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
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Cover by William Steyn

War and the decline of Africa

Richard Cornwell

South Africa has long enjoyed substantial economic and commercial contact with most African states, even though for political and diplomatic reasons these have often been kept out of the public eye. As a result, for many South Africans the rest of the continent has remained dimly understood and of little interest, except inasmuch as it constituted either a vague threat or the ill-defined shape of things to come.

President de Klerk's speech to Parliament on 2 February 1990, and the events flowing from it, have dramatically altered foreign perceptions of the South African government's political intentions and allowed a relaxation of the diplomatic isolation to which South Africa had fallen victim since leaving the Commonwealth. As far as this country's diplomats and entrepreneurs are concerned, Africa is now beginning to open up for public business. In some respects this is ironic, in that it is happening at a time when the continent is being increasingly marginalized in world affairs.

This marginalization is partly the consequence of Africa's economic decline. It also reflects a widespread perception that in 1992, with the formation of a stronger European economic union, those parts of the world unable to insert themselves into one or other of the three major economic blocs are going to find themselves in an increasingly parlous position.

"Africa is drifting off the map of the world's concerns." This is how one African-born journalist was already describing the situation in 1988 after the G-7 summit on aid, held in Houston, focused not on the problems of Africa but on those of Gorbachev's Soviet Union. He went on "In the post-Cold War era, which has robbed Africa of whatever strategic significance that super-power rivalry provided it, the continent and its supporters have an extraordinary task ahead of them: to convince increasingly hard-headed policy-makers of the need to assist a region whose problematic economies and poor future prospects seem less and less relevant to the growth of richer countries."

Since then of course this situation has been considerably aggravated. The precipitate fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe, and the opening of those economies to capitalist penetration, dominate the attention of the world's money markets — with occasional distractions, such as the Gulf crisis, pushing Africa — except Muslim North Africa — even further into the outer darkness.

The only deviation from this rule at present is South Africa — where the government's reform initiatives and the prospect of a new constitutional dispensation that will bury apartheid once and for all still draw comment. Ironically, the death of apartheid may also contribute to the marginalization of Africa in global terms. Apartheid's pending demise has already contributed to an unusually frank and far from flattering reappraisal of the performance of other African regimes: they are being pressured into accepting a greater measure of popular political participation. In future there will be fewer free lunches for African demagogues and despots.

About a year and a half ago the World Bank issued a report entitled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustained growth*. The Bank did not pretend to have complete answers, but its conclusion was a sobering one: "The outlook for Africa is potentially devastating." There are no "quick-fixes", and even a best-case scenario predicts a long and arduous haul.

Difficult though it may be, sub-Saharan economies must grow by at least 4-5 per cent annually to achieve food security, provide jobs and register a modest improvement in living standards. Agriculture will be the main foundation for growth. More explicitly, however, the Bank places great emphasis on what are essentially the internal political factors influencing development — on what it calls creating an enabling environment for the productive use of resources.

Why is the picture most often painted of Africa almost irredeemably bleak? Why are 30 of the world's 47 poorest countries to be found in Africa?

On the economic front it has long been apparent to all but the incurably optimistic that many African countries are poor simply by virtue of their deficient natural resource bases and their reliance on the vagaries of an unkind climate. Some inherited from the colonial period an overdependence on a narrow range of primary commodities for export and foreign exchange earnings, which rendered them excessively vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices.

For various reasons African governments have been drawn into budgeting programmes that involve the running up of huge deficits, to finance either increasingly expensive health and education programmes or for the import of extensive arsenals.

These deficits can usually only be covered by recourse to increasingly expensive foreign loans. Bureaucratic and political mismanagement, perverse

economic policies, incompetence, corruption and even grand theft have often compounded the problem, and most African states now find themselves entrapped in an ever-deepening pit of indebtedness. The external debt of many African states today exceeds 50 per cent of their annual gross national product.

It would be foolish to narrow our perspective on Africa's future to that of economic growth. Economic growth alone does not equal development. Yet it remains an important and essential part of development. This remains true for regimes of all ideological persuasions, and obviously it must apply even if we restrict the core of our definition of development to "combating the effects of mass poverty".

For the outside world, the most graphic images of Africa's plight are those seen on the TV screens, of the dying victims of the latest famines. It is easy to conclude that much of the responsibility for these victims of mass poverty can be attributed to the environment. There is some truth in this: Africa's climate is fickle and its soils are generally poor. But a question that occurs just occasionally in development literature, and which came up time and again at the Royal African Society's recent conference in Cambridge, was the extent to which Africa's sufferings were being aggravated or even caused by violence and conflict.

Talking of the role of the environment, the eminent geographer A T Grove had this to say:

It is certain that droughts in the future will recur, possibly with greater frequency. The question then arises as to whether such droughts will necessarily be accompanied by famines. There has always been a hungry season in most parts of the continent before the harvest... .

The last twenty years have made it clear that drought is now not usually accompanied by famine unless the distribution system is disrupted by conflict or by the breakdown of the civil administration for other reasons. This has been the case in Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan, Angola and Mozambique, where zones of conflict coincide with tropical semi-arid belts and drought is a recurrent feature of the climate... .[1]

Current concern is with the current environment and the degree to which it is to be blamed for present woes. The climate is in part to blame for disasters in semi-arid parts of the continent... .
Otherwise many of the ills from which Africa suffers would never have been as

severe as they are had it not been for conflict between and within the various African countries. With peace, effective government, proper funding and the application of known remedies much could be done to overcome the defective features of the environment.[2]

In 1985, five of the six nations on the UN's list of African states most seriously affected by hunger were in the throes of civil war. To quote Lloyd Timberlake "every African nation suffering from civil war also suffered from 'drought'".[3]

What effect does a war have on the development of a poor nation? Quite apart from the loss of life as a direct result of military action, it destroys the physical infrastructure, from hydro-electric schemes at one end of the scale to village wells at the other. Roads and bridges may be destroyed or fall into disrepair or be obstructed by the fighting. Transport capacity and fuel supplies are redirected to military use.

War and the preparation for war divert scarce resources and energy. Trained and skilled manpower is redirected from the economy and administration. Many skilled professionals have to all intents and purposes fled Africa for employment elsewhere or, having completed courses overseas, simply never return.

Warfare destroys food supplies and livestock, either directly by air or ground forces, by their being pillaged or requisitioned by armed men whom civilian populations are unable to resist. From the vital agricultural sector, which provides the livelihoods of most African families, manpower is conscripted or press-ganged off the land. The social and gender relations so important to the survival of communities with small margins, are disturbed. Fields, crops and even plantations may have to be abandoned, as in the fertile central highlands of Angola, reverting quickly to bush.

Veterinary services and control measures prove impossible to maintain, resulting in the rapid spread of animal disease and massive losses of stock. Because of its social and ritual importance, the loss of livestock involves more than economic damage, however, and disrupts the entire fabric of social life.

The delicate network of trade between peasant communities is disrupted and even destroyed, as is that between

the towns and the countryside. Small traders, the essential links between peasant producers and the urban market, who provide farmers with access to vital agricultural inputs, are driven out of business, either because their stores are destroyed or because hostilities prevent them from selling in needy areas and they therefore refrain from purchasing surplus crops even when these are available.

Social welfare services are disrupted, schools and clinics closed, ransacked or destroyed, immunization programmes are discontinued and hospitals placed under immense strain.

The often wanton destruction of life and property and the military use of terror undermine the sense of value and of the dignity of humanity. War wrecks religious and other value systems and may cause whole societies to slump into fatalism.

War causes massive disturbances in the settlement of whole communities, displacing them internally or externally, most often into marginal areas in the countryside or vast squatter settlements on the edge of the towns, where they aggravate local demand for water, food, fuel and rudimentary services and may distort local development plans. Such settlements of displaced persons are also the recruiting grounds for combatants to fuel the war.

Refugee camps and settlements highlight the relationship between conflict and environmental stress and degradation, though they are by no means the only links in this chain.

Many authors agree that political conflict and environmental degradation are closely interrelated, though the causal link is by no means clear cut or uniform, and cause and effect are difficult to separate. Environmental degradation and socio-political conflict are part of the same vicious spiral. Their relationship could provide some enlightenment about issues influencing security for nations and for individuals.

What kinds of environmental problems lead to political imbalance and conflict? And what kinds of political conflicts lead to environmental degradation?

A government fighting for its life tends to accord a low priority to tree-planting, terracing and environmentally sound agricultural practices. This itself may, however, stimulate or sustain support for rebel movements, as it did in Tigray, for example.

Then there is the matter of military expenditure. Phil O'Keefe of Earthscan is quoted as saying a couple of years ago that "the only early warning system you need of famine is lists of which governments are spending disproportionate amounts of their GNP on military activities: look at Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Angola and Mozambique."[4]

Arms purchases not only increase foreign debt, they require the growing of more export/cash crops, often at the expense of food crops, to earn the necessary foreign exchange. Sometimes weapons shipments have even been paid for by the direct transfer of internationally-provided emergency food aid shipments, as in the case of Ethiopia to the Soviet Union.

The resort to arms also deepens the dependence of Africa on the outside world in a most unfortunate way, as Christopher Clapham has argued:

> ... militarily, for the means of force to compensate for the state's inability to retain the voluntary acquiescence of its people... . [But] in responding to this dependence, the outside world ... is decreasingly willing to pay even lip service to the mythology of state sovereignty ... food aid is readily distributed by non-governmental organisations in ways that not merely by-pass the state, but by operating under the aegis of insurgent movements may actually subvert it.[3]

This has certainly been true of aid efforts co-ordinated over the years with the Eritrean and Tigrayan resistance.

More often, however, development and aid agencies find it simply impossible to administer their programmes in areas of conflict, and may even decide to divert their resources elsewhere. This conjures up a nightmare far worse than that of deepening dependence on outsiders. To quote Clapham again: "tired of propping up states which cannot maintain themselves ... the Western world might simply abandon Africa to its own inadequate resources."[6]

The whole question of conflict in zones with meagre resources raises another set of questions, those concerning individual versus national security.

Only too often we accept the definitions of security offered by national governments, without questioning what is at stake or whether in fact the defence of the status quo offers security to the individuals and communities making up a country: physical security, cultural security and so on. Looking outside of Africa for a moment, this

paradox is illuminated by the current plight of the Kurdish and Shiite minorities in Iraq. As Irving Markovitz asked more than twenty years ago: "Stability for whom and in whose interest?" The Iraqi experience also raises the question of how much longer the UN, and by extension perhaps the OAU as well, will be able to maintain its pristine position of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states?

At a basic level, the conflict between state and community security can be illustrated by the position of pastoralists, who require that boundaries remain open to allow the passage of herds and flocks to new grazing. If national borders are closed or regulated, this may aggravate the degradation of pasture, resulting in the loss of stock and the irrevocable impoverishment of whole communities, whose recourse is then to banditry, or to refuge in camps or squatter settlements.

There is a very good case to be made for states and individuals taking a wider view of security than that generally offered in strategic or military terms. Particularly in Africa, with its fragile environment, security has to address the needs of people, especially those leading a marginalized life, as much as it does the security of the state. Indeed, the two are inseparable.

It may perhaps be thought of as odd to be writing of conflict just when a number of civil wars appear to be coming to an end. With absolutely no desire to indulge in Schadenfreude, I think we should temper optimism with a realistic consideration of just how long will be the road back for those countries where the end of protracted conflict may now be in sight. Rehabilitation involves more than the rebuilding of physical infrastructure — roads, water supply, housing, schools, clinics, reclaiming land to agricultural use, and the resettlement of vast numbers of refugees and displaced persons. It also means restoring the confidence of local people, especially those returning to their homes, in the agents of government and law and order — the very agents who may have been responsible for the devastation in the first place.

Many people will have gone through the traumatizing experience of seeing parents and children killed or maimed. Many will themselves have learned to use modern weapons and may in fact have retained these. Talking of the

thousands of child soldiers of Museveni's NRA in Uganda, some as young as five, a Makerere professor said "these children are growing up without any sense of values... . They know nothing but the gun. We are creating in Uganda another generation of Idi Amins."[7]

This brings us to the dangers inherent in the continuation of a culture of violence. Christopher Clapham put most succinctly the consequences of a general awareness of the fragility of the state, leading to the increased viability of resistance to bad government.

> Resistance, however, is infectious; and once the boundaries of peaceful political opposition have been crossed, the prospects of a further resort to violence are enormously increased. ... War teaches few skills beyond the use of weapons; it destroys much of the already weak economic base on which a newly independent government must painfully build; and fighters who view themselves as having borne the brunt of the struggle for freedom, then find their expectations of victory bitterly disappointed, have few resources with which to improve themselves beyond a renewed resort to arms. ... However understandable the initial resort to violence may be, its long term consequences are appallingly counterproductive.[8]

The vast proliferation of weaponry in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Uganda, Mozambique and Angola will make it very difficult to restore order, especially where, as in Ethiopia and Somalia, unresolved territorial disputes remain.

Finally, James Mayall, another of the speakers at Cambridge, applied the lessons of Africa to South Africa, voicing a concern that violent conflict could become endemic here, with disastrous consequences for the entire region:

> ... the fact that the Soviet model is no longer available, does not mean that Africa is made safe for social democracy and liberal capitalism. It is possible that the State — and the embryonic regional diplomatic system — will not be able to contain the potential for ethnic violence that lurks just below the surface in many African countries. The regional conflicts in Southern Africa have not yet become structured across international boundaries in the manner of those in the Horn of Africa... . But given the massive dislocation that has occurred in these countries over the past fifteen years, and their high level of militarisation, it is possible that in southern Africa as in some other parts of the continent, the culture of insurgency may have taken root. If so, it is likely to frustrate all attempts to construct a viable political order.[9]

Those in South Africa who are willing to contemplate the use of violence to gain political ends would do well to consider what has happened in Africa over the past thirty years, and how difficult it is to rediscover the road back to peace and development.

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The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC): Past and future

Bernard Weimer of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany, looks at the past and prospects of the SADCC with particular reference to South Africa's possible future role.*

Introduction

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) celebrated its tenth anniversary last year, moving its secretariat in Gaborone to an impressive new building and admitting Namibia as its tenth member-state. This would therefore seem an appropriate time to consider what this grouping has achieved, where its shortcomings are and what its future holds. Will the SADCC become obsolete — as suggested by many observers — giving way to a new form of regionalization dominated by South Africa? Will South African guns and regional destabilization simply be replaced by "order-books"[1] and the "mind of confrontation" remain intact? Or will a democratic South Africa become the eleventh SADCC member and, if so, under what conditions and with what effects on regional economic and political relations?

Before discussing these questions, a general characterization and assessment of the SADCC would appear in order. I believe that the SADCC will continue to exist and have a valid rationale, providing an adequate framework for

regional co-operation and the integration of a future democratic, non-racial South Africa. I would also argue that, under certain conditions and with necessary changes and adjustments in its philosophy and programme of action, the SADCC will be able to provide the focal point for the regional economic and political transformation needed to meet the challenges of the end of the twentieth century. This includes the establishment of qualitatively new relations between South Africa and her neighbours.

SADCC – A general characterization

As a point of departure, a look at certain data might be useful. The SADCC region presently comprises ten countries, independent Namibia being the newcomer. We are talking about some 5,7 million square kilometres and a population of 82,7 million. The overall gross domestic product (GDP) is about US$23,2 billion (1989) with mining and agriculture the most important contributors. Manufacturing accounts for only 12 per cent of the region's GDP. Consequently, the region has a very marked propensity for imports of

manufactured products, whereas its exports consist mainly of mineral raw materials. Its debt is currently estimated at US$25 billion.[2]

If it is true that a camel is a horse designed by a committee, then what type of animal is the SADCC, which was indeed designed (in 1979) by a committee, that of the then leaders of the Frontline States (FLS)? The point, frequently made by SADCC officials, needs to be emphasized that the SADCC's approach to co-operation to date is not to be confused with regional integration in the strict sense of a preferential trade, customs, or monetary union — much less in the sense of an economic community. These could only be projects based upon economic or political (neo-functionalist) theory. In distinction to some such theoretical approach, the SADCC evolved from the political practice of the FLS by extending FLS co-ordination of liberation politics to the realm of regional economic co-operation, project co-ordination and planning. Its essential structure is thus a regional network of multilateral projects in seven broad sectors: agriculture and natural resources, mining, energy, industry and trade, manpower, transport, communications, and tourism. Trade is part of

the SADCC approach; and this raises certain questions concerning SADCC compatibility with the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which comprises 20 African states from Djibouti in the north-east to Lesotho in the south. All SADCC members but Botswana have joined the PTA, with Angola the newcomer. In the following analysis, the SADCC and the PTA are not considered as mutually exclusive. As one senior Mozambican diplomat put it, the SADCC provides the foundations and the walls of the Southern African house, whereas the PTA is considered to be the roof[3]. The PTA without the SADCC does not make much sense.

So far, the group's emphasis has been on national planning and decision making, with some co-ordination of projects in areas of agreed concern to two or more SADCC members. As we shall later see, the focus on national decision making hinders to some degree any further regional integration in the sense of increased regional trade or the creation of a regional economic body with lower economic barriers between members. It seems as if the point is now being reached at which a higher degree of integration is a necessary condition for further SADCC development. In the final analysis such an integration would mean a shift or delegation of national decision-making power to a regional body as well as a dismantling of economic barriers within the region. This point has been clearly recognized by the SADCC's executive secretary, Simba Makoni, who has announced the drawing up of a more formal SADCC charter that would spell out the rights and obligations of member states in place of the current loose arrangements, which on many points rely upon political good will.[4]

The organizational structures of the SADCC are still very modest, with a rather small secretariat in Gaborone and the technical and sectoral units in member countries the focal points of day-to-day activities. The size and relative autonomy of the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC) in Maputo is exceptional. Annually, both the council of ministers and the heads of state meet to review progress made. The consultative conference between the SADCC and its donors also takes place on an annual basis.

It is important to stress the political framework within which the SADCC operates: it accepts differences between member states in terms of political and economic order, size and language, and emphasizes close and co-ordinated co-operation in areas of mutual interest. Conflicts are resolved primarily through dialogue and negotiation — within the general consensus that a common sense of destiny and harmonious political and economic relations based upon mutual benefit are general preconditions for successful regional economic co-operation. The SADCC can therefore be considered a kind of regional multiparty system, in which, as a matter of principle, a non-racial, democratic South Africa has her place. This was reiterated at the SADCC's tenth anniversary celebrations in Gaborone in September 1990.

Objectives and history

For an assessment of SADCC performance, not only do its original objectives need to be recalled but there must be an appraisal of the external and internal circumstances under which the group operated during its first ten years. The organization's overall objectives, which provide criteria or points of reference for its evaluation, are set out in the Lusaka Declaration of 1980 as:

— reducing the economic dependence of member states, especially, but not exclusively, on South Africa;

— creating and rehabilitating the regional network of transport and telecommunications infrastructure as a precondition for genuine and balanced regional integration;

— mobilizing resources in order to promote national, bilateral and regional development policies and programmes;

— co-ordinating action so as to secure international co-operation with and support for SADCC projects.

These general objectives have been translated into an SADCC programme of action, which represents a kind of regional development programme and is broken down according to sectors. This programme is presented to international donors at the annual consultative conference and to the public in SADCC member states. It needs to be reiterated that all projects contained in the programme

of action are decided upon by consensus. That this must be so is stipulated in the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutions of SADCC" which was agreed upon at the Harare summit in 1981 and is something approaching an international legal document governing SADCC operations.

On the external and internal socio-economic conditions in which the SADCC countries operated during the past ten years, four points need to be made.

First, and this has general relevance to most African countries for most of the past decade – the SADCC economies were plagued by such things as drought, the worsening of terms of trade, the effects of the recession in the industrialized world, the debt problem, declining per capita GNP, de-industrialization and so forth, all of which militated against a strong economic performance. All SADCC members were prejudiced to a greater or lesser degree.

Second, and linked to some of these difficulties – most of the SADCC members, namely Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, undertook structural reform programmes, some of them backed by World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral donor support, during the second half of the 1980s. While these adjustment programmes have generally contributed to a better macro-economic performance of the economies concerned, they have considerably worsened or even "destabilized" the social situation (especially that of the urban population) in member countries, thus creating new political and economic problems and sources of conflict.

Third, mention must be made of the wars in Angola and Mozambique and their spill-over effects into neighbouring countries. They seriously disrupted and damaged social and economic life in general and led to a tremendous increase in the number of internally displaced people and refugees. These wars arose not only from domestic political and ethnic causes.

Fourth, these wars were used and manipulated by the South African state and its security establishment in pursuit of its Total National Strategy during the 1980s. The material cost of what is generally referred to as South African "destabilization" for the period between 1980 and 1988 has been estimated as high as US$60 billion.[5] This is more

than four times the amount the SADCC received as Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the same period. Although this estimate is alleged to be greatly exaggerated (and its calculation methodologically flawed), it nevertheless underlines the point that South Africa, by supporting *Uniao para a Independencia Total de Angola* (Unita) in Angola and *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) in Mozambique, and by militarily attacking other Frontline States, inflicted heavy and unnecessary economic and social damage upon these SADCC countries, compelling them to restructure their budgets in favour of unproductive defence spending to the detriment of development.

While in the era of President de Klerk South Africa's military intervention in the region seems to have come to an end, the wars in Angola and Mozambique continue to hurt the economically poor and the socially helpless. The same holds true for some of the structural adjustment programmes. And if President Chissano's peace overtures to Renamo, and Portugal's mediation effort in the Angolan conflict, backed by Soviet and American support, are concluded successfully and eventually lead to cease-fires and peace agreements, both Angola and Mozambique may not that easily return to a climate of peace and stability. The burden this places upon the entire SADCC community is very clear.

The SADCC – an interim evaluation

Despite the adverse conditions in which the SADCC has operated over the past ten years, its performance may be qualified as, in sum, a success. This at least is the conclusion of a number of studies, including those by Jens Haarlov and Joseph Hanlon.[6] My own appraisal shares their general view. Taking into account both achievements and shortcomings, this favourable evaluation overall may be seen as a positive bottom line to the SADCC balance sheet.

Achievements

Six achievements may be noted.

First, the SADCC continues to provide an authentic and indigenous approach to regional co-operation, emanating from the political determination and decisions of the governments of the FLS and its other members. They have succeeded in avoiding the entertainment of concepts and strategies foreign to their needs and interests. Neither have they embraced the European Economic Community (EEC)-type model with its economic-community foundation nor have they adopted concepts emanating either from Pretoria ("Constellation of Southern African States" – Consas), or from Lagos or Addis Ababa (the "Lagos Plan of Action"). Thus, Haarlov can write:

> The specific approach of SADCC – distinct from traditional types of regional co-operation and integration – has been of paramount importance for the relative coherence, political backing and practical results until now.[7]

The self-esteem and confidence arising from the indigenous SADCC approach has particularly been important to foreign donors who, from the organization's very beginning, have occasionally attempted, quite strongly, to woo (or even push) the SADCC community in favour of certain donor interests. So far, the SADCC has been able to resist such pressures.

Second, the SADCC has managed to progressively convince and draw in donors who, to start with, had been sceptical if not outright hostile and thus not inclined to contribute significantly to the cause. The World Bank and the USA are cases in point. Today, the World Bank lauds the SADCC as the one successful regional co-operative effort in Africa and one from which other regions could learn. As long ago as 1987 a study jointly carried out by OECD and SADCC analysts concluded that

> ... one of (the) SADCC's major achievements has been to initiate and sustain an extensive range of consultative mechanisms and consultations with international partners, thus being remarkably successful in presenting its programmes and strategies to the international community, in attracting interest and resources from abroad and in building a network of functional relations internationally and in the region.[8]

This achievement had been anticipated by Gavin Maasdorp, who concluded his SADCC evaluation by stating that the...

> SADCC already has been most successful in focusing the attention, once a year, of major aid donors on Southern Africa. The importance of this function cannot be overlooked ...(the)... SADCC probably is instrumental in changing the perception

of donors about the sub-continent — something which may be well reflected in changing foreign policy in due course.[9]

There can be no doubt that the increasing support by industrialized countries for the SADCC has also been a function of their strategy of avoiding having to impose comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. Here certainly lies a danger for the future of the SADCC because if apartheid disappears, some of the financial support given the SADCC may disappear as well. Thus one of the challenges for the SADCC is to convince donors that

> it deserves support in its own right, because it is doing the right things. It is doing the necessary things for the survival and betterment of the nations of Southern Africa.[10]

In general, however, it may be assumed that international support for the SADCC will continue, because even conservative governments in donor countries have increasingly become familiar with and recognized the merits of this particular approach to regional co-operation. Judging from the record, it can then be said that the fourth general objective of the Lusaka Declaration has by and large been achieved. Two important expressions of this achievement are to be seen in the signing of a preferential co-operation declaration between the SADCC and the Nordic States[11] and the EEC's stated support for the SADCC on a region-to-region basis.[12]

Third, the SADCC has succeeded in reducing the dependence of most of its members upon South Africa in a number of fields, especially in transport and communications. As early as the end of 1987, 75 per cent of the dry cargo imports and exports of land-locked SADCC members were shipped through SADCC harbours, despite the wars in Mozambique and Angola. If we include petrol and other fuels, the ratio was 67:33 in favour of SADCC ports.[13] This ratio is bound to increase as continued progress is made in the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure and harbours. A peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique will certainly provide an additional boost for transport and trade conducted through these countries and so contribute to much greater cost-effectiveness. At present it is estimated that within five to ten years more than 90 per cent of the SADCC's external trade will be

handled by its own transport facilities. By and large, then, considerable progress has been made in achieving the second objective of the Lusaka Declaration, as well as the first objective in so far as the reduction of dependence upon South Africa is concerned.

Fourth, the SADCC projects have exerted a favourable influence upon the economic performance of most of its members. Excluding Angola, Malawi and Zambia, the macro-economic situation of the SADCC region has improved, notably in Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This is not to suggest that the region's socio-economic situation and performance are satisfactory overall. Neither is it implied that SADCC projects have been the key factor in the relative improvement noted. But there can be no doubt that without the SADCC the situation would have been worse. In fact, as recent *Annual Progress Reports*[14] indicate, there have been positive trends in some macro-economic indicators since 1987/88 for the SADCC region as a whole. The real growth rate averaged 3,5 per cent in 1987, 4,5 per cent in 1988, and 3,5 per cent in 1989, with Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe the leading performers in terms of GDP growth.

It is worth remarking at this point that the growth situation noted above contrasts markedly with the situation in South Africa. Even workaday Mozambique, from 1987 onwards, has recorded real growth: an increase in marketable agricultural and industrial production as well as in foreign exchange earnings, albeit from a very low base. Despite the disappointing regional growth rate of 3,5 per cent for 1989 the macro-economic situation in the region – Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe being exceptions – seems to have been stabilized, a suggestion supported by the statistics for regional food production. Nevertheless, the question for the SADCC is whether the positive macro-economic reforms taking place in almost all SADCC countries (and with negotiations for a political settlement in Angola and Mozambique well under way), will significantly improve the SADCC region's chance of continued growth on a sustained basis. Here lies the challenge.

Fifth, the SADCC has considerably contributed to the creation of a regional

Southern African identity, a "sense of common destiny" as well as a viable platform for harmonious political and economic relations in the region, South Africa included. Despite its principled commitment to the abolition of colonialism and racism, the SADCC has always pursued a *modus vivendi* and consequently designed pragmatic policies *vis-à-vis* its powerful southern neighbour. No SADCC member has been criticized or rejected for its co-operation with South Africa in areas deemed to be in the national interest. This is especially true for Mozambique in the period after the Nkomati Accord. In its bilateral relations with Pretoria, Maputo is treating South Africa almost as a *de facto* SADCC member. Within the SADCC proper, the sectoral co-operation is not restricted to development projects but covers broad areas, including security matters. This spectrum of official, interstate co-operation is mirrored in the co-operation between SADCC non-governmental organizations, such as those of the professions, universities, trade unions and so forth.

Sixth, and last, there is the creative capacity of the SADCC to critically evaluate and readjust its programme of action and approach. Here there is a significant difference to be seen when the SADCC is set beside other contemporary instances of regional co-operation, whether it be co-operation in West Africa or the long-established East African Community (EAC). An example of this SADCC flexibility is the 1987 revision of the Lusaka Programme of Action when investment for improved infrastructure was de-emphasized in favour of investment for production facilities. Other examples are the welcoming of private enterprise into the SADCC effort, the Beira Corridor Group (BCG) being an outstanding achievement. The establishment of SADCC business councils and national contact points is another instance of the thrust to get private capital behind the SADCC effort.

The challenges of the future will certainly be a major test of the SADCC's creative capacity and ability to readjust. Fortunately, the ongoing work on plans to harmonize the investment codes of members, establish cross-border investment facilities and possibly a regional capital market, and stipulate much more clearly the rights and obligations of members in a full SADCC Charter, are

all indicators of the SADCC's preparedness to meet its challenges.

Shortcomings

Here, three points need to be made.

One: SADCC dependence upon foreign funding has reached a critical threshold. If we look into the statistics, we find that, until now, more than 90 per cent of the financial requirements for SADCC projects have come from foreign and only less than 10 per cent from local sources. Presently, there is a funding gap amounting to 50 per cent of projected financial requirements. This underlines not only SADCC dependence upon foreign donors but also its neglect of local and regional capital markets. It also contradicts two aims of the Lusaka Declaration, the mobilization of member's own resources and the lessening of economic dependence upon others. This external dependence might also be considered a recipe for increasing the foreign debt problem even if one takes into account that most of the funding is made available on a grant or a soft-loan basis. If then the dependence on foreign funds is to be reduced, local savings and investment funds need to be generated, especially for investment in the productive sectors. At a recent conference in Maputo it was stated by Emang Maphanyane of the SADCC secretariat that in order to achieve and sustain a GDP growth of 4 per cent per annum, the investment ratio needs to go up from its present 15 per cent of GDP to at least 25 per cent.[15] If some SADCC members were to cut their defence spending and channel funds thus saved into investment for production, the region might provide convincing examples of how the state can help to stimulate growth in GDP. Such positive examples would in turn certainly have a positive impact upon the preparedness of local and foreign investors to increase their involvement in the region.

Two: and this is almost a commonplace, intra-SADCC trade has been very low, standing at some 5 per cent of member's total trade – 80 per cent of which is attributable to Zimbabwe alone. The constraints acting against any increase in regional trade are a lack of tradeable goods and services, a similarity if not uniformity of products, and serious payment and foreign exchange problems in most SADCC member countries. Concerning SADCC

trade with South Africa, data is very scant. It is estimated that in 1984 members sent 9 per cent of their total exports to South Africa, whereas 30 per cent of their imports were sourced in the Republic. SADCC members in the Southern African Customs Union (Sacu), the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland) and Namibia, make up a large proportion of this percentage. It has been estimated that the SADCC's exports of merchandise and services to SADCC destinations more than doubled between 1984 and 1987, underlining the importance of the SADCC market for South Africa's manufacturing industry. South Africa's exports to the SADCC market are likely to be somewhere around 20 per cent of the Republic's total exports. Thus South Africa is and will continue to be an important SADCC trading partner, despite bilateral trade regimes within the SADCC and the existence of the PTA.

So far, the SADCC has done very little to boost intraregional trade. On the contrary, there have been instances where existing bilateral trade agreements ("open general import licence-schemes") have been abridged or cancelled by unilateral action, having been termed "absurd trade rules" and thought of as primarily inspired to protect the national industries of one SADCC member, Zimbabwe.[16] Such behaviour is certainly not in line with the spirit of the SADCC. With or without South Africa as a future SADCC member, trade issues are likely to become much more keenly contested with South Africa and Zimbabwe competing in new SADCC markets (see below). The issue of a regional trade regime needs to be addressed sooner rather than later.

Three: an additional shortcoming, related to the trade issue, refers to an obvious lack of determination and capacity to translate the logic of regional co-ordination and planning into SADCC members' national decision-making process. As Emang Maphanyane has stated, 'national planners have remained totally parochial in approach and have not provided information necessary to influence the political trade-offs that are necessary in regional integration .... Consequently, regional co-operation is yet to become a daily experience in the management of national affairs".[17] Other observers put it more bluntly by referring to "national chauvinism" as the major cause of the

failure on the part of members to integrate their economies.[18]

One outstanding example of this distortion has been Zimbabwe's somewhat nationalistic approach to electricity generation and supply, which has not taken into account the surpluses readily available from neighbouring countries. Imports from Zambia or Mozambique would have had a positive impact on regional trade and helped to balance Zimbabwe's regional trade surplus, thus underlining the SADCC principle of the mutuality of benefits within the regional context. The dichotomy between "think national" and "think regional" is also manifest in the organizational structure of the SADCC. The different sectoral technical units, although to a large degree integrated into the national administration of the SADCC member responsible for those sectors, are in every instance somewhat removed from the national decision-making process. In many instances these units are scarcely consulted, if at all, when preparations are afoot to make national decisions concerning projects in the sector concerned. Such decisions, of course, may affect the entire region. This is particularly true of manpower development, co-ordinated by Swaziland. One result here is that some SADCC members engage in huge manpower development programmes and training schemes — especially in the vocational field — without taking into consideration similar training schemes set up by their neighbours or changes in supply and demand within the regional labour market. Here, "SADCC co-ordination" is reduced to a mere phrase, void of any substance.

When it comes to co-operation in production and investment, too, the SADCC dichotomy needs to be resolved and strict rules established. The Harare Summit in 1989 clearly recognised that

> Co-operation in production will, of necessity, demand from us closer co-ordination of macro-economic issues such as taxation, exchange rates, licensing, prices and exchange controls. It is therefore clear that co-operation in production is a field of co-operation that will blur the hitherto clear distinction between national and regional policies.[19]

The need for a higher degree of economic integration is echoed by scientists who have closely studied and evaluated the SADCC as a whole and/

or its different sectors. For example, Tom Ostergaard in his case study on industrial co-operation stresses the necessity for SADCC members to "go beyond their previous policy of co-ordinating national initiatives"[20] if their attempts to boost both regional industrial development and trade are to be crowned by success.

Looking at these challenges and the advent of a democratic, non-racial South Africa, the SADCC will not very much longer be able to avoid creation of a new "supra structure" in which elements of the sovereignty of its members will be vested and which will thus enjoy a degree of central decision-making power in regional matters.

In summarizing and drawing up a balance of successes and shortcomings of the SADCC, it ought to be said that the overall picture is a positive one. Indeed, the SADCC has been regarded as one of Africa's few successful attempts at regional co-operation. There is no doubt that the SADCC approach continues to be valid and functional for regional co-operation, and that the organization will continue on its way and path with even better prospects for success if it creatively tackles the challenges ahead. For the next decade these challenges will be formidable: a larger degree of integration and unification; higher competitiveness; more investment in production; more employment opportunities; some organizational reform; and reasonable co-operation with a free South Africa.

The SADCC and South Africa — some pertinent issues

As South Africa moves painfully to disperse its inherited potential for violence and edge towards a negotiated non-racial constitution, economists, planners and politicians in SADCC countries, in South Africa, and elsewhere are working towards a clearer view of the future of regional economic co-operation in Southern Africa. Ministers of finance, economists and strategists from the region have already been in contact in order to discuss ways and design means of better integrating a free South Africa into the regional economy and resolving the economic conflicts that are bound to occur in the process.[21] Although these deliberations have only partly been

made public, it is by no means too difficult to guess at the issues discussed: economic interdependence, trade arrangements, structural adjustment programmes and their effects, world market and North-South relations and investment issues. Given its approach and record, the SADCC appears to be the appropriate forum for further consultations, and one in which South Africa has her natural place. This is not only the "official position" of SADCC policy-making bodies, reiterated at their tenth anniversary council meetings in Gaborone in 1990, but increasingly recognized by South Africans such as Simon Brand of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) whose professional interests lie in such issues as regional co-operation.

Some of the issues mentioned above as enjoying regional priority, such as economic interdependence, trade and structural adjustments, will be discussed below. It goes without saying that any analysis and speculation concerning the economic future of Southern Africa must initially make certain assumptions concerning the future socio-economic development of South Africa, in relative terms the region's economic giant. How strong are this giant's muscles? What are his weak points? Is this a giant with feet of clay? And how successfully will he be able to effect socio-economic transformation — quite as necessary to his health and welfare as the parallel changes in the South African body politic?

This is not the place to discuss these primarily South African issues which quite naturally are of the utmost importance to the policies and strategies of the Republic's neighbours during the period of their necessary adjustment to change in the south. It should suffice to note that a best-case scenario of rapid economic recovery, and return to a real growth rate of more than 5 per cent annually (on a sustained basis), is not necessarily the most likely one. South Africa's economic transformation and recovery might instead turn out to be a laborious, difficult and slow business accompanied by considerable internal conflict. This, of course, would make the South African economy a partner of somewhat different quality for the SADCC if compared to a scenario positing a well-oiled steadily growing economy which – in the view of many South African businessmen – would

provide a kind of locomotive for pulling other regional economies along the track of speedy recovery. In my own view, a less favourable scenario is the more likely outcome.[22] This of course would make South Africa a less strong partner in regional relations and reinforce already existing interdependent economic relationships, particularly beneficial for her smaller neighbours.

Economic interdependence and complementarities

When looking at the history of South Africa and the SADCC (especially its smaller members), it is clear that the region has witnessed the development over the past few years of an ever larger degree of economic interdependence. The extremely asymmetrical interdependence, heavily in favour of South Africa, that existed throughout most of this century has been reduced during the last decade or so. This has been a result of the efforts of the SADCC and South Africa's declining economic strength. Paradoxically, the sanctions adopted against South Africa have contributed to this balancing process by pinpointing the importance of the SADCC countries to South Africa as markets, investment areas, transit economies, suppliers of low-cost skilled labour and raw materials, and so forth. This is not to suggest, however, that economic symmetry has been reached. Nevertheless, as the studies by Ronald Libby and Stephen Lewis have suggested, the high degree of structural dependence upon South Africa, notably by the BLS countries, has been considerably reduced. Their economic importance and bargaining power *vis-à-vis* South Africa has consequently increased.[23]

Botswana may be considered a major winner from this shift in interdependence, having been able to reduce its erstwhile heavy dependence in a number of fields.[24] The reasons for this reduction lie in the success of Botswana's national policies as well as in successful SADCC projects, notably in transport and communications, agricultural research and production, food security, energy generation and more. From South Africa's side – and this has already been generally stated – the market provided by Sacu members has been gaining more and more importance for the Republic's manufacturing industry. The latter is not only

the key to the provision of jobs in a South Africa suffering rampant unemployment; it is also, with the export-oriented mineral and agricultural sector, responsible for earning the foreign exchange necessary to offset the outflows of capital from the country arising from an economic strategy that has to consistently avoid current account deficits. As the products of the South African manufacturing industry are by and large not competitive on world markets, the regional market will remain of strategic importance to manufacturers in the foreseeable future. Hence the calls by South African trade officials for the creation of a Southern African Common Market (Sacom) are understandable: they reflect present trade patterns and needs – from the South African point of view - and we will touch on them later.

One of the key theoretical and practical issues in trade relations is the argument concerning complementarity between trading economies. Now there is indeed a large degree of complementarity between South Africa and most of the SADCC countries. This complementarity is presently much more visible – revealed by the multifaceted South African crisis in the main – and instances of it are much more openly admitted at the political level than they were in the 1960s and 1970s. This is certainly true of trade. But there are many other sectors of complementarity, agriculture and investment being cases in point.

As far as agriculture is concerned South Africa, for a variety of demographic, social, financial, and ecological reasons, may be heading towards finding itself a net importer of foodstuffs; and SADCC countries such as Zimbabwe and a peaceful Mozambique might in future in certain conditions, turn out to be South Africa's granaries. Already (1990), South African importers and industrialists are busy travelling through SADCC countries to secure contracts with agricultural producers that would allow for the import of agricultural raw materials (grain, fruit, vegetables and meat) to South Africa for processing both for local and overseas markets. And in the sphere of investment, the South African multinational corporations, with their tremendous cash-flows, are seeking investment opportunities in the SADCC countries, where these

enterprises have had a long-established presence anyway and where foreign investment capital is presently a scarce commodity. This is particularly true of countries such as Mozambique.

Overemphasizing the point of interdependence and complementarity: South Africa *might* in future provide goods, services, markets, finance in certain areas and sectors of the SADCC region; and SADCC members *might* increasingly provide the South African market with goods, services and so forth in other areas. For example, it would certainly be in the interests of both Angola and South Africa for South African oil purchases to be made in Angola and for consumer goods and manufactured products for the Angolan market to be sourced in South Africa.

Already the first high-level contacts between the two parties have taken place (at ministerial level), initially with Namibia acting as match-maker. A longish list of mutually beneficial economic co-operation arrangements could easily be drawn up; it would include certain elements in electricity and water supply, tourism, and so on and so forth.[25] It has even been suggested that a thoroughly co-ordinated tourism industry might turn out to be a foreign exchange earner for all participating countries, its economic importance matching that which gold has had for so long in the South African economy.[26]

Trade

In our assessment of the SADCC, both the lack of intra-SADCC trade and the importance of South African exports to the region have already been stressed. Of course, one of the key issues concerning future Southern African co-operation has to do with the regional trade regime, one including South Africa.

"Ideally", writes Colleen Lowe Morna, "if regional integration is taken to its logical conclusion, the whole of the SADCC would become one customs union", including post-apartheid South Africa as the eleventh SADCC-member.[27] This would amount to an expansion of today's Sacu into a kind of Sacom consisting of eleven SADCC members.

However, today's manifold regional trade arrangements must be taken into account, too, when discussing and devising some uniform regional trade regime. The most important of these existing trade arrangements are:

— Sacu, with its free trade between members and a common external tariff. South African exporters in particular consider Sacu the nucleus of a future Sacom;

— preferential bilateral trade agreements with reduced or non-quantitative trade restrictions for specified goods in certain sectors, payment being made in foreign exchange and/or local currencies. This type of preferential bilateral trade exists, for example, between South Africa and Zimbabwe and between South Africa and Malawi;

— preferential bilateral trade agreements/protocols with a strong clearing/barter element. This type of arrangement exists between some SADCC members such as Angola and Zimbabwe or Tanzania and Mozambique. In the latter instance, the Ruvumo free trade area is a special case;

— preferential bilateral trade agreements, with a most-favoured clause for third parties. This type of agreement exists between Mozambique and South Africa with Botswana as the most-favoured nation;

— bilateral free trade based on Open General Import Licence (OGIL). All goods put on the licenced list may be freely imported. Such an arrangement presently exists between Zimbabwe and Botswana;

— the Organization of African Unity (OAU)-sponsored PTA that, for the SADCC segment of the much larger PTA area, provides some sort of umbrella for a number of different bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements. Of SADCC members, Botswana and Namibia have not yet joined the PTA. At the core of this trade regime is the Harare-based PTA Clearing House, which increasingly uses local currencies for trade transactions, thus enabling trading partners to save valuable foreign exchange. At present (1990), PTA members are discussing the establishment of a free market combined with a monetary union and common currency for the PTA area by the year 2000.

Each of these schemes has its merits and deficiencies; and matters are complicated by the fact that both

deficiencies and benefits are often unevenly distributed among the trading partners. Generally speaking, economies with a sectorally more diversified structure and a solid industrial base are better placed to benefit from these arrangements, a few exceptions confirming the rule. It is clear that South Africa and Zimbabwe belong in this category although they are likely to compete which each other much more fiercely than hitherto in a post-apartheid regional setting. It has even been argued that no country in the region, not even Zimbabwe, would "survive economically, if the full force of South African competition were unleashed".[28] Having regard to the severe structural crisis of the South African economy and the difficult road ahead to transformation and recovery, this assessment appears to be grossly exaggerated. There will certainly be fierce competition between Zimbabwe and South Africa in the regional marketplace. However (as Maasdorp has written with reference to recent empirical research), economies similar in the composition of their GDP and the structure of their manufacturing "tend to be one another's best customers",[29] making them "ideal" candidates for an economic integration scheme of the customs-union type. "Complementarity" is therefore not a necessary precondition for an expanding trade between economies. This general conclusion certainly bears some relevance to Zimbabwe and South Africa. It follows that the extension of Sacu into a Sacom, including Zimbabwe and other SADCC members, would not necessarily be detrimental to Zimbabwe's trade interests. On the contrary, there are strong theoretical and empirical arguments suggesting that Zimbabwe (and South Africa) would be the winners in such an arrangement.

There are equally strong arguments against such an expansion, as I have suggested above. Despite Sacu being the oldest existing customs union in the world – its predecessors date back to 1889[30] – it has conferred mixed blessings upon its lesser members. For them – under normal conditions – the free flow of goods and the disproportionately high financial transfers from the Sacu common-revenue pool to their state budgets are the two most important benefits received. There are

drawbacks, however, not to be over-looked. For these smaller members, notably BLS, Sacu membership has been coupled with considerable disad-vantages in industrialization and job creation, a loss of sovereignty in fiscal matters (and in the case of the Rand Monetary Area comprising South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swazi-land, monetary matters), and a ten-dency to suffer from high-cost high-price imports of both manufactured and agricultural goods from South Africa. The latter is a high-cost pro-ducer in many a sector, arising particu-larly from its earlier import-substitu-tion-cum-industrialization strategies. A recent study by the Institute for World Economics of the University of Kiel in Germany suggests that Bot-swana's Sacu membership has had unfavourable effects on the country's food security situation because the duty-free import of highly subsidized South African agricultural produce has not only stifled local food production but increased the food import bill, too, because South African food products have been more expensive than those Botswana could have purchased on the world market.[31] The logic of this argu-ment is also true for a broad range of manufactured products. It must be said, however, that the decline of the Rand exchange rate since 1985 has offset to some extent the relatively high prices of her neighbours' imports from South Africa. Nevertheless (we take one example of everyday manu-factured products), it has been esti-mated that it would be cheaper for Botswana to import tyres for her vehi-cles not from within the customs union (from South Africa) but from the world market – even were she to remain in Sacu and have to pay the external import tariff on them.[32]

On this argument, Botswana and Swaziland (Lesotho and Namibia are – for different reasons – special cases) have a case for re-examining the ratio-nale and cost-benefit analysis of con-tinued Sacu membership. At least a question mark must therefore be placed against the continued existence of Sacu in its present form and/or mode of operation. If Namibia in the next decade can emulate Botswana's macro-economic successes, especially by reducing her economic dependence upon South Africa, continued SADCC membership might yield less and less

benefits for these two countries. With two members presently bonded to Sacu as a matter of convenience (Botswana) and economic necessity arising from recently acquired independence (Nami-bia), and both potentially deriving less and less benefit from their member-ship, a gradual dissolution of Sacu – and/or a re-shaping of the customs union in the sense of transforming it into a wider and different trade arrangement – might not be an impos-sible scenario for the future.

From the South African standpoint, too, a review of the Sacu agreement, especially its revenue-sharing formula, might make economic sense. According to Walters,[33] the South African govern-ment as long ago as 1982 rejected amendments to the Sacu agreement suggested by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, arguing instead for the re-negotiation of the agreement as a whole. One of the reasons for this may have been the South African govern-ment's concern at its own declining shares of the revenue pool, as well as planned changes in indirect taxation which have been introduced in the meantime (replacement of the General Sales Tax by a Value Added Tax). Both Namibia's accession as a fully fledged Sacu member and the continued rela-tively high economic growth rates and import tendencies evinced by BLS, taken together with the likelihood of continued economic stagnation in South Africa, might not brighten the prospects of South Africa's increasing her share of the Sacu revenue pool. This, in turn, might gradually alter the cost-benefit balance of existing Sacu arrangements to South Africa's detri-ment. So, whatever the future of exist-ing Sacu agreement terms, and despite the vested interests of those who confi-dently hope to gain from any expansion of Sacu to cover the whole region, the tide may be against Sacu and its expan-sion on all three grounds – empirical, theoretical, and political.

What of some future South African membership in PTA? On formal, legal grounds, a democratic non-racial South Africa is eligible for OAU membership and consequently for the PTA. On empirical grounds, South Africa al-ready trades with all PTA members, both directly, and indirectly through Sacu members who are also members of PTA (Lesotho, Swaziland). But South Africa's trading partners also

include members of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the *Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale* (UDEAC) and of the *Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEEAC). According to recently published figures,[34] South Africa's annual exports to the rest of Africa amount to R5 billion, almost one-third of South Africa's manufac-tured exports being sold on the African continent.

Although the volume and details of Africa's bilateral trade with South Africa are not known, it can be said in general that the major factors behind South Africa's export successes, espe-cially in Southern Africa, are her range of appropriate export products, tailored to the different market profiles and needs; the proximity of markets, and the high degree of security in supplies; export promotion incentive packages for South African exporters, including credit facilities; and the currently low Rand exchange rate, which offsets gen-erally high price structure of South African products. If South Africa were to become a full PTA member, she would therefore, in addition to the con-ditions presently favourable to her, cer-tainly benefit from the abolition/ reduction of tariffs and quotas within the PTA trade regime. This, of course, could hardly be in the interests of some of the less competitive PTA members, engaged as they are in their own (import substituting) industrialization programmes designed to contribute to a solution of their unemployment prob-lems. On these grounds it is highly unlikely that South Africa the future PTA member will be granted unre-stricted access to the huge PTA market.

Whatever the future of PTA con-sidered as the "trading roof" of the SADCC, the issue of protection needs to be addressed, both as it concerns intraregional trade and trade between the Southern African region and the rest of the world.

Concerning intra-Southern African trade, all the trade arrangements listed above contain provisions and instru-ments available for the protection of certain (infant) industries. Recognizing the legitimacy of protection as a limited and temporary instrument for industri-alization and job creation, it needs to be emphasized that job creation is one of the major tasks ahead for policy makers

and planners in all SADCC member states as well as in South Africa. Thus protection issues will continue to be on the economic policy agenda throughout the whole region. Yet it needs to be stressed that protection cannot seek its *ultima ratio* in industrialization and job creation, because it tends to inhibit efficiency and productivity, often resulting in expensive products of low quality and, in the long run, potentially de-industrialization. What then seems to be called for in Southern Africa is a mix of trade liberalization measures that boost efficiency, productivity and quality on the one hand, and selective, temporary and flexible protective measures on the other.

In my view, the breaking down of tariff- and non-tariff trade barriers within the SADCC region and the harmonization of taxes, levies, exchange rates and exchange controls should enjoy a higher priority than protective measures. But some of the (weak) economies of the region continue to need selective protection. To avoid an upsurge in intraregional trade conflict and to harmonize protective and liberalization measures, close consultation between trading partners in Southern Africa will be essential. The establishment of a network of bilateral chambers of trade and commerce working hand in hand with existing mixed bilateral economic commissions at government level might help to smooth off conflicts arising from trade issues and balance economic interests between regional economic partners – not only in the narrow field of trade.

What of protection for the Southern African region (including South Africa) against world market competition? Well, there are strong tendencies against any such protection. First, the participants in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (Gatt) Uruguay Round, and particularly the Group of 77, strongly advocate the liberalization of world trade. This would certainly have relevance for Southern Africa, South Africa being a founding member of Gatt. Second, and this may be more important, the IMF/World Bank-led structural adjustment programmes in Southern Africa stipulate trade liberalization (a reduction of quotas and tariffs) as one of their conditions. In the SADCC economies, trade liberalization *vis-à-vis* the outside world initiated by adjustment programmes has quite definitely contributed to the

stagnation of intraregional trade, opening up the SADCC market to cheap suppliers from outside the region.[35] To illustrate this point: markets for beef in Angola and Mozambique previously supplied by fellow SADCC-members Botswana and Zimbabwe are now in the hands of EEC producers who, from the high degree of agricultural subsidization within the EEC-Common Agricultural Policy (Cap), enjoy certain advantages and so are able to outmanoeuvre regional suppliers. If an increase in intraregional trade continues to be considered a worthwhile economic policy objective – which seems to be so for the SADCC states themselves and for major SADCC donors – then across-the-board trade liberalization for SADCC members *vis-à-vis* the outside world, notably the EEC, would be counterproductive indeed. This type of enforced liberalization would also jeopardize the application of those provisions of Lomé IV designed to boost regional co-operation and trade. For these reasons a flexibly handled degree of protection for the Southern African region against the most powerful international trading blocs with solid financial backing, such as the EEC, must not be rejected out of hand but tolerated by donors, trading partners and Washington institutions.

If we are to summarize our rather sketchy considerations concerning trade in Southern Africa, it seems clear that the creation of a Southern African Common Market through the expansion of some Sacu-type trading arrangements is still some way off. The same is true for the creation of a monetary union, a proposal propagated by the PTA. This does not mean, however, that intra-regional trade could not be boosted. The argument and thrust of trade policies set out by SADCC officials clearly point to a reduction or abolition of tariff- and non-tariff trade barriers and the harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies. Such policies need to be supplemented by selective, flexible and temporary protection measures for certain sectors and (small) economies. And structures for consultation on trade and the harmonization of conflicts need to be strengthened, both at bilateral and regional levels. Some degree of protection *vis-à-vis* the outside world is called for, too, which would not only contribute to an increase in regional trade, but also open up new possibilities for the stimulation

of regional trade and co-operation: an example would be certain benefits from Lomé IV. South Africa, already one of the most important regional trading partners for most of the SADCC states, will continue to play an important role in regional trade, one subsuming the potential to be admitted, some day, a PTA member. (Success here would, however, not necessarily mean unhindered South African access to the entire PTA market!)

On the form to be adopted by some future regional trade regime, an expansion of the type c-trade-arrangement we listed (bilateral preferential trade with most-favoured party or parties) seems to hold some promise, at least in my opinion. The establishment of an SADCC-wide network of bilateral preferential trade arrangements with most-favoured nation clauses might be considered an appropriate (and indeed decisive) step towards the establishment of some future Southern African Common Market that would not simply be an extension of today's Sacu. This step would certainly be compatible with the aims of the PTA which, according to its secretary-general, Bingu wa Mutharika, is not primarily interested in any one particular form of trading arrangement but only in the capacity of such an arrangement to boost regional trade.[36] Such a regime would equally be in line with the SADCC approach to regional co-operation and integration. And Sacu – maybe with less members in future – might survive some more years before being embraced by (or submerged in) a future Southern African Common Market and monetary union under the PTA umbrella. This is one possible vision of Southern Africa in the year 2000.

Challenges of structural reform and ecology

South Africa and SADCC members presently face very similar political and economic challenges in the field of structural reform and adjustment under potentially deteriorating international economic and political conditions. And the high degree of integration that already exists makes them "partners in a crisis". One example: the whole of Southern Africa has been facing the phenomenon of de-industrialization, as is clear from the study by Allan Whiteside.[37] It has to be reiterated that

the industrial (and notably manufacturing) sector is probably the only key to solving the growing unemployment problem in all the countries of Southern Africa. This problem has been labelled a "time-bomb", especially in countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana, where many thousands of educated young people join the labour market every year. But industrialization needs investment – especially direct foreign investment, technology transfer, technological innovation, development aid, credit and so forth. It is generally suggested that in its present circumstances Africa as a whole does not provide a climate very conducive to direct foreign investment. Worse, there are strong indications that foreign private capital and official development assistance might increasingly be directed towards the "reform economies" of Central and Eastern Europe. If this is to be the case, Southern Africa would certainly be one among the many losers, unless she makes a special and co-ordinated effort to attract finance and investment, by, *inter alia*, tapping her own financial sources and bringing into line her different economic policies in the fields of trade, investment and so on. In such a situation, South Africa's current call for a Marshall Plan for Southern Africa might one day be of particular relevance to the SADCC governments, which have hitherto rejected the idea. On the other hand, South Africa's interest in participating in the annual consultative conference of the SADCC as a fully fledged member with a view to attract and channel foreign aid to Southern Africa is already obvious.

Looking at the political and economic agendas of the SADCC countries as set forth in the keynote paper of the SADCC conference in Lusaka in February 1990, one detects the very same challenges South Africa is facing, albeit on a different scale: the fight against unemployment and poverty; the "empowerment of the poor" and the democratization of society; the development and beneficiation of human resources at all levels; increasing productivity and technological capabilities and innovation; investment in production in all sectors; a greater role for the private sector; the development of domestic and regional market; and so on. These are challenges that will not only have to be addressed under conditions of

increasing internal social and political debate (and possibly massive conflict), but also under the critical eyes of donors, investors, banks and funds, all of whom will be more and more selective as to where they put their finance and support. From the investment standpoint, too, a co-ordinated regional approach to some of these challenges would seem to have more chance of success than a string of single national appeals.

Regional co-ordination applies particularly to the environmental challenges that generally accompany modernization and industrialization. The highly alarming, indeed severe damage, which industrialization under apartheid and its defence have done to the soils, water, air, plants, animals and, last but not least, people of Southern Africa is gradually becoming visible and known.[38] But we still lack in-depth information on the magnitude of environmental damage and its consequences for life not only in South Africa but also in the SADCC countries. In particular, we lack knowledge concerning the long-term and long-distance effects of industrial and agricultural pollution (and its ramifications) upon health, climate, soil fertility and so on. What environmental consequences do the South African emissions of toxic industrial pollutants through high stacks have for remote areas and neighbouring countries?[39] Is there, for example, an acid-rain problem not only in the Eastern Transvaal but also in Mozambique, a problem originating in the highly industrialized Pretoria-Vereeniging-Witwatersrand area in South Africa with its notorious sulphur-dioxide emissions? To take another example: what are the wider regional consequences of the tsetse eradication programmes in Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi by aerial spraying of pesticides, if one takes into account that only some 50 per cent of the aerosol sprayed may actually reach the target area?[40] What are the consequences for people, plants and animals of toxic residues (stemming from agrochemicals) in rivers? Since the Zambesi, Limpopo, Usutu and other rivers all pass through several countries, a co-ordinated regional approach and the passing and collation of appropriate laws are the only approaches to environmental and conservation issues that hold any promise.

The creation of transborder game parks and wildlife reserves, anti-poaching and similar measures are other appropriate tasks the tackling of which is only thinkable within a regional conservation strategy. Such issues will in future feature ever more prominently on national, regional and international policy agendas, requiring co-ordinated research and consultation together with laws and policies enjoying some sort of regional agreement. SADCC members and South Africa would be well advised to breathe new life into regional bodies such as the Southern African Regional Council for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil (Sarccus) and create and strengthen additional resources for monitoring policy-advisory capacities. Southern Africa, as other parts of the world, has to rid itself of and ban for good certain agricultural and industrial practices and chemical substances that are known to bring harmful effects upon humankind. Environmentally and ecologically oriented, non-government transnational organizations, operating at national and regional levels, must not only be tolerated, but encouraged in their work. Their strengthening and encouragement could in turn strengthen the democratization processes taking place in most of the countries of the region.

Conclusions

In summary, it may be concluded that a future democratic, non-racial South Africa would easily fit into the SADCC as a full member. Given her relative strength in many fields, she could and would significantly contribute to a reshaping of the SADCC, influencing members towards a higher degree of economic integration already on the SADCC policy agenda. Old and new topics (such as trade, structural reform and the environment) will dominate this agenda and require answers of a regional nature. Judging from its track record, the SADCC seems to be well equipped not only to incorporate South Africa but also, creatively, to address new challenges and suggest answers. Irrespective of whether South Africa will be a fully fledged SADCC member (or a close associate, as suggested by Erich Leistner and Joseph Hanlon),[41] the need for close co-operation and integration remains. Fortunately – relative to other African subregions – there already exists a high

degree of economic integration and interaction in Southern Africa, as well as a determination on the part of its well-experienced governments to tackle the challenges of the future constructively. Yes, Southern Africa without doubt has better chances than other parts of Africa to grow together. If the peoples and governments of the region succeed in creating a new Southern Africa, the region might well prove a "preferential trading and co-operation partner" with other world regions and trading blocs, notably the EEC. Adopting this scenario, Southern Africa may have a good chance of getting back on to the world economic map, this making it potentially the most important partner of the industrialized world on the African continent. One contribution to the re-creation of an economically, socially, politically, and environmentally sound and stable Southern Africa could be seen to lie in the establishment of a regional regime of economic (and military) limits, checks and balances, and confidence-building measures adopted on the basis of the mutual benefits they guarantee. Significant steps in this direction have been taken already. Further progress is now necessary. Here, the SADCC, together with post-apartheid South Africa, can take Southern Africa from a region of economic, social, and military conflict to a region of peace.[42]

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Thirty years of independent Africa

*Douglas Rimmer, Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, provides a more optimistic appraisal of Africa's first thirty years of independence.**

In 1960 there appeared in Africa south of the Sahara seventeen newly sovereign states — Nigeria, Zaire, Somalia and nearly all the former French dependencies of *Afrique noire*. Including these seventeen, 31 new states were created in this region between 1956 and 1966. By the latter date, the dissolution of the British, French and Belgian colonial empires in Africa was almost completed, the principal exception being Zimbabwe, whose independence was not internationally recognized until 1980. The Portuguese African empire was slower to disappear, but came to its end in 1975.

For most of the countries of Black Africa, therefore, independence or the post-colonial period has now lasted around thirty years, longer than the lifetimes of most Africans now alive. What judgement should be made of the record of this period? Are the peoples of Africa better off? Have the hopes and aspirations that were vested in political independence been realized?

Most of the answers that have been given to these questions, especially in recent years, have been strongly negative. With few exceptions, African countries are believed economically to have languished, or even retrogressed. Their administrations are regarded as having become incompetent and corrupt; their governments, which are often self-appointed, as authoritarian, intolerant of opposition, and commonly

dependent for their survival on external support. The policies that have been followed are seen frequently to have been economically wrong-headed.

Africa is perceived as beset by intractable problems — runaway population growth, diminishing capacity to feed its people, deteriorating physical environments, crushing burdens of external debt. The consensus view was expressed in 1985 by a former President of the World Bank when he said, "The harsh truth is that sub-Saharan Africa today faces a crisis of unprecedented proportions".[1]

The value of the African crisis to some outside bodies

Many reservations may be made against this apocalyptic view of the condition of Africa. For example, some outside bodies, including the World Bank, have interests entrenched in an African crisis; their importance, the resources they command, perhaps even their very existence, depend on a perceived need to rescue Africa from disaster. It does not follow that the "crisis" is an illusion, but only that our recognition of it owes much to the presence of various international economic institutions and aid-donating national agencies. Why, to express this point another way, was no such crisis perceived in the 1890s, when people in east and central Africa suffered enormous mortality through the spread of animal and human diseases, or in the 1930s, when African economies were devastated by

falling export prices and burdens of external debt just as they have been in the 1980s?

Continuities between colonial and independent regimes

Again, some of the strictures made on independent African governments could just as well be made on their predecessors. The colonial governments also were self-appointed, in some respects arbitrary, and at times violently oppressive. Was it not naive and unrealistic to expect that such regimes could be abruptly replaced by liberal democracies based on consent and not force, observing the rule of law and providing freedom of speech and political association and regular free elections? Such a political order had no roots in earlier African history, and very little time was given to its implantation — in the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese and Spanish territories, no time at all.[2]

Perverse economic policies and where they came from

Consider also the provenance of the wrong-headed economic policies attributed to many of the independent African governments. These policies aimed to contrive economic diversification and to impel modernization, so as to make the African economies less dependent on external markets and sources of supply and better able to deliver welfare in various tangible

forms. In addition, monetary autonomy was asserted in some countries, particularly in the former British territories, so as to relieve the dependence of government spending on tax revenues and voluntary loans. These policies often involved fiscal discrimination against exports and subsidization of substitutes for imports; official control of transactions in foreign exchange, and the licensing of imports; expansion of the public against the private sector, including the setting up of parastatal enterprises; and the fixing of official prices for consumer goods and producer inputs. Raising of the investment rate within the context of a national plan of development was seen as a key factor in this process of transformation.

Such policies have become substantially discredited. Where they were pursued with most zeal, as in Guinea, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, average living standards were pushed down rather than raised up. Exports were discouraged, but the demand for foreign exchange was not commensurately reduced, and dependence on the outside world consequently did not lessen. Governments found the tasks of rationing foreign exchange, licensing imports and controlling prices beyond their capacity efficiently to discharge. Parastatal enterprises commonly required continuous public subsidization. The more governments intervened in economic life, the greater became the opportunities for graft and corruption, and the greater the profitability of diverting transactions into "parallel" or "underground" economies. Policies certainly created material welfare for some people, but the distribution was determined mainly by political consideration. Inflation, once thought to be a useful adjunct to more orthodox systems of taxation, was found to have destructive consequences for the state itself. The investment rate turned out to have little or no connection with the rate of economic growth, and the attempts centrally to plan development became farcical.

But these policies, which are now so much decried for their perversity, were not invented by the politicians of the newly independent African states. In some respects they were pioneered by the colonial administrations. They expressed the humours of the early postwar period. After independence, they were supported even more strongly by economists and other practitioners in the art of developing underdeveloped countries. According to the mainstream of expert opinion, economic and social advancement in these countries was impossible unless the government directly undertook the reshaping of the economic structure within the framework of a national plan. Political independence provided wider scope for tackling this necessary task, the performance of which would ensure that independence did not remain merely nominal, but was complemented by economic autonomy. The predominant opinion of the time may be illustrated by an event that took place in Accra in April 1963. Ghana's Seven-Year Plan, which was supposed to secure the country's rapid emergence as an industrialized and socialist state, was laid before a conference of eminent economists drawn from a dozen countries including the USA, Great Britain, the Netherlands, India, Hungary and Poland and from the United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa and for Latin America. According to an observer at the conference, these distinguished visitors offered "constructive professional advice" to the planners, "... but very little by way of fundamental criticism of the strategy".[3]

A discontinuity: the indigenization of public administration

Thus there were continuities between colonial and post-colonial Africa in both the authoritarian style of government and in conceptions of governmental economic responsibilities. But not everything remained the same. The new rulers were, of course, racially different from the old; more significantly, their social mores were different. Colonial officials had been detached from and relatively impervious to most of the sectional interests among the peoples they governed. Even their partiality towards white settlers and European businesses was restrained, since those interests often conflicted with an official view that government acted as trustee for the native peoples. In contrast, the African politicians, and the African officials who executed their policies, were members of indigenous societies and could not be immune against pressures to defend or promote particular interests. These interests were characteristically those of widely extended families or clans, the units to which primordial loyalty was owed; and sometimes they coalesced for tactical purposes into tribal or ethnic groupings. Hence the impartiality of the public administrations in the new states was always strained. Competing groups aimed to get their own people into positions of authority, from which jobs, contracts and government amenities were expected to flow in favour of the successful competitors. Political corruption had its origin in the understood obligation of big men in public life to look after their kin and followers and the places from which they came. Of course, this pressure on the impartiality of government policies and public administration is not unique to independent Africa. African countries have rather been distinguished by the lack of restraint in such use (or abuse) of office, a tendency for the circle of beneficiaries to narrow, and the scale of the economic damage done. These unhappy consequences have followed from the rapidity of decolonization in Africa and the telescoping of political change; the ethos of a neutral public administration, like the institutions of liberal democracy, was inadequately rooted.

Population growth

Consider next population growth as an aspect of Africa's troubles. According to the World Bank's estimates, the population of sub-Saharan African (excluding South Africa) will be around 495 million in 1990.

Projecting backward by the annual rates of increase estimated by the Bank, the 1960 total would have been around 215 million. While neither figure can be regarded as an accurate, or even an approximate, measurement, there would be general agreement that the population of the region has more than doubled in the last thirty years.

This amazing demographic surge is commonly regarded as a major element of disaster in Africa. But it is perhaps more obviously evidence of remarkable achievement. While factual knowledge of African demographic history before the present century is almost nonexistent, there are good grounds for believing that the long-term increase in numbers was extremely slow, and that

it became slower, and possibly stopped altogether, in the 18th and 19th centuries as a result of the export slave trades and the initial impact of the colonial conquests. As late as 1930 there was disagreement whether the African population would increase in the future, or actually diminish. Then the historic constraints on population in Africa were somehow broken.

The demographic surge has not been propelled by an increase in birth rates or total fertility rates, but by falling mortality, especially in early childhood. This falling trend began in the 1930s, or possibly a little earlier – that is, in the later colonial period – and it appears to have continued since independence. The crude death rate for tropical Africa as a whole is now estimated at 16 per thousand, compared with a crude birth rate of 47. Associated with the falling mortality rate has been a lengthening in life expectancy; between 1960 and 1990 the expectation of life at birth has apparently increased from less that 40 years to more than 50 years. This demographic performance is clearly inconsistent with the common perception that Africa has languished or retrogressed.

Population growth and food supply

The question is often asked: how can populations that are growing so fast possibly feed themselves? Evidence of several kinds has been produced to show that they cannot. Figures showing slow growth in aggregate food production and falling calorie consumption per head have been published by the FAO and other bodies, but their statistical validity is low and it may be suspected that they are heavily influenced by more partial evidence. Thus, first, there have been famines — in the West African Sahel and Ethiopia in the early 1970s, more widely in the early 1980s, and more recently in Ethiopia again. Second, exports of agricultural produce have trended down; according to the World Bank, Africa lost half of its world market share in exports (other than oil) between 1970 and 1983.[4] Third, and conversely, food imports rose.

None of this partial evidence conclusively shows a declining trend in the capacity to feed African populations. The famines have occurred in areas that

have always been vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall, and most of which were currently affected by warfare, insurrections and massive displacements of population. The decline in agricultural exports was undoubtedly connected with fiscal and other policy discrimination against production for export. The growth in food imports, which was observable in some countries as early as in the 1940s, resulted initially from the use of additional income to buy preferred items of diet. Subsequently food imports — along with imports of everything else — were given a fillip by the overvalued exchange rates maintained in many African countries until recently.

At their peak in the early 1980s, food imports may have reached about 15 per cent of total food supply in tropical Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, these imports were growing in volume at around 4 per cent per annum according to the World Bank, or by as much as 7,5 per cent according to other estimates. Taking the higher figure for the sake of argument, imports may have increased total food supply by a little over 1 per cent per annum at most. Given the estimates of population growth of 2,5 to 3 per cent per annum, food consumption per head would have dropped to impossibly low levels if imports had been the only source of additional supply.[5] Clearly, therefore, aggregate food production in Africa was not declining during the period of growing food imports but, on the contrary, was the chief support of the growing populations. With the fall in African export earnings since the early 1980s, and the removal of currency overvaluations, food imports have much diminished, while food production (according to the World Bank)[6] has kept up with population growth in tropical Africa as a whole.

Educational expansion

Not only have African countries been able — for the most part, and in the absence of drought and wars — to feed their fast growing populations, but they were also able, until recently, to make considerable advances in educating these increasing numbers. In West Africa, the net primary school enrolment ratio (proportion of enrolled children of the relevant age-group to estimated size

of the relevant age-group) roughly doubled — from 30 to 60 per cent — between 1960 and 1980, while the equivalent ratio for secondary schooling rose from 3 per cent to 12 or even 15 per cent.[7] According to the World Bank, the gross primary school enrolment ratio for all tropical Africa rose from 41 to 79 per cent between 1965 and 1980 but has since fallen somewhat, while the secondary school ratio rose from 4 per cent in 1965 to 20 per cent in 1986.[8] While tertiary or higher education remains relatively rare, it too has greatly expanded. For instance, Nigeria now has 24 universities, compared with only two in 1960.

Educational enrolments are imperfect data. They are vitiated, especially at primary level, by drop-outs from school. They tell nothing about the quality of the schooling. Quality has deteriorated in recent years, for want of public revenue and foreign exchange as well as, or rather than, because of rising numbers of pupils. Even so, African peoples are undoubtedly better informed and more literate than they were under colonial regimes. As a notable example, literacy in Tanzania has changed in a single generation from the exception to the norm.

Population growth in historical perspective

The apparent secular rise in food output and educational provision since independence is difficult to reconcile with the idea that population growth is an important explanation of the perceived crisis in Africa. Indeed, the principal support for this idea is not derived from empirical evidence. Reliance is placed rather on projections. An anticipated doubling of the population every twenty years provides what the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has called a "nightmare scenario" of land shortage, massive unemployment, huge migratory flows accompanied by social and political tensions, ecological degradation and deepening poverty.

Of course, it has always been possible to reach hopelessly pessimistic conclusions about the future of humanity by extrapolating current trends and assuming human incapacity to do anything about them. A famous example is the 1792 Essay on Population of T.R. Malthus. Again, in the early 1970s we were assured that there must be "limits

to growth" imposed by exponential growth in usage of the natural resources of the physically finite world.

An alternative view is that pressure on resources is the principal propellant of technical progress and cultural adaptation. Necessity is the mother of invention. A striking feature of the African past is that this pressure of necessity has seldom been exerted, or at any rate has seldom been strong enough to produce results. A combination of thin population and an intractable natural environment kept techniques simple in agriculture, transport, mining and manufactures. The same forces produced social fragmentation and hindered the creation of substantial states. Land abundance, an almost imperceptible growth in population, prohibitively high transport costs and social organization small in scale are circumstances unpropitious for technical advance, economic growth and political development.

From this standpoint, the releasing of African population from the factors that constrained its growth in the past is a change offering hope as well as hazards for the future. While the resources already available still remain vastly underused in large areas of tropical Africa, there are countries such as Kenya where necessity is already pressing. This pressure understandably excites alarm. The creation of a class of landless workers is seen as socially harmful. Loss of self-sufficiency in food supply is deplored, and attempts made to prevent it. Urbanization is regarded as a deleterious trend, and young men and women are urged to stay on the land. In historical perspective, these attitudes can be seen to be conservative or reactionary. In expressing — again, understandably — fear of the unknown, a shrinking from the "crisis", they also inadvertently express a preference for backwardness. A society composed predominantly of self-sufficient and unambitious peasant cultivators might be easy to administer, but it would not be economically progressive.

The durability of African boundaries

The numerous small units of authority indigenous to Africa, and the many African peoples who believed themselves distinct from one another, found themselves incorporated into larger political entities during the relatively brief colonial interlude in African history. A remarkable feature of post-colonial Africa has been the survival of these essentially artificial entities and the durability of the boundaries among them. Fissiparous tendencies have been felt, as in Zaire and Nigeria in the 1960s and in the Sudan repeatedly (and also in the indigenous African empire of Ethiopia), but none of the states has actually broken up, even though all but two of them are composed of numerous ethnic groups, and many of the ethnic groups spread across national boundaries. There has been a large number of outside military interventions — interventions by the armed forces of other Black African states[9] as well as by those of South Africa, France, Libya, Cuba and the Soviet Union — but the objective almost invariably has been either to defend or to overthrow a government, not to annex territory. There have been petty border disputes in West Africa, but the only serious attempts to alter the boundaries fixed in the colonial period have been the Somali wars with Ethiopia and the Libyan incursions into Chad.

Two reasons can be offered for the stability of sovereign boundaries in post-colonial Africa. First, each state as it emerged from colonial rule was accepted as a datum by the international community, including in particular the United Nations and its specialized agencies which have done much to maintain African administrations through technical assistance and financial aid. Irrespective of its size and genesis, its geography and ethnic composition, each state was legitimized by international recognition, and its representatives were treated in formal and ceremonial ways as possessing no less validity than other national representatives. African statehood became, indeed, more a matter of international juridical recognition than of effective government — juridical rather than empirical in its content.[10]

Second, the lack of fit between the states and ethnicities meant that almost every independent African government felt itself threatened by irredentism. Scarcely any were safe from territorial claims. In almost every instance, neighbouring states contained people who believed themselves kin to one another. At an early stage, therefore, the African governments meeting in the Organization of African Unity recognized their common interest in the fiction that the states were coterminous with nations, and with few exceptions they have adhered to the principle that the boundaries established by colonial rule are inviolable.

Political decisions are best judged by their results, not their motives. The motives in this case are not edifying, but the result has been that Africa, after the dissolution of the European empires, has been for the most part spared the kind of sanguinary quarrels over national territories and ethnic minorities that followed the disintegration of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires and may yet follow the end of the Russian empire.

When so much has gone wrong in post-colonial Africa, the suppression of this source of discord and strife deserves to be noticed.

Changes in the world economy

Arguments about African economic performance since independence tend to polarize on the question where the blame lies for its shortcomings. One view emphasizes the economically destructive character of the economic policies followed in many African countries. The other view shifts the chief responsibility to external factors — to adverse changes in world markets for commodities and capital, possibly exacerbated, or even instigated, by the supposed need of the international capitalist system to exploit Africa.

External factors certainly count. Countries as economically small as those of tropical Africa depend crucially for improvement of their living standards on the value of their exports, capital inflows and the capacity to import. The truth of the matter is that external factors were generally favourable in the late colonial period and the early years of independence, and that they subsequently became unfavourable, especially from about 1980. Internal factors, or domestic policies, were for some time overwhelmed by favourable external factors, but, when the external factors turned sour, the negative consequences of policy became apparent.

The table shows estimates of the rates of growth in real Gross Domestic

Estimates of percentage annual rates of growth in real GDP per head

	1987 population (millions)	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1950-75	1960-80
Africa*		2,4	2,2		2,4	
Nigeria	106,6	2,1	0,4		2,6	
		4,1	*0,3*	*6,2*		*3,2*
Ethiopia	44,8	2,3	2,7		2,0	
		2,5	*2,0–*	*0,1*		*0,9*
Zaire	32,6	1,1	2,4		1,6	
		3,1	*4,1*	*–3,9*		
Tanzania	23,9	3,7	3,0		2,6	
		3,1	*2,1*			*2,6*
Sudan	23,1	2,7	–0,7		3,3	
		..	*1,2*			*0,6*
Kenya	22,1	1,0	3,2		1,8	
		0,2	*1,3*	*–0,5*		*0,4*
Uganda	15,7	0,8	3,0		0,6	
		0,4	*1,4*	*–2,3*		*–0,5*
Mozambique	14,6	3,9	2,9		1,9	
		2,8	*–3,8*			*–0,6*
Ghana	13,6	1,9	–0,7		0,7	
		0,7	*–4,2*			*–1,7*
Côte d'Ivoire	11,1	..	4,3		2,0	
		3,5	*3,3*			*3,4*
Cameroon	10,9	1,5	4,4		2,5	
		3,7	*1,3*			*2,5*

* Including North African countries but excluding South Africa. Figures in this row relate to GNP per head.

.. Less than 0,05

Sources: David Morawetz, *Twenty-five years of economic development 1950 to 1975*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1977, Statistical Appendix, Table A1; Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "Improved international comparisons of real product and its composition: 1950-1980", *Review of income and wealth 30, 2, 1984*. Population estimates from World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989.

Product per head of population for those tropical African countries having populations in 1987 estimated at more than 10 million. Figures for 1950-75 come from a study done for the World Bank by Morawetz. Those italicized in the table are based on GDP estimates revalued at the "average international prices" of 1975 by Summers and Heston and adjusted for movements in each country's external terms of trade up to 1980.

It will be seen that there are positive rates of growth in the 1950s; also in the 1960s with a very few exceptions; and for the whole period from 1950 to 1975. The rate of 2,4 per cent shown for all of Africa in 1950-75 understates the performance of tropical Africa, since the North African countries grew in this period more slowly than those of tropical Africa, according to the figures used by Morawetz. Assuming population growth averaging over 2 per cent annually in this period, the rate of growth in the aggregate GDP of tropical Africa would seem to have been around 5 per cent. This rate of growth was brisk by almost any standards.

Apparently it was only in the 1970s, and more particularly in the later 1970s, that many of the countries began eco-nomically to retrogress. Even in the 1970s, rapid growth in GDP per head at international prices and adjusted for terms-of-trade effects was maintained in the largest country, Nigeria, and also in Côte d'Ivoire. Contrasts in the 1970s appear also among the smaller countries that are not shown in the table. Thus, according to the data produced by Summers and Heston, GDP per head fell rapidly in this decade in Chad and Senegal but inceased rapidly in Malawi, and very rapidly in Gabon and Botswana.

After 1980 retrogression becomes more common, although not universal (Cameroon, Botswana and Congo continued to grow). The World Bank estimates aggregate GDP for tropical Africa to have increased by only 0,5 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1987, implying an annual fall in GDP per head of some 2,5 per cent. Nigeria was one of the countries worst affected, and, because of its great relative economic size in tropical Africa in 1980 (approaching one-half of the aggregate GDP of the region in that year), its decline greatly affected performance in the region as a whole. Indeed, the World Bank's estimate of the growth rate in 1980-87 for tropical Africa excluding Nigeria is 2,3 per cent, compared with 0,5 per cent when Nigeria is included.

What do these estimates signify? They do not support the view that Africa as a whole has been gripped by economic malaise since about the time of independence. Rather they suggest that most of the countries of the region suffered acute economic recession from about 1975 or, more commonly, 1980. The internal factors may indeed have been adverse, the policies that were followed often misguided, but, if negative consequences did not become commonly apparent until 1975 or 1980, it seems that these factors were not so important that they could not be overridden by other forces until exogenous changes occurred about one or other of these dates.

Exogenous changes there certainly were. Armed conflicts became widespread and destructive from the mid-1970s, partly in consequence of the revolutions in Lisbon and Addis Ababa and the intervention of outside powers in the affairs of Southern Africa and the Horn. The drought of 1982-84, which was experienced in about twenty countries, has already been mentioned. Warfare and drought, often affecting the

same countries, such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique and Chad, resulted in massive refugee movements and losses of production.

In addition damaging shifts occurred in the world economy. From the end of the second World War, the terms of trade of African countries (the ratio of their export prices to import prices) followed an upward trend. This trend was broken by the middle of the 1970s for exporters of minerals like Zambia, Zaire and Liberia. But it continued until the end of the decade, and became even more favourable, for the oil exporters, including Nigeria, and for agricultural exporters like Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya; and it encouraged the governments of such countries greatly to enlarge their programmes of spending and to borrow heavily from abroad. In the years 1979 to 1981, the trend in the terms of trade was reversed for these countries too. Failing to react quickly to the change, their governments maintained for some years high rates of expenditure and consequently became further indebted externally. At the same time, the costs of borrowing were increasing as interest rates rose worldwide through the pressure of the US budget deficit.

According to the International Monetary Fund, the terms of trade for tropical Africa as a whole had risen by 76 per cent between 1970 and 1980, but between 1980 and 1987 they fell by 32 per cent, or by 24 per cent if Nigeria is excluded.[11] During the years of buoyant export prices, the effects of the declining trend in export volumes had been masked. But in the early 1980s, Africa's external earnings were dragged down both by falling export prices and by falling volumes — including now the volumes of oil — while at the same time a large fraction of the earnings was required for the servicing of external debts. The debt service due in 1987 was about 50 per cent of the value of the region's exports, and this with benefit of reschedulings of the greater part of the debts; even the servicing charges that were actually paid absorbed over 26 per cent of the export value.[12] Further, the combination of falling export earnings and high debt servicing obligations had devastating effects on African creditworthiness; net capital inflows dropped from US$11 to US$13 bn per annum in 1980-82 to less than US$1 bn per annum in 1986-87.[13]

One consequence has been a radical rethinking of economic policy in almost all the African countries. Levered by their creditors, the African governments have become persuaded of the advantages of realistic exchange rates, of the exploitation of current comparative advantage in international trade, of the pricing of goods by their economic values instead of by political criteria, of privatizing or commercializing parastatal enterprises, and of relying on market forces in preference to administrative regulation. With support and guidance from the IMF and the World Bank, most of these governments (35 at the last count) have embarked on programmes of economic reform or "structural adjustment", broadly to be interpreted as the unravelling of the distortions produced by the earlier attempts at "structural transformation".

Such reforms can make the African economies better able to respond to and profit from whatever opportunities are provided in the outside world by markets and by sources of supply both of goods and factors of production. But the reforms cannot themselves do much to create such opportunities. They cannot themselves generate expanding markets and rising prices for oil, coffee, cocoa, copper, tropical hardwoods and the other products that Africa is used to export. They cannot themselves create the need for outsiders to put more capital and enterprise into exploiting African resources. The gains from following programmes of structural adjustment have in fact been inconspicuous so far. These programmes appear in Africa more as a price exacted for short-term relief in the balance of payments and for the rescheduling of debt obligations than as a means of becoming materially better off. So long as export earnings remain depressed, external debts oppressive and foreign investment small, little economic growth can be expected in tropical Africa and the political rewards for reforming governments are likely to be negligible at best.

When these unpalatable facts are faced, a common reaction is to put the onus for their removal on the international community. For example, it is argued that African export prices should be raised through international commodity agreements, the debt burden reduced by the easing of repayment terms or outright forgiveness, and lack of outside investment made good by more grants or concessional lending by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. Even the critics or opponents of structural adjustment, such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa, think that the costs of their alternative solutions to Africa's troubles should be met by the international community.[14]

Such solutions are palliatives rather than cures. They belong with the perception of Africa as the poor relation of mankind, the relief of whose indigence and solving to whose problems is the moral responsibility of better-off people. They reflect the paternalist attitude that outside powers have maintained toward Africa for the last two hundred years. They may relieve some of the symptoms of Africa's ailments but they do not tackle the causes. If Africa's historic backwardness is to be ended, it can be only by the positive and constructive responses to "crisis" of the people who live and work in Africa. A crisis is, after all, a turning point, and not necessarily for the worse.

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A spatial and socio-economic profile of urbanization in Southern Africa

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Introduction

Urbanization, the universally experienced transformation whereby communities change from a rural to an urban way of life, has close relationships with industrialization and regional development. Industrialization — by virtue of its employment creating potential and the sound economic base it affords towns and cities — is a catalyst par excellence for urban growth. However, the location of industry being dependent upon a whole range of factors — a suitable resource base, agglomeration economies, markets and infrastructure to name but a few — it is subject to their uneven spatial distribution, resulting in selective industrial concentration and urbanization at certain places only. The outcome is an unbalanced space-economy featuring relative over-concentration in large urban cores and economically lagging peripheral regions. Much of the deficient development in these peripheral regions must be ascribed to the absence of strong regional innovation centres, for without virile urban nodes peripheral growth is unlikely to occur. Functional cores act as service centres in which and from which regional

needs (examples: employment, shopping, marketing, education, recreation and health) can be provided for efficiently and cost-effectively. The circulation of people, goods and services in the region is activated and co-ordinated by the core. Stated in another way, the core generates the energy required for the region to function. The process is undergirded spatially by a web of demographic and socio-economic variables. So it is that traditional opinion holds that urbanization is a prerequisite for economic growth and regional development.

Because urbanization plays such an important role in regional development, this article aims to discern spatial demographic patterns in the total spectrum of urban centres; to construct socio-economic profiles for the higher-order urban centres; and to describe the salient features of urbanization in Southern Africa as deduced from empirical data and local opinion. Although a substantial body of research literature exists on the urbanization process in Southern Africa,[1] this article takes a different approach. Making use of the latest census data for Southern Africa, a methodology is developed in which demographic cartography, socio-economic profiles and the informed opinions of local leaders are used to create a new view from a new standpoint. The interdependence of urban systems in Southern Africa

necessitates the study area's encompassing the Republic of South Africa and the independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

This approach involves an empirical analysis of the official 1985 population census results for 727 recognized urban settlements, interviews with local decision-makers, and inspection *in loco* of the urban milieux discussed. Considering the strong spatial dimension in any description of urban centres, processing and presentation of the data is carried out cartographically, supplemented by tabulated statistical profiles of the population at selected urban points and the interpretation of observed patterns. The paper begins by recording the overall Southern African urbanization situation as manifested in the spatial and demographic features of all the region's urban centres taken together. The focus then narrows to a presentation of the socio-economic characteristics of a selection of higher-order towns and cities; followed by an extraction of the quintessence of these empirical analyses and by certain substantiating informed opinions. We conclude with some thoughts on urbanization prospects.

The full spectrum of urban centres: Their spatio-demographic features

Historically, urbanization on the subcontinent has been woven from a set of

economic, social and political constituents to produce a complex and provocative urban tapestry. An overall picture of the magnitudes of this Southern African urbanization emerges from Table 1. Counting the inhabitants of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei with those of the RSA, the 1985 population of historical South Africa totalled about 29,3 million, of whom 47 per cent were urbanized. The total population of the RSA was approximately 23,4 million — more than 13 million (56 per cent) of whom lived in urban areas.[2] In contrast to the 89,6 per cent of RSA whites and 81,3 per cent of coloureds/Asians, only 39,6 per cent of the black population were urbanized in that year. Nevertheless, these 6 million urban blacks in the RSA accounted for 43 per cent of Southern Africa's total urban population. Thus they constituted the largest component of the urban population, followed by whites (30 per cent) and coloureds/Asians (21 per cent).

All indications are that a superior share of future population growth and urbanization impact will come from the ranks of the black population. White urbanization has already reached saturation, while the trend for the coloured and Asian populations has also begun to level off.[3] In contrast, the black population shows a relatively low urbanization level and an imminent high rate of urbanization. According to scholars in the field of urbanization it is reasonable to expect that the black urban population will increase by approximately one million persons annually to the end of the century.[4] The burning question is: *Where* will they urbanize?

Inspection of Table 1 reveals that urbanization presently occurs in a very concentrated manner. Clearly, this concentration is mainly in white areas, relatively little urbanization taking place in the self-governing territories and independent national states. Even more striking is the position of development region H, the primate core, with its more than one-third share of Southern Africa's urban population and an urbanization level of 81 per cent. This metropolitan area, principally mainly comprising the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) conurbation, has a dominant attraction for urban migrants in South Africa. With its 3,5 million inhabitants, the Witwatersrand metropolis alone is 2,2 times larger than Cape Town, the centre second in size.

Table 1: URBANIZATION MAGNITUDES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1985

	Total population	Urban population	Contribution to total SATBVC urban population	Level of urbanization	Growth rate of total population (1980-1985)*
SATBVC per country					
Transkei	2 933 206	148 512	1,1%	5,1%	2,3%
Bophuthatswana	1 743 435	254 143	1,8%	14,6%	5,6%
Venda	459 819	13 492	0,1%	2,9%	5,9%
Ciskei	766 636	404 500	2,9%	52,8%	2,4%
RSA	23 385 645	13 068 343	94,1%	55,9%	2,6%
Total	29 288 741	13 888 990	100%	47,4%	2,8%
RSA per population group					
White	4 568 739	4 091 626	29,5%	89,6%	1,6%
Coloured/Asian	3 654 066	2 971 799	21,4%	81,3%	2,6%
Blacks	15 162 840	6 004 918	43,2%	39,6%	2,9%
RSA per ethnic area					
White areas	16 495 237	11 958 661	86,1%	72,5%	1,7%
Self-governing territories	6 890 408	1 109 682	8,0%	16,1%	4,9%
SATBVC per development region					
A (Western Cape)	2 912 954	2 387 094	17,2%	81,9%	3,1%
B (Nothern Cape)	928 476	405 711	2,9%	43,7%	2,1%
C (OFS)	1 910 999	859 827	6,2%	45,0%	1,9%
D (Eastern Cape)	4 077 778	1 688 311	12,2%	41,4%	2,8%
E (Natal)	7 055 348	2 359 841	17,0%	33,5%	2,1%
F (Eastern Transvaal)	1 586 479	481 273	3,5%	30,3%	2,3%
G (Northern Transvaal)	3 206 003	276 109	2,0%	8,6%	3,9%
H (PWV)	6 168 868	5 008 013	36,1%	81,2%	3,1%
J (Western Transvaal)	1 441 836	422 811	3,0%	29,3%	3,3%

* The urban growth rates between 1980 and 1985 were not calculated due to their incomparability arising from the fact that the 1980 census results have been enhanced to compensate for underenumeration, while those for 1985 are unadjusted. As a substitute, the total population (rural plus urban) change for the intercensual period has been calculated.

A graphic illustration of the urban rank-size system of Southern Africa (Figure 1) confirms this primacy. Further corroboration of the concentration may be had from Figure 2, which shows that in the Southern African urban rankings the 13 centres of more than 100 000 inhabitants house about 66 per cent of South Africa's urban population, while the 599 towns of less than 10 000 inhabitants accommodate only 11 per cent of the urban population. The 115 towns in the middle ranks (10 000 – 100 000 inhabitants) are responsible for the remaining 23 per cent of urban dwellers. Although such uneven urbanization is a universal phenomenon, the Southern African urban system exhibits signs of abnormal imbalance: too many small towns housing too few people set against too few large metropolises with relatively too many people in them.

The ranking of urban settlements according to their population numbers,

as shown in Figure 1, exhibits some informative characteristics of Southern Africa's urbanization system. An optimally balanced rank-order system implies an integrated hierarchical concatenation of towns and cities spread along a sloping straight line as indicated in the diagram. While the middle-order South African centres show little deviation from balanced urban development (as indicated by the straight line) the primacy of the Witwatersrand and the prominence of the other metropoles contrast starkly with the small and underdeveloped towns. Little wonder then that so many small towns on the platteland, their *raisons d'être* gone, have decayed. Often the unjustified claims for growth incentives by this surfeit of small towns handicap the growth of more worthwhile and deserving *larger* regional centres.

These features are borne out in Figure 3. Here the relative size of towns and cities can be traced in more detail and the deconcentration and industrial development points are indicated in order to show their location in the region's urban system overall. The spatial distribution of the 727 recognized urban settlements in the RSA and the TBVC countries demonstrates that a relatively dense concentration occurs along the coast as well as in the northern and eastern interior. The metropolitan areas[5] hold an unmistakably dominant position in the urban system — the PWV complex being the indisputable leader, followed as prominent metropoles on the second tier by the Cape Peninsula and Durban-Pinetown complexes. Broadly, this picture mirrors the historical settlement pattern and the richer resource base of particular areas. In these areas urban settlements are not only closer together but generally larger in size. Finally, at the third metropolitan tier, are the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and the East London-Mdantsane complexes. (It is worth interjecting here that the vigour of the latter complex should not be underestimated.)

In sum, the Southern African urban scene is noticeably dominated by the five metropoles: during its 336 years of Western occupation, South Africa has indeed experienced remarkable urbanization. But it must be pointed out that not all urban centres have shared equally in this urbanization, with the result that a strongly unbalanced urban pattern has evolved (in time and space).


Figure 1 Urban hierarchy, 1985

Likewise the designated growth points show a rather uneven distribution and do not always relate to the ranking of the urban centres.

A further demonstration of this uneven urbanization pattern is given by the level of urbanization expressed on a magisterial district basis. This is

Figure 2 Cumulative contribution of centres to urban population

Figure 3 Distribution and size of urban centres, 1985

illustrated in Figure 4 and must be interpreted against the background of the size and location of urban centres (Figure 1). The most obvious feature is that the proportion of the population living in urban areas shows considerable regional variation. Thus the districts with an urbanization level greater than 80 per cent are mainly concentrated in metropolitan areas, while the 40 per cent level roughly divides the country into a relatively more urbanized south-western and a relatively less urbanized north-eastern part. It is noteworthy, however, that the main areas of rural population concentration (Figure 5) are also in the northern and eastern

parts of the subcontinent, these being potential reservoirs for future urbanization. It follows that Figures 3 and 5 must be interpreted complementarily in order to deduce where future urbanization impact can be expected to be most intense.

A prominent feature in Figures 1 and 3 is the position of the deconcentration and industrial development points within the general urban framework. Most of these growth points have not realized expectations and appear to be incapable of generating sufficient multiplier effects to stimulate further economic and social development in their surrounding regions.

The performance level reached by these development points is self-evident from Figures 1 and 3, and Table 2.

The majority of growth points, we repeat, have not come up to expectations and have made only a minimal contribution to any redistribution of Southern Africa's population. In figures, only 2,01 million (14,5 per cent) of the 1985 urban population in the SATBVC countries is accommodated at the approximately 50 deconcentration and industrial development points. In 1980, five years earlier, this same group of urban areas housed 13,2 per cent of the subcontinent's urban population. This mere 1,3 per cent relative population displacement over a

five-year period is hardly sufficient to bring about an appreciable turnabout in the urbanization pattern. Thus, to date, the Regional Industrial Development Programme has had a negligible impact on the spatial redistribution of urbanization in Southern Africa.

Within the context of the growth point strategy it has been deemed wise to single out the higher-order centres for a selective investigation of their performance. This should facilitate an evaluation of their present and potential roles as urbanization cores in a national regional development plan for Southern Africa.

The higher-order centres: Their socio-economic profile

Using the Southern African urban ranking, 57 higher-order centres with populations of more than 25 000 (see indication on Figure 1) were identified for subjection to continued socio-economic evaluation. The cut-off is arbitrary; but it is reasonable to accept that growth points are seldom viable in towns smaller than some specified "threshold". Figure 3 gives the location of these 57 selected towns and cities. For the sake of completeness 30 existing deconcentration points and industrial development points having populations of less than 25 000 have been added, giving a total of 87 urban centres to be examined in this section.

The primacy role of the metropoles is evident again in their size as much as in their generative effect on the size of nearby towns. This uneven distribution of higher-order centres raises a serious problem for balanced regional development in Southern Africa, the western Karoo and northern Cape for example being quite deficient in these towns, principally due to their restricted resources. Possibly a better cut-off value for the higher tier of towns would be 50 000 inhabitants; if this value is adopted, the scarcity of large-scale urbanization in the non-metropolitan interior becomes even more obvious. The search for strong regional centres as candidates for growth-point status must probably be made among this latter group of centres with over 50 000 inhabitants each. Here the location of existing deconcentration and industrial development points (shown in Figures 1 and 3) is illuminating: there is no suggestion of any concentration of these

Figure 4 Level of urbanization, 1985

existing growth points at any particular urban size level. This smacks of a lack of appreciation of a basic requirement for successful urban growth and decentralization.

In order to move towards a sounder adjudication — with an eye to a regional development plan of the growth-point potential of these settlements, an urban profile of each centre's demographic and socio-economic characteristics was compiled and is presented in summarized form in Table 2. Eight variables relating to the total population were chosen from the 1985 population census to serve as norms of evaluation in these 87 profiles.

- _Population number_ is a measure of a settlement's size and, indirectly, of its ability to grow in the future. Population growth rate is by its nature the more correct indication of population change and development potential but, since the urban census figures for 1980 and 1985 are not strictly comparable, this parameter has been omitted.
- _Population age and children_ in a certain sense refer to a settlement's degree of economic dependence and size of potential workforce. The

former variable is reckoned as the average age in years, the latter as the percentage of children younger than 15 years.

- _Illiteracy and education level_ refer to the population's skills governing their access to particular occupations and income. Both reflect the level of development a community has reached. The former variable was calculated as the percentage of persons older than 25 years not in possession of a standard 2 qualification; the latter is the percentage of matriculated persons older than 25 years.
- _Personal income_ is not solely an indication of magnitude of remuneration, but also reflects the economic dynamism, quality of life and purchasing power of a settlement. It is expressed as the average per capita income in rand of the economically active population. Owing to the fact that this type of information was not collected during the 1985 census this is the only variable based on 1980 census data.
- _Unemployment_ normally measures the deficit of employment opportunities in an urban area, so pointing

Table 2: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES OF SELECTED URBAN CENTRES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1985

| Town/City		Population (number)	Average age (years)	Children (% 15 years)	Illiteracy (% std 1)	Educational level (% std 10)	Personal income (rand 1980)	Unemployment (%)	Not economically active (%)	Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing	Mining	Electricity/Water	Construction	Transport/Communication	Manufacturing	Community services	Commerce/Accommodation	Financial services
																	Economic Sector (% employed)	
Witwatersrand		3 395 286	28,8	27,0	14,6	25,8	4 330	10,1	31,8	1,7	8,3	1,1	6,3	6,3	25,4	27,9	14,8	8,1
Cape Town		1 581 946	27,5	31,7	8,4	25,9	4 115	9,1	38,9	1,4	0,3	1,1	9,8	7,1	25,9	30,7	16,3	7,4
Durban		1 482 127	27,5	30,6	15,0	22,4	4 545	13,6	41,5	1,6	0,4	0,6	7,3	9,2	31,3	28,1	15,5	6,0
Pretoria		754 327	29,0	26,4	13,3	37,8	5 124	5,9	31,7	3,2	0,5	0,9	7,0	7,1	16,3	44,3	11,9	8,9
Port Elizabeth		495 623	27,4	31,8	10,0	20,2	3 542	20,4	45,6	0,7	0,3	0,4	7,1	7,8	32,1	30,7	15,7	5,1
Vereeniging/Vanderbijl		462 242	26,4	33,9	20,5	17,6	3 638	12,0	39,5	5,0	1,0	2,6	8,1	4,0	36,9	26,7	12,2	3,5
Mdantsane	*	242 823																
Pietermaritzburg	**	222 966	27,3	32,5	12,6	24,3	4 001	18,2	45,7	1,6	0,3	0,6	6,3	7,1	23,7	38,7	15,6	6,1
Bloemfontein	*	209 159	28,4	28,8	12,2	27,3	3 625	7,8	37,8	2,4	0,4	0,3	6,4	12,3	8,0	46,2	17,2	6,9
Kimberley	*	137 299	26,1	35,7	15,3	17,4	3 277	13,3	42,8	0,7	8,2	1,6	6,5	11,3	8,9	41,8	16,9	4,1
Carltonville		120 499	29,0	16,3	31,8	8,7	2 332	3,1	13,5	0,5	84,3	0,1	1,6	1,0	1,4	6,6	3,8	0,7
East London	*	112 886	30,7	28,0	9,8	28,0	4 293	5,9	37,9	0,8	0,4	1,3	7,3	11,2	23,7	32,0	16,7	6,7
Uitenhage		107 363	26,2	34,3	14,0	14,0	2 885	19,1	49,3	0,7	0,2	0,7	7,3	9,0	40,8	28,2	10,8	2,3
Welkom		99 958	26,4	30,9	11,7	24,2	4 357	5,9	29,3	0,3	23,5	0,3	13,2	0,3	9,7	29,4	16,4	4,2
Botshabelo	*	95 625	23,1	42,7	40,8	1,5	0	25,9	55,2	2,6	7,6	0,7	23,1	6,7	7,2	40,0	11,2	0,8
Klerksdorp		82 127	28,0	30,1	16,9	23,9	4 130	10,3	38,2	1,6	10,6	1,1	6,4	6,3	9,6	36,1	22,9	5,3
Potchefstroom		78 865	26,7	29,1	21,1	24,1	3 498	8,6	43,0	1,3	2,0	0,5	6,2	3,8	13,6	55,7	13,2	3,6
Witbank		77 171	26,0	32,4	14,8	24,7	3 921	8,5	34,0	0,8	6,8	8,8	9,2	5,3	23,9	26,1	15,1	4,0
Paarl		73 849	26,7	32,9	14,4	21,6	3 387	8,7	38,1	4,1	0,3	0,6	12,2	3,5	36,6	25,0	12,7	4,9
Soshanguve		68 598	23,1	38,8	19,3	12,7	1 808	15,0	43,5	1,0	0,4	0,6	7,2	8,1	21,7	38,5	19,5	2,9
Madadeni	*	65 832	22,3	42,4	28,9	7,8	1 474	0,2	90,9	1,8	10,2	0,1	0,4	52,5	9,3	23,1	1,3	1,3
Kroonstad		65 165	27,2	32,5	15,5	16,9	3 603	14,2	45,5	1,3	0,6	0,8	5,8	12,3	11,9	44,7	18,7	3,9
Ga-Rankuwa	**	60 115																
Umtata		57 796																
Nigel		54 787	26,6	32,3	17,8	18,3	3 490	11,7	36,8	1,6	8,6	1,1	5,7	3,1	32,9	32,1	12,3	2,6
Worcester		54 007	26,3	35,8	13,1	21,0	3 005	12,4	42,4	3,6	0,6	2,9	7,5	6,3	24,5	32,9	17,4	4,4
Mabopane		52 214																
Osizweni	*	51 934	22,1	45,1	37,8	2,9	0	0,0	87,5	2,6	24,1	0,0	0,1	59,4	5,3	7,0	0,3	1,1
Grahamstown		48 452	26,6	32,6	20,5	19,3	1 884	27,1	54,7	0,8	0,5	0,7	9,1	4,6	8,5	57,8	14,4	3,5
Mpumalanga		47 938	23,0	39,6	18,7	7,5	1 601	11,9	40,9	4,4	0,3	1,1	3,7	4,1	59,0	17,9	8,4	1,0
Sasolburg		45 871	26,8	29,8	10,6	28,7	4 178	3,0	27,4	0,3	2,5	3,0	7,1	1,9	55,0	21,8	6,3	2,2
Middelburg		44 762	26,0	33,5	17,3	26,0	3 697	6,4	32,1	1,0	4,8	2,1	8,0	3,7	20,7	35,9	19,3	4,6
George		41 920	28,0	32,5	17,3	26,9	3 400	4,9	39,8	4,1	0,5	1,5	15,6	5,1	17,5	30,0	19,1	6,6
Stellenbosch		40 944	27,1	25,2	10,3	38,8	4 316	4,9	47,9	3,2	0,2	0,5	7,3	2,7	21,2	44,7	14,2	6,0
Upington	*	40 463	25,2	38,4	24,9	15,6	3 378	9,6	45,1	4,8	0,9	1,5	12,2	8,8	6,8	38,3	22,2	4,4
Rustenburg		37 712	28,4	28,9	14,1	32,8	6 363	1,4	29,2	1,1	42,4	0,5	3,8	2,3	6,7	25,1	12,9	5,3
Oudshoorn		37 112	26,8	35,4	14,9	22,8	3 052	9,8	43,4	1,7	0,2	0,5	8,6	5,1	11,7	49,3	19,1	3,7
Bethlehem		35 301	27,2	32,8	20,9	19,5	2 804	8,1	38,2	1,4	0,5	0,9	8,5	11,4	12,1	37,9	22,0	5,2
Newcastle	*	34 931	25,3	34,7	5,8	39,3	6 283	5,0	33,2	0,5	1,5	0,4	4,4	3,9	38,9	27,0	14,4	9,0
Seshego	*	32 895	24,6	36,8	17,9	13,7	1 453	14,0	39,8	0,4	0,8	0,6	4,6	6,6	23,4	36,7	24,0	2,9
Queenstown		32 699	28,2	33,4	15,9	19,4	3 330	20,6	45,3	1,5	0,7	0,5	9,7	9,0	9,0	40,7	23,6	5,4
Ermelo		32 047	26,7	30,3	25,3	18,5	3 065	7,6	28,8	1,0	22,1	3,8	11,0	10,0	5,5	25,5	16,1	4,9
Standerton		31 800	26,4	32,3	21,9	19,6	2 776	10,5	39,2	1,2	2,5	6,4	12,5	5,6	21,3	29,9	17,6	2,9
Ladysmith	*	31 670	26,4	32,5	15,0	21,8	3 682	12,1	38,1	0,8	0,4	1,0	4,7	14,4	20,7	36,4	16,6	5,0

Table 2: CONTINUED

Town/City		Population (number)	Average age (years)	Children (% 15 years)	Illiteracy (% std 1)	Educational level (% std 10)	Personal income (rand 1980)	Unemployment (%)	Not economically active (%)	Economic Sector (% employed)								
										Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing	Mining	Electricity/Water	Construction	Transport/Communication	Manufacturing	Community services	Commerce/Accommodation	Financial services
Zwelitsha		30 960																
Temba		30 720																
Pietersburg	*	29 909	27,5	33,3	6,2	44,9	6 426	1,5	34,5	1,8	1,1	0,7	5,9	7,6	10,0	39,4	21,7	11,8
Strand		29 801	32,9	26,6	8,0	35,7	4 502	5,7	43,4	2,1	0,4	1,0	14,6	5,0	24,6	29,1	16,4	6,7
Atlantis	**	29 524	21,3	42,4	15,1	5,9	2 041	7,5	33,3	1,1	0,3	5,7	7,8	2,8	59,5	13,5	8,0	1,3
Orkney		29 490	27,4	25,8	19,1	13,5	3 146	5,9	24,3	0,7	66,4	0,5	3,5	1,6	2,3	15,3	8,4	1,2
Odendaalsrus		27 463	26,1	33,9	16,7	15,4	3 541	12,7	42,9	0,6	20,0	0,6	9,3	4,9	11,4	30,9	19,8	2,5
Ezakheni		27 277	22,5	43,2	27,0	4,9	1 145	0,1	69,2	8,0	0,5	0,0	10,3	37,3	13,3	21,4	4,7	4,5
Butterworth	*	26 776																
Secunda		26 774	21,8	39,6	4,3	51,6	9 345	1,1	30,5	0,3	10,9	0,1	2,8	1,0	55,4	21,3	5,4	2,8
Sada		26 730																
Vredenburg/Saldanha	*	26 091	24,7	37,0	17,2	20,2	3 155	4,0	34,4	6,7	0,8	0,9	7,2	14,4	29,6	25,0	12,8	2,6
Virginia		26 166	25,9	32,8	9,4	25,8	4 758	3,4	29,9	0,4	34,3	1,0	4,3	3,0	5,9	31,6	16,9	2,7
De Aar	*	22 484	25,6	38,1	27,2	11,4	2 690	16,2	48,4	1,9	0,5	2,5	9,8	21,4	5,1	41,2	14,8	2,9
Dimbaza	*	21 672																
Phuthaditjhaba	*	21 453	22,9	38,4	22,6	23,0	1 416	0,3	89,8	11,0	1,7	0,1	8,3	19,5	18,1	7,2	11,0	23,1
Ezibeleni	*	20 604																
King William's Town	*	19 823	27,5	33,9	9,9	25,8	3 675	10,4	39,1	1,5	0,5	0,7	13,4	3,2	16,4	35,7	21,8	6,8
Siyabuswa	*	19 464	20,6	46,2	62,3	10,2	1 370	10,2	74,9	1,1	2,4	2,2	18,4	5,0	6,2	51,5	12,9	0,3
Brits	**	17 450	26,2	34,6	15,9	25,8	4 803	13,3	40,5	2,1	2,5	2,0	5,9	4,3	37,5	22,5	18,0	5,1
Walvis Bay	*	16 607	27,4	29,0	13,4	14,2	3 258	2,9	24,1	4,0	2,2	0,7	6,3	11,8	32,4	24,9	15,0	2,4
Richards Bay	*	16 129	24,8	33,2	21,1	37,5	7 245	1,6	24,5	29,3	4,6	0,5	3,8	13,1	18,9	17,9	7,9	4,0
Nelspruit	*	15 519	27,0	33,6	7,2	51,7	7 000	2,4	32,1	3,5	1,0	2,2	5,6	9,4	9,6	33,6	21,5	13,6
Harrismith	*	14 855	26,9	34,5	18,4	19,8	2 439	8,1	32,9	2,0	0,5	0,9	5,8	3,7	39,0	21,9	22,5	3,7
Thohoyandou	*	12 737																
Empangeni	*	11 403	26,2	32,1	5,3	47,8	6 007	2,7	26,7	0,7	1,2	1,2	8,1	16,6	14,5	31,0	16,6	10,2
Messina	*	9 029	25,9	37,7	36,1	13,1	2 043	8,3	32,1	0,5	39,2	0,2	4,2	5,6	6,9	30,5	11,2	1,6
Pacaltsdorp	*	8 468	24,4	39,1	18,4	12,8	1 833	6,6	37,5	2,9	0,4	0,8	20,8	3,7	16,3	33,1	18,8	3,1
Lebowa-Kgomo	*	8 369	21,5	42,3	11,3	38,2	2 174	9,1	35,2	0,9	0,4	0,7	12,7	2,6	4,2	69,5	7,8	1,4
Potgietersrus	*	8 195	32,1	31,5	4,5	42,5	6 095	1,2	38,8	3,6	1,4	0,4	5,8	6,0	8,2	30,5	32,7	11,5
Mafikeng	*	7 957																
Giyani	*	7 749	22,8	34,2	32,0	33,4	2 685	0,0	96,3	69,1	2,2	0,0	0,0	5,5	18,2	5,0	0,0	0,0
Louis Trichardt	*	7 475	29,4	30,6	13,9	33,6	4 830	3,6	29,4	5,4	1,6	0,1	10,4	5,8	8,2	34,6	26,1	7,9
Kabokweni	*	7 284	22,6	41,4	23,9	13,0	1 504	0,0	90,8	8,1	9,8	0,0	0,0	6,4	7,5	16,5	0,3	51,4
Bronkhorstspruit	**	6 954	27,8	32,4	20,0	32,9	3 422	4,7	29,4	3,4	1,0	0,8	12,8	5,7	11,7	38,1	19,4	7,0
Nkowakowa	*	6 319	22,1	43,8	29,6	18,9	2 088	1,5	91,2	5,2	1,9	0,0	0,7	7,4	47,2	13,0	0,7	23,8
Selosesha	*	6 034																
Tzaneen	*	5 795	28,7	31,8	16,5	44,7	3 973	0,8	25,8	18,9	0,8	0,4	4,7	5,0	9,5	30,8	19,9	10,0
Witrivier	*	4 416	29,5	32,8	8,6	52,2	6 585	2,4	31,89	6,7	0,4	0,2	10,5	8,8	11,5	28,5	21,6	11,8
Ulundi	*	4 312	23,4	27,9	19,0	42,2	0	0,0	98,7	10,5	42,1	0,0	0,0	21,1	26,3	0,0	0,0	0,0
Ekangala	**	3 505	21,3	42,8	15,0	8,5	0	10,6	36,0	0,5	1,7	0,4	2,7	7,1	48,3	21,9	15,6	1,7
Mogwase	*	2 326																
Lusikisiki	*	1 819																

*   Deconcentration Point
** Industrial Development Point

Figure 5 Distribution and size of rural population, 1985

to lack of economic vitality. The number of unemployed was computed as a percentage of the potential (economically active plus jobless) workforce.

Not-economically active population, which comprises children, students, housewives, pensioners and the jobless, is expressed as a percentage of the settlement's total population. Because this group of people is to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon the economically active segment, it can inhibit development should the ratio become too distorted.

- *Employment per economic sector* refers to the nature and composition of economic activities and job opportunities, and by implication to a settlement's economic reason for existence. The generally accepted nine major industry groups provided the classification adopted, the number of workers in a particular industry being expressed as a percentage of the total economically active population. By making reference to this classification and measure, the economic sector in which an urban centre's economic base is seated can be evaluated

should the need arise to stimulate associated development.

As more data become available the list of measurable variables can be augmented to provide a more representative picture. No interpretation will be attached to these profiles here because they are meant to be a reference source for decision-makers interested in the socio-economic performance of some particular town or city. Interestingly, most of the present deconcentration and industrial development point profiles have no characteristics conspicuously distinguishing them from other centres.

Salient features of urbanization

What follows is a distillation of the essence of our analysis, together with additional elements particularly relating to black urbanization in the TBVC countries and self-governing territories, the latter being gleaned from the informed opinion of some 50 local leaders and decision makers interviewed in these countries.

- Urbanization has manifested *imbalance* both spatially and ethnically over time. *Spatially* uneven urbanization means relative over-concentration in a few metropoles compared with the growing number of declining towns on the stagnating platteland. The impact of urbanization is primarily focused on five metropolitan areas: PWV, Cape Peninsula, Durban-Pinetown, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and East London-Mdantsane. The last-named metropolitan area, when considered at multilateral level, features far more strongly than is normally conceded. Here, as elsewhere in Southern Africa, artificial homeland boundaries lead to gross misconceptions concerning the reality of urban settlements functioning as a total integrated system.
- *Ethnically-differentiated urbanization* over time reflects the fact that whites and coloureds/Asians who urbanized first are now reaching saturation level. Against this, blacks are at a low level of urbanization, but presently entering a strong phase of acceleration. Further urbanization in Southern Africa will involve dramatic population growth in urban areas, fundamentally supported by the black contribution from the northern and eastern parts of the country (Figures 3 and 5).
- The *dualistic structure* of the South African apartheid city comprises a white component reminiscent of the Western-style American model, whereas the segregated non-white component (black/coloured/Asian) shows more similarities with the Third World colonial city model. Regulatory politico-institutional structures and restrictive policy frameworks have been instrumental here, often leading to ineffective urban functioning.
- The urban subsystems of the differ-

ent countries in Southern Africa cannot function independently, but are linked in an *integrated urban structure* overarching more than 700 urban settlements in the RSA and TBVC countries.
- The trends and features set out above generate a variety of prominent *urban problems*. Problems in the TBVC countries and self-governing territories are symptomatic of those experienced in Third World developing countries. Among these are the large numbers of people who must still urbanize; lack of employment opportunities and housing; shortage of available land for urban expansion; inadequate services and infrastructure; shortfall of funds and lack of skills for efficient urban management; disruptive migration patterns and long commuting distances; low quality of life and disrupted family lives; crime; and competition with the RSA's urbanization interests. *Per contra*, urban areas evoke the perception of plentiful employment opportunities and a better quality of life — ideals that cannot always be realized, leading inevitably to disillusionment and frustration for many a migrant.
- The *level of urbanization* is still low in the TBVC and self-governing states, but the large numbers of rural inhabitants offer a potential for rapid urban growth. The attraction of the RSA metropolitan areas is very powerful — and detrimental to urbanization within the independent and self-governing black states themselves.
- A well-developed *hierarchical urban system* is lacking in any of the independent and self-governing states, this being ascribable to the interdependence of the urban subsystems of the SATBVC countries. The existence and growth of an urban area in an independent and self-governing state is usually dependent upon some nearby centre in the RSA. Even the capital cities of these states experience scant growth.
- The *economic base* of homeland towns is inadequate; they therefore do not operate as complete functional entities. In many instances they are, in fact, dormitory towns serving only as reservoirs of labour.

Shopping and recreation facilities and other services such as schools and hospitals are insufficient. Leakage of purchasing power to urban areas in the RSA further drains the economic and tax bases of these local towns, giving nearby and competing RSA-controlled metropolitan areas added stimulus at the cost of local growth.
- Urbanization in the independent and self-governing states is influenced adversely by *traditional tribal structures* and accompanying land tenure systems. People desiring to own private property emigrate to RSA towns or to the few proclaimed local towns in order to evade the tribal communal system. The acquisition of land for the siting of towns in these states is difficult, severely inhibiting urban growth.
- The *definition* of an urban area is itself complex. Next to the normal binary distinction of rural and urban habitation made in Western countries, the situation in Third World countries calls for a third category, peri- or semi-urban. Such settlements have a rural location, but with a large proportion of their inhabitants going to work daily in nearby urban centres. They are rural then by virtue of their location — but urban by occupational activity. This type of settlement should not be confused with rural nucleated settlements; these are hut clusters having a rural economic base.
- Urbanization influences *family life* in that fathers or mothers (or both) are absent for longer or shorter periods as migrant workers in, or commuters to, RSA cities. This is often the root of social problems. Many people, encouraged by transport subsidies, *commute* over long distances, daily total travelling distances of 100 to 200 kilometres being not uncommon. This phenomenon is also socially disruptive and expensive, using up funds that could be put to better use alleviating other pressing urban problems.
- *Migration patterns* are subject to four residence-workplace alternatives: (i) reside and work locally in the national state; (ii) live in a national state, but commute daily to work in an RSA urban area; (iii) migrate temporarily as a worker to

an RSA urban area with periodic returns to family in the national state; and (iv) live and work as a permanently settled migrant, with family, in an RSA urban area. These migration options are usually exercised in stepwise fashion or along various migration courses: (i) platteland to a nearby local town; (ii) local town to RSA city; and (iii) platteland direct to RSA city.

Interviews with local leaders and decision makers indicate that the most important motivations for migration to cities are: better employment opportunities and concomitant income; better housing prospects; superior services (such as schools) and infrastructure (such as electricity); acquisition of property rights; reuniting of families; and push factors in rural areas lacking an economic base.

- The *abolition of influx control* does not appear to have had a dramatic effect on migration to RSA cities. Nor is it expected that more people will migrate to cities than would, in any case, have moved illegally.
- *Local employment* in the national states is preferred to a career in an RSA metropolitan area owing to the desire to preserve family ties and traditional interests. This illuminating observation was recurrent. A voiced condition, however, is that equivalent remuneration, suitable housing, and services — especially schools — will be offered in the national states. Unfortunately, the capital to supply such conditions is lacking. Unemployment is increasing. The only option is to migrate to cities in the RSA.
- *High-density housing* is virtually absent in black communities, apparently because blacks desire ground-level living space. However, housing densities will have to be increased by flat development, projects already begun proving quite useful.
- Urbanization must be positively exploited as a *constructive opportunity* in the social and economic development of regions/states and for improvement in the quality of life for people living there.
- Although its importance is unanimously recognized, to date no TBVC country has an *official*

urbanization strategy. This undermines orderly long-term development by occasioning haphazard and ad hoc urbanization activity. A positive sign is that some of these countries are in the process of preparing such plans.

Being a subjective perception of various participants' experiences of urbanization, the foregoing observations do not necessarily provide a factually correct view of things: most of the respondents have been at the receiving end of urbanization strategies.

Postscript

It is proposed that contemporary and future Southern African urbanization trends be interpreted against the background sketched above. Some speculation is in order about the direction future urbanization trends will assume. A broad continuation of existing urbanization realities, as described in the second section, can be expected. The actual course, however, will be subject to human preferences and behaviour, in addition to the nature of any deliberate regulation by and policy strategies of government institutions. Nonetheless, provision will have to be made in the cities for about 14 million additional blacks by the year 2000, at which time it is expected that the black urban population will stand at about 21 million and their level of urbanization about 45 per cent.[6]

Urbanization will still be directed at the metropolitan areas, in particular the PWV region. This does not imply that the latter core is oversized; by general international standards it is not abnormally unwieldly or ineffective; ostensibly it still functions well. The question that does arise, however, is whether such relative over-concentration is beneficial to the development of other urban centres and indeed entire regions. It is evident that some form of decentralization policy is needed to counteract the lack of progress in certain areas.

Urbanization and decentralization revolve around the location and spatial distribution of people and their economic activities. To leave to its own devices a Third World urbanization system of enormous proportions, such as exists in Southern Africa, to leave it to operate uncontrolled and at the mercy

of inherent forces — this could well be catastrophic. Control measures are certainly needed. More important, it is clear that any policy measures that do not take account of the realities of this urbanization have limited prospects of success.

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2 The census defines an urban area as a concentration of population having some or other form of local authority, and as such does not include rural nucleated settlements or peri-urban areas.

3 I J van der Merwe, *op cit.*

4 Human Sciences Research Council, *op cit*; J F de V Graaff, *op cit.*

5 For the purpose of this study a metropole has been identified and constituted by virtue of the spatial contiguity of built-up areas. Hence our metropolitan population figures are not simply sum totals of a number of magisterial districts as is frequently encountered — with less realistic results.

6 Human Sciences Research Council, *op cit*; J F de V Graaff, *op cit.*

Notes on the demography of black Africans in South Africa in the early 1980s

Susan de Vos, Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, surveys the demographics of South Africa's black population in the early 1980s to compare the situation with that in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

Introduction

It has become popular in scholarly circles to omit South Africa from discussions of sub-Saharan Africa since it is not ruled by a black government, and usually compare the situation of black Africans in South Africa with that of other racial groups in that country — especially with that of white South Africans. The pattern of inequality is impossible to ignore. Such a comparison was a central theme in a 1983 report from the Science Committee of the South African President's Council of the demographics of the South African population.[1] What is equally, if not more, interesting from an outsider's viewpoint, however, is how black Africans in South Africa compare with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. This will be especially interesting if we are to adopt the assumption that black rule in South Africa will bring the country back into the African fold. However, the sizeable white, Asian and coloured elements in the population would make such a direct comparison of South African and other African demographics nonsensical, for the question that would be asked every time would be "Yes, but how do the *black* Africans in South Africa compare... ?" This is really to acknowledge that any comparison between black South Africans and other black populations elsewhere is somewhat artificial, for no other reason

than that the situation of the different groups in South Africa is one of interdependence. But there seems to be no alternative.

Another criticism of such a comparison might be: "But black South Africans are made up of many different ethnic groups.[2] Why not differentiate among ethnic groups rather than follow the current government's use of race to categorize people?" Ethnicity *is* an important characteristic which deserves attention. The nature of the available data however, constrains one to consider black Africans in South Africa as one group. Data for countries to the north do indeed also refer to whole national or regional populations irrespective of race, but non-blacks constitute only minor portions of these other sub-Saharan African populations and so scarcely affect the figures or the argument.

Demographic information concerning black South Africans tends to be much poorer than for any other racial group in South Africa. The census undercount[3] is greater; and even basic statistics, such as those for mortality, have to be estimated with more assumptions than are made for other groups. The problem of estimation is not limited to South Africa however, and most of the figures for Africa published by such agencies as the United Nations also tend to be estimates. That they may be of relatively poor quality has never

been denied. The present argument is merely that these estimates are better than nothing.

The article is organized into four sections. First, it surveys what is known about mortality and fertility (and family planning). Then it turns to the issue of the population's size, past growth and projected future growth. Finally, the article takes a bold leap into the morass of population distribution, involving forays into migration and urbanization.

Mortality

Table 1 contains estimates of life expectancy at birth (Eo or the average number of years one is expected to live after birth) for different African populations in the early 1980s. According to one widely-used estimate, black South African males had an Eo of about 55 years while females had an Eo of about 60 years.[4] This may well be an overestimate since the same source underestimates the infant mortality rate, as discussed further below. A US Census publication which appeared at about the same time as the South African President's Council report estimates a total Eo for both male and female black South Africans at 55,6 years.[5] In both surveys it appears that overall life expectancy is a little lower than, but basically similar to, the average for developing countries (58 years); and a

Table 1: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH BY SEX AND FOR TOTAL POPULATION FOR SELECTED POPULATIONS OF AFRICA AND THE WORLD, EARLY 1980S

	Male	Female	Total
Black Africans in South Africa	~55*	~60	55,6**
World			62††
More Developed Countries			73††
Less Developed Countries			58††
Africa			50††
East Africa			47††
West Africa			47††
North Africa			57††
Middle Africa			48††
Botswana	52,9†	56,1†	
Lesotho	46,3†	52.3†	
Mozambique	44,4†	46,2†	
Swaziland	46,9†	50,2†	
Zimbabwe	54,0†	57,6†	

* Estimated approximations (~) by W P Mostert and J L van Tonder, *Moontlike bevolkings-groei in Suid-Afrika tot die middel van die 22e eeu*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, Report S-83, 1982 and reported in Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Science Committee of the President's Council on Demographic Trends in South Africa*, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1983, p 34, for 1980.

** From United States Bureau of the Census, Center for International Research, *Detailed statistics on the population of South Africa 1950-2010*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983, Table B-2. Estimate for 1980.

† From United Nations, *1985 Demographic Yearbook*, New York, 1985, Table 34. Estimates for 1980-85.

†† From Population Reference Bureau, *1986 World Population Data Sheet*. Rates generally refer to the early 1980s.

Table 2: INFANT MORTALITY RATES FOR SELECTED PARTS OF AFRICA AND THE WORLD, EARLY 1980S

Black Africans in South Africa*	94-124
World**	82
More Developed Countries**	17
Less developed Countries**	92
Africa**	118
East Africa**	123
West Africa**	129
North Africa**	100
Middle Africa**	114
Botswana**	76
Lesotho**	111
Mozambique**	153
Swaziland**	129
Zimbabwe**	80

* From "Black babies' mortality rate is 10 times higher", *Natal Mercury*, 10 June 1987. See also Derek Yach, "The preventive potential for death and disease in South Africa", *RSA 2000*, vol 10, no 1, 1988. Based on data from the South African Medical Research Council.

** From Population Reference Bureau, *1986 World Population Data Sheet*, Washington, DC, 1987. Refers to the early 1980s.

little higher (mortality figures being lower) than for other African populations (50 years).

Since much of the mortality of high-mortality populations affects infants in particular, we must also consider the infant mortality rate (IMR).[6] Based on five surveys conducted between 1982 and 1987, the IMR has been estimated at between 94 deaths per thousand and 124 per thousand,[7] higher than the level of 90 per thousand estimated for 1980 and reported by the President's Council.[8] This is similar to the average for all of Africa: 94-124 compared with 118 (see Table 2). The more recently estimated rate was similar to the rates of 111 recorded for Lesotho and 129 for Swaziland.

The infant mortality rate among black South Africans is estimated to have been *higher* than in such neighbouring countries as Botswana (76) or Zimbabwe (80). One reason for this may be the maternal and child health programmes in those countries. In the early 1980s, most pregnant women in Botswana and Zimbabwe received prenatal medical attention and delivered under medical supervision.[9] Demographers generally consider the IMR a relatively sensitive indicator of "development," perhaps more indicative than GNP per capita.

A large part of the infant mortality in Africa is caused by relatively easily preventable diseases related to intestinal and respiratory illnesses. Indirect causes are usually attributed to malnutrition (weakening the body's immune system) and poor access to health facilities. Such improvements as access to safe water, nutritious food and extended health facilities would do much to lower the figure, although such improvements are hampered by rapid population growth.[10] Kok's analysis also suggests that literate parents may mean lower infant mortality than illiterate parents.[11]

Reduction in high fertility may also reduce infant mortality.[12] Longer intervals between births contribute to the strength of the mother, prolong the period before infants must be weaned, and lessen the necessary sharing of resources among infants.

The majority of diagnosed AIDS cases in South Africa are still to be found among white males, but the spread of the virus among the black African urban population is alarming. Schoub *et al*[13] suggest that an epidemic among South Africa's black population began in about 1987, and that the doubling time of an infection rate among such groups as "sexually transmitted disease clinic attenders" is less than one year. These authors also suggest that while the infection rate at present occurs primarily among urban dwellers, "regular movements between urban and rural areas could well introduce and amplify infection in rural areas".[14]

In projecting the population into the 22nd century, Mostert and Van Tonder assume that mortality among black Africans in South Africa will continue to decline to parity with other racial groups in the country as a result of socio-economic developments and extended public health services. By 2040,

it is assumed, life expectancies at birth will be 71 years for males and 77 years for females — higher than current life expectancies for whites.[15] These assumptions appear unrealistic given the present levels of and access to health care. Black African South Africans in rural areas enjoy very poor access to health professionals such as physicians, dentists or nurses compared to their urban counterparts, who in turn have poor access compared to people of other racial groups.[16]

Fertility

The Total Fertility Rate (TFR), or the expected average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime, was estimated to be about 5,2 around 1980 (Table 3). This was considerably lower than the average for Africa, which in the early 1980s was about 6,3. It was also lower than the rate in any of the surrounding countries for which we have data. It is quite high, however, if one considers that the replacement level is somewhere between 2,1 and 2,5 depending upon mortality, and that the average in the developing world as a whole is about 4,2. In general, Africa has the highest fertility rates in the world.

In the early 1970s, fertility among Nguni-speakers (including Zulus and Xhosas) appeared somewhat higher than among Sotho-speakers (at Crude Birth Rates of 40,9 per thousand compared to 35,8).[17] However, the differential did not appear in an investigation of fertility among black Africans in "white" South Africa in 1982.[18]

Over the period of our figures, black Africans in South Africa appear to have *wanted* above-replacement numbers of children. For instance, the ideal number of children indicated by residents of Soweto was 3,9 in 1980.[19] Van Tonder reports that in 1982 black African ever-married (currently-married or formerly-married) women 15-49 years of age in "white" South Africa wanted an average of 4,4 children.[20] (Data are limited to "white" South Africa.) While this is above replacement, it is considerably lower than the desired number in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Sai reports that the lowest desired family size he found was for Lesotho at 5,9 children.[21] The highest was in Senegal at 8,8. The reason for this range of almost three children was not explored.

TABLE 3: TOTAL FERTILITY RATES IN SELECTED PARTS OF AFRICA AND THE WORLD, EARLY 1980S

	Total Fertility Rate
Black Africans in South Africa*	5,2
World**	3,7
More Developed Countries**	1,9
Less Developed Countries**	4,2
Africa**	6,3
East Africa**	6,8
West Africa**	6,6
North Africa**	5,8
Middle Africa**	6,0
Botswana**	6,6
Lesotho**	5,8
Mozambique**	6,1
Swaziland**	6,6
Zimbabwe**	6,7

* In W P Mostert and J L van Tonder, *Moontlike bevolkingsgroei in Suid-Afrika tot die middel van die 22e eeu*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1982, Report S-83, taken from Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Science Committee of the President's Council on Demographic Trends in South Africa*, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1983, Table 2.17.

** From Population Reference Bureau, *1986 World Population Data Sheet*, Washington, DC, 1987.

Fertility regulation

Since the desired fertility among many black Africans in South Africa was below the level of fertility they would have without the use of contraception, it is reasonable to ask how many of them made use of contraception. Contraception, in turn, is partly a function of the availability of family planning services, community opinion of family planning or fertility control in general, and husbands' attitudes.

Unfortunately, available data only refer to residents of "white" South Africa. The President's Council reported that contraceptive use among women aged between 15 and 49 in Soweto rose from 26 per cent in 1970 to 45 per cent in 1980.[22] In 1982, 57,4 per cent of black African "exposed" women (women at risk of conceiving) of 15-49 years of age in "white" South Africa used contraception.[23] This is higher than the estimated use in the early

1980s for women "in union" in urban Botswana (37,1 per cent),[24] or in urban Zimbabwe (46,6 per cent).[25] According to a 1977 fertility survey in Lesotho, only about 21 per cent of "exposed" women who wanted no more children were using contraception, and about 30 per cent of these used "inefficient" methods.[26]

However, only 66,7 per cent of the "exposed" black women in the "white" areas of South Africa who wanted no more children were using an efficient method of contraception in 1982.[27] Why was this so? First, the availability of family planning services in South Africa has been limited. In discussing the National Family Planning Programme in "white" South Africa (which mainly serves non-whites), the President's Council reported that:

1. family planning services mainly reached residents in large urban areas who already knew that they wanted these services;

2. functional and organizational problems, such as limited availability of personnel, funds and technical aids, have existed;

3. there have been serious communication and administration difficulties with the family planning program.[28]

The report also suggests that the politicization of family planning by certain black African leaders has sometimes resulted in services not being "sufficiently extended".

Abysmal as it is, this situation unfortunately does not compare badly with that in the rest of Africa. Sai reports that there was little concern by sub-Saharan African governments about population growth until fairly recently; and that even in the early 1980s 10 of 24 government surveys still considered the level of fertility "satisfactory".[29] Sai also reproduces figures from a World Bank Report showing that in 1984, in 24 of 47 sub-Saharan countries for which there were data, one had a "moderate" level of "family planning program strength", three had "weak" levels and 18 had "very weak" levels.[30]

Second, there have also been unfavourable attitudes on the part of many black African community leaders in South Africa toward fertility control. This was described (with some anecdotes) by Van Tonder who considered it an "acute problem".[31] Monica Ferreira, in interviewing a sample of "Black

opinion leaders", found considerable suspicion of family planning.[32] The KwaZulu Minister of Welfare and Pensions, Mr Stephen Sithebe, was quoted several years ago as saying "that in spite of hardships faced by large families, sacrifices should be made in producing more children in the name of the liberation struggle".[33]

A third factor contributing to relatively low levels of contraceptive use may be male attitudes. Traditionally, in many black African groups, a bride-price was paid to the wife's family, partly in compensation for the fact that the new couple's children would become part of the husband's family. It is not far-fetched, therefore, for the husband to feel that *he* is the one who must decide upon the extent of the couple's fertility. A wife's use of contraception could also lead a husband to perceive her as somehow "a loose woman". Unfortunately, this is an under-researched issue which is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves.[34]

It is sometimes argued that an important way to reduce high fertility is to reduce infant and child mortality.[35] According to the "child survival" hypothesis, parents have more births than the number of children they want, or think they will have, because they expect some of them to die; that they have extra children as "insurance" or "replacement"; and that once they find that such "extra" children are surviving to adulthood they begin to think in terms of limiting their fertility. A major criticism here is that any effect of mortality reduction on fertility is bound to be minor compared to the desire for an *above-replacement* number of *surviving* children. Nevertheless, this view has not been proved one way or the other.[36]

The President's Council argued that the major motivation for change in fertility norms comes about through socio-economic development.[37] This certainly is consistent with the findings of Van Tonder for black women in "white" South Africa.[38] For instance, the average desired fertility among currently-married women was 3,9 children among city residents, compared to 4,7 among rural residents. He found (bivariately) that desired fertility was negatively related to education, and that women whose husbands held professional, technical or clerical jobs had lower fertility

desires (3,7) than women whose husbands were in sales or service (4,3), were craftsmen or producers (4,3) or farmers (5,0).[39]

Research summarizing the findings of the historical demographic experience of Europe has certainly found cultural factors to have played more of a role in fertility declines than had previously been thought.[40] Lack of "an appreciation of the socio-cultural framework..." is also a criticism voiced by Van der Vliet.[41] She argues that there are many reasons to be cautious, if not pessimistic, about the success of a population development programme, knowing as we do the low status of black women.

The President's Council recommended that attention be paid to upgrading educational services, since education is thought to have effects on both mortality decline and fertility decline.[42] Education also has cultural as well as socio-economic value, and is the centrepiece of Caldwell's "theory of fertility decline" based largely upon research in West Africa.[43] However, the Council also argued that population growth is a major impediment to upgrading educational services because the number of children to be serviced is expanding so rapidly: resources that could have been used to upgrade the education of fewer children would instead have now to be used to try to keep up with the need to educate more children.[44]

The argument appears plausible to a point. But population growth is not the only major impediment to upgrading educational services. Under present apartheid laws, public education is separate for blacks and whites. Black African classrooms average more than twice as many students as do white ones; "the flow of pupils to the secondary and tertiary levels is considerably less favourable among Africans than among the other population categories;" black African teachers tend to have received less education than those in comparable white schools; and there is a dearth of qualified black African teachers.[45] Unlike the situation for whites or Asians, education for black Africans is not yet compulsory.

"The HSRC Education Report recommended that a pupil-teacher ratio of 30:1 be set as the ideal for 1990 [compared to 41:1 for black Africans and 19:1 for whites in 1984], which means that the budget will, in real terms, have

to be increased by 190% during the present decade."[46] The argument is basically that it would be asking too much of the government to reduce the ratio to 20:1, which is what it is supposed to be for whites, even if the necessary personnel could be found. Astonishingly, neither the 1983 President's Council Report nor the 1987 HSRC report recommended that education for black Africans be made compulsory.

Some researchers suggest that mechanisms for enhancing "non-formal" education be addressed because so many black Africans end up with less than a primary school education, and because the demands of a formal education system are (realistically speaking) unlikely to be met.[47] Non-formal education to include such "here and now" subjects as "food, shelter, health, nutrition, water-supply and sanitation" could contribute significantly to community development, lower mortality and lower fertility.

Population size and growth

The black African population of South Africa, estimated at about 21 million in 1980,[48] is estimated at about 28 million in 1990, assuming an almost 3 per cent yearly growth. This makes it the largest and most dominant population in Southern Africa. The black population has been growing since at least 1904 because of an excess of births over deaths.[49] The fastest growth appears to have been since 1951; and during the 1970s it was estimated at about 3 per cent per year, or a doubling time of about 24 years. This is typical for sub-Saharan Africa. The average growth rate between 1973 and 1983 in 47 sub-Saharan countries is estimated to range from 1,9 to 4,6 per cent per annum, with 13 of the 24 countries surveyed by Sai averaging 3 per cent or more.[50]

If fertility remains constant at the 1980 level, the black African population is projected to reach 89 million by 2030.[51] Yet a population of 70 to 80 million of all races may well be the maximum the country could manage to support with the resources available.[52] There is an obvious need of lower fertility. It should be noted, however, that even if the total fertility rate were reduced to replacement level, the population would continue to grow for at least 80 years because of its age structure. Forty-one per cent of the black African population were 14 years old or

Table 4: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK AFRICANS IN SOUTH AFRICA (EXCLUDING TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA AND VENDA) IN 1980*

Area	Total	Per cent	Per cent black
Total RSA	17 022 248	100,0	68,0
White Areas	10 154 745	59,7	56,1
Cape	1 569 215	9,2	30,8
Natal	1 367 319	8,0	51,0
Transvaal	5 662 440	33,3	67,6
Orange Free State	1 555 771	9,1	80,2
"Nation States"	6 867 503	40,3	99,3
Urban RSA	6 458 064	37,9	100,0
White Areas	5 296 835	82,0	52,2
Cape	976 984	15,1	62,3
Natal	312 115	4,8	22,8
Transvaal	3 489 932	54,0	61,6
Orange Free State	517 804	8,0	33,3
"Nation States"	1 161 229	18,0	16,9

* These are figures adjusted for undercount. The 1980 census was _de facto_: migrants were enumerated at their current residence, not place of legal residence.

Source: Republic of South Africa, Central Statistical Services, _1980 Population Census Report no 02-80-13: Geographical distribution of the population with a review for 1951-1980_, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1985, Table 1.

TABLE 5: SEX RATIO OF BLACK AFRICANS IN DIFFERENT AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA (EXCLUDING TRANSKEI, VENDA AND BOPHUTHATSWANA) IN 1980 (ADJUSTED STATISTICS)

| Area	Black African Sex Ratio*
Total RSA	106
White Areas	124
Cape	114
Natal	110
Transvaal	132
Orange Free State	120
"Nation States"	84
Urban RSA	119
White Areas	125
Cape	108
Natal	126
Transvaal	130
Orange Free State	102
"Nation States"	103

* The sex ratio is the number of males per hundred females.

Source: Republic of South Africa, Central Statistical Services, _1980 Population Census, Report no 02-80-13: Geographical distribution of the population with a review for 1951-80_, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1985, Table 1.

younger in 1980. Even if they only reproduce themselves, then, at replacement level the black population will stabilize only when the age distribution becomes that of a low-fertility population. This situation holds throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

Population distribution

In 1980, 60 per cent of black Africans in what the census took as "South Africa" (excluding Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda) resided in "white" areas (Table 4).[53] Black Africans constituted less than a third of the population of the Cape Province (which borders on Transkei; see Figure 1), but a constituted majority of the population in the other provinces. Fifty-two per cent of the black Africans in "white areas" lived in urban areas. Of the approximately 40 per cent living in one of the homelands (referred to as "nation states" in the census), only about 17 per cent were "urban" (Table 4). The urban proportion for _all_ South Africa was somewhere between 37 and 52 per cent, as discussed below. This situation is unlike that in any other part of sub-Saharan

Africa, of course, because (1) there is a more sizeable non-black population in South Africa than elsewhere, (2) some areas are officially designated as "white" and, (3) until recently, many black Africans were forbidden by law from living in urban areas.

Migration

Many black Africans enumerated in 1980 and 1985 as living in an urban area in South Africa were temporary migrants who had "passes"[54] to live in these areas in order to work there. In 1970, temporary migrants constituted 28 per cent of the total male work force.[55] Many lived in "temporary" non-family housing.

Temporary migrants were typically male, although the number of women migrants may be increasing.[56] Using 1970 census data, Nattrass estimated that at least 60 per cent of the males between the ages of 20 and 44 in the biggest homeland, KwaZulu, were temporary migrants.[57] The proportion was even higher among the better educated. A survey of KwaZulu households taken in 1981 found that 69 per cent of the absentees were adult men; and that,

among adults, women outnumbered men by 3,5 to 1.[58] In 1980, although the sex ratio for all black Africans in South Africa was 106,[59] it was quite unbalanced at 124 in "white areas", compared to only 84 in the homelands or "nation states" (Table 5). Women with children and old people are left behind to take care of agricultural land.

This situation is not unique to South Africa, but occurs all over Africa, perhaps owing to what some people have called "the urban bias in development planning", plus certain push factors in the rural areas themselves. A distinctive feature of migration in Africa is that it is often temporary and dominated by young adult males.[60]

There are, of course, benefits and costs to temporary migration. Benefits include: 1) the earning of more income than would be possible if the worker stayed in the rural area, 2) the low cost

Economic community of Southern Africa (ECOSA)

of housing for the family in the rural area, 3) the family's agricultural production, 4) the retention of rights to rural land, 5) "a certain measure of security in old age, in case of sickness, unemployment or other misfortune in town," 6) the potential for an improved standard of living, and 7) a "comfortable" rate of modernization in the supplying area.[61]

Costs include those to individual workers, to their families and to the larger community: 1) labour shortages at critical moments in the production process, causing agricultural output to fall, 2) drain on the supplying area in terms of "investment in people" such as education, 3) a change in "taste" which results in a decrease in investment in

enterprises situated in the supplying area, 4) a desire to keep the supplying area "traditional" because of the worker's negative reaction to his experience in the destination area, thus militating against constructive change, 5) "social costs" such as the separation of families and the burden borne by women in maintaining households on their own.[62] Psychological costs, such as loneliness, disorientation, and those deriving from family separation are not usually discussed in treatments of temporary migration; but they cannot be ignored.

That the benefits of temporary migration to urban areas has not outweighed the costs at individual worker level is strongly suggested by the many

laws prohibiting black Africans from migrating permanently to white urban areas. These "pass laws" were finally abolished in 1986, after the figures reported on here were collected.

Urban residence

In 1980, approximately 37 per cent of the black population of South Africa (including Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda) were considered by the census to be urban.[63] Given South Africa's level of industrialization and that less than half of the black workers in South Africa as early as 1970 were in agriculture according to the census, this seems too low. That is the assessment of such urbanologists as Simkins[64] and Graaff,[65] although they disagree on what the

proportion should be. Both Simkins and Graaff try to include, as urban, census-defined non-urban areas in homelands whose residents commute to "white" urban areas for work. Simkins calls such areas "fringe", Graaff "peri-urban" (although he is unhappy with the term). According to Simkins, 13,6 per cent of the homeland population in 1980 were fringe.[66] According to Graaff, 15,7 per cent were peri-urban.[67] Although Simkins stops here, Graaff includes as urban "semi-urban" areas, concentrations of more than 5 000 people.[68] This brings his own estimate of black urbanization to 51,8 per cent compared to Simkin's 41,5 per cent and the census figure of 37-38 per cent (a difference here depending upon the inclusion or exclusion of Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Transkei from the figure for "South Africa").

The census figure of 37-38 per cent urbanized was close to the average for the "developing" world, and somewhat above that for Africa overall. It is considerably above the proportion in such neighbouring countries as Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The averages for East Africa and West Africa were only 18 and 28 per cent respectively. If the true level of urbanization is somewhere between 42 and 52 per cent, South African blacks are indeed more urbanized. (There are considerable differences — by country — over the definition of "urban", so one cannot compare these figures with any degree of precision.)

Since the pass laws were abolished in 1986, there has been considerable debate and speculation about what the future urban scene will be. One opinion has been that all temporary migrants would move permanently to white urban areas with their families. Another argument has been that permanent settlement in white urban areas would not be as great as some analysts anticipated.

Perhaps the most commonly touted figures are those of Kok, who projected the black African urban population as assuming a level of urbanization of 95 per cent in 2040.[69] His projections assume not only that all temporary migrants would relocate permanently but that many others would relocate from rural to urban areas as well. In contrast, Graaff argues that many assessments of would-be permanent migration are made on the following questionable

TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE URBAN FOR SELECTED POPULATIONS OF AFRICA AND THE WORLD, THE EARLY 1980S

	Per cent
Black Africans in South Africa*	37
World**	43
More Developed Countries**	72
Less Developed Countries**	34
Africa**	30
East Africa**	18
West Africa**	28
North Africa**	42
Middle Africa**	34
Botswana**	19
Lesotho**	6
Mozambique**	13
Swaziland**	26
Zimbabwe**	24

* From Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Science Committee of the President's Council on Demographic Trends in South Africa*, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1983, p 147. Includes Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei and Transkei.

** From Population Reference Bureau, *1986 World Population Data Sheet*, Washington, DC, 1987.

assumptions:

1 that migrants will be the *first* people to move with the abolition of influx control;

2 that *all* migrants will move;

3 that migrants will be the *only* people to move;

4 that *all* their family members will move with them;

5 that they will move *across* homeland boundaries.[70]

Graaff takes issue with all but Kok's first assumption, noting that many migrants have land in their homelands which they will not wish to give up; that many landless black Africans who do not necessarily migrate at present might wish to move permanently to urban areas; that many family members (especially pensioners) may not wish to move; and that to many it may well be more attractive to commute from their homelands than relocate to costlier urban areas.

Such considerations have made Graaff more conservative in his estimation of black African movement to

urban areas. Consistent with this view, a study by Nattrass and May asked respondents, many of whom had a migrant family member, "why the family did not move permanently to town".[71] Responses indicating that laws constraining permanent residence in the destination area were important among a minority of the respondents (not representative of *all* residents); 29 per cent said they wished to hold on to their land; another 15 per cent did not like "the urban life"; and 31 per cent said the cost of living in towns was too high. Twenty-seven per cent replied that they were limited from doing so by current laws.

Also consistent with Graaff's view is the fact that while the government abolished the pass laws, it has continued to advocate policies of "orderly urbanization" which in effect discourage permanent migration.[72] Contributing here is the slow pace of construction of new housing in black African residential areas, helping to make the cost of available housing high. People are thus compelled by economic considerations to inhabit one of the "rural slums" that service the cities.[73]

It should be noted, finally, that the black African population within urban areas will grow substantially through natural increase even if there is no new in-migration. A much larger urban population is therefore a fact which will have to be faced by any future government.

Conclusion

Not astonishingly perhaps, black Africans in South Africa are demographically quite similar to other sub-Saharan populations. They exhibit some qualities that are more "developed" than populations in neighbouring areas; but one does not find their having pioneered the major leadership role which might have been expected given South Africa's level of industrialization. Although the expectation of life at birth in the early 1980s was *higher* than the average for Africa as a whole (Table 1), infant mortality was higher than it was in Botswana or Zimbabwe and about the same as the average for Africa (Table 2). (Infant mortality may well be a better indicator of "development" than overall mortality or per capita GNP.)

In the early 1980s, the Total Fertility Rate was estimated at 5,2, significantly

lower than that of much of sub-Saharan Africa which tended to have averages in the 6-7 range (Table 4). The desired number of children also tended to be lower, but still much higher than replacement level. Over a third of "exposed" women who did not want more children were not using contraception, either because family planning services were poor, because their husbands still wanted more children, or because they were discouraged by community opinion from making use of the services available. Although this situation did not seem worse than that in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, it was still bad enough to have the population growing by about 3 per cent each year (a doubling time of about 24 years). Over 40 per cent of the population in the early 1980s was under 15 years of age, indicating that the population will continue to grow for about 80 years *after* replacement-level fertility is achieved.

A President's Council report argued that "development" was the most effective way to reduce mortality and fertility.[74] Of various possible policies, the increasing of educational opportunities was emphasized because education shows a strong correlation with demographic factors as well as being of social, cultural and economic value. Improving education will require substantially more resources than the government currently allocates, however. In addition, compulsory education would seem in order.

A majority of South Africa's black Africans lived in what often have been termed "white" areas, many migrating there only temporarily and leaving the rest of their families behind in their homelands. Perhaps 69 per cent of adult males in the homeland of KwaZulu were temporary migrants in 1981. One result is a very skewed sex ratio: 124 males per 100 females in white areas in 1980 compared to only 84 per 100 in the homelands. Women and older people are often left to manage agricultural land and the raising of children.

Although the migration of rural residents to "urban" areas in significant numbers is occurring all over sub-Saharan Africa — and black Africans in South Africa are no exception — the urbanization pattern there *is* different because of the sizeable non-black proportion of the population, because some parts of South Africa are deemed "white" by the present government, and

because until recently there were numerous prohibitions against migrating permanently to a white urban area. Thus the census estimate of 38 per cent of urban dwellers in 1980 is probably a gross underestimate if one considers the peri-urban or fringe settlements in non-white territory. If the more liberal definition is used, then South African black Africans have a high level of urbanization indeed (ranging from 41 to 52 per cent). All the more reason for us to be dismayed by their high mortality.

There is, at present, a wave of optimism regarding the future of the black African in South Africa. This must be tempered by an appraisal of the population's demographics, however, for no matter what form a future government takes, it will have to deal with the facts we have outlined here.

Notes and references

1 Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Science Committee of the President's Council on Demographic Trends in South Africa*, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1983.

2 Though of the same racial group, black Africans are of distinct major tribes such as the Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga and Venda. These distinctions have been entrenched and promoted by South African government policy and practice.

3 The census estimates that, in 1980, 19,5 per cent of the black Africans were not counted initially, compared to 7,1 per cent of whites and 6,1 per cent of coloureds. In the 1985, the undercount for black Africans may have been 20,4 per cent compared to 7,6 per cent for whites. Coverage tends to be more problematic for males than for females, and the undercount of black African males in 1980 may have been more than one fourth.

4 Republic of South Africa, *op cit.*

5 United States Bureau of the Census, Center for International Research, *Detailed statistics on the population of South Africa 1950-2010*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983.

6 A special age-specific mortality rate (ASMR), the infant mortality rate is usually measured as the ratio of deaths to infants under one year of age in a given year to the total number of infants under one year of age in that year, multiplied by one thousand. Although usually interpreted as the proportion of babies that die within the first year of life, the numerator and denominator do not necessarily come from the same population. In general, one can specify any age group and calculate its particular mortality rate by dividing the

number of deaths to individuals of a given age during a given year by the mid-year population of that age. There is no generally agreed-upon multiplicative factor for ASMRs other than the infant mortality rate, the most common being 1, 10, 100 or 1 000.

7 This was reported in the *Natal Mercury* 10 June 1987, "Black babies' mortality rate is 10 times higher". The article obtained its data from a recently-released report of the Medical Research Council. See also Derek Yach, "The preventive potential for death and disease in South Africa", *RSA 2000*, vol 10, no 1, pp 20-24.

8 W P Mostert and J L van Tonder, *Moontlike bevolkingsgroei in Suid-Afrika tot die middel van die 22e eeu*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, Report S-83, 1982; Republic of South Africa, *op cit.*

9 See Botswana Family Health Division, Ministry of Health, *Botswana family health survey, 1984*, Columbia, MD: Westinghouse Public Applied Systems, 1985; Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council, *Zimbabwe reproductive health survey, 1984*, Columbia, MD: Westinghouse Public Applied Systems, 1985.

10 The ability of South Africa to train enough "community health" nurses just to keep up with the expected additional demand of a rapidly growing population will be a challenge. See "42 million 'will need health care' ", *Natal Mercury*, 24 April 1987, p 19.

11 P C Kok, *The relationship between socioeconomic factors and population dynamics: An international perspective, with reference to policy implications*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, Report S-84, 1982. During my recent visit to South Africa 1 was horrified to learn that some mothers were feeding their infants "Cremora" (a non-dairy coffee creamer) instead of infant formula because it was less expensive — apparently unaware of its poor nutritional quality.

12 Alberto Palloni and Sarah Millman, "Effects of inter-birth intervals and breastfeeding on infant and early childhood mortality", *Population Studies*, vol 40, 1986, pp 215-236.

13 B D Schoub, A N Smith, S Johnson, D J Martin, S F Lyons, G N Padayachee and H S Hurwitz, "Considerations on the further expansion of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa — 1990", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 77, June 1990, pp 613-618.

14 *Ibid*, p 613.

15 W P Mostert and J L van Tonder, *op cit.*

16 See, for example, J L Botha, D Bradshaw, R Gonin and D Yach, "The distribution of health needs and services in South Africa", *Social Science and Medicine*, vol 26, no 8, 1988, pp 845-851.

17 J M Lotter and J L van Tonder, *Fertility and family planning among blacks in South Africa: 1974*, Pretoria: HSRC Institute for Sociological, Demographic and Criminological Research, 1976.

18 J L van Tonder, *Fertility survey 1982: Data concerning the black population of South Africa*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1985.

19 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*, p 102.

20 He also reports that the average number of children wanted differed significantly by age, being only 3,5 among women 20-24 but 5,8 among women 45-49, *op cit*, p 188. Optimistically, this could be interpreted as a lower desired family size among younger people.

21 Fred Sai, "Changing perspectives of population in Africa and international responses", *African Affairs*, vol 87, no 347, 1988, pp 267-276.

22 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*, p 102.

23 J L van Tonder, *op cit*.

24 Botswana Family Health Division, *op cit*.

25 Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council, *op cit*.

26 Lesotho, Ministry of Planning and Statistics, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Lesotho fertility survey 1977: First report — Volume II*, Maseru, 1981.

27 J L van Tonder, *op cit*.

28 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*, pp 104-105.

29 Fred Sai, *op cit*.

30 *Ibid*, p 274.

31 L S J van Tonder, "Some prominent socio-political considerations pertaining to demographical conditions with special reference to South Africa", *South African Journal of Sociology*, vol 11, no 2, 1980, pp 51-72.

32 Monica Ferreira, *Some attitudes of black opinion leaders towards family planning and the National Family Planning Programme*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, Report S-107, 1984.

33 "No room for a baby boom", *Natal Mercury*, 4 April 1987.

34 But see G Erasmus, "Decision-making in regard to the use of contraceptives after confinement: A study among urban black women", *South African Journal of Sociology*, vol 15, no 2, 1984, pp 94-97.

35 See, for example, Carl E Taylor, Jeanne S Newman and Narindar U Kelly, "The child survival hypothesis", *Population Studies*, vol 30, no 2, 1976, pp 263-271.

36 David M Heer, "Infant and child mortality and the demand for children", in R Bulatao and R D Lee (eds), *Determinants of fertility in developing countries, Volume 1: Supply and demand for children*, San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1983, pp 369-387.

37 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

38 J L van Tonder, *op cit*.

39 *Ibid*.

40 Barbara A Anderson, "Regional and cultural factors in the decline of marital fertility in Europe", in Ansley J Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins (eds), *The decline of fertility in Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1986, pp 293-313.

41 Virginia van der Vliet, "South Africa's population crisis", *Optima*, vol 32, no 4, 1985, pp 147-153.

42 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

43 John C Caldwell, *Theory of fertility decline*, New York: Academic Press, 1982.

44 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*, chapter 7.

45 Human Sciences Research Council, *The South African society*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987.

46 *Ibid*, p 32.

47 See, for example, D Vermaak, "Education and development: The role of non-formal education, especially in developing countries", *Development Southern Africa*, vol 2, no 2, pp 411-421.

48 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

49 *Ibid*.

50 Fred Sai, *op cit*.

51 W P Mostert and J L van Tonder, *op cit*.

52 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

53 These are *de facto* figures from the 1980 Census adjusted for the significant undercount alluded to in note 3. Unfortunately, the figures exclude the "independent" states of Venda, Bophuthatswana and Transkei. (Ciskei became "independent" only after 1980). Considered separate nations by South Africa, these states are not recognized as separate by other countries.

54 The government had a number of laws that prohibited most black Africans from residing permanently in urban areas. The best known may be the Urban Areas Act which only gave permanent residence status to black Africans who were "born in the particular urban area" and resided "there continuously since birth, and to those who entered urban areas legally and had resided there continuously for 15 years or who had worked for one employer for 10 years", Michael Savage, "The imposition of pass laws on the African population in South Africa 1916-1984", *African Affairs*, vol 87, 1986, pp 181-205; Martin West, "From pass courts to deportation", *African Affairs*, vol 81, 1982, pp 463-477. Immediate family members were also permitted to live with the person granted residence on these grounds. Except for a visiting period of up to 72 hours, all other black Africans had to carry passes, certificates verifying that the bearer was employed and had government permission to reside in the area.

55 Jill Nattrass, "Migrant labour and South African economic development", *The South African Journal of Economics*, vol 44, no 1, 1976, pp 65-83.

56 Nattrass and May argue that, "This could indicate that there has been increasing economic necessity for women to find wage employment as the potential of subsistence agriculture is eroded", Jill Nattrass and Julian May, "Migration and dependency: Sources and levels of income in Kwa-Zulu", *Development Southern Africa*, vol 3, no 4, 1986, p 590.

57 Jill Nattrass, *op cit*, p 75.

58 M V Gandar and N Bromberger, "Economic and demographic functioning of rural households: Mahlabatini District, KwaZulu," *Social Dynamics*, vol 10, no 2, 1984, pp 20-37.

59 The normal range is between about 98 and 106, depending upon such things as the population's age. There are usually more women than men in the older age brackets but more males than females in the younger.

60 Lezek A Kosinski and John I Clarke, "African population redistribution — Trends, patterns and policies", in John I Clarke and Lezek A Kosinski (eds), *Redistribution of population in Africa*, London: Heinemann, 1982.

61 R T Bell, "Migrant labour: Theory and policy", *South African Journal of Economics*, vol 40, no 4, 1972, p 340; see also Jill Nattrass and Julian May, *op cit*, pp 584-585.

62 Jill Nattrass and Julian May, *op cit*.

63 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

64 Charles Simkins, "Projecting African population distribution and migration to the year 2000", *RSA 2000*, vol 7, no 1, 1985, pp 41-46.

65 J F de V Graaff, "The present state of urbanisation in the South African homelands: Rethinking the concepts and predicting the future", *Development Southern Africa*, vol 4, no 1, 1987, pp 46-66.

66 Charles Simkins, *op cit*.

67 J F de V Graaff, *op cit*.

68 "Rural populations are the remainder (after subtracting the peri-urban and semi-urban) of a particular homeland's *de facto* population", *ibid*, pp 47-48. There are problems with these terms, which Graaff frankly acknowledges. Of major concern is that, functionally, even "rural" areas depend in large part upon income earned in urban areas.

69 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

70 J F de V Graaff, *op cit*, p 58.

71 Jill Nattrass and Julian May, *op cit*.

72 Alan Mabin, "Struggle for the city: Urbanisation and political strategies of the South African state", *Social Dynamics*, vol 15, no 1, 1989, pp 1-28.

73 Colin Murray, "Displaced urbanisation: South Africa's rural slums", *African Affairs*, vol 86, no 344, 1987, pp 311-329.

74 Republic of South Africa, *op cit*.

Reversing the effects of 'betterment planning' in South Africa's black rural areas

Professor P A McAllister, Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, offers some thoughts on the undesirable effects of betterment schemes and the need to remedy these in the planning of future land use in South Africa.

"Betterment planning" in South Africa refers to successive schemes by various central and homeland governments to, *inter alia*, combat the deterioration of natural resources and contribute to agricultural development in black-occupied rural areas. The history of betterment and the various phases it has gone through have been well documented,[1] as have the social and economic effects of these schemes upon the rural population.[2]

Far from conserving the environment, developing agriculture and improving the quality of life in rural areas, betterment has had the opposite effect. A number of writers have argued, in fact, that the real motives underlying its implementation had nothing to do with environmental conservation and agricultural development, but more to do with ensuring a steady supply of migrant workers to the mines and industries of white South Africa and, later, with control of the rural population. As such, betterment is closely associated with the development of racial segregation and the ideology of apartheid.

South Africa appears presently to be on the threshold of major political, social and economic change, one consequence of which is likely to be the re-incorporation of the homelands

("independent" or not) into a unitary state. Linked to this is the whole issue of the redistribution of land and land-use (examples: land administration and tenurial systems) in the new South Africa. Since betterment schemes centre on the planning and administration of land use, the question of betterment — in terms of both its future and its effects to date — will need to be addressed in the years to come. This article offers some preliminary thoughts on the matter. In the first section the nature of betterment is outlined. This is followed by a summary of the known effects of betterment schemes, and in the final section the future of betterment is considered. Here two questions arise, one rather easier to answer than the other. First, it has to be asked whether betterment has any role to play in South Africa's future, and, if not, what kind of efforts need to be made in attempting to foster rural development. Second, since betterment has been widely implemented in South Africa, with, as we shall see, largely undesirable effects, we need to ask how to go about reversing its effects. This is, of course, relevant to the first question as well, because it may help to point to the sort of things to do (and to avoid) in future rural development attempts.

Betterment planning and its effects

Betterment, also known as "soil conservation" and "agricultural rehabilitation", or sometimes simply as "planning", involves the following basic steps:

- The proclamation of a given area (usually a rural ward or "location") as a "betterment" area.
- The development for the area of a land-use plan, this including the division of the land into three types — residential, arable and grazing. There are usually a number of residential and arable areas, and a number of different grazing camps.
- The relocation of people from their previous (usually widely dispersed) homestead sites to the new village-type residential areas.
- The fencing of residential areas and grazing camps.

The plan may also include the provision of water supplies (boreholes and reservoirs), agricultural extension services, livestock improvement, soil erosion works and so on. In recent years such provisions were seldom implemented; and in the Transkei, at least, even basic materials such as fencing have been forthcoming with less and

less frequency. Older plans made provision for development projects such as dairying schemes and small-scale irrigation works, but most of these were not implemented either.

In theory, before betterment can be implemented the consent of the local population has to be obtained (though there have been phases in the history of betterment when this nicety has been dispensed with). In practice, largely because of the nature of authority systems in the homelands, including the fact that chiefs and headmen have seldom been accountable to the people under them, consultation has been minimal and most rural people have had little say over whether they wanted betterment or not.

The results of betterment schemes are social, political, economic and ecological, and may be outlined in terms of the effects of residential relocation, the general re-organization of space, the effects on agriculture and other elements of the local economy, and the effects on conservation and the environment.

In what follows I will review the effects of betterment under these headings, my reference being the area in which I have field-work experience, the Transkei. Many of these effects have also been reported from other areas, particularly the Ciskei; I believe that they apply even more widely, to betterment in South Africa as a whole.

Residential relocation

Betterment schemes demand a village-type settlement pattern, and people not living in the areas demarcated for villages have to relocate. This is a form of forced removal not yet well documented in the extensive literature on such removals in South Africa. The effect of residential relocation may be examined first as it concerns the individual household and then as it impinges upon the local community as a whole.

For the individual household, removal to a village means having to abandon the old homestead site and reconstruct a homestead on a new site in a new area. Objections to this are often phrased in terms of emotional attachment to the old homestead, and also in religious terms, since the graves of previous heads of homestead (who may include important "communicating" ancestors) are often in or about the old homestead site. There is also a considerable economic cost involved, since a new homestead (huts, byres for livestock, chicken coops and so forth) has to be constructed. Compensation is supposed to be paid by the state, but is inadequate or not forthcoming at all.

Application for a new site must be made to the local tribal authority, which allocates sites in terms of the plan administered by the local representatives of the homeland government. Such an application has to be accompanied by a gift (in the form of cash and/or liquor) to the local headman or chief, as chairman of the tribal authority. This is probably one of the reasons why chiefs are sometimes in favour of betterment while their subjects are not. Before a new site is granted, the tribal authority requires in addition that the applicant be up to date with tax payments and other levies.

Households who have thus moved find themselves in the new area living next to relative strangers rather than their old neighbours. Groups of close kin who inhabited a common local area are broken up (though groups sometimes make an attempt to co-ordinate their move) and well-established relationships based on the occupation of a common area are destroyed. Hostility and suspicion between neighbours has been reported from a number of betterment areas, together with a higher incidence of misdemeanours such as theft and trespass.

The destruction of old neighbourhood networks as a result of residential relocation seriously affects local economic activity, which depends largely upon an ethic of mutual help and co-operation, and in which reciprocal ties between kin and neighbours feature prominently. As we shall see below, the disappearance of territorial units and the changes that affect the political structure also have the effect of impeding economic co-operation.

Spatial re-organization

The spatial re-organization associated with betterment usually means that old territorial divisions and subdivisions become irrelevant in the new order. Without going into detail, the effects of this may be summarized as follows:

— destruction of the existing political organization, which is based upon territorial divisions and the relationships between these divisions (for example: the sub-wards of the ward or location, and again between sections of these sub-wards)

— coinciding with this are two interrelated phenomena, the loss of autonomy and control by local communities over important areas of their existence, and the imposition of centralized, state control in its place

— destruction of economic relationships between sub-wards and sub-ward sections

Perhaps some clarification of these points is required. In pre-betterment situations a location headman devolves authority and administration in issues such as land to his sub-headmen, each of whom is associated with a sub-ward or sub-location. In effect, decisions concerning matters such as the allocation of arable land and homestead sites, and the control of grazing and other resources such as thatching grass, rests with the senior residents of the sub-ward, whose views are represented by the sub-headman to the headman or chief. The latter, though technically in control of land in his area, often merely rubber-stamps decisions made at lower level. With betterment, the control of land and other related issues is taken away from local communities and exercised by the state in conjunction with the tribal authority. The power of the state and of the tribal authority (with a headman or chief as its head) is thus dramatically increased at the expense of local autonomy and democratic processes.

Since there are invariably fewer new village areas than there were old territorial divisions and subdivisions, and because the new areas may have to accommodate people from three or four of the older areas, these older units are perforce merged in the new areas, thus losing their identity as social and political units. This identity is retained for many years at the symbolic level, in that the groups to which food and beer are allocated at rituals and ceremonies continue to be based on the old territorial identity.

The destruction of the existing territorial units (which often coincide with kinship groups) also affects co-operative work. Most work parties of the larger kinds are made up on the basis of sub-ward and sub-ward section membership. Co-operative ploughing groups, which are based primarily on a combination of

kinship and territorial principles[3] cannot be held together after betterment and households are frequently forced to resort to an expensive hiring of tractors in order to get their ploughing done.

Agriculture

The planners, who seldom spend more than two or three days in the area to be "planned", excise lands deemed to be no longer suitable for agriculture and demarcate areas in which new fields can be established. Apart from problems such as excising land that is still productive and demarcating as new arable land areas which are totally unsuitable for agriculture,[4] the general effect of betterment is to reduce the total amount of arable land available.[5]

Worse, in areas where large gardens have been established (often to compensate for the declining fertility of fields) homesteads lose their gardens because they have to move to new sites in the villages, existing householders in the villages being compelled to reduce the size of their gardens in order to allow for the boundaries of the new sites. This is a serious setback to agricultural activity, especially for people who have come to rely heavily upon their gardens, and for those who are unlikely to be allocated a field in the new areas (owing, as an example of this, to their not having had a field under the old system). Even for those who are allocated new arable land, turning such land from virgin grassland into productive plots takes time and money. It has been recorded that betterment schemes, for reasons such as this, actually *discourage* investment in agriculture.[6]

The net result of all this is an inevitable slide into greater dependence upon migratory labour earnings and a higher degree of rural poverty.

Ecology

Betterment seems to be based upon an assumption that rural people do not exercise any control over their natural resources. In fact, as Sansom shows, the pre-colonial settlement patterns of the indigenous peoples in South Africa were well adapted to the nature of the environment and made ecological sense.[7] It has also been shown that even today, where the residence pattern is relatively undisturbed as in certain parts of the Transkei, rural people attempt to exercise control over resources such as land, wood, grass and

water through organizational structures based on territory and neighbourhood. Betterment breaks down these structures and thus the mechanisms through which at least some degree of environmental regulation takes place.

In general, recent betterment plans contain no provision for rehabilitation or conservation works and contribute to environmental deterioration rather than conservation. There are a number of reasons for this apart from the one already mentioned. The concentration of people in villages leads to excessive exploitation of nearby grazing, wood and water resources, and to the formation of erosion gullies along footpaths in and around the new homestead sites. The establishment of rotational grazing camps does not seem to have made a difference to the supply of grazing, either because the required extension work to institute and manage such schemes has not been forthcoming, because fences have not been maintained, or because the funding for fences has not been made available in the first place. Another reason for a lack of improvement to the grazing is the establishment of the new villages on what were formerly grazing areas, and the unjustified assumption that areas excised as arable land will revert to grazing in due course.

The future

For reasons that need not be speculated on here many homeland governments continued to implement betterment schemes after being given self-governing or independent status in terms of the apartheid plan. There is some danger, I think, that this will go on irrespective of future political developments. However, recent years have provided evidence that rural people are again voicing their objections to betterment after a long period during which their resistance appears to have been successfully suppressed by the state. In some parts of the Transkei, for example, communities have hired legal experts to keep betterment at bay. In others, people subjected to betterment some time ago have started to ignore the boundaries imposed on them and move back to their previous residential sites. In addition, recent speeches by Nelson Mandela in the Transkei have been interpreted by some rural people as meaning that they will not in the future be forced to relocate

their homes, and that betterment will therefore be abandoned.

Even should this forecast turn out to be true, however, there are still a number of issues relating to betterment that will need to be addressed. These fall into two groups, one concerning more desirable forms of rural development in place of betterment, the other concerning what can be done in areas where betterment has been implemented — with all the effects we have noted.

The first question can be answered fairly easily in terms of the known effects of past betterment and the general principles that should guide rural development planning. Such principles are already well accepted among many concerned with rural development, and the lessons learnt from betterment bear them out. Since these principles are well known they need not be discussed in detail here. They include the necessity for bottom-up rather than top-down development strategies; the need for an adequate knowledge of the area and the people; the involvement of the people at grassroots level in the development of plans and in the implementation of projects, and so forth.

Rural development projects must be flexible rather than rigid; be based on people's expressed needs and desires; address as many of these as possible in an integrated manner; and be implemented by the people themselves – with outsiders (the state, non-governmental organizations) acting as facilitators rather than doers.

Funding agencies must ensure that it is *people* who are doing the developing — and developing themselves — rather than a region or homeland that is *being developed* from outside. Fischer and others have shown that expensive, high-tech rural development schemes have in the past been motivated and justified by the contribution that they make to a "homeland's GNP".[8] From such schemes a few local people (usually an élite) may benefit; but the majority may in fact end up worse off than they were before. This is partly why it is critical that rural people define their needs themselves, that they define, in other words, what "development" means to them, and that they control this throughout the implementation process, using their own local organizational and decision-making structures.

The second question is more difficult to answer. A useful start can be made,

perhaps, with the political dimension. It seems clear that the local authority system in the homelands will need to be redesigned in any new political dispensation. Here then is an opportunity to redress at least the political wrongs of betterment — the loss of autonomy and local control that accompanied the re-organization of space under betterment plans. Even in areas long subjected to betterment, there seems to be a need for the re-organization of local authority systems to provide the potential for people to acquire a real say in their own affairs, and make local leaders accountable to their constituencies. This would go a long way towards restoring the sense of autonomy and local control that betterment took away. The existing tribal authority system was created in terms of the ideology of apartheid and separate development, and has proved to be little more than an extension of control exercised by the state in an attempt to keep rural people in line. Betterment, as we have indicated above,

was one of the ways in which this control was exercised and tightened.

Care must be taken, whatever is planned, not to compound the mistakes of betterment. It is possible, even likely, that in areas long subjected to betterment, new forms of local organization (at the level of the local village community) will have come into being. Research is needed to establish what these forms are, and how they could be linked to a future re-organization of local government structures in order to facilitate rural development. Such research could also ensure that future rural development initiatives will be based upon adequate information relevant to the social, economic, demographic and ecological situation of these betterment villages.

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Party politics and local government: Reflections on the performance of local government during Nigeria's Second Republic

S K Asibuo, Lecturer in Public Administration at the School of Administration, University of Ghana, Legon, discusses the implementation of local government reform in Nigeria during the Second Republic, giving particular attention to the political and socio-economic context in which attempts at reform were made.

Introduction

One of the most notable decentralization programmes in Africa was initiated in Nigeria in 1976. Local government reform that year contained far-reaching provisions for the salutary development of local government. Prior to the reform, there had not been a satisfactorily uniform system of local government in Nigeria. Several differing systems of local government had been practised by different state governments. Practices were so diverse that even citizens were confused and had no clear idea of what local government really meant. Besides, administrative authority was highly centralized and local councils deprived of adequate operational resources. Moreover, local government councils existed as symbols more than anything else, being basically looked upon as local arms of state administration.[1]

This article seeks to discuss the implementation of local government reform in Nigeria during the second civilian regime, giving particular attention to the political and socio-economic context in which attempts at reform were made. I shall also try to illuminate the impact of party politics upon the operational effectiveness of local government councils. It has too often been assumed that the provision of an appropriate institutional and legal framework and constitutional safeguards will ensure the successful implementation of a decentralization programme, without pausing to consider whether or not, empirically determined, this is actually so. This article argues that the existence of local government law in Nigeria during the Second Republic seems to have had little impact in determining either the extent of the autonomy enjoyed by local authorities or the actual role they played. The conclusion must be that it was the socio-economic objectives and political orientation of the central ruling élite and, more importantly, the nature of the political environment in which the regime operated, that influenced the functioning of Nigerian local government.

Objectives of the 1976 reforms

The cardinal theme of reform was greater decentralization. The head of state at that time, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, denounced the over-centralization of power and underscored the need for a "decentralization (of) power whenever possible, as a means of diffusing tension".[2] On another occasion, in 1977, Brigadier Shehu Yar Adua, an influential member of the ruling Federal Military Government, justified the government's decentralization policy by stating that the 1976 reform was "intended to stimulate democratic self-government and to encourage initiative and leadership potential".[3] The 1976 reforms therefore, were intended to bring government closer to the people through the meaningful participation of rural people and their traditional leaders in

development activities at grassroots level. It was envisaged that local authorities (being closer to the people) would be better placed to appreciate and satisfy their needs and aspirations than had been state governments. The thinking of the Federal Military Government was mainly concerned with the prospect of local authorities exercising powers, employing their own staff and financing their own projects; and above all, with their being accountable to the electorate. This was indeed an affirmation of classic local government principles.

The provisions of these reforms

The 1976 reforms abolished all existing forms of local administration and introduced a fairly uniform pattern of local government based upon a modified version of the British local government system. Local government was recognized as the third tier of government in the federal arrangement prevailing in Nigeria. A single-tier local authority was adopted, local government councils being charged with overall responsibility for the socio-economic development of their areas of jurisdiction. Most of their powers and functions, which had earlier been removed, were restored. These local councils were granted considerable freedom to plan and implement their programmes including powers to draw up their own budgets. They were also empowered to delegate some of their statutory functions to subordinate councils and grant them financial support from their own budget.

It was unambiguously stated that the members of these local government councils should be mainly elected, either directly or indirectly, on a non-party basis. However, state governors were empowered to nominate some members to the councils and also confirm the appointment of council chairmen. Further, the powers of dissolution or disbandment of councils and the appointment of local government secretaries were also vested in state governors. The substantial powers granted to state governors were one way of ensuring state control over local government activities. The life-span of a council was to be three years, subject to renewal. Traditional rulers might be made ceremonial presidents of local government councils.

In order to discourage the fragmentation and proliferation of local authorities,

attention was given to the relationship between size and viability. Local government, it was pointed out, should serve populations ranging from 150 000 to 800 000.[4] This was to ensure that the new local government councils would be economically viable and large enough to carry out their functions effectively. A total of 299 local authorities were created throughout the country. The population limit, according to Nelson Kasfir, weakened the power base of the emirs because it led to the breaking up of the large emirates; the barring of northern emirs and chiefs from acting as sole authorities in local administration was the most revolutionary of the provisions of the 1976 reform.[5]

The financial provisions were impressive and provided a yardstick for measuring the value the federal government placed upon local government reform. The federal government recognized that increased functions and powers would require corresponding financial resources if there were to be good results. It therefore provided substantial financial resources in order to ensure the steady flow of income that would permit the effective implementation of local government functions by the new councils. The federal government made available the following huge allocations to local government between 1976 and 1980.

Table 1: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO STATES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Financial year	Grant
1976/77	N100 million
1977/78	N250 million
1978/79	N150 million
1979/80	N300 million
1980	N278 million

Source: Alex Gboyega, "Local government reform in Nigeria", in Philip Mawhood (ed), *Local government in the Third World: The experience of tropical Africa*, Chichester: John Wiley, 1983, p 240.

The federal government was to pay 10 per cent of national revenue to local government in statutory grants; state governments were also to contribute 10 per cent of their recurrent revenue to local governments. This, together with

the federal government grants, was to be paid into a state joint local government account. It should be pointed out that state governments were emphatically forbidden to borrow from this joint account. Local authorities were also permitted to use their traditional sources of revenue. These included licensing, fees, community tax, permits, dues specified by local government by-laws, property rating, interest on investments and so forth.

It is important to mention that all these provisions were enshrined in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution which further guaranteed the future existence of local government as the third tier of government, including its powers, functions and sources of revenues. Local government councils were therefore assured of a sound financial base and given freedom to spend their grants on any projects of their choice, because grants were not tied to any specified projects or services. This also allowed for initiative in the determination of priorities. More importantly, the 1976 reform brought federal government into the financing of local government. Provisions were also constitutionally laid down to prevent any future fragmentation of local government authorities.

Thus assured of adequate financial support, the crucial issue would now be the availability of skilled personnel to implement the reforms. Among the reforms themselves were measures designed to improve the staffing situation of local government councils. Shortage of staff had been a perennial problem and the major cause of the ineffectiveness of many local councils. Thus the Public Services Review Commission pointed out in 1974 that "The greatest single factor that persistently inhibits the effectiveness of local authorities is their inability to attract and retain (an) adequate number of competent technical, professional, or administrative staff...".[6] In recognition of this problem, a Local Government Service Board (now Commission) was established in each state to take charge of the appointment, promotion, transfer and disciplinary matters concerning senior local government staff. Furthermore, the federal government set up a Local Government Staff Training Programme Committee as part of the reform implementation machinery. Upon its recommendation, the federal government designated the Universities of Ife, Nigeria

(Nsukka) and Ahmadu Bello as training centres for local government staff with an initial grant of N1 million to each institution. Here, too, was a commendable scheme for staff development.

Implementation of the reforms: 1979-1983 party politics and local government during the Second Republic

On the positive side, it would only be fair to state that local government during the Second Republic became actively involved in many successful projects that they would not previously have undertaken. This shows the significant impact of the reforms, especially in the southern states whose previous record in the provision of local government services had been unimpressive. No doubt the availability of new financial resources was a factor in their success. Nevertheless, by and large, the implementation of the 1976 local government reform encountered enormous difficulties traceable to a multiplicity of interrelated factors whose effect was to paralyse local government activities. Civilian politicians completely abandoned the implementation of local government reforms and thus destroyed all hopes of firmly institutionalizing a local government system,[7] for the central government's main goal of decentralizing powers and resources to local government was not shared by the state governments, who viewed local government as a threat to their power base and security. After the collapse of the Second Republic, in an editorial opinion on the moribund state of local government in Nigeria, the *Daily Times* stated:

> Indeed, the abuse which Local Government suffered in this country during the recent years (Civilian Regime 1979-1983) was such that the (Local Government) system turned out to be a curse rather than a blessing to the people.[8]

Local government in Nigeria, it was clearly believed, was a poor shadow of its true self, having been bankrupted and destroyed by party politics. Local councils could not pay the salaries of their employees — salaries were in arrears for several months — let alone undertake development projects, because their coffers had been depleted by the politicians.

Thus *The Guardian* of Nigeria stated,

> The scenario deteriorated so badly that the basic roles which are universally accepted as local government functions became unattainable in Nigeria during the era of the ousted politicians.[9]

The Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon in his June 1984 speech to the inaugural meeting of the Committee on the Review of Local Government Administration in Nigeria stated that the civilian administration of the Second Republic had made a complete mess of all the objectives of the local government reforms. The politicians had not only violated the constitutional provisions concerning local government but also displayed their complete disrespect for the fundamental philosophy behind the 1976 reforms.[10] Most Nigerian newspapers described the abysmal state of local government as the result of a "criminal assault" waged by politicians.

The manner in which politicians toyed with and manipulated the entire local government system to suit their parochial interests during the Second Republic suggests the powerful influence of the general political environment of the time. There was competition for the control of the apparatus of state between various parties, and local government became highly politicized and incorporated into the reward system. It existed at the pleasure of state governors who by law could dissolve or suspend local government. These civilian governors appreciated the advantages which could be derived from dissolution of councils; so local government councils, upon the expiry of their three-year tenure of office in 1979, were dissolved by state governments who failed to arrange fresh elections to local councils throughout the four years of their operation. Caretaker/management committees were appointed to manage the affairs of the defunct councils.

The dissolution of the councils was a more controversial issue because it raised a constitutional question. The appointment of management committees by state governors was clearly a violation of the constitution. However, the arguments adduced to justify their existence both were and are formidable. The three-year tenure of councils came to an end at the close of 1979, so they had ceased to have legitimacy. Moreover, no electoral register had been

prepared to facilitate the conduct of fresh local government elections in the different states. The National Assembly had yet to pass an electoral bill. And until the bill was passed, the Federal Electoral Commission lacked a legal basis for the preparation of the electoral register.[11]

The State Governments enhanced their control by appointing supporters of the ruling party to the local councils. Members of these caretaker committees were in most cases party candidates unsuccessful at the 1979 elections. The local government arena with its multifaceted resources did indeed provide much grist to the political mill of politicians and their supporters.

Politicization and fragmentation of local councils

One major problem impeding the implementation of Nigeria's 1976 reforms was the meaningless fragmentation of local authorities during the Second Republic. This is another illustration of the effect of the environment upon the operation of the decentralization programme. In the first place, the constitutionally guaranteed restraint upon the fragmentation of local councils was violated. This posed a serious threat to the salutary life and operational effectiveness of local councils because this fragmentation was undertaken without regard to size and viability. According to Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, the Chief of Staff, the politicians created several non-viable mushroom local government councils merely to satisfy their selfish political interests: "Almost every village or hamlet was 'donated' a Local Government". The Chief of Staff added that some of the states had increased the number of their local governments by as much as 200-250 per cent.[12]

It is also interesting to note that the allocation of "local government" became an important political resource at the disposal of politicians, brokers and clients. Many local communities collected huge sums of money to give to prominent politicians for the sole purpose of persuading state legislators and members of the state executive either to give them a local government or site local government headquarters in their particular town.[13] The facts show that in Oyo, for instance, the number of local councils rose from 24 in 1979 to

53 by April 1981. Oluyole Local Government, the smallest local authority in Oyo State with a population of 154 118, was broken up into three separate authorities.[4] This was a violation of the constitutionally stipulated minimum size of 150 000 for a local council. In Kaduna State, the number of local councils rose from 14 in 1979 to 99 by 1983, each constituency having its own local council.

At state level, some governors created more local councils in the hope that these would increase their political clout and give them additional electoral constituencies too.

Undoubtedly all such party politics played a major role in the creation of, financially speaking, non-viable local government units. Following the overthrow of the second civilian regime, the Federal Military Government led by Major-General Buhari abolished all local government councils created by the politicians and affirmed its recognition only of those listed in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. The "sole administrator" system, though it derogates from the basic tenets of local government, was reintroduced as a temporary measure in 1984.[15]

Politicization and the encroachment of state governments upon the local government domain

Many state governments violated the constitution by tampering with their allocations from the State Joint Local Government Account which they were forbidden to use. This practice, according to *Nigerian Tide* editorials, did not permit effective local government.[16] The failure of many state governments to pay their statutory grants to local governments also financially crippled the operational effectiveness of local councils. The *Nigerian Tide* editorial reported that it was aware of one state government that did not make a single contribution to the State Local Government Joint Account during the civilian regime and that this was a serious contravention of the 1979 Constitution.[17]

Other problems contributing to the "criminal assault" upon local government and its finances were the extravagant salaries and fringe benefits of local government chairmen and councillors.

Although these political council officials were paid by the councils, they did not, according to Chief of Staff Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, work in or for the councils but were mainly concerned with canvassing at grassroots level for political support for the ruling party.[18] It is clear from this that party politics diverted the attention of councillors from concentrating on the development of their local areas, contrary to Section 25 of the Guidelines on Local Government in its entirety. This stated that "Nominated councillors should concentrate on the development of their local government area rather than being involved in national or party politics".[19]

Returning to my previous notes on council extravagance, huge salaries (for instance, N12 000 for council chairmen) proved a serious drain on council coffers. This is confirmed by Alex Gboyega, who states that the emoluments of some councillors and their chairmen were even above the salaries proposed by the Nigerian Association of Local Government! — and that extravagant salaries of this sort contributed to the depletion of local government finances.[20] To worsen matters, grants were unduly delayed and/or not fully released, which caused serious delays in the execution of projects at local level.

The gradual erosion and weakening of the financial base of local councils was taken a stage further by the removal of some of the non-statutory sources of revenue set aside for local authorities. This grudging encroachment on local government finances was pioneered by the Lagos State government which took over property rating from the local authorities. The Ondo State government aggravated the financial burden of local councils by increasing their responsibilities without granting them corresponding increases in financial support. The local authorities in states controlled by the defunct Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) were made to contribute financially to the free-education policy.[21] Here is yet another illustration of the political context in which local government operated at this time. Little wonder that support for the fears expressed by Nelson Kasfir that the impressive decentralization programmes initiated in Nigeria might be changed in the highly politicized environment of a civilian regime, and that opposition parties in

states not controlled by the national ruling party might introduce new measures in local government which would impede the effectiveness of the new local authorities, seems to have gained in strength as a result of actions of the UPN controlled and predominantly Yoruba states.[22]

The financial base of local councils was further threatened by the abolition of some of the traditional sources of local council revenue. In October 1979, for example, the governors of the two northern states, Kano and Kaduna, abolished certain traditional taxes — "haraji" (community) tax and "jangali" (cattle) tax — on the grounds that they were oppressive and financially burdensome for citizens. They were also seen as symbols for maintaining and perpetuating the "feudal" structures of the north. This aroused the greatest indignation from citizens of other states who pressurized their state governments to abolish similar taxes.[23]

Corruption and political interference in local government

It should be pointed out that between 1976 and 1979 when the local government reforms were being implemented under the Federal Military Government, several corrupt practices were recorded. Two instances: the findings of the Reports of Justice Obi's Committee on Oredo Local Government in Bendel State[24] and Justice Manuel's Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Yenagoa Local Government in Rivers State both showed a high incidence of corruption and other malpractices among local government staff.[25]

It is a fact that, under the Second Republic, party politics not only played a major role in the proliferation of a number of economically non-viable local councils but also escalated the rate of corruption in local government administration in many parts of Nigeria between 1979 and 1983. The spate of probes into some of the new local governments (in all parts of the country) provide factual evidence of several cases of embezzlement. There were several irregularities in the award of contracts to ghost names; the collection of contract bribes of between 10 and 15 per cent; and funds voted for the implementation of projects were siphoned into private

pockets and the projects abandoned.[26] One instance of corruption in local government was the report that between 1979 and 1983 the sum of N16 million vanished from Gongola State Local Government Joint Account.[27]

The Guardian, in an editorial on malpractices in local government and their effects on the poverty of local councils, stated that "all these criminal racketeering and swindlings went on while the salaries of local government employees and teachers were left unpaid for months".[28] Vigorous competition for new resources no doubt breeds nepotism and corruption among contenders for power. Unfortunately a corrupted élite will not be capable of eliciting sacrifice or even hard work from its subordinates. More important still, corruption is a phenomenon not congenial to the successful implementation of local government development programmes. Colin Leys has written that the problem of corruption is that "to the extent that the official public morality of a society is more or less systematically subverted, especially if the leadership is involved in it, it becomes useless as a tool for getting things done, and this is expensive in any society where resources are scarce".[29]

A related problem which also affected the salutary development of local councils was the frequent interference in the internal affairs of local authorities by state governments especially in matters affecting personnel, the award of contracts and the determination of local development priorities. The award of contracts in local government councils was determined by the political affiliation of the contractor and preference was usually given to contractors who funded the electioneering campaign of the ruling party in the state. Similarly, decisions as to which projects should be sited at what town or in what area of a district were not determined by any objective economic criteria of need and merit but solely by the electoral support that particular local government area gave the ruling party. This practice affected the development of areas controlled by opposition parties. This phenomenon is not peculiar to Nigeria. Some authorities have cited Italy, where the ruling Christian Democratic Party depends upon votes from the rural south. It has been observed that the Fund for the Development of the South "has become a gigantic patronage organization which

employs people and awards developmental contracts strictly on the basis of political considerations".[30] Besides its contribution to economic growth and development in the south, the Fund is managed, it is said, in order to enhance the Christian Democratic Party's electoral strength in that depressed area of the Italian peninsula. G E Mills states that the central ruling party in Jamaica tends to deliberately and constantly starve local authorities controlled by the opposition party of the much-needed resources that would enable these councils to undertake development projects as well as provide the normal services traditionally expected of local councils. Supporters of the opposition party in Jamaica are also denied government contracts and any allocation of houses and jobs. This has led to a situation of bitterness, with deep-seated cleavages between supporters of the governing party and those of the opposition.[31]

The examples we have just quoted from Nigeria, Italy and Jamaica hold far-reaching consequences and implications for the future of decentralized programmes in rural areas and for the task of nation building. Each reveals the effects of political pressures on the allocation of resources and the distribution of rural development projects. The successful implementation of local government development programmes requires an atmosphere of peace and stability; in an environment of intrigue, cleavage and disorder effective implementation may be undermined and there may not be in effect significant progress at all. Under such conditions, Lemarchand observes that "... where clientelism becomes a technique for neutralizing a political opposition, absorbing at the same time the economic and financial resources needed for development, the result is evidently dysfunctional in terms of developmental process".[32]

According to Idode, political appointees on the local councils in Nigeria often interfered in routine administrative matters of the local authorities in their care, resulting in most instances in clashes between these politicians and local government secretaries.[33] It is pertinent to add that in an environment in which local government is highly politicized there is an increasing tendency for the distinction between politics and administration to be blurred; and that this facilitates encroachment on purely routine matters

leading to ever more confusion and rivalry between councillors and council staff. Panter-Brick also points out that there was bureaucratic opposition to the domination of Nigerian politicians in council matters. According to him, administrative officers seconded to local councils were often unhappy that the introduction of decentralization had once again placed them under politicians whom they looked down upon.

Conclusion

The Nigerian experience of local government reform under the Second Republic has shown that state governments subordinated administrative to political expediency in order to protect and consolidate their power base. In order to achieve their political objectives, these state governments resorted to various strategies — manipulation of local authorities, dissolution of local councils, failure to conduct fresh local elections, appointment of caretaker committees, appointment of favourites as council chairmen and councillors, and interference in the internal affairs of local councils. They did this to pursue policies that differed from conventional practice. These state government strategies were a product of the political and social environment at the time.

The politicization of local government during the years 1979-1983 proved to be a serious obstacle to democratic participation. There were several violations of the constitutional provisions for local government. All resulted from a lack of genuine political commitment to the local government reforms. More importantly, the Nigerian experience provides a useful illustration of how governing élites can manipulate and pursue policies completely different from the publicly enunciated goals of local government, even to the extent of circumventing constitutional provisions to suit their own selfish political interests.

Apart from the importance of the political context, the Nigerian experience has provided valuable insights into the extent to which the implementation of local development programmes is undermined by the scarcity of financial resources. This supports the experience of other African countries where governments are increasingly finding it difficult to provide sufficient resources for decentralization programmes. The

failure of many state governments to pay their statutory grants to local government councils; the removal of some non-statutory sources of revenue for local authorities; the extravagant salaries of council political officers; the corruption and malpractices in local government; the tampering with the allocation from the State Joint Local Government Account and the heavy dependence of local government councils upon central government grants — all these adversely affected the finances of local government.

A basic financial problem facing a majority of Nigerian local councils was the persistent imbalance between revenue and expenditure. This was unhealthy; in any viable organization, revenue should clearly exceed expenditure. These councils could not generate sufficient revenue from internal sources for development — and lacked the managerial ability to tap new sources of income.

The Nigerian 1976 reforms have won the admiration of many scholars and according to Nelson Kasfir, the reforms "...were quite extraordinary steps for any country in tropical Africa to take".[34] But the politicians destroyed all hopes of firmly institutionalizing such a local government system. Party politics at local level has been justified as providing a training ground for political aspirants. But in Nigeria it played a significant role in undermining the healthy development of local government. It helped to render local councils so poor that they could not pay the salaries of their employees, let alone execute development projects. After the collapse of the Second Republic, the havoc done to local government by party politics was summarized in the *Nigerian Tide* newspaper as follows:

The assault and battery unleashed against the local government system in the past five years was three-pronged. The state governors staged the frontal attack, by rendering them impotent. Their agents, as caretakers, mounted the counter attack by looting the cash box. The council officers organised the mopping up, declaring the loot unaccounted expenditure.[35]

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Tribal government at the crossroads

Professor J C Bekker of the Department of Private Law, Vista University, looks at the changes wrought in the institution of chieftainship in South Africa by political considerations.*

Introduction

The object of this article is to discuss the position of chiefs and tribal authorities in the process of constitutional change in South Africa. The colonial powers used chiefs to maintain control over tribes, by implication the indigenous black population. The South African government has since manipulated the system to fit its ideology of apartheid. The basis was that

> (the) ruling ideology has defined the social organisation of the rural African population in terms of the concepts "tribe" and "chief". The projected image is of territorially discrete African groups content to pursue agricultural livelihoods under the authority of hereditary paternal leaders.[1]

Some black homeland leaders participated in the establishment of administrative and constitutional structures based on tribalism — so much so that at times it appeared to have been inspired by them, rather than imposed upon them.

It would appear that the system is a spent force. Chiefs and tribes, albeit to a certain extent colonial creations,[2] are nevertheless present realities. They and the structures built on them will have to be taken into account in any debate about the constitutional future of South Africa. This is confirmed by Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal.

When we speak of chiefs in Africa in the present context, we are not speaking about an extinct or even a dying species. We are speaking at most about a threatened one, threatened by the intervention of the legislator and the administration, who are all too often of the opinion that through legal reforms, institutions such as that of chieftaincy, still firmly entrenched in African society, can be blotted out or robbed of their legitimacy.[3]

Some of South Africa's "homelands" have made their own laws on chieftainship and tribal administration. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei have independent sovereign legislative powers and the six self-governing territories derive theirs in this respect from Item 30 of Schedule 1 to the Self-governing Territories Constitution Act, 21 of 1971. Their laws differ in detail from the South African laws, but the principle features are similar. For instance, the chief ministers and the presidents of the homeland governments have the same control over chiefs as the South African State President (executive) has. However, this article is indeed not an effort to describe the position in particular homelands. Where examples are given this is done merely to illustrate trends.

The legal foundations of tribally based constitutional structures

The basic approach to tribal government is still enshrined in the Black Administration Act, 38 of 1927, as amended:

The State President shall be Supreme Chief of all Blacks in the Republic of South Africa and shall in respect of all Blacks in any part of the Republic of South Africa be vested with all such rights, immunities, powers and authorities as are or may from time to time be vested in him in respect of Blacks in the Province of Natal.[4]

The State President may — (a) define the boundaries of the area of any tribe or of a location and may from time to time alter the same and may divide any existing tribe into two or more parts or amalgamate tribes or parts of tribes into one tribe or constitute a new tribe, as necessity or the good government of the Blacks may in his opinion require.[5]

These provisions mean that chiefs and tribes are completely under central government control. Not only can the State President exercise chiefly functions, but he can create, divide and amalgamate tribes. Although, conceivably, he will take the history and tradition of a tribe into account, he need not do so. Legally traditionalism has been replaced by administrative and political expediency. Tribalism is merely an inferior, malleable arm of the executive.

Tribalism was further formalized by the Black Authorities Act, 68 of 1951. This provides for the *establishment* of black authorities and for a *definition* of their functions (my emphasis). Here too the wording indicates that it is not merely a matter of recognizing traditional authorities and allowing them to fulfil traditional functions. They are established by law and assigned statutory duties.

The Black Authorities Act of 1951

then provided for the establishment of authorities for the main tribal reserves. It was quite extensive, for there are at present some 492 tribes in the country and 20 in the TBVC states.[6] The outcome was that tribal authorities, based on existing chiefdoms and their councillors became embedded in the administrative system. Community authorities were established for communities that lacked chiefs or where two or more small communities were combined. Transkei went even further by eliminating the legal difference that had been made between tribal and community authorities. In terms of the Transkei Authorities Act, 4 of 1965, these were merged under the designation tribal authority. Tribes that had been dormant were revived and officially recognized.[7] This had far-reaching effects, especially in Transkei where "for a long time the policy had been to demarcate 'locations' as the basic administrative areas, and to appoint paid headmen in them, in a deliberate attempt to destroy chieftainship".[8] A group of two or more tribal authorities could be constituted a regional authority and a group of two or more regional authorities a territorial authority — the territory being the area "reserved" for the total ethnic unit, Tswana, Venda, and so on.

In short, the black population of the reserves was rearranged to bring every person under the governance of a tribal authority. In the process some artificial tribes were created and some questionable appointments were made. For instance, when the Pedi in Lebowa decided to form a tribal authority in terms of the Black Authorities Act, a list of 96 councillors was proposed to the government. A tribal authority with so many councillors, however, was unacceptable to the administration and the list was cut down to 35. This led to dissatisfaction, because many tribal heads who in fact functioned as chiefs in their own right, were omitted. Dissatisfaction, conflict and turmoil ensued.[9] It further complicated the fact that tribes are in any event not clearly defined, discrete units.

After tribalizing all the reserves, the next step was to classify them into ethnic units. This was done by identifying and recognizing eight national units: Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, Xhosa, Tswana and Zulu.[10] To this list was added the Southern Ndebele in 1972.[11]

Territorial authorities constituted the first stage towards granting the national units (states) self-government and ultimately independence. For our present purposes it is unnecessary to go into detail. The point is that independence formed the highest rung on the ladder of tribally-based government. Chiefs figured prominently in the legislative assemblies. At independence the National Assembly of Transkei consisted of the paramount chiefs and chiefs and 75 elected members.[12]

Each and every black was furthermore willy-nilly designated on ethnic grounds to be a citizen of a self-governing territory[13] or of an independent state.[14]

Urban areas outside the black reserves were regarded and administered as the domain of the whites, in which white interests were paramount. The tribal concept was, however, extended to the urban areas. In terms of the Urban Bantu Councils Act, 79 of 1961, chiefs were entitled to appoint representatives in "white" urban areas to look after the interests of their subjects in these areas and powers of civil and criminal jurisdiction over their own people in "white" urban areas could be conferred on these chiefs' representatives. In addition tribal authorities could appoint representatives to act on their behalf in urban areas. In terms of the Promotion of Black Self-government Act, 44 of 1959, district and regional authorities could nominate representatives to represent them among their own people in "white" urban areas. A representative was entitled to appoint a council to assist him. He was expected to keep the authorities or councils in the black area informed of all matters in the urban area that might affect the interests of the particular national unit. Later this representation was elevated to national ethnic level and that remains the position to this day. The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act of 1959 has undergone a sea-change. It no longer provides for national ethnic units; it has a new name[15] and merely provides for reciprocal representation. The South African government is represented in the non-independent homelands by commissioners-general and the homeland governments may appoint representatives in South Africa. All the homelands, however, still owe their existence to the 1959 Act.

Failure of the tribally-based constitutional structures

The tribally-based homelands are constitutional realities. They are nevertheless political, economic and bureaucratic failures. What are the reasons for this?

On the one hand one may regard them as a genuine effort to blend African systems of government with Western-type democratic ideals. However, the motive, to manipulate tribalism to achieve constitutional ideals, was an ill-conceived point of departure. There are, moreover, several fundamental reasons why tribalism is not amenable to this type of constitutional artifice.

Low-ranking of chiefs

In all cases the traditional "heads of state" (chiefs) play second fiddle to "elected" heads of state. The traditional and elected heads may even be at loggerheads. There are different situations, but one may infer that the elected leaders use the traditional leaders and do not treat them as equals — and by no means as superiors — in the game of government. Quinlan argues, for instance, that the chiefs in Qwaqwa are virtually pawns in the hands of the chief minister.[16] One may differ from his conclusions, but the fact of the matter is that the relationship between chiefs and chief ministers is one in which the chief ministers play a dominant role. In other cases the tribally-based legislative assemblies are platforms from which the chief ministers and presidents conduct their political enterprises. One grants them whatever platforms present themselves in the circumstances. Yet it is obvious that the chiefs are merely figureheads. Traditionally, chiefs are not figureheads. Consequently in some cases the potential for conflict looms large.

The system called for a substantial chiefly presence in the executives as well, so much so that the 1972 Constitution Proclamations of Bophuthatswana, Venda and KwaZulu provided that chiefs must be appointed as chief executive councillors.[17] This has also resulted in more chiefs being appointed as cabinet ministers. In 1974, 22 chiefs and two ministers were members of homeland excecutives. The total executive membership was only 46.[18] In two instances elected chief ministers

acquired chieftainships.[19] Kaiser Matanzima was a minor chief, but was later elevated to paramount chief of the Emigrant Thembu to put him on the same level with four other Transkeian paramount chiefs.[20] This shows how important chieftainship status was in homeland politics.

Above all, the supreme chieftainship of the State President makes the whole system ludicrous. One would like to believe that retention of this provision on the statute book is a mere oversight. In fact it is not. It is part of his powers to make or break tribes, to legislate for tribal (black) areas by decree and generally to administer blacks. He obviously wants to retain these powers and functions and they have generally been transferred in their entirety to the of homeland governments. Chiefs and tribal affairs are controlled by the offices of the presidents and chief ministers rather than by departments of local government.

Colonial uses and abuses of tribal affiliations

From 1951 onwards the National Party carried to its extreme the use of tribalism for political purposes. Its uses and abuses of tribes were, however, not an original idea. During the colonization of Africa tribes were either ignored or treated in the way that suited the particular colonial power. Skinner wrote that

> The Europeans often marked off political boundaries on the map without taking into consideration the ethnic, linguistic and political groupings affected. But the Europeans also imposed or facilitated coalescence between erstwhile disparate groupings. Again, the Europeans often followed a policy of divide and rule, thus frequently disrupting "the power that is regarded as central". On the other hand, the Europeans also 'manufactured' chiefs and provinces for people who had no such political institutions.[21]

The policy of British colonial administration was also to divide and rule. Shepstone's location policy was a typical example. He created new tribes with government-appointed chiefs at their heads. According to the 1881/82 Natal Native Commission there were 173 chiefs or headmen in Natal of whom 46 were created or appointed as chiefs and 28 were appointed as headmen. The legitimacy of these chiefs was based on Shepstone's policy of indirect rule and not on hereditary claims. Magistrates even used any signs of opposition as an

excuse for deposing chiefs and appointing court indunas or interpreters as a means of rewarding them for years of loyal service.[22]

In 1951 the National Party government took up where Shepstone and others left off. It ensured that every part of the black reserves fell under a tribal authority, with a sprinkling of community authorities. It was assumed that every black person in this country somehow has a tribe with which to identify.

Failure of tribal authorities as administrative organs

The government of the day probably genuinely believed that administration could sensibly be left to the statutorily created tribal authorities. An extensive array of functions were assigned to them, including the maintenance of minor location roads, the organization of agricultural competitions and shows, education, soil conservation, registration of work-seekers, registration of births and deaths, the screening of applications for pensions and other social benefits and licensing of dogs.[23] It is an understatement to say that "they have failed to meet expectations".[24] They failed utterly. The President of Bophuthatswana said of his own tribal, community and regional authorities:

> It has come to our notice that the majority of the authorities mentioned above are either dormant or inactive or their standard of activity is at a very low level.[25]

Hammond-Tooke is more explicit:

> Throughout the Transkei, magistrates were complaining in the 1960's that the system was not working as it should ... . The introduction of the Bantu Authorities system has meant a significant increase in the spheres in which bribery can operate ... . The constitution of the new authorities, with its limited representation, has caused resentment, and it is significant that those headmen who are on the tribal authority council have, in many cases, tended to lose the confidence and support of the people.[26]

Enquiries have shown that tribal authorities throughout the country perform poorly or not at all. Bothma summed it up as follows:

> Despite the intention of governments to stimulate community development through the recognition of traditional authorities, officials have held on to all meaningful governmental and administrative powers, thereby reducing the functions of traditional authorities to ceremonial matters.[27]

The reason is not difficult to establish: they do not fulfil a real need. Functions have long ago been delegated to magistrates, who are able to render services more efficiently than chiefs. Nor are tribal authorities really the local authorities they are sometimes made out to be. They lack the financial means and skills to perform local authority functions and are not directly accountable to the people.[28]

The role chiefs play in the administration of tribal land has also been criticized by observers and researchers. Tribal land tenure, supplemented by regulations, govern the allocation of land in rural black areas. In practice the administration of land is, to say the least, unsatisfactory.

Officials are also to blame, but the main problem is that chiefs have no real control and some use their powers to allocate land as an excuse to feather their own nests. In KwaZulu, for instance, in 1975:

> ... chiefs were warned "not to continue with the unlawful practice of receiving money or kind in return for the allocation of a site". The chiefs were literally cashing in on the land hunger of displaced people. Buthelezi attacked the chiefs for "fleecing" the people in that they were charging for sites, arable land and services such as pensions. These practices have been confirmed by Zulu, in a paper based on research conducted in the early 1980's. He wrote that "nine out of every ten respondents who required a site on which to build a house had to make some monetary payment either to the chief or to the local induna", and in some cases this payment became an annual "rent".[29]

The traditional "lotsha" system has degenerated into a demand for "services" rendered.

The unsatisfactory state of affairs is confirmed by another commentator, Henning, who wrote:

> The other weakness [of rural land tenure] is the current feeble tribal administrative institutions. If the new system [of privatising private land] were handed to them without an institutional capacity being built into the authority, it would be like "handing to them a staggering responsibility with a Christmas shopping list of temptation."[30]

The power to grant or withdraw land rights is the last real hold that chiefs have over the majority of the people. They would therefore probably resist any reform of land tenure that provided for private ownership.

Geo-political units

The homelands were artificially created, but they do now constitute geo-political units. As such they are seen by some as part of the basis for a regionalized constitutional dispensation for South Africa.[31] They are, however, by no means viable constitutional units. Each one has its own geographic shortcomings. Only the extremes need to be mentioned. KwaZulu consists of 19 patches of land spread all over Natal. Bophuthatswana consists of six — one of them the vast multi-ethnic urban sprawl, Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State. Qwaqwa was once a minor magisterial district. Between 1970 and 1983 its population increased from 25 334 to 500 000.[32] In 1980 the average population density of the homelands was 67 persons per square kilometre compared to 16 persons per square kilometre in the remainder of South Africa.[33] Some of them are not remotely homogeneous in ethnic terms. KwaNdebele is largely a haven for a variety of people who find it convenient to live there within commuting distance from Pretoria. Likewise parts of Bophuthatswana in the vicinity of Pretoria are occupied by a conglomeration of ethnically diverse people employed in and around Pretoria.

The government long ago abandoned the idea of consolidating the homelands. Prime Minister Botha said in 1980:

> The fact is that it is impossible so to consolidate the geographical area of each national group that it will be economically viable on its own, or that the material aspirations of the people within its geographical borders can be satisfied.[34]

Many so-called citizens of the homelands in any event do not wish to be ethnically identified with the homelands. According to Welsh:

> Many Blacks, particularly urban people, reject compulsory ethnic designation, and others, while acknowledging that they may be Zulu, Xhosa or North Sotho, would deny that their ethnic group identity was their utmost salient one. Individuals may have multiple identities, particular ones being invoked in particular contexts. A Zulu may combine a Zulu ethnicity with as strong or even stronger feelings of identity as a Black.[35]

The geo-political units, based as they are on compulsory ethnicity, and being over-populated and impoverished, would not be suitable for regional constitutional entities.

Failure as members of legislative assemblies

The legislative assemblies of the homelands consist of elected members and nominated chiefs. In most there are so many chiefs that they hold the balance of power. There is therefore no true democracy. But even if one concedes that this is a type of African democracy, one may ask what practical role chiefs play in the assemblies. Their tribal areas also fall within electoral areas, so that tribespersons are doubly represented in the assemblies. There is no demarcation between the constituencies of elected and nominated representatives. Representation in the legislative assemblies is indeed a mixed bag. It has been shown that in Bophuthatswana some tribes and community authorities were represented by as many as seven or eight designated and/or elected representatives while others were not represented at all.[36]

But the actual, as distinct from the imputed, role of chiefs is a greater cause for concern. It would appear that, as a whole, in the legislative assemblies they are out of their depth: they merely fill the benches. Recent discussions with people involved in homeland government revealed that the majority of chiefs hardly ever participate in debates in the assemblies. It would appear that they are ill-informed about bills and other business tabled in the assemblies and are seldom directly involved. Things are said and done for them by the ministers rather than them saying or doing things themselves. As far as could be ascertained they are not a lobbying power either. The chief ministers and presidents would keep their ears close to the ground to ensure that they do not offend the chiefs, but they do not really consult with them about parliamentary business. One could go so far as to say that their presence in the assemblies has no effect upon the outcome of parliamentary business, except that now and again they have to say "yea" or "nay", more often than not "yea" to a proposal by a minister

In the nature of things there are exceptions. There are well educated and politically astute chiefs who can hold their own in any company.

All the same, membership of the legislative assemblies placed the chiefs in the political arena. To a certain extent this changed their traditional superior status, because

It would not be possible for chiefs to rely, as in the past, on the dignity of their office. In the debating chamber they would in truth have to submit themselves to the "yapping of dogs" in a way quite incompatible with traditional ideas as to the proper role of a traditional ruler. No longer would they be constitutional monarchs, immune from the criticism that in the past was deflected to the chief councillor. They would now stand or fall by their own actions.[37]

At an enquiry into traditional authorities in Bophuthatswana "irrefutable evidence was submitted that the participation of chiefs in party politics was detrimental to tribal administration".[38]

The judicial functions of chiefs

The way in which chiefs exercise judicial functions is by no means ideal. In a fairly comprehensive study in Kwa-Zulu I discovered that chiefs did not know how far their powers went. Some also continued to perform judicial functions after being convicted of theft, arson and assault. A strong inference could be drawn that they were biased against accused persons and defendants. In a study covering a four year period, the 551 cases tried by seven chiefs did not once favour the accused/defendant.[39]

This is not to say that in principle there is anything wrong with chiefs and headmen exercising limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. The blame for defects has to be laid at the door of the governments concerned, for leaving the chiefs to their own devices. With guidance and proper control chiefs could continue to dispense traditional justice.[40]

The tribal (ethnic) basis of pluralism

The government was bent upon establishing ten sovereign independent states based on the tribal paradigm. Although the ideal of independence has to all intents and purposes been abandoned, the ten units are now held up as living proof of South African pluralism. Maré and Hamilton saw it thus:

> What has happened in South Africa, especially since the introduction of Bantu Authorities, clearly illustrates a process in which "cultural pluralism" becomes the politicization of tribal differences ... . In other words, pre-capitalist social, economic and political forms of organization are artificially maintained or recreated.

However, they are in a distorted form, and in a context where they have very little relevance (other than to create antagonisms and to serve as a handy point of reference if conflict should arise).[41]

Degenaar defined pluralism

... as a political theory on the basis of which man may be described, not as a sovereign or isolated individual, but as a person acting within a plurality of associations or groupings. These associations or groupings are autonomous, which means that the rules governing the behaviour of the individual within the association are laid down by the association itself.[42]

The theme of this article does not lend itself to a detailed discussion of pluralism and its implications for constitutional reform. It is evident, however, that in South Africa a constitution in any manner based on ethnicity would have a shaky foundation. As shown above, the ethnic nationalities have been created and engineered for the sake of an ideology of absolute division (apartheid). A pluralistic model requires unity of diversity. In this regard one can do no better than to emphasize Degenaar's warning:

Because of the very fact that ethnicity has been so abused in South Africa through its servitude to the apartheid policy as an integral part of ethnic nationalism, a course should be followed with the greatest caution so as not to use it in consociational pluralism in such a way that it creates the impression of merely being apartheid in a different guise. Unfortunately nationalists have already misused the term in this manner, consequently many Blacks are reluctant to take pluralism serious as a new paradigm. Nationalism itself is in a paradigmatic crisis with respect to the South African situation, and the liberating quality of a new paradigm should be divorced honestly and clearly from nationalism, and unambiguously offered as something new.[43]

The essence of the matter is that the majority of the black population simply never accepted the government's plans to promote the development of ethnic national groups. In fact, while the process was going on, blacks were becoming more and more urbanized and formed non-ethnic affiliations, such as trade unions, political parties and churches, that took no account of ethnicity. Above all, the champions of ethnic nationalism either ignored or tried to suppress African nationalism. As Sharp put it:

White South Africans believed, and still like to believe, that the African nationalist

vision was the preserve of a tiny educated minority, isolated from the continued ethnic loyalties of the African masses (and now in forlorn exile). Nothing could be further from the truth: although it was presented in many different forms, the African nationalist message made significant, albeit highly uneven, inroads into popular consciousness in both urban and rural areas.[44]

The ethnic composition of black plural entities militate against consociationalism. At the end of a broadly-based examination of consociational engineering in South Africa, Stultz concluded that:

From the standpoint of consociational theory, South Africa is at best a doubtful case; most of the alleged "favourable conditions" for consociationalism simply do not exist ... . [S]egmental elites [do not] know and trust each other after more than one-third of a century of their forced separation under apartheid. There are accordingly no traditions of inter-elite accommodation. Segmental isolation, said to be a facilitating factor, is only moderately present, while cleavages between the segments tend to reinforce each other rather than cross-cut, jeopardizing community feeling.[45]

The future of chiefs

The main thrust of this article has been to show how chiefs and tribes should not be used to achieve political aims. There is evidence from different quarters, however, that chiefs cannot be left out of the picture entirely. As pointed out by Dlamini, chiefs are rejected or regarded as irrelevant by a large section of the community, but still enjoy a large measure of support in rural areas.[46] In Botswana chiefs still play a vital role. Sanders said:

Traditionally the Botswana also respect their chiefs. Despite the curtailment of the chiefs' powers there remains a widespread allegiance among the people to their tribal leaders, and tribal governments still form the most effective channel through which the central government can reach the people, and the people the government.[47]

The African National Congress on the one hand proposes to outlaw "the advocacy or practice of racism, fascism, nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness".[48] On the other hand:

The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole in

conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution.[49]

Masemola elaborated on these guidelines, broadly indicating that the African National Congress favours a council of chiefs, and would expect the chiefs to play a role in rural land administration, local government, administration of justice and administration generally.[50]

The chiefs have also recently begun to make their voices heard. They have formed two organizations, the Conference of Traditional Leaders of Southern Africa and the Transkei Traditional Leaders Association, to promote their interests. Their objectives are, broadly speaking, to create an understanding of the role played by chiefs, and to ensure that they are not left out in the cold. They generally want meaningful participation in a future constitutional dispensation.[51]

The South African government's viewpoint is contained in a Tribal and Community Authorities Bill tabled in Parliament.[52] This is a *revision* of the Black Administration Act, 1927 and the Black Authorities Act, 1951, but does not contain any new principles. In fact, it is largely a consolidation of the two Acts. It is unclear why the government chooses to introduce this Bill right now. The constitution, powers and functions of tribal authorities are constitutional matters that should be dealt with in a broader context. According to a memorandum on the objects of the Bill, tribal and community authorities are seen as "embryo" local authorities and should be allowed to develop as autonomous local authorities. This is a one-sided view that may not find favour with all concerned. As suggested above, tribal authorities are not really local authorities. In this regard Vorster says:

It should be noted that these [local authority] functions did not originally form part of the functions of chiefs ... . If chiefs are expected to render these services on local level, their functions should be radically transformed with a simultaneous shift in focus from rule over people to control of services ... . If they are to become mere administrators the question arises as to whether hereditary chiefs are necessarily efficient administrators. In such cases it seems to me that chiefs have no special claim to be accommodated.[53]

The Bill, if it becomes law, will furthermore not apply in the selfgoverning territories, nor, or course, in the TBVC

states. There is therefore the possibility of there being no less than eleven different systems of chiefly rule and tribal authorities. In view of the impending new constitutional dispensation, this seems quite unwarranted.

It may safely be accepted that chiefs still enjoy substantial support in rural areas and play a significant role in the lives of tribespersons. Bearing this in mind one may suggest that their future role should be as follows.

Administrative

The use of chiefs and tribal authorities as administrative organs should either be tackled comprehensively or abandoned altogether. If they are expected to perform administrative functions they should be provided with the necessary infrastructure, organization, staff and money. If this cannot be done it would be better to let well alone.

Developmental

Chiefs and tribal authorities should in any event be drawn into rural development. Development projects are more likely to succeed if they have the blessing and co-operation of chiefs and tribal authorities. An in-depth discussion of development in Africa is beyond the scope of this article. It might merely be stated that literature on the topic abound in comments such as the following:

> The widespread assumption that the state can take over the role of "chef de terre" fails to take into account the structure of African societies. The transfer of mechanisms developed on the microlevel (the clans) to the national level, by the creation of "state land" (domaine nationale) took for granted a national cohesion which does not yet exist.[54]

Legislative

Chiefs should not be nominated members of a legislative assembly. Apart from the issues raised above, this would change the democratic nature of a legislative assembly. It has been suggested that a house of chiefs would probably enjoy wide support.[55] It is doubtful, however, whether the chiefs themselves would accept this, because it would relegate them to the status of mere advisors. An upper house consisting of chiefs would be more satisfactory, but other interest groups would object to such an upper house. A "mixed" upper house of chiefs and

other interest groups again would pose insurmountable difficulties in determining who should be represented. Moreover, any claims to traditionalism would completely fade away in a variegated upper house.

It is simply impossible to make a theoretical recommendation in this regard. The practical outcome will depend upon what the chiefs themselves want and what is politically feasible to grant or to withhold from them.

One may nevertheless venture to say that any chief who wishes to be involved in national politics and to stand for election should be allowed to do so on condition that he abandons his chieftainship.

Judicial

There should not be any serious objections to chiefs continuing to exercise limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. It would, as intimated above, be necessary to give them guidance and to exercise better control. One might even make their jurisdiction more sensible than at present. They are now hedged in by limitations reminiscent of the petty jurisdiction of justices of the peace. They could perhaps be given unlimited powers of mediation, subject to review by higher authority on request by one of the parties involved. Criminal cases pose a bigger problem, especially when it comes to punishment. Imprisonment is not only foreign to indigenous law but is also impractical and may lead to inhumane detentions. Corporal punishment is, I hope, on its way out. It will be untenable under a bill of rights. In Namibia the Supreme Court held that corporal punishment at schools and court-ordered whipping violated the constitution, which outlaws torture as well as "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".[56]

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AFRICA MONITOR

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Marita Snyman

NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

In mid-December Pres Bendjedid Chadli toured the Middle East in an effort to find a peaceful end to the **Gulf crisis**. Saudi Arabia, however, gave a cool response to his efforts, saying it was up to Saddam Hussein to resolve the crisis. A visit to France in order to get support for a joint Franco-Algerian peace effort proved futile. He also spoke with Italian, Spanish and Moroccan leaders (SWB 17/12, 18/12, 19/12, 24/12, 28/12, 12/1; AED 24/12; JA 8/1; AC 25/1).

On 26 December the national assembly passed a draft law on the use of **Arabic**, banning the use of **French** in official or business documents. Penalties for violating the ban were laid down. Arabic had been the official language since independence, but previous attempts to eliminate the use of French had failed and its use had continued predominantly among the élite. The move caused strong protest within Algeria and France, as many civil servants in Algeria speak little Arabic. It would also not help Algeria's effort to attract more **foreign investment** (SWB 29/12; AED 7/1; AA 11/1; JA 15/1; ARB 15/1; AE 2/91).

The national assembly adopted the **budget** for 1991 and the 1991 annual plan on 29 December. Revenue would amount to 189,5 bn dinars compared with 144,4 bn dinars in 1990. The number of goods receiving state subsidies were increased to fifteen, including bread, semolina, flour, milk, sugar and petrol. The prices of these goods were frozen. Also, the system of taxing each business's turnover was replaced by value added tax (VAT) "as in capitalist countries" (ARB 15/1).

The Algerian Press Service (APS) and the Egyptian Information Service (MENA) signed a co-operation agreement on 11 January which included the opening of a **direct telex line** between them (ARB 31/1).

(Agreement with Tuaregs – see Mali.)

Chad

The US State Department announced on 3 December that it would **not** formally **recognize** the new government of Idriss Déby, which it accused of being backed and financed by **Libya**. The French government, however, pledged US$90 mn in aid on 23 December and received Déby with open arms on his first official visit from 11 to 13 February. Libyan leader, Col Gaddafi, sent his congratulations to Déby on 5 December and welcomed a decision to repatriate 2 000 Libyan prisoners of war held since the end of the 1986-87 war (K 12/90; C 4/12; S 4/12; AC 7/12; E 8/12; AED 10/12, 18/2; JA 11/12, 18/12, 1/1; WA 16/12; ARB 31/12; NA 1/91; AE 1/91; DN 8/1; SWB 14/2).

On 4 March Déby announced the appointment of Jean Alingue Bawoyeu as **prime minister**. A new government with 16 newcomers was announced the next day. The new government was created under the terms of a new "national charter" adopted on 29 February; the cabinet and an advisory council of the republic replaced the provisional council of state created in December. The charter, which effectively signalled the postponement of any move to introduce a **multiparty system**, also confirmed Déby's own position as president. Drawn up by a panel of civilian and military experts, the charter was to remain in force for a 30-month interim period, at the end of which a referendum would be held on a **new constitution** for Chad (JA 5/2; SWB 4/3, 6/3; TS 4/3; AA 8/3; AED 11/3; WA 24/3).

On 3 March a Libyan-based opposition group, the National Movement of Chadian Renovators, claimed in a communiqué to the *Agence France Presse* news agency that the national charter was "anti-democratic" and that a national conference should be called to draw up a "genuine draft constitution" and an election timetable (K 3/91; SWB 8/3).

On 18 March the two organizations that had opposed Habré — the Chadian People's Revolution and the Original Front for the Liberation of Chad — amalgamated with Déby's Patriotic Salvation Movement (SWB 20/3).

(Visit by Compaoré – see Burkina Faso.)

Egypt

Pres Mubarak, together with Pres Assad from Syria, visited Libya on 3 January. All expressed their views on the seriousness of the **Gulf crisis** and the need to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Meanwhile Mubarak issued a stern warning to Sudan against making any attack on the **Aswan Dam** on behalf of Iraq. Some alarmist reports had been circulating to the effect that Khartoum might participate in an Iraqi terror campaign. Also, during mid-January anti-Egyptian demonstrations took place in Khartoum. Relations between the two countries worsened with the deportation of five Egyptians from Sudan, Sudan's suspension of the river transport link between Wadi Halfa in Sudan and the Aswan river in Egypt and Egypt's refusal on 24 January to allow nearly 600 Sudanese **refugees** from Iraq to cross its territory to reach home. Back home in Cairo, hundreds of students joined an **anti-war** protest (SWB 4/1, 23/1, 24/1; FG 25/1; E 26/1; ARB 31/1; C 25/2).

The government agreed to two of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) main conditions for a **stand-by agreement**: floating the pound and ending restrictions on bank interest rates. Economic observers said an IMF delegation had taken a firm stand during a visit in December, pressing Egypt to raise domestic energy prices, free the exchange rate for the pound and increase the price of consumer goods. The Cairo government argued the need for gradual reform, pointing to the food riots which followed the sudden increase in bread prices in 1977 (AED 7/1; ARB 15/1; AA 8/2).

(Telex line – see Algeria.)

Libya

An alleged American **intelligence operation** directed against Col Gaddafi was apparently aborted in December after the Déby take-over in Chad. Libyan defectors — close to 700 — belonging to the Libyan National Liberation Army (LNLA) were members of a specially US-trained unit housed in a **secret camp** close to N'Djamena. They were airlifted by the US military first to Nigeria and then on to Zaire (S 12/12; DT 12/12; SWB 17/12, 20/12, 21/12; AC 24/12).

(*Congratulations to Déby – see Chad; Visit by Mubarak – see Egypt.*)

Morocco

On 14 December, hundreds of **rioters** descended on the city centre of Fez, looting and burning symbols of authority and privilege: police stations, a barracks, banks, shops, and the five-star Merinides hotel. Soldiers restored order the following evening at a cost of five dead (the official figure) or up to 100 dead (the estimate of doctors in the local morgues). Less bloody riots also took place in other towns. The country's two biggest trade unions, Democratic Labour Confederation (CDT) and Moroccan General Workers Union (UGTM), organized a strike on 14 December to demand a US$250-a-month minimum wage. The unions blamed the army for the chaos, saying it encouraged the violence. On 2 January 1991 King Hassan II announced a 15 per cent increase in the **minimum wage** and the creation of more jobs. He also absolved the trade unions of blame for the riots and accused drug traffickers and criminals. The trade unions rejected the king's offer and promised more strike action if the government did not stop prosecuting its members.

A peaceful **pro-Iraqi march** took place in Rabat on 3 February, organized by five opposition parties and Islamic fundamentalists. It was estimated that about 300 000 people took part, more than the organizers had expected, and as a result ran out of US, Israeli, French and British flags, so people had to make their own crude copies before they could burn them.

Amnesty International reported in March about thirty years of political repression, torture and "disappearances" in Morocco. The government tried to take the edge off the report by releasing some of the 650 political prisoners and entering into negotiations with certain international human rights organizations (SWB 17/12, 18/12, 19/12, 24/12, 5/2; DN 18/12, KT 19/12, S 19/12; E 22/12, 23/2; WA 24/12; ARB 31/12; LIR 18/1, AF 2/91; C 4/2; AA 23/3; TS 26/3).

On 27 December parliament adopted the 1991 **budget**, despite rejection by the opposition, who said it was out of date and did not meet the country's needs. The budget emphasized the **social sectors** such as education, health and justice, as well as infrastructure. Special provision was also made for the repayment of internal public debt and external debt (ARB 15/1).

(*Talks on Gulf crisis – see Algeria.*)

Sudan

Lt-Gen Al Bashir visited Iran from 10 to 13 December for talks with Pres Rafsanjani. From 20 to 26 February the Sudanese leader visited Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria and Jordan (SWB 12/12, 29/12, 31/12; C 12/12; DT 12/12).

On 3 December the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) claimed to have taken much of south-western Sudan and that sixteen towns had fallen into their hands, including the strategic town of **Sorsiyubu**. That meant the SPLA controlled the Central African Republic (CAR) border with the Sudan. The CAR appealed for international help with the problem of approximately 15 000 to 25 000 Sudanese **refugees**. After talks on 21 to 23 December SPLA leader John Garang and a former armed forces chief, Gen Fahti Ahmed Ali, agreed on a joint strategy to topple the government and restore democracy. In January the two forces announced a government-in-exile, headed by Ali and with Garang as deputy leader (ARB 31/1, DT 3/1; SWB 23/12; C 26/3; ION 30/12).

In a speech to the nation on New Year's Eve, Al Bashir reaffirmed the implementation of the **Shari'a Law** (Islamic law) in the near future, but said this need not apply in the south, inhabited by Christians and animists. On 5 February the military junta announced the implementation of a **federal system** in Sudan (ARB 31/12; ION 5/1; AC 21/1, C 25/1; KT 6/2; B 23/3).

On 7 January the Sudanese government released five **Palestinian terrorists** convicted of killing British citizens. In reaction, Britain withdrew £31,4 mn development aid, reduced its embassy staff in Khartoum and advised Britons to leave the country. The five Palestinians killed seven people, including five Britons, in a grenade attack on 15 May 1988. The terrorists were freed after paying **blood-money** to the families of the two Sudanese victims, one of the ways of settling fueds under Shari'a law (NT 9/1; ION 12/1; ARB 31/1).

Al Bashir reshuffled the **cabinet** on 20 January. Observers saw his appointment of able and competent technocrats as a move to weaken the power of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), although he appointed former security chief, Col Salah Karrar as transport minister (S 22/1; SWB 23/1, AA 25/1, AED 28/1; ARB 31/1).

(*Warning by Mubarak – see Egypt, Talks with Babangida – see Nigeria.*)

Tunisia

On 20 February Pres Ben Ali reshuffled his **cabinet**. The move was seen as a reaction to an attack on the party headquarters by armed Islamic fundamentalists. With the reshuffle, the last ministers with ties with or sentiments for the Islamic opposition group, En-Nahda, were removed. Earlier, on 29 November, an Islamic terrorist group was discovered and dismantled, and documents of their plans to assasinate political figures were made public (ARB 31/12; SWB 19/2, 22/2; AED 25/2, 4/3).

Prime Minister Karoui presented the **budget** on 11 December. The most contentious forecast in the budget is the projected deficit amounting to $500 mn, or 3.5 per cent of GDP. Karoui promised that by the end of 1991, the majority of imported goods would be free of restrictions. The revived **state privatization programme** also meant that profitable state firms would, for the first time, become liable for privatization (ARB 15/1; AA 25/1).

WEST AFRICA

Benin

After a **referendum** on 4 December in which the Beninois indicated that they were in favour of a **multiparty democracy**, legislative and presidential **elections** were held in February and March. The 19 February legislative election saw a turnout of 52 per cent, while 56 per cent of the Beninois showed up for the first round of the presidential election on 10 March. From thirteen candidates the electorate gave 36 per cent of their votes to **Nicéphore Soglo**, the prime minister and ex-World Bank official. Pres Kérékou came second, with 27 per cent of the poll. At the second round, on 24 March, Soglo won with 67,61 per cent of the votes cast against the 32,39 per cent for Kérékou. After a long reign, which was often brutal, Kérékou became the first military leader in Africa to have gained power by coup d'état only to be **ousted** by the electorate (SWB 5/12, 9/1, 30/1, 8/3, 9/3, 15/3, 20/3, 25/3, 26/3, 27/3, 29/3; AED 10/12, 4/3, 18/3, 1/4; LT 13/12; WA 16/12, 10/3, 24/3; JA 18/12, 5/3; AR 1/91, IS 1/91; ARB 31/1; DN 25/2, 27/3; C 6/3, 18/3, 19/3, 22/3; KT 6/3; E 16/3, 30/12; TWR 27/3).

Burkina Faso

After a visit to Idriss Déby of Chad by Capt Compaoré on 23 December, a joint communiqué said the two leaders had agreed to establish a joint commission to promote co-operation and to establish diplomatic relations. Déby also paid a visit to **Burkina Faso** from 8 to 9 February (SWB 28/12, 11/2).

On 28 December the government decided to stage **multiparty elections** by the end of 1991 as part of a packed calender to return the country to **civilian rule**. A census was held from 5 to 20 January and the new constitution would be put to a vote on 2 June. The presidential election was set for 3 November, to be followed by parliamentary elections on 8 December. Although it would appear that the ruling Popular Front was sincere in its reform efforts, opposition groups complained of even more **restrictive measures** than before (SWB 21/12, 6/2, 6/3; ARB 31/12, 31/1; AED 7/1; JA 8/3; WA 31/3).

Cape Verde

In the first **multiparty election** in Portuguese-speaking Africa on 13 January, Cape Verdians voted the ruling PAICV **out of power**. The

Movement for Democracy (MPD) won 65 per cent of the seats and observers ascribed their success to the Roman Catholic Church's support. More than 80 per cent of Cape Verde's population is Catholic. The new prime minister is **Carlos Veiga**, a forty-one year old lawyer. On 17 February Pres Pereira was voted out in the presidential elections, and another lawyer and former supreme court judge, **Antonio Monteiro**, won a landslide victory with 75 per cent of the vote (AED 21/1, 4/2, 25/2; SWB 25/1, 19/2, 20/2, 19/3, 21/3, 25/3; ARB 31/1; InfA 31/1; AB 2/91; AE 2/91; JA 12/2, 5/3, 12/3; S 18/2, 19/2; BD 19/2; B 19/2; DN 20/2; AC 8/3; KT 13/3).

Côte d'Ivoire

A **South African** delegation, led by the minister of mineral and energy affairs and public enterprises, Dr De Villiers, visited Pres Houphouët-Boigny on 13 December at his Cocody private residence (SWB 18/12; AEM 20/12).

On 30 December the ruling Democratic Party of the Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) won the **municipal elections** characterized by a record **abstention rate**, in some districts as high as 80 per cent. The victory followed earlier successes in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. Opposition parties made fresh allegations of PDCI **cheating** in the elections, staging a protest in Anyama on 13 January where police arrested several activists. The next day the Ivorian Human Rights League (Lidho) denounced the savage treatment of the demonstrators by security forces (SWB 4/1, 21/2; JA 15/1, ARB 31/1).

In the meantime, on 21 February Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara announced **cutbacks** of 20 per cent in the number of government departments, in line with his four-point plan of **accelerated reform**. The reform included reorganizing public and parastatal companies, privatization, debt restructuring as well as improving public sector finances. (AED 4/3, 11/3).

The Gambia

On 8 January Gambia and **Senegal** signed a new friendship and co-operation agreement in an effort to govern **relations** between the two countries. The agreement followed the demise of the Senegambia Confederation, which was dissolved in December 1989 (SWB 10/1; WA 20/1; ARB 31/1).

The **IMF** approved a **loan** equivalent to US$10 mn in support of the third annual arrangement under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The IMF said in a statement that Gambia registered **strong economic growth** and a substantial improvement in its balance of payments despite a downturn in tourism receipts in the period 1989/90 (AED 10/12; IMF S 10/12; AA 14/12; ARB 15/12; WA 6/1).

Ghana

In two speeches, on 31 December and 1 January, the chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), Flt-Lt Jerry

Rawlings, finally addressed the subject of a **constitution** for Ghana. He announced that the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) would present a constitutional report in March and expected to have a draft constitution ready in a year's time. The NCD had also been requested to open the voter's register by the end of 1991 and issue identity cards to all Ghanaian citizens. Rawlings commented on calls for **civilian rule** by saying that the idea of a civilian government was a **colonial legacy** and that the security forces must be seen as part of the larger community. The NCD subsequently handed the report to Rawlings on 26 March. (S 2/1, 3/1; WA 20/1; ARB 31/1; SWB 1/2; DN 28/3).

Finance and economic planning secretary Kwesi Botchwey presented the 1991 **budget** on 9 January. The budget offered **tax cuts** to individuals and businesses and incentives designed to reinvigorate the productive sector and promote exports and efficient import substitution. Analysts felt the tax cuts were designed to encourage mass support for the government's political programme (AED 21/1; ARB 15/2).

Pres Mugabe of **Zimbabwe** visited Ghana from 12 to 16 January and co-signed an agreement establishing a joint commission on economic co-operation (SWB 17/1; ARB 15/2).

The September 1991 **Non Aligned Movement (NAM)** meeting due to take place in Accra caused quite a stir in Ghana, with government plans to build a new conference centre on the race course and improve the hotels, roads, restaurants and street lighting. Critics said the whole project was far too extravagant, a prestige project with huge economic costs, something the ordinary Ghanaian could do without (AED 24/12; NA 3/91).

Guinea

On 23 December the people of Guinea overwhelmingly (with a 98,7 per cent vote) endorsed a **new constitution** which stipulated that the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) government of President Lansana Conté be wound up, the troops be confined to barracks, and a two-party democratic government be established within five years. Elections would be held in 1996. The CMRN was dissolved on 16 January. It was replaced by a Transitional Committee for National Regeneration (CTRN), composed of 15 civilians and 15 military personnel. The first **municipal elections** in thirty years were planned for 10 March (SWB 29/12, 8/1, 9/1, 4/3; ARB 31/12; AED 14/1, NA 4/91).

Guinea-Bissau

On 17 December the central committee of the ruling Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) decided that a **multiparty system** would "be a reality after 1993", following a period of transition to democracy. On 9 January Gen Vieira announced that the PAIGC would no longer be the leading power in the country. He also asked religious and political leaders to forget

past mistakes of the PAIGC since independence in 1974 and play their part in new policies designed to produce a national renaissance (SWB 19/12, 15/1, 25/1, WA 13/1, 24/2; C 21/1; ARB 31/1, InfA 28/2; AC 8/3).

Liberia

On 5 December UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar made an appeal to the international community for US$13,8 mn in **humanitarian aid** to assist the estimated 350 000 Liberians in Monrovia, who were in urgent need of food and medical aid. On 19 December UN officials reported that they failed to receive any pledges. Distribution of food assistance by local relief organizations was reportedly under way in mid-January and the US also pledged US$6 mn to assist refugees (K 12/91; DT 21/12; ARB 31/1; AED 11/2; WA 17/2).

Following on the 28 November agreement, the three contending armed factions signed a further agreement on 21 December in **Banjul** declaring their intention to set up a **national conference** in 60 days as a prelude to the establishment of their own interim government and a technical committee to oversee the ceasefire. The agreement, however, made no mention of the existing interim government headed by Amos Sawyer. The **ceasefire agreement** lasted throughout January and February. On 12 and 13 February talks were held again, convened by the Ecowas mediation group. This time meeting in Lomé, the factions agreed to a detailed plan for monitoring the ceasefire, and agreed to hold a national conference in March with a view to establishing a transitional government. **Charles Taylor**, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) who had to be persuaded by Burkina Faso's Compaoré to attend the meeting, felt he should have been given the interim presidency. He then **boycotted** the 15 March conference in Monrovia, to the anger of some delegates who accused him of delaying proceedings. Twice the conference despatched delegates to Taylor, in an effort to convince him to attend, to no avail. He apparently criticized the composition of the conference, demanding the participation of elected representatives of Liberia's 13 counties, of which his faction claimed to have control over 12. The conference was composed of: the six recognized political parties, the three civil war factions, the three religious communities, trade unions and students. Sporadic outbreaks of **fighting** reported during March was mainly attributed to unruly rebel groups (K 12/90; SWB 1/12, 5/12, 21/12, 24/12, 7.1 11/2, 1/3, 12/3, 19/3, 23/3, WA 9 12, 16 3, 31/3; AC 10/12, 8/2; JA 11/12; AFP 24/12, 18/3; ARB 31/12, S 18/1, T 26/1 BD 12/2; DN 14/3).

On 20 January Harry Moniba, vice-president under Doe until mid-1990, laid claim to the **presidency** and called on Sawyer's interim government to step down. Meanwhile Sawyer announced the appointment of six cabinet ministers and said his administration did not intend to stay in power for more than one year (K 1/91; S 21/1; SWB 23/1; AA 25/1; AED 28/1).

Liberian radio reported in late January that

two Nigerian journalists, missing in Liberia since August 1990, had been killed by the NPFL in October (K 1/91; SWB 30/1).

Mali

Peaceful demonstrations by over ten thousand people in favour of democracy and political pluralism took place in Bamako on 10 December, to mark the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was followed by another demonstration involving fifteen thousand people on 30 December and a general strike on 8 January. It was the country's first general strike since independence thirty years before. The strikers sought, among other demands, a 50 per cent increase in wages. Then on 21 January students marched in Bamako to protest the arrest of some of their leaders. This was the first demonstration that turned **violent**, with rioting being met with forceful tactics by the police. On the 23rd tanks were deployed and all schools in the country were closed. Amnesty International said on 29 January that children, some under twelve years old, were reported to be among people tortured after mass arrests on 22 and 22 January. A meeting between government representatives and democratic groups on 21 February ended in **stalemate**, although Pres Traoré promised to discuss the possible introduction of a multiparty system at the ruling Malian People's Democratic Union's congress scheduled for 28 March. The demonstrations continued on 5, 17 and 22 March and a strike was called for 20 March, resulting in the deployment of armoured cars and riot police in the streets of Bamako. The riots that followed allegedly left close to 150 people dead and many more injured. A curfew was imposed and on 24 March Traoré appealed for calm in an address to the nation and **promised elections**. He also said in an interview he would not resign and that his troops are loyal to him. Workers launched a strike on 25 March, to demand Traoré's resignation. On 26 March the inevitable happened: Traoré was **arrested** by a newly formed military council, headed by Lt-Col Amadou Toure, who promised co-operation with the pro-democracy groups in Mali. Consequently a new prime minister, **Soumana Sacko**, was appointed on 2 April (SWB 12/12, 1/1, 23/1, 24/1, 25/1, 26/1, 1/2, 2/2, 4/2, 5/2, 21/2, 27/2, 5/3, 19/3, 21/3, 23/3, 25/3, 26/3, 27/3, 3/4; ARB 31/12; WA 6/1, 20/1, 10/2, 17/2, 31/3; AED 14/1, 4/2; S 24/1, 25/1, 25/3, 26/3; C 25/1, 16/2, 23/3, 25/3; JA 29/1, 5/2; AC 8/2; TWR 27/3; WR 29/3; E 30/3; AE 4/91).

On 6 January the Mali government and representatives of the Tuareg nomads signed an **agreement** in Tamanrasset in Algeria in order to end the fighting that killed hundreds of people in 1990. According to the agreement, the Mali government agreed to give two Tuareg areas in northern Mali a special status amounting to internal autonomy. Twenty-four Tuareg prisoners were also released on 10 March according to the agreement (SWB 8/1, 6/2, 11/3; C 8/1; AED 21/1; JA 22/1; ARB 31/1; AA 22/2).

(*Talks with Babangida – see Nigeria.*)

Mauritania

On 4 December the Mauritanian government announced a **coup attempt** on 27 November and made allegations of **Senegalese involvement**. This followed shortly on news that relations between the two countries were finally being rectified. The allegations were denied by Senegal. **Amnesty International** expressed concern that the Mauritanian government might be using the coup plot as a further pretext for the harassment and torturing of the country's minority black community. The organization had been highly critical of Mauritania's **human rights** record in the preceding months and also requested an investigation regarding the 200 prisoners arrested in connection with the coup plot. On 20 January a Mauritanian navy vessel fired on Senegalese trawlers, apparently in Mauritanian waters, killing a fisherman. In another incident, four Senegalese civilians were killed on 2 March when Senegalese and Mauritanian soldiers exchanged gunfire on the Senegal River. (SWB 7/12, 17/12, 25/1, 6/3; KT 7/12; WA 23/12, 6/1, 13/1, 10/2, 24/3; ARB 31/12; AED 7/1; C 17/1).

The 1991 **budget** was presented on 27 December and the government said it was in line with the objectives of the structural adjustment programme and aimed at achieving lasting economic growth. The agricultural sector was given priority with 153 projects of which 110 were already under way (ARB 15/1).

Pro-Iraqi demonstrations took place in Nouakchott on 15 January. Schools were closed the next day and foreign nationals "who might be the target of exaction" were asked by the government to seek refuge in their respective embassies. The government then reiterated its solidarity with Iraq (SWB 17/1, 18/1, 22/1; AC 8/1).

Niger

The national assembly adopted the **budget** on 22 December. The budget was substantially smaller than the previous one, reflecting the "weakening of both internal and external resources". Niger also became the first country to receive help from a new **debt reduction fund** to buy back all of its outstanding commercial bank debts. The new $100 mn fund would be administered by the International Development Agency (IDA) (ARB 15/1; AED 18/2, 25/2; WBN 21/2; AA 22/2).

Since the beginning of the year, **fifteen new political parties** were registered in Niger in preparation for the first multiparty elections to be held in 1992. On 8 March the army withdrew from the ruling party, the National Movement for Social Development (MNSD). It would not be aligned with any political parties in future. On 29 March the national assembly approved the new constitution which assured **multiparty democracy** (ARB 31/1; SWB 1/2, 9/1, 11/3, 15/3; C 11/3, 1/4).

On 25 February more than 5 000 students demanded punishment for those responsible for repressing demonstrations in 1990, setting fire to cars and hurling petrol bombs at shops. Consequently the government closed all high

schools and the university and only reopened them again on 20 March after talks with parents and the Niger students' union (S 26/2; SWB 1/3, 4/3; DN 22/3).

(*Talks with Babangida – see Nigeria.*)

Nigeria

On 8 December Nigeria held its first local party political **elections**, which went off peacefully, but with a low voter turnout of less than 20 per cent. A controversial **open ballot** system was used, in which electors line up in front of their candidates' posters. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) won 232 chairmanship and 2 934 councillorship seats, while the conservative National Republican Convention (NRC) won 206 chairmanship and 2 558 councillorship seats. Observers were pleased with the conduct of the elections, but pointed out that the campaigns were very bland and rallies poorly attended, no doubt reflecting the **artificial** nature of the political competitors. Pres Babangida announced that the election was an indication that the two parties were well established and the government would not fund them any longer (WA 9/12, 16/12, 23/12; A Con 10/12; DT 10/12; BD 14/12; E 15/12; SWB 18/12; ARB 31/12, 31/1; AE 1/91).

While on a visit to Equatorial Guinea, on 11 December Babangida said at a state banquet in Malabo that Nigeria had no territorial ambitions, but want to develop and strengthen the existing **bilateral relations** between the two countries. He also said the Nigerian government had begun consultations with countries in the Gulf of Guinea with a view to establishing a **Gulf of Guinea commission**, for "the most cost-effective and orderly manner of transforming their natural resources into regional prosperity for their people". Countries concerned are Gabon, Cameroon, São Tomé and Principe and Equatorial Guinea (ARB 31/12; WA 6/1).

The **Sudanese** leader, Lt-Gen al-Bashir, visited Nigeria from 27 to 28 December; he held talks with Babangida on bilateral co-operation (SWB 29/12, 31/12).

Babangida presented the 1991 **budget** on 1 January, saying the hallmark for 1991 would be strict budget discipline. The main message in the budget was broad policy measures designed to increase investment, raise agricultural production and improve performance in the social services sector (AED 7/1; AA 11/1; WA 20/1; AB 2/91).

From 6 to 9 January it was the turn of Pres Mugabe of **Zimbabwe** to visit Nigeria (C 7/1; B 7/1; DT 9/1; WA 20/1; G 17/2).

On 13 January a Nigerian human rights group, the **Committee for the Defence of Human Rights** (CDHR), released its 1990 report, in which it accused authorities of carrying out secret executions, lynchings and torture. Nevertheless, at an OAU human rights committee meeting on 20 March, Babangida said Africa should pay more attention to human rights if the continent wanted to develop (C 15/1, 22/3; S 15/1, 22/3; WA 10/2, 24/2; DN 22/3).

On 11 February Babangida held talks with his **Malian** counterpart, Gen Traoré in Abuja,

Nigeria. Abuja was again the venue when Babangida received **Nigerien** president Saibou on 19 February. **Chadian** president Déby also visited Babangida, from 23 to 24 February (SWB 13/2, 22/2, 27/2; DT 26/2).

(Nigerian journalists killed – see Liberia.)

Senegal

On 10 January **Amnesty International** complained that human rights violations was continuing in Senegal, with the government appearing to have given the security forces a "virtual blank cheque" to torture and kill people in the southern **Casamance** region where rebels were fighting for independence. The Senegalese government rejected the allegations on 22 February, saying that Senegal was a lawful state which respected its own rules (C 10/1; SWB 22/2).

(Co-operation agreement – see Gamnia; Involvement in coup attempt – see Mauritania.)

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone braced itself for **elections** in May and although it would be held under the single-party system, people were already looking foward to a **multiparty democracy** in furture. A new political movement, the Grand Alliance of Patriotic Sierra Leonians had been formed in the hope that pluralism would be legalized before the elections. Pres Momoh, however, crushed these hopes when he rejected calls by student leaders on 22 March to make a public statement on multiparty politics. This followed several days of students' strikes which started on 18 March. In the meantime, a rumpus had broken out in the press over voter registration, with complaints that eligible voters had not been allowed to register, while fraudulent names were inserted on voters lists. In Makeni, for example, a small four-bedroomed house was said to have registered 62 occupants (NA 1/91; SWB 18/1, 19/3, 21/3, 25/3; ARB 31/1; C 4/2; S 4/2; AA 22/2; WA 24/2, 24/3; NA 4/91).

Less than half-way, five months through the 1990/91 fiscal year, the government had already **spent** up to 51 per cent of the **budget**. Finance minister Taylor-Morgan told parliament in December that May and June 1991 could be unprovided for, and then presented a mini-budget to stave off a collapse. Transport fares had been increased in an effort to provide additional revenue. The country's involvement in the Ecowas peacekeeping force in Liberia and the effects of the Gulf war were blamed for the dislocation of the budget (AED 7/1, 14/1; ARB 15/1).

Togo

After a five-hour showdown with opposition leaders on 18 March, Pres Eyadéma granted some **concessions** which showed that political protest was at last yielding dividends. Among the concessions were: an amnesty for political prisoners, a "national dialogue forum" and new guarantees on the creation of political parties. As in other West African states, students were at the forefront of the action, launching strikes that led to wider unrest, reminiscent of the strikes in October 1990. In a speech on 30 October 1990 Eyadéma did commit himself to multipartyism, but since then had been proved markedly reluctant to move towards this goal. Ten opposition groups united in a *Front des Associations pour le Renouveau* (FAR) and appeared to have taken much of the initiative in Togo (SWB 31/12, 20/3; NA 1/91; ARB 31/1; TS 21/3; AED 25/3; WA 31/3).

Eyadéma hosted a **summit meeting** with the leaders of Senegal and Nigeria on 29 January in Lomé to discuss events in Liberia and the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania (SWB 1/2; ARB 15/2).

The IDA provided a **credit** of $55 mn to support Togo's efforts to restore economic growth, raise incomes and improve living conditions. The programme included measures to improve the efficiency of three chief economic ministries and the civil service as well as efforts to extend basic social services to the poor. The National Assembly adopted the **budget** on 31 December. In accordance with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), sustained economic growth and increased employment opportunities were the major objectives (WBN 20/12; ARB 15/1, 15/2; AED 11/2).

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

On 6 December the national assembly adopted a draft law for the introduction of a **multiparty political system** which allowed for an unlimited number of parties, provided that they are not based on ethnic or regional groupings. Since then a number of parties were established, the most important of which was the Social Movement for New Democracy led by **Yondo Black**, well-known former bar association president and political prisoner. There was, however, still much criticism of the government's apparent reluctance to let go of its hold on Cameroonians, as seen in the example of the new press laws that ended the need for prior authorization to publish a newspaper, but still provided for pre-publication censorship. That the situation for the press had not really changed for the better was shown on 27 December when an issue of *Le Messager* carrying an "open letter" to Pres Biya was seized and the newspaper's editor and the author of the article arrested. Their trial sparked protest demonstrations in mid-January with at least three people killed. **Demonstrations** again took place in March (WA 16/12, 23/12, 13/1, 27/1; SWB 20/12, 22/12, 15/2, 20/3, 25/3; ARB 31/12, 31/1; AED 7/1; WM 25/1; AC 25/1; NA 2/91; AE 3/91).

Biya received **South African** Minister of mineral and energy affairs and public enterprises, Dawie de Villiers, first in mid-December, and then again from 20 to 21 February. The aim of the visit was to discuss possible co-operation between the two countries. De Villiers also visited Gabon (BD 18/12, 22/2; B 22/2; C 25/2; SWB 1/3).

Central African Republic

The major **strike** action, called by the National Federation of Centrafrican Workers (USTC) in November, ended when the government agreed to pay CFA1,6 bn of the CFA7 bn owed in salary arrears (WA 6/1; ARB 31/1).

Edouard Frank, a judge who was previously minister in charge of government co-ordination and relations with parliament, became the first **prime minister**. The Central African Republic Congress created the post in February for the purpose of defusing the pro-democracy protest in one of the staunchest one-party states in Africa (AR 31/1; SWB 5/3, 11/3; S 18/3).

(Neighbouring refugee problem – see Sudan.)

Congo

On 3 December the prime minister, Alphonse Souchalaty-Poaty, announced his **resignation**. He also resigned from the Congolese Labour Party (PCT). He cited "profound differences" with the course the government was taking (dropping Marxist ideology and approving of multiparty politics). In line with decisions made during the PCT's fourth congress in December, a national conference opened in Brazzaville on 25 February with over 1 100 people in attendance, 700 of them affiliated to opposition groups. The right to strike was suspended during the conference. Intense procedural wrangling took place, the main dispute being over the powers of the conference. The opposition groups wanted the conference to be sovereign, so that decisions on a **new constitution** could be made there. (The government initially planned the conference to be only consultative.) On 11 March the conference elected Bishop Ernest Kombo as chairman and the duration of the conference extended to run into April. In the end an agenda was voted in on 16 April. The constitution would be abrogated and the main institutions of the former regime (the national assembly, the constitutional council and the economic and social council) were suspended (C 5/12; SWB 5/12, 21/12, 11/1, 14/2, 26/2, 1/3, 5/3, 19/3, 25/3, 22/4; DT 6/12, 12/12, 26/2; S 7/12, 11/12; AED 10/12; JA 18/12; WA 23/12, 17/2, 10/3, 31/3, 7/4; ARB 31/12, 31/1; AR 1/91; TWR 6/2; SS 24/2; DN 26/2).

Gabon

The cabinet adopted a bill on a **new constitution** on 21 December. Changes endorsed were: the establishment of a senate and a national assembly, and the presidential term was changed from seven to five years, with his mandate only renewable once. At a national assembly meeting on 15 March, members unanimously formally adopted the new constitution and a charter regulating political parties.

The new constitution provides for a semi-presidential regime and gives clear guarantees on individual and public liberties. A constitutional court would be set up to monitor the constitutionality of laws and check on the running of elections. The adoption of the constitution followed after the national assembly rejected the **budget** in January because of the low spending on the social sector compared to that on the presidency and the army. It was a high-spending budget which ignored structural adjustment and cut repayment to creditors (SWB 29/12; WA 7/1; AC 8/3).

A Gabonese delegation visited **South Africa** on 21 January to discuss closer ties with Pres de Klerk. The two countries had already negotiated overflight rights a month before as a result of the clandestine relations between Pres Bongo and South Africa for many years. Bongo's daughter was a member of the Gabonese delegation. As a follow-up of this visit, De Klerk arrived in Libreville on 7 February to meet the Gabonese leaders. Energy minister Dr Dawie de Villiers also visited Gabon, on 21 February (S 22/1, 22/2; SWB 8/2, 19/2; B 22/2; BD 22/2; C 22/2, 25/2).

Gabonese health workers who started a **strike** on 23 January refused to return to work even when faced by the government ultimatum that salaries would be stopped from 1 March. They protested their working conditions, such as the state of the buildings they have to work in and the drug supplies drying up (WA 31/3).

Sao Tomé and Principe

The ruling Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tomé and Principe-Social Democratic Party (MLSTP-PSD) was **defeated** in **democratic elections** on 20 January. **Strikes** had paralysed vital sectors in the preceding two months and it is believed that economic woes, due partly to collapsing prices of the country's main export, cocoa, led to the regime's downfall. The Democratic Convergence Party (PCD) won 33 of the 55 seats. Voter turnout was about 80 per cent. On 3 March a former prime minister who was once jailed and exiled for an alleged plot to overthrow the state, **Miguel Trovoada**, was elected president. Former president Manual Pinto da Costa decided wisely not to contest the election (ARB 31/12, 31/1; SWB 25/1, 28/1, 8/2, 2/3, 5/3, 6/3, 8/3, 15/3; AED 28/1/ 11/3; InfA 31/1; S 4/3; C 5/3; DT 5/3; KT 13/3).

Zaire

On 3 December security forces killed four people and injured three who were taking part in a **demonstration** in Kinshasa, to protest the high cost of living in the Zairean capital. The following day two were killed and six wounded in similar circumstances in Matadi (BD 5/12; SWB 5/12, 7/12; WA 23/12; ARB 31/12).

Ten opposition parties called a **general strike** for 7 to 9 January as part of a campaign to get rid of Pres Mobutu, calling him the "biggest African dictator". On 18 January the government authorized 19 political parties to

compete in the elections promised for 1992. 94 Applicants were regarded as "incomplete". The qualifying parties included Mobutu's Popular Revolutionary Movement and those led by two of his staunchest opponents, Etienne Tshisekedi and the former foreign minister, Nguza Karl-I-Bond. By 16 February, 66 parties had been recognized. Mobutu also announced an **amnesty** to Zairean exiles: If they return before the end of 1991, previous offences against the state would be forgiven. Political observers linked the peace offer to the increasing isolation facing Mobutu. He held a meeting with 49 of the opposition parties on 28 February to discuss the broadening of the transitional government. Following these discussions, the prime minister, Lunda Bululu, on 14 March announced the resignation of the transitional government which had been in office since 4 May 1990. He was replaced by a university professor, Mulumba Lukoji, on 15 March (SWB 8/1, 22/1, 4/2, 21/2, 1/3, 5/3, 15/3, 1/4; C 16/1, 16/3, 1/4; S 17/1; WA 20/1; ARB 31/1; AA 8/2; AE 3/91; SS 3/3).

Mobutu's dream of hosting the **Francophone summit** scheduled for October 1991 was shattered when it was announced that the prestigious summit of all French-speaking African countries would be held in France. Belgium and Canada, who were willing to put up finance for the meeting, said it would not be available for Zaire. The reason for this decision was Mobutu's refusal to allow an international enquiry into the Lubumbashi massacre as well as other reports of human rights violations. Opposition groups in Zaire were **jubilant**, as they said Mobutu was using the summit as a platform for his own election campaign (AED 7/1, 25/3; WA 13/1; JA 22/1; AE 3/91; NA 3/4).

Zairean sources reported in early February that French mercenary **Bob Denard** was training South African mercenaries in Zaire as a presidential guard for Mobutu. These reports followed similar news in the 7 December edition of Africa Confidential where it was claimed that SA mercenaries were propping up the Zairean government and were based at the *Joli Site* hotel in Kinshasa. The allegations were denied by the South African government, who said Denard had never left the country. The Zairean government also denied the reports (AC 7/12; S 12/12; SS 2/2; B 5/2; SWB 6/2).

Servicing of the **national debt** would account for 62 per cent of spending in the 1991 budget presented by Bululu to parliament. He announced that the fiscal base would be broadened by instituting a new customs duty on state imports. The budget provided for a deficit of $53 mn and spending of $1 158 mn. Inflation rose above 150 per cent in the previous year and the growth rate was expected to have been −4 or −5 per cent, leaving the country with a dismal economy (AED 21/1; ARB 15/2).

According to a government announcement on 25 March, a measles epidemic reportedly killed 500 children in the Kivu region of eastern Zaire (C 26/3, S 26/3; SWB 27/3; DN 28/3).

EAST AFRICA

Burundi

Burundi's ruling party, the Union for National Progress (Uprona) held a special three-day **congress** from 27 December. Proceedings were opened to non-members, independent figures, businessmen, clerics and representatives of Burundians abroad, swelling the numbers of participants to 1 000. Maj Buyoya was elected chairman of the Uprona central committee, a restructured body of 80 members. The congress adopted a draft charter for **national unity** which was subsequently put to a referendum on 5 February and overwhelmingly adopted by 89 per cent of Burundians who voted (DN 28/12; SWB 29/12, 1/1, 11/2).

Comoros

During a military ceremony on 1 December France took charge of the command and functioning of the Comoros Armed Forces, to be known in future as the *Force Comorienne de Défense* (FCD) (ION 8/12).

On 13 December, **South African** Foreign Minister Pik Botha arrived in Moroni for talks with Pres Djohar, with whom South Africa had kept close ties. Those ties were emphasized when, on 23 March, Djohar said diplomatic ties at ambassadorial level would be a possibility soon and that he hoped South Africa would remember Comoros' friendliness in the past. SA Airways resumed weekly flights to the Comoros from beginning of March (C 14/12, 25/3; ION 15/12; SWB 22/12; S 25/3; B 25/3).

Djohar received representatives of all members of the opposition union on 11 March. Their discussion focussed on the holding of a round table for a review of the constitution. The opposition agreed to such a meeting with some conditions, among which a referendum to be held within a mximum of three months. The round-table discussion was to have started by the end of March (ION 5/1, 12/1, 9/2, 16/2, 9/3, 16/3).

Djibouti

During the night of 8 January a soldier was killed during an attack on a barracks at Tadjoura in northern Djibouti. Eighty people were arrested, mainly from the **Afar** tribe who were closely associated with Ali Aref Bourhan, the ex-president of the government council before independence. Bourhan himself was also arrested on 10 January, on charges that he was planning a coup d'état involving the assassination of several leaders and the start of a civil war between the Afars and the Issas. Clashes between security forces and the Afar community took place in Djibouti on 13 January, injuring six. According to the Indian Ocean Newsletter, these events served as a pretext for a **large-scale round-up** of Afars. Later, on 4 March, the government put its foot down even harder by rejecting multipartyism (SWB 11/1, 14/1, 15/1; ION 12/1, 19/1, 16/2, 23/2, 9/3; C 14/1; AC 25/1; ARB 31/1; NA 3/91; JA 12/3).

Pres Aptidon visited Pres Mengistu of

Ethiopia on 27 February. He also visited China from 12 to 17 March (SWB 1/3, 19/3; ION 2/3).

Ethiopia

It was reported on 6 February that **World Bank** project lending to Ethiopia would be increased from approximately US$100 mn to US$125 mn in the form of a long-term, low-interest loan from the International Development Association (IDA). The EC announced grant aid worth US$387 mn over the next five years, to be directed towards rural development and small-scale industry and agriculture, with emphasis on the private sector (SWB 13/2).

Peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) were held in Washington on 21 to 22 February, chaired by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen. The Ethiopian Government offered "broader autonomy" for Eritrea, "tantamount to a federal structure", but the Eritreans insisted on a referendum on **independence** (DT 19/2, 21/2; SWB 23/2, 4/3; AED 4/3; ION 9/3).

From 2 March the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and their allies, grouped under the title of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), claimed to have gained control of the **Gojam region** north of Addis Ababa, as part of a successful offensive launched on 23 February. By 19 March they were within 50 km of the capital. The EPLF had meanwhile captured Tio on the Red Sea coast on 2 March, and Edd by 11 March, coming within 160 km of Assab, the port through which the capital received most of its **fuel supplies** (K 2-3/91; SWB 26/2, 27/2, 28/2, 1/3; ION 2/3, 23/3; C 5/3, 23/3; DT 6/3; AA 8/3).

Kenya

At a special meeting of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) on 3 to 4 December more than 3 000 delegates agreed to retain the existing **one-party political system**, although the voting system requiring voters to line up behind their candidates was scrapped. They thus endorsed recommendations of a party review committee which had been set up after the rioting in July 1990 in the wake of a growing campaign by pro-democracy supporters. In direct challenge to this decision, veteran opposition leader Oginga Odinga announced (for the second time in four months) on 13 February that he was forming the National Democratic Party (NDP). The government refused to register the party, saying it would be a contravention of the constitution. On 5 March Gitobu Imanyara, a civil rights lawyer and editor of the Nairobi Law Monthly, was charged with sedition. The reason for the charge was the publication of the NDP's manifesto. Imanyara's advocacy of multiparty democracy as well as a recent article on **tribalism** in Kenya, where he wrote that many public corporations were headed by members of Pres Moi's Kalenjin tribe. Following his arrest, the US State Department issued a press statement on 1 March, calling for his release. Kenya's foreign and international co-operation minister Wilson Ndolo Ayah accused the USA of treating Kenya as a "**colonial puppet**" (K 12/90, 2/91, 3/91; NA 12/90; AE 12/90, 1/91; AR 12/90; SWB 4/12, 18/12, 6/3; TS 4/12; KT 4/12, 5/12, 14/3; BD 5/12; WM 7/12; WR 7/12, 15/2, 22/3; ION 8/12, 16/2, 9/3, 16/3; ARB 31/12; AC 21/1, 8/3; AA 8/3; E 9/3; S 14/3).

Several dissidents appeared in court on 11 December on treason charges. Among them was former MP **Koigi wa Wamwere**, arrested on 9 October on his return from exile (see Africa Insight 1/91). Wamwere's lawyers alleged that he was **kidnapped** in Uganda before being repatriated to Kenya, where he was arrested and tortured (K 12/90; ION 15/12, 22/12; KT 18/12; SWB 21/12; WR 21/12; ARB 31/12; NA 2/91).

Relations between Kenya and **Uganda** again hit a low when reports of alleged Ugandan **support** for Kenyan dissidents surfaced. Fears that Museveni had designs on Kenya were voiced again, although the Kenyan government said on 11 February in a statement that the emphasis was on the Kenyan dissidents' plans and the help they were getting from the Ugandans, rather than on any plan by the Ugandan government to launch a military invasion of Kenya. Museveni also came up with allegations of destabilization, by announcing that Kenya was planning to recruit 500 foreign **mercenaries** to invade Uganda and topple his government (SWB 8/2, 9/2, 11/2; KT 8/2; WR 15/2; ION 16/2; JA 26/2; AE 3/91).

During a short visit to **Tanzania** on 13 March, Pres Moi signed a **citizenship pact** with Pres Mwinyi, in order to facilitate the settling of Kenyans who wish to live in Tanzania, and vice versa (KT 14/3; SWB 15/3; ION 23/3).

Mauritius

On 20 February the **government alliance** between the Mouvement Socialiste Militant (MSM) and the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) held a congress to confirm their determination to prepare for the forthcoming **elections**, although they would not give a date for the elections. Observers believe it would be held towards the end of 1991, especially after prime minister Sir Aneerood Jugnauth announced the lowering of the prices of 100 consumer products (S 3/1; ARB 31/1; ION 23/2; AA 22/3).

Réunion

Eleven people died in three days of riots following the government's closure of a popular pirate TV station, *Tele Free Dom*, on 24 February. The local station had been challenging the monopoly enjoyed by the French-funded channel *Radio France d'Outre-Mer*. Clashes broke out after police cracked down on demonstrators who started looting shops. French overseas minister Louis le Pensec and some 440 French paramilitary reinforcements were sent to St Denis. French prime minister Michel Rocard also visited Réunion, on 17 March, to assess the situation. His visit sparked off more **riots and looting**, which carried on for two days (C 26/2, 27/2, 20/3; S 26/2, 27/2; SWB 26/2, 27/2, 28/2, 1/3, 2/3, 19/3, 25/3, 29/3; B 27/2; ION 2/3, 9/3, 26/3; E 23/3).

Rwanda

Following their invasion in October 1990, Uganda-based rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched smaller-scale **incursions** in December and January 1991. According to government sources, some 200 rebels were killed in mid-December, on 4 January, 150 and by 27 January, 120 more rebels killed. On 4 February Pres Habyarimana appointed new defence, interior and justice ministers, a move which according to official sources reflected concern about the rebel activity. Talks between Tanzania's Mwinyi, Uganda's Museveni and Habyarimana took place on 17 February in Zanzibar. The talks resulted in Habyarimana agreeing to observe an immediate ceasefire in return for Museveni's promise that he would undertake to "persuade" the RPF to do the same. A regional conference to discuss the 500 000 Rwandan refugees was held in Dar es Salaam on 19 February and was attended by the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania. It resulted in the Rwandan government offering a comprehensive **general amnesty** to all refugees.

In spite of these positive developments, there was renewed **fighting** between government forces and the RPF in early March. In a peace initiative brokered by Zaire's Mobutu, the two parties reportedly signed a draft ceasefire agreement on 18 March that was due to come into force at the end of March. In the meantime, Rwanda's state security court sentenced eight people to death for collaborating with rebels in October 1990 (AE 12/90; NA 12/90; K 12/90, 1/91, 2/91, 3/91; SWB 1/12, 20/12, 22/12, 24/12, 7/1, 24/1, 4/2, 14/2, 19/2, 23/2, 7/3, 16/3; KT 15/12; ARB 31/12, 31/1; WA 6/1; S 24/1, 4/2, 21/2; JA 29/1; AN 11/2; WM 22/2; AED 4/3).

Seychelles

Pres René promised representatives of the Catholic and Anglican churches in January that he was considering putting foward a proposal for a **referendum** on political reforms to be adopted eventually by the country. He planned to make the proposal at the next Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) congress scheduled for April. One of the opposition movements in exile, the Crusade for Democracy, expressed itself in favour of such a referendum under certain conditions (ION 19/1, 26/1).

The five exiled opposition groups of the Seychelles formed a loosely knit united front under chairmanship of former foreign minister Dr **Maxime Ferrari**. The groups met in Brussels from 15 to 17 March (AA 22/3; ION 23/3).

South African minister of foreign affairs, Pik Botha, visited Seychelles on 12 December to restore relations that broke down a few

years ago after South African involvement in a coup attempt. There were also reports of South African defence minister, Magnus Malan, visiting Seychelles on 1 April (B 12/12; SWB 3/4).

Somalia

The government, in an attempt to fight back the rebel onslaught, announced on 26 December that **political parties** had been legalized with immediate effect. The united rebel movement, the United Somali Congress (USC), dismissed the announcement as "futile" and claimed by 1 January to control large areas of the **capital**. By this time, many foreigners had already left the country or were being evacuated by the Italian government and the United Nations. A period of intense fighting in the streets of Mogadishu ensued, leaving it without water, electricity and medical supplies. On 26 January Pres Barre **fled** the capital in a tank, to an unknown destination. On 29 January **Ali Mahdi Mohammed** was sworn in as the new president. He had been a government minister in the 1960s, but was imprisoned after Barre's takeover in 1969. The Somali National Movement (SNM) rejected the appointment of the president, claiming that they and other rebel groups should have been **consulted**. Mohammed announced a conference to decide Somalia's future so that free elections could be held as soon as possible. However, the date for the conference scheduled for 28 February was first postponed to 14 March and then indefinitely when it became clear that other groups involved in Barre's overthrow would not participate. On 2 March USC leaders held talks with members of the Somali Patriotic Front (SPM), which controlled areas in the south, but fighting between different rebel groups broke out and on 21 March the SPM claimed to have defeated USC forces close to Mogadishu. The refugees pouring into neighbouring countries also posed a severe problem, with close to 18 000 refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya (K 12/90, 1/91, 2/91, 3/91; KT 27/12; SWB 28/12, 1/1, 2/2; SWB 31/12, 30/1; DT 2/1, 9/1; S 2/1, 4/1, 7/1, 28/1; B 3/1, 30/1; BD 3/1; E 5/1; ST 6/1; AED 7/1, 4/2; TWR 30/1; ARB 31/1; AE 2/91; E 2/2; AC 8/2).

Tanzania

Pres Mwinyi created a presidential working group to survey Tanzanian opinion on **multiparty politics** in January. He opened the first session on 20 March by explaining the importance of there being only a single working group, and that the group would submit its findings in a report by February 1992. The formation of this working group resulted from calls in mid-December from a group of northern-based lawyers, politicians and businessmen for such an investigative committee. The ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) also went through some changes during a meeting from 14 to 17 February. Members of the party would in future be allowed to own tenant houses and have several sources of income. Membership itself was also made easier; the three-month ideological tuition was scrapped

(TS 14/12; SWB 19/12, 8/2, 13/2, 21/2, 1/3, 8/3, 12/3, 23/3; NA 1/91, 2/91; DN 7/2, 27/2; ION 23/2, 2/3, 9/3, 30/3; AE 3/91; AC 22/3).

The IMF agreed to increase its assistance to Tanzania as a reward for the country's success in following an IMF and World Bank-approved **economic recovery programme** that broke with the socialist policies of former president Julius Nyerere (FG 14/12; AED 24/12).

(Talks with Habyarimana – see Rwanda.)

Uganda

On 10 December Ugandan police killed two students and injured three others at Makerere University in Kampala. The students wanted to attend a meeting at the university where lectures had been boycotted for a week to protest the lack of basic requirements. According to a government statement the shooting was not authorized and stern action would be taken and subsequently the chief of police and his deputy were **suspended** (C 12/12; SWB 12/12).

Pres Museveni promoted the Ugandan prime minister, Samson Kisekka, to the position of vice-president. George Cosmas Adyebo filled Kisekka's post (SWB 23/1; ARB 31/1).

Museveni, accompanied by foreign minister Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, left for a visit to **Iran** on 4 March for talks with his counterpart, Hashemi-Rafsanjani. They reported at the end of the talks that **diplomatic exchanges** would take place soon (SWB 5/3, 6/3, 7/3, 8/3).

Authorities charged 431 **Muslim youths** with murder after four policemen were killed in clashes on 22 March outside Uganda's main mosque. The youths had been occupying the mosque since 20 March to protest against the corruption of the supervisory body of the Muslims, the Uganda Supreme Muslim Council (USMC) (S 25/3; SWB 25/3, 27/3; ION 30/3).

The government enacted a new **investment law** to streamline the procedure for lisencing of investors, granting them more favourable incentives and better protection of investment. It would be known as the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) and functions include the **lisencing** of investors and rendering assistance to prospective and other investors. Employment of Ugandans and the aquisition of skills and technology arising from the operations of foreign investment in Uganda would also be encouraged (ARB 15/1).

(Worsening relations with Kenya – see Kenya; Talks with Habyarimana – see Rwanda.)

Southern Africa

Angola

At the third **congress** of the ruling MPLA, held on 4-9 December in Luanda, delegates agreed on a package of reforms, including steps towards a **multiparty system**. The congress took place against a backdrop of increasing diplomatic activity aimed at securing a cease-fire brokered by the United States and the Soviet Union. Delegates endorsed the replacement of the party's Marxist ideology

by a commitment to "**democratic socialism**", for the president and legislature to be directly elected by universal secret ballot and for a revised constitution which would guarantee freedom of expression, permit the formation of political parties, and end the MPLA's control over the armed forces. The congress also agreed to work towards the establishment of a free market system.

On 12 December the leader of Unita, Jonas Savimbi, met the then Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shavardnadze for talks in Washington, while at the same time, US Secretary of State, James Baker, met Angolan foreign minister, Lt-Gen Pedro de Castro van Dunem. Baker said Angola's moves towards multipartyism had removed the last obstacle for a peace settlement. Fighting in Angola continued throughout this period, however.

In the meantime, on 9 January, there were **reshuffles** in the MPLA politburo and cabinet, which were interpreted as strengthening the president's hand and reducing the influence of the military.

Optimism surrounding a **peace plan** worked out in January by Soviet, Portuguese and US diplomats faded when the sixth round of talks, postponed from 28 January and rescheduled for 6-8 February in Lisbon, failed to take place. Stumbling blocks were the dates for the signing of a cease-fire and for the general elections. Eventually talks were resumed on 4-5 March with new proposals on the table, such as a truce, multiparty elections, the creation of a single army and the holding of the seventh round of talks at the end of March. The MPLA agreed on 7 March to study a US proposal to hold elections 15 months after a ceasefire (the MPLA initially wanted a 36-month timespan) (K 12/90, 1/91, 2/91, 3/91; NA 1/91; FF 1/91; WA 6/1; C 10/1, 31/1, 9/2, 5/3; SWB 11/1, 14/1, 9/2, 5/3, 22/3; S 11/1; AED 21/1; ARB 31/1; InfA 31/1; BD 11/2, 13/2; DN 12/2; DT 26/2; MSE 3/91).

Botswana

Conservationists, determined to save what they regard as one of Africa's last remaining wildernesses, threatened to "go to any lengths" to stop the Botswana government **dredging** a 40 km stretch of the Boro River in the **Okavango Delta**. One of the steps they were prepared to take, was the **sabotaging** of construction equipment. The Botswana government said the project was aimed primarily at supplying water to thousands of drought-stricken farmers and about 16 per cent of the water would go to the **Orapa** mines, without which they would have to close down. International conservationist groups threatened to boycott Botswana's beef and diamonds should the country go ahead with the dredging of the swamps. The controversy deepened when it became public that the government also planned to erect a game-proof buffalo fence on the north-western fringes of the Okavango Delta. Conservationists said the fence would cut right across animal migration routes and would threaten the lives of thousands of animals which would be cut off from the swamps during the dry season. Eventually it was

decided to put the plans on hold pending an inspection by **Greenpeace International**. On 13 February the government and Greenpeace jointly announced that the dredging plan had been abandoned (S 5/12, 8/1, 11/1, 16/1, 15/2; SS 8/12, 13/1; BD 10/12, 14/2; DN 11/12; F&T 21/12; AA 11/1; WB 11/1; NA 3/91; AED 4/3).

The president, Dr Quett Masire, accompanied by the minister for external affairs, Dr Gaositwe Chiepe, attended the funeral of King Olav V of Norway on 30 January (DN 30/1).

Lesotho

Mr Ntsu Mokhehle, president of the prominent Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), said a constitutional settlement in South Africa might lead to Lesotho **joining** the republic as part of a **federal system**. Mokhehle is Lesotho's "prime minister that never was". He won the kingdom's general election in 1970, only to be cheated out of power when his defeated opponent, Chief Leabua Jonathan, staged a post-election coup with South African backing. The country's military leader, Maj-Gen Lekhanya, allowed Mokhehle back from exile in 1989. Local observers believed the BCP to be the most popular party and that if there was an election, Mokhehle would certainly win. In the meantime, Lekhanya urged the constituent assmbly to hurry up with its constitution-making so that they could meet the June 1992 deadline for return to **civilian rule** (C 28/1; ARB 31/1; WM 1/2).

Malawi

Following a series of **Renamo attacks** on Malawi's trade routes in January, the two sides apparently held talks since 15 January. The Harare-based Southern African Research and Documentation Centre made the allegations, also saying the Malawi delegation was led by John Tembo, co-chairman of the Malawi/Mozambique Joint Security and Defence Commission. Tembo denied all the rumours. On 12 February the two governments held talks to discuss the sefety of the trade route (C 12/1; SWB 19/1, 28/1, 15/2; DT 28/1; ARB 31/1; ION 2/2).

The US had **written off** a loan of over US$19 mn to the Malawi government, to enable that government to concentrate funds on the health sector (DT 15/1).

Mozambique

Further **talks** between the government and Renamo took place in **Rome** on 20 December under the auspices of the verification commission. In January it transpired that Renamo had violated the terms of the agreement reached on 1 December. They promised then to withdraw from the area between the two transport routes, but their attacks continued as soon as the Zimbabwean troops retreated. Meanwhile talks resumed in Rome on 26-27 January, but were **broken off** by Renamo, accusing the government of violating the ceasefire agreement of 1 December in that

Zimbabwean troops were fighting in Mozambican government uniforms in other areas of the country. A Renamo spokesman said on 21 February that they intended to recommence attacks on the corridors. The shaky ceasefire agreement was constantly violated, but the two sides eventually decided to hold another round of peace talks in Rome starting on 8 April (SWB 5/12, 18/12, 21/12, 31/12, 29/1, 11/3, 25/3; S 7/12, 28/3; ION 8/12; E 8/12; ACon 17/12; MIO 20/12; TS 27/12; WM 11/1; AED 14/1, 18/3; BD 19/1; B 25/1; ARB 31/1; AC 22/2).

A joint Mozambique government and World Bank report, released at a donors' meeting in Paris on 10 December, warned that half of the country's 16 mn people faced **starvation**, largely as a result of the civil war. At least 2 mn people were left **homeless** by the war, and the report estimated food aid needs for 1991 as totalling approximately 1 mn tonnes. Donors at the meeting had pledged US$1 200 mn in **aid** for 1991 (K 12/90; B 10/12; S 11/12; AED 17/12).

Pres Chissano reshuffled the **cabinet** on 3 January, making four changes, among them the dropping of two veteran ministers, Jose Oscar Monteiro, minister of state administration since 1974, and Antonio Branco, minister of industry and energy since 1980. On 30 January he promulgated the country's Law on Political Parties, which provided for the legal foundation for the establishment of a multiparty state. Two new political parties (Unamo – Mozambican National Union and Palmo – Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique) announced that they would start their electoral campaign as soon as the government decided on an **election date** (K 12/90, 1-3/91; ARB 31/12).

(*Disruption of trade routes – see Malawi.*)

Namibia

A minor **cabinet** reshuffle was carried out on 19 February when two new ministries were created. The first was the ministry of fisheries and marine resources under Helmut Angula and the second the ministry of youth and sports under Pendukini Ithana, the second woman in the cabinet (B 20/2; SWB 20/2; AED 4/3; AA 8/3).

On 14 March foreign affairs minister Theo-Ben Gurirab led a 32-member delegation to **talks** in Cape Town with a delegation led by Pik Botha, on the issue of South Africa's **Walvis Bay** enclave and the offshore Penguin Island group. The talks ended without agreement. However, on 15 March Gurirab referred to UN Security Council **Resolution 432** of 1978 calling for the reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia (VWB 22/2, 8/3; K 3/91; BD 1/3, 14/3; C 1/3, 7/3, 14/3, 15/3; AED 11/3; S 12/3, 15/3, 18/3).

South Africa

African National Congress (ANC) president, **Oliver Tambo**, returned to SA on 13 December after 30 years in exile, in time for an ANC consultative conference from 14 to 16 December in Johannesburg. A "secret" meeting between Pres de Klerk, ANC deputy president

Mandela and Tambo was held on 17 December to discuss plans for an all-party conference in 1991. On 18 December De Klerk granted exiles **indemnity** against prosecution on charges of leaving the country illegally before 8 October 1990. In a statement on 8 January and marking the 79th anniversary of its founding, the ANC proposed the convening of an **all-party conference** to draw up the principles for a new constitution. However, the PAC, Inkatha and the Conservative Party announced that they would not attend.

Following the death of Zephania Mothopeng of the Pan Africanist Congress in October, **Clarence Makwetu** was elected new president of the organization. He said the PAC would not negotiate with the government until a constituent assembly had been elected.

The European Community (EC) announced on 16 December that it had begun the process of easing sanctions by **lifting** the voluntary ban on new **investment** in South Africa.

The findings of the **Harms Commission of Inquiry**, which in November 1990 concluded that there was no proof of allegations that the police operated death squads to eliminate prominent government opponents, were called into question by a court decision on 18 January. Judge Johan Kriegler dismissed a libel action brought against two newspapers by the head of the police forensics service, Lt-Gen Lothar **Neethling**. The papers had accused Neethling of issuing poison to members of so-called hit-squads for administration to anti-apartheid activists.

On 12 January at least 35 mourners at a **nocturnal vigil** for a murdered ANC activist were **killed** when unidentified gunmen attacked a crowd at Sebokeng, using AK-47 rifles and hand-grenades.

High-level delegations from the **ANC and Inkatha** met in Durban on 29 January where a **joint peace strategy** emerged after seven hours of discussions. The hope was that their public encounter would diffuse tension in the townships between the two sides. The violence had placed severe strains on the ANC's relationship with the government over the perceived **police partiality** towards Inkatha supporters.

At the opening of parliament on 1 February Pres De Klerk promised to scrap all remaining **apartheid legislation**. Legislation in question were: the **Land Acts** of 1913 and 1936; the **Group Areas Act** of 1966; the **Black Communities Act** of 1984 and the **Population Registration Act** of 1950.

Mrs **Winnie Mandela** appeared before the Rand Supreme Court on 4 February to face trial together with three others on a charge of **kidnapping and assault** in connection with the alleged abduction of four youths in December 1988.

Talks between the government and the ANC took place on 12 February where the ANC made a commitment to end **infiltration** into the country by armed guerrillas and the government promised to **release** more political prisoners.

On 12 March the government introduced in parliament a policy paper and tabled draft legislation intended to repeal 187 laws and

innumerable regulations enforcing white ownership of 87 per cent of South Africa's **land**. The paper contained provisions for state-aided settlement schemes to encourage black farmers to set up on 485 000 hectares of government land, but ruled out reparations to the 3,5 mn blacks forcibly evicted and moved to "homelands" over the past 30 years.

An ANC delegation met the minister of law and order, Adriaan Vlok, and defence minister, Magnus Malan, on 13 March to discuss the worsening **security situation** in the townships. The ANC said it believed that a "**third force**" was stirring up violence between ANC supporters and supporters of Inkatha. Mandela and Buthelezi met again on 30 March and issued a five-point plan to try to control the situation, which had resulted in the deaths of more than 100 people in Natal during March and more than 5 000 people in all the township violence since 1986.

On 20 March finance minister Barend du Plessis presented the **budget** offering large incentives to business, with the emphasis on promoting growth. Expenditure would total R85 000 mn, with cuts in defence spending, but an increase of 15 per cent in social spending (K 12/90, 1-3/91; C 9/1, 22/1, 2/2, 23/2, 13/3; S 21/1, 23/1, 30/1; ARB 31/1; B 2/2; SS 2/2, 10/3; ION 2/2; VW 8/2; WM 21/3).

(*Visit by De Villiers – see Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Gabon; Denard in Zaire – see Zaire; Talks with Djohar – see Comoros; Talks with René – see Seychelles; Walvis Bay talks – see Namibia.*)

TBVC States

Bophuthatswana — On 6 December Pres Mangope rejected any idea of reincorporation into South Africa. The only opposition party in Bophuthatswana, the National Seoposongwe Party, announced that it would soon become part of the ANC (C 7/12, 10/12; S 7/12, 10/12; SWB 8/12; B 10/12).

Ciskei — Two weeks after army officers failed in an attempt to overthrow him on 26 January, the military leader, Brig Oupa Gqozo, survived a further attempted coup. Junior officers were reported to have fought a gun battle on 9 February with the former army chief, Andrew Jamangile, and three other officers, later arrested. On 27 February the Ciskei took what Gqozo called "the first step to reincorporation into a new, non-racial SA". Under an agreement signed by Ciskei and South Africa, the latter country would take over Ciskei's ministries of economic affairs,

finance and justice, and also agriculture, public works and transport (C 28/1, 14/2; SWB 28/1, 29/1, 12/2; S 29/1, 11/2; BD 29/1, 11/2; WM 1/2; SS 10/2.

Zambia

On 4 December Pres Kaunda **dismissed** his defence minister, Lt-Gen Lungu and replaced him with the former deputy defence minister, Dodson Siatalimi. He also dismissed the editors of two of Zambia's daily newspapers.

In accordance with a commitment made in September 1990, on 17 December Kaunda signed into law a bill approved by the **national assembly** on 4 December, amending the constitution to allow for the formation of **political parties** other than the ruling United National Independence Party (Unip). He predicted an optimistic future for Zambian democracy and announced that he was looking foward to a "good fight" in **elections** scheduled for October 1991. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), a loose alliance of opposition groups formed in July 1990, immediately applied for **registration** as a political party. A second opposition party, the National Democratic Alliance (Nada) was formed on 22 December. It was reported on 31 December that the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had decided to switch its support from Unip to the MMD (B 5/12; S 5/12, 18/12, 24/12; C 5/12; SWB 7/12, 19/12, 24/12; ARB 31/12; NA 1/91; AE 1/91).

Kaunda flew to **Iraq** on 9 January for talks with Saddam Hussein. At an MMD rally attended by about 50 000 supporters on 13 January, a leader of ZCTU, Newstead Zimba, said the Gulf mission would not boost Kaunda's image at home. Later that month, rumour was that Hussein's wife was in Zambia. Kaunda denied this (C 10/1, 29/1; AA 11/1; SWB 12/1, 14/1, 28/1; S 28/1).

Zimbabwe

On 12 December the house of assembly approved a law which amended the constitution in order to allow the state greater power to **nationalize land ownership**. The legislation allowed the government to confiscate white farmers' land and to pay compensation at a price of its own choosing, without being subject to legal challenge by the owner of the land. The provision was designed to assist the government in aussuaging wide-spread land-hunger by resettling some 110 000 peasant farmers on about 5 mn hectares of white-owned land, the bulk of which lay in the

fertile maize and tobacco belt in the northeast of the country. In an address to the fourth session of the ruling Zanu central committee on 14 December Pres Mugabe asserted that issues such as **land-hunger** and **unemployment** were in need of urgent remedial action. On 21 December, however, the minister for lands, agriculture and rural resettlement, Witness Mangwende, reassured the white community that it was not the government's intention to "**grab land**" for the resettlement programme (K 12/90; AE 12/90; N 12/91; S 7/12, 11/12, 13/12, 19/2; BD 10/12, 16/1, 17/1; C 13/12, 14/12, 26/1; SS 15/12; SWB 19/12, 24/12, 14/1; ARB 31/12, 31/1; FF 2/91; AA 22/2; DN 4/3).

(*Troop withdrawal – see Mozambique; Talks with Babangida – see Nigeria; Visit to Ghana – see Ghana.*)

References

A – *Afrika*; AA – *Africa Analysis*; AB – *African Business*; AC – *Africa Confidential*; A Con – *Africa Concord*; AED – *Africa Economic Digest*; AE&M – *Africa Energy & Mining*; AIB – *Africa Institute Bulletin*; AN – *Africa Newsfile*; ANews – *Africa News*; AP – *African Preview*; AR – *Africa Report*; ARB – *Africa Research Bulletin*; B – *Beeld*; BD – *Business Day*; BDN – *Botswana Daily News*; C – *Citizen*; CI – *Crescent International*; Cr – *Crescent*; D – *Drum*; DN – *Daily News*; DT – *Daily Times*; E — *The Economist*; FF – *Frontfile*; FG — *Financial Gazette*; FM – *Financial Mail*; F&T – *Finansies & Tegniek*; G – *The Guardian*; H – *The Herald*; I – *The Independent*; IMF S – *IMF Survey*; InfA – *Informafrica*; ION – *Indian Ocean Newsletter*; JA – *Jeune Afrique*; K – *Keesing's Record of World Events*; KT – *Kenya Times*; KN – *Kwacha News*; LT – *Lesotho Today*; M – *The Mail*; MF – *Mozambiquefile*; MIO – *Mozambique Information Office*; MNR – *Mozambique News Review*; MSE – *Market South East*; N – *Namibian*; NA – *New African*; NM – *Natal Mercury*; NN – *New Nation*; R – *Rapport*; Rep – *Republikein*; S – *Star*; SAB – *SA Barometer*; SAD – *South African Digest*; SAE – *Southern African Economist*; SAN – *South African Newsletter*; SAT – *Southern Africa Today*; So – *South*; SN – *Swazi News*; SS – *Sunday Star*; ST – *Sunday Times*; SWB – *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*; T – *Transvaler*; TS – *Times of Swaziland*; TWR – *Third World Reports*; U – *Uniform*; VWB – *Vrye Weekblad*; WA – *West Africa*; WBN – *World Bank News*; WM – *Weekly Mail*; WR – *Weekly Review*; ZN – *Zimbabwe News*.

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