


**AFRICA**

ISSN 0294-2104

vol 18 • no 4 • 1988

# INSIGHT

an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. R5,60 (R5,00 + 0,60 GST).



**Africa Insight** is an independent publication which endeavours to promote insight into the process of change and development in Africa.

The Institute does not necessarily subscribe to the opinions of contributors.

© Copyright reserved.

Contributions and subscriptions should be sent to:

The Editor  
P O Box 630  
PRETORIA  
0001 Republic of South Africa  
Telephone: (012) 28-6970

Editor: Richard Cornwell

#### **Editorial Committee**

Mr André du Pisani  
Dr Denis Fair  
Mr Richard Haines  
Ms Frieda Harmsen  
Dr Stan Schoeman

#### **Publications**

Africa Insight  
Journal of Contemporary African Studies  
Occasional papers  
Research communications  
Statistics and factual information  
Maps  
Africa Institute Bulletin (members only)

#### **Annual subscription**

Rand Monetary Area	R30,00
Elsewhere	\$30,00
Airmail rates on application.	

Each volume corresponds with a calendar year and consists of four numbers.

**THE AFRICA INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA** is an autonomous research and information service functioning on behalf of all population groups in South Africa. It was founded in 1960 by the South African universities and the *Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns* as a central and academically independent organization to undertake scientific studies of African affairs. The Institute is governed by a Council on which these organizations, amongst others, are represented.

Findings and analyses are disseminated through periodicals and other publications, the library, news media, and public appearances by members of the Institute's staff.

The Africa Institute of South Africa (reg no 61/00002/08) is registered as a non-profit association.

**COUNCIL:** Dr P Smit (Chairman), Prof P A Nel (Deputy Chairman), Prof C J A Barratt, Mr J J H Booysen, Prof W J Breytenbach, Prof J A Heyns, The Hon Justice V G Hiemstra, Mr W B Holtes, Dr D C Krogh, Sir Richard Luyt, Prof G Maasdorp, Prof C J Maritz, Prof A C Nkabinde, Dr P S Rautenbach, Mr D Sole, Prof L T Taljaard, Prof H J van Aswegen, Prof N J van der Merwe.

**DIRECTOR:** G M E Leistner  
**ASSISTANT DIRECTOR:** P W Esterhuysen  
**SECRETARY:** B C Fisher



Printed by Blackshaws (Pty) Ltd Cape Town

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

# INSIGHT

an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. R5,60 (R5,00 + 0,60 GST).

Cover by William Steyn

<b>Comment</b> The OAU 25 years: Survival the foremost priority — <i>Pieter Esterhuysen</i>	158
<b>Disasters</b> Disaster and relief in South Africa: Defining the crisis of the 1987 floods — <i>C R Cross and M T Nzama</i>	160
<b>Social Science</b> Social science in Africa: Problems and prospects — <i>L Bloom</i>	174
<b>Agriculture</b> Agriculture in two Chinas: Lessons for Southern Africa — <i>Prof T J Bembridge</i>	180
<b>Cities</b> The capital cities of Africa with special reference to new capitals planned for the continent — <i>D Pfaff</i>	187
<b>Ports and harbours</b> Angola's ports and oil terminals — <i>Denis Fair</i>	197
<b>Art</b> African art and artists: A new identity? — <i>Prof E J de Jager</i>	202
<b>Africa monitor</b> — <i>Jenny Macgregor</i>	206

licences granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

Rep by Sabinet Gateway under



# The OAU 25 years: Survival the foremost priority

*Pieter Esterhuysen, assistant-director of the Africa Institute, assesses the OAU's major achievements in its first 25 years.*

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) celebrated its 25th anniversary on 25–26 May this year. As might have been anticipated, the meeting of African leaders at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa was marked by the mutual back-patting associated with gatherings of this kind. There was no lack of emotion as the leaders rededicated themselves to the ideals of continental unity and solidarity. Nevertheless, nobody attending could fail to note the striking contrast between the splendour of the festivities and the human misery extending from outside the conference venue across the continent.

It was hardly surprising then that observers of the African scene saw this momentous occasion as an opportunity to voice serious misgivings about the organization's record. *Newsweek* published its report under the heading, "The OAU has become increasingly irrelevant".<sup>1</sup> Baffour Ankomah wrote in *New African*, "If Africa knows any shame, the leaders meeting in Addis Ababa to celebrate the OAU anniversary should turn up in mourning cloth".<sup>2</sup> *West Africa* asked, "Why should a continent so endowed with human and material resources appear to be on the verge of extinction?" while its editor noted that OAU leaders, despite their self-complacent rhetoric, "... seemed to wonder why their undeniable unity of purpose has not yielded the results that are quantifiable". All seemed to agree with ex-President Julius Nyerere, himself a founding father of the OAU, who commented that "... the most important cause for celebration is that the OAU has survived".<sup>3</sup>

In South Africa, perhaps as a result of the OAU's long history of confrontation with the country's rulers, many people have simply lost interest in what seems like a continuing but futile exercise on the part of the OAU. Consequently, media interest in the organization tends to flare up only when something

sensational has taken place, as in 1982 when the OAU was split to the extent that it failed on two occasions to achieve a quorum for its summit meetings, or when a head of state is toppled by a *coup d'état* in his home country while attending the OAU, as happened to President Gowon of Nigeria in 1975. One remembers, too, the remarkable year of 1976 when OAU Chairman Idi Amin had to rush home to confront the crisis caused by the hijacking and subsequent rescue of an Israeli aircraft with crew and passengers at Entebbe Airport. President Nimeiri, in turn, arrived late for the same summit because of an attempted coup in Sudan. That year also saw serious ideological division within the OAU when its members divided on the issue of whether the MPLA regime should be recognized as Angola's government or whether a government of national unity should be installed.

Moreover, the OAU's glaring failure to make any headway towards resolving the continent's vexing socio-economic problems has not helped to impress on South Africans the idea of the OAU as an effective and, therefore, relevant force. In addition, political trends in Africa and ideological divisions within the OAU have apparently reinforced the perception that the OAU is incapable of playing a constructive role in the continent.

Indeed, Africa's socio-economic crisis made for a rather subdued atmosphere at the jubilee conference, in contrast to the high spirits prevailing at the founders' conference. Twenty-five years ago the founding fathers did not have to cope to the same extent as Africa's current leaders with mounting foreign debts, lack of foreign exchange, food shortages and rising unemployment. It is perhaps symbolic of the state of the OAU that only about the same number of heads of state who had attended its founding in 1963

turned out for the jubilee celebrations, despite the fact that membership has grown from the original 30 states to 49.<sup>4</sup> After the festivities only some ten heads of state stayed for the annual summit meeting at which President Moussa Traoré of Mali succeeded President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia as chairman.

Although the OAU terminated the practice which allowed for tyrants such as Idi Amin to be elevated to the status of OAU chairman,<sup>5</sup> the election of Moussa Traoré focusses attention upon a broader malaise affecting Africa and the OAU. Traoré represents a large category of African leaders — the majority — who came to power in their countries by violent means. In fact, 22 of the organization's 30 founding fathers, including President Kwame Nkrumah and Emperor Haile Selassie, were ousted in military takeovers. (Only one of the OAU's founders, President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, is still in power.) Since competitive politics is ruled out in most African countries, violence is often considered the only way to get rid of unpopular rulers.

As a result of the prevalence of authoritarianism in Africa, few of the continent's 600 million people enjoy greater civil liberties than they did under the European colonial governments. Consequently, those in power in South Africa, though they understand the OAU's aversion to racism, tend to marvel at the organization's insistence on the achievement of democracy in South Africa and Namibia.

The OAU's strict adherence to its Charter's requirement that the organization and its members should not interfere in the domestic affairs of member states has provided a convenient excuse to avoid sensitive moral issues like the violation of human rights throughout the continent. Julius Nyerere, during whose presidency Tanzania

invaded Uganda and brought to an end Amin's tyranny, said, "Because of respect for this (OAU) charter we have become so muzzled that if something goes wrong in one country we do not speak against the government of that country".<sup>6</sup>

Certainly, an OAU Charter of Human Rights has recently been introduced, but it remains to be seen if this can put a stop to governments' harassment of individuals and groups (including political opponents), not to mention such atrocities as the recurring massacres in Burundi. Normally South Africans would have no quarrel with the principle of non-interference in countries' domestic affairs, but they tend to agree with President Museveni of Uganda that "Tyranny is colourblind and should be no less reprehensible when it is practised by one of our own kind. African silence in the face of gross abuses undermines Africa's moral authority to condemn the excesses of others like the Pretoria regime".<sup>7</sup>

The OAU's adherence to its charter is also reflected in the rigid adherence to the illogical borders inherited from Africa's colonial past and the organization's opposition to secessionist and irredentist movements. On the one hand, these principles have contributed to ethnic insurrections which have claimed the lives of many thousands in Nigeria (Biafra), Ethiopia (Eritrea and other provinces) and in southern Sudan. On the other, claims to neighbouring territories have caused instability and even bloody wars. Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara during 1976–1979, Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia during 1977–1978 and Libya's intervention in Chad until recently are cases in point. Such disputes have proved difficult for the OAU to settle, though in all fairness, it can also be argued that the OAU's adherence to colonial boundaries has avoided much greater conflict than has occurred.

The fact that the OAU has survived for a quarter of a century in a continent renowned for its cultural diversity and national and sub-national divisions might suggest that Pan-Africanism, the philosophical basis of the

OAU, is perhaps a stronger unifying bond than is generally realized among those who tend to overemphasize the very real phenomenon of ethnicity. Only time will tell whether Emperor Haile Selassie was too optimistic 25 years ago when he expressed the wish that "... this continental union may last a thousands years". Nevertheless, until now the emotional appeal of Pan-Africanism, together with practical realities, has had a lot to do with the OAU's staying power.

The OAU is unique in the sense that it has no counterpart of equal standing in other continents. Providing institutions on a continental scale, it is the largest single geographical bloc in world forums. The member-states of the OAU cover some 20 per cent of the world's surface and accommodate approximately 10 per cent of the world's population. While they account for 31 per cent of the United Nations membership, the 49 OAU states contribute less than 3 per cent of world production and less than 2 per cent of the UN budget.

Thus, the amount of political leverage which this large African grouping has achieved in world politics would vanish were its unity to crumble. African leaders are aware that individually their states are so weak and their international standing so low that it is only by facing the international community as a united front, organized by the OAU, that their opinions may carry any weight.<sup>8</sup>

Its survival apart, the OAU's outstanding achievement has undoubtedly been its support of decolonization in Africa since 1963. Through voting as a bloc at the UN, supported by the rest of the Third World, and by persuading public opinion abroad, the OAU bestowed legitimacy on, or lent weight to, political movements and initiatives aiming at the eradication of colonial rule. Although the OAU accepts that the South African situation is not a colonial one, South Africans have likewise experienced the OAU's capacity to act as a pressure group, promoting their country's isolation in Africa and the rest of the world.

In conclusion, it would seem that the OAU's instinct for self-preservation is paramount. Shot through with contradictions and ambiguities, it has to compromise and accommodate diverse interests in order to prevent its disintegration. In this respect the OAU does not differ fundamentally from other international organizations. It is, therefore, a futile exercise to evaluate it in terms of successes and failures, though the tendency among observers is to overlook the successes (such as the very fact of survival) and to concentrate on the failures.<sup>9</sup>

The significance of the OAU for South Africa lies in its capacity to survive and to exert influence, rather than the achievement of definite objectives. It should, therefore, be expected that this organization will remain a real factor in the lives of South Africans for the foreseeable future.

## Notes

- 1 *Newsweek*, 6 June 1988, p 18.
- 2 *New African*, May 1988, p 21.
- 3 *West Africa*, 6 June 1988, p 1007.
- 4 South Africa was not invited to the founding of the OAU, which was attended by the leaders of 30 of the 33 independent states in May 1963. Morocco and Togo signed the charter later that year. That former state withdrew its membership in 1984 as a result of its dispute with the OAU over the Western Sahara issue.
- 5 Prior to 1983 it had become the custom for the Conference of Heads of State and Government to be held in various member states and to elect the head of state of the host country as OAU chairman for the coming year. This practice has been circumvented by holding these summit meetings at OAU headquarters only.
- 6 *West Africa*, 6 June 1988, p 1034.
- 7 *Newsweek*, 6 June 1988.
- 8 Cf Erich Leistner, "Prospects for the OAU", *Africa Insight*, vol 14, no 2, 1984, p 122.
- 9 Cf Colin Legum's *Third World Reports*, 4 May 1988, Richmond: CSI Syndication Services.

# Disaster and relief in South Africa: Defining the crisis of the 1987 floods

*C R Cross, of the Department of Development Administration and Politics at the University of South Africa, and M T Nzama and O S Dlamini of the KwaNgele Land Tenure Project examine the impact of the 1987/88 floods on a community in the Valley of a Thousand Hills and draw conclusions about the responsibility for "natural" disaster, the relative vulnerability of the female poor to its effects and the appropriate responses of aid agencies.*

In the last week of September 1987, the rains came to Natal and KwaZulu. It was the expected rain of spring planting, so rural people were relieved, but this time there was something wrong. One elderly woman from the Valley of a Thousand Hills recalled:

As the rains started when due at the end of September, we were happy, thinking we were going to obtain so much food. The rains continued and we started to get afraid that our homes were going to fall. By Monday September 28 there came a big wind and the atmosphere was dim. Before bedtime there were signs that something horrible was coming. . . . No one of my family slept. We were all sitting on the bed, waiting for what was coming. The houses started to shake. They didn't waste any time, bit by bit the walls were falling. I started to shout, praying and calling God.<sup>1</sup>

The results of the Natal flood disaster are now history. The rains continued with cloud-burst intensity for four days and nights without stopping. Storm-driven, Natal's biggest rivers burst their banks and the main dams overflowed, releasing floodwaters that drowned people as far inland as Mooi River. Houses were washed away, roofs were torn off by the violent winds, roads, bridges and communications were destroyed, damage to physical infrastructure was widespread. By November, the best estimates were that more than 400 people were probably dead; the true total will never be known. Bodies were washed out to sea, and many of the missing may never have been reported.

Natal and KwaZulu staggered under the impact, and newspapers frequently quoted the view that a natural disaster of this magnitude only occurred once in 200 years (sometimes 100 years, sometimes 500 years). In fact a second serious flood occurred in the same area just five months later. As the floods subsided and fears of widespread starvation and epidemic declined, evidence began to emerge that a huge loss of housing stock was probably the single worst consequence for the majority of victims. By far the greatest number of the homeless were rural, semi-rural and peri-urban black families, residents of KwaZulu, living in improvised sub-standard housing.

The Built Environment Support Group estimated that over half a million people in the Durban Functional Region alone had either lost their homes or had them so badly damaged they would have to be rebuilt, leaving the victims effectively homeless. These figures were immediately denied by Minister of Health Dr Willie van Niekerk: using government tallies of people sheltered in churches and halls or state-supplied tents, the Minister insisted that only about 50 000 people were homeless.<sup>2</sup>

Two points emerge from this summary: the first is the specific question of the impact of the flood disaster on the rural black community, and what has been done and is being done to provide relief, but the second is larger and more urgent still. The floods caught Natal largely unprepared for a natural

calamity of such suddenness and force, but "natural disasters" are in fact largely predictable. This flood was not the first and will not be the last of this decade in Natal, and the disaster should not have come as a surprise to any level of South Africa's provincial or national administration. There appears to be a serious gap in the popular, professional and political understanding of disaster in this country, which needs to be addressed as soon as possible.

This article begins with a brief introduction to the theory of disaster in the modern world, before going on to examine the impact of the flood rains of 1987 in a black peri-urban district of KwaZulu. It attempts to sketch some of the reasons why black women from crippled households may have predominated among the homeless, and to relate their situation to the larger political, economic and environmental realities of the Third World.

## Unnatural disaster: Theories of poverty and crisis

Wijkman and Timberlake argue that ". . . [the] common view of 'natural disasters' is due for a radical change . . .".<sup>3</sup> The point they are making is that in the late 20th century the kind of event that people call a disaster is likely to be of human manufacture. The role of the environment is limited to what Wijkman, Timberlake and the Earthscan group refer to as trigger events, that is, an actual geological event — earthquake, tsunami,

volcanic eruption or climatic deviation — that can touch off the human devastation that is the disaster itself. A quake in an unpopulated region is not of much concern and is not a disaster, but large numbers of people dying of famine or in civil unrest will qualify immediately, even without the involvement of any natural phenomenon. Supporters of this approach go further by arguing that it takes extensive human intervention before most of these geological or climatic events can do enough harm to humans to fall in the disaster category.

This argument, together with the anthropological, geographical and Marxian debates linked to it, has immediate implications for the way the disastrous 1987 Natal floods have been handled, at all levels. At a more general level, it also constitutes an attack on the prevailing view of disaster planning and relief work.

The aim of this article is to ask why there has apparently been so much inadequately planned disaster response in this country, if in fact disasters are caused by humans, are fairly predictable, and their precipitating conditions well known? In reporting, we can examine an actual pattern of flood disaster response from the community, the aid agencies and the state, in relation to micro-level community data. The 1987 floods rains in Thousand Hills can be shown to be almost a textbook case of a modern Third World "natural" disaster that actually arises from poverty and overpopulation, deformed patterns of land use, and governmental neglect and indifference. We have previously used some of this data to write about the human dimensions of flood disaster.<sup>4</sup> This time, we want to put the local situation into context with overseas data and theory in order to highlight the hits and misses, and to suggest some of the axioms about disaster which are not widely known, but need — in the bitter light of hindsight — to be better understood in this country.

### The theory and practice of disaster

The established view of disasters has confirmed:

... a straightforward acceptance of natural disasters as a result of "extremes" of geophysical processes. The occurrence and essential features of calamity are seen to depend primarily on the nature of storms, earthquakes, flood, drought. ... Actual usage almost invariably refers to an objective geophysical process, such as a hurricane or frost, as "the hazard". In turn, damage and human actions are defined by, or as responses to, the type, magnitude, frequency, and other dimensions of these processes ... in the dominant view then, disaster itself is attributed to nature.<sup>5</sup>

The end result is a technocratic — or as Hewitt suggests, bureaucratic — approach, one which is comfortable for governments and agencies, an exercise in the prerogatives of experts.

In this sense, it holds that disasters are largely unpredictable events from outside the normal human order. In advance, they can partly be guarded against by vigilant technological monitoring; once they have hit some unsuspecting population, they can best be met by a massive technocratic reaction. Drawing on Habermas and Foucault, Hewitt suggests that government in its bureaucratic incarnation is threatened by unpredictable events which disrupt established order and bring its institutions face to face with the irrational, and that governments therefore mount an ideology of control "where the grounds for conviction seem the least".<sup>6</sup>

Against the established technocratic/bureaucratic view, Torry notes the emergence of a backlash from human science disciplines once empirical studies of natural disaster situations began to accumulate: "Following the worldwide droughts late in the 1960s and on through the early 1970s came a surge of studies giving social scientists good cause for thoroughly debunking this naturalistic premise ...".<sup>7</sup> Focussing specifically on famine hazard, upon which much of the empirical work has been concentrated, Torry continues, "Famine harm relates to poverty, the data showed, and society creates poverty ...".<sup>8</sup> As Wijkman and Timberlake note, similar conclusions emerged for the unnatural disasters which proceed from most of the other environmental hazards worldwide.<sup>9</sup>

In other words, it became clear that a "natural disaster" tends to hit the Third World, or else pockets of poverty in the First World, and both its incidence and severity relate not to the unpredictable environment but to human intervention. The figures on disaster incidence and severity are disturbing. Wijkman and Timberlake of Earthscan quote more than 3 000 deaths per disaster in low-income countries, against fewer than 500 for high-income countries.<sup>10</sup> Red Cross and US official statistics reproduced by them show that Bangladesh lost more than 10 000 people for each of its many disasters between 1960 and 1981, while Japan, also hit by numerous environmental events, lost an average of 63 people for each disaster.<sup>11</sup> Alternatively, a 1971 earthquake in San Fernando, California, registering 6.4 on the Richter Scale, caused 58 deaths and minor damage; in 1973, a quake that registered 6.2 hit the capital of Nicaragua, all but levelled the city and killed an estimated 6 000 people.<sup>12</sup> Declared "disasters" appear to be most frequent in low-income countries (on the basis of deaths and casualties) and second most common in rich countries (on a property damage criterion — because there is much more property to get damaged).

From this kind of analysis emerged a revisionist paradigm of contemporary disaster: a political-economic interpretation, which relates the vulnerability of the poor to

man-made disaster to their position in national and international power relations and in the material relations of production.

Waddell traces the history of the literature on disaster research to the early and successful claims to the terrain made by White, Burton and Kates, geographers associated with the Institute of Behavioral Science in Boulder, Colorado.<sup>13</sup> Originally arising from flood control research in the United States,<sup>14</sup> the large output of this group fell generally within the technocratic approach, and was congenial to relief organizations in particular. It supported the assumption that disasters originated in the environment and that they could best be mitigated by providing relief, countering popular ignorance, and increasing the integration of remote communities into the international world order.

Meanwhile, social science research was accumulating, particularly from anthropologists and geographers, which pointed to the failure of this paradigm to deal with Third World disaster or even to recognize its origins. Waddell's own research in New Guinea<sup>15</sup> went a long way toward showing that interference from the world system could be a cause of disaster for Third World communities which could otherwise cope quite well with natural hazard. When these studies entered the theory of political economy, an underdevelopment theory of disaster emerged, mainly in England.

Torry derives this perspective from the proposition that disaster "... stems from commercial and political interests outside the village economy".<sup>16</sup> Waddell, who inclines that way himself, remarks more sweepingly:

The analysis is Marxist, the causes are structural and the solution is one of "guerilla warfare". Acts of God become Acts of Capital and the disaster that struck the highlands of Guatemala in February 1976 is characterised by one [writer] as an earthquake and by the other as a classquake. ...<sup>17</sup>

Along with a fairly orthodox, neo-Marxist interpretation of natural hazard, a number of other related approaches also appeared.

The more formal neo-Marxist alignment, represented by Watts, O'Keefe and Wisner, focuses on mechanisms of dependency in interpreting disaster, and admits uneasy links with ecological anthropology. Waddell argues that (through the French neo-Marxist school) the political economic view of natural hazards "effectively integrates cultural ecological models into economic anthropology and underdevelopment theory",<sup>18</sup> while elsewhere in the same collection Watts faults cultural-ecological adaptation models for their functionalist bias and their connections to biology and cybernetics.<sup>19</sup> Continuing his analysis, Watts, a geographer, maintains that hazards research has provided the opportunity to fill in the shortcomings of the cultural adaptation theory by introducing it (possibly with the help of

Godelier) to the Marxian theory of social reproduction, which allows a metabolic view of the dialectic of man and nature<sup>20</sup> through the medium of labour: "Nature, then, is historically unified through the labour process".<sup>21</sup> Torry, an anthropologist, in turn faults hazards analyses such as Watts's for working out elaborate historical schemes to show how communities become vulnerable to disaster, without ever really getting down to analysing the disaster in question.<sup>22</sup>

At base, anthropology has supplied hazards research with theory and data on ground-level cultural adaptive mechanisms for mediating risk, without which such historical-materialist explanations could not be developed. In turn, these studies have contributed to a *theory of marginalization* relating disaster risk to Third World poverty and exploitation.<sup>23</sup> This work stresses the process through which institutions that helped pre-colonial societies insure themselves against hazards, have been hollowed out or stripped away by the integration of these societies into the world system on the familiar, unequal terms of underdevelopment. In this view:

Disaster proneness is the result of the interface of a population undergoing underdevelopment and a deteriorating physical environment. The process of relief usually reinforces the status quo ante, namely the process of underdevelopment that produced such vulnerability in the first place. . . .<sup>24</sup>

Along with other points, the authors conclude that:

As exploitation continues, disasters will get worse and more frequent.  
The poor will suffer the most.  
Relief works against the poor.  
The only disaster planning that can work is located in development planning.  
As exploitation will continue, the only way out is through political change.<sup>25</sup>

Waddell<sup>26</sup> sees the role of disaster research and relief in challenging the flawed order which permits underdevelopment, and argues that only minimal internal intervention should be allowed, with maximum attention to reinforcing indigenous responses. The authors end their modelling exercise with the remark that the poor, ". . . instead of inheriting the earth, are being eaten up by it. . . ."<sup>27</sup>

### Disaster rising: Causes and results

It is from this last body of theory that the proposition derives about the steady increase of man-made disasters in the modern world. Environmental events, genuinely natural occurrences which trigger disasters, do not seem to be increasing, but since the early 1970s the rate and incidence of sudden-impact disasters — floods, cyclones, earthquakes, mudslides, tsunami, and so forth — has been climbing steadily. What has changed is the relation of human populations to their environment, according to Bindi Shah

of the London School of Economics:

World population pressure and hunger for land are forcing more and more people to inhabit the earth's hazardous zones. It is not major changes in the earth's climate and structure that have led to an increase in disasters, but the concentration of social and economic activity in disaster-prone areas. . . .<sup>28</sup>

To this statement, authors such as Hewitt, Watts and Susman, O'Keefe and Wisner, as well as Wijkman, Timberlake and Cuny, would add that human intervention in the ecosystems has acted directly to increase the number of disasters actually occurring. Wijkman and Timberlake, who maintain the clearest focus on the ecological factor, note that "people can alter their environment to cause more frequent and deadly disasters" by two broad categories of action:

First, people can alter their environment to make it more *prone* to certain disaster triggers, mainly to drought and flood. Second, people (and it appears from fatality statistics to be mainly poor people) can live in exposed structures on dangerous ground, making themselves more exposed and *vulnerable* to disaster trigger mechanisms.<sup>29</sup>

In the end this entire sequence can be traced in the end to the marginalization and underdevelopment of the poor.

Along the same lines, the disaster consultant Frederick Cuny observes:

At the center of the research issue are the parallel problems of land and economic opportunity. As the population increases, land in both rural and urban areas becomes more scarce. . . . Such trends result in both rapid and unchecked urbanization and massive deforestation of mountainous and jungle regions that occurs as small farmers push into less tenable areas for farming. . . .<sup>30</sup>

Agreeing that underdevelopment is the real problem, and citing "political failure of governments to develop new economic systems and to allocate resources (especially land) to benefit the nation as a whole", he continues:

. . . low-income families in search of land for housing must settle in areas of low value. These lands may be the slopes of steep hillsides or ravines, or may lie along the banks of flood-prone rivers. Worldwide, millions of families live in squalid shanty towns constantly under the threat of landslides or flooding. Nor are the houses safe. . . .<sup>31</sup>

The most effective practical ways to provoke droughts and floods operate through the environmental degradation that inevitably accompanies the desperate attempts of the agrarian poor to make a living from less and less land. By stripping ground cover, which results in collapsing and compacting soil structure, encouraging erosion damage and loss of soil into rivers, the destructive impact of sheetwash run-off is multiplied while actual rainfall itself may be reduced. Either flooding or drought — or both alternately — can result, and the effects of storm, wind or

earthquakes become much more dangerous. Mudslides or landslides become likely in mountainous terrain due to supersaturation of stripped and damaged hillsides, and thousands of casualties can result, often in squatter settlements. It is significant specifically for the situation in Natal and KwaZulu that floods are particularly reactive to environmental damage.


Floods are the single form of sudden-impact disaster which is increasing most rapidly worldwide, and throughout the 1970s floods were the leading natural hazard in terms of the number of people affected per year, according to Red Cross figures. With the Sahel disasters in the 1980s, droughts have taken over the lead. Drought, however, is a somewhat different problem, since it is a slow-onset crisis which need not be related to any environmental event. So-called "droughts" have often been caused by distribution breakdowns or solely by price squeeze mechanisms on marginal families, without any contribution from climate or environment being required.<sup>32</sup> In contrast, floods in the modern world are overwhelmingly an environmental event caused by man. Cuny explains:

Flooding is the one natural hazard that is becoming more of a threat rather than remaining constant . . . storms that previously would have caused no flooding today inundate vast areas . . . reckless building in vulnerable areas, poor watershed management, and failure to control the flooding also help create the disaster condition. Ecologists have found evidence recently that human endeavors may be directly affecting the weather conditions that produce extensive and heavy rains. . . .<sup>33</sup>

The flood process is shown schematically in Figure 1. It depends on damage to the environment which is not recognized or acted on in policy terms, including deforestation, erosion, unsafe building, unsafe siting and risky farming practices in the general region.

Natal and KwaZulu, but principally the latter, fit this picture disturbingly well. Since colonial times policy efforts have tried to force the Zulu-speaking population out of white areas and back into the demarcated tribal lands,<sup>34</sup> and most recently large-scale movements off white farms have brought KwaZulu's population density to alarming levels, even in rural districts. Ground cover has been stripped and soil leached and packed, while government attention to the environmental problems of black areas has been limited mainly to attempts to enforce "betterment" planning, until recently without the commitment of resources to development. The run-off of topsoil down Natal's steeply sloping rivers is notorious, and proceeds from badly cultivated white farms as well as black reserves. During the flood rains that accompanied Cyclone Demoina, extensive damage to whites' sugar-cane fields was related to the practice





Source: F Cuny, *Disasters and development*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983

of cultivating right down to the river banks, increasing erosion and silting.<sup>35</sup>

In combination these factors exposed an overpopulated region with rickety buildings to a typical flood disaster pattern of violent storm winds, rain, flooding and mudslides — almost an oil portrait of the Natal/KwaZulu disaster, down to the over-usage of marginal land, the destruction of housing and the casualties from mudslides in shack communities. Against this background, with all the preconditions for an expected disaster present and accounted for, we can take a brief look at the results of the spring rains in Natal at the end of September 1987.

## Bitter water: The flood rains at Thousand Hills

The floods were awesome. A week after the rains had stopped, the *Sunday Times* reported as follows:

No information is now available from those who lived on the banks of the river. Rescue workers say it is impossible to get there. From the helicopter, only the roofs of isolated trading stores were visible above the waters of the swollen Umngeni. . . .<sup>36</sup>

The impact spread throughout Natal/KwaZulu, but its distribution reflected the typical gap between the structured economies of the developed core and the impoverished black rural districts. In white areas, damage to infrastructure and property was severe, but injuries and drownings were few, and the number of white families left homeless for any length of time was apparently fairly small. In the black areas outside the townships, the difference was almost total, and in the peri-urban zone the impact was tremendous.

To quote from a summary we published earlier this year:

. . . many areas in the deep rural districts of KwaZulu were completely cut off and went through severe hardships [but] suffering in the densely populated areas of Durban's peri-urban zone may have been even greater. The area holds at least 350 000 black people, living under conditions that made them very vulnerable to flooding [and landslides]. On one day, the St John's Ambulance organization fed more than 5 000 flood victims in the shack settlement areas of Inanda. At Lindelani, after mudslides tore open the cemetery, "coffins protruded grotesquely from the ground and the remains of relatives were strewn over the area" (*Sunday Tribune* 11 October 1987). Unknown numbers of shacks were flattened or made uninhabitable in this settlement, with 3 000 people left homeless. . . .<sup>37</sup>

In semi-rural districts further afield, the collapse of the road network and other communications added a serious risk of food shortages to the actual damage caused by the storm winds and flooding. The force of the floodwater was all-consuming. A woman who had come from the Mngeni Valley as a

refugee to the neighbourhood we studied told her story like this:

As the rains started on Friday the 25th of September, I didn't take any notice that things were going to be worse than before. . . . The river let us know, as it was full and things were moving inside. My family told me that we better all move to neighbours. I said no! I am going to die inside my house, they better move. They took their things and went to my other sister's house. At this time the small rondavel for young people was already down. . . .

On Monday it was worse. Mngeni was full and was sweeping the fields and everything next to them too. We couldn't see what was inside as there was mist. Everyone was mad, shouting to ask if our livestock was still around. I tried to go and check at my field what was happening. There was not a sign of the field, only mud and sand.

There were many pieces of things and I walked again and I saw a body of an unknown boy, naked. I told my neighbours to come and look but no one seemed to know him. It seemed he was taken by the river somewhere else. He was taken by the helicopter on Wednesday 30th September. . . .<sup>38</sup>

But the terrifying accounts of the force of the floods can be misleading. In examining the reasons why women seem to have borne the brunt of the damage, it is important to remember that more people suffered from the rains than from the floods caused by the rains. Most of the housing stock lost during the floods was destroyed when dwellings with earthen walls became waterlogged in the unending torrential rain and collapsed. A second, less serious form of widespread damage was loss of sheet-iron roofing in the violent winds, which could cause property loss and leave a home temporarily uninhabitable.

In this respect, "KwaNgele", the community where we carried out our brief study a month after the rains, is probably typical. Located on a high ridge above the deep Mngeni Valley, most of the damage it suffered in the disaster was from the force of the rain rather than from flood waters. Only the people living in the low river valley were in real danger of drowning, losing their livestock, or having their houses swept away by water. But for the majority of the population living above the actual floodline, the devastation of the rains was very widespread:

I looked around the neighbourhood — I saw that Zimbo Rose Sithole was homeless, and Mbheles, Hlatshwayos, Ndlovus. Towards Esidangeni, there at Sitholes, Themba's home, also Mbanjwas, Dlamini's of Nyangana, also Mlulu's home, and Ngitshelani, MaGcwabaza, Chonchos and Colin's house were all down. . . .<sup>39</sup>

For the less privileged families in the community, the experience of losing their homes caused shock, fear and despair. They risked physical injury as well as the loss of housing, and could not fully foresee the implications

at the time it happened: many were in terror of divine vengeance.

That was a miracle wind I have never seen in my life. This wind continued going with heavy rains till it was time to sleep. We did sleep. But at the time one after midnight the miracle wind woke us up. I asked the time as I knew I was leaving the world with my children. I went to Tsotsi's house for shelter; Bantu my son went to Willie Cele's house. Before we left the place both rooms were already down. . . . Myself I can say we are now dying because of our sins.<sup>40</sup>

On Sunday I noticed that the frames were loosened. That was our main house. At the time 7 pm the rains were very heavy, going together with wind. The roof went away, and after that the whole wall was down. . . . Again the second house fell down on the midnight of Monday 28th. The wall on one side fell next to the wardrobe so we took out all the furniture. . . . I told the kids we should run away but they refused. Myself I left my house at 8:30. I went to my neighbour at Makathini's house. . . .

At the house I was at, it was sounding as if there was someone outside singing with a funny voice to and fro. The house I was at was shaking though its a cinder-block house. About 12 am that wind was a miracle. All of us were saying, Oh Lord why are we dying with our generations? At 2:00 am I asked one male somebody to go and check what was taking place at my premises. He found that all the family of my neighbour was standing inside the only house that I had that was left standing. They themselves had none left. . . .

I left my neighbours' place at 4 am and told myself to go to my house and take out the corpses, as I thought they were dead. I found that everybody was alive, standing shivering with fear. . . .<sup>41</sup>

## Disaster's impact: The risk for women

What kind of harm then, did KwaZulu women face in the 1987 floods? Data from the peri-urban case study suggests that to a greater extent than men, they lost homes and had to find shelter as refugees, sought and obtained a certain amount of help from others, became involved in outreach activities of their own, were sometimes preyed upon or victimized and, by the time of our study in November, had become desperate for building materials in their determination to re-establish their homes and their independence.

The greatest loss clearly remained that of shelter and home property. In our neighbourhood sample above the level of the flood waters, only one flood-related death was reported, that of a man badly cut by sheet-iron while attempting to repair his house. Casualties directly caused by collapsing houses may not have been many — newspaper reports cited one case in another district where a house fell down on a sleeping family and killed a number of people, but

in the cases reported to us people became aware of the danger and managed to escape in time. Even so, there were scattered deaths and injuries from neighbourhoods nearby, and nearly every family had relatives or friends among the dead or injured in less fortunate localities. For the most part, the people we interviewed reported no physical injury, but some instances of loss of work were reported. Economically, the situation was less clear. Though employers were usually sympathetic, in some cases families who were already marginal lost their jobs because of the disaster.

At the same time, damage to household fields and gardens appears to have been significant. Even where fields were not actually stripped by the river, the four days' pounding rain cut gullies in the earth and caused erosion damage. Since the agricultural season had only just begun and the "KwaNgele" community supports itself mainly by means of wage work and through the informal sector, respondents' accounts made considerably less of the disaster's impact on their fields and gardens than on community housing stock. All the same, the loss of the marginal contribution to household support made possible by cultivation remains significant to poor families.

For those left homeless, further losses were involved. Many families lost all their important household goods when their homes collapsed, resulting in devastating financial losses:

We were living on the side of Umngeni River. Those floods swept away everything. . . . After those floods had gone down I heard that there will be people coming from the aid agency, coming to give us help . . . we are still waiting. They have promised us the sum of about R200 to R3 000, that will depend on how much of your goods had swept away. For myself, it's not much — as a poor somebody I claimed it can be R250.<sup>42</sup>

I lost my houses and all my livestock, the river took them, but I am saying too much about my cattle. Food was wet, also my children's clothes and blankets. . . . I don't know now what I will do as I am homeless, my husband is not working, and we have many children. . . .<sup>43</sup>

At about 7:30 am I left staying with the neighbours, I went home to see. As I was about to arrive home I met Mkhize, who told me he's been around to look at our house to see if it was saved. He told me the whole roof is gone with the wind, the furniture is under the walls. I felt like crying but I held on to it, I went to see. Every Tom, Dick, and Harry was broken, this was more than R2 000 in damages. . . .<sup>44</sup>

Although not based on formal sampling procedures, our results strongly suggest that the female poor ran a higher risk of all kinds of harm, but particularly housing loss. This risk relates to the structure of poverty which we have been investigating in a long-term longitudinal study in this community,

and which may be common throughout the peri-urban zone.

### Collecting accounts of the flood disaster

Our earlier studies<sup>45</sup> were quantitative; the present one, which arises out of the human dilemma of the floods, is impressionistic. It draws on case-study data collected in November 1987 by the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal.<sup>46</sup> The approach we used did not try for mathematical rigour: we obtained our small, non-random sample by trying to give people who had suffered severely during the days of the flood a chance to tell their story, an experience which the psychological disaster literature suggests is therapeutic.

The study used the critical incident method, a technique used to examine events of a certain type of class.<sup>47</sup> In this method, respondents are asked to recount their most recent experience of the type under study, and these accounts are then analysed to expose the main characteristics of the respondents' common experience. When we looked around our Thousand Hills study area for people with harsh memories of the time of the rains, the majority of sufferers turned out to be women.

Of the 22 detailed accounts we used as the basis for our tentative analysis, 79 per cent were told by women, and nearly all of these were from women who, with their families, would count as disaster victims. This strong slant in the incidence of reported disaster victim status is not likely to result from the gender composition of the study team: it contained one local woman (M T Nzama) and one local man (O S Dlamini), who contributed roughly equal numbers of disaster accounts. The interviewing brief was simply to go to people who had suffered and ask them to recount their experiences. The rains were impersonal. Why did women appear to be victims so much more often?

The underlying factors seem to be connected to vulnerability. Vulnerability is usually taken to mean "likely to suffer"; the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*<sup>48</sup> gives "That may be wounded . . . susceptible of injury, not proof against weapon, criticism, etc" in other words, unable to fend off attack or harm, and unable to recover from injury once incurred.

But in the Natal/KwaZulu flood disaster, as is often the case, vulnerability meant a higher exposure to risk in the first place, which is to say — not only were poor women hit harder and hurt worse than others, they were also the ones chosen in the first instance by a disaster which bypassed their better-off neighbours.

Table 1 describes the general marital standing of the respondents who reported on flood disaster experiences in the critical incident study. While it is impossible to attribute any statistical validity to the distribution of reports appearing in the table, the pattern is striking. Single women responsible for their own families — unmarried, widowed, deserted or divorced — look much more likely to have been disaster victims than their married counterparts.

There is no prior reason to regard "KwaNgele", the peri-urban area of KwaZulu where the study was done, as strongly atypical. Superficially at least, it resembles most other peri-urban communities in the Durban region. If the incidence of flood victim status in this neighbourhood is more or less equal to that in other, similar communities throughout the Durban Functional Region, it is possible and even likely that women — and particularly single mothers — have suffered much more severely than other sections of the community. In order to examine this proposition, it is necessary to take a look at the severe distortion of household structure in this peri-urban community, together with the effects this has on the distribution of income.

### Crippled households: Poverty dynamics in Thousand Hills

In a poverty study for the Carnegie Conference in 1984,<sup>49</sup> an analysis was made of the economic status of several different household types in the "KwaNgele" community. Not surprisingly, the female-headed families, those structured around women and without responsible men, were at the bottom of the pile in economic terms.

In the Carnegie study an attempt was made to put numbers to the poverty risk of different household types. Results showed that members of disorganized households centered around unmarried women — female-core households — ran by far the

**Table 1**  
**GENDER AND MARITAL STATUS OF VICTIMS REPORTING**

	Women	Men	Total
Single/widowed household head	11	1	12
Married household head	0	2	2
Married, not household head	4	0	4
Other household member	1	2	3
	16	5	N = 21

greatest risk of having incomes below the *de facto* local poverty threshold (roughly R30 per capita per month in 1981). The community as a whole was relatively prosperous, with only about 12 per cent of the sample households falling into the poverty bracket. Of female-core households, 43 per cent were impoverished. This concentration of single mothers, their relatives and dependents represented 14 per cent of the families in the community sample, and constituted the core of the poverty grouping at "KwaNgele".

In addition to these female-centered households with a male ratio of 0.8 and a serious shortage of responsible adult males, poverty was also common in a different category of disorganized household — those without marriage ties to serve as structural glue. Households centred around unmarried men — single-generation families — seemed to lack the coherence needed to create a reliable base of mutual economic support: members of these households tended to behave economically as if they were living on their own, unable to count on support from other household members and often unwilling to contribute to the support of others themselves.<sup>50</sup> Because all members had to have their own cash income to support themselves, per capita incomes in this group were often extraordinarily high — averaging more than R100 a month — but most of these households appeared to consume their income very quickly through unproductive personal expenditure which did not invest in the household's future.

This second group of weakly-structured households made up 17 per cent of the community sample, and nearly a quarter of them fell in the poverty bracket. Women — elderly mothers, unmarried sisters, temporary lovers, cousins with no other place to go — made up about half the personnel of single-generation households. This category of household appears to feed the poverty underclass of the peri-urban region with additional marginalized and dislocated women.

Specifically, the comparatively prosperous "KwaNgele" community seems to conceal an impoverished nucleus whose adult membership is probably nearly 75 per cent women who are more or less on their own.

Some of these female-core households succeeded in surmounting their difficulties and achieved elite-level incomes, but most did not. Without formal marriage to hold them together these were weakly-structured households, and most of them had serious difficulty in getting workers into the formal job market in the urban centres. When they did have access to outside employment, it was usually relatively low-paid domestic work. When they did not (as was very often the case), women in this category had to get by with local employment — "working around the neighbourhood" — and/or other

**Table 2**  
**POVERTY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY OF HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING**

	Destruction of housing			No loss of housing	Total
	Well-off	Middle-income	Poor		
Single female household head	—	2	9	3	14
Married male household head	—	1	2	2	5
Unmarried male household head	—	—	3	—	3
	—	3	14	5	N = 22

work in the informal sector. Earnings in this system are abysmally poor (in 1981 R1 a day or R5 per week was common) and households in this category tended to rely more than the rest of the community on their agriculture for subsistence.<sup>51</sup>

According to the typical pattern of disaster vulnerability predicted by the underdevelopment model, it seems to be this group which was marginal to the community, and which systematically suffered the greatest loss and harm in the 1987 flood disaster.

#### Disaster's impact: Loss of housing

Exposure to housing loss thus relates directly to class or socio-economic position. Women in crippled households who support their families on poorly-paid domestic work or low-grade informal sector activity, were vulnerable to the 1987 flood disaster because of their poverty. At the time of the disaster, the well-off and middle-income groups in the peri-urban region were rapidly switching to cinder-block housing. All the people in the neighbourhood sample who lost housing were living in earth-walled dwellings. Although in the middle-income group these could be cement-plastered, the cement seems to have offered no protection against the walls collapsing of their own weight once water had seeped inside. Some middle-income families lost their sheet-iron roofs, but few lost their homes. The female poor were the main group still living in low-cost, earth-walled dwellings — usually old rondavels, with rotted or termite-eaten sticks as interior supports for their walls — which disintegrated in torrential rain.

Table 2 illustrates the economic distribution of housing loss in the "KwaNgele" community.

The well-off group were fairly well protected in the cinder-block structures. The respondents who did not report destroyed housing included one well-off single woman, one rich married man, two middle-income single women, and one single poor woman who was already homeless. With the exception of the homeless woman, all had the new

style of cinder-block house. In these cases, their disaster experiences involved fright, injuries, attempts to claim flood relief, marginal damage to their homes or loss of outbuildings, but none was rendered homeless by the rains. The wife of one well-off family remarked with relief after the house she was living in had partly collapsed,

All along I was not worrying about rains, because I knew that I was to complete my cinder-block house during December. . . . We don't have to rebuild, we only need to buy corrugated iron for our new block house.

After nearly losing her sheet-iron roof in the violent windstorms, a well-off single woman head of household commented,

This is a new house — I don't know what to do about it or if I must change the roof. Anyway I will see as time goes by, if I am getting more money.

In cases like these, the effects of the disaster became relatively marginal and a calculable risk. For the poor, who have no alternatives and no financial resources, the situation has been different. Responses suggested women struggling to make ends meet while somehow mobilizing the resources needed to rebuild:

As I'm now homeless, I live by working for people in the neighbourhood. I am still battling to rebuild this home of mine, just to keep the children growing up. . . .

At this time I'm still staying with the Mbondas. For myself I have no way to support except to work around the place doing all kinds of jobs, so I can give some little help to those I'm staying with. . . .

Questions then arise about what kind of assistance — community, provincial, state or private and voluntary — was available to women with so few resources of their own, who found themselves refugees in their own communities.

#### Disaster's impact: Searching for help

The refugee process in a situation like this seems to be of a very specific kind. The word

refugee usually evokes a picture of large numbers of homeless people, shocked and starving, carrying a few precious possessions and struggling across a harsh landscape. The image is one of mass migration, of a human flood escaping from war or disaster, leaving their uninhabitable homes without any clear idea of their ultimate destination. The result of the 1987 flood disaster was different.

The disaster caused large-scale homelessness, but no mass movement of refugees seems to have resulted. There are no indications that settlements were wiped out and their populations forced to flee the area. Instead, in any given community there was a percentage of disaster victims who became homeless and had to search for shelter. While they certainly fit the image of the refugee family struggling over difficult terrain with whatever possessions they could save, such displaced people usually did not travel far. What mass movement there was seems to have been local, from low ground to high ground, and the refugees appear normally to have been absorbed into temporary shelter within their own or adjacent communities.

In the community we studied, families found shelter with neighbours in nearly every case. Two families out of 19 asked their local tribal councillors for official shelter, and were given unused rooms in housing originally built for teachers at the local high school. In the other 17 cases, refugee families looked to their social networks for shelter:

On the first day . . . there came big floods, coming with things like goats, wood, corrugated iron, clothing — coming with a very fast speed. We ran out of the house, we saw many of the neighbourhood people with children, blankets and some goods. They were moving up the hill, so we did the same . . . everyone was to look for some relative around the place with a safe accommodation. . . .<sup>52</sup>

For the better-off families, the situation was still containable. Those whose houses were damaged had ample social resources to provide them with shelter. For the poor, and particularly for single women who had to ask for help they would not have resources to pay for, the situation was less congenial.

So the rains continued, and I tried by all my means to take things to cover my walls outside but to no avail. . . . The wall fell, and the rains were running each and every place. As I am stubborn, I tried to tell myself not to move. Then it happened, totally, on the 28th, around midnight. The wall of my bedroom fell down and I shivered. I cried out for some help. There was no answer . . . my house was just open. So I changed my mind, and decided to go to my relatives in the big house, to ask them to open their doors to me as a homeless person. I felt that there were hurts on my heart, as after my husband died I left these in-laws to live on my own in my own house. In the morning I saw that both rooms of my house were fallen down. Not much was damaged, there was only the

mud which fell on my possessions. But once again I am under the authority of someone else. . . .<sup>53</sup>

In the large majority of cases, people left homeless went to their neighbours and nearby relatives and, by the nature of the process we have already described, this usually meant a poor family asking the better-off for help. Because the person in authority in the refugee family was more often than not a woman, the process of assistance normally seems to have moved from woman to woman.

We left to go to my home, it's not very far from Mncwango's. The first thing I saw was that we are homeless. So I cried, shouting to my neighbours, who just arrived in a few minutes. They saw themselves what to do, to help me in this. Mrs Sigwaza MaKhumalo, a close relative, asked me where I have been when this happened. I told her I was fulfilling the promise I made with Mncwango's that I will plant for them, as they had given me the sum of R15 to look after my children as I'm now a single woman. My husband is now five years away, he is staying with another woman. Mrs Sigwaza, with the others, told me they will move what they can take away to her house. I agreed, so they did so. . . . It annoyed me to be a nuisance to my relatives, so I later decided to go back home. . . . I wish God would help the poor.<sup>54</sup>

This kind of charitable or humanitarian help appears to have passed between women or between families on an individual basis, between relatives or, most frequently, between neighbours. Even in these cases, the kind and degree of help offered seems to have been within strict limits: for the most part, assistance was available only in a short-term, bridging context, and seemed rarely to continue into the phase of re-establishment and rebuilding. In our small quota sample, only the three women quoted above reported assistance beyond the provision of immediate shelter and/or food: they received substantial help from relatives, one had a rondavel built for her by neighbours, and one reported being given food and other relief free of charge by a local storekeeper. All these women belonged to the more traditional or conservative section of the community.

### Disaster response: Blame and self-help

Under the sharp stress of sudden deprivation, bitter tensions surfaced in the community once the rains had stopped. The sharp skeleton of modernization was harshly exposed in the hard light of the clearing skies, and people complained repeatedly of the modern community's lack of human concern for its afflicted. Although there were exceptions, the general climate within the community ranged from bewilderment to surprising bitterness. This was especially true among the refugee poor.

Our nation is killing us. I don't think anything will be better, as we are still cheating each other. As for our community, I think it's them who are poisonous. Because if we repeat that things are like this, they say we better talk to those in charge with the goods. It seems they are dividing it up for themselves. At other places people are helped by their chiefs and *indunas*.

In the modern community, extended help between relatives is no longer the norm, and informal loans are requested by people in need rather than contributions where the obligation to repay is not specific. Against this background of increasing economic particularism, the social ethic prescribing that the poor are entitled by right of poverty to ask for help from the community at large<sup>55</sup> tends to lose its force against the iron wall of the powerlessness of the poor and of women, as argued by Chambers.<sup>56</sup> Complaints that the rich did not help the poor were frequent.

I always watch — in some bars the rich buy liquor for others. They say they are giving them so they can forget that they are homeless. . . .

The rich do nothing for the poor. Some of the poor do help other people. It's not easy for the rich to help us. They haven't got time. They are thinking about the businesses. They can't give you even a shelter of one day.

Many women also spoke angrily about what they saw as the failure of the tribal administration to locate and follow up serious cases.

Our community is not very well, not looking after its people, which is very bad. They are the ones to pull up their socks to see what's going on, but no one has been around, checking our sadness and poorness.

There is nothing done by the community . . . things have not been changed yet, we all suffer of this. Maybe even themselves they are not concerned about it. To myself, they must try and take further steps to improve what is needed. Those people in authority don't even know how many of us are in bad living, for they are also under control.

In this context of confusion and insufficient leadership, spontaneous efforts at community self-help did emerge. Unfortunately, those reported seem to have met with equivocal or bitter conclusions.

Mrs Miriam Khumalo, daughter of our late famous *induna*, tried to find us some means of help. She sent an Indian man here to Khanyisa Trading Store. There were groceries and blankets to support us. The spoiled kids of the place were there, big kids, not small. They just took everything, running away. Another thing: the persons who were not damaged or had houses that fell, they took all the groceries plus blankets. The Indian was cross and ashamed seeing the bad deed, the kids and old people making a noise and doing funny things. The Indian finally drove his car and went away. The poor people were crying, folding their arms.

More private efforts avoided chaos, but may have encouraged suspicion and jealousy instead. In one case where a woman brought in relief packages for elderly women of her own family after local stores had stopped distributing food relief because of the quarrelling, neighbours came around and demanded to know how the family had obtained relief aid from the local store, insisting that it must have been bribery.

As people struggled to rebuild their homes, sharp practice and outright crime also came into the open, preying on the aftermath of the disaster. With the entire community desperate for building supplies, women on their own again seem to have been the principal victims. One widow first had her wheelbarrow and ten sheets of corrugated iron (which she had bought to rebuild her house) stolen, only to find the timber from a large tree she had planted on her property appropriated by a neighbour after the tree had been blown down by the storm. The culprit who had stolen the corrugated iron was caught when trying to sell the stolen goods to a neighbour, who stripped him naked and forced him to model, while the man who had taken the timber threatened to assault local officials who called him to account. Court cases resulted, and ill feeling in the neighbourhood deepened. With building material so scarce it is being stolen from house to house, the risk of exploitation of single women is likely to remain significant for some time. Under prevailing political and economic conditions, the chances for community self-help do not look good.

### Disaster response: The limits of coping

It has become an axiom of recent disaster research that disaster victims are in fact disaster participants, that they are far from helpless and can often sort out their own problems if outside bodies do not interfere or take over.<sup>57</sup> A closer look at some of the consequences of disaster for the poor may not fully support this optimistic assessment of the community's coping capabilities. Not all members of the community will be able to return themselves to where they were before the disaster struck.

Looking at poverty instead of hazards, Chambers identifies disaster as capable of causing "poverty ratchets" — irretrievable loss of assets that moves the household down one notch towards destitution, usually through causing sale of land or pledge of extra debt.<sup>58</sup> Torry argues that far from being unusual and anti-social events, disasters work according to established custom. They are in effect occasions where customary usages provide for the community to shed some of its weaker and less necessary members, and that in India, girls, wives and

old women are subject to abandonment when they become inconvenient in this kind of crisis.<sup>59</sup> In KwaZulu, the female poor in crippled households are probably too poor already to sell land or find a creditor (and have no one to abandon them), but in a disaster they are likely to lose whatever resources or contingency provision they may have been able to build up, and also find themselves with worse shelter than before — a kind of half-ratchet, because they do not have much further to go.<sup>60</sup>

The weak economic position of the female poor is compounded by the community's weakened institutions. In an area where land-based organization is modernizing very rapidly, pre-existing neighbourhood-level organization declines and dissipates, leaving relatively little reliable social control.<sup>61</sup>

Modernization of popular values accompanies organizational changes, so that previous forms of co-operation cannot be relied on. Another result is the sharp drop in the formal marriage rate which determines the large number of damaged or crippled households.<sup>62</sup> As shown above, over 30 per cent of the community live in either male-centred or female-centred families whose internal structure and labour economy are weak and unreliable. The major mediating factor in poverty risk appears to lie here, in the household structure, and these families seem to have less capacity to restore their losses than others with a normal structure.

Finally, the modern community's capacity to organize and help itself in disaster is compromised by the flattening or suppression of local leadership which often occurs under the tribal authority system. Appointed traditional group heads often find themselves overwhelmed by the modern demands of their job, while modern leadership is restricted in scope and finds it difficult to function fully. The implications for disaster response are unfavourable.

Rubin's analysis of community recovery from disaster in the United States heavily stresses effective local leadership as a condition for recovery: "Leadership is an essential and almost sufficient condition for efficient recovery . . .".<sup>63</sup> Her analysis emphasizes the point that only existing community leadership structures are likely to work in disaster conditions — elaborate, special disaster plans were completely ignored about half the time, in spite of their popularity at the national level and the amount of Federal money they absorbed. Leadership requires a vision of what the future should be like, organizational flexibility, and the ability to attract competent assistants.<sup>64</sup> These capabilities are not salient in the tribal authority system, and at "KwaNgele" a partial vacuum seems to have developed at this level. Assistance to the dispossessed female poor was left largely to voluntary relief agencies, which also met with less success than they might have.

### Relief and disillusion: The agencies, the state, and the people in the Thousand Hills disaster

The question then emerges of what would have been the appropriate response to the disaster, either from private voluntary agencies or from state institutions. Significant relief was provided by voluntary agencies, and compensation for loss of housing was also available from official sources. In many ways, the community could be said to have been unusually well served by its outside helpers. But the fact remains that only one or two of the response texts collected a month after the rains included praise for the relief effort, while a very large percentage were dissatisfied, and sometimes bitterly so:

I don't know about the local aid agency, as other people around here are crying as I am. From that agency I only obtained 12,5 kilos of mealie meal, one loaf bread, a half brick of margarine, plus clothes for the kids only. They promised us poles. I went there twice and the third time that girl in charge told us that we are going to obtain the job at that aid agency. They give work doing weeding. Then again she said as it's sunny we better go back and fix our houses. I don't know what to fix as I am homeless.

About the local aid agency: I heard that they have got some help, but everyone is making complaints. We heard that they are giving their friends groceries, blankets, clothes, etc. Myself I went to our *izinduna* [who distributed some relief aid]. They said the agency is going to give poles and nails afterwards. They asked me if I need mealie meal. I said no — it's the house I haven't got, not food.

Even allowing for a normal level of depression and disillusionment setting in at this phase of disaster reaction, these criticisms tend to conform to a pattern. Taken as a group, they seem to revolve around two themes:

- Cases where genuinely homeless and poor respondents were not recognized and therefore unable to get emergency relief supplies available from the main locally active aid agency;
- Repeated complaints that building supplies, desperately needed for reconstruction, were promised — in some versions promised to everyone, in others only to the poor — but never materialized.

Although the agency in question had longstanding ties with the community, and worked day and night immediately after the rains to distribute food, clothing, blankets and tents as emergency supplies, the persistence of these complaints cannot help but draw into question the effectiveness of the flood relief operation at "KwaNgele". Why, if so much enthusiasm, sacrifice and dedication went into emergency relief, were people

complaining? Answers pertain not to the specific efforts of this dedicated agency, which were well above the standard for the region, but rather to the entire concept of flood relief and disaster response by official bodies in Natal/KwaZulu, as well as throughout the Third World. The main problem was that of *appropriate aid*. This was accompanied by side issues of the *timing* of aid, of *coping mechanisms*, *need assessment* and *consultation*.

**Relief: Defining the right goods?**

Probably the single most serious problem for aid efforts in response to disaster is sending the right supplies. In the preface to Cuny's book on the need to locate disaster aid in long-term development strategies, the executive director of Oxfam-America comments:

Are specialized aid organizations, which provide relief exclusively, inherently unaware of or indifferent to the development processes at work in the disaster-affected community? It is well documented that food relief organizations inundated Guatemala with unneeded food aid after the earthquake in 1976. Development-minded agencies, on the other hand, heard the Guatemalan villagers say that their priorities were shovels to recover food from collapsed household granaries, funds to build larger granaries for the oncoming harvest, and protection of local grain markets against a glut of imported food relief. . . .<sup>65</sup>

This gets worse as disaster literature accumulates: Wijkman and Timberlake remark:

Stories abound in the relief field of completely inappropriate aid: the British charity that sent packs of tea, tissues, and Tampax; the European Community sending powdered milk into an earthquake area where few cows had perished, but there was no water:

and the West German charity which constructed 1 000 polystyrene igloos which proved too hot to live in. But the igloos could not be dismantled or moved. They had to be burned down, and when burning gave off toxic fumes. . . .<sup>66</sup>

Their list continues down another page, but is too long to quote. Cuny formulates some more general questions on the topic of aid provision in a disaster context:

Is the emphasis on rapid response desirable? Is response focusing on the most important needs? Do the relief approaches used and the goods commonly supplied meet the needs of the victims or those of the donors? Are we concentrating our response during the most appropriate phase of the disaster?<sup>67</sup>

To all these questions, he argues, the answer is frequently "No", but for various reasons agencies and governments active in disaster areas are often reluctant to re-examine their assumptions. Many of these assumptions date from the period after the Second World War, when relief agencies did essential work in providing European refugees with food, blankets, tents and clothing.<sup>68</sup> These commodities then became part of an entrenched custom, being supplied almost by reflex as agencies extended their work to deal with disaster in the Third World, though Cuny insists that they are inappropriate as often as not in disasters where people want to stay at their homesites, may not need food, and may not want Western-style old clothes.

The agencies were difficult to discourage. Wijkman and Timberlake continue:

Blankets donated to India were donated by India to Nepal, which donated them back to India: the blankets were never needed or used. Turkey after a 1983 earthquake asked donors not to send any medicine or second-

hand clothes, but a Northern donor flew in a few days later with a planeload of precisely these items — and a TV crew to cover the distribution. . . .<sup>69</sup>

The point is that disasters differ by type, and that their associated relief needs are individual, not general. Figures 2 and 3 summarize the main types of harm done by the major disasters, and indicate the forms of aid likely to be needed.<sup>70</sup> For a flood and wind-storm situation, the pattern includes cash (such as insurance payments), loans or credit, temporary lodging, short-term food aid, immunization against water-borne diseases, blankets if refugees are far from home, and agricultural assistance if the community is agrarian. Clothing is not listed as required, and neither is emergency shelter such as tents.

By this checklist, most of the supplies donated or collected from the white economy were not of high priority. The greater part of relief donations were collected in Durban by the provincial relief effort, and funnelled to organizations capable of handling relief on the ground. To some extent, the agency at "KwaNgele" had to take what it was sent. As it was, supplies of donated old clothes were reported to be piling up throughout the province as local relief workers found themselves oversupplied. The agency itself was apparently not always successful in convincing the provincial effort that part of what it knew of local priorities was not being addressed. The exception was food aid, on which the agency concentrated, but the need for food normally passes quickly, as it did in this case. It was apparently only at this point that the aid agencies, half-exhausted by their earlier efforts, began to see the enormous and continuing need for building supplies.

**Table 3**  
**IMMEDIATE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS**

	Short-term migrations	Permanent migration	Loss of housing	Loss of industrial production	Loss of business production	Loss of crops	Damage to infrastructure	Disruption of marketing systems	Disruption of transport	Disruption of communications	Panic	Looting	Breakdown of social order
<b>CATAclysmic Disasters</b>													
Earthquake			X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X
Cyclone			X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X
Flood	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Tsunami			X	X	X	X	X			X			
Volcano	X		X			X		X					
Fire	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X
<b>LONG-TERM CONTINUING Disasters</b>													
War	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Drought/famine	X					X							

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

**Table 4**  
**APPROPRIATE AID**

	Cash	Emergency shelter	Temporary lodging	Immunizations	Short-term feeding (normal foods)	Long-term food aid	Intensive feeding	Supplementary feeding	Surgical aid	Medical supplies	Clothing	Blankets	Loans or credit	Agricultural assistance
<b>CATAclysmic DISASTERS</b>														
Earthquake	X				X				X			X*	X	
Cyclone	X		X		X							X*	X	X
Flood	X		X	X	X							X*	X	X
Tsunami	X				X								X	X
Vulcano	X		X		X							X*	X	X
Fire	X		X		X				X			X*	X	X
<b>LONG-TERM CONTINUING DISASTERS</b>														
War	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X*		X
Drought/famine	X			X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X

\* Depending upon the climate

### Housing: Priorities and coping

In his seminal report, Cuny argues that the need to replace housing is the single pre-eminent need in disaster assistance: "The damage to and destruction of housing in cataclysmic disasters are the single highest cause of death and injury and result in the greatest economic loss to the poor in terms of property . . .".<sup>71</sup> On flood disaster specifically, Wijkman and Timberlake confirm, "Much of the disaster mitigation associated with floods involves housing. . . . This work involves both making the houses disaster-resistant and building better houses after the disaster".<sup>72</sup> Though housing aid comes somewhat later in the sequence than the acute phase on which relief usually tries to concentrate, it could be argued that disaster response should generally take as its major priority the assessment of housing destruction, even ahead of short-term aid. However, in the Natal/KwaZulu disaster, housing seems to have become a priority partly by accident, and was not dealt with effectively.

In relation to housing, the Natal aid effort received a fortuitous gift in the form of the Built Environment Support Group's quick assessment study, done by teams of students immediately after the rains — an instance where a non-governmental organization (NGO) was in the right place at the right time with the right service. According to the Built Environment Support Group's results, some 528 900 people in the Durban Functional Region alone had their homes either destroyed in the disaster or so badly damaged they would have to be rebuilt: stipulating household size at 6.5, this amounts to about 81 300 dwellings belonging to over

half a million homeless people. To rebuild these entirely from materials supplied by the natural environment is simply to re-invite disaster. But cinder-block construction able to resist the flood rains is far too expensive for the rural poor, and particularly for the women from crippled households who may have stood by far the greatest housing loss. A potential role for outside assistance therefore existed.

Realizing finally that a huge emerging need had been identified, the provincial relief effort was reported in the press and on the radio to have begun stockpiling building supplies for future distribution. The agency working at "KwaNgele" therefore made its tentative arrangement, which in the minds of administrators was never meant to be a promise, to supply the very poor with poles and nails — vital materials in very short supply. With the best of intentions, it was a mistake.

By late November, two months after the floods, no building supplies had been delivered to the agency. It is not clear whether the logistics of moving significant quantities of building material through the frayed transport network or the simple size of demand closer to the centre defeated the effort.

Many people at "KwaNgele" were waiting, bemused, to receive supplies before beginning reconstruction. Uncertainty was high, increasing the psychological dislocation that follows disaster, and resentment was on the increase. As the staggering size of this demand for building supplies came into focus, agency staff became discouraged and gave up on trying to secure materials, deciding in the end that the capacity of the community to replace lost housing

would finally have to answer. The community itself was left up in the air, not sure whether or not supplies might be obtained after all. After months, the poor began to rebuild their vulnerable, earth-walled houses.

Allowing for accentuated rural differentiation and a possible drop in the housing standards of the poor, most semi-rural communities in KwaZulu probably would eventually be able to restore most of their housing stock to something similar to its previous standard. What seems to have caused the anger and bewilderment recorded from some of our respondents was partly this unintended disruption of their coping, and the added burden of extra uncertainty. Unfortunately both are frequent outcomes of relief attempts worldwide.

In addition, people left stunned and depressed by the aftermath of disaster are already in a fragile emotional state, likely to be affected by any action that seems to ignore their human dignity. "KwaNgele" respondents seemed to have a sense of help floating somewhere over their heads, just out of their reach, and a frustrating uncertainty about whether they would be acknowledged or not.

The agency deserves full credit for a number of real achievements: it provided food and other relief supplies to most of those in need after the rains, it kept relief work within a development framework, it tried to work through existing networks and largely prevented local elites from diverting aid meant for the poor. More recently, the agency has continued operations and launched what is likely to be an effective housing related programme aimed at the reconstruc-



tion phase. However, in spite of determined efforts, its attempts to reach and communicate with the elusive poor have met with less success. To the agency's frustration, many of the female poor remained unaware of the benefits that were available to them after the floods and how they could be obtained, or were unable to challenge hasty or arbitrary decisions by overworked junior relief staff. In contrast, the well-off educated stratum, which possesses the necessary skills to deal with a bureaucratic system, did very well out of the relief operation, though due to careful monitoring they were not likely to be able to claim more than their share.

### The aid effort: Determining priorities

In hindsight, and with the help of the literature that few agencies appeared to consult, it seems that the provincial aid effort, which was partly private (through voluntary organizations) and partly official, was held back at several points by the way it conceptualized relief. The floods seemed to come as a surprise, in spite of the abused condition of Natal's catchment areas and the well-known erosion damage virtually throughout rural KwaZulu. The disaster effort mobilized quickly, but partly or largely around inappropriate assumptions about what rural relief in a flood situation should be. To a certain extent, relief planning seems to have developed by default. With some help from the earlier experience of Cyclone Demoina, it was not totally unco-ordinated, though some of its goals were questionable.

Communication and consultation between the grass-roots and the organizing bodies do not, from results in Thousand Hills, seem to have been very effective at the outset: community priorities in housing aid do not seem to have surfaced as the aid machine rushed into operation. By the time housing needs surfaced, with a lucky push from a non-relief group, voluntary workers may well have been partly worn out. At this point, the long haul of reconstruction was still ahead of them.

At the level of the state, the picture becomes unclear. On the one hand, the government set up a disaster fund and had made a contribution of R30 million by February 1988.<sup>73</sup> Substantial payments on applications for assistance from flood victims have already been made, while R81 million in aid has been paid to farmers. However it is difficult to determine how much of the total disaster assistance went to black areas. According to Makanjee's assessment, funds for housing reconstruction have moved through a number of different departments and agencies, and are difficult to count. The government has also provided a substantial amount of money to different departments for rebuilding infrastructure, but attempts to make housing relief available through the state-sponsored tribal authorities have not been particularly successful.

As a result, NGOs have tended to take over the administration of rural relief in black areas.

Overall, the general thrust of the government's approach to disaster relief seems to have been aimed at maintaining political stability rather than reducing vulnerability, assisting the poor, or developing black communities. Makanjee comments that "... once the initial crisis ended and political stability ensued, the state moved away from all direct relief efforts in black rural areas in the region",<sup>74</sup> leaving the poor to rebuild as best they could. Communication with the ground level seems to have been through tribal authorities and military communication links, with short-term political rather than long-term development goals. Within this very partial and particular view of the relief process, the government appeared to be trying to minimize its expenditure on the black communities.

The Minister of Health's position at the outset, when he insisted on a homeless figure of 54 351 for the whole of KwaZulu on the basis of the number of flood refugees sheltering in public buildings under government supervision, appears to be a case in point. He was quoted as saying that "some people might want to create the impression that the social structure was supporting more 'squatters' than it actually was."<sup>75</sup> Presumably, the government favours the low figure as a means of minimizing claims by dispossessed flood victims.

Against this view, the results from our quick study suggest that only a small fraction of refugees went into any kind of official shelter — most people immediately asked for space with relatives or neighbours. Confirmation is lent by Raphael; quoting Bolin, she asserts that 75 to 90 per cent of disaster refugees normally take shelter with family members even in the developed First World.<sup>76</sup> On this evidence, the number of homeless may be up to ten times higher than the Minister of Health maintains, which would agree closely with the Built Environment Support Group's estimate of half a million. If this is true, then the government might consider increasing its contribution to flood-related development assistance by a factor of ten.

### Participation: Alternatives for helping the poor

Whether, in the end, this would make it possible to supply housing assistance effectively to half a million people is another question. In his discussion of the Programa Kuchuba'l housing aid programme that followed the Guatemalan earthquakes of 1976, Cuny demonstrates that large-scale education and reconstruction programmes with strong participatory credentials are practical; they can be worked on a basis that is financially acceptable to the aid agencies involved, and

can help bring about a standard of rural housing much more able to withstand local hazards. On the other hand, it is not clear that the scale of need in Guatemala was on a level with that in KwaZulu, though 90 per cent housing loss was estimated for an area that may have been as large as 1 500 square kilometers.

Programa Kuchuba'l promoted the subsidized sale of an improved roofing material that was popular locally (with special concessions for the very poor), and also taught earthquake-resistant building techniques compatible with local practice. It relied heavily on existing local organizations such as co-operatives, and offered a work programme to enable families to earn money to buy more building materials from the community. It also took the reduction of dependency and the promotion of competence and self-reliance as major goals. After an uneven start, in which the co-operatives were overburdened, the programme began to function effectively and expanded into road improvement operations.<sup>77</sup>

Conceivably, a somewhat similar programme could help upgrade the standard of housing among the poor in peri-urban KwaZulu. However, in addition to raising funds, such an effort would still have to come to terms with the weakness of local organization, and the shortage of even labour resources in the damaged households of the female poor. These factors may have been less significant in Guatemala.

By the early part of this year, plans for relief aid for the Valley seemed to have overcome their shaky start and zeroed in on housing stock. Many of the agencies that are attempting to help appear to be well aware that the poor do not have the cash resources to rebuild in such a way that their dwellings will be less vulnerable in the future, and are trying to provide assistance on a basis that will reach those most in need without completely wiping out any resources they may still have left. The Red Cross is trying to build local-level membership and organization among blacks; World Vision has put together a housing kit which would provide the materials to build a complete dwelling for R350, and is willing to extend loans on relatively easy terms; Valley Trust is developing plans for a rotating credit fund to enable the dispossessed to buy building materials and pay them off slowly.

These efforts are important, and will help many of the marginal poor who still have access to income sources. On the other hand, it is likely that for many women who have no access to outside jobs and no reliable members of the family working, an expenditure of R350, even on easy credit terms, is out of reach.

These women do not have employers who can serve as a resource, and the modern community is unlikely to provide them with any substantial help. Their predicament

suggests that there is still room for organized, development-related aid programmes aimed at housing. Alternatives here might include expanded work programmes which, as Torry notes, are a mainstay of India's effective counter-disaster planning,<sup>78</sup> and rural savings and credit plans adapted for the poor.<sup>79</sup> Any of these alternatives would require a fairly extensive re-orientation of the disaster relief operation at provincial and national level, and might also require committing substantial amounts of money. It remains to be seen whether the experience of Natal's 1987/88 floods will suffice to change disaster thinking at various levels along these lines. Against the background of the deteriorating environment, there is possibly no other choice.

## Conclusions: The meaning of disaster and the politics of stability

Measures to be taken against disaster are only one side of the emergency coin. The other is the question of who is responsible for the disaster in the first place. In the dominant paradigm, disasters are acts of God, and no individual agency is at fault. But in the revisionist rescension, disaster is an act of man, and a search for responsibility begins. The recent Natal/KwaZulu floods are not an isolated occurrence; others can be expected to follow soon. The cost in human lives, as well as in destroyed housing, is likely to rise.

At present, the people of "KwaNgele" are attributing the disaster directly to God, and it is likely enough that most of KwaZulu is thinking along those lines. But at the same time, people are bewildered. Many attribute God's anger to the sinfulness of man — a frequent interpretation of the flood disaster was that God or the Devil was punishing the people for the civil violence in Pietermaritzburg and Durban. Others found it difficult to reconcile biblical accounts with ongoing events; people's tentative explanations reflected uncertainty:

I am asking you if this has ever happened before? If so where? Because we heard that there was the Flood — others are asking why, because Noah was informed about the Flood, so why were we not also informed? But Juba my son says even Noah wasn't informed of the time of his death. We really don't understand this thing. . . .

Other respondents stood back and took a more cool and comparative view:

People are saying different things about this flood. Some say it is because people were coming from Shaka's grave (on Shaka Day at Stanger). But others say it's because people are still worshipping Shaka instead of only God. Myself since I was born I never heard of a flood that takes out the graves so they can float. . . .

Disaster research findings suggest that a search for meaning is part of the human reaction to the sudden destruction, part of the effort to resolve the conflict over personal survival.<sup>80</sup> But, in addition, search for meaning is itself an indicator of continuing emotional upset and distress.<sup>81</sup> Biblical or supernatural explanations for sudden disaster are so common worldwide as to be normal; specifically, they are also the easiest to accept, and offer the best chance for the survivor to reintegrate his moral universe and renew his life.<sup>82</sup> One "KwaNgele" woman remarked that either God or the Devil was behind it, but if it was God the people could not blame him.

The corollary appears to be that when disaster is clearly attributable to human action it becomes far more bitter and distressing. Explanations involving God fall away, leaving survivors gripped in a helpless, suppressed rage manifesting as listless depression. Lifton and Olson quote Luchterhand, whose research included the Holocaust: "As the source of stress shifts away from indiscriminate violence by nature to the discriminate oppression by man, the damage to human personality becomes less remediable. . . ."<sup>83</sup> Presumably, it is possible for this rage to be translated into action if an opportunity should develop.

It would seem to follow that if the whole chain of cause and effect — between flooding, environmental harm, long-standing state land and development policy under apartheid — should become known among KwaZulu's flood survivors, a momentum of deep suppressed anger could result. Blunted fury manifesting as apathy, of the kind Lifton and Olson studied in Appalachia and which continued for years after the 1972 flooding there, would clearly have negative consequences for development work. Conversely, simmering anger over government negligence and indifference could possibly move the rural areas appreciably closer to the revolutionary climate advocated under the more extreme radical paradigms of disaster interpretation.

If so, any danger to the stability of the South African government associated with the flood rains may not be over after all. The social and political impact of disaster is a significant force in itself. Both radical and less than radical commentators have noted that mishandled disaster relief policies have shaken governments and sometimes toppled them.

In East Pakistan in 1972, resentment built up over the failure of the West-centred ruling group to send adequate aid after a major cyclone disaster:

Using the disaster as a rallying point, a major political movement took control of the Pakistani government in the general election that followed several months later. The West Pakistani clique in power refused to relinquish control and within a short period of time civil war erupted. . . .<sup>84</sup>

Ultimately India invaded, and Bangladesh formally separated from Pakistan. Not dissimilarly, intense relief and reconstruction work in rural Guatemala after the earthquake disaster almost followed the prescribed course of the radical paradigm. Rural communities became intensely conscientious and began to demand change, provoking a right-wing backlash from the army and an assassination campaign. Civil war followed four years later.<sup>85</sup>

In other, less drastic cases, conflict over disaster and entitlements have also led to tension and violence. As of now in Pietermaritzburg, failure by the state to upgrade the appalling condition of the black townships' infrastructure has regularly been identified as a major contributing factor in the civil violence, which itself qualifies as an ongoing disaster.<sup>86</sup> Again, the catalyst seems to be unwillingness to provide disaster money to an ethnically defined section of the population to which the government is not responsible.

Against this background of civil strife and a rapid rise in so-called natural disasters, there is a clear need for a South African social science literature of disaster response at the level of the community and the aid agencies, and also further up the aid vine, at policy level. Marginal and disadvantaged groups within poor communities are in no position to put their case at the management levels of the relief bureaucracy, and this is particularly true in the case of women.

If in fact Natal does suffer from more floods in the near future — as seems probable since even stringent conservation measures would probably be too little, too late — it is perfectly possible that word may get round KwaZulu's rural districts connecting past government policy to its environmental results — with or without the intervention of relief workers. Should this happen, it may turn out to have been cheaper for the government to have invested in development and disaster preparedness before the flood risk became endemic. Disasters shake social systems as well as the physical environment, and the shockwaves they produce need not stop with the rural poor.

## References

- 1 Mrs G Phewa, quoted in C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "God said a fire not a flood next time: Some black peri-urban experiences in Natal/KwaZulu's flood disaster, 1987", Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, Durban, 1988.
- 2 Dr W van Niekerk, as reported in the *Sunday Times*, 11 October 1987.
- 3 A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *Natural disasters: Acts of God or acts of man?*, London and Washington, DC: Earthscan, International Institute for Environment and Development.
- 4 C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, *op cit*; *idem*, "God said a fire not a flood next time",

- Indicator SA*, vol 5, no 3, Autumn/Winter 1988; *idem*, "When the rains came: Women of Thousand Hills in the 1987 flood disaster." *Africanus*, vol 18, nos 1/2, 1988.
- 5 K Hewitt, "The idea of calamity in a technocratic age", in K Hewitt (ed), *Interpretations of calamity*, Winchester, Massachusetts: Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp 5–6.
- 6 *Ibid*, p 10.
- 7 William I Torry, "Morality and harm: Hindu peasant adjustment to famines", *Social Science Information*, vol 25, no 1, 1986, p 141.
- 8 *Ibid*.
- 9 A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *op cit*, pp 27–28.
- 10 *Ibid*, p 27.
- 11 *Ibid*, p 28, quoting the Swedish Red Cross.
- 12 Frederick Cuny, *Disasters and development*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p 14.
- 13 E Waddell, "Coping with frosts, governments, and disaster experts: Some reflections based on a New Guinea experience and a perusal of the relevant literature", in K Hewitt (ed), *op cit*, pp 38–40.
- 14 Michael Watts, "On the poverty of theory: Natural hazards research in context", in K Hewitt (ed), *op cit*, p 239.
- 15 E Waddell, "How the Enga cope with frost: Responses to climatic perturbations in the central highlands of New Guinea", *Human Ecology*, vol 3, no 4, 1975.
- 16 William I Torry, *op cit*, p 141.
- 17 E Waddell, "Coping with frosts . . .", *op cit*, p 38.
- 18 *Ibid*, pp 40–41.
- 19 Michael Watts, *op cit*, pp 234–242.
- 20 *Ibid*, p 242, quoting A Schmidt, *The concept of nature in Marx*, London: New Left Books, 1971.
- 21 *Ibid*, p 243.
- 22 William I Torry, "Social science research on famine: A critical evaluation", *Human Ecology*, vol 12, no 3, 1984.
- 23 P Susman, P O'Keefe and B Wisner, "Global disasters, a radical interpretation", in K Hewitt (ed), *op cit*, p 263.
- 24 *Ibid*, p 279.
- 25 *Ibid*, p 280.
- 26 Quoted in A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *op cit*, p 120.
- 27 *Ibid*.
- 28 *Ibid*, p 29, quoting B Shah.
- 29 *Ibid*, p 29.
- 30 Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, p 14.
- 31 *Ibid*, p 15.
- 32 Cf Michael Watts, *op cit*.
- 33 Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, p 36.
- 34 C R Cross and R J Haines (eds), *Towards freehold: Options for land and development in South Africa's black rural areas*, Cape Town: Juta, 1988.
- 35 Cf Vijay Makanjee, "Goin' down in the flood", *Indicator SA*, vol 5, no 3, Autumn/Winter 1988.
- 36 *Sunday Times*, 4 October 1987.
- 37 C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "God said a fire not a flood next time" *op cit*, p 54.
- 38 Mrs T Nzama quoted in C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "God said a fire not a flood next time . . .", *op cit*.
- 39 Mrs V Nzama on the third day of the rains.
- 40 Ms J Mdluli.
- 41 Mrs V Shozi.
- 42 Mrs M Nyoni.
- 43 Mrs T Nzama.
- 44 Mr N Hlatshwayo.
- 45 C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "God said a fire not a flood next time: Some black . . .", *op cit*; *idem*, "God said a fire not a flood next time", *op cit*; *idem*, "When the rains came . . .", *op cit*.
- 46 C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "God said a fire not a flood next time: Some black . . ." *op cit*.
- 47 J Montgomery, "Probing managerial behaviour: Image and reality in Southern Africa", *World Development*, vol 15, no 7, 1987; G Fivers, *The critical incident technique: A bibliography*, Palo Alto, California: American Institute for Research, 2nd edition, 1980.
- 48 J B Sykes (ed), *The concise Oxford dictionary of current English*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (7th edition), 1982.
- 49 C R Cross and E M Preston-Whyte, "Modelling poverty household dynamics: A data approach through per capita income", *Proceedings of the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development*, Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town, 1985. See also C R Cross and E M Preston-Whyte, "The informal sector: Maximization vs desperation strategies", *Indicator SA*, vol 1, no 2, Spring 1983.
- 50 *Ibid*.
- 51 C R Cross, *If you have no land you are not a man at all: Attitudes and the mechanics of land tenure in modern KwaZulu* (Final report of the Committee for Development Research project), Durban: CASS, University of Natal, 1985; C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "God said a fire not a flood next time", *op cit*.
- 52 Mrs B Khoza.
- 53 Mrs N Nzama.
- 54 Mrs I Sithole.
- 55 Cf James Scott, *Weapons of the weak*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- 56 Robert Chambers, *Rural development: Putting the last first*, London: Longman, 1983.
- 57 A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *op cit*, pp 105–107; Randolph C Kent, *Anatomy of disaster relief: The international network in action*, London and New York: Pinter, 1987, pp 14–15; Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, pp 84–85 (quoting Kieffer) *et passim*; K Hewitt, *op cit*, pp 13–14; and especially E Waddell, "How the Enga cope . . .", *op cit*, pp 249–273.
- 58 Robert Chambers, *op cit*, p 104.
- 59 William I Torry, "Morality and harm . . .", *op cit*.
- 60 For a more detailed discussion of C R Cross, M T Nzama and O S Dlamini, "When the rains came . . .", *op cit*.
- 61 C R Cross, "If you have no land . . .", *op cit*.
- 62 *Ibid*.
- 63 Claire B Rubin, with M D Saperstein and D G Barbee, *Community recovery from a major natural disaster*, University of Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, 1985.
- 64 *Ibid*, p 28.
- 65 Short in Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, p viii.
- 66 A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *op cit*, p 108.
- 67 Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, p 5.
- 68 *Ibid*, p 18.
- 69 A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *op cit*, p 108.
- 70 Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, pp 49–50, 60–61.
- 71 *Ibid*, p 6.
- 72 A Wijkman and L Timberlake, *op cit*, p 133.
- 73 Vijay Makanjee, *op cit*, p 59.
- 74 *Ibid*, p 60.
- 75 *Sunday Times*, 11 October 1987.
- 76 Beverley Raphael, *When disaster strikes: How individuals and communities cope with catastrophe*, New York: Basic Books, 1986, p 126.
- 77 Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, pp 164–196.
- 78 William I Torry, "Morality and harm . . .", *op cit*, p 145.
- 79 C R Cross, "Informal credit — or, how does a rural community capitalise itself?" Paper delivered to the 17th Congress of the Association for Sociology in South Africa, University of Natal, Durban, 1986; C R Cross, "Informal lending — do-it-yourself credit in black rural areas", *Indicator SA*, vol 4, no 3, Summer 1987; C R Cross, "Agricultural lending into the reserves: Some World Bank theory and some ground-level practice", Paper delivered to Workshop on the South African Agrarian Question: Past, Present and Future, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987.
- 80 R J Lifton and E Olson, "The human meaning of total disaster: The Buffalo Creek experience", *Psychiatry*, vol 39, 1976, p 8.
- 81 Stephen J Dollinger, "The need for meaning following disaster: Attributions and emotional upset", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol 12, no 3, 1986, p 307.
- 82 R J Lifton and E Olson, *op cit*, p 8.
- 83 R J Lifton and E Olson, *op cit*, p 10, quoting E G Luchterhand, "Sociological approaches to massive stress in natural and man-made disasters", *International Psychology Clinic*, vol 8, 1971.
- 84 Frederick Cuny, *op cit*, pp 54–55.
- 85 P Susman *et al*, *op cit*, p 275.
- 86 C R Cross, P Mtimkulu, C J Napier and E C van der Merwe, "Conflict and violence in Pietermaritzburg: The development factor", Department of Development Administration and Politics, University of South Africa, *Working Document in African Politics*, no 2/1988.

# Social science in Africa: Problems and prospects

*L Bloom analyses the uneasy relationship in Africa between the social sciences striving for academic detachment on the one hand, and the political commitment expected by politicians and governments on the other.*

## Introduction

This article proposes to examine the delicate relationship between social science in Africa and the African milieu — political, social and administrative. Our argument will run, against the defeatist view of such commentators as Mehryar,<sup>1</sup> that social scientists are doing both their profession and their societies a disservice if they surrender the study of social problems to politicians and administrators.

## Social science and social policy.

Few, if any, African societies have escaped damaging economic, political, social and technological changes since independence. Thus, values and practices, organizations and institutions that once answered the needs of these communities, now collide with innovations, often with unpredictable and socially disruptive consequences.<sup>2</sup> Such interactions may be sparked within Africa itself or introduced from outside; in either case their consequences, both short- and long-term, are hard to predict and even harder to control.

Social policies are designed, in an ideal world, to deal with the consequences of change. Marshall *et al*<sup>3</sup> have analysed two fundamental questions which guide policy-makers, and, although they wrote on more industrialized and urbanized societies — in which the social sciences have a relatively long history of co-operation with government — their questions apply equally to Africa. Marshall's questions are apparently simple enough. First: what are the concealed

and open theories of social justice called upon by governments to justify their policies? Second: what do governments know, or believe, to be acceptable to the communities or groups that will be affected by their policies?

In Africa, there are scanty signs, even in formal constitutions, that governments recognize the need to articulate either question. But let us now step aside for a moment and ask whether, despite the continent's widely differing social and political systems, we cannot, *prima facie*, set out a few generalizations, common to these governments, on the nature of society and social justice.

First, there is a strong tendency to authoritarian and hierarchical government, taking the patriarchal family as its ancient model, and a complementary suspicion of participatory democracy. Second, there exists a conflict between the hallowed tub-thumping calls for national identity and the lively persistence of "ethnic", linguistic, or even smaller, territorial groups. Third, there is the pervasive influence of the extended family and the narrowly ethnic group as the dynamic (and cohesive) force behind wider economic, political and social units. The growth of a small wealthy class has barely touched this influence. It tends rather to reinforce it. Fourth, there is the male domination, or, even, male monopoly of power and influence in many sectors of society: in particular, little or no effective sharing of political power by men with women. Father or elder brother rules! There is not yet even one female head of state in Africa. Only in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa have African women been encouraged to take a significant share in political activity, despite their contribution

to the struggle for independence in states such as Ghana.

Now what governments know, or believe, to be acceptable to their citizens depends upon the assumptions they hold on the mechanisms of consultation. Mechanisms that were once practical, and acceptable to nations of villagers, are no longer adequate. There are few leaders (exceptions such as Nyerere, Gowon and the young Nkrumah come to mind) who have understood the necessity of maintaining some emotional rapport with the various communities that go to make up a society. And such attempts as these leaders did at one time make would now, in the 1980s, be inadequate or inappropriate. New constituencies have formed. New economic, political and social interests have been adopted by new groups. Old power groups based upon older interests have lost influence. It would indeed take a bold man to predict the future in detail, though many observers have noted that immediate political power today has an urban base.

Rein<sup>4</sup> considers three further issues. First, how, if at all, do the administrators of policy in Africa today take into account the necessity of harmonizing individual needs and want with broad social goals? Do administrators take the matter seriously? Or do they brush it aside with arguments about "the common good" as paramount? When the Nigerian government was planning the new capital, Abuja, there was indeed some consultation with people who were to be dispossessed, about their resettlement wishes and needs. But the decision to build the new capital was never in question, although many Nigerians questioned its necessity

and resented the huge expenditure.

It may be asked whether social scientists are concerned about the fundamental *ethical* problem of if, and how, such harmonization of individual and social needs may best be effected. In Africa the social sciences have tended to shun such questions. Second, Rein asks: should social scientists challenge the administrators or governments that employ them? And finally, he asks if social scientists should be moral critics, moving beyond the conventional limits of pure and applied research to question the ethical foundation of the policies whose consequences they are happy to study empirically.

Nowhere in the world have the social sciences been able to assert their independence without struggle. Again, in Africa as elsewhere, the social sciences have never been encouraged to explore the fundamental conflicts of their societies. Neither vested interests inside government nor the most powerful economic groups outside care to have their positions challenged, even if the challenge consists of little more than showing the consequences for society as a whole of the limited perspective of those in power. And in Africa, we must remember that there is always an additional taboo on damaging criticism. It arises from the shame of admitting that in post-independence states, economic and political inequalities, maladministration and political violence, and many other social problems can less and less plausibly be blamed on the inadequacies (or mischief) of long-departed colonial administrations. In 1988, 1988's governments are responsible for 1988's problems! Throughout the continent, young people, in particular, are increasingly unwilling to blame yesterday's white administrators, when often today's black ones are manifestly no better.

Rein argues that the central duty of social policy is to investigate — as fully as practical techniques permit — how needs, wants and goals are influenced by policy decisions. A politically sensitive issue is at once apparent. For although it may be technically possible to monitor the effects of government policies on individual and communal needs, wants and goals, yet in societies in which governments are unused to scrutiny and challenge, even detached professional monitoring is unwelcome. Let us make no mistake: monitoring challenges the very root of authority: that government, that a universal father-figure knows best what its people, its children need, want and indeed *ought* to want.

The inexperience and instability of many African governments, the weakness of African administrations — often with too few experienced and trained professionals to run them — have understandably brought about a particular sensitivity to outside scrutiny and evaluation. Barren and irrele-

vant policies abound; the severity of Africa's economic, social and political problems has been such that no existing administration or infrastructure has been strong enough to manage circumstances. The record of African governments in accepting the *bona fides* of critics, even those of unexceptionable moderation, has been unworthy of the continent's need for constructive criticism. Few African states have not closed down educational institutions, not arrested academics and students, not shackled the media. Alas, social scientists are not famous for their boldness!

Rein has argued that social scientists and policymakers should "try to question the orthodox and established pattern, trying to discover where it is vulnerable and what alternative approaches are required". This is commendable advice. But unless the educational and political systems and the mass media are free — and indeed encouraged — to criticize society, there will be little or no incentive for debate. Questions, especially from younger people, are all too often perceived as potential rebellion; and education is controlled by starving students of funds and depriving them of the stimulation of contact with the wider world outside Africa.

The deeper motives of both the orthodox and the fringe *soi-disant* radical are equally suspect to the truly independent critic. Those who zealously criticize, reject or seek to destroy the orthodox, are often tainted by their own dogmatism. If they come to power they will usually be found inflexibly determined to introduce and maintain a new orthodoxy. And, inspired by this new dogma, they inevitably proceed to establish a new and rigid social structure; a structure which by its very unyielding nature will stimulate opposition and, in its turn, be torn down and rebuilt. This unstable see-saw, from one socio-political system to another (and back), stems incontrovertibly from the misguided search for one magical formula to cure all evils.

Rein thus assigns the role of moral critic to the social scientist. But scientists, like policy-makers, have their individual and collective values, beliefs and attitudes. These are rooted in both individual experience and in class and other social loyalties and affiliations. Perplexing questions arise on and around the complex of individual and social constraints, inducements, fears and fantasies that influence the political and ethical views upon which government policy is ultimately based. Many a decision is permeated by the irrationalities of the policy-makers' indifference, partiality, or even hate for some particular group or community. In recent years the irrationalities of chauvinism in its varied forms has done much to weaken the rational elements in decision-making. Elsewhere, a nervous intolerance of the more-educated has weakened many once lively African academic communities so that, for

all practical purposes, criticism can, willy-nilly, emanate only from beyond the borders of the continent, with the field wide open to misunderstanding and misinterpretation — willful or innocent.

Tizard<sup>5</sup> has warned of another significant distortion of general thinking on policy: the conviction that only long-term goals are important.

(This discourages) short-term goals and indications of immediate well-being . . . . Only when we abandon notions about the supposed or hoped for long-term prophylactic values, Head Starts and permanent cures, will we begin to examine the characteristics of the environment that contribute to immediate happiness.

By rejecting contemporary problems with the argument that they are local, trivial or temporary, and that they can only be solved when long-term, more radical policies are carried out, government ineptness and lack of sensitivity can be excused. The infallible wisdom and authority of the father can be maintained. Discontented children can be hushed.

Societies, like personalities, can be characterized as either over-optimistic (euphoric, even) or over-pessimistic and defeated. The former are frenetically confident of their ability to improve everything. An ideological position, a new constitution, a charismatic leader, yet another "War against Indiscipline", will blaze the route to a better world. Alas, although there have been many such roads to Utopia, none has yet led any society within striking distance of that elusive destination. The pessimistic society, on the other hand, is equally impractical. It is distinguished by the belief that society cannot be changed — at all — by human intervention. We must await the intervention of a religious or political God. Or we must patiently expect a religious or secular millennium. Unwillingness to attempt even realistic change is often associated with obdurate determination to maintain the status quo. Hunger, ignorance, disease, political uncertainty and social insecurity continue.

In these circumstances, social scientists (if tolerated at all) run the very real danger of finding themselves the slaves of pressing circumstance, crisis-driven, compelled by panicky governments to find speedy overnight solutions to insoluble emergencies, and blamed for their ineffectiveness when problems are found to be more difficult to understand than governments had hoped, and therefore more intractable, as scientists knew all along to be the case.

## Social policy and human needs

In Africa we have thus largely wasted the opportunity to study systematically the human consequences of economic, political and social change. (Note that the equally impor-

tant opportunity to consider the consequences of ecological change, and arrest its devastating effects before it is too late, has been almost totally ignored too.) Social scientists have too often been conscripted into the wasteful role of proposing *ad hoc* justifications for *ad hoc* policies, diligently cobbling and patching away to save them from outright failure.

But must the social sciences be so wasted? Even sceptics such as Mehryar and Moghaddam and Taylor grant them a limited — if highly politicized — role.<sup>6</sup>

Mehryar's bitter and tendentious paper argues that psychology (and, no doubt, other social sciences) has two functions: "acknowledging the real cause of . . . poverty and backwardness", and "reminding (people) of the need for political struggle". He continues by rejecting the "Western" tradition that individuals are responsible for their actions, and observes that social scientists are "often part of the machinery of control". Moghaddam and Taylor plead for a psychology (and, no doubt, other social sciences too) that rejects colonial attitudes towards "Third World" societies.

Mehryar's paper is as value-laden as the views that he rejects; and it proposes nothing more practical than seeking "a target for change . . . in the hearts of the ruling elite". Moghaddam and Taylor propose that social sciences should be "appropriate". They lay down six criteria which constitute appropriateness. Social sciences, they argue, should be applied to questions of: "(1) self-reliance, (2) needs responsiveness, (3) cultural compatibility, (4) institutional feasibility, (5) economic suitability, (6) political practicality". Such a proposal is compatible with our view that an essential task of the social sciences is to remind governments and administrators of basic human needs and wants, and of the many ways in which these needs and wants can be neglected or prejudiced.

One approach to the question: "What are basic human needs?", is to consider the domain of social psychology. Let us look at Moscovici.<sup>7</sup> He and his school consider their field under three broad headings: first, the nature, formation and change of attitudes. This includes the central topics of conformity and obedience, innovation and the influence of minorities, the changing of attitudes, and continuity and change in behaviour and experience. Second, the interactions between members of groups, and between groups — how are group decisions made? How are novel, creative decisions made? Third, thought and social life, possibly the most crucial section, includes such essential questions as the following. How do we think in everyday life? How are events explained? To what causes are events attributed? What is the community's collective view of reality? How does it interpret such social pheno-

mena as health and illness, childhood, occupations? How are classes of people perceived? How are language, thought and communication related?

Moscovici's domain is largely cognitive and offers an over-intellectualized view of human needs and activities. It also omits another aspect of human needs, made familiar by psychoanalysis. This embraces the quality of relationships between men and women, between members of different generations, and within generations — a vast disturbing field in which love, sex and aggression are fundamental and not to be ignored.

Looking further at Moghaddam and Taylor's criteria: "self-reliance" refers to a country's confidence in using its own resources — not "isolationist", but establishing "a genuine exchange between equals" when dealing outside that society. A major psychological and sociological problem touched on here is that of attitudes shifting from narrow, sectional, chauvinistic loyalties towards an orientation that embraces wider circles of meaningful contact, both within Africa and beyond.

Another criterion depending upon a changing psychology is "political practicability": how feasible is it to implement (policy) given the political limitations existing? The psychological and social factors that inhibit (or encourage) continuity (or change) modify, or are modified by, ruling policies, *whether this is taken into account or not*. People resist changes or accept them; they weave them into the fabric of society; or that fabric is, itself, newly re-woven. A major problem in Africa has been the almost total indifference by governments and administrators to the *socio-psychological* consequences, and so feasibility, of their policies.

Social scientists should be (are!) well-placed to evaluate the extent and nature of the harm or good that policies and programmes may or might do to those directly and indirectly affected by them. We must remember that administrators, and governments themselves, may on occasion pay the price for creating economic, political and social instability through their policies. It is arguable that sensitivity to people's needs and wants might have saved more than one deposed African head of state and government. Moving in this direction, moving boldly beyond their classical positivist, hypothesis-testing and fact-finding roles, social scientists would cease responding to the question: "Professional independence — good or bad?". They would be responding to a more difficult question: "Professional independence — what price do we pay through selling it to governments by tacitly refraining from looking into what policies mean to the people; into how they feel about them; and how people (and government) might respond to the damage done by such policies?" Interestingly, Berry and Lonner<sup>8</sup> in-

clude papers that discuss social problems as perceived both by administrators and by "those administered". But asking opinions of the administered challenges the nervous arrogance of those who know best and who readily assume the mantle of authoritarian infallibility in societies where most people are politically ill-educated in the values, attitudes and practices of participatory democracy. Moreover, to pose such a challenge — however tactfully presented — raises the disturbing question of the social psychology of political failure in Africa. Broadly, this failure is closely related to the authoritarian conservatism of many social institutions and groups, so that criticizing authority is emotionally equivalent to criticizing the elders or the father, and, by an easy and natural extension, is equivalent to opposing the long-established mores of the family. Socialization within the family — political or not — is rarely of a sort to encourage participatory democracy that includes both sexes and all age grades. An imposed loyalty to the father and the group exposes the entire group to considerable emotional distress and confusion if the father fails. If sibling rivalry becomes uncontrollable, again the most bitter strife results.

In evaluating the effectiveness of policy it is not too difficult to devise criteria that are rational in administrators' eyes. It is far more difficult to devise criteria that are psychologically better founded. "Effective" must lead on naturally to: "Desirable for whom? With what positive and negative consequences for the people affected? With what consequences for social and psychological cohesion, stability and happiness?"

## How are the social science professions to be regulated?

It is a near truism that the applied social sciences are as exposed to bias and professional opportunism as are most other human activities. Yet the need for collective self-scrutiny by the profession is far from widely accepted. An example: two recent discussions of applied social sciences, by Argyle and Cherns, fail even to mention the problems of professional self-examination, self-regulation and integrity.<sup>9</sup> The scrutiny we are pleading for is of two kinds. Its first object may be the status of the profession in a society at a given time. The second object of such scrutiny may be the biases and opportunism of a profession in relation to its institutional masters. At its most blatant, social science research and its implications for policy may be little more than sophisticated justification of the political status quo and current ideology — either because the profession tacitly accepts its privileged position in that society, or because it is more or less openly dancing to the tune played by its masters.

In Africa (even more than elsewhere) there are too few social scientists committed to studying the application of social theories to everyday problems. Yet these problems proliferate, and social scientists may be tempted to go beyond their narrower competencies. They are thus exposed to the impatient disenchantment of their society, or altogether rejected by society as a whole when it is found that they may be very little wiser than the current administrators of the land. The profession may then attempt to assuage a collective sense of guilt by justifying its methods and principles, pleading for more resources for better research. But if it is given more resources, government control and scrutiny will be more intense, independence more difficult to achieve, and the profession will become even more weak and ineffective. Already within the profession, strain and conflict is growing: some practitioners maintain detachment as the ideal, others advocate open political commitment to the situation as they find it. So, either an overly sanguine profession may claim that it has solutions to all society's ills, or it may grow so modest about its competence that it leads government to doubt whether it is competent to advise on anything at all.

Applied research, or research-in-action, competes for resources with fundamental research; and to the extent that the former is favoured and laid down by governments, the social sciences become increasingly unsuited to explore the broader implications of research or generate debate about the nature and functions of their discipline. Moghadam and Taylor<sup>10</sup> refer to the "question of how feasible it is to implement a given type of (social science) . . . given the political limitations existing in a country". Feasibility is likely to be differently perceived by government and social scientists. One of the most delicate tasks of the latter may be to educate government to be more sensitive to what it is possible for the social scientist to do, both *qua* detached scientist and committed citizen.

Africa's many urgent and compelling social problems press social scientists and governments to waive fundamental research. Instead, social scientists are driven to seize any opportunities to fund applied research, hoping that more basic or theoretical research and debate may become possible when times are more propitious. There is no certainty that this will occur. Meanwhile, the laity may become more familiar with the scope and limitations of social science research; but even this will not occur unless social scientists are more active in entering into dialogue with administration. Professional social scientists in Africa have been less than active in using the prestige and influence or regional and international bodies to educate their governments. Instead, too often, an opening address by a Minister is followed by governmental silence or, at best,

by little or no lessening in chauvinism and ideological suspicion of the profession.

Mace,<sup>11</sup> discussing psychology, held the view that psychologists, "unlike most other scientists, cannot maintain, even professionally, a state of complete political neutrality". They cannot, therefore, ignore the latest political implications of their work. Mace's statement applies to all social scientists. Let us illustrate by listing seven of the major social problems affecting Africa: the influence on traditional values, beliefs, ideologies, information and skills of values originating outside Africa; the creation of wider, national, regional and Pan-African loyalties, and identification in communities with intense local loyalties; communication in societies that are multilingual, multicultural and composed of few educated and many uneducated people; migration from rural to urban areas, resulting in grave distortion of traditional economic, social and political organizations; the creation of academic, vocational and professional education, suited to a rapidly changing Africa; the selection and training of workers in new occupations, trades and industries, including neglected and inappropriately skilled women; and, the development of workable economic, social and political organizations and institutions.

These seven issues encompass innumerable theoretical and empirical questions that have barely been touched. It is, however, difficult to imagine a satisfactory report on any aspect of any one of these issues which does not establish or imply a preferred, favoured position from which policies might be elicited. Yet there are few indications of an emerging, indigenous social science in Africa, the concerns and questions of which differ significantly from those we have noted, rooted in all of which are Western assumptions and values.

Bruckner, however, in his disturbing book: *Le sanglot de l'homme blanc: Tiers Monde, culpabilité, haine de soi*,<sup>12</sup> cautions against assuming that different cultural and social patterns are *lived* by different types of human beings. He warns:

Take care: running through this contemporary term, "Third World", is a symbolic conflict in issue: that of the psychological space that we reserve in the future for non-European people. To speak of the Third World as though it were a hospice, is to shrink the psychological horizons of our contemporaries. It disqualifies four billion human beings as a future generation.

It is sociologically and psychologically meaningful to contrast two major divisions of mankind: the Western — industrialized and rich, and the Third World — rural and poor. But it is sociological and psychological nonsense to treat these divisions as immutable. It is methodological nonsense if the social sciences in Africa fail to borrow, from the universal body of social science methods, principles and findings, whatever may be

relevant to understanding universal problems of change and conflict.

## Africa's unique problems?

The previous reflections apply to both the more- and the less-technologically advanced societies, and the problems of the non-African social scientist are shared by his African brethren. Nevertheless, there are problems that are especially acute in Africa — and, perhaps, in other parts of the Third World.

Probably the gravest problem experienced by social scientists in Africa is the ignorance and suspicion among both administrators and the general public of the role and function of the social sciences together with their responsibility to society. Professional detachment is often misinterpreted to mean indifference to social problems. Social scientists are seen as civil servants, and loyalty rather than "to speak truth to power"<sup>13</sup> their principal duty. Caplan *et al*<sup>14</sup> studied how social science knowledge was used in the USA, and found that senior executives ranked the contributions of the social sciences in the following descending order of importance: (1) "Sensitizing policy-makers to social needs"; (2) "Evaluation of ongoing programmes"; (3) "Structuring alternative policies"; (4) "Implementing programmes;" (5) "Justifying policy decisions;" and (6) "Providing a basis for choosing among policy alternatives". The effectiveness of all these contributions depends, of course, upon power's readiness to listen to and act upon truth. It further depends upon truth's care to avoid speaking too softly, too obscurely and too hesitantly.

But professional independence and outspokenness are practicable only where political and social structures and ideologies permit. Or where, at the least, the growth of organizations and discussion of ideologies that challenge the status quo are tolerated. In Africa, socio-political structures, whether traditional or modern, do not readily accommodate the more-or-less encapsulated, self-regulating professions to which Western societies are accustomed. Such independent organizations are essential if development is to succeed. They are, however, experienced as emotionally intolerable in societies where social and political life are intimately and closely regulated, and often subordinate to the demands of family, kin and region. Deviant organizations, like deviant individuals, are only with difficulty tolerated until roles are evolved for them. Further, professionals have their own conflicting emotional loyalties, for they too are tied into the family, kinship, ethnic or even linguistic group. They, too, are pressured to use their skills and influence to benefit those individuals and groups to whom they have a

special social obligation extending beyond the professional. It seems that professional independence will thus remain vulnerable until societies develop in which social mobility is common.

Note a further danger: if the profession attempts to distance itself from control through administration, it is all too often accused of creating a professional mystique and an unjustifiable and privileged position.

The profession is exposed to the accusations outlined above in both socialist and capitalist countries. In capitalist countries, the profession may be unable to avoid association with elitism in an inegalitarian and hierarchic social system. Equally, there exist in socialist countries established elites, with which the profession may be driven to associate itself in order to extend its political influence, and thus its independence.

## Problems of detachment

Two policies have commonly been adopted to escape accusations of elitism and increase independence of political influence:

- the standards of entry to the various professions may be modified in order to encourage more entrants drawn from a wider base;

- the professions may intentionally seek to be involved in debates on policy and in decision-making. In Africa, the medical profession has struggled to avoid diluting its standards of entry, though it is doubtful if it has succeeded anywhere as far as it would wish. Lawyers, on the other hand, have almost traditionally become closely linked with the political and administrative establishment, often proving little more than time-servers to political extremes of "Left" or "Right".

The professions may in fact become conservative pressure groups of the "Left" or the "Right", and their declarations of professional neutrality may be no more than rationalizations, concealing partisan support for an ideological position, or allegiance to a power-elite.<sup>15</sup> Thus, do a close attachment to the government of the moment and a sensitivity to ideological whims drive the social scientist further and yet still further from being able to offer expert and independent advice? The politically unacceptable truth will not be told. The harmful consequences of policy will be concealed.

The predicament of the social sciences is therefore threefold. How can a balance be created and held between: a professional contribution to understanding and solving social problems; professional integrity and a high standard of expertise; and the open accessibility of the skills and findings of the social sciences to all those concerned with them — both policymakers and those affected by those policies?

The balance between these three ele-

ments will necessarily be unstable; but it may be less so if governments become more confident that detached, professional criticism does not necessarily conceal political ill-will or latent opposition.

Bitensky<sup>16</sup> has analysed (pessimistically) the frequent failure of social scientists to apply their skills, arguing that the fundamental reason for this failure is that they are so nervous of political risk that they retreat into "a state of aimless methodologism". Cuff and Payne<sup>17</sup> tackle this nervousness head-on. They assert boldly that there is no choice for social scientists who seek to do something about social problems. They cannot avoid operating "as social reformers, as politicians, or as citizens". But the political risks in Africa are great, not because of the power of governments but because of their underlying weakness. There are thus double dangers for social scientists: they put themselves at risk both when they educate their masters *and* when they comment upon policy.

Becker<sup>18</sup> has warned social scientists that whatever they may do, or refrain from doing, a question they must always pose to themselves is: "Whose side are we on?" We well know that all social scientists favour certain groups and ideologies and disfavour others. But they are more likely to gain and retain their independence by demonstrating their allegiance to a scientific approach to social problems, and by a refusal supinely to succumb to the pressures and constraints of government and administration. So "Whose side are we on?" In the long run the answer has to be: on the side of the people who will still be in need of the social sciences when today's brief government is gone and forgotten. Social scientists have a duty to maintain, openly or covertly, the fundamentally subversive and essentially political activity of providing sign-posts to the way, or ways, ahead through the quicksands of political fears, bigotry and ideological euphoria.

Does the international recognition of a professional organization protect its independence? Conflicts of two sorts may arise between the international professional network and national, political considerations.

First, the internationally acceptable level of professional training and practice may be politically acceptable: governments have insisted on the lowering of professional standards in order to raise the numbers of professionals. Professionals have, moreover, been forced to participate in ethically objectionable practices. Lawyers as an instance, have drafted and administered unjust and repressive laws. Writers have lied persuasively for their governments. Social scientists have collaborated in the planning of mass-movements of population. Yet there is much to enter on the other side of the ledger: often, social scientists have actively opposed tyranny, criticized government folly and inefficiency, and proposed notions of an

alternative society not, we may add, as a result of the direct and open collective decision of a profession, but from the convictions of individual members or minority groups, indirectly supported by the profession's collective (if sometimes tarnished) standards.

Second, professional associations have been tempted to seek political advantage by adopting ritual "anti-expatriate", "anti-white", "anti-foreign" or "ethnic" prejudices. Rational policies of recruitment, training, teaching and research are thus subordinated to the irrationalities of some current political ideology and prejudice.

However, the position of the social science associations within an international system, sharing international values and a sense of the commonality of human social problems, may yet demonstrate that the problems of society are solved by neither supporting the status quo, nor by encouraging a revolutionary itch to build society *de novo*.

## Africa needs the social sciences

It is arguable that less-industrialized societies, as in Africa, have an even greater need of independent social scientists than more "developed" societies, for in our rapidly changing continent there are desperately urgent economic, political and social problems that governments cannot even begin to solve without adequate statistics and policy analysis.

Consider some of Africa's major social and psychological problems. Rural communities are becoming more urbanized (their countryside depopulated), while growing urban communities face problems of a magnitude unknown since the urban revolution in early nineteenth century Britain. Societies with political organizations that evolved for small-scale and localized communities are compelled to invent, reject and again invent new forms of political and social organization competent to deal with large-scale economic and social problems. Fragments of polity have to devise means to adapt to nationwide, even continent-wide, politics. The problems of ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological conflict have not been solved any more in Africa than in Europe, and their consequences have been, and are, no less tragic.

The emergence of wider bases for "identity" have yet to be solved. The growing alienation of individuals from groups, arising from the depersonalization attending changes in economic, political and social organization, is destroying the once strong African collective ethos. Associated with such alienation is the growth of "learned helplessness",<sup>19</sup> the conviction that efforts to control one's life are in vain. Africa has had too few experiences of success from its own



efforts, and has been taught a depressing sense of failure by the constant over-emphasis of the material strengths and power of the West. This learned helplessness has been caused, in part, by the failure of education to encourage the cognitive skills required for success in a changing economy and society; and it has been exacerbated by the persistence of relationships of authority which inhibit young people, women of all ages, and those of lower status from acquiring independence, expressing divergent and unorthodox opinions, and enjoying the exhilaration of open minds in open societies. Political and social indoctrination is both common, widespread and suffocating.

Governments cannot, of course, be uniquely blamed for these problems. They can be, perhaps, legitimately criticized for failing to uncover the true range of skills and talent in their population, women and men alike, and in all the ethnic, linguistically different and religious groups whom they govern; and for equal failures in education, training and employment. The constant threat of crisis and administrative breakdown that haunts many African states is largely the result of the failure of governments to provide opportunities for knowledge and skills to be acquired and applied, even where they oppose the current wisdom. Jaques<sup>20</sup>, in a study of the unconscious, psychological origins of social rigidity, has shown how "effective social change is likely to require analysis of the common anxieties and unconscious collusions underlying the social defences determining phantasy social relationships". In particular, Jaques finds it emotionally less anxiety-provoking to search for collective scapegoats and assign them the blame for social problems, than to put faith in social scientists and their consideration of the realities on which problems are based: the more so since these are all too often unacceptable to those listening.

To conclude: administrations tend to be nervously obsessed with detailed rules and procedures, rigid and oppressive. They are, above all, disinclined to self-analysis and self-appraisal. How unlikely will they then be

to call upon the social sciences to assist in those necessary and anxiety-provoking, yet ultimately liberating, areas!

There are two fundamental socio-political problems in which the international community of social scientists could assist governments without the latter's admitting failure. First, to anticipate and monitor the social and psychological tensions and conflicts that accompany change and growth in organizations, cultures and values. (Conversely, successful change might be monitored and the lessons learned from it shared with other communities.) Second, to develop new and more effective forms (and new organizations) of social and political participation; to encourage the evolution of communities away from authoritarian structures and values; and to direct them towards a respect for the individual and for minority, unpopular groups, a respect for which few contemporary states display much concern.

## Conclusion

Even if these contributions are rejected by government, there remain educational functions for the social sciences. They can most certainly encourage administrations to accept the relevance of the human aspects of those technological and administrative techniques that are known to direct and facilitate economic, social and political change. And the social sciences can provide leadership in educating people at all levels of authority to respect the value of a "Fourth Estate" of social scientists, free from political pressures, advocating rational ways of making sense of society, and liberating Africa from ignorance, disease, poverty and conflict.

## References

- 1 A H Mehryar, "The role of psychology in national development: Wishful thinking and reality", *International Journal of Psychology*, vol 19, 1984.
- 2 L Bloom and H I Amatu, "Nigeria: Aggression, a psychoethnography", in A P Goldstein and M H Segall (eds), *Aggression in global perspective*, New York: Pergamon, 1983.

- 3 V C Uchendu, "The cultural roots of aggressive behaviour in modern African politics", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol XII, 1977.
- 4 T F Marshall *et al*, *Evaluation for democracy*, London: Home Office Research Unit, 1978.
- 5 M Rein, *Social science and social policy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.
- 6 J Tizard, "Psychology and social policy", *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, vol 29, 1976.
- 7 A H Mehryar, *op cit*.
- 8 F M Moghaddam and D M Taylor, "The state of psychology in the Third World: A response to Connolly", *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, vol 39, 1986.
- 9 S Moscovici (ed), *Psychologie sociale*, Paris: PUF, 1984.
- 10 J W Berry and W J Lonner (eds), *Applied cross-cultural psychology*, Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitinger, 1975.
- 11 M Argyle, "The development of applied social psychology", in R Gilmour and S Duck (eds), *The development of social psychology*, London: Academic Press, 1980.
- 12 A Cherus, *Using the social sciences*, London: Routledge, 1979.
- 13 F M Moghaddam and D M Taylor, *op cit*.
- 14 C A Mace, "Democracy as a problem in social psychology", in C A Mace, *Selected papers*, London: Methuen, 1973.
- 15 P Bruckner, *Le sanglot de l'homme blanc: Tiers-monde, culpabilité haine de soi*, Paris: Editions du Senil, 1983.
- 16 A Wildavsky, *Speaking truth to power: The art and craft of policy analysis*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
- 17 N Caplan *et al*, *The use of social science knowledge in policy decisions at the national level: A report to respondents*, Ann Arbor: Institute for Soviet Research, University of Michigan, 1975.
- 18 I L Horowitz, *The new sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- 19 R Bitensky, "The conscience of the social scientist", *New Universities Quarterly*, vol 30, 1976.
- 20 E C Cuff and G C F Payne, *Perspectives in sociology*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1984.
- 21 H S Becker, "Whose side are we on?", in *Social Problems*, vol 14, 1967.
- 22 M E P Seligman, *Helplessness: On depression, development and death*, San Francisco, Freenan, 1975.
- 23 E Jaques, "Social systems as a defence against persecutory and depressive anxiety", in M Klein *et al* (eds), *New directions in psychoanalysis*, London: Tavistock, 1955.

# Agriculture in two Chinas: Lessons for Southern Africa

*Professor T J Bembridge, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Fort Hare, Alice, Ciskei was Visiting Research Professor at the National Taiwan University in 1983. He visited Communist China and Taiwan in 1983 and again in 1987 and in this article he briefly outlines the fundamentally different agricultural development strategies adopted in the People's Republic of China and in Taiwan, Republic of China, with the object of highlighting lessons which can be learned or adapted in the developing areas of Southern Africa.*

## Agriculture in the People's Republic of China (PRC)

Agriculture remains the sustaining core for the bulk of mainland China's one billion people. The population density is 105 people per km<sup>2</sup>. Each farming family has less than 1 hectare, and there is less than 0,1 hectare of arable land per person.<sup>1</sup> Some 70 per cent of China's population continue to produce basic grain and other food for local consumption. Over the past 35 years, self-sufficiency in foodstuffs has been a basic tenet of China's economic outlook. From a relatively poor basis in 1949 when the PRC was founded, the achievements of the nation in agricultural production have been remarkable.

Until the 19th century, agriculture was the sole industry of China. As in the developing areas of Southern Africa, the farm economy was rooted in a family division of labour, with men doing the ploughing and women the weaving. Under the traditional Chinese farming system the farmer cultivated his own plot, made fertilizer with pig and human manure, and sold his produce to the nearby market.

A self-sufficient rural society was based on commodity exchange between rural villages and market towns, with farmers producing a few commodities and trading them for others. In those days agricultural production reached a position of equilibrium and then stagnated until the economic conditions in that society changed. Without the aid of modern science, there was little innovation and farm production remained static but stable for a long period.

For almost 100 years after the Opium War of 1842, China's inability to cope with foreign invaders and avoid civil war was a direct result of difficulties in solving her agricultural problems. The constraints at that time were, firstly, the small-scale family farms which constituted an obstacle to agricultural modernization; secondly, a poor rural environment which lacked institutional support and incentives for production; thirdly, lack of modern technology, and finally, shortage of modern farming inputs. By the end of the Chung dynasty in 1911 these problems still remained unsolved.<sup>2</sup>

Following the revolution of 1911 a republic was established under the leadership of Dr Sun Yat Sen. During the period 1911–1928 the government was unable to control the country effectively. It was only after Sun Yat Sen's death in 1925, when Gen Chiang Kai Shek took over as leader that there was some degree of national unification. Until the Japanese invasion in 1937, there was a period of agricultural expansion through the improvement of traditional farming systems which resulted in a considerable increase in grain yields. It was during this period that improved varieties, the use of chemical fertilizer, insect and disease control measures, and improved irrigation technology were introduced. Agricultural experimental stations were established, and marketing introduced through the National Agricultural Research Institute in co-operation with other institutions.

With the Japanese invasion of 1937 and the subsequent occupation until 1945, the national economy deteriorated and agricultural production dropped to about two-

thirds of the pre-1937 level. In 1949 the Chinese Communists occupied the Chinese mainland and Gen Chiang Kai Shek and his government and advisors fled to Taiwan.

The recent development of agriculture in the PRC can be subdivided roughly into three stages (Figure 1): 1949–1957, a period of general progress in development; 1958–1977, when agricultural production slowed down due to political upheaval, and after 1978 with the introduction of the agricultural production responsibility system.

Communist China began its agricultural development with a land reform and a land-to-the-tiller programme. This involved the creation of 80–100 million peasant smallholder households on a total area of 45 million hectares of redistributed land (45 per cent of total arable land).

During the first four years the government concentrated on the socialization of agriculture and by 1952 agricultural production again reached the pre-1937 level. From 1950 to 1953 grain production increased by 6 per cent per annum simply because of land reform and the mobilization of small-farmer initiative. In the early years of communist rule, however, agricultural production was not given high priority. In 1953 the government started its first five-year plan and transformed the agricultural structure by creating people's communes, providing labour intensive inputs, as well as improving irrigation and drainage. During this period farmers were still allowed to keep a plot of land for private use. This resulted in a 3,8 per cent increase in production for the period 1953–1958 (Figure 1).

In 1958 people's communes first appear-




Fig 1 Population and agricultural production trends in the People's Republic of China, 1952–1981

Source: H Chen, *op cit*

red. By the end of 1958 more than 26 000 communes embraced practically the entire rural population. Financial management, marketing, retailing, the co-ordination of production, control of water, health services and agricultural extension were handled by the commune. Small water conservation projects and primary education were run by the brigade. The production teams, which were the basic production units, owned and controlled the means of production.

In 1958 "The Great Leap Forward" movement took place with its slogan of doing everything bigger, quicker, better and cheaper.<sup>3</sup> Government policy concentrated on industry to the neglect of agriculture. This, combined with the fact that farmers had no incentives, led to a decline in growth over the period 1958–1961 (Figure 1). Industry which had to depend on agriculture for support now encountered serious difficulties.<sup>4</sup>

The Great Cultural Revolution launched in 1966 interfered with agricultural production, which now entered a period of stagnation until 1969. Only after 1970 did production begin to increase again. Figure 1 shows that, except for periods of intense political struggle, agricultural production has grown faster than the population. This steady growth in production can be attributed to improvements in management, adapted tech-

nology, and the supply of modern inputs.<sup>5</sup> Improvements in irrigation and drainage, increased use of fertilizer (Figure 2) and farm machinery have also played a role in increasing agricultural production. However, up to 1977 the income of the average rural family increased only slightly.

By 1977 there were five million village-level production teams in China with an average of 30 to 40 families, or about 150 to 200 people, farming anything from 15–100 acres. A brigade normally has about 450 households, or 2 000 people. There are 50 000 communes, with an average of 16 000 members, though the size varies according to the agro-ecology. The commune centre is normally situated in the old market town.

Prior to 1978, members of a production team shared in the net output or income of their unit on the basis of workpoints. Much of the production activity was under centralized unit control. The assignment of workpoints often did not reflect differences in work intensity or skill. Resulting incomes were relatively equal within each unit, but differed considerably from one unit to another, depending on the agro-ecological area, quality of management and availability of inputs.<sup>6</sup>

From 1962 onwards political leaders be-

gan to recognize that agriculture was the foundation of the economy. However, it was not until 1978 that a liberal new reform programme to boost agricultural production was introduced; this marked a turning point in Chinese agriculture. The new reforms were based chiefly on more incentives for farmers and less intervention by planners, and some changes from the bottom up rather than from the top down.<sup>7</sup> Major changes were:

- A 25 to 40 per cent increase in farm produce prices in 1979.
- Alteration of prices of various farm commodities to encourage regional crop specialization aimed at increasing overall production efficiency.
- Relaxation of prohibitions on grain sales in rural markets. Peasants were allowed to keep whatever they produced above a fixed quota which had to be delivered to the state, and to sell the surplus at a premium price for their own benefit.
- Management and organizational changes which by 1983 permitted about 95 per cent of farm households to manage their own plots under contract from collectives, if not formal ownership. Individual ownership of buildings, live-stock and farming equipment is permitted.<sup>87</sup>




Fig 2 Grain production and fertilizer consumption in the People's Republic of China, 1952–1984  
Source: International Fertilizer Correspondent, vol 27, no 2, 1986

New land reforms, which allowed some subletting and guarantees of permanent tenancy in terms of land management for 15 years. Some new provincial laws allowed for the handing down of farms from parents to children.

A closely associated rural policy involves encouragement of "specialized households", many involving non-farming activities. These include handicraft production, local industry, transport and marketing services, and rural construction work.<sup>9</sup>

### Progress in agriculture

Grain output in the PRC has more than doubled over the past 35 years. The national mean yield of grain production has increased from 1 320 kg per hectare in 1952 to 3 396 kg per hectare in 1983.<sup>10</sup> The percentage arable area irrigated increased from 18,5 per cent in 1952 to 45,1 per cent in 1983. The total arable area over the 31 year period decreased by 8 per cent. The population grew at an average rate of 1,9 per cent from 1952 to 1983, well below the comparable growth rates of 2,8 per cent for grain output and 4,0 per cent for gross value of agricultural output.<sup>11</sup>

Increased decentralization in agricultural planning and control coupled with price incentives for cash-crop production has resul-

ted in a decline in the area under grain from 121 million hectare in 1952 to 114 million hectare in 1983, whereas the area under cotton and oilseeds increased by 35 and 19 per cent respectively over the same period.<sup>12</sup> Thirty-five per cent of family income is still derived from sideline home enterprises such as fishing and raising pigs and rabbits.<sup>13</sup>

### Technology

Chinese farmers have a long history in the effective use of organic manure to build up and maintain soil fertility. The close link between crops and animals characterizes the Chinese approach to animal husbandry. In crop-growing areas pig production is the main animal husbandry activity and it is estimated that a pig provides 2,5 tons of droppings per annum. In the pastoral zones sheep and goats are of great economic importance. Poultry, beekeeping and rabbit raising constitute sideline activities.

There are very few tractors in Communist China and most of the ploughing is done by the water buffalo. This agriculture is very labour-intensive. Chinese experience shows that technology is "appropriate" for various classes of farmers. Technology is a highly specific function of a complex set of variables: time, location, local resources, existing manpower, current crop patterns, farming systems and effective and guaranteed

marketing systems. The PRC's experience suggests a mix of three approaches to technological development:

- The first approach applies to the vast mass of traditional subsistence farmers. It is based on improving and mobilizing existing traditional techniques, inputs, labour organization and tools.
- A second approach is applied to farmers who show signs of readiness and capacity to absorb new agricultural technology.
- The third approach takes a realistic view of the fact that there is a small class of progressive farmers who could, and do, make use of modern technology.

In the second phase of the new reforms, emphasis is now placed on scientific farming and the application of bio-technology. One of the main areas of research is to develop disease resistant, high-yielding varieties of grain which could cut down on the costs of expensive inputs such as pesticides and chemical fertilizers.<sup>14</sup>

### Social development in rural areas

There is certainly not a uniform countryside in rural mainland China, rather a patchwork in which emerging prosperity is to be found alongside subsistence farming. There is no doubt that the policy of individual initiative, incentives and responsibility is working well.<sup>15</sup> Although prior to 1978 income distribution was similar in most households, in the post-1978 period, the income gap among households has become more pronounced.<sup>16</sup> Rural incomes have increased in relation to urban incomes and the majority of households (70 per cent) are better off than in 1978. Evidence shows that the average per capita net income in agriculture increased by 19 per cent per year between 1978 and 1982.<sup>17</sup>

For the first time peasants are buying clothing, bicycles, and opening savings accounts.<sup>18</sup> Today 60 per cent have access to television and 66 per cent to radio. Colour TV sets, refrigerators and washing machines have become status symbols amongst peasant families. While many residents of the rural areas are poor by Western standards, they are reasonably well housed, fed and clothed compared to many countries in Africa, including the developing areas of Southern Africa. Whatever its shortcomings, the collective system has contributed to a tremendous development in rural infrastructure.

The Communists have established a widespread network of schools, clinics, roads and other infrastructure in the rural areas, paid for largely by the teams and brigades themselves. Although education levels continue to improve, only about one in 160 000 peasants has a college-level education.<sup>19</sup> The average life expectancy has risen from 20–25 years before 1949 to 64 years in the 1970s.<sup>20</sup> Infant mortality has,

over the same period, decreased from 200 deaths per 1 000 to 35–40 per 1 000.<sup>21</sup> The government of the PRC now insists that every family has no more than one child, except in special cases; penalties for transgression are severe. While such a birth control programme is necessary and commendable, its rigidity will probably result in social problems in the long term.

China's rural institutions have been reorganized to provide a more suitable framework for the implementation of the new agricultural policy. The essence of the change is that the leaders of the production team are no longer the managers of the farm, but instead act as a contracting body to ensure the fulfillment of agricultural plans by peasant producers.<sup>22</sup> One of the most important changes has been the handing back of state-run supply and marketing cooperatives to the peasants.

Another important change taking place in Communist China as a result of the full application of the responsibility system, is the growing division of labour in the village between those who want to farm and those who prefer other occupations.

## Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC)

By 1952 both the PRC and the ROC had recovered from the ravages of war. Even though cultural and social traditions, particularly as regards small-farm farming systems, are similar, Communist China and the ROC have followed different strategies and directions, and the results of agricultural development have been markedly different over the past four decades.

In mainland China, greater attention was paid in earlier years to industrial development. Agricultural development was only given emphasis after the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960). In contrast, the ROC placed the initial emphasis on agricultural development which supplied capital for later industrial development.

Between 1952 and 1978 agricultural production recorded an annual growth rate of 3.46 per cent in the ROC compared to 2.36 per cent in mainland China.<sup>23</sup> As can be seen from Figures 1 and 3 agricultural growth in Communist China barely kept pace with population growth, whereas in Taiwan it considerably outstripped population growth.

The differences in growth were due largely to institutional support, technology development and the use of modern inputs, such as seed, fertilizer, insecticides, machinery and buildings. For example, in the ROC the use of fertilizer per hectare increased from 62 kg in 1946 to 970 kg in 1981. In mainland China, fertilizer application increased from 0.6 kg per hectare in 1952 to 115 kg in 1983.<sup>24</sup>

Between 1952 and 1981 rice yields per




Fig 3 Trends in agricultural production and population growth in the Republic of China, 1952–1981

Source: H Chen, *op cit*

hectare increased by 78 per cent, wheat by 133 per cent, soya beans by 156 per cent and groundnuts by 90 per cent. Horticultural crops such as bananas (215 per cent), pine-apples (160 per cent), water-melons (108 per cent) and citrus (90 per cent) also increased phenomenally.<sup>25</sup>

### Labour and land productivity in the PRC and the ROC

Labour and capital, in combination with land, are two major factors in agricultural production which mutually interact in substitution for each other in the process of agricultural development. Labour productivity is widely believed to be a major determinant of farm income and is frequently used as a measure of economic progress.

Prior to 1978 Communist China was in a situation when agricultural growth barely surpassed population growth (Figure 1). Owing to the collective system and popula-

tion growth, labour productivity did not greatly improve between 1952 and 1977.<sup>26</sup> Since the reforms of 1978, labour productivity has increased at a greater rate (Figure 4), but land productivity expanded much more rapidly (8 per cent) than labour productivity (4.9 per cent) over the five-year period up to 1982.<sup>27</sup> Because of the decreasing land-labour ratio, labour productivity growth was explained by the growth in land productivity.<sup>28</sup>

As shown in Figure 4 the index of land productivity in the ROC increased from 100 in 1952 to over 217 in 1981, while in mainland China it only increased to 171. During the same period labour productivity in the ROC increased from 100 in 1952 to 211, compared to 118 in Communist China (Figure 4). Technological improvement was thus far greater in the ROC.<sup>29</sup> Agricultural development in Taiwan has been characterized by increases in labour together with capital ex-




Fig 4 Growth of land and labour productivity in the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, 1952–1981  
Source: H Chen, *op cit*

penditure in order to raise both land and labour productivity.

### Technology

In general, technological development in the ROC can be divided into two stages in terms of investment policy. From 1952 the emphasis was on food production to meet domestic needs due to the influx of people from Communist China to the island. This policy target was soon realized with the aid of technology aimed at increasing yields. At this stage labour was abundant and cheap but development capital scarce.<sup>30</sup>

From 1966 rapid growth occurred in the industrial sector, which led to competition for labour and a great change in the structure of the ROC's economy, which posed new problems for agriculture. Agriculture has moved from the traditional labour-intensive technology still practised in Communist China, towards labour-saving, capital-intensive agriculture.

While many factors have contributed to the phenomenal success of the ROC's agriculture, technology — supported by strong farmers' organizations and extension programmes — has played a particularly important role. Technological development has

been the prime mover of Taiwan's agricultural development.<sup>31</sup>

The most important technological development up to 1966 was the introduction of new plant varieties and improved breeds of livestock. These included improved short-season varieties of rice which enabled the growing of three to four crops a year, maize, sorghum, sugar cane, potatoes and sweet potatoes. Horticultural crops such as seedless water-melons, new varieties of mangoes, grapes, pears, apples, asparagus and mushrooms were also developed. Crops are rotated in a multiple cropping pattern. Equally spectacular technological progress has been made in animal husbandry, especially in pig, poultry and fish production.

In the second phase of agricultural development from 1966 onwards, the emphasis was more on high return cash crops and mechanization, and improvement of irrigation technology. For example, because of the competition for labour from industry, the number of power tillers in the ROC increased from 3 239 in 1960 to over 93 000 in 1981. In contrast, mechanization in mainland China has been slow because of the need for labour-intensive technology. To sum up, technological progress in the ROC has been phenomenal.

### Institutional reform

It is well known that the land reform programme in the ROC has had a significant effect on its agricultural development. This involved the transfer of land ownership from landholders to tenants. Because of a manpower shortage, more recently there has been a move towards joint farming operations, as well as farm management by groups of farmers to enable them to realize economies of scale in production and marketing, through the co-operative use of farm inputs and the range of farm products, without altering land ownership.<sup>32</sup> There has also been a programme of land consolidation to assist mechanization.

An important factor contributing to the growth of the agricultural industry in the ROC is the fact that since 1953 the country has had a series of four-year economic development plans for the balanced development of the economy as a whole. Planners have been successful in designing policies and techniques for boosting agricultural production. Of fundamental importance was the establishment of an agricultural planning and co-ordination agency responsible directly to cabinet, with the function of advising the government on agricultural organization and agricultural development policy. A Bureau of Agriculture which employs professional staff in all fields of agriculture is entrusted with administrative policy in agricultural production.<sup>33</sup>

Agricultural research in the ROC is dynamic, well-planned, well-managed and co-ordinated. Currently there are some 43 institutions employing 1 564 professionally trained scientists. Extension work is carried out by commodity organizations such as the sugar co-operative and fruit co-operative, as well as by commercial firms. However, most of the extension work is carried out by extension workers employed by township farmers' organizations. They have specialist back-up from the Bureau of Agriculture and from research stations. The emphasis is on a whole farm approach, embracing adult education among farmers, farm women and the youth.<sup>34</sup>

Of key importance to the success of the ROC's agriculture is the Farmers' Association movement which is a federated system of multi-purpose co-operative organizations formed by *bona fide* members, at county, township and village level. Their objectives include increasing farm production and income, promotion of farmers' welfare, improvement of knowledge and skills, improvement of rural living conditions and the general improvement of the rural economy. The movement provides a unique organization through which agriculture and rural life have been improved.<sup>35</sup> Farmers' associations have a multiple function in providing credit, farm inputs, marketing, savings schemes and extension services. Irrigation associa-

tions administer and maintain irrigation networks, construct irrigation works and provide water to irrigators.

In addition to credit being obtainable from farmers' associations, it is also available through agricultural banks. Agricultural marketing, which is a function of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, has been adapted to changing circumstances. Minimum producer prices are paid for major crops and quota production schemes provided for specialized crops. Farmers' associations also provide co-operative marketing programmes for pigs and vegetables.<sup>36</sup>

It is clear then that the ROC has been successful in providing the institutional requirements and supporting services for agricultural development.

### Socio-economic impact

Whereas in Communist China family farms are still largely run at the subsistence level, subsistence farming in the ROC has given way to a highly productive commercialized agriculture scheme, with the bulk of agricultural products (86–88 per cent) being sold. In the ROC the high percentage (about 90 per cent) of non-viable, small-scale farming units has generally not acted as a disincentive to agricultural production, probably because of the provision of the necessary technological and institutional support.

As a direct result of increased agricultural production, the incomes and living standards of the rural population have shown a tremendous improvement. The percentage of family income spent on food declined from 51 per cent in 1964 to 33 per cent in 1979. The majority of ROC farmers are in the cash economy, whereas in Communist China most households are little above subsistence level. Modern appliances such as gas and electric cookers, refrigerators, television and electric fans are now commonplace in the rural areas of the ROC, while educational levels are continually improving and social life has changed dramatically.<sup>37</sup>

### Lessons for the developing areas of Southern Africa

An important reason for the ROC's success is a combination of capital investment, farmer education, research, extension and infrastructural development coupled with improved institutional support and incentives.<sup>38</sup> Even though there has been great progress in Communist China in recent years, the problems of efficiency, technology, modern inputs and incentives have not been completely solved. Capital is still a scarce resource, while labour is abundant.

The lesson to be learned from the more recent experiences in Communist China (from 1978 onwards) and in the ROC, is that successful agricultural development is dependent upon a combination of factors which include political commitment to a bal-

anced operational agricultural development policy, wise use of resources in accordance with their potential, the provision of "appropriate" technology, and the provision of the necessary institutional support in terms of sound forward planning, suitable land tenure arrangements, well-planned agricultural research, an effective extension service, strong local farmer organizations, provision of credit, price incentives and marketing channels. All of these are deficient to varying degrees in the developing areas of Southern Africa.<sup>39</sup>

In Southern Africa it is becoming increasingly apparent that new approaches are needed to make agriculture and rural development programmes more effective. One country, particularly when the environment, culture and traditions are so different, can never successfully copy another; however, it can learn from the experience of other countries and adapt such experiences to its own situation.

Aspects of agricultural development in Communist China and the ROC which are worthy of consideration in the developing areas of Southern Africa include:

- The Communist Chinese experiences have shown that appealing to a political ideology and applying pressures based on fear as an instrument to increase productivity, although initially successful, will not succeed in the long term. In contrast to the rulers of the Soviet Union and some other Eastern Bloc countries, Communist Chinese leaders have learned the need to restore incentives and encourage individual initiative as the basis for successful development. Incentives and opportunities for agricultural development are generally lacking in the developing areas of Southern Africa.
- The ROC, and latterly Communist China, have not only formulated, but have been committed to implementing a series of economic development plans, with a good balance between urban and agricultural development. In Southern Africa there is a need for strong centralized planning organizations with planning based on the physical potential and feedback from local-level organizations on area development needs.
- The experience of both the ROC and the PRC has demonstrated the importance of putting greater emphasis on agricultural development through achieving a balance between industrial and rural development. In Southern Africa the emphasis has tended to be on urban and industrial development and capital-intensive agricultural projects.
- Decentralization of agricultural planning and control has worked well in both the PRC and the ROC. The need for strong local leadership in rural areas has been demonstrated in both countries. In Southern Africa there is a need for

strengthening and developing district and village-level organizations through national support and training, so that local people can play a greater role in their own development.

- In contrast to the PRC and the ROC, where, for example, there is at least clean water laid on in most villages, adequate fuel supplies and pre-school facilities, such infrastructure and amenities are generally lacking in Southern Africa. There is thus a need for planned infrastructural development aimed at improving the quality of life, preferably on a participatory self-help basis.
- Both in the ROC and the PRC there has been considerable development of village-level industry based on the utilization of local resources, as well as the "contracting out" of assembly work from major urban industries. In Southern Africa there is a dire need to create village-level industry to provide employment, particularly for the increasing numbers of landless people living in the rural areas.
- The Chinese experience has clearly shown the need for security of land tenure and production incentives. In Southern Africa there is a desperate need for land reform aimed at security of tenure and negotiability of land and grazing rights, coupled with production incentives in terms of commodity prices.
- In Southern Africa there is also a need to consider other land reform measures such as leasing of land, as well as group farming aimed at more effective utilization of land. In both the PRC and the ROC no land is allowed to lie idle and unproductive, as is the case in Southern Africa.
- The importance of agricultural credit, marketing and price incentives has been clearly demonstrated both in the ROC and the PRC. Although some progress has been made there is still a great need to improve these facilities in the developing areas of Southern Africa.
- Since 1978 mainland China's economic policies have stressed differential rewards for higher productivity, particularly through the contract system. Similar incentives may well have application on capital-intensive irrigation schemes and other agricultural development projects in the developing areas of Southern Africa.
- Both the PRC and the ROC have a strong agricultural research organization to support and reinforce extension services. Since the developing areas of Southern Africa do not have their own agricultural research organizations, there is a need to strengthen universities and institutions which are currently carrying out research there.
- Particularly in the ROC, the importance of effective extension services aimed at farmers, women and children has been

clearly demonstrated. The need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of extension services in Southern Africa has been well documented.<sup>40</sup>

- Both the ROC and the PRC have put great emphasis on the development of "appropriate" technology for various categories of small-scale subsistence and commercial farmers. In Southern Africa technology advocated by extension services has not always been suited to local conditions; there is therefore a need to develop suitable village-level technology based on Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSRE). The approach involves a careful study and diagnosis of local farming system constraints, followed by appropriate adaptive research aimed at solving problems diagnosed at village level.
- The Chinese biological farming system of integrating animals and crops into a stable farming system has application in Southern Africa, where soil fertility is generally decreasing.
- Unfortunately, in Southern Africa mechanization of ploughing operations has tended to become almost a status symbol. The real breakthrough in small-scale farming in this region will ultimately come through the greatly extended use of simple animal-drawn implements and hand-powered mechanical tools, as are used in Communist China. Large tractors and mechanization have a place on commercial farms and projects only. It is only when high levels of subsistence farming have been achieved that there will be a place for capital-intensive mechanization.

## Conclusion

This review of agricultural development in Communist China and the ROC suggests that great improvements in agricultural pro-

duction can also be brought about in Southern Africa through sound policies, backed by efficient planning, institutional support and provision of economic incentives. Political commitment to decentralization of responsibility and development of local-level organizations, provides an important incentive to improve farming efficiency and agricultural output.

## References

- 1 W Y Lee, "Reducing China's one billion", *Mazangira*, vol 8, no 4, 1985, p 21.
- 2 H Chen, "Agricultural development and its problems in Mainland China", paper presented at the Ninth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 1980, p 4.
- 3 Y Kiang, *China perspective*, Chicago: Adams Press, 1975, p 47.
- 4 H Chen, *op cit*, p 15.
- 5 T B Wiens, "Chinese agriculture: Continued self reliance", *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol 60, no 3, 1978, p 872.
- 6 P B Trescott, "Incentives versus equality: What does China's experience show?", *World Development*, vol 134, no 2, 1985, p 207.
- 7 S Wen, "National and regional trends in production and productivity for post 1978 Chinese agriculture", *Cornell International Agricultural Mimeograph III*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1986.
- 8 P B Trescott, *op cit*, p 208. For a number of years private ownership of houses has prevailed in rural areas; see N Lardy, *Agriculture in China's economic development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp 47-58.
- 9 P B Trescott, *op cit*, p 208.
- 10 Y Y Kueh, "Technology and agricultural development in China: Regional spread and inequality", *Development and Change*, vol 16, no 4, 1985, p 547.
- 11 *Ibid*.
- 12 *Ibid*, p 565.
- 13 P Hendry, "Land use and living space: China's efforts to provide adequate housing", *Ceres*, vol 16, no 6, 1983, p 16.

- 14 G Dalibor, "Country spotlight — China", *International Agricultural Development*, vol 5, no 4, 1985, p 22.
- 15 R Bernstein, *From the center of the Earth*, Taiwan, 1981, p 80.
- 16 S Wen, *op cit*, p 30.
- 17 *Ibid*.
- 18 F Butterfield, *China: Alive in the bitter sea*, np: Times Books, 1982, p 251.
- 19 *Ibid*, p 248.
- 20 J Banister and S H Preston, "Mortality in China", *Population Development Review*, vol 7, no 1, 1981, p 107.
- 21 F Butterfield, *op cit*, p 241.
- 22 J Gray, "Rural China: A strong chain of continuity", *Ceres*, vol 17, no 5, 1984, p 33.
- 23 H Chen, *op cit*, p 16.
- 24 Y Y Kueh, *op cit*, p 519.
- 25 T J Bembridge, *A systems approach study of agricultural and rural development in Taiwan, Republic of China*, Alice: University of Fort Hare Press, 1983.
- 26 J Gray, *op cit*, p 36.
- 27 S Wen, *op cit*, p 24.
- 28 *Ibid*.
- 29 H Chen, *op cit*.
- 30 Y T Wang and H H Chen, "Strategies of technical progression in Taiwan's agricultural development", mimeograph, Department of Agricultural Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, 1981.
- 31 *Ibid*.
- 32 Y T Wang and H H Chen, *op cit*, p 9.
- 33 T J Bembridge, *op cit*.
- 34 *Ibid*.
- 35 S M Yeh, "Agricultural marketing success: A case study of the Taotun Township Farmers' Association", *Industry of Free China*, vol 59, no 2, 1983.
- 36 T J Bembridge, *op cit*.
- 37 *Ibid*.
- 38 H Chen, *op cit*, p 21.
- 39 T J Bembridge, "An overview of agricultural and rural development in less developed areas of Southern Africa", *Development Southern Africa*, vol 3, no 1, 1986.
- 40 T J Bembridge, "Agricultural extension in the less developed areas of Southern Africa", *Proceedings of the Development Society of Southern Africa Conference*, Cape Town, 1986.



# The capital cities of Africa with special reference to new capitals planned for the continent

*D Pfaff of the Department of African Studies, University of Stellenbosch, looks at the new capitals being planned by Africa*

Seven of the fifty-one states on the continent of Africa have planned new capital cities (introduced capitals<sup>1</sup>, see Figure 1). This has created a unique situation, peculiar to Africa in that it is not to be found on a similar scale on any other continent.

The origins of this phenomenon may be traced to Africa's unusual history. The colonial powers subdivided the continent in a haphazard way, creating an "unnatural" political geography, both internally and externally. Surveying the scene after independence, the leaders of some of these states wondered whether they should retain the inherited capitals or found new ones according to a more rational assessment of their preferences and needs. Although the financial implications of such projects militated against their immediate implementation, several African governments committed themselves to the building of introduced capitals.

This article proposes to study the phenomenon of introduced capitals in order to determine the chief reasons for their creation. Furthermore, it aims to establish to what extent they are desirable and feasible within the African context. In view of the breadth and diversity of the subject, the historical survey of the capitals of Africa is only cursory: the emphasis is on the situation and development of colonial capitals in the primate cities of Africa.<sup>2</sup> The characteristic features of these capital cities are discussed, followed by a more detailed look at the planned new capitals.

## The capitals of Africa before the era of independence

Prior to colonial rule, capitals in Africa differed according to the size and the power

bases of the political units they were intended to serve. The central seat of authority varied from imposing capitals to settlements of more modest dimensions.<sup>3</sup> The absence of a "state concept" in large areas of Africa and obvious technological limitations resulted in many capital cities serving only a limited hinterland. Pritchard<sup>4</sup> emphasizes the fact that until the arrival of the colonial powers the cities of Africa were the least developed, in comparison with those of the rest of the world. He attributes this to the isolation of the continent, a lack of economic activity and to forms of political organization which, by and large, were both small and disunited.

The colonization of Africa saw the emergence of a pattern of states within which the European powers established their own system of administration. Most colonial capitals were situated at the coast, to facilitate the administration's contact with the metropolitan power and control of the management of the colonies. The location and function of these capitals were directed primarily at satisfying the functional needs of the colonial power.<sup>5</sup> The indigenous population's distribution and needs were of secondary importance.<sup>6</sup> Apart from being the focal point of political, administrative and military activities, the colonial capital also co-ordinated the commercial links with the metropole.<sup>7</sup> This resulted in the emergence of a pattern of urbanization during the colonial period disproportionately directed at the capital. In the course of time this led to most colonial capitals gaining a position of dominance as primate cities in their territories.<sup>8</sup>

## The development of capital cities since independence

Following independence most African

states retained their former colonial administrative structures, including the colonial capital cities, which were further developed to accommodate local needs. The result was that the considerable degree of primacy already enjoyed by African capitals increased in the post-independence era.<sup>9</sup>

For example, O'Connor,<sup>10</sup> using population as a criterion, points out that Nigeria was a country without a dominant primate city, but that Lagos has assumed the *function* of a dominant city since independence. The present population of Lagos is more than three times that of any other city in Nigeria. The development of Lagos toward primate status is also confirmed by comparing the increase in the number of telephones, electricity consumption and banking facilities. The same comparisons in the progression towards primacy are applicable to Ghana (Accra), Kenya (Nairobi), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Zaire (Kinshasa), Mali (Bamako), Niger (Niamey) and the Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan).

The vast increase in primacy in the African context in the post-independence period can be associated with a variety of other factors besides the special functions performed by a capital city.<sup>11</sup>

The Africanization of the decision-making machinery after independence ushered in a new era, characterized by the consolidation of political power. The problems emanating from the nation-building process and the accompanying efforts to promote a patriotic nationalism forced most African governments to centralize political power. As a consequence, regional centres, and the capital cities in particular, received more than their fair share of national resources.<sup>12</sup>

According to Peil,<sup>13</sup> political considerations are an important factor when a



Fig 1 The capitals of Africa

decision is to be made about the siting of new industries or other economic inputs which influence urban growth. Cities associated with anti-government activities are accordingly left in the cold and cannot rely on the establishment of economic projects by the authorities. Cities, towns and settlements which have contact with national leaders are often given unfair advantage in terms of services and infrastructures. Not

surprisingly, therefore, a capital city, and hence the seat of the governing party, is favoured with many benefits. Peil also indicates that the central administration has been the main source of urban growth since independence. With few exceptions, those African cities which have experienced more than a threefold growth since independence are the capitals of the states concerned.

The large measure of centralization of

government functions has also had a tremendous impact in many other fields, and has contributed in no small measure to the further extension of the capitals' primacy. Since the 1960s African countries have based their economic policies on industrialization as the key to economic progress.<sup>14</sup> Because the capital cities alone had the necessary infrastructures they were the logical choices as sites for the new industries.<sup>15</sup> In




Fig 2 Capitals: Degree of primacy

the socio-cultural field too it is the capitals that offer the most and the best facilities. This, together with the expectations aroused by independence, provided a strong incentive for migrants to head for the national centres.<sup>16</sup> In addition, since the 1960s African governments have generally followed policies that favour their power base in the urban élite, and this has resulted in the creation of increased opportunities in the city.<sup>17</sup> Health

and education services are also usually concentrated in the cities, as are secondary and, particularly, tertiary education facilities.<sup>18</sup> Viewed against this background it is evident that the capital cities of Africa have received more than their fair share of development aid, this is sometimes referred to as the Matthew effect: "to him who has shall be given".<sup>19</sup>

In most countries of the world today the

capital is the largest and most important city. In the twenty-five states of Europe the political capital is the largest city, the only exceptions being Berne and Bonn — for sound reasons in both cases.<sup>20</sup> In Africa the capital of a state plays an even more dominant role.<sup>21</sup> In Figure 2, the degree of primacy of the capital cities of Africa is portrayed by comparing the population of the respective capital cities with that of the next largest city




Fig 3 Situation of the capitals of Africa

in the state. The high degree of primacy of Africa's capitals is strikingly illustrated by the fact that there are fourteen capitals with a population more than six times that of the next largest urban centre in their respective countries, namely: Luanda (Angola), Bujumbura (Burundi), Djibouti (Djibouti), Conakry (Guinea), Bissau (Guinea-Bissau), Nouakchott (Mauritania), El Aaiun (Western

Sahara), Dakar (Senegal), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Lomé (Togo), Monrovia (Liberia), Kampala (Uganda), Mogadishu (Somalia) and Bamako (Mali). Paradoxically, Africa is also the continent with the great exceptions to the rule, with six instances where the capital is not the largest urban centre in the country concerned — Porto Novo (Benin), Yaoundé (Cameroon), Lilongwe (Malawi),

Rabat (Morocco) and Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), all of which are the second largest centres, while Pretoria (South Africa) is only the fourth largest centre in this country.<sup>22</sup>

**The planning and creation of new capital cities in Africa**

According to Whittlesey<sup>23</sup> the capital city re-

Reproduce this article in any form without the prior written permission granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

flects the wealth, organization and political power of a state. De Blij<sup>24</sup> goes even further, claiming that some states try to turn their capital into a showpiece which is portrayed as a symbol of the country's aspirations, goals and national pride. Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia, for example, was described in the late 1940s as "a mask behind which the rest of the country is hidden".<sup>25</sup> The capital cities of Africa are mostly creations of the colonial powers. As a result their location was determined by the need to facilitate access to the metropole, rather than by considerations such as the geographical centre of the country or the gravitational heart of the population.<sup>26</sup> Figure 3 shows that twenty-eight of the fifty-one state capitals are harbour cities — a high percentage if one considers that fourteen of these countries are landlocked. Even in these landlocked countries the capital city was often situated close to the border at a spot where it could best serve the colonial power. An example of this is Livingstone, capital of what was Northern Rhodesia; despite its hot, humid climate it was chosen as the colony's capital because it was closest to Cape Town and London.<sup>27</sup>

The question that is raised is to what extent the location of the "inherited" colonial capitals satisfied the needs of the African states functionally after independence. If a circle is regarded as the ideal form for the hypothetical state, then the best site for the capital is the centre of the circle, since control over a state is easiest from a central position.<sup>28</sup>

In Figure 4 this hypothesis is applied to Ethiopia, a compact state with a capital situated close to the geographical centre of the country. Though this should facilitate central control it is perhaps significant that the authorities here are unable to suppress the rebel groups operating in Eritrea and the Ogaden, which to a large extent fall outside the circle.<sup>29</sup> Equally understandable is the concern among most African states that the peripheral situation of their capitals does not fulfil their needs. With the exception of Nouakchott and Gaborone, this has been an important consideration in the planning of new African capitals.

The rapid rate of urbanization in the post-colonial era (Table 1) and subsequent expansion of the primacy of African capitals promoted severe over-population of these cities. The resultant socio-economic problems became an embarrassment to the "national centre". The authorities were powerless either to combat unemployment or to provide the necessary housing and services. Vast squatter camps where people live in poverty and in atrocious conditions have become an everyday phenomenon in African capitals. The squatter problem has created parlous conditions of poor hygiene, disease and crime which have endangered social and political stability. Ninety per cent of Addis Ababa, once the pride of Ethiopia,




Fig 4 Ethiopia: Guaged by the ideal form of a postulated hypothetical state

**Table 1**  
**THE POPULATION GROWTH OF SELECTED AFRICAN CAPITALS, 1960-85**

Estimated population in thousands	1960	1970	1980	
Addis Ababa	500	850	1 300	1 464 <sup>2</sup> (1985)
Lagos	600	1 600	3 000	...
Kinshasa	500	1 400	2 700	...
Dakar	380	600	950	...
Accra	390	740	1 100	...
Luanda	250	470	750	...
Nairobi	270	510	900	1 103 <sup>2</sup> (1984)
Abidjan	220	600	1 200	1 800 <sup>3</sup> (1983)
Dar es Salaam	170	380	800	1 096 <sup>2</sup> (1985)

1 A O'Connor, *The African City*, London: Hutchinson, 1983, p 48.

With more recent data from:

2 United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1985*, United Nations: New York, 1987, pp 247-250.

3 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1986, p 834.

now consists of squatter areas. In Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, one third of the inhabitants reside in squatter townships.<sup>30</sup>

The influx of citizens to capital cities unable to accommodate them has led African governments in general to adopt development policies emphasizing greater balance between rural and urban areas. Such policies would seem to include reducing the momentum of the influx to the primate cities; the creation of new capitals can also be accommodated within this framework.<sup>31</sup>

Urbanization proceeding at an ever-increasing but irregular pace also had an adverse effect on the activities of the national centre, to such an extent that some African leaders came to the conclusion that their capitals were no longer symbols of national pride. Added to this was the desire of African countries to dissociate themselves from colonial heritages and structures.

This led African governments to promote the creation of new centres of national administration more suitable to their countries' situation. A capital which has prestige value encourages national patriotism,<sup>32</sup> and the creation of several introduced capitals, with a number of others in the planning stage is thus a natural consequence.

With the exception of the national states of South Africa, there are at present seven capitals in Africa which can be classified as introduced capitals (Figure 1): Nouakchott (Mauritania), Gaborone (Botswana), Kigali (Rwanda), Lilongwe (Malawi), Abuja (Nigeria), Dodoma (Tanzania) and Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire). A more detailed discussion of these follows.

### Nouakchott, Gaborone and Kigali: Capitals founded out of necessity

Nouakchott, Gaborone and Kigali, the capitals of Mauritania, Botswana and Rwanda respectively, form a special category of introduced capitals. They were born out of necessity as these states had previously been administered from neighbouring territories. While under French rule, Mauritania had been administered from St Louis in Senegal, and when independence was achieved the harbour city Nouakchott became the capital. According to Peil<sup>33</sup> this capital has developed into a political, administrative, cultural and economic centre of which the Mauritians can be proud. Botswana, administered from Mafeking in South Africa until independence, now has its capital in Gaborone, close to the southern boundary with South Africa.<sup>34</sup> It is interesting to note that both the aforementioned capitals are situated on the national periphery, probably indicating a desire on the part of government in the early 1960s to establish outside ties, particularly in the case of Botswana, which was largely dependent on



The central area of Blantyre, 1971



Architects model for the new capital, Lilongwe



New government buildings, Lilongwe

Reproduce this article for personal use only. No other reproduction or distribution is permitted.

South Africa. Kigali, on the other hand, is centrally situated in Rwanda, which formed part of the Belgian Trust Territory Ruanda-Urundi before independence and had been administered from Bujumbura.<sup>35</sup>

### Lilongwe: "First" introduced capital of Africa

In the early 1970s Malawi became the first African state to plan a new capital. President Banda considered the "inherited" capital of Zomba unsuitable as a national centre, as it is too close to the commercial capital, Blantyre (also the primate city), in the south of the country and is thus unable to serve as a successful growth point. Lilongwe on the other hand is centrally situated and has a fertile agricultural hinterland, the ideal situation for a new focal point for economic development.<sup>36</sup> In keeping with the value he places on nation-building, Pres Banda wanted to create a modern political centre of which the nation could be proud.<sup>37</sup>

His decision to build a new capital evoked strong criticism, in the main due to the cost of the project which, for a developing country that was not only one of the poorest in Africa but also had a low level of urbanization, could not be seen to be justified. Consequently only South Africa was prepared to contribute to the financing of the project.<sup>38</sup> In the event, the project engulfed at least 15 per cent of Malawi's development expenditure during the 1970s, an amount far in excess of the £30 million that had been estimated.<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, Mlia has argued that Lilongwe may eventually prove to be of great benefit to Malawi, stimulating development in the central part of the country before the south becomes too dominant.<sup>40</sup> O'Connor, too, supports Pres Banda in his assertion that the central location of Lilongwe is better suited to contact with the various regional centres than is the peripherally-situated Zomba/Blantyre.<sup>41</sup>

The development of Lilongwe progressed systematically in the early 1970s, and by 1975 most of the administrative infrastructure had been established there. Only time will tell to what extent trading and industrial activities will take root in this new capital. To date there has been a steady growth in the commercial and industrial activities of Blantyre, while the population has increased annually at a rate of 7 per cent to approximately 270 000 in 1980.<sup>42</sup>

### Dodoma: The new people-centred capital of Tanzania

Dodoma, the planned new capital of Tanzania, enjoys the unique distinction of being an "elected" capital. In a national referendum held in 1973, the vast majority of Tanzanians voted in favour of Dodoma as their new introduced capital. Dodoma is

more favourably located and promises better prospects than Dar es Salaam, the primate city, whose urban infrastructure has to contend with the pressure of rapid urbanization due to large-scale migration, and the extension of the harbour facilities to cope with the increasing freight from Tanzania and Zambia. Planners are also of the opinion that it will be cheaper in the long run to administer Tanzania from a central location.

Several other factors also favour Dodoma. The city, which is close to the geographical centre of the state and ideally situated for the existing transport network, lies at the crossroads of the national road which runs from north to south and east to west, as well as the railway linking Dar es Salaam with the great lakes and its western neighbours, Rwanda and Burundi. Dodoma, at a height of 1 000 metres above sea level, has a more moderate climate than Dar es Salaam. The capital city project can also contribute to the stimulation of the development of a relatively neglected area in central Tanzania.<sup>43</sup>

The blueprint for Dodoma was finally approved in July 1976 by President Nyerere in his capacity as Minister of Capital City Development. Nyerere stipulated certain guidelines:

We have to build (Dodoma) in a manner which is within our means and which reflects our principles of human dignity and equality as well as our aspirations for our development. We have to take advantage of the opportunity to make Dodoma a good place in which to live and work, and to bring up children as good Tanzanians. The town must be integrated as a society as a whole; it must neither be an ivory tower nor a new version of our existing towns. It must draw upon the lessons for other specially built cities throughout the world, but it must not be a copy of them. Dodoma must be a town which is built in simple style but with buildings which reflect the light, air and space of Africa. It must reflect the future and there must be room to grow, but it must not be futuristic in the sense of symbolizing passing and individualistic emotions.<sup>44</sup>

It is clear from the above that the project is intended to act as a nationally unifying force, a symbol in which all Tanzanians can take pride.

Another interesting feature in the planning of Dodoma is that the new capital is to be built within the framework of African traditions and current economic needs. For example, the planning of the basic structure of the city rests on self-sufficient district units separated from each other by so-called green belts. In the green belts encircling the residential areas a plot is allotted for each family to till. Since unemployment is a common problem in African cities this will enable families to become self-supporting.

The layout of Dodoma aims at the creation of a people-centred city. Overpowering skyscrapers will be avoided; single and double storey buildings will predominate, and taller

structures with a maximum height of four storeys will be situated among parks. The concrete jungle of the modern city will thus be avoided. Interaction between the various socio-economic groups will also be encouraged by housing them in the same residential areas.<sup>45</sup>

The urban structure is so planned that people may commute to work and other destinations in comfort and safety. In the open spaces between the suburbs provision has been made for foot and cycle-paths. The emphasis has, however, been placed on an effective bus transport system to connect the various centres with one another.

The city will be entirely surrounded by a plantation of approximately 20 000 hectares which will have a functional value in combating erosion, producing firewood and serving as a recreational area.

The implementation strategy provides for the transfer of the civil service from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in two phases, each of ten years. Although progress has thus far been retarded by the economic recession, 15 per cent of the city's civil servants, including the office of the Prime Minister, are already housed in Dodoma. The sessions of the National Assembly now also occasionally take place in the new planned capital. The population of Dodoma has increased from 33 000 in 1974 to 141 000 in 1985, and is expected to reach 350 000 by the year 2000.<sup>46</sup>

### Abuja: Planned new capital of Nigeria

A new capital in the centre of Nigeria is being planned at Abuja. This follows a reassessment of the role of Lagos as federal capital in the 1970s. A coastal capital appears impractical for the administration of a country measuring 1 300 km from south to north and 725 km from east to west, with a total area of almost 900 000 square kilometres. The rapid growth rate of Lagos in the colonial era, and especially after independence (9 to 12 per cent per year during the 1970s), has placed severe strains on that city. In a study by the Ford Foundation conditions in Lagos are described as follows:

In Metropolitan Lagos, for example, chaotic traffic conditions have become endemic; demands on the water supply system have begun to outstrip its maximum capacity; power cuts have become chronic as industrial and domestic requirements have escalated; factories have been compelled to bore their own wells and to set up stand-by electricity plants; public transport has been undated; port facilities have been stretched to their limits; the conditions have degenerated over extensive areas within and beyond the city's limits, in spite of slum clearance schemes.<sup>47</sup>

In 1975, a panel chaired by Justice Aguda proposed that the federal capital be shifted from Lagos to Abuja. Abuja is located in a

sparsely populated area very close to the geographical centre of the country. Its climate is pleasant, and it boasts an abundance of water and plenty of land for future development. Linkage with the existing rail and road transport systems would also be entirely feasible. In addition, the area does not fall within the sphere of influence of any of the principal ethnic groups, and can thus act as an important stimulus in the process of nation-building.

In spite of these attributes, the extensive development of Lagos at much less financial cost could obviate the giant Abuja project. Nevertheless, it has been justified by the panel as follows:

It is our belief that one way of forging the idea of unity of this nation is building a capital city which will belong to every Nigerian, where every Nigerian will rest assured that he has an opportunity to live in parity with every other Nigerian, and where no Nigerian will be regarded, either in law or on the facts, as a "Native Foreigner".<sup>48</sup>

The first official activities in Abuja began in October 1982. Guidelines for the master-plan proposed an attractive and healthy environment for the new seat of government. The city is to be structured in the shape of a half-moon (Figure 5). The starting point for expansion is the central area, with the residential areas on either side giving the city a crescent-shape. The central area will consist of the National Assembly, government buildings, national institutions and the commercial centre. It is linked to the residential areas by main and express roads.

Mountains surround both the central and residential areas, providing a natural boundary for possible uncontrolled development. The planning has made sufficient provision for the creation of a spacious city; a wide variety of parks has been planned, which will complement the existing densely-wooded river valleys.

The building of the new capital is to take place in several phases, with the first scheduled for completion in 1987. This phase includes government buildings and residential areas which can accommodate a population of 200 000 to 250 000. The federal government provides the required facilities for the infrastructure, such as roads, water, electricity, offices and national institutions; while private initiative and the business sector develop most of the residential and commercial sites.<sup>49</sup>

Good progress has been made with the necessary infrastructure. However, the drop in the price of oil resulted in a shortage of foreign exchange which in turn meant a lack of funds available for the capital city project. Consequently the project has not kept pace with the schedule of planning.<sup>50</sup> Despite this set-back the project is being implemented more quickly than that of Dodoma in Tanzania, and Abuja will probably be a large city by 1990. Its growth will depend on a variety of




Fig 5 Abuja: City plan

(Based on M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 28)

factors, some of which are beyond the control of Nigeria, while others will be determined by the country's own policy. It is, for example, as yet unknown whether Abuja will develop into a multi-functional metropolis, or merely into a large administrative city similar to Canberra in Australia or Brasilia in Brazil.<sup>51</sup> Peil has serious reservations as to whether private industries and commercial enterprises will consider moving to Abuja.<sup>52</sup>

### Yamoussoukro: Incomplete introduced capital of Côte d'Ivoire

A new capital is being planned for Côte d'Ivoire at Yamoussoukro in the central part of the country. The introduced capital is being planned on a grand scale to replace Abidjan, the expansion of which is limited by its location on a lagoon. Yamoussoukro is the birthplace of President Houphouët-

Boigny who has dominated Côte d'Ivoire politics for the past three decades. Vast sums of money have already been spent on the building of an impressive new airport for the town and a 250 km road linking Yamoussoukro and Abidjan.<sup>53</sup> Although February 1983 was the date scheduled by the National Assembly for the transfer of the seat of government, enforced financial cut-backs caused a curtailment of the project which has now been postponed indefinitely.<sup>54</sup>

### Evaluation

A number of the problems associated with the capitals of Africa stem from the fact that most of them were inherited from the colonial period. While the colonial capitals satisfied the needs of the metropolitan powers, this was not necessarily the case for the newly independent states. The establishment of a new capital is, however, a project



of vast dimensions, beyond the means of most African states. In addition to the financial implications, account must also be taken of existing economic patterns and systems which have developed over time largely in response to the various functions and services of the existing capitals. In practice, one could say, the colonial capitals experienced only a change of ownership at independence, with the exception of those less fortunate states which were administered from neighbouring areas. Nouakchott, Gaborone and Kigali are thus, strictly speaking, not introduced capitals planned from the outset to replace existing ones.

Malawi initiated the introduction of new African capitals in the 1970s, with its development of Lilongwe to replace Zomba as the state's planned new capital. Tanzania and Nigeria followed with the introduction of Dodoma and Abuja in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The Côte d'Ivoire in turn undertook the planning of its Yamoussoukro project in the late 1970s. The most important reasons for the planning and creation of these new capitals may be grouped into three categories as follows:

Firstly, it was maintained, without exception, that the peripheral situation of the colonial capitals did not satisfy the function of a national centre. The creation of a new capital in the central area of the country would activate a new focal point for economic development. In the cases of Dodoma and Abuja, it was also argued that the situations of the new capitals were climatically more suitable for the inhabitants than the hot, humid and even ecologically unhealthy conditions of the coastal cities of Lagos and Dar es Salaam.

Secondly, uncontrolled urbanization and the development of the primacy of the colonial capitals continued in the post-independence period and even increased in momentum. This caused overcrowding in the capitals, resulting in functional inadequacies in respect of services and housing. Problems such as unsatisfactory infrastructure, poor hygiene and squatters' camps resulted, which in turn caused serious social problems, making cities like Dar es Salaam and Lagos an embarrassment to their respective states. Overpopulation hindered further expansion and, in the cases of Lagos and Abidjan, the nature of the terrain also prevented additional development.

Finally, motivation for introduced capitals was coupled with the specific needs and preferences peculiar to the African situation. There was a strong belief that the creation of a new national centre would stimulate patriotic nationalism and thus promote the building of a nation. Nigeria in particular, in the past a victim of civil war, could benefit tremendously from the ethnically neutral location of Abuja. The new capitals thus present an opportunity for the states concerned to adapt their national centres to their own

special requirements and preferences, an aspect clearly illustrated in the planning of Dodoma and Abuja.

The new capitals planned for Africa have aroused great interest, particularly within those African states who are now grappling with similar problems. There has also been some criticism, particularly that these are unproductive projects absorbing much-needed resources and funds which could be used more fruitfully to stimulate development in other sectors. This is especially valid in view of the present economic crisis besetting most African countries. Building a new capital does not appear to be the most appropriate course of action, and lack of funds has already delayed implementation of the Yamoussoukro, Dodoma and Abuja projects. Another criticism is that the introduced capitals will not be strong enough to lure new industries away from the existing primate cities. It is feared that some of the capitals may, on completion, prove to be no more than administrative white elephants.

At present it is only at Lilongwe that all the functions of a capital are in operation. Only time will tell whether the introduced capitals offer a solution to the multifarious problems facing the capitals of Africa. This analysis of the new capitals planned for Africa leads one to doubt both the desirability and the viability of these capitals. The ever-increasing debt of the African states and the emphasis placed on appropriate development aid which yields positive dividends, will probably result in the projects for new introduced capitals being regarded as a luxury which many African countries can ill afford — certainly in the immediate future.

## References

- De Blij uses the term "introduced capitals" to denote the new capitals. H de Blij, *Systematic political geography*, New York: John Wiley, 3rd ed, 1980, p 120.
- The primate city is the dominant city in a country, its size overshadowing the rest of the urban community in all respects. Primate cities are usually distinguished by their sound economic basis, the accumulation of capital and potential work opportunities. The primate city also dominates the country's political, administrative, cultural and social activities. See I J van der Merwe, "Die stedelike sisteem van Suidwes-Afrika/Namibië", in W S Barnard (ed) *Kompas op SWA/Namibië*, Stellenbosch: Society for Geography, 1985, pp 45–46; A O'Connor, *The African city*, London: Hutchinson, 1983, pp 248–253; S D Brunn and J F Williams, *Cities of the world*, New York: Harper & Row, 1983, pp 7–8.
- H S Wilson, *The Imperial experience in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1870*, Minnesota: Minnesota Press, 1977, pp 95–97.
- J M Pritchard, *Africa*, London: Longman, 1979, pp 123–154.
- I L Griffiths, *An atlas of African affairs*, London: Methuen, 1984, p 157; H W Eldredge (ed), *World capitals: Toward unguided urbanization*, New York: Anchor Press, 1975, pp 437–439; M Peil and P O Sada, *African urban society*, Chichester: John Wiley, 1984, pp 18, 83.
- A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 47
- M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 18.
- I J van der Merwe, *op cit*, pp 44–45; A O'Connor, *op cit*, pp 41–46.
- A O'Connor, *op cit*, pp 248–253; M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, pp 83–84.
- A O'Connor, *op cit*, pp 248, 252.
- N J Pounds, *Political geography*, New York: Heinemann, 1972, pp 200–202; R Muir, *Modern political geography*, London: Macmillan, 1975, pp 30–33; H J de Blij, *op cit*, pp 116–119; M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 25.
- A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 253; M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 25.
- M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, pp 25, 26, 36.
- S Acharya, "Development perspectives and priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Finance and Development*, March 1981, p 17; P Wickens, *Africa 1880–1980, an economic history*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1986, p 258.
- K C Kotecha and R W Adams, *African politics: The corruption of power*, Washington DC: University Press, 1981, p 428; A M O'Connor, *The geography of tropical African development*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971 p 109.
- K C Kotecha and R W Adams, *op cit*, pp 428–429; W A Hance, *Black Africa develops*, Waltham: Crossroads, 1977, p 129; M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 43.
- S Acharya, *op cit*, p 17; G M E Leistner, "Black Africa in search of an appropriate development strategy", *Africa Insight*, vol 11, no 2, 1981, p 136.
- W A Hance, *op cit*, p 129.
- M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 36.
- N J Pounds, *op cit*, pp 186–187.
- "In most African countries the primate city is so much an important nerve centre that its effective control is tantamount to control of the nation as a whole." A Mehretu, "Cities of Sub-Saharan Africa", in S D Brunn and J Williams (eds), *Cities of the world: World regional urban development*, New York: Harper & Row, 1983, p 274.
- United Nations, *Demographic yearbook 1985*, New York: United Nations, 1987, pp 247–249; *Encyclopaedia Britannica 1986*, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1986, pp 832–837; *Africa south of the Sahara 1987*, London: Europa, 1986.
- D Whittlesey, *The earth and the state*, New York: Holt, 1939, p 196.
- H J de Blij, *op cit*, p 116.
- D Mathew, *Ethiopia*, London: Longmans, Green, 1947, p 5.
- I L Griffiths, *op cit*, pp 156–157; P Shayo, "New capitals in Africa", *African Construction*, no 2, 1982, p 36; J M Pritchard, *op cit*, p 149.
- I L Griffiths, *op cit*, p 158. In 1931, however, the capital was shifted to Lusaka, which is at a higher altitude and has a cooler and healthier climate.
- N J Pounds, *op cit*, pp 188–189.
- D F Pfaff, " 'n Politiek-geografiese analise van die grenslynprobleme op die Horing van Afrika met spesifieke verwysings na Somaalië", unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1980, pp 195–196.
- P Esterhuysen, "Snelle verstedeliking in Afrika", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, vol 23, no 12, 1983, p 109.

- 31 P Esterhuysen, *op cit*, p 109; D Fair, "Medium-sized towns and African development", *Africa Insight*, vol 16, no 2, 1986, pp 73–78; T J D Fair, "Tanzania: Some aspects of urban growth and policy", *Africa Insight*, vol 14, no 1, 1984, p 35.
- 32 H J de Blij, *op cit*, p 120, points out that several African states, notably Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Zaire, tried to transform their existing capitals into modern symbols of the aspirations of their independent nations.
- 33 M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 26.
- 34 A C G Best, "Gaborone: Problems and prospects of a new capital", *Geographical Review*, vol LX, no 1, 1970, pp 1–14.
- 35 A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 263.
- 36 J Connell, "Lilongwe: Another new capital for Africa", *East African Geographical Review*, no 3, April 1972, pp 90–91. Cf M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 26; C McMaster, *Malawi foreign policy and development*, London: Friedman, 1974, p 80; P Short, *Banda*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, pp 287–288.
- 37 J McCracken, "Malawi: Recent history", *Africa south of the Sahara*, London: Europa, 1984, p 555. Peil points out that Lilongwe is close to the birthplace of President Banda, and can therefore be regarded as a permanent "monument" to the first president of Malawi; see M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 26.
- 38 A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 264.
- 39 M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 26.
- 40 J N Mlia, "Malawi's new capital city", *Pan-African Journal*, no 7, 1975, pp 387–401, as in A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 264; cf G Richards, *From vision to reality: The story of Malawi's new capital*, Johannesburg: Lorton Publications, 1974, pp 51–53.
- 41 A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 264.
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 R E Shayo, *op cit*, p 36. Cf M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 27; A O'Connor, *op cit*, pp 264–265.
- 44 R E Shayo, *op cit*, pp 36–37.
- 45 *Ibid.* This accords with Tanzania's policy of African socialism, which aims at the creation of a more egalitarian community; see J K Nyerere, "From uhuru to ujamaa", *Africa Today*, vol 21, no 3, 1974, pp 3–8. It is interesting to compare this with the opposite tendency in the planning of Nigeria's new capital, where there will be a greater degree of residential segregation according to income; see *Africa Now*, October 1982, p 120.
- 46 R E Shayo, *op cit*, pp 37–38. United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, New York: United Nations, 1987, p 250.
- 47 *Africa Now*, October 1982, p 120. Cf M Pacione, *Problems and planning in Third World cities*, London: Croom Helm, 1981, p 133; P Jason, "Lagos' choked ports", *New African*, May 1985, pp 38–39.
- 48 *Africa Now*, October 1982, p 120.
- 49 *Ibid.* The first of four luxury hotels, the Agura, has already been completed at a cost of \$40 million and has been in use since May 1986; see *African Business*, October 1986, p 93.
- 50 T J D Fair, "Nigeria's unbalanced development: Urban growth and rural stagnation", *Africa Insight*, vol 14, no 4, 1984. Cf I I Griffiths, *op cit*, pp 80–82; A O'Connor, *op cit*, pp 265–266.
- 51 A O'Connor, *op cit*, p 266.
- 52 M Peil and P O Sada, *op cit*, p 27.
- 53 P Esterhuysen, *op cit*, p 107.
- 54 A Rake, "Ivory Coast: Economy", *Africa south of the Sahara*, London: Europa, 1985, p 551.

# Angola's ports and oil terminals

*In this latest contribution to his series of articles on the ports and harbours of Africa, Denis Fair, senior research fellow at the Africa Institute, looks at Angola and at the communications network vital to its economic recovery.*

Prior to independence in 1975, Angola had much in its favour in terms of the resources it possessed and the degree to which they had been developed. It is a large country, 1,25 million km<sup>2</sup> in extent or slightly larger than the Republic of South Africa. It is rich in oil, diamonds and iron ore and its rivers possess considerable potential for hydroelectric power development and irrigation. It has large areas of fertile soil, produced sufficient to satisfy its own food requirements and ranked fourth as a world coffee producer, while rich fishing grounds lie off its southern coast. The Lobito corridor — the Benguela railway and the port of Lobito — was the conduit for the export not only of much of its own production but also for the copper, manganese and other minerals from its inland neighbours, Zaire and Zambia.

In the early 1970s Angola's economy was strong and healthy. However, the economy including commercial agriculture, was unbalanced in the sense that it was largely in the hands of Portuguese settlers who before independence numbered nearly 350 000 or only 5,5 per cent of the total population, the vast majority of whom were indigenous Africans.

The change that came with independence was tragic. Economic decline began as various black groups, engaged in the war of liberation against the Portuguese, disrupted production and attacked the country's farms, railways and other infrastructure. Farms, businesses and homes were abandoned by 300 000 white settlers who left for Portugal, taking with them valuable capital, equipment and other goods. Rival groups then competed for power in the independent state and became locked in a civil war which has persisted with debilitating effects on the economy. Large parts of south-eastern Angola are in the hands of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita), which has been backed by South Africa and the United States. Unita claims the right to share power with the present Marxist regime, Popular Movement for the Liberation

of Angola (MPLA), which enjoys the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The continuing destruction of infrastructure and the neglect of mines, factories, plantations, farms and coastal fisheries as well as the high cost of the war have brought the economy to a very low ebb. Coffee exports have fallen from 245 000 tonnes in the early 1970s to only 11 000 tonnes in 1986–87; iron ore mining has ceased and the Benguela railway has not been fully operative since 1975. Moreover, the weakening of world oil prices, after years of being extraordinarily high, resulted in a fall in income for Angola's once flourishing oil industry. Nevertheless, were it not for oil Angola's plight would have reached abysmal proportions. Fortunately, its oil producing areas are located in the Cabinda enclave to the north of the Zaire river and in offshore fields in the far northern parts of the country and beyond the main areas of persistent guerrilla attack. Its oil exports now account for over 90 per cent of the country's total export revenue, lower prices for oil having been partly offset by a rapid increase in production over the past five years.

## Oil production

Angola's oil was first discovered onshore near Luanda in 1955. Subsequent onshore and offshore finds saw oil overtake coffee as Angola's chief export in 1973 and the country has become sub-Saharan Africa's largest oil producer after Nigeria. In 1977, two years after independence, total output was 8,5 million tonnes (171 200 barrels per day). It then declined to 6,5 million tonnes (129 000 b/d) in 1982, owing to a fall-off in exploration and development. Thereafter it recovered strongly, to the extent that with new wells being opened up estimates of production in 1988 vary from 21,5 to 24,5 million tonnes (430 000–490 000 b/d), earning the country some US\$2 000 million in exports. However, with the fall in the world price of oil from a high of \$35 a barrel in 1981

to around \$14–16 in 1988, Angola's export earnings from oil have not appreciated at nearly the same rate as production. This fact certainly highlights the vulnerability of the Angolan economy to a heavy dependence on a single commodity. All the more so when over half of the country's foreign currency earnings have to go towards military expenditure. Of this, a considerable proportion pays for the food, accommodation and fuel of the 45 000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola in support of the MPLA regime.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Angolan state oil company (Sonangol) was established in 1978 as "exclusive concessionaire for all exploration and production rights but permitting foreign companies to participate in the search for and production of hydrocarbons in association with Sonangol on the basis of a production sharing agreement or through the establishment of a joint venture" in which Sonangol has a 51 per cent share. Investment in oil exploration and development has been considerable and totalled \$2,3 billion in the period 1980–85 and is estimated at \$3 billion between 1986 and 1990. Angola is particularly attractive to oil companies in view of the high success rate so far achieved in both exploration and production and the comparatively low operating costs.

## Oilfields

At least 15 oil companies have been involved with Sonangol in the development of the country's oilfields. The major share of crude oil output at present comes from 7 companies operating in 5 specific areas. Two are onshore areas, the Kwanza basin near Luanda and the Congo basin immediately south of the Zaire river estuary, the latter having commenced production in 1965. Both fields will produce some 7 per cent of Angola's oil in 1988 and they are operated by the Belgian company, Petrofina.

Far more significant was the offshore Cabinda discovery in 1966. Further dis-


coveries and production in the early 1980s brought this field's output to 58 per cent of Angola's estimated total for 1988. It is operated by Cabinda Gulf Oil Co (Cabgoc), a subsidiary of the American Chevron, with the Italian Agip a minor partner. A second offshore field (Block 2) began operating off the mouth of the Zaire river in 1980. Involved here are the American Texaco, the French Total and the Brazilian Braspetro companies. The block accounted for only 1.5 per cent of total output in 1987 but this will expand sixfold in 1988 to 10 per cent of the total when three new areas commence production.

The most recent field to be exploited (Block 3), adjacent to Block 2, began production in 1985. It is operated by the French Elf Aquitaine company and will produce 25 per cent of total output in 1988. This share will increase as two further areas are brought into production by early 1990. The whole Angolan coastline has now been divided into 13 blocks for exploration purposes. In addition to the activity now taking place in Blocks 2 and 3, exploration is proceeding in another 5 offshore blocks involving at least 16 international companies. Over the past ten years estimates of Angola's oil reserves have been steadily rising. The latest estimate puts these reserves at a life of 20 years at current production rates.

### Oil terminals

Angola possesses a number of loading terminals for the export of its oil. The first is at Luanda where the country's only refinery is located. This plant uses most of the country's onshore production of crude oil and distributes fuel oils, gas oil, petrol and other petroleum products to other parts of Angola as well as having a surplus of crude and fuel oil for export. A new terminal is planned at Luanda for the export of refined products.

All the offshore oil produced is exported. The first loading point is the Malongo terminal, 24 km north of the small port of Cabinda, where Cabgoc's onshore storage facilities are connected by pipeline extending out to sea for 13 km to a mooring point which can take tankers of up to 100 000 dwt. The second terminal is the Soyo-Quiniquena associated with Block 2. It came on stream in 1982. Crude oil from two offshore fields, the Cuntalà and the Essungo, is pumped ashore here to storage tanks and then fed by pipeline to a mooring point some 12 km offshore where tankers can load. The third terminal is the latest and was developed as part of Elf Aquitaine's Block 3 project. Here oil is pumped from the Palanca and Pacassa fields, located some 45 km offshore, first to a nearby storage tanker, the *Licorne Pacifique* of 264 000 tonnes, and then from this storage facility through a floating hose to sea-going tankers. Thus the whole operation, pumping, storage and loading, is carried out offshore.



Angola: Railways and ports


### Ports and railways

The prosperity and growing volume of Angola's oil exports contrasts sharply with the decline in the volume of goods handled by the country's three main ports.

In 1985 Luanda, Lobito and Namibe, once thriving export harbours, handled only 1.5 per cent of the country's commercial exports, a mere 148 000 tonnes. Imports through these harbours considerably exceeded exports. Of 1 487 000 tonnes imported,

however, a considerable proportion was food, for Angola now has to import well over half its food needs owing to the disruption by war of its agriculture. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that in 1988-89 a deficit of nearly 600 000 tonnes of maize will be experienced, implying that nearly 350 000 tonnes of food aid will be required from donor countries in addition to commercial imports of food.

A sombre reflection of the decline in commercial activity through Angola's ports is the



Angola: Oil fields

fact that in 1973, before independence, they handled 11,2 million tonnes of incoming and outgoing cargo and minerals — seven times the 1,6 million tonnes of 1985. The most dramatic reductions in traffic have been experienced by Lobito and Namibe as a result of the closure of the railways feeding Zaire's and Zambia's copper mining regions and Angola's iron ore mining area, respectively.

The war, however, has been responsible for a substantial traffic through the three ports of military hardware, equipment and

supplies from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other sources. According to Hodges, nearly 45 per cent of government revenue in 1985 was spent on defence and security, and the value of military imports in that year accounted for no less than 53 per cent of total imports.

The considerable growth in air traffic at Angola's main airports can also be attributed in part to the increase in military activity. Cargo handled has increased from 3 500 tonnes in 1973, before independence, to

39 400 tonnes in 1985 and is projected to rise to 130 500 tonnes by 1990. Of this total, international freight handled will rise from 10 500 tonnes in 1985 to 20 200 tonnes in 1990. *New African* describes the airport as the busiest place in Luanda, with Russian Aeroflot cargo planes bringing in Soviet weaponry and MiG fighter aircraft landing and taking off continually on exercises.

## Luanda

Luanda is Angola's capital and largest city with a population of 1 200 000 in 1982, subsequently swelled by migrants from the war-torn countryside. The city stands on a large natural harbour, protected by an offshore sandspit, in which vessels of any size can anchor. As evidence of a run-down economy, the *New African* describes the city as displaying an air of "neglect and decay" in the poverty of its commercial activity and in its flourishing black market.

Deep water port facilities were first provided in 1945 with the building of a quay capable of accommodating eight large vessels. Commercial traffic through the port has fallen from 2 324 000 tonnes in 1973 to only 942 000 tonnes in 1985. While goods loaded (exports) have steadily dropped from 185 000 tonnes in 1980 to 104 000 in 1985, goods unloaded (imports) have increased from 612 000 tonnes to 838 000, much of this being food. Hodges writes that in addition to low freight volumes "port efficiency is low, especially at Luanda". Inadequate unloading, transporting and storage facilities for container traffic, poor organization and a poorly motivated work force give rise to long delays in clearing goods from the port.

Luanda's rich agricultural hinterland, responsible for most of Angola's coffee production, is served by a 423 km railway to Malange, commenced in 1886 and completed in 1909. In pre-independence days Luanda exported over 80 per cent of Angola's coffee, together with other commodities, and the railway carried 301 000 tonnes of goods in 1973. Since then, because of the decline in coffee production, recent competition from road transport and sporadic guerrilla attacks, traffic on the railway fell to only 63 000 tonnes in 1985.

Improvements to Luanda's harbour and access routes are now planned as part of a larger programme, estimated to cost \$340 million, to refurbish and rebuild Angola's port, railway, road and airport infrastructure. Thus roads from Luanda to Uige, to Malange and Saurimo, including the diamond mining area of north-eastern Angola, are to be rehabilitated, as is the Malange railway. Funds for the first stages of this work are being sought. Over and above this programme, plans for the restoration of the Lobito corridor are also being prepared (see below), all indicative of the tremendous reconstruction required in order to get the country's economy back on

its feet. However, until hostilities end, oil prices recover and donor countries come forward to assist financially, these plans will remain nothing more than plans.

### Lobito corridor

Like Luanda, the port of Lobito is also protected by a sandspit. It has 8 berths for freighters and a tanker terminal for the off-loading of petroleum products. Its bulk ore-loading plant, however, has been inoperative for a number of years due to the closure of the Benguela railway from Shaba in Zaire in 1975. This 1 300 km railway from Lobito to the Zaire border was commenced in 1903 and connected with the line to the Shaba (then Katanga) copper mines in 1931. Until 1950, when the *Société Générale* purchased the railway from the British South Africa Company, little use had been made of the line for the export of copper or other minerals. The Belgians preferred to use their own rail and river route, the *voie nationale*, to the port of Matadi at the mouth of the Zaire river. Also, by agreement, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) exported its copper via Indian Ocean ports.

Subsequently, Zaire switched much of its copper traffic to the Benguela railway not only because this was the shortest route to the coast and to Europe but also as a result of increased difficulties on its *voie nationale*. Moreover, when the border between Zambia and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was closed in 1973 during the Rhodesian war, Zambia had little option but to make increasing use of the Benguela route. In the process the railway's owners and the Angolan government earned a substantial income from the use both of the railway and the port.

In 1973 the railway carried 2 567 000 tonnes of commercial freight, of which traffic to and from Zaire and Zambia accounted for 1 640 000 tonnes, or 64 per cent. The port of Lobito handled 2 545 000 tonnes in that year. In 1975, during the war of liberation with Portugal the line was put out of action and Zaire closed its border with Angola. In 1978 the line was formally reopened after agreement between the governments of Zaire and Angola, but only a "trickle" of traffic flowed across the border as the civil war with Unita was now in full swing. The line was closed again in 1982 when Unita resumed its attacks.

In 1987 talks were held between those countries concerned about reopening the line, and the *Société Générale* was approached to discuss the prospects for its rehabilitation. It now owns 90 per cent of shares in the railway through a subsidiary company and the Angolan government owns 10 per cent. However, the security situation remains little changed at mid-1988 and Unita continues to keep the line closed over most of its length. The result is seen in the fall of inbound and outbound traffic to

262 000 tonnes in 1985, all of which was domestic traffic, or to only 10 per cent of the total carried in 1973. Even domestic traffic in 1985 was down to only 28 per cent of the 927 000 tonnes carried in 1973. Financial loss to the *Société Générale* runs into millions of dollars, over and above the revenue lost to the Angolan government at the port. Traffic through the port declined drastically from 2 500 000 tonnes in 1973 to only 522 000 tonnes in 1985 and 440 000 tonnes in 1987, of which some 90 per cent were imports.

The railway is now inoperative over nearly two-thirds of its length to the Zaire border. Trains run regularly on the 30 km coastal stretch to the town of Benguela but intermittently and under guard to Huambo some 350 km further east and very occasionally to Kuito in Bie province.

The Benguela railway, or Lobito corridor, is one of five main export routes whose rehabilitation is a prime objective of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in its efforts to reduce the dependence of its member states on South Africa's railways and harbours. The use of the South African transport system, particularly by Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, has greatly increased in recent years because of wars in Mozambique and in the then Rhodesia up to the time of the independence of these two countries in 1975 and 1980 respectively, and as the result of continued dissident activity on the part of Renamo rebels against the Mozambican Frelimo government since 1975. During this time the Indian Ocean ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala have been, in effect, partly or fully closed to Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi for their international trade. Thus, South African outlets have had to be resorted to, at considerable cost since distances were much longer. The three Mozambican ports, as well as Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, are now all in advanced stages of rehabilitation. In addition, once the use of Lobito is restored these five ports could more than cope with traffic from Zaire and Southern Africa's landlocked states.

While it is obvious that work on the Lobito corridor cannot begin until peace and security return to Angola, the SADCC, the *Société Générale* and the Angolan government have reached agreement on a ten-year programme of rehabilitation of the railway, the port, roads, telecommunications and civil aviation facilities. The estimated cost is nearly \$600 million. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, this will include an emergency phase of 1½ years, costing \$114 million, which will at least start international traffic moving once more to the port. A second phase, costing \$305 million, will involve upgrading the port and rehabilitating roads and electricity supplies while a third phase, to cost \$156 million, will see further improvements to the port and the railway, in-

cluding the construction of a container terminal at the port. By the year 2000 the railway and the port should have a capacity of 3 million tonnes per year compared with 2.6 million carried by the line in 1974.

However, these estimates are questionable. *Africa Economic Digest* reports that the chairman of Tanks Consolidated Investments, the *Société Générale's* subsidiary which holds the Benguela operating concession, has stated that the company "has no idea how much repair work is necessary". Moreover, a planned meeting between the SADCC and possible international donors has been postponed a number of times, indicating the generally tentative attitude towards the line's rehabilitation while uncertainties and hostilities persist. Prospects for peace in Angola do seem to have brightened in the past six months (see below) and, should the security situation significantly improve, Tanks has indicated that it is ready to send a survey team to assess the damage and the costs of repair.

### Namibe

Namibe, formerly Moçamedes, is situated on an open bay with easy access. It was first provided with deep water facilities in 1950. The port's main function was the loading of iron ore from the mines at Cassinga, opened in 1957 and located about 650 km by rail from the port. However, due to falling profitability and at a time when hostilities were escalating in southern Angola, the mines were closed in 1975. Mechanical loading facilities for the ore are located at Porto Saco, 10 km from the general cargo port, where vessels of up to 200 000 dwt can be accommodated. In 1973 the port handled 6 379 000 tonnes of exports, of which iron ore accounted for 97.5 per cent. By 1985 traffic was down to 171 000 tonnes, of which only 6 000 tonnes were exports.

The railway serving Namibe was built to Sa da Bandeira, now Lubango, between 1905 and 1923. It was later extended to Serpa Pinto, now Menongue, giving it a total length of 798 km. A 90 km branch line to the Cassinga mines was later added. With the closure of the mines, rail traffic fell from 6 409 000 tonnes in 1973 to 265 000 tonnes in 1981 and, following continuing attacks on the line, to 196 000 tonnes in 1985. From Namibe to Lubango and eastwards to Matala, a distance of about 400 km, the line operates fairly regularly, but beyond that town, for another 400 km, it has been largely inoperative since it runs through strongly-held Unita territory in the province of Kuando Kubango.

A feasibility study of the mines has recently been undertaken but, the security problem apart, their reopening will depend on a substantial improvement in world prices for iron ore and on obtaining the funds necessary for the rehabilitation of the mines

and the railway.

The future commercial viability of the port is uncertain until peace returns but a SADCC report has been prepared with Swedish assistance and its rehabilitation forms part of the larger transportation plan for Angola, referred to earlier. Meanwhile, in April and May 1988 there was a considerable escalation of military and support activity at the ports of Lobito and Namibe, with the advance of some 15 000 Cuban and Angolan troops into southern Africa as far as the Namibian border.

## Conclusion

Overall, the task facing the rehabilitation of Angola's non-oil economy is daunting. Hodges notes that "the disruption of the internal transport system is one of the principal barriers to economic recovery". The cost of recovery will make heavy demands on Angola's own funds, so much of which are going to the unproductive military sector, and on those from international lending agencies and donor countries. Hodges sees little prospect for export diversification or for the recovery within the next five years of its once major export industries — coffee, dia-

monds and iron ore. But, as has already been pointed out, the country's potential is considerable.

An international seminar on the rehabilitation of Angola's coffee production was held in February 1988, aimed at restoring "the outstanding role" that coffee once played in the economy. The SADCC has completed a feasibility study on integrating Angola's northern, central and southern electric power systems, while its proposed rehabilitation of the country's ports and railways, including the vital Benguela railway, will resuscitate its foreign exchange earnings and revitalize its agriculture.

For Angola, as Hodges indicates, "a return to peace is the indispensable condition for a broad based economic recovery". In the light of negotiations now proceeding between the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments there are now reassuring signs that peace might be returning in the foreseeable future. By July 1988 these countries had reached agreement on a set of principles upon which the road to peace could be based. By 1 September South African troops had pulled out of Angola in terms of the agreement and had returned to bases in northern Namibia. However, thus

far consideration of Unita's future role in Angola's political development does not figure in the trilateral talks. Thus, Unita's opposition to the MPLA government persists and its attacks upon towns and installations, including the Benguela railway, continue. Peace in Angola will come not only when the external actors — the Soviet Union, the United States, Cuba and South Africa — are removed from the scene but when the country's internal divisions are also resolved.

## Sources:

*Africa Analysis* (UK); *Africa Confidential* (UK); *Africa Economic Digest* (UK); *Africa Research Bulletin* (UK); *African Business* (UK); *Angola Press Service (Angop)*; *BFAI Market Information* (West Germany); *EASA, Trade and Investment in Eastern and Southern Africa* (UK); *Economist Intelligence Unit* (EIU), *Country Profiles* (annual), *Country Reports* (Quarterly), *Quarterly Energy Review and Annual Supplement* (UK); W A Hance, *A geography of modern Africa* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1975); T Hodges, *Angola to the 1990s — the potential for recovery* (Special report 1079, EIU, 1987); *Lloyds of London Press, Ports of the World* (UK); *Modern Africa* (UK); *New African* (UK); *SADCC Energy* (Angola); *UN Energy Statistics Yearbook* (NY).

# African art and artist: A new identity?

*Professor E J de Jager of the Department of African Studies at the University of Fort Hare discusses the relationship between African Expressionism and classic African art.*

## Introduction

The colonization of Africa by the European powers — Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain — especially following the “Great Scramble” of the 1880s, led to large-scale cultural contact and conflict between the two continents. As a result Africa has undergone great changes in almost every aspect of its existence, be it social, economic, political, educational or religious.

The process of acculturation in Africa has been studied in great detail by economists, anthropologists, sociologists, educationists and others, and consequently we have a fairly good idea of what has happened in most of these spheres of existence. There are, however, aspects of this cultural contact and change that are not so well known and which by comparison have received little attention. One such aspect is the field of aesthetics and art, especially the visual arts in plastic and pictorial form. Such research as does exist focuses almost exclusively on reconstructing African art as it existed before the era of partition, or is aimed at establishing what happened to traditional art forms under the onslaught of acculturation. This article is aimed at establishing what happened to the African artist and his work in the modern dimension, that is those artists who have largely broken with traditional society and who work in contemporary universal styles, forms and techniques.

## Art and artist in old Africa

In order to understand what has happened to the contemporary African artist it is necessary to look very briefly at traditional African society, in so far as this affected aesthetic and artistic expression.

It is important to remember that traditional African art should not be seen as a mono-

lithic entity. There were regional variations, and consequently important differences in style and form. However, since the philosophy and world-view underlying traditional African art was basically the same everywhere, I will refer mainly to what has become known as *classic African art*, that is the art of the societies found along the two great river systems of West and Central Africa — the Niger and the Congo. It was the art of these regions that first impressed and appealed to the Western mind and that constitutes an outstanding contribution to universal culture. The lasting qualities of classic African art derive from the response it draws from the viewer, and the way in which it reflects the universal values of human expression.

The fundamental basis for the existence of classic African art is contained in *the relationship between art and the societies in which it was produced*. Its basic aim and purpose was to assist in controlling the social, psychological, spiritual and cosmic forces that affected and determined the very existence of society. These forces were of a personal nature and consequently could be personified in masks, heads and figures, which therefore had strong totemic characteristics. By personifying these forces in this way society could manipulate them during rituals and ceremonies (Plates 1, 2 and 3).

This is not the place to discuss traditional African philosophy, world-view and religion in any detail. Briefly stated, however, traditional African religion involved a belief in a supreme or creator god; and the conviction that man was central to creation, that the spirits of the deceased (ancestor spirits) could influence the lives of the living, and that a person, alive or dead, could directly influence another by manipulating the life forces present in all organic and inorganic created forms. *Animism* and *animatism* were thus basic to religious beliefs and per-

ceptions in traditional African culture and society. In this context, the authority Laude had the following to say about the social function and purpose of African art objects:

They all aim to trap nonmaterial forces, but only in order to augment the group's life-force. . . . Their second mission is to control the force which, if allowed to wander freely and indiscriminately, would pose a serious threat to the collectivity . . . also [to] shield man from genii and spirits and from the liberated and scattered energies in nature.<sup>1</sup>

The above is confirmed also by other authorities on traditional African art, for example, Duerden<sup>2</sup> and Bleakley.<sup>3</sup>

This does not mean that classic African art was without aesthetic considerations, but merely that these were not the prime motivation in their creation. It can be said that the societies in which classic African art originated and existed were characterized by a *religious-sacral nature* that permeated all aspects of life. Fundamentally, the *raison d'être* of classic African art was, therefore, social and spiritual rather than aesthetic and artistic.

The result was that in traditional African society the scope of the artist was determined by what his clients needed in this religious-sacral sphere and it prescribed to the artist the very nature of what he had to produce. It also laid down the canon and conventions within which the artist had to create. Once again we may quote Laude who, with reference to the artist in traditional African society, unequivocally states:

. . . an artist is not free to choose his themes, which are prescribed by the future owner; neither is he free to choose his technique since, theoretically, he is bound to the style of the group in which he works. Not once in the course of his work does he yield to subjective impulses, at least not consciously. . . . The artist works within a framework of regulations which define the purpose of the





**Plate 1** Bobo mask, Burkina Faso  
(Collection, University of Fort Hare)

finished pieces and specify the stylistic conventions.<sup>4</sup>

Other scholars and students of African art confirm this, amongst others, Brian<sup>5</sup> and Chesi.<sup>6</sup>

It is very important to note that the art objects of Africa, especially those that have become classic in their own right and which can be found all over the world in prominent art museums, galleries and collections, have great intrinsic aesthetic and artistic merit, even without reference to the social and religious circumstances surrounding their creation. However, for the purpose of clarity and a full understanding and appreciation of classic African art, it should also be pointed out that it was the Western (European) mind that first distinguished these objects as art objects *per se*, and often separated them from the social and religious context within which they were conceived. Fortunately today those scholars seriously trying to understand African culture and society of the past, realize that these art objects were not created gratuitously but were inextricably linked to the societies and cultures within which they were created.

Art was not created in a social and cultural vacuum, and the objects were not isolated and exclusive creative manifestations; they were created to form part of a larger whole with a defined role to play and were inseparable from their religious-sacral nature and magical significance.

### The new African artist

Under the new conditions brought about by contact with European culture, the gifted modern African artist is relieved from the tribal chores and duties that bound him under the old system. His art now offers him a means of subsistence and monetary reward, and thus independence. This gives him a socio-economic mobility unheard of in the old system. Creatively he has also become independent. He is freed from the rules and norms that prescribed creativity under the traditional system, as well as the group-oriented thought processes of that society.

The art of the contemporary African artist has become individualized. It is no longer anonymous or merely attributed to a certain tribe. In sociological terms the artist's status is now achieved and no longer ascribed. He has become a critical rather than a passive participant and is able to make an individual



**Plate 2** Malinke female figure, Mali  
(Collection, University of Fort Hare)

contribution. The artist reacts outside of the narrow confines of his own society, and has a much larger audience. He can direct his art at people outside of his own group and can even become a critic of his own community. The merits of his art are now determined by the personal and intrinsic qualities of his work and it is judged by more objective and universal aesthetic criteria.

To summarize, it can be said that the contemporary African artist's creative actions are no longer prescribed, secluded and consecrated acts. He has creatively, by comparison with the traditional African artist, become a "free agent".

### African art today: The new identity — Neo-African Expressionism

Even a superficial viewing and analysis of contemporary African art reveals that it belongs to the art style that has become known



**Plate 3** Dogon door, Mali  
(Collection, University of Fort Hare)

Reproduced from the Publisher (dated 2010)

as *Expressionism*.<sup>7</sup> Thus the contemporary African artist expresses himself in a style characterized by stylistic exaggeration and distortion of form, spontaneity and vitality, an abandonment of naturalism but not of realism, an expression of inner life and a projection of personal emotion.

Although the term "Expressionism" was first used in the avant-garde periodical *Der Sturm* in Munich in 1912 to describe the revolutionary art movements that arose in Germany during the decade before the outbreak of World War I, it is not a phenomenon peculiar to the twentieth century. Throughout the ages artists have used the stylistic qualities associated with this twentieth-century art movement to express themselves. This also applies to classic African art. It would, therefore, not be wrong to state that both classic and contemporary African art belong to the creative approach and style that have become known as "Expressionism" and that there are thus important stylistic and creative links between them.

Classic and contemporary African art, however, share more than just this label. Other continuities and links that contemporary African art shares with classic African art and with the continent from which it originates, qualify it to be called *African Expressionism*. At the same time contemporary African art is not merely a continuation, or a modified form, of classic African art. It is fully part of the modern world, and more specifically of modern Africa. Contemporary African art expresses its own particular identity, an identity that can best be called *Neo-African Expressionism*. The African artist of the present, as well as the past, seems to have a special and natural affinity for the style and forms of Expressionism.

As already mentioned, no artist ever creates in a social and cultural vacuum. Naturally this also applies to the contemporary African artist. He has, in the acculturation process, absorbed much that is new, while at the same time maintaining various forms of continuity with the old order. The artist is, for example, still very much attached to his own society and he still reflects in many ways the experiences of this society. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are many similarities to be found between contemporary art and classic African art.

In much contemporary African art urban life is reflected as a penetrating experience. In South Africa proof of this is to be found in the so-called *School of Township Art*,<sup>8</sup> as well as in other art manifestations where this urban awareness or urban consciousness is often subtly blended and fused with African history and legend, and with traditional motifs. This is also found in other parts of Africa. It can be said that in contemporary African art the artist's urban consciousness has largely replaced the religious-sacral nature of the old culture. Also this urban consciousness, together with a search for an




Plate 4 Charles Nkosi, *Human bondage*. Linocut, c 1976

artistic identity, has led to strong undertones of social realism, which is also reflected in African literature (drama, prose and poetry), theatre, music and dancing (Plate 4).

For the contemporary African artist, this link with his society, and the presence of urban awareness and social realism in his art, is often reinforced by factors of a broader social nature. In South Africa, for example,

African artists tend to have a common socio-economic environment and background, their inspirational sources are still largely similar and uniform, and their social, economic and political status is still very much ascribed.<sup>9</sup>

Other continuities with traditional art can be found in technical and conceptual links, and in the retention of a certain spiritual es-

sence, as expressed in philosophy, world-view and perceptions of humanity.

A review of contemporary African sculpture, for example, reveals a conceptual and technical link with classic African sculpture.<sup>10</sup> In much contemporary African sculpture one detects the same feeling of natural restriction brought about by the tree trunk form; the same solidity of mass; the same absence of outward movement from the central axis of the sculpture; the same qualities of distortion, elongation of the torso, simplicity of form; and the same solidified feeling of movement (Plate 5).

Many contemporary African artists establish a link with traditional African culture by drawing heavily on tradition, custom, legend and folklore and the natural environment (Plate 5). These sources are adapted according to their own personal experiences and the images produced are consequently rendered in an intimate and artistically individual manner. Often these sources and other elements of African culture, such as a deep-seated mysticism and an anthropocentric (humanistic) and spiritual perception of man, are blended and fused with contemporary experiences and feelings. In this way a synthesis is brought about between the old, the new and what is personal to the artist. The contemporary African artist consequently creates from a new level of awareness what can be called his version of modern art, so revealing both his own new identity and that of his art. This, as we have stated, can best be called Neo-African Expressionism.

## Conclusion

I have indicated that both classic and contemporary African art belong to the creative approach and style that became known as Expressionism and that African Expressionism possesses its own peculiar and particular character. Contemporary African art participates fully in modern Africa through a fusion of the old and the new and has



**Plate 5** Sidney Kumalo, Upright figure. Bronze, 1974 (Collection, University of Fort Hare)

reached a new level of creative awareness. There is every justification for referring to this as Neo-African Expressionism.

Typical of this Neo-African Expressionism is that it shares all the characteristics of an Expressionistic approach, that it has man as central concern, that it reflects a particular historical and social reality, and that it has many stylistic, conceptual and spiritual qua-

lities in common with the art of old Africa. At the same time there is a reflection of the pulsating reality of the modern world. The synthesis of old and new often reflects an anticipation of the future.

We are fortunate indeed to belong to the generation that can observe at first hand the birth of this new African art, that we can witness its gestation, its coming into being. Although at the same time we mourn the passing of the old, classic African art, it would be pointless to regret it and not appreciate or welcome the new. History and human nature teach us that this has always been the way in which new cultural traditions and artistic trends are born; that human culture is not static but dynamic and ever changing; that out of the passing of the old is born the new. Willet<sup>11</sup> is therefore correct in stating that it seems likely that posterity will judge the second half of the twentieth century to have been a period of artistic renaissance for Africa as a whole.

## References

- 1 J Laude, *The arts of black Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, pp 244–245.
- 2 D Duerden, *African art*, Feltham: Paul Hamlyn, 1968, pp 8–9.
- 3 R Bleakley, *African masks*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1978.
- 4 Laude, *op cit*, p 98.
- 5 R Brian, *Art and society in Africa*, London: Longman, 1980, p 261.
- 6 G Chesi, *The last Africans*, Cape Town: C Struik, 1977, p 15.
- 7 W Gaunt, *Everyman's dictionary of pictorial art*, London: J M Dent, 1969, p 225.
- 8 E J de Jager, "Township art in Southern Africa", *Fort Hare Papers*, vol 7, no 6, 1984.
- 9 E J de Jager, "Contemporary African art in South Africa", *Africa Insight*, vol 17, no 3, 1987, pp 209–210.
- 10 E J de Jager, "Contemporary African sculpture in South Africa", *Fort Hare Papers*, vol 6, no 6, 1978.
- 11 F Willet, *African art — an introduction*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1971, p 239.

# AFRICA MONITOR



## Africa Monitor May – August 1988

Jenny Macgregor

### AFRICA

Millions of tons of **toxic chemical waste** which cannot be easily disposed of in Europe or America is being secretly dumped in West African states in exchange for large payments. Nearly a dozen countries are thought either to have signed contracts to accept industrial waste, are negotiating such contracts, or have been approached to do so. Nigeria recalled its ambassador to **Italy** in protest against the discovery of more than 1 000 tonnes of Italian chemical waste, while in Guinea a Norwegian firm was found to have dumped 15 000 tonnes of toxic waste from the United States. European and United States companies are reported to have signed contracts with Guinea Bissau to export three million tonnes a year of industrial waste for \$120 mn per year. Nigeria, embarrassed by the discovery of 3 884 tonnes of waste after it had urged African countries to reject such ideas, has now taken an uncompromising stance. Côte d'Ivoire has introduced stringent laws against dealings in toxic industrial waste, with fines and imprisonment of 15–20 years being legislated, and in May the **Organization of African Unity**, prompted by Nigeria and Togo, adopted a resolution condemning the dumping of toxic wastes, a move followed by the European Parliament's ban of large-scale export of toxic waste to the Third World (AC 24/5; S 10/6,16/6; SWB 18/6; DT 15/6; WA 13/6; AED 24/6).

### NORTH AFRICA

#### Algeria

Algeria and **Morocco** have restored **diplomatic relations**, the border between the two countries has been opened and travel restrictions eased. Ties were severed in 1976 when Algeria began backing the anti-Moroccan guerillas of the **Polisario Front**. The move reflects a shared desire for a solution to the Western Sahara conflict in the light of recent negotiations (SWB 18/5,7/6; WA 25/5; DT 7/6).

#### Chad

The International Development Association is to provide a \$47 mn loan for the rehabilitation of 2 000 km of high priority roads, including the rebuilding of the two main arterial roads linking the capital with the northern roads system and the highway linking the capital with industrial and farm centres in the south (WA 16/5; AED 27/5).

The World Bank has granted the government over \$44 mn towards a **financial rehabilitation programme** which focuses on public finance and a comprehensive plan to restructure the cotton sector (AED 5/88).

Libya's recent promise to release 355 Chadian prisoners is being seen by Chad as a bid to disguise the lack of progress made by the two countries towards a lasting solution to their long-standing conflict. Chad has also expressed doubts that those to be released are in fact all Chadian prisoners of war (SWB 12/7; AED 26/8). (See also *Libya*.)

#### Egypt

A decade of **Nile drought** is having serious consequences, with only 6 bn cubic metres left of the 110 bn cubic metres of live storage water normally in Lake Nasser. The Aswan High Dam power station is in danger of being shut down, and Egypt's projected food and cash crop production over the next few years is being dramatically revised downwards. Most growth projections were based on the assumption that the **Jonglei canal project**, held up by the Sudanese civil war, would by now have been completed (AA 27/5; South 6/88; DT 23/6). (See also *Angola*.)

#### Libya

Marking the 25th anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Pres Gaddafi has announced his **recognition of the Chadian regime** and has undertaken to end all the outstanding problems between the two countries. Habré has expressed his willingness to normalize relations

with Libya, but has rejected Gaddafi's invitation to attend a national reconciliation meeting with Goukouni Oueddei. Gaddafi has made no mention of the **Aouzou Strip**, which remains the main point of contention between Libya and Chad (SWB 27/5–30/5; DT 31/5,3/6; WR 3/6; WA 6/6,13/6).

(See also *Chad, Nigeria, Uganda*.)

#### Morocco

Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) have accepted in principle a UN peace plan for **Western Sahara** which calls for a formal ceasefire within one month and a referendum within six months. 2 000 UN soldiers will act as a monitoring force during the period leading up to the **referendum**. Morocco will reduce its troops in Western Sahara from 50 000 to the level of Polisario's forces — an estimated 8 000, while Polisario fighters will be confined to certain areas (DT 23/8; AA 2/9; E 3/9).

Fears over possible job losses have brought Morocco's **privatization programme** to a virtual standstill, leaving bus services as the only public enterprises to have passed into private hands. The original aim was for an initial 500 of the 2 000 state firms to be sold. The programme, based on the British model, is designed to free the state from the heavy financial burden of subsidizing its often unprofitable enterprises, and forms a major part of the IMF-sponsored adjustment programme. The problem is that the grossly overstaffed companies can be made attractive to private buyers only by a massive shedding of workers, but this would cause enormous social and political strains because of pressing unemployment problems. In other respects, Morocco's adjustment programme is on schedule and showing positive results — in 1987 there was a current account surplus of \$164 mn, and a budget surplus of \$358 mn — both the first for many years (AA 2/9). (See also *Algeria*.)

#### Sudan

Prime Minister Sadiq-el-Mahdi has confirmed that **Islamic Shari'a laws** would be revived for

Sudan's Moslem majority. The **Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)**, which has been fighting since 1983 to end what it sees as the rule of a Moslem minority clique, says Shari'a must be repealed before peace talks can start (DT 3/5).

The International Committee of the Red Cross has begun its first major **famine relief** in two years in southern Sudan, following the approval of a food distribution plan by both the government and the rebel SPLA (C 15/7).

The prime minister announced the formation of 27-member **national unity government** on 14 May. In a wide-ranging government restructuring, the finance and economic planning portfolio has gone to former agriculture minister Oman Nour el-Diam of the Umma party (AED 20/5).

The government declared a **state of emergency** in August following torrential rains which caused the **worst flooding this century**. Almost half Khartoum's estimated 4 million population, and an unknown number of people in towns in the east and north of the country, were reported to be homeless, all the major crop-growing areas were affected, and roads between Khartoum and Port Sudan were cut. Damage in the northern region has been estimated at \$111 mn. The southern part of the country was also severely affected by the floods, aggravating the already acute food shortage created by the civil war. Little of the aid pledged recently by the international community seems to be reaching the area, the result according to foreign ambassadors, of the **army seizing supplies** at the airport and diverting them to the black market or to government troops (AED 12/8, 19/8, 2/9; AA 19/8).  
(See also Kenya.)

## Tunisia

Ethiopia and **Tunisia** have agreed to restore **diplomatic relations** which were severed 13 years ago (SWB 28/5).

Pres Ben Ali has taken control of the Ministry of Defence, in addition to his role as head of the armed forces. This is the first time for nearly a quarter of a century that such a position has been held in Tunisia. The move gives him better control over the army at a time when the country is undergoing a period of transformation. Other moves in the reshuffle reflect the desire to bring in younger cadres and achieve greater efficiency (ARB 15/5).

**Agricultural production** for 1988 is estimated to be down by 15 per cent, the result of droughts, locusts and sirocco winds, causing the loss of an estimated 50 000 jobs in the agricultural sector (ARB 31/7).

One of the principal opponents of ex-president Bourguiba, M Ahmed Ben Salah, an exponent of the planned economy, returned to Tunisia on 16 June, after receiving an amnesty from Pres Ben Ali. He left the country 15 years ago after escaping from prison (ARB 15/7).

At the three-day **party congress** held at the end of July, Pres Ben Ali imposed his personal stamp on the ruling party, which former president Bourguiba dominated for more than half a century, when he reorganized the leadership of Tunisia's ruling party. New appointments make up some two-thirds of the party's central committee. Three Bourguiba-era ministers were also sacked in the cabinet reshuffle just before the congress (when nearly half the cabinet was changed). President of both the party and the state, Pres Ben Ali ended the three-day "congress of salvation" with

strong hints that he intends to remain firmly at the helm of both party and government, and that any pluralistic reforms will be of his own making (C 1/8; S 2/8).

## WEST AFRICA

### Burkina Faso

Capt Campaore received a cordial but cool reception from Zambian officials on his recent **image-rebuilding campaign** visit to the country. His visit to Nigeria in April was also marked by criticism from the media about his person and his regime (AC 12/5; ARB 15/5).

More than one-third of the population require urgent food and medical aid due to drought and locust infestation. This year's overall food deficit is estimated at 100 000 tonnes (AED 22/7).

Campaore reshuffled his government in August, continuing late Pres Sankara's practice of annually changing the cabinet (AED 2/9).

### Côte d'Ivoire

The World Bank has estimated that the country's financing gap for 1988 has now reached \$1 343 mn. Further lending is being considered by the Bank, but approval depends on whether the government adopts further revenue-raising measures (AED 3/6).

In April commercial creditor banks in the London Club officially agreed to **reschedule** almost all the country's **principal debt** of \$2 493 mn — 30 per cent of total external obligations, estimated at \$8 603 mn. Finalization of the accord is crucial because an unusually high proportion of external debt comprises commercial loans. It should allow the state to cover the projected 1988 financing gap and resume debt service, suspended in May 1987 (AED 6/5; DT 9/5; AA 13/5).

The government has, however, failed to meet a target date for resuming current interest payments on a \$310 mn debt due to commercial banks. This has clouded prospects for the durability of the rescheduling agreement negotiated with the London Club in April. France is now putting together a financial package to help the country, with huge cocoa stocks being put up as collateral for an emergency loan package (AED 17/6; AA 24/6).

Côte d'Ivoire, which supplies one third of the world's **cocoa**, has vowed to continue to **withhold supplies** from the international cocoa industry to drive up prices. The price of cocoa, which accounts for 40 per cent of export earnings, was at its lowest in real terms for 50 years in May. An estimated 150 000 tonnes had accumulated at the port of Abidjan (AA 24/6; DT 24/6). However, the government's policy of restricting cocoa sales, in the hope of forcing up prices unilaterally, may have to be abandoned or modified because of the country's growing foreign exchange crisis. About 50 000 tonnes of cocoa was sold in July when the highest prices since February were paid, but with the consequent fall again in prices, stockpiling of last season's crop continued. Trade forecasts predict that the 1988/89 crop will set a new record — above the 635 000 tonnes of last year, adding to the expected global surplus. Prices reached a seven-year low at the end of August (AED 29/7, 9/9; C 27/8).

Four thousand wild animals are to be air-freighted from **South Africa** to Côte d'Ivoire over the next three years in what is seen as a major coup for **conservation sharing** in Africa. If successful, the R5 mn project is expected to set a precedent for major wildlife exporting from South Africa (SS 14/8).

Border discussions between Côte d'Ivoire and **Ghana** at the end of July have resulted in the agreement to a **fixed definition** of the 400-mile long **border** between the two countries, bringing a solution to a deeply rooted, and economically and emotionally complicated problem. The area under dispute was valuable agricultural land along the northern and central parts of the frontier (WA 15/8).

(See also Africa.)

### Gambia

The application of **economic reforms** since 1985, together with good weather and substantial external financing flows, are the factors behind the rise in real GDP by 5.4 per cent in 1986/87, and the decline in inflation from 46 per cent in 1986/87 to an average 13.2 per cent. The economy, however, is still vulnerable because of the narrowness of the production base, with groundnuts accounting for 20 per cent of GDP and 15 per cent of exports (ARB 31/6, 31/7).

### Ghana

Aware of the economic potential of the mining sector, the government is giving high priority to its upgrading and expansion. Mining generates almost a fifth of the country's export earnings. Notably Ghana is to increase **gold production** (gold accounts for more than four-fifths of the total value of mineral exports) and earn more foreign exchange through a \$120 mn project that will help rehabilitate the State Gold Mining Corporation (SGMC), strengthen the Minerals Commission and the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, and make small-scale mining operation more efficient (WBN 24/7, S11/7).

The World Bank has approved a \$100 mn interest-free credit to Ghana to support a programme of **reforms** aimed at strengthening the **banking and financial systems**. The World Bank believes that the continued success of the reform programme depends on a sound financial sector capable of handling investment growth and increased private sector activity (AED 20/5; AA 27/5; WBN 22/7; H 15/6; WA 20/6).

Under pressure from smuggling and from traders using cocoa as a means of acquiring hard currency, the government has granted an 18 per cent increase in the producer price of cocoa. The price rise is part of the government's attempt to raise living standards and to encourage **cocoa** farmers to grow more, despite the slump in world cocoa prices. Producer prices for both coffee and shea nut have also been increased — by 19 per cent and 1 per cent respectively (ARB 31/7; AA 2/9).

**West Germany** has **cancelled bilateral debts** worth \$212 mn, out of a total \$500 mn. The move is part of West Germany's proposal to write off \$1 281 mn in principal and interest arrears from six African countries (AED 19/8).

Head of State Jerry Rawlings received a warm reception from Togolese leader, Pres Eyadema, when he visited Togo in June for the first time.

Tension has been high between the two since September 1987 when Togo accused Ghana of complicity in a coup attempt (NA 9/88). (See also Côte d'Ivoire.)

## Guinea

Rehabilitation of the rundown and inadequate road network — long considered a priority to economic revival — is now receiving World Bank support. In the first phase, costing \$200 mn, important trade and business routes will be upgraded. The long-term aim is to rebuild about 10 000 km of the network (AED 24/6).

The first phase of Guinea's **economic adjustment programme**, launched in 1985, has shown positive results: in 1987 the economy grew by 6 per cent in real terms, inflation fell from 78 per cent in 1986 to 33 per cent, and private sector participation in the economy has grown (WA 20/6).

The World Bank has given endorsement to Guinea's economic adjustment programme by the granting of \$63 mn structural adjustment loan. Guinea is still awaiting a decision from France on whether to grant the country re-entry into the **franc zone**, a move which will be a key indicator of the country's economic well-being (AA 22/7). (See also Africa.)

## Guinea Bissau

The government's **structural adjustment programme**, launched in early 1987, has resulted in a 34 per cent increase in exports, although there has also been a rise in inflation. In May the government reduced subsidies on petroleum products, thereby pushing prices up by an average of 40 per cent (AED 10/6).

(See also Africa.)

## Liberia

Rumours of **corruption**, exacerbated by the recent release of a report itemizing the embezzlement of \$1.3 mn between June 1986 and December 1987, have given added impetus to a series of new measures introduced in an effort to encourage fiscal discipline and economic recovery — the general ban on foreign travel and a freeze on the purchase of new vehicles for government are among the series of new measures (WA 16/5; ARB 30/6). Pres Doe has also directed the General Auditing Bureau to conduct quarterly audits of all public corporations in the country to ensure proper accountability and management of government agencies (ARB 31/8). A *Washington Post* report of 29 May accusing Pres Doe of taking nearly \$750 000 as personal expenses to the OAU summit in May, has been vigorously denied (WA 20/6).

An alleged **armed invasion** on 13 July by a group of 11 led by Nicholas Podier was foiled. The coup attempt resulted in the death of five people including Podier, the former vice head of state who had been in exile since 1986 after an abortive to overthrow Pres Doe. There have been many reports of coup attempts since Doe seized power in the bloody 1980 coup, the most recent in March this year for which 14 people are facing charges of treason. Two US citizens have been charged with treason in connection with this plot. The president is reported to have been consolidating his power in recent weeks, with amendments to the elec-

toral code allowing him to stay in power indefinitely (SWB 16/6; WA 20/6,25/7; AED 22/7,16/9; C 25/7).

## Mali

On 6 June, Pres Moussa Traoré made a major cabinet reshuffle in which he abolished the post of prime minister and dropped five former cabinet members. It is thought unlikely that the reshuffle will affect the outline agreement with the IMF on an 18-month standby facility concluded in early May (SWB 18/6; AED 17/6).

A decision by Mali and **Mauritania** to undertake the **demarcation of their borders** from October, crowns 25 years of discussions and meetings (ARB 15/7).

Mali is becoming one of West Africa's important exporters of **gold**, with recent research showing that a further 22 tonnes exist at Kalana, Mali's first industrial gold mine, and 28 tonnes of Loulo. Gold represents 20 per cent of the country's total export earnings, and because of its low tax of 15 per cent on exports, Mali has become a re-exporter of gold, especially from Guinea and Sierra Leone (AA 8/7).

The government is undertaking a programme under which it hopes to improve the performance of its public enterprises and reduce their burden on the state. The programme will include the **reform of key economic policies** concerning the management of public resources and the structure of economic incentives and reforms in the financial sector (ARB 31/8). On 5 August the IMF announced loans totalling \$59 mn to support the **economic adjustment programme**, which aims to reduce inflation, increase growth and stabilize the external financial position. This amount is in addition to credits totalling \$49.5 mn granted at the end of June for the extensive reform of the public sector. Announcing the loans, the IMF said the country's financial situation has been "deteriorating rapidly" since the end of 1987 (AED 12/8; ARB 31/8).

## Mauritania

The World Bank is to lend \$18.2 mn for a \$37.4 mn five-year education project. The scheme is part of a government reform programme that aims to **shift the focus of the education system**: expanding primary schooling while containing growth of enrolment in higher education, particularly in the humanities and social sciences. Science programmes will be strengthened to help to meet growing demand for technical workers, as will short-term programmes aimed at helping rural areas and the informal sector (AED 5/8; WBN 21/7).

Up to 600 people have been arrested since the end of July in a government offensive against the **Baath Arab Socialist Party**. Former minister Mohamed Yehdih Ould Breidelleyl and academic Memed Ould Ahmed are among those detained, who include hundreds of army and police officers. Observers suggest reasons for the ferocious anti-Baathist purge include the party's success in organizing trade union activity and the possibility of the disclosure of a proposed coup. All the Baathists are from the Beydane ethnic group which dominates the country (SWB 14/7,11/8; AC 9/9) (See also Mali.)

## Niger

On 15 July Pres Saibou carried out an extensive cabinet reshuffle — the second since he took power in November 1987. Long-serving prime minister Hamid Algabid was dropped in favour of his predecessor, Mamane Oumarou, while Allele Habitou is the new minister of foreign affairs. There are seven new ministers in the 23 man cabinet (AED 22/7). On 2 August Pres Saibou announced the creation of a single party, the National Movement for the Developing Society (MNSD) — the first political party to be sanctioned since 1974. The role and place of the new party within the institutions of state are to be defined in a **new constitution**, which will be drafted by the *Conseil National de Developpement* (CND), which was set up by Saibou in June. The CND will become a constituent assembly of 150 members, civilian and military. It will be elected for three years (S 3/8; SWB 4/8; AED 12/8; WA 15/8; ARB 15/9).

## Nigeria

Nigerian **workers**, who had been **striking** in different parts of the country in protest against the 10 April **increase in the prices** of petroleum products, have now returned to work, following a truce on 2 May between the government and labour leaders. The government promised to release detained unionists and speed up salary reviews in the public and private sectors (ARB 31/5; AED 6/5). The 42 trade unions in the country are to be restructured and reduced to 19 by a committee comprising employers and government representatives, so as to make them more manageable (SWB 8/9).

Nigerian **universities** reopened on 31 May six weeks after they were closed following the nationwide student demonstrations against the hike in fuel prices (DT 3/6; WA 30/5).

The newly elected **constituent assembly** which is charged with drafting a new constitution had its inaugural meeting on 11 May. Of the 562 members, 117 were elected, most notable among the latter being the former military governor of Gongola and Benue state, Col Yohana Madaki, now a private legal practitioner. He was among several members who have served in previous administrations, bringing into question the government's stated intention of enforcing the political ban placed on former holders of public office (AC 10/5; SWB 13/5,14/5). At the opening of the new Constituent Assembly the chairman announced that Nigeria's next constitution will contain provisos prohibiting any person or groups from taking over the government by force (WA 13/6; 27/6).

Pres Babangida ended a two-day visit on 30 May to **Libya** after the two countries agreed to boost links and together seek an end to Tripoli's feud with Chad. The setting up of a joint Nigerian-Libyan bank was also discussed. Bilateral strains and Libya's military role in Chad are seen to have contributed to the 5-year delay in the reciprocal visit, following Col Gaddafi's visit to Nigeria in 1983. Babangida's visit is likely to have won him the favour of many Nigerian students and trade unionists who regard Col Gaddafi as the hero of the "down-trodden" (DT 2/6,7/6; SWB 3/6,4/6; AA 10/6).

Nigeria refused to receive **Jonas Savimbi**, leader of the Angolan rebel group Unita, during his 20-country tour of Africa (S 30/6).

An Italian ship has sailed off with 167 containers of **toxic waste** retrieved from the Nigerian port of Koko, where it had been secretly unloaded a year ago. The ship was one of two sent by Italy to remove several thousand tonnes of toxic waste dumped 240 km south-east of Lagos, in response to the Nigerian seizure of an Italian ship to enforce its demand that the waste be removed. In future all incoming cargo will be monitored by environmental task forces (ARB 31/8).

A decree giving legal backing to the **privatization and commercialization programme** of the federal government has been promulgated, with the government now empowered to privatize, wholly or partially, its holding in commercial enterprises. Under the decree, the government is to sell 60 per cent of its shares in the country's three steel rolling mills. Also to be partially privatized are Nigeria Airways, the Nigerian National Shipping Line, and the Nigerian Newsprint Manufacturing Company. Sixty-seven companies are to be fully privatized. One surprise has been the governments refusal to surrender its equity in 12 commercial and merchant banks, a decision thought to spring from their importance to the structural adjustment programme. The decree requires sales of equity to ensure that governments receive fair value for the assets offered and that ownership of shares is fairly distributed, both socially and geographically. Earlier attempts to carry out the programme were frustrated by the arguments from the north that the companies to be disposed of would go to the southerners, who dominate the Nigerian economic and financial scene (DT 19/7; AA 22/7; AED 15/7,22/7,29/7; ARB 31/8).

(See also Africa, Equatorial Guinea.)

## Senegal

The government has presented a balanced **budget** of \$1 685 mn for 1988/89, a 7 per cent rise on the previous year. Structural adjustment efforts begun early in the decade are beginning to reflect positively in a generally improved fiscal position: the inflation rate has been reduced to around 6 per cent, the current account deficit as a proportion of GDP has dropped to just below 11 per cent, and for the third successive year the economy has expanded more rapidly than the population, with GDP growing by an estimated 4 per cent in real terms last year (AED 17/6, WA 6/6, IMF S 16/5).

The government has approved the draft of a **new mining code** — the first comprehensive revision of mining legislation that dates back to 1961 — which aims to boost investment in mineral resources still largely untapped. Mining accounts for around 14 per cent of GDP and has become a significant contributor to exports through sales of **phosphate** rock. This is the only valuable mineral exploited at present, apart from sea salt. The other main mineral resources are iron ore and gold (AED 19/8).

In a bid to defuse the **political crisis** that has gripped the country since the February elections, Pres Diouf has announced substantial **price reductions** for such basic foods as rice, sugar and cooking oil. Furthermore, depressed export earnings due to the low prevailing world price of groundnuts, and the burden of a 50 per cent government subsidy to groundnut producers (which has been the incentive for production to have almost doubled in the past two years) has led the

government to reduce the producer price by 22 per cent. These moves, taken in the face of unprecedented urban unrest in the past two months, are likely to be popular with the urban population who are the main supporters of the opposition *Parti Democratique Senegalais* (PDS) (AED 13/5, ARB 31/5).

Additional efforts to restore political normality have been taken with the leader of the opposition PDS, **Abdoulaye Wade**, been given a notably light, **suspended sentence** of one year's jail, and the state of emergency has been lifted. Diouf has also announced an amnesty bill for political detainees arrested during the pre- and post-election disturbances. Wade's release on 11 May was followed with the surprise offer by Diouf to meet him unconditionally. They have subsequently met on two occasions to organize a "national round-table" as a forum for discussing the country's problems (WA 16/5,30/5; DT 23/5,1/6; AED 27/5,3/6,10/6).

Following the 15 August "**national round table**" meeting, the main opposition party, the *Parti Democratique Senegalais* (PDS) has threatened to withdraw altogether from the talks unless the ruling *Parti Socialiste* provides "solid evidence" of its interest in finding a solution to the country's political problems, most notably a reform of the electoral code and access to the official media. The Democratic League and the Independence and Labour Party (both Marxist groups) also walked out of the meeting. Fourteen activists from opposition political parties were subsequently held for questioning about the staging of a conference on 29 August in defiance of a regional governor's order banning such gatherings. Those held include 12 members of the Democratic League and two members of the PDS. The meeting was set to review the abortive proceedings of the nine party round table talks (AED 26/8; SWB 31/8).

## Sierra Leone

The government has a "**shadow agreement**" with the **IMF** to receive a loan of \$20 mn, without paying off its \$30 mn arrears to the fund. This will give some breathing space to Pres Momoh after his failure to extract any aid from Kuwait and other Gulf states. The government has rejected proposals for installing foreign administrators in several key ministries, although there is to be a monitoring period, running up to the end of the year, during which basic economic reforms will be attempted. IMF insistence on a 60 per cent devaluation of the leone has been rejected by the government (AA 24/6; AED 24/6).

A tight hold on inflation, control of the budget deficit and a flexible exchange rate policy have been promised in the 1988/89 budget. Finance Minister Kanu has reaffirmed the need for agreement with the IMF on a new package of measures, but acknowledged that the government had defaulted on its foreign loan repayments and, as a result, has received no new financial inflows. Economic performance in 1987/88 was poor; per capita income declined, mineral exports fell in value and the overall balance of payments deficit rose to \$122 mn from \$66 mn the previous year (AED 8/7).

Former president **Siaka Stevens**, who ruled from 1968 first as prime minister and then as president until a voluntary handover of power in 1985, **died on 29 May** (AED 3/6; WA 6/6, 13/6).

Bank of Sierra Leone officials are among 23 people who have been brought to court on corruption charges. The government's financial secretary, Peter Kuyembah, is one of those arrested, along with several senior employees of the parastatal Commercial Bank (AA 27/5).

## Togo

Fresh backing for the **financial adjustment and economic recovery programme** for 1988–90 emerged from a recent donor's meeting in Geneva, with pledges totalling \$355 mn. The increased support for adjustment efforts will help to revive economic growth. It will also partly offset the adverse impact on national finances of the estimated \$1 179 mn outstanding external debt — equivalent to 88 per cent of GDP. Total debt service for 1988 is put at \$172 mn, roughly double what the government can afford (AED 17/6). (See also Africa, Ghana.)

## CENTRAL AFRICA

### Cameroon

A cabinet reshuffle in May, considered to be the most far-reaching since Paul Biya became president, saw the departure of 24 ministers and the appointment of 17 new ones. As well as reducing the overall size of the cabinet, Biya has **streamlined decision-making structures** by overhauling the office of the presidency and abolishing four ministries. Biya has outlined his government's priorities for the next five years as economic recovery (an IMF approved reform programme is imminent), national unity and neutrality (SWB 18/5; AED 20/5,27/5; WA 23/5).

### Central African Republic

The World Bank has extended its support for the **economic recovery programme** by approving a structural adjustment loan of \$40 mn which will provide continuing balance of payments support, and help to finance imports for phase two of the structural adjustment programme. The government will pursue further growth-oriented reforms aimed at achieving 4 per cent annual growth by the early 1990s. Phase two of the adjustment programme focuses on agriculture, which is to be liberalized further (AED 24/5; WBN 24/7).

### Congo

Five people were arrested in connection with the plan to dump 1 mn tonnes of **chemical waste** from Europe. They include 3 senior civil servants, who would allegedly have shared payments of about \$4 mn during the three-year period of an illegally-issued import licence. The ruling *Parti Congolais du Travail's* call for "severe and exemplary measures against all those — both near and far — involved in the attempt to import toxic waste into Congo, resulted in two ministers losing their jobs in the cabinet reshuffle of 30 July (AED 24/6,5/8).

(See also Angola.)

## Equatorial Guinea

The government has expelled seven **South Africans** working on **agricultural projects** following strong objections from Nigeria, which described the South African presence as a "threat" to Nigeria's security. Concern in Lagos appeared to centre on the fact that one of the farming projects was on the island of Bioko, only 40 minutes by air from Nigeria's south-eastern oil-fields (SS 15/5; DT 18/5,23/5; S 19/5; SWB 28/5; AED 27/5; ARB 31/5).

At the end June, Severo Moto, the President of the exiled Progressive Party of Equatorial Guinea (PPGE), returned from voluntary exile in Spain to request the legalization of his party. The country remains a one-party state although nine years ago when Pres Obiang came to power, he promised a multi-party democracy. After his fifteen day visit Moto said that political, social and economic chaos is reigning in the country (SWB 29/6; SS 3/7).

The World Bank may force Equatorial Guinea to abandon or significantly modify its scheme to dump **toxic waste** on the island Annobon, 450 km west of Gabon, before agreement can be reached on the economic assistance package being negotiated (AA 2/9).

## Gabon

About 3 500 Africans — mostly fishermen and traders from West and Central African countries — who did not have papers, were recently arrested in Libreville. Gabon claimed in 1985 that Libreville had 80 000 **foreigners** out of a population of 300 000 inhabitants. Concern about the influx of foreigners has led to the minister of foreign affairs announcing plans for expulsions to combat the problem (ARB 15/7).

France has given an important boost to the **structural adjustment programme** with the granting of credits worth \$41 mn. The loan, which is intended to allow the government to regulate domestic debt arrears and finance productive investment, has been given at a special interest rate of 6 per cent (AED 19/8).

## Sao Tomé and Príncipe

**Angola** has started withdrawing its troops from Sao Tomé, reducing the number to 300 from the 3,000 that were in the country in 1975 when they came to the country, at the request of the government, shortly after it gained its independence from Portugal (WA 27/6).

A series of **economic reforms**, including a further devaluation of the dobra, came into effect on 22 July. The dobra has been devalued by about 48 per cent dropping to \$1 = STD100. The prices of consumer goods and fuels have been increased by 60–100 per cent; state subsidies on six basic foods have been halved to 20 per cent of the import price; import tariffs and custom duties go up by 33–50 per cent; producer prices for export crops have been raised by 60–80 per cent and wages in the agricultural sectors increased by 15 per cent (AED 29/7).

## Zaire

The African Development Bank is to extend a grant of about \$1 mn to Zaire for **AIDS research**. The grant will assist in research on the vaccine,

the "**MM I**" drug — coined from the initials of Zairean President Mobutu, and Egyptian President Mubarak (WA 23/5, 20/6).

Defence chiefs from Angola and Zaire have held talks in Lusaka on alleged airlifts of weapons from Zaire to **Unita** rebels in Angola. Angola has accused the United States of supplying Unita with weapons through Zaire (S 11/6,14/6; SWB 8/6).

Foreign Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond has expressed Zaire's willingness to serve as **mediator** between the Angolan government and the Unita rebels. In June Zaire hosted a meeting between Unita rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, and Chester Crocker, US State Department Head of African Affairs (DN 14/6; C 14/7).

A series of administrative changes initiated in July in the name of a **campaign against corruption**, have resulted in three government ministers losing their posts, the sacking of the heads of 34 of the country's 43 largest parastatals, the setting up of eight military regions to replace the existing three, the appointment of new governors in five states, the sacking of 24 mayors in Kinshasa, and a general purge through the middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy (AED 5/8; AA 2/9).

Pres Mobutu has confirmed that the government has **failed** to reach **agreement on a new financial recovery programme** with the IMF because of a dispute over the conditions attached to the second-year disbursement of the \$182 mn structural adjustment facility. The World Bank, in turn, is prepared to disburse the second tranche of a \$165 mn structural adjustment loan package, but will not do so until agreement has been reached with the fund. The major areas of dispute with the IMF centre on the exchange rate, interest rates, fuel prices and the budget deficit. Mobutu has described the fund's policy prescriptions as amounting to "**economic re-colonization**" because they fail to address the priority for growth. In June Mobutu warned that Zaire may suspend repayments to the two organizations, claiming the country had repaid \$100 mn in the first five months of this year, and received nothing in return. Zaire's external debt totals about \$7 000 mn, of which 95 per cent is owed to official creditors (AED 17/6,15/7,22/7).

Piped water systems are to be installed in 18 rural centres in a \$52 mn project backed by the World Bank, through an International Development Association loan of \$45 mn. Water-borne and water-related diseases affect about 70 per cent of Zaire's population and are the primary causes of the country's high infant mortality rate (WBN 30/6; AED 8/7,2/9).

## EAST AFRICA

### Burundi

Burundi is set to implement a programme of **economic reforms** that will help accelerate growth and increase income. The International Development Association (IDA) is supporting the programme with a credit of \$90 mn. The programme, which includes measures to boost the private sector, reform public enterprises and increase agricultural productivity, extends reforms initiated by the government in 1986 and introduces other reforms to promote the growth of a market-oriented economy (WBN 24/7).

The improvement in relations with **Belgium** since Pres Buyoya came to power in September

1987, has been underlined by a joint economic commission meeting in which Belgium agreed to allocate an initial \$6.6 mn in support of the structural adjustment programme, and to renew support for development programmes suspended in the closing months of Pres Bagaza's regime (AED 22/7).

The army has restored peace to Burundi within weeks of the start of the outbreak of **tribal feuding** which left about 5 000 dead and over 55 000 taking refuge in neighbouring Rwanda. Ethnic tensions in the north triggered the violence, after members of the majority Hutu, who represent around 85 per cent of the 5 million population, killed a number of Tutsi, the numerically inferior but politically dominant group. The Hutus say it was because they had heard that the Tutsis were planning another **massacre**. (In 1972 100 000 Hutus were killed after a Hutu-led coup attempt.) Unofficial sources put the death toll as high as 24 000 — an estimated 20 000 in army reprisals. The army and government are dominant by Tutsis, who hold 16 of the 20 cabinet posts. Though Pres Buyoya has taken steps towards accommodating the Hutus, including appointing some to senior posts, it appears the ever-present Tutsi fear of a mass Hutu uprising prompted the army killings. Pres Buyoya and Rwandan Pres Habyarimana met in Zaire to discuss the return of the refugees from **Rwanda**, a country which has a similar ethnic mix, but a Hutu-led government (C 19/8,31/8,5/9; S 22/8; DN 24/8; AED 26/8; E 27/8; SWB 27/8; JA 31/8; SS 4/9).

## Comoros

The large **South African** hotel chain, Sun International, has signed an agreement with the Comoros government to operate two hotels, through the *Nouveau Socotel* company, on the island of Grande Comore. Establishment of the two resorts will cost an estimated R52 mn (S 15/7; ION 22/7).

Comoros celebrated the thirteenth anniversary of its independence on 6 July in the face of a very delicate economic situation, and a three month deficit in payment of wages to its numerous civil servants, with the number of state administrators having doubled in the past four years to 8 500, (out of a total population of 400 000). As a consequence of non-repayment of debts, creditors are no longer willing to invest in the country. Fresh discussions are due to be held with the IMF and the World Bank in October on a structural adjustment programme, covering fiscal policy and the marketing of agricultural produce, and on loans totalling \$13.8 mn, although the maladministration of state companies poses a stumbling block. The main reasons for the **financial difficulties** are the drop in export receipts (the slump in sales of copra, cinnamon, ylang-ylang and the principal crop, vanilla), corruption and the virtual drying up of aid, especially from Saudi Arabia (ION 11/6,25/6,27/8,10/9; ARB 31/7).

## Djibouti

The government has begun to provide large quantities of military aid and supplies to government troops fighting the rebel **Somali National Movement** in northern Somalia. The ties between the two countries, which have been strengthened since the February 1987 visit to Somalia by Pres Gouled Aptidon, have met with strong reserva-



tions among Djibouti's **Afar community**. The status quo between a small Afar guerilla group and the government is already under threat following the death of three men at the Dikhil refugee camp. The camp, which the government is preparing to close down, houses some 13 500 residents made up of Ethiopians and homeless Djiboutians (ION 25/6, 3/9).

**France** has reinforced its **air deterrent force** in Djibouti by replacing the Mirage-111Cs in its fighter squadron with Mirage F1s, capable of equalling the Soviet made MiG-29s, based on South Yemen and in Ethiopia. An additional 3 600 French soldiers based in the country provide military protection, accorded since 1978, to Djibouti (ION 4/6; ARB 15/7). Amid expectations that the Afar opposition group is going to step up its activities in Djibouti, in July the US provided the government with military aid in the form of trucks. Djibouti is one of the few African countries to have received increased US military aid during the 1989 fiscal year (ION 23/7). (See also *Somalia*.)

## Ethiopia

The government has **released** seven members of the deposed **royal family** who had been imprisoned without trial since the 1974 revolution which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie (SS 22/5).

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has handed over its northern **food distribution programme** to the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The Geneva-based League is to oversee operations by the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, which will take over the ICRC's famine relief stockpiles and equipment (AED 17/6).

The **European Economic Community** (EEC) has changed its "emergency aid only" policy and **unblocked long-term development assistance** in response to the adoption of agricultural policy reforms, approving two grants, worth a total of \$96 mn, for rural development. The government has **privatized** the grain trade since December and allowed the movement of grain across provincial borders, following pressure from donors. The EEC has also promised that it will not suspend its emergency aid to Ethiopia and given assurances about the return of humanitarian organizations to the northern regions. The moves follow the June visit to Ethiopia by the EEC's commissioner for development (ARB 31/5; ION 18/6, 25/6; AED 24/6).

The government has declared a state of emergency in the northern provinces of **Tigray** and **Eritrea** and proclaimed exclusion zones (a band of territory ten kilometres wide along the whole of Eritrea's border with Sudan and coastline of the Red Sea) which will be transformed into "military garrisons". Special administrators will be appointed to run the provinces, with the help of military and security councils. These measures are seen to have been decreed with the clear purpose of preventing food supplies from reaching the guerilla and the civilian inhabitants under their control who are threatened by famine. Rebels in Eritrea hold most of the western and north-western districts, and are active outside the towns. These measures were followed on 17 May by another order from the Council of State that all Ethiopians must pay a special levy for the prosecution of the war — equivalent to a month's salary (SWB 16/5; 18/5; H 19/5; AED 20/5; ION 21/5; AC 31/5).

In June the **EPLF** leader, Issayas Afawerke, offered to open peace talks with the government following his organization's crushing victory at **Afabet** and its subsequent agreement on military coordination with the **TPLF**. The movement reportedly wants a referendum to determine the status of Eritrea. At the end of May the government also expressed its desire for a negotiated settlement, Mengistu repeating the offer of regional autonomy made under the 1987 constitutional changes (AC 27/5, 1/7; DT 3/6).

Following fierce fighting in **Tigray** during the second half of June, government forces recaptured several towns. Prior to this they held only the provincial capital of Makelle and a few garrison towns on the province's main north-south road. In what the TPLF says is the greatest "massacre" perpetrated by the regime of Col Mengistu since 1974, 600 civilians were killed and 360 injured when government aircraft bombed the ancient market town of **Hawzien** for six hours on 22 June. The rebel movements have accused the Ethiopian Air Force of using napalm in raids on some towns (H 7/5; ION 4/6, 18/6, 2/7; C 29/6).

Against a background of severe famine and renewed fighting in the northern provinces of Tigray and Eritrea, the parliament has approved a budget calling for expenditure of \$2 898 mn for 1988/89. Military spending, which goes up to around 20 per cent of GDP is the main priority, although Pres Mengistu has admitted he sees no speedy end to the war (ARB 31/7).

The US is sending a special mission to study the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa. Lack of food and an escalation in the fighting between Somali government forces and the rebel Somali National Movement have resulted in up to 300 000 refugees crossing into Ethiopia this year — they have been crossing at the rate of 2 500 to 4 000 per day since June. Aid workers — already struggling to cope with refugees from south Sudan, Tigray and Eritrea — say the influx represents a "disaster of unimaginable proportions for the region as a whole". The World Food Programme has begun an assistance programme valued at \$5.7 mn. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has opened an appeal for \$11 mn to improve poorly built and inadequately supplied camps. Meanwhile, 370 000 Ethiopian refugees camped in northern Somalia have been caught in the crossfire between rebels and government troops. Ethiopia itself is host to about a million refugees from the conflict in southern Sudan, while fighting in northern Ethiopia has caused a similar influx into Sudan (AED 22/7, 12/8; ION 27/8).

On 23 August 245 **Somali** men, who were all captured during the 1977-78 Ogaden war, were freed in exchange for 3 500 Ethiopian prisoners of war. The prisoner exchange was carried out under the auspices of the The International Committee of the Red Cross. The deal, negotiated in April under the peace treaty, was delayed because 90 of the Ethiopians refused to be repatriated and have asked instead to be sent to a third country, preferably Canada (AED 2/9; ION 3/9).

In the course of a short working visit to **Moscow** by Pres Mengistu, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the hope that the Ethiopians would succeed in "their search for a just solution to the Eritrean problem on the basis of the multinational Ethiopian state." Gorbachev went on to underline the importance of the current international consensus of support for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. These remarks have been interpreted as an appeal for a search for a **political**

**solution** with the Eritrean guerillas and the confirmation that the Soviet Union is not disposed to increase its military aid to Ethiopia. It remains Ethiopia's principal arms supplier, as well as major source of economic aid. In 1987, Soviet military aid totalled \$3 000 mn; around \$2 000 was provided in economic aid (ION 30/7; AED 5/8). The Soviet Union has also been showing a shift in its economic policy towards Ethiopia, with a focus on food self-sufficiency and debt repayment. The major Soviet concern is the dramatic trade imbalance between the two countries and the inability of the Ethiopians to pay their debt. (While Soviet-Ethiopian trade increased tenfold between 1977 and 1985, it has declined every year since.) The Soviet Union has also encouraged a policy of agricultural reform (ION 3/9).

(See also *Tunisia, Somalia*.)

## Kenya

Pres Moi has threatened to reconsider Kenya's payments to the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) if other African countries fail to pay off their arrears to the organization. Some African countries are more than 10 years in arrears in their payments to both the OAU budget and the OAU liberation committee (DT 3/6; C 2/6).

An agreement on the establishment of a joint permanent commission on co-operation and on the expansion of direct links was signed during Pres Moi's two-day visit to **Tanzania**. The purpose of the visit was to improve bilateral relations, which have been cool since the break-up of the East African Community in 1977 (AED 15/7; ARB 31/7).

The annual report of the East African Development Bank estimates overall growth in 1987 to 5 per cent and inflation at 7 per cent. The highest performing sector was tourism, which grew by 25 per cent, and is the third highest export earner. Industrial activity improved by 6 per cent, mainly due to a drop in the price of imported raw materials (ION 20/8). A recent report by the UN Industrial Development Organization (Unido) forecasts that GDP will slip back to 3.8 per cent in 1988 from 5 per cent in 1987, (1 per cent higher than the population increase), despite the fact that the pace of growth has been sustained, because of depressed prices of Kenya's principal exports, coffee and tea. The report advises a flexible industrial policy to halt the declining pace of industrial growth, which has slackened considerably in recent years due to a rapid decline in domestic demand, and difficulties within the manufacturing sector itself. Although the government has been committed to economic liberalization throughout most of the 1980s, Unido says that Kenya needs to redress the costs of **unbalanced growth** (bias towards the domestic market, its reliance on imported inputs and its capital-intensive nature) and break down the barriers to entry within the sector (DT 2/9).

Kenya has been granted two loans totalling \$112 mn by the World Bank to help it carry out a number of **reforms in industry**, in an effort to diversify the export of manufactured goods. The measures planned involve the liberalization of trade, customs duties, price regulation, encouragement of exports, company taxation, financial policy and public sector industries. Kenyan industry currently accounts for 11 per cent of gross domestic product and employs 7 per cent of the working population. The long-term

aim in restructuring the sector is to diversify the export of manufactured goods and encourage investment in industry (ION 2/7).

Incentives to export-oriented industries, major inducements to investors and the streamlining of import procedures were the major focus of the 1988/89 budget presented in June (ARB 31/7; AB 8/88).

Parliament has approved important changes in the **detention laws**, and in rules governing the **tenure of judges** and members of the Public Service Commission. The bill, gazetted on 28 July and passed unanimously on 2 August, allows police to detain suspects without charge for up to 14 days and allows judges and commission members, who are responsible for appointing civil servants, to be dismissed by the president without an independent tribunal hearing. Until now, no law as important as this one has ever been passed without a debate. Intimidations and the expulsion of some members of parliament in recent times are seen as having effectively silenced any official opposition. The changes are seen as now giving Kanu, the single party, total control over the political life of the country (SWB 4/8; AED 5/8; DT 5/8; ION 20/8).

**Tension** between **Uganda** and **Kenya** has again risen with reports of a **clash between security forces** on the Kenyan border near Lake Victoria (ION 23/7; C 31/7). Kenya has also responded with cautious concern to the Ugandan visit by the commander of the Sudanese armed forces, amid accusations from Uganda and Sudan that military material has been supplied to rebels in both countries from sources in Kenya. Kenya fears the strengthening of military relations between its "pro-Libyan" neighbours (ION 20/8). Prés Moi has denied Sudanese accusations that Kenya is assisting the rebel **Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)**, alleging himself that Sudan is planning to open offices for Kenyan dissidents. SPLA officials are active in the Kenyan capital, but their requests for official status have been refused (DT 2/6; SWB 3/6; ION 4/6).

## Madagascar

The World Bank has approved a credit of \$125 mn from the International Development Association for a major **public sector adjustment programme**, which includes market-oriented incentives and measures to raise the efficiency of resource allocation and use.

The loan forms part of the total of \$700 mn reserved for Madagascar over five years by the organization. The decision will release up to \$145 mn in co-finance from the African Development Fund, France, West Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the USA (WBN 7/7; AED 8/7,12/8; ION 16/7).

**France** has granted a new structural adjustment loan of FF220 mn to Madagascar, up from FF190 mn the previous year. FF120 mn will be paid in two parts into the sole foreign currency fund used to facilitate imports, but is conditional on the progress of negotiations with the IMF and the resumption of talks on the compensation of French firms nationalized in 1976 (ION 18/6).

## Rwanda

Prés Habyarimana has said that Rwanda is so overcrowded that it cannot accept the return of

**refugees** and is even seeking to move some of the present population to other African countries. Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa with an estimated 6.8 million people crowded into 26 300 sq km. A World Bank report has claimed that by the end the century there will be no more arable land available (T 29/6). (See also *Burundi*.)

## Somalia

The April **peace agreement** between **Ethiopia** and **Somalia**, which was meant to ensure the collapse of the guerrilla movements, has resulted instead in the **Somali National Movement (SNM)** launching a full scale invasion of northern Somalia, plunging the area into turmoil and causing an estimated 15 000 deaths. Both sides are reported to have committed numerous atrocities against civilians. On 27 May the SNM mounted their most serious offensive yet against the government when they temporarily seized the strategic town of **Burao**. The fighting took the government by surprise, causing Pres Siad Barré to leave the OAU conference in Addis Ababa. By the end of June, **Hargeisa**, the northern capital, had been reduced to a mass of ruins following air raids. All foreigners under the auspices of the UN have been evacuated from the area. On 30 June the Ethiopian Vice Minister of the Interior announced that at least 110 000 Somali refugees had taken refuge across the border in Ethiopia (ION 4/6,11/6,18/6,9/7; SWB 6/6; AED 10/6; DT 15/6; AC 17/6; JA 22/6; AA 24/6; AE 6-7/88; NA 7/88; E 9/7).

Fighting in northern Somalia has intensified, with the Somali National Movement claiming on 24 July to have taken the airport at Berbera, the port at the southern entrance to the Red Sea which is a base for US air and naval facilities in the region. (Berbera is one of the three northern Somali towns where the Somali **Issaq clan**, which provides the entirety of the SNM forces, predominates.) Fierce battles for Hargeisa are also continuing, while the SNM claim to have taken several other smaller towns — Meit, Heis and Bulhar. **Ethiopia** has been accused by the government of sympathizing with the rebels. The threat to Pres Barré's government has been aggravated by a mutiny of soldiers of the Hawiye clan. The fighting has precipitated the flight of a large number of refugees — now estimated to have risen to 300 000 — into Ethiopia at the rate of 2 500 to 4 000 per day since June (AED 22/7,19/8; AC 29/7; ION 30/7,27/8,3/9).

The International Monetary Fund held talks with the government at the end of July on the main elements of a new **structural adjustment programme** following the 45 per cent devaluation of the national currency. Somalia, however, remains ineligible for IMF funds because of arrears amounting to SDR 26,9 mn (ION 27/8; ARB 31/7). (See also *Djibouti, Ethiopia*.)

## Tanzania

Trades union leaders have warned of a political crisis if **Zanzibar** carries out its plan to lay off 5 000 civil servants as part of a plan to cut public spending and revive the flagging economy. The budget for 1988/89 announced in June reflects an economy with falling production, dwindling foreign exchange earnings and declining national in-

come — an economic crisis that is linked to and compounded by the political crisis. Clove production has slumped from 11 303 tonnes in 1986-87 to just 1 880 in 1987-88, while copra production has also declined. National income as a whole fell by 0,5 per cent in 1987, while wages fell in real terms by 53 per cent between 1981 and 1985 (DT 4/5; EASA 10/6; ION 11/6).

The ruling party, **Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)**, has **expelled** six top **Zanzibari politicians**, accusing them of undermining the island's 24-year-old union with mainland Tanzania. The six, among them **Seif Shariff Hamad**, Zanzibar's chief minister until January, automatically lost their government positions. On the same day, 13 May, **riots** broke out in Zanzibar when security forces fired on a crowd of Muslim demonstrators, killing two and injuring about a hundred. The crowd, said to number some 10 000, were protesting against a proposal by the wife of secretary-general of the CCM that the party should declare polygamy illegal. While many Muslim women would support the need for dialogue on the question, they object to the party having powers to interfere in religious matters. Fears that Nyerere intends to annex the islands (of Zanzibar and Pemba) and the intolerance of the government to any opposition, are resulting in a growing undercurrent of rebellion in Zanzibar and unpopularity of the CCM party (H 14/5; ION 21/5; TWR 25/5; AC 17/6).

According to the 1986 national functional literacy evaluation (the fifth since the campaign started in the country in 1970), Tanzania has achieved a 90.4 per cent literacy rate and hopes to improve this to 95 per cent by 1990 (AC 17/5).

Mainland Tanzania's 1988/89 **budget**, covering the last year of the three-year economic recovery plan, reflects the country's continuing economic difficulties. Expenditure and revenue rose by about 50 per cent in absolute terms, although the shilling's 70 per cent depreciation against the dollar and an inflation rate of more than 30 per cent mean there is little real increase in view. Most marked is the rise in development spending, largely for transport and agricultural measures aimed at alleviating some of the effects of the **economic recovery programme**, particularly those that have hit urban dwellers. The budget has been welcomed by the population, which has given the credit for it to the government of Pres Mwinyi (ION 25/6; AED 24/6).

Production of cotton, coffee, tea and other export crops increased by an estimated 12 per cent in the 1987/88 financial year, but the higher output did not translate into higher exports or earnings. Better supply of inputs to farmers, higher producer prices and good weather were cited as the main reasons for the increase, which followed an overall 19 per cent rise in 1986/87. However, world market prices for most of the crops declined, so that even where export volumes rose, earnings did not necessarily do so (AED 19/8).

The Tanzanian government has received substantial though measured financial support for its economic recovery programme following a **World Bank** consultative group meeting. \$800 mn in aid for 1988, and a similar amount for 1989, have been granted. Of the \$800 mn promised for 1988, 45 per cent will be used for support for imports. Satisfaction was expressed by the donors with the outcome of measures taken by the government: in 1987 GNP grew by 3,9 per cent, representative of a real increase in income per capita of 1 per cent. Tanzania still faces the problem of a \$4

bn debt, equal to seven times the country's export income, and \$285 mn in non-concessional loans owed to the IBRD and the IMF (ION 16/7).

Former president, Julius Nyerere, has said the CCM will not accept capitalism and profiteering amongst its leaders "but a leader will not be denied his membership because of hearsay for silly reasons like owning an economic project,". These remarks do not herald a purge, but in fact indicate that Nyerere recognizes and accepts the current contradictions prevalent among the political elite who, like the middle class generally, are very actively involved in consumerism and small business activity (SWB 14/7; H 14/7; ION 23/7). (See also Kenya, Uganda.)

## Uganda

Early in April a senior officer and 70 of his men were detained at Bombo barracks after an unreported **coup attempt**. They are part of a group of dissident officers belonging to the Baganda ethnic tribe who want Pres Museveni to hold all-party talks with several rebel armies, improve conditions for soldiers and expel some 100 Libyan and 250 North Korean military instructors. As a result of the threat, Tanzanian troops are now acting as Pres Museveni's personal bodyguard as well as protecting his official residence (NA 6/88; C 9/6; ION 18/6).

The Ugandan authorities are holding 19 Zairean rebels who crossed into western Uganda earlier this month, after heavy fighting in eastern Zaire. The rebels are from the *Parti de Liberation Congolais* movement (H 24/6).

Pres Museveni signed a **peace agreement** with the **Uganda People's Democratic Army** (UPDA) on 3 June so that "Uganda could revive the war-ravaged economy of the north and north-east of the country." The pact also promises a new constitution in 1989 and a chance to vote on whether to permit competing political parties. Local and legislative **elections** are to be held before the end of the year in the north and east of the country. Museveni has appealed to the international community for aid to resettle the 2.7 mn people displaced by almost two years of civil strife (ARB 15/5,15/7; DN 23/5; NA 6/88; C 4/6; DT 14/6).

An **International Development Association** loan of \$41.6 mn — repayable over 40 years — has been granted towards a \$65 mn programme to re-establish health services which have deteriorated sharply during more than 10 years' political turmoil. The programme involves the rehabilitation of several important hospitals and health centres, health education, and the planning and management of health activities. In recent years, funding for the health sector has fallen dramatically, resulting in immunization programmes that reach only a fraction of the population and a resurgence of the more common diseases. The country is also facing a growing **AIDS epidemic**. Uganda has the world's second largest number of AIDS sufferers — 4 066, compared with 69 085 in the US, according to the World Health Organization, but officials expect a dramatic increase in the next five to eight years (WBN 30/6; AED 8/7,26/8; E 13/8). The International Development Association has also approved an \$18 mn loan to strengthen the Finance Ministry and Bank of Uganda. The interest free loan, which is repayable over 40 years, is designed to improve the uptake by various ministries of donor funds in support of the economic recovery programme (AED 2/9).

Uganda's currency was **devalued** by 60 per cent on 1 July for the third time since Museveni came to power. The move was expected in view of the fact that the black market value for the dollar has grown to over eight times the official rate. Four external problems made the devaluation necessary: the delay in arrival of promised aid after the last devaluation; lower than expected coffee revenue due to low prices; the border conflict with Kenya which delayed inputs; and repayments on the \$1.2 bn external debt which consumes 70 per cent of forex earnings. Observers have expressed reservations about the effectiveness of the devaluation to foster a move towards exchange rate parity so long as the privatization of parastatals continues to be delayed and inefficiency and corruption is not dealt with. The tough 1988/89 budget announced on the same day brought 100–150 per cent increases in producer prices, massive hikes in petrol and sugar prices, and tighter taxation, indicating the government's resolve to continue the reform policies advocated by the World Bank and the IMF. The bank formally approved the second, \$50 mn tranche of its structural adjustment credit on 7 July. Negotiations with the IMF on a new structural adjustment facility are progressing more slowly as they are seen to be unhappy with the budget deficit of Shs38.9 bn, equal to 32.4 per cent of budgeted expenditure. Inflation is running at 120 per cent, Uganda has a \$1.2 bn external debt to pay and a \$662 mn balance of payment deficit to settle (AA 8/7; AED 15/7; ARB 31/8; NA 8/88). (See also Kenya.)

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Angola

The government's appeal for **emergency assistance** for more than 1.5 mn people affected by the war has attracted firm donor pledges of around \$75 mn. Forty nations took part in the one-day emergency meeting under the auspices of United Nations Disaster Relief Organization. Major donors were the European Community and Italy; the Soviet Union was absent (S 18/5; DT 19/5; AED 27/5).

On **3–4 May** talks were held in **London**, under US mediation, between officials representing Angola, **Cuba** and **South Africa** with a view to achieving a **peace settlement** to the conflicts in south-western Africa. The talks were essentially exploratory but in the light of the continued military stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale, there was some optimism that they might pave the way for more substantive negotiations, despite expressions of alarm that the Cubans appeared to be increasing the size of their expeditionary force in Angola (C 2/5,4/5,5/5; S 3/5,6/5; FM 6/5; SWB 6/5,9/5,13/5).

On **13 May** talks were held in **Brazzaville**, capital of the Congo, between members of the Angolan and South African governments. There was some doubt, however, as to whether these diplomatic exchanges would continue as MPLA and Cuban troops began to move south in some strength towards the Namibian border. As military tensions rose, Soviet and US diplomats held talks in Lisbon, and at the beginning of June the leaders

of the two superpowers publicly expressed their desire for a negotiated settlement to this regional conflict (S 14/5,17/5,18/5,11/6,17/6; C 17/5,18/5,2/6,10/6; BD 17/5,19/5,27/5; SWB 14/5,16/5; FM 13/5,20/5,10/6; WA 16/5,23/5; TWR 18/5; ST 15/5,22/5,29/5; SS 15/5).

A deadlock over the venue for the next round of talks was broken when Pres Mubarak offered to host them. On the eve of the four-power peace talks in **Cairo**, however, South Africa warned Angola that the build-up of Cuban forces in southern Angola could threaten the security of the entire sub-continent. Military officials claimed that a force of up to 12 000 troops had formed a 450 km line along the border with Namibia. Despite a heated opening session to the ministerial exchanges on 24 June, the participants expressed the belief that some progress had been made and said they had agreed to continue the talks in July (C 10/6,23/6,25/6,27/6; SWB 11/6,23/6,27/6; AED 17/6; S 20/6; BD 21/6; B 24/6,25/6,27/6; R 26/6; ST 26/6; SS 26/6).

On 27 June a serious clash occurred between South African troops and a mixed force of Angolans and Cubans north-west of **Caluque**. Later in the day twelve Angolan aircraft bombed the Caluque dam and pump station in southern Angola in an apparent attempt to destroy the dam wall. Eleven South African soldiers died in the attack (S 29/6; BD 29/6,30/6; SWB 30/6; C 27/6,29/6,30/6).

The July peace talks held in **Washington** from 10–13 led to agreement in principle on an outline settlement for South West Africa (Namibia) and the withdrawal of foreign troops. However the talks failed to produce a timetable for Cuba's withdrawal from Angola and an end to white rule in Namibia, or for a ceasefire in the region. A further round of talks were held from 22–23 July aimed top secrecy in the **Cape Verde Islands**, before the parties met again in **Geneva** from 2–5 August. Here South Africa caused some consternation by making public its proposal for the rapid implementation of **UN Resolution 435**, suggesting 1 November as the target date.

Following these talks, a formal cessation of hostilities was announced, and 1 September set down as a deadline for agreement on a timetable for total Cuban military withdrawal from Angola. Commenting on the ceasefire, Pres dos Santos of Angola said that it had changed "in a decisive way the climate of tension and of war". Talks were resumed on **24 August** in **Brazzaville**, Congo, but no compromise was reached on the time period for withdrawal of the 50 000 Cuban troops from Angola — South Africa proposing a 1 year period, and Cuba and Angola, 4 years, though a compromise of 2 years was suggested. Angolan officials linked the withdrawal directly to the cessation of US aid for Unita rebels. The ceasefire came into effect on 1 September, with a joint South African-Angolan military committee monitoring the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola (TWR 6/7,17/8; C 21/7,26/7,9/8,26/8,29/8,30/8; FM 22/7; AED 22/7,29/7,26/8; E 30/7; SWB 2/8; S 3/8,6/8,25/8,29/8; ST 21/8; AC 26/8). (See also Sao Tomé & Principe, Zaire, Botswana.)

### Botswana

Botswana maintained its record as **Africa's fastest growing economy** in 1986–87, with real GDP growth of 14.7 per cent. At the end of 1987 it had foreign reserves of \$2 bn, equal to 23 months'

import cover, and inflation was 8.1 per cent in December 1987 (FM 20/5).

Following a warning from **South Africa's** Foreign Minister in April that South Africans travelling to Botswana may no longer be safe, Botswana's tourism industry has dropped an estimated 50 per cent (S 31/5; EASA 10/6).

**Zimbabwe** has extended for three months a special **trade pact** with Botswana, due to have expired at the end of June, to allow time for a new pact to be negotiated and become operational (C 2/7).

The acquisition by Botswana of an undisclosed number of Strikemaster ground attack jet fighters, as part of a programme to build its fledgling defence force into a credible deterrent against incursions into its territory, has raised the possibility of clashes with South Africa in any future SADF action against Botswana. Defence expenditure in the 1988 budget is up 15 per cent to R200 mn — almost 13 per cent of total budget expenditure (S 12/5).

Relations between **South Africa** and Botswana have been strained following the arrest of two South Africans in Botswana after a clash near the border with members of a Botswana police patrol. The two, allegedly members of the SADF, entered the country illegally. They have been charged on five counts and, if found guilty, could face life imprisonment. A third South African subsequently also appeared in court in connection with the incursion. A white South African couple have been charged in Gaborone with treason and refused bail. The two have pleaded not guilty to five charges related to the incident (S 23/6, 24/6; C 24/6; ST 26/6; S 28/6; WM 30/6; C 7/7, 9/7).

A Botswana Defence Force corporal who failed to order his patrol to engage intruders from South Africa has been sentenced by a court martial to 15 years' jail for cowardice (S 12/5).

Botswana has paid Z\$85.6 mn to the Zimbabwe government as compensation for the railway and other assets involved in the railways takeover in the country (H 26/7).

One of the world's biggest **diamond** producers with annual production of more than 13 mn carats a year, Botswana will boost output further when it opens a plant in 1990 at Jwaneng to sift ore tailings for the stones. The extra output should increase national earnings by about 10 per cent (ARB 31/8). Botswana is, however, seeking to reduce its reliance on diamonds. Several mining firms are scouring the country, including the Kalahari desert, for precious metals such as gold, platinum and nickel (BD 3/8).

**Angola** has admitted that on 7 August one of its fighter aircraft attacked Pres Masire's executive jet over Cuito, having mistaken it for a hostile aircraft. Pres Masire, who was on his way to a meeting of the front-line states in Luanda, was slightly injured; the plane which lost its starboard engine made an emergency landing at Cuito. Botswana has accepted the explanation and emphasized that relations between the two countries have not been affected (AED 19/8, 2/9; C 11/8, 22/8; SWB 25/8; ARB 15/9).

## Lesotho

Lesotho is launching an urban development project and a scheme to improve the management of rural land resources, with credits totalling \$36.4 mn from the International Development Association. Of this sum, \$20.7 mn will finance the re-

inforcement of municipal management and the expansion and upgrading of housing in the capital, Maseru, which has an annual growth rate of 10 per cent (AED 13/5; WBN 16/7; LT 26/5).

Lesotho stands to gain an estimated R50 mn a year in revenue from South Africa for its use of the **Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme**, and to save R10 mn in fees to South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom), in addition to the major infrastructural input surrounding the project. Due for completion in 1995, it has been estimated that the project could lift Lesotho from one of the world's 50 least-developed countries to one of the highest per capita earners in Africa (BD 14/6).

The government has issued a **warning** to the country's **opposition** leaders — the "Big Five" — that action will be taken against them if they continue to engage in party political activity, which was suspended more than a year ago. The Big Five, consisting of the Basotho Congress Party, the Basotho National Party, the United Democratic Party, the Basotho Democratic Alliance and the Communist Party of Lesotho, have accused the military rulers of abusing their power and dividing the Basuto nation. They also condemned the military government for suspending peace talks with the country's church leaders because of claims that the churches and the politicians have divided the nation. Heads of churches had requested that they be allowed to act as a bridge between the government and the people in exile (SWB 9/5; S 12/5; C 14/5; SWB 16/5; LT 18/4, 12/5, 19/5; AC 15/7).

Talks held in May aimed at bringing members of the banned **Lesotho Liberation Army** (LLA) back into Lesotho were attended by senior members of the Lesotho government and the exiled Basotho Congress Party (BCP). The leader of the BCP, Ntsu Mokhehle, is the former leader of the LLA. The LLA waged a small guerilla campaign against the ousted government of Chief Leabua Jonathan. About 500 of its supporters are in exile (S 19/5, 23/5; LT 19/5; SWB 20/5).

An extension of Lesotho's state of emergency was announced on 24 August. No reasons were given (S 7/9; BD 9/9).

The International Monetary Fund has approved a \$13 mn structural adjustment facility to support a three-year **economic and financial reform programme**. In return, the government will implement economic and financial reforms to slash its budget deficit, bring inflation under control and reduce the country's trade deficit. The programme aims to reverse the low growth rates, rising budget deficit and inflation, and deteriorating balance of payments position that have characterized the economy in recent years. The stagnation of GDP is largely the result of a sharp drop in agricultural output caused by drought. The deterioration in the external and budgetary position reflects static remittances from migrant workers in South Africa and stagnant revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (AED 8/7; S 1/7; ARB 31/7).

**South African Air Force** helicopters took part in a major **relief operation** which provided food, medicines and blankets to thousands of people in villages isolated by snowfalls. An estimated 50 000 people were cut off at various points in the mountainous region between Mokhotlong and Qacha's Neck (S 15/7–20/7).

## Malawi

At a World Bank meeting held in June, Malawi's finance minister requested \$550 mn over the next

two years from its creditors in order to meet the new economic problems arising from the regional situation. He revealed that the civil war in neighbouring **Mozambique** adds \$60 mn each year to the cost of Malawi's exports, with the cost of transporting exported goods amounting to 40 per cent of their value, against 25 per cent previously. In addition, strain is being put on Malawi's health and education budgets with the influx of Mozambican **refugees**. At the end of June the refugee population was estimated by UN officials to have passed the 600 000 mark (ION 25/6; C 14/7). At the meeting the World Bank board approved a \$69 mn credit to support the trade and industrial policy adjustment programme which aims to boost growth in the manufacturing sector by liberalizing trade, supported by exchange rate adjustments and revised fiscal and tax policies (AED 24/6). The second phase of the import liberalization programme came into effect on 8 August (AED 19/8). Western donors have endorsed Malawi's medium-term adjustment strategy, which includes cutting back on public sector costs and giving the private sector more autonomy, with tentative aid commitments totalling \$555 mn for the next two years. The figure represents a near 60 per cent jump in annual support compared with 1987. Debt servicing is expected to be around 44 per cent of export earnings this year (C 25/6; ARB 31/7). On 15 July Malawi became the first recipient of an IMF enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF). Worth \$73 mn, or 150 per cent of the country's fund quota, it will support the government's medium-term economic objectives outlined in the three-year policy framework paper approved by the World Bank in mid-June (AED 22/7).

Pres Joaquim Chissano was warmly welcomed on his first official visit to Malawi from 4–7 July. His visit reflects the marked improvement in relations between the two neighbouring countries which has been taking place since the start of last year (C 4/7, 8/7; M 8/88; ION 9/7; NA 9/88).

## Mozambique

In a joint operation, Mozambican and **Zimbabwean** troops captured the main **Renamo** base at Matenge, 30 km south of the Malawian border, on 22 April (S 9/5).

Mozambican and **South African** delegations meeting in Maputo on 25 May have agreed to revive the joint security commission set up in March 1984, under the **Nkomati non-aggression pact** (S 26/5; SWB 27/5; ION 28/5; AED 3/6).

Thirty-five **US senators** have signed a petition asking the United Nations to investigate **Renamo** violence and brutality in Mozambique and the subsequent increase in the number of Mozambican refugees in Southern Africa. The petition follows a report by the US State Department Bureau for Refugees Program's consultant that more than 100 000 Mozambicans have been murdered by Renamo bandits during the past two years. A US Deputy Secretary of State for Africa has described Renamo activities as "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary beings since World War Two". The report has led to a re-examination by Renamo supporters of their position (SS 1/5; C 3/5; S 3/5, 13/5; H 18/5).

Following the tripartite meeting of **Portugal**, Mozambique and **South African** in Lisbon on 21–22 June, the respective governments have agreed to the revival of the **Cahora Bassa** hydro-

electric scheme. The power transmission lines are to be reconstructed and rehabilitated with a Mozambique security force providing security for personnel during the operation, and the tariff agreement of 1984 is to be maintained (BD 20/6; S 20/6; SWB 24/6; ARB 31/7).

The government is to hand back all **church property** seized in 1975 and allow the return of all religious dominations. Church-state relations, severely strained since independence, have eased with the gradual return of religious groups in recent months. The Pope is scheduled to visit Mozambique during his Southern African tour in September (SWB 27/6; C 26/6).

More than 30 000 Mozambican **refugees** will be repatriated from Zimbabwe before the end of the year and resettled in 13 villages being built in the central province of Manica. The UN has estimated that of the more than one million Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries, 100 000 are in Zimbabwe (S 15/6).

On 2 July Mozambique **devalued** its currency by 22,4 per cent from MM450 to MM580 to \$1; this is the second devaluation this year and the fourth in 18 months, bringing the cumulative devaluations to 93 per cent (C 6/7; AED 8/7; ION 9/7).

The Mozambican/South African Joint Security Commission — established under the Nkomati Accord to deal with problems between the two states — met for the first time in more than three years in South Africa on 7 July. The historic reinstatement of the commission follows agreement on the revival of the Cahora Bassa dam scheme. A wide range of security issues were discussed (C 8/7; S 8/7; SWB 9/7; ION 9/7).

Pledges totalling \$60 mn have been received from donors for the \$200 mn second phase of the **Limpopo railway rehabilitation** programme, linking landlocked Zimbabwe to Maputo (AED 5/8; AB 9/88). Only \$213 mn of the \$270 mn pledged in April this year by 22 countries has been received. The request, by the government and UN, for \$332 mn, was for basic food supplies and essential rehabilitation projects, for an estimated 7 million people affected by war and drought (AED 26/8).

(See also *Malawi, Zimbabwe*.)

## South Africa

On 20 June Pres Botha announced that legislation would be tabled to provide for the establishment of a multiracial national council, which would serve as a negotiating forum on constitutional reform (SWB 29/6,30/6; ARB 15/7).

At the beginning of August, Zach de Beer, executive director of Anglo-American, was elected leader of the **Progressive Federal Party** in succession to Colin Eglin (FM 8/7; C 5/8; ST 7/8).

On 22 August parliament began debating the revised **Group Areas Bills**. This precipitated a minor **constitutional crisis**, in that the House of Delegates and the House of Representatives refused to discuss the new proposals.

(See also *Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Comoros, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique*.)

## TBVC States —

SA paid R2,76 bn to the four independent homelands during the 1987/88 fiscal year in direct assistance and transfers in terms of bilateral agreements. An additional R29 mn was paid out in grants for job-creation programmes. The

budget of **KwaNdebele**, a self-governing state, has more than doubled during the past three years to R212,2 mn in 1987/88 (BD 26/5).

Venda — On 10 May Headman Frank Ndwakhulu **Ravele**, the former Minister of Justice, was sworn in as Venda's new president following the death of Life-Pres Mphephu in April (S 11/5). Within six weeks of taking office, Pres Ravele dissolved the National Assembly and called for new parliamentary elections to be held on 14–15 September. The move came as a surprise as elections were not expected until July 1989, when the Assembly completes its present 5-year term of office (AIB No7/1988).

A school boycott lasting five weeks and a 5 day stay-away by thousands of workers in protest against alleged ritual killings in the homeland, ended on 22 August. Demands for the sacking of the new Minister of Justice, Mr Tshivhase, who has been accused of the ritual murder of a Venda school teacher and implicated in the alleged cover up of at least 15 killings this year, resulted in Pres Ravele stripping him of his portfolio until the forthcoming election. He subsequently resigned from the cabinet. Rumours of a coup attempt following his sacking were strongly denied. Pres Ravele has appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the alleged ritual murders (C 17/8,18/8; S 17/8,19/8,22/8; SS 21/8; FM 19/8; BD 19/8; SWB 25/8; WM 1/9.).

Transkei — Following the issue in May of a warrant for his arrest in connection with allegations of corruption arising from an inquiry into Transkei's Department of Public Works, former Prime Minister **George Matanzima** fled to Austria. After a short and apparently penniless exile there, he returned to South Africa in August, but an extradition order brought his return to Transkei where he faced four charges of bribery. Bail of R5 000 was granted. The case will be heard in the Supreme Court in November. In June his estate was sequestered to settle debts amounting to nearly R4 mn (SWB 6/5; WM 19/5; C 21/5,28/5,17/6,29/7,20/8; S 10/6,23/7,3/8,6/9; ST 14/8).

Transkeians are once again being either barred from entering **Ciskei**, or being deported following their government's refusal to extradite three Ciskeians. The incidents follow a warning that if Transkei did not extradite General Charles Sebe, Mr Namba Sebe and Chief Lent Mqoma, "drastic" steps would follow (S 11/7; C 11/7; SWB 14/7).

The record 1988/89 budget of R1,95 bn exceeds that for the previous year by 22 per cent. The largest share of the budget goes to education, which gets R433 mn. Revenue of R1,6 bn is anticipated, of which R936 mn will come from internal sources. Budgetary assistance from South Africa will total R660 mn (S 3/6).

## Swaziland

The 50 per cent rise in exports in 1986 has been attributed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry to marketing efforts, and not to the movement of **South African based companies** to Swaziland under the threat of sanctions. In order to qualify for a "Made in Swaziland" label, SA products need only have 25 per cent of their value added on in Swaziland, for which they stand also to benefit from the preferential trade agreement of the Lomé Convention (BD 13/6).

**Eight members of the Royal family**, detained in March have been **released** on orders from the

King, Mswati III. The reason for the detention was not made public, but is thought to relate to an ongoing feud within the ruling royal Dhlamini clan (DN 3/6; TS 16/6,22/6).

The King has pardoned the former Swazi prime minister, Prince Bhekimpi, and nine other politicians only four months after their conviction on treason charges. They have all been released except Prince Mfiansabili, who is regarded as the group's ringleader (AC 12/8).

The Minister of Interior has estimated the number of **refugees** in the country to have reached 134 000, more than 20 per cent of the total population of 600 000 (S 26/8).

## Zambia

At the end of June the Bank of Zambia reported that the country had run out of **foreign exchange** — a direct result of Pres Kaunda's "go-it-alone" policy which set the kwacha at an artificially high exchange rate. (Foreign exchange monthly allocations were cut from \$40 mn to \$16 mn in June.) The same policy has limited debt servicing, causing Zambia's arrears to soar over the past two years — Zambia now owes \$570 mn on its debt of \$1 bn to the International Monetary Fund, while the World Bank arrears now stand at \$90 mn. Ineligible for IMF and World Bank funds, Pres Kaunda reported at the end of June that the government is willing to negotiate with these two bodies over a new financial assistance programme and enter an accord, providing it does not push up inflation, now running at 55 per cent. (AED 10/6,8/7; AA 10/6; S 27/6; C 30/6).

The World Bank demands that Zambia devalue its currency and repay its \$90 mn arrears to the bank before resuming their economic ties, has been rejected by the government. Zambia fixed the exchange rate at Kw8 = \$1 in May last year when it abandoned the IMF economic readjustment programme (H 8/7; C 14/7).

A severe shortage of spare parts and vital equipment because of Zambia's lack of foreign exchange has resulted in a sharp **decline in copper production** for the first quarter of 1988 (S 1/7; AA 8/7).

At the end of the five-day general conference of the United National Independence Party, Pres Kaunda dissolved parliament and announced that **general elections** will be held on 26 October (SWB 25/8; AED 29/7,2/9).

(See also *Burkina Faso*.)

## Zimbabwe

The Zanu (PF) front company, Zidco Holdings has continued to expand its business ventures with the multi-million-dollar takeover of the Mike Appel Organization and has acquired a large stake in Treger Industries. By owning business enterprises "on behalf of the people" (the ventures cater for ex-guerrillas and party loyalists) Zanu says it is practising socialism. The party's wealth-accumulation process is seen by economists as "**back-door nationalization**" running parallel to the state's acquisition of enterprises with an estimated share capital of more than R500 mn (EASA 10/6; BD 10/6; H 9/6).

Zimbabwe has signed a trade agreement with **Brazil**, a move that will expose Zimbabwean goods to a new market of 140 mn people (H 21/6).

The government has banned with immediate effect the import of motor vehicles and office machines bought by foreign currency obtained as holiday travel allowances, and reduced the maximum of imports aggregate a family could bring back to the country from Z\$3 000 to Z\$900, limited only to husband and wife (H 21/6).

After two years of stagnation in the expansion of real GDP, the Reserve Bank has forecast growth of 5 per cent for 1988. The projection is based on expectations of significantly improved agricultural output and earnings, notably the maize and tobacco crops, plus 'moderate' growth in the mining and manufacturing sectors (H 4/6; AED 24/6).

The April general **amnesty** has resulted in the release of nearly one thousand prisoners and the surrender of large groups of dissidents. Acting Pres Simon Muzenda described the amnesty, which ended on 31 May, as an "outstanding success" (H 6/5; C 7/5,13/5; AA 27/5; S 31/5; ZN 6/88; SWB 4/6).

In early June Zimbabwe and **Mozambique** signed a military co-operation agreement which reiterated their intention to continue with joint operations (H 11/6; ARB 31/7).

The standstill **budget** for 1988/89 announced at the end of July, slashes all social services spending except that on education, while still failing to give business many of the incentives demanded. The deficit is projected to reach a new record of \$618,2 mn, equal to 9 per cent of GDP. Education spending is up 18 per cent, defence up 14 per cent; the big losers are funding for communal (peasant) land development, which is cut by 80 per cent, and money for land resettlement purchases, down some 67 per cent. Zimbabwe's commitment to bring **compulsory education** to all is bringing the country close to becoming one of the first African nations with universal secondary education. The drive, is however, resulting in growing unemployment which is already estimated at 30 per cent. The number of school leavers in 1990 is projected to reach 300 000, while the number of new jobs is likely to be less than 10 000 annually (FM 22/7, 5/8; BD 29/7; AED 29/7,5/8; H 29/7; AA 5/8; ARB 31/8).


On 26 July Zimbabwe extended the **state of emergency** for a further six months on the basis of security threat that South Africa poses (S 13/7; SWB 25/7).

The government has withdraw charges against

six whites, some of them senior civil servants, accused of spying for **South African** military intelligence, because of insufficient evidence. The six, who are still in detention, were detained in November last year. (C 2/8).  
(See also *Mozambique*.)

## Sources

AA — *Africa Analysis*; AB — *African Business*; AC — *Africa Confidential*; A Con — *Africa Concord*; AE — *Africa Events*; AED — *Africa Economic Digest*; AIB — *Africa Institute Bulletin*; ARB — *Africa Research Bulletin*; B — *Beeld*; BD — *Business Day*; C — *Citizen*; DN — *Daily News*; DT — *Daily Times*; E — *Economist*; FM — *Financial Mail*; H — *The Herald*; IMF S — *IMF Survey*; ION — *Indian Ocean Newsletter*; JA — *Jeune Afrique*; LT — *Lesotho Today*; M — *This is Malawi*; NA — *New African*; R — *Rapport*; NN — *New Nation*; S — *Star*; SS — *Sunday Star*; ST — *Sunday Times*; SWB — *Summary of World Broadcasts*; TS — *Times of Swaziland*; TWR — *Third World Reports*; WA — *West Africa*; WBN — *World Bank News*; WM — *Weekly Mail*; ZN — *Zimbabwe News*



Reproduced by Sabmet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)