

AFRICA


vol 24 • no 2 • 1994


ISSN 0256-2804

Reg. No. 61/00002/08

INSIGHT

an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. R15.00 (VAT included)





ISSN 0256 2804

© Copyright reserved

Africa Insight is published quarterly by the Africa Institute of South Africa, an independent study centre concerned with African affairs.

The Institute does not necessarily subscribe to the opinions of contributors.

For information about the Institute, membership and subscription rates see inside back cover.

Contributions and subscriptions should be sent to:

The Editor

Box 630

PRETORIA, South Africa

0001

Telephone: (012) 328-6970

Telefax: (012) 323-8153

Council

Prof P Smit (Chairman), Prof P A Nel (Vice-Chairman), Prof C J A Barratt, Prof W J Breytenbach, Prof C R M Dlamini, Prof W M Freund, Prof J A Heyns, Ms R Kadalie, Prof T Lodge, Prof G G Maasdorp, Prof E T Mokgokong, Mr E Osborn, Dr C J Scheffer, Mr D B Sole, Ms N C Tisani, Prof P C J Vale, Prof H J van Aswegen.

Fellows

Dr Adebayo Adedeji, Dr Louis Emmerij, Dr Denis Fair, Dr Erich Leistner (resident) and Mr Douglas Rimmer.

Advisory Panel on Publications

Prof Patrick Chabal*, Prof Fantu Cheru*, Prof Christopher Clapham*, Dr Christian Coulon*, Prof Sam Decalo*, Prof André du Pisani, Dr Denis Fair*, Prof Richard Haines, Ms Frieda Harmsen, Prof Jeffrey Herbst*, Prof Edmond Keller*, Dr Erich Leistner*, Dr Patrick Ncube* and Dr Oliver Saasa*
*(Fellows or research Fellows of the Africa Institute)

Executive Staff

Executive Director

Director, Administration and Finance

Director, Current Affairs

Director, Publications

Director, Research

Editor *Africa Insight*:

Dr Denis Venter

Mr Bernie Fisher

Mr Richard Cornwell

Mr Pieter Esterhuysen

Dr Simon Baynham

Ms Madeline Lass

Cover by William Steyn
Layout by Pritchard Productions
Repro by Graphco (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd
Printed by Colorpress (Pty) Ltd

INSIGHT


an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa.

Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| Comment: Towards one-party dominance in South Africa? <i>– Pieter Esterbuysen</i> | 82 |
| South Africa's 1994 election in an African perspective <i>– Roger Southall</i> | 86 |
| Nigeria changes course – <i>Douglas Rimmer</i> | 99 |
| South Africa: Future training needs for commercial and small farmers – <i>B J Erasmus and J Hough</i> | 110 |
| Assessing the affective domain in agricultural science <i>– J A Myburgh</i> | 117 |
| Food aid for sub-Saharan Africa – <i>Denis Fair</i> | 122 |
| Health care in the new South Africa: Surveying the more radical options – <i>J M Luiz</i> | 127 |
| Local government reform: The Zambian case – <i>B Chikulo</i> | 133 |
| Street children – <i>Robert Peacock</i> | 138 |
| Black households of the Vaal Triangle Complex in economic perspective – <i>T J C Slabbert and M Levin</i> | 144 |
| Bookshelf | 151 |

Comment: Towards one-party dominance in South Africa?

Pieter Esterhuysen, Director of Publications, Africa Institute



In this issue Roger Southall writes about South Africa's historical watershed election in the context of political trends elsewhere in Africa. Commentators waxed lyrical about this event, not so much because it was the mother of African liberation elections, but rather because of the miraculous change in the public mood that affected just about everybody who shared the experience. Never had the overall result of a South African election been such a foregone conclusion, yet never had one produced such widespread euphoria.

The election came at the end of a crucial phase in the country's transition to democracy, but also at a time of general despondency over the senseless bloodshed and boycotting of the election by politically significant groups. There was palpable uncertainty about the future. Many South Africans tended to lose sight of what had already been so laboriously achieved in the course of 50 months of negotiations: having retreated from the abyss and talking to each other, their leaders had already avoided a potential cataclysm.

By insisting on holding the election at a stage when South Africa did not appear to be ready for it, the government and the majority of the negotiating parties took a calculated risk but were eventually vindicated. True, the independent electoral authority

watched by thousands of international observers, provided a glaring example of how an election should not be conducted. And to be sure, it had been given an impossible task: to arrange what amounted to ten elections (one national, nine provincial) for some 23 million potential participators (the bulk of them first-time voters) distributed across 1,2 million square kilometres in one of the continent's largest countries, within less than *four months*. Not to mention that one of the principal parties entered the process with barely a week to spare!

Nevertheless, everybody who really wanted to vote could do so and those who had to wait many hours, even days, for ballot papers to arrive did so with great patience and understanding. By casting their votes, some 20 million South Africans of all hues and creeds (87% of the electorate), apart from making a choice between parties, endorsed what the negotiators had agreed upon. With probably less than 2% of the electorate actually boycotting the election, it turned out to be a highly inclusive exercise. At last, the country's vast silent majority had a chance to speak. Calmness descended upon the country on 27 April and the following days while the incumbent rulers bowed out gracefully. Under these circumstances there was nobody who could argue that the outcome of the election would have been substantially different had greater efficiency prevailed.

The sight of democracy at work – the formerly voteless masses regaining their dignity and, indeed, also that of a whole continent – sharing the general feeling of relief to be at last living under legitimate government were solemn and dramatic experiences. An exuberant bishop said it was like falling in love. But the jubilation that followed was also inspired and, at the same time, restrained by a sense of national achievement and solidarity among those who had just voted for the first time and many of those who had done so before. By inauguration day it had dawned upon many South Africans, witnessing the end of isolation, that their country was perhaps taking its first step on the road to nationhood and restoration of the confidence needed for economic revival.

Yet it was also realized that this road was going to be long and arduous. One must bear in mind that South Africa is only about halfway through its transition. What have been elected are central and provincial governments of national unity that are to govern for the next five years, during which time the country's final constitution is to be written. There is no doubt that several issues could severely strain relations between the power-sharing partners, notably central-provincial relations, provincial-local relations, ethnocentricity and resentment among some sections of the population, the search for the truth about political atrocities in the past and amnesty for the perpetrators, implementation of affirmative action, and the imperative of financial stability and fiscal discipline.

Leaders in the unity government are well aware that South Africa will enter the twenty-first century as a stable and promising country only if it can make a success of its transition to a democratic order. Therefore, apart from external affairs, almost everything on the domestic agenda can be classified under the headings *national reconciliation and integration* (nation-building) and *economic reconstruction and development*. Balancing these broad objectives will

severely tax the wisdom of the country's leaders for that which may be in the interest of reconciliation might be detrimental to reconstruction and vice versa.

In view of the promising start to all-embracing democracy, and national reconciliation in particular, and considering that South Africa, after all, is an African country, it is instructive to look at the African experience. In this respect, Roger Southall's article and that by Douglas Rimmer on the abortive Nigerian transition make for interesting reading.

As Southall points out, African opposition parties have shown a tendency to become weaker as ruling parties consolidated their hold on power following the liberation elections preceding decolonization. This process was marked by the concentration of political power at the central (presidential) level and by increasing authoritarianism. The decline, and in many instances, suppression of opposition parties, was justified at the time on account of political competition being perceived as obstructive to political stability, national unity in multicultural societies and speedy implementation of economic reconstruction and development programmes. At best, these trends gave rise to the one-party dominant state (eg Botswana, The Gambia and Zimbabwe) and, at worst, to moves away from democracy culminating in legalized one-party or non-party states. The latter systems, which did or did not provide for one-party or non-party elections, became prevalent in Africa from the early 1960s to the late 1980s.

The contemporary wave of multiparty elections in Africa (see Southall) represents a third attempt to establish electoral systems that measure up to the continent's needs. In effect, it means a return to democracy. Although it is still too early to see whether multipartyism will survive this time, the obstacles to the system remain. However, the widespread disillusionment with authoritarian systems, arising from experience, is a potent factor working in favour of sus-

tained democracy as it is realized that the development dictatorships delivered neither national unity nor development. While it is true that the disorder and instability that often mark the introduction of democracy do not necessarily imply that the system does not stand a chance – it is natural for political competition to be messy – it is obviously also the case that undemocratic conduct places the system in jeopardy.

Observing the difficult transitions to democracy and the post-election trauma in many African countries, one wonders, whether the continent is ready for the kind of competitive politics where strong opposition parties pose as alternative governments.

One is drawn then, in view of the quest for stable African politics, a precondition for economic advancement, and because of the demonstrated propensity of majority parties to consolidate, to look again at the one-party dominant systems. Their salient feature is the weakness of the opposition parties represented in parliament and the incapacity of these parties of posing any real threat to the government. They differ from authoritarian systems inasmuch as they are a reflection of the voters' political preferences and are not forced upon the electorate. Dominant parties, to be sure, have great scope for undemocratic conduct but countries where this system is in operation are generally among the continent's most stable. A reason for this is the inclusivity of most dominant parties whose widespread support bases cut across ethnic, social and religious boundaries and invariably include the overwhelming support of the largest tribal constituency or constituencies.

In addition to the examples cited above (one-party dominant states since independence), Egypt and Senegal have maintained this system since their "third wave" elections in the 1970s. Among those countries that have in recent years held liberation elections or reintroduced electoral democracy, the ruling parties or coalitions in Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and

Zambia have shown varying potential for dominating these countries' politics. However, one should hasten to add that this depends on maintenance of their cohesion and further expansion of their support bases, that is, whether they are able to sustain their dominance. Lesotho, having recently held its third election since decolonization, was actually transformed by the voters into a *de facto* one-party state, because they had preferred to elect not a single opposition member to parliament. Tunisia is another example of a largely similar one-party system. In practice, there is little difference between one-party dominant and *de facto* one-party systems.

Despite their stability in general, both systems are prone to excessive centralization, manipulation, corruption and growing apathy on the part of the voters.

In South Africa the next round of national and provincial elections, slated for 1999, will signal the end of a period of transition and liberation that will have lasted more than nine years from the day it was set in motion – certainly one of the longest peaceful (though not bloodless) revolutions that Africa will ever see. But many millions more voters, youngsters who will have reached the voting age, will still vote for liberation, regardless of whether expectations have been met under the national unity government.

Barring unforeseen circumstances, such as substantial fragmentation (applicable to all parties), the African National Congress (ANC) stands a

good chance to improve on its recent performance in the next elections. Having drawn overwhelming support in the 1994 election among at least eight of the country's dozen or so principal cultural groups, the ANC proved itself to be a pan-South African mass movement virtually unequalled in a continent that has seen many mass movements.

In addition, the fact that this widespread support translated into landslide victories in five of the nine provinces means that one-party dominant systems have already been established in large parts of the country. If it is further taken into account that the margin between the ANC's national electoral score and a two-thirds majority is less than 4%, the prospect of eventual one-party dominance, also on the national level, appears to be real.

The indications are that the countervailing forces to one-party dominance are rather weak in South Africa. None of the minority parties seems to have a potential for building cross-cutting support bases on a scale comparable to that of the ANC, at least not in the foreseeable future. Although the possibility of eventual two-party systems (parties alternating as governments) in some of the provinces cannot be ruled out, the best that can be hoped for under these circumstances is vigorous and sustained, yet responsible, opposition on both the national and provincial fronts. Democracy in the legislative chambers is meaningless, however, if political parties can-

not operate freely outside, especially if all of them do not have free access to all constituencies in election times. Political intolerance remains a salient feature of African and South African society and acts as a barrier to competitive politics.

One is tempted then to argue that strong and stable parties or coalitions, ruling without serious electoral threat, are perhaps what African countries need at this stage of their political development, in order to allow time for this rudimentary form of democracy to evolve naturally, let us hope, towards more competitive dispensations. For South Africans legitimate one-party dominance will nevertheless represent progress after decades of dominance by a minority party.


In contrast to Nigeria's protracted transition that was regulated (and manipulated) from above by the country's military rulers (see Rimmer), the democratic nature of the South African transition is likely to be that country's fundamental guarantee against the monopolization of political power.

Through many years of negotiation and powersharing, South Africa, by the end of the century, will hopefully have equipped itself with a sovereign and workable constitution that should act as a severe constraint on its rulers, irrespective of which version of democracy is in use. And, respecting their own constitution is perhaps the most important contribution that South Africans can make to the continent's development.


Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher/Printer to the National Library of South Africa

Distribution of electoral support for principal parties
(Based on the provincial results)


AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC)




NATIONAL PARTY (NP)




INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP)




FREEDOM FRONT (FF)



DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DP)



PAN-AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC)



Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

South Africa's 1994 election in an African perspective

Roger Southall, of the Political Studies Department, Rhodes University, provides a comparative African perspective on South Africa's liberation election.*

David Held has recently noted that the political changes that occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989–1990 were “world shaking events by any standard”. Observing further that “an extraordinary sense of exhilaration was created within and beyond Europe”, he also goes on to quote Alex Callanicos, who in his own comments upon the same set of events, notes that even people not directly affected by the changes “shared a sense of suddenly widened possibilities”, that parts of the post-war global furniture had “suddenly disappeared”, and that “previously unalterable assumptions” had “abruptly collapsed”.¹

In a week when news of indescribably appalling genocidal massacres in Rwanda hit the global headlines, the outbreak of peace which descended upon South Africa during its election in April 1994 was greeted, far and wide, as seemingly miraculous. Normally staid media commentators were exuberant, and at times remarkably uncritical, as the outpouring of joy, human fellowship of black and white, and the shared national pride in achievement which constituted perhaps the most important aspect of the moment of the election infected the world at large. Whilst the tragedy of Rwanda once again marked Africa out as the Dark Continent, the South African triumph of transition, from

apartheid to democracy, and from diplomatic isolation to global respect, offered a presentiment of hope that was no less remarkable and no less liberating than the Eastern European revolutions of 1989.

In this sense, South Africa's was often referred to by analysts in the media as a “liberation election”, a term whose basic reference point in this context was comparison with decolonization elections in Africa, electoral moments signifying liberation from white, colonial rule, the triumph of nationalist struggle, the arrival of self-determination and the progression to political independence. Furthermore, in spite of the apparent racial harmony which long and patient election queues celebrated – as blacks gained full citizenship and as whites seemed to throw off their burden of guilt from the past at the polls – the focus upon liberation none the less suggested an inevitability and a polarity in the voting, reflecting an historically determined division of the electorate into camps of *colonizers* and the *colonized*, represented primarily by the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) respectively.

If, indeed, we do choose to conceive of the South African as a liberation election, in an African rather than an East European sense, then we must seriously consider whether South Africa is merely at the beginning of a cycle which has seen many African countries move from liberation

through consolidation to "third wave" elections. Before we consider the South African case in more detail, by comparison to examples from Anglophone African countries whose experience seems most relevant, it is therefore necessary to explore of what this cycle consists.

Africa's election cycle

With only rare exceptions, decolonization in Africa was marked by liberation elections, which were normally administered on a relatively "free and fair" basis by the departing colonial power, and which provided for the displacement of colonial by nationalist rule. Such transitions were versed simultaneously in terms of anti-colonialism, self-determination and liberal democratic pretensions, and ushered into power, in most cases, dominant political parties which claimed (not without reason) to have mass support, whether they had developed this by popular mobilization during a relatively peaceful, orderly and constitutional process of decolonization, or through guerrilla warfare culminating in a negotiated settlement.

The nationalist regimes which assumed power turned out to be much more fragile than was widely anticipated. On the one hand, the states they inherited too often lacked mass (or regional) legitimacy, administrative coherence and political capacity, resulting in diverse tribal, class-based or popular challenges to their rule; on the other hand, they typically dominated society in that they were central to the allocation of resources in what were overwhelmingly undiversified economies, rendering them subject to the discontents of those excluded from the benefits of patronage or disappointed by the material fruits of independence.

Ruling nationalists laid claim to be embodying the national interest, only to be challenged by parties of opposition, who often claimed to be no less nationalist themselves. Hence it was that following the transfer of power, ruling parties – espousing the virtues of national unity, stability and devel-

opment – sought to consolidate themselves in office. The means were varied, and often used in combination, as opposition elements were variously incorporated, intimidated, marginalized or outlawed. None the less, most incumbent governments (albeit, in some cases reluctantly) came to recognize the importance of their conducting post-independence elections if they were to retain their claim to popular legitimacy and support. In some cases, of course, as for instance in Nigeria and Uganda, civilian regimes were displaced by the military before they had the opportunity to renew their mandate. But where second – and succeeding – elections were held, governments sought either to manage a competitive electoral process in their favour (eg Sierra Leone, Botswana, Lesotho) or moved to a system of one-party elections, which were non-regime threatening and restricted competition to contests between party-approved individuals (Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia). Such consolidation elections could, and in various instances did, allow for limited protest to be expressed, and if facilitating defeat of sitting ministers and parliamentarians, they often did serve both legitimizing and political recruitment functions.² Furthermore, where – as in Tanzania and Zambia – presidential elections (requiring electorates to vote for or against a single ruling party presidential candidate) were grafted on to the Westminster parliamentary system, they did enable leaders to retain something of a direct connection to the mass of ordinary people.

None the less, the irony of consolidation elections was precisely that, although they served to entrench regimes in power in the short run, they rarely worked to deepen support in the long run. Restricted or non-competitive elections offered only hollow victories which facilitated systematic corruption and other authoritarian abuse of power. Such developments offered the excuse for military intervention in numerous African countries, and, in turn, led in some cases to demilitarization elections

whereby armies returning to the barracks sought either to install favoured parties (eg the National Party of Nigeria under Shehu Shagari in Nigeria in 1979) or to re-establish competitive multi-partyism (as in Ghana in 1969). However, in few cases were such attempted returns to civilian rule successful, for most succumbed to yet further intervention by militaries now used to the exercise of political power.

In the wake of continental economic decline and the associated erosion of liberties and liberal democratic norms, a variety of external and internal pressures has led in the post-Cold War era to a spate of what, following Huntington,³ we may identify as "third wave" elections in Africa.

Huntington identifies a first "long" wave of democracy as beginning in the 1820s and extending to the late 1920s in 29 democracies located principally in Europe and North America, before suffering a reverse wave which reduced the number of democratic states to 12 by 1942. The triumph of the Allies in World War II then initiated a second wave that reached its zenith with Afro-Asian decolonization, before, in turn, itself suffering a reverse wave. A third wave of democracy then began from the early 1970s – stimulated *inter alia* by the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes, the expansion of urban middle classes occasioned by the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, and not least by changes in the foreign policies of the European Community, United States and Soviet Union – which by 1990 saw some 30-odd countries making transitions from authoritarian rule.

I would argue that, in Africa, external factors were so intrusive that third wave democratization occurred only from the late 1980s, that is, the end of the Cold War, and that demilitarization exercises which preceded this are more appropriately conceived of as attempts to re-enter the second wave.⁴ In contrast, we may identify as third wave those elections which have in large measure been brought about by Western political and/or financial

pressures, and in which, even if they have been administered by domestic governments, a substantial degree of foreign observation or monitoring has been involved. Hence, in recent years such elections have produced the replacement of long incumbent civilian or military regimes in countries such as Benin, Madagascar, Zambia, Lesotho and Malawi, whilst in others, incumbent governments have been either partially re-legitimized (eg Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana) or have again withstood a variety of pressures to reconsolidate their rule (eg Cameroon, Kenya); and in Nigeria, of course, the result of the 1993 presidential election proved so inconvenient to the military that it was scrapped.

As indicated above, Huntington notes that both the first and second waves were followed by major reverse waves, during which countries with unfavourable conditions for democracy reverted to authoritarian rule. Similarly, he argues that the "third wave ... of the late twentieth century will not last for ever" and that it "may be followed by a new surge of authoritarianism sustained enough to constitute a third reverse wave". He notes further that African countries may well be particularly adversely affected by such a reversal, for whilst economic development makes democracy possible, "the economic obstacles to democratization in sub-Saharan Africa will remain overwhelming into the twenty-first century".⁵ Most of Africa, he implies, may have to await the development of a fourth wave of democracy some decades ahead.

All this poses serious questions about the South African election of 1994. In particular, the analysis of South Africa's as a liberation election, which implies a later stage of consolidation, is at odds with what we may label the authorized perspective – held by the new government of national unity, international organizations and sorely hoped for by the global and South African communities at large – which proposes that South Africa has crafted a transition to democracy, which is buttressed by political realities and firm constitution-

al guarantees. Following a brief treatment of necessary preliminaries, it is with discussion of this ambiguity that this article is primarily concerned.

Background to the South African election of 1994⁶

The election, which took place over the three days of 26 to 28 April 1994 (the 26th was for categories of special voters, such as the infirm, only) represented the culmination of a complex transitional process which, for convenience, may be dated as having begun on 2 February 1990, when President F W de Klerk proclaimed the unbanning of the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party and other organizations, announced the release of political prisoners (notably Nelson Mandela), and committed the NP government to the negotiation of a fully inclusive, non-racial and democratic constitution.

The difficult, often acrimonious, negotiation process that followed went through three rounds. The first, under the umbrella of the *Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa)*, opened in December 1991 and made considerable progress in specialist areas. Early agreements made on a multilateral basis included, critically, a decision that the existent first-past-the-post (FPTP) constituency-based electoral system should give way, for at least an initial democratic election, to proportional representation (PR) based on the party list system. Such an election, it was further agreed (in acknowledgement of ANC insistence that a democratic constitution could only be finalized by a democratically elected body, rather than by unprovenly representative or unrepresentative parties acting on the people's behalf), would be to an interim Constitutional Assembly. However, because the NP feared the potential extent of an ANC majority, Codesa deadlocked over the former's insistence that just 25% of members of a Constituent Assembly should be able to block constitutional change, whereas the ANC refused to concede such a veto power to anything less than 30%.

Backstage contacts between particularly the ANC and NP thereafter led to the second round of negotiations, under the auspices of the *Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP)* which, whilst essentially revolving around the major parties and a doctrine of (deliberately ill-defined) "sufficient consensus", included minor parties from across the political spectrum. Surviving the withdrawal of the (Kwazulu homeland-based) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the white right Conservative Party (CP) in July 1993, and the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei homeland governments in October, the MPNP had by January 1994 completed its negotiations. That is, having agreed a text for an interim constitution which recognized a division of powers between a central government and nine provinces; it had also produced drafts of five key bills (subsequently enacted by the existent tricameral parliament) which were designed to prepare the way for a free and fair election (fixed for 27–28 April). These were, respectively, the Transitional Executive Council Act; the Independent Electoral Commission Act; the Independent Media Commission Act; the Independent Broadcasting Act; and the Electoral Act, all of which were promulgated in the last months of 1993. Importantly, too, all the major parties committed themselves to the key principles embedded in the interim constitution providing the basis for a final constitution to be agreed by the post-election constituent assembly.

The Transitional Executive Council (TEC), composed of delegates from the different parties which had remained in the MPNP, came into being in January 1994, and was charged with: first, beginning the task of transforming the South African state away from apartheid towards democracy; and second, promoting a climate for free political participation and the conditions for a free and fair election. In these tasks it was assisted by some eight specialist subcouncils, as well as by the appointment of an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the Independent Broadcasting Com-

mission, and the Independent Media Commission. Whilst the racially based de Klerk government remained formally in office, its authority was now effectively circumscribed by the TEC which claimed a non-racial legitimacy, and which enjoyed legal powers to demand information from ministers, to investigate and to even veto various of their activities.

Parties to both the left and right of the spectrum argued that this transitional process had been driven by the ANC and NP to the exclusion of their concerns. The Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) argued for the defeat of, not discussion with, the "settler regime", whilst the PAC – although remaining within the negotiation process – decried the alleged willingness of the ANC to sell African interests out. More disturbing, however, were threats to disrupt the elections and to oppose the new constitution with force which issued from the far white right (notably the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) led by Eugene Terre'Blanche) and from the Freedom Alliance (FA).

This latter was a grouping which, from late 1993, combined the AVF, the Afrikaner Volksfront (an umbrella which linked the CP to extra-parliamentary organizations committed to securing an Afrikaner *volkstaat*) with the IFP, and the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei governments around a common interest in ethnic self-determination.

To head off the serious threat of civil war, the ANC therefore launched yet another (third) round of negotiations in a desperate, late bid to make the elections all-inclusive. To this end it offered the FA key concessions, notably: a constitutional principle on self-determination, and mechanisms for the consideration of a *volkstaat*; acceptance of demands for separate ballots for the election at the national and regional levels; a constitutional provision allowing provinces in drafting their provincial constitutions to determine their own legislative and executive structures; and guarantees that provincial powers would not be substantially reduced by the final con-

stitution (whatever the size of the ANC majority).

These concessions went a long way to meeting the FA's demands and were accepted in their essentials by the AVF, which under the leadership of former (1981–1985) Defence Force chief General Constand Viljoen committed itself to participating in the election under the colours of a so-called Freedom Front (FF) in early March. In contrast, the CP opted to maroon itself by declining to take part in the election without prior, *guaranteed* recognition of a *volkstaat* – or homeland – under the interim constitution. Yet with Viljoen neutralized, and with right-wing whites provided with an electoral home, the ANC considered that the CP could now be effectively ignored.

Prior to all this, the FA had already been weakened when, in late January, Ciskei had quit to join the TEC, its leader Brigadier Gqozo admitting that he had been forced to do so by his own senior officers who feared being excluded from a new South African army. Indeed, Gqozo soon found his entire regime replaced by two South African administrators when he entirely lost the compliance of his security forces and civil service.

Then, in more dramatic circumstances, a similar fate befell President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana whose intransigent defence of the juridical sovereignty of his homeland was linked to a refusal to permit the election, voter education and campaigning to take place in his territory. When, in March, a civil servants' strike developed into a popular uprising which went unchecked by his army and police, the South African Defence Force (SADF) intervened, prior to Pretoria insisting that he resign. Crucially, too, the limited capacity of the far right wing to disrupt the transitional process was exposed by the humiliation of a murderous posse of the AWB. This had moved to Mangope's aid but, after randomly shooting some thirty blacks, was driven out of the homeland by the SADF and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF), in circumstances which saw

the televised slaughter by a berserk BDF soldier of three of this armed gang.

These developments left the IFP as the only significant political force remaining outside the election, for although it "provisionally registered" for the poll in early March, after the ANC had offered its concessions, its leader Chief Mangosotho Buthelezi declined to make a final commitment. This was of major concern because it was IFP-ANC rivalry in Kwazulu-Natal and between (mainly) Zulu hostel-dwellers and township residents in the PWV which had reduced numerous African communities in those areas to a state of virtual civil war in which some 14 000 people had lost their lives since 1990. Indeed, the IFP's new isolation seemed to render it more dangerous, for whereas Viljoen had indicated that the ANC had moved far to meeting the FA's demands, Buthelezi rejected the concessions offered as inadequate.

The IFP now therefore engaged in talk of Zulu secession and of the interim constitution as a threat to the position of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelethini and to the Zulu nation as a whole. This effectively threatened to render Kwazulu a no-go area for would-be voters and election officials during the election.

That this was brinkmanship was widely appreciated, not least because non-participation in the election would allow the ANC – which claimed widespread Zulu support – to make the unhindered capture of Kwazulu-Natal, which under the new constitution was to form a separate region and wield significant powers. Such control, it was widely proclaimed, would rob the IFP of its powers of patronage, which at present it wielded through the Kwazulu homeland machinery. Against this, not only would IFP non-participation question the overall legitimacy of the election, but it also threatened a continuation of violent strife into the "new South Africa". Hence it was, as the election drew closer, that Zwelethini and Buthelezi became subject to mounting pressures, not the least of which was

widespread desire within the IFP to vote.

The ANC responded with yet further concessions, these concerning the status of the king. More important, however, may have been a deal – kept secret from the ANC until after the election – whereby President de Klerk agreed to transfer control over all land in Kwazulu from the bantustan government to the king, a move apparently designed to deny future control over the Zulu heartland to any post-election, ANC regional government. As a result, amidst much national as well as more local relief, Buthelezi announced just one week before the election that the IFP would take part in the election. The dramatically sudden reduction in violence was as remarkable as the IFP's instant election media blitz, a sure sign that it had made provision for such an eventuality (if a late entry had not been planned all along).

The conduct and result of the election

Political competition between the ANC and Inkatha, war-mongering by the far right, deliberately induced mayhem within black communities by (rogue?) elements within the security forces, a number of highly publicized terror attacks upon "white settlers" by the Azanian People's Liberation Army (the military wing of the PAC yet apparently beyond the control of its leadership), and a major element of criminal activity reflecting political anarchy in the townships, were all major contributors to an alarmingly high level of violence in the months leading up to the election. Hence it was so remarkable that, at the moment of truth, when South Africa went to the polls, peace broke out all over the land, marred only by a rightwing bomb campaign which fortunately was contained by the police.

South Africa's interim constitution was based upon the full legal reincorporation of the four previously "independent" and seven "self-governing" homelands, and the redivision of the country into nine regions (which were defined by a mix of functional, histori-

cal and economic criteria). Outlining a division of both concurrent and exclusive powers between central and regional government, it required that the election take place, by separate ballots:

- First, for 400 members of a National Assembly, 200 of whom would be drawn proportionately from national party lists; and 200 from regional party lists, each region being allocated a proportionate number of seats against presumed size of population.
- Second, for provincial legislatures of the nine regions, the number of seats of which again varied according to presumed number of regional voters.

Following the elections, a Senate (or national upper house) would be drawn from the nine provincial legislatures, each of which would provide ten senators, nominated by political parties on a proportionate basis according to their relative strength regionally. The overall picture is reflected in table 1.

The new President, the leader of

provincial premiers would similarly be elected by the provincial legislatures, with ten other members of provincial executives chosen in proportion to party strength from parties which succeeded in securing at least 10% of the vote provincially.

Nineteen parties contested the election at the national level, and a varying number in the different provinces. Thirteen of those competing nationally were recognized as minor parties, many of them newly created, which hoped that proportional representation would see them attain a presence in the National Assembly to represent their special interests. (These latter ranged from political survival in the case of homeland-based parties, such as Gqozo's African Democratic Movement, through to promoting a religious, ideological, gender or minority interest, as in the cases of the African Christian Democratic Party, the (Trotskyist) Workers' List Party, the Women's Rights Peace Party and the Minority Front.) The principal focus of pre-election speculation about these parties centred on the proportion of

Table 1: Parliamentary assemblies in the new South Africa

| Provinces | Senate | National Assembly | | Provincial legislatures |
|---------------|--------|-------------------|----------|-------------------------|
| | | National | Regional | |
| PWV | 10 | – | 43 | 86 |
| Kwazulu-Natal | 10 | – | 40 | 81 |
| Eastern Cape | 10 | – | 28 | 56 |
| Western Cape | 10 | – | 21 | 42 |
| Northern Tvl | 10 | – | 20 | 40 |
| North-West | 10 | – | 15 | 30 |
| OFS | 10 | – | 15 | 30 |
| Eastern Tvl | 10 | – | 14 | 30 |
| Northern Cape | 10 | – | 4 | 30 |
| Total seats: | 90 | 200 | 200 | 425 |

South African Council of Churches: *South Africa: The Transition to Democracy*, 1994, p 25.

the majority party (or who could command a majority) in the Assembly, would head a Government of National Unity which would similarly be selected from different parties on a proportionate basis from their members of parliament, as long as they had obtained 5% of the total national vote,

the vote they would take away from the major players, and whether any of them would obtain national representation.

With no past election experience to go on, analysts were forced to base their speculations about the result upon opinion polls, whose reliability

in the new conditions of a fully enfranchised South African electorate was highly suspect, and upon the racial distribution of the electorate, both nationally and provincially. This latter reckoning is reflected in table 2.

Prognostication was made even

(notably in the Cape) be swelled by the attraction of both former CP voters and DP voters, all keen to provide a strong, consolidated opposition to the ANC, or would the FF provide a platform for a strong right wing and the DP for a

country – notably in township and homeland rural areas – concerning administrative failings on the part of the IEC, notably with regard to the unavailability of ballot papers. Furthermore, and much more damaging to the IEC's reputation, was the chaos that characterized the counting which led to enormous delays in processing the results, and the apparent horse trading between political parties behind the scenes which led to endorsement of major voting and counting irregularities in various parts of the country, notably in Kwazulu-Natal. The IEC was also to finally admit that probably some 5% of the vote remained uncounted, whilst insisting that this in no way affected the shape of the proper result.

Whatever the imperfections of electoral administration by the IEC, the result was decisive. The ANC had won an undisputable majority vote, even if not the two-thirds vote which would have enabled it to re-write the constitution over the next five years on its own; and it had won six provinces outright, and missed a 50% majority in the Northern Cape by a whisker.

The question now is this: If this was a victory of liberation, does it provide a basis for "third wave democracy" – or is it more likely that the ANC will misuse the next general election to consolidate itself in power?

Continuities and discontinuities with Africa

It seems not inappropriate to consider South Africa's election of 1994 one of liberation. The newly enfranchised African majority very evidently conceived the election as the culmination of decades of struggle against apartheid, and as inaugurating a new era of majority rule. If Mancur Olson had been on hand to explain to individual black voters that their individual votes would have infinitesimal marginal utility, and that they could at no risk leave electing an ANC government to others,⁸ few would have listened to him. As was said so often in the wearisome and lengthy queues, blacks had waited years and lifetimes to vote, and

Table 2: Racial distribution of voters, by percentage

| | African | White | Coloured | Asian | Total |
|---------------|---------|-------|----------|-------|-------|
| National | 72 | 16,0 | 9,0 | 3,0 | 22,7m |
| PWV | 69 | 28,0 | 4,0 | 1,0 | 4,86m |
| Kwazulu-Natal | 76 | 10,0 | 1,6 | 13,0 | 4,59m |
| EasternCape | 84 | 8,2 | 7,5 | 0,3 | 3,18m |
| Western Cape | 19 | 25,0 | 55,0 | 1,0 | 2,41m |
| Northern Tvl | 96 | 3,7 | 0,2 | 0,1 | 2,29m |
| North-West | 86 | 12,0 | 3,0 | 0,3 | 1,73m |
| OFS | 82 | 15,0 | 3,0 | 0,0 | 0,64m |
| Eastern Tvl | 83 | 16,0 | 1,0 | 0,5 | 1,59m |
| Northern Cape | 31 | 18,0 | 51,0 | 0,2 | 0,44m |

Work in Progress, 96, April/May 1994: *Reconstruct* (Supplement), Issue No 17.

more difficult, because the size of the electorate could only be approximated: the apartheid heritage was such that it was undisputed by all parties that it was impossible to draw up an electoral register. The electorate was therefore composed of all those who were eighteen years or older, were South African citizens or permanent residents, and who possessed one of five types of "voter's eligibility documents". The presumed size of the electorate, based on figures adjusted from the 1985 census figures for South Africa and the TBVC states, was some 22 709 152 potential voters.⁷

From such speculation, the following key questions emerged:

- Would the ANC, which most analysts reckoned would obtain at least 58% of the vote, do so well as to secure a two-thirds majority (a magic figure because it was the extent of a majority which would be required in parliament to pass a new constitution)?
- How strong would the NP's performance be in second place?
- Would its apparent major inroads into the coloured community

liberal, moderate centre?

- Would any of the established parties prove to have a non-racial support basis?
- Would Inkatha's support extend significantly beyond Kwazulu-Natal?
- And would the PAC, the joker in the pack, be able to translate an incoherent campaign profile into the African liberation majority that it claimed?
- Finally, and provincially, would the NP take Western Cape, and Inkatha Kwazulu-Natal, and would the ANC be denied majorities in the PWV and Northern Cape?

These results were the most complete that could be mustered by the IEC, which proclaimed the election to have been not without its flaws, yet fundamentally free and fair (an opinion which was largely endorsed by the host of foreign independent observer organizations). This was not uncontroversial, for although voting had gone off remarkably smoothly, there were numerous complaints from around the

By the time the dust had settled, the answers were given as follows:

Table 3: National count

| | Votes | Percentage | Seats |
|--|------------|------------|-------|
| ANC | 12 237 655 | 62,6 | 252 |
| NP | 3 983 690 | 20,4 | 82 |
| IFP | 2 058 294 | 10,4 | 43 |
| FF | 424 555 | 2,2 | 9 |
| DP | 338 426 | 1,7 | 7 |
| PAC | 243 478 | 1,2 | 5 |
| ACDP | 88 104 | 0,5 | 2 |
| Other parties | 59 296 | 0,9 | 0 |
| Votes counted | 19 726 579 | | |
| Percentage of estimated total electorate | 87,7% | | |
| Votes rejected | 193 081 | | |
| Total valid votes | 19 533 498 | | |

Table 4: Provincial results, by percentage of vote gained by parties

| | ANC | NP | IFP | FF | DP | PAC | ACDP | Others |
|---------------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|------|--------|
| PWV | 57,6 | 23,9 | 3,7 | 6,2 | 5,3 | 1,5 | 0,6 | 1,2 |
| Kwazulu-Natal | 32,3 | 11,2 | 50,3 | 0,5 | 2,2 | 0,7 | 0,7 | 0,9 |
| Eastern Cape | 84,4 | 9,8 | 0,2 | 0,8 | 2,1 | 2,0 | 0,5 | 0,2 |
| Western Cape | 33,0 | 53,2 | 0,3 | 2,1 | 6,6 | 1,1 | 1,2 | 2,5 |
| Northern Tvl | 91,6 | 3,4 | 0,1 | 2,1 | 0,2 | 1,3 | 0,4 | 1,0 |
| North-West | 83,3 | 8,8 | 0,4 | 4,6 | 0,5 | 1,7 | 0,4 | 0,3 |
| OFS | 76,6 | 12,6 | 0,5 | 6,0 | 0,6 | 1,8 | 0,4 | 1,5 |
| Eastern Tvl | 80,7 | 9,0 | 1,5 | 5,7 | 0,6 | 1,6 | 0,5 | 0,4 |
| Northern Cape | 49,7 | 40,5 | 0,4 | 6,0 | 1,9 | 0,9 | 0,4 | 0,2 |

Sunday Times, 8 May 1994

a few more hours would not matter. In the event, at most polling stations, those who waited all day on 27 April could have strolled in to vote at their leisure on 28 April, when the queues had largely disappeared – yet such rationality would have lacked the drama of history that “freedom day” presented. For the previously unfranchised, voting was an act of electoral communion, an immensely solemn moment of intense emotion and joy, something to be savoured at length.

The figures at our disposal (19,9m voters out of a presumed 22,7m) indicate a very high turnout, in the region of 88%. (The IEC’s uncounted 5% would increase this; the general reckon-

ing that the election demonstrated that the 1985 census undercounted Africans significantly would decrease it!) Whatever the actual figure, the turnout was fully consistent with the high poll in other liberation elections in settler societies in Africa, such as the 69% vote in Kenya in 1963,⁹ and more notably the 88% and 94% polls in Zambia in 1962 and 1964,¹⁰ and the 94% poll by African voters in Zimbabwe’s 1980 election.¹¹ (Compare with only 59% and 50% in the two pre-independence elections in non-settler Ghana in 1954 and 1956).¹² South Africa may have long been independent, but for the internally colonized, the 1994 elections were the moment they seized power. None-

theless, the interim constitution was designed specifically to serve as a bulwark against any political excesses that might be committed by the ANC as a triumphant nationalist party.

This argument, and its electoral implication, is worth pursuing in more detail before we examine various similarities to wider African experience that the 1994 election does betray.

South Africa and Africa: The difference argument

Whatever bold prognostications of their own electoral strength other parties made from time to time in public, the South African negotiation process was shaped by the shared expectation that come a liberation election, the ANC would win a handsome majority. For the minority parties, it followed further therefore that the new interim constitution should take particular account of two historical experiences: that of South Africa itself, from 1948; and that of post-independence Africa.

These experiences were in essence remarkably similar, involving the initial capture of the state by nationalist parties which then set about the consolidation of their power by methods including constitutional manipulation.¹³

In the South African case, of course, the NP was explicitly ethnically as well as racially based, and it used its narrow victory in 1948 as a basis for ensuring that, whilst maintaining elements of (white) democracy, it should never lose an election again: coloured voters were removed from the common voters’ roll in 1956, the minimal representation (by whites) allowed Africans in parliament was removed in 1959, and of course “loading” of rural constituencies by electoral delimitation commissions systematically favoured the NP over its more urban-based opponents until the very last years of its rule. This electoral dominance the NP then utilized to erect what Heribert Adam termed some years ago a “democratic police state”.¹⁴ In independent Africa, meanwhile, many other victorious nationalist parties were employing similar methods to consolidate their power,

and to effectively extinguish liberal democracy.

It would be grossly unfair to the ANC to suggest that they were unaffected by these experiences, whilst the NP was frankly determined that no future ANC government should be able to do what it had itself done to others after 1948. Given other influences, such as right-wing pressure for ethnic self-determination ("no group should be able to dominate another") and centrist lobbying for a division of powers and other entrenchments of liberalism by elements such as the DP, the interim constitution emerged as a document which, as well as embodying many enactments and protections of human rights, incorporated significant consociational aspects specifically designed to prevent any repetition of Africa's – and South Africa's largely calamitous constitutional history.

Central to this process was a deliberate move away from aspects of the Westminster system whose concentration and centralization of power in the hands of an executive, drawn from a legislature which is subordinated to it, was seen as having provided the constitutional basis for dictatorship in most of ex-British Africa (South Africa included). Hence it was that there was early acceptance of, and virtually no debate about, the discarding of the FPTP electoral system (which overrepresents winners, squeezes minorities and encourages development of a two-party system) in favour of list system PR; hence also the adoption of federalism, even though it was generally referred to as "regionalism" in deference to the sensitivities of the ANC (which had long argued the need for strong government from the centre to cope with South Africa's developmental backlog); and hence too the agreement that the central and provincial governments should all be coalitions, constructed on a proportionate basis according to parties' performance in elections.

In addition, whilst it was widely accepted that a provision that once elected, parliamentarians would not be able to change parties would greatly strengthen party machineries versus

party dissidents, it was also recognized that in African parliaments the Westminster conventions that minimize floor-crossings have been quite insufficient to prevent opposition members falling prey to inducements to join the government benches and hence to swelling the power of the incumbent executive.¹⁵ Finally, a whole series of restrictions limiting the capacity of a simple majority government to unilaterally amend the interim constitution and/or write the final constitution – most notably requirements, first, that all such changes would require a two-thirds majority and second, that alterations of the boundaries and powers of provinces would require their consent – were also viewed as having manacled a future government.

Against this, in contrast to developments in important ex-British African countries, one important aspect of the Westminster system, namely the continuing dependence of the presidency upon the directly elected house of parliament, was retained.

The Nigerian elections of 1979, 1983 and 1993 were all conducted under adapted US-style arrangements which marked a major break from the inherited Westminster legacy: that is, they involved a separation of presidential and parliamentary elections and powers. In contrast, the break was far less sharp in Tanzania in 1965, Zambia in 1973, Zimbabwe in 1990, and Kenya in 1992 when election of the presidents was first separated from elections for the national assemblies.

In the first two cases, this development was linked to the introduction of one-party states, although it was only in Tanzania – where the electorate was offered the choice of *rejecting* the ruling party's presidential candidate – that the presidential election was less than a formality. In Zambia, by contrast, the lack of an alternative candidate resulted in the automatic election of Kaunda. In Zimbabwe too, although the first presidential election was a competitive affair between Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) fully intend-

ed that a massive popular vote for the former, as for the ruling party itself, should provide a basis for the introduction of a one-party system.¹⁶

Nonetheless, the point is not so much that this form of presidentialism has often been linked to one-partyism, for the latter has now been swept away. It is rather that in the recent reaffirmation of multi-partyism in all these three countries, separate elections for executive presidents have been retained whilst the presidents so elected retain responsibility for selecting cabinets that are simultaneously drawn from and formally accountable to parliament. In other words, in such "Afrominster" systems, the presidency has in constitutional terms been enormously strengthened relative to parliament, deriving its legitimacy directly from the people.

This applies too to the case of Kenya, where the election of 1992 was conducted under a recent constitutional amendment whereby the candidates for president competed in a presidential election, whilst also standing as candidates for parliament, although what would happen if a successful presidential candidate was defeated in his constituency was left unstated – and untested, as at this level Moi was left unopposed.¹⁷

In a controversial intervention which elicited much academic interest, Donald Horowitz recommended adoption of a popularly elected presidency for South Africa, whereby in order to promote pan-ethnic and national coalitions in an historically racially divided country, the successful candidate – as in Nigeria under the constitution of 1979 – would have to garner a minimum level of support from different parts of the country as well as obtaining the largest number of votes nationally.¹⁸ However, in the light of General Babangida's cancellation of the result of the presidential election of 1993,¹⁹ it is undoubtedly fortunate that the new South African constitution is not based upon Nigerian precedent!

Those who negotiated the interim constitution avoided such African experience. Instead, the NP initially

proposed the idea of a collective presidency, this composed of three to five candidates (each one drawn from a different political party) and directly voted by the voters, with one member of this collective serving as head of state on a fixed rotating basis. Meanwhile, for its part, the ANC early on in the process opted for a president elected by a national assembly rather than on a basis of a popular vote.²⁰

At the end of the day, it was the latter proposal which was adopted, and Mr Mandela – who was first on the ANC's national list – was initially elected as a member of the national assembly, and only subsequently as president. The extent to which he plays an active role in parliament, and whether or not Mr Thabo Mbeki, the First Vice-President, emerges as his effective prime minister, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, especially in the light of South Africa's experience from 1983, whereby under the tricameral system P W Botha systematically concentrated power in the executive and enabled the military to subvert civilian influence, it is scarcely surprising that the interim constitution should seek to impose parliamentary limits upon presidential autonomy. On that, the ANC and NP were both fundamentally agreed.

Thus it was that South Africa ended up with an interim constitution which its negotiators claimed had been accommodated to national realities, and which had erected firm defences against the abuse of power. Consequently, for all that the ANC has now won a handsome victory, there is confidence in other camps that South Africa's liberation election stands as much, if not more, chance of providing for democracy as it does of leading to an African-style dictatorship.

Nonetheless, for all that South Africa displays a far higher level of industrialization than any other African state, possesses consequential better prospects of economic development, and importantly too, has a level of diversification and complexity which has produced a relatively autonomous and vigorous civil society

– all factors which theorists rate as conducive to democracy – the 1994 election suggests that it may have more parallels to African countries than those who hammered out its interim constitution may care to admit.

South Africa and Africa: The similarity argument

Relative to African decolonization, the most remarkable aspect of the South African transition was that it was managed by South Africans themselves, without the ring being held by an external power. Similarly, whilst liberation elections have elsewhere been administered by the departing colonial power (formally, of course, the UN in Namibia in 1990), the already sovereign status of South Africa suggested to the major players in the negotiations that national pride would be impugned if an external agency were to be charged with running and officially validating the election, although international and unofficial observer groups were to be welcomed. Appointment of the IEC, headed by prominent South Africans of diverse backgrounds, therefore satisfied the requirement for neutrality which entrustment of electoral arrangements to the government-run Department of Home Affairs (which had run previous, racially restricted elections) would not have done. Nevertheless, overall, the negotiation and outcome of South Africa's transition bore some remarkable similarities to African experience elsewhere.

It needs to be recalled, first, that the negotiation of decolonization in African countries was in many cases no less complicated than in South Africa; for instance, Inkatha's long boycott of the negotiations, threats of secession and attempted mobilization around the king correspond remarkably closely to similar antics performed by the Baganda leadership in the equally tortuous run-up to independence in Uganda. However, the more forceful parallels involving the election itself concern particularly:

- the intensification of intimidatory political competition between rival

nationalist parties in the run-up to the vote;

- regional voting along certain racial and ethnic fault lines; and
- the electoral reflection of central-local political tensions supposedly catered for by the adoption of a federal constitution.

Political rivalry

Anthony Smith has observed that “[i]n rhetoric, if by no means always in practice, radical African nationalism became mass-mobilising, attempting to incorporate the majority of the population at least symbolically”.²¹ The claim to be representative of the oppressed “nation” was obviously fundamental to the challenge to the colonial state and the demand for self-rule. However, once the principle of self-government had been conceded, and what was left was to determine the terms and mechanics of a transfer of power, the nationalist cause was not unusually disaggregated as rival parties (or rivals within parties) either sought to prove their right to inherit the state, or minority elements sought to erect barricades against intrusions by recognized future electoral victors. The examples are legion:

- A first instance is the formation of the National Liberation Movement, formed in defence of “Ashanti interests” after the Convention People's Party's victory in the supposed preindependence election in 1954, which urged federalism and cajoled the colonial government into conceding yet another election in 1956.
- A few years later in Zambia, the coalition between the radical and nationalist wings of the nationalist movement which formed the first African dominated government in 1963, split into its component parts to contest the 1964 election separately and recorded a handsome win for Kaunda's United National Independence Party (Unip) over Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress (ANC).
- Similarly, Zanu broke the Patriotic Front (which it had forged with its

rival Zimbabwe African People's Union in 1979 to administer the final blow to settler power) in order to establish its hegemony in the liberation election of 1980 in Zimbabwe.

- The vicious strife between the ANC and Inkatha which took place between 1990 and April 1994 can be viewed from a similar perspective. Of course, it is important when considering the South African election, to avoid spurious comparisons, and just as the disaggregation of all the cited nationalist struggles possessed their own very special characteristics, so ANC-Inkatha rivalry had a very complex background and incorporated diverse elements. These included: Buthelezi's bid, from the late 1970s, for his homeland-based Inkatha movement to supersede the banned ANC as the principal vehicle of African nationalism; subsequent battles between the United Democratic Front (as an ANC surrogate) and Inkatha, and between the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the United Workers' Union of South Africa in Natal in the late 1980s; the export of what had become a regional civil war to the PWV from 1990, notably involving hostilities between Inkatha-aligned hostel-dwellers and ANC supporting township residents; the erosion of his national leadership ambitions and the relegation of Buthelezi to the status of a regional leader; the covert support given by the government to Inkatha as a moderate ally until around mid-1992, from which time the IFP was increasingly perceived as a problem; and, not least, covert involvement by the security forces to bolster Inkatha and its "warlords" against political encroachment upon the former's turf in Kwazulu.²² Nonetheless, for all that these elements need disentangling, the upsurge of political conflict which took place following Mr de Klerk's landmark speech of 2 February 1990 indisputably centred on the determination of Inkatha to

retain the political base it had secured via control of the homeland administrative apparatus in Kwazulu, and to extend its control to wider Natal.

Almost 14 000 people died in South Africa in incidents of political conflict between de Klerk's speech and December 1993: some 3 400 in 1990, 2 580 in 1991, 3 446 in 1992, and 4 398 in 1993. Violence then surged even higher in early 1994, when deaths in Natal ran at a level double the 1993 monthly average. (By comparison there were a "mere" 2 450 such fatalities between September 1984 and December 1988 at the height of that period of unrest.) As has been noted often elsewhere, violence normally peaked around key events during the negotiation process, and the overwhelming majority of deaths occurred in Natal and the PWV, the epicentres of competition between the ANC and Inkatha. As one commentator has noted, Natal's conflict "linked primarily to violent political contestation between rival opposition parties", ultimately knew no spatial or geo-political boundaries, and threatened to spread a regional civil war to the entire country.²³

That the struggle between the ANC and Inkatha came to be contained before the election owed much to the determination of the former's national leadership to arrive at a negotiated settlement which would enable the latter to participate in the election, and for the latter to be thereby unquestionably legitimated. Equally, Buthelezi's stance against participation in the election seems to have been undermined by those within Inkatha who feared loss of control over resources, were the ANC allowed to sweep Natal on an artificially low poll. Crucially, too, at the end of the day, incidents such as the SADF's role in displacing Mangope seemed to indicate that it would commit its loyalty to the post-election government, and despite much war talk, there were

few who believed in Inkatha's military capacity to repulse it if Buthelezi tried to go the route of Jonas Savimbi (whose recent rejection of an adverse result in the multi-party election of 1993 had once again thrown Angola into bloody turmoil). Capture of Natal – by effective prevention of a free and fair election within the region – therefore offered a more strategic option.²⁴

Racial voting

Inkatha had so greatly feared an election because the civil war in Natal had deeply divided its ethnic constituency, and various polling predictions had indicated that the ANC in fact enjoyed considerably greater Zulu support. It was, in other words, because it feared that Zulus would *not* vote as a bloc that Inkatha threw its administrative and police machinery into the fray in its support on polling day. Nevertheless, that regional outcomes were heavily skewed by the ethnic and racial distribution of the South African population is very evident from a cursory survey of the wider result. Again, unsurprisingly, there are numerous African parallels.

To avoid labouring this point, it is convenient to make reference to a paper by Roddy Fox, written well before the election, in which he addresses "the interplay of ethnicity, in its regional manifestation, with the political process as found in Kenya, Zambia, and Namibia". From this basis inferences are drawn concerning South Africa.

Noting that political parties in Africa have often sprung from a specific ethnic or racial community, Fox argued that it followed that they had clearly had a geographically restricted power base: "a region that delivers a very high proportion of votes to that party". He cited the South West African People's Organization (Swapo) in Namibia, Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe, and the now defunct Luo Union and ANC in Kenya and Zambia as examples. Failure by such parties to broaden their ethnic or racial identity by attracting party members or voters

from other communities led to their coalition with parties from other ethnic or racial groups. Further, because constituency demarcations in both Kenya and Zambia had closely followed ethnic population patterns, the FPTP system had lent itself much more easily to ethnic representation than had the proportional representation system in Namibia, where the list system had facilitated parliamentary representation of Swapo – an Ovambo centred party – by a “multi-racial, multi-ethnic line-up”. Finally, noting that the interplay between ethnicity and political representation is generally far less pronounced in metropolitan areas, he concluded that the more strongly urbanized character of South Africa suggested that overall the electorate might well be more influenced along class lines.²⁵

Some fairly straightforward points follow. The first is quite simply that in the South Africa election, voting was overwhelmingly along racial lines. Indeed, despite the adoption of proportional representation to allow for the representation of minorities, only the IFP emerged from the pack to challenge the establishment of a two-party system (or a one-party dominant system?). The point scarcely needs elaboration that the ANC failed to gain substantial majorities only in regions where there was not a majority of African voters (Western Cape and Northern Cape), except in Natal, where its hegemony was challenged by the IFP.

By contrast, of course, the coloured community split overwhelmingly between the NP and ANC. (Detailed analysis will likely indicate that this was along class lines.) This was most significant in the Western Cape and the Northern Cape, the two provinces in which coloureds constitute a significant minority of the population. If we compare tables 2 and 3 above, it would seem that we may draw the following very rough conclusions. The first is that, if we assume that in the Western Cape the FF, DP and ACDP total vote of 10% came overwhelmingly from whites, then it would seem that the NP's 53% majority was

gleaned from an approximately 45% white vote and 8% coloured vote. In contrast, and secondly, the ANC's 33% vote would seem to have attracted perhaps 14% of the total approximately coloured's 25% vote. In the Northern Cape, meanwhile, the ANC's bare (effective) majority of 50% would seem to have drawn perhaps just over a third of the vote of the coloured electorate.

The material inequalities and segregated patterns of South African life render the racial rigidity of the voting outcome in the 1994 election unsurprising. Two fairly obvious consequences follow.

In the first place, the results suggest that unless the ANC finds itself subject to a major fissure, it will retain control at a subsequent election of at least six out of the nine provinces. It may expect to continue to lose Western Province; the marginality of the result in Northern Cape indicates that any future result is open; and guaranteeing a free and fair election in Natal may remain problematic. However, unless perhaps there was a severely reduced level of African participation, the ANC would seem odds on to retain control of the PWV (where it won “only” a 58% victory).

The other consequence is that, electorally, the coloured community may well become a pole of attraction for both the ANC and NP, and at regional level particularly, in both the Western and Northern Cape, disproportionate patronage may flow in its direction.

Meanwhile, one further point may be noted with regard to the impact of the electoral system. This is that, given the vote along racial lines, the proportional representation system provided the transitional guarantees for whites which in Zimbabwe in 1980, under FPTP, required the reservation of 20 racially allocated seats to ensure a white presence in parliament. Similarly, despite drawing the overwhelming weight of its support from the African majority, the ANC was enabled by the list system to overrepresent racial minorities amongst its parliamentarians. Swapo has similarly

overrepresented ethnic minorities in Namibia.²⁶

The putative fragility of electoral regionalism

The allocation by the interim constitution of certain reserved powers to nine, newly defined provinces, in order to accommodate minority demands and to limit the power of the new government at the centre, parallels decolonization arrangements in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya – all countries in which federalism was adopted to accommodate central-local tensions. It is only in Nigeria that the federal idea has survived, in conditions that are very different from South Africa. Yet even there has been a marked trend towards the centralization of power. The South African election result, giving control of seven out of nine provinces to the ANC, suggests that a similar outcome could well happen here.

In Nigeria a federal structure was first erected upon the base of the three colonially defined regions. However, with the north greater in population size than both the eastern and western regions put together, federalism was subject to a fundamental disequilibrium: under FPTP, with no pan-Nigerian nationalist party, control of the Westminster-style central government was almost bound to lie with the north. This imbalance ultimately precipitated the first coup, by eastern-led officers in January 1966, and thereafter their overthrow by northerners in July, and the subsequent attempted secession of Biafra, stopped only by a bloody civil war. Adoption of a US-style federal structure under the Second Republic in 1979, under which reduced regional powers were now diffused between nineteen states, was again to fall prey to the military in 1983, under whom the number of states was increased yet further to 31 in time for the aborted presidential election of 1993.

Uganda's asymmetric federalism (under which Buganda enjoyed greater powers than the three other kingdoms and 11 districts) fell victim to constitutional dispute between

Buganda and the northern-dominated central government. This culminated in Obote's coup of 1966, following which the southern kingdoms were abolished and subjected to a unitary constitution.

In Kenya, meanwhile, the majimbo constitution – under which powers were allocated amongst eight regional governments – was fundamentally altered just a year after independence. Regionalism originated with white farmers who foresaw that political control would pass to Africans and who wanted to seal off the “white highlands” from a central government and save the wealth of that prosperous area for those they considered responsible for developing it.²⁷ It was subsequently taken up by Kadu, which expressed minority tribes' fears of domination by Kanu and the Kikuyu. However, faced with Kanu's overwhelming victory in the 1963 election and their consequent exclusion of access to government patronage, Kadu leaders proved swiftly amenable to joining the government and playing a key role in Kenyatta's subsequent crushing of his party's radicals, broke away to form the Kenya People's Union under Oginga Odinga.

It would be foolish to draw from these experiences a conclusion that the federal nature of South Africa's new constitution is bound to fail. The relatively industrialized economy and developed civil society; the prospect of an independent judiciary; and not least, various entrenchments and safeguards written into the constitution, may render federalism a more successful venture than elsewhere in Africa. Nonetheless, there are aspects of South Africa's new electoral regionalism which do raise questions in the light of the examples above.

In contrast with Nigeria, where control of the centre by the regionally based Northern People's Party led inexorably to the collapse of the first republic, the ANC has become the major player in the government in South Africa by virtue of its widespread national support. Furthermore, its domination of government in seven of the regions should facilitate unob-

structed, coordinated implementation of national policy throughout most of the country. However, given that the stuff of politics in federal countries like Canada, the US and Australia revolves around the bargaining and collaboration of central and regional governments composed of a *different* political complexion, the domination of government at both levels by the ANC in South Africa may provide the basis for a progressive centralization of power. As with Kanu in Kenya, the ANC accepted federalism (a word which it prefers not to use) under duress, and it is likely to counter bids by the regions it controls. National-regional relations are therefore more likely to tend towards the centralized federalism of India than the increasingly peripheralized version of Canada.

Such a development would be enhanced if, in response to local pressures, the ANC followed the Nigerian example by multiplying the number of regions. Given that the present regions are entirely new administrative creations, and that they are having to integrate previously separated racial administrations into one, the chances of self-defined disadvantaged minorities calling for their own regions is high: indeed, during the recent election, the DP in the Eastern Cape campaigned for a smaller region, distinct from Transkei, and in this enjoyed the quiet support of prominent members of the ANC in non-Transkei areas. The ANC's apparent preparedness to consider creation of a *volkstaat*, if that concept's protagonists can demonstrate sufficient Afrikaner support, might also lead to excision of territory from an existing region. Given the limited scope of its control over Natal, the ANC might also be tempted to seek division of that region into two – perhaps abandoning a northern half to the IFP, but securing to itself a southern half including Durban.

The past history of conflict between the ANC and IFP would seem to render some future crisis in relations between the central government and Natal inevitable. As with Buganda,

secessionist noises made before the election may be repeated afterwards, linked to attempted mobilization of Zulus around the personage and status of the king. The outcome, as in Uganda in 1966, could well be the abolition of the kingdom itself, by a central government enjoying the support of the army and not a small proportion of the local population.

Finally, South Africa might also replay a version of the Kenyan scenario. Under the interim constitution, the NP is guaranteed part power at national level for five years. Thereafter it is likely to be relegated to opposition. This might prove an unacceptable proposition to those accustomed to office and the patronage it bestows. The termination of the government of national unity might therefore well see the departure of the brightest and best of the national NP into the ranks of the ANC. In turn, this would probably divide the NP in the Western Cape, and perhaps create an opening there for the ANC to improve its performance at the next election.

South Africa has no federal tradition, and African experience suggests that future years may see a reassertion of centralized control.

Conclusion

The key question posed by this article has been whether South Africa's liberation election will serve as a precursor for African-style consolidation, or whether it will provide the basis for a sustainable “third wave” democracy.

Consideration of the prospects for democracy in South Africa has been extensive ever since the country set out upon its transition. On the one hand, cautious optimism has centred on such factors as the global decline in the credibility of the one-party state, the existence in South Africa of a reasonably developed “civil society” with the capacity to retain autonomy from government, and the existence in commerce and industry of a pole of “countervailing power”. In contrast, respected analysts have also argued that whilst egalitarian strategies may be necessary to root democracy,

redistribution of resources may be resisted by established interests; that acute social and political dislocations may severely challenge a perhaps fragile state; and that whilst South Africa possesses the capacity to become democratic, this will prove to be more difficult than reverting to authoritarian rule.²⁸

The analysis offered here is similarly ambivalent: South Africa's future is open, and democracy is there to be made. However, what it does argue is that African experiences provide a useful backcloth against which to assess South Africa's prospects, and importantly, that comparative reference to Africa serves to counter the widespread tendency to consider South Africa as unique, or perhaps its democratic experiment as more comparable to Latin American than to African experience. Indeed, perhaps the greatest value of this exercise is to assert the rather obvious point that South Africa is an African country!

Yet it is appropriate to finish with an entirely domestic point, and a consequent sobering thought: 1994 ranks with 1924 and 1948 as only one of three South African elections which have led to a change of government. If the past is anything of a guide to go by, South Africa will not experience another change of government for many years. Indeed, the 1994 election has provided the country, not with a one-party, but a one-party dominant government. Experience from Africa, no less than from Eastern Europe, indicates that it will be as much of a challenge to the ANC as to its opponents to ensure that this dominance does not transform itself into arrogance and authoritarianism.

Notes and references

1 David Held, "Liberalism, Marxism, and democracy", *Theory and Society*, vol 22, no 2, 1993, pp 251–252. The quotes from A Callanicos come from his *The revenge of history: Marxism and East European revolutions*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p 8.

2 G Hyden and C Leys, "Elections and politics

in single-party systems: The case of Kenya and Tanzania", *British Journal of Political Science*, vol 2, no 4, 1972, pp 389–420.

3 S Huntington, "Democracy's third wave", *Journal of Democracy*, vol 2, no 2, 1991, pp 12–34.

4 Space is too limited to argue this adequately here, but I intend to pursue the point in a paper on "Elections and electoral systems in Anglophone Africa" which I am preparing for a workshop on African Democratization at the University of Leeds in September 1994.

5 S Huntington, *op cit*, pp 31–34.

6 What follows is drawn up largely from "Press clips on South Africa's transformation", prepared by Joan Muller for the Department of Politics, Rhodes University.

7 Independent Electoral Commission, Communications – Information and issues (Document 6): Voters and seats per province.

8 M Olson, *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965.

9 C Sanger and J Nottingham, "The Kenya election of 1963", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol II, no 1, 1964, pp 1–40.

10 B Chikulo, "Elections in a one-party participatory democracy", in B Turok (ed), *Development in Zambia*, London: Zed Press, 1979, pp 201–213.

11 Colin Legum (ed), *Africa contemporary record 1979–1980*, New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981, p B977.

12 D Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946–1960*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp 238 and 247.

13 J F Maitland-Jones, *Politics in ex-British Africa*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973: pp 57–82.

14 On this latter aspect, see for instance A Mazrui, "The tensions of crossing the floor in East Africa" in his *Violence and thought*, London and Harlow: Longmans, Green and Co, 1969, pp 122–3146.

15 H Adam, *Modernizing racial domination: The dynamics of South African politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

16 J Moyo, *Voting for democracy: Electoral politics in Zimbabwe*, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992.

17 For Constitutional Amendment no 6 of 1992, see the *Kenya Gazette, Supplement 70, Act 5 of 1992*. I am indebted for a clarification of this detail about Kenya to Dr Roddy Fox of the Department of Geography, Rhodes University.

18 D Horowitz, *A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a divided society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, nd.

19 I Campbell, "Nigeria's failed transition: The 1993 presidential election", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol 12, no 2, 1993 (forthcoming).

20 For a more extended discussion, see R Southall, "Constructing a culture of consent: Dilemmas in the making of a South African democracy", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol XXVIII, no 3–4, 1993, pp. 259–271.

21 A Smith, *State and nation in the Third World*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983, p 53.

22 For one survey, see K Von Holdt, "Vigilantes versus defence committees: The Maritzburg war", *South African Labour Bulletin*, vol 13, no 2, 1988, pp 16–27.

23 G Howe, "The Trojan Horse: Natal's civil war 1987–1993", *Indicator South Africa*, vol 10, no 2, 1993, pp 35–40. The figure for 1993 fatalities is drawn from *Human Rights Review: South Africa 1993*, Braamfontein: Human Rights Commission, p 15. The reference to 1994 deaths is drawn second-hand from the Human Rights Commission, via a report in *The Sunday Times*, 5 June 1994.

24 The full story of the election in Natal remains to be told. But note the *Weekly Mail's* (6–12 May, 1994) report on "The votes horse-trade". It alleged that in the face of "massive electoral fraud by Inkatha supporters", the ANC was left with three options (i) insist that the election be declared unfair and raise massive bloodshed; (ii) give Natal to Buthelezi, and provide him with a larger power base; or (iii) strike a deal that ignores the voting process and gives neither party full power in Natal, leaving the balance in the hands of the NP. It predicted that the ANC would opt for the last choice.

25 R Fox, "Ethnic regions and the political process in Africa: a preliminary assessment", Department of Geography, Rhodes University 1991, unpublished.

26 W Lindeke, W Wanzala and V Tonchi, "Namibia's election revisited", *Politikon*, vol 19, no 2, 1992, pp 121–138.

27 C Sanger and J Nottingham, *op cit*, p 10.

28 I have reviewed some of this literature in "The New South Africa in the New World Order: Beyond the double whammy", *Third World Quarterly*, vol 15, no 1, 1994, pp 119–135.

• I would like to acknowledge financial assistance from Rhodes University and comments by my colleague Janet Cherry.

Nigeria changes course

Douglas Rimmer, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, looks at the failure, in recent years, of Nigeria's drawn out programmes for democratic reform and economic reconstruction. Mr Rimmer is also a Fellow of the Africa Institute.

Early in 1986, a promise was made by the head of the federal military government in Nigeria, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, that the country would be returned to civilian rule by October 1990. Later in the same year, the government embarked on an economic programme of structural adjustment, the leading feature of which was the substitution of market forces with administrative discretion in determining the exchange rate, allocating foreign exchange and procuring imports. These transitions – the one political, the other economic – dominated Nigerian affairs until the end of 1993. Both were then halted: the first by General Sani Abacha's assumption of power on 17 November 1993, the second in conjunction with the federal budget announced on 10 January 1994.

"The search for a new political order"

This was the title given Babangida's address at the inauguration in January 1986 of the Political Bureau, a group among whom academics formed the majority and which was charged with conducting a national debate, and then reporting, on the political future of Nigeria. Over the next eight years, the search became increasingly tortuous as frequent, and frequently bewildering, changes were made in the

rules laid down for political activity. Its terminal date was deferred first from October 1990 to October 1992, then to January 1993, and finally, and unavailingly, to August 1993.

It is worthy of remark that the transition from self-appointed military government had begun well before Western governments recognized, in 1990, a need for the democratization of African states. Parties, elections and popular representation in the national government were generally recognized as norms of Nigerian political life, notwithstanding the limited first-hand acquaintance that Nigerians had with them. However, the Political Bureau was responsible for recommending, and the military government for agreeing to, a radical departure from these democratic norms by limiting to two the number of parties that were allowed to contest elections. The grounds given for this remarkable detraction from free association were that two parties were better than none, and better than only one, and that multiparty systems tended anyway to evolve into two-party competition.¹ Another consideration was surely that, in the absence of this limitation, parties might be formed that were ethnically or regionally based, and the activities of which could threaten national unity. Yet this difficulty had been met already in the constitution of 1979, which prescribed that parties should not by their names or emblems be identified with any

ethnicity, region or religion and that the governing body of each should contain members from at least two-thirds of the states of the federation.² This provision was not enough for the Political Bureau, which wanted the differences between parties to lie only in "the priorities and strategies of implementation of the national objectives". The objectives were taken as givens, astonishingly so by a body in which political scientists and historians were strongly represented.

After a new constitution embodying the two-party system had been promulgated³ and the ban on political parties removed in May 1989, 13 parties applied for registration and six of them were judged by the National Electoral Commission to warrant consideration for selection. But none was acceptable to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), which ordered the formation of two entirely new organizations, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Though the first of these parties, according to the manifesto written for it, was "a little to the right", and the second "a little to the left of centre", in practice both evolved, as might have been foreseen, as coalitions of aspirants to political office innocent of any ideological convictions.

Elections were contested for local government councils in December 1990, for state governorships and assemblies in December 1991, and for the Senate and House of Representatives of the National Assembly in July 1992. An innovation in these elections was the open (as opposed to secret) ballot, whereby electors lined up at the polling station before the candidate, or a poster representing the candidate, of their choice. While this practice was held to diminish the risk of ballot-rigging by making any rigging more obvious, it obviously jeopardized free electoral choice in another way. Confusion was created in the state elections by a decision of the military government, taken only a few weeks before the elections were due, to increase the number of states from 21 to 30 – this in spite of a recommen-

dation by the Political Bureau that, in order to give time for any new federal structure to become established, no new states should be created in the three years preceding the return to civilian rule. Also in 1991, the number of local government areas, and therefore of elected local councils, was increased from 453, first to 501, and then to 589.⁴ These changes were made regardless of the very restrictive provisions in the 1989 constitution governing the creation of new states and local governments and in spite of earlier official declarations that the composition of the federation would not be altered.

When parties were unbanned in 1989, almost everyone who had ever held political office at national or state level, or office in a political party, was declared to be excluded from electoral candidacy. In the view of the military government, the civilian politicians of the past were irremediable. A "new breed" was sought in their place and was expected somehow to arise from the "grassroots" of local government. It is doubtful that anyone achieved such an ascent. Local government elections were rather an arena in which political notables tried to show their power to deliver a locality to the party cause.

A further restriction on candidacy appeared in November 1991, when the National Electoral Commission was empowered, in the interest of public order or public morality, to disqualify any candidate from standing for election, or from filling an office if he or she was elected to it. This power was used to debar a substantial number of aspirants to state governorships and to membership of the National Assembly, in some instances at the eleventh hour. There was no right of appeal, or even to explanation, in any individual case. Then, following the state elections, the blanket ban on former political office-holders was unexpectedly and inexplicably removed, and politicians of the old breed joined with those of the new in the contests at federal level. The possibility of disqualification nevertheless remained as a threat to men who aspired in 1992 to

secure party nomination for the presidency.

There were initially over one hundred of these aspirants, among whom 23 qualified to contest the party primaries. The first group of primaries in August 1992 was generally acknowledged to have been a hopeless failure, with reported totals of votes far exceeding any believable numbers. From the rescheduled primaries in September, a retired major-general, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, emerged as a clear winner in the SDP, while a re-run was required in the NRC between Umaru Shinkafi, a former head of the National Security Organization, and Adamu Ciroma, a former governor of the Central Bank, neither of whom had satisfied a requirement of obtaining at least one-third of the votes in each of at least two-thirds of the states.

Throughout these primaries, however, there had been reports that votes had been bought, accreditation cards faked, results falsified, and totals simply allocated among candidates by party officials; and in both parties disappointed contenders protested against the outcomes. In October the AFRC nullified those outcomes and dissolved the party executives. A new process of nominating the parties' presidential candidates, for an election to be held on 12 June 1993, was begun, but all 23 of the individuals who had contested the 1992 primaries were declared to be disqualified from this election.

Completion of the political transition had now to be postponed for a third time. The chosen date became 27 August 1993, the eighth anniversary of the formation of Babangida's administration. Possibly in an attempt to allay resentment at this further prolongation of military rule, the AFRC was replaced by a National Defence and Security Council, while the day-to-day conduct of government was entrusted to a Transitional Council. This body, composed of civilian ministers, was chaired by Ernest Shonekan, a respected Yoruba businessman, formerly chairman of the United Africa Company of Nigeria.

From the revised process of party selection, M K O Abiola emerged as the SDP nominee for the presidency, and Bashir Tofa as that of the NRC. They had much in common. Both were rich businessmen, Muslims, politicians of the old breed and cronies of Babangida, who can be assumed to have approved their candidacy. Abiola, however, is a Yoruba from Abeokuta, Tofa a Hausa from Kano. Abiola's running mate – the SDP candidate for the vice-presidency – was Baba Gana Kingibe, a Kanuri Muslim who had been national chairman of the party. Tofa's was an Igbo, Sylvester Ugoh, who had been a minister in the civilian government of the early 1980s.

The election on 12 June was generally considered to have been fairly conducted, although the turnout was low – perhaps partly because of uncertainty whether the election would actually take place. According to interim and unofficial results, Abiola won 58% of the votes cast, with majorities in 19 of the 30 states and in the federal capital territory of Abuja. Not only was he successful in the Yoruba states, as had been confidently expected, and in several of the states occupied by ethnic minorities in the middle belt and the south-east, but apparently he also secured majorities in Kaduna and Kano states in the north and in the Igbo state of Anambra. Disregarding the low turnout (believed to have been about 36% of the registered electorate), Abiola could reasonably be said to have been the popular choice.

But the results were never officially released, and on 23 June the election itself was annulled. The reasons given were specious: that legal wrangling following the election had exposed the courts to politicization and ridicule (but the wrangling was mostly over failure to release the results, and, for the rest, the constitution provided for adjudication of election petitions and the appropriate tribunal was actually sworn in), and that both Abiola and Tofa had resorted to malpractices in gaining their nominations (yet they had been cleared to run by the National Electoral Commission).

Promising a new election, Babangida declared Abiola and Tofa ineligible to run again on ground of the malpractices of which they were accused. Paradoxically, however, the 23 aspirants disqualified for the same reason in 1992 were now declared eligible to compete. A further objection raised against Abiola and Tofa, but which might have been no less plausibly made against most other aspirants to high political office in Nigeria, was that they had private business interests inconsistent with national interests. Further to disqualify Abiola, a new rule was invented requiring any presidential candidate to have been a member of his party for at least one year, while Tofa was additionally penalized by raising to 50 years, from the 35 years specified in the constitution, the minimum age required for occupation of the presidency.

As the practicability diminished of holding a new election before 27 August, the date on which Babangida had repeatedly stated his commitment to resign power, it became increasingly likely that his intention was to carry on, possibly as a civilianized president approved by the National Assembly. In the end he was forced out, the day before the due date, by pressures within the armed forces, believed to have been articulated by Abacha, his closest associate in the military regime since 1984.

An Interim National Government was then appointed in the place of the Transitional Council. It included several members of the former Council, including Shonekan as its chairman. Abacha continued as defence minister and became deputy head. A new presidential election was again promised, this time for February 1994. Executive power was now supposed to lie with the interim government and legislative with the National Assembly, but real authority was generally believed to remain with the military. Less than three months later, on 17 November 1993, Abacha and other senior army officers compelled Shonekan to resign. The interim government was then declared to be dissolved, along with the National Assembly, the elect-

ed institutions at state and local levels, and the two political parties. The constitution was abrogated. Government reverted to something similar to what it had been before the political transition began. In the place of the AFRC there was a Provisional Ruling Council composed mainly of military men, with Abacha as chairman and the chief of general staff, the Yoruba general, Oladipo Diya, as vice-chairman. In the place of the council of ministers there was a Federal Executive Council composed of Abacha, Diya and 30 civilian ministers. The states were again entrusted to military governors, the local governments to appointed administrators. According to Diya, the life of this new military regime was to be short, but no expiry date was given. A constitutional conference was promised, but with what object was obscure, and in March 1994 it was postponed indefinitely.

The failure of the political transition

In retrospect the political transition appears as a charade. Babangida and his associates and agents devised the parties that could complete in a system, the democratic credentials of which were dubious from the beginning. They arbitrarily changed the territorial units in which elective offices were available. Exercising the power of disqualification, and also the power of removing disqualification, they effectively chose which individuals could compete in elections at any time. When, in the last stage of the transition, a president was elected by popular vote, he was found unacceptable. The reasons given for his rejection, along with that of his rival, were derisory. There could be no confidence after 12 June that anyone elected to the presidency would be judged suitable. Whatever Babangida's intentions in 1986 may have been, by 1993 his overriding concern, like that of so many other holders of power, seems to have become the keeping of power. What forced him out was not the transition to democracy but the view taken by another faction of the

military that his time was up. His fall was followed by replacements of his appointees by Abacha's men in several key military posts.

Although from the middle of 1989 at the latest there were reasons to question Babangida's motives, not until the annulment of the presidential election in 1993 was his bad faith altogether exposed – to the annoyance of those Western governments that had believed Nigeria to be on the way to democratic governance.⁵ In the country itself scepticism had been commonplace. Either the military would in the end refuse to go, or they would soon be back. "Hidden agenda" were attributed to Babangida: measures taken ostensibly for some benign purpose were really meant to serve the prolongation of his rule. This perception appears now not to have been mistaken, except in so far as it failed to recognize that Abacha too might have a hidden agenda.

The party politics of 1989–1993 did little to help the democratic cause. For the most part, elections to the National Assembly, to state governorships and assemblies, to local government councils and to offices in the parties themselves were recognized to be about securing emoluments and opportunities for patronage. Candidates were the champions of local or communal interests or ethnic identities; supporters campaigned with the object of getting "their" man into the position from which he could give protection and dispense largesse. Aspirants to office sought to increase their support through payments, or the promise of payments if they were successful. The presidential primaries in 1992 were undoubtedly corrupted, and it would be astonishing if the selection of the two candidates in 1993 was unassisted by material inducements.

Understandably, in view of the motives out of which men and women sought political office, there was rarely difficulty in recruiting civilians to ministerial posts in the federal military government. Those who served while the transition still had some plausibility might be justified. They could be said to be helping it

along. Shonekan, for one, believed his participation in government to be a public duty, and a duty for which, incidentally, he refused remuneration. On the other hand, national officers of the SDP were readily persuaded by the prospect of appointments in the interim government to give up their insistence that the outcome of the presidential election be honoured. And, after Abacha's coup, Abiola himself nominated members of the Federal Executive Council.⁶ Kingibe, his running mate in the presidential election, became foreign minister. Iyorchia Ayu became minister of education. Having been deposed by the Senate as its president just before its dissolution, because of his insistence that the result of the presidential election be observed, he was regarded as a man of principle. Others who had "stood on June 12" acquired the portfolios of transport and aviation, works and housing, and police affairs. Olu Onagoruwa, who had a reputation as an activist for democracy, was appointed minister of justice and attorney-general; he also became one of the three civilian members of the Provisional Ruling Council, along with Kingibe and Alex Ibru, a newspaper publisher regarded as a campaigner against military intervention, who obtained the internal affairs portfolio. Associates of Adamu Ciroma, the disappointed presidential aspirant of 1992, became ministers of power and steel, industries, commerce and health. Tom Ikimi, the former national chairman of the NRC, had his hopes of ministerial office frustrated, but was later compensated by appointment as special adviser to Abacha. The election of 12 June resulted not only in a comprehensive reinstatement of military rule but also in a redistribution of spoils among members of the political elite. For this result people had died in the violent aftermath of the annulment.

The corruption of political life in Nigeria has been generally acknowledged. Public office has been sought and used for private advantage. Public funds have been raided for personal or sectional purposes. Communities

and other social groupings have given political support for the sake of cutting a bigger slice of the cake. At every level of the federation, departments of government and, more especially, public agencies and publicly owned enterprises have escaped central control, failed frequently to account for their activities, and built up their own client networks. None of these characteristics is peculiarly Nigerian. In some measure they may be observed in every country. What distinguishes Nigeria is the measure: it is "the virtual *absence* of any constraint at all on the use of office; the spectacularly voracious and predatory scale of the corruption that results; the narrowness of the circles that share in this fabulous accumulation; and the depth of the economic disarray, political chaos and popular anger and alienation that result".⁷

Corruption and mismanagement in the use of public resources have justified assumptions of power by the military. The first military regime was corrective in intention and, it has been argued, eventually in performance.⁸ The second launched in 1984 a "war against indiscipline", a war that was to be revived in 1993. By their own account, the military leaders were imbued with patriotically national aspirations and they discharged political responsibilities efficiently and disinterestedly, in striking contrast to those civilian politicians who were deemed in 1989 to be irremediably tarnished. Few Nigerians believe this story now. Whatever the failings of the civilians, they are generally considered to have been matched by those of the soldiers. Indeed, "given the events of the past eight years," said the former head of state Olusegun Abasanjo in February 1994, "it is clear that the civilian politicians of the Second Republic were far less rapacious in their corruption compared to the military who succeeded them, and far less degenerate in their social and economic management."⁹

In an attempt to erect standards of probity in administration, a code of conduct for public officers had been laid down in a schedule of the 1989

constitution. Among the requirements imposed on a public officer by this code was the periodic declaration to a Code of Conduct Bureau of his assets and those of his spouse and unmarried children under the age of 18. Another stipulation was that bank accounts were not to be held outside Nigeria. Even to "live above" an officer's "legitimate income" contravened the code. Breaches could be punished by disqualification from office, this penalty being additional to any that might result from criminal proceedings. Similar provisions had been made by the 1979 constitution, but had been ineffective because they required enabling legislation which the National Assembly never passed. But now the Code of Conduct Bureau and the associated Tribunal were established by decree. Apparently, however, there is no record of any public officer ever having been referred to the Tribunal as contravening the code – notwithstanding the universal recognition that public officers have frequently been corrupt. Nor, it seems, has any member of the public ever gained access to the statements of officers' assets supposedly made to the Bureau. Offered as a solution of corruption, the Code of Conduct had become part of the problem – "like most things Nigerian".¹⁰

In March 1994 the chief of the general staff admitted that "[t]he sight of the military had become a symbol of corruption, indiscipline and distrust". He added: "We all had been living under the shadow of this shame." But now, he declared, a line would be drawn. "All that had happened in the past should be left behind us. To be probing individuals is to probe millions of Nigerians in the business class, in the civil service, in the judiciary, in the military, in the police, etc We have not got the time for probes and looking backwards We will not spare anybody accused of corruption or any act of misconduct from now on and we mean it."¹¹ There could hardly be a starker admission of the shortcomings of previous administrations – administrations of which Abacha had been a powerful member

continuously since 1985 as chief of army staff, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff or minister of defence – nor a clearer statement that the new government would not act against past miscreants. A line was to be drawn. The new order of probity, strict accountability and unsparing prosecution of misconduct would date only from 17 November 1993.

There could be little confidence in the reality of this new order. As Abacha conceded in his budget address in January 1994, "our people's impatience with government and almost total distrust of its functionaries can no longer be dismissed as merely cynical".

The structural adjustment programme

Evidently the military had postulated standards of political and public conduct that were unattainable by civilian politicians, whether of the new breed or the old, and, indeed, by the soldiers themselves. But if bribery, misappropriation of funds, nepotism and the like could not possibly be removed from the body politic, their relative importance might nevertheless be lessened. The means to this end were deregulation – the removal of administrative controls on economic life – and privatization – the substitution of private for public ownership and control of assets. To reduce corruption by thus limiting official powers over the distribution of income and the use of assets was an idea that had been for some time canvassed,¹³ but faced formidable opposition from two quarters.

First was the strong strain of *dirigisme* in economic policies. While this strain originated in the colonial period, it had been developed by nationalist and socialist ideology, becoming most conspicuous in 1970 in the second national development plan. According to the authors of that document, it was "vital ... for Government to acquire and control on behalf of the Nigerian society, the greater proportion of the productive assets of the country." Toward this end, the government was to acquire equity partici-

pation in "strategic industries", to be the dominant partner if not sole participant in those that exploited "strategic natural resources", and to play the "leading role" in industry and mining. A place would be left for private investors, foreign as well as indigenous, but only as "partners in progress led by the public sector".¹⁴ Such views were to be orthodox in Nigeria for the next fifteen years and there was reluctance, particularly among the intelligentsia, to give them up. Thus, as late as 1987, by when fashions had changed, the Political Bureau recommended that "Nigeria should adopt a socialist socio-economic system in which the state shall be committed to the nationalisation and socialisation of the commanding heights of the national economy", and in which "[t]he private sector should be limited to agriculture and small/medium scale enterprises".¹⁵

The second source of resistance to reduction in official powers was the value of those powers to people who disposed of them or were favoured by them. Licences to import, to produce or to buy, allocations of foreign exchange or credit, protection against competition and divergences between official and free-market prices were prized sources of rent-income under the regime of economic controls. For example, the official pricing of foreign exchange at less than its market value enhanced the profitability of trading in imports and lessened the costs of foreign travel, foreign schooling and foreign medical treatment. That this practice conferred an implicit subsidy that was somehow and somewhere being paid by implicit taxation was disregarded. The cheapening of foreign exchange by import and exchange controls was considered an attribute of national sovereignty, rather than an outcome of domestic politics driven by class interests.¹⁶

The conditions for economic reform were created by the oil glut of the early 1980s. The government's take from oil, its predominant source of revenue, fell in real terms by about 50% between 1980 and 1984. At the same time, external debts accumulat-

ed, less by design than involuntarily, as a result of failure to curb demand for imports. A need to reschedule these debts became urgent, but could not be achieved without an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the terms of which were unacceptable both to the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari and to the military that seized power on the last day of 1983. After Babangida replaced Major-General Buhari as head of state in August 1985, the issue of IMF support was put to a public debate, which, predictably, was opposed to such external interference. Nevertheless, the structural adjustment programme was begun in the following year – with the Fund's approval, though without drawing on its credit.

The SAP, as the structural adjustment programme was usually called in Nigeria, formally ended in June 1988, but by then the government had affirmed its continuing commitment to the principles underlying the programme, and in the end structural adjustment was popularly used as a synonym for whatever economic policies the government was following. Those policies were never altogether consistent with the principles, and the inconsistencies grew as time passed.

The intentions of the SAP were essentially to unravel the "distortions" (from opportunity costs, market-determined prices, and lawful economic transactions) created in economic structures by earlier policy choices, and so to improve economic efficiency in the short term and the chances of economic growth in the longer term. One component of the programme was stabilization of monetary demand (or of its growth) through fiscal and monetary policy, in order to control inflation and relieve pressure on the balance of current external payments. The other component was structural reformation. The means of achieving this objective were removal of the overvaluation of the naira that made foreign exchange cheap (for people granted access to it) and most exports unprofitable;¹⁷ withdrawal wholly or in part of the subsidies – on producer inputs, consumer goods and

for the operating costs of parastatals – that contributed largely to budget deficits and the difficulty of containing demand for imports, as well as to loss of contact between resource allocation and economic criteria; and decontrol of prices and relaxation of restraints on competition in trade, including the competition of imports. Among the implications of the programme were the scrapping of import licensing and a reduction in tariffs; the prejudicing of import-substituting industries (more especially those with high ratios of foreign exchange costs); the final abandonment of crop marketing boards;¹⁸ a contraction of the public sector, involving the reversion of some activities to private enterprise and attempts to privatize some public enterprises and the winding up of others; and deregulation of the financial system.

The dedication to reform was never whole-hearted. Although import controls were in practice largely removed, prohibitions were maintained until 1992 on the importation of food-grains, regardless of whether these products could be grown and delivered at competitive prices in Nigeria, or even grown at all in quantities sufficient to meet current use. The export of staple foodstuffs was also prohibited. In 1990 there was an abortive attempt to ban the export of cocoa beans, so as to ensure that sales in future be made exclusively to Nigerian processors. Although bank lending rates were deregulated, a maximum rate was reinstated in 1991, then removed in 1992; meantime the banks were subject to rules concerning the sectoral allocation of credit. Although the principle of comparative advantage was at the forefront of the SAP, the long-standing official attachment to the promotion of heavy or basic industry remained undisturbed. Public resources continued to be pumped into steel-making capacity, where there was no expectation that import costs could be matched, or even approached. In 1991 an aluminium project, the commercial future of which was equally unpromising, was added to the portfolio of productive

enterprises largely in public ownership. A programme of privatizing these state enterprises had been launched in 1988, but with the proviso that majority public stakes were to be retained in mineral oil extraction and banking, and substantial minority stakes in the marketing of petroleum products, steel rolling, and the production of fertilizers, paper, sugar and cement; and by 1992 – so the World Bank complained – the value of the Nigerian privatizations relative to GDP was less than 1% of what had been achieved in Argentina, Malaysia or Mexico.¹⁹ Although the rules requiring indigenous participation in the ownership of foreign enterprises were much relaxed in 1989, the dispensation did not apply to enterprises already established in Nigeria, or at all in banking, insurance and mining. Although import tariffs were reduced in 1986, a new structure effective for seven years from 1988 raised them above what they had been before the reduction, and they are now expected to rise further in 1995. Although the fertilizer subsidy was reduced in 1986, it was subsequently increased by much more than the reduction,²⁰ and although the privatization of fertilizer procurement and distribution was from 1987 regularly promised, it has yet to happen. Between 1986 and 1993 several attempts were made to wind down the subsidies on petroleum products, subsidies that were both enormously costly²¹ and highly contentious politically, but they survived, and, indeed, it was difficult even to reduce them so long as rapid inflation continued – for then the prices of petrol, kerosene, diesel and electricity fell in real terms even as they were being raised in nominal terms.

Thus in several ways the SAP remained incomplete, and in several respects policies were being pursued that contradicted its principles. But these matters might be thought of secondary importance. Macroeconomic policy is the area in which the World Bank would primarily judge the success of structural adjustment, the criteria of success being reductions in the budget deficit and the rate of inflation

and greater competitiveness in the exchange rate. And in fact the Bank has rated Nigeria among the half-dozen African countries that made large improvement in macroeconomic policies, and were appropriately rewarded in the rate of increase in GDP per head, when 1987–1991 is compared as an adjustment period with 1981–1986 as pre-adjustment years.²²

This large improvement was mostly attained, however, in 1986/87, the first year of the SAP. The naira was then greatly devalued (by 60% between September 1986 and February 1987) through the auctioning of foreign exchange, while the effects on domestic prices were contained by fiscal and monetary discipline. The World Bank was bullish at that time about Nigeria's prospects. Its representative resident in Lagos considered the external debt as a problem only of cash flow. His reservations concerned only the risk of a reversal of policies when the political transition came to an end and elected politicians were back in charge.

But by September 1987 discipline had been lost. "Fiscal policies and control over public expenditure" were proving to be "the most difficult area ... to implement", according to a review of the SAP published at that time.²³ The budget outturn in 1987 was a deficit equal to 10% of the GDP estimate, compared with a projection of 3%. Partly for this reason, the IMF declined to renew the standby agreement when it expired in January 1988. In 1988 the budget was frankly reflationary²⁴ and monetary control was relaxed. When, as a result, the naira continued to depreciate, the Central Bank instructed dealers in the auction market to bid for foreign exchange at a naira price 50% less than that offered for so-called autonomous funds in the interbank market, and a ceiling was also imposed for a time on the interbank rate.²⁵ At this point commitment to the SAP was evidently faltering.

From time to time the commitment was renewed, only later to waver again. Endorsement by the IMF was recovered early in 1989, was in doubt

about the middle of that year, was lost in April 1990, secured again at the beginning of 1991 and within eight months lost again. The difficulties with the Fund centred on the budget deficits and the attempts of the government to hold up the exchange value of the naira in spite of the deficits and the associated monetary expansion. A further area of disagreement arose from a surge in Nigerian earnings from oil in 1990, and concerned the uses to which the additional earnings were being put.

In spite of the growth of revenue in 1990, the deficit of that year was double the original estimate, and in his address on the 1991 budget Babangida described large fiscal deficits as "seemingly intractable". He nevertheless announced "strict fiscal discipline" as the watchword for 1991. The budget was to be balanced and the government would forgo borrowing from the banking system. In 1992 "the principle of a balanced budget" was reiterated. In 1993 fiscal discipline was to be "the bedrock" of the budget, but the Transitional Council found itself obliged to budget for a deficit of 28,6 billion naira, which was projected to be 5,6% of the GDP estimate. In the event, the fiscal outturns of these last three years were acknowledged to have been deficits equivalent to 12,4 and 9,8 and around 19% of the respective GDP estimates.²⁶ The deficits were very largely covered by borrowing from the Central Bank. They were associated with rapid inflation, the annual rate of increase in the consumer price index being about 50% in the earlier years and rising to around 100% in the latter part of 1993.

The deficits also led inexorably to pressure on the exchange rate. The fixed official rate had been given up in 1986, but in practice the auctioning of the foreign exchange accruing to the government was heavily managed by the authorities. Access to the auction was regulated, the rate that bidders could bid was advised – if not prescribed – and attempts were made to control the uses to which purchases were put. Since the purpose of this management was usually to hold up

the exchange value of the naira, the auction rate tended persistently to diverge from the rate obtainable for the foreign exchange that did not accrue to the government. The practice known as round-tripping then developed. Foreign exchange bought cheap in the auction market was sold dear in the parallel market. Since access to the auction market depended on banking status, the number of banks multiplied, with many of the newcomers having no business other than the buying and selling of foreign exchange (and being linked, it was generally supposed, with members of the military government). Ironically, one consequence of Nigerian economic liberalization had been the replacement of a licence to import by a licence to bank as the easy way of getting rich.

At the beginning of 1989 the separation of sales of official foreign exchange from those of "autonomous" funds was abandoned. Funds from both sources were to be available for purchase by banks in a supposedly unified foreign exchange market. In the same year, *bureaux de change* were licensed as a means of legalizing the surviving black market. Since, however, the value of the naira in the official market continued to be administered, it depreciated there more slowly than in the bureaux, and duality in the rate of exchange soon reappeared. In another attempt to unify the market, the naira at the official rate was devalued by 40% against the US dollar in March 1992, and an "effective floating" was promised. But in practice the authorities were still unable to accept the consequences for the official rate of the continuing fiscal deficits, monetary expansion and inflation. In May 1993 they set and held the rate at just under 22 naira to the dollar. By the end of the year the dollar was worth over twice as much in the parallel market.²⁷

The short boom in oil receipts that preceded and was reinforced by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 drew attention to the maintenance by the federal government of extra-budgetary accounts. The original griev-

ance of the IMF was that the windfall was not being used to honour commitments in rescheduling agreements made with the Paris Club of official bilateral creditors, but to build up Nigerian reserves or for purposes the government preferred not to disclose. Subsequently criticism focused on the lack of transparency in the government's accounting. Some part of the earnings from oil exports, and the spending of those earnings, were transacted through dedicated accounts which were kept apart from the budget, the details of which were not divulged. The published accounts of revenue and expenditure were therefore seriously incomplete, as was the "foreign exchange budget" which each year was presented in conjunction with the federal budget. The objects of these extra-budgetary accounts were, of course, a matter of speculation, but were assumed to be such as would be disapproved by the multilateral agencies or politically too dangerous to be confided to the Nigerian public. The accounts were of more than marginal importance. In 1992 they represented "a whopping 48 per cent of total expenditure" and were chiefly responsible for the federal deficit, according to a press briefing by the finance minister.

In January 1994 a new minister, Dr Kalu Idika Kalu, announced the discontinuation of all dedicated accounts. All that this decision meant for the 1994 budget statements was a disclosure that nearly 70 billion naira of revenue would be "set aside" to meet payments due from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in its joint ventures with the oil multinationals which are responsible for almost all the Nigerian oil production. Although this amount of revenue and its use had to that extent become "transparent", the dedication remained. The 70 billion was not incorporated in the budget, where it would have increased the estimate of federally collected revenue by nearly 50% and the estimate of foreign exchange receipts by nearly 40% – and where it might also have raised questions about the rights of the states

and local governments to share in it.²⁸ In a later oral statement, explaining inconsistencies in the budget figures, Kalu mentioned another 11 billion naira, also outside the budget, which had been set aside for the subsidization of fertilizers. These admissions of dedication do not match the earlier speculations about the purposes for which extra-budgetary accounts were kept.

The failure of the SAP

Notwithstanding the World Bank's naming of Nigeria among the successes of structural adjustment, it is clear that the SAP had failed well before it was effectively given up in January 1994. The policy imprimatur of the IMF had been withheld since the middle of 1991. Further rescheduling of the Paris Club debts had consequently not been possible and arrears accumulated in the servicing of those debts from the latter months of 1992. By October 1993 the arrears totalled over \$4.5 billion; by the end of 1994 they are expected to reach \$7 billion. Public expenditure had persistently overrun the estimates and there had been regular and large resort to deficit financing. The inflation rate approached three digits by the end of 1993. It proved impossible to establish an exchange rate that was both reasonably stable and market-determined, and in consequence impossible also to unify the market for foreign exchange. The shift achieved by privatization in the ownership and control of assets was unremarkable. Other disappointments were the failure to escape the overwhelming dependence of export earnings and public revenues on oil, the small inflow of foreign direct investment (except into oil and gas exploitation), and the continuing low utilization of manufacturing capacity (except in the informal sector).

Adjustment was bound to be difficult. In the 1970s the country had been awash with foreign exchange. Whatever might constrain economic development, it was not finance. Nigeria even offered itself briefly as an

aid donor. The contraction of ambition necessitated by the oil glut after 1980 was enormous, and was aggravated by the reluctance of the Shagari and Buhari administrations to react to changed circumstances. After 1986 one powerful source of disequilibrium was relieved by depreciation of the exchange rate, but another survived in the subsidization of petroleum products. These subsidies became a principal explanation not only of the budget deficits but also of the financial difficulties of the NNPC in maintaining the domestic supply of the products and in meeting its obligations as majority shareholder in the oil-producing joint ventures.²⁹ The IMF pressed repeatedly for their removal, and action was regularly promised by the government; it was regarded as "the single most important test of will" according to Shonekan in January 1993. Prices were increased on a few occasions, but the effect on the subsidies was soon swamped by inflation, and popular reactions were such as to make the government fearful of trying again.³⁰

The SAP was a reaction to adversity and, through the rescheduling of external debt servicing and the mustering of support by the World Bank, a means of moderating adversity. But it was frequently misrepresented as the cause of Nigeria's economic troubles by the press and among the intelligentsia. "I am not allowed to finish a sentence," the World Bank's chief economist for Africa said of his attempts to justify structural adjustment to audiences at the universities.³¹ Serious "anti-SAP" rioting in June 1989 was instigated by students. Misunderstanding does not alone explain these reactions. Whatever it did or failed to do for the growth of the GDP, structural adjustment undoubtedly affected its distribution. To the extent that adjustment was effective, it eroded administratively generated rents, replaced politically determined prices by market values, reduced subsidization and diminished the protection against competition of favoured groups. Detailed knowledge is not available of how the distribution

of income changed, but there can be little doubt that rural livelihoods were improved at the expense of urban, and agricultural interests advantaged at the expense of industrial. Antagonism of the SAP was understandably to be found in the cities rather than in the countryside, and among the salaried, wage-earners and manufacturing interests rather than among farmers. Although the losers were in a minority, they were also best situated to make known what they thought of structural adjustment and to influence policy.

Significantly, the policy changes made in conjunction with the 1994 budget have been chiefly defended as means of reviving activity in large-scale manufacturing. Three principal changes have been made. First, all earnings of foreign exchange are now to be paid into the Central Bank (CBN), which will maintain a fixed rate for the naira, initially 22 to the US dollar. The *bureaux de change* are to act only as agents of the CBN in purchasing foreign exchange, and are likely, before long, to expire. Commercial banks will apply for foreign exchange on behalf of their customers, and are supposed somehow to ensure that 50% of this resource is used for manufacturing requirements, 10% for agricultural, 30% for finished goods and 10% for invisibles. But these banks will not themselves decide which customers are to be favoured. It seems that, formally, the selections are to be made by the CBN. In practice, however, such a valuable source of patronage will surely be grasped by federal ministers and the Provisional Ruling Council. In short, the allocation of foreign exchange has now been altogether removed from the market and returned to the political class – a class which includes the military brasshats.

It is hardly necessary to detail the consequences. So long as the fixed exchange rate implies overvaluation of the naira, there will be, on the one hand, excess demand for foreign exchange, constant pressure on the probity and efficiency with which allocations are made, and shifting of

the allocations into a black market. On the other hand, exporting will be deterred, except of such products as have low ratios of naira costs to export value.³² Foreign investment will also be deterred, the cost of bringing in capital having been roughly doubled. In his budget speech, Abacha listed intensified export promotion and more foreign investment as among the requirements of exchange rate stability. Fixing the exchange rate has, however, put the cart before the horse.

The second change is in bank interest rates. Savings and deposit rates have been fixed at minima between 12 and 15%, while the maximum lending rate will be 21%. Since this 21% rate was frustrated when previously ordained in 1991, it has been made clear that it must now include all bank charges; but the likely consequence is intolerable strain on the administrative means of allocating loans.³³ The new rates might be thought consonant with the budgetary estimates showing (once again!) a balancing of revenue and expenditure, with the monetary guidelines laid down for 1994, and with the targeted inflation rate, which is 15%. But, while the balanced budget, tight money and the inflation rate are problematic, the interest rate prescriptions have already arrived. Again the cart precedes the horse.³⁴

Third, changes in the customs and excise regime provide further support for manufacturing. Duties have been removed on imports of industrial machinery and equipment and spare parts, explicitly with the purpose of encouraging capital intensity in production. In addition, the vehicle assembly industry is protected by an increase in the import duty on vehicles from 4% to between 30 and 100%, while on the other hand CKD components for the domestic industry become duty free. And “adequate protection” for domestic production is promised in the new tariff structure that is to take effect in 1995.

Notwithstanding these reversals of the policies that have been followed, ostensibly at least, since 1986, hopes are expressed that Nigeria will be

allowed to access the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility of the IMF and that, armed with the Fund's approbation, it will then secure a rescheduling of its Paris Club debts on the most concessional terms currently granted to the poorest African countries. The chances that these hopes will be realized are currently negligible, and likely to remain so until the government is able to show that it is avoiding deficit financing, that 22 naira to the dollar is somewhere near an equilibrium rate of exchange, and that 21% is a realistic bank lending rate.

Conclusion

Unlike the political transition, the SAP does not appear to be a charade, even in retrospect. Influential civilian members of the Babangida administration genuinely believed in its merits, and the soldiers went along with their views. The launching of the programme in 1986 was an attempt to break decisively with the old regime of economic controls. As the programme slipped, efforts were made to put it back on track – for instance, by the devaluation in March 1992. Continuously from 1986 to 1993, adherence to the SAP was officially declared to be the necessary condition for economic recovery.

In practice, however, adherence was not possible. Nigerian commentators, and spokesmen of the government itself, have spoken often of the sacrifices made in the course of structural adjustment. But the sacrifices required actually to limit the fiscal deficit and stabilize the exchange rate – such as wholesale removal of the networks of public patronage, giving up the oil subsidies, withdrawal of the government's participation in directly productive activities, and abandonment of some of the large-scale manufacturing industries – were unacceptable and never made. Office-holders were unwilling to give up their clientele, both producers and consumers wanted cheap fuel, the appeal of *dirigisme* was not lost,³⁵ manufacturing interests rallied in defence of their

investments. Economic reform foundered because Nigerians did not want it badly enough.³⁶ Perhaps the same can be said of the political transition.

Measured by population, and probably by economic potential, Nigeria is much the largest country in tropical Africa. The failure there to establish democratic governance and to deregulate economic life has severely damaged the credibility of the policies followed toward Africa by the multilateral agencies and bilateral donors in recent years.

Notes and references

1 *Report of the Political Bureau, March 1987*, Abuja: Directorate of Social Mobilisation, nd, pp 128–131.

2 *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979*, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1979, secs 202–203. This constitution also prescribed that the winner of a presidential election had to secure at least one-quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of the states (sec 126), and that the winner of a state governorship election had to rescue at least one-quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of the local government areas in the state (sec 164). The first fraction in these formulae was raised from one-quarter to one-third by the 1989 constitution.

The new constitution was drafted by a Constituent Assembly, the powers of which were, however, circumscribed by stipulations that the constitution would remain federal, that the offices of head of state and head of government would be combined in an elected president, and that proposals to create new states or local governments, or to alter their boundaries, were inadmissible. When the Assembly could not reach agreement on the application of Shari'a law, that area of competence was also taken away.

4 Earlier, in May 1989, the AFRC had created 149 new local councils. The original number had been 304.

5 Sanctions affecting only Nigerian military personnel themselves were imposed by the British and US governments and the European Community.

6 *Newswatch*, 6 December 1993, pp 11–16.

7 Larry Diamond, in a review of Richard A Joseph, *Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic*, in *African Affairs*, no 88, April 1989, p 285. Corruption in the First Republic is discussed in Diamond's own *Class, ethnicity and democracy in Nigeria*, London: Macmillan, 1988. A summary

characterization of Nigerian political activity is given in the present writer's "Development in Nigeria: An overview", in Henry Bienen and V P Diejomaoh (eds), *The political economy of income distribution in Nigeria*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981.

8 Martin Dent, "Corrective government: Military rule in perspective", in Keith Panter-Brick (ed), *Soldiers and Oil*, London: Frank Cass, 1978.

9 Address at a conference in Kaduna, 2 February 1994, printed in *Newswatch*, 14 February 1994, pp 30–32. General Obasanjo was head of state in the final phase of the first military regime, 1976–1979.

10 *Newswatch*, 14 February 1994, p 6.

11 Statement by Lieutenant-General Oladipo Diya, printed in *Newswatch*, 21 February 1994, p 10.

12 Diya's statement was issued in connection with the findings of an enquiry into the activities of four army officers and two police commissioners during the period they acted as administrators of states between 17 November 1993 and the appointment of military governors on 8 December. Five of these officers were alleged to have grasped this brief opportunity to misuse funds at their disposal, particularly in making payments to contractors. One was linked to the illicit trade in petroleum products. It was not proposed, however, that their cases be referred to the Code of Conduct Tribunal. The soldiers were to be tried by a military court, the policemen dealt with according to the regulations governing the police force.

13 See, for example, Wolfgang F Stolper, "Economic growth and political instability in Nigeria: On growing together again", in Carl K Eicher and Carl Liedholm (eds), *Growth and development of the Nigerian economy*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970.

14 *Second National Development Plan 1970–1974*, Lagos: Federal Government of Nigeria, 1970, p 289.

15 *Report of the Political Bureau, op cit*, p 56.

16 The present writer attempted to make these points, to the dissatisfaction of his Nigerian colleagues, in "The overvalued currency and over-administered economy of Nigeria", *African Affairs*, no 84, July 1985.

17 Exports with a large margin of rent between costs of production and realized prices continued to be profitable to produce. These exports were crude oil and, to a lesser extent, cocoa beans. Illegal exports might also be profitable, since the proceeds were converted into naira at black-

market, rather than official, rates of exchange or into goods smuggled into Nigeria and sold at free-market prices; the profitability of these exports was enhanced if they were of goods obtained at subsidized prices in Nigeria.

18 The marketing boards for export crops were dominant among the economic fauna of Nigeria from the 1940s until the emergence of a relatively huge oil sector in the early 1970s. As a result of the growth of domestic markets for all but one of these crops, the boards became residual buyers rather than monopsonies, as was effectively confirmed by the decree reconstituting them in 1977. The exception, surviving as predominantly an export crop, was cocoa, which continued to be controlled by a marketing board until 1986. The Grains Board, established in 1977 to purchase food-grains for domestic consumption, never played more than a marginal role in the market; in 1986 it too was wound up.

19 World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, results and the road ahead*, Washington DC: 1994, p 4.

20 Paul Mosley, "Policy-making without facts: A note on the assessment of structural adjustment policies in Nigeria 1985–1990", *African Affairs*, no 91, April 1992, pp 232–233.

21 In 1993 the cost of these subsidies in foregone public revenue was put at 40 billion naira, while another 23 billion were sacrificed from the profits of the publicly owned refineries and the firms distributing the products. These costs were met partly for the benefit of smugglers and of users in neighbouring countries, since it was estimated that 60 000 of the 360 000 barrels per day of crude then being refined in Nigeria were used to supply the contraband trade. For the purpose of comparison, it may be noted that the official figure for revenue collected by the federal government in 1993 was 133,7 billion naira. At the official rate of exchange in the latter months of 1993, 63 billion naira were equal to 2,86 billion US dollars.

22 World Bank, *op cit*, Overview and Ch 2.

23 Nils Borje Tallroth, "Structural Adjustment in Nigeria", *Finance and Development*, vol 24, no 3, September 1987, p 21.

24 Pius Okigbo, the vastly experienced Nigerian economist, wrote of the 1988 budget: "I can see two schools of thought struggling for dominance in the budget bureau of the Federal Government, one seeking to promote public and private consumption of all costs even by wanton disbursement of funds, and the other anxious to restrain or contain the rate of inflation. ... In the end, the expansionist school won the day with its belief in the supremacy of bloated public spending": P N C

Okigbo, *National development planning in Nigeria 1900–1992*, London: James Currey, 1989, pp 178–179.

- 25 Foreign exchange available in the auction market was obtained from taxation of oil exports and from balance-of-payments support provided by the World Bank and bilateral donors. The autonomous funds were those obtained from exports other than oil, private capital inflows and remittances from abroad.
- 26 In his press briefing on the 1994 budget, the Minister of Finance gave the 1993 deficit as over 63 billion naira, or more than 12% of the GDP estimate. In London a few weeks later he revised the figure of the deficit to about 100 billion naira.
- 27 On its introduction in 1973, the naira had been given an official value of \$1,52. In 1986 before the launching of the SAP it was officially at par with the US dollar.
- 28 According to the 1989 constitution, all federally collected revenues other than the proceeds of the personal income tax from residents of Abuja have to be paid into a federation account. This account is then shared in pre-determined proportions, which are currently 48,5% to the federal government, 24% to the states, 20% to the local governments, and 7,5% to five special funds (for the development of the mineral producing areas, Abuja, environmental protection, etc).
- 29 The NNPC fell into arrears in the payments due from it in joint ventures during the latter months of 1993. The arrears totalled around \$500 million in March 1994. The Corporation's partners were then entitled to seek compensation out of its share of the crude being produced. In addition their willingness to continue exploration, on which the maintenance of Nigeria's producing capacity depends, was prejudiced.
- 30 Three weeks of urban disturbances followed price increases in April 1988. Later statements by Babangida suggested that the issue of the subsidies would gladly be left to the successor civilian administration. But in 1993 the NNPC campaigned strongly for reduction of the subsidies, and one of Babangida's last acts as president in August 1993 was to raise prices again (from 0,7 to 7,5 naira per litre in the case of petrol). This action led to the calling of a general strike of urban workers, and it was then rescinded by the interim government. In November another attempt was made, the petrol price being increased to 5 naira. Further disturbances and strikes followed. Abacha partially retracted the increases, the petrol price becoming 3,25 naira. Petrol then cost about 15 US cents per litre at the official exchange rate and 7 cents at the black-market rate.
- 31 Ishrat Husain, quoted in Douglas Rimmer (ed), *Action in Africa*, London: Royal African Society with James Currey, 1993, p 1.
- 32 Illicit exports will not be deterred, since they sell for what they will fetch, not for what the government thinks they ought to earn. But this trade, which has flourished in recent years, was checked by the 50% devaluation in January 1993 of the CFA franc used by neighbouring countries – checked except where the trade consists of subsidized petroleum products and subsidized fertilizer.
- 33 In 1991 the banks added “administrative charges” to the rate of interest. It is reported that now their practice is to capitalize part of the interest charge, ie to advance an amount substantially less than the loan that is recorded.
- 34 That the budget will actually balance in 1994 is highly improbable. It requires the states and local governments to survive on a reduction of about one-third in their receipts from the federation account, and that the recurrent spending of the federal government is no more in 1994 than it was originally estimated to be in 1993 – this after a year in which the domestic purchasing power of the naira (measured by consumer prices) fell by about two-fifths.
- 35 Notwithstanding the shift of policy under the SAP in favour of private initiatives, the three-year rolling plan projecting the development of the economy has continued to assign about two-thirds of total investment to the public sector – as indeed was the pattern in the unadjusted economy.
- 36 Ironically, the burden of explaining and defending the new policies of 1994 has fallen on K I Kalu who, as Babangida's first minister of finance in 1985–1986, was responsible for launching the SAP. It can be assumed that the decision to reverse the policies of deregulation was taken against his advice and that of Paul Ogwuma, governor, since September 1993 of the CBN.

South Africa: Future training needs for commercial and small farmers

Professors B J Erasmus and J Hough, of the Department of Business Economics at the University of South Africa, examine the impact of management challenges on commercial and small farmers in developing curricula in a changing environment in South Africa.

The agricultural sector in South Africa plays an important role in the economy. Although it contributes only between 5 and 6% of gross domestic product, the total impact of this sector is extensive owing to income and labour multipliers (11% of the economically active population are included in this sector) and linkages with the rest of the economy. It has been estimated that R1 million invested in the agricultural sector creates twice the number of employment opportunities than investment of an equal sum in the industrial and manufacturing sectors.¹ The importance of this sector is further evident from the fact that the reduction in agricultural growth owing to the recent drought largely contributed to more than a 50% drop in the expected annual economic growth rate.

Statement of problem and purpose

The agricultural sector's performance is a direct function of the managerial and technical capabilities of its workforce. To assist commercial farmers (who produce for a market) and small farmers (who mainly produce for their own livelihood) and their workers and possible new entrants to the agricultural sector, their training needs have to be identified to

meet the challenges of a new South Africa. The purpose of this article is to suggest curriculum changes required to meet the training needs of commercial and small farmers in a transitional South Africa.

Background information

South Africa, one of eleven countries in the Southern African region, can be viewed as the socioeconomic giant of not only this region, but also of an economically deteriorating Africa as a whole. However, we have to accept as a matter of fact South Africa's Third World status. We share some basic characteristics with other Third World countries, such as a rapid population growth, high urbanization figures, a shortage of skilled manpower (hence high illiteracy), high structural unemployment statistics, a large subsistence sector, urgent educational needs and serious housing shortages. Our dependence on external aid (notably for development and education) is minimal although we have a relatively low national income in comparison to First World countries.

However, there is a need for a broader alliance – cooperation between South Africa, its neighbouring Southern African countries and the world community is required. South Africa (and the other Southern African countries) need financial and other forms of assistance from the world, but they must be monitored to ensure their effectiveness.

Demographic realities

Population

Estimates of the South African population (including the former TBVC states – Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were approximately 37.7 million in 1991.² Blacks make up approximately 75,2% of the total population and whites 13,4%.³ South Africa has a population growth rate of approximately 2,68% and although it is projected that this rate will drop as we approach the year 2020, estimates are that between 1991 and 2010, the total population of South Africa will grow to approximately 70 million, with the black population constituting almost 83% of the population.⁴ Africa's annual rate of natural increase is the highest in the world – an average of 3,1%. Europe's is less than 0,5%. The likely impact on natural resources – especially water – is clear.⁵

Economically active population

The economically active population (EAP) currently constitutes approximately 37,5% (\pm 13,8 million) of the total population.⁶ Of the EAP approximately 70% are black and 64% are male. It is estimated that approximately 73,7% of the EAP will be black by the year 2000.⁷ A total of 9,6% of the economically active population is employed in the agricultural sector.

Education

It was estimated in 1991 that approximately 56% of the South African population was illiterate (standard 4 qualification and lower) while only 17% of all black, Asian and coloured workers had a standard 8 qualification or higher. On the other hand, 63% of all whites had a standard 10 or higher. The gap in per capita state expenditure on education for whites and blacks narrowed from 18:1 in 1969/70 to 4:1 in 1989/90. However, in order to bring about parity in spending or to relieve backlogs in education a considerable increase in expenditure is required. Estimates are that approximately 35% to 42% of the budget will be necessary to accomplish this,

whereas in 1989 approximately 21% was spent. In comparison with other countries, such as Canada and Australia where approximately 12% and 13% respectively is spent on education, even 21% is already relatively high.⁸

Investment in human capital (education, training and development) thus ought to be given prompt attention – not only by the state – but also by management and organized labour. Low educational levels, illiteracy and low skill levels all lead to unemployment, poverty, violence and crime – all of which impact negatively on industrial relations, the economy and society as a whole.⁹

Agriculture

Agriculture and forestry comprise 89% (95 million hectares) of total land utilization, while urban areas and nature reserves make up 8% of the total. Other land constitutes 3% of the total area in South Africa.

Twelve per cent of the 95 million hectares is cultivated land and under permanent crops such as maize, wheat, grain sorghum, sunflower, soya beans, barley and oats. Only 3% of the agricultural land is used for artificial pastures (for example rye grass, kikuyu) while more than 80% of the total agricultural and forestry land comprises natural pastures. There are approximately 27 million sheep, 10 million cattle, 4 million goats and 1,5 million pigs in South Africa at present.

Like other developing countries, South Africa has seen the relative importance of its agricultural sector decline while other sectors have grown. Although some 15% of the labour force is engaged in agriculture,¹⁰ this sector's contribution to the GDP declined from almost 10% in 1974 to about 5% in 1991.¹¹

Classification of agricultural producers

Agricultural producers can be classified broadly into three basic categories, namely commercial, small farmers (including subsistence farmers and emerging commercial farmers) and part-time farmers.

Commercial farming

A commercial farmer produces crops in excess of his need for the broader market. The commercial farming sector is shifting towards market-determined price structures, away from protection and subsidies, in an attempt to pre-empt changes that are likely to come into effect under the new government. Other factors that will affect the traditional commercial farmer and that should receive attention to strengthen this sector in the transitional phase, are the extension of labour legislation to commercial farming and the possibility of equity participation schemes to accommodate farm workers.

As a result of these measures commercial farmers will increasingly be governed by competitive market prices that will be closely related to regional and world commodity prices. Owing to limited public sector resources, they will have to rely on the private agribusiness sector for inputs and services to remain effective. Provided that trade in general (ie input, processing industries and marketing arrangements) is liberalized, there is no reason to believe that the approximately 60 000 commercial farmers will not emerge economically healthy in the long run. For the present, however, they will have to cope with volatile operating circumstances.

Land use patterns in commercial farming differ from one region to the next and are related *inter alia* to factor costs, cash flow positions, relative product prices and tax incidence. Natal and Transvaal have arable land with the highest potential. However, a relatively low cropping intensity is registered in this region. The average size of farms is 636 hectares in Natal and 690 hectares in the Transvaal.

Smaller farm sizes in high potential areas and more labour-intensive technology are expected to emerge in the long term. This group of farmers is also highly trained and the majority of them are owners of farms and have attended secondary school.

Small farmers

It is estimated that this group (comprising subsistence and emerging commercial farmers) constitutes 1,2 million. The majority are illiterate and live in rural areas. (The rural population is expected to increase by 2,5% per annum.) These farmers farm on small plots and the average arable land holding ranges from one to four hectares from which 5 to 10% of family income is derived.¹² The average family consists of six to seven persons and in 30–60% of cases the de facto heads of households are women.

Increasing public service support to this group and emergent farmers at the expense of commercial farmers is envisaged as part of an affirmative action programme. It is expected that redistribution of access to productive resources will allow a new group to enter small-scale commercial farming operations in selected areas. There is good reason to believe that these farmers will receive significant support from the public sector and related services to expedite the transition to commercial production. Entitlement to farm land and procedures by which people can accede to land, such as financial support and training, are crucial elements.

Part-time farmers

For a large number of households, farming only supplements incomes from other sources. At the moment more than 30 000 people are farming part-time for a specific market or for their own consumption.

However, for purposes of this article we will concentrate only on commercial and small farmers.

Training in agriculture

Education and training in the agricultural sector can be classified broadly as formal and informal.

Formal higher education and training

Formal higher education in agriculture takes place mainly at eight universities (awarding degrees) and twelve agricultural training colleges (awarding diplomas). Six of these colleges train

mainly commercial farmers over a two-year period while the other six focus, *inter alia*, on training extension officers over a three-year period. The main subjects in these practical diploma courses are farm planning and business management, stock and dairy management, engineering, soil science, crop production and computer soft-ware operations. Formal education also takes place at agricultural schools (secondary education), but they are limited in number. The majority of farmers or potential farmers who obtain formal higher education and training become commercial farmers or extension officers.

Informal training

Farmer support programmes (FSPs) are believed to be the most appropriate vehicle for mobilizing underutilized natural and human resources over a broad front in rural areas by providing access to resources.¹³ In rural areas informal training is mainly catered for by extension officers, depending on the agricultural sector involved. Farmer support programmes also include two other elements, namely extension and research. According to Hayward and Botha¹⁴ extension is also called training. The content of informal training focuses mainly on technical aspects to allow small and subsistence farmers to produce crops, meat, milk and vegetables for private consumption. Service centres provided by government also assist with on-the-job training over one or two days. A typical syllabus for natural and artificial pasture management may include the following elements:¹⁵

- types of planted pastures
- seedbed preparation
- planting dates
- elementary soil identification
- identification of grass types and pasture species
- stages of plant succession
- indicator plant species
- grazing evaluation
- stocking rate and stocking density
- the effects of fires on animals

- practical pasture management

These elements are explained by means of figures and graphs and by involving the participants in practical assignments. Owing to a lack of expertise and the low literacy level of the majority of small farmers, further education is limited and in certain instances non-existent.

Management challenges and curriculum changes for commercial farmers

Owing to rapid changes in the socio-economic, political, natural and technological environments, commercial farmers in particular should investigate the impact of these factors on their enterprises and continually evaluate their needs for management training.

An empirical investigation into the present (1993) and future (1996) importance of the abovementioned variables on selected farm enterprises and the identification of management training needs has been launched. We now look at a brief summary of the methodology and the findings of this study.

Research methodology

The population for this study consisted of 1 093 candidates that had attended courses at the Farming Management Centre since 1978. The Farming Management Centre is a private institution that was established in 1977 with a view to undertaking research concerning agricultural management and providing practical training and symposiums with regard to agricultural matters. A questionnaire was posted to the abovementioned 1 093 candidates. The response percentage was 28%. According to biographical details of the respondents, 87% were full-time farmers and 93,9% had a standard 10 or higher qualification. The largest group of respondents (39,2%) were between 31 and 40 years of age while a large group (37,8%) were between 41 and 50. Most respondents had been farming for 16 years and longer and the majority (80,2%) owned their land. The group of respondents with the

most employees (24,3%) had between 11 and 20 employees in their service but most respondents (54,8%) had between 5 and 10 employees.

Frequency analyses were used as a basis for statistical analysis whereas correlations served to determine training needs.

The effect of managerial factors on farm enterprises

Labour management

It was evident from the study that labour productivity is regarded as the most important factor affecting farming enterprises for the present (1993) and the future (1996).

Besides labour productivity, the following items (in order of priority) are regarded as the most important, at present (1993):

- changing labour legislation
- remuneration policy
- conclusion of contracts
- informal training

According to the respondents, further items that are important, but that are allocated lower priority than the items listed above, are upliftment of employees, employment procedures and the formulation of contingency plans for labour matters. However, the three items that are lowest on the list of priorities are trade unions, formal training of employees and career opportunities.

For the future (1996) the following items are given priority besides labour productivity:

- changing labour legislation
- remuneration policy
- conclusion of contracts
- informal training
- upliftment of employees
- employment procedures
- trade unions

The three items that are lowest on the list of priorities are contingency plans for labour matters, career opportunities and formal training of employees.

There is considerable concurrence between the items receiving priority for the present (1993) and the future

(1996). As we have seen, labour productivity is regarded as the one factor with the highest priority for the present (1993) and the future (1996). Low productivity is not only a problem for the agricultural sector but also for numerous other sectors in South Africa. Various factors affect productivity levels of employees but approximately 85% of them can be found within the enterprise and are, consequently, controlled by the enterprise.¹⁶

Financial management

As far as items in the dimension of financial management are concerned, there is little difference between the priorities allocated to items for the present (1993) and the future (1996).

The following items were given priority:

- input cost control (1993=1, 1996=1)
- product prices (1993=2, 1996=2)
- budget control (1993=3, 1996=3)
- keeping records (1993=4, 1996=4)
- prices of implements (1993=5, 1996=5)
- tax structure (1993=6, 1996=7)
- utilization of land (1993=7, 1996=6)
- prices of agricultural land (1993=8, 1996=8)
- crop insurance (1993=9, 1996=9)
- coownership (1993=10, 1996=10)

The emphasis in the South African agricultural sector has shifted from maximum production to effective control of input costs and this shift is clearly reflected in the priority allocated above to input cost control, budget control, keeping records and the cost of implements. The importance of product prices, that occupy the second priority in 1993 as well as 1996, reflects the concern of these farmers with regard to the possible decline in output prices owing to deregulation of marketing boards and the progressive abolition of product subsidies.

It appears that the prices of agricultural land, crop insurance and co-ownership are given relatively low priority by this group of farmers.

Marketing management

Here respondents agree that market-oriented production and the creation of private marketing opportunities are the first and second priority respectively for both 1993 and 1996. The importance of this aspect is also confirmed by the enormous demand for training in marketing management.¹⁷ At present, respondents regard the policy of marketing boards as third priority, whereas changing marketing legislation is regarded as the last priority. However, the opposite applies to the future (1996). At this stage it is not clear how the possible changes in marketing legislation will affect the policy of marketing boards and, specifically, farmers. This uncertainty may explain the relatively low priority that respondents have allocated to these two aspects.

Macrofactors

Economic and political factors are regarded as the two most important factors that may influence farming enterprises for the present (1993) and the future (1996). Other factors that may have an important influence at present (1993) are technological, natural (excluding weather conditions) and social factors. However, for the future (1996), social factors are of greater importance than technological and natural factors.

Training needs

Training needs of farming enterprises take the following priorities:

Priority 1: Marketing management

Priority 2: Strategic management

Priority 3: Financial management

Priority 4: Labour management

Priority 5: General management

Priority 6: Mechanical/technical skills

Priority 7: Purchasing management

The fact that the greatest training need is for marketing management may be attributed to the fact that control is being reduced or marketing boards are scaling down their activities¹⁸ and that farming enterprises are increasingly being expected to manage their own marketing. A

marketing orientation and the practical implementation of marketing activities is also a relatively new field for numerous South African farming entrepreneurs, resulting in a considerable demand for training in this respect at present. The most important macrofactor involved here is undoubtedly economic, since current marketing structures do not comply with the needs of a large proportion of the agricultural sector.

Owing to the uncertain macroenvironment (particularly political and poor economic conditions) it is obvious why strategic management (in particular) and financial management are so high on the list of training priorities for farming entrepreneurs. Various authors¹⁹ have identified the need for strategically oriented management and training in agriculture. However, it seems that this study is the first empirical study that identifies strategic management as an important training priority for the primary producer.

One would expect the need for labour management training to be higher on the list of priorities because of the change in labour legislation. Some of the changes in labour legislation are the result of pressure from unions, primarily to promote the attainment of political goals but also to provide legal protection for the farm labourer and contribute to the social upliftment of this labour group. Labour practices in the agricultural sector have not always received the attention that they deserve. Hough²⁰ writes as follows in this regard:

It is clear that the agricultural sector in South Africa seems to be viewed in certain circles as one of the 'neglected' sectors as far as reform of labour practices, for instance, is concerned.

Urgent attention should undoubtedly be given to this training need.

The allocation of the need for training in general management, mechanical/technical skills and purchasing management to a lower priority, may be attributed to the fact that farming entrepreneurs regard themselves as reasonably competent in these fields and consequently

training in this regard does not merit a higher priority.

However, we need to bear in mind that the training needs identified in this study reflect the needs of farming entrepreneurs as they are experienced within the context of each entrepreneur's level of proficiency in their respective fields. In addition, various macrofactors, prevailing currently or in the future, play an important role in the identification of training needs. Consequently, different macrofactors should not be viewed in isolation of one another but as an integrated whole, a totality, affecting the entrepreneur's ability to operate successfully.

It is clear from the findings of the study that curriculum changes are necessary and that some of the following elements have to be included in syllabi for commercial farmers:

- the analysis and impact of macrofactors on the commercial farming community
- marketing management with the emphasis on market analysis, identification of profitable and alternative markets and the opportunities for adding value to farm produce
- strategic management with the emphasis on vision formulation, analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and the importance of continually revising plans as circumstances change
- labour management which includes the importance of human resources in agriculture, explaining labour laws and how to effectively manage the labour force
- financial management which, *inter alia*, must focus on the importance of maximum profits and not maximum production, management of input cost, the cash flow budget and a conservative risk approach

In view of the training needs discussed earlier, the following specific recommendations are that:

- short courses in strategic farm management for farmers with tertiary qualifications be developed

- established farmers (for example over 40 years of age) be made aware of the importance and value of "life-long" learning for themselves and for the successful management of their farming enterprises
- farmers be trained in the principles of marketing management by developing short courses for those in specific agricultural sectors and for those who have already completed formal agricultural training (marketing management should be introduced as a subject in the formal training of farmers at agricultural training institutions where it is not part of the curriculum – the importance of this subject for the future should also be emphasized during its presentation)
- financial management should form/remain an integral part of any course in farm management (especially where farming enterprises are more technologically advanced)
- general management skills should form an important part of any training package for farmers, particularly since South Africa is experiencing volatile political times

The status of commercial and small farmers with regard to agricultural development phases

It is generally accepted that there are three phases through which agricultural management develops, namely the technical, financial and management phases.²¹

The development and the duration of these phases depend largely on training and education to satisfy the particular needs of farmers in each phase. The lack of training and education (and not so much the need) of the small farmer explains why the majority of these farmers are still in the first or technical phase of agricultural development. The fact that the majority of commercial farmers are in the third or management phase is mainly due to the availability and affordability of university and college education and training.

Small farmers must comprehend technical aspects fully before syllabi can be changed to narrow the gap between commercial and small farmers. It is therefore important to fully understand the training needs of small farmers before curriculum changes can be made.

Agricultural training needs and curriculum changes for small farmers

Agricultural training for small farmers is aimed mainly at providing technical knowledge and skills. One cannot divorce the high illiteracy levels as well as the need to educate small farmers from the impact of environmental factors on them.

The main difference between training strategies for commercial and small farmers in the South African context is that training and education are focused directly on commercial farmers while intermediaries or extension officers are used, and have to be trained, to education and train small farmers. The main aim of extension as part of FSP is to help people to help themselves since human development is a prerequisite for the acquisition of knowledge and technical skills. Farmer support programmes are basically aimed at meeting the needs of the community with the focus primarily on the development of the human being and secondly on agricultural matters.

There are six agricultural colleges for, *inter alia*, training extension officers. However, the number of extension officers (less than 90 per annum) is too low to satisfy the needs of small farmers.

It is apparent from the above discussion that the use of extension officers, primarily at various service centres, should continue if small farmers are to be effective. Potential extension officers should be actively recruited for training at colleges on government bursaries.

However, there is a mismatch between the training needs of small farmers and the present syllabi of colleges, as spelled out above. Curriculum changes are necessary and at

least some of the following elements have to be included in syllabi for these extension officers or trainers involved with small farmers:

Phase 1: Increasing literacy levels and understanding the small farmer's environment

- practical rural appraisal to establish the needs of small farmers
- basic concepts of literacy (principles of teaching people to read and write)
- the stimulation of entrepreneurial activity
- farming as a viable vocation
- the role of the extension officer in creating more favourable agricultural conditions
- the role of farmer support programmes and service centres in the local farming community

Phase 2: Developing and increasing technical expertise in producing crops, planting pastures and raising cattle

- elementary soil identification
- understanding climate patterns
- seedbed preparation
- planting dates
- identification of grass types and pasture species
- stages of plant succession
- grazing evaluation
- stocking rate and stocking density
- the effects of fires on animals
- practical pasture management

Phase 3: Low level management training

- orientation of the management wheel which spells out the basic management functions
- production records and basic budgeting
- importance of local markets
- fund raising

Conclusion

The commercial farming sector is in the process of major structural changes, primarily focused on market-determined or market-related prices and therefore greatly influenced by

macrofactors such as interest rates, inflation, politics, climate, technological and social factors.

Curriculum changes for the training of commercial farmers to meet their needs were described and the importance of labour, financial and marketing management was emphasized. Recommendations were made with regard to curriculum changes for small farmers and it was stressed that extension officers should play an important role in their training. It is also recommended that an empirical study be undertaken to determine the training needs of small farmers since specific details concerning their unique needs are not readily available.

Notes and references

- 1 G Coetsee, personal interview at the Development Bank of South Africa on 1 September 1993.
- 2 Central Statistical Services, *Media release*, Pretoria: CCS, 10 December 1992, p 3.
- 3 *Ibid*, p 27.
- 4 Amalgamated Banks of South Africa, *Economic spotlight: The structure of the South African economy*, RSA: ABSA, 1993, p 2.
- 5 B J Swanepoel, "Current and recent developments in industrial relations in South Africa", paper delivered at the annual conference of the British Universities' Industrial Relations Associations, Warwick, 10-12 July 1992.
- 6 Central Statistical Services, *op cit*, p 2.
- 7 F S Barker, *The South African labour market: Critical issues for transition*, Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1992, p 4.
- 8 Amalgamated Banks of South Africa, *op cit*.
- 9 B J Swanepoel, *op cit*.
- 10 Development Bank of Southern Africa, Unpublished statistics, Midrand: DBSA, 1987.
- 11 Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, *Abstract of agricultural statistics*, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1993.
- 12 J W Hayward and C A J Botha, "Extension, training and research in farmer support programmes", working paper, Midrand: Development Bank of Southern Africa, 29-30 April 1993, p 4.
- 13 *Ibid*.
- 14 *Ibid*, p 2.
- 15 Agricolor, *Agricultural extension-resource manual*, Mmabatho: Agricultural Corporation of Bophuthatswana, nd.
- 16 F S Barker, *op cit*, p 67.

- 17 B J Erasmus and J Hough, *Training needs of farmers in a changing South African environment*, unpublished report, 1993.
- 18 See *Committee of Inquiry into the Marketing Act Report*, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1992.
- 19 J Laubscher, 'n *Strategiese benadering tot landboubeleidsbestuur: Toepassings in die Suid-Afrikaanse sagtevrugtebedryf*, doctoral dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, 1987; J Jacobs, *Strategiese beplanning en aanpassings: Finansiering*, paper delivered at the OEASA Congress, April 1983; A Louw, "Veranderinge in boerdery-en finansiële bestuur: Implikasies vir die toekoms", *Agrekon*, vol 25, no 3, 1986; R E Westgren, "Strategic management in agribusiness firms: Discussion", *AJAE*, no 5, 1987; A Louw, *Veranderinge in boerdery-en finansiële bestuur: Implikasies vir die negentigerjare*, paper delivered at the Farm Management Centre, Pretoria, April 1991; R P King and I G Shuker, "Strategic responses to changes in information technology", *AJAE*, vol 69, no 5, 1987; K F Harling and T F Funk, "Competitive strategy for farm supply and grain elevator business", *AJAE*, vol 69, no 5, 1987; J Hough, 'n *Strategiese bestuursbenadering tot kapitaalvorming deur graankooperasies in Suid-Afrika*, doctoral dissertation, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1991; J Hough, *Strategic management in agriculture with specific reference to agricultural cooperatives in South Africa*, paper delivered at the IAE Conference in Bucharest, Romania, June 1992.
- 20 M Hough, *The influence of the strategic environment on agriculture: The international environment*, paper delivered at the AEASA Congress, April 1987.
- 21 I K Oosthuizen, "Boerderybestuur in Suid-Afrika: Die huidige toestand", *Agrekon*, vol 26, no 1, 1987.

Assessing the affective domain in agricultural science

Mr J A Myburgh, of the Department of Agricultural Science at Vista University in Pretoria, examines the overemphasis on cognitive skills in the teaching of agricultural science and argues for a more holistic approach.

The question that people are increasingly asking these days is: Are we training pupils to enable them to *apply* for a job or are we training people to be able to *do* the job?

South Africa is said to be suffering from the so-called “diploma disease”, which means that people are being awarded diplomas and are receiving other qualifications, but are not able to find jobs or to do the job. Graduates who are jobless and have no prospects of finding a job are a common phenomenon in South Africa today. Are our training and, even more so, our assessment criteria in line with what the world of work requires?

A major reason for this state of affairs is that in South Africa, as in many other parts of the world, theoretical knowledge acquired through cognitive skills has been overemphasized in teaching, while the acquisition of psychomotor skills and skills in the affective domain have been seriously neglected.

Moodley¹ refers to this problem, specifically in the teaching of biology, as the “missing link”. In his work, de Beer² comes to the conclusion that there has been a major disregard for the affective domain in teaching and that teachers “assume” that by emphasizing cognitive skills, pupils will automatically acquire affective skills.

This assumption is totally incorrect.

Shock³ indicates that such emphasis could have negative results in that the more cognitive skills are emphasized, the slower affective skills develop. Research done by Opie⁴ shows that teaching methods and the way they are applied could improve the situation. A study undertaken by Moodley⁵ proves that teachers do not regard affective skills as at all important. The responses show that 12 of the 19 (63%) biology teachers surveyed, regarded affective skills such as initiative and perseverance as important. None of them regarded enthusiasm as an important affective skill in teaching.

Reasons for the emphasis on theoretical knowledge

Examination system in South Africa

A report on national education and training in Namibia,⁶ which at that time was using the Cape Education Department examination system, points out that theoretical tests and cognitive skills are emphasized in the assessment system even in vocational education.

In South Africa the std 10 examination in a subject such as agricultural science is purely theoretical and is set and marked externally. Although the syllabus states that practical work is an integral part of the course, the final std 10 mark does not have a practical mark component.

Problems regarding school-based assessment

It is often argued that the marks for practical work and/or course work are not reliable and differ, depending on the teacher, the school and the year. Although this is so, the situation can possibly be rectified to some extent by simply making use of a correlation between the average external mark for the theoretical examination and the average mark for practical work for a school.

In order to have proper monitoring and moderation systems, an education department needs to invest in the training of internal and external moderators. This costs money. Penny-cuick⁷ also refers to the problem of comparability between marks of different classes in the same school and at different schools. One way of ensuring comparability is to use various methods of moderation. Such methods include correlating external marks and internal marks and correlating marks from year to year as well as between schools, visitation (visiting schools and drawing samples) and consensus (consensus between various assessors/moderators internally and externally).

By applying the abovementioned methods of moderation, reliability could be ensured. Visitation can, however, be very costly. Costs could be cut considerably by sending samples of students' work to the moderator concerned or by establishing a regional visitation centre where schools in the region submit samples of examination papers.

Financial constraints

The establishment of a good moderation system is very expensive. Teachers should be trained to examine practical work and course work and subject specialists should be trained to act as moderators.

The high costs incurred as a result of moderators having to travel extensively can be reduced considerably by implementing a system such as the one used by the Cape Education Department and the Cambridge University Education Syndicate where-

by samples of projects, practical work, etc are sent to an examination body or a central regional visitation centre to be moderated.

Issues regarding practical planning and management

The preference for theoretical examinations and multiple-choice items in examination papers (which make for quick and easy marking) is understandable, particularly in the case of agricultural science which has more than 100 000 registered candidates in South Africa. However, the question should also be asked whether our examinations and examination systems are responsible for "marks inflation". Is it really necessary to draft a question paper of 300 marks (standard grade) and 400 marks (higher grade) to ensure a balanced paper that covers the whole syllabus and differentiates between learners' abilities?

In England and Scotland examination papers (one or two papers) on theory in rural science (agriculture) and horticultural science are normally two to two and a half hours long and count 100 marks. These papers, which are set for pupils 16 years and older to obtain their SCE (Scottish Certificate of Education) 'O' levels or IGCSE (International General Certificate of Secondary Education), are balanced and cover the whole syllabus. By making use of the correct questioning techniques, such as by using diagrams and testing more application skills, the same could be achieved in South Africa.

Overemphasizing reliability and neglecting validity of examinations

Some educators argue that if tests in a particular subject are objective and reliable, a high standard is achieved. Ogunniyi⁸ points out that for a test to be valid, it must be reliable. However, test validity is not always guaranteed if a test is totally reliable.

To illustrate this, an example of a test to obtain a drivers' licence for a 7-tonne truck can be used. If the candidate obtains a mark of 90% for a pen-and-paper test (normally a multiple-choice test), he or she has achieved a high standard, theoretically. Multiple-

choice tests are normally reliable if one uses good items and adheres to the rules of test reliability. However, even if the test is reliable and a high standard is achieved, there is no proof that the candidate is sufficiently competent to drive the 7-tonne truck skilfully. Such a pen-and-paper test is therefore not valid, although it is reliable. The instrument (pen-and-paper, multiple-choice test) is the wrong one to use.

A theoretical test should not be used in agricultural science to test whether a candidate knows how to mix concrete or how to dehorn cattle, because it will not be a valid test. A high standard of training in this field of practical skills cannot be achieved if tests are not valid.

Criterion-referenced assessment

From the above, it is clear that the use of theoretical tests only to assess pupils' competencies and skills other than cognitive skills will lead to invalid results. The truck driver's knowledge of driving, road signs and following distance, etc (cognitive skills) and the hands-on skills (psychomotor skills) required for driving, for example changing gears, stopping, overtaking, etc, require much attention. However, the driver's attitude towards fellow road-users, awareness of the importance of safety precautions, sense of responsibility and general courtesy on the road (affective domain skills) are equally important.

Criterion-referenced assessment is an effective way of assessing affective skills (some very subjective). This type of assessment method accurately indicates what pupils are expected to learn or be able to do according to set criteria for different levels of achievement.⁹

Deckmeyr *et al*¹⁰ confirm that for the purpose of educational assessment, criterion-referenced methods are strongly preferred to norm-referenced tests. They further mention that assessing a pupil's position in a specific group (norm reference) does not mean much, as it is important to know to what extent he or she will be able to apply the knowledge and abilities he or she has mastered.

Making use of criterion-referenced assessment in practical work in agricultural science and using only a scale such as 1–10 with no further detailed description of each grade, is still an impression mark (a mark given based on impression) by expert judging and regarded as norm-referenced assessment.¹¹

Both the Scottish Examination Board (SCE ordinary grade examinations) and the Cambridge University Local Examination Syndicate (IGSCE) use criterion-referenced assessment methods to assess practical work. This is the most scientifically valid system to use, especially if some criteria pertain to the affective domain. It is imperative that each criterion be described adequately and that it should be easy to distinguish them.

Another important prerequisite is that moderators (if more than one is used, eg in a national examination) should agree on the criteria and descriptions, and be trained and experienced in order to achieve similar standards.

One could agree that if you make use of, for example, 20 markers in a national examination, marks given for practical work by the internal marker or internal assessor would not be that reliable. The question that could be asked is whether it is better to assess practical work in this way and let it count towards the final mark (20–30% of the final mark) or to not assess it at all.

We know that examinations are a very powerful tool to use in achieving certain objectives. To make sure that teachers use examinations to promote psychomotor and affective skills they must be assessed during the course of the year and applicable marks must count for the final mark. The saying, "The examination tail wags the education dog" is true in many cases and the examination can be used positively to contribute towards emphasizing these neglected skills.

Criteria for marking practical work in agricultural science

In order to clarify criteria and to make sure that they are relevant and applic-

able, it is necessary to look at assessment objectives or domains used by other authors and examination boards. Midlands Examination Group¹² refers to them as assessment objectives.

Cambridge University Local Examination Syndicate¹³ refers to them as domains. Dreckmeyr *et al*¹⁴ refer to a taxonomy for the evaluation of practical work in the sciences. It does not, however, matter whether they are called assessment objectives, domains or taxonomies as long as it is clear what the pupil should be able to achieve or do, and the criteria are developed accordingly.

Examples of different taxonomies for evaluation of practical work

Sand and Bishop¹⁵ developed a hierarchical taxonomy of objectives for practical work. The following abilities can be distinguished:

- The ability to name practical equipment and apparatus and indicate their main purpose.
- The ability to give the correct procedure for the correct execution of a selected experiment.
- The ability to follow and implement procedures.
- The ability to select appropriate procedures in solving problems.
- The ability to comment on a specific procedure.
- The ability to observe and record observations, etc.

The Midlands Examination Group¹⁶ refers to the following assessment objectives in its rural science syllabus:

- The ability to plan and carry out experiments or practical investigations.
- The ability to follow instructions, control variables, and make observations.
- The ability to measure and record accurately.
- The ability to select and organize knowledge relevant to particular ideas, and to communicate this knowledge in a variety of forms,

including continuous writing, and to translate information presented in the form of graphs, diagrams and tables.

- The ability to devise and carry out experiments or other tests to check the validity of data, conclusions and generalizations.

The Cambridge University Local Examination Syndicate¹⁷ refers to the following domains:

- The ability to locate, select, organize and present information gained from various sources.
- The ability to translate information from one form to another.
- The ability to use information to identify patterns, report trends and draw inferences.
- The ability to present reasoned explanations for phenomena, patterns and relationships.
- The ability to make predictions and propose hypotheses.
- The ability to solve problems, including those of a quantitative nature.
- The ability to use and organize techniques, apparatus, equipment and materials.
- The ability to observe, measure and record.
- The ability to handle experimental observations and data.
- The ability to plan investigations.

Moodley¹⁸ categorizes the assessment objectives as follows:

- The ability to identify apparatus and chemicals by naming and describing their purposes.
- The ability to identify specimens and models or parts of them.
- The ability to describe various laboratory techniques.
- The ability to recall terms, facts, concepts, principles, etc.
- The ability to select apparatus and materials for a specific task.

- The ability to set up apparatus and other materials to carry out experiments.
- The ability to use various laboratory techniques correctly.
- The ability to detect and rectify errors.
- The ability to predict effects and trends.
- The ability to interpret data or results in order to solve problems.
- The ability to pursue his work through to a successful conclusion.
- The ability to improvise apparatus.
- The ability to follow safety regulations.
- The ability to work neatly and tidily.
- The ability to work willingly in groups.
- The ability to initiate new ideas, make suggestions, etc.

From the above it is evident that some of these assessment objectives are similar. An important fact to bear in mind is that these objectives have been adopted by different education systems in different countries. Furthermore, it is important to note that these assessment objectives are written into the British syllabuses but not into the South African syllabuses. (I believe that the South African syllabuses are lacking.)

Some of these objectives require the use of affective skills, such as problem-solving and communication abilities, creative thinking, initiative, perseverance, etc. Dreckmeyer *et al*¹⁹ point out that the assessment of the affective skills (pertaining to attitudes and values, for example) can be highly subjective and that teachers tend to avoid such assessment. They pay more attention to cognitive skills. They also make the point that I have tried to highlight that, although the assessing of these abilities can lower reliability, they may still be valid regarding the outcomes that they are measuring.

Examples of criteria for assessing practical abilities

Examples of criteria adopted from the Cambridge System by the National Institute of Education Development in Namibia to assess practical work (exercises) at junior secondary level²⁰ are set out below.

Criteria for testing practical work

The teacher should award a maximum of five marks (according to a five-point-scale) for each of the following five criteria.

- Responsibility – the ability to assume responsibility for the task in hand, and work from given instructions without detailed supervision and help.
- Initiative – the ability to cope with problems arising in connection with the task, to see what needs to be done and to take effective action.
- Technique – the ability to tackle a practical task in a methodical, systematic way, and to handle tools skilfully and to good effect.
- Perseverance – the ability to see a task through to a successful conclusion with determination and sustained effort.
- Quality – the ability to attend to detail, so that the work done is well finished and presents a good appearance.

A detailed description of each criteria follows:

A Responsibility

- Follows written or verbal instructions without the need for help 5
- Carries out appropriate safety procedures
- Assumes responsibility easily, leads in group work 4
- Follows written or verbal instructions with a little help 3
- Aware of the need for safety procedures but has difficulty recognizing them without guidance
- Shows responsibility for work 2

- Follows written or verbal instructions with considerable help 1
- Shows little regard for safety procedures, even when told
- Some responsibility shown for the work 0

B Initiative

- Offers solutions or explanations to unexpected problems 5
- Recognition of, and ability to anticipate, problems
- Solves problems without help 4
- Comments on imperfections of experimental method or results
- Offers solutions or explanations to unexpected problems after seeking advice 3
- Solves problems with help
- Recognizes faults in experimental methods given some pointers 2
- Uncertain how to proceed, requires considerable help 1
- Recognizes only the most obvious errors in experimental method after considerable guidance 0

C Technique

- Methodical and systematic approach to tasks 5
- Handles tool/apparatus skilfully and confidently
- Carries out practical procedures with dexterity 4
- Handles tools/apparatus effectively 3
- Carries out practical procedures adequately 2
- Handles tools/apparatus clumsily 1
- Has difficulty carrying out practical procedures 0

D Perseverance

- All the required practical tasks and attendant written work completed 5
- Attitude positive and well motivated
- Willing to carry out repetitive procedures 4
- The required practical tasks and attendant written work 3
- Completed with a little encouragement 2

Practical tasks and attendant written work incomplete 1
Somewhat disinterested/impatient when carrying out work and disinclined to repeat procedures 0

E Quality

Practical work thorough, evident attendance to detail producing a very good final result 5
Written work accurate with regard to clear, neat presentation 4
Practical work thorough for the most part producing a satisfactory to good result 3
Written work mostly accurate and clearly presented 2
Practical work rushed, superficial and showing little concern for the finished product 1
Written work inaccurate and poorly presented 0

From the above criteria, it is clear that we cannot make a clear-cut distinction between the cognitive, psychomotor and affective domains. This is, however, not the aim of this article. What is advocated is a holistic approach in teaching and assessment regarding all three domains. This view is also supported by others, for example Andersen and Krathwohl *et al.*²¹

Recommendations

The following recommendations should be considered in order to solve the problems pointed out above:

- The examination system should be changed in order to emphasize the assessment of skills in the psychomotor and affective domains.
- Course work or practical work should account for 25% of the final mark for both internal and external examinations.

- Monitoring and moderating systems should be standardized nationally.
- Pre-service and in-service training of teachers in assessing skills should enjoy high priority to enable them to apply criterion-referenced based testing techniques.
- Subject curriculums should be changed in order to reduce the content aimed purely at theoretical knowledge and more discovery and problem-solving approaches should be followed.

Conclusion

In order to assess skills in the psychomotor and particularly in the affective domains effectively, the method of assessment in South African schools will have to be changed. It is recommended that a criterion-referenced method be adopted for assessing practical work. This can be achieved by changing the examination system.

Examinations are normally viewed negatively, but this could be changed if the "backwash" effect of examinations on teaching and education could be more effective. Establishing proper monitoring and moderation systems cost money. If the money spent on the separation of education departments had rather been used for this purpose, the crisis in education could have been smaller. In the interests of reconstructing South Africa we must aim at training people to do the job and not only enable them to apply for the job.

References

- 1 T K Moodley quoted in J J J de Beer, *Die affektiewe dimensies in biologie-onderwys*, Johannesburg: RAU, unpublished M Ed thesis, 1990, p 4.
- 2 J J J de Beer, *op cit*, p 264.
- 3 Quoted in F W J Opie, *The outdoor classroom*, Cape Town: Department of Environment Affairs and Maskew Miller Longman Ltd, 1989, p 24.

- 4 Ibid.
- 5 T K Moodley, "Scheme of objectives for practical work in biology at the senior secondary level", *Spectrum*, March 1981, p 153.
- 6 M Hultin-Craelius, *Vocational education and training in Namibia: A development proposal*, unpublished report, p 15.
- 7 D Pennycuick, *Factors influencing the introduction of continuous assessment systems in developing countries*, paper delivered at the 23rd Annual Conference of the British Comparative and International Education Society at the University of Bristol, 1988, p 13.
- 8 M B Ogunniyi, *Education measurement and evaluation*, Singapore: Longman Group, 1991, p 83.
- 9 D Satterly, *Assessment in schools*, Worcester: Billing and Sons, 1989, pp 117-18.
- 10 M Dreckmeyer, W J Fraser, J A Slabbert, J G Dekker and O van Niekerk, *Classroom testing in biology and physical science*, Pretoria: Haum, 1991, p 17.
- 11 *Ibid*, p 155.
- 12 Midlands Education Group, *Syllabus for rural science*, Cambridge: GCSE, 1991, p 2.
- 13 Cambridge University Local Examination Syndicate, *Syllabus for agriculture*, Cambridge: IGCSE, 1992, p 2.
- 14 M Dreckmeyer *et al*, *op cit*, p 28.
- 15 Quoted in C Christofi, *Assessment and profiling in science. A practical guide*, London: Cassell Educational Ltd, 1988, pp 31-4.
- 16 Midlands Examination Group, *op cit*, p 2.
- 17 Cambridge University Local Examinations Syndicate, *op cit*, p 2.
- 18 T K Moodley, *op cit*, pp 39-42.
- 19 M Dreckmeyer *et al*, *op cit*, p 33.
- 20 Ministry of Education and Culture, *Rules and regulations. Junior Secondary Certificate. Agricultural production and farming technology syllabus*, Windhoek: Namibian Ministry of Education and Culture, 1992.
- 21 H O Andersen, "The holistic approach to science education", *The Science Teacher*, vol 45, no 1, 1978, pp 27-28; D R Krathwohl, B S Bloom and B B Masia, *Taxonomy of educational objectives. Handbook 2: Affective domain*, London: Longmans, 1964, p 48.

Food aid for sub-Saharan Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa food aid becomes ever more urgent as natural and man-made disasters continue to threaten the region's food security. Denis Fair, Research Fellow at the Africa Institute, recounts some recent events in this field in sub-Saharan Africa and reviews assessments of the effectiveness of food aid both as an emergency measure and as a development tool.

No social or economic problem facing the world today is more urgent than that of hunger," claim Drèze and Sen.¹ There is no "instant remedy", they say, and action by governments may take various forms – improved food production and distribution, increased regular income and employment creation, relief employment for wages, cash or in kind, the provision of health care and epidemic centres, the expansion of productive activities in general, among others.

This strategic diversity, they say, contrasts with the common belief that food aid is the only appropriate channel to enhance food availability in a famine-affected country.

Much depends, certainly, on how timely the arrival of food aid is, but its protagonists, notably those in the UN's World Food Programme (WFP), point to the effectiveness of food aid not only as an emergency relief measure but also as a tool for promoting longer term social and economic development.

The objectives of the WFP encompass all the alternative strategies mentioned by Drèze and Sen. In addition, its environmental activities aim at promoting a sustainable agricultural production in affected countries. The WFP would agree with these writers that "the spade is more powerful than the spoon".

Food aid objectives

Whether supplied for emergency purposes (*targeted* food aid) to offset natural and/or man-made disasters or as a longer term development measure, food aid releases the foreign exchange expenditure that would have gone to purchase food on the more expensive commercial market. In this sense it is a form of budgetary support to the recipient country. It provides balance of payment assistance and as such it is termed *programme* food aid. It may also be made available for sale on the open market in the recipient country, usually at subsidized prices, and the revenue received in local currency (counterpart funds) can supplement food made directly available by donors for any number of developments (*project* food aid). These include infant, maternal, school, hospital and other institutional feeding schemes, health-care projects, training, self-help and community schemes, the build-up of buffer stocks and food security reserves, and rural infrastructural developments including roads, water supplies, irrigation works and buildings of all kinds via food-for-work arrangements. Food aid in this sense becomes indirect financial support. As such it is not an inferior substitute for financial aid but is additional to it.²

India is an example of the successful use of food aid as a development tool. In the 1960s the country suffered a large food deficit and was the

recipient of large amounts of food aid. At the time pessimistic forecasts doubted its ability ever to emerge from a total dependence on food aid. Yet by the early 1980s India had become an exporter of cereals. Food aid had helped the country to "break out of the vicious circle of malnutrition, intermittent famine, crop failures, post-harvest losses and the lack of adequate logistics capacity in rural areas, while the technological know-how assisted her in developing new crop varieties with high yields and drought resistance; improved marketing and storage facilities; expanded veterinary services; milk bottling and processing; capital for fertilizer plants; dams and irrigation schemes, along with the requisite managerial skills".³ Food aid was part of the solution but its success lay in its integration into a wider, more comprehensive development strategy for the country.⁴

It is the developmental, not the emergency objective of food aid, that has generated a lively debate to which we return later.

The World Food Programme

One-fifth of the world's population lacks food security defined by the World Bank as "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life".⁵ International commitment to giving food aid to needy countries was an essential element of the Marshall Plan for Europe after World War II. There followed the disposal by the United States of surplus grain and other agricultural commodities to developing countries in terms of its Public Law (PL) 480 of 1946.⁶ In 1963 the United Nation's World Food Programme was established as the first multilateral body concerned exclusively with food aid. Involved first in mobilizing food surpluses from developed countries, it then, after the first Food Aid Convention in 1967, also accepted cash commitments appropriate to food aid programmes.⁷

A multiplicity of governments, agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are now involved in rendering emergency humanitarian assistance to countries struck by nat-

ural or man-made disasters. Apart from the WFP, UN bodies include the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (Unicef), UN Fund for Women (Unifem), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO). In 1992 the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) was established to coordinate the emergency activities of these organizations.⁸

The United States and the European Community are the WFP's largest multilateral donors. It supplied donated food to 46 countries involving 27,5 million people in 1992 and accounts for one-third of all food aid moved globally. This amounted to some 4,1 million tonnes of which 2,8 million was for emergency relief.⁹ Much of the food is delivered under difficult conditions and Pirie points to the "logistical nightmare" of making deliveries where transport facilities are inadequate, security risks are high and corruption prevalent.¹⁰ The head of the WFP refers with pride to countries helped by the organization which, over the past 30 years, were food-aid recipients but are now potential donors. Examples are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Venezuela, Greece, Hungary and on the threshold of graduating out of food aid, Mexico.¹¹

Food aid and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

There has been a shift in the geographic allocation of food aid towards the least developed countries, especially those of SSA whose food problems are regarded as of "exceptional severity".¹² Not only are many poor and structures fragile but their levels of food security have deteriorated since independence. More than 100 million people (about 25% of SSA's population) obtain, on average, over good and bad crop years less than 80% of the FAO/WHO-recommended daily calorie supply.¹³ The population living below the absolute poverty income level ranges from 40% in Cameroon to 55% in Kenya, 60% in Tanzania and 85% in Malawi. Studies

by the International Food Policy Research Institute and the World Bank/WFP indicate that the gap between food production and consumption will widen more than six-fold to 50 million tonnes by the year 2000.¹⁴

Drought and economic crises have forced the WFP and other bodies to divert funds for food aid-supported development projects in SSA to famine emergencies. Between 1986 and 1990 the WFP's emergency operations in Africa increased from 46 to 85% of its worldwide total. Since then, owing to civil war and continuing drought, even greater efforts have been necessary. Seen in the wider context of SSA's economic malaise, observers point out that food aid, nevertheless, can play only a limited role in the region's recovery. "A far more pressing need is debt reduction, increased development assistance of all types and a concerted effort to improve the global economy in ways that benefit Africa's trade position."¹⁵ Agricultural production along with incomes and employment must improve but population growth must decline.

The African food crisis of 1982-1986

It was this event rather than the earlier crisis of 1972-1974 that brought the problem of SSA's food insecurity vividly to the fore. The source of the crisis lay in a number of overlapping and interacting factors. Widespread abnormal rainfall patterns and severe drought in Western, Eastern and Southern Africa contributed directly to the crisis as did civil war and externally financed insurgency in at least five countries. Then there was the collapse at the time of the prices of export commodities combined with the oil price hike of 1979-1980 which laid weaker countries more open to natural disasters. Nor did internal factors help. Some governments pursued policies that were biased against agriculture. Farmers were given no incentive to produce, since food prices were held down to the benefit of urban consumers. Rising population numbers contributed to environmental

degradation culminating in many places of too many people on too little arable land.¹⁶

Initially the international response was tardy but once spurred by media coverage of famine conditions, especially in Ethiopia, the response was "massive".¹⁷ Total cereal food aid rose to almost five million tonnes in 1984–1985 supplemented by financial aid.

In Ethiopia and Sudan the famine claimed half-a-million lives.¹⁸ In Ethiopia a Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, established after the famine of 1972–1974, failed as an instrument to predict and to prevent the crisis.¹⁹ Only 75% of food aid delivered was distributed. In Sudan 64% of that received was distributed, 91% of food pledged having been off-loaded at the ports.²⁰ Politics, too, bedeviled matters. In Sudan, for example, railway unions and management refused to transport food in the hope of toppling an antagonistic regime.²¹ In Somalia the massive diversion of food aid into the hands of elites and others was such that the United States General Accounting Office estimated that less than 20% was actually consumed by refugees.²²

By contrast, some countries coped well, according to Drèze and Sen, less because of food aid than the large-scale intervention by their governments. There is as much to learn, they say, from "the quiet successes" in Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya and Zimbabwe as from the "attention-catching failures" elsewhere in Africa.²³

Lessons learned from this crisis included a renewed interest in early-warning systems and a re-examination on the part of donors of their emergency procedures and the need for more rapid and better coordinated responses. An Africa Task Force Secretariat was established within the WFP in 1985 and this enabled donors to see where and when gaps in food requirements would occur.²⁴

The 1990s food crisis

In May 1992 the risk of starvation faced 2,5 million people in Somalia.

The WFP coordinated food deliveries landed by ship at the port of Mogadishu as well as by plane from Kenya at locations inside Somalia. The problems were "enormous"; armed gangs, for instance, in Mogadishu and Berbera looted more than 15 000 tonnes of relief supplies while staff were routinely threatened at gunpoint.²⁵ In December 1992 the UN-sponsored military intervention, Operation Restore Hope, was launched to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Instead, security worsened, hampering relief work. Omaar and de Waal's preliminary assessment of the operation, as at May 1993, was that "it has achieved little or nothing of substance".²⁶ A later comment is that the multinational peacekeeping force had become ensnared in the conflicts which it had sought to resolve.²⁷

In 1992 Southern Africa experienced its worst drought in living memory.²⁸ A total of 20,6 million people (24% of the total population) in the ten countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were vulnerable to starvation and disease, and another one million in South Africa. Cereal production in that year in the eleven countries was less than half the normal production and cereal imports had to be increased five times over normal imports. Of the 6,7 million tonnes imported by the SADC countries, 3,9 million was food aid. For its own account (no food aid) South Africa's cereal imports were 5,2 million tonnes.

The international community responded quickly to ward off the worst effects of the drought. The DHA coordinated the mobilization of donors with logistic support from a regional coordinating body and the combined efforts of UN agencies, SADC, government departments, the private sector and NGOs. Shipments were off-loaded at all the South African ports and at Maputo, Beira, Nacala and Dar es Salaam. A Logistics Advisory Centre, jointly staffed by the WFP and SADC, was established in Harare to monitor the flow of all international

food aid entering the region. A similar office, a Grain Operation Control Centre, was set up in Johannesburg. WFP crews were deployed across the region, directing the loading and unloading of food at the ports. The WFP handled 90% of the contributions received from donors.

These efforts averted famine and the operation was pronounced a success. More serious than a shortage of food, however, were deaths owing to cholera and other water-related diseases resulting from stagnant pools in rivers and streams which had ceased to flow. The economic effects on all 11 countries were severe – rising budget deficits and foreign debts and slower, even negative, economic growth. Observers believe the region will take three to four years to fully recover but excellent rains in 1994 have brightened prospects considerably.

Lessons have also been learned from this drought. Bearing in mind, as the DHA has noted, that drought is a recurrent and long-term problem in Southern Africa, donors again need to be alerted to food needs timeously, health security requires as much attention as food security and disaster training, already initiated, is essential. Moreover, plans for emergency response must be built into long-term development strategies so that emergency, recovery and development programmes can be better integrated. Thus, regional food security should be enhanced to make it less dependent on global supplies and faster ways need to be found to help countries make the transition from relief to post-emergency recovery.

Angola remains a thorny problem for the WFP.²⁹ When civil war broke out again in January 1993 some WFP relief workers were killed or wounded, offices were destroyed, food looted and relief aircraft fired upon. The WFP effort continues, nevertheless, in an attempt to avert further human tragedy.

By contrast, politically stable but drought-prone Botswana has switched to what the government believes is a more realistic food security strategy. The regularity of drought predisposed

the government in recent years to take stabilization measures,³⁰ which some regard as an African success.³¹ But for more than 20 years, states Cathie,³² while as much as 50% of the population has depended on food aid, this has not contributed to the economic development of the country or to a self-sustaining arable agriculture. The strategy change announced by the government in its 1991–1997 national development plan moves the previous objective of national food self-sufficiency to one of national and household food security.³³ This means earning foreign exchange from those exports in which Botswana is competitive, such as minerals, sorghum and manufacturing, and importing those food items, such as maize, that cannot be profitably produced locally. At the same time rural incomes are to be enhanced by various means so as to give households power to purchase the imported food. This is no guarantee that international food aid will necessarily cease.

The food aid debate

The pros and cons of food aid have been debated since the concept and practice was first introduced.³⁴ Does it encourage dependency? Is it a disincentive to local agricultural production? Does it distort traditional feeding habits by supplying exotic foods, eg, wheat and rice, to people used to coarse grains such as maize? Emergency aid is less of an issue than project and programme aid. Is food aid, then, “a free narcotic paralysing initiative” or is it a tool for development?³⁵ Much depends on the setting in which food aid is given. There are many examples where food aid has helped to get domestic production going, India being one, as mentioned, and Zambia’s settlement of Angolan refugees another. Farzin indicates that Somalia’s dependence on food aid over a prolonged period in the 1980s was due not to food aid per se but to ill-formulated and uncoordinated food aid programmes in concert with unsound domestic economic policies such as low producer prices and urban bias.

The disincentive effect has been described as the “storm centre” of the debate and a voluminous literature of “spiralling complexity” has arisen over it.³⁶ The crux of the criticism is that “food aid will discourage farmers’ own production efforts” since not only will the food made available reduce the demand for local products but it will also undercut prices. Thus, it is of no help to the objectives of development. Moreover, food aid, it is claimed, not only discourages farmers but it also influences governments to maintain a *status quo* and not face up to the structural problems that gave rise to the need for food aid in the first place.³⁷

The reply to the argument that food aid drives down prices is that, since it takes the place of commercial imports, no additional supply of food is involved.³⁸ Moreover, food aid would also not depress local prices if handed out to people who, for lack of income, were unable to buy local food anyway.

Then again, food aid given as programme aid and balance of payments support should enable the recipient country to follow more expansionary domestic policies, such as public works which increase rural employment and result in an additional demand for local food; and so on. Singer notes that “neither history nor empirical analysis suggests any close correlation between the receipt of food aid and neglect of domestic agriculture”.³⁹

Overall, a general conclusion is that disincentive risks do exist – warning lights were flashing in Ethiopia, Sudan and Senegal in 1984–1985 – and must be taken seriously.⁴⁰ They can, however, be successfully avoided or counteracted. It is when the proceeds from food aid commodity sales have not been invested in employment-expanding ways that food aid can have its most injurious effects on local agriculture.⁴¹

There is now a greater awareness among donors and recipients of disincentive risks and of the measures required to avoid them.⁴² The record of countries that were recipients of

food aid decades ago refutes fears of dependency and disincentiveness.

Food aid, some critics say, promotes an undesirable shift in consumption patterns away from traditional local staple foods towards commodities such as wheat, rice and dairy products. This need not be a disadvantage provided an improved nutritive value is matched by no increase in cost. The commonest change has been the introduction of bread, initially consumed by better-off urban dwellers, but now spreading to other areas. It becomes a problem where wheat is not a normal crop and does not grow well, as in tropical Africa.⁴³ Triangular transactions, as they are called, have therefore become popular permitting food, indigenous to the region (eg, white maize) to be obtained in neighbouring countries having export surpluses as was the case with Zimbabwean maize in good years and Thailand rice.⁴⁴

Conclusion

“Food aid is a fact of life and will certainly not disappear in any foreseeable future,” states Singer.⁴⁵ He explains that food aid represents an international commitment to the amount of at least 7.6 million tonnes of cereals on a multiannual basis, a situation which has never been achieved in the case of financial aid. Food aid, too, in the last few years has shown signs of increase exceeding the UN target of 10 million tonnes annually in sharp contrast to financial aid where there is a shortfall of 50% below the UN target of 0.7% of a country’s gross national product.

Dawson points out that the great surpluses of food accumulated by the West as a result of policies to protect its farmers have been and are of financial benefit to countries that buy them at a discount and to those of the Third World that receive them as aid. It is politically inconceivable, he says, that Western countries would have been able to provide the equivalent of this assistance in the form of hard cash.⁴⁶

It is time to stop debating, says Singer, whether food aid is better or

worse than other forms of aid or income transfer but rather to accept the challenge to make it more effective, maximize the potential benefits and avoid the potential harm.⁴⁷ Drèze and Sen concur. The debate needs to be "de-escalated". It is hard to believe, they say, that aid can emerge as being generally good or generally bad. Aid has to be assessed by balancing its positive and negative consequences in the respective contexts.⁴⁸

A major challenge is the increasing need to concentrate food aid on the countries of SSA. But, warn Mellor and Pandya-Lorch, despite some successes project food aid, as distinct from emergency and programme food aid, has a "dismal" record in SSA owing primarily to poor commodity and project management.⁴⁹ The success achieved in meeting the challenge of the 1992 drought in Southern Africa should be a source of encouragement, therefore, that food aid well coordinated and well managed can be both an emergency relief measure and a valuable development tool.

References

- 1 J Drèze and A Sen, *Hunger and public action*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp 4, 18, 160–61.
- 2 H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *Food aid: The challenge and the opportunity*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p 6; SADC/WFP Logistics Advisory Centre, *Summary of food aid pledges and deliveries*, Harare, 1993, pp 1–2.
- 3 H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *op cit*, pp 9–10.
- 4 H H Schumacher, "Food aid: Drug for developing countries", *D+C Development and Cooperation*, no 4, 1989, p 24.
- 5 *Ibid*, p 23.
- 6 H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *op cit*, p 6.
- 7 E Clay and E Benson, "Triangular transactions, local purchases and exchange arrangements in food aid: A provisional review with special reference to Sub-Saharan Africa", in E Clay and O Stokke, *Food aid reconsidered*, London: Frank Cass, 1991, p 147.
- 8 J Eliasson, "The response of the United Nations to humanitarian emergencies", *The Courier*, no 136, Nov–Dec 1992, pp 54–55.
- 9 E Bessner, "Feeding the world", *The Courier*, no 138, March–April, 1993, pp 89–90.
- 10 G Pirie, "Transport, food insecurity and food aid in sub-Saharan Africa", *Journal of Transport Geography*, vol 1, no 1, 1993, p 14.
- 11 F Mwanza, "Interview with Ms Bertini, WFP executive director", *World Food Programme Journal*, no 25, July–Sep 1993, p 3.
- 12 H Singer, "Food aid and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa", in E Clay and O Stokke, *op cit*, p 180.
- 13 World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1989, p 72.
- 14 J W Mellor and R Pandya-Lorch, "Food aid and development in the MADIA countries", in U Lele (ed), *Aid to African agriculture*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press/World Bank, 1992, p 548, 561.
- 15 D Weathers, "Africa: Still no signs of recovery", *World Food Programme Journal*, no 19, Jan–March 1992, pp 4–5.
- 16 J Borton and E Clay, "The African food crisis of 1982–86", in D Rimmer (ed), *Rural transformation in tropical Africa*, London: Bellhaven Press, 1988, pp 140–67.
- 17 E Clay and O Stokke, "Assessing the performance and economic impact of food aid: The state of the art", in E Clay and O Stokke, *op cit*, pp 19–20.
- 18 C Collins, "Famine defeated: Southern Africa, UN win battle against drought", *Africa Recovery*, briefing paper, no 9, Aug 1993, p 1.
- 19 J Borton and E Clay, *op cit*, p 159.
- 20 U Lele, *op cit*, pp 536–537.
- 21 G Pirie, *op cit*, p 15.
- 22 A de Waal, "Somalia: The shadow", *Africa Report*, vol 38, no 2, 1993, p 26.
- 23 J Drèze and A Sen, *op cit*, p 71.
- 24 J Borton and E Clay, *op cit*, p 154.
- 25 E Bessner, *op cit*, pp 89–90.
- 26 R Omaar and A de Waal, *Somalia: Operation restore hope, a preliminary assessment*, London: African Rights, 1993, p iii.
- 27 C Clapham, "The horn of Africa: Consequences of insurgency", *Africa Insight*, vol 23, no 4, 1993, p 185.
- 28 C Collins, *op cit*, pp 1–12; G Pirie, *op cit*, pp 15–8.
- 29 A Meldrum, "Angola: Food in peace and war", *World Food Programme Journal*, no 24, April–June 1993, pp 2–.
- 30 World Bank, *op cit*, p 78.
- 31 J D Holm and R G Morgan, "Coping with drought in Botswana: An African success", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 23, no 3, 1985, p 463.
- 32 J Cathie, "Modelling the role of food imports, food aid and food security in Africa: The case of Botswana", in E Clay and O Stokke, *op cit*, pp 107–108.
- 33 Botswana, *National development plan 1991-1997 (NDP 7)*, Gaborone: Government Printer, pp 257–258.
- 34 E M Regenhardt, "Pros and cons of food aid", *D+C Development and Cooperation*, no 3, 1982, pp 24–25; O Matzke, "Food aid: Pros and cons", *Aussen Politik*, vol 35, no 1, 1984, pp 87–98; A Dawson, "In defence of food aid: Some answers to its critics", *International Labour Review*, vol 124, no 1, 1985, pp 17–30; H Singer, "Food aid: Pros and cons", *Intereconomics*, vol 23, no 2, 1988, pp 79–83; Y H Farzin, "Food aid: Positive and negative economic effects in Somalia", *The Journal of Developing Areas*, vol 25, no 2, 1991, pp 261–282.
- 35 H H Schumacher, *op cit*, p 24.
- 36 S Maxwell, "The disincentive effect of food aid: A pragmatic approach", in E Clay and O Stokke, *op cit*, p 66.
- 37 H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *op cit*, pp 187–188.
- 38 H Singer, *Intereconomics*, *op cit*, p 81; H Ezekiel, "An approach to food aid strategy", *World Development*, vol 16, no 11, pp 1377–1378.
- 39 H Singer, *Intereconomics*, *op cit*, p 80.
- 40 H Singer, "Food aid: Development tool or obstacle to development?", *Development Policy Review*, vol 5, no 4, 1987, p 333; S Maxwell, *op cit*, p 86.
- 41 A Dawson, *op cit*, p 22.
- 42 H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *op cit*, p 188.
- 43 *Ibid*, p 189.
- 44 H Singer, *Intereconomics*, *op cit*, pp 84–83; E Clay and C Benson, *op cit*, pp 143–179.
- 45 H Singer, *op cit*, p 82.
- 46 A Dawson, *op cit*, pp 17–18.
- 47 H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *op cit*, p 203.
- 48 J Drèze and A Sen, *op cit*, p 274.
- 49 J W Mellor and R Pandya-Lorch, *op cit*, p 557.

Health care in the new South Africa: Surveying the more radical options

Mr J M Luiz, a lecturer in the Department of Economics at Vista University's Welkom Campus in the Orange Free State, argues that health care in South Africa urgently needs to be revamped but that economic realities must be taken into consideration to avoid idealistic wish lists.

The World Health Organization (WHO) regards health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". It goes on to say that "as a minimum all people in all countries should have at least such a level of health that they are capable of working productively, and of participating actively in the social life of the community in which they live".¹ Internationally it has been recognized that the concept of health goes beyond its traditional meaning. For people to be healthy, they need access to decent housing, sufficient nutritious food, adequate and safe water, and proper sanitation. All these, in turn, are related to one's income. The South African health system has not viewed health in this holistic framework, preferring to concentrate on costly First World medical and technological advances, which were available to the white population only. This article will examine the broad options available to South Africa in developing an appropriate and just new health care system, which not only is affordable (both to the patient and the state) but is also accessible to the entire population.

Current expenditure

The estimated state expenditure on health services in the 1992/93 finan-

cial year was R9,93 billion, which represented a 22% increase in expenditure on the previous year. The 10,9% increase in expenditure in the 1993/94 financial year caused the health budget to grow to R11,07 billion. South Africa's health spending amounts to about 5,6% of GDP, an appropriate amount for its current stage of development. The proportion spent by the state on health services is significantly lower, namely 3,2% of GDP, but is still in line with international comparisons (for example, Brazil's government spends only 2,4% of GDP on health services). However, in South Africa 20% of all patients (mainly white) consumed 56% of all private and public sector expenditure on health services, with the remaining 80% of the population receiving only 44% of health expenditure.² The per capita expenditure on health care in 1987 shows enormous discrepancies: R597 for whites; R356 for Indians; R340 for coloureds; and R137 for blacks. The maldistribution reflects, to some extent, the unequal distribution between the private and the public sectors. In 1987 per capita expenditure on the population covered by the public sector was R159 and that for private medical scheme members was R555.³ Although the ten homelands contained about 44% of the total population of South Africa, they were allocated only 29% of the national health budget in 1990/91. Another peculiar feature of South Africa's health budget

is that while the government has committed itself to primary health care, only 5% of this health budget was devoted to this purpose. The overall conclusion is that South Africa's current health expenditure is reasonable by international standards. What can be questioned is whether public sector health expenditure (3,2% of GDP in 1988) is acceptable if one then considers the maldistribution within this sector.⁴

Problems in the existing system

South Africa's health indicators are a reflection of this country's general socio-economic development. Van der Berg⁵ states that South Africa utilizes its economic resources inadequately in meeting health needs. Regression results indicate that South Africa's health performance compares poorly with its expected performance, given resources of income, medical personnel and food supply. The infant mortality rate per 1000 births for South Africa in 1990 was as follows: Africans 52,8; coloureds – 28; Indians – 13,5, and whites – 7,3. The infant mortality rate in the TBVC states was 59,8.⁶ Life expectancy at birth in 1987 was 73 years for whites and 63 years for Africans. Tuberculosis (TB), a so-called "social disease" and a sensitive barometer of the general health status of a population has risen in the past few years, especially in the African and coloured population. Contrast the 1990 coloured TB rate of 599,7/100 000 to the 16,5/100 000 for whites. These statistics bear testimony to the legacy of racial discrimination, amongst other things. However, health care in South Africa also reflects many of the problems associated internationally with modern medicine: its technological ineffectiveness in improving the overall health status of large populations, its rising economic costs, and the maldistribution of its resources.⁷ In South Africa these difficulties are intensified by unsuitable development strategies which fail to recognize the importance of providing for the population's basic needs.

According to Kane-Berman,⁸ South Africa's health services have a number of critical weaknesses:

First, there are structural flaws:

- Health services are fragmented both horizontally and vertically, with 14 departments and three levels of government all providing services to different – and to the same – groups. Public and private sector health care is uncoordinated, and not very cooperative, and the public is both under- and overserved by a health care system which both duplicates services and fails to meet essential basic needs.
- The private sector has expanded out of control, resulting in an over-supply of beds relative to the population served, while failing to meet the needs for emergency care, or of the masses, and draining the manpower resources of the public sector.
- Investment in high-tech, high income-generating equipment has led to an inappropriate use of scarce resources and an unwarranted increase in expensive investigations and procedures.

Second, there are socioeconomic weaknesses:

- Services are not affordable by the patients, the providers, the third party payers, or the state.
- Spiralling health costs and increasingly unaffordable subscriptions – for employers and employees – have driven many medical aid schemes to the brink of bankruptcy.
- Rapid urbanization has increased the incidence of degenerative "First World diseases" (resulting from changes in diet and lifestyle) among African and coloured communities living in the cities.
- Health services that are paid for by third party payers – the medical aid schemes – are subject to abuse. There are no limits to demands and expectations. Moral hazard is also evidenced in overservicing by providers.

Third, there are political weaknesses in the health services:

- Lack of political will to effect necessary changes.
- Lack of accountability to the majority of the population.
- Lack of community awareness of health service issues, so that there is minimal political pressure from the public for better services.
- Lack of community participation in health service decision-making.
- Resistance to change from powerful lobbies, such as health care professionals and workers via their councils, and the various associations and unions.

Fourth, resource distribution and utilization is equally flawed, which affects funding, facilities, and manpower:

- There is gross inequity between black and white, rich and poor, urban and rural areas, and between city and suburb, on the one hand, and the townships on the other.
- More than 50% of doctors are in private practice, but 80% of the people depend on public service medical staff.
- Facilities are incorrectly located and inaccessible, so that the poorest are worst served and have to travel the furthest.
- Overall, services are inadequate in terms of quantity, quality, and the scope of care.

Natras and Roux⁹ criticize the irrational basis for allocating health spending in South Africa, in that it is not meeting the greatest need in the communities:

...Rather than expenditure being a function of need, it appears to be dominated by the demands of existing bureaucracies and a preference on the part of medical personnel for a more capital-intensive curative approach. For example, of the 82 per cent of health spending allocated to non-homeland areas in South Africa, 76 per cent goes to provincial administrations (which administer curative hospital-centred health services), 18 per cent to the

Department of National Health, 4 per cent to the tricameral structures and only 2 per cent to local government.

Given that most primary health care occurs within the ambit of local government, it is evident that very little is allocated to primary health care.

The real tragedy of the situation is that as early as 1944, the National Health Services Commission under the chairmanship of Dr Gluckman recognized these faults and produced a plan which might have put good, free health care within reach of every South African by means of a national health service. It blamed the high level of disease largely on socio-economic conditions. It criticized the health services for being inadequate, uncoordinated, and misdirected and it emphasized prevention rather than cure.

Options for the future

Van Rensburg *et al*¹⁰ conceptualize the ideal health system for South Africa as a socially accountable system that provides effective, applicable health care for an acceptable standard at the lowest possible cost to the entire South African population in all its diversity. Such a system should meet the following demands:

- *Availability*: The entire spectrum of services and facilities must be distributed so as to allow people to use them readily.
- *Appropriateness and relevance*: A clear coordination must exist between the services available and the needs within the community.
- *Acceptability*: Services must be personally and socioculturally acceptable to the consumers.
- *Adaptability and flexibility*: The health system must continually be reinforced and synchronized with changing needs.
- *Accessibility*: The removal of all barriers in the way of need-based access to appropriate health care.
- *Affordability*: The cost of health services should be reasonable and no one should be barred from basic

care as a result of an inability to pay.

The ANC¹¹ believes that access to health care is a human right and should be based on the primary health care principles adopted by the WHO at Alma Ata in 1978. This essentially amounts to community development. It aims to reduce inequalities in access to health services, promotes equitable distribution based on appropriate technology, and integrates the many sectors of modern life, such as education and housing. The ANC proposes the creation of a comprehensive and integrated national health service, run by a single government structure dealing with health, which will coordinate all aspects of private and public health. This health service will also help correlate sanitation, water supply, fuel supply, food and agriculture, housing and other social services. In the longer term, most health care should be provided by the public health service by inducing private practitioners to return to the public sector. The ANC suggests that essential health care available at public health facilities will be free at point of service. However, since government resources are limited, those who can afford to will contribute to the cost of health care, either through general taxation, or by contributing to a national health or social insurance fund, or both.¹²

The final draft of the ANC's health policy, which was published on 18 May 1994, does not differ much from the above. It provides for an increase in state health spending of about R2 billion – financed largely by huge tax increases on tobacco and perhaps alcohol. It proposes a major revamp of South Africa's health services, leading to free medical care by the public sector for all children under the age of six years, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant mothers, and some chronically ill patients. The plan stresses primary health care, with emphasis on preventive and promotive care. Priority will be given to immunization programmes and nutrition intervention. It advocates a single national

health system to regulate private and public health care. A commission will be established to examine medical aids and the possible establishment of a national health insurance system.

The National Party (NP) government also made some suggestions regarding a new health dispensation for South Africa handing before over power to the Mandela government. Key aspects are that:

...the emphasis has shifted from sick people to the healthy, that the total physical, psychological and social needs of man must be addressed, that health care services must be community oriented and that the emphasis must shift from curative to preventative (primary) care and health promotion.¹³

The NP maintains that it remains the individual's responsibility to protect his own physical and mental wellbeing. It hence foresees a much larger role for the private sector and proposes a partnership between the two. The NP agrees with the ANC that financial ability should not have preference over the need for treatment. It calls for maximum decentralization in the organization of service rendering, with local government supplying all primary health care. It also foresees one single health department replacing the existing fourteen departments.¹⁴

Overall, the two most important issues of future health care in South Africa are that of primary health (on that there is little disagreement) and that of a national health service (on which there is much controversy).

Primary health care

Primary health care is based on eight critical elements:¹⁵

- education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of identifying, preventing and controlling them;
- promotion of food supply and proper nutrition;
- an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation;
- maternal and child health care, including family planning;

- immunization against the major infectious diseases;
- prevention and control of locally endemic diseases;
- appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and
- the provision of essential drugs.

Increasingly it is recognized that the health status of people is affected by many factors that are not traditionally seen as part of health services, such as the provision of clean water and basic sanitation. More importantly, it has been shown that primary health care can be delivered at a fraction of the cost and still achieve good results. For example, Sri Lanka spends only 1,7% of its GNP on health and yet has one of the highest life expectancy rates in the non-industrialized world, largely because of its commitment to basic needs policies. Natrass and Roux¹⁶ estimate (based on international experience) that comprehensive and high-impact primary health-care services can be provided at a cost of R12,50 per capita per year or at a total cost of R475 million (less than a tenth of 1989/90 health spending). They go on to say that a good quality primary health programme might produce savings by reducing pressure on more expensive curative facilities. Primary health projects rely heavily on social mobilization and community participation rather than on expanding state health bureaucracy, again minimizing costs.

The government in 1990 introduced primary health care projects in various regions in South Africa. With a budget of only R4 million, it was estimated that these projects made a primary health care accessible to at least 400 000 people. These projects relied heavily on the contributions from local authorities, NGOs, and the private sector.¹⁷ Unfortunately, although the government committed itself to primary health care, only 5% of the 1991/92 health budget was devoted to this purpose.¹⁸

National Health Service

South African health care is facing two contrasting policy frameworks, name-

ly privatization versus socialization. The NP government privatized many facets of the South African economy, including health services. This is partly due to their belief in the efficiency of the market, and is consistent with privatization efforts in the UK, USA and elsewhere. It is also a response to rising costs and fiscal pressure associated with increased use and higher average costs. Privatization can also be seen as a defensive strategy to help preserve the level of care to which the more affluent are accustomed. Some whites believe that desegregation will affect the quality of service and have thus turned to the private sector.¹⁹ In general, the arguments in favour of privatization include the following:²⁰

- Privatization reduces the costs to the state of health care because patients have to pay for it themselves.
- If people have to pay for health care, the tendency to overuse health services can be considerably reduced.
- Privatization permits a range of levels of health care to be offered by providers, increasing consumer choice.
- Where it is necessary for the government to intervene to ensure a minimum level of health for the indigent, the aged, etc, the government should subsidize the individual, not the institution. This is claimed to be cheaper for the government because private providers in a competitive market are more efficient than bureaucratically controlled, non-competitive public providers.

Whilst many would agree with the general benefits of privatization, it is largely held that the problems confronted by the health sector are unique, leading to non-optimal resource allocation. Perhaps of greatest importance is uncertainty. Consumers do not really understand how to gauge output in terms of

quantity or quality. Consumers often trust providers to determine the appropriate level of care, which establishes an evident clash of interest for the provider when compensation is on a fee for service basis and can lead to improper care.²¹

In a privatized system it is the patient's purchasing power that determines which services, if any, he or she can obtain. Van Rensburg *et al*²² warn that:

...[t]hereby the health sector is exposed to the more vulgar side-effects of a free health market and capitalism: inequalities in health care provision, financial exclusion and discrimination, a two-class health care system with first and second-rate services and first and second-class patients, blatant profit seeking, the unashamed development and further expansion of monopolistic interests, exploitation and misplaced values and priorities.

Benatar²³ calls privatization of health care "economically unsound, politically foolish, morally deficient and a potential major contributor to social conflict". A free market health system, although feasible, is an inappropriate model for South Africa because it will exacerbate existing imbalances, favouring the wealthy, on the one hand, and a curative-oriented system on the other.

At the other extreme, Van Rensburg *et al*²⁴ also characterize a socialist health care system as a currently unfeasible model for South Africa. Characteristics of socialist health care systems include:

...complete state control of the organisation, financing and provision of care; collective resources and mechanisms or methods of financing; decentralised, democratic health care planning amidst central management; and the neutralisation of opposition against the process of socialisation, typically by means of the deprofessionalisation of the health professions.²⁵

On the other hand, the above authors see a national health service as the capitalist version of a socialist health system. Here the principles of egalitarian health care provision are retained, but the process of financing is adapted to reconcile these values with the

capitalist political economy. The financial resources for health care are generated by a combined system of income and consumers' tax. The typical method of remuneration to providers in a national health service is by means of a capitation fee, the provider's "salary" being determined by the number of patients treated, again stimulating competition among providers. The state retains the right to deploy providers according to a quota policy so as to eliminate the maldistribution which would arise in a market system. A national health service is therefore seen as a feasible and applicable model of a socially accountable health care provision for South Africa.²⁶

Van Rensburg *et al*²⁷ believe that a national health insurance (NHI) is a necessary transitional measure to a national health service, because the first step thereto is the centralization of health care financing. Essentially, this entails a national insurance system in which employers and employees transfer their current contributions to various medical schemes to a single, national financing concern, which already administers public health funds. The consumers receive health care "free" at the point of service to the degree in which health services are subsidized by this central financing agent.

Unfortunately NHI, like most other insurance, runs the risk of moral hazard. If medical insurance pays the bills in full, the private costs facing doctors and patients are zero, even though the social cost is positive and usually considerable. This results in inefficiency owing to the overconsumption of medical care. Moral hazard also includes a lack of preventive concern when relatively costless care is taken for granted. The more complete the cover and the lower the psychic loss from the insured event, the less individuals have to bear the consequences of their actions and hence the less the incentive to behave as though they bore the loss themselves. Moral hazard can be reduced, though not eliminated, by imposing some of the cost on the individual using assorted ploys:

frequent claimants pay higher premiums; deductibles make the insured pay the first Rx of any claim; with coinsurance, the insured pays x% of any claim. Adverse selection and moral hazards are fundamentally information problems. The problem is solved if the principal (the insurer) has sufficient information to monitor the agent's (the insured's) behaviour.²⁸

The Centre For Health Policy at Wits University offers one of the most reasonable sets of proposals for future health care provision in South Africa. The Centre's proposals consist of:²⁹

- A central fund. This would receive income from general tax, as before. But it would also be fed by dedicated, earmarked contributions. These might be levied on salaries. So in the formal sector, payslips would have a line "National Health Insurance Contribution".
- The fund would pay for the suitably cost-effective care of all South Africans, whether or not they were national health insurance contributors.
- The health care would actually be administered by both public and private providers.

In essence, then, the proposal is for mixed provision and public finance.

Such a system would not entail immediate and disruptive reorganization of the providers, but using its monopsonist's power, the central fund could encourage private providers to administer more cost-effective and equitable care. Richer patients will still be allowed to buy services refused on the national health insurance by taking out private top-up insurance against such an eventuality. Collecting taxes from the informal sector will be encouraged by providing contributors with certain frills (such as appointments at primary providers, rather than waiting in line at afternoon surgery). The problem with this monopsonistic situation is the resulting exploitation of medical practitioners (MRP exceeding their resource price ie their wage). The fact that doc-

tors are paid depressed wages will serve to dissuade people from entering the medical profession and even encourage the emigration of good medical personnel. Inefficiencies and deteriorating quality may result owing to the lack of competition and the lack of financial incentive. The Centre goes on to suggest that public expenditure on health financed by the general exchequer be held constant at 3,2% of GDP, but that the proportion of GDP spent publicly on health increase to around 6% via a "pay-roll health insurance tax". The question is whether this is feasible given all the other demands on incremental tax revenue.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates the necessity for the restructuring of health services in South Africa, because of various existing inefficiencies and poor results. It is widely acknowledged that resources need to be shifted towards primary care, given its low cost and positive fruits. However, this will be no easy task owing to numerous powerful interest groups which will lose out during this redistribution. The question of a NHS is even more complex. On the one hand, there is a case to be made for restricting the role of government simply to more basic preventive care. On the other hand, it can be argued that this will simply reinforce existing inequalities, as the majority of the population cannot afford private health care or medical aids. A NHI, run by the state but financed primarily by private contributions, seems to be the most likely alternative even though it may entail extensive corruption (eg via moral hazard). The final outcome, like everything else in South Africa, will depend on the politics of the day, which may not necessarily be in the true interests of the country.

References

- 1 E Karlsson and J Mentz. "Health and development". *Development Southern Africa*, vol 2, no 2, 1985, p 262.
- 2 South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race relations survey 1991/92*. Johannesburg: SAIRR. 1992. p 115.

- 3 D McIntyre and R Dorrington, "Trends in the distribution of South African health care expenditure", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 178, 1990, p 128.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 S van der Berg, "Meeting the aspirations of South Africa's poor", *Monitor*, April 1990, p 74.
- 6 South African Institute of Race Relations. *Race relations survey 1992/93*, Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1993, p 279.
- 7 M Savage and S Benatar, "An analysis of health and health services", in R Schrire (ed), *Critical choices for South Africa*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990, p 147.
- 8 J Kane-Berman, "Critical weaknesses and solid strengths in the health system", *Race Relations News*, vol 54, no 2, 1992.
- 9 N Nattrass and A Roux, "Making welfare spending work", in P Moll et al, *Redistribution*, Claremont: David Philip, 1991, p 93.
- 10 H van Rensburg, A Fourie and E Pretorius, *Health care in South Africa*, Pretoria: Academica, 1992, p 364.
- 11 African National Congress, *Ready to govern*. ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa adopted at the National Conference held on 28–31 May 1992.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 "Negotiating the switch to primary health care", *Hospital Supplies*, March 1992, pp 44–45.
- 14 Department of National Health and Population Development, *Points of departure in developing a new social welfare dispensation for the RSA*, Pretoria: Department of National Health and Population Development, 1992.
- 15 "Negotiating the switch to primary health care", *op cit*, p 44.
- 16 N Nattrass and A Roux, *op cit*, p 95.
- 17 "Meeting the needs of the disadvantaged", *Salus*, vol 15, no 4, 1992, p 5.
- 18 South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race relations survey 1991/92*, *op cit*, p 109.
- 19 P Hilsenrath and H Joseph, "Health economics: Issues for South Africa", *South African Journal of Economics*, vol 59, no 2, 1991, p 150.
- 20 M Price, "Health care beyond apartheid", *Critical Health*, no 8, 1987, p 8.
- 21 P Hilsenrath and H Joseph, *op cit*, p 148.
- 22 H van Rensburg *et al*, *op cit*, p 374.
- 23 S Benatar, "A unitary Health Service for South Africa", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 77, 1990, p 444.
- 24 H van Rensburg *et al*, *op cit*.
- 25 *Ibid*, p 391.
- 26 *Ibid*, p 393.
- 27 *Ibid*, p 394.
- 28 N Barr, "Economic theory and the welfare state: A survey and interpretation", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol 30, no 2, 1992, p 753.
- 29 J Picard, "Towards a National Health Insurance system", in Coetzer *et al*, *Social safety nets*, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, 1992, p 3.

Local government reform: The Zambian case

Professor B C Chikulo, head of the Department of Development Studies at the University of Botswana, considers some of the problems experienced in attempting to reform local government in Zambia.



It has now become abundantly clear that Africa is experiencing a new wave of democratization. However, with this process comes the important need to foster an environment which not only encourages but also sustains the rule of law, human rights, popular participation, public accountability and transparency in government. Democratization, therefore, requires not only institutional pluralism, but also independent institutions, such as an independent judiciary, an impartial civil service, an effective parliament and a strong and autonomous local government structure. In short, what is really required is good governance based on the principle of separation of powers.

Of great importance in this regard is the fact that the move from one-party regimes to multi-party systems has necessitated a number of reforms to prepare the ground for pluralism. During the post-independence era of one-party and military regimes in Africa, the civil service was highly "politicized" and local government was either non-existent or was turned into a mere appendage of the ruling party. It is therefore obvious that a move to a multi-party system will require the reorganizing and restructuring of public administration. First, the civil service and local government have to be "de-linked" from the ruling

party. Secondly, measures have to be undertaken to strengthen democratic control over public administration and increase its accountability to democratically elected bodies. Administrative reform is therefore undoubtedly an inseparable part of the democratization process.

Zambia was among the first countries to succumb to the clamour for democracy. Pressures for multi-party democracy led to the scrapping of the one-party system on 17 December 1990 and to the introduction of political pluralism.¹ The first general elections under the new multi-party constitution (Act 1 of 1991) were held on 31 October 1991, heralding an end to 19 years of one-party rule and a crushing defeat for the former veteran President K D Kaunda and his party – the United National Independent Party (UNIP) – at the hands of the opposition – the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). The Zambian elections set a precedent in Africa not only in the peaceful transition from one-party rule to a multi-party democracy. The introduction of multi-party democracy ushered in Zambia's Third Republic and ended the ruling party's constitutional paramountcy over the civil service and state apparatus at all levels. As a consequence, the civil service and the entire state apparatus had to be "de-linked" from the ruling party (UNIP). The official "end of marriage between UNIP and the State" came on 4 September 1991

with the adoption of a new constitution.

This article analyses the impact of the democratization process on local government reform in Zambia. Zambia's experience is obviously relevant for the process of democratization and administrative reform in Africa as a whole.

Background

The proclamation of a one-party state in Zambia in 1972 ushered in Zambia's Second Republic, outlawed all opposition parties and granted the ruling party – UNIP – constitutional paramountcy over the civil service and state apparatus at all levels. In other words, all state institutions were “linked” (married) to the ruling party. The result was increased centralism, politicization and the strengthening of party control over the civil service, local government and other government institutions. With regard to local government, centralization and politicization were reinforced by the enactment of the Local Administration Act 15 of 1980, which came into force on 1 January 1981.² The objective of the Act was:

[t]o ensure an effective integration of the primary organs of the Party and other local administration units in the district.

The major structural change brought about by the Act was the abolition of the distinction between the ruling political party and central and local government. This involved the creation of a politico-administrative structure composed of party functionaries and officials from central and local government. As a result, a single structure incorporating government and party functions, was set up in each of the 55 districts. By replacing the former tripartite local government structure and incorporating the party organization into the new system of local administration, the system was placed beyond what Leeman³ calls a “fused” or single hierarchy model of government at the district level.

This system was basically an attempt to create a kind of institutional synthesis between the ruling party

and central and local government, in order to enhance the “leading role” of the party. The end result was the transformation of local government into local administration.

As a point of clarity, local *government* refers to autonomous local bodies with a separate legal existence. They have their own budgets, with authority granted to them by the central government to handle substantial material resources and a range of different functions. Thus, the distinguishing feature of local government is possession of the following:

- a legal personality;
- specified powers to perform a range of functions; and
- substantial autonomy, especially in financial and staff matters, of course, subject to limited control from the central government.

The term *local administration*, on the other hand, is used whenever the criterion of “substantial autonomy” is considered to be absent or very limited. The term local administration should therefore be used whenever and wherever councils are stripped of their autonomy and transformed into mere administrative extensions or appendages of the central government field administration, implementing the policies of the central government, as was the case in Zambia under the one-party system.

The Local Government Act 22 of 1991

The process of “delinking” local administration from the central government and converting it into a fully fledged autonomous local government system, was set in motion by the enactment of the Local Government Act 22 of 1991, on 28 August 1991.

Objectives

The objectives of the Local Government Act were to:

- repeal the Local Administration Act 15 of 1980;
- make provision for an integrated three-tier local government system; and

- define the functions of local authorities.

In other words, the objective was to democratize local government in Zambia by introducing representative local councils. Consequently, the major structural change entailed by the Act was the reintroduction of the distinction between the ruling political party and central and local government.

Structural changes

The Local Government Act 22 of 1991 also introduced a mayoral system and made provision for different categories of representative local councils, ranging from city councils, municipal councils in urban areas, and district councils in outlying rural areas. The new structure therefore closely resembles what Leeman⁴ calls a “dual-hierarchy model”. In short, the intention was to reduce the powers of the central government and increase the powers of local authorities and thereby to empower local communities. The Act therefore represents, to some degree, a return to the kind of local government that existed in Zambia prior to the establishment of a one-party state. The structural changes entailed by the Act are summarized below.

Councils

The Act provides for different categories of representative councils ranging from city councils, municipal councils and district councils under the mayor in urban areas and chairman in rural areas.

Under the 1980 Act, each council operated under the chairmanship of a centrally appointed political appointee, called “district governor”. The district governor was not only a politico-administrative head but was also the state president's alter ego at district level. Under the new system, however, the mayor/chairman and their deputies are to be elected by the council from persons who are local councillors. These officers are to be elected annually at the first ordinary meeting of council after September in

that year. Furthermore, the Local Government Act 22 of 1991 stipulates that no person may hold office as mayor, deputy mayor, chairman or vice-chairman, of a council for more than two consecutive terms.

The council is a statutory deliberative and consultative body, concerned with the determination of broad policy objectives and the critical assessment of development programmes. It is responsible for the efficient and effective general management of the district. The council has the authority to decide on and formulate bylaws and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective running of local government in the district. Councils may also discharge all or any of the functions set out in the second schedule (section 61) of the Act, which include the following (among others):

- agriculture
- community development
- public amenities
- education
- public health
- public order
- sanitation and drainage

Composition of councils

Under the Local Administration Act of 1980, the composition of councils was weighted in favour of political appointees. Furthermore, even the district local representatives were not directly elected by local residents but chosen by the elected ruling party officials. In other words, party members elected officials and they, in turn, elected the chairmen from among their own ranks; the elected chairmen of the party ward committees automatically became councillors on the district council.⁵ Since the councillors were selected through the party machinery rather than open elections, the Local Administration Act improved the participation of local party members and excluded the majority of the local residents who were not party members. As a result, the majority of the population had little say in the running of local councils.

The Local Government Act 22 of 1991 abolished the old system of electing councillors and introduced the principle of majority elections to councils irrespective of political party affiliation. In other words, councillors do not have to necessarily belong to the ruling party; they could be members of any registered political party or even independent candidates. According to the Local Government Elections Act 26 of 1991, section 16:

... a person shall be qualified for election as a councillor of any council if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless –

- (a) he is a citizen of Zambia
- (b) he has attained the age of twenty-one years; and
- (c) he is ordinarily resident in the area of that council.

The Act gives every citizen who is registered as a voter the chance to vote for the candidate of his choice, no matter which political party that candidate belongs to. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the effectiveness of city and municipal councils, the Local Government Act also introduced the aldermanic system: any person who has held office as a councillor for more than ten years in council, qualifies for appointment as alderman. The significance of this system of local representation is that decisions affecting the local communities are now to be made at the appropriate level, by genuine local representatives.

Committee system

The Local Government Act also provides for a system of standing and occasional committees. It therefore requires any council consisting of more than six councillors to establish a finance committee, and allows any council to appoint such other standing and occasional committees as may be necessary. The Act has therefore reasserted the committee system as the pivot of the system of local government administration. The committee system entails breaking up the council workload into functional units usually referred to as “standing committees”, viz: finance, general

purposes, housing, health and amenities, etc.

Thus the Act has made provisions for substantial freedom for councils to establish committees, composed wholly or in part of individuals who are members of the council. As noted above, the finance committee is the only standing committee which is statutory under the Act and councils are therefore obliged to bring it into being for the purpose of:

- (a) advising the council on financial matters; and
- (b) discharging such functions of the council relating to finance as may be delegated to it under this Act or as may be conferred or imposed upon it by or under any other written law.

As a mechanism to safeguard against mismanagement, a council may abolish any committee other than the finance committee established under section 31(3) of the Act.

Finance

Finance is of the essence of any local authority's life; consequently, financial powers have been vested in councils which will draw up their own budgets. However, the Act has also increased legislative constraints by reintroducing the tight reign exercised by the central government over local government finances prior to 1980.⁶

Under the Local Administration Act of 1980, councils could make their own regulations for the general control and management of their finances. However, under the Local Government Act of 1991 (section 46(1)), it is the minister in charge of local government who has the authority to make financial regulations for the control and management of the finances of councils. Furthermore, while under the previous system, the councils' annual estimates of expenditure and revenue were approved directly by parliament; under the 1991 Act, the estimates have to be approved by the minister. The intention of these provisions, according to the government, is to impose uniformity and minimum standards upon councils countrywide.

In addition, while councils may raise the money required to discharge their functions by means of bank loans, the issue of stocks and bonds, by mortgage or from any other source, they are prohibited from borrowing money or receiving grants of money from foreign governments or organizations.

Unfortunately, the Local Government Act 22 of 1991 does not give sufficient consideration to the issue of local government finance. It has been pointed out elsewhere⁷ that the paucity of any significant sources of local revenue have in the past proved to be major constraints on the effective operation of councils owing to the fact that the financial structures of councils varied considerably: big councils in urban areas (especially city councils) were almost financially independent of central government in so far as their recurrent expenditure was concerned; councils in rural areas, on the other hand, had a very weak resource base and were therefore heavily dependent on the central government for grants. Since the Local Government Act of 1991 has not resolved this issue, the latter category of councils will continue to be dependent on central government for most of their financial needs.

The relationship between central and local government

With the enactment of the Local Government Act of 1991, local government employees ceased to be members of the Public Service Commission. Instead, the Act has made provision for the establishment of a separate cadre of local government employees by creating a unified Local Government Service, which is to consist of all persons employed by and receiving a salary or wages from a council and such authorities which provide local government services. Members of the Local Government Service Commission are appointed by the state president and serve on a full-time basis for at least a two-year term. The responsibilities of the Local Government Service Commission include the following:

- confirmation of appointments and promotions of such categories of officers as may be specified in the regulations;
- review of disciplinary cases from councils relating to officers and employees of such councils;
- hearing of appeals on disciplinary matters from officers and employees; and
- establishment of a national grading scheme.

The decisions of the Local Government Service Commission are binding upon the councils and employees, subject to appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed, the above system is also intended to provide senior local authority officials, and to a lesser extent their subordinates, with not only the incentive of a structured career but also with the protection against unfair discrimination and ill-treatment by the mayor or councillors.

Furthermore, the creation of a unified career system for local government in which local authority staff are employed locally but organized nationwide in a single service parallel to the Public Service Commission, reflects a desire to promote efficiency and professionalism in local government. In addition, a separate pension system for local government employees was created under the Local Authorities Superannuation (Amendment) Act 27 of 1991.

Problems and prospects

The Zambian government attached great importance to the new system of local government and was anxious to see an appreciable improvement in the management of councils. Unfortunately the record thus far has not been very encouraging.

Financial position

I have noted elsewhere⁸ that local government finance is a major obstacle to effective local government administration. A cursory examination of local newspaper commentaries⁹ reveals that the question of local government finance remains one of

the most intractable problems. Almost all the councils operate on a shoe-string budget and survive on government subventions. Furthermore, a number of councils, especially those in rural areas, are not only unable to meet their obligations but cannot even manage to pay their workers monthly wages and salaries.¹⁰

A number of efforts have been made to resuscitate the councils and turn them into independent and self-sustaining institutions. These include:

- the resumption of government grants to councils;
- the freezing of council debts to the government; and
- intensified revenue collection exercises.

Provision of social services

Although the new councils are expected to take charge of development and provide services in their areas of jurisdiction, their precarious financial position has meant that councils have been unable to meet their statutory functions and obligations. Indeed, concern is increasingly being expressed over the operation and functioning of councils. As the editorial of the *Times of Zambia* of 30 June 1993 put it:

Municipal councils in this country need to be steered in the right direction. It is a source of concern that there is more continuity than change even after the local government elections. There is very little evidence of a new start. This may of course be inevitable given the years of inertia, neglect and financial deprivation. Even so there should be a clear effort to break with the past at least in terms of policy. But even in that field they appear largely hamstrung.

In short, the services that councils should provide to the public have still not materialized.

Coordination

Under the previous system, all government departments in the district were answerable to the council and were required to submit progress reports to council secretariats, even though the system had its own problems. With the introduction of the new mayoral system of local govern-

ment, coordination between councils and government departments seems to have suffered a major setback. Departments now report directly to their provincial headquarters who, in turn, report to their ministerial headquarters in the capital city of Lusaka. In the process, coordination and planning at district level suffers without the much-needed inputs from government departments such as labour, education, works and roads.

Political issues

Councils have also been plagued with political problems. These have been three-fold.

Public apathy

The local government elections for councillors under the new system were held on 30 November 1992. These elections seemed to signal the end of the process of democratizing local government. The ruling party, MMD, captured about three-quarters of the 1190 council seats (in 400 of them there was no opposition). The United Democratic Party, a splinter group that broke away from the former ruling UNIP, won 18 council seats, mostly in the rural areas of North-Western Province. Unfortunately, despite the huge and expensive publicity campaign, the local government elections were marred by voter apathy. Indeed, in some wards, less than 10% of registered voters bothered to turn up and cast their ballot.¹¹

Political interference

Secondly, there have been complaints of political interference in the administration of local councils. A spokesperson for the Institute of Local Government Administrators of Zambia blamed the failure of local authorities on political interference and called for

the granting of real autonomy for councils. As he aptly put it:

Councils in the last Republic [under the one-party state] failed to tick because the central government usurped their role ... and that putting local authorities in straight jackets choked development and bred poor standards which *still haunted the new [democratic] era*.¹²

Similarly, Lusaka City Council accused former Local Government Minister, Michael Sata, of interfering in the running of the council to such an extent that it has led not only to financial loss¹³ but also to political infighting among councillors belonging to the ruling party, MMD.

Inconsistencies and ambiguities in the Local Government Act

There are complaints that the Local Government Act 22 of 1991 has vested "too much power" in the Minister of Local Government,¹⁴ but in addition to that problem the Act has a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities. This has created needless conflict between the councils, the Local Government Service Commission and the minister – especially with regard to appointments, promotions, retirements and transfers of council staff and employees. The Act therefore needs to be reviewed and amended.

The above constraints have been a major hindrance to the effective functioning of the new authorities in Zambia.

Conclusion

Local government reform is part and parcel of the democratization process currently in ascendance on the African continent. In Zambia, the enactment of the Local Government Act 22 of 1992, which provides for an autonomous and democratically elected local government system, was a reaction to the over-centralized and

over-politicized local administration system that obtained under the one-party regime.

However, while the Zambian Government has fully accepted the fact that a strong, independent and democratic local government system is a vital part of any functioning democratic system, the institutionalization of the new system of local government presents difficulties that cannot easily be surmounted.

Notes and references

- 1 M Bratton, "Zambia starts over", *Journal of Democracy*, vol 3, no 2, 1992, pp 81–94.
- 2 B C Chikulo, "Reorganization in Zambia: An analysis of the Local Administration Act 1980", *Public Administration and Development*, vol 5, no 1, 1985, pp 73–81.
- 3 A F Leeman, *Changing patterns of local government*, The Hague: IVLA, 1970.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 See B C Chikulo, *op cit*, p 79.
- 6 See B C Chikulo, "The Zambian Local Administration Act, 1980: Problems of implementation", *Planning and Administration*, vol 16, no 1, 1989, pp 62–67; C M Chitoshi, "Suggestions for improving the financing of local administration in Zambia", *Planning and Administration*, vol 11, no 2, 1984; K J Davey, "The changing patterns of local government: From McKenzie to McKinsey", *World Development*, vol 2, no 2, 1974, pp 71–72.
- 7 B C Chikulo, "The Zambian Local Administration Act, 1980 ...", *op cit*; C M Chitoshi, *op cit*.
- 8 B C Chikulo, "The Zambian Local Administration Act, 1980 ...", *op cit*, p 64.
- 9 *Zambia Daily Mail*, 19 January 1993; *Sunday Mail*, 28 June 1992; *The Weekly Post*, 26 March–1 April 1993.
- 10 *Times of Zambia*, 31 December 1992.
- 11 *Africa Confidential*, vol 34, no 3, 5 February 1993; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 20 December 1992.
- 12 *Times of Zambia*, 21 September 1992 (emphasis added).
- 13 *The Weekly Post*, 5–11 March 1993; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 5 September 1993.
- 14 *Times of Zambia*, 12 March 1992.

Street children

Robert Peacock, of the Department of Criminology, University of Transkei, discusses the phenomenon of street children as a symptom of socio-political change in South Africa with specific reference to the criminogenesis of a street life style.



When societies are in transition there is usually an upsurge in the numbers of street children. Ample examples of such increases can be found in history, for example one can refer to the occurrence of street children during the Industrial Revolution, or even more recently, as a result of World War II. Often, social disruption is characterized by urbanization, political instability, family disintegration and poverty, all of which contribute to the acceptance of a street life style.¹ In South Africa, it is mainly the black family that is exposed to social turmoil. Violence in the townships, and inadequate social welfare services make a street life style preferable to that of a family life that is characterized by poverty, alcohol abuse and parental rejection.

Against the background of this socio-political system, the main objective of this article is to present an analysis of the interaction between the street child phenomenon and individual factors responsible for the commitment of crime once the child arrives on the street. The following discussion will indicate that street children are by no means a new phenomenon. The terminology might be new, but the manner and extent of its occurrence changes only with regard to time and locality. Every so often, these children are the victims of social change and they have to survive the brutality of a

street life in order to cope with social turmoil.

Historical perspective

Ancient times (about eighth century BC)

During this period, the phenomenon of street children was virtually unknown, primarily as a result of ancient Roman law, which provided the father with unlimited power over his children. The father's power to decide over the fate of his children often caused unwanted children to be assassinated or to be sold off as slaves. Hence, few children were left to fend for themselves.²

From this, one could argue that the street child phenomenon was primarily prevented by the "easy" and at times "profitable" manner in which unwanted children were dealt with.

Middle Ages

In contrast to ancient times, one can surmise with greater clarity that street children occurred during the Middle Ages. In this regard, Agnelli³ states that during the year 1212 nomadic children were noticed in the rural areas of Europe. Against the background of famine and civil war, these children survived by raiding villages. Eventually, many of them were captured in the south of France and Italy and sold off as slaves.

Nineteenth century

During the Industrial Revolution, street children were a common sight in Europe. Large numbers (30 000) of dirty and naked abandoned children were for example noticed in London.⁴ Their dreadful circumstances were also recorded in literature. Charles Dickens' *Oliver Twist* and Victor Hugo's *Les misérables* testify to the plight of street children.

Social change, urbanization and poverty associated with the Industrial Revolution were largely deemed responsible for this phenomenon. These changes had especially a degenerative effect on the families of that time. As a result of family disintegration, many children had to seek refuge on the street.

Twentieth century

Gangs of urban youths (called *besprizorni*) were noticed during the Russian Revolution (1917) in Russia. The Russian Revolution was characterized by social turmoil not dissimilar to that of the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century. Within the context of civil war and famine, many children were forced to survive on the street. This they did through begging, theft or the performance of odd jobs. Estimates indicate that during this period there were about 6 000 000 street children, or rather, *besprizorni*, in Russia.

Also, with the focus on the twentieth century, the period 1930–1940 is of special significance. Because of the world-wide economic depression many children were compelled to leave their parental homes, and once again, to live as nomads on the street.⁵

Statistics obtained during and after World War II are very unreliable. Valuable data concerning street children could have been lost. However, this period was also characterized by urbanization, family disintegration and poverty.⁶ When considering the foregoing historical perspective on street children, one can surmise that these factors also contributed to the occurrence of street children during this period.

Although street children occurred through the ages, it was only during the late 1960s that this phenomenon was recognized as a serious problem. The media reported a "staggering increase" of children who ran from their parental homes to join the hippies in large cities such as San Francisco. According to estimates there were about 1 000 000 juveniles who were leading a street life style in the USA in 1973.⁷

In South Africa, it was only during 1957 that notice was taken of the appalling conditions under which black street children had to fend for themselves. Two journalists, Motsisi and Magubane, attributed this phenomenon to the forced removal scheme of the National Party. According to them, many black parents were separated from their children when they were forced by the government to vacate their residential areas in order to make way for white development. The parents could either not "prove" to the Resettlement Board that they were the parents of their children, or the children refused to move to the new (inferior) allocated residential areas. Motsisi and Magubane concluded that the "menacing young vultures" were in fact the direct result of apartheid.

Apartheid

Apartheid legislation, such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, placed an additional burden on the black family that was undergoing (and still is) a process of Westernization. This Act prohibited a black child from staying with his parents when they were working in a so-called "white residential area". As a result, many children were placed under the supervision of a relative, acquaintance or even a stranger who lived in a black township. In the absence of parental love and guidance, many black children roamed the streets in order to compensate for this unnatural situation.

Large-scale family disruption was also the result of the South African government's homeland policy. Influx control – which was abolished only in 1986 – ruled it illegal for a black man

to take his family with him once he had secured employment outside the borders of his homeland. When influx control was abolished, many blacks streamed to the major cities outside their homelands, where they experienced the typical problems of urbanization such as poverty and housing shortages.

Inadequate social welfare services did little to ameliorate the position of the black family. In 1986, for example, there were only eleven registered "children's homes" available to blacks in comparison with the seventy-six "homes" available to whites, despite a population ratio of five blacks to one white.⁹ Whereas white children in need of care could have been accommodated in children's homes, black children, almost invariably, had to survive on the street.

Bantu education was implemented as the cornerstone of apartheid. Its aim was to make it impossible for blacks to compete with whites in almost all spheres of South African society.¹⁰ Inferior schooling and concomitant poverty forced many black children to leave their parental homes – sometimes in spite of love and care – in order to support their families financially. In some instances, street children left their parental homes in the hope of receiving formal education after their local schools had been burned down by the "comrades".¹¹

The heritage of apartheid is inescapable in contemporary South Africa. Politically motivated killings, violence in the schools, unemployment, dislocation and relocation of families, as well as an erosion of all structures people depend on for their very existence, are all factors responsible for an upsurge in the numbers of black street children in South Africa.

Stress in the families of street children

In the light of the foregoing depiction of socio-political turmoil, it should not surprise one that the black family is exposed to severe stress. Analysis of interviews conducted with twenty black street children in Johannesburg, South Africa, indicated a positive

correlation between family stress and the acceptance of a street life style. Although no generalizations can be made from the data gathered with regard to the total universum of street children in South Africa, the interviews reflected the individual's experience of stress, and should serve to initiate further research with bigger samples and control groups.

With reference to table 1, it is clear that a variety of factors precipitate a child's arrival on the street. Not only is poverty prevalent amongst the families of all the respondents (100%), but the fears and feelings of the futility of poverty were aggravated by alcohol abuse, which in turn contributed to child abuse and rejection. Sello, a respondent, says the following: "My parents and us children were always fighting about food because my parents were always drunk. I left home because of this fighting and also to bring some money home." Themba, another respondent, says: "I left home because I want to work for my family to get money and food for them. I do this by means of prostitution."

Table 1: Family stress in the lives of street children

| Stress | Frequency | % |
|----------------------------|-----------|-----|
| Parental rejection | 16 | 80 |
| Strict parental discipline | 13 | 65 |
| Parental alcohol abuse | 15 | 75 |
| Poverty | 20 | 100 |

Analysis of the interviews indicate that once the majority of subjects found themselves on the street, they committed crimes owing to the interaction between individual factors and the social environment. Personality determinants such as constitutional, group membership, role and situational, were all of special significance.

Personality determinants

Constitutional determinants

Constitution refers to the sum of the individual's physical characteristics at any given moment. It includes, therefore, a wide variety of elements. However, the most important are considered to be age, gender, physical body type and skin pigmentation.¹²

Personality will primarily be the result of the interaction between constitutional variables and the social environment. Rephrasing constitution to a socio-constitutional determinant will therefore be more apt in the quest to explain crime. In this regard one can refer to the interaction between skin pigmentation and crime. Although blacks are often disproportionately represented in crime statistics in countries such as South Africa and the USA,¹³ it is not because of their skin pigmentation per se. It is a matter of a social reaction towards their skin pigmentation. Blacks are for example more likely to be viewed as possible offenders by the police and are also given more harsh sentences for their crimes than in the case of their white counterparts.¹⁴

Also, when attention is given to the foregoing historical depiction of apartheid, it is evident that racial discrimination is not only reflected in lack of opportunity, but it is also reflected in its interaction with other constitutional determinants. In this regard, one can refer to age which

caused many subjects – usually the oldest children – to leave their socio-economic disadvantaged homes in order to support their families financially. Without the appropriate academic qualifications, crime (such as prostitution) becomes a survival mechanism, albeit paradoxically. Also, being *pre-pubertal*, the majority of subjects (65%) could fulfil the sexual needs of white paedophile clients.

Against the background of their inferior social status (being merely dirty-looking black street children), their *weak* and *underdeveloped* physiques did not pose much of a physical threat to the child abuser, but 85% of the subjects were also victimized by members of the police, adult criminals, and the general public.

Finally, in order to cope with the harshness of a street life style, 75% of the respondents use drugs. The twelve-year-old Moses says the following: "I sniff glue because I don't get hungry. It makes me feel warm and strong." *Biological* needs such as hunger and cold were also responsible for the respondents committing crimes such as burglary, theft, shoplifting and prostitution. Of the respondents (90%) were prostituting to escape hunger, 80% committed burglary to avoid hunger and cold, and because of hunger 75% were involved with theft. Daniel describes his predicament of having to choose between biological survival and crime as: "I want to stop with prostitution because afterwards I feel sick. But I need to eat."

The street child's constitution is not the only determinant of his involvement with crime. The peer group also plays an important part.

Group membership determinant

The social group to which the individual belongs, or wishes to belong, contributes to the formation of his personality. Membership influences personality because the group exposes the individual to a specific social environment and value system.¹⁵

Durkheim and Hirshi are of the opinion that group integration may result in group control of the individual's needs. The intensity of group control is nevertheless dependent on the degree to which the individual is committed to the interests of the group.¹⁶

Cohen¹⁷ emphasizes that crime is primarily the result of group integration. Crime follows in that the needs of the individual are controlled by that of the group. Through their resistance of middle class values, a working class group may therefore expect of the juvenile to subject his needs to the needs of the group and accordingly, commit crime with the group.

Erikson is of the opinion that the child may regain lost ego integrity within the group. In other words, the peer group provides an environment

of security to the child, which in turn assists him to recover lost dignity.¹⁸

As a result of the importance that the peer group holds for the child, the child may alter his personality in order to adapt to the group. The child may acquire an attitude that could favour the committal of crime, for example, an attitude that could rationalize crime, or the committal of crime can be positively reinforced by the group.¹⁹

Sutherland (cited by Bartollas)²⁰ is of the opinion that it is also in group context that the *modus operandi* of various crimes are taught. In the view of various researchers,²¹ the peer group introduces the majority of subjects to crimes such as prostitution (90%) and drug abuse (93%). The importance of crime within the context of the respondents' peer group is reflected in table 2.

Table 2: Crimes committed by the friends of the subjects

| Crimes | Frequency | % |
|--------------|-----------|-----|
| Robbery | 4 | 20 |
| Burglary | 9 | 45 |
| Theft | 18 | 90 |
| Assault | 4 | 20 |
| Prostitution | 20 | 100 |
| Drug abuse | 20 | 100 |
| Shoplifting | 15 | 75 |
| Motor theft | 2 | 10 |

From table 2 it is clear that a wide variety of crimes were committed by the peer group. All of their friends were involved with drug abuse and prostitution, whilst theft was committed by 90% of their friends and shoplifting by 75%.

The criminal influence of the peer group was furthermore highlighted by the high percentage (90%) of subjects who indicated that they were more often than not obedient towards their peer group. The subordination of their personal needs to that of the group did not only manifest in crime, but also reflected the need to be loved and accepted. In this regard, Swart²² is of the opinion that one of the greatest fears of street children is not being maltreated physically, but ending up alone and unloved.

Although the street child's peer group is very supportive and compensates for his immediate pathological environment, as well as for trauma experienced previously within family context,²³ a predisposition to commit crimes within group context may already have been prevalent as a result of the role personality determinant.

Role personality determinant

The specific cultural environment in which the individual finds himself is responsible for defining the roles expected of him. Therefore, as a result of minimum cultural bonding, the individual might be confused about his culturally prescribed role.²⁴ Murray, in support of Freud and Jung, is also of the opinion that in addition to its directive value, culture is responsible for the repression of anti-social

instincts and needs.²⁵ For the community to survive, the individual needs to be socialized according to acceptable societal expectations.

Merton (cited by Mannheim)²⁶ is of the opinion that the criminal is confused about his culturally prescribed role. A lack of culturally institutionalized norms and values promotes non-conformity towards institutionalized norms and values. Therefore, crime is not only related to cultural alienation, but also threatens the survival of the community, especially if this cultural alienation occurs in a society where problems such as poverty and family disintegration are rife.

According to Murray, cultural alienation stems from inadequate superego formation, primarily as the result of insufficient conveyance of cultural val-

ues to the child by the family, church and school.²⁷

Because of the influence of Freud, it is accepted as a truism that parent-child relationships strongly influence personality development. Within cultural context, parents transfer specific societal values and norms to the child. The family could, therefore, play a key role in the socialization of the child. With reference to the typical problems prevalent in the families of many street children,²⁸ it is doubtful whether it could act as an appropriate cultural agent. Moreover, the street child becomes increasingly alienated from his family owing to his street life style.

Next to the family, the church plays an important part in the transfer of cultural values. Religion forms an integrated part of almost all cultures and is mostly transferred to the child within the context of a church. It is also within the framework of religion that a child could learn what is acceptable and what is unacceptable behaviour. Although church attendance plays an important part, it must be emphasized that church attendance does not imply religiousness, or the acceptance of religious norms and values. An individual's commitment towards his faith is of more importance. But it is also the case that the weaker the commitment, the greater the possibility of church absence. For example, Smith²⁹ discovered that more non-delinquents than delinquents attended church. The preventive influence of religion in conjunction with church attendance was absent amongst most of the juvenile delinquents.

In agreement with the research of Smith,³⁰ the majority of respondents (65%) did not attend church. They did not only indicate that they disliked attending church services, but also that the churches were situated too far from where they lived. Given the population density and urban character of the area in which they lived, churches were in abundance, but race groups other than white were not always welcome in all of the churches.

Reasons for those subjects (35%) who were attending church regularly,

were closely correlated to the hostile and deprived nature of a street life style. Vincent says: "I go to church because I don't want to steal" and Moses continues: "I go to church because I see other people are happy at the church. I also want to get happy with them."

The school complements the function of the family and church in transferring cultural values and norms. The school does not only educate, but also socializes. It could therefore have a positive and directive influence over the child, which in turn could assist the child in meeting the demands of society.³¹

Despite the recent reforms in South Africa, it is still not compulsory for black children to attend school. Even if they do attend school, they do not benefit much from the school as an educational and cultural agency, primarily because of the inferior quality of the black education system. The aim of Bantu education was that "... natives [were to] be taught from childhood that equality with Europeans [was] not for them" and that "... there is no place for the Bantu in the European society above the level of certain forms of labour".³² As has been mentioned before, symptoms of this discrimination are still very much part of contemporary South Africa. Overcrowded schools plagued by violence do not only lack facilities, but are faced with the added problem that the cultural aspirations of blacks are not catered for by the white-based curricula. For example, history books deal predominantly with the history of whites, whereas blacks are mainly portrayed as obstacles to white interests.³³

With regard to the respondents' exposure to school, all of them (100%) left school prematurely. They also enrolled at school for the first time at a very advanced age. The average age for starting their school careers was nine years. An educational system providing blacks with the same quality of education available to whites would have ensured that the respondents benefited more from school, and also from an earlier age.

Moreover, the school could have compensated for the inadequate cultural conveyance that took place in their families. Despite the negativity that surrounded their school careers, all of the subjects wanted to resume their school careers. Themba says the following: "I can see if I am not educated, I will suffer. I also want to show progress in life so that I am not inferior to other people."

Situational determinants

This group of personality determinants can be described as every-day events influencing the personality of the individual.³⁴ Evidently, situational determinants can be composed from an omnibus of determinants.

Confining these determinants to the every-day life of the street child, it is apparent that the street functions as one of the most important situational determinants. Events on the street (such as victimization, or peer group integration) do not only impact on the street child's personality, but also create apt opportunities for committing crimes. In this regard, Burgess and Parks are of the opinion that it is especially the central business district and surrounding areas that provide opportunity structures for committing crime. These areas are characterized by cultural heterogeneity, inadequate social control, poverty and a lack of access to goods and services usually available to the more affluent groups in other residential areas.³⁵

Cloward and Ohlin also view situational determinants as opportunity structures that promote crime. They state, in accordance with Fromm, that society not only provides the breeding ground of crime, but that it also creates the opportunity and place for committing it.³⁶ In terms of this view, one can surmise that the street exposes the street child to deviant subcultures which in turn provide new situational determinants for committing crimes.

In support of the above view it was found that 95% of the respondents were introduced to the practice of prostitution on the street. Only 53% of the respondents were introduced to

drugs on the street. In comparison with prostitution, this percentage is significantly lower, most probably as a result of the more ready availability of drugs such as solvents in the parental homes of the subjects.

The negative labelling of street children is another situational determinant that promotes crime. According to the labelling theory, it is more likely that a labelled individual will commit crimes than one that is not labelled. Cooley refers to this as the *looking-glass self* phenomenon.³⁷ Because society treats street children as undesirable criminals, they are often forced to accept this prescribed role. They are criminals in the eyes of other people and might as well continue with their delinquency, especially when it is the expectation of the community. This labelling also intensifies the victimization of street children and serves as a stigma that isolates them from mainstream society. Reflecting the plight of street children in South Africa and elsewhere, Wellington says the following: "If I could remodel the world to my heart's desire, there must be no discrimination to everybody who lives in the world. We all have the same blood."

Conclusion

Street children must not be considered pathological, but merely symptomatic of a pathological society. Although they are the victims of social turmoil, they are of the first to be abused and exploited. The manner in which a society deals with its abandoned children is directly reflected by its level of civilization. One can conclude that an abusive society deserves its crimes, especially if these crimes are committed by children as young as six years who must fend for themselves like adults in the brutal fashion of a street life style.

Notes and references

- 1 S Agnelli, *Street children: A growing urban tragedy*, London: George Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1986; D Miller, F Hoffman and R Duggan, *Runaways: Illegal aliens in their own land*, New York: J F Bergin, 1980.
- 2 D Miller, F Hoffman and R Duggan, *op cit*.

- 3 S Agnelli, *op cit.*
- 4 D Brandon, K Wells, C Francis and E Ramsay, *The survivors: A study of homeless young newcomers to London and the responses made to them*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
- 5 D Miller, F Hoffman and R Duggan, *op cit.*
- 6 C Burt, *The young delinquent*, London: University of London Press, 1965.
- 7 R Peacock, *Die manlike swart straatkind: 'n Verkennende psigokriminologiese ondersoek*, unpublished MA dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1989.
- 8 J M Swart, *An anthropological study of street children in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, with special reference to their moral values*, unpublished MA dissertation, Unisa, Pretoria, 1988.
- 9 F McLachlan, *Children: Their courts and institutions in South Africa*, Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1986.
- 10 H Perold and D Butler, *The right to learn*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988.
- 11 J M Swart, *op cit.*
- 12 L A Hjelle and D J Ziegler, *Personality series: Basic assumptions, research and application*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1976.
- 13 B S Griffen and C T Griffen, *Juvenile delinquency in perspective*, New York: Harper & Rowe, 1978; R C McNeely and C Z Pope, *Race, crime and criminal justice*, London: Sage, 1981; H Venter, *Kriminologie*, Pretoria: J L van Schaik, 1983.
- 14 D Davis and M Slabbert, *Crime and power in South Africa*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1985.
- 15 A Theron and R Peacock, "Die swart straatkind se portuurgroep as ondersteuningsgroep en kriminogene faktor wat tot die pleeg van misdaad kan bydra", *Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology*, vol 5, no 2, 1992, pp 56–62.
- 16 S H Kadish and A Z Morrison, *An encyclopedia of crime and justice*, vol 82, New York: Free Press, 1982.
- 17 A Cohen, *Delinquent boys*, London: Routledge, 1955.
- 18 L A Hjelle and D J Ziegler, *op cit.*
- 19 R Peacock, "The interaction between personality, social environment and crime: A theoretical synthesis", *Journal of Human Sciences*, no 2, 1991, pp 11–16.
- 20 C Bartollas, *Juvenile delinquency*, New York: Wiley, 1985.
- 21 J J Biggs, M P Bender and J Foreman, "Are there any psychological differences between persistent solvent-abusing delinquents and delinquents who do not abuse drugs?", *Journal of Adolescence*, vol 6, no 1, 1983, pp 71–86; L F Lowenstein, "Glue sniffing and substance abuse", *Contemporary Review*, vol 224, no 1421, 1984, pp 309–313; and M H Silbert, A M Pines and F Lynch, "Substance abuse and prostitution", *Journal of psycho-active drugs*, vol 14, no 3, 1982, pp 193–197.
- 22 J M Swart, "Street children: Refugees, drop-outs or survivors?" *Child Care Worker*, vol 5, no 10, 1987, pp 6–8.
- 23 A Theron and R Peacock, *op cit.*
- 24 R Peacock, "The relationship between the role personality determinant and crimes committed by street children", *Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology*, vol 5, no 1, 1992, pp 69–74.
- 25 S R Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*, Homewood IL, Dorsey, 1980.
- 26 H Mannheim, *Comparative criminology Vol 2*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
- 27 R Peacock, "The relationship between the role personality ...", *op cit.*
- 28 R Peacock, "Family stress in the lives of street children", *Social Work: A Professional Journal for the Social Worker*, vol 29, no 2, 1993, pp 173–180.
- 29 P R Smith, *Die manlike kleurling jeuggoortreder in die stad: 'n Vergelykende kriminologiese ondersoek*, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Pretoria, 1971.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 M G T Cloete and H Conradie, *Juvenile delinquency in school context*, Pretoria: Haum, 1983; D Popenoe, *Sociology*, Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
- 32 S Burman and P Reynolds, *Growing up in a divided society*, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986.
- 33 *Ibid.*; R Peacock, "The relationship between the role personality ...", *op cit.*
- 34 R Peacock, "The interaction between personality ...", *op cit.*
- 35 W B Sanders, *Juvenile delinquency: Causes, patterns and reactions*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981.
- 36 C Bartollas, *op cit.*
- 37 S Sandhu, *Juvenile delinquency*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.

Black households of the Vaal Triangle Complex in economic perspective

Mr T J C Slabbert, senior lecturer in the Department of Economics at Vista University's Sebokeng campus, and Prof M Levin, of the Economics Department at Vista University's Port Elizabeth campus, analyse expenditure patterns of black households in the Vaal Triangle Complex.

Background

This article is based on results of a research project conducted during the last quarter of 1991. The research was done by means of a questionnaire and the results were published in four research reports. This article is a consolidation of the main findings of the research.

Black households taking part in the survey resided in the townships mentioned in table 1. The estimated population¹ and estimated number of households (based on an average household size of 5,5 persons as determined by the survey) in each of the townships is indicated in table 1. Population estimates for the beginning of 1992 were used as no major

changes would have occurred in the two months between the date of the survey (31 October 1991) and the 1 January 1992.

Research methodology

The questionnaire

The purpose of the survey was to collect socioeconomic data of the inhabitants of the black townships of the Vaal Triangle Complex (VTC). Questionnaires were chosen as the best way of collecting the required information. These were completed for households that were preselected after the area had been stratified to ensure complete and total population and geographic coverage.

The basic unit for which questionnaires were completed was the house-

Table 1: Estimated population of the black townships surveyed

| Area/ township | Estimated population | Estimated number of households |
|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 SEBOKENG | 252 741 | 45 953 |
| 2 EVATON | 208 050 | 37 827 |
| 3 BOPHELONG | 44 730 | 8 133 |
| 4 BOIPATONG | 28 087 | 5 107 |
| 5 SHARPVILLE | 98 824 | 17 968 |
| 6 ZAMDELA | 52 013 | 9 457 |
| 7 RAFENKGOTSO | 8 842 | 1 607 |
| TOTAL | 693 287 | 126 052 |

| Township | Percentage |
|-------------|------------|
| SEBOKENG | 37% |
| EVATON | 30% |
| SHARPVILLE | 14% |
| ZAMDELA | 8% |
| BOPHELONG | 6% |
| BOIPATONG | 4% |
| RAFENKGOTSO | 1% |

hold. Preference was given to the household (and not to the family unit), because households include both family and non-family members living together.

The following definition of "household" was used: *one or more persons who pool their income to buy food, live (eat and sleep) together in one or more houses/huts/living units on the same plot/site and depend financially on one another.*

Questionnaires were completed at the site. Details with regard to the site were listed, but no names were recorded with regard to the head of the household or other persons living at the site. This was done to ensure anonymity and thereby encouraging honest and reliable information.

The first question of the questionnaire (a question concerning number of households, number of people and separate occupied houses/huts/living units on the plot) was completed by questioning the main tenant or owner of the site. The other questions were completed for each separate household on that site. It was therefore possible to complete more than one questionnaire at a single site. This was done deliberately in order to obtain information about backyard tenants and also to establish their incomes and expenditures.

Every precaution was taken to ensure that questions were well understood and that quality answers were obtained.

Fieldworkers

Seventeen fieldworkers in total were used, most of them reliable second-year students of Vista University in the subject economics.

Fieldworkers were used in the area/zone where they lived. They were initially trained in a group and subsequently some of them received individual coaching. All had the opportunity of calling on the supervisor in cases where they encountered problems.

Fieldworkers started completing questionnaires on Thursday, 12 September 1991 and had to return completed questionnaires on Friday

13 and Monday 16 September for checking. Common errors were pointed out and specific doubtful responses were identified and discussed. More training was given where necessary. Fieldworkers from then on could return questionnaires on a daily basis.

Spot checks were made by a staff member on a random basis, after all questionnaires were completed. These checks were an endeavour to judge the degree of accuracy with which the questionnaires were completed. No errors occurred in these questionnaires, and the figures released could thus be accepted as reliable.

Fieldwork was completed by 31 October 1991.

Sampling

Maps of all the black townships administered by the Evaton and Lekoa municipalities were obtained. A sample stratification was designed on account of the geographical distribution and concentration of people in the areas. Firstly, the various townships were divided into different zones and then questionnaires were allocated on a basis of approximately one questionnaire for every 164 sites. Altogether 303 questionnaires were completed, covering approximately 0,25% of the households. These included owners, main tenants and backyard tenants. All 303 questionnaires were used for the analysis. Experience in previous surveys conducted by the Employment Research Unit (ERU) and other institutions (eg Bureau of Market Research) has shown that samples of this size with a low refusal rate supply statistically reliable data within reasonable limits.

Plots/sites at which fieldworkers were supposed to complete questionnaires were identified individually from the maps before the fieldworkers went out. However, where people could not be obtained for an interview, or where it was impossible to trace the house, inhabitants of a house next to the selected number were interviewed. Information was obtained from the breadwinner or the spouse. Questionnaires were completed only in the evenings and over the

weekends when members of households were expected to be at home.

Reliability of results

It must, as a general principle, be kept in mind that a properly conducted sample survey could yield useful estimates, but might not give exact unquestionable values. The following could have affected the reliability of the results of this survey: sampling errors (because only a fraction of the population was interviewed), survey errors (stemming from memory errors, misunderstanding of questions, etc), processing errors (errors of calculation in the processing of data) and the political climate.

Households

For the purpose of this survey a household was defined as one or more persons who pool their incomes to buy food, live (eat and sleep) together in one or more houses/huts/living units on the same plot/site and depend financially on one another.

In most instances households were also natural families. However, they should not be regarded primarily as such, because the definition was designed with a view of obtaining socioeconomic information about households and not for sociological purposes.

Table 2 contains details regarding household sizes of blacks in the VTC. Households sizes of 1 to 12+ persons as well as the percentage of households falling into the different categories are given.

The average size for black households in the VTC was determined at 5,5 persons per household. This average is irrespective of the kind of accommodation eg shacks, brick houses or backyard shacks.

Employment and unemployment

The unemployment rate

Definition

For the purpose of defining "unemployment", the definition of "unemployment" as formulated by the Eighth

Table 2: Average size of black households in the VTC

| H/H size | Freq | % | cum % |
|--------------|------------|--------------|-------|
| 1 Person | 8 | 2,6 | 2,6 |
| 2 Persons | 28 | 9,2 | 11,9 |
| 3 Persons | 32 | 10,6 | 22,4 |
| 4 Persons | 55 | 18,2 | 40,6 |
| 5 Persons | 41 | 13,5 | 54,1 |
| 6 Persons | 45 | 14,9 | 69,0 |
| 7 Persons | 40 | 13,2 | 82,2 |
| 8 Persons | 16 | 5,3 | 87,5 |
| 9 Persons | 11 | 3,6 | 91,1 |
| 10 Persons | 10 | 3,3 | 94,4 |
| 11 Persons | 5 | 1,7 | 96,0 |
| 12+ Persons | 12 | 4,0 | 100,0 |
| TOTAL | 303 | 100,0 | |

International Conference of Labour Statisticians in Geneva was accepted as the departure point. This definition states that unemployed people are "... people who are temporarily or indefinitely laid-off without pay and those without a job who are available for employment and are seeking work (or seeking work for the first time) for pay or for profit".²

This descriptive definition can be translated into a statistical definition which reads as follows: A person is unemployed if he prefers to work and complies with the following requirements:

- did not work, that is, has not worked for more than five hours over the previous seven days;
- tried to find a job over the last month;
- is able to accept an appointment within one week;
- is between 16 and 64 years in the case of males and 16 and 59 years in the case of females.

The unemployment rate was calculated according to the standard equation:

$$\frac{\text{Number of unemployed persons}}{\text{Number of employed + unemployed}} \times \frac{100}{1}$$

Interpretation of the unemployment rate

To calculate the unemployment rate two of the criteria of the statistical definition were relaxed.

First, all those persons who were

looking for a job were regarded as unemployed persons, and not only those who were *actively looking for a job over the preceding month*. The reason for relaxing this criterion is that there is very little point in blacks registering as unemployed persons. Many of them have given up looking regularly for a job. Should those who have given up looking for a job be excluded, then the unemployment rate would tend to be less, rather than more accurate.

Secondly, it was not required from respondents to explicitly state that they could start working *within one week*, should they be able to find a job. It was assumed that unemployed persons are available for employment straight away, and that a question concerning such information from the typical urban black unemployed person served no purpose.

Unemployment rate of the sample population

The ERU³ had also undertaken a unemployment survey in June 1989. These results are compared in the following table with the results determined by the October 1991 survey.

The unemployment rate increased in magnitude from 33,3% in 1989 to 35% in 1991. These rates, converted to percentages for the total population amount to 13,5% in 1989 and 14,5% in 1991.

This 1,0% increase in the unemployment rate can be explained as follows: the economically non-active group plus the aged (men 65+ and women 60+) and children (15 years and younger) together decreased over the same period from 59,5% to 58,7% – thus by 0,8%. The decrease can be attributed to the fact that a portion of the children and economically non-active population (students, housewives, schoolchildren, etc) moved into the economically active portion as unemployed persons who were looking for employment opportunities. The other 0,2% can be attributed to the worsening economic climate, seeing that the number of persons employed as percentage of the sample population decreased by 0,2% from 27,0% in 1989 to 26,8% in October 1991 (table 3).

The conclusion can be drawn therefore that the local economy is not able to keep on providing sufficient employment opportunities for the increasing number of people entering the economically active segment of the population.

The unemployment rate of 35% suggests that 14,5% of the total population of the VTC's black municipal area was unemployed and preferred not to be unemployed (was involuntarily unemployed). Converted into numbers it involves an estimated 100 527 people in 1992.

Sectors of employment

Of all the employed blacks in the VTC, 88,2% were employed in the formal sector and only 11,8% in the informal sector. The total number of employed black persons in the VTC is estimated at 185 801, of which 88 070 are male and 97 731 female. The majority of them are employed in the manufacturing sector (26,6%), the community, social and personal services sector (23,4%) or in the wholesale and retail trade, and catering and accommodation sector (17,3%) (see table 4).

The different employment sectors and the percentage of blacks working in these sectors is shown in table 4.

Table 3: The unemployment rate and the employed and unemployed as a percentage of the sample population: June 1989 & October 1991

| YEAR OF SURVEY | 1989 | 1991 |
|--|---------------|---------------|
| Unemployment rate | 33,3% | 35,0% |
| A Employed as % of sample population | 27,0% | 26,8% |
| B Unemployed as % of sample population | 13,5% | 14,5% |
| C Economically non-active + Aged + Children ≤ 15 years as % — of sample population | 59,5% | 58,7% |
| TOTAL: A + B + C | 100,0% | 100,0% |




Table 4: Sectors of employment and the percentage of blacks employed in each of the different (formal) sectors

| Sector of employment | Freq | % |
|--|------------|--------------|
| 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing | 2 | 0,4 |
| 2 Mining and quarrying | 5 | 1,1 |
| 3 Manufacturing | 117 | 26,6 |
| 4 Electricity, gas & water | 13 | 3,0 |
| 5 Construction | 22 | 5,0 |
| 6 Wholesale & retail trade, catering & accommodation | 76 | 17,3 |
| 7 Transport, storage and communication | 30 | 6,8 |
| 8 Finance, insurance, real estate business service | 13 | 3,0 |
| 9 Community, social and personal services | 103 | 23,4 |
| 10 Unknown/not classified | 59 | 13,4 |
| TOTAL | 440 | 100,0 |





Table 5: Average total income (monthly & annual) of black households

| INCOME SOURCE | MONTHLY | ANNUAL | % |
|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1 Formal sector | 1 221 | 14 652 | 85,0 |
| 2 Informal sector | 138 | 1 656 | 9,6 |
| 3 Other (pension) | 77 | 924 | 5,4 |
| TOTAL | 1 436 | 17 232 | 100,0 |



Incomes of black households

Average total income

Incomes of black households in the VTC come from three major sources: formal sector income, informal sector income and other sources (mainly pensions and family remittances).

Table 5 shows the average income per household received from the different sources as well as the relative contribution of each source to total income.

The total gross income (formal + informal + other) that black house-

holds in the VTC receive monthly/annually is given in the different income categories in table 6.

Formal sector income

The average income per household received from the formal sector was R1 221 per month or R14 652 per year. As demonstrated in table 5, 85% of the households' income comes from the formal sector. The mean income annually earned by members of households in each of these sectors is given in table 7.

The definition of a household that is used in this study implies that more than one member of the household can work and have an income. In table 8 the incomes (from the formal sector) received by households are given in categories as well as the percentage of households falling in these categories. From table 8 it is clear that the majority of households (58,4%) receive a monthly income from the formal sector of between R251 and R1 000.

Informal sector income

Average informal incomes in categories as well as the percentage of households falling in these categories are given in table 9.

As mentioned earlier, 9,6% of the average income households receive comes from the informal sector. As given in table 5, it amounts to R138 per household per month. This income is generated by 11,2% of the employed blacks who are involved in the informal sector of the VTC. The average amount that a person involved in the informal sector receives is R383 per month (R4 596 per year).

Other income

Other income that black households in the VTC receive, consists mainly of pensions and family remittances. Table 10 gives the categories of income and the percentage of households falling in each category.

The average amount that households receive in the form of "other" income is R77 per month (R924 per year) per household. The average amount that every receiver (most cases pensioners) receives is R285 per month. From table 10 it is clear that 72% of the households which received "other" income fall in the category of R201-R300 per month (R2 401-R3 600 per year).

Expenditure of black households


Average expenditure on different items

Households spend their income on various household items during the

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

Table 6: Percentage of households in different income categories: Total income

| INCOME CATEGORY: | | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|------------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|
| MONTHLY | ANNUAL | | |
| 1 | 1—250 | 1—3000 | 4,0 |
| 2 | 251—500 | 3001—6000 | 13,5 |
| 3 | 501—750 | 6001—9000 | 13,5 |
| 4 | 751—1000 | 9001—12000 | 12,2 |
| 5 | 1001—1250 | 12001—15000 | 12,5 |
| 6 | 1251—1500 | 15001—18000 | 7,6 |
| 7 | 1501—1750 | 18001—21000 | 7,9 |
| 8 | 1751—2000 | 21001—24000 | 9,6 |
| 9 | 2001—2250 | 24001—27000 | 3,3 |
| 10 | 2251—2500 | 27001—30000 | 5,0 |
| 11 | 2501—2750 | 30001—33000 | 1,0 |
| 12 | 2751—3000 | 33001—36000 | 2,3 |
| 13 | 3001—3250 | 36001—39000 | 0,7 |
| 14 | 3251—3500 | 39001—42000 | 1,7 |
| 15 | 3501—3750 | 42001—45000 | 0,7 |
| 16 | 3751—4000 | 45001—48000 | 1,0 |
| 17 | 4001—4250 | 48001—51000 | 0,3 |
| 18 | 4251—4500 | 51001—54000 | 0,3 |
| 19 | 4501—4750 | 54001—57000 | 0,0 |
| 20 | 4751—5000 | 57001—60000 | 1,0 |
| 21 | 5000 + | 60001 + | 2,0 |
| TOTAL % | | | 100,0 |



Reproduced by SABINET Gateway under license granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

course of a month. Table 11 shows the average spending of households on different items per month and their percentage of total expenditure. The percentage that the Bureau of Market Research,⁴ found in 1985 is listed in the second (BMR) column.

It is a commonplace economic phenomenon that a household will spend a smaller percentage of its income on food when welfare increases. When people have satisfied their most basic needs, they start spending their money on other items. From table 11 it is evident that there has been a shift in spending from food to specifically clothing and furniture.


Expenditure on energy was in absolute and relative terms much higher than in 1985. This was due to abnormal circumstances, namely that electricity to the black townships had been cut-off (because of a rent boycott) before and during the time of the survey. Households were thus obliged to rely on coal and paraffin, and this increased the percentage of their expenditure on fuel and energy (electricity was not regarded as part of “housing” expenditure).

The average income per household is R1 436 per household per month. The average expenditure reported

above is only R887 per household per month. The reason for this could be an under-reporting of some items in the expenditure on “other items”. If our percentage is compared with the findings of BMR in 1985, it is 13,6% points lower. The difference can be explained by the fact that the BMR used a much more detailed questionnaire to determine the expenditure on “other items”. The questionnaire used by the ERU did not go into as much detail. As it is not easy for people to give the correct amount they spend on all the items, making up “other expenditure” (for instance education, medical and dental services, recreation,

Table 7: Sectors of employment and mean annual income earned by household members in these (formal) sectors

| SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT | INCOME |
|--|---------------|
| 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing | 5 760 |
| 2 Mining and quarrying | 13 416 |
| 3 Manufacturing | 11 313 |
| 4 Electricity, gas & water | 14 280 |
| 5 Construction | 8 677 |
| 6 Wholesale & retail trade, catering & accommodation | 8 613 |
| 7 Transport, storage and communication | 11 645 |
| 8 Finance, insurance, real estate & business service | 11 612 |
| 9 Community, social and personal services | 14 832 |
| 10 Unknown/not classified | 8 990 |
| TOTAL | 11 659 |



entertainment and sport, cigarettes and tobacco, washing and cleaning materials, personal care, communication, reading matter and stationery, dry cleaning, holiday expenses, taxation, HP car, family remittances, etc) without calculating it carefully, their estimate probably could make too low.

If a person is not reminded of all the different things he/she buys every month (toothpaste, soap, cigarettes etc), then it is easy to underreport the right amount.

Analysis of expenditure on major items

Food

Almost 29% of a black household's

expenditure is on food, amounting to R254 per month for the average household. Table 12 gives the average monthly expenditure of households in different expenditure categories.

Households in the VTC were also questioned on where (specific shop/store and town) they buy most of their food. Table 13 shows the different shops/stores where they buy the most and the percentage of households which buy most of their food there.

Concerning stores/shops, it seems that most households (37,1%) buy their food from OK Bazaars. OK Bazaars is followed by Checkers with 15,5% and then Pick 'n Pay, with 10,3%. All other stores and shops

grouped together attract 37,1% of households' shopping.

Concerning localities (towns where households buy their food), the majority (48%) buy their food in Vereeniging and 21,2% in Vanderbijlpark. Concerning black towns, Sebokeng attracts 11,6% of the household expenditure on food.


Clothing

After food, the greatest part of the black households' income is spent on clothing. An average of R134 per household is spent on clothing monthly. Table 14 gives the average monthly expenditure of households on clothing in different expenditure categories.

The shops/stores where most of the households buy clothing, are firstly Sales House (30,5%) and secondly Edgars (29,3%). All other clothing stores grouped together attract 40,2%. Vereeniging seems to be the town mostly favoured by black households when buying clothing, as 60,5% of the households buy their clothing in Vereeniging. Then comes Vanderbijlpark with 24,1% and Sasolburg with 4,9%. The rest of clothing purchases (10,5%) are done outside the VTC, mostly in Johannesburg. None of the households interviewed buy clothing in any of the black townships.

Table 8: Percentage of households in different income categories: Formal sector

| NO | INCOME CATEGORY: | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|----------------|------------------|-------------|--------------|
| | MONTHLY | ANNUAL | |
| 1 | 1—250 | 1—3000 | 6,5 |
| 2 | 251—500 | 3001—6000 | 21,4 |
| 3 | 501—750 | 6001—9000 | 17,6 |
| 4 | 751—1000 | 9001—12000 | 19,4 |
| 5 | 1001—1250 | 12001—15000 | 11,6 |
| 6 | 1251—1500 | 15001—18000 | 10,9 |
| 7 | 1501—1570 | 18001—21000 | 2,6 |
| 8 | 1571—2000 | 21001—24000 | 4,1 |
| 9 | 2001 + | 24001 + | 5,9 |
| TOTAL % | | | 100,0 |



Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

Table 9: Percentage of households in different income categories: Informal sector

| INCOME CATEGORY: | | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|------------------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| NO | MONTHLY | ANNUAL | |
| 1 | 1—100 | 1—1200 | 25,5 |
| 2 | 101—200 | 1201—2400 | 21,8 |
| 3 | 201—300 | 2401—3600 | 19,1 |
| 4 | 301—400 | 3601—4800 | 8,2 |
| 5 | 401—500 | 4801—6000 | 3,6 |
| 6 | 501—600 | 6001—7200 | 2,7 |
| 7 | 601—700 | 7201—8400 | 1,8 |
| 8 | 701—800 | 8401—9600 | 6,4 |
| 9 | 801—900 | 9601—10800 | 0,9 |
| 10 | 901—1000 | 10801—12000 | 2,7 |
| 11 | 1001 + | 12001 + | 7,3 |
| TOTAL % | | | 100,0 |

Table 10: Percentage of households in different income categories: Other income

| INCOME CATEGORY: | | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|------------------|---------|-----------|--------------|
| NO | MONTHLY | ANNUAL | |
| 1 | 1—100 | 1—1200 | 1,2 |
| 2 | 101—200 | 1201—2400 | 12,2 |
| 3 | 201—300 | 2401—3600 | 72,0 |
| 4 | 301—400 | 3601—4800 | 1,2 |
| 5 | 401—500 | 4801—6000 | 4,9 |
| 6 | 501 + | 6001 + | 8,5 |
| TOTAL % | | | 100 % |

Furniture

Almost the same percentage that black households spend on housing, is spent on furniture monthly (table 11). The average amount monthly spent on furniture is R118 and this amounts to 13,4% of the total expenditure. Table 16 gives the average monthly expenditure of households on furniture in different expenditure categories.

Housing

The average amount that black households spend on housing (rent, electricity and bond-payments) is R113 per month. Seventy-five per cent of

the households spend an amount less than R100, while 13,5% of the households spend an amount of more than R250. The latter in most cases are households that have bought their house, and are paying back the bond. The average monthly expenditure per bond-payer was R453. Table 17 gives the percentage of households in the different expenditure categories.

The question was put to households whether they would like to own their own house. Almost 65% answered “yes”. The average monthly amount that they could afford to pay for a house was R195. The majority of them (52,8%) would prefer to obtain a bond where they have to pay back an


amount of about R150 per month. About 16% preferred a building society loan where they have to pay back not more than R500 per month, and 31% preferred to build a house with a kind of self-help scheme where they have to pay about R6 per month back.

Households were also asked “where” they would prefer to buy a house, if they had the opportunity and finance. About 76% preferred to buy a house in one of the VTC’s black townships (most of them indicated Sebokeng), about 14% preferred to buy a house in one of the white suburbs of the VTC and about 6% would like to move outside the VTC. The rest (4%) preferred “any place”.

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

Table 11: Average spending of households on different items (monthly)

| ITEMS OF EXPENDITURE | AVERAGE AMOUNT SPENT | % BMR 1985 | % ERU 1992 |
|----------------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1 Food | R254 | 32,3 | 28,9 |
| 2 Clothing | R134 | 9,4 | 15,3 |
| 3 Housing | R113 | 11,5 | 13,0 |
| 4 Fuel, energy | R 55 | 2,4 | 6,3 |
| 5 Transport | R 92 | 10,4 | 10,5 |
| 6 Insurance | R 48 | 5,5 | 5,4 |
| 7 Furniture | R118 | 7,7 | 13,4 |
| 8 Other | R 63 | 20,8 | 7,2 |
| TOTAL | R887 | 100,0 | 100,0 |



Note: Housing expenditure includes: rent/bond payments, water and electricity.

Table 12: Average monthly expenditure of households on food: Percentage of households in different expenditure categories

| EXPENDITURE CATEGORY | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|----------------------|--------------|
| 1 1—100 | 28,9 |
| 2 101—200 | 15,3 |
| 3 201—300 | 13,0 |
| 4 301—400 | 6,3 |
| 5 401—500 | 10,5 |
| 6 501—600 | 5,4 |
| 7 601—700 | 13,4 |
| 8 701 + | 7,2 |
| TOTAL % | 100,0 |




Table 13: Percentage of households buying most of their food in different shops and localities

| PLACE, STORE/SHOP: | OK | CHECK | P & PAY | SCORE | OTHER | TOTAL % |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| Vereeniging | 24,8 | 4,3 | 9,6 | 4,3 | 5 | 48,0 |
| Vanderbijlpark | 6,3 | 9,9 | 0,0 | 1,7 | 3,3 | 21,2 |
| Sasolburg | 4,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 4,0 |
| Sebokeng | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 11,6 | 11,6 |
| Evaton | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 7,9 | 7,9 |
| Small black towns | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 1,0 | 1,0 |
| Outside VTC | 2,0 | 1,3 | 0,7 | 0,0 | 2,3 | 6,3 |
| TOTAL % | 37,1 | 15,6 | 10,3 | 6,0 | 31,1 | 100,0% |

Transport

Table 18 gives the percentage of households in the different categories of monthly expenditure on transport. Transport expenditure takes 10,5% of the total expenditure, amounting to

R92 per month on average per household. More than half of the households (52,5%) however spend an amount less than R60 per month on transport.

Household income compared to the household subsistence level

Potgieter defines the household subsistence level (HSL) as “an estimate of the theoretical income needed by an individual household if it is to maintain a defined minimum level of health and decency in the short term”. It is calculated at the lowest retail cost of a budget of necessities of adequate quality, comprising the total food, clothing, fuel, lighting and washing and cleansing materials required for each person, together with fuel, lighting and cleansing materials needed by the household as a whole, the cost of rent, and of workers transport. The appropriate calculation can thus be made for a household of any given composition.⁵

The HSL for each individual household partaking in the survey was calculated according to Potgieter’s HSL calculations (given in the table below) for the VTC in March 1992.⁶

The HSL for each individual household was then compared to the total monthly income received by the household. It was found that 30,1% of the households receive an income lower than the HSL figure as calculated for the specific household.

...As the HSL indicates the cost of a theoretical budget of necessities, it does not suggest an adequate income because in practice, out of a total income equivalent to that budget, one third will be diverted from the specified items to other immediate essentials. In this case, the income is not effective in enabling the household to maintain the standards of short-term health and decency specified in the HSL. The Household Effective Level of income is that which, after one third of it has been allocated to other items, is equal to the cost of the HSL requirements for that household — i.e. the Household Effective Level = 150 per cent of the Household Subsistence Level.⁷

According to this definition of the household effective level (HEL), 45,9% of the black households in the VTC receive lower than the household effective level, and 54,1% of the households receive an income greater than the HEL. Table 20 gives the

incomes of households as a percentage of the HSL and the percentage of households falling in the different categories.

Conclusion

Household income and expenditure patterns are analyzed above. The average total income for a black household in the VTC was calculated at R1 436 per month (table 5) and the size of an average household was calculated at 5,5 persons (table 6). The household subsistence level for an average black household in the VTC was determined at R750 per month and the household effective level at R1 125.⁸ From this information it appears that the average black household in the VTC received a total income higher than the household effective level (HEL) at the time of the survey. About 30% of the households' income are lower than the HSL, 46% lower than the HEL and about 54% of the households receive an income higher than the HEL.

The unemployment rate for blacks in the VTC was determined at 14,5% of the total black population and 35% of the economically active population. Although about a third of the economically active population is unemployed, it seemed that, at the time of the survey the average household still had some employed members that were supporting the unemployed members and keeping the monthly income well above the HSL. It is however believed that this situation has deteriorated drastically since the time of the survey, and for this reason a new survey will be conducted in the near future to establish the present situation.

Table 14: Average monthly expenditure of households on clothing: Percentage of households in different expenditure categories

| EXPENDITURE CATEGORY | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|----------------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 1—50 | 21,8 |
| 2 | 51—100 | 31,3 |
| 3 | 101—150 | 18,0 |
| 4 | 151—200 | 10,6 |
| 5 | 201—250 | 3,9 |
| 6 | 251—300 | 6,3 |
| 7 | 301—350 | 1,4 |
| 8 | 351—400 | 3,5 |
| 9 | 401 + | 3,2 |
| TOTAL | | 100,0 |

Table 15: Percentage of households buying most of their clothing in different shops and localities

| PLACE, STORE/SHOP: | EDGARS | SALESHOUSE | OTHER | TOTAL % |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Vereeniging | 13,5 | 22,5 | 24,4 | 60,5 |
| Vanderbijlpark | 9,8 | 3,8 | 10,5 | 24,1 |
| Sasolburg | 1,5 | 2,6 | 0,8 | 4,9 |
| Sebokeng | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| Evaton | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| Small black towns | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| Outside VTC | 4,5 | 1,5 | 4,5 | 10,5 |
| Total % | 29,3% | 30,5% | 40,2% | 100,0% |

Table 16: Average monthly expenditure of households on furniture: Percentage of households in different expenditure categories

| EXPENDITURE CATEGORY | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|----------------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 1—50 | 15,5 |
| 2 | 51—100 | 19,0 |
| 3 | 101—150 | 19,5 |
| 4 | 151—200 | 14,5 |
| 5 | 201—250 | 9,0 |
| 6 | 251—300 | 11,0 |
| 7 | 301—350 | 2,5 |
| 8 | 351—400 | 3,5 |
| 9 | 401 + | 5,5 |
| TOTAL | | 100,0 |

Table 17: Average monthly expenditure of households on housing: Percentage of households in different expenditure categories

| EXPENDITURE CATEGORY | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|----------------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 1—50 | 53,0 |
| 2 | 51—100 | 22,3 |
| 3 | 101—150 | 6,8 |
| 4 | 151—200 | 2,8 |
| 5 | 201—250 | 1,6 |
| 6 | 251 + | 13,5 |
| TOTAL | | 100,0 |

Table 18: Average monthly expenditure of households on transport: Percentage of households in different expenditure categories


| EXPENDITURE CATEGORY | | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|----------------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 1—20 | 5,2 |
| 2 | 21—40 | 17,2 |
| 3 | 41—60 | 30,1 |
| 4 | 61—80 | 14,1 |
| 5 | 81—100 | 11,0 |
| 6 | 101—120 | 4,3 |
| 7 | 121—140 | 2,5 |
| 8 | 141—160 | 5,5 |
| 9 | 161—180 | 1,5 |
| 10 | 181—200 | 3,7 |
| 11 | 200 + | 4,9 |
| TOTAL | | 100,0 |

Table 19: Determination of the household subsistence level by Potgieter for the VTC, March 1992

| AGE AND SEX | FOOD | CLOTHING | FUEL, LIGHT, WASHING AND CLEANSING | TOTAL (RANDS) |
|------------------------|--|----------|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Children | | | | |
| 1—3 years | 46,43 | 6,72 | 2,04 | 55,19 |
| 4—7 years | 55,17 | 13,45 | 2,04 | 70,66 |
| 8—10 years | 65,19 | 13,45 | 2,04 | 80,68 |
| Boys and men | | | | |
| 11—14 years | 78,43 | 20,17 | 2,04 | 100,64 |
| 15—18 years | 81,59 | 30,87 | 2,04 | 114,50 |
| 19 + years | 82,99 | 30,87 | 2,04 | 115,90 |
| Girls and women | | | | |
| 11—14 years | 75,08 | 20,17 | 2,04 | 97,29 |
| 15—18 years | 72,32 | 26,89 | 2,04 | 101,25 |
| 19 + years | 71,33 | 26,89 | 2,04 | 100,26 |
| | Household fuel, light, washing & cleansing | | | 91,33 |
| | Rent per household | | | 61,50 |
| | Transport per working member of household | | | 56,00 |

Table 20: Household income expressed as a percentage of the HSL percentage of households in different categories

| INCOME AS A % OF THE HSL | | % HH'S | % CUM |
|--------------------------|---------|--------------|-------|
| A | 0—50% | 9,3 | 9,3 |
| B | 51—100 | 20,8 | 30,1 |
| C | 101—150 | 15,8 | 45,9 |
| D | 151—200 | 18,2 | 64,1 |
| E | 201—250 | 9,6 | 73,7 |
| F | 251—300 | 6,3 | 80,0 |
| G | 301—350 | 6,6 | 86,6 |
| H | 351—400 | 4,6 | 91,2 |
| I | 401—450 | 3,0 | 94,2 |
| J | 451—500 | 1,3 | 95,5 |
| K | 501—550 | 0,3 | 95,8 |
| L | 551—600 | 1,3 | 97,1 |
| M | 601—650 | 0,3 | 97,4 |
| N | 651—700 | 1,0 | 98,4 |
| O | 701 + | 1,6 | 100,0 |
| TOTAL | | 100,0 | |



Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

References

1 Regional Development Association Report, *Vaalrivierkompleks ontwikkelingsvoorstelle*, Vereeniging: RDA, 1990.

2 J L Sadie, *Labour demand and supply*, Stellenbosch: Kosmo Publishers, 1980.

3 M Levin and T J C Slabbert, *The unemployment rate of blacks in the Vaal Triangle*

Complex: June 1989, Research Report 11, Port Elizabeth: ERU, 1990.

4 J de H van Wyk, *Income and expenditure patterns of urban black multiple households in the Vaal Triangle 1985*, Research Report 130.13, Pretoria: Bureau of Market Research, 1986.

5 J F Potgieter, *Background and interpretation of the household subsistence level*, Port

Elizabeth: Institute of Planning Research, nd.

6 J F Potgieter, *Household subsistence level in the major centres of the RSA*, Fact Paper 92, Port Elizabeth: Institute for Planning Research, 1992.

7 J F Potgieter, *Background ...*, op cit.

8 J F Potgieter, *Household subsistence level*, op cit.

BOOKSHELF

Hemmed in: Responses to Africa's economic decline edited by Thomas M Callaghy and John Ravenhill. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 573 pp. ISBN 0-231-08228-2

Hemmed in: Responses to Africa's economic decline analyses Africa's current economic situation, and the political and social developments that have contributed to it.

Case studies of Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe focus on the following issues: economic and political constraints Africa faces in pursuing more productive linkages with the world economy; the relationship between the IMF, World Bank, bilateral aid conditionality and the progress of economic reform; flaws and misconceptions in Western perspective restraining economic progress; sectoral dilemmas in agriculture and manufacturing; everyday coping strategies of the informal sector; and the effects of simultaneous economic and political reform.

This comprehensive examination of responses contributes to the debate on solutions to Africa's accelerating marginalization and dependence.

Administering education in Namibia: The colonial period to the present by Cynthia Cohen. Windhoek: Namibia Scientific Society, 1994, 454 pp. ISBN 9-991-6-7021-1

Administering education in Namibia investigates Namibia's educational administrator resource potential during its transition from a colonial education system to the three years after independence.

With the help of original tables and more than 70 interviews conducted in Namibia and abroad, Cynthia Cohen:

- documents the historical development of the education system independent Namibia inherited;
- analyses the organizational structure and personnel of educational administrations created during South African rule;
- examines educational and administrative training of Namibians living abroad during the period of resistance to South African rule;
- makes a comprehensive study of educational administration in Zimbabwe to illuminate comparable issues in Namibia; and

- assesses the challenge of educational management in independent Namibia, and the need for competent, qualified administrators in the new system.

Gender, work & population in sub-Saharan Africa edited by Aderanti Adepoji and Christine Oppong. London: James Currey, 1994, 245 pp. ISBN 0-85255-408-7

In Africa, south of the Sahara, women exhibit both the highest rates of economic activity and fertility and the highest levels of maternal and child mortality in the world. In spite of marked advances made in the past two decades these economic and demographic facts and their interlinkages are neither well recorded and analysed in the majority of the countries of the region nor adequately addressed in population and development discourse and national planning.

This volume looks at several aspects of the culturally prescribed and biologically determined roles of women and men, and their relevance to the recording of the facts upon which national policies and plans promoting the welfare of labour and national economic development are supposed to be based.

Among the gender issues addressed and questions raised are:

- What use are manpower and agricultural surveys when women have been labelled as housewives, unpaid family workers or farmers' wives?
- How often are women invisible in official labour force statistics, when in actual fact their hours of economically valuable activity, maintaining family dependants, are frequently greater than those of their male counterparts?
- How are the bearing, nursing and socializing of the next generation being combined with women's heavy work schedules?
- What roles do women play as grandmothers, as well as wives and mothers, with regard to family planning and welfare?
- How do models of family relations and domestic organization need to be built in order to reflect African realities more effectively?

Season of migration to the south: Africa's crises reconsidered by Kole Omotoso, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1994, 146 pp. ISBN 0-624-03271-X

Season of migration to the south is the author's own

experiential comparison between Nigeria and South Africa, with a lot of other insights gathered from his travels through Africa and elsewhere. It concerns the politicians, intellectuals, writers and analysts who help shape the dynamics of transition.

French lessons in Africa: Travels with my briefcase through French Africa by Peter Biddlecombe, London: Abacus, 1993, 434 pp. ISBN 0-349-10509-X

French lessons in Africa is a hugely entertaining account of the author's travels and encounters in Francophone Africa. It gives an entertaining perspective on French Africa's politics, bizarre business traditions and culture, and provides a mass of practical advice on everything from how to eat a water-rat to talking your way through a road block in the middle of an attempted coup.

Ethnicity & conflict in the Horn of Africa edited by Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis. London: James Currey, 1994, 242 pp. ISBN 0-85255-226-2

Ethnicity and conflict in the Horn of Africa exposes the subtle and ambiguous role ethnicity can play in social conflict – a role that is nowhere as simple and direct as commonly assumed.

Social conflict is routinely attributed to ethnic differentiation because dividing lines between rival groups often follow ethnic contours; and cultural symbolism has proved a potent ideological weapon. This book examines the nature of the bond linking ethnicity to conflict in a variety of circumstances.

The ten studies from Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya are based on primary research by anthropologists and historians who have long experience of the region and the subsequent insights gained in this way, help to refine common assumptions about conflict among ethnic groups.

A history of African archaeology edited by Peter Robertshaw. London: James Currey, 1990, 378 pp. ISBN 0-85255-020-0

This book is a first on the history of the development of the subject of archaeology – a subject which has proved to be the most informative source on Africa's past.

A history of African archaeology gives different viewpoints by specialists within the broader political, social and economic context: a regional approach; an examination of particular periods of prehistory; and the changing interrelationships between Africa and the other disciplines.

It is enhanced by some 70 photographs of pioneer archaeologists and their excavations.

Traditional medicine in Botswana: Traditional healers by Frants Staugård. Gaborone: Ipelegeng Publishers, 1985, 276 pp. ISBN 91-7810-396-7

This book is the first volume in a trilogy, which aims at giving a description of Tswana traditional medicine its historical background and its contemporary conceptions and practices.

The present volume, on traditional health care in Botswana, describes the various Tswana traditional healers, their social and religious roles, and methods for preventing and curing disease. It also describes the health problems and the system of modern health care in Botswana and brings the results of a recent survey on the health-seeking behaviour of the population in rural and urban Botswana.

A concluding chapter of the book formulates guidelines for the future cooperation between traditional and modern health workers – a cooperation which is seen by the author as a necessary precondition for the attainment of the goal Health for All Batswana by the year 2000.

Kenya: The national epic by Jim Bailey. Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 1993, 332 pp. ISBN 0-620-18170-2

Kenya: The national epic is a record of a young nation's struggle for self-reliance, as it was photographically recorded in the pages of *Drum* magazine. It takes us through Kenya's history from the resistance and the emergency period to the dawn of freedom. It discusses the political evolution from Harambee, Kenyatta and Nyayo to Moi, the search for stability, the urge for economic development to the creation of *Taifa Moya* (One Nation) and democracy.

From another point of view, it is the story of what was considered the model of a promising African economy now gradually declining to ruin.

The black child in crisis: A socio-educational perspective edited by Johann le Roux. Pretoria: J L van Schaik, 1993, 2v. ISBN 0-627-01870-X (v1), 0-627-01966-8 (v2)

The black child in crisis is a thematic discussion of the South African situation. Divided into two volumes, where the first volume deals with sociopedagogics and the need to find solutions for the urgent socio-educational problems, health and welfare, child abuse and neglect, political repression, the "street child" phenomenon, migration, squatting, preschool demographics, language and schooling.

Volume two discusses the definitions of concepts concerning social issues, the culture of poverty, compensatory education, assistance to the black child and the socio-educational perspective, multicultural education, anti-racist practice and teaching family life, the "latchkey" concept, child abuse and issues concerning AIDS among black children.

AFRICA INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA

(Company registration number 61/00002/08)

- An independent non-profit association, the Africa Institute has established itself as an internationally recognized research and information centre concerned with African affairs.
- The Institute's mission is to collect, process, interpret and disseminate information on African and especially Southern African affairs. It focuses primarily on the political, economic, international and developmental issues facing contemporary Africa.
- Information is made available through publications, a specialized reference library, conferences and non-Institute media. A small expert research staff answer enquiries and provide comment on topical developments. Apart from their regular studies, the researchers undertake commissioned research.
- In addition to its own researchers, the Institute appoints associates in the field of African studies, runs a programme for visiting researchers, and conducts seminars and workshops. While serving the public as a whole (both professional and lay), the Institute devotes particular attention to educational institutions as well as decision-makers in the business and public sectors.
- The Institute was established in 1960 and is controlled by a council composed of representatives of the South African universities and other experts. Because it therefore has a broad-based academic character, the Institute is funded mainly through a grant from the Department of National Education.

Membership

Membership of the Institute is open to everyone who supports its aims and functions, and entails the following advantages:

- Receipt of *Africa Insight*
- Receipt of *Africa Institute Bulletin*
- Discount on *other Institute publications*
- Access to the reference library
- Consultation with professional staff
- Invitations to conferences
- Participation in Annual General Meetings

Membership fees

Individuals and schools: South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R80 per annum (*VAT included*). (Elsewhere: US\$40 or equivalent, per annum)

Institutional membership: (*Academic bodies, libraries, governmental and non-governmental organizations and embassies*) South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R200 per annum (*VAT included*). (Elsewhere: US\$100 or equivalent, per annum)

Corporate and donor membership: (*Companies and organizations not included under individual or institutional membership*) South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R500 per annum (*VAT included*). (Elsewhere: US\$250 or equivalent, per annum)

Reference library

The library holdings, consisting of some 60 000 books and many thousands of periodical articles, are indexed on computer. In addition, newspaper and periodical articles on current African events, supplemented by an international news service, are kept on readily accessible country and subject files. The library is open to members and students on weekdays from 08:00–16:00.

Institute publications

Africa Insight (Quarterly)

Africa Institute Bulletin (Monthly)

Africa at a Glance (Two-yearly)

Irregular series of research and occasional papers

Subscription to Africa Insight

Africa Insight is also available on subscription to non-members

Annual rate for South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland: R60 (*VAT included*). (Elsewhere: US\$30 or equivalent)

Overseas airmail rate: US\$80 or equivalent

Single copies (also back copies) available at R15 or US\$10 outside South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland

I/We support the objectives of the *Africa Institute* and undertake to pay the annual membership for individual/institutional/corporate/donor members. I/We wish to subscribe to *Africa Insight*.

Enclosed herewith the amount of being the membership/subscription fee for the first year.

Surname Title and initials.....

Organization*

Postal address**

..... Postal code


Signature Date

*Institutional/corporate/donor members only

** The postal address must be exactly as you wish it to appear on the Institute's mailing list.

Application for membership
Subscription to *Africa Insight*
The Secretary
Africa Institute of South Africa
Box 630
0001 PRETORIA

AFRICA



Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)