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
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Cover by William Steyn

Operation Restore Hope: Africa's Introduction to the New World Order?

Richard Cornwell

Operation Restore Hope, the United States' recent humanitarian intervention in Somalia has set some commentators wondering whether this might set a precedent for military operations of similar type and scale elsewhere in Africa. After all, though Somalia may represent an extreme case of institutional collapse, there are other African states that may not be far behind: Liberia, Angola, Sudan, Mozambique, Zaire, Chad, Togo – states covering almost a third of the area of the continent – could all be proposed as prospective candidates for international intervention. The talk of a "New World Order" and the advent of the first post-Cold War administration in Washington also fuel a natural speculation on the shape of Africa's future situation within the international community.[1]

I think there are various reasons why we are unlikely to see any bold long-term departure from existing policy towards Africa.

The US operation in Somalia, undertaken with the blessing of the UN Security Council, certainly establishes a fairly new principle in international affairs: that once a country loses any ability to govern itself, the United Nations may choose to ignore its claims to sovereignty and assume a form of trusteeship for its people.[2] Another important consideration is to prevent the destruction of adjacent states that might otherwise collapse into the chaos left by such an implosion.

The Somali case is interesting in other respects too: military forces have deployed under a UN mandate to undertake peacemaking rather than peacekeeping. And for all Washington's insistence that its troops are there simply to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid, others – including UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali – see the Somalia operation as a test-case for a new doctrine of internationalist interventionism under UN auspices.[3] I am far from saying that this would be undesirable. I am just not convinced that the obstacles to its happening can be overcome.

Somalia's is only one of the conflicts clamouring for UN attention now that the end of the Cold War has released this body from its enforced paralysis and presented it with the opportunity to achieve the objectives set down in its founding charter. There have been more UN peacekeeping operations in the past five years than in the preceding forty-two, and over the last eighteen months the organization has been swamped by calls for observer, peacekeeping and preventive diplomatic missions. Whether the UN is to play the leading role in defining the New World Order will depend at least to some extent on how it responds to the current welter of crises.

The UN Secretariat and the UN Security Council are very badly designed to deal with internal conflicts, communal violence and civil war, especially on the scale now being experienced. The UN's Peacekeeping Operations directorate is dangerously understaffed and under-equipped, and the decision-making apparatus cumbersome and slow. As Boutros-Ghali himself noted in a recent article, one lesson learned during the rapid proliferation of peacekeeping operations is the need to accelerate the deployment of UN forces. At present some three to four months can elapse between the Security Council authorizing a mission and its becoming operational.[4] A great deal can happen on the ground during that time, either allowing the situation to deteriorate or rendering the original mandate and mission inappropriate in some other way – as has already been demonstrated in Angola. There is an undoubted need for more effective preventive, early-warning and quick response systems to head off disasters before they require much larger and more expensive inputs.

The Secretary-General has already begun a streamlining of the UN Secretariat, in an effort to reduce the duplication, inefficiency and profligacy that have provided its critics with so much ammunition. But he emphasizes that more is needed than restructuring. What Boutros-Ghali is asking for is a transformation of the organizational culture of the UN. During the Cold War, he notes, many delegations' activities were characterized by a "propensity to rhetoric, to protocol

and a delight in maneuvering for marginal advantage or national prestige".[5] While all this was going on there have been more than a hundred major conflicts around the world since 1945, leaving at least 20 million dead.[6] The Secretary-General is now calling on the membership of the UN, and the Security Council in particular, to give the Secretariat the tools with which to perform the task required of it.

In the first half of 1992 peacekeeping costs rose from $700 mn to $2,8 bn annually. Yet UN peacekeeping operations are constantly on the verge of bankruptcy because many countries either withhold or delay payments to the peacekeeping fund. In October 1992 the five member states with the largest arrears in regular budget and peacekeeping assessments were the United States and Russia.[7] Unless member states meet their financial obligations the UN will be neither viable nor credible.

Boutros-Ghali has now proposed that members should provide his office with a working-capital fund for the initiation of new operations, so that cash is available immediately it is needed. This also would require the modification of existing financial procedures to allow the Secretary-General to spend funds as soon as an operation had been organized. As things stand, the UN is finding it difficult to fund existing operations and find money for new ones. Boutros-Ghali has suggested an emergency peacekeeping fund of $50 mn and an endowment fund of $1 bn to cover contingencies.[8]

Then there is the question of military manpower. Most peacekeeping personnel are made available by governments. It is obvious that a standing force under UN command would be both impractical and inappropriate, but Boutros-Ghali suggests that governments be asked to commit themselves to holding ready specially trained units and equipment for peacekeeping services. This would enable the UN to construct peacekeeping operations in various sizes and configurations at short notice.[9] In addition the UN should be provided with a reserve stock of those basic items always required by peacekeepers, to be pre-positioned at various locations globally.[10]

If the Secretary-General's proposals in terms of finance, manpower and equipment could be implemented this would certainly go some way to making the organization's peacekeeping exercise more effective. Yet many of the present crises suggest the need to do even more, by way of changing the rules of engagement under which UN forces operate.

Some parties to conflicts fail to observe ceasefire agreements. If the UN is to provide an effective system of collective security, it should be able to act forcibly in such situations. This would require the availability of units authorized to take coercive action against violators without seeking the permission of other parties. UN forces will only be really effective if their commanders in the field are empowered to act with a wide degree of latitude. This is just one way in which the command and control of peacekeeping forces must be modified. The implications are complex and present difficulties in terms of the relative powers of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and the Peacekeeping Division and its force commanders.

Such developments would have further implications for the issue of sovereignty. This is an area of contention that the UN has always sought to avoid wherever possible. Such avoidance no longer seems feasible. While the UN affirms the idea of the state as the basic unit of international relations it is time to rethink the question of sovereignty and what it entails.

For example, when intervening in civil wars the UN has to bear in mind that not all parties to the conflict are governments. Peacekeepers therefore have to learn to deal with a multiplicity of "authorities". As Boutros-Ghali has pointed out:

> The leaders of such groups are often inaccessible and their identity even unknown; chains of command are shadowy; armed persons who offend against agreements signed by their supposed leaders are disowned; discipline is nonexistent or brutal. And everywhere there is an evil and uncontrolled proliferation of arms.[11]

The nature of these types of operation is very different from Desert Storm. Many "small wars" are themselves collections of localized conflicts, inherently difficult to cope with and requiring a mix of counter-insurgency and policing activities.

This also raises the relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking. In the past the UN has often intervened to defuse an immediate crisis only to find that this leads to diplomatic immobility. Unless a more interventionist policy is sanctioned, real peace efforts must await another flaring of the conflict.[12]

The new tasks required of peacekeepers are demanding: the concentration and demobilization of guerrilla armies; running and monitoring of elections; training of police forces; rebuilding infrastructure and caring for the victims of civil war. This and the need to interact with civil populations and officials invariably entangles the soldiers in essentially political tasks.[13] There are fewer military forces available and capable of effectively undertaking these than might be imagined. Many first-rate forces are already overstretched and facing further cuts. Their political masters will be reluctant to release them for duty akin to that of armies of occupation, which may tie up irreplaceable resources indefinitely. Nor are they likely to give a blank cheque to an international organization to place their troops in dangerous situations.

Even under ideal conditions, combat operations are subject to the difficulties of reconciling political and military control. This is doubly so where units of different nationalities are cobbled together under supranational command. In a recent article, General Colin Powell, Head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff of the USA, wrote of the conditions governing the use of force to achieve political objectives.

> Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?[14]

Powell also warned that force must never be used imprecisely or out of frustration. Yet the US intervention is already being criticized on precisely these points, and its commanders are likely to discover that intervention was far easier than withdrawal.

The Secretary-General's proposals were originally contained in a document produced in June 1992, in response to

the request by the Security Council itself. So far it has been greeted by applause from most UN members, but little more substantial. Central to this reaction is the unwillingness of the permanent members of the Security Council to yield significant decision-making and executive powers to the Secretary-General.

The misgivings of the permanent members of the Security Council about the capabilities, effectiveness and priorities of the Secretariat are legion. Several unsourced press stories have suggested a less than happy working relationship with the new Secretary-General. Boutros-Ghali is accused of having a poor working style, of lacking tact and displaying petulance and impatience. He tends not to pander to the *amour propre* of UN ambassadors and prefers to deal with foreign ministers directly. Whatever the truth of the matter, he has undoubtedly ruffled diplomatic and bureaucratic feathers at Foggy Bottom.

In a recent article, however, *The Economist* suggested a different perspective on the situation: "It is wrong to blame the UN for the defective commitment of its most powerful members". It is the lack of consistent commitment that is at the heart of many of the organization's problems, it continued. It went on to agree with the Secretary-General that much has gone wrong because of penny-pinching, and that much of the blame lies at the door of the UN Security Council. Central to Boutros-Ghali's proposals lies the challenge of proving that in the New World Order the Security Council is not merely an extra arm of Western foreign policy. If the UN is to take on a neo-imperial role as it is constituted then it will look like a surrogate for US, British and French interests, and the North/South divide will replace that of East and West.[15] As the author of the piece in *The Economist* went on to say:

> The permanent membership of the Security Council, confined to the victors of the second world war, is absurdly anachronistic; the veto system is rusty and calls for change. If the council, which makes all the decisions to do with peacekeeping, is to be more imperial about intervening in other states' business, it must reform its own membership, wiping out all thought that it is a club of ex-imperialists.[16]

Another critic warned more bluntly against expecting a New World Order at all:

> ... what we are plainly witnessing is the collapse of the new world order before we know what it might be.
>
> That, however, is the analysis most western political leaders reject. Their incapacity to act compels them to argue that there is no pressing need for action.[17]

Is it likely, then, that the UN will receive the surgery that Dr Boutros-Ghali regards as essential to its new role? Not very. My guess is that unless there develops a crisis of such magnitude and complexity that established practice is potentially disastrous, bureaucratic and political inertia – assisted by vested interest – will ensure that the UN remains benignly impotent. Perhaps events in Bosnia or another area inconveniently close to the advance industrial nations would provide the necessary spur to action. Somalia will not. This is partly because the US and others who will be required to provide the lion's share of personnel and money

no longer have any substantial interests that require intervention in Africa. Their voting publics simply could not care less.

In addition, in the case of Somalia:

> There is ... concern that America is stumbling into Africa's vast store of troubles without having thought through the consequences and without realizing that patience is the Dark Continent's principal weapon against foreign invaders.[18]

There must be considerable doubt that the Somalia operation can be ended as cleanly and quickly as President Bush wanted. The gunmen may simply retreat into the desert to outwait the foreigners.

Those Africans who place their hopes on being saved from the follies of their leaders by international peacekeepers are likely to be sadly disappointed. There will be no second "colonization", even under the guise of trusteeship. The hopes raised in Somalia are liable to prove false. Africa's leaders should be left in no doubt that *they* are going to be largely responsible themselves for the fate of their countrymen. If the advanced nations wish to intervene in Africa's affairs they will continue to do so through the conditionality of international banks and agencies, not with bayonets.

Notes and references

1 See, for instance, Francis A Kornegay Jr, "Africa in the New World Order", *Africa Report*, January–February 1993.

2 Strobe Talbott, "Collapsing countries", *Time*, vol 140, no 24, 12 November 1992, p 33.

3 "Somalia: Warlords meet the New World Order", *Africa Confidential*, vol 33, no 24, 4 December 1992.

4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", *Foreign Affairs*, vol 72, no 5, Winter 1992/93, p 92.

5 *Ibid*, p 102.

6 John Ralston Saul, *Voltaire's bastards: The dictatorship of reason in the West*, London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992, p 179. "One of the great pretenses of the last half century is that we have been at peace. This vision of the world is not so much false as falsely focused. The West has been locked in the grip of a nuclear peace, the only alternative to which was massive, if not total, self-destruction. But the creation of nuclear weapons produced two separate levels of peace and war. For almost fifty years we have had nuclear peace, while gradually slipping into a new sort of conventional world war. However, by limiting our focus to the developed world, we have been able to pretend that there has also been conventional peace. The result is a perfectly artificial view of what constitutes war."

7 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *op cit*, pp 94–95.

8 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An agenda for peace", *UN Chronicle*, September 1992, pp 2–4.

9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering ...", *op cit*, pp 92–93.

10 *Ibid*, p 93.

11 *Ibid*, p 91.

12 *The Guardian Weekly*, 19–25 February 1993, citing the case of Cyprus, where there has been an expensive UN military presence now for 30 years.

13 "Mr Human Rights", *The Economist*, 26 December 1992–8 January 1993, p 60.

14 Colin L Powell, "US forces: Challenges ahead", *Foreign Affairs*, vol 72, no 5, Winter 1992/93, p 38.

15 "Mr Human Rights", *op cit*, pp 60–62.

16 *Ibid*, p 62.

17 Hugo Young, writing in the *Guardian Weekly* of 18–22 December 1992.

18 Jim Hoagland "Generous intentions, little experience" *Washington Post* in the *Guardian Weekly* 18–22 December 1992.

Feeding Africa's cities: The role and potential for urban agriculture

Professor C M Rogerson, Department of Geography, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, assesses the role of urban agriculture in sustaining Africa's rapidly growing cities.

Introduction

Over the past few years, urban policy makers across Africa have been forced to confront a wide range of issues surrounding "sustainable development".[1] In particular, the concern for sustainable development has been prominent since the concept was popularized by the publication of *Our common future*, the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, which also is known as the *Brundtland report*.[2] The central argument of this highly influential study was that throughout the developing world, sustainable development will in future be crucially dependent on solutions to problems of poverty. In the urban context a number of so-termed "pressure points" have been identified as issues that decision makers must address in order to move towards "sustainable urbanization".[3] Among these pressure points of urban poverty – which include job opportunities, waste disposal, health, energy and shelter – one of the most significant in Africa presently concerns the question of urban food supply.[4]

Until recently, the burgeoning literature on food security issues accorded only a passing mention to the problems of the urban poor in the developing world.[5] Nonetheless, with escalating levels of urbanization, expanding populations and a declining ability of many countries to feed themselves, the supply of food for the urban populations of Africa no longer is a matter that can be taken for granted.[6] Acute pressures have been placed on the food supply and production systems of many African cities. The problem of securing regular

urban food supplies is exacerbated sometimes by rapid city growth taking place on prime farmlands and often by policies that furnish relatively cheap imported food for urban populations, providing little incentive for local farmers to produce food for the market. Two major suggested solutions for attaining greater food security are to stimulate hinterland food-carrying capacity or to encourage gardening and food production within urban areas.[7]

The objective in this article is to focus the discussion upon this second solution. More particularly, the goal is to assess the role of urban agriculture in Africa and of its potential contribution to feeding the cities as a broader element of sustainable development policy. In this regard, Wekwete is emphatic that in Africa "urban farming has become a critical variable in sustainability".[8] This viewpoint echoes substantially the *Brundtland report*, which urges that governments in the developing world should "consider supporting urban agriculture", arguing that in most cities "considerable potential exists".[9] More especially, the report states:

> Officially sanctioned and promoted urban agriculture could become an important component of urban development and make more food available to the urban poor. The primary purpose of such promotion should be to improve the nutritional and health standards of the poor, help their family budgets (50-70 per cent of which is usually spent on food), enable them to earn some additional income, and provide employment. Urban agriculture can also provide fresher and cheaper produce, more green space, the clearing of garbage dumps and recycling of household waste.[10]

Three segments of discussion are presented in this article dealing, *inter alia*, with the case for urban agriculture, a review of the role of urban cultivation in Africa and finally, an analysis of the current state of policy debates.

The case for urban agriculture

Urban agriculture was firmly placed on the policy agenda by the new emphasis accorded to strategies for promoting sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".[11] A major impetus was given to new policy thinking and analysis concerning urban agriculture by the United Nations University's research programme on the Food-Energy Nexus.[12] Prior to the launch of this research effort urban farming had been given scant attention by government or research agencies and consequently little documentation existed on the actual extent or potential of urban agriculture.[13] Under the directorship of Ignacy Sachs the research sponsored by this programme contributed greatly to establishing, beginning in the 1980s, a case for urban cultivation as a key policy issue in the developing world.

Urban and peri-urban food production was presented as a central part of a strategy for food self-reliance for cities in developing countries.[14] The goal of self-reliance was seen as a starting point for the design and implementation of urban strategies inspired by, what Sachs terms, "the ecodevelopment approach".[15] This concept centres on ecological sustainability both as regards resource conservation and minimizing environmental degradation. Urban development that takes place within the context of a renewable resource ecosystem enhances the "metabolism" of cities.[16] Food self-reliance for many developing countries would be an axis of an urban bootstrap operation premised "on the belief that a dependable supply of cooked food should be regarded as a fundamental human right".[17] It was acknowledged that while in many cities total self-sufficiency was an impossible goal, it was still necessary to understand and seek to extend the degree of urban self-reliance in food production. Objectively, it was conceded also that urban gardens cannot constitute a short-term solution for the nutritional deficiencies of the urban poor; they are a complement rather than a replacement for programmes of income redistribution.[18] Nonetheless, the overarching contention was still defensible: "the concept of greater urban self-reliance should not be dismissed as a utopian idea that has no place in reality".[19]

The key argument of the group of United Nations University researchers was that urban gardening was not merely a "pleasant or subsidiary" activity but instead "a critical part of developing more productive and viable urban habitats".[20] The direct production of food by the vulnerable poor in developing cities was both essential and should by facilitated by policy makers. Indeed, the major advantage of urban agriculture was seen in its potential to improve the socio-economic situation of the poor. As noted by Sachs and Silk, urban cultivation can furnish "a significant contribution to the poorest of the poor, for whom small amounts of food ... can make a crucial difference".[21] More recently, Hussain has noted that urban food production "in addition to improving the nutritional quality of the diet, can become a valuable income-generating activity for the unemployed and underemployed and can utilize spare and unused lands available in cities".[22] Beyond direct economic benefits to low-income households of self-help production, however, are benefits derived in other ways "that may ultimately be the most significant in shaping a positive future for Third World cities".[23] Specifically, Wade draws attention to the powerful psychological impact of successful community-based efforts at food production.[24] In addition, urban cultivation was recognized as conferring many advantages to cities from an ecological viewpoint as regards resource conservation and reducing the need for environmentally and economically expensive transportation of perishable food commodities.[25]

Finally, much optimism was generated for urban agriculture by several examples of cities in Asia and the Pacific which had succeeded in producing large quantities of food for their inhabitants.[26] As Yeung notes "wherever it is practised in Asia, urban agriculture is intensive and highly successful" and despite, in many instances, the lack of government support, many Asian cities "have produced effectively within their spatial confines".[27]

The state of urban agriculture in Africa

The practice of cultivation within the overall boundaries of urban areas in Africa is not a new phenomenon.[28] Nonetheless, across contemporary Africa, urban cultivation is a widespread activity that is becoming a permanent part of the landscape in many large cities. Indeed, for the inhabitants of small towns it is frequently the main occupation. With recession and the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s the position emerges that "urban agriculture is both prevalent and economically significant",[29] and now is interpreted as an essential component of everyday survival in the African city.[30] Typically, in urban Tanzania "every open space, utility service reserve, road, valley or garden in the towns has been taken up for planting of all sorts of seasonal and permanent crops, ranging from vegetables, maize, bananas, to fruit trees".[31]

Several studies underscore the extent of growth in farming as both a part-time and full-time occupation for urban households.[32] In Harare, research shows the significance of urban gardens as a vital source of subsistence food production.[33] Moreover, since the middle 1970s an expansion of informal cultivation has taken place in the shallow valleys occupying the city's periphery.[34] For Nairobi, a so-termed "city of farmers", there is a considerable body of evidence disclosing that informal urban cultivation of open space is markedly on the increase.[35] It is noted that "there are few areas of the city of Nairobi where the activities of urban farmers cannot be observed".[36] Urban cultivation, however, reaches its most striking extent in the case of Lusaka, where nearly 60 per cent of low-income households were recorded as cultivating food gardens.[37] In the evocative words of Sanyal:

> It was February and Lusaka looked abundant. The rainy season was just over and bright yellow sunlight touched the edges of dark green maize plants which had sprung up all over the city. There

were maize plants outside the Lusaka International Airport, standing in contrast to the purple bougainvillea which had been carefully planted by the Department of Public Works to welcome the dignatories of an International Conference. Maize plants grew all along the edges of the Great East Road – the thoroughfare connecting the airport, the university, the National Assembly building and the central business district. Even outside the boundary walls of the elegantly designed Hotel Intercontinental, maize grew in abundance.

The abundance of maize plants was not only confined to the "official areas" of Lusaka. Hidden from the main thoroughfares of Great East Road and Great North Road, the squatter communities...looked lush and green with only small mud houses reminding one of habitation. There was maize in front of the mud houses and around the periphery of the communities: there were large banana trees around the rickety structures of pit latrines. Pumpkin leaves covered low fences that separated unfriendly neighbors; and tomatoes and ground nuts grew in front of the houses where women sat together washing dishes and lighting fires... .[38]

Indeed, in Lusaka the expansion of urban agriculture has been so extensive that the city has been described as "the world capital of urban cultivation".[39]

Overall, this recent expansion of urban farming has been interpreted as a part of a process of the "ruralization" of African cities which poses important new challenges for policy makers and planners.[40] Contrary to popular belief, however, this dimension of ruralization of the African city cannot be attributed to rural-urban migration. Several studies on urban farmers in Nairobi and Lusaka demonstrate clearly that "urban cultivation is not practised exclusively or even primarily by recent migrants".[41] The majority of farmers originate from households who are fully entrenched in the urban economy and have secured access to land, which at least in the case of Zambia, "usually requires seven to eleven years of urban residence".[42] A profile of urban cultivators in Kenya shows that "average length of urban farmers' residence was 20.4 years, 85 % had resided in the city for at least five years, 57.5 % had been living there for 15 years or more, while 15 % had dwelt there for more than 40 years".[43]

Leading the march of urban cultivation in Africa are the poorest households for whom agriculture represents a vital survival strategy in the city. Sanyal maintains that the post-1980 upsurge of household cultivation by the urban poor is "an innovative response from below" to the decline of formal urban economies across Africa.[44] Cultivation by the urban poor "reduces their vulnerability to the fluctuations of fortune that currently beset the economies of developing countries' cities".[45] There is some limited evidence, however, to suggest that in certain areas of Africa the practice of urban cultivation is not merely confined to the poorest strata of households.[46] Nevertheless, it is clear that in most African cities, urban cultivation is largely a survival strategy of the poor designed to reduce their vulnerable condition in cities.

The fragmentary material available on urban cultivation in South Africa points to its importance for especially unemployed and elderly women.[47] At Mamelodi, women have planted the township's vacant and unused land with maize, wild spinach and groundnuts thus enabling them "to feed their families and eke out a meagre living".[48] The peri-urban

cultivation taking place in Harare is primarily conducted by low-income families who grow food crops for domestic consumption and sale.[49] In Nairobi the vast majority of cultivated plots "are creations of the very poor, and represent a major source of subsistence for the urban underclasses".[50] Research on urban cultivation in Kenya underlines the vital role of women as major food producers and not merely as supplementary producers of incomes to the male bread-winner.[51] Freeman notes that urban cultivation "is a serious, even critical, business for most of the women farmers of Nairobi" whose overwhelming concern "was to provide their family with enough to eat".[52] Similarly, Stren reports the finding of a International Development Research Centre study in which the majority of women urban farmers in Kenya said they would starve or suffer considerably without urban gardening.[53] Again, in the case of Lusaka, farming is a particularly important survival niche for groups of low-income women with limited schooling or marketable skills in the formal economy.[54] The activities of Lusaka's women cultivators are fundamental to household reproduction and not simply, as commonly attributed, an unimportant pastime indulged in by city housewives. Indeed, it has been estimated that for the poorest households in Lusaka, subsistence food amounts to about one-third of all food consumed. Accordingly, it is argued that, as a survival strategy, "urban cultivation is probably the most important to the urban poor since it provides food – the very basic necessity of life".[55]

In summary, from research undertaken on urban agriculture in Africa it is apparent that, while a small number of cultivators are commercial farmers, "the picture that emerges is essentially one of a family subsistence-oriented urban agricultural sector in which, on average, cultivators allocate 85 per cent of their crop to feed their own household".[56] Furthermore, the vast majority of urban cultivators pursue farming in the urban environment "out of sheer necessity, the alternative being the threat of hunger, malnutrition, and even starvation of the cultivators and/or their families".[57] The produce and revenues of urban agriculture constitute a much-required source of income and nutrition for the urban poor and especially for the growing numbers of women-headed households in the African city. Finally, it is important to re-iterate the important finding for policy debates that urban agriculture is not a manifestation of rural habits. Rather, it is a rational response by the urban poor to the inability of the formal economy to provide them with sufficient real income for survival in the city.

Policy debates about urban agriculture

In terms of policy debates it is important to recognize that urban agriculture is part of the primary sector of the informal economy in the developing world.[58] It is therefore an anachronism that the general movement towards more official tolerance of the urban informal economy has, to a large extent, excluded the practice of informal cultivation. Accordingly, projects to assist urban agriculture are not generally part of the package of international development aid programmes.[59]

Across urban Africa the expansion of urban cultivation has occurred, despite official neglect and often in the face of negative actions by authorities. Food production in African cities is usually not appreciated by urban authorities and certainly not planned for and supported by governments.[60] Moreover, as Lee-Smith and Stren aver, "neither land-use planning nor urban management are traditionally geared to coping with urban food production".[61] Hostility and repression has confronted the activities of urban farmers in many African countries. Kenyan authorities view urban agriculture as part of the broader embarrassment of the informal sector, a blot on the city landscape, "a continuous but unwelcome reminder that programmes for development and efforts to project an aura of modernity and progress have not reached very far below the surface".[62] Although Malawi's President Banda praised the practice of urban cultivation in Lilongwe, the official attitude towards urban agriculture is ambivalent, with criticism directed at the threats which it poses to the city's recreational space.[63] In Zambia the harsh repression of urban cultivation, at one time, was justified on the grounds that it facilitated the breeding of malaria-carrying mosquitos.[64]

As new research highlighting the benefits of urban agriculture has appeared and attitudes slowly change towards at least the benign acceptance of the actions of cultivators, the policy ground has begun to shift. It is important to recognize that acceptance of urban cultivators as a legitimate part of the urban environment does not imply the abandonment of orderly land-use planning and development. Rather, as Lado points out, "planning itself can be a productive tool to aid the harmonious integration of informal urban agriculture with other complementary and even competing forms of land use".[65] In similar vein an official acceptance of a goal of urban self-reliance in food production does not mean less work for the state, rather a different type of work that involves supportive initiatives rather than blockage measures.[66]

Several observers support the contention that not only should the harassment of cultivators be stopped but also active steps should be taken to encourage the practice of urban agriculture.[67] Among a range of suggested policy interventions are measures *inter alia* that provide greater assurance to low income households, including the granting of legal titles to cultivators either for renting, leasing or owning land; the development of appropriate cultivation techniques; the provision in urban areas of government farm extension assistance packages; and direct assistance to cultivators in the form of improving water supplies or relieving shortages of seeds and planting materials. More broadly, in the design of "progressive" programmes to assist local urban food production Wade recommends a review of existing land use policies and their replacement by four sets of guidelines, namely: plan for temporary land use, multiple use of land, maximum use of land, and upgrading of low-income settlements.[68] Beyond changes in land use policy, suggestions have also been mooted for developing more flexible water and waste-management policies that might enhance the potential for community food production.[69]

Clearly, the overall thrust of policy-making is towards the creation of more supportive environments for the practice of urban cultivation. Some important cautionary comments, however, are injected by Rakodi into the policy debate.[70] It is contended that while food production provides a crucial or at least useful food supplement for many families, at present there is insufficient available information to evaluate the extent to which urban food production can satisfy household basic needs. Therefore, Rakodi argues prior to advocating more widespread cultivation, that it is necessary to assess its benefits as compared to alternative economic opportunities that might be made available through other initiatives.[71] Equally important is to assess its impact upon women, who conduct most of the work of urban agriculture. As Rakodi concludes: "While attention to urban agriculture may be justified, it must be remembered that it does not resolve the basic problems of women's inadequate access to education, skills, wage employment, and more lucrative opportunities for self-employment; therefore, it should form only one part of a strategy designed to improve the income of poor households, and of women in particular, in the urban system".[72]

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Islam in sub-Saharan Africa

Eduardo Serpa

Islam in Africa is important for various reasons: the large numbers of Muslims living in Africa; the rapid expansion of their communities; the fact that they constitute either majorities or, at least, strong minorities in some of the most important African countries; and the leading positions occupied by Muslims in cultural, business and political circles.

Geographical and human boundaries

As a result of various socio-cultural circumstances, discussed below, Islam acquired a specific identity in sub-Saharan Africa. For this reason this article will not include Mediterranean Africa, nor will it deal with Muslim communities of Asian origin living south of the Sahara. Despite their considerable size and the important role they have played in the religious, cultural and economic sphere, these groups have been omitted because they have retained a marked cultural and religious identity, which has precluded them from integrating with the black Muslim communities that have developed a particular brand of Islam.

Asian Muslims will therefore be mentioned only in passing, when reference to them will contribute to a better understanding of matters directly related to black Islam.

The present situation

Although no reliable statistics are available, it would appear that Islam has gained in importance over the last few decades. Monteil says that if the population of black Africa was estimated at 320 million in 1978, it is possible that this figure included some 90 million Muslims, more than a quarter of the total. More than two-thirds of these Muslims were living in Nigeria and in East Africa. The majority of the remaining third were settled in West Africa – between the Senegal and Niger Rivers – and in Central Africa.[1]

This concentration of Muslims in certain parts of the continent explains why, in the mid-1980s, nineteen countries in black Africa had Muslim majorities. Not that these were Muslim states in the technical sense. Their legal systems were not based on Islamic principles. Indeed, the majority of these countries were ruled by Christian heads of state, supported by mission-educated élites.[2] This situation may be changing, however, as illustrated by the cases of Senegal and Tanzania, where the Catholic Presidents Léopold Senghor and Julius Nyerere have been succeeded by Muslims. This may also prove to be the pattern eventually in Côte d'Ivoire.

This analysis of the numerical strength of Islam in Africa cannot be concluded without reference to an additional problem. The difficulties caused by the lack of statistics are exacerbated by the symbiotic character of Africa's religious and cultural life. African traditional religion often combines with either Christianity or Islam. Many millions of Africans are adherents of such combinations. To be simultaneously a Muslim and a Marxist is also possible for many Guineans, Algerians and Somalis. It seems, however, that such a list of hybrid combinations, to which many more could be added, includes only one rigid line of mutual exclusivity, that separating Islam and Christendom.[3]

The Crescent moves into Africa

The relationship between Africa and Islam is almost as old as the faith preached by Muhammad. Besides that, for a long time Islam was part of the only close contact that Africa had with the outside world. As Jan Knoppert said, for twelve centuries, from 640 to 1840, people of Arab stock were the only external force present in the heartland of Africa: "They went to live there, meaning by that to marry, build a family, trade, build an organization, in the end, to teach." The latter aspect of their presence was of great importance because, as Richard-Mollard puts it, Islam often acted in black Africa as "a cyclical stimulant of the society of the Sudan".[4]

Islamic expansion in Africa began with the conversion of the Copts of Egypt, followed by that of the Berbers of North Africa, to the Moroccan shores of the Atlantic. This process was completed by the eleventh century.[5]

At that stage, some thousand kilometres to the south, the traditional black beliefs of West Africa seemed protected from the Crescent by the double barrier of sea and desert. The latter was not, however, impenetrable, as it was crossed by caravans. In the eleventh century, the Lemtouna, living between Morocco and the Senegal, were converted to a puritanical and militant Islam. The new converts became known as the Almoravids. Some of them conquered Morocco and crossed

Rain forest

Desert

Arab possessions in (A.D.) 750

Direction of spread of Islam

Arab coastal trade

Spread of Islam in Africa

the sea to Spain. Others seized control of the black empire of Ghana, whose population had to choose between conversion and death. Their success was short-lived, and animism soon regained its hold. By the end of the sixteenth century Islam had almost disappeared from the southern fringes of the Sahara.[6]

Nevertheless, some populations retained their new faith, even if their rulers were heathen. One such people, the Toucouleurs of the Senegal valley, revolted against their animist masters and organized a feudal and theocratic confederation, ruled by an imam.[7]

The revolt of the Toucouleurs was followed by a long period of Islamic military expansion. Chékou Amadou established an independent Muslim state on the Upper Niger. The Hausas, established a large empire in what is now northern Nigeria, with two capitals, Sokoto and Kano.[8]

East Africa was exposed to Islam long before West Africa. The first conversions took place in the ninth century, along the coast of the Red Sea. The coasts of the Indian Ocean were frequented by the Arabs from the tenth century onwards. These contacts resulted in a mixed population, the Swahili, who followed Islam and spoke a mixture of Arabic and native languages. Islam also spread to the Comores and Madagascar.[9]

The Nile valley offered another route for Islamic expansion, but it penetrated no further than northern Sudan for a long time. In 1350 the obstacle represented by the Christian kingdom of Dongola was removed. From there, Islam pushed westwards to the shores of Lake Chad. In Ethiopia, the Muslims from the Red Sea encountered a barrier in the central plateau, occupied by Christians. Nevertheless, the coastal region of Ethiopia and part of the plateau of Harar became Muslim.[10]

The coast of the Indian Ocean provided a platform for Islam's penetration of the hinterland. There were two routes: one gave access to Lake Victoria, the other to Lake Tanganyika. The latter route continued to the Congo. Many Muslim communities were established along that route, but for the most part the population of the hinterland remained pagan. Some of these populations were converted to Christianity at a later stage.[11]

Islam in contemporary Africa

The rapid expansion of Islam in West Africa in the nineteenth century has continued up to the present.

According to Trimingham, about half of the Hausa of northern Nigeria were Muslims by 1900. By 1952 that figure had grown to some 80 per cent. In some cases, this expansion was the result of the Crescent's ability to compete successfully with the Cross. In Senegal, the Serer, either animist or nominally Christian, turned to Islam en masse.[12]

There is still a strong animist block in the hinterland of Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. This area is now being penetrated by Islam, which tends to be the winner in the competition with Christianity. In Mali, about half the population is Muslim, with the latter element concentrated in the towns and along the trade routes. This country is also the citadel of the most educated Muslims in West Africa.[13]

Niger, with its strong Muslim majority, provides a good illustration of the heterogeneity of African Islam:
- in the north, along the Niger, the Djerma "follow an Islam full of magic, in which possession and exorcism play a big role";
- in the centre, the Hausa, the "*tidjaniya*" Muslims and the pagans are mixed;
- in the east, the Kanuri, previously part of the empire of Bornu, have been Muslims for many centuries.[14]

The same kind of distinctions may be found in the north of Nigeria, which is almost entirely Muslim. In the middle of the country, Muslims and pagans are thoroughly mixed, while part of the south is characterized by a mosaic of Muslims, Christians and animists.[15]

Moving towards Central Africa, northern Cameroon is strongly Muslim, as a result of its inclusion in the empire of Bornu and of the Peul invasions in the eighteenth century. Further to the south, the sovereign of the Bamoun was converted in 1914 and proclaimed Islam as the official religion of his people. Northern Chad is Muslim. The regions of Kanem, Baguirmi and Ouadai are old citadels of Islam. However, southern Chad remains strongly animist. The black Shamites of East Sudan are Muslims, while the entire south, the region of the "real blacks", remains animist or has become Christian. The blacks living along the western border of Ethiopia have remained animists.[16]

In the former British colonies of East Africa, the Swahili-speaking coast is almost entirely Muslim. For some time now, Zanzibar has played the role of a regional centre of Islamic propagation. All over Kenya and Tanzania scattered Muslim communities can be found.[17]

There are large numbers of Muslims along the northern coast of Mozambique, particularly in the province of Cabo Delgado, which has much in common with the Swahili world. Mozambique provides a good example of the vitality of East African black Islam, which was able successfully to resist the pressures of an anti-religious government. Until very recently, the authorities of Maputo were conducting an intensive campaign of atheist indoctrination and placed strict restrictions on public worship and religious propaganda.

Frelimo's anti-religious policies considerably undermined the influence of the various Christian denominations, but not that of Islam. The authorities had to take a low profile when dealing with the Muslims if they were to avoid violent reaction. It is quite possible that an Islam able to proselytize in the recently restored climate of religious freedom will enter a phase of renewed expansion, facilitated by the effects of more than a decade in which superficially Christianized populations have had no clergy.

The reasons for Islam's success

Islam's success in Africa seems to be the result of a combination of circumstances, structural and coincidental, which favoured its expansion, together with the use of certain methods of proselytism.

Islam projected an image with an appeal enhanced by the

Percentage of population:

- to 0.9%
- to 4.9%
- to 29.9%
- to 49.9%
- to 79.9%
- to 100%

Largely Indian and Malay

Present distribution of Islam

existence of many points common to Arab and African mental and social frameworks. These were the main structural factors easing the spread of Islam in Africa.

Islam's image is of a "plain, clear and sound faith", without abstractions, or even mysteries. The image of simplicity and cohesion provided by the Islamic faith is supplemented by the, apparent, socio-spiritual cohesion of the society formed by the believers: "the brotherhoods are not sects and the malikite legal school is sovereign", except in East Africa. Christianity, on the other hand, presents an image of multiplicity and division, with rivalries between Catholics and Protestants, and this has enhanced the impact of the appearance of unity offered by Islam.[18]

That there is a fundamental incompatibility between Islamic monotheism and animist polytheism does not strike the African mind. The fact that the existence of a creator God is admitted in most of Africa provides African traditional religion with the concept of a supreme being, a belief

that opens the path for a possible penetration of a monotheist faith.[19] It seems that there is also a great deal in common between Islam and African traditional religion with regard to the interpretation of dreams and visions.[20]

According to Fr Schildknecht, there are similarities between the African and Arab mentalities. Their social circumstances demand an overlapping of the temporal and the spiritual forms of life, and require some kind of fetishism in the concept of the chief.[21]

The adoption of Islam may well have acted as a spiritual lifebelt as traditional animist society began to crumble under the impact of European technology.[22] According to Schildknecht, such a role became possible because Islam, as a "supratribal society", appeared to offer a remedy against detribalization, while preserving, in a sense, the continuity of the African cultural heritage.[23]

The feelings of fraternity normally associated with the Muslim religion may also have provided a possible defence against the sensation of isolation associated with the crumbling of traditional communities. The need for such a defence was particularly strong in the case of people accustomed to life in a strongly collectivist society, where associations of various types were important. Islam did its best to provide an environment where a Muslim could feel at home wherever he found a fellow-believer.[24]

Subsequently, Muslim brotherhoods come to replace the former tribal secret societies in a far more comprehensive manner. Such a form of social organization plays a role that is more than defensive. As soon as the pagans become a minority, these societies will mock them in such a way that they will convert in order to escape ridicule.[25]

It seems clear that the brotherhoods were important to the success of the Islamic expansion south of the Sahara. Deschamps is of the opinion that, since the eighteenth century, the conversion of black Africa to the Koran has been principally the work of the brotherhoods. The masses found in those associations a social structure, travelling and trading facilities, a spirit of sect, and chiefs with supernatural powers.[26]

The African acceptance of Islam was facilitated by that religion's ability to adapt to local conditions. This quality made its rapid Africanization possible.[27] As pointed out by the Nigerian pastor Majola Agbedi, Islam was in essence no more African than Christianity.[28] Nevertheless, adaptation could occur quickly, perhaps because Islam required from its converts only the recitation of the chaada, which expressed the central belief of the faith preached by Muhammad. To say "Allah is God and Muhammad is his Prophet" was enough to create a Muslim.[29]

Islam did not oblige its converts to change their way of life, or even their religious concepts. The traditional family structure could survive, since polygamy was not attacked. The maintenance of slavery helped ease the situation. Many black Muslims were allowed to retain most of their animist beliefs and practices.[30]

The adaptability of Islam in Africa was probably enhanced by the fact that in most cases the propagation of the religion was undertaken by Africans themselves. This contrasted with the foreign image currently associated with Christianity.[31] Ali Mazrui provides evidence of the importance of Islamization being conducted by indigenous agents, when he compares the geographical expansion of the Crescent in East and in West Africa. He mentions, among the possible reasons for the more modest Muslim presence in East Africa, that whereas the Islamic leadership in West Africa was deeply indigenized from a very early stage, in East Africa it remained Arab. This situation could be manipulated by Christian propaganda in a region where Arabs had played the principal part in the slave trade.[32]

Besides, Africans tended to relate Islam to the idea of a superior culture, which could work as a modernizing factor. However, as pointed out by Louis Massignon, that image of superiority presented a character which did not alienate the indigenous population. This was due to the Muslims' willingness to admit their converts immediately to a position of equality.[33] Integration in this superior culture offered prospects of both collective and individual gain.

According to Basil Davidson, Africans identified the modernizing role of Islam very early. This was related to the fact that the Muslims brought skills of great importance for the expansion and development of states and empires.[34]

Political modernization was accompanied by an economic counterpart, as the Muslim trader introduced a market economy.[35]

The Muslim's dress, his manners, and the style of his prayers all added to the attractions of the religion. To be a Muslim, even if the conversion was merely external, provided the new convert with a sense of importance, of gaining in terms of vital force.[36]

The attractions of this positive image among the population at large were augmented by particular elements appealing to various groups. Women accepted Islamization because it could represent a form of emancipation. The Koran granted them a share in the family inheritance refused them by traditional society.[37]

According to Monteil, none of the factors presented as causes of the Islamic expansion in black Africa is sufficient in itself to explain that religion's expansion. However, "their combination generates an irresistible movement".[38]

The methods employed by Islam in its spiritual conquest of Africa were suited to its catalytic role, taking account of the character of African traditional societies. This is particularly so in the case of the hierarchical societies of the western and central parts of the continent.

Historically, Islam attempted to conquer the aristocratic element before moving on to a slow penetration of the peasant masses. The sudden disappearance of a chief in an agricultural society of a religious character might well sow confusion and turn it into a potential acquisition for Islam.[39] This is a condition that continues to apply today.

A culture interprets a religion

The distinctive character of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa is related to the existence of "some correspondence between the traditional structure of a society and its manner of interpreting Islam".[40]

This character, reflecting a strong African cultural identity, was made possible by Islam's willingness to accommodate African traditions. The fact that such willingness exists, indicates that the evolution of Islam in Africa and its local response to major contemporary issues will be a function of the interaction of two cultures which, in spite of profound differences, also have a good deal in common.

As already pointed out, there is a distinct possibility that Islam will play an increasingly important role in Africa. The study of the religious attitudes of black Muslims, therefore, is a matter of fundamental importance, because those attitudes will play a major role in the shaping of their socio-political and economic choices and of their approach to fundamentalism. Their interpretation of the Koranic message will also play an important role in the formulation of the foreign policy of those African countries where Muslims are in the majority or, at least, constitute a strong minority. This could be of particular significance should fundamentalism prove successful in the Middle East or in the Maghreb. Such a development could well generate a political block with militant and expansionist tendencies.[41]

Black Islam and the challenge of the modern world

Over the past forty years or so, black Islam has been forced to confront the serious challenge posed by the modern world to all cultures: to their forms of religious expression. This challenge is comprehensive, embracing philosophy, culture, politics and economics. The nature of this challenge itself set in motion a sociological process involving every aspect of life in the black Muslim communities of sub-Saharan Africa.

Ultimately the outcome of the response to the modern world's challenge will be determined by a combination of factors. Thus, the essence of African culture will play a role of a rather qualitative and selective kind, by determining which aspects of modern secularism will be acceptable to black Muslims. The cultural element will not, however, be the only factor influencing a process that also has a quantitative element.

The outcome of this acculturation process will be greatly influenced by the level of Islamic expansion south of the Sahara and with its pattern of regional distribution. These elements will determine if and where a possible symbiosis of the African version of Islam and modern Western secularism will be the choice of individuals or local religious communities or if it they will choose rather to play a meaningful role in national, regional or even international affairs.

The threat from Western secularism

At present, Christianity does not appear to constitute a formidable barrier to Islamic expansionism in Africa. The same cannot be said of Western secularism. This threat applies particularly to the most advanced countries, such as Nigeria.

The Islamic societies of sub-Saharan Africa experience the impact of secularism and of other forms of Western influence differently according to region, social class and age group.[42]

In East Africa, for example, the encroachment of the secularist outlook has affected neither religious doctrine nor institutions. There the traditional Muslim "feels intuitively that Islam is the factor of continuity in a world of change". Trimingham explains that this is because these people have not lost contact with Islamic social traditions in the same way in which many Westerners have lost touch with Christian traditions.[43]

The effects of secularism and Westernization in general seem to be felt more at a practical than at a theoretical level, because they are "narrowing the domain of Islam, restricting the sphere in which it can mould the lives of its adherents".[44]

This situation is explained by Mazrui, when he says that when young Muslims are "mesmerized by disco music and nightclubs, their faith is endangered more than when they listen to a Christian preacher ..."[45]

The penetration into Africa of forms of foreign influence alien to both the Islamic faith and African culture, have encountered strong forces of resistance. Some of the forces are genuinely indigenous, while others are part of an attempt made by the Muslim world in general to preserve the purity of its principles.

Indigenous tradition versus Westernization

Mazrui is of the opinion that, in the long run, Western influence will be unable to destroy traditional African culture. If this proves the case, the tradition might become Islam's involuntary ally in its effort to halt the penetration of Western secularism into black Africa.[46] Mazrui also maintains that this may result from a repetition of what happened previously, in the cases of both Islam and Christianity, which were penetrated by traditional African culture, generating two new syntheses that have a good deal in common. The same kind of symbiosis seems possible in respect of Western culture and its institutions.[47]

Mazrui bases his hypothesis on the resilience of indigenous cultures in preserving their identity. He uses the Yoruba of Nigeria to illustrate his point. Their culture "absorbed both Westernization and Islam, and still insisted on the supremacy of the indigenous".[48]

Fundamentalism versus secularism

Throughout Islam over the past few years the fundamentalist or revivalist movement has militantly opposed the secularist influence disseminated by the West.

Fundamentalism is based on the traditional idea which claims that, in Islam, religion and politics are inseparable. This close connection between religious and socio-political life is a direct consequence of the fact that the latter is governed by the *shari'a*, a set of legal rules prescribed by the Koran. The full implementation of the *shari'a* requires the existence of an Islamic state, based on the pre-eminence of the judiciary over both the executive and the legislature, since the law, as a product of divine revelation, may not be developed or modified. This concept implies the subordina-

tion of the religious to the political. Hence, the legitimacy of the ruler is determined by his upholding of the *shari'a*, and of the moral order that guarantees the integrity of the community of the believers.[49]

Islamic fundamentalism appeared as a response to the need to preserve the basic foundations of the faith and of their expression in the realm of social life, threatened – or perceived as such, either by developments taking place within the Muslim world itself or, more recently, by the impact of Western influences.

Fundamentalism itself constitutes a recurrent rather than a new phenomenon in Muslim history. The roots of the present fundamentalist cycle should be sought in a preoccupation with the influence of the dominant West, perceived by Muslim thinkers as a danger to the integrity of their culture and faith.[50]

Fundamentalism in Africa

In December 1991 a senior United States official was reviewing potential causes of political ferment in Africa in the 1990s. He singled out only one worrying trend: the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. There are a number of Africanists who believe that the fundamentalist tide gathering momentum in North Africa could sweep south to affect the political stability of countries from the Horn of Africa to East and West Africa.[51]

It is too early to assess the long-term implications of the expansion of fundamentalism in sub-Saharan Africa. There are several reasons, however, to doubt that Islamic fundamentalism will have such a disruptive effect in the region this century.

The Islamic revival sparked by the Iranian revolution, which had a profound impact in many countries either Muslim or with Muslim majorities, affected Africa only superficially.

It is true that revivalism has been evident in some African countries. But, even there, its influence seems limited to minorities, with no appeal to the masses.

Revivalism in Africa has been spread either from above, as in Sudan, or from popular layers of society, as in Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. It seems also that countries where Islam was introduced long ago are more prone to fundamentalist penetration than those which started to be Islamized recently.

United States officials have long regarded Sudan as a test-case to determine fundamentalism's potential in sub-Saharan Africa. The rationale is that if the National Islamic Front is able to impose its vision of society on a country where various ethnic and religious groups have coexisted for generations, then other African states are also vulnerable to similar movements.

It must be remembered, however, that the imposition of an Islamic regime in Sudan – which provides the best example of revivalism from above – has proved no easy task. Sudan constitutes a particular case, in terms of "its history and its geographic position, half in Islamic Africa, half in Black Africa". The legend of the Mahdi and his *jihad*, and a population roughly 65 per cent of whom are Muslim, made a country profoundly influenced by Sufi radicalism and mysticism susceptible to people tempted by the concept of a fundamentalist state. In 1983, the imposition of the *shari'a* by President Gafaar Nimeiri elicited a most energetic reaction from large sectors of the population.[52]

Even the junta in Khartoum has admitted that transforming Sudan into "a bastion of Islam in Africa" will require a formula with which to accommodate a large non-Moslem minority.[53] This is an approach followed in a number of countries with religious profiles similar to that of Sudan. There, the most important Islamic events coincide with public holidays, which are celebrated so discreetly that even Christians participate in the festivities.[54]

Nigeria is a country where Islam is the most popular religion, although Muslims constitute, at most, half of the population. Northern Nigeria was Islamized long ago. Some observers believe that the Islamic movement intends to transform Nigeria into a Muslim state. Certain fanatical youths in the Hausa region are willing to accept "all the injunctions of their Mullahs, including killing and dying for the cause of Islam".[55]

This situation made possible the bloody destruction caused in 1980 by the self-styled prophet Marwa Maitatsine, when for several days his followers engaged in conflict the entire security apparatus of the state of Kano. In 1987 a spate of religious violence engulfed the regions of Kanfanchan and Kaduna, causing some hundred deaths and huge material losses. Incidents of the same kind, but of smaller proportions, were reported in 1991 in Bauchi and Katsina.[56]

The emergence of fundamentalism in Nigeria generated an ambivalent reaction from the mainstream Muslims: "they dare not support, or oppose – lest they be accused of either aiding anarchy or quarrelling with those who fight on behalf of Prophet Mohammed".[57]

The problems created by fundamentalist youths in Tanzania have a great deal in common with those caused by revivalists in Nigeria. In Tanzania there is a growing rift between moderate and radical Muslims.[58] Indeed, the radicalization of the Muslim youth, the result of a combination of socio-economic factors, stimulated by religious ferment, appears to be a distinct possibility in other African countries, too. In Kenya where Muslims constitute upwards of a quarter of the population, there is a sense of frustration that they are under-represented in the civil service, academia and the private sector. This perception, associated with the suspicion that the Muslim establishment is doing too little to protect the interests of its followers, could easily trigger a process of radicalization, which could itself be exacerbated by democratization.[59]

A similar trend is to be detected in Uganda, a country where Muslims constitute about a fifth of the population. In March 1991 four policemen were cruelly murdered by members of the Tabliq Youth (a Muslim fundamentalist group). Some hundred members of that group were arrested and there are rumours that many of them died in prison. The policemen's deaths occurred when more than 2 000 youths attacked riot police outside the mosque of Kampala. The incident followed a decision by the Supreme Court to elect a Grand Mufti not favoured by the Tabliq Youth.[60]

The reaction to the fundamentalist movement in Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda would seem to vindicate Versi's view that Africa "is not ready for radical Islam".[61] Several reasons may be given for this. The most important is related to the peculiar characteristics of black Islam, which lacks those characteristics that facilitated the rapid expansion of fundamentalism in the Middle East, Malaysia and Mediterranean Africa.

Fundamentalism as an idea cannot succeed unless Islam is taken to be an exclusivist doctrine and seen as a message whose supernatural character precludes the possibility of doctrinal evolution to make it acceptable to the demands of a certain historical period or of a certain culture. This is not the case with the kind of Islam followed south of the Sahara, which is the outcome of a profound acculturation process.

The same assessment seems to apply to the possibility of success in Africa of the socio-political components of the fundamentalist option. The inseparable link between the religious, the political and the legal spheres of life defended by the fundamentalists has no appeal to black Muslims. This is also true of the African lack of interest for the implementation of the *shari'a*.

Nevertheless, although Africa does not offer ideal conditions for the propagation of radical Islam, regional outbursts of fundamentalism are viable under certain conditions, such as economic crisis or political oppression. The Sahel provides examples of this happening:

Now Islam is consolidating its position as people turn to the strict Muslim moral code to give them a sense of direction. ... Persistent drought and the spreading desert have caused poverty, misery and hardship. This diversity has created a favourable terrain for increased religious fervour.[62]

The development of Islamic revivalism in Ethiopia and in Somalia should be connected to the situation of drought, famine and war which has been ravaging those countries for about a decade. This topic has been widely dealt with by Somalia poets and fictionists, namely by Somalia's leading novelist, Nuruddin Farah, in his works *Sweet and Sour Milk* and *Maps*. Social and economic deprivation are not alien to the expansion of fundamentalism in Sudan. In this latter case, Numeiri could have made use of revivalism, namely by imposing the *shari'a*, in order to gain support from orthodox Muslims for his attempt to defuse the tension caused by economic hardship.[63]

Mazrui is of the opinion that outbursts of fundamentalism could also be related to a curious combination: a situation of new wealth and a concomitant feeling of self-confidence, on the one hand, and the fear that such gains could be endangered by the threat posed by the West. He points to Libya and, to some extent, Iran as examples of this sociological phenomenon.[64]

Conclusion

That Islam has been gaining ground in sub-Saharan Africa over the past few decades is not in doubt. Muslims now constitute a majority in nineteen African states, and strong minorities in many others.

This expansion may be expected to continue, because Islam has shown a remarkable ability to accommodate African cultures and traditions, giving it an advantage in its competition with Christianity. This flexibility may also prove a useful tool in combating the effects of Western secularism, the major threat to the integrity of Islamic communities in Africa, particularly in the main urban centres.

On the other hand, it is the ability of Islam to come to such accommodations that also poses the greatest obstacle to the expansion of Muslim fundamentalism south of the Sahara. This is bound to have profound consequences for the politics of the region, domestic and international. The survival of secular regimes will help preserve the peace in many countries with large non-Muslim minorities. It will also allow African states to preserve their neutrality and avoid entanglement in an Islamic fundamentalist block, which is likely to take shape in the near future.

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Structural Adjustment Programmes and welfare interventions: The case of Ghana

Yaw Boachie-Danquah, of the School of Public Administration, University of Ghana, Legon, looks at the interventions necessary to mitigate the adverse social and development effects of SAPs, using the Ghanaian case to illuminate the broader problem. *

Introduction

What is generally alluded to now as the African economic crisis of the 1980s immediately conjures up pictures of mal-nourished children, debt burdens, low capacity utilization, drought, unfavourable terms of trade, international recession, and *coups d'état*. This state of affairs has prompted a series of meetings, conferences and seminars, both within Africa and at the United Nations and other international forums. Important resolutions and measures for dealing with the crisis have been introduced and passed. Yet the problems persist.

There seems to be no solution. As far back as 1979, the World Bank commissioned a special paper on the economic development problems of sub-Saharan Africa. The paper was to bring out recommendations for accelerated develop-ment. The ensuing report, known as the *Berg Report*, appeared in 1981 and proposed an "Agenda for Action" addressed to African leaders and foreign donors. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) held a special summit on the African crisis in Lagos that same year, and came out with its Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), a framework for Africa's economic recovery. In 1985 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) drew up Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) for 1986 to 1990. The United Nations organized a special ses-sion on Africa's development crisis in 1988. The most

recent diagnostic-prescriptive programmes are the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) being run by most countries on the continent with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), popu-larly known as the World Bank.

During much of the last decade, most African countries have been running SAPs, which are having far-reaching effects not only on their socio-economic policies, but also their politics. SAPs are supposed to obliterate what are per-ceived to be the causes of the African economic crisis, and to launch the economies of the African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development that would prevent any recurrence of the economic distortions.

Indications from the protagonists of SAPs are that the programmes are going to be around for some time. While there is some consensus on the political will necessary for the introduction and sustention of such programmes, discus-sions on the socio-economic policies needed to cushion the harsh realities of life resulting from the austerity pro-grammes inherent in SAPs, are still marginal.

Because the African economic crisis was perceived as the product of economic distortions, SAPs, at least initially, con-centrated strictly on macro-economic policies relating to the removal of economic bottlenecks in the development pro-cess. This meant that questions on the local political condi-tionalities needed for the success of SAPs, and more impor-tantly, the impact of the policy elements of SAPs on inter-nal socio-economic conditions, were marginalized. If this

marginalization was perhaps tenable when the programmes were being conceived, the devastating effects of SAPs on the living conditions of the majority of the people in sub-Saharan Africa, and the continuing deterioration of these conditions even as SAPs are vigorously pursued, demand that much more serious attention be focused on social policies in the face of SAPs than has hitherto been the case.

It is now being argued that social policies mitigating the harsh effects of adjustment should be incorporated into SAPs or even written independently of SAPs. For apart from the obvious deeper fear of the prescription of erroneous therapies that could result from a failure to do so, the harsh realities resulting from the austere economic policies of SAPs are liable to antagonize important social groups and political interests, thus derailing the logic of SAPs: economic recovery and stable development.

This article, intended as a contribution to the debate, focuses on the social policies that have been put in place in Ghana since the introduction of the SAP in 1983. In doing so, it examines the nature and extent of such policies. The basic thrust of this article is the resolution of the conflict between the anti-welfare state policies in SAPs and the social policies needed for equitable development in a country such as Ghana.

The welfare state concept: An overview

The concept and the nature of the modern welfare state have been extensively discussed in political theory. The basic problem that has constantly concerned political thinkers and social analysts is the relationship that should exist between the abstract entity called the state and the individual. Some of the fundamental questions have been:

- What is the state and what is its basic role in society?
- What principle should determine the particular form of institutions and agencies of government?
- What is the nature of man and what are his basic needs for living?
- How can the respective ends of authority and the welfare of the individual be reconciled?

The welfare state concept is built upon the consent and social contract views of the modern state. Obedience to the state by the individual is predicated upon the assumption that the state will promote, enhance and protect the welfare and the needs of the individual. In this scenario, where the welfare of the people becomes the supreme law, certain essential but basic duties and services have to be undertaken by the government through direct and indirect public policy measures. The extent and nature of these duties and services have varied with the level of development of a society and its form of government. In current terms, however, the welfare state idea is generally measured by the basic needs of its citizens. The basic needs concept relies on the idea that certain basic indicators or requirements need to be fulfilled to make life worth living. These include: food, security, shelter, guaranteed employment, education, health, transportation and political participation.

The welfare state concept then rests upon social justice and equity. The interface between these demands and the logic of SAPs creates the problem of the compatibility or coexistence of the welfare state and development policy conditions and necessities in the countries of Africa.

Development policy conditions and necessities in Ghana: The SAPs

Background to SAPs

Ghana initiated an SAP in April 1983. That the economy was in dire straits by the end of 1982, and that it required drastic action to ensure a turn-around was obvious to many impartial observers. The steady decline of Ghana's economy had begun in the early 1960s. A combination of several years of local economic mismanagement and an adverse international economic environment had laid the foundation for economic decline in the 1970s and early 1980s.

While the country's population increased rapidly during the period, the economy registered very low GDP growth rates. The average annual rate of growth was -0,5 per cent during the period. The index of food production per capita fell sharply between 1969 and 1972 while the rate of inflation increased steadily, peaking at some 117 per cent in 1981, despite the existence of a system of price controls aimed at controlling inflation. The overvalued currency made imports of both final and intermediate goods cheap, thus raising the country's import bill. Droughts and bush fires also contributed to the crisis. Meanwhile, output of cocoa, the country's largest foreign exchange earner, was falling substantially, mainly because of low producer prices. In addition to these fundamental local problems, external factors played an important role in the crisis. For example, whereas prices for Ghana's exports – mainly raw materials – kept falling, prices of critical imports, over which Ghana had no control, continued to rise. Apart from the deterioration in the terms of trade resulting in the reduction of foreign exchange earnings, Ghana also suffered from imported inflation.

Policy elements of SAPs

The basic thrust of the SAPs adopted by countries such as Ghana, is to halt macro-economic distortions in their economies.

In Ghana, the essence of the SAP has been the reduction or withdrawal of direct state intervention in the productive and distributive sectors of the economy, the restriction of the state to the creation, mainly through the manipulation of fiscal and monetary instruments, of an institutional and policy framework conducive to the mobilization of private enterprise and initiative.

Within the above broad scenario, the SAP in Ghana has resulted in the following specific policies:

- Public expenditure: Steps have been taken to reduce public borrowing and budget deficits by cutting expenditure and establishing ceilings. The direction of public investment has shifted to the export sector. Public

service expenditure is being reduced through redeployment and retrenchment. Subsidies for the provision of public services have been removed in accordance with the policy of cost-recovery.

- Domestic savings: A package of measures intended to increase domestic savings has been introduced. Examples are the manipulation of interest rates and tax reforms.
- Divestiture: The objective here was the rationalization of the state-owned enterprise sector of the economy. State ownership and control of economic activities was to be reduced to the minimum. Surviving state-owned enterprises were to become more profit-oriented and less protected from market conditions. To achieve this, some state enterprises were to be sold off to private parties. Some enterprises were to be liquidated altogether. Rationalization exercises involving the retrenchment of employees and a severe reduction in real wages were embarked upon. State budgetary subventions were reduced or removed and enterprises were expected to charge economic rates.
- Market-oriented policies: In a sense, most of the measures in the SAP are market-oriented, aimed at giving market forces greater maneuverability. In this regard, state controls on the determination of the value of the national currency were removed. This inevitably resulted in a steep devaluation of the local currency against foreign currencies. Exchange controls have been removed. Curbs on imports, prices and distribution have been withdrawn.
- Export-oriented adjustment: To deal with the macro-economic distortions and to check the chronic shortage of foreign exchange, a vigorous export drive was embarked upon. Producer prices were increased and incentives were given to exporters.
- Liberalized investment code: This involved the promulgation of an investment code granting extensive concessions to foreign investors.

Implications of the SAP for the welfare state concept in Ghana

No matter what the objectives and the potential long-term prospects of the SAP may hold for Ghana, a decisive factor for its success will be the short-term acceptance of the austere conditions unleashed by the SAP on Ghanaians.

The broad mass of working people, including the middle class, wage labourers as well as lower-level employees in both the public and private sectors, have been seriously affected by retrenchment and redeployment policies, which are critical components of the SAP. Even for those who remain, the decline in real earnings of both the top and lower echelons have led to mass impoverishment. The escalating prices of all basic goods and the astronomic increases in the cost of public services, brought about by the adherence to the Thatcherite principles of value for money and cost-recovery introduced in tandem with the SAP, have

added to the catalogue of woes. The demands of the SAP have eroded the standard of living of most working people.

A considerable number of local manufacturers have been forced to close shop as a result of the import liberalization measures, the removal of measures protecting local industry, interest rate policies and the general squeeze on credit.

Let us now consider the loose segment of the urban population that we describe as the urban poor. This group includes people with no access to land, who, not being in wage employment, engage in small-scale buying and selling and render petty services. Their social and material conditions are precarious even in the best of times. But the policies of the SAP have added considerably to their burden. One example is the increase in the cost of public services.

General rural impoverishment is a feature of underdeveloped economies. This picture is sometimes obscured by the determination of average rural incomes which group big landowners, commercial farmers and rural money-lenders with peasants, share-croppers and landless labourers. One of the principal policy measures of the SAP in Ghana has been an increase in producer prices. There has been the extension of some social services to these areas as well. However, the benefits of these measures have not been spread evenly throughout the rural community. The rural poor have felt the impact of the negative effects of the SAP. The increasing cost of credit and the removal of subsidies weigh heavily on them, while social services, such as medical facilities and education, remain beyond their reach.

Thus, at least in the short term, the poor in Ghana have generally become poorer, both relatively and absolutely, since the introduction of the SAP. Has nobody benefited from the SAP then? On closer examination, it appears that in the short run, some social groups have gained from the policies of the SAP. They generally include:

- Top executives in the public services, who, owing to the technocratic demands of the SAP, are called upon to attend numerous conferences, workshops and seminars and are also engaged as consultants and advisors.
- Top executives in private business who deal with foreign capital and have benefited from the injection of foreign exchange into the economy.
- Local agents of foreign business, partners and consultants to such businesses and institutions providing specialized services such as hotels and advertising agencies.
- Beneficiaries of divestiture measures who are able to buy up or buy into state-owned enterprises.
- Large land-owners and big-time commercial farmers who benefit from higher producer prices and other incentive packages.

Mitigating the harsh realities of the SAP: Adjustment with a welfare face?

Since the SAP was introduced in 1983, the economy has shown signs of recovery, albeit at the macro-economic level. Output growth has averaged about 5 per cent per annum,

inflation has come down from the high 123 per cent in 1983 to an average of 32 per cent per annum, and the severe foreign exchange constraints seem to have eased. Infrastructural work has been carried out.

But, as has already been pointed out, SAP policies have resulted in austere economic programmes and social deprivation. The question that must now be asked is whether SAPs can be implemented in such a way that the sapping effects inherent in their policies can be minimized.

The late 1980s saw the initiation of a growing number of special multisectoral programmes that sought to minimize the social costs of the adjustments. Attempts were made to "humanize" the SAP by introducing various policies related to the welfare state idea. These policies were virtually in contradiction to the logic and demands of the SAP. Nevertheless, they attempted to establish a compatibility between the welfare state concept and the policy demands of the SAP.

In Ghana, these programmes included public employment, severance payments, credit schemes for displaced workers, urban renewal and sanitation programmes and the provision of an infrastructure for rural development. Their specific application has taken several forms:

- The programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (Pamscad): Pamscad works with established government agencies, local communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It administers 23 anti-poverty interventions that cover public works, credit, training, low-cost water, health, drugs, nutrition, and shelter – all with a strong orientation towards community involvement. Pamscad is an administrative response to the harsh realities of the SAP and represents a substantial departure from the original philosophy of the SAP, which is to reduce government intervention in the working of the economy. Its overall impact, however, is debatable.

- The Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise Development (Fusmed): In 1988, the Bank of Ghana obtained a US$28 million credit from the international Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank for the establishment of a Fusmed. Fusmed was to provide financing services through qualifying participating financial institutions – commercial banks, merchant banks, development banks and other financial institutions – to small and medium enterprises in all sectors other than primary agriculture, trading and real estate. A major weakness in this arrangement is that the lending risk falls fully on the participating bank. Thus, only banks that have a shortage of cash would participate in this scheme.

- Priority Works Project (Pip) and Urban I and II Projects: Major public works and urban renewal programmes were carried out under these three programmes. All the programmes were supported by the World Bank. Pip involved a credit of US$10 million, whereas the Urban I and II Projects attracted US$90 million. The Urban I and II Projects were aimed at financing and rehabilitating the infrastructure and services in the urban centres of Accra, Tema, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale.

- The National Board of Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI): Set up within the Ministry of Industries, Science and Technology, the NBSSI is the main government body that sees to the affairs of small-scale enterprises. The Board organizes training programmes for entrepreneurs, advises on business operations, and advances credit to small-scale farmers.

- The Ghana appropriate Technology Industrial Service (Gratis): Gratis provides technical support to small-scale businesses through the establishment of intermediate technology transfer units (ITTUs) in the regions. There are now ITTUs in six of the ten regional capitals.

- Mobilization Squads (Mobisquads): Through the Ministry of Mobilization and Social Welfare, financial and technical aid are channelled to people who have been retrenched from the formal sectors of the economy. The Mobisquads are organized into co-operatives.

- Labour Re-deployment Benefits: Started in 1987, this programme aims at the settlement and payment of end-of-service benefits to former employees who were affected by the redundancy policies of the SAP. As at July 1991, an amount of US$10 billion had been paid to 148 937 redeployees.

It must be clear by now that the objective of these programmes is to alleviate the hardships that have befallen various sections of the Ghanaian community as a result of the implementation of the SAP. In a way, the coexistence of policies of economic necessity and the welfare state concept is being tested. The success of these poverty-alleviating programmes, however, will depend on:

- how far they are compatible with the theoretical demands of the SAP;
- how far they are able to alleviate poverty through recourse to the imperative of the welfare state;
- how long such programmes can be maintained before Ghana becomes "fully adjusted".

Concluding remarks

The aim of this article has been to establish the compatibility of the welfare state concept and development policy conditions and necessities in Africa. Ghana, a country that has been widely acclaimed by the international donor community as a success story in adjustment policies, has been used as a case study.

The basic problem in the "SAP scenario" in Ghana now is how to achieve the objectives of the SAP while at the same time ensuring that the people – in whose name development is always invoked – are not crushed by the austere demands of the SAP. The resolution of this contradiction will be the acid test to determine on whose behalf the SAP is being pursued.

Meanwhile, the following points are recommended for consideration:

- There should be a proper targeting of the poverty-alleviating measures. Although the SAP admittedly affects

every citizen, it is also necessary to establish who the "real poor" are.

- The social dialogue between the governing and the governed should be improved. Indeed, when the people understand the issues, they might readily respond to economic challenges and bear further sacrifices just as long as they are assured that everybody is sharing the burdens equally.

- Fair and just prices must be paid for the commodities of developing countries like Ghana. It is almost an absurdity to realize that the SAP-induced export-led recovery has no solid future because of fluctuating commodity prices. In the interim, more concessionary aid and support will be needed from external sources.

- Capacity-building is definitely required. Investments in institutions and the human capital to manage the economy both in the SAP and post-SAP periods is vital.

- The social policies accompanying the SAP should be broadened. And, they should either be written into SAP documents, or, better still, act as independent policy sources for the amelioration of the SAP policies.

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Comparative lessons for land reform in South Africa

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> The challenge of agrarian reform does not lie in the expropriation of land or in the reclamation of public land alone but in the capacity to generate new forms of organization and socio-economic relationships for the peasant.[1]

Introduction

The reform of land tenure patterns is probably one of the most important but simultaneously one of the most intractable issues facing South Africa. The traditional attachment of Afrikaners and blacks to land, linked to the current racially skewed tenure patterns in favour of whites, and increasing demands from blacks for dramatic redistribution of land, all contribute to the potentially explosive situation. South Africa is by no means the exception as similar problems were also experienced in other countries where land reform was an issue.

Some of the most extensive experiments in land reform took place in South East Asia after the World War II.[2] Similar experiments were implemented in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s[3] and are still continuing in Africa.[4]

Cross-cultural case studies in land reform have already generated sufficient comparative data to make several valid generalizations about the issues involved, the complications caused by conflicting vested interests, the options that can be considered and the goals and strategies that have been pursued in the process.[5] However, during July 1991 the author undertook a research project to obtain additional primary data on certain aspects of land reform in three Latin American countries: Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. The data were obtained by the following means:

- interviews with key decision-makers who were directly involved in land reform; and

- interviews with academic specialists in the field who have been monitoring the process.

The information and experience obtained from these case studies are relevant to South Africans as they face similar problems. As far as I know, Hughes[6] and Watts[7] are the only researchers who have attempted to systematically analyse and assess comparable experiences in land reform in order to draw some relevant conclusions for our situation. This is not intended to be an exhaustive study of land reform worldwide, but merely an reconnoitring attempt at redressing the lack of local attention to comparable experiences and at focusing on the lessons we can learn from their outcome.

This article is therefore a very superficial comparative overview of some relevant results that have been achieved with land reform in various developing countries.

Land reform in South-East Asia

Land reform started in the East after the World War II. The reasons for the reform initiatives were diverse, but the direction these reforms took were surprisingly similar (with the exception of Communist China). The experiences of Japan, Taiwan, India and China are summarized below:

Private ownership: Japan, Taiwan and India

Japan

After World War II, nearly half of the land in Japan was still owned by landlords and farmed by tenants. The defeat of Japan in the war resulted in the American occupation forces demanding the "democratization" of land ownership in an attempt to boost agricultural production.[8]

A Land Reform Bill was introduced to limit the amount of land that could be owned by landlords who cultivated their own land. All land exceeding the stipulated amount was bought by the government and resold, usually to the tenants on the land if they were interested. Absentee landlords who

were not personally involved in the cultivation of their land were permitted to retain only 2,45 acres to lease out. Local committees assisted with the task of identifying land to be transferred as well as the recipients. Half of the members on these committees were tenants.[9]

Compensation of 40 to 48 times the average rateable value of the excess land was paid to the original owner farmers. Absentee landlords were compensated on the basis of 130 per cent of the average value of the land of owner farmers. This compensation was paid in two ways: 30 per cent was paid in cash while the remaining 70 per cent was paid in government bonds, repayable over a period of 22 years at 3,65 per cent interest. The tenants obtained the land at the same price, payable over 30 years at an interest rate of 3,2 per cent. A large number of people were involved in the administration of the system (36 000 officials and 115 000 committee members handled the transfer of more than 30 million pieces of land).[10]

The land reform programme resulted in a redistribution of 35 per cent of the total cultivated area in the country. Over 30 million separate pieces of land were transferred in this way from approximately 2 million original land owners to over 5 million new land owners.[11] The availability of detailed land transaction records facilitated the reform programme.[12] Inflation, however, diminished the compensation paid over such a long period in some cases to the value of one crop only.[13]

Taiwan

The need for increased agricultural yields and growing demands for land caused by the population explosion made the land reform programme that was started in Taiwan in 1949 unavoidable.[14]

In 1949 the Provincial Land Bureau first placed a limit on the maximum rent that could be charged on land in order to control exploitation. This was followed by selling land owned by public sector agencies to existing tenants or other interested farmers. The third and last phase was the adoption of a "Land-to-the-tiller Act" in 1953, which was similar to the Japanese programme. Size limitations of 3 ha for rice land and 6 ha for dry land were established. Land exceeding these limitations was resold, mostly to tenants. Local committees consisting of various interest groups assisted with the programme.

Owners were compensated for the market value of excess land in the following way: 70 per cent of the compensation consisted of two cash or *in natura* payments per year over a period of 20 years, while the remaining 30 per cent of the compensation was in the form of stocks in government enterprises. New owners were required to pay for the land within 10 years, also either by means of cash or *in natura* payments. Farmers' associations were responsible for the redistribution of *in natura* payments.[15]

During the two years between 1951 and 1953, 62 000 ha of farmland was sold to approximately 122 000 new owners, while by 1971 a total of 90 per cent of the land was owner-cultivated compared to 55 per cent in 1949.[16] Extensive

training programmes prepared both officials and the communities involved for the project.[16] Good recordkeeping of land transactions also facilitated matters.[17]

India

In 1947 a total of 80 per cent of agricultural land in India was owned by absentee landlords. About 50 per cent was owned under the so-called "zamindari" system of intermediary rights resulting from the British colonial tradition of according proprietary rights to tax collectors. These rights were then frequently sold to other landlords.[18]

The Indian land reform programme consisted of the abolition of intermediary landlords, the establishment of land ownership limitations, compensating owners for excess land and the sale of excess land to tenants.[19] Each state devised its own compensation formula. It usually consisted of a mixture of cash and bonds, payable over a negotiable period and at negotiable interest rates.[20] Land reform tribunals were responsible for the compensation. They were specialized courts who worked in conjunction with the Department of Revenue. The purchase price was usually the same as the compensation to the owner.

The state governments who had to implement the programme, were not as committed to it as the national government[21] and little was therefore achieved. The land ownership limitations were also high and loopholes in legislation were exploited by owners. The results were not good. Not much land was released and the process took very long to run its course because no extra personnel was appointed.[22] Inflation also took its toll on the value of the compensation to owners as a result of these long periods which were involved. This in turn benefited the new buyers.[23] Bergmann concludes that –

> ... the prerequisite for success of agrarian reform is not the availability or abundance of land for distribution; it is rather the political will to implement it.[24]

China: Collectivization

Simultaneously with the Taiwanese experiment, land reforms were initiated by Communist China. The reasons were ideological: redistribution to eliminate class differences.[25]

Land reforms were drastic: the land of landlord owners was expropriated without compensation and given to poorer peasants in an attempt to achieve equality. Land allocations therefore depended on the size of land already owned by peasants.[26] A process of enforced collectivization was also started.[27]

The reforms were initially successfully effected because Party officials at all levels were committed to the programme. Land owners could not do anything about their position. The changes were enforced by means of the Agrarian Reform Law adopted by the National Committee of the People's Consultative Conference.[28]

In the longer term, however, these reforms failed totally: in 1978 the Chinese government started to dismantle the collectives which they had created in favour of small individual family farms. Within six years of implementing these

reforms agricultural production increased by an incredible 61 per cent.[29]

Land reform in Latin America

The wave of land reform which swept Asia in the 1950s, reached the shores of Latin America in the 1960s. When it subsided in the early 1970s, it left in its wake a dramatically restructured societies and power relationships, as had been the case in Asia, with one big difference: In Latin America –

> ... there was an almost universal conviction ... that associative forms of productive organization could play the abovementioned role.[30]

Ideological origins

Diametrically opposed ideological objectives were the main driving forces behind these two sets of reform experiments on the different continents. As was the case in China, social-ist-oriented governments in Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru and other countries, dismantled (especially after 1965) the huge colonial agricultural estates in their respective coun-tries, and replaced them with smaller peasant collectives or co-operatives – not always on a voluntary basis. In all cases the state played a prominent part in the programme.[31]

These programmes were stimulated and promoted by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in co-operation with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, or more com-monly known by its Spanish acronym CEPAL). These two regional institutions therefore provided important ideologi-cal support for the direction taken by the land reform pro-grammes in Latin America.[32]

In a recent study of agrarian reform in the above-men-tioned countries in this region, Ortega describes how the original general objective of land reform quickly changed to the specific goal to establish what he terms "associative enterprises" (or peasant collectives/co-operatives).[33] He is in a good position to assess this experiment, having been personally involved in it from the start in his capacity as an influential agricultural economist in the Joint Agriculture Division of ECLAC/FAO in Santiago, Chile.

ECLAC apparently decided as early as 1954 that land tenure is an obstacle to economic development in Latin America.[34] At the time the problem was described as follows:

> ... a considerable portion of ... land ... remains in the hands of a relatively small number of persons ... (It) makes it almost inac-cessible to the landless farmer .... Hence the unusual phenomenon of the minute subdivision of the land into numerous small uneco-nomic holdings that constitute a small part of the total area, while an insignificant number of landowners holds the greater part of available land ..."[35]

The problem is illustrated by the extreme Paraguayan case where 3 per cent of the population owned 90 per cent of the land in the country.[36] Structural transformation of land tenure patterns was necessary to stimulate economic growth. Socialist agrarian change in Bolivia, Cuba, Guatemala and

Yugoslavia,[37] provided the opportunity for ECLAC to stimu-late similar reforms in other Latin American countries. The political wave of socialism which also swept Latin America in the 1960s facilitated land reform. Socialist oriented politi-cal parties came to power on land reform tickets and immedi-ately set out to deliver on their campaign promises with the enthusiastic support of ECLAC.

Land reform models

Ortega[38] found a series of similarities in land reform in Latin America:

> Agrarian processes in Latin America are generally similar to each other in their legal procedures and evolution. Although there was not necessarily coincidence of dates and periods in which they were developed, there was ... a ... characteristic cycle common to all of them.

Usually the first stage consisted of a consensus in gov-ernment that the existing system was insufficient, followed by the adoption of policies authorizing the government to intervene. This normally happened even before the socialist-oriented government came into power.

In the second stage, legislation was promulgated, authoriz-ing the government to expropriate private land and make it, together with public land, available to peasants in various ways.

Three types of agricultural production units were usually established. They were:

– individual/family agricultural units;
– peasant agricultural collective units; and
– mixed agricultural units with land allocated for both family and collective production.[39]

Most governments initially expressed an explicit ideolog-ical preference for collectives to be established without dividing up estates in order to retain their viability as pro-duction units.[40] They also preferred and propagated full col-lective ownership.

Three models of land tenure reform were also found:[41]
– state ownership and leasehold to individual families or collectives (usually transitional and not widely used);
– collective ownership of the land (initially the most popu-lar); and
– individual family ownership with voluntary contributions to the collective (in later stages the predominant model with increasingly infrequent collective contributions).

At the height of these reforms (between 1973 and 1982), over 12 000 "associative enterprises" were established in the countries studied by Ortega. In 1986 there were only just more than 5 000 left, and the steady decline in their number is continuing.[42]

The governments normally adopted laws to authorize expropriation with compensation to the expropriated own-ers.[43] Peasants were required to pay for the land over a period of between 10 and 30 years. The price was either equal to the compensation paid to the original owner or was set according to real estate register values for public land.[44] Frequently no interest was charged and grace periods for

repayment of up to three years were allowed. Owners were compensated through cash payments as well as shares or bonds in government enterprises.[45] If payment occurred over a period of 20 to 30 years, inflation caused the eventual price to be relatively cheap.[46]

Land corporations were used to administer and control the process. These corporations tried to find compromises between the interests of the owners and those of the peasants, within the policy objectives of the government.[47]

The third stage usually consisted of a backlash from vested interests who had been detrimentally affected by the reforms. It generally resulted in adaptations to or a review of the reforms in two ways:

The first type of revision was brought about by dissatisfied former land owners who used the courts to reverse or restrict the reforms. In this way many expropriations in Chile, Paraguay and other states were reversed, and the land returned to the original owners because of legal and technical hitches in the expropriation process.[48] Some cases are currently still in progress.[49]

The second adaptation usually took place as a result of changes in government when more conservative, free-market oriented political parties or politicians gained power and either tried to reverse the process or limit its direction and scope dramatically. This can also be illustrated by developments in Chile and Paraguay where generals Pinochet and Stroessner respectively came to power and virtually immediately stopped the previous governments' land reform policies.

In both Chile and Paraquay the systems of general expropriation of land were largely abolished and replaced with systems encouraging individual and family ownership as well as new taxes on land and agricultural potential to induce owners of large tracts of land and underutilized land to sell some of their land voluntarily. These taxes are still widely used in Latin America.[50] They form a package deal and interact with each other.[51]

The land tax is a progressive tax on the size of the land held, while the other tax is based on a generalized formula for the production which a specific crop should potentially achieve on each farm, given the conditions that prevail each year. The formula that is used, has been worked out by agronomists and is based on the type of crop that is produced, the climate and soil conditions, productivity indexes, etc.[52] The combined effect of these two taxes is the restriction of land speculation practices which do not produce a certain minimum income for the farmer. Land that is not used at all, or that is underutilized, is taxed more than land that is used productively.[53]

The result of the imposition of these taxes was that virtually all unused or underutilized land that could not be afforded was voluntarily put on the open market.[54] Land prices initially came down because of an oversupply, but stabilized later at more realistic levels.[55]

Reasons for failure of collectives

The most extensive land reforms were brought about in Chile, Peru and Mexico, where literally thousands of collectives were established. Half of all the collectives on the South American continent were established in Chile after 1965. Today they have virtually all collapsed. In the other countries studied, some still remain in operation, although the strong declining trend is continuing.[56]

The main reasons for the dramatic failure of the Latin American experiments with collective enterprises are the following:[57]

- Many collectives were forced on the peasants who did not have any other alternatives available, given the strong stand taken by their governments.
- The Hispanic culture is an individualist culture. Where agriculturally viable, many collectives broke up into smaller individual family holdings, or one enterprising owner/family bought out the others who were not such committed farmers. The ousted families usually then migrated to the cities.
- Insufficient planning, training, technical and financial support services and access to markets, especially in view of the fact that peasants with no farming experience were given land and expected to succeed in agriculture.[58]
- The "hacienda" culture of dependence on others to give direction and leadership and to take the initiative, persisted in many peasant families. Their enterprises usually failed.[59]
- Mixed enterprises were more successful, and in many cases they developed into transitional forms of agricultural production, with the clear trend towards individualization.

On the basis of his recent exhaustive and authoritative analysis of agrarian reform in Latin America, Ortega makes the interesting observation that the more fertile the land and consequently the better the agricultural potential, the less viable collective farming seems to be and the more viable becomes individualized tenure systems. The reverse seems to be true as the agricultural potential weakens,[60] probably because of labour considerations, overhead costs and a desire to spread the risks involved wider. Further, the more capital intensive, technically sophisticated and export oriented the crops that are farmed, the less successful collectives seem to be.[61]

Land reform in Africa

At the start of independence in Africa in the early 1960s, the bulk of African countries' land was held under customary tenure, with some land held under private individual tenure by white settlers.[62] South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were exceptions to the rule. In those cases, private ownership of land by whites was the major land tenure system. The economic need to modernize traditional tenure patterns and the political and ideological need to redistribute land more equally among all citizens, were the main driving forces behind African land reform initiatives.

Bruce[63] identifies four models of land reform in Africa. They are:

- collectives/co-operatives;
- state ownership and leasehold;
- modernizing customary tenure; and
- private ownership.

The application of these models is summarized below.

Collectivization: Tanzania and Ethiopia

Tanzania

Tanzania established a system of "African socialism" or "ujamaa" immediately after independence in 1961. The programme's objectives were to prevent the development of class inequalities in the rural areas, along the lines of Marxist doctrine.

All land became state property and all freehold tenures were changed into 99-year leasehold schemes.[64] In 1967 a process of forced villagization and collective production was started. Despite all out promotion attempts, agricultural production dropped dramatically and resistance against villagization increased, while large scale capitalist production had disappeared by 1974.

The Tanzanian government admitted in 1980 that collective farms had produced less efficiently than private farms.[65] Most people rejected the system, and the programme therefore failed.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia established a system of "scientific socialism" (to eliminate huge estates owned by élites) and share tenancy after a coup succeeded in 1974.[66]

All land was nationalized in 1975. Former tenants remained on the land and just stopped paying rent. Local peasant associations were appointed to administer the process of reform along Marxist-Leninist lines; and landless peasants were given the right to occupy land.[67] These attempts at collectivization elicited resistance from private farmers and former tenants. In the end only a small percentage of farms were collectivized, while individual farms proved to be more efficient than the few co-operative farms.[68]

State ownership and leasehold: Zambia and Zimbabwe

After independence all land was generally nationalized, to achieve greater equality of tenure, with the exception of a few cases like Sudan and Senegal where only land held under indigenous tenure was nationalized. It is argued that leasehold is more consistent with traditional control over, and allocation of, land.[69] A distinct ideological element preferring socialist state intervention in society can, however, also be detected in these cases.

Zambia

The new Zambian state transformed former crown land into state land, without altering tenure patterns existing at the time. To date state land comprises just over 5 per cent of all land, but it includes most of the commercial farming land. All freehold titles were converted in 1975 to 99-year lease-

hold titles by a Land Act, following President Kaunda's "back-to-the-land" campaign.

About 80 per cent of Zambia's land area comprises trust and reserve land under indigenous tenure.[70] Subject to the consent of the relevant chiefs, 14-year leaseholds are granted by the state to aspiring farmers in these areas. It is, however, not a consistent programme of converting tribal land to leasehold.

Where land was taken over by the state, compensation was paid for improvements only.[71] Resettlement of landless people was effected on state-controlled land. It was, however, not always successful. In cases where black Zambians took over farms from whites, a drop in production frequently occurred because the new farmers did not have similar training or experience and tended to farm less capital intensively.[72]

Resettlement was arranged by the state itself or through Family Farms Ltd, a church-related organization specializing in buying large farms from whites, subdividing them and resettling nearby black peasant farmers from overcrowded areas.[73] Where the quality of the land was good, the resettlement normally worked. In many cases, though, it failed. Watts remarks that on the basis of the Zambian experience with land reform, state involvement in resettlement should be minimized to only essential cases – for political and social reasons.[74]

Zimbabwe

Just more than half of Zimbabwe's agricultural land was already occupied by and overcrowded with African farmers under customary tenure at independence in 1980. Units were small and poorly managed. The other half was made up of large commercial farms owned by whites. Productivity on these commercial farms was high, although 40 per cent of the land was underutilized. An additional 3 per cent of agricultural land was owned by African farmers under freehold title.[75]

Liberation movements attached great ideological and symbolic importance to the redistribution of land in Zimbabwe: while some 5 700 white farmers owned just less than 16 million ha of land in commercial farming areas (or approximately 1 754 ha per farm), 8 100 black farmers owned 1,5 million ha of commercial farm land (approximately 185 ha per farm), and approximately 1 million black farmers cultivated 16 million ha of land (approximately 16 ha per farm) under customary tenure.[76]

During the independence negotiations, the new government, however, agreed to –

- implement land reform only on a "willing buyer, willing seller" basis;
- compensate owners at market value; and
- pay compensation in foreign currency.

These terms obstructed large-scale redistribution.[77] In 1986 the Land Acquisition Act was adopted by Parliament. In terms of the Act prospective sellers of agricultural land have to offer the land to the government first. If the government issues a "no interest" certificate, it can be sold on the open

market. Land found to be underutilized or derelict can also be expropriated in terms of the Act. This last provision has, however, rarely been activated because of the difficulty of determining underutilization.[78]

The following models for resettlement have been made available by the government:[79]

- Model A: individual tenure without any security. This is the most popular option – no title deed, but only a five-year lease and a promise of a longer term lease if they prove to be successful.

- Model B: villagization and co-operative farming. This was originally the government's preference but was not very popular or successful.[80]

- Model C: professionally managed state farms servicing surrounding individual freehold farms.

- Model D: a simplified model A. Individual tenure, but with less infrastructure and planning.

- Model E: additional grazing land for communal farmers.

By early 1990, 51 000 families had already been resettled on 2,65 million ha of land (with an average size of 50 ha per farm). The cost of resettlement has been high for the state. It did not sell the land to the new occupants but bought the land at market value and resettled peasants free of charge, mostly along the lines of models A and B: individual tenure and collective resettlement. The new settlers did, however, not receive any title deed or other form of security of tenure.[81]

Government officials have admitted that model B collective resettlement schemes have failed. Of a total of 81 co-operative schemes, not one had proved to be successful by the start of 1991, while a large percentage of the 99 model A individual tenure schemes had succeeded.[82] The government has now stated that only farmers with proven ability to farm successfully will be resettled in future on the basis of individual tenure.[83] This has elicited strong criticism from peasant organizations who alleged that the huge tracts of land acquired by high government officials will detract from the government's commitment to serious land reform for the poor who cannot pay for land.[84]

One recent commentator states that many small model A farms have a good productivity record because of their low overhead costs and family labour.[85]

Immediately on the expiry of the Independence restrictions in 1990, the Zimbabwean parliament adopted new legislation empowering the government to –

- acquire any land it deems necessary by expropriation;

- determine and pay a fair compensation within a reasonable time for land expropriated;

- pay compensation in local currency;

- restrict ownership of land to one farm only, unless exemption is justified;

- prohibit ownership of agricultural land by absentee landlords;

- impose a land tax on large-scale commercial farmers to restrict speculation in land; and

- monitor underutilization of land and absentee landlords.

In addition, landowners have no recourse to the courts if they feel they are treated unfairly.[86]

This caused an uproar among white farmers, but the Act has so far not been implemented.

Modernizing indigenous land tenure: Botswana

Indigenous land tenure is still very important in Africa.[87] Retention of many elements of indigenous tenure were tried with varying degrees of success in land reform programmes in a few countries. Normally, modernization or renovation of indigenous tenure is effected through small changes in traditional tenure rules, changes in administrative organization and new support linkages with other levels of government.[88] In all cases the communal element is retained.

Mechanisms used to effect these changes include transforming traditional communal ownership to joint tribe, community or family ownership, trusts, companies or partnerships. This was tried in Nigeria, Ghana and also Kenya. The most successful example in this respect, however, is Botswana.[89]

Approximately 70 per cent of Botswana's land is under communal tribal control. Botswana was neglected by colonial settlers because of its low rainfall and because diamonds were only discovered later. White commercial farms make up only a small percentage of the country, mostly in the south-eastern Tuli block adjoining South Africa and in the north-west around Francistown. No large-scale land conflict therefore ensued after independence. This fact partially explains the relative political stability of the country.

Although ownership of land remained vested in the tribes, indirectly elected tribal land boards were established at independence to keep the land in trust for the tribes and to control land allocation and administration.[90] Traditional chiefs were ex officio members of the boards. Many resigned soon as a result of the diminution of their powers because the boards fell directly under the control of the national government. This created institutionalized conflict with the decentralized tribal authorities. Nevertheless, the system does work relatively well despite the fact that it should be decentralized to a greater extent.[91]

A Tribal Grazing Lands Programme was established in the mid-1970s to alleviate overgrazing and land degradation in tribal areas.[92] It consists of the purchase of big commercial ranches by the government to provide scientific rotating grazing programmes. Farms for sale have to be advertised, and a heavy transfer tax is imposed on non-citizens.[93] This grazing programme has provided mixed results so far.

Private ownership: Kenya

In stark contrast to the other case studies summarized so far, a process of "individualization" was implemented in Kenya after independence in 1963. The fear that the approximately 60 000 Mau Mau detainees who were released at independence would unilaterally sieze land caused white settlers and government officials to increase dramatically the size of the African reserves and to start granting freehold titles on a massive scale.

A deliberate programme, the Million Hectare Scheme, was started to convert indigenous tenure to registered individual freehold. This was allegedly a consolidation of trends which had already started to emerge in Kikuyu tribal customs.[94] The scheme was financed by the new government through loans from Britain, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the World Bank.

Land was originally bought by or vested in the Settlement Fund Trustees who offered it to prospective buyers at a price based on an estimate of its production value. Freehold title was only granted after repayment by the buyer of a compulsory loan for two-thirds of the price of the land and an optional loan for assistance with the financing of crops, livestock and machinery.[95] Settlers were selected on their ability to repay loans. Despite this, repayments have been slow and uneven.

Although it has been an expensive and time-consuming operation, the conversion granted maximum security of tenure to owners and together with other facilitating factors like very good soil and conditions for agriculture and appropriate policies by the post-independence government (including well-planned and effective anti-soil erosion measures), it has boosted agricultural output to record dimensions.

However, there have been some negative results:

- women had less security because their husbands could now sell the land without their being in a position to do anything about it (in contrast to the protection they had under communal tribal tenure);
- individual tenure aggravated landlessness and stimulated the landlord-tenant relationship, because –
  - no restrictions were placed on buying land for investment and speculation purposes and on the size and number of new freehold farms;
  - tenants were not given alternative employment opportunities in urban areas; and
  - inherited communal land was informally and *de facto* subdivided into small, unviable farming units among all heirs because these units were too small for formal, registered freehold in terms of the law.[96]

Bruce questions "whether the results have justified the expense involved".[97] Other critics view these reforms as the creation of a new "landed rural élite".[98]

Other commentators are more favourably impressed with the results of the Kenyan experiment. Watts[99] quotes Abrams, a British land expert, as saying in 1977 that the scheme was "one of the most imaginative", involving "the orderly transfer of agricultural land from large scale ownership to small scale settlement ... ever attempted anywhere". Another reason for the relative success of the Kenyan land reforms are probably the fact that, owing to the good agriculture, urbanization was slowed because the rural areas could sustain the population there.[100] Watts also ascribes the experiment's success to the fact that new farmers were given realistic incentives.

Calls for a new land reform initiative are, however, made increasingly, together with proposals for a ceiling on the size of farms and the introduction of a land tax, both policies which have so far been rejected out of hand by the Kenyan government.[101]

Lessons for South Africa

The most important implications of the comparative experiences with land reform on the Asian, Latin American and African continents for future land reform in South Africa, are the following:

Origins of land reform initiatives

In general, land reform was initiated in an effort to redress inequalities in land ownership. Most programmes were initiated to address historical inequalities, while one specifically tried to forestall the development of inequalities (Tanzania). In other cases, rights to land were redistributed instead of the land itself, setting in motion a longer term process which will have a dramatic effect on future land tenure patterns.[102]

Two specific driving forces can be identified: the economic need to modernize traditional land tenure patterns,[103] and the ideological objective of establishing either individual freehold tenure systems or collectives.[104] In a recent study, El-Ghonemy stated explicitly that in his experience, land reform is basically a social and political issue:

> ... the problems rest upon a host of retrogressive institutional arrangements and rural power relations.[105]

All these forces are operative in South Africa. The country can first of all be classified as a developing society like most of the others compared above. Land is maldistributed among the population as a result of apartheid and free market policies. There is a great need to rationalize communal land patterns in the rural areas, in order to stem soil and agricultural degradation and farm the available agricultural land more productively.

There are two clear options for reform: collectives and private ownership systems. The choice between these two systems will clearly have to be made in the light of the above experiences with land reform.

Not implementing land reform could seriously obstruct economic development. The sooner land reform is implemented the sooner economic growth will be stimulated.

Nature of reforms

In virtually all cases the government of the day played a very prominent role in the land reform initiatives. Legislation authorizing the government to intervene in a specific way was usually promulgated. Authoritarian methods nearly always failed. The most durable and successful land reform programmes generally were those that did not expropriate land but used other inducements to persuade owners to sell.

Peasants must be given the opportunity to make their own decisions.[106] There seems to be a general consensus that the state should not interfere in this process. It is, however, important to devise ways to assist the poorest of the poor in obtaining land.[107] This class of people will initially

always have to be subsidized in some way by the state to get started. Training and other support services may bring them to a level where they can proceed without further assistance.

Only three distinct models of land reform can in practice be identified. They had different degrees of success in the cases where they were applied. The first is the state owner-ship and leasehold model. In the cases where this type of reform was applied, it did not prove to be at all viable in the medium and longer term. In the short term, however, it may in certain cases be necessary to establish poor and desperate settlers in this way, and to follow it up with extensive train-ing in personal and community development skills. In view of the comparative experiences in this regard, however, it seems preferable to establish these settlers immediately on a freehold basis on their own pieces of land. Owner farmers are more efficient than tenancy farmers,[108] although long-term leasehold from the state can give a measure of security to tenants.[109]

The second type of reform is the collective or co-opera-tive system. This model also seems to be at best a transi-tional mechanism in cases where it is necessary to settle communities or groups in the short term in order to start with training and production while issues relating to land demarcation and transfer are sorted out. The inherent self-interest of human nature precludes this model from being viable in practice (the same problem that socialism in general seems to suffer from).

The third distinct model is that of private ownership. This model has proved to be the most durable and efficient for agricultural production,[110] if it is subject to the following conditions –

– restrictions on the number and size of pieces of land which a person or family can own;

– land and income taxes inducing owners to use their land in the most productive way in order to curb the excesses of unbridled capitalist speculation and exploitation;

– careful screening and selection of new settlers in order to settle people with the necessary commitment to and experience of farming on agriculturally good land;

– extensive basic training in personal value system changes, personal and community development skills and agricul-tural, financial, technical, marketing and management support services in order to maximize the potential for success of these programmes and the capital and human investments in them.[111]

In Kenya commercial farms were largely successfully transferred from white middle class ownership to black ownership through market mechanisms,[112] while the land reforms towards private ownership in South East Asia were also successfully achieved.

The Latin American reforms in the 1960s and early 1970s were less successful. The big estates (latifundia) were frequently well integrated and managed farming units with a high level of productivity. Reform broke these units up into minifundia and distributed them among inexperienced and less committed peasants. This caused a drop in agricultural

production and produced in many cases unproductive units. A second reform model of these areas was the asentamiento or collective model. This was even more unsuccessful. The individualist culture in Latin America contributed largely to their failure. The dependence of these collectives on state support exposed them to the negative effects of state policy changes. They are increasingly being transformed into indi-vidual family-owned units.[113] Co-operatives can be success-ful only in the short term as a transitional measure to change ownership of big estates to peasants without destabilizing production. It must soon be transformed into freehold.[114]

If land reform does not take place through market mecha-nisms but through expropriation actions by the state, com-pensation is necessary. The price of the land for the new owners should be nearly equal to the compensation paid, to diminish the financial burden on the state.[115] Compensation can be paid over a period in order to provide income for the original owners and further diminish the financial burden on the state. Not only cash but also shares or stocks can be con-sidered for the purpose of compensation.

Reform results

Strong and unambiguous political commitment is needed for the best results with land reforms. The "political will" to reform must be present.[116] The influence of land owners in government and the bureaucracy, however, obstructs reforms as the Indian experience shows.[117]

The supposed African predisposition to co-operative farming can be questioned on the basis of the experience with collectivization in Africa. It seems as if traditional co-operation is normally linked to kinship or other long-estab-lished social ties. It is further also usually found only in cases of special, urgent need or when it has clear and con-crete mutual benefits to all involved.[118]

Communities must further be involved at national, regional and local levels in the form of land corporations, commissions and committees in order to maximize partici-patory planning and minimize resistance.[119]

In conclusion, comparative experience seems to teach that individual private ownership qualified by the conditions summarized earlier in this section, is the only viable long-term option for successful land reform.

The sooner all South Africans come to terms with this, the better.

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The subordination of African armies to civilian control: Theory and praxis

In the fifth of his series of articles on African military and security issues, Dr Simon Baynham of the Africa Institute examines a key dilemma in the realm of civil-military relations: the question of political control of the military, a topic of vital importance as Africa emerges from the straitjacket of authoritarian (and often military) rule towards political pluralism and the "second liberation".

Introduction

In an earlier essay on security issues and civil-military relations in Africa, the background to and explanation of the interventionist inclinations of the continent's armed forces were discussed at some length.[1] It was noted that, in numerical terms, 31 African states have already experienced a successful coup d'état and 19 have been subjected to more than one.

> By the beginning of 1987, half the continent's countries were under military rule, in many cases for the second or third time. Some of them (for instance, Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan and Libya) have been governed by the armed forces for most of their independent existence.[2]

On the other hand, the armed services have not been politically dominant throughout Africa. Far from it, in fact. A significant number of regimes have maintained civilian authority over their military establishments for periods exceeding 25 years: Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Senegal, Gabon, Swaziland, the Gambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Mauritius, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia all fit into this category.

Indeed, added together, well over a third of the continent's states have remained free of military domination since independence. And in a number of cases, civilian supremacy has remained intact despite top-level leadership successions – for instance, when Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978 and after Julius Nyerere handed office to Ali Mwinyi in 1985.

We come, therefore, to a crucial issue in the study of African civil-military relations: the question of political control of armed force – in other words, of how civilian governments mobilize resources and mechanisms to protect themselves from their own security forces. Clearly, this is a subject of key importance but one that has received inadequate attention in the study of African political affairs.

At some risk of simplification, conceptualizations of civilian control over military institutions tend to be of three types, the first of which – the traditional model – may be discarded for our purposes since it is premised upon the absence of differences between civilians and soldiers, as exemplified by seventeenth century European monarchies where the "... aristocracy simultaneously constituted the civilian and military elite ... [In short] The same men wore both hat and helmet."[3] In this model, civilian supremacy is maintained because the differentiation between military and non-military élites is absent or insignificant, the corollary of which is no armed intervention. From the 1800s onwards, the system gradually disappeared with the introduction of standing armies and the displacement of ascriptive by achievement criteria as the basis for selection and promotion.

However, since the traditional system is a mainly historical phenomenon, and therefore of marginal contemporary applicability (some conservative Gulf emirates excepted), the theoretical and practical interest here is on the alternative liberal and penetration models, which roughly replicate Samuel Huntington's "objective/subjective" pattern variable.

In his classic text on the theory and politics of civil-military relations,[4] Huntington gives considerable attention to the question of how civilian supremacy over the armed forces might be assured. He begins by making a conceptual distinction between what he calls "objective" and "subjective" control.

In the former, the officer corps is disciplined by its own professionalism, the most important constituent involving service to the community. Huntington concludes that the more professional an army (that is, the more it saw itself serving society), the less of a threat it would pose. This objective or liberal model is closely associated with Western parliamentary democracies (United Kingdom, Scandinavia, USA and so on), where control is affected through the maximization of military professionalism, thus

> ... rendering them politically sterile and neutral ... . A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.[5]

Put another way, the formula operates on the premise that the soldiers internalize, or become attitudinally disposed to, their own subordination. At the same time, the politicians are expected to exercise due regard for the internal professional autonomy of the fighting forces.

According to the subjective model, civilian supremacy is enforced by the denial of an independent military sphere. Here the military becomes an integral, though subordinate, part of the political authority and is inculcated with civilian political values and interests.

The subjective format is most clearly identified with absolutist or totalitarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany, Cuba and the former USSR, where policy is or was ultimately determined by force and coercion. In such states, internal military power is checked, *inter alia*, by:

- breaking up the officer corps into competing groups,
- establishing political armies and special military units (*Waffen-SS*, Soviet MVD security troops, etc.),
- infiltrating the armed services with parallel political chains of command (commissars), and
- indoctrination, covert surveillance and close party supervision in the appointment of reliable officers to sensitive commands.

This system approximates to Eric Nordlinger's "penetration" (as well as Robin Luckham's *apparat*) model, where civilian dominance is ensured through the widespread deployment of ideological controls and surveillance, founded upon a dual structure of authority in which military personnel are subordinate to political functionaries.[6]

To sum up the above in Huntington's own words:

> Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making it the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tools of the state.[7]

Military subordination in Africa: Praxis

In the Third World – and certainly in Africa – civilian authority over the military owes most of what success it has had to the subjective (or penetration) model rather than to the objective (or liberal) formula outlined above. This brings us to a more focused examination of the actual techniques and institutional mechanisms used by African civilian regimes in their efforts to subordinate the armed services to their authority.

Eight strategies or devices are discussed here, but it should be stressed that there is some overlap between them and most regimes employ a combination of strategies to pre-empt the praetorian ambitions of the military.

Ethnic/kinship selectivity

Experience in India had led the British to believe that some tribes were inherently fit for soldering: the concept of the "warrior type" and "martial races" – from whom ready loyalty and absolute obedience to command could be expected – was deeply entrenched. The same attitude prevailed in Africa, where the colonial authorities deliberately manipulated the ethnic profile of locally recruited forces in order to build reliable armies for the subjugation and pacification of the indigenous population.

This technique has been borrowed by the post-independence political élites, as exemplified in Daniel arap Moi's Kenya, where the Kalenjin (Moi's group) dominate the top positions in the security establishment. Today, only one of the seven most senior security posts in the military, paramilitary and police is occupied by a Kikuyu, while the Commandant of the General Service Unit (GSU) and President Moi's Sandhurst-trained Chief of Military Intelligence are just two examples of a virtual Kalenjin monopoly in Kenya's top military brass.

Another case in point is Chad, where President Idriss Déby relies on his own ethnic group for his personal security. In other countries the ascriptive manipulation of posts has been taken one step further by the appointment of presidential family members to strategically important commands in the security services. Ian Khama's meteoric rise through the ranks of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) is just one instance among many.

Instrumental pay-offs

A second stabilizing control mechanism has been to "buy" the loyalty of soldiers through the maximization of material satisfactions relating to pay, privileges and related rewards.

This might entail, for example, the allocation of a very high proportion of the defence budget to pay and benefits rather than to hardware.[8]

In Zambia, but also in Kenya and other African states, the senior commissioned ranks have been drawn into the inner circles of privilege by the allocation of land grants for commercial farming. Other methods of patronage for keeping the military "sweet" include selection for overseas diplomatic posts and training courses. Such postings inevitably carry special allowances and other financial perks, particularly the rare opportunity of returning home with a duty-free motorcar.

In countries where civilian governments have included the armed forces in economic austerity measures, the result has often been military intervention – as in January 1972, when the expelled premier, Dr Kofi Busia, described Colonel Acheampong's takeover as "an officers' amenities coup".

Political/bureaucratic co-optation

Closely linked to the instrumental purchase of fidelity through the provision of creature comforts is the widely-used method of co-optation. In a number of African states, senior and even middle-ranking members of the officer corps have been drawn temporarily into government circles by appointments to the boards of parastatals or as regional governors and party/political functionaries.

In a deliberate strategy to neutralize the interventionist inclinations of the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF), the CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*) has incorporated the TPDF into the party/governmental system along the lines seen in Mexico during the 1920s. The Tanzanian armed forces are, in fact, part of the governing élite, with frequent transfers of officers from the TPDF to ministerial, diplomatic and party positions and back again.

When I visited Tanzania in late 1990, General Kimario, for example, had just been appointed Regional Commissioner for Dar es Salaam, having been Minister for Home Affairs (and thus of cabinet rank) before that. Until late 1989, General Luhanga was Chief of Operations and Training; but for the past three years, he has been Regional Commissioner for Ruvama – a civilian appointment. Similar examples of co-optation are to be found in Gabon, Zambia and Côte d'Ivoire, to name but a few.

Manipulation of military mission

Another control device is what might be called manipulation of the military mission. By this is meant the deliberate deployment of the armed forces in order to keep them fully occupied and – it is hoped – professionally happy. This may take the form of countering external threats, or it might mean using the military for civic action programmes or for domestic law and order operations in aid of the civil power. There is, however, a danger to civilian control here since internal security commitments have a potentially politicizing impact on the minds of the military – as some claim has occurred in South Africa.

Ideological indoctrination

A fifth technique – and one that mostly reflects the subjective mechanisms of control still seen in the People's Republic of China and in Castro's Cuba – is to deliberately indoctrinate the armed forces with the ideological values of the party-state.

After the mutiny by the First and Second Battalions of the Tanganyika Rifles in 1964 (a mutiny put down by British marines at Nyerere's request), the army was virtually dissolved and a new one – the TPDF – was created, whose members were obliged to join Tanu, the Tanzania African National Union (now the CCM). Since then, and in order to identify the military with the ideology, policies and orientation of the governing party, the officers and ranks have been systematically subjected to political education, which accounts for 20 per cent of the time devoted to training.

Another example comes from Ghana, where in 1962 the Minister of Defence issued a directive that party education would be introduced into the army through an Armed Forces

Bureau; and officers were to be sent on extended courses to the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Ideological Studies. For Nkrumah, the inherited (British) model of civil-military relations clashed, diametrically, with his vision of a one-party state encompassing the national institutions of Ghana. What was required, he argued, were politically committed armed forces who owed loyalty, not only to Ghana, but to the Convention People's Party (CPP) and to himself in person.

In this context – and there are plenty of other African examples – Western traditions of political detachment and neutralism are rendered meaningless and are replaced by an ethos in which enthusiasm for the existing regime becomes an essential quality in a military officer.

This view has been expressed succinctly by the former Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere:

> Our conception of the President's office is obviously incompatible with the theory that the public services are and ought to be politically impartial.[9]

Expatriate recruitment

Another method of control has been the recruitment of foreign officers (or mercenaries) to the crucial command posts and to other sensitive appointments inside the security establishment – a strategy with a time-honoured lineage as seen in the Vatican's Swiss Guard.

One African example is Gabon, "... where a major mainstay of Bongo's control of the Gabonese armed forces is the number of [expatriate] appointments of this kind".[10] This method of control maintenance is also characteristic of a number of Gulf states, where British officers and NCOs (including former Special Air Services personnel) have acted as loyal guardians for the likes of the Sultan of Oman.

Divide et impera: Security counterweights

The appointment of expatriates to serve as sentinels for the security of the regime is closely associated with one of the most prominent mechanisms for control visible in independent Africa: the creation of rival security formations to act as a check on the regular armed forces.

The Ghanaian case, with which I am most familiar, provides one of the best examples of an attempt by politicians in a one-party state to subordinate the military to civilian authority.[11] In the early 1960s, President Nkrumah set up a National Security Service (NSS) – composed of five units (Military Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, a Cuban-trained bodyguard, Special Intelligence and the President's Own Guard Regiment) – which duplicated and usurped the functions of the regular military and police.

In this deliberate system of institutionalized dualism, Nkrumah encouraged rivalries and dissensions among officers, thereby hoping to discourage them from taking united action against him. In fact, he was unsuccessful because in February 1966, shortly before the counterweight security apparatus threatened to become effective, Nkrumah was overthrown by his army and police.

In many cases, the counterweight military and paramilitary forces are trained by a foreign government or even by a

number of foreign armies. For instance, in Zaire – where Mobutu Sese Seko's political longevity is explained partly by his creation of numerous security agencies – the Civil Guard (*Garde civile*) is Egyptian-trained, the army's 31st Brigade is French-trained and the élite Special Presidential Division (*Division spéciale présidentielle*) is Israeli-trained.

It is interesting to note that the DSP is composed mainly of Ngwandi, Mobutu's own ethnic group, and that several of its officers are foreign nationals. In short, the *Division* (which was responsible for flushing out army rebels from the Voice of Zaire in the January 1992 coup attempt) reflects a mixture of control techniques within one organization. On top of this, divisional and brigade commanders in Zaire are constantly moved and re-posted in order to undercut any base of support they might otherwise develop.

Two final examples worthy of special note are Kenya's paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), built up by President Moi to break the monopoly of the regular armed services, and the heavily-armed Police Field Force in Tanzania, one of six bodies comprising that country's security establishment in a comprehensive system of checks and balances.

External guarantees

The penultimate, and more than usually effective, method of civilian control in this inventory boils down to external guarantees from friendly foreign powers. With the possible exception of Cuba, French military policy have attracted the greatest international attention in this regard. Almost every francophone African state had – or continues to have – defence agreements with Paris; and standing French garrisons in the Central African Republic (CAR), Djibouti, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Senegal have been an abiding feature of the continued French presence on the continent for the past thirty years.

In all these countries, Paris has underwritten – and at various stages acted in order to ensure – the stability of her African friends. Indeed, on one occasion, French Legionnaires intervened to restore the civilian administration of President M'ba after he was overthrown in the coup of 1964.

The United Kingdom has been much less active in this manner. Nevertheless, British troops were responsible for putting down the East African army mutinies in 1964 (in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) and élite troops from the SAS moved into the Gambia to restore Sir Dawda Jawara to power in 1981.

It is often assumed that outside foreign powers have played the only deterrent role in this regard. But that is not so. A large number of *African* states have provided military assistance to protect endangered civilian neighbours from the political ambitions of their own armies.

Surprisingly perhaps, Guinea emerges as the leading exponent of the external use of military power, having intervened to support friendly civilian regimes on no less than five separate occasions. But Tanzania comes a close second with regime-supportive military assistance to governments in the Comoros, Seychelles and Uganda. (Of course, Tanzania's forces were also responsible for the best-known

instance of regime-opposing intervention, when 20 000 Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda and overthrew Idi Amin in 1979.) A final example here of African outside military guarantees is in Equatorial Guinea, where President Obiang retains office assisted by a large detachment of Moroccan troops provided by King Hassan.

Other considerations

Although the issue is not included in the list of mechanisms offered above, there is another critical determinant of control that has little to do with the military at all. "It is the existence of civil institutions which are both legitimate and effective"[12] especially over an extended period of time.

As regards the relationship between effective legitimacy and the format of civilian control, one might summarize as follows.

> The higher the levels of legitimacy and effectiveness, the more likely it is that control will take "objective" forms (self-restraining military professionalism ...); and the lower the levels of legitimacy and effectiveness, the more likely control is to assume "subjective" forms.[13]

To sum up: from the evidence available, it seems clear that once the subordination of the military has been engineered, subjective control may be singularly effective. But its limitation lies in the fact that it can only be implemented at great risk.

Before concluding, two other observations must be noted, both of which have relevance to the current and future pattern of civil-military relations in South Africa.

In the first place, it is important to stress that, to a greater or lesser extent, all armies intervene in politics. In Finer's continuum, the possibilities range from "influence" (legitimate inputs into defence budget decision-making), to "blackmail" (intimidation of the civilian authorities), to "displacement" (removing, or permitting the removal, of one set of civilian politicians for another) and, finally, to "supplantment" (where the military seize power and install themselves in office).[14]

In the second place, a sense of military professionalism may make the armed forces less rather than more responsive to civilian control. his is because the soldiers may see themselves, first and foremost, as the servants of the *state* rather than of the particular government of the day. In such circumstances, the military might intervene to protect the national interest (as it sees it) from a parochial or ineffective administration.

Conclusions

With the major general exception of Southern Africa, military coups have been widespread on the African continent, escalating in number over time as the process of decolonization created ever more sovereign states. By the 1970s and 1980s, armed interventions had become the principal manner by which governments were changed.

The erosion of constitutional channels of opposition in one-party states, against a backdrop of escalating economic

decline, helps to explain why so few African governments have changed hands in an orderly fashion. Peaceful transfer from one civilian administration to another following free and fair elections has occurred only half a dozen times since independence – mostly since 1991, when the ruling single-party incumbents were swept from office in Cape Verde, São Tomé, Benin and Zambia. Power, as Mao Tse-tung wrote, flows from the barrel of a gun, or so it has seemed in Africa.

But rather than resolving domestic conflict, military rule in Africa – which has been characterized both by excesses and inadequacies – has contributed to a pattern of lasting political instability in the majority of African countries. The question today is whether or not this state of affairs will continue to hold true for the remainder of the 1990s and into the twenty-first century?

Western conditionality regarding democratic and economic reforms – together with similar demands for an improvement in human rights and for major reductions in defence spending – suggest that the answer is "No".

On the other hand, there are plenty of reasons why we should expect continued, indeed heightened, levels of political turmoil in Africa during the next decade and beyond. There are at least four reasons for this assessment:

• economic sacrifices and social suffering: which are inherent in the implementation of structural adjustment programmes

• heightened expectations raised by the surge towards political pluralism and democracy: inevitably, the process is going to be an extended and painful one and popular aspirations will not be matched by material results in the short to medium-term (if ever)

• the global renaissance of ethnic/nationalist sentiment and secessionist demands: the outside world is already providing a role-model for separatist tendencies; indeed, the creation of new and internationally recognized states such as Armenia and Croatia (and the virtual recognition of Eritrea) suggest that the status of Africa's colonial borders will not remain wholly sacrosanct

• finally, there is the danger of marginalization: the West is totally preoccupied with the Middle East and with the monumental tasks confronting the CIS republics and Eastern Europe; for these reasons, the dangers of aid fatigue are very real and Africa faces a fate worse in some respects than being fought over – being ignored.

All these developments suggest growing and parallel problems relating to domestic and regional security. Under such conditions, the armed forces of Africa may become more, rather than less, interventionist. And in a number of countries, the future may quickly resemble Hobbes' savage state of nature, where life is "… solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". Indeed, Somalia has already reached that point, and other states such as Mozambique have not far to go.

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Peace and security in a changing Southern Africa: A Frontline view

*Professor Hasu H Patel, of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe presents a Frontline perspective of the South African reform process and its implications for the region as a whole. ***

Introduction

During approximately the last decade and a half, and especially over the last few years, momentous changes have taken place in the Southern African region. Often turbulent and tragic, but also hopeful and positive, these changes have impacted, both positively and negatively, on the lives of individuals, groups, societies, governments and states, and questions of peace and security, among others, retain their relevance during the transition to what is now often referred to as a "new South Africa" and/or a "post-apartheid South Africa".

This article will deal with, first, the commonly understood and real elements in the ideas of peace and security; second, the major conflictual elements impacting on questions of peace and security in the Southern African region; third, some of the major trends in the unfolding scenario; and fourth, the impact of a changing South Africa on questions of peace and security in the region.

Peace and security

The ideas of peace and security are nebulous and ambiguous and are often seen in military terms,[1] that is, peace is seen as the absence of military hostilities or war, and security of society, government or state is seen as the absence of potential or actual domestic and/or external threats to the stability or existence of society, government or state.

However, ideas of peace and security should also include the non-military dimension. One may talk of, for example:

- Social peace: the absence of strikes, demonstrations and physical violence by people contesting what they consider to be vital issues and interests, and occasional or recurrent social protest on a massive scale.
- Psychological peace: perceptions of individuals, groups, societies, governments or states concerning threats to their interests, even in cases when no threats objectively exist.
- Economic peace, in relation to absence of material hardships, for example, shortages of commodities, price rises, inflation, unemployment, economic immobility, shelter, health, education, food or water.

Thus, in addition to military security, we may talk of food security, health security, educational security, employment security, momentary security, environmental security, social security, psychological security, and so on.

> As Caroline Thomas has argued, for most Third World states national security exists not only in terms of national, political consolidation or "integrity", but also in the fields of monetary, trade, food and health, as well as military security.[2]

Major areas of conflict in the Southern African region

There are three major areas of conflict, all interconnected, which have led to insecurity in the Southern African region.

First there is the conflict between white domination and African liberation, especially in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which became, and still is, the dominant motif in the region. Wars of liberation were pitted against the white settlerism of the Portuguese, Rhodesian,

South West African and South African regimes. The collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa and of Ian Smith's Rhodesia added fuel to South Africa's destabilization policy in the region, which caused widespread death, destruction, misery and financial cost to the region, the effects of which will be felt for many years to come. While South Africa's regional destabilization activities have decreased during the last few years, they could be revived, depending on developments in South Africa.[3]

Second, there have been conflicts resulting from socio-economic and political developments in the region: from race, class, ethnicity, regionalism, religion, personal ambition, the nature of the political and economic system and policies, ownership and distribution of wealth and income, access to and affordability of health, education, shelter, food, water and sanitation, refugees, migrant labour, wars, AIDS and so on.[4] The worst drought in living memory is ravaging the Southern African region and has exacerbated human and financial hardships for the countries and peoples of Southern Africa. It could lead to conflictual situations in the region.

Third, developments in the above two conflict areas are also affected by others in the international system. Generally, the position of Third World states – including those in Southern Africa – has been one of insecurity, which

> ... refers to the relative weakness, the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack of room for manoeuvre which Third World states have on economic, political and of course, military levels.[5]

In the earlier Cold War era of East-West rivalry and conflict, the Southern African region witnessed both positive and negative effects. The forces of African liberation received support from the East, while forces of the status quo and retrogression – white settlerism and its surrogates – received support from the West. Small, weak, vulnerable states could (and did) at least play off the East-West rivalry and conflict for some advantages in the fields of politics, diplomacy, economics and liberation. But the price in death, destruction, misery and economics was high for many countries in the Southern African region, especially Angola and Mozambique.

Developments in recent years leading to the end of the Cold War (officially proclaimed so at the November 1990 Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – CSCE) have created burdens for some states and liberation movements, and ambiguities and opportunities for others. The post-Cold War era is characterized by, for example:

- one political and military superpower, the USA;
- the collapse of Eastern European and Soviet Communism;
- the disintegration of countries such as the USSR and Yugoslavia;
- the rise of a new "European Home" from Vancouver to Vladivostok;
- the emergency of a true North-South (white vs non-white) division of the world;
- an economically multipolar world with the rise of Japan,

Germany and trading blocs in North America, Europe and Asia; and
- greater weakness and vulnerability but also less manoeuvrability and autonomy for Third World states.

In the Southern African region the above elements in the post-Cold War era have resulted in, among other things, the loss of material support for liberation movements, such as the African National Congress of South Africa, from the East, and the accentuation of a long-standing concern of the West for the welfare and rights of the whites in South Africa. The West's basic position will continue to be "majority rule with guarantees for the white minority".[6]

Some major trends in the Southern African region

Political independence
In the mid-1970s the region saw the independence of Angola and Mozambique, followed by that of Zimbabwe and Namibia in the 1980s. In all these countries the basic conflict was between white settlerism and African nationalism, and was resolved through the process of armed struggle and negotiation between contesting forces. Although some of these countries' independence was bedevilled by internal military conflicts, fuelled by South Africa's destabilization policy, their independence also narrowed the arena of South Africa's white *cordon sanitaire* in the region and enlarged the possibility of majority rule in South Africa itself. Further, in first Zimbabwe and then Namibia the policy of national reconciliation (between competing races, ethnic groups, classes, political parties and military structures), laid great emphasis on a consensual approach to nation-building from the crucible of war. Reconciliation is most likely going to be the official policy of a new South Africa and indeed, reconciliation is also evident in South Africa's Codesa process, even though it contains many imponderables.[7]

Regional/economic co-operation: The SADCC and PTA
The political independence of countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe facilitated attempts at regional economic co-operation, initially through the SADCC and later, additionally, through the PTA. The SADCC was formed to lessen economic dependence on South Africa, ensure equitable regional integration, mobilize resources for implementing national, inter-state and regional policies, and find international co-operation for a regional strategy of economic integration. Later some SADCC members created and joined the PTA, essentially a free trade area for promoting greater trade in East and Southern Africa. The results have been mixed as a result of, for example, the project-based rather than macro-economic approach by the SADCC, South Africa's destabilization policy against the independent African countries, conflict between the planned trade approach of the SADCC and the PTA's free trade approach, and so on. Intra-SADCC trade continues to be very much smaller than SADCC-non-SADCC trade.

Even though South Africa has reverse dependence on the SADCC states, intra-SADCC trade is substantially lower than SADCC-South Africa trade. Clearly both the present and the future "new South Africa" will be the dominant regional economic power, but future conflictual situations in the region could be avoided by equitable, mutually beneficial, non-hegemonic and non-dependent economic relations between members of the new SADCC. This kind of relationship is envisaged by, for example, the ANC, but only time will tell whether or not national priorities will overtake regional concerns.[8]

Preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts

Progressively since 1984, but especially during the last five years, there has been a growing preference in intra-state affairs and inter-state relations for peaceful resolution of conflicts. A combination of domestic political, economic, social and military calculations, South Africa's destabilization of the region, changes in the international system, and both intervention by and co-operation from non-regional actors, have ensured this regional preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In Zimbabwe, the dissident or bandit problem in Matabeleland, which started in late 1980, ended when the ruling Zanu(PF) and its earlier partner, PF-Zapu, signed the Unity Agreement in December 1987, since which Zimbabwe has been ruled by a united Zanu(PF) government.

The peace process in Mozambique, which started in the mid-1980s with Frelimo-Renamo (or MNR) discussions mediated by South Africa after the Mozambique-South Africa Nkomati Accord of March 1984, was galvanized from 1989 onwards. While this peace process has been slow-moving, a Partial Cease-fire Agreement was signed by Frelimo and Renamo in December 1990, and three protocols (on principles, political parties, and the electoral law) had been signed by March 1992.

The peace process in Angola began hesitantly with the Angola-South Africa Lusaka Accord of February 1984 and was stimulated by the December 1988 New York Accord after South Africa's defeat in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in mid-1988. These accords were crucial for the independence of Namibia. The Angolan peace process received additional impetus with the 31 May 1991 General Peace Accord between the MPLA and Unita in terms of which multiparty elections are due to be held in September 1992.

The democratic reform process in South Africa during the last few years, culminating, for the moment, in the Codesa negotiations, is also a peace process – a search and a preference for a peaceful resolution of the long-standing conflict in South Africa, although the outcome is quite uncertain. It should be remembered that the South African peace process did not begin with De Klerk in February 1990, but rather with the August 1989 Harare Declaration of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on South Africa.

The Harare Declaration was really the adoption of the ANC's constitutional proposals. Further, the formation of the Patriotic/United Front in October 1991 was a crucial

precursor to the formation of Codesa, which began its life in December 1991. Importantly, it should be remembered that the region's preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts, in particular the South African conflict between white domination and black liberation, can be traced to at least the late 1960s, to the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969.[9]

Loss of guerrilla bases and the suspension/ending of the armed struggle

The support of Southern African countries for the South African liberation movement included a variety of political, diplomatic, economic and military support, individually and through the OAU. Only Angola, Tanzania and Zambia provided military base facilities: Angola and Zambia to the ANC and Tanzania to both the ANC and the PAC. Zimbabwe provided neither base facilities nor rights of transit, but did lend political, diplomatic and economic support to the ANC and the PAC, individually and through the OAU. Botswana offered neither base nor transit facilities, and Mozambique gave facilities for MK's command structure as well as transit facilities. Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho were hostile environments for the South African liberation movement.

This uneven support for the South African liberation movement shrank during the last decade. For example:

- Swaziland's then-secret February 1982 security agreement with South Africa was directed against the ANC.
- The March 1984 Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa resulted in ANC cadres being expelled from Mozambique.
- In mid-1988 Zambia expelled ANC cadres to Tanzania (principally) and Uganda.
- The December 1988 New York Accord between Angola, Cuba and South Africa not only involved South African and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and independence for Namibia, but also led to the expulsion of ANC cadres from Angola.

Indeed, at its Second Consultative Conference held in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, the ANC concluded that it could not secure rear bases in the region for military operations against South Africa.

In effect, this shrinking rear base and the effective loss of guerrilla bases in the region was the result of, first, South Africa's destabilization policy; second, the USA's policies of linkage, constructive engagement and the Reagan Doctrine; and third, the USSR's New Political Thinking, which, in part, led to the end of support for revolutionary violence of liberation movements. These all led to a regional fatigue on the question of support for the armed struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

Additionally, the ANC suspended its armed struggle in consequence of the "Pretoria Minute" between the ANC and the ruling National Party in August 1990. While the PAC and Azapo/BCM(A) continue to keep alive the option of the armed struggle, except for some attacks on security personnel the armed struggle seems to have effectively ended, at

least in terms of guerrilla rear bases. What remains, and is still a crucially powerful force, is mass action through, for example, labour withdrawal, township committees, boycotts, and urban guerrilla warfare.[10]

Political and economic pluralism

Particularly since 1989 a new wave of democratization has engulfed Africa, including the Southern African region. It is a new wave because it represents a continuity and resurfacing of an earlier wave of democratization in Africa: the nationalist, anti-colonial struggle for freedom and sovereign independence. However, the new wave of democratization has been emboldened by the "contagion" or "demonstration" effect of democratization in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

In Southern Africa, Marxist-Leninist political systems with vanguard one-partyism have conceded multipartyism in Angola and Mozambique, and Zimbabwe has dropped the idea of a de jure one-party state and continues to retain a multiparty system. Even non-Marxist-Leninist socialist Tanzania has accepted multipartyism and in humanist Zambia the long rule of Kenneth Kaunda and Unip was swept away in multiparty elections in October 1991. Namibia attained its independence in March 1990 with a multiparty constitution. Botswana has long retained a plural political system. Even in South Africa, the reform process since late 1989 is also a democratization process, and a multiparty democracy has been accepted not only by the two main players (the ruling NP and the ANC and its allies, the SACP and Cosatu), but also by others in the Codesa process as well as by some of its opponents: the PAC and Azapo/BCM(A). Regionally, only Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho retain one-man or one-party rule, a monarchy, and a military government.

Additionally, economic pluralism has also been imposed on or accepted by many countries in Africa, including those of Southern Africa. Economic structural adjustment and trade liberalization programmes (ESAP/TLP) are being implemented in countries such as Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa will have its new economic structural adjustment and trade liberalization programme even in the transitional and post-apartheid periods because of new pressures on the fiscus resulting from demands for at least social redistribution to benefit the black majority. Economic pluralism is another way of saying that the new economic policy is based on the market economy, or market-led growth, rather than upon nationalization of key sectors of the economy or a centrally planned economy.

Political and economic pluralism is another way of speaking of political and economic conditionality. While many of the pressures for political and economic pluralism have been domestic (in that the new democracy movement has been a "home-grown" statement about the people's loss of faith in leaders, governments and states, and disgruntlement about their worsening economic conditions), political and economic conditionalities have become essential components of the policies of Western governments, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, and the NGOs and have become vehicles for the maintenance of Western hegemony.

Democracy, human rights, market economies, and so on have become the new buzz-words and even though these have been accepted (by, for example, the Commonwealth at its summit meeting in Harare in 1991) as a moral good and a policy prescription, nevertheless it should be remembered that political pluralism may not be compatible with economic pluralism. Multipartyism may well further heighten tensions that may have increased as a result of economic reform programmes. Political and economic dissatisfactions, when linked, can create (and have created, in, for example, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa) enormous tensions and pressures in societies, and create new threats to peace and new insecurities. ESAP-TLP (which involve – ideally in the short term – high prices, inflation, unemployment, cuts in government subsidies and expenditure, the loss of value of currency, and shortages of goods and services) may make the rich richer and the poor poorer and immiserize the middle class. The last-mentioned two classes, especially the poor, the weak and the dispossessed, may engage – and indeed, have engaged – in disrupting the peaceful social and political status quo. Political pluralism, even though good in itself, may more openly divide the political system; be used by those who are "democrats by day and autocrats by night"; generally raise the political temperature to unbearable levels; lead to further loss of legitimacy of leaders, governments and states; and add to social, economic and political upheaval and insecurity.[11]

South Africa's destabilization policy

From the mid-1970s (with the faltering independence of Angola and Mozambique) and especially during the 1980s, the Southern African region has been haunted by South Africa's destabilization policy. It will take generations, if ever, for the region to recover from the death, destruction, economic losses, and physical and psychological scars inflicted on it by South African destabilization,[12] the effects of which have been felt most acutely by Angola and Mozambique.

For Angola:

> The cost of the war over the last fifteen years has surpassed (US)$20 billion. Over one million Angolans ... have been displaced by war and close to 500 000 have died. More than 1.9 million people are directly threatened by famine in nine southern and central provinces. Added to this is the fact that 70 000 Angolans are war-mutilated.[13]

For Mozambique:

> Nearly 1 million people are estimated to have died as a direct or indirect result of the war between 1980 and 1988. 1.9 million people inside the country and a further 1.5 million outside are displaced from their homes and lands. Half the country's primary schools and more than a third of its health network have been destroyed in attacks. Half the population of 14 million depend on food aid for survival. Foreign aid accounts for 76% of Gross National Product, compared to an average of 11% for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, making Mozambique the most aid-dependent country in the world. Its per capita consumption levels – estimated at between US$80 to 100 per year – have been described by the World Bank as "about the lowest in the world".[14]

For the Southern African region:

The total GDP losses of the SADCC member states total well over 60 billion US dollars according to most estimates. This approximately equals three times their total external debt, or about four times the value of all developmental assistance received by them during the same period (1980s).[15]

South Africa's destabilization policy was meant to:

- perpetuate white minority rule in South Africa;
- make South Africa's neighbours dependent and pliant states;
- humiliate radical states in the region;
- ensure that socialism was seen as bankrupt and defeat it in neighbouring states;
- show that South Africa was a victim of international communist intervention and aggression and thereby gain Western assistance and support for the "Western, anti-communist and Christian bastion" that South Africa was supposed to be;
- show that the threat to white minority rule in South Africa was external and not internal opposition to it by the black majority;
- show South Africa's neighbours that support for the South African liberation movement and sanctions against South Africa would be costly to them; and
- maintain white South Africa's hegemony in the region.[16]

South Africa's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in mid-1988 illuminated the fact that there were limits to its regional hegemonic ambitions and led to a scaling down of its regional destabilization policy.[17] It realized that destabilization of the region actually "exacerbated rather than reduced the threat to white power. ... An embattled state, as South Africa has become, cannot sustain a strategy of destabilisation".[18] South Africa has generally replaced its regional destabilization policy with a policy of regional accommodation,[19] but it must be remembered that South African "non-official" support for Renamo continues and, depending on developments within South Africa, the destabilization policy could be reactivated.

Recent developments in South Africa

Since late 1989 the ideological, political, and social rigidity of decades has been replaced by fluidity. Reforms and the search for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the South African conflict have had reverberations, but problems and dangers continue to cast their deadly shadows over the evolving South African landscape. Positive, breathtaking, negative and tragic aspects of the unfolding events are discernible.

Since his September 1989 election victory President de Klerk has engaged in many important reforms, including:

- the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP, Azapo and other organizations;
- the release of many political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and other leaders;
- the lifting of the State of Emergency;
- the granting of amnesty to and the return of many political exiles;
- some modification of the Internal Security Act;
- the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1956, and the Population Registration Act of 1950;
- the signing of the National Peace Accord between the ANC, the South African government and the Inkatha Freedom Party in September 1991 to control violence and effect a code of conduct for political parties, organizations and the security forces, under which the National Peace Commission and the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry on Public Violence and Intimidation were established; and
- the beginning of real negotiations on peaceful, constitutional changes for a democratic South Africa with the December 1991 inauguration of the Codesa process.[20]

Given the decades of white reactionary and obstinate politics, De Klerk's reforms show great courage. However, it should be remembered that these reforms are the involuntary response of a beleaguered white power structure to pressures and challenges. For example:

- South Africa's black majority's insurrection of 1984–1986, the armed struggle, and mass labour withdrawals and boycotts of recent years (for example, the ANC/Cosatu anti-VAT stayaway of 3,5 million people in November 1991).
- The international community's preference for a peaceful negotiated settlement arising especially from the former USSR's New Political Thinking and the subsequent thawing and ending of the Cold War.
- The Southern African region's increasing preference for a peaceful negotiated settlement in South Africa, for example the Harare Declaration of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern African of August 1989, later endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth, and largely adopted by the UN General Assembly.
- Pressures arising from South Africa's economic downturn and defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in mid-1988, which increasingly made white minority rule economically and militarily indefensible.[21]

Thus the Codesa process, which is an anti-apartheid, pro-democracy and a peaceful, negotiated settlement process, did not unfold in a vacuum but arose out of the interplay of local, regional, and international pressures. It has resulted in an agreement, in principle, on an interim government and a democratically elected body to make and approve a new constitution, although there are, and will continue to be, arguments about the details. This constitutes the adoption by the ruling National Party, the ANC, and others, of the PAC and Azapo demand for an interim government and a democratically elected constituent assembly. Indeed, these were the key elements of the Patriotic/United Front Declaration and Statement, both of October 1991. Thus it is a pity that Azapo was excluded from the Patriotic/United Front Conference of October 1991, and that neither the PAC nor

Azapo are part of the Codesa process, because it has fractured the liberation movement and thus has given an advantage to De Klerk.[22]

A Codesa-appointed interim government and a democratically elected constitution-making body are likely to be in place shortly. These will be significant achievements in the long road to a peaceful, negotiated settlement. However, in addition to the absence of the PAC and Azapo, there are other worrying features in the Codesa process, for example:

1 The fact that Bophuthatswana and the Inkatha Freedom Party did not sign the Codesa's Declaration of Intent in December 1991 is indicative of their probable desire to carve out independent states for themselves from a post-apartheid South Africa.

2 The opposition Conservative Party and white right-wing militant groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) are not part of the Codesa process because they and their supporters in the security and police forces want to carve out an independent white state from a future post-apartheid South Africa.

3 Cosatu is in alliance with the ANC and SACP, but it has made claims for separate representation at Codesa – a harbinger of a probable split between the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu in the future.

4 De Klerk's pursuit of a dual agenda of negotiations and violence. For all the talk of abolishing apartheid and creating a democratic South Africa, De Klerk continues to pursue policies of "no domination by whites or blacks", "power sharing", "minority rights", and so on, which are code words for the maintenance of white power and privilege in a fettered post-apartheid South Africa. While the more than two-thirds "Yes" vote in the 17 March 1992 referendum by South African whites suggests that they are ready for a peaceful, negotiated settlement, it is important to remember that they voted for power-sharing and not for unfettered black majority rule. De Klerk's inability or unwillingness to reign in the security and police forces only fuels general white right-wing violence through the "Third Force", with its death squads, assassinations of political activists, financial and military support for the IFP, and so forth. There is much speculation about a possible right-wing military coup and indeed, such a coup is a distinct possibility.

5 While the role of the "Third Force" in the "black on black" violence has been repeatedly documented, nevertheless, there must be at least a minimal ethnic, economic and political basis on the ground for the many thousands of blacks being killed in clashes between supporters of the ANC and the IFP, which has nullified the ANC/IFP Peace Treaty of January 1991.[23]

Conclusion

It has been suggested that while peace and security are commonly seen in military terms, non-military aspects of peace and security should always be borne in mind. Absolute peace and security are unattainable and, therefore, illusionary. What one is left with is relative peace and security as a result of human endeavour, but even this may be modulated by the vagaries of non-human events. The current drought, for example, the worst in living memory to affect southern Africa, (especially South Africa and Zimbabwe), has terrible effects on food, water, power-generation, and financial resources, resulting in the malnutrition and starvation of many people.

The Southern African region has been a war zone since the mid-1970s and especially during most of the 1980s, principally because of the key conflict in the region: that between white domination and African liberation. This conflict resulted in South Africa's regional destabilization policy which brought death and destruction to the region. Since about 1989 this destabilization policy has largely been wound down and hopefully a "peace dividend" could be used for socio-economic development in the region.[24] However, it should be remembered that the region will take generations, if ever, to recover from the vast human and non-human damage to which it has been subjected, and a true peace dividend will only come with a relatively smooth transition to majority rule in South Africa.

South Africa's regional destabilization policy used existing conflicts and/or engendered new conflicts within specific countries in the region. Further, developments in the international system, such as the Cold War, resulted in both positive and negative interventions by the dominant countries in the world system. These sometimes strengthened progressive or retrogressive forces within the countries in the region.

The Southern African region exhibits a variety of potentially beneficial trends, for example political independence and national reconciliation, economic co-operation, preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts, political and economic pluralism with their emphases on political and economic democracy and greater empowerment of the people. However, to a great extent, peace and security in the region will also be a function of developments in South Africa.

Changes in South Africa during the last few years, in particular, exhibit both promises and dangers not only for South Africa but for the region as well. A variety of internal, regional and international factors have impacted on many structures in South Africa, resulting in that country gradually moving towards a possible peaceful, negotiated settlement of its terrible conflict. The main political players are the ANC and the NP, and, therefore, a historic compromise will require at least the agreement of these parties. But neither party can afford to ignore other political players such as the PAC, Azapo, IFP, CP or AWB. While the Codesa process is meant to be inclusive of these other players, the boycott or absence of these other players and the recalcitrance of the IFP and Bophuthatswana are pointers to the dangers to a smooth transition to majority rule in South Africa.

Even if there is only a "minimalist compromise settlement": one involving the ANC and the NP plus any other willing signatories, such a situation is likely to be volatile and dangerous because:

- there is the possibility of an authoritarian post-apartheid South Africa, if only to check the non-signatories, and South Africa's civil society is likely to come under pressure;
- the white right-wing, including the CP, the AWB and elements of the security and police forces, will still want to create a white state; and
- the black right-wing, for example the IFP and Bophuthatswana, will still want to carve out independent states for themselves.[25]

A minimalist compromise settlement is likely to involve universal adult suffrage in some kind of a federal rather than a unitary state, in which there will be majority rule fettered by white guarantees even more comprehensive than those in Zimbabwe under the Lancaster House Independence Constitution. Even assuming that this will be acceptable to the majority right-wing elements in the security and police forces, there are both optimistic and pessimistic analyses of the possibilities of the integration or absorption of the liberation movements' forces (for example, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* and APLA) in the security and police forces of post-apartheid South Africa, with the pessimistic analysis suggesting, for example, that forces such as MK will be absorbed rather than integrated into a future SADF, which will still be dominated by white officers. Such a "new" SADF (and a "new" SAP) could hold the post-apartheid South Africa to ransom, especially on the issue of the preservation/observation of white guarantees. Further, their size, particularly the SADF, as well as the SADF's history of internal repression and regional destabilization, will create suspicion and insecurity in South Africa and the Southern African region, and the Frontline States may not have much confidence in security arrangements with a post-apartheid South Africa.[26]

Another possibility for South Africa is that it may fracture, as in the cases of Yugoslavia and the USSR, into different independent states: a majority rule state under the minimalist compromise settlement, plus one or more black states (for example, Bophuthatswana, Zululand), and a white state. This will be taking ethnic guarantees and white guarantees to their extreme conclusions. Even if such a situation is resisted by the majority, as is most likely, it will be a nightmare scenario of chaos and massive civil war and a possible Lebanonization of South Africa. Such an outcome will be tragic for peace and security not only in South Africa, but also for the Southern African region as a whole.

One way to check the possibility of this scenario in South Africa would be to ensure a civilian/military monitoring and enforcement role for the international community: the UN, as in Angola under Unavem II or in Namibia under Untag. Other options include such a role for the OAU or the Commonwealth or the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) but the UN has considerable experience in African situations of conflict/settlement/reconciliation, for example in Angola and Namibia, and it would be useful to capitalize on this experience. So far the Codesa process has accorded observer status to the UN,

the Commonwealth, the OAU and the NAM, but it needs to go further. Nelson Mandela's call on 3 April 1992 for an international force to halt violence in black townships in South Africa is testimony to the need for an outside agency "with teeth" to assist practically in a smooth transition to a post-apartheid South Africa. The NP has so far rejected even any international monitoring of any election process. The PAC has been demanding the intervention of the international community to effect dramatic change in South Africa. Azapo has been demanding a neutral venue outside the country under a neutral chairman. Except for the NP's position, all the above-stated positions of the liberation movement create a feeling of deep foreboding about any purely South African engineered transition to a democratic future. One of Codesa's working groups is concerned with the role of the international community, and the sooner it agrees to a decisive civilian/military role for the international community, especially the UN, along the lines of Unavem II in Angola or Untag in Namibia, for the period of transition to and for a period after majority rule government is in place in South Africa, the better it will be, not only for South Africa but the region as a whole. Not only will such international intervention assist in possibly checking the nightmare scenario, it should also help to guarantee the minimalist compromise settlement and ensure that, for example, the integration or transformation of the existing civil, security and police administrations may be undertaken with a degree of control and safety, and that black and white right-wing demands for separate statehood could be held in check. The task of the international community's intervention in South Africa would be greatly assisted by a highly probable development within South Africa itself: that even if the ANC wins a commanding lead in any universal adult suffrage elections under the minimalist compromise settlement, it will institute a government of national unity (and a policy of reconciliation) to allow meaningful political space to as many actors as possible. Such a development would help to bring peace and security not only to South Africa, but to the Southern African region as well.[27]

A post-apartheid South Africa that is able to preserve even minimal calm and continuity will be the major economic, financial, technical and military power in the region, (just as even turbulent apartheid South Africa has been), and will be the "big brother" in the Southern African region. But it is important to remember that "little brothers" often view, rightly or wrongly, "big brothers" with suspicion, at least, and that "big brothers" also have problems of their own. For example:

- a post-apartheid South Africa may well become an engine of growth for the Southern African region, but this capacity should not be overestimated, because it could become a focal point for outside investments, aid, loans and so forth, to the detriment of the region;
- in spite of having inherited a troubled economy, a new government will have to engage in, at least, massive social redistribution in favour of the majority of its people who have for so long been victimized and brutalized by wilful neglect by successive South African governments;

- the economic cost of the above will be very high and may even be unaffordable, and South Africa could find itself living beyond its means, only later to come under a painful Economic Structural Adjustment Programme;

- even with the best of intentions and the will to create a mutually beneficial and non-dependent regional economic co-operation system (for example, through an enlarged SADCC or PTA), South Africa will still dominate the region;

- while a new regional security organization may be created (for example, by enlarging the Frontline States' Southern African Inter-State Defence and Security Commission, or an arrangement modelled on the European CSCE), based on the principles of equality and mutual advantage, nevertheless South Africa will still be the dominant regional military power and could use this position to maintain or enhance its political, diplomatic and economic power.[28]

As stated earlier, there is no such thing as total peace and security, and both the military and non-military aspects of peace and security should be borne in mind. Thus, while the Southern African region now seems to be settling down, after a long period of war (both intra-state and inter-state), war clouds still hover overhead. Additionally, non-military issues – such as malnutrition, starvation, poverty, refugees (some 15 million in Southern Africa), mass rural-urban migration, access to and affordability of health care, education and housing, AIDS, the most severe drought in living memory with its attendant consequences – have crucial negative implications for the peace and security of the region. Peace and security will continue to be of concern for the governments and people of Southern Africa.[29]

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Population growth and environmental degradation in Malawi

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Introduction

Located in south-eastern Africa astride the Great Rift Valley of Eastern Africa, Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. In terms of the World Bank's basic economic indicators that are used to differentiate developed from less developed states, Malawi is ranked tenth from the bottom of the list of Fourth World African states.[1] The per capita GNP in 1988 was a mere US$170. The life expectancy is only 45 years. The population growth rate estimated at 3,3 per cent is among the highest in the world. This growth rate translates into a population doubling time of 21 years. Estimated at 8 million people in 1987 the population of Malawi should reach 16 million by 2008.

Unlike many of its well-endowed neighbours, such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, Malawi cannot boast of significant mineral resources or fabulously large tracts of fertile land to attract outside investors and generate foreign exchange. However, Malawi's considerable variations in altitude and location within the Great East African Rift Valley system produces a wider range of climatic conditions than in any of her surrounding neighbours. As De Blij points out, Malawi possesses some of the most fertile soils in Africa.[2] Good soils and humid conditions mean that at least half of the country is cultivable. It is these good environmental conditions that have contributed to Malawi's diversified agricultural base and food self-sufficiency. While the media have been filled with the now familiar stories of mass starvation in Ethiopia, Mozambique and various parts of West Africa, Malawi has stood out as an underdeveloped country that is not only able to feed itself but to export substantial quantities of maize, fish, sugar, and other foodstuffs to neighbours who are short of food.[3] The following quote clearly supports Malawi's emerging status as the food basket of south-eastern and central Africa.

> For the fourth year in a row, Malawi will be exporting grain to its neighbours following a successful agricultural season. The Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation's decision to raise the price of maize helped increase output by 6.3 per cent. This enabled Malawi to export 200 000 tons of maize last year to Zambia and Mozambique – a total which is expected to be matched this year.[4]

Thus Malawi, as a landlocked country without an abundance of readily exploitable raw materials, must rely almost exclusively on agricultural development for its economic growth. Since independence in 1964, the main thrust of the government's economic policy has involved the agricultural sector. However, the issue of whether the available land resources are adequate to support the ever-expanding population has not been seriously addressed and debated in government planning circles. Already there are visible signs of widespread environmental degradation in Malawi.

The aim of this article is to develop a simple conceptual framework within which the linkages and interrelationships between population growth and environmental degradation in sub-Saharan Africa, using Malawi as a specific case study, can be examined in greater depth. The basic argument is that environmental degradation currently under way in Malawi, and for that matter in other parts of Africa, can be linked directly to population growth and pressure on land as a result of deforestation, overgrazing, overuse of land for subsistence, and government development strategies that favour large-scale agricultural development.

The debate on population and resources

High population growth rates resulting in overpopulation have been singled out as one of the major factors that has greatly contributed to the declining economies and food production in most African countries.[5] A furious debate rages around the question: "Just how far is the growing population to blame for the environmental problems the world faces today?".[6] One of the arguments in the debate is presented by the neo-Malthusians, who stress the negative impact of popu-

Figure 1: Malawi: Regions and districts

make a positive contribution to economic growth and development. Population growth, it is argued, can have beneficial effects by stimulating demand, encouraging technological innovation, and permitting economies of scale in transportation and communication and in production for large-scale markets.[10] According to this school of thought, blame for today's environmental ills and famine is placed on inappropriate technology; overconsumption by the affluent; inequality and exploitation which squeeze poor farmers onto "marginal" land and "force" them to over-exploit it.[11]

Curtis Skinner, an expert in Latin American affairs, argues in the structuralist or anti-Malthusian tradition that the growth of population by itself does not threaten the quality of life on earth. Problems of distribution and social reform are at the bottom of the Third World environmental crisis.[12] Skinner believes that the solution to these problems is political reform rather than population control. In short, anti-Malthusians argue that social inequality and the lack of access to the means of production, namely, land, knowledge, equipment and other similar resources, is at the root of the population problem in the Third World. As noted by Harrison, this debate is extremely significant since it provides ammunition for and against the most contentious issue in development: family planning and population control.

To argue for a slow-down in population growth in the context of some developing countries does not necessarily entail the acceptance of Malthusian propositions in their totality. The problem facing many developing countries is not that their population is growing per se but rather that it is growing so rapidly that it can be a factor in environmental collapse. In this respect the ideas presented by anti-Malthusian writers such as Boserup, Kuznets, Lappe and Skinner cannot by themselves be used to totally refute the need for population control measures under certain circumstances.

A conceptual framework

In trying to understand the intricate relationship between population growth, environment, and resources in Malawi, I have developed a conceptual framework (see Figure 2) on the basis of an extensive review of the literature on the topic of population growth and its relationship to the environment as well as my first-hand knowledge of Malawi. Conceptual frameworks such as this, though descriptive and simple in nature, have been successfully employed elsewhere and have proved a useful starting point for formulating hypotheses to be tested.[13]

The framework highlights the four main phases in the intricate relationship between environmental degradation and population growth. The precursor phase identifies the underlying causes for the fast population growth in Malawi. The problem phase establishes the major potential ecological and economic consequences of fast population growth. Finally, the model shows the synergistic relationship between environmental decline on the one hand and the reduction in food production systems as well as the lowering of the standard of living on the other. If Malawi is not careful it could easily

lation growth. They argue that since the potential growth of population knows no limits, while the means of subsistence is subject to real limitations because the supply of land is absolutely limited, "overpopulation" is inevitable.

Lester Brown, arguing in this tradition, points out that our oldest enemy, hunger, is again at the door. According to him, with more hungry people in the world today than when the 1980s began, there is little to celebrate on the food front. Brown has persuasively reviewed the changing environmental conditions in the post-Green Revolution years, which indicate that population growth is likely to be greater than the potential increase in food production.[8] Glantz, in support of Brown's assertions, argues that growing populations will force agricultural societies in many areas to depend more and more on marginal land for food production.[9] Glantz raises an intriguing question: Is the climate changing or are people undertaking land-use activities that the climate cannot support in the long run and hence environmental degradation?

Another argument in the debate is offered by the anti-Malthusians, who take the view that population growth can

Figure 2: Population growth and environmental stress: A conceptual framework for Malawi

move into the basket-case situation in which many African nations find themselves. Environmental degradation will imply the onset and intensification of landlessness, political unrest, ethnic conflict, rural-urban migration, unemployment and other similar hardships. These and other problems already manifest in Malawi are discussed in greater depth in the following sections.

Population growth and age composition

As Goliber[14] points out, the combination of rapidly growing populations and stagnating economies has made the issue of

population and development in sub-Saharan Africa one of the great unfolding dramas of our time. Many countries on the continent are in the early expanding stage of the demographic transition. Death rates have experienced a significant decline while fertility levels have remained very high. Crude birth rates on the continent are generally 50 or more per 1 000 and crude death rates, although very high by world standards, have experienced a rapid decline to a low of 15 deaths per 1 000 people. The fast decline in mortality levels has been brought about by the introduction of modern medicines and public health programmes. Socio-economic development has, to a certain extent, influenced declining mortality rates. The

Figure 3: Population growth in Malawi, 1900–2020

huge difference between death rates and birth rates has meant a high population growth rate for the continent. Africa's rate of population growth is estimated at 2,9 per cent, which implies a population doubling time of less than 25 years. Currently estimated at 606 million,[15] Africa's population can be expected to double to 1,2 billion by 2015. With rapid population growth, combined with degradation of arable and pasture land, political strife, and government's failure to support agriculture adequately, per capita agricultural production has been falling since the 1960s.[16]

Malawi is no exception in this regard. Its population is growing at a rate of 3,3 per cent per annum.[17] This is slightly higher than the 2,9 per cent growth rate for the whole continent. According to the Malawi National Statistical Office projections, the country's population should reach 12,5 million by the turn of this century, less than 10 years from now.[18] In 1966 there were only 4,4 million persons and in 1977, 5,5 million. The 1987 population was 8 million. An estimate for the year 1990 puts the figure at 8,75 million people.[19] These figures demonstrate that the population of Malawi has doubled in less than 25 years (see Figure 3). Figure 3 also indicates that the population growth of Malawi is following a geometric or exponential trend.

The rapid population growth is only to be expected. As medical facilities have improved and more people have learnt to observe the rules of hygiene, mortality rates are declining. In the Malawi Population Change Survey of 1970/72 the crude death rate for the country was at 26,5 per 1000 persons; while infant mortality was estimated at 171 per 1 000 live births in the 1977 census.[20] By 1988 the crude death rate had fallen to 20 per 1 000 persons.[21] These figures are very high by both world and average African standards but they represent a remarkable decline from previous rates.

But as the concept of birth control is almost non-existent in Malawi, there are no reasons to believe that fertility rates are declining. In the 1970/72 survey, the crude birth rate was

estimated at 50,5 per 1 000 with an average number of children per woman of completed family size of 6,6.[22] In 1988 the estimate for the crude birth rate was 53 per 1 000 with a total fertility rate of 7,0.[23] Today, more babies are surviving and life expectancy has increased considerably from a low of 30 years to a high of 45. The resultant population explosion has increased the pressure on the land as well as the ratio of dependants. The young, together with the old, need to be provided for in every respect.

The refugee influx from neighbouring Mozambique has added close to a million people to Malawi's population.[24] The people of Malawi have had to accommodate the largest number of refugees fleeing rebel atrocities in the now 15-year-old civil war in Mozambique. The refugees are straining Malawi's logistical capacity and putting pressure on already tight economic resources.

Malawi has a very young population as evidenced by the broad-based population pyramid (Figure 4). In 1987, 46 per cent of the total population was under the age of 15, as compared to 45 per cent in 1977 and 44 per cent in 1966. A very young population such as this one results in a high dependency ratio. In 1966 the dependency ratio was 92 dependants per 100 persons in the economically productive age group of 15 to 65 years. In 1987 the ratio had risen to 101 dependants for every 100 persons.

The significance of this large contingent of young people can best be appreciated in terms of pressures it imposes upon the social and demographic system. In spite of efforts to step up economic development in the agricultural and industrial sectors, Malawi has failed to achieve its economic goals.[25] What is gained by technological development is absorbed by the high consumption rate of an expanding population. Of course there are other factors that contribute to the imbalance between production and consumption, but as present data indicate, population is one of the major factors adversely affecting economic growth. With so many dependent young people to educate, the country's educational facilities have become overburdened and thousands of school-going children have difficulty gaining admission to schools every year, especially in the secondary school category. Those who are lucky enough to gain admission and obtain a secondary school education are finding it increasingly difficult to secure employment. The failure to provide adequate educational facilities is reflected in the low rate of literacy, estimated at 25 per cent (see bottom of Figure 4). Socio-economic development in Malawi is being outpaced by fast population growth.

From a demographic point of view, the large proportion of children create a built-in momentum for future population growth.[26] Goliber argues that even if fertility immediately drops to the "replacement" level of a little over two births per woman, births would still outstrip deaths and the population would continue to grow for at least 50 years. It is unlikely that fertility rates in Malawi will experience any significant decline in the near future, especially in the absence of an aggressive family planning campaign and

Male				Female	
Age	% of population			% of population	Age
70+	0,7%			0,6%	70+
60–69	1,4%			1,4%	60–69
50–59	2,4%			2,4%	50–59
40–49	3,5%			3,9%	40–49
30–39	4,5%			6,1%	30–39
20–29	7,3%			8,1%	20–29
10–19	11,1%			11,4%	10–19
0–9	17,5%			17,7%	0–9

1,600   800   0   800   1,600

(in thousands)

- **Total population: 7 679 000**
- **Total male population: 3 717 000**
- **Total female population: 3 962 000**

- **Literacy rate: 25%**
- **Urbanization: 12,3%**

Figure 4: Age/sex pyramid for Malawi, 1987

given the cultural setting which favours large families. After a long period of dragging its feet on the population issue, the government of Malawi has taken the first step in addressing itself to population matters by launching a child-spacing programme. As the name suggests, the programme simply emphasizes the proper spacing between two successive births rather than direct birth prevention. While this programme might, if successful, have the desirable effect of reducing fertility, it needs to be complemented by other measures, including incentives and disincentives to discourage large families.

Several individuals have argued that the Aids epidemic might have an impact on population growth of those countries hardest hit by the disease. Malawi has a relatively high prevalence of Aids infection. Bongaarts[27] has shown that the impact of Aids on population growth rates in Africa will not be drastic.[28] It is possible that Malawi could experience a reduction in the growth rate of up to 1 per cent as a result of Aids, which would bring down the growth rate from 3,3 per cent to 2,3 per cent. A population growing at a rate of

2,3 per cent would double its population in 30 years. Malawi will therefore continue to experience rapid population growth.

Population and land resources

Thus by the year 2000 there will be 5,7 million additional citizens to be fed, clothed, housed, educated and provided for in every other normal respect. In 1987 Malawi had an overall density of 85 persons per km^2,[29] the fourth highest in Africa. This figure, however, conceals marked regional and district variations. The regional densities were 34 persons per km^2 in the Northern Region, 88 persons per km^2 in the Central Region, and 125 persons per km^2 in the Southern Region.[30] At district level the range in densities is even greater, from 16 persons per km^2 in Rumphi district in the Northern Region to 300 persons per km^2 in Blantyre and Chiradzulu Districts in the Southern Region. Figure 5 shows some of the spatial variations in density. The variation in densities means that population pressures have not had the

same impact in the different parts of the country. It is apparent from Figure 5 that the Southern Region is the most densely populated area in the country.

According to some estimates, Malawi has enough land to accommodate additional population for another ten years – up to the end of the 1990s – if presently-employed technology continues to be used.[31] Chipande[32] notes that by 1983 many areas in the country had exhausted all the idle cultivable land. Of the total land area about 55 per cent is considered cultivable. As shown in Table 1, in 1985 there was a total of 24 682 km^2 of vacant arable land remaining in the country. This constitutes 26 per cent of the total land area and is slightly more than the percentage currently under cultivation, which is estimated at 21 per cent. It might therefore be argued that Malawi is capable of supporting twice the current population estimated at 8,75 million.

At the regional level, the Southern Region has the largest percentage of vacant land that can be put under cultivation. The percentages of vacant land from Table 1 are 18,1, 24,8 and 34,6 for the Northern, Central and Southern Regions respectively. It is clear from these figures that the Northern Region is the least endowed. However, when this data is considered together with a more refined measure of population density, namely, number of persons per square kilometre of arable land, it becomes obvious that the Southern Region is experiencing greater population pressure on land resources than the other two regions (see Table 1). Some districts in the Southern Region have already run out of uncultivated cultivable land and in some parts people are forced to cultivate steep, unsuitable land simply because they have no choice. Thus, in relative terms, the Northern and Central Regions have more vacant land available for cultivation than the Southern Region.

A simple graphical means of comparing the spatial distribution of population in relation to land resources is given in Figure 6, the Lorenz curve. This compares the cumulative percentage of the number of persons in the 24 districts that comprise Malawi with the cumulative percentage of land in the districts for the years 1966, 1977 and 1987. A straight diagonal line indicates even distribution of the population across the districts; a strongly bowed line indicates spatial inequality in the distribution of the population. It is apparent in this figure that the population is unevenly distributed, with the year 1966 being farthest away from the norm – the straight diagonal line. The curves for the years 1977 and 1987 are a little closer to the norm line than 1966, with 1987 being the closest. The curves suggest that between 1966 and 1987 there has been a shift in the spatial distribution of population. The trend is towards the straight diagonal line, implying a move towards a more evenly distributed population.

In addition to the Lorenz curve an index of dissimilarity was calculated for each of the three years to give the relationship a more precise statistical form. One way of defining this index graphically is to consider it as the maximum vertical distance or deviation between each Lorenz curve and the diagonal. The index is expressed in percentage

Figure 5: Malawi, population density by district, 1987

terms, where 100 means maximum uneven distribution of population in relation to land resources, and zero means even distribution. Thus, smaller values of this index indicate even a real distribution of the population. The indices were 31,2 per cent for 1966, 29,56 per cent for 1977 and 27,29 per cent for 1987. The decline in the index of dissimilarity over the three years strongly suggests that the population of Malawi has been redistributing itself during the past 25 years since independence, in search of vacant land. The little vacant land remaining is being gobbled up as the population continues to grow. For an in-depth study of internal migration and population redistribution in Malawi see Kalipeni.[33]

Table 1: Malawi, Arable Land Use Densities by Region, 1985 and 2000

Region	Total land area in sq km	Arable in sq km	Population 1985	Arable density 1985*	Population 2000	Arable density 2000*	Vacant arable land, 1985 in sq km**
Northern	26,940	10,189	845,200	83	1,387,415	136	4,881 (18.1%)
Central	35,594	25,591	2,794,400	129	4,583,818	212	8,823 (24.8%)
Southern	31,752	20,076	3,589,200	179	5,890,667	293	10,978 (34.6%)
Malawi	94,284	51,856	7,226,800	139	11,861,900	229	24,682 (26.1%)

* Number of persons per sq km of arable land
** Percent in perenthesis is the proportion of vacant arable land over total land area at the regional level
Source: Data from Malawi Departement of Town and Country Planning, National Physical Development Plan Vol II – Background Study Report, Lilongwe, May 1987, Table 6.3b, p 181 and Malawi National Statistical Office, Population and Housing Census 1987, Preliminary Report, Zomba: Government Printer, 1987, p 1.

Environmental and social consequences

When Paul Theroux, one of America's well-known writers, was a Peace Corps volunteer in Malawi in 1963, Malawi had a population of less than 4 million. Twenty-five years later, on his return to visit the country, the population had doubled to 8 million. The lush forests and woodlands in the countryside had disappeared with barren infertile fields in their stead. The following lengthy quote provides a glimpse into the catastrophic environmental collapse now under way in Malawi.

> It seemed to me on my return that Malawians were better dressed but that the woods were more ragged – the hills showed the effects of serious deforestation. There were more people in evidence: they crowded the roads, they jammed the buses, they had plowed and planted most of the visible hillsides. Malawi was no longer a country of cyclists; it was a wilderness of pedestrians. The population had doubled. It now stood at more than eight million .... Driving north some days later, I could not help noticing again how bereft of trees Malawi was: empty hills, plowed valleys and plains. Some fruit trees remained, as did the groves of hardwoods that were always left around burying grounds. What happened to the trees?[34]

Theroux's observations as noted above should scare any concerned governmental official. These observations support the argument that as the population continues to grows one can expect not only increased deforestation but also increased poaching in parks and game reserves, soil erosion, overgrazing, overfishing and in general over-exploitation of the available resources. Environmental degradation is already a serious problem in some parts of the country and calls for urgent remedial measures.

Ecologically delicate marginal areas such as hillsides and steep slopes are being cleared for cultivation. As a general rule of thumb, Africa's ecology is fragile. Owing to their fragility, African soils (those of Malawi included) can withstand only a number of years of continuous or nonstop use. After that mineral leaching, hard panning and soil erosion set in. Before the penetration of Africa by Europeans, the Africans had developed a unique system to preserve the environment. This was the system of shifting cultivation and mixed cropping. Essentially, in this system a family clears or slashes and burns a piece of wooded area. The ashes act as fertilizer for the next two years or so. Different types of crops are grown concurrently on the same plot. This protects the soils from turning into laterite, brick-like soils. After three years they would move on to another piece of land, while the former stays fallow to regenerate. Regeneration may take up to 30 years or more. However, such a system requires a reasonably low population density. The system of shifting cultivation was widely practised in Malawi until recently when it became impossible as a result of high population densities.

There are those like Esther Boserup who argue that population growth is not inherently a bad thing for development. But more important, a large population is likely to produce some geniuses that can come up with technological innovations to produce enough food for all. Population growth in itself forces people to use intensive methods in agriculture so that more food can be produced. Some of these authors argue that, if anything, the continent is suffering from underpopulation.[35] They point out that the average density of sub-Saharan Africa is only 16 persons per km^2 and much less in rural areas. They compare this to China and India which have densities of 100 per km^2 and 225 per km^2 respectively. According to these scholars Africa needs more people to cultivate its lands. They put the blame on the unequal distribution of resources.

If this is true, why is the continent turning into desert so fast as clearly demonstrated by Sahelian countries? Why is there so much deforestation taking place throughout the continent? One estimate states that the continent as a whole is losing 50 acres of wooded land every minute.[36] It is true that certain parts of Africa have low population densities, but others have very high population densities that are pressing against the carrying capacity. One should also take into consideration the delicate nature of the African environment which can only withstand so many people.

Figure 6: Lorenz curve for distribution of land and population by district

In the absence of relevant data it is hard to demonstrate statistically the relationship between population growth and environmental degradation in Malawi. However, the available statistics show that today only 38 per cent of Malawi's land area is under forest cover.[37] Forests provide 90 per cent of the nation's fuel requirements and substantial volume of timber as an input into a number of industries. Forest cover also protects steep slopes and upper river catchment areas from the effect of soil erosion, river siltation, flash flooding, and low rainfall infiltration of soil. However, a combination of land-clearing for agriculture and wood consumption for fuel by a rapidly growing population has brought about an unacceptably high rate of degradation of forests. Total forest cover according to government estimates is declining by 3,5 per cent a year, with much higher deforestation rates in areas with high population densities.[38] If nothing is done to check rapid degradation of forest lands, Malawi will be laid completely bare in less than 12 years. Already there is an acute shortage of fuelwood in the country.

The reduction of tree cover and cultivation on steep slopes are contributing to high rates of soil erosion in parts of the Central and Southern Region where population pressure is

pushing people onto marginal lands. Deforestation and encroachment on forest reserves is having a direct impact on surface water supply. Many forested areas serve as sources of uncontaminated water catchment providing water for human consumption. The supply of clean and adequate water is in jeopardy as a result of the dwindling forest cover in catchment areas. Poaching in game reserves is on the increase as people try to supplement their meagre diets. The already small percentage of land under game reserves (12,5 per cent of the total land area) is under intense pressure from encroachment for agricultural purposes as landless people try to get hold of any available piece of land for agricultural purposes.

Intense competition for land is becoming a common feature in Malawi. As pointed out above, although there is enough vacant land for cultivation up until the end of this decade, a considerable proportion of land considered arable but uncultivated is of only marginal quality and special care would need to be taken in exploiting it to avoid rapid degradation. In fact, it is generally agreed that the future of agriculture in the country lies more in the intensive use of already cultivated land than in the cultivation of hitherto unused land.[39] The projected amount of cultivable land

estimated to be required per household is very much suspect. According to one estimate, as little as 0,73 hectares of good quality (high potential soil) land would is sufficient for a household of 4,5 persons to become self-sufficient in food; for land of low potential soils 2,19 hectares is considered to be a minimum economic size, under the now discontinued "Master Farmer Scheme", for a farmer to be able to conserve his soil, rotate his crops, and adopt good standards of management.[40] Furthermore the projected balance of uncultivated land for the year 2000 does not allow for land demands for large commercial estates, fuelwood, livestock grazing and human settlements.

Over 80 per cent of the agricultural produce originates from the smallholder (subsistence) sector. However, large scale estate production has always played an important role in the monetized sector of the economy and since independence in 1964 its role has been growing, accounting for 80 per cent of agricultural exports. Increasing amounts of land are being allocated to the agricultural commercial estate sector. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, in 1978 over 800 licences were issued for commercial estate development in the few districts with ample land reserves. In 1979 more than 1 000 such licences were issued.[41] One such district, Mchinji, had no commercial agricultural estate development at all in 1970, but by 1984 almost all of the northern part of the district had been converted to estate development. Well over 40 per cent of the good land in the district is under commercial cultivation. This is also true of sparsely populated areas in such districts as Kasungu, Mzimba, Nkhotakota, Chikwawa and Machinga. Yet these are exactly the areas to which landless people are migrating in an effort to find land for subsistence cultivation. Given its relative degree of success more land may continue to be allocated to the commercial agricultural estate sector at the expense of the smallholders. However, not all land leased in large blocks to urban-based, politically influential commercial "farmers" is put to productive use or used efficiently. Furthermore, this type of agricultural development contributes to rapid disappearance of vegetation cover in the interest of quick profits.

Smallholders are experiencing particular problems in gaining access to land in the Southern districts where, by 1983, densities exceeded 300 persons per km^2 of arable land. A 1980/81 national survey revealed that over half of the smallholder farmers sampled had less than one hectare of land, about a quarter had less than 0,5 hectares, and the average hectarage was only 0,3. This average is less than the amount of land which is estimated to be required by an average household for self-sufficiency in food. One study revealed that households with less than 0,5 hectares could produce only about 37 per cent of their basic food requirements, while those with holdings between 0,5 and 0,99 hectares could produce only 75 per cent of their requirements. Thus, within the smallholder sector the country's much heralded increased agricultural output is mainly due to farmers with higher hectarage and it is this proportion of the farming community that is in a better position to grow cash crops besides producing surplus food. Chipande[42] notes that scarcity of land and population pressure have had a variety of effects on the various socio-economic groups: some people have managed to improve their productivity and income positions, but the majority have either stagnated or even deteriorated. Population growth and government development strategies are leading to the creation of a landless group that is being forced by circumstances to migrate to the few urban centres in the country. But more detrimental to the environment is the clearing of delicately balanced and ecologically vulnerable areas.

Concluding remarks

As Macgregor rightly states, in the absence of technology, the human impact on the environment has been severe.[43] Population pressures have had both an ecological and socioeconomic impact. Population pressures have affected the ecologically sound system of shifting cultivation, and this has brought about declining soil fertility through undesirable practices such as overcultivation, overgrazing and deforestation. Marginal lands that have been pressed into use are being quickly exhausted through soil erosion. Once cleared, African savanna hardwoods take a very long period of time to regenerate and this, coupled with an increased demand for wood for fuel and construction, has encouraged deforestation. Deforestation in turn has prompted further erosion and loss of soil fertility. High population growth rates have also encouraged a rapid growth in livestock resulting in widespread overgrazing.[44]

Ecological consequences are themselves having a direct impact on socio-economic situations for most Malawians. A landless class of Malawians appears to be in the making as the land fragmentation is no longer a viable solution in densely populated areas. The landless are being forced to migrate to urban areas or to sell their labour at less than market values to other farmers or the large-scale agricultural commercial estates. These and other problems require immediate remedial measures. It is time to start a vigorous campaign to forestall the rocketing population growth. Malawian women and men ought to be educated and provided with the means to reduce the sizes of their families. Theroux's observations should scare any policy-maker or governmental official. It could be argued that the Green Revolution and intensification of agriculture can provide the food needs for all Malawians irrespective of numbers. But with a miserably low per capita income of less than $160 per annum, few Malawians can afford the necessary agricultural inputs mandated by the Green Revolution. Relaxation of Malthusian "laws" would certainly not work in Malawi, given the current level of technology and skilled manpower in the country and taking into consideration Malawi's powerless position in the international economic order.

Finally, the issue of equitable distribution of land and other resources within a market economy framework needs to be given serious attention. Fast population growth has

been condoned by the policy-makers during the post-independence era. Now that the population has doubled in a couple of decades, the people must be provided for in every respect. They ought not to be deprived of the basic factor of production – land. The fast growth of commercial estates should be curbed in order to free more land resources for the landless people created by high population pressure in the Southern Region and other parts of the country. In addition to this, the policy-makers should now start looking for means to reduce population growth. Without such measures one can only foresee Malthusian "laws" taking charge of the current situation in Malawi as far as population is concerned.

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Military regime performance in decentralization and local administration for development: A Ghanaian case study

Ghana's Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) placed great emphasis on the virtues of decentralization and grass-roots participation in national development. In this article Dr S K Asibuo of the School of Administration, University of Ghana, Legon, presents a case study of the decentralization programme as carried out in one district between 1982 and 1988.

Introduction

On 31 December 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings seized power for the second time. He immediately formed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which became Ghana's supreme governing body.

The PNDC government soon discovered that the country's administrative machinery suffered from several defects that needed remedying in the interests of development. The PNDC ascribed certain past failures to overcentralization. This, it maintained, not only hampered the formulation and implementation of grass-roots development programmes, but also resulted in a complete lack of involvement on the part of the local people in the country's development effort.[1] It accused previous Ghanaian regimes of insufficient commitment to decentralization. In addition, the PNDC argued that rigid financial controls in central and local government administration had frustrated the implementation of several important development projects.[2]

The PNDC was determined to provide an effective institutional framework affording all Ghanaians the opportunity to participate directly in the decision-making process affecting their welfare. According to Rawlings:

> ... the time has come for us to restructure this society in a real and meaningful democratic manner so as to ensure the involvement and active participation of the people in the decision-making process of this country [so that] nothing will be done from the castle [Government House] without the consent and authority of the people.[3]

The PNDC also emphasized its commitment to rural development. It recognized that rural communities made significant contributions to development, yet received the least share of the resources allocated.[4] It was to reverse this imbalance that the PNDC promulgated decentralization as its major policy. Thus the fundamental objectives of the PNDC government's decentralization programme were to promote mass grass-roots participation in decision-making and to mobilize support for the government. The PNDC's decentralization programme also aimed at restructuring the machinery of government to improve administrative efficiency.

The PNDC launched its decentralization programme on 2 December 1982. In November 1988 it introduced a new local government law (PNDC Law 207) in pursuance of the objectives of the policy of decentralization. This article presents a case study of the decentralization programme of the PNDC, surveying the experience of Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe District Council between 1982 and 1988. It seeks not only to highlight problems of implementation but also the effect of the decentralization policy on district development.

The concept of decentralization

Decentralization entails the removal of tasks from the centre, either functionally or geographically. Functional decentralization refers to the transfer of authority to perform specific

tasks or activities to specialized organizations that operate nationally, or across local jurisdictions. Geographical decentralization, on the other hand, involves both processes of deconcentration (delegation to field offices) or devolution (to local authorities or other local bodies).

Decentralization becomes necessary as government functions become increasingly complex. It is the result of the need to apply general policies and standards to local situations where the size of area and population served by an administrative system is large and constitutes a major problem. As a strategy of administrative reform, it appeals in a number of ways. It ensures that public business will be dealt with more expeditiously; various types of delay and red tape will be eliminated by doing away with the need for frequent reference to central authority before action can be taken in the field. Decentralization is valuable because it tends to ease the burden of detail that weighs on ministers, ministries and senior managers and gives them more time to devote to major policy issues and problems. Besides promoting local initiative, decentralization also serves to mobilize the rural people in development efforts affecting their welfare. It is usually espoused as one method by which increased participation can be achieved by bringing institutions within the effective reach of the people.

It needs to be pointed out that although decentralization has become the latest fashion in development administration, the validity of the assertions and theoretical potentialities of decentralization have not yet been adequately explored, queried and tested. As Irene Rothenberg rightly points out:

> Assumptions regarding the virtues of decentralized implementation patterns must be questioned rather than assumed because potential reformers require information about the real impact of particular distributions of administrative authority within specific organizational settings.[5]

The PNDC's Decentralization Programme of Action, 1982

In its resolve to carry through its programme of decentralization, the PNDC was aware of the pre-existing practice of nominating councillors. Thus, Law 14, passed in March 1982, dissolved the existing elected district councils and temporarily instituted nominated committees. The strategy apparently aimed to restructure the entire system, after which elections to the various offices would be held. The restructuring introduced a three-tier system of local administration. At the apex was the regional council, followed by the district councils, with area/town/village councils at the base.

Apart from the members elected from district councils, all other members of the regional council were appointed. The regional secretary, a political appointee of the PNDC, chaired the regional council. The principal functions of the regional councils included planning and programming the overall development of the region within the broad policy guidelines of the government; and co-ordinating and supervising the activities of the district councils and government

organizations. Other functions were to identify potentially viable projects for development; to allocate central government grants to district councils and examine and approve the provisional estimates of the district councils.

The district councils were the basic units of administration. They were responsible for the co-ordination and monitoring of policy planning and implementation within their respective areas of jurisdiction. District councils could make by-laws and levy taxes. Their other functions included providing markets, primary and middle school buildings and equipment, and lorry parks; enforcing control measures for public sanitation; constructing and maintaining streets, bridges and culverts, and public buildings and road rehabilitation. These were, therefore, also the functions the Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe District Council should perform.

PNDC Law 14 provided for the appointment of an interim management committee (IMC) for each district council. The IMC was to have no executive powers but to supervise the decentralized departments in the district. All ministries were expected to establish decentralized offices in the districts to co-ordinate the various activities of the town/area/village councils. Members of the IMC were selected by the PNDC Secretary for Local Government in consultation with the regional secretaries and subject to the approval of the PNDC. The PNDC district secretary chaired the IMC. This appointive principle undermined the supposed democratic intentions of the reform and the sovereignty of the electorate.

Each district council had to work through five mandatory committees: Planning and Development; Economic; Social Services; Utility Service; and Administrative and Budgetary. The district administrative officer was the secretary of the district council.

At the base was the third and last organ of the three-tier system – the area/town/village council. The committees for the defence of the revolution (CDRs) were expected to run affairs at this level. They were expected to form sanitation, rent, market and production committees. These committees were assisted by way of staff and materials by the district councils and every member of the town or village was expected to be organized within a CDR committee of the council. No restriction was placed on the size of the committees. The area/town/village council was to organize and supervise the general sanitation and cleanliness of the village or town and encourage the inhabitants to embark on self-help projects. The village/town council had to ensure that rates and fees were promptly paid and to provide a focal point for the discussion of local problems with a view to finding solutions to them.

As part of the decentralization programmes a composite budget would be introduced; this was intended to allow the various decentralized departments operating at the district level to prepare and discuss their budgets within the administrative and policy framework of the district councils. In the past, budgets were prepared in Accra by people who had no knowledge of local conditions, so that budgets often did not reflect the realities of the existing situation in the localities.

The idea behind the new policy was to allow for the popular expression of local aspirations. It was intended that budgets would incorporate programmes that would take into consideration the realities of the individual localities and their felt needs.

Problems of implementation

The Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe District Council and the decentralized government departments encountered several difficulties that hampered their effective functioning, thereby rendering them incapable of fulfilling their developmental role.

Inadequacy of financial resources

Inadequate funding was a major stumbling block affecting both the work of the District Councils and the decentralized government departments. This problem was principally the result of the financial crisis confronting the PNDC government. This situation could be traced to the economic bankruptcy inherited from previous regimes and to the rigid conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Additionally, it is perhaps relevant to emphasize that the fluctuations in the international price of Ghana's chief exports and main foreign exchange earners, the oil crises in the 1970s and their long-term effects on the Ghanaian economy were all important factors contributing to the financial difficulties of the PNDC military government.

In addition, several unforeseen environmental factors contributed to the severe economic difficulties. The 1983 drought and the widespread incidence of bushfires in the country destroyed both cash and food crops. These resulted in famine and the need to import supplementary food supplies. The situation became critical with the sudden expulsion of over a million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and the depletion of Ghana's foreign exchange reserves. The government had no choice but to reduce capital projects and budgetary allocations to local government councils and decentralized departments, with the result that social services and developmental programmes were severely reduced.

Besides the inadequacy of finance, another serious financial problem was that authorized budgetary funds were not released at the proper time. This had administrative repercussions: it paralysed the execution of many council and field agencies' projects. The piecemeal disbursement of approved funds was also a problem, making any comprehensive planning very difficult – bulk allocations would have been better. Within the financial quarter, expenditure was restricted by the Treasury so that a department could not spend more than its monthly quota.

The financial situation of district departments had so deteriorated that at times there was no money to purchase stationery and other office materials. In fact, my investigations revealed that many departments did not have office equipment such as typewriters, duplicating and stapling machines, filing cabinets, materials for duplicating, typing paper and, above all, office furniture.

Financial constraints lay at the root of all the problems confronting local government councils in Ghana, and Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe District Council was no exception. A look at the grants-in-aid made to it reveals the inadequacy of central government funding. Grants-in-aid were intended for development, yet it is clear that such grants were static during the People's National Party (PNP) regime of the Third Republic (1979–1981) and the PNDC period up to 1983. No increases were made to compensate for the astronomical rate of inflation. In 1984 and 1986 no grants-in-aid were given to it, presumably because of the central government's acute financial difficulties. In 1985 the grants-in-aid were resumed but at a drastically reduced rate.

Article 184 of the 1979 Constitution made provision for the establishment of a Local Government Grants Commission to ensure that the central government made available grants to local government councils. This system simply failed to function.

Another consequence of the government's financial difficulties was that in July 1985 the PNDC decided to pay only 50 per cent of the salaries and wages of council staff. This radically altered a system of financing that had operated since July 1974, when Colonel Acheampong's military government introduced the integrated system of local administration, merging local government staff and field agencies staff. Local government staff had been absorbed into the civil service and the central government had taken over responsibility for the payment of their salaries. This had been done in the hope that the revenue derived from basic rates, licensing fees, tolls and other local sources would be utilized for development projects rather than salaries. Prior to this, local government councils had been spending about 90 per cent of their revenue on employees' salaries, leaving only 10 per cent for development projects. Now, in July 1985 the PNDC decided that it could no longer shoulder the responsibility for the full payment of council employees, leaving the councils to make up the difference.[6]

The district councils, however, were incapable of shouldering this new burden. Very few councils were able to pay the salaries and wages of their staff and cover administrative expenses and no money was left for any meaningful development projects. Thus, the provision and maintenance of mandatory social services was relegated to the background.[7]

The recent World Bank *aide-mémoire* on Ghana's fiscal decentralization highlighted the poor financial performance of district councils:

> capital expenditures by district councils accounts for 5-20 percent of their total expenditure over 1984-88, with the majority of the councils falling at the lower end of the range. This eroded the confidence of the public in the ability of the district councils to promote development, and consequently affected their ability to raise revenues.[8]

Development projects such as roads, markets, health, post, clinics, could not be undertaken as the Ejisu-Juaben District Council was unable to pay its 50 per cent share of workers' salaries and wages following the implementation of the new policy. Prior to this, the District Council had

about one thousand workers on its pay roll. The labour force was now cut by half.[9] There was an especially sharp reduction in the number of unskilled labourers. The obvious effect of this was that the regularity, quality and quantity of certain Council services to the communities were seriously affected. This policy also had implications for decentralization, the effectiveness of which obviously depends on the availability of adequate funding.[10]

Encroachment by the central government on certain traditional sources of council revenue was another serious financial obstacle encountered by the Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe District Council. Fees for the issue of licences in respect of certain local activities were collected by both the central and local government. This meant that those engaged in these activities were paying double tax. For example, herbalists, hairdressers, petrol filling-station managers and timber contractors had to pay a licence fee and income tax to both the District Council and the central government. This reduced the District Council's tax base, already limited by the weakness of the existing tax collection apparatus. Indeed on a number of occasions revenue collectors had been either beaten or manhandled while performing their duties.[11]

Shortage of personnel

One of the major obstacles to decentralization was the acute shortage of skilled and trained personnel to work at district level and to assist with the developmental programmes of decentralized departments. This problem could have been partially solved if permission to recruit had not been centralized in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The personnel problem was further exacerbated by the central government's decision in 1985 to place an embargo on the recruitment of staff.

The Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe District Council had considerable problems in that it lacked the professional staff required for major development programmes. It also lacked technical personnel, especially artisans, to assist the various communities in the execution of their development projects through direct communal labour. The frequent transfer of administrative personnel also made for difficulties, affecting continuity and therefore administrative efficiency.

Centralization of decision-making authority in the capital

One of the principal constraints affecting the implementation of the 1982 PNDC decentralization programme was that the stated intention of reforms notwithstanding, decision-making authority remained centralized in Accra, the national capital. Local officials still lacked the authority to make on-the-spot decisions on many issues, although there was a measure of decentralization in day-to-day administration.

Every major decision entailed districts officers having to travel to the national headquarters or to the regional departmental head for directives. Most of the transactions at the district level had to receive the blessing of headquarters

through the regional departmental heads. This usually caused delays in the implementation of district department programmes because of the numerous and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures the project or programme had to pass through before being approved. In a real sense, therefore, the district departmental heads enjoyed no real decentralization of authority from the centre.

In addition, departmental policies and programmes were formulated in the central ministries without any local inputs. The district officers merely implemented programmes regardless of whether they were relevant to the local environment. This tended to be very frustrating for local field staff.

The centralization of financial allocations also led to inefficiency, delays, omissions and additional expense.

Opposition of central ministry officials to the decentralization programme

Closely related to the problem of the inadequate decision-making authority of field staff was the reluctance of central ministry officials to give up some of their powers and influence. This was partly a result of their lack of confidence in the abilities of field staff, despite their role in appointing them. The central ministry officials were certainly not committed to the success of the programme.

In these circumstances there was a reluctance on the part of many civil servants to accept transfers to the rural areas, even though the shortage of competent staff made their services greatly needed. Nor was any serious disciplinary action taken against officers who refused to accept a transfer to the rural areas.

This situation was frustrating and even demoralizing for officers who had served in the rural areas for a considerable number of years and would have preferred to be transferred to either a regional or the national capital.

Another important cause of reluctance to transfer was the lack of administrative and infrastructural facilities such as electricity, furniture, pipe-borne water, clinics, hospitals, schools, good roads and a good communications network.

The Ejisu-Juaben district had no telephone network and this caused delays in the execution of rural development programmes of both the District Council and the decentralized departments. Important issues as well as routine matters which could have been treated easily and quickly on the phone had to be dealt with by correspondence. The postal system too, tended to be unreliable, because many postal vehicles broke down. The conditions of some of the roads in the district also hindered development because they were virtually impassable during the rainy season. Some parts of the district were not easily accessible and might not be visited at all in a whole year by district officials, such as agricultural extension officers whose advice was needed by the farmers. Under such infrastructural constraints, co-ordination among decentralized departments is extremely difficult because local officials cannot communicate quickly with either national headquarters or the surrounding towns and villages.

Conclusion

The PNDC decentralization policy was introduced with much fanfare. There was a yawning gap between political rhetoric and reality, however, and for at least six years (1982–1988) after the implementation the policy there had been no significant progress.

The constraints on decentralization are so enormous that one must be sceptical about its future prospects in Ghana. Indeed, decentralization requires certain fundamental conditions that most African governments find difficult to provide. It requires strong political commitment – something too often ignored. It also calls for adequate personnel to run decentralized agencies and careful sequencing of activities in the design of policies and their implementation. These pre-requisites for successful decentralization should be given careful attention.

Nevertheless, whatever the shortcomings of recent decentralization experiments in Ghana and other African countries, these states have not abandoned decentralization but still see it as the only indispensable alternative strategy for increasing popular participation and rural development. It is hoped that in the course of time there will be a considerable improvement in their performance to be able to dispute the conclusions of a United Nations evaluation that "the actual impact of decentralization for effective administration has been very limited".[12]

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