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0001
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Primary road
Secondary road
Old parts
New parts
Old city wall
Scale: 1 : 80 000

To Iseyin
To Ilora
To Ibadan
To Akinmoorin
To Iwo
To Ogbomoso
NEW AKETAN
N

Source: Oyo Local Government Secretariat, Town Planning Department, Oyo

Contents

The new development credo:
Getting politics right

Goran Hyden, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida in the USA and fellow of the Africa Institute of South Africa.

AFRICAN countries are faced with a new challenge in the 1990s; no government can hide any longer behind the principle of state sovereignty. Whether on material or moral grounds, the rest of the world, and notably Western donors, are pushing what has become in recent years the new development credo: get your politics right. What has at least implicitly become a right to intervene in the politics of a given country expresses itself in a new set of conditionalities focused on improved governance, democratization and greater respect for human rights. How did this new credo emerge and what are the implications for African countries?

When international development theories first appeared some forty years ago, the core was economic. It was a matter of designing *projects* in which external and domestic resources were combined in innovative ways to promote national development. Drawing on the success of the reconstruction of Western Europe by massive capital transfers through the Marshall Plan, development theorists, inspired by Keynesian economics, treated the development equation in an econocratic and technocratic way. Development was seen as a relatively straightforward business.

In the late 1960s the mood among development analysts and practitioners had changed quite dramatically. Projects were seen as too one-dimensional and not responsive to the needs of the people. Development was now redefined to include both economic and social dimensions. These could be covered only in the context of *programmes*. The latter became the new mechanisms for doing development. As such, development remained a top-down exercise in which attention to design and implementation strategies dominated.

Like in the previous phase, the pre-eminent role of government in promoting development was likewise acknowledged.

By the end of the 1970s, however, development theory shifted from mechanisms to context. Analysts and practitioners alike realized that development was not as simple as the earlier technocratic approaches implied. Proper design was necessary but by no means sufficient to achieve development results. Structural and institutional factors had to be considered too and they could only be changed by focusing on *policy*. With its structural adjustment programmes the World Bank went in the forefront of those insisting on the need to "get policies right". The overall objective was to create a more hospitable environment for resource utilization. During the 1980s, this was treated as exclusively an economic affair.

As we entered the 1990s, however, this notion was being challenged by those who argued that the problem with development (or rather the lack of it) in Africa is political. The time had now come to "getting *politics* right". With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the Western governments could push their own agenda without any immediate opposition from the communist bloc. Equally important, however, was the support that existed in countries which had laboured under dictatorial governments, whether leftist or rightist, for democratic ideals. The result is that today development and politics – like sports and politics – are treated as intimately interwoven.

"Getting politics right" does not necessarily mean the same thing in the rest of Africa as it does in South Africa. In the former countries, it means building a civil society that can somehow take the place of the weak state which has proven in-

capable of fulfilling its developmentalist mandate. This means supporting the organizations outside government. Western donors are increasingly channelling their funds through these NGOs. There is increasing evidence that the donors are satisfied with the outcome of this shift in channelling their funds.

There are also problems with this approach. Donors tend to provide a very narrow definition of civil society and operationalizing it to suit their own conceptions of development. African NGOs become primarily implementors of donor strategies. Civil society associations turn out to be the extended arms of their financial sponsors rather than true articulators of popular demands. Furthermore, by pitting civil society against the state, donors tend to overlook the fact that without a functioning state, civil society will not prosper.

The situation in South Africa is in some respects the polar opposite. Here civil society has grown in strength in opposition to a powerful – and oppressive – state. With some 50 000 organizations representing various sectors of civil society, South Africa possesses a developmental foundation that is lacking elsewhere in Africa. The challenge here, therefore, is not so much to build new and alternative structures for development as it is to connect state and civil society in new ways so that political promise also becomes developmental practice.

This means, at least in the short run, a focus more on the state than on civil society. Getting politics right in South Africa means perhaps above all creating representative organs at the local level that can feed into the state machinery. At the same time, one can only hope that the understandable priority given to the RDP does not translate into a neglect of civil society or the cre-

ation of a monstrous bureaucracy. Nor would one like to see the diversity and vitality of civil society in South Africa being weakened by political cooptation as former leaders of civil society associations today occupy positions of power in government.

Small is still beautiful and should be nurtured to further strength rather than be ignored. As lessons of development elsewhere in Africa suggest, inducements to develop come strongest in organizations where people have a chance to know

each other and learn from experience on their own. One can only hope that donors and governments are ready to honour this principle when it comes to "getting politics right" here in South Africa and elsewhere in the continent.

The New International Order:
State, society and African international relations

In this article Dr Wm Cyrus Reed, who is Director of the Office of African Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo, argues that international actors based in civil society play a critical, and largely unexamined, role in African international relations.

SINCE Sudan and Ghana obtained independence in 1956 and 1957 respectively, the sovereign state has served as the analytical focal point of studies of African international relations. Orthodox approaches to the field focused their attention upon the activities of "new states" which were nearly always portrayed as unitary actors with decision making firmly entrenched in the hands of the executive, while other branches of government and non-state actors were thought to play little if any role in foreign affairs.[1] Subsequent studies argued that the dynamics of the inter-state system at the regional and sub-regional levels in Africa operated independently of wider patterns of global conflict. The emergence of a host of international organizations in Africa provided additional grist for the mill of state-centric analyses of African international relations.

Political economy approaches to African international relations examined the historical evolution of global and domestic inequalities and the subsequent impact of such inequalities upon African international relations. The central focus of these studies was the impact of global peripheral status and domestic class structures upon the behaviour of the state. By beginning their analysis with the incorporation of the Third World into the global economy, rather than the attainment of political independence, these studies added historical depth, as well as an economic dimension, to the study of African international relations. When non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, were examined, it was done to illus-

trate the structural restraints upon the African state.[2]

International relations implies more than the relations between and activities of states.[3] This notion was clearly articulated by Robert Keohane in his early work which examined "transnational relations".[4] Keohane argued for the inclusion of the cross-border movement of capital, people, goods and services, and information in the study of international relations. By analysing the evolution of public policies which govern transnational relations, the notion of foreign policy is broadened, though the state, rather than other actors involved in such transactions, has often remained a central analytical focal point.

This article will argue that in Africa, international actors based in civil society play a critical, and largely unexamined role in African international relations.[5] This is, in no small part, because of the ambiguous nature of the state in African society, and because of recent patterns in the evolution of the African state. African states are based upon ill-defined borders which, because of trans-state ethnic structures, mobile populations, and ineffective administrative structures, do not effectively demarcate the populations under their authority. During the early phases of independence, many states developed the will to control virtually all aspects of international relations, though few developed the capacity. As such, non-state international actors often operated beyond the jurisdiction of states, which is to say they undertook their activities illegally. The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s eroded

the international capacity of African states still further and structural adjustment policies have required many states to recast their policies in new directions. As the state in Africa has been forced to retrench, particularly in the international arena, new political space has emerged in which non-state international actors play an active role. These non-state actors do not operate in a vacuum, though, and can only be understood by examining the new international ordering of state-society relations in Africa; one of the dimensions of this relationship which has largely been ignored.[6]

This article will begin with an analysis of the concept of statehood, which is deeply rooted in the concept of sovereignty. It will proceed with an examination of the conditions of sovereignty in the African context and the impact these have upon African international relations. In addition, I will argue that the conditions of sovereignty in Africa require us to adjust the tools with which we analyse African international relations, in particular by moving beyond the sovereign state and to incorporate society into our analysis of African international relations. Finally, the article will conclude by examining the implications of this discussion for new directions in research on African international relations.

On sovereignty

The notion of sovereignty can be divided into two spheres: de facto sovereignty, which is often associated with the ability of a state to function in the domestic

realm, and de jure sovereignty, which is often associated with the ability of a state to gain external recognition through international law.⁻ De facto sovereignty is thus understood as the ability of a state to exercise effective authority "over all action taking place within its area of jurisdiction".[8] The central element of domestic sovereignty is the ability of a state to monopolize the use of force in enforcing its decisions. Implicit in this discussion of domestic sovereignty are two characteristics identified by Ian Brownlee – a clearly demarcated area of jurisdiction, ie territorial boundaries within which the state can act, and a clearly identified set of individuals over whom a state can enforce its decisions, namely a population of citizens living within territorial boundaries.[9]

External, or de jure sovereignty is often understood as the ability of one "governing entity" to obtain formal recognition as a sovereign state by the international community of sovereign states. Since the end of World War II, the principle measures of external sovereignty have included membership in the United Nations and formal recognition by and the establishment of diplomatic relations with other sovereign states. Initially, as Jackson points out, international sovereignty was bestowed upon those states who had obtained domestic sovereignty and was withdrawn from those who had lost that attribute.[10] Following the end of World War II, the onset of the Cold War, and the end of European imperialism, the international norms which governed external sovereignty changed from those which reflected effectiveness to those rooted in the right to self-determination and independence from colonial domination.[11] As such, once an African colony obtained formal independence from its former colonial masters, international sovereignty was not withdrawn regardless of how ineffective the domestic institutions of a particular African state became. Nor was international sovereignty extended to entities, such as Rhodesia, whose governing institutions were among the most effective on the continent, until it gained legal independence from Britain. Similarly, only those entities which were defined by colonial powers and which were subsequently granted independence by them, have been able to obtain international recognition; subdivisions of those entities, such as Biafra and Somaliland, which recently declared its independence from the southern portions of Somalia, have not. In Eritrea, which obtained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, leaders based their claim to independence both on the fact that Eritrea had been administered by

Italy as a colonial territory independently from Ethiopia, and that Ethiopia itself had been a participant in the "scramble for Africa". As such, Ethiopia's presence in Eritrea was essentially that of a colonial power and, therefore Eritrea had a "right" to independence.[12]

Several problems with sovereignty quickly emerge when the concept is applied to Africa. Domestic sovereignty hardly exists among Africa's "soft states". In addition, equating external sovereignty with recognition removes the "empirical dimension of international sovereignty".[13] States may be formally recognized, but that does not necessarily imply that they have the capacity to "enter into relations with other countries", one of Brownlee's major qualifications for being a state.[14] Moreover, if conducting "relations with other countries" is clearly within the jurisdiction of a state, and the state does not have the capacity to manage those relations, then we can argue that it has lost a certain element of its de facto sovereignty in the international arena.[15]

The remainder of this article explores the ambiguity of both domestic and external sovereignty in the African context and discusses how this has given rise to an expanded role for civil society in the conduct of Africa's international relations. In the process, actors and patterns of interaction have emerged in Africa which broaden the notion of international relations far beyond the activities of states.

The ambiguous African state

As Rosberg and Jackson so cogently argue, the empirical elements of statehood obtain only to varying degrees in Africa, all of which limit the role of the state in African affairs and enable non-state actors to carve out niches of activity for themselves. Within these areas, non-state actors often make authoritative decisions which, at least, limit the sovereignty of the state, and, at most, enable these actors to become "semi-sovereign" themselves. Below, each of the three elements of de facto sovereignty – borders, citizens, and states' abilities to act authoritatively – will be examined in their African context. Subsequently, we will examine the impact of changes in the international environment upon the de jure sovereignty of African states.

Ill-defined borders and mobile populations

While Africa's borders, initially outlined at the Congress of Berlin, are among the most stable in the world, they are perhaps also some of the least meaningful.[16] Bear-

ing closer resemblance to latitudinal and longitudinal markings on maps, these borders bear "no respect for pre-existing social and political groupings or even, sometimes, for natural geographical features".[17] Moreover, during the colonial era, boundaries dividing territories under the control of one colonial power were extremely fluid and often permitted the free movement of goods and people across them.[18] In other cases, arbitrary borders were not demarcated on the ground. This has led to a series of conflicts,[19] particularly in the Maghreb, where areas without water were initially deemed uninhabitable and thus unworthy of demarcation.[20] Following the discovery of vast deposits of natural resources in the Sahara, demarcating the boundaries became increasingly important and gave rise to growing tensions between Algeria and Morocco. In the Horn, various treaties established different boundaries between Somalia and Ethiopia – with each treaty reflecting the fluctuating distribution of power between European colonialists and the imperial government in Ethiopia. As a result, no one border was acceptable to both Somalia and Ethiopia, none was demarcated on the ground, and all remained largely irrelevant to the movement of people and cattle between the two states.[21] An equally complicated situation is the Halieb triangle, which borders Sudan and Egypt. While the Halieb falls within the legal borders of Egypt, it has long been administered, populated, and claimed by Sudan. Long forgotten, Egypt reasserted its claim to the territory once it was thought that this area might contain petroleum reserves. In 1993, Egypt began to sell mineral rights in the area, an act which Sudan protested vehemently, though about which it could do little. In response to Sudan's alleged complicity in the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, Egypt strengthened its presence in the area by moving in troops.

International borders in Africa demarcate international boundaries most effectively where official intercourse between states occurs, namely where roads, railroads, ships, and airline routes enter and exit. To avoid the border crossing, one simply need avoid official means of travel – a task not far beyond the ability of many people in a largely rural continent with perhaps fewer miles of accessible transport per capita, or square kilometre, than any other region of the globe. Customs officials at Zimbabwe's border with South Africa estimate that as much trade went "around" the official crossing as went through it. Much of this trade was accompanied by well-armed guards who

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did not hesitate to protect their wares from wary customs officials.[22]

Even where roads exist, many of the official border crossings are themselves porous. Administrative structures which are supposed to control the movement of goods and people have been rendered ineffective because of administrative weakness and rampant corruption. At one extreme, it has been possible to cross the border from Ghana to Burkina Faso without any travel documents and without any attention being paid by the immigration officials of either country.[23] Where officials are attentive, but willing to sell their services, border controls may become synonymous with extortion – or rent-seeking activities by state officials. Such activities may change the costs of moving goods across state boundaries, but they hardly restrict such movement altogether. In short, while most – though not all – African states possess internationally recognized borders, such borders often do not exist in any effective fashion on the ground.

Arbitrary and ill-defined borders not only blur the effective territorial jurisdiction of African states, they make the identification of populations over which African states "rule" difficult at best and impossible at worst. Arbitrary borders mean that population groups have more often than not been divided between various states, rather than united in one.[24] As Calvocoressi noted, "bisected tribal groups are too numerous to catalogue; the Ewe who straddle Ghana and Togo and the Azande who straddle Sudan and the Central African Republic are prominent examples of countless overspills".[25]

As a result, the distinction between the "us" of one state and the "them" of another is often overshadowed by the kinship or linguistic bonds which transcend international borders in Africa. In many instances, such trans-state loyalties take precedence over or at least provide alternatives to state loyalties. Such conditions facilitate interaction between "citizens" of different states. While the presence of trans-state groups may not prevent strife, it does "distinguish [it] from war against foreign enemies".[26] When such enemies are seen to be the governments of the states in which one part of a group lives, Zartman has noted that members of this group may have a "natural ally" and find "sanctuary" across the border.[27] Thus, if the state attempts to enforce an unpopular policy, individuals technically under its jurisdiction can move beyond that area on a temporary or permanent basis by passing through porous international boundaries and joining their kin in neighbouring territories. Conversely, individuals techni-

cally under the jurisdiction of one state, but who have bonds with individuals under the jurisdiction of another, may respond to public policies pursued in the second by becoming politically active in the domestic affairs of that state.

A striking example of this occurred in 1991. In what otherwise would have been considered an act of inter-state war, soldiers and officers in the Ugandan army invaded neighbouring Rwanda in an attempt to overthrow the government of that country. The invasion was redefined as a Rwandan domestic conflict, though, because of the fact that the soldiers in question, though their families had lived in Uganda for nearly thirty years, were largely of Rwandan ethnic stock. While these people were indistinguishable from Ugandans, they were direct participants in the politics of what they, and other Ugandans, considered to be their home country, Rwanda. Thus, in this case, the "domestic realm" for Rwandan politics transcended the boundaries of the territorial state.[28] A similar argument could be made in the case of Sudan, where much of the formal political opposition to the current regime, dominated by the National Islamic Front, maintains its headquarters in Cairo.

Such a situation is complicated still further because of patterns of regional migration. Many African groups had long established migratory routes which took them through what are now many different states. In areas of low rainfall, such as the Ogaden, Kalahari, and the Sahara, seasonal migration of cattle-based societies is essential for survival. Patterns of extensive agriculture and shifting cultivation also required migration over a period of years. During the colonial era, migration within European empires was often encouraged. Workers from throughout Southern Africa migrated to South African mines,[29] as civil servants from contemporary Benin served throughout French West Africa. Muslims from throughout the continent pass through northeast Africa on their way to Mecca[30] and contemporary Hausa/Fulani traders migrate throughout West Africa.

The result of this has been an even larger ethnic mix, which, when coupled with ill-defined borders and mobile populations, has oftentimes blurred the distinction between citizens and foreigners in African states. Cross-border ethnic structures and porous international boundaries combine to enable citizens to undermine the sovereign ability of the African state to enforce decisions on its citizens. In the process, they enable citizens in Africa to become engaged in activities that in other parts of the world would be considered international. In short, the nature of

African boundaries and population structures limits the capacity of the state to regulate cross-border activities. As such, space is opened for societally based actors to undertake a wider range of international activities than would otherwise be possible.

Institutional capacity and the international environment

The expansive state: Increasing responsibility in foreign affairs

Ambiguous borders, coupled with transstate population structures rendered administration extremely difficult under the best of circumstances, and even more so under the circumstances under which state structures emerged in Africa. Initial state structures were designed to fulfil the requirement of the Berlin Congress of "effective occupation".[31] Subsequently, they evolved to facilitate the extraction of resources – primarily minerals and cash crops for export. As Young has noted,

> the colonial state in general, while insisting upon the ascendancy of its law, did not (and could not) enforce a comprehensive legal monopoly. The colonial legal order confined its demands for exclusivity to economic and social spheres covering the activity of the external estate of Europeans and other immigrants, as well as criminal offenses which were deemed, directly or indirectly, to affect the colonial peace.[32]

As such, states penetrated societies only to the extent that was necessary to achieve these goals and focused their attention on the coastal regions, major cities, and transportation networks. Colonial states exerted their greatest control over those areas involved in international transactions, including the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, namely, transport networks which linked the interior with the sea, telecommunication systems, and ports – both sea and air. Because the state exerted extensive control over the international dimension of the economy, which played a central role in the overall cash economy, the state controlled virtually all of the formal economic sector as well. Thus, even when production of export crops remained in the hands of African farmers, as it did throughout much of West Africa, marketing structures were firmly in the hands of the colonial state.[33]

At independence, the tradition of state control inherited from colonialism blended well with dominant political and economic trends. Associating capitalism with colonialism,[34] most African states adopted

some form of socialism which was later coupled with a move towards a one-party state and the pursuit of a state-centric development strategy, often based upon import substitution.[35] This strategy viewed the state as the central agent for organizing development and, as such, its expansion became a prerequisite for development. Moreover, import substitution required an entire panoply of new structures to protect infant industries. Tariffs, import licenses, and currency allocations all required the expansion of state administrative structures, while maintaining access to inexpensive imported components required an overvalued local currency managed by a central bank under the control of state leaders. Furthermore, as members of the "international community", newly independent African states quickly established foreign ministries and related diplomatic networks.

Shortly after independence, most African states quickly consolidated their jurisdiction over virtually all aspects of international affairs. Ministries of foreign affairs controlled official diplomatic contacts with other governments, the issuance of visas for those coming in, and the issuance of passports for those going out. Because virtually all aid was official and directed towards government ministries, the state was able to control local interaction with international donors. Marketing boards controlled agricultural exports and ministries of trade and finance regulated imports and access to foreign exchange. Newly created central banks managed both the supply and the official value of local currencies. By controlling the domestic media and telecommunications system, the international flow of information also fell within the realm of the state. Such expansion also fulfilled the political needs of most African regimes, which were able to consolidate their support through the growing opportunities for patronage which expanding state structures provided. Because of the strategic importance of African states in the Cold War, their international status was secured by both Superpowers and the other major powers who often adhered to diplomatic protocols of "non-interference in the domestic affairs" of other states. In addition to funnelling virtually all foreign assistance through state structures, major world powers ignored the shortcomings of African governments in return for support in the international arena. Thus the French regularly intervened in their former colonies to insure that regimes favourable to their policies remained securely in place.[36] Perhaps the most extreme example of this was Zaire, where a political system based upon the use of revenue generated by the sale of copper and other minerals to purchase patronage, was actively supported by the United States in return for President Mubuto's staunch anti-communist policy.[37]

Expanded responsibility amidst declining power

By the mid-1970s, the state in Africa had expanded its responsibilities in the realm of international relations tremendously. Its ability to act authoritatively in this realm, though, declined dramatically, in part because of shifts in the international arena, and because of the ability which actors in civil society had to circumvent the state authority.

The Opec-induced oil crisis of the 1970s, and the resulting recession in the Western economies, led to declining demand – and thus prices – for international commodities. This, coupled with rising costs of production for manufactured goods in the West, and the rising cost of energy imports, further exacerbated trade balances in Africa, which, many have argued, stemmed from an import substitution development policy which provided few incentives for exporters. To balance their books, African states borrowed heavily from international lenders.[38] In an effort to reduce the domestic impact of rising international prices – and to reduce the local currency value of their external debts, African governments often maintained overvalued currencies. While this move benefited those who consumed imports, it had two other impacts as well. Access to foreign exchange, which was controlled by the state, became increasingly valuable and the benefits to be had from selling this access rose dramatically. Thus, state-regulated access to foreign exchange, which might well have been designed to favour imported components for import substitution, quickly became a rent-seeking activity which simply increased the cost of international imports. At the same time, an overvalued currency raised the international costs of exports.

Faced with rising domestic inflation, and declining prices for their products in real terms, many farmers chose the "exit" option,[39] by operating beyond the authority of the state. Thus, farmers shifted their production into those areas not controlled by the state, ie away from the production of cash crops and into the production of products for their own use.[40] While such a move might have increased production for domestic consumption, it had a devastating impact upon already declining export revenues.[41] Agricultural producers also sought to market existing products through the unofficial or parallel economy which reflected relative scarcities. Where such opportunities were not available domestically, farmers drew upon porous international boundaries and smuggled their produce into neighbouring states where producer prices were more favourable. Thus, the government of Ghana routinely accused farmers of smuggling large shares of Ghana's cocoa into the Ivory Coast for sale there, though it was largely incapable of halting that activity. In the case of Uganda and Zaire, the "unofficial economy" – that which existed beyond state authority, overshadowed the official economic activities.[42]

One final variant on the exit option was for Africans to move physically beyond the geographical jurisdiction of the state. With "kith and kin" just across an often times readily accessible border, Africans took to their feet. In the face of increasingly narrowly based regimes, Africa, the continent with the smallest population, quickly developed the dubious distinction of having the largest refugee population. At the same time, a new group of actors, individual citizens, became linked with the international arena.

Africa's economic crisis was coupled with a political crisis. One-party states did not often permit alternative routes of access to policy making. The overall development strategy of African states favoured the urban elite, which, when coupled with declining resources available to the state for patronage, meant that the "loyalty" option was not attractive to most Africans. Limited access to the state because of one-party political systems and controlled media, also limited the "voice" option. Two variants, both of which brought local actors into the international arena, did, however, exist. Unable to raise funds domestically because of the pervasive role of the state and the state elite, domestic political opposition groups could turn to the international arena for funds. Thus, in South Africa, the government often accused opposition movements – such as the South African Council of Churches – of not representing popular opinion because of their heavy reliance upon foreign funds.[43] Such an option was limited for most Africans, though, because most donors continued to route official foreign assistance through the state.

A second variant on the voice option was the pursuit of violence, or an armed struggle against the state. Such a move also quickly thrust those organizations pursuing it into the international arena in order to seek physical sanctuary and to attract funds for the political and military battles. Initially, international Cold War structures provided patrons for rebels in those states which belonged to the opposing "camps". Thus, Soviet support for the

ANC in South Africa helped to keep it alive during its nearly two decades in exile,[44] while neither Unita in Angola nor the Mozambican National Resistance would have been able wreak the havoc they have were it not for support they received from the United States and South African governments, respectively.[45] Similarly, Libya's Qadaffi supported the rebels in Liberia and together with the Mengistu's marxist government in Ethiopia, provided the initial backing for the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in Sudan.[46] In Zimbabwe, the now ruling party, Zanu, drew tremendous advantages from the Sino-Soviet split which resulted in its alliance with the People's Republic of China.[47]

As international patrons have lost interest in providing official backing, armed struggles have become increasingly self-financing. In the process, they have transformed their international role, but they have not lost it. Rather than gaining access to funds directly from their supporters, Unita has funded much of its operation by assuming state-like functions in the international marketing of diamonds which are produced in areas currently under its control.[48] Similarly, at its peak, the SPLA/M controlled vast territories in southern Sudan and established the National Economic Commission, the equivalent of a Ministry of Trade, whose sole purpose was to facilitate the export of timber, ivory, tea, and other products, and the import of essential commodities, including oil.[49]

Thus, by the end of the 1970s, the African states and international actors based in African society were moving in very different directions. While the state had formally expanded its jurisdiction in international affairs, this jurisdiction became increasingly ineffective as the state lacked the resources to enforce its decisions over a population which did not hesitate to utilize trans-state group connections and porous international boundaries to its own advantage. At the official level, relations with other governments and international organizations became increasingly problematic as Africa's foreign exchange crisis curtailed most state's diplomatic activities. Unable to fulfil their financial obligations to international organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity and Ecowas, many became forums for testing African political opinion, rather than organizations which had the capacity to enact actual decisions.[50] If African states had consolidated their de jure role in international affairs, by the end of the 1970s, their de facto role – their ability to make binding decisions

with regard to international affairs – had largely eroded.

Entrenching civil society in international relations

Africa's continued pursuit of a state-centric development policy in the face of rising costs of imports and plummeting prices for exports led to rising levels of international debt, and ultimately to financial collapse. Unable to service its international obligations, African regimes were forced to turn to the World Bank and IMF as lenders of last resort. By the 1980s, the international environment was not as supportive, or as tolerant, of African states, as it had been earlier. This change in attitude was expressed first in the World Bank's *Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa* in which the Bank diagnosed the major block to African development to be an over-extended state which rewarded political control more than economic investment or production.[51] The cure, according to the Bank, was to adjust African economic structures so as to integrate them more fully into the world economy on a more competitive basis.[52]

The policy prescription was straightforward – combat inflation by raising real interest rates well above the level of inflation and by reducing government spending, which involved among other things, selling para-statals to the private sector. To redress balance of payments deficits, and to insure that international obligations could be met, the Bank recommended that economic incentives be increased for those who produce for the international markets. Part and parcel of this, and as a way to decrease demand for imports, was to float, or sink, African currencies to the point that even under conditions of free trade – which the Bank also recommended – the price of imports would rise to the point that demand for them would fall. Such a move would, in theory, replace state structures with markets which would be self-regulating, and enable the state to reduce expenditures still further by reducing its payroll. Implementing policies to reflect the Bank's cure became a pre-condition for access to international finance. In essence, structural adjustment required the reduction of state jurisdiction over international transactions and the deconstruction of those elements of the state apparatus which were designed to administer such transactions.

Along with economic conditionalities, international donors also began to impose political conditionalities. Mirroring the limited economic role of the state envisioned by the World Bank, the dominant one-

party political system also came under siege as donors, particularly the United States, sought to foster the emergence of liberal political structures, while the World Bank sought to strengthen "accountability", enhance "good governance", and build "institutional capacity".[53] Under such approaches, international donors sought to foster the emergence of multi-party political systems, complete with an independent press and legal system. Moreover, donors began to support actors in society which could monitor the activities of the state. Thus, human rights organizations, trade unions, fledgling political parties, and other interest groups with the capacity to analyse public policy, became the targets of foreign assistance.[54]

The imposition of liberal economic and political reforms legalized tremendous arenas for activity in civil society which linked actors there directly with other international actors. By entrenching a free trade regime, agricultural producers who sought to export their products through neighbouring territories were no longer seen as "smugglers", but were now legitimate exporters responding to market incentives. Similarly, political organizations which obtained external funds for domestic operations were, under the best of circumstances, seen as becoming members of a budding "loyal opposition".

Changes in technology supported this process. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Africa invested enormous amounts of capital to replace antiquated telecommunications technology with micro-wave links, earth satellite stations, and direct dialling for international calls. This, once installed, is very difficult to control, and becomes all the more so when combined with faxes and electronic mail. African states have virtually lost whatever control they ever had over the flow of information across their borders. A stunning example of this was in the months prior to the referendum on one-party rule in Malawi. Here, the opposition took a page out of the history of the People's Republic of China – a history which they might well have learned by watching Cable News Network (CNN) – and utilized fax machines throughout the country to distribute information and to communicate with supporters outside Malawi.

Moreover, the free trade and privatization regime which has been implemented has also led to the establishment of private radio and television stations throughout the continent.[55] The US-based CNN is readily available throughout Africa, and the South African based "Multi-choice" network is now available in more than 40 African countries. Because of ready access

to satellite dishes by the upper classes, so are television broadcasts from around the world.

At the same time that the role of civil society is being entrenched in African international relations, the strategic importance of African governments is declining. Following the collapse of the "East", and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a host of international sources of support for Africa collapsed.[56] At the same time, the West no longer feels the need to support regimes in Africa simply because they were "anti-communist". Indeed, preventing the collapse of the former Soviet Union and reconstructing the former "Eastern bloc" are emerging as priorities which compete with Africa in increasingly effective ways. Moreover, European unification may well temper the enthusiasm with which that part of the world, and particularly France, supports Africa.[57] Moreover, as the cases of Somalia and Rwanda illustrate, international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity have shed some of their previous reluctance to undertake humanitarian interventions in domestic conflicts within Africa. In short, there are indications that the norms of the post-War system which enabled Africa's "weak states to persist", are rapidly disappearing.

Implications: Toward a new research agenda in African international relations

In short, the new order in African international relations is firmly rooted in the re-ordered relationship which is emerging between civil society and the state in Africa. While the state is certainly not about to be supplanted in international affairs, the recasting of its capacities and jurisdictions, and the expansion of the international activities of actors in the societal realm, does indicate that the African state will have to share political space with a growing number of non-state actors in the coming years. This process has already begun and challenges scholars to branch out beyond the state-centric analytic approaches of both comparative politics and international relations to examine the international activities of societal actors. Such an approach will both enable and require us to examine the activities of non-state actors, the impact such activities have upon the international activities of the state, and vice versa. In short, such an approach will enable us to examine the international dimension of state-society relations in Africa.

Within society, individuals have long been recognized as actors in international relations, but the analysis of their behaviour has often been limited to behaviour within an organizational setting, which has often been the state. New approaches will need to examine the behaviour of individuals in society who are also international actors. To some extent, this process has begun as the study of why individuals decide to become international refugees has expanded. In one fascinating study, Robert Gersony concluded that the huge exodus of refugees from Mozambique was due to the domestic atrocities committed by the Mozambique National Resistance, which itself could be seen as another non-state international actor.[58] In addition to examining why individuals decide to become refugees, a central question is how do refugees secure resources? To whom do they turn – international organizations, non-state actors, or host governments? How do they approach these actors – as individuals or in organized groups, on what basis do refugees organize – as refugees, by nationality, or by ethnic group? If refugees come from ethnic groups which transcend state borders, which identity takes precedence? Finally, what patterns of interaction do these various actors display with regard to refugee policies?

Aids transmission is certainly the result of international transactions and the inability of the state to manage such transactions. The spread of the disease throughout Southern and Eastern Africa has followed the paths of truck drivers and migrant workers. In Egypt, the government has attempted to deal with the spread of the disease by testing the blood of foreign residents and deporting those who test positively for HIV. Commercials about Aids on Egyptian television warn Egyptians who travel abroad to be cautious by citing a verses from the Koran which forbid adultery. Because of the large role which tourism has played in the Egyptian economy, and because of existing treaties with Sudan, which until recently have not required Sudanese to have a visa to enter Egypt, neither tourists nor Sudanese – two likely points of entry – are checked for HIV.

In the economic realm, individuals who decide to smuggle goods into and out of a country are also international actors. The extent to which this activity occurs autonomously of the state – because the state does not have the capacity to manage international transactions – or the extent to which it occurs with the complicity of state actors, is an often ignored area of inquiry. In Nigeria, this issue has arisen because of the extensive illicit drug trade which utilizes Nigerian airports. The American response has been to station its own drug

enforcement agents in Nigeria, rather than to rely solely upon Nigerian officials.

While often viewed in terms of criminal activity and human suffering, smuggling and migration also provide indicators for where regional integration in Africa is actually occurring. In her studies of the economy of Zaire, Janet MacGaffey has argued that Eastern Zaire is more fully integrated into an economic system centered in Eastern Africa than one based in Kinshasa.[59] Southern Sudan and Eastern Central African Republic could also be added to this list. Such integration exists because of the cross-border international activities of non-state actors. Such patterns of international activity have major implications for the study of regions and regional integration. Mainstream studies of regional economic cooperation examine the successes, and more often the failures of international organizations comprised the governments of states which attempt to foster regional cooperation from the top down.[60] An alternative approach would be to identify where regional cooperation exists at the level of civil society, and the extent to which these patterns of behaviour grow out of, or exist in spite of relations between states at the official level.

At the organizational level, new non-state international actors are emerging, often with the support of international donors. In the academic realm, a host of donor-supported organizations have emerged, including the Nairobi-based African Academy for Science, the African Association for Political Science, the African Economic Research Consortium, and the Dakar-based Council for Research on Economic and Social Development (Codesria). Donors are also encouraging universities to form joint degree programmes. In the commercial arena, one can well imagine regional chambers of commerce, which might ally with international donors to form a bloc whose interests would be very costly for the state to cross. Human rights movements already enjoy trans-state ties through Amnesty International and the World Watch umbrella of organizations which help to link human rights organizations in various states.

Religious movements have long played an important role in African international relations. Recently, the Islamist government of Sudan sought to manipulate Pope John Paul's visit to Khartoum in order to gain legitimacy for itself internationally. Subsequently, the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury decided to visit rebel-held territory in southern Sudan, rather than visit Khartoum as a guest of the regime. This highly political move by a religious leader resulted in a major international incident

leading to the expulsion of the British Ambassador in Khartoum, and the Sudanese Ambassador in London. In southern Sudan, state structures have virtually collapsed and the only organizations which perform state-like functions are those affiliated with the Nairobi-based New Sudan Council of Churches.

The international role of Islam is also a critical, and unexplored area. As Calvocoressi notes:

> The very idea of the finite state accords uneasily with Islamic tradition, as witness not only Gaddafi's (sic) cavalier attitude to state frontiers but also the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baath – competing movements which nevertheless concur in their disregard of state boundaries ...[61]

The government of Egypt routinely accuses the National Islamic Front government of Sudan of training Islamic militants to infiltrate Egypt and overthrow its government. Indeed, militants from around the Islamic world who fought in Afghanistan have been sighted in Sudan, and are said to be supported by Sudan's principle allies, first Iraq and now Iran. Moreover, Islamic parties in Kenya and Tanzania are thought not only to be linked to each other, but also to funding sources in Sudan. The extent to which such militants are able to work together to secure control of the state and to transform it from its secular base into a theocratic state could well be a major determinant in the future of African development.

At the official level of interaction, state actors are finding that they must share space with non-state actors. At the United Nations, long the bastion of state actors, non-governmental actors (NGOs) are being given a forum from which to voice their opinions. Thus, at the recent UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the NGOs played a major role and made life embarrassing for the states which hoped to hide behind the facade of "non-interference" in domestic affairs of other members. Similarly, the Organization of African Unity has long been criticized as being an organization composed of the representatives of largely ineffective, corrupt governments which did not represent the people of Africa. While the initial Pan-African organizations included non-state actors,[62] the OAU has recently contemplated the idea of creating a Council of Elders – prominent Africans who did not hold political posts and could be used to facilitate the process of conflict resolution. The international system which Rosberg and Jackson argue has guaranteed the survival of weak states has changed fundamentally. With a few exceptions, following the end of the Cold War, Africa has lost its strategic importance to the West. Propping up dictators who have built political bases upon foundations which are anathema to the political foundations of the West is no longer attractive, and might well be costly, for Western leaders. Thus, sanctions have been placed upon some of the West's closest allies, including Kenya and, prior to his decision to hold a referendum on multiparty rule, Banda's Malawi. In a remarkable move, the US Congress voted in support of the self-determination of southern Sudan, a move which has been supported by the Department of State. Here, the principle of self-determination, one of the principles which protected African states, has been turned on its head to help dismember one.

Conclusion

State society relations in Africa have been undergoing a profound change since African states first achieved their independence. Based upon ambiguous international borders and ill-defined population groupings, state structures were initially not designed to reach beyond the narrow interests of the colonial power. After independence, African states expanded their juridical role in international affairs, but by the 1970s, much of their de facto role in managing external transactions had collapsed. The economic and political conditionalities which have been imposed upon Africa during the 1980s and 1990s have retrenched the international role of the state, and entrenched the role of international actors in civil society. Moreover, much of the external supports which kept African states in place have been withdrawn. This convergence of events requires analysts of African international relations to adopt a new research strategy which moves beyond the activities of sovereign states to include an analysis of the international activities of societally based actors.

Notes and references

1   In his discussion concerning the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, Jeffrey Herbst argues that the business community, perhaps the best organized and best financed group in Zimbabwe, played virtually no role in what were no doubt that country's two most important foreign policy decisions. (Jeffrey Herbst, State politics in Zimbabwe, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.)

2   For a comprehensive collection of the leading studies in African international relations, see Mark Delancey, Wm Cyrus Reed, and Peter Steen, African international relations: An annotated bibliography, 2nd ed, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. For overviews of the field, see Wm Cyrus Reed, "African international relations: Towards a new era", in Mark Delancey, Wm Cyrus Reed and Peter Steen, op cit; Wm Cyrus Reed, "Directions in the study of African international relations", in Mark Delancey (ed), Handbook for the study of African international relations, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

3   The debate between analysts who focus upon inter-state activities and those whose analysis includes international transactions is characterized in the debate between Kenneth Waltz, The theory of international politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979; and Robert Keohane, Neo-realism and its critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

4   Robert Keohane and Joseph S Nye Jr (eds), "Transnational relations and world politics", special issue of International Organization, vol 25, no 3, 1971.

5   John W Harbeson, "International politics of identity in the Horn of Africa", in John W Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds), Africa in world politics, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, pp 199–143, argues that dynamics of the Horn are not dominated by states, because the nation-state status of the actors there is precisely what the conflict is about. He limits his analysis to what might be referred to as "aspirant-states" – actors who seek recognition as states. This article argues that international relations in Africa requires that we include a host of actors who do not seek international recognition as states, and that the nature of recognized states in Africa enables the wide range of non-state actors to exist.

6   One of the leading texts in this area, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), The precarious balance: State and society in Africa, Boulder: Westview, 1988, devotes its fourth section to the international dimension, but limits its analysis to the state and to the activities of governments.

7   Robert H Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and juridical in statehood", World Politics, vol 35, no 1, 1982, p 2.

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11 Robert H Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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13 Wm Cyrus Reed, "International politics and national liberation: Zanu and the politics of contested sovereignty in Zimbabwe", *African Studies Review*, vol 36, no 2, 1993, pp 31–59.

14 Ian Brownlee, *op cit*.

15 Wm Cyrus Reed, "International politics and national liberation ...", *op cit*.

16 Jeffrey Herbst, "The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa", *International Organization*, vol 43, no 4, 1989, pp 673–692.

17 John Ravenhill, "Redrawing the map of Africa", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), *op cit*, pp 282–283.

18 Crawford Young, "The colonial state and its political legacy", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), *op cit*, p 32.

19 See Saadia Touval, *The boundary politics of independent Africa*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972; and Carl Gosta Widstrand, *African boundary problems*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969.

20 William I Zartman, *Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa*, updated edition, New York: Oxford University Press for the Council of Foreign Relations, 1989, pp 19–81.

21 *Ibid*, pp 82–132.

22 I am grateful to Tim Shaw for this accounting.

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24 Ian Brownlee, *op cit*, p 6; and Al Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africa: Ethnic relations across Africa's international boundaries 1884–1984*, London: C Hurst and Co, 1984.

25 Peter Calvocoressi, *Independent Africa and the world*, New York: Longman, 1986, p 15.

26 William I Zartman, *op cit*, p 86.

27 *Ibid*, p 83.

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31 Crawford Young, *op cit*, p 41.

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The fourth horseman of the Apocalypse:
Drug trafficking in Africa

Dr Simon Baynham, Head of Research at the Africa Institute of South Africa, focuses on the increasingly threatening impact of the African trade in illegal narcotics.

"DRAMATIC domestic and international changes in both the developed and the developing worlds over the past few years have been progressively altering the [global] security agenda. One subject that is rising progressively to the top of the security agenda ... is drugs."[1]

According to the US State Department in its March 1995 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, the world's drug cartels rival corporations in their use of sophisticated business techniques and have eluded most efforts to wipe them out.[2] A month earlier, the Vienna-based International Narcotics Control Board (which cooperates with Interpol) noted that drug production and drug abuse were on the rise across the globe, with organized criminal gangs from Latin American, Asia, Africa and the former Soviet Union collaborating more closely in trafficking illicit substances. Board president Hamid Ghodse expressed particular concern over a rise in domestic drug abuse in Africa. Owing to weak detection controls, crime syndicates had targeted Africa as a major transit route, utilizing the continent's airports and harbours for shipping heroin from Asia to the United States and cocaine from Latin America to Europe.[3]

Indeed, during the past fifteen years, Africa has become a revolving door – and a major centre of consumption – for the drug trade. The narcotics business has become one of the most serious threats to the stability and economic development of the continent: a scourge that has ramifications well beyond the misery it inflicts on millions of malnourished Africans.

More widely, the abuse of narcotics – often in combination with each other or with alcohol – greatly affects the Third World, where 20% of the globe's 40 million illicit drug users live. World expenditure on illicit drugs and psychotropic substances now runs second only to armaments, with an estimated 2,7 million people globally (excluding consumers) believed to be directly implicated in drug-related activities. The term "drug abuse" refers both to the non-medical ingestion of drugs that are intended for legitimate medical treatment and also to the misuse of drugs (for instance, hallucinogens) that have no accepted medical purpose.

Types of drugs

The so-called "danger drugs" are mainly marijuana, cocaine, heroin and a number of other synthetic narcotics.[1]

- *Marijuana* (also known as cannabis, dagga or ganja) is a tobacco-like substance derived from the Indian hemp plant. It is grown and produced throughout the world, including Africa, and can be ingested by smoking, chewing or eating. It is cheap and classified as a "soft" drug but abuse of the product can lead to disorientation, paranoia and psychosis.

- *Cocaine*, which is extracted from the coca plant in the Andean countries of Latin America, is the most potent stimulant of natural origin with powerful psychotropic properties. It can be administered by smoking, sniffing or intravenous injection; and it creates extraordinary dependency with very serious physiological and psychic consequences. Crack – a mixture of cocaine, sodium bicarbonate and water – delivers many times the impact of powdered cocaine.

- *Heroin*, a semi-synthetic narcotic derived from the opium poppy, can be taken by smoking, sniffing or through injection. The principal areas of production are the "Golden Triangle" (the highlands of Burma and the northern regions of Laos and Thailand) and in South-West Asia's "Golden Crescent" (southern Afghanistan, northern Pakistan and parts of Iran). The drug has a high physical and psychological dependency factor. Heroin overdose can be fatal.

- *Synthetic drugs*, for instance amphetamines and the hallucinogen, LSD, are produced and consumed mainly in Europe and North America. However, considerable quantities of the depressant methaqualone ("Mandrax") are produced and exported from India. South Africans seem to have a craving for Mandrax – a strong tranquillizer often crushed with marijuana and smoked as "white pipe".

Trade routes

The drug invasion in Africa since the early 1980s has been facilitated by the geography of the African landmass. On the West African coast, the Ghanaian and Nigerian drug barons obtain their consignments of cocaine from Colombia, the Latin American

state whose name has become virtually synonymous with a drugs *mafiosi* of truly terrifying regional power and global reach.

On the Horn and in East Africa, the trail originates in the South-East Asian "Golden Triangle" and in South-West Asia's "Golden Crescent". It is from these regions that much of the world's illicit opium crops are refined into heroin. By the start of the current decade, one-third of the heroin intercepted in Europe had transited through Africa. The East African region – once viewed as relatively innocent as compared to the West African coast – has now been identified by anti-narcotics agencies as a major transit point for hard drugs. Most of the drugs funnelled through East Africa originate from India and Thailand and are destined for the Gulf, Europe and Southern Africa. Indeed, "[s]o alarming is the drugs menace [in the region] that in the case of Zanzibar, the US and Britain have agreed to assist the isles' authorities with intelligence on traffickers", together with special equipment for Zanzibar's airport.[5]

Other known conduits include North Africa, a centre of traffickers in Mandrax, and Central Africa, where the airports of Bangui (Central African Republic), Kigali (Rwanda) and Kinshasa (Zaire) play a decisive and clandestine role in the lucrative onward trade into Western Europe. Further south, the routes into South Africa out of Lubumbashi (Zaire) and Lusaka (Zambia) are facilitated by small networks of mainly Greek entrepreneurs operating out of Johannesburg. With the independence of Namibia in 1990, a new route for illicit drugs through southern and western Zambia into Namibia has also now opened. It is also understood that South African passports are widely used by Nigerian, Zairean and Zimbabwean drug traffickers. Many of the drug couriers arrested in South Africa have been from these countries. Passports are also being stolen from the Home Affairs Department (often in collusion with departmental officials) and then illegally sold on the black market.

Southern Africa is an important conduit to the rest of the world because it is regarded by drug syndicates as a safe transit route to Europe and the United States. In addition, the end of apartheid in South Africa has triggered an unprecedented inter-state movement of people in the sub-region, some of whom are otherwise unemployed criminals engaged in cross-border drug peddling. And as the Republic creates new trade links with other countries, with international flights spreading to more destinations,[6] so the country has

become a larger target for drug syndicates. Indeed, a US survey of drug movements around the globe has shown that South Africa is becoming a major centre of attraction for international drug cartels as it emerges from its isolation era. In the August 1994 words of White House national drug control policy director, Dr Lee Brown, "A few months ago South Africa did not appear on the radar screen – but recently that has changed".[7] These points have been succinctly summarized in a speech by the US Ambassador to South Africa, Mr Princeton Lyman:

> Narcotics is an international business, as transnational as that of any major corporation or business in the world today. South Africa, while suffering from the trafficking and use of dagga and mandrax, was shielded from much of the growth of narcotics trafficking that has taken place in the rest of the world in the last two decades. But with the explosion of air connections in and out of South Africa – during sanctions few airlines but SAA operated, today fifty international airlines service the country – South Africa beckoned. Connections now exist through South Africa between Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North and South America. Narcotics syndicates were quick to move into this virgin territory. They have come from all parts of the world ... We see it in visa requests that bear the mark of traffickers we have seen elsewhere. South Africans see it in arrests of South Africans for drug offences in various parts of the world.[8]

South Africa

In short, there are increasingly ominous signals that South Africa is being targeted as a major trans-shipment centre for a wide variety of narcotics. Already, considerable quantities of Mandrax are trafficked from the Indian subcontinent to South Africa (much of it smuggled into the country by "mules", mostly elderly men and women who are travelling regularly between India and the RSA); and cocaine (a stimulant) – which until as recently as five years ago had not been a problem in South Africa – has the potential to become as serious a threat as Mandrax. Indeed, figures released early in 1992 by the then South African Police reveal that the trade in cocaine, for both transit and consumption, had already become a multi-billion rand industry in the Republic. In the meantime, and according to the South

African Association of Retail Pharmacists, 90% of global Mandrax production is sold in South Africa, while 25% of all marijuana seized worldwide is confiscated locally.

During 1993, police confiscated approximately R1 billion worth of drugs, an amount estimated to value no more than 10–15% of the South African narcotics trade. One 1994 government document disclosed that cocaine and Mandrax trafficking – which had seen an increase in arrest rates of some 120% and 40% respectively in the previous year (mid–1993 to mid–1994) – "are showing the most alarming growth rate both in abuse and in appearance in the region". The report added: "Although SA serves largely as a transit route for heroin, there are already signs that abuse of this substance too will mushroom at an alarming rate during the next five years".[9]

It is now thought that more than 100 of the estimated 273 crime syndicates operating in South Africa are involved in narco-trafficking. Apart from South African syndicates, which focus on the inter-connected crimes of vehicle- and weapons-smuggling, foreign-exchange fraud and drug-dealing, dozens of international gangster groups have moved in on the scene. These include East European and Russian gangs trading in illegal weapons, illicit gemstones and ivory; Nigerian, Ghanaian and Israeli cocaine smugglers; Chinese operators linked to the infamous Triads; and Zairean passport racketeers.[10]

From the perspective of international crime syndicates, South Africa has the "right profile" for exploitation, similar in many respects to that of the former communist states: a sudden boom in free trade, the movement (legally and illegally) of much larger numbers of people across its borders and an inadequate bureaucracy ill-prepared to meet the new challenge. Growing drug abuse is also closely correlated to the RSA's burgeoning and uncontrolled levels of urbanization.[11] Also worrying to the United States – which views Pretoria's drug problem as a direct threat to Washington's global offensive against the drugs trade – is the RSA's combination of poverty, lawlessness and a highly sophisticated banking system through which drug funds can be efficiently laundered. Indeed, the US is so concerned about the South African problem that is has already become actively involved in providing advice and technical assistance. For example, at a special briefing to the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) subcouncil on foreign affairs in February 1994, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials laid out for the group what then Ambassador

Harry Schwarz called "a very frightening situation".[12] The sub-council was urged to put pressure on a new government to give the matter top priority and was informed that Washington and the UN stood ready to provide the relevant training and co-operation.

Social and security implications

As well as causing widespread suffering, illness and deaths among addicts, the drug racketeers engender corruption and violence, and many users resort to theft and prostitution to support their habit. Drugs consumption is ruining the lives of many Africans, often those who have already been ravaged by malnutrition and epidemic diseases. It wreaks havoc on the lives of millions of families, being associated with both spouse-battering and child abuse. In some African countries, it has the potential of destabilizing the entire economy and threatening the very fabric of society – as in Colombia where the authorities have been forced to spend exorbitant sums on detection and security.

But it is the corrupting nature of this business that is perhaps the most frightening. This is a business that preys upon weakness, upon greed. Poor people are drawn into carrying drugs, demeaning themselves, physically and morally in the process. The ways in which carriers, known derisively in the trade as 'mules', debase their bodies to carry drugs is beyond .. imagination. Youths gangs are drawn into trafficking in their neighbourhoods, earning previously unseen amounts of money, becoming warlords dangerous to society, indeed so heavily armed as to be almost beyond the power of police or government. Addiction in the country is key to the syndicates' needs. Not only does growing addiction offer more people to be used as 'mules', but it opens up a domestic market, that in South Africa, with its relative wealth, is very attractive indeed. Every means to spread addiction will be used.[13]

In the RSA, drug dealers have already infiltrated government and police ranks. Individuals in high public service positions have been placed on illegal payrolls and are currently helping the syndicates by providing legal documents and permits. In some cases, police and customs officers and other law enforcement officials have moved beyond facilitating smuggling by becoming actively involved as couriers. The corruption of politicians and bureau-

crats undermines the legitimacy and credibility of government and subverts the political security of the states concerned.[14] Indeed, in November 1994, President Mandela warned that drug trafficking could threaten the ability of the Government of National Unity (GNU) to assert its authority and maintain peace and security. A few months previously, a plot to assassinate Gauteng premier Tokyo Sexwale for his stand against the drug trade was uncovered.

There is also increasing alarm about the growing collusion between the international narcotics trade, terrorist organizations and gun-running. "In this respect the black market in narcotics has for many years provided common ground for both apolitical, entrepreneurial drug traffickers and ideologically motivated revolutionaries."[15] In Pakistan, for example, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has charged that drug barons were helping to promote terrorism in retaliation against her government's tough policy on drug trafficking. And in Colombia (where the greatest threat to stability and democracy in recent years has come from the narcotics syndicates) at least 30 people were killed and 217 injured when a large bomb exploded during a music festival in June 1995. The attack came the day after police captured cocaine king Gilberto Orejuela – an arrest that represents Colombia's biggest blow to its powerful drug syndicates since security forces shot dead cartel boss Pablo Escobar in December 1993. More widely, the impact of illegal drugs on that country may be appreciated by the fact that, since the late 1980s, 3 100 Colombians have been killed, four presidential candidates have been assassinated and billions of dollars have been poured into security in drugs-related incidents.

Violence associated with the narco-business includes coercion, intimidation, blackmail, kidnapping, torture and murder. In fact, "Murders related to the drug business have become the primary cause of death among Colombian men between the ages of 20 and 45 .... A whole generation of human capital in the form of educated, skilled people is being eradicated. Out of fear for their lives many study and work abroad."[16]

Economic implications

The economic consequences of the narco-trade are equally appalling. On a global level, and according to a UN report released in Vienna in March 1995, drug addiction is costing countries between 0,5–1,3% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For instance, the cost of drug

abuse to the budget of the United States (taking account of medical charges, Aids-related treatment, the growth of criminal activity and the loss of productivity resulting from drug abuse) has been estimated at $76 billion, or around 1,3% of GDP in 1991, as compared to $44 billion in 1985. The study, which analyses the economic and social consequences of the abuse and illicit trafficking of drugs, also highlights the considerable growth in recent years in the number of deaths linked to drug addiction. For example, from 1980 to the early 1990s, the death rate was six times higher in Germany, five times higher in Italy and more than double in Britain.[17]

Moreover, and more ominously, it should be stressed that cocaine, amphetamines and other narcotics can be injected – a practice that when used with non-sterile needles presents a particular risk of infections, including the Aids (HIV) virus which has reached almost epidemic proportions in some parts of Africa, not least in South Africa itself.[18]

The drug trade takes a heavy toll on the already weak economies of African states. Campaigns to eliminate production and curb the trafficking of illegal narcotics cost considerable sums of already scarce state finances. Also, the political and security implications of the narcotics trade discussed earlier have additional economic consequences: the high incidence of drug-related violence and crime contributes to domestic capital flight and discourages foreign investment. It also has a negative impact on the tourist industry, a key economic sector in many East and Southern African states. Furthermore, and as touched on above, drug abuse contributes to the loss of worker-hours, hampering the future development of the African continent.

In South Africa, there is growing concern that expanding illegal drug consumption – especially it is thought in the townships – will further strain the already fragile social and economic fabric of transitional society. However, the abuse of illegal substances is also having a knock-on and negative effect in South Africa's boardrooms. Although alcohol is the most common form of abuse, there is a growing trend among stressed executives to use cocaine in the mistaken belief that it helps them to cope. But once an individual is addicted to cocaine, the problem of funding the dependency assumes paramount importance. As a consequence, there is a direct correlation between escalating levels of white collar crime (computer fraud, stock manipulation and other financial irregularities) and narcotics abuse. Finally, on the question of economic consequences, we come to the business

of laundering drug money – a topic which, because of its highly destabilizing role in the domestic economy, will be examined under a separate heading.

Money-laundering

A major problem related to the illegal drugs trade is the associated issue of money-laundering – "the conversion of profits from illegal activities, in this case drug activities, into financial assets which appear to have legitimate origins".[19] It is extremely difficult to gauge how much "dirty" money flows through the global financial system on an annual basis; but there can be no doubt that the sums involved are enormous. According to one (widely accepted) estimate by Albert Pacey, head of the British National Criminal Intelligence Service, some $500 billion may have been laundered worldwide in 1993. Perhaps 50% of that emanates from the illegal narcotics business, the balance from other types of organized criminal activity and terrorism.[20]

In the view of the South African Law Commission, money-laundering schemes – which aim to legitimize dirty money by mingling it with clean – habitually use orthodox financial institutions, shell corporations registered in obscure offshore centres and other investment vehicles to transfer illegally obtained proceeds and convert them into assets of an apparently legitimate origin. In addition, many sophisticated money-launderers have mastered the use of electronic-payment mechanisms, calling on friendly accountants and legal expertise to design new methods of disguising the source of the money they handle. In this they are abetted by lax regulations, official corruption and newly opened economies that make the masking of illicit transactions easier. This dirty money also threatens to undermine legitimate business enterprise, particularly in developing financial markets: because the cash is coming from crime, it gives the criminal organizations' business a competitive edge over legitimate money earned at lower profit margins and which is subject to tax.

Africa remains a major problem area in terms of financial/banking regulations and Nigeria in particular is a centre for laundering the proceeds of drug-trafficking. Keeping an eye on the business of laundering, and implementing measures to control it, demands much better co-operation between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies, governments and financial institutions; but the task is not made any easier by the global trend towards financial liberalization.

Conclusion

It should be clear from the above that the multi-dimensional threat of drug trafficking is a serious global problem; and Africa continues to be the weakest link in the international war against illegal drug operations. Owing to underdevelopment, porous borders, weak detection controls and rampant corruption, crime syndicates have targeted Africa as a major transit route, exploiting expanding transport and communications systems (sea ports, airports, etc) for their clandestine activities.

It is also common knowledge that once a relatively wealthy country such as the RSA becomes a major transit route, it is not long before it becomes a major drug consuming country. And in the view of President Clinton's chief drug policy coordinator, Lee Brown, South Africa has to be "the cornerstone of our overall drug strategy in Africa", adding that the subcontinent's other key power, Nigeria, "was not fully co-operating with our anti-drug effort."[21] Brown's understated criticism did not make clear that, although Nigeria does not produce heroin or cocaine, Nigerian traffickers are pivotal to the worldwide trafficking of both substances.

The question of counter-measures will be addressed in a subsequent article on the narco-trade. However, the key to the quandary lies in the word "cooperation", a point made unambiguously by an Institute for Defence Policy document cited earlier:[22]

> In countering drug trafficking and cross-border crime, regionally-based liaison with similar agencies in other countries must be encouraged. The international nature of the drug scourge requires common regional strategies in training and professional approaches. There is an urgent requirement to harmonise legal instruments and the ratification of protocols to enable law enforcement agencies to act effectively. ... Although there is much talk of co-operation, a lack of willingness and capacity to share information/ intelligence between the countries of Southern Africa on the issue of drugs and drug trafficking is evident. Some of this may be due to lack of trust .... Through mechanisms such as the OAU, pressure should [also] be exerted on countries which are known as conduits for drugs in Africa, to desist from such actions and institute effective controls.

Unless Africa and the international community heed these imperatives, a new epidemic of momentous proportions – the "Fourth Horseman of the Apocalypse" as it has been aptly described – will be added to the continent's woes of war, famine and Aids.

Notes and references

1   I L Griffith, "Drugs and security in the Commonwealth Caribbean", *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol XXXI, no 2, July 1993, p 70. On the same page, Griffith goes on to say: "The links between drugs and security are examined ... in the context of the redefinition of the term 'security'. This redefinition goes beyond the 'high politics' characterisation of security, which emphasises its military dimension, especially in relation to the international arena. It extends the conceptual boundaries of the term to economic and ecological questions, stressing links between security and development. This conceptualisation of security also posits that internal security questions are not only important in their own right, but that they complicate, and sometimes aggravate, external problems. Moreover, the distinction between internal issues and external ones is often blurred."

    For further discussion on changing notions on the nature of security, see, too, S Baynham, "Towards peace and security in Southern Africa", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, vol 34, no 3, 1994, p 2.

2   Agence France Press, 011903 GMT, March 1995.

3   *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 28 February 1995.

4   See I L Griffith, *op cit*, pp 72–73; and "Combatting drug abuse in the 1990s", *Background Brief*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, August 1991, p 1.

5   *Africa Analysis*, 10 February 1995, p 16.

6   "Air links are a particularly weak element in border control, which facilitates drug trafficking. Many international airports in the region lack proper security systems and equipment, which makes them susceptible to incidents involving illegal immigrants and drug traffickers. It would also appear as if corruption and inefficiency are rampant." J K Cilliers, "Report on the [24–25 November 1994] seminar on border security in Southern Africa", Midrand: Institute for Defence Policy, 1994, p 5.

7   *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 29 August 1994.

8   *Global problems that confront nations today*, address by Ambassador Princeton Lyman to the South African Institute of International Affairs (East London branch), US Embassy, Pretoria, 29 August 1994, p 6.

9   *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 4 August 1994.

10 Major-General W Grové, "The drug trade as a national and international security threat: Where do we stand?" *ISSUP Bulletin*, 7/94, p 5; and *The Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 6 November 1994. In an article on organized crime in South Africa,

one journal notes: "The US. Italian and Russian mafias, the Colombians and the Triads are alert to the opportunities. They have all initiated moves to exploit South Africa's weakening criminal justice system. Criminals from many parts of the world have set up operations in the country, and are using Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban as staging-posts for international drugs traffic and money-laundering". *Africa Analysis*, 25 August 1995, p 16.

11 Apart from urbanization, the South African Drug Advisory Board also blames the rise in drug use on unemployment, family disintegration, lack of religion, peer pressure and family violence. *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 22 June 1994.

12 *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 11 February 1994.

13 P Lyman, *op cit*, p 6.

14 I L Griffith, *op cit*, p 84. Griffith continues (p 87):

"The corruption of law-enforcement officials . also has distinct implications for military security: it compromises the agents of national security, with the consequence that (a) their capacity for effective action is undermined, and (b) individuals and groups become inclined to resort to vigilante tactics because of that diminished capacity. Moreover, drugs have precipitated a sharp increase in crime generally and gang warfare in particular."

15 W Grové, *op cit*, p 3. The author goes on to add (pp 3–4):

"The difference between apolitical, entrepreneurial drug traffickers and revolutionaries resides in the divergence of their aims. However, it is not unlikely that these groups may form coalitions in future, although each group will still pursue its own goals. There are several countries where ideologically inspired revolutionaries are presently actively involved in drug trafficking to further their own political goals. A typical example is the Shining Path terrorist movement in Peru .... Narco-terrorism is generally perceived to be the real or potential ability of drug-trafficking cartels to impair a government's ability to enforce and maintain its authority, be it to attain financial gain and/or to further ideologically inspired aims."

16 *Unisa Latin American Report*, vol 9, no 2, September 1993, p 17.

17 Agence France Press, 141604 GMT, March 1995.

18 For details of the distribution of Aids in Africa, see P Esterhuysen, *Africa at a glance*, Pretoria: Africa Institute of SA, Figure 20, p 38.

19 I L Griffith, *op cit*, p 82.

20 *The Economist*, 25 June 1994, p 91.

21 *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 2 September 1994.

22 J K Cilliers, *op cit*, p 5.

The question of defence conversion in South Africa: Issues from the international experience

Prof C M Rogerson of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, explores a range of issues surrounding the international experience of defence conversion initiatives which offer certain policy lessons for South Africa.

WITH COMPLIMENTS

THE question of defence industrial conversion is one that looms large on the policy horizon of post-apartheid reconstruction, particularly in the wake both of a re-thinking taking place on the role of the South African security establishment and of recent cuts in the defence budget.[1] The national Reconstruction and Development Programme is curiously muted on the defence sector. Nonetheless, it is stated that "the democratic government must redirect military/strategic production to civilian production. Policies should encourage former employees to develop spin-offs".[2] Further, it urges that the defence force must be transformed from being "an agency of oppression into an effective servant of the community with a capacity to contribute towards reconstruction and development" and that South African "society must be thoroughly demilitarised".[3] The question of defence conversion is raised most sharply in the 1994 discussion paper on a national policy for the defence industry. Here, it was recognized that, alongside the importance of the retention of some segments of the defence industry, there was also a clear need for implementing a policy of diversification "that encourages and assists defence companies to utilise their potentially multipurpose (military/civilian) capabilities to meet civilian market needs".[4]

The new democratic South Africa is not alone in confronting the issue of defence conversion. Changes in the global strategic environment since the close of the 1980s, most importantly the ending of the Cold War, have forced a major reappraisal of global military spending and precipitated significant reductions in the defence budgets of many countries.[5] Pressures on government finance as a result of global recession placed a further constraint on military spending.[6] Accordingly, the issue of defence cutbacks and defence conversion is one that currently occupies the energies of national governments in both market and planned economies. Especially in North America,[7] Western Europe,[8] China,[9] Eastern Europe,[10] and the former Soviet Union,[11] the process and consequences of defence conversion have generated much controversy and concern. The global importance of disarmament has ignited the interest of several international development agencies, most notably from various sections of the United Nations and the International Labour Office, concerning the implications of defence conversion.[12]

A wide range of international writings and experiences therefore can be drawn upon to "inform" policy debate in South Africa concerning the issue of defence conversion. At the heart of much international writing is speculation over a "peace dividend" which might be utilized to address pressing economic, social and environment problems.[13] Nonetheless, as Willett[14] points out, since mechanisms for converting defence savings into a realizable peace dividend are not clearly articulated, there is a

real danger that defence cuts may be turned into a "peace penalty" as jobs are lost and former defence production facilities closed.

The objective in this article is to examine certain issues relating to matters of defence conversion and to draw out their implications for policy analysis. More specifically, the purpose of this review is to tease out relevant policy issues for South Africa from the international experience. This task is approached through the presentation of two uneven sections of material. First, the meaning of "defence conversion" is clarified through examining a set of different approaches to conversion. Second, pertinent issues raised by defence cutbacks for regional and local economic development are discussed. The concluding section reflects on the question of defence conversion in South Africa, emphasizing particularly the need to recognize the local ramifications and responses to defence cutbacks.

The meaning of defence conversion and of conversion strategies

The concept of "defence conversion" is far from precise in the existing literature. With the ending of the Cold War, Willett[15] notes, "conversion has become an all-encompassing concept open to many interpretations". For several analysts, including many dealing with the experiences of the former Soviet Union and China,[16] conversion is understood simply in terms of the transformation of military resources into civil activities and production. Typically, Renner[17] states "conversion encompasses an adaptation of research, production, and management practices in arms-producing factories to civilian needs and criteria". For other groups of researchers, especially those associated with the ILO, the issue of conversion must be more broadly focused on questions of labour and skills rather than merely on a transformation process from military to civilian usage. International Labour Organization researchers stress that the challenge posed by defence conversion is "to make the best use of all the resources released by defence cuts, particularly the previously employed labour force, at the least social cost".[18] Certainly, the controversy raised over defining the terms for "conversion" underscores the point that there can be "no universal plan or 'blueprint' for arms conversion" across the international experience.[19] The policy responses vary according to a host of factors operating at national (eg, national policy goals, availability of resources, structure of gov-


Figure 1: The macro-economic ramifications of defence spending (Source: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Economic aspects of disarmament: Disarmament as an investment process, UNIDR, Geneva, 1993).

ernment), industrial/sectoral (eg, extent of dependence on military markets, technological base, links to other sectors) and, corporate (eg, size and penetrability of civil markets, history, culture and organization of enterprise) levels of analysis. Renner[20] avers:

> Each country must chart its special path toward a peace economy, judging the degree of government involvement desirable, deciding how much leeway to give communities and regions, and determining whether conversion should be targeted toward expanding the supply of consumer goods or providing 'socially useful' products and services like health care and education programs, public infrastructure, and environmental protection.

Likewise, Harbor[21] concludes "the first lesson of conversion is to beware of 'off-the shelf' strategies". Successful strategies for conversion "will be based on local economic, technical and political realities and circumstances, and will encompass a range of policies to deal with separate goals and problems".[22]

In attempting to disentangle the various threads of writings that surround defence conversion, it is useful to follow Willett[23] and distinguish between at least three separate strands of writing that tack-

le the issue of different levels of analysis. These are:

- a macro-economic approach;

- a cluster of micro-economic approaches; and finally,

- a set of broader national economic and political strategies for economic regeneration.

In essence, the macro-economic approach concerns the demand side of the problem, interrogating what the impacts of defence cutbacks will be but "without considering the problems of adjustment, or simply assuming that the market will deal with them".[24] By contrast, the micro-economic approach centres on supply-side adjustments which are viewed at the level of the enterprise, plant or community. The final approach attempts to deal with all levels in a coherent and consistent manner and to incorporate as its explicit objective, that of demilitarization.[25]

Macro-economic approach

The macro-economic conversion approach centres on the negative relationship between military spending and economic growth.[26] One attempt to model the complex economic effects of defence spending is presented schematically in Figure 1. This model draws from the research of the

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research[27] and illustrates the intricate web of relations between defence spending, the outputs of the defence industries and the armed forces, and the consequent macro-economic effects.

Several studies in the macro-economic approach argue that in the long term "military spending and the existence of a large defence industry workforce have a number of negative impacts", particularly with respect to investment patterns, the development of civilian technologies and on the level and structures of employment.[28] Accordingly, this school of writing suggests that it is in the interest of society as a whole and the national economic wellbeing "to support the conversion of the defence industrial base to civil production".[29] Although it is admitted that, in the short run, defence expenditure reductions might result in unemployment – the duration and scope of which would hinge on the amount and structure of alternative government spending – in the long term it is argued a switch to civilian activities would result in a boost to employment creation.[30]

The key point is that the proclaimed benefits from reduced defence expenditure in terms of increased investment and employment do not occur *automatically* but instead are contingent upon appropriate policy instruments to channel the released resources into the civilian sector.[31] Particular problems are raised by this approach when there is an implicit assumption that defence contractors "are able to adjust without government assistance and that the defence workers with their particular skills will be able to gain employment in the jobs created by the increase in expenditure in other parts of the public sector, and those created in the private sector by multiplier effects".[32] Indeed, a contrast is drawn that most defence workers are highly skilled in both manual and non-manual occupations whereas most employment generation in social welfare occupations tends to be for low-skill (and low-paid) workers. This implies a shift in labour demand for relatively high-skill to low-skill and low-paid work and contains the danger that important skills may be lost.[33] Overall, in the view of Willett,[34] the macroeconomic approach is "a very conservative model of conversion" for it poses "no challenge to existing patterns of accumulation" and operates within the confines of economic orthodoxy, being heavily reliant on the market. Finally, despite the fact that it views conversion as an "opportunity" the macroeconomic approach is criticized for its narrow outlook on change. Specifically, it is seen as "un-

able to conceptualize the urgent social and environmental needs which the peace dividend could be used to deal with, apart from employment generation".[35] Thus, it is urged that other approaches to conversion be considered to complement this general macroeconomic perspective.[36]

Micro-economic approaches

The approach of micro-economic conversion includes enterprise and/or plant-based conversion and is centred essentially on the re-use of existing military resources for civilian purposes. A distinction must be drawn between enterprise *conversion* and *diversification*: the former implies the abandonment of military production for civilian production, whereas the latter involves enterprises shifting into other kinds of production (often through corporate mergers or acquisitions) but without converting defence industrial facilities and by implication does not necessarily involve the substitution of military work. In terms of the recorded experience of defence enterprises, diversification is the preferred form of corporate adjustment strategy to defence expenditure cutbacks. Often, however, these attempts at corporate diversification are of marginal significance as compared to the production and employment losses that occur in their defence divisions. Both Lovering[37] and Willett[38] track the marginal retreat of British defence companies from their military specializations in the post-1980 era of major corporate restructuring. Indeed, evidence for the successful conversion of existing military plants to civilian production is extremely thin, notwithstanding some isolated (albeit well-publicized) instances of former Russian, Chinese or Ukrainian military facilities converted for producing televisions, washing machines or tractors.[39]

The general failure of enterprises to transform "swords into ploughshares" in large measure stems from the essential nature of defence-industrial enterprises.[40] Typically, as Markusen[41] describes for the USA, the military-industrial complex demanded a production process starkly different to that used in commercially-oriented plants, thus fostering a whole segment of industry which was dedicated to designing and producing ever-more costly products in an environment which was highly flexible, experimental and shrouded in secrecy. In essence, the whole culture and management style of defence enterprises militates against their successful penetration into the competitive markets of civilian products.[42] As Richards[43] observes, the fact that the defence industry is used to

a single client ordering a highly specialized product has made it "reluctant, and ill-placed, to compete in civilian markets". The list of "cultural" problems associated with defence enterprises includes inexperience in commercial marketing, an emphasis on product rather than process innovations, a skills hierarchy and a technological orientation "distorted" by the weapons acquisition system, a reliance on protected markets, and risk aversion resulting from government subsidies for research and development as well as capital investment.[44] Taken together these factors coalesce to erect high "barriers to exit" from the defence industry and explain the limited degree of success of attempts made to convert military enterprises into civilian production.

At the plant level, the key actor in the conversion process is the so-termed "alternative use committee". This body might include representatives of management, labour and the local community with a mission to draw up an alternative business plan. There are several documented cases of such committees operating in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, with the best known being the activities and proposals made by the Britain's Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee.[45] Nonetheless, despite growing interest in such committees "so far there are few examples of successful alternative use planning to be found".[46] Their failures stem from the often unrealistic assumptions made by alternative use committees about how business and markets function in the commercial world and their absence of experience in commercial production or marketing. Further, there is the additional limitation that rarely are the capital and labour endowments of defence facilities appropriate for volume-based production. Moreover, Willett[47] argues that the emphasis in plant-based conversion programmes on finding product-solutions reflects a weak level of understanding of the importance of new process innovations, such as "just-in-time" which represents the application of existing techniques and technologies to a range of existing products, rather than the evolution of new products *per se*.

Finally, in the category of micro-economic conversion, note must be made of the role of local authorities and community groups working often in harmony to develop strategies to reduce the vulnerability of local economies to defence expenditure. Emphasis in the American-inspired programmes for community economic adjustment is upon local-level initiatives for supporting workers at local plants to convert facilities or diversify local economies away from defence dependency.[48] Beyond a

small number of success-stories, the record of these local and community level initiatives seeking to transform defence facilities to civil production is not inspiring. The general disappointments associated with such initiatives has led to a shift in emphasis from the defence plant to the broader context of regenerating the local economy, along lines inspired by the archetypal small-firm "industrial districts" of Western Europe. In this shift to broader local economic restructuring, some local initiatives are beginning to mesh and resonate with the final approach to conversion, *viz*, that of national economic and political regeneration.

National economic and political regeneration

In this last approach, the stress is placed not only upon dealing with the immediate economic aspects of conversion, such as unemployment and industrial decline, but the process is contextualized within a broader socio-economic and political framework. More specifically, conversion is linked now to a general shift in national priorities away from the domination of military imperatives, questioning existing industrial and technological priorities. In the cases of Britain or the USA, the priority attached to defence needs concentrated scarce R & D resources on the innovation and production of large-scale sophisticated and costly weapon systems.[49] The regeneration approach seeks to "include producers and customers in democratic ways which challenge the market's failure to meet basic human and environmental needs".[50] The new targeted "national needs" might include industrial renewal, environmental restoration, sustainable agriculture or renewable energies.

Central to the functioning of this last approach to conversion is the establishment of some form of structural adjustment agency or programme to deal with the defence sector. For example, in Britain, calls have been sounded for the formation of a Defence Diversification Agency to assist and support the defence sector in adapting to the industrial and economic consequences of the ending of the Cold War.[51] Another initiative might be the programmes initiated in the USA to "pick out technological winners of tomorrow" as a means to realign the conversion process. The overall thrust is toward government deploying direct subsidies as well as incentives for industry to conduct basic research, improve technologies, and support job (re)training programmes in order to shift to a new national set of technological priorities.

Conversion in this final approach becomes part of a wider socio-economic programme of radical change in a country's structure of production. It is a lever to effect an industrial and technological reordering of economies and societies. For this sort of "national needs"-led strategy to be put in place, however, it is first necessary for government, in partnership with industry, local authorities and trade unions, to draw up a broad-based industrial strategy, driven by national needs, and aimed at developing and strengthening the country's civilian industrial base.[52]

The regional and local dimension

It must be understood that defence spending is an issue which impacts greatly upon patterns of regional and local economic development.[53] Several scholars draw attention to the important phenomenon of the "military re-mapping" of the geographies of the United States, Britain or France during the 1970s and 1980s as defence spending substantially influenced new spatial patterns of regional and local economic growth.[54] Likewise, in South Africa, the impact of defence spending is felt unequally across regions, cities and local communities.[55] In particular, the greatest impact of defence spending is experienced in those regions and towns where defence installations are situated or where production activity takes place for the armaments sector.[56]

Accordingly, whilst much discussion now takes place around the aptness of "national economic regeneration" approaches to conversion, it must be appreciated that the effects of defence cutbacks are experienced unevenly across regions and localities. The implications of defence conversion, in terms of local job cuts and decline in the economic base, become a very real set of policy issues to be confronted by regional and local authorities. Although, in many countries, the issue of disarmament presents little problem from a macro-economic approach, serious difficulties would confront those individual regions and communities which are recognized as "defence-dependent".[57] This lends credence to the importance of adopting what ILO researchers describe as "the regional and local approach" to the question of defence cutbacks.[58] Indeed, in the current research programme of the ILO, considerable stress is placed upon analysing the effects of disarmament and defence cutbacks at the regional and local scale of analysis.[59] A regional approach cannot substitute for national policy actions; instead, it is argued, "a regional approach, with active manpower policies,

assisted job search, etc, supported by local authorities is a necessary complement to national policies with respect to defence production cuts and to industrial conversion".[60]

The actual sensitivity of regions and locales to defence spending is obviously contingent on the relative weighting of defence in the workloads of firms present in the areas concerned.[61] In Britain defence spending has nurtured, what Lovering[62] styles, "a new aristocracy of labour". In defence-dominated localities "the leading companies tended to be the best employer a man could hope to work for (a woman was unlikely to be employed at all)".[63] In the USA, military firms are able to exert considerable influence in defence-dependent regions and communities, such that the pursuit of defence money is a major component of local economic growth initiatives.[64] As a general rule, vulnerability to defence budget cuts is enhanced in regions or communities which are largely devoid of alternative production opportunities, a situation likely to occur particularly when a single defence enterprise dominates the local economy.[65] Nonetheless, the common integration of defence production with civilian production in a single enterprise or plant means that it is sometimes "difficult to identify the vulnerability of workers to displacement as defence contracts are reduced".[66]

One broad empirical finding is that defence production tends to be geographically concentrated in a small number of regions and localities within a country.[67] The international experience is reflected in findings from a series of case studies undertaken by the ILO which produced "a largely converging picture on the regional concentration of defence production".[68] In the USA military expenditures by the Pentagon hugely favour the Sunbelt at the expense of the Frostbelt; indeed, over 50% of defence contracts are concentrated in only six states (California, Texas, New York, Massachusetts, Florida and Missouri in rank order).[69] In particular, the Southern California region is important as the nexus of first-tier subcontracting produces a subcontracting cluster of defence-linked enterprises,[70] aptly earning the area the title "Fortress California".[71] While subcontracting by prime defence contractors may induce a limited degree of geographical dispersion, the existence of clusters of well-developed subcontracting close to prime contractors amplifies the localized economic impact of defence contracting in the USA.[72] The key regions of defence procurement act as magnets for an inter-regional "brain drain" within the USA of technical and scientific personnel.[73]

Beyond defence manufactures, there is an important impact of military spending in terms of the geography of the service sector with the largest recipient regions being Washington, DC and, once again, California.[74] Overall, it is evident that in the USA patterns of defence contracting during the Cold War period functioned as a powerful, *implicit* regional development policy restructuring the national space economy.[75]

The US pattern of a regional concentration of defence facilities is replicated in several other countries. In the United Kingdom, despite a phase of restructuring in the defence sector, it is estimated that almost two-thirds of defence-related employment is still concentrated in only three regions, led by the southeast of England.[76] Nonetheless, examination of the relative significance of defence manufacture in total industrial employment discloses that "the most defence-industry-dependent part of the United Kingdom, however, is Northern Ireland, where one in eight manufacturing employees works for defence".[77] At a local level in the United Kingdom, notable areas which are highly defence-dependent, include the city of Bristol[78] and the isolated northern England town of Barrow-in-Furness, which was described by one researcher as a classic "symbol of the symbiosis between defence work and community well-being".[79]

The UK evidence points to one further important feature relating to the regional aspects of defence production, namely the issue of regional and local defence-dependence over time. It is clear from longitudinal data that in some regions the degree of defence-dependence has heightened not because defence expenditure has increased much, but because de-industrialization, in terms of a fall in the manufacturing workforce, has reduced the size of the other industries in the region. In the UK many civilian industries have been eliminated or relocated so that the defence industries have in a sense been "left behind".[80] One good example of this is furnished by Willett's[81] study of Greater London, where the engineering industry as a whole has lost labour at a considerably faster rate than defence enterprises.

Across the major arms-producing nations of Western Europe a pattern of intense regional concentration of defence production is once more in evidence. In France, the regions of concentration of defence industries are those of Ile de France (Paris), Acquitaine and Provence.[82] In Belgium, the southern region of Wallonia accounts for "a highly disproportionate and growing share of military industry employment, compared to its share of population and to overall

employment nationwide".[83] In Italy, the regional distribution of the defence industry is "very unequal", concentrated in certain areas particularly in Lombardy and Liguria.[84] In Germany the pattern is that the southern regions of Bavaria and Baden-Wuttemburg receive the largest share of military orders but the north German cities of Bremen, Kiel and Hamburg are identified as centres which exhibit high degrees of defence-dependence.[85] Finally, even in the cases of the small arms-producing nations of Europe, such as Austria, Switzerland or Sweden, a picture emerges once again of the regionally focused nature of arms production.[86]

As Paukert and Richards[87] note, the generally uneven regional distribution of defence enterprises is a consequence variously of historical, economic and strategic considerations. Although the market economies of Western Europe and North America furnish examples of the dispersal of military production for strategic reasons, the clearest expression of strategic influences on the location of military production are found in the planned economies of China and the former Soviet Union. In the case of the former Soviet defence industry, Cooper[88] dissects the regional distribution of defence industry employment, isolating as the leading centres the following regions: Vladimir, Tula, Chelyabinsk, the Udmurt and Tatar Autonomous Republics, Perm, Kuibyshev, Kirov, St Petersburg, the Far East, Southern Ukraine and the Moscow region.

In China, the stress placed on strategic siting of military facilities reaches its most remarkable extent.[89] Following close on a major escalation of US involvement in Vietnam in 1964 China launched "a major programme of building and relocating a vast number of military-related industries in the so-called Third Capital Construction Front".[90] The particular geographical foci on this vast programme were the two regions of (a) Sichuan province, Guizhou, Yunnan and part of Gansu, which together comprised the principal raw materials, intermediate product and defence industry infrastructure; and (b) the southern portions of Gansu and Shaanxi regions, and the western parts of Henana, Hubei and Hunan, which were bases for weapons manufacture and assembly.[91] The thrust of the Third Front programme was to "develop a large comprehensive self-contained and self-sufficient industrial and economic system which could survive a nuclear strike and prosecute a major war by relying entirely on its own resources and food and ordnance production".[92] Accordingly, "industries and plants were deliberately sited in the most remote and inaccessible locations, often dug into mountainside

and underground facilities so as to be able to withstand a nuclear strike".[93] These Third Front facilities have been especially hard hit by Chinese defence cutbacks as a result of these factories' poor transportation and communications access and being "badly served by a supporting and interconnecting industrial infrastructure".[94]

What the international experience on the spatial concentration of defence production points to is the scope of the conversion problem at the regional and local scales in many countries. Furthermore, it underlines the importance of complementing a national approach to conversion with a sensitivity to regional and local questions. Above all, they confirm the significance of embracing what the ILO terms "the regional and local approach to conversion".[95] The regional approach must be highly sensitive to issues of aggregation or otherwise it might fail "to identify particular towns and communities which might be highly dependent on defence spending and hence potentially vulnerable to disarmament".[96]

Reflections on defence conversion in South Africa

The recent dramatic reductions in defence spending, with the prospect of further cuts in future, has compelled many of South Africa's public and private defence enterprises to reassess their military production activities and/or to search for new, alternative markets for their products. In particular, Denel and its subsidiaries (Fig 2) and major private sector subcontractors have led the movement towards attempts at conversion. Nonetheless, several enterprises have sought to increase arms exports whilst others have embarked upon efforts at conversion. As Bachelor[97] points out, most attempts at conversion in South Africa have been of a relatively limited nature and have followed the micro-economic approach. In other words, the current adjustment efforts are in the form of either corporate diversification or company/plant-based initiatives for conversion. Despite recommendations made by several researchers[98] no concerted efforts have been mounted hitherto in the direction of macro-economic, community-based or national regeneration approaches in South Africa.

The broad macro-economic climate of local and global recession has clearly imposed major limitations on conversion efforts.[99] In addition, Williams[100] argues that corporate strategies within the local arms industry currently "reflect the strategies being adopted by arms manufacturers elsewhere in the world but fall short of the integrated approach required in a viable

conversion policy". Indeed, as is the case with the international experience of defence enterprises, the production "culture" of South African defence firms (both private and public) has been traditionally geared towards low volumes (ie few economies of scale) and product rather than process innovation (ie faster, stronger, more accurate weapon systems) with little regard for cost considerations.[101] Moreover, owing to the nature of the defence market, which is dominated by a simple buyer and a few local sellers, private and public sector defence enterprises in South Africa have been somewhat isolated from normal market forces. Because of their often limited experience in commercial marketing and sales many local diversification and conversion efforts have foundered because they have produced "civilian" products which are variously too highly specialized, too precise or simply too expensive to be commercially viable.[102] Nevertheless, the Defence Industry Working Group[103] suggests that the programmes for reconstruction and development "are likely to provide domestic markets that could create opportunities for diversification and conversion".

At present, the broad conclusion seems to be of severe difficulties being experienced by many South African defence firms engaged in moving production away from military into civilian products.[104] The caveat must be added, however, that the future prospects for conversion vary considerably and are contingent upon, among others, the nature of the military product (radars and computer systems are more readily adaptable to civilian products than tanks or howitzers) and whether enterprises seek to diversify into new civilian markets or existing markets which are already sometimes overtraded and intensely competitive. Owing to the limitations imposed on the likely success of micro-economic approaches, several observers are airing calls for alternative approaches to conversion to be adopted in South Africa. These include linking conversion to a new national strategy for industrial regeneration which might involve establishing a state agency committed to diversification and conversion.[105]

These are important issues surrounding the defence conversion question in South Africa. Nonetheless, sight must not be lost of the regional and local issues that surround defence conversion. It has been shown elsewhere that the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region is the major national axis for defence manufacture and systems enterprises.[106] This region, which benefited most from the build-up of the military sector now therefore faces the key challenges of conversion; the draft RDP for the

Figure 2: The changing image of South African defence enterprises

PWV province acknowledges that one of the key issues confronting the province's economic policy makers is the "extensive role" of defence-related manufacturing.[107] It is evident that defence spending has been an historically important factor in the regional growth of the PWV complex and correspondingly that the economic health of this region is acutely sensitive to the reduction of defence expenditures. The issue of defence conversion and of the possibilities of learning from the policy experience of other countries therefore will be of crucial significance to the development of the PWV region, particularly over the next decade of potential "military builddown".

Two important policy conclusions emanate from this research. First, there is a need for a more detailed data base on the experience of PWV enterprises in relation to the defence cutbacks; in particular, little is known of the impact of cutbacks and of the adaptations made by different kinds of defence enterprises in the region. In planning for the future PWV region, the heartland of the national defence industry, what is urgently needed is fine-grained research on the local ramifications of defence spending cutbacks. Second, whichever path to conversion is chosen by the new democratic government, it is clear that room must be made for accommodating a regional or local approach to the matter of defence conversion. As argued by the ILO:[108] "Regional and local governments clearly have an interest in making a transition from military to civil production as easy as possible since the more disruption local economies experi-

ence, the more likely it is that local and regional governments will be required to provide an increased level of social services at the same time as their income (from personal and corporate taxes) is declining". In addition to serving as conduits for assistance from the central government to affected industries and workers, "regional and local governments can also use their own taxation policies to influence the conversion process and can set in motion other policies to promote the diversification of the regional or local economy".[109]

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The changing face of retailing in the South African city:
The case of inner-city Johannesburg

Jayne Rogerson, of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, examines the changing mix of formal and informal retail activities in the inner-city area of Johannesburg. It is suggested that the present changes taking place are making the appearance of the retail landscape of Johannesburg converge with that of other sub-Saharan African cities.*

SINCE the mid-1980s with the ending of the era of racially exclusive business areas the landscape of South African cities has irrevocably changed. Although the changes associated with the "deracialization of space" have touched virtually all areas of the urban fabric, it is the inner-cities of South Africa that have witnessed the most visible shifts.[1] The activity of retailing has been at the forefront of the changing South African city as the retail sector has been forced to adjust to new consumers, their demands and shifting tastes. Accompanying the dramatic changes that have occurred since the 1980s there has been a shift in the direction of retail research in South Africa from a traditional concern with white shopping patterns and the formal retail landscape to the discovery of the black consumer and the phenomenon of informal retailing.[2] The aim in this article is to examine the changing face of the retail economy of Johannesburg, South Africa's leading city and especially to focus on the situation in the inner-city. The discussion consists of three sections of material. The first provides a review of the major data sources and methods used in this study. The second presents a picture of the contemporary retailing economy (both formal and informal) within the inner-city of Johannesburg. The final section examines the shifting nature of retailing activities within the inner-city, particularly in the era of deracialization of urban space.

Scope, sources and methods of investigation

Throughout this study the inner-city of Johannesburg is defined as including: the CBD, Ferreirasdorp, Marshalltown, Wemmer, Salisbury Claims, Doornfontein and New Doornfontein, Selby, New Centre, Village Main, Newtown, Fordsburg, City and Suburban, Braamfontein and Hillbrow (Fig 1). It is remarkable that very little secondary research has been undertaken on contemporary inner-city patterns and changes of formal retailing in Johannesburg. In the light of the shortcomings on retailing data, a wide range of sources were tapped in this investigation including necessarily a number of primary research

Figure 1: The Johannesburg inner-city

of material. First, a broad overview of the structure and spatial distribution of retailing across the Johannesburg inner-city is sketched. Second, the contemporary profile of informal retailing in the inner-city is discussed.

Structure and geographical overview

In total, the BMR Trade Register records 1 250 retail establishments in the inner-city of Johannesburg.[4] Of this total, 855 establishments or 68,4% are located in the CBD; the remainder, 395 establishments or 31,6% of the total, are situated outside of the CBD. While the geographical breakdown of retail nodes shown in Table 1 reveals the primacy of the CBD as regards formal retail activities, it is also apparent that there are a number of secondary retail nodes in the inner-city. In descending order of importance these are Fordsburg, Hillbrow, Braamfontein, and Doornfontein (this has been combined with New Doornfontein). Finally, of minor significance in terms of retail activities are the following zones of the inner-city: Selby, Newtown, City and Suburban, New Centre, and Village Main.

In terms of the kinds of retail activities in the inner-city the most prevalent forms are (a) general outfitters, (b) dealers in furniture and household appliances, (c) grocers, (d) men's outfitters, and (e) jewellers. Together this group of activities accounts for approximately 47% of all retail operations.

Table 2 presents a division of the different types of retail activities between CBD and non-CBD areas. The leading retail activities in each area are as follows: for the CBD, furniture and household appliances, general outfitters and jewellers; for the non-CBD, general outfitters, grocers and butcheries.

bases. Information used in this study was gleaned from four major sources: the BMR Trade Register; interviews with the major retail property owners in Johannesburg; newspaper clippings; and existing secondary material relating to the informal retail economy. The BMR Trade Register provides the most valuable basis for examining the contemporary picture of retailing and wholesaling in the inner-city of Johannesburg.[3] This register provided a database of 6 550 retailers and wholesalers located in the Johannesburg and Randburg magisterial districts. For each establishment, information is provided as regards location and type of retailer and wholesaler (in terms of a six-digit SIC code). The advantage of the Trade Register is that it allows the construction of a detailed profile of the structural and spatial characteristics of retailing across the inner-city. The profile of present-day retailing in the inner-city was obtained by extracting the inner-city establishments from the listing of all Johannesburg and Randburg retailers and wholesalers in the 1994 Trade Register.

Since little historical retail information exists for the inner-city of Johannesburg, detailed interviews with representatives of property institutions, and newspaper clippings provided additional useful bases for

constructing an historical and changing picture of formal inner-city retail activities. Special cognisance was given to the growth of informal street traders and the changing market of inner-city retailing trade.

The contemporary inner-city retailing economy

The discussion on contemporary retailing activities is divided into two sub-sections

Table 1 Spatial patterns of retailing within the inner-city of Johannesburg, 1994

Area	No of establishments	%
CBD	855	68,4
Fordsburg	127	10,2
Hillbrow	81	6,5
Braamfontein	74	5,9
Doornfontein	59	4,7
Newtown	19	1,5
Selby	16	1,3
Village Main	8	0,6
New Centre	6	0,5
City and Suburban	5	0,4
Total	1 250	100,0

Source: Based on data extracted from unpublished BMR Trade Register.

Table 2 The number of retailers within the inner-city of Johannesburg by category, 1994

Category	Non-CBD	CBD
Butcheries	32	39
Dairies and dairy products	3	1
Grocers	38	70
Bottle stores	19	31
Men's outfitters	20	73
Ladies' outfitters	15	43
General outfitters, piece-goods and textiles	64	97
Shoe stores	9	40
Furniture and household appliances	31	102
Book stores and stationers	20	26
Jewellers	16	74
Pharmacies	27	37
Building material, hardware	24	31
Sports and entertainment	14	39
General dealers	29	38
Dealers, not elsewhere classified	22	85
Repair services	12	29
Total	395	855

Note: Repair services are a separate category in the BMR Register, but have been added to the retail lists in this study.

Source: Based on data extracted from unpublished BMR Trade Register.

The retail activities which are relatively concentrated in the CBD are dealers in furniture and household appliances, men's outfitters, jewellers and shoe stores. Correspondingly, those kinds of retailing which are relatively concentrated outside the CBD are butcheries, grocers, pharmacies, building materials, general dealers and general outfitters. These findings are suggestive of the existence of different zones of the inner-city taking on specialist roles for different types of formal retail activities. In general, it is to be noted that, with the sole exception of dairies, the CBD accounts for at least 55% for all the different categories of retailing; and that in certain categories the proportion of retail activities in the inner-city which is accounted for by the CBD rises to beyond 75% of the total; examples are jewellers, men's outfitters, and furniture/household appliances.

A more detailed spatial analysis of retailing in the inner-city can be presented in terms of the major, secondary and minor sub-nodes of the inner-city. The midtown district (Fig 2) of the CBD (the


Figure 2: The Johannesburg CBD and midtown district

Ethnic retailing: Fordsburg

P J Stickler

central core of the city, concentrated on Eloff Street) is the historical formal retail heart of Johannesburg. This particular zone is dominated in its mix of formal retailing by men's outfitters, general outfitters, shoe stores and jewellers. In particular, this zone sees the clustering of the leading national chain stores in the inner-city such as Foschini, Woolworths, OK Bazaars, ABC Shoes, Clicks, Truworths, Miladys, Edgars, Bradlows, Geen and Richards, Garlicks, Jet, Sales House, Levisons and A & D Spitz. It should be recognized that, whilst the number of jewellery stores in this area is quite substantial, the majority of establishments currently in the midtown area either are chain stores (such as Sterns or American Swiss) or small independent jewellers; significantly, with the exceptions of Katz & Lourie and Mervis Brothers, there are few high-quality jewellery establishments in this midtown district. Of secondary significance in the retail mix of the midtown district, it is noteworthy, are the two categories of ladies' outfitters and furniture stores.

In terms of the secondary retail subnodes of the inner-city, the most important secondary sub-node is Fordsburg which is dominated by a large cluster (47 in total) of general outfitters and textiles dealers. In this Indian-dominated part of Johannesburg the distinction between clothing wholesaling and retailing establishments becomes somewhat blurred. Beyond the strong cluster of clothing and textiles-related retailing in Fordsburg, note should be made also of the specialist cluster of food activities in terms of Muslim butcheries and specialist grocers (such as spice shops). These retail specialities of the Fordsburg area clearly reflect the district's distinctive population character. As regards the other secondary retail subnodes of the inner-city, Hillbrow's large

retail mix is led by convenience stores, such as grocers and pharmacies, which is explained by the residential character of this suburb. In similar fashion, there is a component of convenience retailing in Braamfontein but also in this sub-node one observes the type of retailing which melds into the area's commercial and educational functions. The last secondary sub-node, Doornfontein, contains a diverse mix of retail establishments. Finally, to complete a detailed geographical picture of retailing in the Johannesburg inner-city, it is worth observing that of the minor sub-nodes, the Newtown area is particularly distinctive as it contains a cluster of butcheries, which is a spillover from Fordsburg of the specialist Muslim food sector.

Contemporary informal retailing

Informal retailing activities clearly now constitute a notable and highly visible segment of the Johannesburg inner-city economy. The rapidly changing picture concerning informal retailing means that studies undertaken only four to five years ago are already out of date.[5] In order to piece together a sense of the present-day activities of informal retailers reliance is placed here upon recent newspaper reports, official council documents and preliminary findings of a census conducted by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (Case) for the Johannesburg Administration.[6]

The overall size of the informal retailing element of the inner-city is difficult to determine accurately. Perhaps the best estimates, drawn from the Johannesburg Health, Housing and Urbanization Directorate, suggest that in 1993–1994 there was a total of roughly 15 000 hawkers operating in the "Greater Johannesburg" area. Of this total, the number of hawkers regularly trading in

the inner-city is unclear; nonetheless, one commonly quoted statistic is that some 4 000 hawkers are operating within the CBD.[7] It would appear from the most recent survey evidence that this data is perhaps an underestimate of the current volume of hawkers trading in the CBD. The Case census undertaken in late 1994 disclosed a count of 3 167 stalls operating within an area of 318 blocks demarcated in the CBD. Geographically, the highest concentration of street traders are to be found in the CBD and Hillbrow areas of the inner-city. Within other suburbs limited amounts of trading also take place at main intersections, bus stops, taxi ranks or near shops.

The dynamism of informal trading in contemporary inner-city Johannesburg is evident. As Manning observes: "Anyone returning to SA after a lengthy absence cannot help being struck by city streets that now bustle with evidence of a mushrooming informal sector".[8] One important dimension of this contemporary informal retail economy is the substantial number of non-South Africans now trading in activities with low entry barriers on the pavements of inner-city Johannesburg.[9] The most widely quoted estimate of the number of foreigners engaged in hawking activities is 7 000 of the total of 15 000 in Johannesburg as a whole.[10] There are several pointers that a major segment of these non-South African hawkers comprise communities of illegal immigrants variously from China, Korea, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zaire and Eastern Europe.[11] In addition to these hawkers, there are also many traders who originate from Swaziland, Ghana, Ivory Coast, India and Pakistan. Fragmentary evidence points to the fact that there are distinct specialities in informal retailing which are the domain of particular immigrant communities. One study suggests that in future the major wave of informal trading will be from Francophone Africa (especially Zaire and Ivory Coast) and that within the next five years Francophone Africans could control the bulk of commerce in Johannesburg's cosmopolitan Hillbrow area.[12]

It must be appreciated that the vast majority of informal retailing taking place in the inner-city of Johannesburg falls into the category of "survivalist enterprise".[13] The Case census[14] revealed little marked difference in the gender structure of the hawker population: the majority (52%) were male. As regards age structure of hawkers, it was found that more than three-quarters were in the 25–49 age category. Racially, Africans were overwhelmingly the majority of the hawker population; in the Case survey, they formed 96% of the total with Indians only 2%. Stalls

were constructed from a variety of materials with cardboard boxes constituting the highest proportion (25%); other commonly used materials were plastic and wooden crates, empty drums or tins, planks of wood or paper and plastic placed directly on the ground. The size of stalls in the Johannesburg CBD were mainly (53% in the Case study) less than 2 m^2 and only a quarter were larger than 4 m^2 in size. In spatial terms, although retailing occurs almost as a ubiquitous activity throughout the inner-city zone, there are notable concentrations of informal traders, particularly around the taxi and bus termini and the major formal retailing streets of the CBD, such as Eloff, Market and President Streets. By contrast, the tempo of hawking is much lower in other areas of the inner-city, most notably in the financial district which is dominated by office functions of the mining houses. In the industrial areas (eg Selby, Village Main) of the southern strip of the inner-city hawking activities are dominated by food vending operations.

The Case census showed a marked clustering of hawker activity within the CBD. The different blocks of the CBD were classified in terms of four levels of density of trading which were operationally defined as follows: a low-density block was defined as any block with nine stalls or less; a middle-density block was any block that had between 10–49 stalls; a high-density block was one that had between 50–399 stalls; and a very high-density block was one with 400 stalls or more. Of the blocks surveyed, 154 were classed as low density, 79 middle density, 7 high density and 1 very high density. The very high-density block incorporates Park Station. Areas of high-density trading were located around Joubert Park, a block opposite the Supreme Court, and a block near the Magistrate's Court, which includes a taxi and bus rank. Such areas have a large volume of passers-by and hence a high market potential for hawker operations. The middle-density blocks were geographically located in the central areas of the CBD; these areas were bounded by Joubert Park and Park Station as well as between Park Station and the Carlton Centre. Other middle-density blocks were found around Diagonal Street, encompassing the taxi rank in Bree Street and the Market Theatre environs. The lowest density hawker trading areas were situated on the CBD periphery in areas which fringed into the inner-city's light industrial zones; the hawker operations in these peripheral zones were primarily to service the essential daily needs of industrial workers. Overall, the preliminary findings from the Case census appear to confirm in statistical

Formal retailing: Eloff Street

terms a picture that can been gleaned from observation. One surprising finding was, however, the classification of the Sauer-Bree Street intersection and taxi ranks as only a middle-density hawker area; field research would suggest that this part of the inner-city might be more appropriately classed as a high-density zone.

The different types of retailing taking place in the present-day inner-city are richly diverse. A sense of the diversity comes from one newspaper report which said that you can find "everything you need from hawkers in a single street. Don't go into a shop".[15] Among the huge range of informal retailing activities are sellers of cooked food (fried chicken, sheep's heads, steak and pap), fruit and vegetables, sweets, cigarettes, popcorn, jeans, watches, jewellery, authenticated coloured perfume (fakes), shoes, lingerie and underwear, bedding, duvets, pillows and crafts. In addition, there are a host of informal retail services which span shoe repair and even leather Bible binding.[16]

Although no accurate statistics are available, it is evident that the major sectors of contemporary informal retailing centre on the vending of food, clothing and soft goods textiles. This finding is certainly confirmed in the results of the Case census which showed that the highest proportion of the total of 3 167 stalls were involved in variously food and drink (38%), fruit and vegetables (34%) and clothes and accessories (32%). The lowest kind of hawker activity recorded in the CBD was of "service" type operations, such as photography, car and bicycle repairs, shoe repairs and shining, and hairdressing. The Case study highlights spatial variations in hawker operations within the different areas of the CBD. The most important finding was that the hawking of clothing and accessories (defined as including old and new

clothes, handbags, jewellery, hats, umbrellas, shoes, watches and sunglasses) predominated in the area classified as the very high-density block. It was argued by Case research that as this area enjoys a large volume of pedestrian traffic the hawkers capitalize on the high profit margin potentially available from the vending of clothing and accessories as opposed to the lower profit margins obtainable from food or fruit and vegetable trading. In terms of importance, the second most significant activity in this very high-density zone was the hawking of food and drink (defined as including hot or cold prepared food, snacks, sweets, cold or hot drinks, and ice cream). Throughout the rest of the surveyed areas of the CBD – including the areas classed as low, medium and high density – the major types of hawker activity centred upon food and drinks or fruit and vegetables.

Finally, in terms of completing a broad brush picture of contemporary informal retailing in the Johannesburg inner-city brief mention must be made of the number of formal markets (especially flea markets) that now exist. In the inner-city the most important of these markets occur around the Market Theatre and smaller markets at Park Station, Hillbrow/Windybrow and the new Bank City market. As one study disclosed, the traders at these flea markets include both independent hawkers and a substantial number of traders who are linked to formal retail establishments elsewhere in the Johannesburg inner-city. Moreover, it was shown that the flea markets vary in their racial complexion of traders and consumers.[17]

The changing retail economy of the Johannesburg inner-city

In this section, an attempt is made to give a sense of recent change taking place in the

Informal retailing: Fruit and vegetable hawkers in the inner-city   *P J Stickler*

mix of retailing operations in the Johannesburg inner-city. It is useful to segment the discussion into two sub-sections which deal respectively with the formal and informal retail components. As is evident below, these two types of retail economy do not exist in isolation, rather they interact and affect each other's development.

Informal retailing

The mass informalization of the urban retail economy of Johannesburg as a whole and of the inner-city in particular is one of the most spectacular expressions of the changing nature of the South African city. It is evident from examining a range of research which was conducted in the late 1980s that a major surge of informal retailing has taken place over the last decade.[18] The findings of the Case census for the Johannesburg Administration confirm this trend towards a burgeoning informalization of retail activity in the CBD. In the early 1980s, at the time of the heyday of official repression of African street traders in the ostensibly "white" city, there were less than 300 hawkers functioning in the Johannesburg inner-city, a population that has since multiplied by at least twelvefold.

Three key factors that underpin the last decade's growth of informal retailing are:

- the changed official policy environment from repression to one of greater tolerance and even, through certain initiatives, the limited promotion of street vending;

- the downturn in the formal labour economy which compelled many work seekers to initiate survival enterprises; and

- the growth of poverty in the context of an expanding city population, particu-

larly with the demise of influx control regulations and more recently with the arrival of considerable numbers of international immigrants.[19]

Certainly, the march of deregulation and the accompanying relaxation of former legislation which tightly controlled where and how many hawkers could operate in the inner-city are the major factors behind the growth of a new informal retail economy in Johannesburg.

However, a number of problems and conflicts have arisen around the expanding hawker community in the Johannesburg inner-city. First, there is the antipathy of local African hawkers towards the "unfair competition" posed by the international street traders.[20] Although certain agreements have been reached between local and foreign hawkers as regards opening new sources of supplies of goods, calls for deportation have been made by local traders asking the local administration to declare "war" on foreign hawkers.[21] Second, there are the objections frequently voiced by the formal retail sector against the practices of certain itinerant hawkers of selling their wares directly in front of shops.[22] Third, there are the host of complaints which link the rise of street trading both to the growth of petty crime in the inner-city and to the problems of litter and general cleanliness of the inner-city.[23]

Several initiatives have been mounted both by the Johannesburg Administration and the private sector to find a delicate balance between, on the one hand, facilitating the access of hawkers to a much-needed income opportunity and, on the other hand, avoiding a threat to the general productivity of the inner-city through the problems caused by a deregulated hawker business environment. Significant policy steps towards a more progressive

and accommodative stance towards hawkers in the inner-city of Johannesburg include the notion of management districts, programmes for the initiation of new permanent markets, and private sector involvement in leasing pavement space to furnish an appropriate and controlled environment for hawkers.[24] Given an economic environment in which the formal labour market is unable to absorb the numbers of potential work seekers, the development of a sound and appropriate planning framework for informal retailing is a crucial management issue for the major stakeholders in the inner-city of Johannesburg. The ongoing policy initiatives surrounding the Case research and census of hawker activity affords a platform for the development of such a management framework for informal retailing in inner-city Johannesburg.

Formal retailing

The growth of the informal retail economy is part of the broader process of the desegregation of urban space and the shift towards a post-apartheid city. The inner-city of Johannesburg was at the leading edge nationally of the movement towards urban desegregation in South Africa. Over the past decade the city's formal retail economy has been compelled to adjust to the changing racial complexion of Johannesburg. In addition, it has been forced to shift in line with the departure of many office functions from the inner-city and associated loss of clientele to suburban locations; the closure and demolition of many inner-city office buildings has obviously impacted upon the climate of retailing.[25] Several changes were observed in the inner-city retail economy in a series of interviews which were conducted with long-established retail portfolio managers and brokers.[26]

The most dominant theme that emerges is that the retail mix of the inner-city has shifted to accommodate the new dominant African consumer and changed business climate of the area. Over a decade ago, it was still justifiable to view the dominant trends in the inner-city retail economy as conditioned by the consumer demands of a predominantly white buying public. To satisfy these particular consumer demands and tastes there existed an array of high-order, specialist retail functions alongside a wide range of more general retail outlets headed by major chain stores and a mass of small independent line shops.[27] One aspect of the changing formal retail economy is the disappearance or running down of these specialist, high order types of retailing activities. Examples would include

the departure from the inner-city mainly to new suburban shopping malls of exclusive ladies' boutiques and jewellery outlets, specialist medical retail outlets, and a range of other shops which cater primarily for a white consumer clientele, such as hobby or toy shops, and interior design establishments.[28] Another loss from the inner-city has been the rundown of the retailers which cater for the tourist market, such as certain jewellers and curio outlets, which also have sought out the suburban decentralized areas.[29] This aspect of the changing retail landscape links to the general downgrading of the inner-city hotel and tourism industry. Underpinning this downgrading in the formal retail structure of the inner-city is the rise of crime in the inner-city of Johannesburg.[30] A property manager observed that "every single retailer (in the property portfolio) has been robbed, held up or had an attempted break in".[31] One index of the escalating effect of crime on the landscape of inner-city retailing is that, whereas a decade ago most shops had open display windows, now the majority have security roller shutters.[32]

Downgrading has impacted clearly on certain streets, such as Eloff Street, where the former white line shops and departmental stores have been replaced by small general dealers, many of which link to the growing informal retail economy.[33] Behind this shift was the recession of the late 1980s which saw the closure or relocation of many traditional "white" retail outlets leaving vacant retail space that the property sector was willing to fill with new tenants geared more specifically to low-income markets.[34] In the slow economic upturn post-elections in April 1994 the property sector is beginning to replace a segment of these downgraded retail sites in the more prestigious areas of Eloff Street with higher grade tenants. The phase of "downgrading" has not, however, affected all areas of the inner-city retail economy; to some degree the Carlton Centre appears to be an exception through marketing its attractions primarily for the African consumer.[35]

What might be called the "downgrading" of the inner-city retail economy should not, however, be associated with a collapse of the formal retail sector. Indeed, the retail vacancy pattern in the CBD has remained constantly low as new types of retail operations immediately have replaced those departing enterprises.[36] The emergent and growing types of formal retailing activities are clearly those geared to the mounting purchasing power and tastes of the African consumer. Significantly, the sector of the retail trade which is engaged in furniture

has remained situated in the inner-city, experiencing no significant downturn. A growing area of the retail economy which is firmly associated with new African purchasing power is that of men's outfitters. It has been observed that a number of high class men's outfitters, located within or around the environs of the Carlton Centre, are experiencing a surge of activity. One index of the prosperous nature of the men's clothing retail sector is provided by the expenditures made by shop owners on fittings; one men's shop in the Carlton Centre recently spent R100 000 on new fittings.[37] This sort of development is linked to the growth of a new professional class of African (mainly) male middle management working in the Johannesburg inner-city with relatively high disposable incomes. It is notable that A & D Spitz store, newly relocated to the Carlton Centre, is reportedly the chain's top performing retail outlet nationally.[38] The relatively small number of African professional women accounts in part for the much weaker position of ladies' outfitters in the inner-city and the flight of the high class boutiques to the suburbs in search of the affluent white female consumer.

The role and responses of the major retail chains to the changing complexion of the inner-city has been a key factor in altering the retail landscape. A small number of the high class retail chains have left the inner-city entirely; the best examples would be the departure of Stuttafords or John Orrs. The majority of retail chains, however, have re-adjusted their operations and re-geared themselves to the changed market environment. Illustratively, Topics have diversified by retaining their normal range as well as opening additional stores, known as Topics 1, which aims for a lower income sector of the retail market.[39] Another form of response is that of the Woolworths group which focuses its mix of merchandise in the inner-city stores to their most basic and reasonably priced items; in addition, Woolworths have opened up a new range of retail outlets (mostly near to taxi ranks) selling excess stock left over from their nationwide sales. A further common adjustment made in most of the clothing chain stores is to stock up and expand their range of children's clothing, a major purchase of African consumers. Beyond shifting the range of their goods, many of the chains offer cards which allow consumers to purchase goods on a six-month interest-free payment scheme. In turn, this has had a negative effect on those other smaller retail establishments which were formerly reliant on a "lay-bye" arrangement. In common with the clothing stores, the food retailing sector has adjusted also

to accommodate African tastes introducing, for example, the sale of chicken. It is significant that those fast-food retail establishments which have failed to readjust their product mix to the African consumer are suffering in financial terms.

Key findings and conclusions

The key findings of this research on the changing face of inner-city retailing in South Africa's leading metropolitan centre may be summarized as follows:

- The formal retail sector in the Johannesburg inner-city is CBD-focused; of the estimated 1 250 formal retail establishments in the inner city 855 (68,4%) are situated in the CBD. Beyond the CBD as primary retail node, the most important secondary retail nodes are Fordsburg, Hillbrow and Braamfontein. Sectorally, the most important types of retail activities in the inner-city were (a) general outfitters, (b) dealers in furniture and household appliances and (c) grocers. Nonetheless, differences exist in terms of the leading kinds of retail activities found in different zones of the inner-city. The retail core of the city occurs in the midtown district; within this area occurs a wide range of retail establishments and a clustering of the leading chain stores.

- Over the past decade, an enormous expansion has taken place in the informal retail economy of the Johannesburg inner-city. The fluid and rapidly changing situations means that accurate statistics of the hawker population are difficult to ascertain. The most commonly cited statistics suggest that some 4 000 hawkers trade in the CBD; however, one recent survey points to this figure as being a significant underestimate. Of note is the strong presence of a community of non-South Africans in the hawker population. The majority of hawking is of a survivalist character and its growth linked to the worsening (un)employment situation in the local and national formal economy. Hawking is geographically concentrated in particular areas of the inner-city with the CBD zone having the largest concentration. The major sectoral clustering of hawkers is little changed from that found in the early 1980s with food and drink, fruit and vegetable and clothing/soft goods hawking the most dominant activities.

- The changing face of retailing in the inner-city area of Johannesburg reflects

most strongly the shifting consumer base from a predominantly white buying public of a decade ago to the emerging dominant African buying public of the present-day. The informal retail economy is almost wholly geared to the tastes and income levels of a segment of the African consumer working and shopping in the inner-city. The formal retail economy has adjusted in character to the needs and markets offered also by the new African consumer. Most importantly, most high order specialist retailers have left the inner-city for new suburban shopping malls, certain retail stores (notably jewellers and curio outlets) geared to the tourist market have experienced a downturn; and, leading chain stores have adjusted their selling strategies, retail range and mix of merchandise in order to provide more basic and reasonably priced items. In some types of retailing, growth has occurred to accommodate the market offered by the new African consumer; examples would be children's clothing and men's clothing.

In the final analysis, what is currently occurring is a restructuring of the retail economy of inner-city Johannesburg. This restructuring is taking place in terms of both the informal and formal sectors of retailing and generating a new spatial landscape. The key contours of this new retail landscape are only beginning to emerge. There are signs that together with an overall improvement in the economy, redirecting marketing efforts towards African consumers has given retail activities within the inner-city a new lease on life. The future spatial patterns of retailing in the Johannesburg CBD will be determined largely by the outcomes of a number of major planned developments and refurbishments, such as the planned upgrading of the Carlton complex and the pedestrianization and upgrading of Eloff Street. That said, with the growing march of the informal retail economy, the shifting face of the retail sector of the Johannesburg inner-city is beginning to signal the end of an era in which South Africa's formerly white-dominated cities were distinctive in the African context. Indeed, the changing retail character of South Africa's major cities is indicative of a growing convergence in its features with that of other sub-Saharan cities in Africa.

Notes and references

1   See M Swilling, "Deracialised urbanisation: A critique of the new urban strategies and some policy alternatives from a democratic perspective", *Urban Forum*, vol 1, no 2, 1990, pp 15–39; and G Saff, "The changing face of the South African city: From urban apartheid to the deracialization of space", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol 18, 1994, pp 378–391.

2   This change is traced by K S O Beavon, *From Hypermarkets to hawkers: Changing foci of concern for human geographers*, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Occasional Paper no 23, 1981.

3   The BMR Trade Register for Johannesburg and Randburg was made available by the University of South Africa, Bureau of Market Research. This is an unpublished data base.

4   All the information and discussion in this section derives from the data extracted and analysed from the BMR Trade Register. It should be acknowledged that certain shortcomings were observed in using this data base to track and analyse formal retailing. Gaps in information included no data on turnover and employment of retail establishments. Other problems related to undercounting and coverage. Despite these shortcomings and given the large volume of traders listed by this data base, it is argued that the trends which emerge in this study are representative.

5   See for example the following studies which examined aspects of informal retailing in the inner-city of Johannesburg during the 1980s or early 1990s: K S O Beavon and C M Rogerson, "The 'informal sector' of the apartheid city: The pavement people of Johannesburg", in D M Smith (ed), *Living under apartheid*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp 106–123; R Tomaselli, "On the peripheries of the defended space: Hawkers in Johannesburg", in R Haines and G Buijs (eds), *The struggle for social and economic space: Urbanization in twentieth century South Africa*, Durban: University of Durban-Westville, Special Publication no 3, 1985, pp 131–190; R Tomaselli and K S O Beavon, "Johannesburg's Indian flower sellers: Class and circumstance", *GeoJournal*, vol 12, 1986, pp 181–189; K S O Beavon and C M Rogerson, "Aspects of hawking in the Johannesburg Central Business District", in C S Yadav (ed), *Slums, urban decline and revitalization*, New Delhi: Concept, 1987, pp 221–235; C M Rogerson, "The underdevelopment of the informal sector: Street hawking in Johannesburg, South Africa", *Urban Geography*, vol 9, 1988, pp 549–567; C M Rogerson and D M Hart, "The struggle for the streets: Deregulation and hawking in South Africa's major urban areas", *Social Dynamics*, vol 15, 1989, pp 29–45; and C M Rogerson, "Informal sector retailing in the South African city: The case of Johannesburg", in A M Findlay, R Paddison and J Dawson (eds), *Retailing environments in developing countries*, London: Routledge, 1990, pp 118–137.

6   The findings from the unpublished study by Community Agency for Social Enquiry were kindly made available by the Health, Housing and Urbanization Unit of the Johannesburg Administration. Thanks are due to Ms J Rudolph and Case for this very rich and useful source.

7   This is drawn from *The Star* (Johannesburg), 31 August 1993 and *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 29 September 1993.

8   C Manning, "Dynamo or safety net: Can the informal sector save the day?", *Work in Progress*, no 87, 1993, pp 12–14 (quote on p 12).

9   See the report on a conference on immigration issues by S Friedman, "Unpacking xenophobia", *Democracy in Action*, vol 9, no 3, 1995, p 19.

10   *The Star* (Johannesburg), 18 August 1994.

11   *The Star* (Johannesburg), 10 March 1994, 18 August 1994, and 13 October 1994.

12   G Ansell and P Bond, "The crazy pavement wars go on", *Africa South and East*, November, 1992, p 27.

13   See L Funani, S Zobani and J Ndlovu, Micro-enterprises and support services in the PWV area", in R Hirschowitz, M Orkin, C Rogerson and D Smith (eds), *Micro-enterprise development in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry for the European Union, 1994, pp 203–230.

14   Much of the remaining discussion in this section draws from the findings of the unpublished study by Community Agency for Social Enquiry as provided by the Johannesburg Administration.

15   *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 4 March 1994.

16   *Ibid.*

17   T J Morton, "An assessment of fleamarkets in Greater Johannesburg", unpublished paper, Johannesburg: Department of Geography, University of the Witwatersrand, 1991.

18   See for example C M Rogerson, "The underdevelopment of the formal sector ...", *op cit*; "Informal sector retailing ...", *op cit*; and C M Rogerson and D M Hart, *op cit.*

19   See C M Rogerson, "South Africa's micro-enterprise economy: a policy-focused review", in R Hirschowitz, M Orkin, C Rogerson and D Smith (eds), *op cit*, pp 14–37; and C M Rogerson, "Urban poverty and the informal economy in South Africa's economic heartland", *Environment and Urbanization*, vol 7, no 2, in press, 1995.

20   See South African Institute of Race Relations, *Annual Survey, 1993–94*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1994, p 184.

21   *The Star* (Johannesburg), 10 March 1994, 21 April 1994, 13 October 1994.

22   *The Star* (Johannesburg), 22 December 1994.

23   *The Star* (Johannesburg), 25 March 1992 and 22 December 1994.

24 *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 26 May 1993; *The Star* (Johannesburg), 21 May 1993, 13 June 1993 and 6 August 1994.

25 Interview by J Rogerson with D Sampson, Manager Property Investments, Old Mutual Properties, 7 December 1994.

26 Interviews conducted by J Rogerson with C Minenza, CBD Portfolio Manager, Sage Properties 15 December 1994; R O'Sullivan, Retail Manager, Ampros 15 December 1994; Z Ramsay, Property Manager, Russell Marriot and Boyd Trust, 14 December 1994; and P Tredoux, CBD Senior Property

Manager, Old Mutual Properties, 13 December 1994.

27 Interview by J Rogerson with Z Ramsay, *op cit.*

28 Interview by J Rogerson with P Tredoux, *op cit.*

29 *Ibid.*

30 Interview by J Rogerson with C Minenza, *op cit.*

31 Interview by J Rogerson with P Tredoux, *op cit.*

32 *Ibid.*

33 Interview by J Rogerson with C Minenza, *op cit.*

34 *Ibid.*

35 Interview by J Rogerson with R O'Sullivan, *op cit.*

36 Interviews by J Rogerson with C Minenza and P Tredoux, *op cit.*

37 Interview by J Rogerson with R O'Sullivan, *op cit.*

38 *Ibid.*

39 Interview by J Rogerson with C Minenza, *op cit.*

The (urban) poor and employment creation

Prof M Levin, Head of the Employment Research Unit and the Department of Economics at Vista University's Port Elizabeth Campus, discusses some of the factors to be considered in developing employment creation strategies.

The South African economy

A continuous decline in South Africa's production and employment growth, resulted, by 1993, in widespread poverty and unemployment. Many of the poor and unemployed concerned are living in urban areas to which they migrated in the 1980s. Political reform and South Africa's return to the international economy will bring economic recovery and a growth in employment.

As with most countries, unemployment and poverty in South Africa are major problems. In 1993, only 56% of South Africa's economically active population were employed in the formal sector. This contrasts with the 74,3% employed in the 1960s and illustrates the magnitude of the economy's present inability to cater for the annual increases in the labour force.[1] In the early 1960s more than 90% of new entrants into the labour market could find employment in the formal sector. In the 1970s this figure fell to just over 60%. At the beginning of the 1980s it fell further to 19,4% and at the beginning of the 1990s it was only 8,5%.

The real gross domestic product *per capita* graph shows the growth of the South African economy between 1960 and 1994. The real annual change has been converted to a three-year moving average, and the curve drawn by linking the annual growth rates thus calculated. Adjustments have been smoothed the curve to show the trend of growth more clearly. The curve shows a clear downward trend. Its highest peak was near the beginning of the period and its lowest point near the end. The variation is between 4%+ and −3%+.

Real gross domestic product per capita

1960–1994 (3 year moving average)

— ● — % change per annum

1985 prices

The relative decline of the South African economy, in terms of its ability to employ its economically active population, is a direct result of continuously declining real growth rates.[2] In the 1960–1970 decade real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 5,7% per year. In the 1981–1990 decade growth was only 1%. In the early 1990s it turned negative. While employment grew at 2,6% per year in the 1960–1970 period, it grew at only 0,4% in the 1981–1990 decade. In 1991 and 1992 the employment growth rate was negative.[3]

The most important consequence of the disappointing production and employ-ment performance of the economy was a dramatic increase in the number of unem-ployed persons to an estimated total of 5,4 million. Some 2,8 million of these sur-vive in the informal sector and subsis-tence agriculture.[4] Many of the unem-ployed (and under-employed) live in urban areas.

Between 1980 and 1991 the urban population of South Africa increased from 45,9% of the total population to 61,9%[5] At the beginning of the 1990s, the urbaniza-tion picture in South Africa started to show characteristics similar to those in other developing countries. There was in-creasing evidence of informal and squatter

settlements, with a lack of basic infrastructural services and shelter, and of disproportionate numbers of unemployed and poor. What has happened in fact is that urbanization has made urban poverty and unemployment particularly conspicuous and this has shifted attention to the urbanization phenomenon, because the latter has been seen by many as the cause of present high levels of unemployment and poverty.

The about turn in South African policies in 1990 removed the shadow of economic and political sanctions and so nullified the element in the economy's decline arising from structural causes. South Africa's return to the international economy should now pave the way for a major recovery and a return to structural progress, provided that domestic economic and political policies do not frustrate business confidence. Also in the economy's favour, the cyclical downswing which had started in 1989 bottomed out by the end of 1993. It is consequently more than likely that the cyclical recovery will be piggy-backed by a structural recovery as the South African economy becomes re-integrated into the world economy at large. The resultant production growth will be accompanied by employment growth, and this will have positive effects on poverty.

Unemployment and the poor

The lack of safety nets for the South African poor makes them a deserving target for employment creation programmes. The poor nevertheless, have specific characteristics which make it difficult to design suitable employment programmes for them. Preference, therefore, should be given to providing appropriate education and stimulating entrepreneurship because these provide a sure escape from poverty (and unemployment). To make these escape routes effective, they need to be supported by appropriate health care and physical infrastructure.

The *universum* of the poor consists of employed and unemployed people. Knowledge about this universum is necessary if a government wishes to pursue employment policies that will effectively reach their true target.

Poverty is defined by the World Bank[6] as "... the inability to obtain a minimal standard of living"; and this minimal standard of living can only be maintained if sufficient income is earned. Those earning below a certain minimum are described as "poor". The simplest way to measure poverty is to express the number of poor as a proportion of the population. This percentage is called the *headcount index*.

And because poverty is related to income, unemployment, which presupposes zero income, affects the numbers of the poor and the extent of their poverty.

Employment programmes are more critical for the poor than for the non-poor, because of an absence of appropriate and sufficient safety nets. Their absence renders the poor very vulnerable and they therefore deserve special consideration. However, this vulnerability differs between rural and urban poor. Poverty among South Africans shows the typical rural/urban split observed in many developing countries.[7] Since the middle of the 1970s an increase in urban poverty has been more conspicuous.[8] Yet in terms of income, the rural poor in South Africa are worse off than the urban poor.[9]

In South Africa the rural areas of the old homeland are over-populated and over-saturated in terms of labour supply. Outside the old homelands, commercial farming is becoming less and less labour intensive. These are strong pushing forces for rural-urban migration. Yet, in order to reduce the pressure on rural resources rural-urban migration has to be accelerated by means of an urbanization strategy carefully planned for the country as a whole. Such a strategy can be successful only if adequate employment opportunities are created in the urban areas.

Although urban incomes are generally higher than rural incomes and urban services and facilities more accessible, poor town dwellers can suffer more than rural households from some facets of poverty.[10] In particular, the urban poor are typically housed in slums or squatter settlements. Often they have to contend with overcrowding, poor sanitation and contaminated water. Sites are frequently illegally occupied; and dangerous, too, because they are often located in areas of natural hazards. Evictions, floods and pollution are constant threats. The rural poor are less often exposed to these dangers.

It is generally acknowledged that rural poverty can be addressed only if urban poverty is addressed. The focus on urban poverty is often referred to as the *urban bias*.[11] However, a sound understanding of the rural-urban symbiotic relationship is required, because policies and strategies applied in the urban environment also affect the rural environment and vice versa. In South Africa, prevailing circumstances dictate a pragmatism which requires that policies to stimulate economic growth, economic development and employment creation should be focused first and foremost on the urban economies. But this does not mean that the rural areas are less important or can be neglected. On the contrary.

In a developing environment it is often difficult to identify the poor (urban or rural) who are really unemployed. What is more, the concepts "employment", "unemployment" and "underemployment" are often inadequate when applied to developing economies. Even in developed countries, practical conditions such as immediate availability for employment, or voluntary work, or education, may contaminate interpretation of the definition.[12] Yet, in general, conditions exist in developed countries which do give these terms a fairly clear meaning: there are, for instance, trained workers able and willing to work, but temporarily without jobs.[13] Much of this does not apply to developing countries – a livelihood is more important than wage employment for casual workers, seasonal workers, housewives and older people who do not regard themselves as unemployed in spite of the meagre and erratic incomes they may earn.

Even if developed countries' definitions could be used to identify those who are unemployed, it might still not be possible to do it accurately. For instance, in a household with an unemployed mother and daughter, both might declare themselves available for employment. However, should one of the two find employment, the other one might no longer be available for employment. When unemployment increases, or is at high levels, there is this multiplier effect which makes it very difficult to identify those who are really unemployed. (Bromberger[14] mentions similar and additional examples.)

The true unemployed, for whom employment ought to be created, are consequently not precisely definable, because they may not regard themselves as unemployed or may present themselves as unemployed when in fact they are not available for employment. Many individual persons among the poor, for whom employment must be created, are therefore not identifiable. This makes the poor a very special case within the general problem of employment creation and in a sense dictates employment strategies that will provide a general safety net able to catch those who happen to fall.

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the poor live and exist in low income subsistence environments and have a *poverty culture*.[15] Three characteristics of a poverty culture which tend to ensure that poverty is perpetuated are often mentioned: firstly, the propensity of the poor to have so many children; secondly, the lack of energy, or a high leisure preference; and thirdly, a strong short-term horizon with an inability to plan ahead.[16] In South Africa's townships, in addition to these

characteristics, criminal activities abound. The absence of personal protection makes the opportunity cost of crime very low. Crime in fact is often regarded as a viable option to low paid employment, and unless the opportunity cost of crime can be increased it will remain an option for many.

A lack of opportunity, a lack of education and a lack of exposure to the labour market may have engraved the above characteristics on the poor. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that human capital – educated persons – are one of the keys to reducing poverty.[17] The principal asset of the poor is labour-time, and education increases the productivity of this asset. The result, at an individual level, is higher income and less poverty. A lack of education is therefore generally regarded as a major cause of poverty.[18]

There can be little doubt that educating the children of the poor greatly improves their chances of escaping poverty[19] for, as we have established, labour is the only scarce resource on which all the able-bodied poor can rely. Increasing the productivity of this labour is clearly the most effective way to combat poverty. Uneducated individuals may have been successful in the past, but uneducated societies have never been successful.

Functional literacy and numeracy as well as vocationally orientated training are highly important for worker productivity, regardless of the occupational status of the trainees.[20] In 1989 an estimated 14 million people or 38% of the population in South Africa were functionally illiterate, in other words they were not sufficiently educated beyond primary school level to function effectively in a formal economic system, especially in an urban environment.[21] The National Productivity Institute (NPI)[22] have estimated that roughly 30% of the South African labour force have received no formal education at all.

South Africa experienced a huge increase in its urban black population in the 1980s. A substantial portion of this increase arose from migration from rural to urban areas. (Note: there was also a lesser degree of migration from urban to urban areas.) Migrants from rural areas and the long-term unemployed (roving from urban area to urban area) suffer from a lack of both experience and exposure to the modern labour market. Their knowledge of job search, interviewing and placement is limited. In South Africa, for the majority of the urban poor, there is no source of assistance in work search, placement or counselling.

Once people have been unemployed for a long time it becomes even more dif-ficult to escape that state. Such unfortunates through erosion of their skills become part of the *structurally* unemployed. Eventually, they are unable to match any vacancies requiring skill and have to be retrained, even to allow them to re-enter the labour market at the least rewarding level. One way to prevent this happening is to stimulate entrepreneurship and create opportunities for the poor to become self-employed.

The long-term health of any economy, local or national, depends on its ability to nurture and draw on the talents and capacities of all the people who live and work in it. The availability of resources is certainly important; but people with ideas, knowledge and courage are the dynamic element in the economic equation, the element which moves the others.[23] Large-scale unemployment and a scarcity of employment opportunities for wage earners have been the cause of a growing movement towards self-employment.

In many African countries private entrepreneurship was for decades discouraged. One reason for this was the widespread belief that entrepreneurial functions could be better performed by the state than by private persons.[24] However, a reappraisal of development strategies has taken place over the past decade, spurred on by evidence of public sector inefficiency and of market distortions caused by excessive government intervention. Achieving sustainable growth depends on the capacity of people from all levels of society to respond to opportunities and needs. Governments cannot create sustainable employment. The most they can do is to create an environment in which private-sector businesses find themselves in a position to create it. A culture which embraces and nurtures entrepreneurs is therefore required.[25] Until the 1980s, South Africa lacked such a culture.[26] Black entrepreneurs were deliberately excluded from urban areas.

In South African townships, where most of the poor live, many entrepreneurs emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Initially, they simply defied the myriad rules, regulations and laws that excluded them from independent entrepreneurial activities. At the beginning of the 1990s many of the inhibiting rules, regulations and laws were removed through a deliberate process of deregulation, and this created spaces for the mushrooming of large numbers of newly established entrepreneurs. Township enterprises possess characteristics usually associated with the informal sector, because most of these businesses are created for self-employment. They become family enterprises which operate with little capital and often with comparatively extensive family labour.[27]

The South African government acknowledged the importance of entrepreneurial development in a White Paper (1984) and the President's Council has emphasized its importance in three reports (1984, 1985 and 1987).

However, it is not incentives and programmes designed to foster entrepreneurship and small business development that stimulate entrepreneurial challenges. The major influence tends to be the general economic environment, and whether government policy is liberal or restrictive.[28] Establishing small businesses is only one way in which entrepreneurship finds expression. Entrepreneurship must also be allowed to find expression in big businesses, parastatals, the public sector and local government. The creative power of the entrepreneurial spirit must be stimulated and not inhibited. A climate which stimulates entrepreneurship is one that encourages people to start new businesses and pursue new ventures; establishes support networks; identifies and proclaims role models; and provides risk capital, technical assistance and incubator institutions and facilities.[29]

The unemployed poor can be best served if the government follows policies which encourage and reward entrepreneurship at all levels and in every sphere of the economy. And the escape routes from poverty, education and entrepreneurial activity, will be more efficient if they are supported by appropriate health care programmes and physical infrastructures which together will make successful entrepreneurial activity possible.

The biggest asset of the poor (we repeat) is their labour potential. Better diets, housing and control of communicable diseases have raised the quality of life everywhere.[30] By reducing sickness, such improvements have increased people's alertness, capacity for learning, and ability to cope with and enjoy life. By prolonging life, investments in knowledge and skills have been made more valuable. Life expectancy has increased substantially for persons with lower levels of income in certain developing countries since the 1940s,[31] although life expectancy in the very poorest countries is still as much as 20 years less than in other developing countries.

A similar difference was found by Sadie[32] and Lachman[33] in South Africa. In 1991 the life expectancy figures for blacks and coloureds was 61,3 and 61,6 respectively, while those for whites and Asians were 72,9 and 67,8. Health care is also reflected in infant mortality rates (deaths

per 1 000 live births). The South African Institute of Race Relations[34] has calculated infant mortality rates of 74,0 and 47,0 for blacks and coloureds respectively, 10,8 for whites and 16,4 for Asians.

Better health is desirable as an end in itself, of course. It also brings substantial economic benefits. Better health (and nutrition) raises workers' productivity, decreases the number of working days lost through sickness and prolongs their potential working lives.

It is through inadequate access to basic health care, clean water and sanitation facilities in the urban environment that the poor as workers – as factors of production – suffer most. Although it is impossible to quantify the direct link between general health status and performance at work, the link itself is not in doubt. The close connection between inadequate primary health care and absenteeism is undeniably reflected in the earnings of workers and in the level of sustainable effort when at work.[35]

The physical environment of the poor is usually characterized by a lack of, or only a limited supply of, or poorly maintained, physical infrastructure. Urban growth in developing countries in particular is restrained by the capacity of the urban authorities to provide infrastructural services.[36] Maintenance is often erratic and insufficient. Yet physical infrastructure is essential as a support base for entrepreneurial activities.

In South Africa the local authorities of townships in urban areas have been unable to provide the physical infrastructure required to support business development. This has arisen from their inability to generate income. In future, increasing urbanization will make ever-greater demands on infrastructure. Ideally, the financing of urban physical infrastructure will be the responsibility of local, as well as regional and central government.[37] Investments in infrastructure, if the money can be found, can make direct inroads on poverty – both by improving living conditions and by promoting employment.

Agents of employment creation

The accommodation of informal sector activities, the stimulation of small businesses, the establishment of local-initiatives organizations, the market and public sectors and targeted employment can all serve as agents to promote the creation of employment.

Poverty, underemployment and unemployment are, rightly or wrongly, often associated with the informal sector.[38] The concept of the informal sector originated

from the observation (in 1971) that the modern sector (particularly manufacturing) was not able to absorb the growing supply of labour in developing countries. Earning opportunities outside the modern sector, therefore, had to be found in order to ensure survival.

In spite of the growth of the informal sector everywhere, this sector is *not* suitable for use as an engine of growth to the economy at large.[39] An increase in the share of this sector in total employment has invariably been a result of the poor overall performance in both the job and income fronts of the formal sector. Good economic performance has been associated with a rapid expansion of the modern sector and a decline in the contribution of the informal sector to the economy, initially in relative and eventually in absolute terms. The euphoria of many South African policy makers in the 1980s concerning the informal economy has to a large degree abated.[40] In the 1990s, this has been replaced by a more sober assessment of the possible contribution of the informal economy to job creation and the alleviation of poverty.

Nevertheless, the informal sector is regarded as very important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it serves as a safety net for some of those who become unemployed (the World Bank also calls it a residual employer).[41] Secondly, it addresses the problem of inactivity (and thereby inhibits crime). Thirdly, it focuses on self-employment, and therefore serves as an entry point to the formal sector (movement into full formal employment directly from unemployment is not common).[42] Fourthly, because it serves the poor, it provides a channel by which to target aid for the poor.[43]

There is often a lack of differentiation between informal and formal small (and medium-size) businesses. This may be the result of a lack of simple definition. Charmes[44] comes to the conclusion that the most frequently used criterion for the purpose of a definition is *non-registration*. This is also the basis on which the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) differentiates between these two kinds of business sectors. It postulates that the South African business infrastructure is like a pyramid in terms of numbers with informal businesses at the bottom, followed by formal small, formal medium, and large businesses.[45]

Small and medium-size formal businesses are comparatively the best employment creators and thus are an important part of the fabric of an economy. Their survival horizon is longer than that of the informal sector and so the employment

they offer is more secure.[46] Policies that will really help the unemployed are those that make it possible for businesses to grow from informal to formal and to create sustainable employment.

However, informal and formal businesses will be successful only if macroeconomic policies are successful. If macroeconomic policies succeed in creating more rapid growth at the upper end of the formal sector, a vacuum lower down in the business pyramid will be created which will draw the fittest candidates of the informal sector into the formal sector and up on to a higher level of the business pyramid. Such an approach will be most successful, because certain delivery systems for financial aid and advice already exist in the lower section of the formal business sector.

Promoting formal business development in the townships of South Africa requires the pursuit of three definite objectives. Firstly, freehold title registrations must be made possible and efficient. Secondly, because blacks have been excluded from possessing property and other wealth assets, a loan guarantee system has to be introduced to give them access to loans and other forms of credit. Thirdly, the operating costs of those already in business must be reduced by upgrading and extending infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water and communication facilities.

With the increase in the numbers of unemployed people in developing countries since the 1970s, individuals, social organizations, welfare organizations, businesses, and public and local authorities have shown sympathy and identified with the unemployed by launching plans to create employment for them. Such actions are described as local initiatives, although they are also known by other names.[47] In addition, as unemployment has continued to increase, more and more people have been attracted by the idea of running their own businesses. This has resulted in growing numbers of sympathetic individuals, institutions and other parties joining hands in local initiative movements in many areas and instituting policies explicitly designed to encourage local employment and enterprise development.[48]

Through the accumulated experience of all these local initiatives the following key principles have emerged: use local actors and partnerships; do a strategic audit; decentralize; improve the intellectual infrastructure; enhance education; encourage private investment; improve access to risk capital; maintain healthy industrial relations; improve the entrepreneurial climate; show a caring attitude.

Market orientated economic policies are more successful in bringing about economic development. The World Bank[49] maintains that competitive markets are the best way yet found for efficiently organizing the production and distribution of goods and services. The state must, nevertheless, provide the legal framework in which these markets can operate, and it must provide the essential infrastructural services to make their successful operation possible.

Unemployment can be perceived as existing in the form of a pyramid.

The pyramid of unemployed shows a large pyramid with a smaller (dark) pyramid within it. The large pyramid depicts the hypothetical situation before a country embarks on a deliberate policy of employment creation. The smaller (dark) pyramid depicts the hypothetical situation after a country has successfully completed a programme of employment creation. (Such a deliberate employment creation programme will extend over more than one business cycle.)

The optimum combination of market and public sector forces will undoubtedly bring about economic growth, development and higher levels of employment. The employment created in this way will, graphically represented, eat away and shrink the triangle of unemployed from the outside to the inside of the pyramid. The frictionally, seasonally, cyclically and some of the structurally unemployed will find their way into employment. But one group will remain and *not* find employment. This group consists mostly of poor persons. In addition, and in spite of their successes, the bottom stratum of those who do manage to find employment remains periodically vulnerable. These groups, the poor and the periodically vulnerable, are the special responsibility of the public sector. They are depicted by the smaller dark pyramid.

To help the poor and the vulnerable, public authorities could resort to income transfers and special public employment schemes. Evaluating the merit of income transfers falls beyond the scope of this article, but it is well known that the income transfer capacity of governments in developing countries is limited. The use of public employment schemes has more merit, because it focuses directly on offering employment.

Public employment schemes have two functions:[50] The first is to maintain and create physical infrastructure or other utility goods. The second, and more important in this context, is to reduce poverty by providing employment to those in need. Public employment schemes are often

THE UNEMPLOYED

cost-effective (even if only direct benefits are included in the calculation). And since the poor are prepared to work for low wages, public employment programmes can offer wages that screen out the non-poor, so that resources can be used more effectively.

The need for public employment schemes in South African urban areas is indeed urgent for five reasons. Firstly, to serve as a safety net for the poor and other disadvantaged groups. Secondly, in order to exercise a stronger pulling force for migration to the urban areas it is essential that the population in rural areas be reduced. Thirdly, to reduce crime levels. Fourthly, to improve nutritional levels for the children of the poor whose family members will now be in employment. Fifthly, to increase school attendance.

Clark and Layard[51] state that the first principle in remedying unemployment is to create jobs specifically for the kind of people who are unemployed. Various such groups are discussed in the literature. They include the long-term unemployed (or persons unemployed because of structural change and inability to adapt); those making use of food schemes; the poor in the informal sector; and those with the lowest social status in society (women, the aged and children).

The group among the unemployed who need help most are the long-term unemployed – out of work for over a year. Most of these people are not near retirement. The majority of them are in the prime of life, people who could be

the backbone of a properly functioning economy. The top priority is, therefore, to bring the long-term unemployed into employment. Such people should be given preferential treatment in the allocation of jobs. A job subsidy, for instance, would provide employers with an incentive to hire these long-term unemployed.

In South Africa, those who are the products of structural unemployment, those who operate micro-enterprises in the townships, and those women in households which have no wage-earnings or are self-employed breadwinners are all desperately in need of support by means of targeted employment programmes.

Employment creation strategies

The first strategy option to create employment is the use of appropriate macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies which can create growth in production. These policies can be supplemented by conventional and unconventional measures to draw more people into the mainstream of economic activity.

There is an almost universal acknowledgement that properly functioning markets, appropriate education systems, public policies which encourage entrepreneurship and individual incentives, and effective but relatively limited government intervention are essential elements of an efficient economy.[52] These elements are equally important in both a supply-side and a demand-side approach in macroeconomic policy. Every country, particu-

larly in the developed world, has its own blend of these policies; yet in all of them unemployment has increased over the past decades.

There does not, therefore, appear to be a simple solution to unemployment and poverty problems – either for developing, or for developed countries. If there were, no country would be grappling with these twin difficulties. It appears that the policies that bring growth – whether demand-side dominated by supply-side dominated – are the best policies to start with[53] as long as fiscal deficits are kept low and inflation – through monetary policy – is kept in check.[54] Macroeconomic policies are indispensable for creating employment growth, but they are not in themselves sufficient for either accelerating the pace of employment creation or generating sufficient employment to meet the supply pressures of a fast growing (urban) labour force.[55] Macroeconomic policies need to be supplemented with strategies to promote employment creation and eventually draw more people into the mainstream of economic activity. An appropriate supplementary policy of employment creation is one which will first pull in those who are frictionally unemployed, and later also those who are structurally unemployed, including unemployed members of poor households.

Whatever macroeconomic policy mix is used it must be such that there is an adequate level of aggregate demand. Economic growth and job creation are not likely to occur on a significant scale in a climate of depressed demand.

South Africa's return to prosperity must, to a large extent, be based on a structural conversion of a siege economy to a market economy. This structural conversion will be best realized if the following objectives are pursued: firstly, recover the overseas markets that were lost as a result of economic sanctions, ie coal, iron and other metals; secondly, find export markets for those goods over which South Africa has a comparative production advantage, but whose exports were inhibited as a result of economic sanctions; thirdly, export goods in intermediary or final form, rather than in raw form, by adding (labour) value.

Macroeconomic policies which focus on these three objectives will undoubtedly result in output and employment growth and this will partly address the problem of frictional and structural unemployment. But additional measures will be required to further stimulate the labour absorption capacity of the economy.

Two categories of such measures exist. One category includes conventional measures widely used in industrialized and some developing countries. These mea-

sures focus on the supply of and demand for labour. The other category includes unconventional measures. These measures are related to the management of urban economies and the work of local initiatives.

Conventional measures focus on the supply of and demand for labour in general[56] and include strategies such as early retirement, youth employment schemes, work-sharing, short-time working, limiting migration, special employment programmes, training and retraining, employment subsidies, income tax cuts, foreign trade, and small business development. If some of these policies can be successfully employed in South Africa, the absorption capacity of the economy should increase beyond the levels of the past and thereby give an employment growth rate which corresponds with the production growth rate.

In addition to these conventional measures, unconventional measures can also be used. These unconventional measures relate to the process of urbanization and are especially relevant owing to the unique circumstances which prevail in South Africa. Just as economic growth and employment creation depend upon macroeconomic policies, so does the performance of the urban economy affect macroeconomic performance, growth, price stability, exchange rate stability and full employment.[57] The policies of authorities are therefore very important in strengthening the larger national economic fabric which will in turn enhance employment growth and income generation.[58]

In South Africa, the removal of apartheid laws, the adaptation of a development approach in urban planning, and the enhancement of pulling forces for rural-urban migration, dictate a replanning and restructuring of urban economies. Urban metropolitan designs are important because their spatial structure and form have a fundamental impact on the ability of businesses to survive and grow.[59] The configuration of public spaces and movement routes relative to the distribution of the urban population and different land uses exerts a major effect on the spatial pattern and intensity of economic activity. The manipulation of the urban spatial structure is therefore an important tool for influencing the number of businesses and their performance. Until now, South African cities have been designed in a manner which inhibits economic activities and compartmentalizes human activities.

Looking more broadly at the whole urban-area contribution, policies and programmes that will strengthen the ability of the economy to create more employment

are related to the vitalization of urban areas as an economic base, the supply of appropriate infrastructure, and the adoption of modern business-like management approaches to problem solving by local authorities.

The economic base of urban areas is expressed in the presence and relative size of primary, secondary and tertiary sector activities in the urban and nearby rural environment, together with manifestations of urban and rural informal sectors. The economic base of a city very often resides not only in the city itself, but also in the city's physical environment.[60] The processing, upgrading and distribution of the products of the primary sector in urban areas provide opportunities for employment creation and income generation, and it is therefore imperative that they be duly considered and incorporated into town and development planning;[61] rural and urban development are interdependent and complementary.

The skilful incorporation of the economic base of urban areas into urban design will increase the efficiency of urban economies in general and capital and labour productivity in particular. More efficient and productive urban economies will produce a double bonus. Firstly, they will produce more income for urban authorities through taxation, levies and service charges. Secondly, they will produce larger incomes for urban households, because more household members will find employment.

Any restructuring of physical urban elements must be accompanied by the adoption of a businesslike management approach by local authorities over and above their traditional administrative role.

To prepare themselves adequately for their new role as developers of urban economies, urban managements will have to establish competent offices/departments to specialize in development planning. Such offices should identify strong and weak points in the economic base, identify strategies to exploit or overcome them, and, through aggressive marketing, ensure that self-sustained urban economies with significant revenue bases are created. Preparing feasibility studies which include various subsidy elements[62] and the untiring search for suitable industries and businesses should become daily routine. They should also engage in researching methods to better integrate the formal and informal sectors; to identify ways of accelerating the provision and upgrading of basic services; to institute skills training programmes; to develop urban market information systems; and attend to social infrastructure needs and preferences.

The persistently high levels of unemployment in most countries of the world during the 1970s and the 1980s have forced individuals and societies to depart from their traditional faith in the ability of outside forces or authorities to provide employment. A new philosophy has developed: it is preferable to encourage enterprise and self-help by utilizing the resources, energy and imagination inherent in a community itself than to rely upon outside forces or authorities for the creation of new employment opportunities. These new preferences have manifested themselves in what are today commonly termed "local initiatives", "local enterprise agencies", or "local employment agencies" and they are well described in various sources, eg Bekemans,[63] OECD,[64] Todd,[65] Sutton[66] and OECD.[67]

In South Africa, local initiatives may focus specifically on the following:

- Placement and counselling services. Where such services are rendered by the public sector, services can be supplemented and the official workforce strengthened by volunteers.

- Training and retraining. One problem of long-term unemployment is the eroding effect that it has on the skills and knowledge of the unemployed. In OECD countries it has been found that the long-term unemployed are significantly underrepresented on what might be described as conventional skills-training programmes, since these tend to have entrance requirements which the long-term unemployed either never had or no longer have. In South Africa, local initiative agencies can apply themselves to assisting those who have been incapacitated through long-term unemployment by providing or arranging training (even informal) and re-training.

- Public works schemes. These have to be designed and the money negotiated and found for them.

- Promoting self-employment. Various forms of assistance can be given to people to help them become self-employed ie, accommodation, financing, administrative support, and marketing, etc. This is an ideal area of activity for local initiative activities.

Conclusions

The removal of sanctions and South Africa's re-incorporation into the world economy should pave the way for a major structural recovery of its economy. The cyclical upswing which started late in 1993 is likely to be piggy-backed by the more fundamental structural recovery. The resultant economic activity will produce increasing rates of output and employment growth. Yet, because of an inherent bias in favour of production growth, employment growth will lag behind, and this will dictate the introduction of supplementary measures to accelerate its growth. Complicating the challenge to create increasing rates of employment growth is the necessity to create employment for the *poor.*

The poor are at the bottom of the unemployment pyramid. Conventional macroeconomic policies must be used to create employment through economic growth. This will absorb the unemployed at the top of the pyramid. The more growth there is, the more unemployed there will be who will find employment or be drawn into self-employment and thereby reduce the size of the unemployment pyramid. Nevertheless, economic growth in terms of production is never complemented by a similar growth in terms of employment. So conventional macroeconomic policies need to be supplemented by carefully designed measures which can increase the labour absorption of the economy so that even more of those inside the unemployment pyramid can be absorbed.

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Affirmative action in South Africa: A gender development approach

Dr Yolande Sadie of the Department of Political Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, examines affirmative action as a means of developing human capacity. She focuses particularly on the role of gender development in addressing the position of the most oppressed and disadvantaged sector of South African society – rural African women.

THE new South Africa, emerged from decades of apartheid, is now confronted with the major problem of inequalities between black and white and male and female created by race and gender discrimination. Over the past few years affirmative action programmes have been debated, and in many cases implemented, as a means of overcoming these inequalities.

Generally, affirmative action refers to selective policies and programmes by government and non-governmental institutions aimed at the provision of special opportunities for certain people, on the basis of their belonging to specific groups, in order to redress inequalities suffered as a result of racial, ethnic, gender or caste affiliations.

The term "affirmative action" is not only emotive but also controversial. It provokes any number of reactions, varying from outright rejection to acceptance and support by advocates who stress its necessity in a society such as South Africa's, which has through history developed profoundly unequal access to resources and opportunities by various groups. Many critics regard affirmative action as reverse discrimination, putting race before merit, so lowering standards, introducing tokenism and discriminating against those who are best qualified. Proponents of affirmative action counter that such programmes are necessary because disadvantaged communities, although their opportunities may now have been equalized, did not originally start from an equal base.

South African debate about affirmative action and South African scholarly contributions on the subject seem to have concentrated to a great extent on affirmative action in employment. Issues such as the entry of blacks and women into managerial and boardroom positions, and into senior positions in the public sector, have therefore received most attention.[1] In the words of Sam Motsuenyane, Nafcoc president, "We need black directors, producers, investors and employers. It is the responsibility of the corporate sector to embark on affirmative action programmes to achieve these objectives".[2] The general demand is therefore for companies to start reflecting demographic realities in the composition of both their management and their shareholders. Numsa says: "We want to see black people and women on all rungs of the ladder – at the moment, people are not even on the *same* ladder!"

Further dimensions of affirmative action programmes in the workplace are skills training programmes, bursary schemes for management development programmes and literacy education.

Issues commonly raised such as reverse discrimination, applying quotas, falling standards, tokenism, racial hostility and loss of self-esteem, themselves indicate that the affirmative action debate in South Africa centres on exactly how far the broader population mix is, or is not, reflected in business, government and the professions.

Focusing on affirmative action in employment only, however, is a very narrow interpretation of affirmative action. As the definition above suggests, affirmative action also has a broad connotation. In the words of Albie Sachs[3]

> ... (in) every area of life ... affirmative action covers all purposive activity designed to eliminate the effects of apartheid and to create a society where everyone has the same chance to get on in life. In terms of the ANC draft Bill of Rights, all anti-discriminatory measures, as well as all anti-poverty ones, may be regarded as constituting a form of affirmative action.

In a speech on affirmative action, President Mandela has emphasized that "The whole social programme of the new democratic government which we envisage for South Africa will be one of affirmative action".[4] Similarly Thomas[5] argues that affirmative action can be viewed as a "pro-active development tool to overcome ... constraints and more effectively mobilize latent resources in order to stimulate overall development".

In this article, the term affirmative action will be used in its broad sense. It is not seen as a policy to punish groups who have socially benefited in the past, but as a means of developing human abilities – a central part of overall development. Beneficiaries of such development programmes should be defined in terms of objective socio-economic criteria such as living conditions, schooling and income levels. This would ensure that corrective programmes are carefully targeted at the genuinely disadvantaged.

We are therefore focusing here on the notion of "human capacity development" as an aspect of development, doing so against the background of examples which indicate the nature and scope of inequalities that exist in South Africa. Attention will then specifically be given to gender development, with particular reference to African rural women who are regarded as the most oppressed and disadvantaged in South African society. A recent issue of *Mayibuye* declares that "a programme of affirmative action must take into consideration that in South Africa women are divided by race and class. What is important is to promote the development of the most oppressed and disadvantaged women, the African women, particularly those in rural areas".[6]

Table 1 Racial inequalities in SA[9]

	White	African
(A) Monthly household income above R14 400 (1992)	91,8%	20,1%
Monthly household income R4 000 – R10 999 (1992)	25,3%	0,7%
Monthly household income below R400 (1992)	1%	30,1%
Inability of households to afford accommodation (1991)	4%	60%
(B) 1992/93 per capita expenditure on education	R4 372	R1 659
Underqualified teachers (1992)*	0%	57%
Illiteracy above 13 years*	1%	46%
% of population (6 yrs+) with no schooling at all*	2,5%	17,9%
Infant mortality rate (per 1 000 live births)	8,9	65+
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100 000) 1992	19	194
Average life expectancy	71,1 yrs	62,5 yrs
Households without electricity (1993)	1%	60%

* Excluding former independent homelands

The nature and scope of inequality in South Africa

In order to put into perspective the need for affirmative action in human capacity development, we must first look at the extreme nature, range and dimensions of South African social inequality.

Using what is known as the Gini co-efficient, a standard statistical formula for the measurement of inequality, South Africa, of the 57 states for which statistics are available,[7] is classified as the state with the highest rate of inequality, inequality being mirrored here by indicators such as differentiated educational attainment, income, lifestyle, residential circumstances and access to amenities and services. The great imbalance between white and black is substantiated by the United Nations' Human Development indicators. In an overall assessment, white South Africa is rated 24th in the world while blacks take only 123rd position.[8]

A large number of indices of inequality in South Africa between urban and rural dwellers, and between regions, are available. Statistics for inequalities between men and women are however not as readily available or as comprehensive. Although statistics can never reflect the true picture, those in Table 1 will give an indication of where the need for affirmative action is greatest.

From Table 1 it is clear that inequalities between Africans and whites are not only reflected in the fact that, percentagewise, nearly five times more whites than Africans earn an annual household income above R14 400. Inequality is also evident in Human Development Indicators such as infant mortality (percentagewise, eight times more African deaths than whites), life expectancy (nearly 10 years difference), and there being only 10% of white

households without electricity compared to 60% of African homes.

On literacy, the National Manpower Commission has calculated that if the former independent homelands were included in estimates, as many as 66% of the total population would fall into the "illiterate" category. The Commission has also stated that there are large numbers of unemployed whose levels of literacy are such that they are virtually unemployable. The low literacy levels of people in the informal sector contribute to the high level of poverty and the low level of entrepreneurship in this sector.[10]

Data for South African infant mortality, especially among Africans, has many deficiencies. The reporting of births and deaths for rural Africans is poor, so infant mortality figures for some areas are only estimates. One such estimate is that as many as 50% of deaths for African babies are not reported.[11]

South Africa, an upper-middle-income country, shows lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality rates than a number of countries with lower incomes such as Botswana, Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka.[12] The United Nation Children's Fund (Unicef) stated in October 1993 that South Africa's child mortality rate (number of children per 1 000 live births who die before the age of 5) was 72 – in comparison with the worldwide average of 35. The organization went on to say that South Africa's child mortality rate was double what might be expected in a country with its income level.[13] In the Third World, I may add, life expectancy at birth is the best single indicator of general well-being.

South Africa also has a poor record in measles immunization, coming only fourteenth out of 38 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in immunization coverage. In 1990,

75% of whites and 60% of Africans had been vaccinated. These figures exclude the former independent homelands where coverage is especially poor according to the United Nations National Children's Rights Committee and Unicef.[14] In 1988, only 30% of the children in Transkei between one and two years had been fully immunized. Rural areas and informal settlements were mentioned as having especially low immunization coverage.

The *World Bank Development Report*[15] points out that it is not primarily the proportion of GNP spent on health which improves the living standards of the poor but the extent to which available funds are channeled to meet their needs. Effectively targeted health care, principally of a preventative and primary nature, is required to improve the life expectancy of the poor. Health expenditure in 1993/4 in South Africa was 3,5% of the GDP, which is high for a middle-income country. From this we can deduce that far too much health expenditure is going in curative medicine and benefiting relatively well-off whites. This explains the country's poor health performance, in spite of the relatively large share of GNP allocated to health and some superb achievements in advanced health care and theoretical research.

Turning now to figures more specific to rural and urban inequalities, the following may give an idea of the problem. The Standing Committee on Water Supply and Sanitation estimated that, in 1990, 18% of the urban population did not have access to an adequate water supply and 36% of urban residents were without access to adequate sanitation. About 53% of rural households on the other hand have access only to an "improved" water supply ("improved" water supply requires upgrading before it can be defined as adequate for domestic

use) and only 11% have access to adequate sanitation (this includes pit latrines and flush latrines with on-site disposal).[16]

As has already been pointed out (Table 1), more than 60% of South Africa's households have no access to domestic electricity. In urban areas, including small towns, 20–30% of Africans have access. The level of access for Africans in rural areas is "very low", while in the former homelands electricity is available only to between 5% and 10% of the population, according to the Energy for Development Research Centre at the University of Cape Town.[17]

Households without electricity depend on more expensive and less convenient energy sources such as batteries, candles, coal, gas, paraffin and wood. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry said in April 1993 that 30% of the population were dependent on firewood as their main source of energy and predicted that within 30 years the country's natural timber resources would be exhausted.[18]

The worst poverty is to be found in the country's rural areas, which are populated by a greater number of unemployed and unemployables. The Eastern Cape (including Ciskei and Transkei), in which 80% of the population is rural, has the highest rate of unemployment. Poverty is characterized by a lack of housing, low food production resulting in nutritional disorders, high rates of illiteracy and lack of skills, high rates of mortality and morbidity, and dependency on migrant earnings.

The "very poor" make up 55% of the African rural population of South Africa (including the former homelands). "Very poor" is defined here as those with an annual income of less than R2 000.[19]

Turning now to the position of women, the Human Development Report[20] remarks that "women are the world's largest excluded group". Although women constitute a majority of the world's population they receive only a small share of developmental opportunities and are often excluded from education, from better jobs, from political systems and from adequate health care. This is certainly true for South African women, especially rural African women.

Literacy: As has already been pointed out, illiteracy rates are significantly higher in rural areas than elsewhere. Van Aardt,[21] for example, points out that the literacy rate in the former development region G (Northern Transvaal, Venda, Lebowa and Gazankulu), presently known as Northern Province, is only 30%, of whom the majority are men.

Employment/income: 55% of Africans with no income are women.[22] Women's opportunities for self-employment are restricted in a number of ways; and one of

the most important of these is not being able to own property. The Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa noted in June 1993 that despite the fact that 43% of African children are born to single mothers, "almost all" title deeds were in the hands of men.[23]

Childcare facilities: According to the National Council of Women of South Africa, 1,9 million households are headed by women. Women are the worst affected by poverty, because they are unable to find employment owing to a lack of skills and the collapse of the extended family or neighbourhood networks which had previously assisted women with domestic tasks.[24] Childcare facilities are totally inadequate. In the former region G for example, only 12 care facilities for children and families existed in 1991, of which four children's day-care facilities were accessible to Africans.[25] Women therefore find it very difficult to be economically productive since the care of children is one of the basic roles women fulfil in society (see below).

It is generally accepted that by improving the position of women in society and their overall standard of living, a lower population growth rate (which is presently high in South Africa) will be achieved.[26]

The examples not only illustrate the range of inequalities in South Africa but can also be used as indicators of human development, for comparing development in urban areas with that in rural areas, and for comparing development for men with that for women. The UN measure for socio-economic progress, the human development index (HDI), has the three broad indicators: health (eg life expectancy and infant mortality), educational achievement (adult literacy) and income (measured in terms of eg poverty, nutrition and access to other resources needed for a decent standard of living and the leading of a healthy life).[27]

Human capacity development

Over the past few decades there have been various views on the meaning of "development". In the 1950s and 1960s development was strictly measured in economic terms ie by an increase in the real per capita GNP. According to this view, development is achieved through per capita economic growth which will then trickle down to all groups in society. By the early 1970s it had been realized that, although a large number of developing countries did achieve their growth targets, the standards of living of the masses remained unchanged. Since then, development has been redefined as a multi-dimensional

process "involving changes in attitudes and institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and eradication of absolute poverty".[28] Growth on its own is therefore not enough; it has to be accompanied by an improvement in people's lives.

This multi-dimensional approach to development, as it finds expression in the basic needs approach or in the work of Goulet,[29] is based on three basic components or core-values of development: life-sustenance, self-esteem and freedom.

Life-sustenance refers to the most basic needs of people such as food, shelter, health and protection. The second component, that of self-esteem, involves a sense of worth and self-respect. In order to gain self-esteem, material welfare or the fulfilment of life-sustaining needs is indispensable. Freedom, the third value, refers to freedom from "alienating material conditions of life and from social servitude to nature, ignorance, other people, misery ...".[30]

Human development as an essential element in development is so important that according to the Human Development Report[31] it has "moved to the centre of the global development debate". Presently it forms the core of the United Nations International Development Strategy for the 1990s.[32] In the Development Report[33] the concept "human development" is regarded as development of the people by the people and for the people. Development of the people means investing in human capabilities, whether in education or health or in other areas, so that they can work productively and creatively. Development for the people means ensuring that economic growth is distributed widely and fairly. Development by the people means giving everyone a chance to participate – allowing access, for example, to productive and remunerative employment. Electricity and a satisfactory water supply, for example, can increase employment opportunities.[34]

A new dimension in human development is environmental concern. Most of the poor, as we have seen, live in rural areas and put great strain upon ecological systems. The poor depend upon the soil for food, upon the rivers for water and upon the forests for fuel. They need these resources on a daily basis and have little choice but to over-use and destroy them in order to survive.[35]

Affirmative action: A gender development approach

Against the background I have sketched concerning (principally) the position of rural African women and an emphasis on

human development as part of development, this section will focus on a specific approach to affirmative action, that of gender development, in order to emancipate rural women from their subordination and assist them in achieving equality, equity and empowerment.

The United Nations Decade for Women (1976–1985) played a crucial part in highlighting the need to consider women and their role when discussing the social and economic development of Third World countries. Women are agents of change, not merely victims. Their role and status are central to changes in population and development. It is now argued that development plans must be re-thought so that women's abilities, rights and needs can be taken into account.

A "gender", rather than a "women's" focus on development, is advocated because women's problems should not be perceived in terms of their sex – in other words, in terms of their biological differences from men – but in terms of their gender. What we have in mind here is the *social* relationship between men and women in which women have been systematically subordinated. The sex approach would lead to an isolated focus on women; a gender focus will emphasize the social position of women in terms of a social construct which, traditionally, has been one of subordination.

A gender approach is based on the assumption that men and women fulfil different roles in society and therefore have different needs. It is this role and needs differentiation that underlies the conceptual rationale for gender planning and defines its long-term goal as the true emancipation of women.

Moser[36] identifies three roles that women perform, namely reproductive, productive and community managing. The reproductive role means the childbearing and rearing responsibilities required to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the labour force. This role includes "the care, socialization and maintenance of individuals throughout their lives to ensure the continuation of society to the next generation".[37] This work does not generate any income. Women's second role, the productive role, consists of work done by women for income, either as a second income or as sole breadwinner. As has been pointed out, 43% of African women are the de jure heads of household in South Africa. Furthermore, in the rural areas from where men traditionally migrate, a large percentage of women are the de facto heads of household. As is well known, gender divisions in labour (example: agricultural production) exist in

rural as well as in urban areas, and continue to reinforce women's subordinate position. Women therefore predominate at the lower end of the labour market.

The third role, that of community managing work, comprises activities concerning the provision of items of collective consumption such as water, health care and education. This is voluntary unpaid work in women's "free time".

The triple role that women perform, which places limitations on them and identifies particular needs to be addressed, should be taken into consideration when affirmative action programmes in terms of gender development are planned. And rural women's affirmative action programmes should be based on rural women's particular prioritized needs or concerns.

Molyneux[38] distinguishes two types of need, strategic and practical gender needs. A strategic need points to a more equal organization of society, which of course would vary from society to society depending upon the cultural and socio-political context. Examples of such needs are the removal of institutionalized discrimination such as rights to own land or access to credit. It is these needs that can empower women and bring about greater equality.

Practical gender needs, on the other hand, are those that are formulated from the concrete conditions women experience – needs such as shelter, clean water, sanitation, electricity, food and health. Although these are required by everybody, they are identified specifically as the practical gender needs of women because of their reproductive role obligations. Women may also have additional needs in terms of income-earning activities, especially if they are sole breadwinners.

A few areas in which affirmative action programmes can help to satisfy the strategic and practical needs of rural women are training and employment, housing, and basic services.

Training and employment

One fundamental problem faced by the majority of low-income and unemployed/unemployable women is the lack of adequate skills. The provision of training, therefore, meets an important practical gender need: that of access to employment. Whether it meets strategic needs depends upon women's economic independence and upon the type of training they receive.[39]

Training courses in health-care and (broad) home economics, which may include the principles of nutrition and household budgeting, can introduce skills to assist women in their reproductive

roles to become better providers within the household, but do not recognize women's productive role, that of workers who work to earn an income. Skills training should therefore also lead to creating income. This would include practical training such as dressmaking and other forms of manual work which would also meet a practical gender need. Very important, however, are literacy classes: literacy provides the potential for access to better living conditions and empowerment, thus increasing self-respect and fulfilling strategic gender needs.

Current stereotypes of what is properly women's or men's work limit women's employment opportunities. It is therefore also essential that women be trained in areas which are traditionally seen as men's work, such as home carpentry and masonry and other trades in the construction field. This will not only widen immediate employment opportunities for women but break down both existing stereotypes and consequent occupational barriers and fulfil strategic gender needs.

A further problem women face in their search for employment is the assumption that men are the main providers for the family. This means that where there is high unemployment, jobs will be found for or given to men before women, despite the fact that many African households in South Africa are headed by women. A correction in both attitude and practice here will certainly meet women's practical and strategic needs.

It is a well-accepted fact that some 70% of women living in the rural areas of developing countries work on the land. This is also true of the rural population in most regions of South Africa. Women have often been excluded from agrarian reform and training programmes because experts have assumed that men are the main agricultural decision makers. This error has resulted in the failure of many agricultural projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Even when included in such programmes, women have difficulty in obtaining credit to assist them with current agricultural production or help them secure new technological inputs. Agricultural training programmes and credit schemes particularly for women should therefore be developed.

A last point concerning employment is the availability of childcare facilities in the community and at the workplace. This assists women in both their reproductive and productive roles and meets practical needs. Moser[40] also emphasizes the necessity for similar facilities at the father's workplace, which would result in fathers also taking some childcare responsibility. This innovation would meet strategic gen-

der needs and simultaneously alleviate women's burden. We might note here that the corporate sector could in the final instance also be involved, especially in extending the training of particular skills to women and in providing the childcare facilities we have mentioned as desirable.

Housing

As has been pointed out, title deeds among Africans in South Africa are almost exclusively in the hands of men. For women, title deeds are not only a strategic gender need ensuring protection for themselves and their children in violent domestic situations, but are necessary to gain access to credit. Without land rights, women cannot provide collateral. Affirmative action should therefore be exercised in the matter of land-ownership rights.

A further problem in many developing countries which Moser[41] mentions is the problem experienced where zoning legislation exists separating residential and business activities. This assumes a separation of productive and reproductive roles. But, as we know, women are often involved in informal-sector activities in their homes. Yet zoning legislation prevents the making and selling of goods in this way, the only solution for women clearly being to do this illegally. Changes in zoning legislation to allow household enterprises would therefore meet the practical gender need of earning an income.

Basic services and environmental protection

In their reproductive role, rural women depend on the resources of wood, water and soil for daily survival, and as such are primary users of the environment. This is increasingly leading to water pollution, soil erosion and the destruction of firewood resources, all of which contribute to the deterioration of the environment. This in turn leads to disease and food shortages which hit women all the harder because it is they who in the main fulfil the reproductive functions in their families. Services such as a clean water supply, electricity and sanitation will prevent further environmental degradation.

I may also mention here that the lack of the above services also makes both housework and childcare harder and more time-consuming, leaving the women little time for productive and community managing work. Van Aardt[42] points out, for example, that it is these time-consuming demands on women's reproductive work that lie behind the incipient failure of the DBSA Farmer Support Programme

in Lebowa. Better access to services thus fulfils both practical and strategic needs; quality of life will be enhanced; standards of living will be raised.

The final question to be addressed, one that is of particular importance if a new issue such as that of gender is to appear on the planning agenda, is: Who should deal with this issue? The most obvious answer is of course government at central level; but equally important are regional and local authorities, since they have a greater awareness of women's particular needs in their own areas.

We should note at this point that because of women's being compelled to balance their triple role, integrative strategies which cut across sectoral lines are required. This cross-sectoral nature of gender development means that action in this area cannot be limited only to the social welfare department as has happened in many developing countries in the past. Government ministries and departments responsible for education, health, labour, justice, communications and information, culture, industry, trade, agriculture and rural development plus finance and planning should all be involved.

Equally important are the role of community organizations, of which two broad types can be distinguished: people's organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[43] People's organizations are democratic growths representing the interests of persons who share a common experience. They are accountable to these members. Their continued existence does not depend upon either outside initiative or funding. Neither are they necessarily confined to grass roots. Through appointed delegates or representatives, they can expand to local, regional and national level (eg the Women's National Coalition).

NGOs on the other hand are voluntary organizations that work with, and often on behalf of, others. Their work and activities are focused on issues and people beyond their own staff and membership. NGOs often have close links with people's organizations, channeling technical advice or financial support as intermediate service organizations. Organizationally, they differ from people's organizations in that they have bureaucratic hierarchies without democratic characteristics.

The distinction we have drawn between the two types of organization is not always rigid. Certain groups might equally well be assigned to either category. NGOs cover a wide spectrum, from small loosely-knit organizations to nationwide federations and international networks. International NGOs are most frequently donor organizations, while national NGOs are

generally service organizations, comprising those who support or cater for the needs of the grassroots. It is because of this particular ability to reach down to the grassroots that NGOs and people's organizations can play a large role in identifying the needs of women.

Implementation

The question arises as to whether entirely separate new institutions should be created within government and NGOs for addressing gender needs or whether such units should be fully incorporated into existing institutions. Staudt[44] points out that the new and separate women's institutions or "machineries" within government and NGOs established during the UN decade of women (1976–1985) did not fulfil expectations. In fact such "machineries" resulted in a reduction in the overall resources reaching women. One of the reasons for this failure was bureaucratic resistance, as existing institutions are political actors in their own right and saw the creation of new structures as a threat. Second, the creation by governments of separate women's "machineries" was more of a symbolic gesture than a true legitimization of women's activities. Without exception these "machineries" were merely welfarist in their orientation.

What seems to be the solution would be the introduction of "gender planners" or specialists in government departments, NGOs and the corporate sector as integrated members of general planning divisions. Coherent policies should then be developed with specific goals, objectives and strategies. Note: it will be of great importance to follow a "bottom-up" approach, communities themselves, and particularly women, being consulted on their needs so as to ensure effective implementation.

Conclusion

Affirmative action goals in South Africa should be the planning and implementation, as a broad strategy, of appropriate and practical development policies, human capacity development being a central focus and being aimed at those groups which are the most disadvantaged. In these development policies specific attention should be given to a gender approach to development by which women, through a process of empowerment, can emancipate themselves.

In a gender approach to development South Africa is in its infancy. Women and gender issues have only really been appearing on agendas since 1992. This does not mean that women were ignored, until

very recently, in development discussion, but that their position and needs are only now coming under the spotlight; and that the particular window of opportunity created in the national transitional process, is presently there to be utilized for the benefit of women – and in the interests of the wider community's wealth and stability.

The cost of ignoring women is great: uncontrolled population growth, high child mortality, a weakened economy, ineffective agriculture, a deteriorating environment, a divided society and a poorer life for all. For women it means unequal opportunities. Investing in women, on the contrary, will make a critical contribution to alleviating poverty and help future generations to make better use of both resources and opportunities. Differentiating between women's practical and strategic needs (and consequently allowing for the drawing up of two different sets of needs and plans) is the most important principle.

It seems most likely to the writer that making women a development priority will require from decision makers a major change of attitude.

Notes and references

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2   Quoted in *Productivity SA*, Jan/Feb 1993.

3   Albie Sachs, "Affirmative action and good government", Alistair Berkeley Memorial Lecture, 14–15 November, 1991.

4   Quoted in *Affirmative Action*, 1993, p 8.

5   W Thomas, "Affirmative action as a development tool in the South African business interface", in C Adams (ed), op cit, p 60.

6   *Mayibuye*, August 1991, p 28.

7   Trust Bank, *Econovision*, May/June 1990; Gini coefficients are aggregate inequality measures and can vary anywhere from xero (perfect equality) to one (perfect inequality). The Gini coefficient for countries with highly unequal income distributions typically lies between 0,5 and 0,7 while for countries with relatively equitable distributions it is of the order of 0,2 to 0,35. South Africa's Gini Index is 0,68, the largest ever estimated. In unequal Latin American societies, Brazil, for example, measures 0,61 and Honduras 0,63.

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22 South African Institute of Race Relations, *Fast facts*, no 2, February 1994, p 3.

23 *Sowetan* (Johannesburg), 8 June 1993.

24 *Prodder Newsletter*, March 1993, p 5.

25 M van Aardt, *op cit*.

26 Between 1986 and 1991 the population of South Africa (excluding the former independent homelands) grew at an average of 1,9% a year. The annual growth rate for Africans is 2,1%. The population growth rate is almost twice that of growth in the GDP, South African Institute of Race Relations, *op cit*, pp 87–88.

27 UNDP, *Human Development Report 1992*, New York: OUP, 1992.

28 M P Todaro, *Economics for a developing world*, New York: Longman, 1992, p 100.

29 *Ibid*.

30 *Ibid*, p 101.

31 UNDP, *op cit*.

32 The ANC's *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (1994) also contains a strong component of human development emphasizing human resource development in terms of education, training, and meeting basic needs such as those for housing, water, electricity and health care.

33 UNDP, *op cit*.

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35 UNDP, *op cit*, p 2.

36 C O N Moser, *Gender planning and development*, London: Routledge, 1993, pp 27–36.

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38 M Molyneux, "Mobilization without emancipation? Women's interests, state and revolution in Nicaragua", *Feminist Studies*, vol 11, no 2, 1985, pp 232–233.

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Tug of war in Ghana: The centralizing features of decentralization

Dr Eric Acheampong, a recent PhD graduate of Cambridge University, examines contemporary political decentralization in Ghana.

GHANA

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
SINCE the implementation in 1988/89 of Ghana's latest decentralization programme by the erstwhile Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government, interest has been growing in one simple question: has there, or has there not been real decentralization? The source of this interest is traceable to the programme's official char-acter as a strategy for political reform, especially in the matter of tilting power in favour of the people. The introduction of the programme at a time when both bilateral and multilateral donors were calling for political reform in the developing world appeared to indicate a movement away from what Haynes has called a "development dictatorship".[1] But Ayee's discussion of decentralization under the PNDC and his (forthcoming) analysis of the impact of the programme indicate that it has reinforced existing power relationships rather than empowering the people.[2] In similar vein, Haynes has pointed out government's anxiety to decentralize political power – coupled with its failure to inject decentralized structures with sufficient political and economic autonomy. Six years after the inauguration of the District Assemblies (DAs) in 1989, and despite the momentous shift from the dictatorial politics of the PNDC to a constitutional democracy in January 1993, the centralization of political power appears not to have eased off: the gap between the theory and practice of decentralization remains; and so does the contradiction between what we can only call the centralizing features of decentralization and government's portrayal of the programme as a manifestation of its commitment to

participatory democracy and the grant of power to the people.

This article is not another study of the PNDC's decentralization policy in terms of motives and general political-socioeconomic impact[3] but one that seeks to pursue the question of how the policy affects relations between central and district levels of government. Its purpose is to examine this balance of political power by focusing on the character of central-local relations fostered under the decentralization programme. In pursuit of this objective, and to project the political significance of Ghana's decentralization, the article does not make a distinction between "decentralization" and "administrative reform", two concepts which are interwoven in the Ghanaian programme, but prefers to draw attention to the political content of both.

A theoretical perspective

To emphasize the importance of looking into the state of political power relationships between the central government and district political authorities, it will be necessary to consider the true meaning of decentralization. I will however approach the meaning of this concept from the perspective of the forms it takes rather than attempt definition in vacuo. I am not here strictly adhering to traditional methodologies; my aim is to provide a framework in which an analysis of the central-local relationships fostered by the Ghanaian case will be meaningful.

Decentralization involves the delegation of authority for the operation of public functions from the central government or

its agencies to lower levels.[4] In general, the term is used to refer to a transfer of power for decision making from the nation's capital to the periphery, or to groups each having authority within a specific area of the state: it is thus the act of "reversing the concentration of administration of a single centre and conferring powers on local government".[5] This delegation of authority and power, central to the concept of decentralization, can be achieved in two ways: devolution and deconcentration. Devolution refers to the conferment upon formally constituted local bodies or agencies of the legal powers to discharge specific functions. Under devolution, the determination of policies and supervision of certain functions are transferred either to political subdivisions or local bodies which have a substantial measure of autonomy, and, within the context of a unitary state, control of local affairs.[6] Autonomy usually extends to staff and financial resources and the allocation of material resources. Deconcentration, on the other hand, refers to the delegation of authority from some central department of staff at local level. The delegated authority, which is managerial or administrative, is authority for the discharge of specific functions that are to be executed by field officials on behalf of the central authority.[7] Under deconcentration, the exercise of supervision by the central authority is paramount.

Either of these two forms of decentralization can be employed for the same end, despite their differences of principle and practice.[8] Both are political rather than merely organizational. Devolution invokes certain political images: the sharing of governmental power by a central ruling group with other groups, each having jurisdiction over a specific area of the state; democratic participation in the affairs of the locality; and local government in which formal decision making is exercised by locally elected councillors or officials. The administrative reform inherent in deconcentration, however, brings out the political element in this form of decentralization. It is a political progress designed to adjust the power relationship between a bureaucracy and other elements in society.[9] It is embarked upon when existing bureaucratic arrangements are seen to be incompatible with (or impede) the achievement of political goals. More revealing about the political content of administrative reform is the influence of central government in the resultant administrative system. In a developing country the decisions of field officers in a deconcentrated setting may *not* be influenced by local input, owing to a variety of factors that exclude local – in particu-

lar, rural – people from the decision making process. As Mawhood argues, pressures from the central government can cause such decisions to conform to broader political goals.[10]

The apparent congruence between "devolution" and "deconcentration" makes it easy for political leaders to employ decentralization as a method for increasing the power of the centre or eroding that of the decentralized structures. Further, the distinction between administration and politics becomes blurred, possibly disappearing altogether. In the final analysis, decentralization has by this time been transformed into a tool for centralization, a phenomenon common in the developing world.

Ghana's current decentralization programme

Successive Ghanaian governments have been attracted to decentralization as a means of reforming the country's administrative system. The search for effective administration has taken the form of government-instituted commissions and committees whose mandate has been to enquire into the political and administrative relations between the centre and the periphery and make recommendations for reform. Since independence in 1957, such public bodies have included the Greenwood Commission (1957), Van Lare Commission (1958), Mills-Odoi Commission (1967), Siriboe Commission (1968)[11] – all of which expressed concern at the high level of centralized authority in Ghana and argued for a decentralized system that would meld citizens, government and administration in an organic union.

The Mills-Odoi and Siriboe Commissions appointed by the National Liberation Council government (1966–1969) deserve special mention for their impact on subsequent attempts at decentralization. The former was of the view that there should be a radical decentralization of responsibility for the management of affairs. Pursuant to that view, it recommended the merger of the civil service and local government to provide a unified machinery of government at district level. This was to take the form of district authorities, with executive powers, operating under the control of district councils.[12] In agreeing with the position of the Mills-Odoi Commission on decentralization, the Siriboe Commission proposed a structure of local government which could best be described as three-tiered, consisting of regional, district and area/town/local councils. Considered together with the Mills-Odoi report, however, there

emerged a four-tiered structure of regional, district, and local councils and town and village development committees[13] to replace the single-tier structure of local government in the Nkrumah period (1957–1966).

The district councils were intended to be the basic unit of local government, responsible for the usual local government activities revolving around the provision and maintenance of markets, lorry parks, schools, and health and sanitation facilities. In a radical departure from the old system, district councils were also to coordinate the activities of the field agencies of many government departments, including those of health, education, agriculture, treasury and public works. More significantly, control over these agencies was to pass from the central government to the new district councils.[14] These councils were to be made up of between 21 and 27 councillors, two-thirds of whom were to be elected, the remainder being chosen from local chiefs. A district chief executive was to undertake overall supervision and management of the district council.

Since the population of each district would number at least 100 000, local councils (the third tier) were considered necessary in order to increase popular participation. They were to have areas of authority coterminous with the traditional areas of jurisdiction of paramount or divisional chiefs within the district. These local councils, like the district council, would comprise both elected and traditional representatives.[15] As well as deriving their power from the district council, certain functions were delegated to them, including the provision of services and the identification of projects that would benefit a large number of towns and villages. The inclusion of this third tier was to accommodate traditional chiefs in local government arrangements, a move strongly favoured by the Mills-Odoi Commission. The Commission was of the opinion that any system of government at local level should derive its strength from existing traditional and customary institutions, particularly the strong social framework provided by the system of traditional chiefs and the lively sense of communal self-help and self-reliance existing within that framework.[16]

The town and village development committees created in 1951 and incorporated into the tiered structure, were to function in their usual manner – organizing communal labour for small-scale projects like lorry parks, schools and village markets. The position of the district council as the fulcrum of the new local government structure would inhibit the capa-

city of town and village development committees to prove an effective (albeit small) vehicle of popular involvement in local affairs. The origin of this deficiency could be traced to the Mills-Odoi Commission which had been interested in fusing the local government service and the civil service into one district authority. This diminished importance of town and village development committees in local government arrangements contrasts with the expressed hope that their activities would become more effective through being part of what was supposedly a new and coordinated district organization.[17]

At the apex of the entire structure were the regional councils, consultative and deliberative bodies but ones which were to serve primarily as planning organizations and also be responsible for the overall coordination of development in the districts. The establishment in 1968 of regional planning committees in each region was thus to provide the framework within which the execution of development programmes could be effectively monitored at regional level.[18] The location of the planning committees at regional level was rather misplaced. The pivotal role of the district councils could have motivated the attachment of the planning committees to these councils, which in turn could have allowed village development committees to directly benefit from their proximity to the planning machinery.

The reports of the commissions appointed by the NLC together provided what Harris calls "a detailed general model of decentralized administration"[19] that was to influence future reforms in the country's administration. But attempts at decentralization in the NLC period and later in the 1970s failed to register any appreciable change in the balance of power between the centre and the local level, for reasons ranging from non-implementation to structural deficiencies.[20] As with all Ghanaian governments, decentralization revolved round district councils that had no effective power. The centralist character of government thus persisted in a succession of regimes. It is perhaps not unfair to emphasize that decentralization policies as pursued by post-colonial governments were not genuine attempts to reform public administration in Ghana, or to redress political power relationships between the central government and structures below it, but were rather a means of political control.

Against this background, the most comprehensive effort since independence to reorganize administration at local level was undertaken by the PNDC government when it implemented its decentralization

programme in 1988. The programme aimed at reforming the government machine to bring about qualitative changes in the country's administration, including "a systematic devolution of power and control functions from Ministries and Departments in Accra to district assemblies".[21] The guiding principles here were efficiency and effectiveness in administration, both being particularly aimed at rural development administration.

The other prominent feature of this programme was its political objective. After a failed attempt in 1982–1984 to involve people in government and make power accessible to them through community and workplace associations (defence committees), the PNDC saw decentralization as the means to revive its supposed commitment to participatory democracy and collective decision making at grassroots.[22] The recourse to decentralization to promote democratic reforms was articulated in government documents, as paragraph 1.4 of the Blue Book (which was the working document of the decentralization programme) clearly shows:

> In order to democratise State power and advance participatory democracy and collective decision-making at the grass roots, there is the need to set up decentralised political and administrative authorities with elected representatives of the people. The decentralised authorities will be the bodies exercising State power as the people's local government.[23]

The policy objectives of the PNDC decentralization programme depict a blend of both political and administrative decentralization. The previous attempts at decentralization mentioned above had been more interested in the latter – that is, in changes to the structure of the government machine – than in diverting government's political power to lower levels of administration. In contrast, decentralization in the late 1980s aimed at providing a structure capable of discharging efficiently the developmental functions entrusted to it, while at the same time maintaining and pursuing its democratic elements.

DAs in each of the country's 110 districts are the key institutions of the decentralization programme and embody all its policy objectives in administration, development, and democratization. A DA is a political authority providing an avenue for decentralized administration and development: a system capable of not only effective planning and implementation but also one which will make possible grassroots participation in decision making. The DAs are the mid tier of a three-tiered structure

and have replaced the former district councils, abolished in March 1982. They are composed of locally elected representatives who provide two-thirds of the membership and appointees who take up the remaining one-third. These members are joined by the district secretary, renamed the district chief executive (DCE) – the government's representative in the district – who is chairman of the Assembly's Executive Committee, and by the district administrative officer (DAO), a career civil servant serving as secretary to the DA.

The powers of an Assembly to pursue its functions were enshrined in the establishing Local Government Law, PNDC Law 207. Thus each DA has power to prepare its recurrent and capital budgets for approval by the central government, make bye-laws, and raise its development revenue through taxes, licences and fees. The financial powers of the DAs extend to 22 "decentralized" departments in the district (see below) whose budgets are to be controlled by the district treasury.

Regional coordinating councils (RCCs) form the upper tier. The membership of the RCC is made up of elements deriving their authority from the centre – the regional secretary (minister) as chairman, his or her deputy ex-officio, all presiding members (speakers) of district assemblies in the region, all district secretaries in the region, and the regional administrative officer (a career civil servant appointed by government on the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission) as secretary. The functions of the RCC, as outlined in Section 113(2) of Law 207, include drawing up and coordinating the integrated plans and programmes of DAs in the region and bringing them in harmony with national development plans and priorities. In addition, the RCC disburses to the districts public funds approved by the government. These are mostly grants-in-aid given to the DAs to help finance specific community infrastructure such as schools and clinics. Furthermore, the RCC monitors the implementation of programmes and projects within the region and evaluates their performance. The supervisory role of the RCC in the decentralization programme is evident in section 113(1) of Law 207 which proclaims that "a regional Co-ordinating Council shall monitor, coordinate and evaluate the functions of the District Assemblies in the region". The RCC exists to ensure that the district authorities operate within limits defined by government through Law 207 and can therefore guarantee some measure of supervision from the centre.

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The lower tier is made up of two sub-district structures, town or area councils and Unit Committees. The membership, powers and functions of this tier were not specified by Law 207 but left to the Secretary (Minister) of Local Government to outline in future legislative instruments. Their functions are developmental, some of which are to be performed with the approval and direction of the DA.[24] These Councils and Committees are yet to be established in all 110 districts owing largely to conflicts concerning the persons or organizations to whom they should be accountable (see below).

There can be little doubt that the DAs, in theory, represent a decentralized system: they exhibit the key features of both devolution and deconcentration. They are not only local authorities with power to make bye-laws, raise revenue and dispense resources for development, but also administrative structures having delegated power for decision making. Turning for the moment to democratization, particularly in its relation to local development, the DAs were contrived to provide opportunities for ordinary people to participate in decision making and the general processes of development. An equally important appeal was the increased capacity of a decentralized administrative system to improve the planning and implementation of local, in particular rural, development programmes and projects. The devolution of power effected through the DAs was also seen to facilitate the responsiveness of government agencies and organizations to local people's needs and preferences.[25] All this progressive thinking and planning took place in recognition of the need to reform the centralized and bureaucratic administrative system on democratic lines before an effective and efficient delivery of projects and services at local level could take place.

Such a drive to change the *status quo* and introduce new relationships into the political and administrative processes invariably called for a merger of the decentralization programme with civil service reform. The latter envisaged the "decentralization" of 22 government departments/organizations to district level as a means of improving the quality of administration through the transfer of administrative and management skills to rural areas.[26]

These are all theoretical objectives whose planned implementation within one framework set these current decentralization proposals above and ahead of anything proposed previously. There is however the need to move our analyses away from theoretical considerations to an examination of the *consequences* of the decentralization programme. Haynes suggested two possibilities regarding the future of the assemblies:

- that they would be a mere "talking shop" without an important, independent role; or

- that they could become an influential tier in a new democratic system.[27]

The current asymmetry between the central and district structures of power, and the political and administrative problems of the "district focus" strategy of reform, appear to have confounded any prospects the current decentralization proposals might have held as a meaningful arena for power diffusion. This is the subject of the following section, in which we adopt a study of central-local relations as our vantage point.

Central-local relations

Part of the stated objective of current decentralization in Ghana, as we have already indicated, has been to reform the administrative system and introduce structures and procedures compatible with the broad political goal of giving power to the people. Important questions are: How has this goal been pursued in practice? and how has it affected central-local relations? I shall attempt answers by analysing the nature of the relationship that exists between the DAs and the central government. And to be able to do this in some detail I will present the assemblies as both administrative and political bodies and break down the relationship into two related issues, autonomy and control from the centre.

The autonomy of the district assemblies

There is a powerful case for local autonomy. It allows for discretion in decision making and thus encourages boldness, innovation and imagination in determining local affairs. The volume of responsibility entrusted to the DAs requires that they pursue it in a way consistent with their role as instruments of a popular democracy striving for development. Besides reducing dependence on scarce central government resources, autonomy will allow the DAs to draw up policies and plans and implement them without delay. Limited dependence upon the centre will draw more local people to the assemblies as the latters' visible role and influence will tie in closely with the communities' self-help spirit. This closeness with the community (engendered by autonomy) will then make the DAs more responsive to the people's needs and aspirations. Accountability which in certain circumstances tends towards the centre, will naturally be transferred to the people. Local autonomy will also enable the people to exercise some control over affairs deliberated by the district authority. This can be achieved through the expression of community feelings concerning services provided by that authority. The ultimate advantage of autonomy is that it makes possible the active participation of people in local matters and hence makes for responsible local government.

To start with: the position of the DAs as the highest political authority at district level[28] implied that government was prepared to grant them autonomy. The government's desire to introduce decentralized democracy and impress upon Ghanaians its commitment to democratic reform likewise favourably disposed the DAs towards relative autonomy. An examination of the establishing law, PNDC Law 207, reveals a number of features which theoretically safeguard that autonomy. These can be summarized as those that transfer powers (along with means and competence) to the assemblies for their efficient and effective operation.

The introduction of the DAs thus signalled government's intention to decentralize a range of political responsibilities to district level and give communities power to influence the mobilization and utilization of resources in their locality. Moreover, the electorate's choice of representatives does not only give the assemblies the legitimacy to operate on behalf of the people; it also secures for them a political space within which to operate with minimum or no interference from the centre. For instance, no matter how displeased the government might be about the conduct of an assembly member, only his constituents can remove him from the assembly and elect a replacement.[29]

But autonomy, though necessary, does not make the assemblies self-governing authorities. Evidently, the government, which champions the interests of the state, is superior to all local authorities. Nor, in the Ghanaian context, can the DAs claim greater autonomy than they may have at present. Such a claim cannot be sustained on the grounds of local or national Ghanaian tradition. For the DAs are a creation entirely of government design and legislation. Therefore, the government, in giving them a measure of autonomy and independence through Law 207, has done so out of necessity and more as a concession than as a right. We repeat: in *any* system of government,

local authorities cannot be anything but subordinate to their regional or national government. Jackson's summary of the question is that "Local authorities cannot be really independent, for that would make them states and take them outside the field of local government".[30] Now, although the DAs, like any local government system, may be the creation of the central government, yet circumstances operating in the country perforce determine the extent of the limitations placed upon them. In the early 1960s, when democratic centralism was supreme, local government in Ghana exemplified the will and decisions of the central government.[31] In the current attempt at democratic decentralization, however, how does the will of the people stand in relation to the will of the government? Attention must now be turned to central government control over the DAs in order to see how supervision and pressure from the centre have turned the balance.

Central government control

The importance of the DAs for political change gives the impression that anyone who argues for any form of control or supervision will be looked upon as betraying an ideal, this ideal being the creation of autonomous political authorities at district level. Now the very scale of the functions introduced by the development of an extensive system of decentralization – transfer of responsibility for local development to the district political authority as well as the administration of the district – requires a different attitude towards the issue of central supervision. As indicated above, two considerations are uppermost in arguing for a reasonable level of autonomy for the DAs. The first consideration is that unless local authorities operate autonomously, they cannot be efficient in the pursuit of their goals. The other consideration is the need to involve people at grass roots in the management of their affairs with little or no encumbrances emanating from the centre. The central argument we are following, then, is that local government units should not be interfered with as this will be inimical to their proper functioning. In the specific context of the DAs, however, whatever philosophy may be held by those who subscribe to the principle of local authorities being unimpeded by central government and its agencies must be tempered by the realities of the situation. For interference from elsewhere cannot be ruled out of local government unless there is adequate democratic control and understanding to match that control. It ma/ certainly be conceded

that the people, theoretically, will recognize the bad representative and at an early opportunity exercise their right of recall or operate the ultimate sanction of ensuring his or her defeat at the next election. But this may not happen in rural communities where the people can hardly be said to be well informed about the processes of (grass roots) democracy. Moreover, it will take time for these people to gain experience and enable them to establish desirable norms of behaviour for their representatives.

It is, therefore, as a result of the ineffectiveness of democratic control and of the importance of the cumulative operation of all DAs to the country's wellbeing that reasonable degrees of control, supervision and guidance must be favourably viewed. If there can be any preliminary question about central control and monitoring of local authorities, it concerns their *relevance*. Control and supervision by the centre are necessary at three levels: first, in really important matters of the principles of administration; second, where uniformity in the country is essential; and third, where matters dealt with are in dispute between different local authorities. As arbiter and guardian of the public against gross irregularity, injustice or corruption, central government action is not only useful but essential. And given the paternalistic role of government in Ghana, central control and supervision assume added significance. The government's supervisory interest in the DAs is to ensure that their economic activities are consistent with broad national economic policy as embodied in the structural adjustment programme (SAP). An example: fiscal decentralization, an essential component of the decentralization programme,[32] would improve domestic resource mobilization through expanded tax bases. On the other hand, government would like to ensure that this does not compromise fundamental aims such as the efficient tax and expenditure systems envisaged by the SAP. It will therefore act to guard against local authorities relying on central government grants-in-aid and so causing a major deviation from the policy of controlled public spending. The ultimate economic impetus for such control is that the creation of grassroots institutions for development administration and popular democracy should never derail efforts at economic recovery.

Politically, control from the centre is more significant. It guards against the disintegration of government machinery, conserves national unity, and maintains the supremacy of the central government. The DAs may appear to perform the functions

of a modern government; but government officials have made it clear that Law 207 was not intended to turn the country's districts into independent republics.[33] Districts remain an integral part of the machinery of central government, and so their powers and functions are subject to the overriding authority of the centre. Such direction and control are necessary to harmonize the activities of local authorities with the political purposes of the government. It often happens that the interest of the people is projected as the driving force behind central control over local government. Thus the fear that the DAs might infringe their people's economic and civil liberties in raising revenue, passing bye-laws and pursuing general development activities partly underlines the need for government to limit the exercise of their powers. This is particularly important in a country such as Ghana where democratic practices have not yet taken root.

It is in the above context that we should view government's charge that "District Assemblies do not have unlimited powers".[34] How is control over the DAs exercised? Besides established administrative procedures, such as approval of budgets and bye-laws, control takes place through three major agents: the DCE, the appointed members, and the scope of responsibility entrusted to the DAs.

The first check on the assemblies is the presence of the DCE. The DCE's political role is paramount. Any duty he or she performs in and out of the assembly is defined primarily by the central position he or she occupies in the political life of the district. In the DA he or she represents the government; and his/her office is a conduit for transmitting central government concerns to the district at large. He/she therefore has dual allegiance to the government and to the people (through their assembly), an allegiance which, because of his/her office, is heavily tilted towards the former. He/she is the most influential member of the assembly, as reflected by his/her presidency of its nerve centre, the executive committee. His/her pre-eminent position is not really challenged by the presiding member. While Law 207 (in sections 8, 10 (2) and 12 (1)0 is specific concerning the role of the DCE in the assembly, it is not so about the role of the presiding member: only the creation of the office, the term, and the election procedures are mentioned (in section 4). Disagreements have arisen about the interpretation of the powers granted each office. A presiding member who has secured his membership of the DA by election, as opposed to one appointed, is inclined to see himself as wielding more

power in the assembly than the DCE, whose future political life is tied to the fortunes of the government in power and is not dependent upon the existence of the DA. The DCE, naturally, sees his position in the power struggle, in a totally different light as giving *him* the upper hand. Statements in 1991 by the Secretary (Minister) for Local Government, Mr Kwamena Ahwoi, fuelled rather than resolved the conflict. According to Mr Ahwoi, the authority of the presiding member is restricted to the place of assembly where he/she chairs the assembly's meetings and submits decisions taken to the DCE.[35] There need be no astonishment then that the holders of these two offices found it difficult to accommodate each other in the Anlo, Denu, Akatsi (Volta Region) and Ejura-Sekyedumasi (Ashanti Region) DAs.[36]

The control exercised by some DCEs is manifest in their confrontational attitudes to DA members which, in the Adansi West District, contributed to low attendance at assembly meetings. The following statement by the deputy district administrative officer of the Afigya-Sekyere Assembly vividly shows the depth of the DCE's influence.

> When a suggestion is made by the District Secretary [DCE] it is difficult to kick against it. In his absence, the situation during Assembly meetings is different: everybody is free to speak their mind. The presence of the District Secretary is detested by almost all the Assembly members. Those who do not acknowledge his influence are the illiterates.[37]

The influence of the DCE in decision making is not in doubt. For instance, in the Amansie East District, in 1991, the district secretary influenced decisions reached; his counterpart in the Sekyere West district used his discretion on certain occasions to distribute development materials.[38] This being so, it seems valid to conclude that the consensual style of decision making prevalent in most DAs is merely a matter of convenience. There is, then, a tendency for assembly members to regard decisions as being made in the interests of the DCE and the government, rather than in those of the public.

Central control over local authorities is not necessarily evil. However, when it forsakes its proper sphere of constructive control and meddles with the details of local government processes, it assumes functions that are not only unnecessary but in the long run detrimental to the freedom of the local community to pursue its interests within the local authority framework. That the position of the dis-

trict secretary was brought to the attention of the Constituent Assembly which drew up the 1992 Constitution, and that there was introduced into the Constitution a subsequent provision (in article 242) for an appointed DCE to replace him, attest to the DCE's contentious role in Ghana's decentralization. Undoubtedly, the current practice of the president's appointing the DCE, with the prior approval of two-thirds of the members of the assembly present and voting, is a simple way to get round district secretaries who proved a liability to their DAs. But this leaves important questions unanswered. How can DCEs reconcile their position as "government representative" with their accountability to the DA whose members have voted to ratify their appointment? And how does the managerial and administrative authority suggested by their title affect their political authority? A DCE can only assuage power struggles and central government influence in the DAs but never eradicate them completely. Given the role of chief executives in previous local government reforms, any official who replaces the district secretary will not merely be a titular head but will eventually become a power broker.[39]

The second check on the assemblies was sought through appointed membership. Though the government was keen to emphasize the skills appointees could offer, the real motive behind their inclusion in the DAs was political: it was to give them "political direction" (which in the language of the day meant nothing more than serving as government watch-dogs) and ensure that the presence of the government was felt in the assembly forum.[40] The government hoped that appointees, like district secretaries, would give some certainty that the DAs would operate within the confines of central government policy. Every government embarking on a decentralization programme has to contend with the balance between local autonomy and central control, for the sake (we repeat) of political stability, coordination of development projects, and harmony between local and national aspirations. In Ghana, however, the problem has not really been one of maintaining a balance but one of securing closer government supervision and control. Such an encumbrance clearly does not advance any devolution of decision making to supposedly democratic and largely autonomous bodies like the DAs.

It is pertinent to point out that the government's hope of using appointees to its own advantage has not fully materialized. Some have lived up to their image of providing expertise to their assembly. Others have been the most active critics of the

local administration.[41] Nevertheless, despite some appointees having successfully confounded the public view of them as "government agents", one cannot fail to perceive the real threat to the autonomy of the assemblies posed, as a class, by these appointees. Evidence has began to emerge in the Ho and Keta districts that the pro-government stance of some appointed members has not disposed them to a harmonious relationship with their elected counterparts.[42]

The third significant means of central control has been the scope of responsibility assigned the DAs. Like the old local councils, the responsibility of the DAs is restricted to local issues. They can make recommendations to the central government, but through official "clarification", directives and exhortations, the assemblies have been made to understand that their domain of influence is the district. On matters that can even remotely influence national policy they have no power.[43] In so far as the practical powers of the assemblies are concerned, decentralization has been turned into centralization. In fact, with the exception of assisting local development through the provision of finance and materials, the DAs have not, in practice, been entrusted with any major responsibilities at all: they remain on the sidelines of central government activity. Their confinement to local issues has constrained their link role. They transmit the purposes of government to the people. But their ability to persuade the government to modify its policies to conform to popular opinion has been severely curtailed.

The limited scope of the DAs has not changed with time and circumstance. Any hope of their having some impact on national affairs has not been raised by the change from military dictatorship to parliamentary democracy. Such a hope was, on the contrary, dashed by President Rawlings's assertion during his first address before Parliament in January 1993, following Ghana's return to constitutional government, that Parliament was the only proper place for debating national issues.[44] In these circumstances, what we have is the decentralization of structures without the real power that should go with it.

The assemblies do not influence national policy. But government has the power to influence their decisions. The scope of their operations is defined by law promulgated by government. But the law has not set out, in detail, what the DAs can and cannot do. And the interpretation of the powers of the DAs rests with the government. Thus any act of an assembly which the government considers

to be irreconcilable with the law is declared illegal. This procedure has been used to set aside certain DA decisions even where they were in the interest of their communities.[45] Clearly, the dangers of excessive central control do not lie merely in the loss of autonomy but in the *implications* of that loss to community interest and people's power. The DAs do not appear to adequately live up to either of these ideals. They simply have not struck a proper balance between the government and local communities in the actual exercise of power.

A sinister dimension of the power relationship is the exploitation of the district political authorities by central government. DAs have been manipulated to appear to influence policy when it has suited the government. In 1990, when the government-controlled National Commission for Democracy (NCD) embarked on a search for a stable political system for the country, the government canvassed the assemblies for their public expression of support for a system of government that would use them as a basis of non-partisan representation. The views of the assemblies were sought as forums in every region of the country, and the favourable sentiments of individual assembly members were reported in national dailies as representing the view of entire assemblies. Though the government of the day, the PNDC, failed in its desire to use the assemblies to legitimize government's self-seeking policy, the attempt was reminiscent of the earlier one to use people's defence committees to build a non-party representative political system for Ghana.

In addition to the above structural factors, the less than adequate fusion of decentralization with civil service reform has not enhanced the autonomy and power of the assemblies. The ministries and departments centralized to district level were envisaged as instruments of a new decentralized administration that would strengthen impulses from below. But despite the rhetoric about placing the decentralized arms of the civil service under the authority of the DAs and making them effective administrative tools, they have remained for the most part ineffective, because administrative decentralization has not been carried to its logical conclusion. Responsibility for specific programmes and action, related to staffing for example, remains with the parent ministries; and since departmental policies still emanate from the capital, the DAs lack the executive power to coordinate the activities of the "decentralized" departments. In short, since civil reform has not gone far

enough to extricate district branches from the control of central ministries, the district can exercise no effective control.

One would also expect the town/area councils and unit committees below the district level to boost the power of the DAs as they were brought into being to facilitate participation at grass roots level and make concrete the government's commitment to give "power to the people".[46] However, their very design is apt to make them instruments of control. For instance, non-elected members of these sub-district structures are dominated by (members of) the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) who derive their authority directly from the government. As regards accountability, a government directive (in Legislative Instrument 1514, 1991) placed the unit committees under the authority of the CDR, though their developmental, local government functions are supposed to be supervised by the DA. Where area councils have been formed, some assembly members have refused to serve on them, because they see the CDR representative as usurping their authority.[47] In these ways the orientation of the town/area councils and unit committees has not only taken real participation away from the people and their representatives but has also perpetuated the image of the central government as the repository of real power.

Conclusion

The organization of a system of local government that can effectively mediate central-local political relations has proved to be particularly problematic in Ghana, but that has not discouraged the PNDC government from turning to decentralization to assist it in reaching that same objective.

Whatever may have been the motivation behind their establishment, the DAs have to date projected a threefold image. First, they serve as a tool at district level for (rural) development administration. Second, they are agencies for local government. They are essentially a political structure for civic administration, helping to make the purposes of government understood at local level. The third image of the assemblies is that they should open the way to democracy, provide opportunities for popular involvement in local government, function with well-defined powers and responsibilities, and act in harmony with other tiers of local government and indeed with the entire political system. This understanding of the DAs does not imply that they must be institutions with absolute autonomy, but rather that they should be building blocks of a

stable democratic relationship between government and people. The emphasis on power sharing, though hardly devoid of rhetoric, gives the assemblies a distinctive character.

The real role of district political authorities in the new system of decentralization is not clear. From the perspective of rural people, the assemblies provide a welcome opportunity for association with the national political authority and a unique vehicle for advancing their political position in society. From a critical perspective, they have yet to develop a distinctive role of their own, clearly differing from the old system of local councils which had existed under British and previous post-colonial governments. This is so because centre-local political power relationships have not yet changed to a significant degree, despite the inclusion of administrative and political functions in the new system. At local level, it is the authority of the centre that is still felt, exerted through agencies such as the government's official representative, the CDR and other structures created by the PNDC.

A large measure of autonomy is necessary if the DAs are to provide opportunities for political competition and ensure improved relations between government and people. It would certainly be unrealistic to expect the DA system to change the political landscape overnight; but it possessed, at its inception, the potential to offer people at grassroots viable channels of participation in both local and national affairs and thus a distant opportunity to break the central hold on power.

The dominant influence of the central government within the framework of the DAs stands in stark contrast to the tone of political reform embarked upon the PNDC. But this should not be surprising in view of the factors that prompted the setting up of district-level political authorities. As was evident in the regime's dealings with "populist" structures in the early 1980s, and implied in the rationale behind the appointed membership element, the government's biggest problem was how to pursue a process of political reform that would not hold the seeds of the government's own demise. The pressures for political reform, therefore, coupled with a growing political opposition deemed irreconcilable with the government's self-perceived messianic mission to develop the country, led to what Haynes has aptly described as "decentralisation in safety".[48] The transformation of the PNDC into the ruling National Democratic Congress party has not diffused its fear of losing its grip on power. As argued by Ayee, President Rawlings manipulated the constitutionally

laid down procedure for the nomination of DCEs in order to consolidate his rule.[49] Nor has the entrenched interest in centralized political power, reflected in the PNDC's earlier restrictive conception of decentralization as a devolution of central administrative authority to local level for the purpose of grass roots participation in local development,[50] disposed the constitutional government which assumed power in January 1993 to re-examine the position of the DAs in the central-local power politics of Ghana. The 1992 Constitution, in Chapter 20, upheld the basic thrusts of decentralization, but failed to introduce far-reaching modifications into the DA system.

The experience of the DAs to date adds to the strong body of evidence that decentralization does not necessarily result in a genuine devolution of power and authority to local structures. In Kenya, the District Development Committee (DDC) component of the decentralized Special Rural Development Programme established in the 1960s was generally relegated to a subordinate position in planning, merely approving project design rather than actively participating in the design process itself. It was also observed that the DDCs tended to serve primarily as a forum at the disposal of government officials.[51] Similarly, the devolution of power for rural development administration under Tanzania's *ujamaa* meant less than direct local participation in the planning process.[52]

The implementation of a decentralization programme that will achieve its political goals is bound to be influenced by the very nature of decentralization. Conyers points out that decentralization is a political process that involves a change in the distribution of power and influence.[53] Authoritarian regimes, and even constitutionally elected governments with strong interests in centralization, are not prepared to establish what might become centres of opposition. Thus when decentralized structures are created, governments do not devolve much power and authority to them: political influences in and on decentralization tend to erode the actions and the values that would drive local institutions to effective roles in the power game.

It is clearly not enough to create an institutional structure with democratic rationale without tackling the basic issue of changing the pattern of political relationships, that is, the relationship between citizens and central government. The pragmatic implications of Ghana's decentralization programme demanded considerable change in the relationship between the district political authority and the national government. Now, from a practical point of view, problems exist as a result of the creation of a DA system without its creators having had the confidence to merge it with a democratic national government. What type of formal linkage then should obtain between the DAs and the highest echelon of power? With the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution, Ghana's political framework is no longer a civil-military dictatorship but one modelled on parliamentary democracy, a system that upholds the supremacy of Parliament. The question that now begs to be resolved is how to comfortably situate the central-local relations structured around the DAs within the orbit of parliamentary democracy. What *may* eventually emerge is a functional democracy that postulates an organically linked structure from assemblies at district level to Parliament and promises a great deal of improvement in central-local relations.

My normative concern with the compatibility of district political authorities with the parliamentary set up at national level will not appeal to the pure empiricist who is content with indications that local institutions can assume important positions in the country's political system. It does seem of course that some sort of link between local politics on the one hand and national politics on the other is bound to develop. But this raises the following questions: Should this linkage be formalized in one way or the other? or should it be left to develop itself in an informal fashion in the guise of conventions? Should political parties be expected to adopt a genuine "partyless" policy towards the assemblies? Also, what role can be assigned to MPs regarding assemblies in their constituencies, apart from their current status as non-voting members? and what attitudes are they likely to develop to assemblies and assembly members? The fact cannot be ignored that the introduction of the DAs generated some sort of awareness of and desire for better central-local relations. Any effort to construct a conceptual model for the DAs cannot ignore that empirical phenomenon. And accepting the facts, it is not difficult to contrive a scheme of DAs that will reconcile a normative attitude and the empirical trends. This will involve viewing the DA system as a phenomenon aimed at effective local government and sociopolitical reconstruction.

Given the inconsistencies in Ghana's present political system, and the impracticality of operating genuinely autonomous decentralized authorities, it is doubtful whether the DAs will effect a permanent break with the past in terms of goal attainment, that is, in terms of restructuring the political relationship between the central government and the periphery mediated by local, politico-administrative institutions. This paper has indicated that, irrespective of government's professed commitment to reforming this relationship, there are objective conditions that pose real problems to achieving effective devolution and deconcentration of power.

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Planning and morphology of indigenous towns in Nigeria

Ms Olusola A Olufemi, Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, examines the planning and morphology of two indigenous Yoruba towns (Ibadan and Oyo) with a view to drawing up strategies that could be adopted in the planning of the cities and towns of tomorrow.

THE way people lived, their traditions and culture were entrenched in the planning and morphology of towns and cities during Nigeria's precolonial period, the structure of a typical town or city being that of a traditional core and a newer (modern) built-up area. These cities, whether old or new, developed in different areas of the country, each with its different economy and cultural tradition.[1]

Since the morphology of any city is the physical expression of its society's objectives[2] as well as that of the material, equipment and abilities the society in question has at its disposal, we must first indicate the nature of the objectives and capabilities of the Ibadan and Oyo urban traditions. These traditions are still reflected today in these two Yoruba cities (Figure 1). Our goal here is to show that planning principles adopted during the precolonial period can be assimilated in, or are relevant to, the planning of future cities.

Case study

Ibadan is the largest indigenous African city south of the Sahara. Until the 1950s, it was by far the largest city in Nigeria and attracted epithets such as "city village" and "black metropolis" (Figure 2). Often referred to as the "London of Negroland",[3] Ibadan has continued to expand and the city is now sprawling out ever-further. Nevertheless, Ibadan's morphology continues to exert considerable influence in preserving traditional ideas of urban living and interpersonal relationships. It represents a convergence of two traditions of

urbanism – a non-mechanistic, pre-industrial African tradition more akin to medieval urbanism in Europe and a technologically oriented Western tradition.

On the other hand, Oyo town (Figure 3) is an old indigenous town and its morphol-

ogy typifies that of most indigenous Yoruba towns in the south-western parts of Nigeria. Oyo is noted for its historic inter-tribal wars. Oral tradition has it that the youngest of Oduduwa's seven grandchildren, Oranmiyan, who distinguished himself by his


International boundary
State boundary
Local government area boundary
Study area
State capital (Ibadan)

Scale : 1 2,000,000

Source. Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey, Ibadan

Figure 1: Map of Oyo State showing location of towns studied

Figure 2: Ibadan

Figure 4: Traditional central business district in Ibadan

Figure 3: Oyo and environs

bravery and warlike qualities, came to the ancient Oyo kingdom called Oyo-Ile or old Oyo and became the first Alaafin of Oyo ("Oba" or "King" of Oyo).

General morphology of Yoruba settlements in Nigeria

The basic elements in Yoruba cities are twin institutions: the ruler's palace and the central market. In nearly all instances their location is central and they are usually adjacent.

In Ibadan, the internal structure of the city shows *two* city centres – an older centre around the Oja-Iba (King's market) (Figure 4) and a new one centring on the old Dugbe market (Figure 5). The basis for this morphological complexity in Ibadan can be seen in the convergence of traditional and modern economic, social and political institutions, and in the people's maintenance of these institutions. This convergence is reflected in much of the city's character.

Note that the new areas have failed to swallow up the old; both continue to co-exist and function. Oja-Iba is a market centre and a forum for social interaction,

politics and social relations. It is also the terminal point for traditional festivals.

The new central business district (CBD) is the converse of the old. Owing to the scarcity of land and its high monetary value, trading takes place in large high-rise buildings, while retail activities and street trading are very prominent here, too. Big departmental stores, textile shops, finance, banking and insurance buildings, dance clubs, cinemas and libraries feature in this new CBD. The General Post Office and railway yard are also located here.

Oyo town, on the other hand, consists of the traditional compounds of chiefs and their families. The planning concept adopted conforms to the concentric-cum-radial pattern. Of significance is the Royal palace, situated at the centre of the town and often referred to as the "fountain of culture" because of its distinctly traditional architecture and its status as the embodiment of the arts and crafts of the Oyo people.

The King's market (Oja-Oba) is located next to the palace, while all other land-use activities radiate in all directions (Figure 6). The old Oyo town lacks efficiency in terms of proper links, but it is very compact. The newer parts are well laid out. Retail activities have more or less shifted to the Ilora/Oyo axis or highway, though the traditional CBD around the King's palace still maintains its pull as a very strong point of convergence for trading interaction and festivals.

Figure 5: The new central business district in Ibadan

of traditional building technology, and on (historically) changing economic and social conditions.

The fundamental unit of the traditional social structure is the "lineage", that is, family members boasting descent in a direct line from some named ancestor. The adult males of this lineage (with their families) live in a compound. Such compound consists of several dwellings or houses occupied by many separate families. The compounds of chiefs are usually larger than others and often distinguished by a high gabled roof over the entrance. Usually each quarter is headed by a chief (baale); the heads of individual compounds are also referred to as baale. The functions of these chiefs (baale) range from the social to the judicial and the political. They settle land disputes and inter/intra family differences.

Traditional quarters have a very strong social coherence. There are about 27 quarters in Oyo town (Figures 7a and b) and there is always a traditional local market and shrine in front of them. In Ibadan, the

Traditional quarters

Quarters form the basic residential unit in Yoruba traditional towns such as Ibadan and Oyo. These quarters are made up of a series of compounds, each consisting of a group of houses called "Agbo Ile" (compound houses). This morphology is based on traditional social structure, on the level


Figure 6: Old and new part of Oyo

Figure 7a: Traditional residential quarters in Oyo

1. Akesan
2. Oke Afin
3. Basorun
4. Aremo/Isale Oja
5. Apinni/Ilaka
6. Kanga/Ago
7. Asogo/Alapo
8. Lemomu
9. Pakoyi/Idode
10. Bola
11. Isokun/Awumoro
12. Ojongbodu
13. Idiope/Alalubosa
14. Adesina/Idi Ape
15. Agboye

Scale: 1 : 64 000

------- Extent of built up area
——— Boundary of quarters
▬▬▬ Major road
——— Secondary road

Source: Oyo Local Government Secretariat, Town Planning Department, Oyo

Figure 7b: Different quarters in Oyo

indigenous population live in huge rectangular compounds, each containing several hundreds of people.

Traditional compound courtyards

The general pattern of Yoruba settlements is always broadly the same and the compounds are alike. Most of the houses within a compound open on to a large courtyard. These courtyards vary in size with the status of the family and with the number and size of the rooms around them. The largest are about 29 m × 13,5 m while the smallest are about 13 m × 7 m. Courtyards are built in such a way that they are open to the sunlight and the air; they are the centre of all domestic activities and the most frequently used part of the house.

They serve as an entertainment space for guests, for family meetings and moonlight games; as a cooking place and grain storage area; as a place for keeping domestic animals, and as a sleeping place during the hot season (Figures 8 and 9).

Surrounding the courtyard is an open veranda or passage which is referred to as "odede" or "oode". All rooms open up on to this verandah.

Most of the rooms in traditional compounds are poorly ventilated because they are initially designed for privacy and to keep out intruders. The windows are like matchboxes and the bedrooms have to be illuminated with bush-lamps even during the day. The ceiling is referred to as "aaja" and it can still be seen in some traditional houses today. The "aaja" serves as a safe place for keeping important household documents and medicine.

Characteristic features of the layout and morphology of Yoruba towns

Generally, most Yoruba towns and settlements have the King's palace in the centre of the town and the King's market directly in front of it (Figure 10). This has arisen from the notion that the King should be able to watch the assembling of his people from a reasonable distance. The marketplace, usually, is an open space without any buildings.

The planning and disposition of houses is compact rather than dispersed. There also appears to be a haphazard arrangement of houses, but we should remember that there is a social coherence binding them together. This order derives from the sociopolitical structure of the Yoruba. Yoruba houses have traditionally been arranged to reflect the political organization

Figure 8: Typical small courtyard compound in Oyo

Figure 9: Typical cluster of courtyard compounds in Oyo

of society, which in itself evolved to meet the challenges of the environment:[4] the inmates of a compound are responsible to the heads of families who in turn are responsible to the chief of their quarter.

The courtyard system is also very important in uniting members of the family as well as facilitating interaction. Although this concept is fast disintegrating, some single, detached houses in the newer sections of the town still adopt this concept in their design. However, there is the problem of the compound's inefficiency. Most of the traditional compounds are so compact that vehicular access is impossible. Infrastructure facilities are lacking, too. The inaccessibility of these compounds makes it difficult for sewage disposal and refuse collection vehicles, ambulances and fire brigade vehicles to penetrate the maze and deliver their services when urgently needed. The planning of the traditional core areas of these towns is therefore, by today's standards, unacceptable.

Just as the centres of all traditional towns are similar, so also are their peripheries. It was characteristic of Yoruba towns to be surrounded by thickly forested land which served as a place of ambush or refuge when besieged. The forest also provided both agricultural land and privacy for the carrying out of certain religious festivals. The peripheries were also marked by walls and ditches erected for defence against attack. Some of these walls were

| 1 | Corn mill | 5 | V.I.P. residence |
2a	Dilapidated orisa house	6	Warder's quarters
2b	Wives' compound	7	Residential quarters built up by Alafin's relatives (now outside palace)
3	Oyo secretariat		
4	Alafin's modern house		
⎍⎍⎍⎍	Wall		

0   200   400
Feet

Figure 10: The Alafin of Oyo

about 15m high and had gates. Ibadan, for example, had about sixteen gates while Oyo had about four.

Disintegration

The communal living system among the Ibadan and Oyo people is fast disintegrating and the traditional courtyard pattern of housing is also being gradually phased out. Recent developments have very much reduced the power of the head of the lineage and this has broken down the "compound" style of building and living. The younger generation, through their greater awareness, education and Westernization, have different perceptions and social expectations. There is therefore a tendency to individualism rather than to continued support for the extended family and its structures.

Other things responsible for a transformation in the morphology of Yoruba settlements include economic and religious factors, both emphasizing family rather than lineage, and the Islamic and Christian religions rather than the simple deity worship prevalent during the pre-colonial period. The pull of the newer CBD and the infiltration of immigrants from other parts of the country – Hausas, Ibos and other Yorubas – have also been factors in the disintegration of the traditional system.

Lessons for the future

It is evident from our discussion that the morphology of settlements and the design of houses mirror social relationships. In Nigeria, the remains of ancient dwellings and fortifications also image a period of history which we must try to understand more clearly.[5] The major features of the morphology of the pre-colonial Yoruba cities, particularly their older sections, are their amorphous layout, the high density of housing and population, the quality of houses, the sprawling pattern of development and the green-belt component – the last named being vital in the planning of future cities.

We have briefly to note the regrettable persistence of uncontrolled urban growth. It will be the responsibility of town planning authorities to promote orderly development. This can only be achieved by enforcing control measures such as zoning.

Historic preservation in urban or spatial planning links the past with the present and future. For future cities to have an identity, therefore, historic continuity of this sort must be maintained. According to Lloyd,[6] "Yoruba houses are imposing edifices compared with (those in) many other tropical regions". Lloyd goes on to say that, if properly maintained and preserved, "the typical (Yoruba) house is a rigid structure built to last a century".

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Social work and social development: Lessons from Botswana

Dr Heather Ferguson-Brown, senior lecturer in the Department of Social Work at the University of Transkei, South Africa, considers the shifts that need to take place (and to some extent are taking place) in order to make social work in South Africa more relevant to the poor and the needy.

Social work and community development

TO date social work in South Africa has largely focused on urban areas and has concentrated on clinical or casework models for practice. While this derives from the priorities of the apartheid era, social work now needs to move on to a wider frame of reference. Clinical social work will remain, but social work must now incorporate a preventive, developmental approach which takes into consideration rural communities and not just urban social problems. A developmental approach to social work requires a focus not only on the prevention of social problems such as street children, delinquency, teenage pregnancy, domestic violence but in strengthening family and community life to enhance the development of the nation as well as the fulfilment of the individual. A United Nations Conference, as long ago as 1968, identified three primary functions for welfare services: remedial, preventive, and developmental.

It urged that in developing countries emphasis be given to promoting developmental activities which would, for example, give recognition to the place of man in development, strengthen family life and prepare children and youth to improve their own lives as they contribute to national development.[1]

The social welfare bias of social work in Third World countries has been attributed to colonialism and the importation of inapplicable models for social work practice. Ironically most of the first world countries have left the casework era behind and deploy a wide range of intervention strategies to achieve development, and personal and social change.[3]

The early casework approach focused primarily on change from within, seeking adaptation of the individual to society. This was particularly suited to the interests of colonial governments which were not seeking to promote social change or the betterment of the poor. While social work still has concerns for social norms and the rehabilitation of those who seriously deviate from those norms, it has in the last three decades emphasized the interactive dynamic between people and their environment,[1] especially in relation to the accomplishment of life tasks, the alleviation of distress and the realization of aspirations and values.[5] Concentration on the adaptation of the individual has been replaced by a broader concern which seeks to address the causes of social problems and to help to meet people's needs within the context of welfare and development. Thus when a social problem is encountered, the social work agency involved determines through a social assessment of the situation whether the problem can most appropriately be approached through an individual, group work, or community work method. This integrated methods approach is commonly centred on a systemic assessment of the problem where targets for change may be centred on the client, or other players – including groups, institutions and communities – in the problem configuration.[6] Even where individual intervention is indicated, the methods of social work intervention tend to focus on a range of interventions, of which counselling is only a part, using roles such as:

- advocacy, which has been popularized by non-government organizations in Britain, such as the Child Poverty Action Group and the Nottingham Advocacy Group,[7] and concentrates on service users, citizen rights and empowerment; and

- case management, which addresses service delivery in the field of social services, including the roles of brokering, marketing, rationing and developing needed services and resources.[8]

The community work method in social work aims to meet one or more of the following objectives:

- satisfying the broad needs of the community and creating and maintaining a balance between the needs and the resources in the community;

- providing the community with the opportunity to exploit its strengths and potential (knowledge and skills) and to develop these, in order not only to be able to deal with social problems and needs but also to prevent them; and

- effecting change in the community, in group relations and the distribution of decision making powers.[9]

Community work does not differ in essence from community development but can rather be differentiated by the range of problems which it seeks to address. Community development is a term used to refer

to a broad spectrum of development tasks as well as the process of empowerment and the strategies and programmes used to effect empowerment and development.[10] Such strategies are usually those of community facilitation, organization and education and training. Community development is concerned with all areas of development – physical, economic, social and political[11] and as such has a wide arena with broad objectives, while community work is concerned with social development.[12] Social development addresses the welfare of the total community. This welfare refers to, amongst others, health and social welfare services, education and training, recreation, housing, culture and religion, the promotion of good human relations, leadership skills and organizational abilities.

In this context community work strives primarily toward human development and community organization to achieve social development.[13] While social development is only one of the four sectors of community development it is in fact a recognized prerequisite for all successful community development. Economic development and physical development carried out in isolation from social development have failed to achieve the objectives of sustainable development but have invariably led to further underdevelopment of the areas for which the programmes were initiated.[14] It is only through empowerment that people can be fully politically active. It is the contention therefore that community work – focusing on social development – holds the key to the process of community development.

Under the apartheid system South Africa delivered differential services to its racial groups, with disproportionally small budgets being allocated to black African communities. The emphasis on clinical and rehabilitative work was reinforced by greater staffing and other resources being deployed to serve white and Indian residents, thus shifting the focus of need from the rural areas and from the working class.[15] Fortunately, the needs of the rural poor have now been recognized as requiring priority treatment, and the first steps have been taken in the establishment of the Rural Development Programme. South Africa is expressing an interest in the needs of its people and has a parliamentary democratic system eager to respond to the lobbying of the social work advocate.

How can social work make a constructive beginning to achieve this change of focus? Social workers have the knowledge and the skills to work with individuals, groups and communities to promote social change. It is a change in emphasis, structures, and resource deployment that

is required. Social work needs to become a part of a systematic nationwide network of comprehensive and multidisciplinary services if it is to address social need and prevent social and family breakdown, or at least alleviate its impact on community members. Before determining the way forward, it may be worthwhile to evaluate the experiences of one of our Southern African neighbours.

The community development programme in Botswana

Botswana declared its independence from protectorate status on 30 September 1966, since which time it has grown and prospered while also showing an impressive rate of economic and social development. Presently 89% of its population has access to health services; 100% of female and 94% of male children are enrolled in primary school, of which 89% complete their primary education; the best immunization levels in the region; an infant mortality rate (under five years old) of 85 per 1 000[16] (a rate better than that of South Africa at 88 per 1 000 and close to the middle range of all nations), and a Gross National Product of US$1 600.[17] Although it has a small population, estimated at less than two million,[18] about four-fifths of the population reside in the rural areas.

Botswana has a low average population density of 2 persons per km². While the eastern side of the country is comparatively more densely populated, a large part of the population lives in rural villages in traditional mud-and-thatch homes across the length and breadth of the country. Their only link with larger towns and services is usually an untarred, sandy route. Its arid semi-desert conditions, in rural expanse, and the heritage of about 25 miles of tarred road at the time of independence highlight Botswana's commendable achievements in bringing social services to the remote regions. Botswana is now progressing to a point where it may leave its "developing" or "Third World" status behind.

This development has not, unlike most other countries, come through urbanization and industrialization, but through rural development, a thriving beef industry and mining. Its stable, democratically elected government, low incidence of corruption, and the leadership and problem-solving skills of its people enabled Botswana to take advantage of the international development networks and to attract foreign aid with good effect.

An initial programme of community development was instituted in 1964, just two years before independence, "to encourage local responsibility and initiative at

village level".[19] The outflow of this was that community development workers were appointed to rural areas and social welfare officers to the two urban areas. No community development work was undertaken in urban areas and rural areas were thought not to need social welfare since "the framework of tribal law and custom meets the needs of individuals and families".[20] The programme initially fell under the Department of Education, but later resorted under the Social Welfare and Community Development Department. Clearly this department did not have the remit for all development, that is physical, economic social and political. However, as almost all foreign aid was processed to communities through government, this programme did receive a wider remit than social development. Communities tackled problems of communications and infrastructure, housing and health with the help of project funding and the Public Works Department.[21]

Within a year this programme was seriously threatened by a severe drought and the United Nations offered to provide food aid in 1966.[22] It was the implementation of this programme that had serious repercussions for community development because the food aid scheme was linked to development programmes and offered food as payment for development work – mainly public works in the first instance.

This proved very significant in that community development made a beginning in Botswana by establishing an expectation of return in kind for the efforts of the community. The motivation for community members to embark on community projects was not the project and its benefits to the community per se, but the food provided for the labour at a vital time of drought.[23] The Food-for-Work Scheme – whereby the nation's poor gave their services in return for much-needed food aid during the drought crisis created a pattern for the future of which social workers are now very critical. They believe that the Food-for-Work Scheme eroded the self-help spirit of the nation and, more than twenty years on, see a lack of self-help among communities as endemic.[24] Labour costs for community projects should be paid to community members where possible. But there is a danger highlighted by the Botswana experience that where communities are highly motivated to work for food or money they may simply become a labour force for the development needs identified by a few. In this case, many members of the community, although invited to participate in meetings about their development needs remained passive in the process because of their primary motivation for immediate

gain. This essentially fostered a top-down approach to development because the community conceded to the wishes of government workers or their traditional leaders or councillors, for example. Development did indeed take place, in the sense that buildings, roads, water projects came into being – but the opportunity to develop a "bottom-up" approach to community development was lost. The programme rushed ahead in response to the need for food and the availability of United Nations aid at the cost of the development needs of the community. The villagers agreed to projects simply because they would provide work and food and not because they had identified these projects as meeting the development needs of their community.

An evaluation of the Food-for-Work Scheme carried by a United Nations team found the community development component of the associated projects to be lacking and criticized the work output and the technical support such as equipment and tools.[25] The hasty nature of the efforts to get a Food-for-Work Scheme off the ground were evident from the lack of expertise of the development workers and the ambiguous nature of the programme: food relief versus community development; "top-down" versus "bottom-up" development. The philosophy of the programme was unclear and groundwork of training or organizational and management infrastructure were not established. Thus the beginnings of community development in Botswana were, to say the least, shaky. Reviews of community development over the next 25 years showed a continued absence of a "self-help spirit" and highlighted the need for the training of assistant staff.[26]

Lessons from Botswana: What not to do

This is the negative side and has important lessons that could benefit the RDP and social development in South Africa. There are three important points:

- development work cannot be overly hurried;
- development workers need to be trained; and
- self-help cannot be fostered through a "top-down" approach to development.

Lessons from Botswana: What to replicate

A very commendable aspect of development in Botswana is the coordination of service delivery. A network of development workers, employed within the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, has been

established throughout the nation. Rural workers are employed as assistant community development officers and are responsible for about four to six villages each. These workers are supervised by a Community Development Officer whose headquarters is the district office of the local authority. In this way development information, funding, and facilitation have been made available to all, including the rural and remote villages. Because this has not been a piecemeal effort relying on NGOs, a network of rural extension services has been established. This makes it possible to harness and maximize the resources available from various disciplines such as agriculture, health, education and social work.

Unlike the position in most other countries, development has not come about as a sequel to the welfare and social work programme. Development workers were established across the country, while only a few social welfare officers were placed in the urban areas of Francistown and Gaborone. Social services such as allowances for destitutes and preparing home circumstances reports for rural courts, therefore became linked to the community development programme under the Social and Community Development Departments. The assistant community development officer has the broad remit for the delivery of development and social welfare services to the village areas, with the assistance and supervision of community development, home economics, youth and social welfare officers. This generalist approach in government service delivery has allowed the rural community to access the benefits of development available to the nation. In this system social work is primarily preoccupied with development and therefore responds to the needs of the rural poor.

A primary contribution of the community development worker in the rural areas has been the establishment and facilitation of the village development committee. In most instances the development worker has assisted these committees in drawing up constitutions, in electing office bearers, in keeping minutes and accounts and in facilitating the development process. The development worker has also been pivotal in helping communities to access the considerable overseas funding for development that has been channeled through government in Botswana. Both traditional and modern structures are represented on these committees by the headman and the local councillor.

The way forward

Reconstruction and development in South Africa hopes to divert most of the available

money to the development of the poor and to avoid excessive bureaucratic structures which are expensive and unwieldy. This is a valid desire but it is also important to facilitate the development process on a nation-wide basis. Lack of infrastructure in the form of development committees and trained community workers is likely to promote an ad hoc approach and uneven development. The committees that have already acquired some capacity for development are more likely to grasp at the RDP opportunities, while the most disadvantaged communities will miss many development opportunities.

Survival needs of shelter and employment are undoubtedly a priority which must be urgently addressed through the RDP. The building of houses can create an employment resource as well as improve living conditions for the poor, as can water projects and other basic service projects. However, one of the dangers of implementing a system of ad hoc development which prioritizes material and economic development is that of underdevelopment. The phenomenon of underdevelopment has been well documented over three decades.[27] It is only through the development of the people and local resources that some protection can be given against the increasing wealth being diverted to large companies and First World nations. It is important to recognize that real sustainable development comes through prioritizing social development. Through empowerment a more just, less exploitative system can be fostered. Equity and justice and welfare are keys themes of social development.

The way forward is to promote social development by establishing a cadre of trained community workers who will work closely with communities to build their capacity for development and to establish a development network of local village development committees and extension teams. The nature of this training[28] needs to embrace the necessary social development tasks and skills but should not require that all staff have the accredited four-year graduate training currently required for qualified social workers in South Africa.

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Book review

Deng D Akol Ruay, *The politics of two Sudans: The south and the north 1821–1969*, Uppsala: **Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994, 181pp, price SEK 140, £14.95. ISBN 91-7106-344-7**

Sharif Harir & Terje Tvedt (eds), *Short-cut to decay: The case of the Sudan*, Uppsala: **Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994, 274pp, price SEK 200, £19.95. ISBN 91-7106-346-3**

Although the simultaneous appearance of two books on the politics of the same country from the same publisher may look like too much of a good thing, these two volumes are actually very different in subject matter, approach and intended readership, and the overlap between them is minimal.

Deng Ruay's is a straightforward narrative history, the object of which is set out in the opening lines with uncompromising clarity:

> This book is mainly intended for the freedom fighters in the Sudan. They are entitled to know in unequivocal terms why they are fighting, who they are fighting and for what they are fighting.

Any academic reader who expects this statement to lead on to a crudely partisan tract will however be agreeably surprised. Though the author's viewpoint is throughout an avowedly Southern one, he has evidently done his best to maintain a sense of balance which sustains him at least until he reaches the Mahjoub governments of 1965–1969, which produced an escalation of the levels of violence and political repression in the South that renders dispassionate treatment almost impossible. He absolves the Northern Sudanese, for example, of any sense of superiority based on race, although the sense of superiority based on culture and religion is often palpable. He provides careful accounts of critical turning points such as the Juba Conference of 1947 and the Round Table Conference of 1965, and recognizes the role of enlightened Northerners such as Sayed Sirr el-Khatim and Nazir Daffalla, who seemed for a moment in 1965 to be capable of rescuing North-South relations from the damage done by the previous military regime. He also acknowledges the use of torture by the Southern guerrillas, the Anya-Nya, during the first civil war of the 1960s, and recognizes that many people in the South, rather than unequivocally supporting the Anya-Nya, were actually most concerned to avoid looting and murder by either side. His one blind spot is a reluctance to acknowledge ethnic divisions within the South, preferring to ascribe the undoubted factionalism of Southern politics to individual personalities and political opinions. The book takes the story up to Nimairi's *coup d'etat* in 1969, although the narra-

tive section is followed by rather a confused chapter on Islam in the Sudan which might well have been edited out. A second volume is promised on the period since 1969.

The volume edited by Harir and Tvedt, on the other hand, is entirely concerned with the period from the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which temporarily resolved the war in the South, until 1992, by which time the Islamicist government which seized power in 1989 was already well entrenched. It concentrates on developments in the South and in western Sudan (Dar Fur and Kordofan), with an emphasis on the factors that led to the breakdown of the Addis Ababa settlement, and the subsequent process of disintegration. Based on papers given at a conference in 1992, it does not cover the splitting of the SPLA into two and later three factions, but provides a graphic and dispiriting analysis of the way in which relatively manageable conflicts can get out of control, and lead to the abyss into which the Sudan has fallen. In addition to their interest for specialists, moreover, several of the papers contain material that valuably illuminates aspects of conflict and decay in Africa which are relevant well beyond this particular case.

Terje Tvedt's analysis of state failure and the role of non-governmental organizations in Southern Sudan after 1972, for example, suggests that NGOs actually had the unintended effect of undermining the indigenous government, since they possessed resources (such as vehicles) which the government could not match, and were the only people in a position to meet the needs of much of the population; Rwanda and Mozambique immediately come to mind as similar cases. Douglas Johnson's discussion of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the UN-sponsored scheme for delivering relief food to both government and opposition controlled areas of the South, indicates the futility of attempting to rectify the effects of conflict without tackling its causes. Sharif Harir shows how limited competition for resources in Dar Fur developed into large-scale ethnic conflict, with a significant international impact especially from Libya's involvement in neighbouring Chad. Mohammed Salih and Sharir's examination of tribal militias in Kordofan provides a horrifying example of the way in which the distribution of arms by a government attempting to exploit local divisions in order to thwart the opposition leads not merely to militarization and greatly intensified conflict, but to the collapse of local societies into a welter of murderous factions; Liberia and Somalia provide striking parallels. A concluding chronology of events from 1972 to 1992 provides a helpful guide to an exceptionally complex country.

Christopher Clapham

Lancaster University

Religion in Africa by Thomas D Blakely, Walter E A van Beek and Dennis L Thompson (eds). London: James Curry and Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1994. ISBN 0 85255 207 6

This book stems from the conference entitled "Religion in Africa: The variety of religious experience in sub-Saharan Africa" held at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah between 22 and 25 October 1986. Scholars from four continents who study religious expression throughout all the major regions of Africa and the African Diaspora in the Americas have made contributions on a diverse array of topics.

Between state and civil society in Africa by Eghosa Osaghae (ed). Dakar: CODESRIA, 1994, 281 pp. ISBN 2 86978 020 6

The balance of power between an individual and the state he or she lives in is the key to any country's political process. Concepts of citizenship, reciprocity of rights and citizen's duties intertwine in this struggle for assertion.

With a largely collective citizenship, civil society in Afria is alive and vibrant. But in the face of continuing global recession, the present phase of the African crisis is expected to sharpen contradictions within the continent's states. New paradigms have to be sought to explain the formations and realities.

The ten chapters in this book, all written by African scholars, question the western, ethnocentric model of development and look at the wide diversity of African experience. From the Ormo cosmic framework and street-begging in Nigeria, through the role of labour and the part played by wage demands in the African crisis, this volume makes an essential contribution to the debate on Africa's future.

The African experience: An introduction by Vincent B Khapoya. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994, 324 pp. ISBN 0 13 019662 2

To truly understand Africa, one must study its geography, history, social structure and culture. In this interdisciplinary approach, Vincent B Khapoya integrates these important dimensions of the African experience, offering readers a broad perspective of this dynamic continent.

The migration experience in Africa by Jonathan Baker and Tade Akin Aina (eds). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika-institutet, 1995, 353 pp. ISBN 91 7106 366 8

In this book twenty authors investigate the range of the migration experience in Africa. Because of the variety and complexity of the reasons which surround and underpin why African populations are so mobile, this volume adopts an eclectic approach

which illustrates the diversity of theoretical positions, as well as methodological and analytical trends. The book also provides examples of the great breadth and richness of empirical insights into human migrations in the contemporary African context. The contributions identify and address under-researched themes such as gender and migration, and more generally point to lacunae in this important area of the development problematique.

African countries: Official names/Afrika-lande: Amptelike name by Hester H Uys. Pretoria: J L van Schaik, 1994. ISBN 0 627 02039 9

The names of African countries have undergone considerable changes over the past few centuries and these ongoing changes have resulted in a great deal of confusion. Hester Uys's little book brings relief to those who need a handy reference work to clear up doubts regarding the official political names of African countries and surrounding islands. In addition, the book also provides information on:
- brief colonial histories, explaining changes in names
- nationalities (singular and plural)
- official languages
- abbreviated and full names of each country or island in the official language

African languages, development and the state by Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss (eds). London: Routledge, 1994, 254 pp. ISBN 0 415 09476 3

Multilingualism is a fact of African life; multilingualism is Africa's lingua franca. Why then is African multilingualism so often seen as a handicap to development? The contributors to this book argue that multilingualism needs to be developed as a strength, not castigated as a failure.

The contributors examine the rhetoric of language policy and also present detailed case studies of local outcomes. They believe that African language planning must be based on the researched facts of African life and not on preconceived ideas of the relations that should hold between entities called language, development and the state. Since most of Africa has now gained over thirty years of post-colonial experience in language planning, it is possible to assess the legacy of these years and to compare the best and worst practices. Particular attention is paid to the Nigerian experience which, as the most populous of the African states with many years' experience in the formulation of language policy, furnishes an invaluable intra-African example for policy makers in the other parts of Africa, particularly in South Africa, where crucial decisions on language policy are currently under discussion.

Reader's Digest Illustrated Atlas of Southern Africa,
Cape Town: The Reader's Digest Association South Africa,
1994. 232 pp (375 × 265 mm). ISBN 1 874912 28 9

The updated 1994 edition of a popular reference work first pub-
lished in 1984. Somewhat less bulky and easier to handle than its
predecessor, the new edition remains a mine of information by a
publisher renowned for its quality production. This is an authori-
tative work, compiled with the help of consultants. The maps
were contributed by South Africa's Department of Land Affairs
and Stellenbosch University's Institute for Geographical Analysis.

The book's focus is on South Africa, whose fascinating physi-
cal, demographic, historical and economic features are brought
to life in 56 lavishly-illustrated pages of text – thematic maps, sta-
tistical charts and colour photographs. Detailed maps on the
scale 1:500 000, from South Africa's official map series, cover the
entire country and neighbours, such as Botswana and Namibia,
up to Harare in Zimbabwe. Particularly useful are the even more
detailed maps (1:50 000) of large South African cities. South
Africa's new provinces, together with Lesotho, Swaziland,
Mozambique's Maputo area, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe
are also shown in a separate series of maps (1:2 500 000).

There is a section on sub-Saharan Africa with three pages of
illustrated text, placing the southern subcontinent in a broader
context. It contains three large-scale maps (1:7 500 000), covering
most of Africa south of the Sahara.

Recent Africa Institute publications

Africa at a Glance

Facts and Figures 1995/6

This unique compendium contains useful factual data and statistical information on the demographic, cultural, geographic, political and socio-economic features of countries of the African continent and surrounding islands. The information is arranged in 51 tables, with brief explanatory notes, and 60 maps and graphs, many of them in colour.

Price: R60 ($30) for members
R70 ($35) for non-members

Democratisation and demilitarisation in Lesotho

The general election of 1993 and its aftermath by Roger Southall and Tsoeu Petlane

In April 1993 Lesotho completed it first multiparty election since independence. The kingdom's return to civilian rule under the government of Dr Ntsu Mokhehle was to be fraught with difficulty, however, as first the security forces and subsequently the leading opposition party and the royal house threatened Lesotho's fledgling democracy

In this book a group of Lesotho specialists supply the background and analysis essential to an understanding of these dramatic events in this tiny mountain kingdom. They also provide a fascinating insight into the origins and aspirations of Lesotho's political class, and the obstacles they face in satisfying popular expectations as they attempt to guide this improverished democracy through its "second liberation"

Price: R60 ($30)

Africa Wall Map and Fact Sheet

The attractive full-colour Wall Map of Africa and quick-reference Fact Sheet are indispensable to all those wanting to know more about Africa and its countries.

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Price: R50 ($25) for members
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South Africa and the African comity of nations

From isolation to intergration by Denis Venter

South Africa's contemporary relations with the rest of Africa – marked by the development of mutually beneficial co-operation and a proliferation of South African missions to African capitals, and vice versa – have come long way since the days when an exchange of representatives with African countries was seen as a potential threat to the apartheid state

The interplay of forces shaping South African foreign (and domestic) policy perspectives in the course of the last two decades, culminating in today's "neo-realist" diplomacy, is the main focus of this research paper. Starting with the collapse of colonial buffer states, (which sheltered South Africa from the "winds of change" blowing from the north), developments are analysed through the era of "Quixotic" responses to a perceived "total onslaught", to the final collapse of the principal obstacle to normal foreign relations – apartheid.

Price: R15 ($7.50)

Local government in the Third World

The experience of decentralization in Tropical Africa (second edition) by Philip Mawhood (ed)

Local government is a peculiar theme, always recognized in Africa as important yet seldom comprehensively written about or understood. This book is about political decentralization and the devolution of political power, written by authors who have worked close to the real situations. Its readership will range from those who are engaged in the work of government (including consitution-making) to teachers and researchers in the field of development and local administration.

Philip Mawhood and Nelson Kasfir's introductory chapters deal with the concept of decentralization/devolution and how that concept has fared in Africa since independence. There is a brief discussion of the enormous challenge facing South Africa in creating post-apartheid local authorities and the vital need for that country to take note of the experience in the rest of the continent. First published in 1983, this revised second edition also presents case studies: one French-speaking and seven English-speaking countries (Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania).

Price: R60 ($30)

These books are all available from The Secretary, Africa Institute of South Africa, P O Box 630, Pretoria, 0001
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AFRICA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

MOROCCO

Gulf of Gabes

Gulf of Sirte

TUNISIA

CANARY ISLANDS (Sp.)

MADEIRA (Port.)

ALGERIA

LIBYA

EGYPT

Red Sea

S A H A R A

MAURITANIA

MALI

NIGER

CHAD

SUDAN

Gulf of Aden

SOCOTRA (Yemen)

SENEGAL

GAMBIA

GUINEA BISSAU

GUINEA

BURKINA FASO

NIGERIA

DJIBOUTI

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

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ETHIOPIA

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SÃO TOMÉ PRÍNCIPE

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ASCENSION

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

COMOROS

MAYOTTE (Fr.)

MALAWI

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique Channel

ZIMBABWE

MAURITIUS Port Louis

RÉUNION (Fr.)

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

Kalahari Desert

SOUTH AFRICA

INDIAN OCEAN

Cape Town

LEGEND

land above sea level (m)
- \>3 000
- 2 000 — 2 999
- 1 000 — 1 999
- 500 — 999
- 200 — 499
- 0 — 199

land below sea level (m)

continental shelf (-200 m)

ocean & lake

river

peak

state boundary

capital

city / town

Projection: Lambert's Zenithal Equal Area