood for domestic use and supplies are diminishing as consumption grows. These phenomena flow from a complex network of causes each contributing in its way to growing poverty and want, which has, as one obvious symptom, the shortage of fuel for life's basic purposes.

The authors, by means of case studies, examine those causes throughout the nine SADCC countries and consider the policies that can be developed there which will not only help to alleviate the symptom but will help to prevent the imminent catastrophe which it represents.

Elections in Nigeria: A grassroots experience *by William Miles. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1988. 168 pp. ISBN 1 55587 054 6.*

This book presents a case study of what the electoral process in Nigeria has meant, both on a "micro" level and in culturally specific terms. The scale of perspective is that of a single rural village and its outlying district. Based on formal interviews and informal discussions with local party candidates and leaders, attendance at local political rallies, observation of actual voting and tabulation, and general participation in the daily lives of rural villagers before, during and after the campaign itself, the book provides an anthropological perspective to the political scientist's domain.

▰AFRICA
MONITOR

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Jenny Macgregor

NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

Borrowing for the first time from the IMF, Algeria has been granted a $592 mn **loan**. The package includes a $376 mn compensatory financing facility to help pay for cereal imports, which almost doubled last year to $600 mn. This year about 70 per cent of foreign exchange earnings are supposed to be spent on servicing the country's estimated $23 bn foreign debt (AED 5/6).

Opposition groups are organizing publicly on an unprecedented scale following the government's adoption of a law authorizing the formation of new political parties, a move that will lead to a multi-party system in a country which has been ruled solely by the National Liberation Front (FLN) since 1962. Announcing the new developments, Pres Chadli told the FLN that it must fight for popular acceptance of its socialist ideology as this can no longer be guaranteed by the constitution or by law (AED 10/4; ACon 26/5; AA 26/5; S 4/7).

A conclusive ruling has finally been reached on the 1972 agreement which defined the **Algerian-Moroccan border**, marking an important step towards the establishment of a stable Maghreb (ARB 15/6).

Chad

An unsuccessful attempt on 1 April to **overthrow** Pres Habré involved three of his closest confidants — commander-in-chief Hassan Djamous, former army chief Idriss Déby, and interior minister Mahamat Ibrahim Itno. Itno was arrested the following day, but the other two fled with a band of supporters to Sudan, where they applied for political asylum, a move which created tension between the two countries. Resentment at the

recent rapprochement between Chad and Libya and Habré's policy of bringing former exiled opponents into the government are thought to have been the plotters' major grievances (AC 14/4, 28/4; AA 14/4; ION 15/4; AED 24/4, 5/6; SWB 28/4; WA 24/4).

Relations with Libya and Sudan have become increasingly tense due to an apparent build-up of Libyan and pro-Libyan Arab nationalist forces in Sudan's western province of **Darfur**. Chad has accused Libya of preparing to attack the country, despite the 1987 agreement to cease hostilities (AA 14/4; AED 19/6).

Egypt

Pres Mubarak has **dismissed** the man previously regarded as his most likely successor, defence and military production minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala, a move thought to be aimed at separating him from his power base in the armed forces (DT 17/4; E 22/4; AED 24/4).

The opening of the Egyptian-Libyan **border**, closed since 1977, was announced after the Arab League's emergency summit in Morocco which readmitted Egypt to the League. (Egypt's membership of the League was suspended in 1979 after it signed a separate peace treaty with Israel.) The decision followed a meeting at the summit between Egyptian Pres Mubarak and Libyan leader, Col Gaddafi. Daily **flights** between the two countries have been resumed and a Libyan passenger **ship** has docked in Cairo for the first time in over a decade (C 22/5; DT 19/5, 1/6, 5/6, 7/6, 22/6; AA 9/6).

Limited bilateral **air links** between South Africa and Egypt have been revived, after a lapse of 25 years. The service, resumed in June, is for the sole use of South African Muslim pilgrims, who then take connections from Cairo to Mecca (BD 15/6; S 16/6).

(*Political asylum for Libyan pilot — see Libya.*)

Libya

The **defection** of a Libyan helicopter pilot headed for Sudan, to Egypt on 27 April, has brought to the fore the constant aid which Libya is supplying to the Sudanese government. Observers have suggested that Libya is putting **pressure** on Pres Museveni of Uganda to allow Libyan military aid intended for the beseiged government garrisons in South Sudan to cross Ugandan territory (SWB 28/4, 3/5; ION 6/5).

(*Opening of the border — see Egypt; Rising tensions — see Chad; Bourri oil field — see Tunisia; Libyan nationals expelled — see Burundi.*)

Morocco

The peace process begun with **Polisario** in January this year has lost momentum with the failure of a second meeting to take place. The government's denial that a date had been fixed and its apparent refusal to arrange one, has resulted in Polisario's withdrawal of its "goodwill gesture" of a promise to release 200 of the 2 500 prisoners of war it holds. At present, however, there is little if any fighting (ARB 15/6; DT 16/6; AA 23/6; AED 26/6).

Morocco's **economic performance** has recently shown a sharp improvement: GDP increased in 1988 by an estimated 8,2 per cent in current prices; the current account, which moved into surplus in 1987 after rescheduling, remained in surplus last year; inflation has dropped to 2,5 per cent, the lowest figure in more than a decade; and the budget deficit has been trimmed to 4,5 per cent of gross domestic product. Strong support from the IMF and the World Bank, which has committed $3 bn to the country since 1980, as well as moves to lure foreign investors with new economic liberalization policies designed to boost exports, are seen as making a major contribution to these achievements. In 1988 the trade deficit was reduced by 20 per cent to

$1 bn, a dramatic improvement which officials attributed to an overall 25,6 per cent increase in exports in 1988 (TS 17/4; ARB 31/5). (*Moroccan-Algerian border — see Algeria.*)

Sudan

On 3 April the parliament overwhelmingly approved Sadiq el-Mahdi's general policy statement on ways to speed the adoption of the **peace plan** agreed in November 1988 between representatives of the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and of Sudan's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). A Sudanese government delegation held talks with the SPLM in Addis Ababa from 8–10 April, but little of any substance was discussed, though it was agreed that channels of communication would be maintained.

On 10 April parliament voted 154–53 to postpone the debate on the controversial *Shari'a* law issue until the convening of a constitutional conference. This development occurred against a background of violent demonstrations by Islamic fundamentalists in Khartoum, the further deterioration of the economy and the capture by SPLA forces of major garrison towns in the south of the country.

The continued heavy fighting in the south seriously impeded the passage of relief **supplies** provided by international donors anxious to ease the plight of more than two million civilians threatened with starvation. At the end of April the SPLA declared a unilateral month-long ceasefire, which was subsequently extended. The move was welcomed by Sadiq, but although some relief aid was facilitated, there still appeared to be little urgency on either side to secure a lasting peace.

Meanwhile serious clashes occurred in **Darfur** province in May, involving Fur tribesmen and the Arab nomads. As many as a thousand people were reported dead, and there were allegations of the involvement of Libyans and Chadian refugees.

On 18 June Khartoum announced the frustration of a **coup attempt** by supporters of exiled ex-President Nimieri. A number of arrests followed. On 30 June Sadiq's government was overthrown by a group of officers led by Brig Omar Hassan Ahmed el-Beshir. A "National Salvation Revolution Command Council" under el-Beshir's leadership was set up to run the country (E 1/4; SWB 4/4, 12/4, 14/4, 19/4, 8/5, 13/5, 26/5, 20/6; ION 8/4, 27/5; AED 10/4, 8/5; TWR 26/4; AA 26/5; ARB 15/7).
(*Relations with Chad — see Chad; Assistance from Libya — see Libya; CAR breaks off diplomatic relations — see CAR.*)

Tunisia

Pres Ben Ali was returned to power with 99,27 per cent of the votes in the 2 April elections for which there was an 82 per cent turnout. In the parliamentary elections the ruling Democratic Constitutional Union (RCD) gained 80 per cent of the votes and all 141 seats in the House of Representatives. Opposition groups, the left-of-centre Movement of Socialist Democrats and the Islamic Movement, accused the government of irregularities (DN 4/4; SWB 5/4; AC 14/4). The composition of the new government appointed by Pres Ben Ali remains largely unchanged; however two non-members of the ruling RCD were appointed to the cabinet (SWB 13/4; AED 17/4, 24/4).

Agreement was reached in April between Libya and Tunisia on exploration of the **Bourri** oil and gas field in the Gulf of Gabes, setting the seal on growing bilateral cooperation and opening the way for a rapid expansion of joint projects. Because of its proximity to the maritime border, the International Court of Justice in The Hague issued a ruling in 1982 on the division of the shelf. Tunisia, whose oil prospects are deteriorating rapidly, is the major beneficiary of the accords (AED 24/4; ARB 31/5).

A group of Tunisians have set up a Libyan-style revolutionary committee movement and applied to the government for recognition as a political party (DT 28/6).

WEST AFRICA

Benin

The international **financial** rescue package for Benin, which is presently going through its worst economic crisis since independence in 1960, has been completed with IMF approval of a $27 mn structural adjustment facility. The comprehensive adjustment programme adopted by the government aims to produce annual average real growth of 3 per cent. This will be achieved mainly by reducing the state's role in the economy and encouraging greater reliance on market mechanisms. Approval of the IMF credit gives the green light to external creditors to proceed with renegotiation of the country's outstanding **debt**. The government however, remains vulnerable to any new outbreak of popular discontent (AED 26/6).

In a bid to ease growing **civil service** tension, particularly in the teaching field which has been paralysed by strikes since January, the banks were ordered on 5 May to pay salaries for April 1989 to the country's 60 000 civil servants and soldiers, though salaries for the first quarter remain unpaid (AC 6/4, 21/4; AED 24/4; WA 27/3, 8/5, 15/5; SWB 5/4, 19/4, 8/5).

Burkina Faso

Head of State, Capt Blaise Compaore has carried out a major **cabinet reshuffle** primarily intended to strengthen the position of parties supporting the ruling party (SWB 27/4; AED 1/5).

Ghana

A feasibility study at Bogosu has revealed a 54 per cent **increase** in the country's reserves of gold-bearing ore to 10,2 mn tonnes (AED 3/4; ARB 30/4).

The World Bank is to provide a credit of $120 mn in support of the second phase of the structural adjustment programme, which aims to maintain average economic growth of 5 per cent a year, supported by increased investment and domestic savings (WBN 20/4; AED 24/4; ARB 31/5).

Liberia

Several million dollars have been raised following Pres Doe's official launch in April of a nationwide fund-raising drive to help repay the country's **debts**. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has threatened to suspend its programmes and cut off aid unless the USA receives payment of $7 mn arrears on interest owed. Liberia has a mounting US debt of $183 mn; it is also in debt to the IMF for $650 mn and to the World Bank for $180 mn. The West German government has recently suspended financial aid worth $10,7 mn because of the non-repayment of loans (AED 3/4, 24/4; WA 17/4; ARB 31/5).

Mali

A cabinet reshuffle on 8 June brought the **dismissal** of several long-serving ministers and the appointment of a number of close associates of Pres Traore. Minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation for the past three years, Modibo Keita, has been replaced by N'Golo Traore. The post of secretary-general to the presidency, held by Django Cissoko, is now given cabinet status (AED 19/6).

Mali's plans for substantial investment in extending the **electricity** distribution network have received a boost with World Bank approval of an International Development Association loan of $33 mn. At present only 4 per cent of the population is supplied with electricity (AED 1/5, 8/5).

Mali is to exploit alluvial gold deposits in the southern part of the country. Production at the mine is scheduled to start next year with a 2,2-tonnes output, rising to 3,7 tonnes a year by 1998 (AA 28/4; ARB 30/4; AB 5/89).

Mauritania

In April a clash between nomadic Mauritanian herders and black Senegalese farmers

over grazing rights along the **border** between the two West African states sparked ethnic riots in both countries. The incident escalated because of the long-standing economic and ethnic tensions between the two countries. An estimated 200 people were killed in Mauritania, where between 300 000 and 500 000 Senegalese live, while in Senegal, where more than 30 000 Mauritanians live, between 50 and 60 deaths were reported. Although strong trading links exist between the two countries, growing economic problems have revealed many areas of conflict and it is feared that the loss of life will make it difficult to restore bilateral relations and to stave off adverse economic consequences. The violence in Mauritania unleashed ill-feeling against French-speaking black Mauritanians, who resent the political and economic dominance of the Arabic-speaking Moors. Refugees and aid workers in Senegal have estimated that 20 000 people, mostly blacks, have been expelled from Mauritania in the last month, not all of them illegally-resident Senegalese Africans as Mauritanian officials claim. Deportees are said to be growing increasingly militant over their loss of property and cattle left behind in Mauritania (SWB 27/4, 1/5, 9/5, 15/5, 29/5; AED 8/5; WA 15/5; JA 31/5, 7/6; E 6/5, 10/6; ARB 31/5, 15/6; DT 16/6).

Niger

On 17 May at the ruling party's congress, Gen Saibou was elected president of the country's new supreme ruling body, the _Conseil Superieure d'Orientation National (CSON)_, the guiding body of the _Mouvement National pour la Societe du Developpement (MNSD)_ and the future single party. The CSON will replace the Supreme Military Council set up by Pres Kountche and composed exclusively of higher ranking army officers. The congress is the first step towards a return to a normal constitutional life after 15 years of **military** rule (SWB 23/5; ARB 15/6).

In a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle of 19 May, Pres Saibou dropped four **soldiers**, significantly reducing the number of soldiers holding ministerial portfolios to five, including himself. There were 11 new appointments to the 24-member cabinet. The reshuffle — which also marked the return to the cabinet of Sani Bako and Almoustapha Soumaila, two close colleagues of the late Pres Kountché — followed Saibou's unanimous election as head of the CSON (SWB 22/5; AED 29/5; JA 31/5).

Nigeria

The draft **constitution** was submitted to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) for final approval on 5 April. The controversial issue of _Shari'a_ law caused an eight-week delay and threatened to divide the Constituent

Assembly irreparably. The five-year ban on party political activity was lifted on 3 May. Sometime in the third quarter of this year the government will select two parties to contest parliamentary and presidential elections (WA 17/4, 15/5, 22/5; AC 21/4; SWB 5/5; C 1/6; ARB 15/6).

Student-led **protests** against the government erupted in Lagos on 31 May, bringing the unrest which had spread across the country over the previous week to the heart of the capital. Over 13 academic institutions were closed by the authorities after a week of rioting which resulted in an estimated 22 deaths, the temporary arrest of over 1 500 people and the loss of property worth about N100 mn. Political activity in Lagos State was banned. The protests have been fuelled by rapidly falling **living standards** which the students blame on the structural adjustment policies in effect since 1986. The inflation rate exceeds 50 per cent and per capita incomes have fallen from $670 in 1979 to $300 in 1988. A wave of repression against critics of government policy, reports of numerous arrests and the harassment of "radicals" around the country were reported as the government attempted to re-establish control.

Accusations have been made that powerful opponents of the government, angered at being banned from politics, exploited the public's widely-felt hostility towards the SAP and coordinated the riots with the aim of bringing down Pres Babangida. **Leaflets** carrying allegations about the president's "secret wealth" were apparently distributed on campuses throughout the country, sparking the riots. In June the government announced a massive relief package designed to create 72 000 jobs, a programme to boost food production and the offer of assistance for the importation of vehicles for public transport, in an effort to ease the hardships caused by structural adjustment. It will provide N460 mn to implement the complete package (AC 26/5; SWB 29/5, 2/6, 3/6, 14/6, 15/6; C 2/6, 3/6; BD 2/6; E 3/6; AA 9/6, 23/6; ARB 15/6; DT 15/6; WBN 15/6).

Nigeria's first ever **population policy** has been launched by the federal government in an attempt to check the annual growth rate, estimated at 3–4 per cent. The main thrust of the programme is to encourage four-children families, as against the current average of six. The current population is estimated at between 106 mn and 110 mn; if the growth rate remains unchecked Nigeria's population could rise to 160 mn by the year 2000, leaving the country with a food deficit equal to 11 million tonnes of grain (WA 1/5; DT 7/6).

As from 1992, education up to junior secondary level will be free and compulsory for every Nigerian child (ARB 15/6).

An agreement with the London Club of commercial creditors for the **rescheduling** of $5,4 bn of debt came into effect on 14 June,

following payment of interest arrears. Higher than expected oil prices in the past few months enabled the government to clear the interest arrears. The agreement calls for the repayment of around $2 900 mn of medium and long-term debt, to begin in 1992; repayment is in 17 years at ⅞ per cent. Nigeria's total debt is put at around $30 bn (AED 19/6, 26/6).

Senegal

Pres Diouf made a renewed bid to defuse the political crisis in his country by announcing a series of **constitutional reforms** on 3 April. While pledging that bills would be tabled to reform the electoral code and provide better access to the official media for opposition parties, he warned against public disorder, and ruled illegal a mass rally called by opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, who has rejected all Diouf's reform proposals. The measures are likely to be put into effect during the rural and municipal elections, originally scheduled for November 1989, but now postponed for a year. Opposition parties will also be given greater access to the state-controlled media (SWB 7/4; AED 10/4; WA 17/4).
(_Mauritania deporting Senegalese — see Mauritania._)

Sierra Leone

On 3 April Sierra Leone adjusted its **currency** by 49 per cent to $1 = Le65, a move expected to bring the country closer into line with IMF recommendations and to break the deadlock in negotiations with the Fund. Borrowing from the Fund has been suspended until arrears of around $91,4 mn have been cleared (AED 17/4; AA 26/5; ARB 31/5).

The government has taken control of imports of hydrocarbons and decided to nationalize the local refining company following a serious shortage of petrol which paralysed the country for three weeks at the end of April. Negligence by officials of the parastatal company was given as the reason for the move (AE&M 18/5; AA 9/6).

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

Aid donors have agreed to finance nearly 50 per cent of the $144 mn tropical wood action plan which, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, aims to rationalize and relaunch **timber** exploitation. It has been estimated that 200 000 ha of the country's 17,5 mn ha of forest are destroyed each year because of population pressure (AED 8/5; ARB 30/4, 31/5).

Cameroon is moving ahead with a structural adjustment programme that is expected to revitalize its once vibrant economy. Supported by a World Bank **loan** of $150 mn, the programme aims to improve the government's financial management through changes in the country's banking, public enterprise and agricultural sectors, in an effort to revive overall economic growth and end the recession caused by the 1986 oil price collapse (WBN 22/6; AED 26/6). Shortly after negotiations with the bank were completed, a **Paris Club** meeting of official creditors agreed to reschedule around $550 mn of outstanding disbursed public external debt which was put at $2 785 mn at the end of 1987 (AED 5/6).

Pres Biya has carried out a limited cabinet reshuffle of which the main feature is the appointment of former justice minister Benjamin Itoe to head the newly created Ministry of Tourism. **Tourism** is one of the sectors the government is seeking to expand in its search for additional revenue sources, to offset the decline in oil receipts. Paul Tessa, the de facto prime minister, has been removed from the influential portfolio of secretary-general at the Presidency and replaced by Akame Mfoumou Edouard (SWB 15/4; AED 24/4; WA 1/5).

Central African Republic

Diplomatic relations with Sudan were broken off on 29 May — and the **border** closed — following an incident the previous day in which an aircraft carrying Pres Kolingba to Israel was turned back over Sudan "in accordance with the Arab boycott of Israel". An **agreement** for political, economic and cultural cooperation was signed by the foreign ministers of Israel and the CAR at the subsequent meeting (C 29/5; SWB 1/6; AED 5/6; ARB 15/6).

Congo

The government has launched a campaign for debt ratios to be taken into account in determining **"poorest nation"** status. Congo, with a population of less than 2 mn, owes its foreign creditors some $5 bn, which gives it one of the highest per capita debt ratios in the world. The country however, is classified as a "middle-income" country largely because its oil earnings have kept its per capita GNP above the $580 bench-mark level (AA 14/4, 9/6).

Strained relations between Zaire and Congo caused by cross-border **smuggling** and opposing views on Angola, have deteriorated following the expulsion from the Congo of 140 Zaireans, mainly market traders, and the reciprocal expulsion from Zaire of 40 Congolese (AED 1/5; WA 8/5, 15/5).

On 19 May Pres Sassou-Nguesso escaped an **assassination** attempt. Rumours of coup

plots have been rife in recent weeks in the run-up to the ruling party's congress at the end of July at which major changes have been predicted (AC 7/7).

Gabon

A senior figure in Gabon's leading opposition movement, **Father Paul M'Ba Abessolo**, returned to Gabon in May after an exile lasting more than 12 years. President of the National Revival Movement (Morena) which emerged in the 1970s as the main opposition force to Gabon's one-party system, he met with the Pres Bongo to renew requests for a multi-party system (DN 15/5; SWB 16/5, 23/5, 21/6; JA 31/5).

Sao Tomé and Principe

At a meeting of **aid donors** organized by the UN Development Programme it was agreed that Sao Tomé's debt of $91 mn should be renegotiated by the end of the year and that half of it should be at lower levels than those currently on the market. Concern was expressed that without assurances of debt relief and fresh funding the government may abandon the economic liberalization programme (ARB 30/4).

Zaire

Pres Mobutu announced a minor **cabinet reshuffle** on 12 May — the third since October. Among other changes, Mobutu has resumed responsibility for defence, a portfolio he relinquished only in December, after 20 years. The former minister, Nsinga Boyenge Mosambay, retains responsibility for territorial security and war veterans (SWB 15/5; AED 22/5; ARB 15/6).

The funding expected from the IMF in support of the 1989–90 economic and financial programme came through on 9 June, when it approved credits totalling $253 mn. The agreement followed **repayment** to the IMF of $128,1 mn arrears. Of the total, $144 mn is being provided under a 12-month standby arrangement; the remainder comprises a second-year credit under the three-year structural adjustment facility signed in mid-1987. The government has committed itself to reducing inflation and creating conditions for real economic growth through "strong stabilization policies" — liberalization of the exchange rate, higher domestic interest rates, price increases and a cut in government subsidies. IMF approval opened the way for World Bank disbursement of the second $82 mn tranche of the $149 mn structural adjustment loan approved in mid-1987. Overall external debt is estimated at above $8 500 mn; as of the end of 1987, total disbursed external debt was $7 334 mn, of which $5 101 mn was owed to bilateral and $1 355 mn to multilateral official creditors (SWB 25/5; AA 9/6;

C 12/6; AED 29/5, 19/6, 26/6; TS 21/6).

According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Zambia and Zaire failed to take full advantage of the unprecedented increases in **copper** prices on the world market during 1988 because of supply problems. Despite the fact that copper prices ended the year 46 per cent higher than in 1987, overall export commodity prices fell in 1988 by an average of 12,9 per cent, with many key export commodities recording large declines (EASA 19/5).

Pres Mobutu hosted the **summit** of 18 African heads of state at Gbadolite on 22 June to discuss ways of ending the 14-year-old civil war in **Angola**. After the meeting, attended by Angolan government officials and Unita rebels, a **ceasefire** was announced (S 19/6, 20/6; BD 26/6; SWB 26/6).

(Relations with Congo — see Congo.)

EAST AFRICA

Burundi

An estimated 1 000 of the original 63 000 **refugees** who fled to Rwanda following the ethnic massacres last year, have refused to return to their country or, having returned, have gone back to Rwanda. The 31 May was the last day for voluntary repatriation under the auspices of the UNHCR (SWB 3/6; ARB 15/6).

About 70 Libyan diplomats and expatriates were **expelled** from Burundi on 5 April following what the government called continued "acts of destabilization" (SWB 7/4, 8/4, 10/4; AED 17/4).

Comoros

Comoran exports **increased** by 84 per cent in 1988 over the previous year, while imports remained stable with a mere 1 per cent rise. The improvement in exports is largely attributed to the selling off of **vanilla** stocks accumulated over the previous two years. Vanilla represented three-quarters of total 1988 exports (ION 8/4; ARB 30/4).

A bill revising the **constitution** was passed unanimously on 2 June. It contained motions to remove the limit on the number of presidential mandates, provided for the resuscitation of the post of prime minister, and for the election of governors for each island. A referendum on the bill will be held by October (ION 17/6, 24/6).

A "provisional national committee" has been formed by Abdu Bakari Boina, the former ex-party secretary of the liberation movement, Molinaco, and Ahamed Mlindasse, who was a member of parliament. The committee is considered to be the embryo of a new political opposition party working within the country and which supports Mohammed

Taki, who is one of the main contenders for Pres Abdallah's post (ION 1/7).

Pres Abdallah made his first official visit to Tanzania from 19–22 June. Tanzania has recently expressed **concern** about the increased South African presence in Moroni (ION 24/6).

Djibouti

Eight people died and 150 000 people's homes were destroyed by torrential **rains** which fell on Djibouti for three days from 5 to 8 April. Officials estimated that 70 per cent of the capital had been damaged. France gave financial and logistical aid after appeals for international assistance (ION 15/4; SWB 10/4).

About ten people were killed during violent outbreaks of street fighting in Djibouti on 19 April between **Issas and Gadaboursis**, the latter a non-native community representing about 15 per cent of the capital's population. The events were preceded by friction over **emergency supplies** following the floods. Activist Afar groups unhappy about food distribution and about general economic conditions, besieged the Tadjourah administrative centre in the north of the country. The government has reacted to the volatile situation with repression (ION 22/4, 29/4, 27/5). In an effort to diversify external relations and financial sources, and to attract investors at a time when the domestic scene is fraught with unprecedented tensions, partly because of regional problems, but also the lack of economic development, Pres Hassan Gouled has undertaken official visits to Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain and France (ION 29/4, 17/6, 24/6).

Ethiopia

The government foiled a **coup** attempt carried out by senior army officers on 16 May while Pres Mengistu was on a four-day visit to East Germany. The attempt was attributed to widespread discontent within the armed forces over the government's handling of the war in the provinces of **Eritrea and Tigray**. Twenty-eight generals and senior officers implicated in the attempted coup were killed during the fighting or have subsequently been executed, among them the chief of staff of the armed forces, Maj-Gen Merid Negusie, and air force chief, Maj-Gen Amha Desta. Pres Mengistu subsequently carried out a complete reshuffle within the military hierarchy — several loyal colonels were rewarded with promotions to the rank of brigadier-general and at least three brigadiers became major-generals. Vice prime minister, Addis Tedla, replaced Merid Begussie, one of the principal coup leaders, as chief of staff; General Seyoum Mekonen was appointed his deputy (S 17/5, 18/5, 19/5, 7/6; AED 22/5, 29/5, 5/6; TWR 24/5, 7/6; AC 26/5; AA 26/5; SWB 26/5; ION 27/5, 3/6; JA 31/5).

In a dramatic policy change, all 750 deputies attending an extraordinary session of the Ethiopian parliament on 5 June unanimously backed unconditional **peace talks** with rebels in Eritrea, to try to end the 28-year-old civil war. Pres Mengistu, however, ruled out negotiation on the issue of secession for the northern province of Eritrea. In response to the peace initiative, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) reiterated its position that the "fundamental issue of the illegal unity deceitfully imposed on the people" be a principle of negotiations (S 6/6, 15/6; DT 7/6, 15/6; SWB 8/6, 9/6, 10/6; ION 10/6).

Kenya

Former vice-president Josephat Karanja has been forced to **resign** after a no-confidence vote in parliament. Accused of receiving money from Uganda to overthrow the government, he was removed after an unprecedented display of parliamentary unanimity. His resignation prompted a major cabinet shake-up on 1 May, which brought in the minister of finance, George Saitoti as vice-president. For the first time since independence, the Kikuyu, the principal ethnic group, hold neither the presidency nor the vice-presidency. The reshuffle resulted in three new appointments, the creation a new ministry, the abolition of the year old national guidance and political affairs ministry, and reshuffling of 10 portfolios (C 29/4; SWB 2/5, 3/5; AED 8/5, 22/5; NA 5/89, 6/89; ION 6/5; ARB 15/6).

On 15 May the IMF approved a three-year enhanced structural adjustment facility worth $310,8 mn on the basis of the government's latest policy paper and the progress made under the previous programme. The 1989–91 programme aims to build on the previous IMF-backed programme by further reducing inflation, and achieving average GDP growth of around 5 per cent a year. It also seeks to reduce the current **account deficit**, and to provide **employment** for the rapidly expanding labour force (ION 20/5; AED 17/4, 22/5).

The minister of finance, George Saitoti, presented a cautious **budget** mid-June for 1989/90, stressing the government's commitment to structural adjustment and the twin goals of boosting the private sector and promoting exports. Predicting an economic growth rate of 5,1 per cent this year, the budget forecasts a 21 per cent increase in recurrent expenditure. This will mean that the government will be hard pressed to meet its budget deficit, which is equivalent to 42 per cent of GDP (ION 24/6; AED 26/6, 3/7; EASA 30/6).

French prime minister Michel Rocard became the first French government leader to make an official trip to Kenya, when he visited the country on 27–28 April. Economic exchange between the two countries has increased more than four-fold over the last seven years, despite the fact that French investors generally appear to have been withdrawing from the continent (ION 29/4).

Kenya has bowed to international pressure on **human rights** by suddenly setting free political prisoners held without trial. The surprise release of Kenya's seven remaining political detainees was the result of a long, low-key campaign by western nations (DT 8/6; ION 10/6; SWB 12/6). The move was followed shortly after by an amnesty offer by Pres Moi to his political opponents residing abroad (ION 17/6).

Madagascar

Five people were killed and at least 60 injured in three days of **rioting** that followed protests rallies sparked by allegations of fraud in the 12 March presidential elections. Timed to coincide with Pres Ratsiraka's inauguration for his third seven-year term, the rallies were held by two of the defeated contenders, Manandafy Rakotonirina and Jerome Razanabahiny of the newly formed _Alliance Democratique_, who called for the president's overthrow. The election results held few surprises: Pres Ratsiraka was returned with 62 per cent of the votes; second place went to the MFM-MFT leader who has recently converted to liberalism, Manandafy Rakotonirina with nearly 20 per cent of the votes, followed by Jerome Razanabihiny, a resurgent social democrat who confirmed the presence of his Vonjy party with 15 per cent of the votes; Monja Jaona was eliminated with 3 per cent of the votes. On 21 April the president reappointed his entire Cabinet, but dismissed five members of the Council of the Revolution — a presidential advisory body — because they were now openly opposed to the government. Three of the five were candidates who challenged Ratsiraka for the presidency.

Pres Ratsiraka announced a new **election law** on 12 May, after the opposition _Alliance Democratique_ threatened to boycott the 28 May legislative elections. All parties took part in the general elections, which saw the presidential party Arema win 120 of the 137 parliamentary seats, increasing its majority; the opposition parties took the remaining seats. In spite of its success, the Arema party only won two seats in the capital, while in the major cities more than 40 per cent of voters abstained. The opposition parties, MFM and Vonjy, have persisted in their demand for the formation of a provisional government (ION 8/4, 15/4, 22/4, 13/5, 3/6, 10/6; ARB 15/4; C 18/4, 22/4; AC 28/4; AED 1/5, 29/5, 19/6; SWB 18/5, 14/6, 30/6).

The IMF has approved a three-year enhanced structural adjustment **loan** worth over $99 mn for Madagascar. The ESAF replaces the 10-month standby arrangement approved last September and the structural adjustment signed in August 1987. The cash will support a programme for 1989–91 that aims to reduce inflation, increase investment and real per

capita income, and make progress towards financial stability. The agreement confirms the IMF's satisfaction that adjustment measures introduced since 1980 have moved the country towards a more **open**, market-oriented economy (ION 20/5; AED 29/5; EASA 30/6).

Mauritius

Opposition MP Ivan Collendavelloo has resigned from parliament over his links with South African businessman **Sol Kerzner**, whose application for a Mauritian passport he had supported. The disclosure has been a source of embarrassment to the opposition whose members have in turn been accused of corruption by Prime Minister Jugnauth. Opposition to fraud, corruption and South African connections have formed part of the MMM's political platform since 1983; they will now have to answer to the inquiry which the government has set up to investigate the dealings of a South African company, Jalc, in Mauritius (ION 15/4; S 22/4, 16/5; AA 28/4; AC 28/4; AED 1/5).

In 1988 **France** remained Mauritius' principal supplier and its number two customer after Great Britain. Imports rose by 20 per cent, although exports fell for the first time in many years, by 3 per cent, the results of a reduction in sugar imports by France (ION 15/4).

Rwanda

More than one million people in western and southern Rwanda — about one-fifth of the country's population — are facing **food shortages** after unusually heavy rain since February damaged crops. More than 1,1 mn people live in the affected area (DN 11/5). (*Refugees to return to Burundi — see Burundi.*)

Somalia

The need for improved relations with the IMF was a factor behind the 11 April **government reshuffle**, when the president's brother, Abdurhman Jama Barré, was moved from the finance ministry back to foreign affairs and Mohamed Sheikh Osman, former finance minister, was returned to his old job. Four ministers were sacked and several ministers exchanged portfolios (SWB 13/4; AED 17/4; AC 26/5; ION 15/4).

The government appears to have lost control of a large part of the south of the country as **rebellions** among officers have spread from the Kisimayo Military Academy where there was a mutiny in March. At the root of the military mutinies is the exclusion from government of the former minister of defence, Gen Gabiyu, who was demoted in January. The army is largely manned by

Ogadenis, the group to which he belongs (ION 15/4).

After being quiet for months, the opposition Somali National Movement (SNM) made a series of sudden and successful **attacks** on the north-eastern port of Zeila, the town of Loyada on the Djibouti border, and several other small villages. Since last year's government counter-attacks, when Hargeisa and Burao were badly damaged by artillery and air bombardment, SNM operations have been small-scale and scattered. The latest fighting is not so much part of the SNM struggle against the government as an attempt to prevent control of the lucrative trade between northern Somali towns and Djibouti passing out of the hands of the Issaq (who provide the SNM's main support) and into those of another clan, the Gadabursi (AC 26/5; ION 27/5).

Pres Barré was given an **ultimatum** on 26 May by members of his own Marehan clan urging a return to **democracy**. He was presented with a plan of action and given twenty days in which to satisfy the first demand — that he broadcast a statement in which he recognized "the failure of his policy" which has led to a civil war and "which the President is incapable of ending". The ultimatum also called for a **multi-party** system and an early general **election**. As a direct consequence of the demands, the central committee of the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) met on 18–20 June to discuss the end of the one-party system; however, this was not followed by an immediate extraordinary session of the parliament as the president had promised (ION 10/6, 24/6; SWB 22/6).

The World Bank has granted a $70 mn **loan** to Somalia for the economic reform programme which continues Somalia's agricultural-sector adjustment efforts. The programme is expected to boost economic growth, food production, exports, and the wages of people in rural areas (WBN 8/6; ION 10/6; AED 26/6).

Tanzania

The former Chief Minister of Zanzibar, Seif Shariff Hamad, and several of his political associates — Suleiman Seif Hamad, Juma Ng'wali and Masoud Omar — were **arrested** on 10 May on charges of having organized an illegal meeting on the island of Pemba. Seif Hamad was dismissed in January following accusations that he was opposed to the union with mainland Tanzania and favoured the resuscitation of the sultanate. With increasing demands on the islands for a **referendum** to decide on the issue of the union with mainland Tanzania, Hamad's detention is seen as an outcome of party chairman Julius Nyerere's public demand that dissidents be detained. In a continuing crackdown of political dissidents, about 50 people have been subsequently arrested on charges of attend-

ing illegal meetings, and two opposition publications have been banned (AA 12/5, 26/5, 9/6; SWB 16/5; ION 20/5; DT 29/5, 13/6).

A **South African** man has been sentenced to 15 years in jail for endangering and injuring passengers aboard a Soviet jet which was carrying ANC members from bases in Angola to Dar es Salaam. Using explosives as a threat, Bradley Richard Stacey (alias George Hodges) attempted to hijack the plane to Johannesburg (S 1/6, 2/6; C 2/6).

A section of the task force sent to **Mozambique** to help the armed forces protect certain strategic areas against Renamo, and repatriated in September 1988, **mutinied** in Tabora, a south-west Tanzanian town, because of the government's refusal to give them back pay owing from their stay in Mozambique. The party chairman, Julius **Nyerere**, and not the president, personally visited the mutineers to placate them with promises of payment in a move which is seen as **undermining** Pres Mwinyi's position (ION 3/6, 17/6).

Defence minister, Salim Ahmed Salim, has been appointed secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity (DT 8/5).

Tanzania's currency was devalued by 4,8 per cent to $1 = Tsh17 in an effort to boost exports (EASA 30/6).

Pres Mwinyi has launched a five-year **development plan** which endorses the principles of socialism, but also promotes the private sector and foreign investment while focussing on the priority sectors of agriculture and transportation to provide a platform for economic revival and growth. The dilapidated road and rail network is given top priority, with a 24 per cent share of the total $1,3 bn projected investment. Agriculture, whose strong performance has resulted essentially from economic reforms since 1985, will receive 18,5 per cent, resources and industry 10 per cent. Foreign aid is expected to finance almost half of expenditure. Running from 1989 to 1993, the plan aims to increase real GDP growth on the mainland to 6 per cent a year by the end of this period. The launching of Tanzania's fourth five-year development plan after a two-year postponement is seen as reflecting Mwinyi's **consolidation** of power and his commitment to the IMF-backed Economic Recovery Programme (ION 29/4; AED 1/5, 29/5; EASA 19/5).

A preliminary report on the census carried out in 1988, puts the country's **population** at 23 174 336, reflecting an annual growth rate of 2,8 per cent growth over the past 10 years; 640 578 people live on the islands (ARB 30/4). (*Tanzanian concern about South Africa and Comoros — see Comoros.*)

Uganda

In a long awaited **cabinet reshuffle**, Pres Museveni has dropped eight ministers who failed to win seats in the country's new

parliament, and placed two generals in top defence posts. Maj-Gen Tumwine, the army commander-in-chief, has been appointed minister of state for defence and his second-in-command, Maj-Gen Gwigyema, deputy of defence, although Pres Museveni retains overall control of the defence portfolio. Although there are 10 new faces in the 48-member cabinet, there are no changes among the key portfolios (SWB 12/4; ACon 21/4). Pres Museveni later named his 32-year-old brother, Maj-Gen Salim Saleh Akandan-waho, as army commander, and Brig Ikecho as chief of staff (DN 9/5; ION 13/5).

Three opposition movements, the Uganda Democratic Alliance, the Uganda People's Front and the Uganda National Liberation Front, have agreed to form an alliance to provide more effective opposition to Pres Museveni's government. Each organization will retain its name and ideology, but military and political campaigns will be coordinated (ION 10/6).

Government forces claim that they killed about 370 **rebels** in an intensified military offensive in northern Uganda during May. The army said it had fought against more than 1 500 rebels, who for the first time were made up of two former rival forces — the Holy Spirit Movement and the Uganda Peoples Army. About 300 rebels subsequently surrendered (ARB 15/6; SWB 19/6; ION 24/6).

Over one million people in the West Nile region of north-western Uganda are facing **starvation** brought about the loss of crops as a result of heavy rains and swarms of grasshoppers late last year. The problem has been aggravated by rebel activity in the region, which has impeded the distribution of relief supplies (DT 6/6).

Uganda has secured a $238 mn Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from the IMF to finance three years of economic reforms, which it is hoped will help to boost real economic growth by 5 per cent a year and cut annual inflation to 7,5 per cent from 55 per cent by 1992 (AED 24/4; IMF S 26/4; EASA 28/4; ARB 31/5).

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the **Mount Etjo Declaration** on 9 April which established a complex set of procedures to restore peace in the region, notably the withdrawal of Swapo insurgents to bases north of the 16th parallel in Angola. The USA and USSR attended as observers (C 10/4; SWB 11/4).

A **ceasefire** agreement was apparently reached between the Angolan government and the rebel Unita movement at the Gbadolite summit held on 22 June. Details of the agreement remained vague, but some delegates claimed that it made provision for the integration of Unita members into Angolan state institutions and the temporary withdrawal from politics of Unita leader **Dr Savimbi** while a transitional government is formed, leading to elections in which he would compete. Pres **Mobutu** of Zaire, a staunch ally of Unita leader Dr Savimbi, was the principle architect of the talks. As a sign of good faith, Pres dos Santos released 700 Unita prisoners and commuted the death sentences of 50 others, prior to the meeting. The talks were preceded on 16 May by the first-ever concerted regional effort to halt the conflict when an eight-nation summit of African countries met to endorse a proposed peace plan drawn up by Pres dos Santos (S 10/5, 19/6, 20/6, 23/6; C 15/5, 30/5, 22/6, 23/6; WM 23/6; AA 9/6, 23/6; DT 15/6, 29/6, 30/6; SWB 5/6, 27/6, 30/6; AED 22/5).

Angola's request to become a member of the **IMF** has been accepted, making it the 152nd member of the financial institution. Angola's contribution to the IMF budget will be very low — 0,007 per cent (S 15/6).

By mid-June over 10 000 **Cuban** soldiers had left Angola since the signing of the December peace accord (S 17/5; C 14/6).

An estimated 1 500 Angolans **fled** across the border into Namibia during mid-June to escape renewed fighting between Unita rebels and government forces. Not accorded refugee status, they are being assisted by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) because the UN High Commission for Refugees does not have a mandate to assist them (S 11/6, 12/6; C 12/6).

Angola has returned to the international financial markets with the 10 May signing in Luanda of a $220 mn commercial pre-financing **loan**, based on a crude oil sales contract with the UK's BP Oil International. The loan will enable the government to honour some of its outstanding short-term debts, as well as to purchase imports to support the economic recovery programme (AED 5/6).

The Defence and Security Council Economic Commission has approved a basic programme for the reconstruction of southern Angola aimed at promoting greater regional autonomy to overcome existing economic and social bottlenecks. Valued at $240 mn, the **investment plan** does not include the transport sector's rehabilitation of the port of Namibe and the Namibe Railway, valued at $272 mn. Backed by the UN and many western countries, Luanda will host a donor nations' conference in September in the hope of implementing the plan next January (S 23/5; ARB 30/6).

A prospecting, marketing and mining agreement, worth $180 mn annually, has been signed by the Angolan government and **De Beers**. In terms of the agreement *Endiama*, the government-owned diamond firm, expects to start marketing a significant proportion of Angola's diamond production through De Beers' Central Selling Organization (CSO) as early as 1990; thereafter, in principle the CSO will handle all Angola's production through an exclusive marketing agreement. The agreement is expected to lead to the establishment of a joint venture to develop the **kimberlite** mines which could make Angola one of the world's top four diamond producers with earnings of $1 bn. Production of diamonds — 90 per cent of which are of gemstone quality — has increased to an annual rate of 1,6 mn carats, worth $250 mn, five times the level in 1986 (AA 26/5; BD 1/6; C 2/6; AC 9/6).

Lesotho

A leading politician and economics lecturer at the University of Lesotho, Joel Moitse, was **detained** in June under the Internal Security Act (S 1/6).

The IMF has granted a structural adjustment facility worth $5,6 mn. The **credit** is intended to support the economic reform programme and promote "reasonable" economic growth (AED 19/6; IMF S 26/6).

An epidemic of **cutworm** has drastically reduced output of the country's chief grain crops — maize and sorghum — by 45 and 72 per cent respectively. For the country as a whole, the level of staple food self-sufficiency is projected to fall from 65 per cent to between 38 and 21 per cent (AA 26/5; AED 29/5; C 30/5; ARB 31/5).

Malawi

The government has announced substantial **increases** in the minimum daily wage (almost double in the main centres) to help compensate for cost-of-living increases over the past three years. The last wage rises were in January 1986; since then there have been three devaluations and the rate of inflation has risen from around 15 per cent to almost 32 per cent (AED 8/5).

Wide-ranging **tax reforms** to ease the burden of taxation on essential commodities was the main thrust of the recently announced 1989/90 budget which has been described as the best in years. It follows improved economic performance last year, and the promise of increased aid receipts as the country carries out an IMF/World Bank-approved adjustment programme. However, the visible trade deficit in 1988 — MK 274,7 mn against MK 38,7 mn in 1987 as the rise in exports failed to match the near-60 per cent boom in imports — points to continued economic pressures caused by transport bottlenecks (ARB 30/4; AB 5/89).

Mozambique

Pledges amounting to over $350 mn in support of Mozambique's **emergency programme**

1989–1990 were made by the international community at the UN-sponsored donors conference in April. The programme calls for the supply of around 916 000 tonnes of food aid, costing more than $237 mn, plus almost $70 mn in logistical support. It aims to meet the needs of the 7,7 mn people — almost half the population, who are now dependent on food donations as a result of the war and drought. Of nearly three million people seriously affected by the war, more than half have been displaced and are homeless; a further million people are refugees in neighbouring countries. The cost to the country of "Renamo's banditry" was estimated by the prime minister to equal more than $6 bn — double the country's current external debt and 60 times the value of its 1987 exports. **Italy** headed the list of donors, reinforcing its increasingly dynamic aid and cooperation programme in Africa, with a contribution of $78 mn, followed by the **USA** ($65 mn), the **World Food Programme** ($62 mn), **European Community** ($44 mn) and **Sweden** ($30 mn). The outstanding success of the meeting is seen as a clear indication of the broad international **support** the Frelimo government now enjoys in its efforts to put the country on the road to economic and social recovery (AED 17/4, 24/4; ION 22/4; ARB 31/5; AB 6/89).

The World Bank is to provide a third credit, worth $87,2 mn, to support the third phase of the economic rehabilitation programme for 1987–90 which is focussing on the liberalization of trade and production (AED 29/5; ION 3/6).

Mozambique has formally joined the **Preferential Trade Area (PTA)**, the economic grouping of Southern and East African states. Because of the ongoing war against Renamo, Mozambique has been excused payment of dues to the PTA for three years (ARB 31/5).

Donor funding for the second-phase rehabilitation programme for the 533 km **Limpopo railway** has now reached about $104 mn — covering the key elements of the $150 mn core programme which is due for completion in 1991 (AED 26/6).

During British prime minister **Thatcher's** visit to Zimbabwe on 29 March where she met Pres Chissano and Pres Mugabe at the Nyanga military training camp, she announced an increase in the number of British instructors to train Mozambican **army officers**, and reaffirmed her determination to prevent Renamo from ousting the Mozambican government (MF 4/89; ION 1/4).

Renamo rebels promised to lay down their arms from 1 to 30 April to allow aid to reach starving people. Officials have reported that as many as 130 people are dying every day in two isolated districts of Zambezia province. Prime minister Muchungo rejected the **cease-fire** as a "stunt" after a rebel attack on 6 April (C 11/4, 13/4).

Pres Chissano had talks with South Africa's foreign minister, **"Pik" Botha** in Maputo on 23 March to discuss ways of bringing peace to Southern Africa, notably Mozambique. The discussions also dealt with economic and joint development issues. While in Europe the previous month, Pres Chissano confirmed that Mozambique was open to all peace initiatives for Mozambique (MF 4/89; AED 3/4).

In a major political shift Pres Chissano announced in April the government's willingness to talk to representatives of Renamo, but stressed the talks would be aimed at discussing only the **reintegration** of Renamo members back into society and not power-sharing between the ruling Frelimo party and the rebels. While continuing to rule out negotiations about power, Pres Chissano's shift in attitude has been attributed to efforts by religious organizations which are playing an important role as unofficial "mediators" in drawing up a peace plan. (Chissano first gave his approval in August 1988 to representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the 17-church Christian Council of Mozambique meeting with Renamo leaders.) On 23 June the government put forward a tentative plan to end the war against Renamo. Setting out conditions for a possible dialogue with the rebels for the first time, it demands that "all acts of terrorism and banditry" be stopped as the first condition for dialogue. Chissano also indicated that he was ready to modify the existing political order to accommodate the rebels (S 24/4, 26/6; ION 17/6; AC 23/6; C 24/6).

South Africa

After a unanimous decision to dissolve itself, the Progressive Federal Party merged with the Independent Party and the National Democratic Party on 7 April to form the **Democratic Party**. Wynand Malan, Dennis Worrall and Zach de Beer are the co-leaders of the party (S 7/4, 8/4). Known world-wide for her championing of human rights, veteran MP Helen Suzman who has represented her constituency for 36 years, announced her retirement from parliament on 16 May (S 17/5, 19/5, 27/6; ST 21/5).

Pres Botha dissolved parliament at the end of May in preparation for the nation-wide **elections** of all three houses of parliament to be held on 6 September, despite the acknowledged need for a new delimitation of seats. He indicated that he would not stand again in the presidential elections (SAB 19/5; SWB 8/4; ARB 15/6). A spate of ministerial **resignations** followed the announcement of the September elections, bringing to six the number of ministers who have resigned since the beginning of the year. Notable among them was the resignation of the minister of consitutional development and planning, **Chris Heunis** (S 10/5, 13/5; C 12/5, 30/5).

Dr David Webster, the former vice-chairman of the extra-parliamentary opposition group, the Five Freedoms Forum, and a member of the Detainees Parents Support Committee, was killed by an unknown gunman outside his home on 1 May. An estimated 10 000 people attended his funeral (SAB 19/5; ARB 15/6; WM 12/5).

Helene Pastoors, the Belgian national sentenced to ten years imprisonment in 1986 for treason, was released from prison on 10 May following an agreement between the South African and Belgian authorities. Before her release Pastoors was required to sign an undertaking that she would not return to Southern Africa or participate in violent activities directed against South Africa; on her arrival in Belgium she tore up the promise (C 11/5; S 12/5; B 11/5).

The three-year long **State of Emergency** was renewed on 9 June. An estimated 32 organizations and 500 individuals had new restriction orders imposed on them (C 8/6; SAB 16/6).

National Party leader, **F W de Klerk** visited Britain, West Germany, Portugal and Italy at the end of June. The meeting with South Africa's main trading partners was undertaken in an apparent effort to inform them about his plans for reform after the elections when he is expected to assume the presidency (SS 25/6; SAB 30/6).

TBVC States

Bophuthatswana — All eight members of the banned Peoples Progressive Party charged with **treason** were found guilty on 15 June. Most of the eight are members of the PPP national executive. An application by the defence council for the 143 accused that evidence be heard from Rockey Malebane-Metsing, the exiled leader of the coup attempt who is living in London, was granted. In defence of those accused, Malebane-Metsing gave evidence that the eight accused of treason were merely acting as his messengers (S 10/5, 15/5, 2/6, 6/6, 9/6, 15/6; C 16/6).

The estimated **budget** for the Department of the President for 1989–90 is R53 mn — an increase of 106 per cent over the previous year (C 24/5).

Transkei — An attempted **coup** to overthrow Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa was reported on 30 April. Several prominent people in the homeland were arrested, including Lt-Col Craig Duli, a member of the Military Council. The attempt was apparently linked to Gen Holomisa's involvement in a divorce case (S 28/4; SS 30/4; ST 30/4; SWB 2/5).

Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, a 26-year-old Zambian-educated student, has become paramount chief of the **Tembu**, one of the major black tribes in the country. The selection of Dalindyebo by the tribal council in May ended a two-year power struggle for the chieftancy and toppled paramount chief Mtirara, the only pro-South African

government chief to contend the post. There are four paramount chief's in Transkei and all hold powerful positions in the administration of the homeland as well as over their own tribes. The Tembu royal house has been divided by conflicts between the new chiefs father, paramount chief Sabata, who was opposed to independence, and Chief Kaizer Matanzima, his cousin, causing Chief Sabata to flee to Zambia in the early 1980s where he became an "elder" of the ANC. He died in 1986 (C 29/5; S 17/6).

Ciskei — More than R650 mn was paid to Ciskei by **South Africa** in the form of direct assistance and transfers in terms of bilateral agreements during the 1988/89 financial year (C 29/3).

South West Africa/Namibia

On the 1 April, the day which marked the start of the transitional period to independence and consequent withdrawal of South African troops to bases in Namibia, hundreds of **Swapo guerrillas** crossed into Namibia from Angola in violation of regional peace agreements. In some of the bloodiest fighting to take place in Namibia since the bush war began 23 years ago, an estimated 278 insurgents and 27 security force members died. At the Mount Etjo meeting held on 9 April, South Africa, Angola and Cuba reached agreement on the withdrawal of Swapo forces from Namibia. In terms of the agreement, Swapo was given until 21 April to withdraw all its forces from Namibia; the forces were to congregate at 18 UN assembly points in the territory to be escorted north of the 16th parallel in Angola. Swapo blamed the subsequent impasse over their withdrawal on the proximity of South West Africa Territory Force and counter-insurgency police bases to the assembly points. Following the confinement to bases of the South African-commanded forces on 26 April, the withdrawal of the remaining Swapo guerrillas was completed (S 1/4–9/4, 10/5; SWB 1/4–6/4, 18/4; ST 2/4; FM 7/4; AED 17/4, 24/4, 1/5; WA 17/4; BD 18/4; C 27/4, 29/4; ACon 21/4; ARB 15/6).

Outlining Swapo's economic plans for an independent Namibia, leader Sam Nujoma said at a Business International conference held in London on 21 April that he envisaged a **mixed economy** in which there would be "A continued and significant role for the private sector". No wholesale nationalization was planned. Criticizing what he called "widespread irregularities and abuses in the mining industry", he foresaw a renegotiation of the agreements governing this sector to increase state leverage if Swapo formed the new government, as is widely predicted. Land reforms involving a state takeover of abandoned or underutilized farmland and of farms owned by absentee owners were outlined (EASA 28/4; Ff 5/89; AB 5/89; ARB 31/5).

By the end of June, the UN programme to repatriate 47 000 Namibian **exiles** was well under way, with 5 381 now back in the territory. Their return was preceded by a general amnesty for Namibian guerrillas and for the repeal of apartheid legislation signed by South African Pres Botha on 6 June (S 3/5, 7/6, 11/6, 13/6; BD 16/5, 19/6; ARB 15/6; C 6/6, 13/6, 20/6).

Swaziland

Over 40 000 people attended the 21st birthday celebrations of King Mswati III on 19 April when he assumed full executive powers. In a major policy speech, the King reaffirmed his country's policy of good neighbourliness and non-alignment. Regarding domestic policy he defended the non-party system of government and elections, established by his late father, but said it should be adjusted where necessary. He also vowed to take steps to eradicate corruption and reaffirmed the country's policy of free enterprise and a free market economy (ARB 15/4; C 19/4; S 20/4; TS 20/4).

Zambia

Expectations that Zambia's **copper** output had stabilized at around 470 000 tonnes a year have been not been met as copper production for the year ending 31 March has been estimated at 425 000 — down about 14 per cent on the previous year. Declining production has meant that Zambia has not been able to capitalize on steeply rising world prices for copper. Operational problems and unavailability of equipment were named as the reasons. The government has forecast that production will be back to its previous three-year level in 1989, and will rise to 553 000 tonnes in 1993 (AED 3/4; EASA 19/5; AA 23/6).

Pres Kaunda has accused white bureaucrats in neighbouring **Zimbabwe** of unleashing a **smear campaign** against himself which alleges that he is guilty of corruption and of poaching wild animals in Zimbabwe (C 14/6, 15/6; S 15/6).

Following a meeting of the prime ministers of Zambia and Zaire, agreement has been reached on a delineation of the **border**, on measures to restore security along the frontier, and the regulation of cross-border trade (AED 17/4).

Zimbabwe

The **Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations** which replaces the 1982 investment code unveiled on 8 May by Minister of Finance, Bernard Chidzero, has been cautiously welcomed by both local and foreign investors as a modest step in the right direction. The "overall economic reform programme" includes changes in dividend remittance policies, labour relations, prices and incomes. The principal prime aim of the investment guidelines is to attract investment to create jobs. With universal primary education and a massive expansion of the secondary sector, Zimbabwe now has a highly educated **workforce** which is severely frustrated by problems of growing unemployment. Economists have estimated that the number of unemployed at present is around 900 000, while only 6 800 new jobs are being generated annually. There has been little investment in the country for decades, growth having to depend heavily on foreign borrowing. Private capital inflow during the 1980/86 period has been put at no more than $50 mn, while in the past two years there has been a net out-flow of about $100 mn, mainly reflecting disinvestment by SA firms. As a result Zimbabwe has a **debt** service ratio of around 30 per cent of export earnings, around ten times higher than before 1980 (DT 20/4, 18/5; WM 27/4; S 12/5; AED 22/5; AC 23/6; ARB 31/5, 30/6; AB 6/89; BD 8/6, 21/6; AA 9/6).

Zimbabwe's **economy** grew by 5,3 per cent in 1988 — the highest growth rate since 1985, when output expanded 7,3 per cent. Agriculture was the main source of growth, accounting for almost three percentage points of output expansion, while manufacturing was responsible for only one percentage point. Real GDP has been growing at 3 per cent a year, fractionally above the rate of population growth (ARB 30/6).

Several more senior ministers resigned from their posts in April in the wake of disclosures made by the Sandura Commission in the **"Willowgate"** car scandal; Maurice Nyagumbo, number four in the government and administrative head of the ruling party, who resigned in March, subsequently committed suicide (C 13/4; S 10/4; SWB 14/4, 17/4; ARB 15/4; AED 17/4; ST 23/4).

The launch of **Edgar Tekere's** new party, The Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) on 30 April, was dismissed by Pres Mugabe as the "joke of the year". Former secretary-general of Zanu, Tekere was fired from the ruling party last year after repeated accusations of corruption against the government. ZUM's three attempts at holding a political rally have been stopped by the government (C 3/5, 22/5; FM 5/5; AED 8/5; Ff 5/89; S 12/6, 13/6; DT 13/5; ARB 15/6).

Five detainees being held without trial in a maximum security prison in Harare began a **hunger strike** in Harare on 3 May. Prominent among them is a Britain, Jack Lewis-Walker who was arrested in September 1987 on suspicion of being a South African spy; two of the others were arrested on the same charge (S 9/5; C 13/5).

Pres Mugabe announced on 27 June that the Senate is to be **abolished**; the 40 Senate seats are expected to be added to the 100 seats in the House of Assembly (SWB 29/6).

The alleged leader of a South African

commando, **Dennis Charles Beahan** who tried to free six detained men from a maximum security prison in Harare, was jailed for life by the High Court on 30 June (C 29/6, 1/7; S 29/6).

Sources

A — *Afrika*; AA — *Africa Analysis*; AB — *African Business*; AC — *Africa Confidential*; ACon — *Africa Concord*; AED — *Africa Economic Digest*; AE&M — *Africa Energy & Mining*; AIB — *Africa Institute Bulletin*; AN — *Africa Newsfile*; BD — *Business Day*; BDN — *Botswana Daily News*; C — *Citizen*; Cr — *Crescent*; D — *Drum*; DN — *Daily News*; E — *Economist*; Ff — *Frontfile*; FM — *Financial Mail*; F&T — *Finansies & Tegniek*; H — *The Herald*; IMF S — *IMF Survey*; LT — *Lesotho Today*; I — *The Independent*; ION — *Indian Ocean Newsletter*; JA — *Jeune Afrique*; MF — *Mozambiquefile*; MIO — *Mozambique Information Office*; MNR — *Mozambique News Review*; NA — *New African*; SAB — *SA Barometer*; SAE — *Southern African Economist*; SAD — *South African Digest*; SAT — *Southern Africa Today*; So — *South*; SN — *Swazi News*; ST — *Sunday Times*; SWB — *Summary of World Broadcasts*; TS — *Times of Swaziland*; TWR — *Third World Reports*; WA — *West Africa*; WM — *Weekly Mail*; ZN — *Zimbabwe News*; NN — *New Nation*; S — *Star*.

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