Contents

incorporating

AI Bulletin

the **strange life** of African states

*Dr Stephen Ellis,
Research Fellow at the
Afrika-studiecentrum,
Leiden, and Research
Fellow of the Africa
Institute of South Africa*

I t is clear that most of Africa's 53 states are faced with deep problems, in particular what the World Bank in an influential report published in 1989 called "a crisis of governance".[1] Many recent studies share the World Bank's pre-occupation with the nature of governance in Africa and, implicitly or explicitly, search for clues as to how African countries could be governed more justly and more effectively by such means as greater democracy, transparency, accountability and so forth. Many analyses make a connection between these factors and a greater role for civil society. Publications on this subject are of far more than theoretical interest since they have a bearing on the policies adopted by donor countries and organizations including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which have enormous influence in Africa.

The wave of democratization in Africa in the early 1990s – not least in South Africa – produced widespread optimism that Africa's crisis of governance could be overcome. Now, five years or more later, doubts have set in. After dozens of more or less free elections, it is apparent that long-established dictators in Gabon, Kenya, Togo, Zaïre and elsewhere have proved themselves able to live with multi-party politics and even to thrive, without improving the quality of governance which the aid-donors are seeking. Elsewhere, democratic changes of government, such as in Benin, Malawi, Mali and Zambia, have changed the rules of the political game but cannot be said to have shown much sign of tackling the fundamental political and economic problems of the countries concerned. One clear case of democratization – Niger – has now been reversed by a coup. On the positive side, democracy has contributed to ending ruinous conflicts in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. A reasonable summary would be to say that in a handful of countries fundamental political reforms have produced some promise of creating states which can be more effective in producing the conditions which international institutions and many local reformers desire, but that in many other countries such reforms have not been fully implemented or have not led to the anticipated result.

The wave of democratization has coincided with a spread of violent conflict. In some cases at least, the two factors may be connected. The list of countries which now have long-lasting and apparently intractable wars is a substantial one: Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, to name but a few. But in only one case – Somalia – can the state be said to have collapsed more or less entirely. Somalia has no president or cabinet, no national army or police force, no national system of justice, no national system of piped water, electricity or telephones.

Elsewhere, even in countries where the state hardly functions as an organ of government such as Liberia, rival warlords continue to compete for the presidency and generally refrain from declaring independence. This is rather surprising since 30 years ago, at the time of the Katanga crisis and the Biafra war, it was widely assumed that if African states were not strong and assertive, they would be submerged by ethnically or regionally based secessionist movements. The Organization of African Unity, understandably enough, made it a central article of faith that old colonial boundaries must be respected. In fact, only one new state has been created since independence, namely Eritrea, and even then it has adopted the old colonial boundaries. Secessionist movements or tendencies in some other places, notably northern Somalia and southern Sudan, have not succeeded in attracting international or even overwhelming local support for the creation of new states. Genocide in Rwanda, and the migration of millions of people across international borders in the Great Lakes region, has not yet produced any fundamental questioning of the organization of territorial states in the region or any substantial pressure to adjust their boundaries.

In other words, while many African states have lost the ability to enforce a monopoly of violence over their national territory, they have in some respects shown a surprising resilience. Even in

places where the state is unable to carry out many of the basic tasks of modern government – Zaïre, say – those who enjoy tenure of state power are able to retain control of important instruments of political control and, largely for that reason, are still recognized by the international community as the representatives of sovereign states.

To analyse the reasons for this it is useful to consider briefly the history of African states. Until little more than a hundred years ago, before the colonial partition of Africa, the vast area south of the Sahara was occupied by literally thousands of political entities including monarchies with well-established organs of public administration but also many so-called "stateless societies" and constantly shifting federations of territorially based lineages with no fixed boundaries. The partition of Africa subsumed all of these into 48 territories south of the Sahara, of which all but two – Liberia and Ethiopia – were colonial possessions of European powers in some form or other. It is well known that the colonial boundaries cut across older lines of social, political and economic organization. Within these territories colonial powers established highly centralized and authoritarian systems of government according to European notions of public administration. The colonial governments eventually committed themselves to enhancing the economic development of their African subjects and changing their moral codes according to European ideas of what was right and proper. Both the apparatus of government and the pretensions to modernization were taken over at independence by a new generation of African rulers. While the strategies of nation-building and economic development have generally failed to deliver the desired results, the states themselves remain. Most African states are not organic creations, with conventions and boundaries created in the course of time to enhance peoples' ability to live together. Rather than political life having eventually produced an appropriate external form, they were created the other way round: first the states and their boundaries were designated, and later a

political content emerged. They are like bottles which may contain different liquids while retaining the same shape and form.

While these states owe their longevity partly to the ability of their political elites to adapt to new circumstances, a second factor is the needs of the outsiders who played such a major part in their creation in the acts of colonization and decolonization. Since 1945 the world's system of international order has been based on the principle that the entire habitable surface of the globe is divided into sovereign entities represented by recognizable public authorities. These are necessary for modern diplomacy and business, and above all for the satisfactory regulation of contracts. Modern capitalism requires the existence of responsible public authorities for the transaction of loans and other payments, to guarantee diplomatic agreements and to ensure security for investments. In Somalia, transactions of this type can no longer be made on a national level. It appears that Somalia is sufficiently unimportant to the industrialized world for rich countries to ignore the fact that it no longer has a functioning government or state. The rich world cannot afford to adopt the same attitude towards more important countries. Hence, for example, the world continues to recognize the government of General Abacha in Nigeria, however reluctantly, because it can imagine no other way of carrying out international transactions which concern the territory of Nigeria and its 100 million inhabitants. Given the record of some African states in robbing their own citizens, it is at least debatable who needs them the most: the citizens of the country or the international powers which created them in the first place and have done so much to prolong their life, since independence, with financial and other aid.

In the meantime, many African political elites have discovered that they can survive and even prosper in conditions coming close to state collapse as long as they observe certain minimum norms of international order, such as continuing to respect, in theory at least, their international debt obligations. In many cases

they have done this by relocating their power base away from the bureaucracy and the political party, which are now moribund, to the control of informal markets, "elements of society associated with the production and reproduction of capital".[2] In the days when African states still had major resources of their own to manage, they could accommodate the social networks which produce and reproduce capital from a position of relative strength, including by the distribution of largesse and through the provision of jobs and social services. These days, many African presidents can accommodate national political elites most effectively by granting trade concessions or economic opportunities to carefully chosen allies, and by the manipulation of currency, which affects markets outside direct state control. Control of informal or liberalized markets has become a key site of political competition and, like all political competition, it can take a violent form in conditions of instability and uncertainty. Hence many of Africa's wars are partly or even largely concerned with the control of informal markets, particularly the valuable long-distance trades in high-value items such as drugs, currency, diamonds and other gems, and weapons. These have replaced wars between states, or between governments and liberation movements claiming international ideologies.

This observation calls into question much conventional analysis of what African states and societies are, or rather the ways in which they interact with one another. It is increasingly apparent that many of the categories which form the building-blocks of academic analysis, such as notions about state and society, good governance, formal and informal markets and so on, require some serious re-thinking, perhaps along paths which have already been mapped out by some writers.[3] It may be that the bureaucratic, secular states defined by Max Weber, which European colonizers attempted to build in Africa, do not have much future in many parts of the continent. Attempts by aid-donors to build or rebuild such states through campaigns of good governance, societal empowerment, structural adjustment and the other jargon of the development business do not appear to have much chance of success, broadly speaking. For those who live in Africa, or who are interested in what happens there, there is a need to understand the rules of the political game as it is, and not only how it ought to be.

Notes and references

1   World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1989, p 60.
2   William Reno, *Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
3   Notably Jean-François Bayart, *L'État en Afrique: la politique du ventre*, 1989, Paris: Fayard, English version published by Longman, London, 1993.

The *Curse* of War

in Angola and Mozambique

Lusophone African decolonization in historical perspective

has peace finally come to Angola and Mozambique, two countries which have endured war for more than thirty years? Well, perhaps, but how are we to know? How can we judge the prospects for peace?

Angola and Mozambique, both former Portuguese colonies, became independent in 1975, following over a decade of anti-colonial armed struggle. Almost immediately they were plunged into internal wars pitting the new governments against an armed opposition supported by South Africa. Eventually, their governments exhausted and their countries largely destroyed, the Angolan and Mozambican leadership settled with their opponents. Peace agreements were signed (in May 1991 for Angola and October 1992 for Mozambique).

Elections were held first in 1992 in Angola and, contrary to expectations, they returned a majority for the government in power since independence. The presidential results pointed in the same direction.[1] The leader of the opposition refused the electoral verdict. War started again. Another peace accord (the Lusaka Protocol) was signed (although not by the two leaders) in November 1994. Again a ceasefire was agreed upon and its implementation is now supervised by a much-strengthened UN presence. Opposition and government are supposed to work together to allow the long-delayed second round of the presidential elections to be held. Dos Santos and Savimbi have, at long last, met. Will it happen? Will peace finally come?

The experience of the failures of the transition to peace in Angola helped the UN to support more strongly the consolidation of the ceasefire and the preparation of the elections in Mozambique. The elections were held in October 1994 and, as in Angola but not as unexpectedly, they returned the same government and president to office.[2] The outlook for Mozambique, though precarious, is immensely more favourable than it is in Angola, if only because the main opposition has accepted the electoral verdict

and committed itself to working as a "loyal" opposition.

So what are the prospects for these two battered African countries? Well, you know already that as a historian I will, of course, refuse to commit myself! What I would say is that a realistic assessment of the prospects for Angola and Mozambique depends on the understanding of their history. I do not believe there is a curse on these two newly created nations. War and violence can always be explained historically. To call them a curse is justified emotionally but it is otherwise merely an abdication of our analytical responsibility. There is no curse but there is a

Patrick Chabal, Professor and Head of the Department of Lusophone African Studies at King's College London, and Research Fellow of the Africa Institute of South Africa, considers the prospects of these two battered African countries.

Photo: Frontline Features

difficult history to understand. And we should make every effort to understand that history.

The fact that Angola and Mozambique have been at war for over thirty years is the outcome of three sets of historical circumstances:

- the specificities of the decolonization of the Portuguese African colonies;
- the generally deleterious evolution of post-colonial black Africa; and

Angola

Indeed, the decolonization of Portuguese-speaking Africa stands out in the history of Africa primarily because it was the outcome of protracted nationalist wars in three (Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique)[3] of the five Portuguese colonies. My concern here is not to give an account of the nationalist wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique[4] but to ask some questions about the process of national liberation which it engendered — questions which I believe to be relevant to the understanding of the evolution of the Lusophone African countries after independence.

First, how causally significant were the specificities of Portuguese Africa in the evolution of the nationalism which developed there? Second, what were the consequences for Angolan, Guinea-Bissauan and Mozambican nationalism of the experience of armed struggle? Third, how does one assess the importance of the "socialist" or "revolutionary" ideology propounded by the three nationalist parties? Finally, what is the relevance of this historical experience to the current predicament of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique?

As I have said in a previous article in *Africa Insight*,[5] there are a number of historical reasons why Portuguese decolonization tends to be viewed as having been "different". The first, and perhaps most important, is that it occurred a good fifteen years after French and British decolonization. The second is that decolonization was achieved by means of an anti-colonial struggle — taking the form of a guerrilla war in three of the five Portuguese colonies.[6] Although there had been in Africa some anti-colonial violence (eg, Cameroon, Kenya, Congo), the Lusophone experience of armed struggle was essentially new.[7]

Thirdly, the decolonization of the Portuguese territories went hand in hand with the nationalists' apparently unanimous commitment to socialism. This policy of "transition to socialism" was being implemented in the face of a first wave of African "socialist" experiments which were generally being recognized as having failed.[8] It also occurred at a time when socialism world wide was entering a crisis from which, we now know, it was never to recover. Finally, the decolonization of Portuguese Africa came to be linked intimately with the demise of the dictatorship in metropolitan Portugal.

As I have said elsewhere, the context within which the Lusophone anti-

■ the international context of the Cold War and the regional context of South Africa's hegemony.

I cannot discuss all three here. I propose instead to focus on the first set of factors, Lusophone African decolonization, and I do this primarily for historical reasons.

My general argument in respect of contemporary Africa is that we cannot seriously hope to understand the conflicts and violence which have marred the subcontinent (of which the most appalling recent case is that of Rwanda) without first understanding its colonial, and even pre-colonial, history. Thus, in the case of Angola and Mozambique, the twenty years of internal war which followed independence have their roots in the process whereby these two countries sought and achieved their freedom from colonial rule. This is not to say that these wars were "caused" by decolonization, but simply that their origins lie in the process by which decolonization proceeded.

nationalist wars developed, made it improbable that they would engender full-fledged (as opposed to mere nationalist) revolutions. There were no historical, structural or socioeconomic reasons for anyone to expect revolutions on the mould of the so-called "classical" revolutions (France, Russia, China or even Vietnam) in Lusophone Africa.[9] Thus, it was always highly unlikely that the Lusophone nationalist wars would bring about any "transition to socialism", least of all along the lines of the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese or even Cuban models.

While it is understandable why historians have tended to highlight the specificities of Lusophone Africa, I have argued for some time now that a proper comparative understanding of its decolonization demands that we re-anchor the study of Portuguese-speaking Africa in its proper *African* historical context.[10] We need to re-assess the ways in which the experience of armed struggle shaped the post-colonial fate of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique within the general experience of post-colonial Africa. I shall examine three areas which I believe can help both to understand the history of the three countries and to compare their post-colonial evolution with that of the rest of Africa.

First, how did the nationalist struggle affect the consolidation of national unity and the construction of the nation-state after independence? Second, what effect did the war have on the societies most directly affected by it? Third, how did the ambitions of "revolutionary" nationalism work themselves out in the policies of the post-colonial governments?

National unity and the nation-state

It has often been argued that the process of political mobilization underpinning the nationalist struggle was conducive to greater nationalist unity and to a firmer sense of national identity. Where the affirmation of nationalism has to be defended by an armed struggle, it is claimed, unity must rest on more secure foundations than were usually found in black Africa. Equally, where progress in the nationalist war depends on maintaining a united front against a colonial power seeking to divide, the armed struggle is bound to bring about a deeper sense of national

unity than that generated by mere electoral politics.[11]

This is true as far as it goes. Certainly, in Guinea-Bissau the success of the war was largely predicated on Cabral's ability to bring together not just most of Guinea-Bissau's peoples but also Guinea-Bissauans and Cape Verdeans.[12] By contrast, in Angola, where nationalist unity was weakest, the achievements of the armed struggle were the most limited.[13] The question is, however, one of causality. Did the strategy of armed struggle make national unity more or less likely? Did the war bring about a more assured sense of nationhood?

In Guinea-Bissau, nationalist unity, although not complete (the Fulas remained largely on the sideline) was both wide and enduring. During the period of nationalist struggle the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) brought together most of Guinea-Bissau's peoples and integrated them into a party largely led by Cape Verdeans – despite an historically grounded distrust on the part of Guinea-Bissauans of Cape Verdeans.[14] This unity survived the assassination of Amílcar Cabral – itself the outcome of the attempt by the Portuguese to split Guinea-Bissauans from Cape Verdeans within the PAIGC.[15] Thus, Guinea-Bissau, a territory only poorly integrated by colonialism, reached independence united and with a sense of nationhood.[16] It has since consolidated as a nation-state and does not at the moment face any serious crisis of national identity – although its current political and economic difficulties could easily change that.

Angola and Mozambique, the two huge Southern African Portuguese colonies, shared many common attributes and yet developed quite differently in respect of national unity.[17] Both were colonies of white settlement, both had substantial racial minorities (*mestiços*, Indians) who played a considerable role in the social and economic life of the colonies. Both had important links with neighbouring countries (Angola with the Belgian Congo/Zaïre; Mozambique with Rhodesia and South Africa). Both, finally, had potential for nationalist disunity.

Yet, the Mozambican nationalists under Mondlane's leadership managed to bring together the three main nationalist constituencies into the Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), to consolidate nationalist unity and to resist all subsequent fissiparous tendencies.[18]

Angola

Republic of —

Independence: 11 November 1975; former Portuguese colony

National day: 11 November (Independence Day)

Leader: Jose Eduardo dos Santos, b 1942, President since 1979

Capital: Luanda, largest city and main port

Area: 1 246 700 km²

Population: 11,5 mn (1995)

Religions: Christian majority (mainly Catholic) and ethnic beliefs

Languages: Portuguese (official), Kimbundu, Umbundu, Kongo, Chokwe

Life expectancy at birth: 47 years

Foreign trade: Imports: $1 600 mn; Exports: $3 000 mn (1994)

Principal export: Oil (94%)

GNP: $5 996 mn (1989)

GNP/capita: $620 (1989) (latest data)

Currency: $1 – readjusted kwanza (kzr) 5 692 (Jan 1996)

Background: Angola survives on oil production. In addition, the country has other minerals (notably diamonds), well-watered land, hydroelectric potential and a marine fish resource that could not be efficiently exploited because of the civil war since 1975. The conflict stopped temporarily when in May 1991 the MPLA government and Dr Jonas Savimbi's Unita movement signed a peace accord. Savimbi's refusal to accept the MPLA victory in the first round of the elections, held at the end of September 1992, led to a resumption of the war. Thousands more were killed, maimed and brought to starvation in the next two years. Another peace accord, providing for Unita representation in government, was signed on 20 November 1994 in Lusaka. The ceasefire took effect two days later. In 1995 Savimbi declared himself willing to accept a vice-presidential post offered by Pres dos Santos. Meanwhile, the assembling and disarming of Unita forces (under UN supervision) has been proceeding very slowly, delaying a return to normality.

Source: Pieter Esterhuysen, *Fact Sheet.* Pretoria: Africa Institute of SA, 1996

Mozambique

Republic of —

Independence: 25 June 1975; former Portuguese colony

National day: 25 June (Independence Day)

Leader: Joaquim Alberto Chissano, b 1939, President since 1986

Capital: Maputo, largest city and port

Area: 801 590 km²

Population: 16 mn (1995)

Religion: Christians (majority) and Muslims together about 50% of population, rest adhere to ethnic beliefs

Languages: Portuguese (official), Makua, Shona, Tsonga, Swahili

Life expectancy at birth: 46 years

Foreign trade: Imports: $1 000 mn; Exports: $150 mn (1994)

Principal exports: Prawns (50%), cotton and cashew nuts

GNP: $1 328 mn (1994)

GNP/capita: $80 (1994)

Currency: $1 = Meticais (MT) 9 900 (Jan 1996)

Background: An extremely poor country surviving on foreign aid, but with considerable potential for development in the agricultural, mining, energy, transport and tourist sectors. The meagre exports consist mainly of fish, cashew nuts, cotton and copra. In addition to the devastation caused by 17 years of civil war, the country also suffered severe droughts and floods during this period. Marxist policies have been abandoned since 1989 and a constitution providing for a multiparty system was adopted in November 1990. A peace settlement between the Frelimo government and the Renamo movement was finally achieved in October 1992. A large UN monitoring force helped to prepare the country for free elections, which took place in October 1994. Frelimo won 129 of the 250 National Assembly seats, Renamo 112 and the Democratic Union 9. Pres Chissano (Frelimo) was returned to office after receiving 53% of the votes in the presidential election. Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo) got 33% of the votes, while the balance went to 10 other presidential candidates.

Source: Pieter Esterhuysen, *Fact Sheet*, Pretoria: Africa Institute of SA, 1996

In Angola, on the other hand, not only did the two original nationalist constituencies (Luanda-based and Congo-based) develop into two rival organizations – respectively the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola (FNLA) – but they failed to prevent the creation of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Unita), rooted in and largely supported by the highland Ovimbundu peoples.[19]

Why such disparities between the three cases? And how causally relevant was the fact of armed struggle to the issue? Despite the differing complexities of the three experiences, I would argue strongly that both the success of the armed struggle and the consolidation of nationalist unity were ultimately determined by the political skills of the nationalist leadership. That is, it was political agency rather than mere contingency which made possible the bringing together of various ethnic and/or racial groups into one unified movement capable of developing a campaign of armed struggle against the Portuguese. The effectiveness of the nationalist war was thus a consequence (and not a cause) of nationalist unity. In turn, nationalist unity made the construction of nationhood more plausible, if not easier.[20]

Where nationalist politics were built on divisions (as in Angola), the construction of the independent nation-state has been difficult and violent.[21] Where, on the other hand, the nationalists built on more secure foundations (as in Guinea-Bissau), the consolidation of unity has been easier and deeper. In the Lusophone countries, as elsewhere in Africa, nationalism contributed both to the invention of a sense of national unity and to the exacerbation (or creation) of a number of divisions within the new nation-state. War in this respect was thus no more than the continuation of (nationalist) politics by other means.

The extent to which armed struggle strengthened national unity and helped to consolidate the emerging nation-state was the result of the politics of the nationalist war(s). As in all African countries, the roots of unity or disunity are to be found in the long pre-colonial and colonial history of these nations rather than merely in the vagaries of nationalism. Or rather, the vagaries of the nationalist wars are them-

selves best understood in the longer perspective of pre-colonial and colonial history.[22]

The effects of war

Although analytically armed struggle may be seen as a continuation of nationalist politics, in concrete terms it has a dramatic impact on the lives of those who have to suffer it. In this respect, the decolonization of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique was traumatic. Prolonged nationalist violence can have very seriously deleterious effects on post-colonial politics, as is evident in Angola and Mozambique.[23] Above and beyond the obvious suffering which all violence inflicts on ordinary men and women, I want here to discuss some of the political effects which war has had in the three Lusophone countries.

The first and most obvious consequence of nationalist war is that it legitimizes armed action and spreads weapons throughout the country. Whether this becomes an issue after independence, depends primarily on how tightly the political leadership controls the distribution and use of arms. Again, Guinea-Bissau and Angola provide two extremes here. One where weapons were used sparingly and for well-identified political objectives; the other where weapons spread throughout the country to many groups and factions and where they were used much more indiscriminately against civilians and political rivals.

In Mozambique, Frelimo was relatively careful to keep a close political grip on armed action. Yet, the climate of violence which the war engendered made it more, rather than less, likely that Renamo's murderous challenge should result in the "militarization" of post-colonial politics. Although violence is widespread in Africa, the singularly high and nasty level of violence found in Angola and Mozambique is, in part at least, the outcome of the degeneration of politics in a context where there has been armed action since the early 1960s.[24] Savimbi's notion that he can claim power at the barrel of the gun is similarly the outcome of a political process where violence has become endemic.[25]

The second effect of armed decolonization on society is the greater opportunity it affords for those who seek to challenge the social and political structures of "traditional" society. Generally,

the process of decolonization presents the younger political generations the chance to confront their "elders" in ways which were inconceivable in pre-colonial and even in colonial times.[26] Armed struggle creates a political situation in which it is both more legitimate and more feasible for a younger nationalist generation to resist and undermine pre-existing structures of power.

The nationalist legitimacy of armed struggle endows the (necessarily) younger generation of nationalist leaders with new and, if they are successful, greatly enhanced political legitimacy. In turn, such legitimacy makes it possible for the new leaders to challenge "traditional" power during and, of course, after independence. The case of the excessive zeal of Balante "youngsters" in Guinea-Bissau illustrates both the opportunities and the dangers which an armed challenge of the elders can bring about.[27] Equally, Frelimo's blatant hostility against "traditional" leaders after independence is, in part at least, a result of the ease with which the party had seen off the opposition of some such leaders in the areas which it controlled during the war.[28]

Although at the time it seemed that armed nationalism was better able to displace "traditional" power in this way, events since independence have shown that this was a simplistic view.[29] Here again, war is simply the instrument of the universal power struggle between "younger" and "elder" leaders which was exacerbated by decolonization. As in other African countries, the outcome of such power struggles is played out after independence in a context where the new rulers often need to come to terms with the power which "tradition" continues to exercise. This is a lesson which was learnt the hard way in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Thus, armed decolonization sharpened conflicts which took place in all African colonies at independence.

Finally, war led to the displacement of populations, sometimes on a massive scale. Again, this is a problem which now afflicts many areas of Africa, but I want to stress here the extent to which armed decolonization was much more disruptive in this respect than peaceful decolonization. In all three countries, there was a substantial proportion of the population which took refuge in or migrated to neighbouring countries. The consequences of such migration are not yet well understood

but they had a profound effect on post-colonial politics in those countries.[30]

At the very least, the problems of having to accommodate large numbers of people who have lived in another country for many years presented the regimes with severe practical difficulties. Often, it created an atmosphere of distrust between those who had remained and those who returned. Such distrust could be, and has been, politically consequential, particularly in cities like Bissau, Luanda and Maputo.[31] Equally, the links with groups who remain outside the country after independence (in Malawi, Senegal or Zaïre, for example) affect the relations both between groups inside the country and between the governments of the countries concerned.

Mozambique

Finally, the wars provoked internal migration, again sometimes on a large scale. Country dwellers sought refuge in the towns, particularly the capital cities. In Bissau, for example, the population increased about five-fold between the period before the war and independence (to reach about 10% of total population), creating huge social and political problems for the new administration.[32] Of course, urban migration accelerated after independence in all African countries – and in Angola and Mozambique it was massively amplified by the "civil" wars. Nevertheless, the fact that Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique suffered such high urban migration before independence constrained their policy options after independence.

Photo: Frontline Features

"Revolutionary" nationalism and post-colonial politics

The most widely discussed aspect of nationalism in Lusophone Africa is undoubtedly its alleged revolutionary quality.[33] The main nationalist groups from Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (that is, the MPLA, PAIGC and Frelimo) all claimed for themselves a "revolutionary" or "socialist" perspective different from that tried and failed in the 1960s, and which would result in a "transition to socialism" after independence. As I show above, there was little chance that such would be the case.

Here I want to focus more specifically on three areas in which the theo-ry and practice of "revolutionary" nationalism did affect post-colonial policies: first, in the impact it had on the ideological stance of the governments at independence; second, in the relation between party and state which it implied; third, in the development of economic policies, particularly in respect of rural areas.

While the main Lusophone African nationalists were not the only socialists in Africa, it is fair to say that by the 1970s, they were among the most dedicated. That this was the case is, in part at least, the outcome of the process of armed struggle for it is undoubtedly in the course of the nationalist war that the PAIGC, MPLA and Frelimo moved towards a more systematic commitment to socialism.[34]

Had Portugal, like France and Britain, agreed to negotiate the end of its empire in Africa, it is likely that Lusophone African nationalism (even in Angola) would have embraced more liberal and less "socialist" positions. However, in the face of Portuguese intransigence, moderate nationalist opinion tended to be swept aside. As it was, the process of political maturation and mobilization necessary for the prosecution of a nationalist war (and the need to find outside support, inevitably, among socialist states) led to a "move to the left" among the main Lusophone African nationalists.

It is enough, for example, to follow the trajectory of Frelimo's ideology in order to see how the armed struggle contributed to the emergence of a more "socialist" form of nationalism.[35] Mondlane, Frelimo's founder and first leader, was at first a nationalist in the "classical liberal" mould – and certainly much influenced by Nyerere.[36] It was his experience of the sharpened political contradictions brought about by the armed struggle, as well as the growing influence of more Marxist colleagues and outsiders which contributed to his gradual adoption of a much more overt "revolutionary" outlook.

Similar processes took place elsewhere. The nationalist wars produced regimes much more committed to socialism (whatever this may in practice mean) than would otherwise have been the case. Since the nationalists in Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe were directly or indirectly influenced by the MPLA, PAIGC or Frelimo, this meant that all five Lusophone countries were "socialist" at independence.[37] Of course,

"socialism" meant vastly different things in each one of those countries. Nevertheless ideology did impinge on real life, both in terms of the political structures erected and in terms of the policies pursued after independence.

In respect of structure, I want to stress the relation between party and state that such an ideology produced. Not only did Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique become (like all African countries) one-party states but they became singularly statist one-party states. Centralist, nationalizing and intolerant of any opposition or even dissidence, the ruling parties set out to establish the means by which "vanguard" parties would take charge of "command economies". The party congresses which took place in all three countries in 1977 laid down the new political principles to guide state-party relations.[38]

Now, the notion of a "vanguard" party – unlike that of the more usual African "mass" party – implied ambitions of statist control relatively new in Africa. It meant that the aim was to establish a socialist state; not just to "capture" the economy but also to transform society. That is, the ambition was to create the political and administrative structures to enable the party to control virtually all levels of society. This, in a context where it had already become clear that, in Africa, states simply did not have the means of their hegemonic ambitions.[39]

As we now know, the price paid in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique for this statism *à outrance* has been very high – none higher than in the economic sphere, the area of government policy most obviously influenced by the "revolutionary" aspirations of the newly independent regimes. Although there are in Africa a number of examples of countries (Ghana, Guinea, Benin) where a sharp "turn to the left" produced fairly unedifying economic results, it is in the Lusophone countries that the consequences of such "socialist" policies were most pronounced. Indeed, despite the differences between Guinea-Bissau and the two Southern African countries, it is possible to see similar policies leading to similar results.

This is perhaps best illustrated by the gross failure of the three countries' policies of rural development.[40] In Guinea-Bissau, neglect of the countryside, state control of retail trade and investment in "semi-industrial" concerns resulted in the virtual collapse of agricultural exports, widespread smuggling and a return to "subsistence" agriculture in many areas. In Mozambique, the attempt both to implement a policy of "villagization" and of more collective forms of agricultural production not only failed to work but also generated strong rural grievances easily exploited by a Renamo reborn of South African largesse. In Angola, crude attempts at "primitive socialist accumulation" and the war with Unita resulted in the absence of viable rural development policies.

In all three countries, rural producers – the backbone of the armed struggle – were betrayed on the altar of "socialism". The fact that all three countries are now implementing structural adjustment programmes makes the fail-

Photo: Frontline Features

ure of their socialist aims all the more obvious. To be fair, both the Mozambican and Guinea-Bissauan governments eventually had come to admit that their policies were wrong and had shifted resources to support rural development before structural adjustment. But this was too little too late for, by then, Guinea-Bissau had sunk very low economically and Mozambique was suffering the effects of one of the most vicious "civil" wars ever to afflict Africa.[41] As for Angola, until peace comes, there is little prospect of any improvement in the rural economy.

Nevertheless, I would argue that the failure of "socialist" economic poli-

cies in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique is not simply to be explained by the inherent defects of "socialism". It is much more fundamentally a reflection of the economic crisis which is afflicting Africa generally. Whatever one's interpretation of that crisis, one of its root causes is the inability of African states ("socialist" or "free-market") and entrepreneurs alike to generate sufficiently productive (as opposed to extractive) economic activity to sustain growth and development.[42]

In this respect, then, as in all the others, it is now best to consider Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique from the perspective of the evolution of post-colonial Africa as a whole. Both the peculiarities of their decolonization and the consequences of their "revolutionary" nationalism are becoming less and less relevant to their present condition. A re-assessment of the fate of these three countries demands a much more solidly comparativist outlook than has hitherto been used in the political analysis of Portuguese-speaking Africa.

Notes and references

1   The MPLA received 53,7% of the votes while Unita got 34,1%. In the first round of the presidential elections, José Eduardo dos Santos polled 49,5% and Jonas Savimbi 40,07%. A second round was due to be held since dos Santos was short of the 50% mark.

2   Frelimo polled 44,33% of the votes and got 129 seats (a majority) in the National Assembly; Renamo received 37,78% and got 112 seats. In the presidential elections, the sitting president Joaquim Chissano was re-elected with 53,3% of the votes as against his main opponent Afonso Dhaklama who received 33,3%.

3   I leave aside Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe since my aim here is primarily to discuss the relevance of armed struggle to decolonization and its aftermath.

4   The best general introduction to Portuguese Africa, including its decolonization, is M Newitt, Portugal in Africa, London: Hurst, 1981.

5   See Patrick Chabal, "Some reflections on the post-colonial state in Portuguese-speaking Africa", Africa Insight, vol 23, no 3, 1993.

6   See Patrick Chabal, "People's war, state formation and revolution in Africa: A comparative analysis of Angola, Guinea-

Bissau and Mozambique", in N Kasfir (ed), State and class in Africa, London: Cass, 1984.

7   For one good study of one of these cases, see R Joseph, Radical nationalism in Cameroun, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

8   On the first wave of "socialism", see C Rosberg and T Callaghy (eds), Socialism in sub-Saharan Africa, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979.

9   See here J Dunn, Modern revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

10 This argument is one of the main themes of my book, Power in Africa, New York: St Martin's Press, 1992.

11 I emphasize this point in Patrick Chabal, Amílcar Cabral, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

12 For a debate around my book on Cabral, see Politique Africaine. vol 19, 1985, pp 95–117.

13 See J Marcum, The Angolan revolution, 2 vols, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969 and 1978.

14 For a different view, see R Galli and J Jones, Guinea Bissau, London: Pinter, 1987.

15 On the assassination, see Patrick Chabal, Amílcar Cabral, op cit, pp 132–143.

16 This unity survived into independence. For an analysis of the post-colonial period to 1986, including the 1980 coup and the break between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, see "Revolutionary democracy in Africa: The case of Guinea-Bissau" in P Chabal, Political domination in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

17 A useful (though partial) comparative survey of Angola and Mozambique is D Birmingham, Frontline nationalism in Angola and Mozambique, London: Currey, 1992.

18 See E Mondlane, The struggle for Mozambique, Harmondsworth: Penguin African Library, 1969; and for an account sympathetic to Frelimo, B Munslow, Mozambique, London: Longman, 1983.

19 See J Marcum, op cit.

20 On the construction of the nation-state, see Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit, Chapter 7.

21 For the general argument as it applies to Africa, see Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit, Chapter 11.

22 As is well illustrated in D Birmingham, op cit.

23 See here Patrick Chabal, "Pouvoir et violence en Afrique postcoloniale", Politique Africaine, vol 42, 1991.

24 See C Geffray, La cause des armes au Mozambique, Paris: Karthala, 1990.

25 See F Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1988.

26 I develop this argument in Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit, Chapter 15.

27 Patrick Chabal. Amílcar Cabral, op cit, pp 77–83.

28 For evidence of such hostility in one region, see C Geffray, op cit.

29 For the relevance of "tradition" to nationalism in the Zimbabwean armed struggle, see D Lan, Guns and rain, London: Currey, 1985. For a different perspective, see N Kriger, Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

30 Similar problems have arisen in Vietnam, Algeria and Cambodia.

31 For one interesting example, that of the Kinshasa exiles returning to Luanda, see D Birmingham, op cit, pp 96–98.

32 See R Galli and J Jones, op cit, pp 73–74.

33 I discuss this in Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit, Chapter 1, Section 4.

34 The MPLA, it is true, was born of a close association with the Portuguese Communist Party and in Neto always had a connection with the world communist movement. This is not the case of either the PAIGC or Frelimo.

35 For a perspective critical of Frelimo's ideology, see T Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964–1974, London: Greenwood, 1983.

36 E Mondlane, op cit.

37 See T Hodges and M Newitt, São Tomé e Príncipe: From plantation colony to microstate, London: Westview, 1988; and C Foy, Cape Verde, London: Pinter, 1988.

38 The important differences between the three parties cannot be discussed in detail here, but it is important to note that the MPLA was the most (and the PAIGC the least) committed to "vanguardism", orthodox Marxist ideology and state control. See Luís Moita, Os Congressos da Frelimo, do PAIGC e do MPLA: uma Análise comparativa, Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1979.

39 For my discussion of the state in post-colonial Africa, see Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit, Chapter 4.

40 See, inter alia, on Guinea-Bissau, R Galli and J Jones, op cit; on Mozambique, J Hanlon, Mozambique: The revolution under fire, London: Zed, 1984; and on Angola, S H McCormick, The Angolan economy: Prospects for growth in a post-conflict environment, London: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1991.

41 On Renamo, see A Vines, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique, London: Currey, 1991.

42 On the crisis of production in Africa, see Patrick Chabal Power in Africa, op cit, Chapter 9.

the evolving
security architecture
in Southern Africa

Introduction and background

the liberation of South Africa has had an electric effect on Southern Africa. Following the elections of April 1994, the debate regarding regional security cooperation in Southern Africa has indeed been dynamic. A number of concurrent and overlapping initiatives are evident, most of which appear to have been systematized under the broad umbrella of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Progress towards a democratic value system shared by the various constituent states in the region, and sustainable and rapid economic growth are clearly the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security in Southern Africa. However, the prospects for a greater degree of regional economic integration are not favourable. This is principally due to the fact that most African economies are similarly structured, in that they produce, consume, export and import essentially similar products. Instead of complementing each other, African countries are competing, especially in exports of mostly primary commodities that are sent to similar markets, generally in Western Europe. They also compete in importing the same products from the same sources – again mostly Western Europe. In a comprehensive historical study released during April 1995, of attempts at regional integration irrespective of their success or failure and involving all five continents, the World Bank found that the 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest level of complementarity of all those studied. The bank concluded that

...[t]his strongly suggests that the structure of African countries' exports and imports differs so widely that regional trade integration efforts hold little promise for accelerating industrialization and growth.[1]

In fact, only 2,7% of the region's total trade is amongst members.

In exploring security, cooperation and interdependence, the debate on collective and cooperative security has covered a wide range of policy issues. These include, amongst others, so-called "new-thinking on security", the nature of the threats facing Africa, conflict mediation and arbitration, confidence-building measures, disarmament, food and health security. The level at which linkage should occur has also been attended to, with possibilities including the OAU (Africa), SADC (sub-regional) or bi-laterally, or it may require entirely new bodies and structures. Other issues dealt with the establishment of regional or sub-regional peacekeeping forces and even defence and non-aggression pacts. At every stage, the danger of political agreements being undermined by the limited administrative, technical and military capabilities of African states to convert idealistic goals into reality, has called for cautious expectations. At an Institute for Defence

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Director, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, South Africa, focuses on the proposed establishment of a follow-up organization to the Front-Line States and the development of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.

Policy (IDP) seminar in September 1995, the Department of Foreign Affairs emphasized that it

... favours a cautious and step-by-step approach towards regional development, taking into account the availability of resources and of manpower, coupled with the general capacity of the region to accommodate initiatives and to effectively act there-upon.[2]

Yet, the successful examples of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking in restoring democracy to Lesotho recently and the breakthrough in the impasse stalling the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement in Angola, have enthused doubters and sceptics alike.

Although regional economic integration and multilateral cooperation may be a slow process, bilateral security arrangements between South Africa and its neighbours on a variety of issues of mutual interest are flourishing. Examples include measures to counter weapon and drug smuggling, cattle rustling and vehicle theft, disaster relief, security training and assistance, and policing of maritime exclusion zones. While the commitment to the SADC and the OAU dominates at a rhetorical level, it is often these arrangements that rapidly produce tangible results – an impression that is confirmed in private discussions with officials from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

The recent agreement between South Africa and Mozambique to counter the trade in small arms has led to a joint operation in Mozambique between the South African Police Service and the Mozambican authorities (June and September 1995) during which the task force destroyed more than a thousand weapons as part of Operation Rachel. On 12 June 1995 South Africa and Namibia signed a comprehensive agreement on cross-border policing aimed at combatting drug and arms smuggling, and vehicle theft. The agreement, signed by South African Minister of Safety and Security Sydney Mufamadi and Namibia's Deputy Home Affairs Minister Jerry Ekandjo, also included provisions for joint border patrols and sharing specialized training and technology.[3]

Bilateral agreements have also been signed at provincial level. During June 1995, for example, Mpumalanga Premier Mathews Phosa signed an agreement with the neighbouring Mo-

zambican provinces of Maputo and Gaza. The agreements include increased security measures against highway bandits, wildlife protection, organized tourist promotion, agriculture, use of common water resources and training of administrative, cultural and sports staff.[4] Individual provinces are becoming involved in the execution of South Africa's interests in the region, to the extent that the Department of Foreign Affairs is establishing a provincial liaison directorate to act between the provincial administrations and the various branches of the Department and to coordinate activities of mutual concern outside the borders of the country.[5]

By contrast, academic discussions have concentrated on encompassing terms for collective regional security, in which multilateral arrangements would include non-military concerns. The debate has been heavily influenced by the model of the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the OSCE). The OSCE's major strength lies in it being a process in which participating states cooperate to find a solution as against the adoption of a prescription drawn up by a qualified majority. The sharing of common values, parity in levels of development and similarity of geo-political constellations are some of the factors that ease communications and foster good relations among participating states. It is thus possible for amicable solutions and maximum agreement to prevail.

While cooperation is easily achievable amongst partners sharing a common value system and similar levels of development, it is more difficult to attain when significant disparities exist among participating countries.

Parity in levels of development clearly does not exist to any real degree in Southern Africa. This could lead to the establishment of hierarchical domination among cooperating partners. Economic leverage tends to determine decision making and the ability to execute mandates. In the long run, this could undermine effective regional cooperative structures.

The Organization for African Unity

The UN Charter anticipated the involvement of "regional arrangements or agencies" for maintaining interna-

tional peace and security along with the UN. Article 53 of the UN Charter even refers to enforcement action by regional bodies, but requires that "... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council". The involvement of regional organizations, however, was severely constrained by the political realities of the Cold War. This may be changing, as the United Nations is not only overburdened with demands to maintain peace and security in the world, but public opinion in the larger developed countries also appears increasingly reticent to support intervention in conflicts in the developing world. The richer countries are questioning the balance between their financial obligations and the tangible benefits they receive from the UN in this and other areas. This has given rise to attempts to strengthen the capacities and effectiveness of regional and sub-regional organizations.

Since the establishment of the OAU 32 years ago, a system of *ad hoc* arrangements was used to deal with inter-state conflict, while intra-state conflict was mainly left to each member state to handle in an appropriate manner. It is only in the 1990s that the OAU has moved towards a permanent structure to formalize and intensify its ability to assist in building peace in Africa. The end of the Cold War and the liberation of South Africa has served to galvanize its efforts in this regard.

The OAU Charter of 1964 provided for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to encourage members to settle their disputes peacefully. The Commission remained unused as the OAU, involved in decolonization efforts and torn between the East-West conflict, sought merely to maintain at all costs the inviolability of its inter-state boundaries and ignored the gross violation of human rights that characterized intra-state relations in many countries. At various times proposals were made for an African Security Council and for Africa to follow the model of the former CSCE through the establishment of a Conference on Peace, Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa – initiatives that remained unrealized.

In 1990, OAU leaders officially pledged their commitment towards the

peaceful and speedy resolution of conflicts. For the first time, the 1991 OAU Summit of African Heads of State and Government acknowledged in its final Communique for the first time that "... there is a link between security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa" and that the problems of security and stability in many African countries had impaired the capacity of the OAU to achieve cooperation.[6]

A Division of Conflict Management was established in March 1992 and given a small budget. In July 1992 in Dakar, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government agreed "'in principle'" to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution with the mechanism formally adopted in a Declaration by the Heads of State and Government in June 1993 during the OAU Summit in Cairo.

South Africa subsequently became a member of the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution established by the OAU on 30 June 1993 in Addis Ababa. Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU, later stated that

> ... [t]he establishment of the Mechanism was an act of historical significance and self-empowerment. What Africa said to the world is that yes, we may continue to need outside help in dealing with our problems, but we will be centrally involved and provide leadership in any efforts at conflict resolution ... we can no longer fold our hands and wait for the foreigners to come and resolve our problems.[7]

The Central Organism of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution is composed of states which are members of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the State of the outgoing Chairman, the incoming Chairman, with the Secretary-General and Secretariat as its operational arm. The Central Organ assumes the overall direction and coordination of the activities of the Mechanism between Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and functions at the level of the heads of state and ministers as well as that of ambassadors accredited to the OAU or duly authorized representatives.[8] The ambassadors meet once a month in ordinary session and can also meet in extra-ordinary session. The ministers meet twice a year in ordinary session and can also meet in extra-ordinary

session. The heads of state meet once a year.

The Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the establishment of the Mechanism has committed the OAU to close cooperation with the UN in respect of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Moreover, the Mechanism is also committed to close cooperation with regional organizations such as SADC. Presenting South Africa's foreign policy priorities to the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs in Parliament during March 1995, Foreign Minister Nzo stated that

> ... any South African involvement in the prevention or solving of conflict situations elsewhere in Africa, should take place within the framework of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Only if the OAU is seen to be accepting responsibility for, and dealing effectively with its own problems, will the Organisation and our Continent earn the respect of outsiders. ..[9]

Thus far the Mechanism has not been a spectacular success.[10] Observing elections has been the most active area, a practice that has become particularly prevalent since 1990. By mid-1995 the OAU had observed 39 elections or referenda in 25 member countries.[11] According to Nhara,

> Conflict resolution has also been handled effectively by the OAU through the exercise of preventive diplomacy in many forms, including the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General, Eminent Persons, Special Envoys and Representatives of the Secretary-General. In addition, there has been direct contact between the OAU and governments of countries concerned, as well as missions from the General Secretariat to countries in question. Field trips recently undertaken to the Congo, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon and Lesotho have aimed at facilitating the process of mediation between the conflicting parties, or assessing the conflict situation on the ground, with a view to reporting to the Secretary-General and/or the Central Organ for further action. Within the area of conflict resolution, the OAU has been at the centre stage in the use of mediation as a tool for resolving actual conflicts in countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, the Congo, Liberia, Burundi and Rwanda.[12]

While these claims flatter the importance of the role played by the OAU, they do indicate an increased activity

and role for the organization which eclipses its previously virtually dormant existence.

Preventive diplomacy and its attendant functions fall directly within the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Central Organ. In this regard the OAU has an ambitious programme in mind. It intends to:

- establish an Early Warning Network to "... cover the entire continent"[13]
- establish and enhance the capacity of the OAU Conflict Management Centre through seconding staff from member countries
- establish a data-base covering all member states, detailing each country's general profile, its conflict profile, as well as profiles of individuals who can be engaged as Special Envoys or Special Representatives for conflict prevention duties
- have "... Member States earmark forces in their respective armies and security structures for possible utilization in peace observation and peacemaking operations first and foremost by the United Nations and in exceptional situations by the OAU"[14]
- "... establish a proper machinery and unit to manage peacekeeping operations"[15]
- "... examin[e] possibilities of establishing a proper military Coordinating Unit at the [OAU] Secretariat and Funding"[16]

Although the OAU has decided that peacekeeping should not constitute a primary activity of the organization and that conflict prevention and peacemaking are the most important and cost effective areas for OAU activity, pressure from both member countries and, perhaps more important, from donors, is building up for the OAU to extend its activities to these areas.[17] By September 1995 the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU stated:

> Our experience of the last year and a half with the Central Mechanism clearly reveals two shortcomings: The first shortcoming is our inadequacy to fully operationalize the Mechanism in the area of preventing incipient conflicts from erupting into full-blown conflicts mainly due to the lack of speedy exchange of information of conflict situations within Member States. The second problem is that the General Secretariat

has faced in operationalizing the Mechanism, lies in the area of peace-keeping. ... [O]ur experience demonstrates the increasing reluctance on the side of the United Nations, especially the major powers, to get more involved in peace-keeping operations directly. The General Secretariat continues to believe that time has come for Africa to be prepared to take some degree of responsibility for peace-keeping.[18]

As a result of these and other discussions, the OAU Summit of June 1995 endorsed the establishment in Addis Ababa of an Early Warning Network. It will be based on a coordinating facility located in the Conflict Management Centre being constructed with the assistance of the US Government at OAU headquarters. The Summit also agreed to host a seminar on early warning systems in Africa during November 1995 in Addis Ababa. The seminar was eventually hosted during January 1996 and recommended the establishment of the Early Warning system to, among others:[19]

■ "... function under the exclusive control of the OAU ..."

■ also "... monitor ... socio-economic indicators ..."

■ "... not only [be involved in] ... the gathering, analysis and dissemination of information, and informed decision making, but also and more critically ... provide the framework for actual and timely implementation of appropriate diplomatic and preventive action ..."

■ "... identify focal points [for the provision of information] on the level of member states, regional organization and other interested parties"

■ support "... respect for human rights, popular participation, freedom of expression, transparency and accountability"

It was further agreed

■ "... that the OAU should give consideration to an open-ended consultative forum of NGOs to meet regularly in Addis Ababa and provide their insight to the OAU Secretariat"

■ "... that the OAU should obtain an inventory of relevant projects [databases] and explore how links with such databases could enhance the operational capacity of the Mechanism"

■ "... that the OAU considers publishing an annual survey of conflict on the continent"

■ "... that a follow-up mechanism be established in the form of a strategy group to assist the OAU with strategic planning regarding the establishment of the envisaged Early Warning system"

If an early warning of a potential crisis is given, and the will to act is present, a wide variety of tools exists in theory for such action, whether it is undertaken by the UN, the OAU, SADC or by one or more countries acting in collusion. Tools include fact-finding missions, small preventive or observer missions (such as those of the UN and OAU in Burundi), and the use of a special envoy or a similar eminent person. Preventive military deployment is also an option, although beyond the reach of the OAU and possibly also of SADC in the immediate future. The OAU recently requested member states to identify eminent persons who could be considered for posts as special envoys or representatives. The OAU has also decided to establish a capacity for a 100-person preventive observer mission which could be kept on stand-by. OAU member states would then be approached to identify available personnel to participate on a stand-by basis.

A Crisis Management Room where a core of civilian and military officers will, on a 24-hour basis, monitor crisis situations in Africa will also be established and equipped with required communication resources. The OAU has appealed to member states to provide personnel to staff the operations centre which is presently under construction with a completion date of February 1996, funded by a grant of US$300 000 from the US government and a similar amount provided by the OAU.

Two years after the adoption of the Mechanism, Nhara identifies serious shortcomings in the OAU's ability

... to fully operationalize the Mechanism in the area of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, because of delays in the exchange of information on conflict trends and a shortage of resources. Information on new developments relating to conflict situations within member states has been sought, often to discover that it is not possible to obtain the knowledge that would enable the OAU to take the necessary political action. Additionally, serious difficulties and con-

straints in managing OAU missions in the field and in consulting with African leaders in the various national capitals about conflict situations ... have been experienced. This is mainly due to communication problems impeding the decision-making process.[20]

In fact, the Commander of the Tanzania People's Defence Force, General Mbomba, stated during July 1995 that:

The OAU's programme on conflict resolution appears to be faced with some crucial problems, including the lack of the necessary financial resources, as well as the absence of an Africa Rapid Reaction Force. Consequently the OAU appears to be playing only a peripheral role, while the UN and sub-regional organizations are taking the lead in the quest for peace in troubled African states such as Sudan, Senegal, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi.[21]

Even these comments are cautious when measured against regular newspaper reports with headlines such as "Broke, helpless OAU meets amid woes". *The Citizen*, for example, reported on 26 June 1995 that:

One year after the genocide in Rwanda, Africa's leaders gather today for the latest summit of the Organization of African Unity at a time when the body's impotence to tackle the continent's woes has seldom been so pronounced. ... Now the Pan-African body is practically broke and appears helpless in the face of wars, famine and the ravages of AIDS.[22]

Many countries and analysts still find the extent to which the OAU is able to intervene and effectively coordinate operations to be dubious, despite the UN's programme of capacity building at the OAU that has started recently and the possible contribution of South Africa to the organization. In fact, it would probably be accurate to state that South African foreign policy initiatives will continue to pay lip service to the OAU, but will concentrate in building relationships with SADC and the UN (ie sub-regional and international levels). Therefore, it is perhaps at the sub-regional level that preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, mediation and peacekeeping in Africa by Africans may come to the fore.

Peace support operations in Africa

At present, substantial additional negotiations and preparations will be required to establish either an African or

Southern African peacekeeping or rapid reaction force. The practical, logistic and financial implications of such initiatives would tax the resources of participating countries. A variety of unresolved issues, such as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states of the OAU and SADC, further complicate matters. Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad recently commented that

> ... serious questions need to be asked about the effectiveness of outside military intervention to prevent or stop internal conflict. ... The most important contribution that South Africa can make in preventive diplomacy at present is the moral authority it has derived from its own process of national reconciliation and democratization.[23]

Several countries in Africa are already offering peacekeeping training at staff colleges, namely Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At a recent conference run by the Institute for Defence Policy, the SANDF listed the following tasks that the South African Department of Defence could undertake in peace support operations in the region:[24]

- electoral support such as the provision of air transport (the SANDF were involved in similar operations in Angola in 1992 and in Mozambique in 1994)
- humanitarian assistance (the SANDF has already provided humanitarian assistance in Rwanda in 1994)
- engineering operations, especially mine-clearing (the SANDF and South African companies are involved in Mozambique and Angola)
- observation and verification of agreements such as cease-fire or troop withdrawal
- preventive deployment
- medical assistance
- demobilization and arms control
- securing the delivery of humanitarian aid
- disarmament of paramilitary and irregular forces

There are a number of ways in which member countries, the OAU and sub-regional organizations can improve their preparedness for eventual participation in peace support operations in Africa. These include the following:[25]

- Improving the level of preparedness of troops, ie better trained,

equipped and battle ready troops to enable participation.
- Encouraging the standardization of equipment, doctrine and standing operating procedures among African countries, which would greatly enhance inter-operability and co-operation.[26]
- Encouraging countries to participate in UN stand-by arrangements, with governments indicating in principle to the UN the types of personnel and equipment they will be willing to make available for UN peacekeeping operations (by July 1995 only five out of the 41 countries participating in UN stand-by arrangements were from Africa).
- Partnership arrangements between African and donor countries whereby the former provide troops and the latter assist in the provision of heavy equipment for peacekeeping.
- Pre-positioning of non-lethal equipment, such as tents and communications equipment, at advance logistic centres in select locations throughout the continent.
- Dedicated peacekeeping training assistance by and to African countries, as well as conferences and seminars on the subject.

A reason for the increased enthusiasm of the OAU to involve itself in peacekeeping activities, is the pressure from foreign donor governments on African countries to accept a greater degree of responsibility for peacekeeping in Africa. The British Government has, for example, convened seminars in Camberley, Accra (October 1994) and Cairo (January 1995), the United Kingdom/Zimbabwe Workshop on African Peacekeeping in Harare (January 1995) and the United Kingdom/Botswana Workshop in Gaborone (7–8 August 1995) to investigate doctrine, training, logistics, an early warning system, preventive diplomacy, etc. The French proposed an African Intervention Force during the Biarritz Summit of 1994. Finally, the US government (and to a much lesser extent the British government) has funded the Central Organ of the OAU to the tune of several million dollars, while a number of Scandinavian countries are also active at a policy level.

Both the British and French initiatives borrow from the original

proposals made by the OAU Secretary-General in Dakar in 1992 and Tunis in 1994.

The British proposals would require the establishment of logistics bases, skills centres and involve military training assistance. They consist of a range of services, including:

- formulating a clear doctrine, objectives and mandates
- improving communications between the OAU and the UN
- strengthening the capacity of the Mechanism to analyse information and assessments that would be provided by African governments and other sources
- strengthening cooperation between the OAU and sub-regional organizations to harmonize initiatives and conflict management approaches
- clarifying the roles of NGOs in conflict prevention and management
- recognition of the role of the OAU especially in early warning and preventive diplomacy, and the primacy of the UN with regard to peacekeeping
- building an OAU stand-by capacity to rapidly launch small-scale Military Observer Missions[27]

The French proposal centres on the setting up of an African Intervention Force at sub-regional level, under the political direction of the OAU. Essentially, the French government have proposed the creation of a modest permanent force at sub-regional level, with possible contributions from African countries that could be used during times of crisis. As proposed, the OAU would have to enter into an agreement with the European Union (EU) to provide peacekeeping items at short notice once a decision is taken to deploy an OAU force under a UN mandate. African countries would be required to put aside equipment for logistics bases, with the EU supplementing with air transport, air support, intelligence information and technical advice on request.[28]

However, the capacity of the OAU to undertake these duties effectively is questioned by donor countries to the extent that the OAU has stated that

> ... at the initial stages, both the British and French initiatives were not strictly speaking OAU centred and the involvement of the Organization only came after

the insistence of African leaders and Member States on the centrality of the Conflict Mechanism to African peacekeeping efforts.[29]

Yet the OAU believes that it

> ... must provide the necessary leadership needed to coordinate the various initiatives from Africa's external partners. It must also prepare itself to undertake peacekeeping responsibilities.[30]

Partly to address these deficiencies, the OAU has established an observer mission at the UN in New York and is considering an enhanced UN liaison system in Addis Ababa, staff exchanges and the electronic exchange of information. However, early implementation of some of these ideas is constrained by the current shortage of personnel and inadequate capacity within the OAU secretariat.

An additional development has been the recommendation by the 62nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers to hold a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the members of the Central Organ to deal with the technical issues related to peacekeeping. According to the OAU's *Conflict Management Bulletin*,[31] the objectives of this meeting are to:

■ exchange views and information on technical issues relating to peacekeeping operations, including doctrine, planning, command and control, preparedness and training, as well as procedures

■ come up with concrete and practical recommendations to guide the OAU secretariat on matters pertaining to peacekeeping such as structure, stand-by contingents, training, logistic bases, external assistance, relationship between the UN, OAU and sub-regional groupings, procedures

In the light of the perilous state of the OAU's finances, the funding of such ventures is a key consideration, although a special fund, the OAU Peace Fund, was created in the wake of the adoption of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo in June 1993. The purpose of the Fund is to "... provide exclusive, OAU support to operational activities relating to conflict management and resolution".[32] The Fund receives an annual donation of at least US$1 million from the OAU as well as donations.

The Southern African Development Community

Currently there are five main sub-regions in Africa, each hosting a sub-regional organization: the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in the east, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Maghreb Union (UMA) in the north, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). While the main focus of existing African sub-regional groupings is economic development, intra-regional rivalry and squabbles between the member states have impeded integration and development. In addition, increased domestic tension and conflict have had a negative impact on economic performance. Intra-state conflicts have affected even those neighbouring states that were once stable. Nhara recently stated that:

> There is ... a pressing need to restructure and strengthen these sub-regional organizations so that they can become an integral part of the partnership, with the UN as a world body and the OAU as a regional organization, to foster peace and security on the African continent.[33]

Of these organizations, it is to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that much of Africa is looking to provide an example worth following.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).[34] For the first twelve years of its existence the SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. Conscious of the poor record of regional economic integration schemes in Africa and other developing countries, the founders opted for a loose organization promoting cooperation and coordination rather than formal integration. With members' economies being mainly, but not exclusively, dependent on apartheid South Africa, they aimed to reduce this while promoting development. SADCC's original strategy was to concentrate on promoting cooperation in the area of infrastructure. In practice its primary activities were the coordination of members' development initiatives and assistance in raising funds for these projects. The focus of the organization,

therefore, has been on issues of economic cooperation and development.

Yet the SADC has had only limited success in this endeavour. Trade with South Africa increased, even during the time when the organization actively sought to limit this growing dependency, and so has dependence on donors. According to the Africa Institute, SADC projects depend on donor finance for 90% of total costs. Donors are openly critical of members' failure to mobilize their own resources and to maintain completed projects. The efficiency of the organization's internal structures is also criticized. Even the SADC was to admit in 1992 that the

> ... progress towards reduction of the region's economic dependence, and towards economic integration, has been modest.[35]

Yet, despite the criticism, the SADC has been a qualified success in one important respect:

> Of all the contributions made by SADC to regional development, the greatest has been the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa.[36]

In 1989 at the SADCC Heads of State meeting in Harare, it was decided to formalize the organization by giving it a legal status to replace the existing Memorandum of Agreement. Four years of consultation followed. The *Declaration and Treaty of the SADC* was eventually signed by Heads of State and Government in Windhoek in 1992 and expressed confidence that recent developments such as the independence of Namibia and the transition in South Africa, "... will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of cooperation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development. ..."[37] With the change of name the emphasis changed from "development coordination" to "development integration". The true vision of SADC is in essence full economic integration of the Southern Africa region and trade liberalization. However, Dube has stated that:

> While the old SADCC always portrayed itself as an economic body, the organization had more political and ideological inclinations than economic concerns. Its policies always portrayed political beliefs, particulary of the founding

father. Still, like other international bodies such as the Organization of African Unity, SADC failed in many instances to condemn its own members.[38]

Although SADC defines itself as a development agreement, it sees itself at the same time as a sub-regional political organization under the OAU, thus essentially a political organization. This has resulted in considerable ambiguity and confusion on the real nature of SADC, with the organization often involved in areas far removed from that of development coordination and facilitation.

One possible explanation is the weakness of the SADC Treaty on the central focus of the organization. In Article 4, member states adopted the following *principles* without any discussion or elucidation of the implications of each principle:

1 sovereign equality of all Member States;

2 solidarity, peace and security;

3 human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;

4 equity, balance and mutual benefit; and

5 peaceful settlement of disputes.[39]

Article 5 of the Treaty lists eight further *objectives*, including the promotion and defence of peace and security. In order to achieve its objectives, the Treaty lists ten *activities* to achieve its objectives, without referring to defence or security cooperation. The closest is a commitment to "promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international relations of Member States" and to "develop such other activities as Member States may decide in furtherance of the objectives of this Treaty".[40]

The Windhoek Declaration of 1992 that established the SADC, called for, among others,

... a framework of cooperation which provides for ... strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony. .. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.[41]

A number of commissions and sector coordinating units have been established by SADC to guide and coordinate regional policies and programmes in specific areas. Sectors are allocated to individual member states to coordinate and provide regional leadership. Sectoral activities are supervised by sectoral committees of ministers. In reality the capacity of many countries to coordinate activities in their allocated sector is limited. Progress in that particular sector is therefore also limited. This is perhaps most pronounced in the case of Tanzania who is responsible for the vital sector on trade and industry. Where the local civil service suffers from a lack of resources to fulfil its daily, ongoing tasks, SADC responsibilities are an extra function that is often last on the list. The formalization and expansion of SADC's bureaucracy seems inevitable, with the most likely route an increased reliance on commissions, of which two have already been established, one on transport and another on communications. In this process, the small size of the secretariat in Gaborone could become a severe limiting factor. At present, the secretariat already has to stay abreast of developments in 17 sectors and subsectors. However, a major advantage of this approach has been that it has kept costs to a minimum, with South Africa contributing a mere R1,8 million annually.[12]

With South Africa joining in 1994 and Mauritius in 1995, SADC presently has 12 members: the others being Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[13] Among these members are some of the poorest nations in the world. The total combined GNP of the former ten members of SADCC in 1992 was US$28 billion, and that of South Africa was US$106 billion. More countries want to join SADC, among them Madagascar and Zaïre, with the latter having applied three times for membership. As a result, SADC has recently decided on a list of criteria for membership in an attempt to limit further expansion.

Despite questions on its past achievements, SADC is poised to enter a new era. Article 22(1) of the SADC Treaty provides for member states to conclude a series of protocols to "spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for cooperation and integration."[44] These protocols will be negotiated by member states and, after approval by the Summit (ie the Heads of State), become an integral part of the Treaty. During its August 1995 meeting, SADC signed a binding agreement for the first time to share the scarce water resources available in the region.[45] This Protocol on "Shared Water Course Systems" is, therefore, a test case for SADC and will be pivotal to the success of subsequent endeavours, such as the establishment of a sector on security.

SADC has an ambitious agenda, if the plans of its Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende, are anything to go by.[16] The organization is, for example, drafting a treaty that could eliminate internal trade barriers and export subsidies in the region by the year 2000.[47] A further treaty on the free movement of people is planned. Both agreements could present South Africa and some other member countries with a major dilemma. South Africa's economy is nearly four times larger than the combined economies of the other 11 members. South Africans are 35 times richer than Mozambicans, the poorest SADC country. However, development indicators show that black South Africans are often not much better off than many of their neighbours. Intra-regional trade is growing: South Africa's export to its own continent, 70% of which goes to the SADC region, increased by more than 25% from 1993 to 1994, although its imports from the region remain at a low level. Sharing a single currency will be difficult without significantly increased intra-regional trade, despite the fact that the currencies of Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho are all pegged, at par, to the South African rand. No wonder that South Africa, in charge of SADC's finance sector, has not even begun to look at the matter of further spreading this monetary area. With an estimated five million illegal immigrants already in the country, the South African government also fears that the complete freedom of movement pursued by the SADC would mean that millions of people will move south, legally and illegally.[48] However, none of these concerns question the logic of regional integration and cooperation, but suggest that, in certain respects, South Africa would rather err on the side of caution in pursuing regional integration and would prefer an open-ended and phased process without a predetermined timetable.[49]

Following the resolutions and recommendations of the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, held in Windhoek in July 1994,

SADC appeared set to enter the areas of security coordination, conflict mediation and even military cooperation on a grand scale. This was further strengthened by the decision of the Front-Line States (FLS), on 30 July 1994, to dissolve and "become the political and security wing of SADC".

Most importantly, one of the Windhoek working groups on Conflict Resolution recommended that "... Conflict Resolution and Political Cooperation become a 'Sector', the responsibility for which would be allocated to a SADC member state" and that a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution be drawn up. This recommendation was eventually confirmed at the Heads of State meeting in South Africa during August 1995, but only after many of the other recommendations of the Windhoek conference had either been toned down or abandoned.

Among the multitude of recommendations, the Windhoek Working Group on Disarmament and Demilitarization called for the "development of regional mechanisms for peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities" and "equipping and training of national forces for peace keeping roles".

These proposals were subsequently referred to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers in Botswana where many of the intrusive and potentially prescriptive recommendations that could infringe upon the sovereignty of member countries were abandoned. It was decided at the meeting rather to establish a wing for conflict mediation and prevention, as opposed to a sector. This was followed by further dissension and discussion in Lilongwe, Malawi in February 1995. Here the SADC secretariat tabled a non-paper that proposed the creation of a regional peacekeeping capacity within the national armies of the region, but received a cold response from South Africa. The proposal was apparently not resuscitated a the Heads of State meeting in August 1995.

The proposed Association of Southern African States

Pursuing the decision to establish a wing for conflict mediation and prevention, a meeting of SADC Foreign Ministers in Harare on 3 March 1995

recommended the establishment of an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) as the political arm of SADC under chapter 7, article 21(3)(g) of the SADC Treaty. According to these recommendations, ASAS would replace the now defunct FLS cooperative framework and would become the primary mechanism to deal with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Southern Africa.[50] The meeting proposed the organization of two specialized sectors within ASAS, namely a political sector and a military security sector. ASAS would be guided by the principles of the July 1994 Windhoek document, that included the following:[51]

■ the sovereign equality of all member states

■ respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence

■ peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation or arbitration

■ decisions on military intervention of whatever nature only to be taken after all possible remedies have been exhausted, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the UN

The ministers further proposed that the following objectives would apply to ASAS:[52]

■ to protect the people of the region against instability arising from the internal breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression

■ to cooperate fully in regional security and defence, through conflict prevention, management and resolution

■ to give maximum support to the organs and institutions of SADC

■ to mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts

■ to coordinate and harmonize, as far as possible, policy on international issues

■ to promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and to encourage member states to observe universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the OAU and the United Nations

■ to promote peace and stability

■ to promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security

ASAS would be independent from the SADC secretariat, and report directly to the SADC Summit, ie the Heads of State. The ASAS proposal was, therefore, a deliberate attempt to preserve the key features of the previous FLS arrangement, namely an informal and flexible *modus operandi* with unimpeded access to the SADC Heads of State, while keeping bureaucracy to a minimum. Speaking in Parliament on the Foreign Affairs budget vote on 18 May 1995, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo would comment that "... the Foreign Ministers of SADC have proposed that the former Front-Line States be turned into a new political and security arm of the SADC".[53]

But this was not to be. The first problem which subsequently surfaced was the fact that the various ministers of defence, police and the intelligence communities had not been consulted in the formulation of these recommendations. Nor, for that matter, had some of the ministers responsible for SADC liaison within all of the member countries. As a result, at the August 1995 Summit Meeting in Johannesburg, a final decision on the structure which had by now become known as ASAS was delayed for an additional 12 months.

The first sign that the ASAS proposal was going to run into problems at the Johannesburg summit came from Nzo who told a press briefing that the foreign ministers of the SADC would have to again look at the name ASAS and whether it would be an association or a sector. To many commentators the decision to delay the creation of ASAS was rooted in a disgruntled Prime Minister Robert Mugabe who felt that Zimbabwe had a right to a commanding position in any new grouping, similar to the role it had played in the FLS and was piqued at the increased dominance of South Africa. Zimbabwe, had, amongst others, apparently insisted that the permanent chairmanship of ASAS be given to the longest-serving SADC head of state (ie Mugabe), but it was Namibia's proposal that a two-yearly revolving chairmanship would be more appropriate which had won the day.[54] But a two-year revolving chairmanship appears to err on the side of excessive caution, for it would

Figure 1: ISDSC organizational structure

imply that it would be a quarter of a century before any single country would again chair the sector. The final communiqué issued in Johannesburg therefore deliberately omitted any mention of the name ASAS, but simply stated that:

> The Summit reviewed its decision of Gaborone in August 1994, to establish the sector on Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security. The Summit considered and granted the request of the Foreign Ministers of SADC, that the allocation of the sector, to any Member State be deferred and that they be given more time for consultations among themselves and with Ministers responsible for Defence and Security and SADC Matters, on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures, for the sector.[55]

In preparation for the next Heads of State meeting in 1996 (scheduled to be held in Maseru), the various ministers of defence, foreign affairs, police, etc were expected to produce specific proposals in this regard. To this end the SADC Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security met in Gaborone on 18 January 1996 with the task to "... make recommendations on

how best to merge the decisions of the SADC Council to establish a Sector for Politics, Diplomacy, Defence and Security with the proposal of Foreign Ministers of the Front-line States to establish an Association of Southern African States (ASAS)".[56] The subsequent press statement recorded the recommendation to the SADC Summit in favour of

> ... the establishment of a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which would allow more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations. Modalities of how the proposed SADC Organ could be structured and operationalized would be determined by Summit.[57]

A sector had now become an organ in an obvious copy of the rather strange terminology adopted by the OAU.

Despite these delays, much of the concept around which the proposal for the organ had been formulated under the original ASAS name, ie informality, flexibility and confidentiality, were accepted as cornerstones for that which would now follow.

With the political framework now out of the way, a considerable degree of work remains to be done with regard to organization, structures, specific terms of reference and, most importantly, the decision to allocate the sector to a specific country, or to allow it to rotate.

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) is a forum where ministers of Southern African states, responsible for defence, home affairs, public security and state security, discuss a wide range of issues relating to their individual and collective defence and security. At present, it seems as if the ISDSC will become part of the SADC sector on security. Established in 1983 under the aegis of the FLS, ISDSC initially included seven member states, with South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland joining it in November 1994.

The ISDSC is an informal structure operating according to practices agreed upon by member states and

developed over time. It has neither an executive secretary nor a permanent secretariat. The Chief of the Zambia Air Force subsequently listed the objectives of the ISDSC as follows:

■ Prevention of aggression from within the region and from outside the region.

■ Prevention of *coup d'étals.*

■ Management and resolution of conflicts.

■ The promotion of regional stability.

■ The promotion of regional peace.

■ Promotion and enhancement of regional development.[58]

Based on its agenda, the primary functions of the three ISDSC subcommittees may be summarized as follows:[59]

Defence:

■ To review and share experiences on the prevailing military security situation in respective member states.

■ To explore areas of further multilateral military cooperation and practical means to realize this objective.

■ To exchange views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the Southern African sub-region in particular, and Africa in general.

Public security:

■ To coordinate public security activities in the subregion.

■ To exchange experience and information between member states on public security issues such as motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, counterfeit currency, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents and fire arm smuggling.

■ To explore areas and means of enhancing cooperation among police agencies in the subregion.

State security:

■ To review the security situation in the subregion and to analyse issues affecting respective member states, including political instability, armed conflict, influx of refugees, religious extremism and organized crime.

■ To recommend appropriate measures to deal with potentil threats to the stability of the subregion.

■ To consider ways of consolidating and expanding cooperation between member states on matters relating to state security.

In the past, the ISDSC played a key role in conjunction with the liberation movements in coordinating strategy and activities against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. Its mandate, however, has always been and appears to remain confined to making recommendations for the consideration of the Heads of State and Government of member states.

During its meeting in Arusha in November 1994, it was decided that the organization and structure of the ISDSC would remain, and not immediately become part of the SADC or constitute the Sector for Defence and Security of the SADC structure envisaged by the Windhoek conference of July 1994, pending further discussions. The meeting recognized that it had to redefine its role and establish a new basis for common security and multilateral cooperation. The Defence Subcommittee consequently held seminars in Gaborone (16–17 March 1995) and Cape Town to discuss the possible expansion of its structure.

The substructure of the Military Subcommittee of the ISDSC, however, would only be finalized after discussions in Cape Town during September 1995. Here the ISDSC decided on a streamlined organization, consisting of a functional sub-subcommittee (including operations, intelligence, personnel development and logistics), a professional sub-subcommittee (including the chaplains, lawyers and medical associations), a sports committee and the standing maritime and aviation sub-subcommittees. The Defence Subcommittee also decided to support the East and Southern African Liaison Office of the International Military Sports Council (Conseil International du Sport Militaire – CISM) in their efforts to build confidence and friendship through sport. In practice, each member country would nominate one or two persons to participate in each of the committee's activities.

The proposed functions of the military operations and intelligence components are:

■ To promote a common understanding amongst the member states of each of the state's operating and planning procedures.

■ To determine to what extent command and staff procedures, tactics and equipment are compatible and in what fields standardization should be sought.

■ To do contingency planning for the establishment of an operational centre in the case of disaster relief operations being launched.

■ To coordinate the conduct of intelligence and counter-intelligence on military and military-related activities from outside the region which may threaten the sovereignty and stability of one or more of the states in the region.

■ To coordinate the conduct and integration of intelligence and counter-intelligence on military-related factors and developments influencing/affecting security stability within the region.

■ To support strategic planning within the region.

■ To facilitate and support combined operations.

■ To coordinate military intelligence and counter-intelligence in the functional fields to be identified.

■ To participate in an ASAS or any other "Early Warning Mechanism" which may be established.[60]

The extent of potential cooperation on maritime affairs was significantly increased when Mauritius, the only island member of the SADC, joined the ISDSC in 1995. However, the Arusha meeting had already recommended that, although they were not SADC members, Madagascar, Kenya, Zaïre, Congo and Gabon invited to join the Standing Committee on Maritime Cooperation that held its inaugural meeting at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe on 15 June 1995.

Attendance of maritime and aviation meetings will occur at the level of naval and air force chiefs respectively. The proposed purpose of the Maritime Committee is to promote cooperation in developing professional capabilities and a common doctrine and standing operating procedures to achieve interoperability. This was to be achieved through, amongst others, common training, combined exercises and operations, and student exchanges. An obvious priority would be to establish an effective command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure for maritime coordination. The agenda of the Standing Committee could also include assistance with the protection of marine resources (notably fishing) and the marine environment, ecological pollution control

(including oil spills, transportation of hazardous cargo), disaster relief, combating piracy, drug and arms trafficking and illegal immigration, safety of life at sea (through search and rescue operations and monitoring substandard vessels), hydrography and navigation aids and the support of scientific research. This implies that civilian components, such as departments of transport, environment, safety and security would have to be involved.[61]

The decision to opt for a single professional sub-subcommittee replaced the earlier idea to establish a separate Military Medical Doctors' Association, a Military Lawyers' Association and a Military Chaplains' Forum to discuss the training, development and management of a military chaplain's organization within the armed forces.[62]

The ISDSC adopted a principle of unrestricted bilateral defence cooperation between member states, as well as between member states outside the region. It will promote multilateral cooperation and provide intelligence support for preventive diplomacy initiatives in cases of pending or actual hostilities. It must also be able to plan combined operations, such as staff procedures, drills, tactics and telecommunications equipment. It appears increasingly that ISDSC will become the formal mechanism for multilateral military, police and intelligence coordination.

It is expected that discussions on the establishment of a regional non-aggression pact will proceed soon, but that any movement on a mutual defence pact or treaty organization, as proposed at the Windhoek conference in July 1994, will not readily occur. While a non-aggression pact is a virtual requirement to ensure regional stability and build confidence among SADC member states, the implications of a defence pact are far-reaching and complex.

Shortly after the SADC Heads of State conference in Johannesburg, the 17th conference of the ISDSC, the first to be held in South Africa, began on 4 September 1995 in Cape Town. Preliminary meetings of top officials were held prior to the arrival of defence, home affairs and police ministers on 7 September. Agenda subjects included the smuggling of illegal weapons and drugs, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents, counterfeit money, protected animal products and the extra-

dition of fugitives. During the meeting, South African Defence Minister Modise took over as chairman of ISDSC from the Tanzanian Minister of State, Defence and National Service A O Kinana. Chairmanship of the newly established Southern African Regional Police Chief's Cooperation Organization was accepted by South African Police Service Commissioner George Fivaz.[63]

During September 1995 the SANDF issued the following programme of action, based on Modise's closing statement at the conference:[64]

In the light of the report from the sub-committee, the following is the outline of a programme for cooperation over the next twelve months:

- Apply resources to stem cross-border crime.

- Stop the illegal flow of arms between Southern African countries and into our region from elsewhere.

- Undertake joint intelligence exercises and develop a regional threat analysis that can usefully serve as an early warning system.

- Undertake the necessary training, logistical and operational preparation for peace operations, on land, air and at sea.

- Invite member states to participate in training exercises and attend educational and training courses.

- Continue to engage in confidence and security building measures. An example of this is the SANDF's invitation to other Southern African Development Community (SADC) states to observe Operation Southern Cross at South Africa's Army Battle School.

- Help emerging democracies in building civil-military relations consistent with democracy through regional workshops, educational programmes and practical support.

- Promote naval cooperation and protection of the region's marine resources.

- Be ready to meet requests for assistance from the Government of Angola.

The statement listed the following "organizational issues" that required attention during the following 12 months:

- Resolve the debate around the future of the Association of South African States (ASAS) and its relationship to SADC.

- Determine the structures appropriate to each of the defence, police and intelligence sub-committees and ensure effective coordination amongst them.

- Consider the establishment of a crisis management centre on an *ad hoc* basis for when crises arise.

- Appoint an official from each country to take responsibility for inter-state liaison and coordination.

- Be more transparent. Although some aspects discussed were sensitive, much can be conveyed to parliaments and citizens without prejudicing security interests.

As part of the crisis management centre, Modise also called for the establishment of a hotline between leaders and senior officials of the various countries.[65] Newspaper reports speculated on the possibilities of a joint weapon acquisition programme, since a single weapon system would equip the region better for joint peacekeeping operations.[66]

As yet, there is no agreement on the establishment of a regional "early warning system" within the ISDSC or SADC that would enable timely preventive diplomacy and thereby avoid the requirement for additional military or other measures. Although this has been debated for some time, the only consensus appears to be that such a mechanism should not be a permanent structure, for example part of ISDSC, and that this role could be fulfilled through cooperation among members and based on information provided by non-state actors, such as NGOs and academic institutions. In the Southern African region, South Africa is the only country with a diversity of research institutions and would possibly dominate such a system. In this context, the establishment of a regional security "think-tank" as considered by various organizations, may be appropriate. However, its establishment thus far has been hampered by institutional rivalry.

Subregional organizations such as the SADC have the potential to act as building blocks in a system of preventive action and early warning. They could, in particular, promote confidence-building measures, such as security agreements, or provide assurances at subregional level.

Increased military cooperation in the region could decrease the reliance on external assistance and provide additional stability in a volatile area. In this regard, a number of measures are already in place or are planned to increase transparency, inter-operability and professional standards:

- the mutual secondment of soldiers, including regional training cooperation
- equipping and assisting other African forces, for example in land-mine clearance
- goodwill visits and informal liaison
- conducting combined exercises
- a non-threatening force design
- the development of common doctrine and procedures
- participation in multilateral coordination structures
- cooperation in terms of logistics

That South Africa is taking the ISDSC quite seriously is evident from the fact that a ministerial coordination mechanism has been set up to coordinate the input of all the relevant South African ministries dealing with the ISDSC, namely intelligence, defence, safety and security and justice.

Conclusion

The post-Cold War era has collapsed most of the political space that the Third World occupied during the East/West struggle. For the most part, the former Third World is no longer of significant strategic interest to developed countries, neither as a location for military bases nor as the source of prizes in the ideological competition. The demise of the socialist world has not resulted in promoting developing countries, but in their demotion to peripheral status. Cutting evidence of African marginalization is found in the US Institute for National Strategic Studies' *Strategic Assessment 1995*:

> The US has essentially no serious military/ geostrategic interests in Africa anymore, other than the inescapable fact that its vastness poses an obstacle to deployment to the Middle East and South Asia, whether by sea or air.[67]

Virtually all recent wars in Africa were fought over independence and decolonization. They have been fought within states, as opposed to between countries. Even after independence, this deadly legacy persists. In 1990, 13 open conflicts were recorded, including major civil wars in Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia

and Chad. Armed struggles by minorities occurred in Uganda, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, the Western Sahara, Sudan and Rwanda. Droughts and famine have transformed many of these conflicts into major disasters. The problems caused by concentrations of refugees and successive strata of exiles, whether as a result of famine or war, sow the seeds for the next crisis, as witnessed in the constant seesaw in Rwanda and Burundi.

The vast majority of conflicts in Southern Africa, therefore, have been largely intra-state. Complex as they are, they are further aggravated by distrust, religious fanaticism and ethnicism. Old animosities are kept alive and a culture of tolerance remains evasive. In Southern Africa in particular, the legacy of apartheid, colonial exploitation and policies of the ruling elite have contributed to refugee problems, economic migration, smuggling, drug-trafficking, poaching and piracy. Ethnic divisions have forced countries into a downward spiral of civil war, lawlessness, anarchy and misery. The extent of the decline brought about by the struggle for independence, the resistance to such struggles, and by corrupt and inept despots, can hardly be overestimated. The collapse of state institutions and the disruption of government functions severely complicate attempts to intervene and assist these countries, either by the more affluent, developed countries, or by Africans themselves.

In this context, any military attempts to ensure a settlement, intervene in a dispute, or deploy armed forces for humanitarian assistance, are bound to be either limited or would require substantial resources. As such, peacemaking and peacekeeping involve constant danger and are more complex and expensive than the classic monitoring of cease-fires, the control of buffer zones or even preventive deployment. This implies that outside intervention, as has been the case in Somalia and Rwanda, must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and might include the reestablishment of effective government and the promotion of national reconciliation. Should the "intervening powers" come from the region, the potential differ-

ence between the needs of the population who require assistance and the national interest of intervening countries will inevitably further complicate the situation. But more importantly, there must be serious doubts about the persistence and ability of either Africa or the international community to effect such measures.

There is no short-term answer to the multitude of problems that confront Africa. Regional security arrangements could play an important role in stabilizing the region, although such arrangements are only part of the recipe that will eventually enable sustainable development and stability.

Notes and references

1   R Umoren, "World Bank pessimistic about region's economic integration, *Economic Bulletin*, IPS, April 1995, p 14.
2   DFA, "The Southern African Development Community: An integrated approach towards regional cooperation and development", paper presented at an IDP round-table discussion, *The SADC and ISDSC: South African Perspectives*, 26 September 1995, Pretoria, p 12.
3   Anonymous, "SA-Namibia deal to fight border crime", *The Citizen*, 13 June 1995.
4   Anonymous, "Phosa signs security pacts in Mozambique", *The Citizen*, 13 June 1995.
5   DFA, *op cit*.
6   A Haggag, "OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa", paper presented at the ISDSC meeting in Cape Town, 7 September 1995, pp 4–5.
7   S A Salim, "The Front-Line States: A new alliance for peace and development in Southern Africa", keynote address to the Meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of the Front-Line States, Arusha, Tanzania, 10 November 1994, reprinted in *Backgrounder*, no 17, 1994, p 8.
8   The current composition of the Central Organ is as follows: Ethiopia (chair), Tunisia (outgoing), Cameroon (incoming), Namibia, Mauritania, Algeria, Djibouti, Swaziland, Mali, Burundi, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, Lesotho, Gabon, Nigeria. *Resolving conflicts*, OAU Conflict Management Bulletin, vol 1, no 1, December 1995/January 1996, p 6.
9   A Nzo, *Statement before the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs*, Cape Town, 14 March 1995, p 11.
10 W Nhara, "The OAU and the potential role of regional and sub-regional organisations", paper delivered at an IDP/

SAIIA conference, *South Africa and peace-keeping in Africa*, Johannesburg, 13–14 July 1995, p 5.

11 *Ibid*, p 5.

12 *Ibid*, pp 5–6.

13 OAU, *OAU's position towards the various initiatives on conflict management: Enhancing OAU's capacity in preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peace-keeping*, Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3(IV), undated, Addis Ababa, p 4.

14 *Ibid*, p 10.

15 *Ibid*, p 21.

16 *Ibid*, p 22.

17 See, for example, I Johnstone and T Nkiwana, *The Organisation of African Unity and Conflict Management in Africa*, report of a Joint OAU/IPA Consultation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 19–21 May 1993, undated, p 4.

18 A Haggag, *op cit*, p 8.

19 See Institute for Defence Policy Paper No 1, *Summary Record of the Seminar for the Establishment within the OAU of an Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in Africa*, February 1996.

20 W Nhara, *op cit*, p 6.

21 R P Mbomba, "The role of regional bodies in preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping", paper delivered at an IDP/SAIIA conference, *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Johannesburg, 13–14 July 1995, p 5.

22 Anonymous, "Broke, helpless OAU meets amid woes", *The Citizen*, 26 June 1995.

23 A Pahad, "South Africa and preventive diplomacy", paper presented at an IDP/SAIIA conference, *South Africa and peacekeeping in Africa*, Johannesburg, 13–14 July 1995, p 8.

24 *South African policy on global peace support efforts*, Cape Town, 17/18 May 1995.

25 Based on H K Anyidoho, "Prospects for co-operation in peacekeeping in Africa", paper presented at an IDP/SAIIA conference, *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Johannesburg, 13–14 July 1995, pp 5–7.

26 The Chief of the S A Air Force recently made a number of specific proposals in this regard, for example in the standardization on the Pilatus PC-7 trainer aircraft.

27 A Haggag, *op cit*, p 12.

28 *Ibid*, p 13.

29 *Ibid*, p 19.

30 *Ibid*, p 20.

31 OAU, *Resolving Conflicts*, OAU Conflict Management Bulletin, vol 1, no 1, December 1995/January 1996, p 5.

32 *Ibid*, p 8.

33 See, for example, the remarks by W Nhara, *op cit*, p 3.

34 Through the Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, adopted in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 April 1980. The concept of a regional economic cooperation was first discussed at a meeting of the FLS foreign ministers in May 1979 in Gaborone. The meeting led to an international conference in Arusha, Tanzania two months later that brought together all independent countries – with the exception of the then Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa – and international donor agencies. The Arusha conference in turn led to the Lusaka Summit held in the Zambian capital in April 1980. After adopting the declaration, which was to become known as "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation", Sir Seretse Khama was elected the first chairman of the SADCC. P Dube, "Historic SADC summit in SA", *Sowetan*, 25 August 1995.

35 *Ibid*, p 3.

36 *Ibid*, p 3.

37 Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Southern African States, "Towards the Southern African Development Community", *Declaration Treaty and Protocol of Southern African Development Community*, Windhoek, 17 August 1992, p 2.

38 P Dube, *op cit*.

39 *Treaty Declaration and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community*, *op cit*, p 5.

40 *Ibid*, pp 7–8.

41 *Ibid*, pp 5 and 10.

42 From discussions at the IDP round-table discussion, *The SADC and ISDSC: South African Perspectives*, Pretoria, 26 September 1995.

43 The South African decision to join SADC was taken at a cabinet meeting on 3 August 1994. The accession was approved by the Senate and National Assembly on 13 and 14 September 1994, respectively. DFA, *op cit*, p 3.

44 *Declaration. Treaty and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community*, *op cit*, p 19.

45 Angola and Zaïre (not a SADC member) wanted to consult further.

46 Mbuende, Namibia's former assistant minister of agriculture, took over the reins of SADC in January 1994 after the unceremonious departure of Zimbabwe's Dr Simba Makoni. P Dube, "Making economies grow", *Sowetan*, 25 August 1995.

47 As a first step, SADC would embark on an impact study in 1996 to assess the effect of dropping tariffs. This study would also form the basis for a mechanism to be used to compensate countries that could be harmed from the loss of import tariff revenue. The trade and industry sector was also involved in removing non-tariff barriers to trade through the harmonization of standards in the region. A key part of this process was the establishment of national standards authorities. Only five SADC countries have these institutions. J Dludlu, "SADC plans free trade area", *Business Day*, 24 August 1995.

48 Anonymous, "Catching the golden goose may be easier said than done", *The Star*, 5 September 1995.

49 DFA, *op cit*, p 1.

50 The FLS organization was set up in 1970 by the already independent Southern African states, notably Zambia and Tanzania, to lobby for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

51 A Pahad, *op cit*, p 4.

52 *Ibid*, pp 4–5.

53 Remarks by Minister Alfred Nzo, *Foreign Affairs budget vote*, National Assembly, Cape Town, 18 May 1995, p 6.

54 S Brummer, "Mugabe is a spanner in the works", in *Mail & Guardian*, 25–31 August 1995.

55 *SADC Summit Communiqué*, 28 August 1995, Johannesburg, p 3.

56 Press release, "SADC Ministers meet in Gaborone", issued by the SADC Secretariate, 19 January 1996.

57 *Ibid*.

58 See R S Shikapwashya, "Presentation on the aim, roles, functions and organization of the Standing Aviation Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee for the Southern African region", paper presented at the *Sir Pierre van Rhyneveld Air Power Conference*, Pretoria, 3 October 1995, p 14.

59 The kind assistance of Maj Gen D Hamman (rtd) is acknowledged.

60 D Hamman, "The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee: Defence Sub-Committee", paper presented at an IDP round-table seminar on *South African and global peace support initiatives*, Cape Town, 17–18 May 1995, p 5.

61 *Ibid*, pp 5–6.

62 *Ibid*, p 2.

63 Anonymous, "Top brass launch bid to improve security", *The Citizen*, 5 September 1995.

64 "Minister Joe Modise at the 17th session of the ISDSC, Cape Town", *SANDF Communication Bulletin* 92/95, 12 September 1995.

65 N Chandler, "Southern African hotline mooted", *The Star*, 13 September 1995.

66 Anonymous, "Southern Africa most stable region: Mbeki", *The Citizen*, 8 September 1995.

67 Institute for National Strategic Studies, "Strategic Assessment 1995", *US security challenges in transition*, 1995, p 101

Rethinking theories

AN AFRICANIST PERSPECTIVE

Professor Goran Hyden, immediate past President of the African Studies Association, Director of the Center for African Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, and Fellow of the Africa Institute of South Africa, asks whether theories of state have lost their relevance for Africanist scholars and what the alternative ways are of looking at politics today.

One of the most striking things about the political science literature on Africa in the 1990s is the almost total absence of the concept of the state. Students of African politics are as silent about the state today as they were vocal about it in the 1970s and 1980s. The academic discourse has moved on to other concepts influenced by trends both within the discipline and in the practical field of politics itself. The current interest in democratization and governance has been best pursued through other conceptual and theoretical lenses. Have theories of the state lost their relevance for Africanist scholars? What are the alternative ways of looking at politics today? This article addresses these questions by first looking at which theories of the state have influenced our thinking and writing to date, why they have receded into the background, and where the theoretical debate in comparative politics seems to be going at present.

Past perspectives on the state

Political scientists differ in their analysis of the state in terms of whether they treat it as an instrument of control and power or as a tool to solve societal problems. The first group tends to see the state in a negative way. It is an institution that is being used to oppress and exploit the majority of the population. For these writers, the state needs to be done away with, certainly be reformed. The second group views the state in a positive way. It reconciles conflicting interests and provides the forum for finding solutions to pertinent problems facing members of the public. Without the state there would be no society, certainly no civil society. The state, then, embodies the instrumental rationality that citizens through their political representatives bring to bear on public issues. We might also say that the difference between these two perspectives can also be understood by suggesting that the first is primarily structuralist, the second based on the

significance of human agency (even if it expresses itself in an aggregate form at the level of the state).

Writers on the state, however, also differ in terms of whether they consider this institutional phenomenon being best captured through a universalist as opposed to a contextualist or relativist theory. Here the difference is whether the state possesses qualities that are sufficiently general to be empirically tested and understood through a theory with a universal ambition or it can only be fully comprehended with the help of a more contextual approach. For instance, is the state essentially the same in the US as it is in Russia, the same in Britain as in France? This issue has taken on special significance in the Africanist literature where much emphasis has been laid on pinpointing the exceptional nature of the African state.

In going through the literature on the state in Africa one is struck by the fact that we have actually at different times been using all these perspectives. Since the early days of the political development literature in the 1960s, which drew its inspiration from modernization theory, through the 1980s, Africanist scholars have written on the state with the help of at least four separate theoretical perspectives that can be derived from the conceptual distinctions listed above. The perspectives are summarized in Figure 1.

A quick look at this figure suggests that the theories on the left side, ie those with universalist ambitions prevailed in the early days of this thirty-year period, while those on the right side have been more prominent in later years. I shall now briefly discuss each of these perspectives, providing a sense of what they had to say about the state and its role in society.

Modernization theory

It is worth noting that when development economists in the 1960s favoured the concept of the state in their own theories about development, political scientists shunned it because it was viewed as being too crude. Drawing

of the state

their theoretical inspiration from John Maynard Keynes and their practical insights from the success of the Marshall Plan, economic theorists of the day were convinced that the state had a crucial role in stimulating demand for goods and services and thereby promoting economic growth. They did not question the universal character of the state as a problem-solving and coordinating mechanism. It was a given that a well-functioning state could and should make a difference for the better. To the extent that newly independent countries in Africa lacked their own workforce, technical expertise would be made available from the richer countries. After all, in the perspective of the day, what African and other developing countries were engaged in was to "catch up" with the rest, notably the West. The "design of development"[1] was important to these economists who advocated the need for comprehensive development planning so as to carefully identify the gaps that needed to be filled with capital and technical expertise from outside. National development plans became important instruments of macroeconomic management. In the process, the state was being strengthened and no economist really questioned its role as the engine of development, especially in countries such as those of Africa where private capital formation was inadequate to meet the needs of an accelerated national development.

This was the economic development backdrop against which the first generation of comparativists began to politically analyse Africa. Their agenda was different, however, from that of the economists. It was not that they disagreed ideologically with the position taken by the economists about the positivist role of the state. Their reluctance to use the state concept stemmed rather from their interest in understanding the prospects for the political development of these societies along Western democratic lines. In pursuit of this objective they found it necessary to develop a terminology of their own which was sufficiently abstract and detached from the peculiar historical experience of the West, yet captured its basic parameters. This was the challenge for the members of the Committee on Comparative Politics which developed under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council in the 1950s and which culminated in a series of influential publications on political development, the "flagship" volume being that edited by Gabriel Almond and the late James S Coleman.[2]

The conceptual framework that they developed centred on the "political system" and the idea that the political functions performed in each society regardless of its level of development are the same. The difference is found at the level of structure. The more differentiated the structures of society are, the greater the chances that it will be open and foster democracy. In this respect, economic development fostered political development, something that Lipset[3] also went out to prove by analysing data from European and Latin American countries. The universal functions that Almond and his colleagues identified were empirically associated with what both society and state do to arrive at political decisions. They included "political communication", "political socialization", "interest

Figure I: Summary of African theoretical perspectives on the state 1960–1990

articulation", "interest aggregation", "rule making", "rule adjudication" and "rule implementation". Their point was that the state was not the only political actor and that political scientists needed concepts which enabled them to go beyond institutionalist descriptions of state actions. Other volumes in this series, therefore, carefully ana lysed the role of bureaucracy in political development,[4] and given the importance of nation-building in those days, the role of communications[5] and education.[6]

In sum, structural-functionalism abandoned the concept of the state in favour of the political system, because the latter provided not only a better set of tools for analysing political development but also a more "objective" and detached conceptual framework that would provide the basis for a more scientific analysis of political phenomena than the case had been before. To the extent that they acknowledged the existence of the state, these scholars argued that it was only an arena in which social forces compete for an authoritative allocation of scarce resources. During the 1960s, therefore, economists were ahead of political scientists in explicitly recognizing the state as a conscious actor in national development. For political scientists, this was done only indirectly through the analytical tools provided by the literature on political development. What economists and political scientists had in common, however, was their belief in modernization and theories of how to make countries move from one stage of development to another. Walt Rostow's writing on this subject was perhaps the most influential.

Neo-Marxist theory

The concept of state was really brought into international development discourse by the neo-Marxist writers in the latter part of the 1960s. The state has always been a key concept in Marxist analysis, but it came to play a particularly important role in the neo-Marxist paradigm that became so influential in writings on developing countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There were at least three assumptions that featured prominently in this literature. One was the more orthodox notion of the state as an instrument of domination. The state was neither an arena nor an impartial moderator of conflicting interests as assumed in the liberal paradigm underwriting much of modernization theory. Critical to understanding the state, instead, was the question of who controls it. For instance, in the writings of Leys[8] and Shivji[9] much emphasis is being placed on the fact that the control of the state in Africa is being exercised not by an independent and assertive domestic class of capitalists, but by a "comprador" or "bureaucratic" bourgeoisie, which uses its control of the state to feather its own nest with the help of access to public funds. The position of this group or class, however, could not be fully understood without reference to the second assumption made in this literature: that the African state was not really controlled by a domestic force in the first place but by agents of international capital, who in the 1960s had extended their influence across boundaries both in the industrialized world and into the developing countries that were now becoming known as the

Third World. Somehow, state policies in Africa, Asia and Latin America were being dictated by the forces of international capitalism. This argument was supported by two sets of authors. The first was those who maintained that, more generally, Third World countries lacked clout in global relations because they constituted the periphery of the world economic system. Walter Rodney[10] and Samir Amin[11] were particularly influential in putting this point across. Their conclusion was that these countries had no choice but to disengage from the dominant capitalist system if they wanted to enhance their position in the world and to develop their countries by more effectively using domestic resources. Critical to this approach was the notion that national self-reliance was a *sine qua non* for development; that national development had to be engendered from within rather than from without. Because the capitalist economic system had a logic of its own, according to these writers, the only way out was to turn to socialism. Their position might be described as the "thick" dependency approach in that it gave Third World countries no chance to develop in the context of the global economic system because somehow the "laws" of capitalism prevented it. In the 1960s and 1970s when both the Soviet Union and China were perceived as viable alternatives and threats to the hegemony of the West, these were arguments that carried weight both in academic and political circles.

The second set of authors, who focused their attention more specifically on the role of multi-national corporations, had a less far-reaching argument but also one that was more empirically oriented. Examples of authors belonging to this approach include Steve Langdon[12] and Nicola Swainson,[13] and Kaplinsky,[14] all writing primarily on Kenya and making contributions to what in the late 1970s and early 1980s became known as the "Kenyan debate". They tried to demonstrate the role that foreign capital as mediated by international corporations really played in the context of national development in an African country. While some came to the conclusion that Kenyan policy does reflect the interest of these actors, Swainson, among others, cautioned her readers by suggesting that in the shadow of international capital was

emerging a viable and increasingly assertive national bourgeoisie which, at least in the Kenyan context, could not be ignored.

This is not the place for a lengthy critical review of these writings. Suffice it to maintain here that all these authors were methodologically captives of the Marxist position that political and institutional phenomena in society are historically determined by material forces. The state is an integral part of society reflecting the particular class divisions that exist at any time in its development. In this perspective, the state is treated largely as an instrument of power and domination, not in the positivist perspective of solving specific societal problems as the case is with modernization theory. The state is a structural hindrance to development and thus needs to be challenged. At the same time, Marxist as well as neo-Marxist writings share the notion with modernization theory that development goes through stages or that history is inevitably progressive. To be sure, the Marxist scheme of analysis implies a dialectical rather than a unilineal trajectory, yet it assumes a similar track for each society. The laggards follow in the footsteps of the pioneers. Like modernization theorists, neo-Marxists also share a universalist ambition in that one "grand" theory can explain everything. Here the difference is philosophical in that modernization theorists wish to empirically certify their theory as a means of reaching consensus while the Marxists assume that the laws of history exist out there and only need to be fully understood. Their challenge, therefore, is not at the empirical but at the theoretical or ideological level: of persuading everyone what these laws of history are.

Failure of the state theory

This is an approach that has been quite dominant in the literature on African development in the past fifteen years. Its basic message is that the state in Africa has failed to live up to the expectations people had in the first two decades of independence about what the removal of colonial rule would mean. Authors writing in this vein accept that the state ought to be able to make a positive difference; that human agency is mediated by public institutions is important.

It should be pointed out that before this approach emerged in the study of African politics, much attention had been paid to the failures of the state by first administration theorists, arguing for bureaucratic reform, and later by economists, maintaining that market failure was due to over-regulation and rent-seeking by the state. The literature on administrative reform was particularly prominent in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[15] The one on economic reform began to emerge in the early 1980s. Influential contributions include Bates[16] and the World Bank report on how to accelerate development in sub-Saharan Africa.[17] The political science literature under this heading is varied and addresses the failure of the state both as an instrument of power and as a tool for solving problems. My own work, especially my book on the relations between state and peasants in Tanzania,[18] addresses the first aspect. Those in charge of the state do not really have effective control over other groups or classes in society. Peasants remain uncaptured because the ruling bourgeoisie has no means of making peasants comply with its interests. The consequence is that state policy lacks clout. It is being promulgated without adequate enforcement mechanisms. Others who have written in this vein have pointed to the prominence of patronage in undermining the role of the state in society. Richard Joseph's study of prebendalism in Nigeria[19] is one case in point where the argument is that rulers in Africa are unable to act independently of the communities they represent and that in this sense they are captured by considerations other than those that they would have if their primary aim was to foster their own class interest. This point is reiterated in a somewhat different form by Migdal[20] and Chabal.[21] The former argues that the state is unable to act autonomously and hence, in comparison to society, it is weak in most Third World countries. The latter refers to the way in which the "Africanization" of politics on the continent has encouraged a personalization of power relations and thus a move away from the notion of the state as an instrument of technical rationality. This point is also echoed in two other publications on the African state that have been extensively quoted in recent years. One is the edited volume on

"the precarious balance" between state and society in African countries which is also a study of the importance of informal relations and their significance in the study of the state in Africa.[22] The second is another edited volume dealing with the failure of the centralized state,[23] in which the authors call for the need to develop alternative structures of governance and administration at the local level to ensure development on the continent.

What all these publications have in common is first of all that pre-modern values matter; that the rational assumptions that underlie the modern state have not been sustained in Africa in the past three decades. They also deplore, implicitly or explicitly, the virtual collapse of the state as an instrument of development. Finally, they call into question the usefulness of thinking of the state as a universal phenomenon. The state has to be analysed in its local context. The challenge of the researchers is to identify what the conditions or factors are that make the state in Africa so manifestly different.

Post-modernist theory

Post-modernist writing is very diverse and it would be wrong to assume that it can be easily subsumed under one umbrella. Yet, for the purpose of this brief overview, I will attempt a characterization of some of this literature as it bears on the theme of this article. Like the previous group of theorists, the post-modernists – or post-structuralists as they may be better referred to in the social sciences – question the notion that the state is a universal institution that can be studied cross-culturally, but their attack is at the theoretical or epistemological rather than the empirical level. This group of theorists pay special attention to the discourses that shape academic and other minds and call for the subversion of the dominant paradigm in order to demonstrate that there is no single truth. Everything is relative; there is no single normative foundation for our beliefs; no single grand theory that can lay claim to truth. This does not necessarily mean that these theorists agree with the point made by those writing about the failure of the African state that it is anomalous. Rather, as Bayart[24] notes in his book, many of the phenomena that are associated with the weaknesses of the

state in Africa can also be found elsewhere: in Moscow, in Shanghai, in New York and so on. What is at stake in their argument is the extent to which particular paradigms prevent us from recognizing certain phenomena. They detest the totalizing ambitions of other paradigms, whether liberal or Marxist, and often prefer to contextualize the study of given phenomena.

The number of authors who have studied African political phenomena from the perspective of a post-modernist philosopher like Foucault or Derrida are very few and the influence of post-structuralism is more generic and more manifest in neighbouring disciplines, notably anthropology, history, literature and linguistics. Their contribution to our rethinking of the African state theories, therefore, is more indirect, exercised through the broader intellectual currents that affect the study of the humanities and social sciences. One contribution that should be mentioned here, though, as an example of the application of a post-modernist approach to the study of the African state is James Ferguson's work on the influence of the World Bank on the state and society in Lesotho. His main point is that the development discourse of the dominant international finance institutions has a detrimental effect in situations where it occupies an hegemonic position and is not subject to criticism from within or without.[25] The state ends up spending scarce resources on a project that has little chance of being realized but because the money is there and the World Bank has given its stamp of approval, it goes along willingly. For the local residents it does more damage than good and, if anything, in their eyes the government loses its credibility as an agent of development.

To some, post-modernism has meant emancipation from the perceived confining influences of the dominant paradigms in the humanities and social sciences, but it has also had a sobering effect on many in that it has made many scholars humbler in their expectations of what theory can do for them. To be sure, it may also have intensified the rivalry among contending perspectives and confounded many social scientists in terms of where their field or discipline is going. The notion of a "scientific core" around which progress in the discipline can be built is probably under heavier attack today than it has ever been before.

Reasons for paradigmatic shifts

There are several reasons which have prompted the shifts in paradigm that we have identified above and that continue to influence our thinking about the study of politics in Africa. The first is associated with the universalist ambitions that theorists often have in the study of social phenomena. Their ambition is to identify generalities, "laws" that are applicable to phenomena regardless of cultural context. Both modernization and neo-Marxist theorists were captives of this ambition. Some may argue that there is nothing wrong with it; that, in fact, it is the essence of the scientific enterprise. Yet, what typically follows from such an orientation is the reluctance to consider alternative explanations and dismiss other approaches as uninteresting, less scientific, or irrelevant. This kind of intellectual arrogance has been demonstrated in different degrees by advocates of both theories mentioned above and has often had an almost immediate backlash effect. Because they have neglected to recognize other approaches, the single-minded pursuit of their own paradigm has exposed them more directly to the accusation that their approach fails to explain certain key phenomena. Its own criteria of validity have been called into question as has its social usefulness. Thus, a combination of intellectual blindness and failure to operationalize theory for empirical or practical purposes has been the main reason for the shifts away from paradigms with universalizing or totalizing ambitions. In this sense, the downfall of these paradigms is self-inflicted.

Another reason, already alluded to, is the virtual collapse of the state. In fact, in retrospect, we may have been mistaken in our belief that an African state existed in the first place at the time of independence. I personally disagree with that viewpoint but I accept that there has been a gradual disintegration of the public institutions that make up the state. In this sense, the concept of the state has lost much of its explanatory value. Socioeconomic and political issues are better understood through other lenses than those provided by theories of the state. The empirical evidence that we have of what is happening in much of Africa, therefore, no longer fits very well the major theoretical schemes we have applied in the past.

The third reason for the shift in paradigm in the past decade or so, has been the emergence of an hegemonic neo-liberal and largely economistic paradigm with a focus on the market rather than the state. Driven by concerns to reduce rent-seeking by state officials, this school of thought has placed its emphasis on reducing the role of the state. A natural consequence of this shift has been for scholars to adjust their interest accordingly. Thus, the nature and effects of structural adjustment programmes have taken precedence in much academic research in the 1980s and 1990s. This is both good and bad. It is good in the sense that some critical scholarship has emerged of what these programmes are all about,[26] viewpoints that probably would never have been produced had it not been for these independent scholars. It is bad, though, in that much social science research on Africa has adhered so closely to the agenda of the international finance institutions. The effect is that research on development issues in Africa has followed a single track with little interest in factors not relating to this major programmatic initiative. To be sure, structural adjustment programmes are very significant in most African countries and determine their fate in very direct ways. Yet, we may have been overwhelmed by our inclination to be applied and useful and thus overlooked the need for research that transcends the boundaries of the neo-liberal paradigm or discourse. The growing interest, especially among political scientists in issues of democratization, has not really created an alternative paradigm but rather a parallel track within which the dominant development discourse in Africa is being pursued in the 1990s.

What this literature does confirm is that the concept of the state is no longer central to Africanist political science. In fact, not only is this marginalization of the state taking place at the conceptual or theoretical level, it is evident also at the empirical level. Is there really a state in Africa? Jackson and Rosberg[27] suggested that it is only an empirical shell. To this can be added that the state lacks the qualitative properties that Max Weber associated with the state, especially the presence of a system of authority based on instrumentalist rationality. If these observations are accurate, all the efforts to reform the African state may be too little or to no avail. Those engaged in that exercise may be chasing an elusive ghost.

This leaves us with the question of what is really happening in the field of African politics and how it relates to the trends in comparative politics. It is to that question that I will now turn.

Current trends in comparative politics

Looking back at the research on African politics in the past thirty years, it is clear that it has been dominated by a political economy perspective. To be sure, not all scholarship has been of that persuasion but as the review of state theories above indicates, the political economy perspective has been dominant. This means that economic or social structures have been used to explain cultural and institutional variables. Even in rational choice theory that made an inroad into comparative politics in the 1980s, where agency rather than structure prevails, "culture" is reduced to the residuals left after regression analysis has exhausted the explanation of individual utilitarian pursuits.

Another way of emphasizing the same point is to say that comparative politics until recently was focused primarily on how interests shape politics, "interest" being defined as a given that is not mediated by subjective perceptions. Given that most of the competition for realizing one's interest takes place in the context of the state – the locus of the "authoritative allocation of values" – it is not surprising that the state has featured prominently in political science theorizing in the past three decades. These studies of the state have also placed emphasis on the distributive (or redistributive) side of politics: the way politics functions as a way of allocating values and solving conflicts among competing groups and parties. Even the "political systems" literature of the 1960s was based on that premise. When Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol[28] argued for "bringing the state back" into the literature on comparative politics, it was not really quite as radical a break as may at first appear. After all, as the subsequent debate with Gabriel Almond[29] confirmed, the difference between the political systems and state theory literatures was confined to whether, for operational or empirical purposes, the state was as useful a concept as the disaggregated terms used by Almond and his colleagues in the political systems approach. Seen from an Africanist

perspective, it may also be worth pointing out that the call to bring the state back into the analysis of political phenomena reached the rest of comparative politics quite late. By the early 1980s, many Africanist scholars had already been used to applying that concept for a decade or so.

The study of comparative politics that is emerging as dominant in the 1990s follows very different tracks than that of the earlier generations. First of all, it is much less focused on "interest" and there is a growing tendency to abandon the political economy approach. Instead, what appears to be evolving is research that centres on rules and regimes, identities and institutions. The latter four words appear more often in titles and substantive accounts of specific cases than any other. In this sense, there is much more general recognition of political culture as an important factor not only to be explained but also as an explanatory variable in its own right. This metamorphosis characterizes research throughout much of the field but the interest in the role of political culture comes in different forms. At least four are of interest here.

To characterize these approaches, it may be helpful to go back to the same parameters which we used to identify the theories of the state: first, the distinction between agency and structure; second, the distinction between universalism and relativism. With their help, it is possible to explain how today's more important theories in comparative politics relate to each other and what they stand for. The four theories which in my judgement can make claim to leading positions in the field are: neo-institutionalist theory; democratic theory; regime theory; and cultural pluralism theory. Their respective positions along the two parameters are indicated in Figure 2.

The dichotomy between "agency" and "structure" may not be quite as pronounced in the 1990s as it was earlier, thanks to the contribution that Anthony Giddens' so-called structuration theory has made.[30] It argues that agency and structure are actually intertwined because structures do not exist in isolation of agency, and vice versa. By accepting that structures are the creation of human agency, the rigidity of orthodox structuralism is challenged and increasingly abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic

approach. All the same, there remains in the literature a distinct difference between those who place their emphasis on agency above structure, and those who do it the other way around. This difference, which is more in degree than in kind, manifests itself, for example, in a comparison of neo-institutionalist and democratic theory.

The former comes in two versions: one more optimistic, the other more pessimistic, in terms of what difference human beings can make to their destiny. The first is largely an evolution of rational choice theory. During the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that the crude utilitarianism of rational choice theory is so overly simplistic that it quickly loses credibility as an explanatory tool in politics. Beginning with authors like Elinor Ostrom,[31] scholars have tempered its original assumptions about human self-interest by incorporating into their analysis the role of institutions in shaping public or collective choices. The latter, in other words, do not take place in a vacuum but are confined or facilitated by rules and norms – institutions – that human beings have evolved to guide their common activities and thereby create some degree of stability and certainty in their social environment. Africanists like Bates[32] have also accepted the role that cultural factors play in affecting decisions made by individuals in various public contexts. Although the extent to which authors provide policy recommendations varies, much of this literature has a definite prescriptive component to it. Because authors assume that rules and regulations are created by human beings, they can be changed. The challenge for scholars, therefore, is not only to identify what the rules are but also to come up with suggestions of how they can be changed so as to make specific activities more productive or efficient. Borrowing from parallel theorizing in economics, these authors are interested in how so-called transaction costs can be reduced. Their assumption is that neo-institutionalism is a theory with universal applicability. More than any other school in comparative politics, it claims to be the most scientific and that it is thus the way to go in the future.

The second form of neo-institutionalism draws its inspiration largely from sociology or the sociology of organizations. It is associated primar-

ily with James G March and Johan P Olsen.[33] Their main point is that history is not so efficient as particularly economists believe. It has more unanticipated than anticipated consequences. Collective and public action, therefore, leave behind institutional legacies that take on a life of their own. They cannot be easily changed or questioned. The conclusion that these authors draw, therefore, is that human agency is more confined than is typically assumed in policy-prescriptive literature such as the first form of neo-institutionalism. Their theoretical ambition is also lower because it is not built on deductive logic and questions the reductionist tendencies in the other neo-institutionalist approach. All the same, both approaches do share an interest in the interaction between public and collective choices, on the one hand, and institutions, on the other. In this respect, they are primarily concerned with what happens in the present. The past enters into the equation only in terms of how it affects the choices that can or should be made.

Democratic theory is more respectful of structure in the orthodox sense. The type of theory that I have in mind here is not the philosophical statements that have been made about democracy but the studies that have empirically demonstrated that political democracy is positively correlated with the existence of certain kinds of social structures and institutions. Democracy, in this perspective, is a dependent variable. Reference has already been made to Lipset.[34] Other modernization theory literature made similar assumptions and implied that democracy could not be expected in the poor developing countries. Also Huntington,[35] who was critical of many assumptions made in this literature, agreed that political dictatorship was a more likely prospect than political democracy in these countries, given their institutional and socioeconomic make-up. More recently, the relationship between market and democracy has been the subject of a similarly critical analysis.[36]

This literature shares with the neo-institutionalists a universalist ambition but refrains from the prescriptive policy references that characterize the latter. They accept that democratization is a long and painful process that is bound to be associated with as much turbulence as stability; with as

much backward as forward movement. In this respect, they are highly skeptical of the idea that countries can democratize just in any socioeconomic condition.

A similar comparison can also be made between regime theories and those focused on cultural pluralism. The former is really a family of theories, which comes with different emphases. For example, one set concentrates on analysing regimes in transition. Another focuses through the concept of "governance" on how such processes can be managed. Yet another helps us to understand how regimes affect resource utilization. What they have in common is an interest in how norms and values mediate social and political action. They differ from the neo-institutionalist literature in that the unit of analysis is not the individual or an organization, but a "system" that is set in place to regulate human behaviour. They are oriented towards understanding how these systems can be changed in the short run to influence particular outcomes, eg democratization, resource utilization, and social interaction.

Regime transition theories come originally from the study of Southern European and Latin American politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s when these regions went through a period of democratization. Particularly influential in this genre is the concluding volume in a major project to study these transitions, written by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter.[37] It sets out the lessons learnt from these transitions and identifies factors that seem to determine the successful transition to democracy. Different in both style and orientation is another book by Huntington, focusing on the same set of transitions, but being prescriptive to the extent of producing a volume that reads as much as a manual to potential democratizers than anything else.[38]

The concept of "governance" has come to occupy a more prominent position in the general discourse on international development, but only a few authors define it with a view to serving analytical purposes. One attempt in this direction is written by the present author and contained in a volume on governance and politics in Africa.[39] The effort here is to identify what dimensions of regime management are particularly important for understanding how political systems


Figure 2: Influential comparative politics theories in the 1990s

can be sustained and developed. The particular point that this volume makes is that attention needs to be paid more directly to the rules that constitute the framework within which policies are being made and implemented. In this sense, governance is a concept that is best suited to the regime level. It differs from policy-making in that the latter is confined to the level of government and from administration which is located at the level of bureaucracy. It is possible to see these concepts as nested in each other with governance being the outer one.

The question of how specific rules and norms, ie regimes, influence resource utilization is receiving increasing attention from scholars who some years ago would have done straightforward political economy studies. This literature examines how values inherent at different levels of a system mediate resource use. How global norms about protection of certain natural resources influence local actors involved in the management or use of these resources is one example of what falls in this genre. This interest is shared by comparativists and international relations scholars alike.

Regime theories all have in common an interest in the immediate and contemporary, and as with their neo-institutionalist counterparts there is an assumption that the norms and rules making up specific regimes can be changed and manipulated to serve explicit policy purposes. They typically assume a high degree of latitude for human agency and are therefore generally optimistic about the chances of improving the human condition by identifiable changes in the existing regime structures.

Theories that focus on cultural pluralism tend to be much more cautious when it comes to proposals for action. In fact, most authors in this genre assume that the social structures that underlie cultural pluralism are so difficult to mend that they are understandably loathe to advance specific policy recommendations. Yet, because of the tragedies that have taken place in many societies divided along cultural lines, they have for moral reasons found it hard to refrain completely from offering advice. This literature has taken on special significance in recent years, particularly after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of several new states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Interest in these issues has also been strengthened by the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia and parts of Africa and Asia where ethnic violence and warfare have led to extensive bloodshed.

Much of this literature deals with the underlying causes of this bloodshed and focuses on the role that cultural identity, eg language, race, ethnicity or religion, plays in mediating social interactions and indirectly the distribution of resources in society. The current literature has its own pedigree, which, in the context of African studies, goes as far back as the 1960s and early 1970s when ethnicity was being studied in terms of its implications for political action.[40] More recently, considerable attention has also been paid to the specific challenges of cultural pluralism found in South Africa.[41] To the extent that this literature has provided recommendations of a constitutional kind, the specific experience of Europe's so-called "consociational"

states, ie The Netherlands and Belgium, has often been used. For example, in an attempt to propose a solution to the racial divisions and discrimination in South Africa, one author offered recommendations derived from the experience of these two European countries.[42] By and large, however, authors have been cautious in suggesting that there are universal or global lessons that apply to specific cases. Instead, they have been much more inclined to identify the specific contextual factors that make their case so unique. Theory formation, here, as in the case of regime theory, tends to be inductive and more aimed at arriving at workable theories at the middle rather than the universal level.

Current studies of African politics may not follow the trends above in all respects, but it is clear that much of what is being written these days by Africanist political scientists can be subsumed under the four theoretical headings discussed above. If there is any particular emphasis at this point, it seems to be on regime studies and cultural pluralism. This means that African studies tends to stress the contextual or relativist side more than the universalist inclinations of democratic or neo-institutionalist theories. This is in line with the commonly shared observation in the field that the African situation is unique in many respects; that it does not lend itself to fruitful interpretation by theories which make assumptions about human behaviour that appear foreign to Africans.

Conclusion

It is now possible to conclude that there has been a major shift in theorizing in comparative politics in recent years, a phenomenon that has also affected the study of African politics. It may be best characterized as a shift from an emphasis on political economy to political culture. Another way of putting this is to suggest that comparativists in the past were primarily concerned with the study of distributive politics, focusing on the process of who gets what, when and how. While this broader concern has not completely vanished, it has been overshadowed in recent years by what I call our interest in "constitutive" politics. As the review of the literature in the second part of this article indicates, current theories in comparative politics deal more with rules and regimes, identity and institutions. These are the mediating factors that help us understand even political economy issues. How these variables influence political choice and behaviour is now being studied both from a structuralist and voluntarist perspective.

More specifically, it seems "regime" has largely replaced the state as a major focus of interest in the study of African politics. There is little evidence that state theories will make an imminent return to the field, although issues of social equity and redistribution no doubt will become increasingly important as focal points for both academics and policy practitioners. Yet, with the state literally vanishing in much of Africa, scholarly interest is likely to be elsewhere, if not on regimes at least on institutions and the many informal ways in which cultural phenomena in Africa influence formal institutions. If this assessment is correct, state theories will remain on the backburner for some time to come. African politics will continue to find their interpretation with the help of other theoretical lenses.

References

1 Jan Tinbergen, *The design of development,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.
2 Gabriel A Almond and James S Coleman (eds), *The politics of developing areas,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
3 Martin S Lipset, *Political Man: The social basis of politics,* New York: Doubleday, 1960.
4 Joseph LaPalombara (ed), *Bureaucracy and political development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.
5 Lucien W Pye (ed), *Communications and political development,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
6 James S Coleman (ed), *Education and political development,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
7 Walt W Rostow, *The stages of economic growth,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

8   Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

9   Issa Shivji, *Class struggles in Tanzania*, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1975.

10 Walter Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972.

11 Samir Amin, *Unequal development*, Sussex: Harvester, 1976.

12 Steve Langdon, *Multinational corporations in the political economy of Kenya*, London: Macmillan, 1981.

13 Nicola Swainson, *The development of corporate capitalism in Kenya, 1918–1977*, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980.

14 Roy Kaplinsky (ed), *Readings on the multinational corporation in Kenya*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

15 Anthony H Rweyemamu and G Hyden (eds), *A decade of public administration in Africa*, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975.

16 Robert H Bates, *Markets and states in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.

17 World Bank, *Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for action*, Washington DC: The World Bank, 1981.

18 Goran Hyden, *Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

19 Richard Joseph, *Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

20 Joel Migdal, *Strong societies and weak states*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

21 Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1992.

22 Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), *The precarious balance: State and society in Africa*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

23 James S Wunsch and Dele Olowu (eds), *The failure of the centralized state: Institutions and self-governance in Africa*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

24 Jean-Francois Bayart, *The state in Africa: The politics of the belly*, New York: Longmans, 1993.

25 James Ferguson, *The anti-politics machine*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

26 Peter Gibbon, Y Bangura and K Havnevik (eds), *Authoritarianism, democracy and adjustment: The politics of liberalization in Africa*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992; and Ulf Himmelstrand, K Kinyanjui and G Mburugu (eds), *African perspectives on development*, London: James Currey, 1994.

27 Robert H Jackson and C G Rosberg, "Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and juridical in statehood", *World Politics*, vol 35, no 1 (October), 1982, pp 1–24.

28 Peter Evans, D Rueschemeyer and T Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the state back in*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

29 Gabriel A Almond, "Return to the state", *American Political Science Review*, vol 82, no 3, September 1988, pp 853–904.

30 Anthony Giddens, *Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis*, London: Macmillan, 1979.

31 Elinor Ostrom, *Crafting irrigation institutions: Social capital and development*, Decentralization: Finance and management project, Burlington: Associates in Rural Development, 1990.

32 Robert H Bates, *Beyond the miracles of the market*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

33 James G March and J P Olsen, "The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life", *American Political Science Review*, vol 78, no 3, September 1984, pp 734–749.

34 Martin S Lipset, *op cit.*

35 Samuel P Huntington, *Political order in changing societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

36 Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the market*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

37 Guillermo O'Donnell and P C Schmitter, *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

38 Samuel P Huntington, *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*, Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991.

39 Goran Hyden and M Bratton (eds), *Governance and politics in Africa*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

40 Crawford Young, *The politics of cultural pluralism*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976; and Nelson Kasfir, *The shrinking political arena*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

41 Donald L Horowitz, *A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a divided society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

42 Arend Lijphart, *Power-sharing in South Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1985.

Refugees in sub-Saharan Africa
From cause to solution

Prof Denis Fair, Fellow of the Africa Institute of South Africa, reviews some recent events and views concerning sub-Saharan Africa's refugee problem; the interaction between political and environmental causes; the willingness on the part of host countries to accept refugees; the settlement of refugees in host countries; and repatriation.

Sub-Saharan Africa's refugees have increased from some 250 000 in the early 1960s to over 5 million or to 30% of the world's total in a region that accounts for 10% of the world's population and is the least capable of caring for them.[1] Add to this another 10–12 million internally displaced persons and the problems facing both source and host countries in the region as well as the international community are daunting.

The principal legal instruments defining refugees and their status and establishing rules of protection, asylum, admission and repatriation are the Geneva Convention of 1951, its extension by a 1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) convention.[2] The last widened the definition of refugees to include those fleeing war, violence and serious public disorder. Internally displaced persons do not enjoy protection in terms of these conventions and the mandate of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Some of the international attempts to get to the causes of, and solutions to, the problem are the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (Icara) in 1981 and l984, the Declaration on Africa's Refugee Crisis adopted by the OAU in 1990, and the conferences of the World Council of Churches in 1986 and 1995.

Major causes given for Africa's mass migrations are war, including that arising earlier out of Cold War rivalry and South African destabilization in Southern Africa, human rights violations, and political, ethnic and religious persecution. Table 1 indicates the major countries from which refugees fled as at 31 December 1992. These nine accounted for 90% of the total number of refugees from 27 countries listed for sub-Saharan Africa. More recently, further flows have occurred from Burundi, since October 1993, and from Rwanda, after April 1994. The main host countries are 15 in number, accounting for 95% of refugees received by 36 countries at that date. Possibly 11 000 fled overseas.

Politics and the environment

Kalumiya notes that "it is no coincidence that those parts of the Continent that are most affected by soil erosion, drought and other environmental problems are also the main theatres of armed conflicts, recurrent famine and consequent refugee movements".[3] Zolberg and others make the point more forcefully: "the emerging realities of a continent ... where man-made calamities interact with natural catastrophes".[4] The environmental impact on migration is greatest in that vast marginal belt of sub-humid and semi-arid land stretching from the Sahel of West Africa through Chad and Sudan to the Horn of northeast Africa, as the droughts of the 1970s, 1984–85 and the early 1990s testify.

In northern Mali many nomads moved south as well as north to Algeria and Libya after the 1970s and 1980s droughts.[5] Returning rebels sought an autonomous Tuareg state, the violence causing thousands to flee once more to Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Algeria, an exodus that continued into the early 1990s as drought again threatened the land. In 1990 some 10 million people in Sudan were threatened with starvation, half related to the civil war between north and south and half to drought, floods and pestilence which, operating in unison, rendered people vulnerable to poverty and famine.[6]

Three million were forced from their homes to other parts of Sudan while 400 000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

During Eritrea's war of independence, which began in 1962, Ethiopia's policy was to destroy the country's economic and political base by driving people out of their homes and off their lands wherever the liberation movement was fighting.[7] Drought and famine further combined to force hundreds of thousands of nomads and villagers to flee to Sudan in search of food and safety. In the past 20–30 years, war between Ethiopia and Somalia and civil war within these countries has generated mass movements at a time when drought in

the region was at its worst. Most recently in 1992 a two-year drought degraded grazing lands in southern Ethiopia, resulting in conflict between three Oromo pastoral tribes and the outflow of some 50 000 people to northern Kenya.[8] Within a year 40 000 had returned.

The Tigray region of northern Ethiopia is perhaps the classic example of the interplay between politics and environment in generating refugee flows.[9] The problem resulted from long-evolving political, socioeconomic and ecological forces which contributed to resource-depletion, famine, deprivation and mass migration both internally and across borders. The most heavily populated zone in Tigray is the plateau falling away to the Rift Valley on the east and to lowlands on the west. It is settled by subsistence farmers, is overcultivated, overgrazed, prone to soil erosion and easily disrupted by prolonged drought and/or sociopolitical instability.

Over at least 100 years worsening conditions have contributed to resource and agricultural decline, such that by the mid-twentieth century the political and ecological pressures had taken "a tremendous toll on Tigray". Environmental degradation had combined with human degradation among a people whose quality of life was one of the lowest in Ethiopia, suffering illiteracy, malnutrition and disease. Moreover, the revolt in 1943

against 54 years of Amhara domination was suppressed. Recognizing land as the single most important resource and basis of power, the central government confiscated the province's most productive agricultural land, reducing the area of Tigray by 35%.

As conditions deteriorated, helped by the locust infestation of 1958–60, so did migration increase to other parts of Ethiopia. In 1975, after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) began its struggle against military rule and the autocratic Mengistu regime. Through the 1970s and 1980s the Tigrayan people were brutally oppressed. Many were uprooted and resettled in concentration camps and those who did not comply were tortured or killed. Food aid donated by international agencies was withheld and used as a political weapon. All this happened when famine stalked the land, reaching a peak during the disastrous drought of 1984–85 when people were at their weakest and most vulnerable. At the height of their misfortune "tens of thousands of Tigrayans spontaneously migrated to the Sudan as refugees in search of relief". Help finally came in 1991 with the overthrow of Mengistu by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since which time many people have made the journey home.

In the better watered areas of sub-Saharan Africa pressure on land is an important generator of both external and internal migrations. Excessive population densities and land subdivision are regarded as contributing factors to the ethnic conflict and refugee movements in Rwanda and Burundi. Elsewhere, as in the former South African homelands, southern Malawi, Kenya and some coastal areas of West Africa, pressure on land has caused internal displacements, much of them from rural to urban areas.

One observer, pessimistically perhaps, fears for the future. "The vicious circle of environmental degradation, climate change, economic crisis, resource shortages, population pressure, political fragmentation and the supply of cheap weaponry will mean many more wars in Africa, generating new waves of refugees and displaced people".[10]

Host country acceptance

Refugees generally settle in countries bordering their own, ie in countries of first asylum. Many are assisted by the UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), other international agencies and organizations and local governments. The burden of refugees on poor Third World countries is heavy and taxes their limited resources, weak administrative systems and land availability.[11] Yet "traditionally, most African countries have been relatively generous and tolerant in their treatment of refugees".[12] In some others the reaction has been negative and even hostile. The degree of acceptance by host countries is related to the level of familial, clan, tribal, language and cultural links across sub-Saharan's international boundaries.[13]

As one of the world's poorest countries, Malawi's acceptance of over 1 million refugees from Mozambique by the end of 1992 has been described as "no less than heroic".[14] Despite this massive influx which severely strained the country's social services and its transport network and drained its food supplies, the government and the people continued to welcome the refugees as kindred folk.[15] They were settled in and around villages. But as numbers swelled, a limited number of refugee camps had to be established and even the family support system broke down in part. At first the gov-

ernment assisted the refugees itself but later the aid of UNHCR, the Red Cross and others had to be sought, particularly after 1989 when floods rendered homeless more than 100 000 Malawians themselves.[16] The same story is told of settlements for Mozambicans established along the southern border of Tanzania and the eastern border of Zimbabwe.[17]

By 1991, 700 000 Liberians had fled the civil war to Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.[18] These countries went out of their way to help these people whom they regarded as kinsmen in need. They settled them in homes and villages according to their ethnic and family origin, rented out plots, employed them on oil palm plantations and allowed them to start small businesses. As the influx grew, however, tented camps had to be provided and emergency food and health programmes instituted with the help of aid agencies. In some instances assistance given to refugees created disparities and caused resentment among the local population. In the Horn, refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan were welcomed by these same host countries, although they themselves were suffering from internal troubles (with the exception of Djibouti) and deteriorating economic conditions (see later).[19]

These examples are countered by those where refugees were not welcome and where land was a source of friction. At one stage in 1990 Sierra Leone closed its borders to Liberian refugees fearing that the economic and social disruption engendered by their presence might cause political instability.[20] In 1992 the Namibian government was blamed for blotting its "otherwise untarnished human rights copybook".[21] Refugees from Angola were transported to the Osire camp where they were not permitted to work nor, until later, to study. Both restrictions, it was claimed, were in conflict with the 1951 Convention.

South Africa had "one of the worst records on the continent in hosting refugees" from Mozambique, states Sorenson.[22] An electric fence (now deactivated) was even constructed along its border. The government's concern has been distinguishing between genuine political refugees and illegal economic immigrants from all neighbouring countries in search of employment, especially in

urban areas where they exacerbate an already serious unemployment problem. The government's attitude towards the former has since moderated and in 1991 an agreement was signed with the UNHCR recognizing Mozambicans in border areas as refugees (see later).[23]

After independence in Rwanda in the late 1950s power shifted to the majority Hutu, forcing Tutsi to flee to neighbouring countries. Over time resentment increased against those in Uganda.[24] They were accused of taking over land at the expense of the locals, among other acts. Violence erupted in 1982 and many Rwandans fled to their home country. More recently, Zaïre has grown "increasingly impatient" with its uninvited Rwandan refugees following the genocide in that country after April 1994, claiming that they had fed an inflation in food prices, increased local crime and despoiled large areas of woodland and savanna.[25] Unfortunately, in virtually all host countries refugee camps and settlements have created "a circle of destruction" around them, denuding trees and vegetation in the search for wood for fuel and construction.[26] Despite ethnic ties, resentment has often resulted – especially in those climatically marginal areas where the ecosystem is already fragile. UNHCR and international donors have in some cases sponsored programmes to counteract this degradation.[27]

Host country settlement

Refugees are accommodated in host countries in holding camps, in organized rural development schemes or by spontaneous or self-settlement.[28]

Holding camps are established when adequate means and the infrastructure to support a large influx of refugees is lacking. They provide relief or emergency measures in the form of food and medicines. The camps are supported by UNHCR and donor organizations but many are bleak places generating dependency and often despair and helplessness.[29] Since UNHCR and other funds have been curtailed, conditions in some of the camps have deteriorated.[30] As an example, camps in eastern Ethiopia were established to accommodate hundreds of thousands of Somalis who had fled civil war since 1988.[31] In 1991 another 150 000 arrived along with 200 000 Ethiopian returnees

who previously had fled to Somalia in the 1970s and 1980s, giving a total of 700 000 in nine camps in this arid region where not only is water scarce, access difficult but life precarious. So complex is the migration pattern in the Horn that as some returning Ethiopians in 1992 moved out of the camps and back to their homes, and as numbers of Somalis likewise returned home as the impact of the US/UN Operation Restore Hope began at first to be felt, so did up to 100 000 Somalis enter Ethiopia as insecurity and famine in their particular region intensified.[32]

Camps in other countries vary in quality, Zimbabwe and Malawi having a creditable record in those established for Mozambicans along their borders.

Organized versus self-settlement

While voluntary repatriation is considered the most durable solution to the refugee problem, conditions in the home country may not return to normal for many years, necessitating resort to an alternative solution, ie, the integration or resettlement of long-staying refugees in the country of first asylum. This solution meets the objectives of UNHCR's second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa in 1984 (Icara II).[33] It sought to make assistance to refugees and host country populations more development-oriented such that their upliftment became an integral part of the host country's national development programme. Icara I in 1981, by contrast, was concerned primarily with emergency relief.

The means to achieve the integration of refugees were, on the one hand, to allow them to settle freely among local host populations on the basis of their kinship links, ie, self-settlement, and, on the other, for governments to establish organized development schemes aimed at refugee self-sufficiency.

There is debate about which of the two forms promotes integration more effectively and thus provides a sound basis for development.[34] African governments and UNHCR have generally favoured organized settlements because it gives them greater control over the refugees and makes it easier to obtain foreign aid since the people and their needs are readily identifiable.

However, 60% of refugees in Africa are self-settled, preferring to maintain control over their own lives even though some may be economically insecure and lack legal status.[35] It is claimed that they integrate more easily and can earn higher incomes while those in organized settlements generally enjoy superior social services, according to UNHCR.

Most Mozambican refugees in Malawi were self-settled as were Liberians in their neighbouring countries. In Malawi others were given plots on which to build houses but it was not possible to give them scarce farmland or to allow them to accept employment.[36]

For refugees in organized settlements conditions vary from country to country. In eastern Sudan, some from Ethiopia and Eritrea were settled on farmland but, this being limited, two other settlement forms were adopted in the 1980s.[37] These were, first, wage-earning rural settlement providing employment, which was in short supply, to refugees on commercial farms, and, secondly, peri-urban settlement. The former has not proved entirely viable since farm jobs are seasonal and people have no plots from which to supplement their incomes. The peri-urban settlements achieved better results. Two in particular, near the large town of Gedaref, enabled refugees to obtain loans for a variety of informal activities from repair work to manufacturing. Their presence contributed notably to the expansion of the local economy.

In view of Tanzania's earlier liberal attitude towards refugees, its organized settlements proved to be "quite successful".[38] Land was made available, they were treated equally with nationals and were granted naturalization if they wanted it, a rare concession in African countries. However, secondary migration from rural to urban areas was discouraged and many refugees preferred to be self-settled. Recently, since the outbreak of fighting in northeast Burundi, Rwandan refugees who sought asylum there after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 attempted to flee to Tanzania which, apart from a few, has blocked their entry, claiming the country is already overwhelmed by 750 000 refugees.

In 1987 it was reported that the Zambian government had allocated 150 km² of land in the southeast for Mozambican refugees.[39] As many as 62 villages with 300 people each arose on the site at which social services were established and a variety of crops reaped. It was described as "an excellent, well-structured, efficiently managed programme where refugees are being given an opportunity to live in peace and become self-reliant". The settlement was considered "a long-term solution to a short-term problem".

The International Labour Organization points to the fact that the majority of refugees in Africa are women and children yet "once the emergency phase is over and long-term assistance programmes are introduced, male refugees become the target group".[40] This is because the latter are quicker and easier to train, employ and self-employ, and are less socially restricted by household duties. Women, however, form the main productive group within a camp or settlement and they, advocate the ILO, should be a major target group for long-term assistance.

However meritorious is the newer development approach to the settlement of refugees, it is often difficult to put into practice.[41] The massive outflows of refugees from violence-torn countries in recent years created a demand for emergency relief rather than development aid. Moreover, where land is scarce and host countries' economies are already under severe stress, opportunities for adopting such an approach are slim. The UNHCR is not a development agency. Its funds are limited and it has, as a result, attempted to act as a catalyst in seeking assistance from more development-oriented UN agencies and other international organizations, coordination between which and with local governments is not easy. Then, too, unless refugees are given the opportunity to participate in their own development and unless host countries are fully committed to their integration, development goals are unlikely to be achieved. But where conditions are favourable refugees have made, and can continue to make, substantial contributions to a number of host countries.

Now that the refugees from one camp in Malawi have returned to their home country, a development spin-off, thanks to the European Community and the UNHCR, has been the taking over of the facilities – health,

education and transport – for use by the local population which they did not enjoy before.

Repatriation

"There is only one major solution for most refugees in Africa", states Winter and that is "informal voluntary repatriation when security permits it".[42] In terms of UN and OAU resolutions forcible repatriation is forbidden.

It stands to reason that refugees will be reluctant to return home if conditions there are still unsettled. While eager to return, refugees in Malawi were distrustful of conditions in Mozambique, as were Liberian refugees in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire of the on-going civil war in their country. They posed two questions: could their safety be guaranteed and what compensation and alternative source of income was there when farms and villages had been destroyed?[43] A similar mistrust of the Mengistu regime's declaration of amnesty in the late 1980s convinced few Ethiopians to return home. In Angola the UNHCR's planned repatriation of refugees in 1993 had to be suspended following the resumption of hostilities there. Many of those who had returned in 1992 again fled.[44]

Apart from the resolution of conflict the home country must create conditions conducive to return, ie, create opportunities for homeland readaptation.[45] These include catering to the social and educational needs of children who may have been separated from their parents or who had never lived in their parent's country of birth; involving the returnees in planning their own re-adaptation, and establishing culturally sensitive and economically viable rehabilitation projects. Attempts to do this are underway in Mozambique, for example.

However, the sudden repatriation of thousands of refugees poses a major "returnee emergency"; how to cope with these people in countries whose economies and infrastructure have been vandalized or destroyed.[46] The new Eritrean government welcomes back its refugees from Sudan but families have been disrupted, the society "has little more than goodwill to spare", the urban centres are unable to absorb them, social services are fully stretched, employment opportunities are few and there is little affordable housing. A single massive return could be catastrophic, so much so that many of the refugees would be "better off staying where they are".[47] A project to voluntarily repatriate 300 000 Ethiopians from Sudan at the rate of 750 every three days got underway in December 1995 after a year's delay.

TABLE 1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Refugees (as at 31 December 1992)

Source countries	Number	Host countries	Number	% from	
Angola	306 010	Burundi	271 745	Rwanda	90,4%
Burundi	204 150	Côte d'Ivoire	174 450	Liberia	99,6%
Eritrea	430 000	Djibouti	100 600	Somalia	99,4%
Ethiopia	275 625	Ethiopia	288 000	Somalia	90,3%
Liberia	607 115	Guinea	564 550	Liberia	71,6%
Mozambique	1 678 345			Sierra Leone	28,3%
Rwanda	365 975	Kenya	422 835	Somalia	76,4%
Somalia	687 570	Liberia	112 000	Sierra Leone	100,0%
Sudan	266 710	Malawi	1 058 490	Mozambique	100,0%
Sub-total	**4 821 500**	South Africa	250 000	Mozambique	100,0%
Rest of S-S Africa	553 450	Sudan	644 780	Ethiopia	31,2%
Total S-S Africa	**5 374 950**			Eritrea	66,7%
(27 countries)		Tanzania	285 335	Burundi	59,4%
		Uganda	195 260	Sudan	46,8%
				Rwanda	43,5%
		Zaire	342 115	Angola	57,9%
				Sudan	32,0%
		Zambia	142 830	Angola	71,3%
		Zimbabwe	236 640	Mozambique	99,8%
		Sub-total	**5 089 630**		
		Rest of S-S Africa	274 100		
		Total S-S Africa	**5 363 730**		
		(36 countries)			

Source: *World Refugee Report*, Washington DC: Bureau for Refugee Programmes, Department of State, July 1993.

Dolan points out that "even discounting individual and household motivations, it is clear that the areas from which most Mozambicans fled to South Africa could not support their sudden return. And if they are forced back the economic situation there will almost certainly drive them back to South Africa very quickly".[48]

In 1982 when Uganda turned against its Rwandan refugees they fled as returnees, many to find the border closed against them and President Habyarimana stating that Rwanda was "too full to accommodate them". This, in turn, led in 1990 to the invasion of Rwanda by the refugees under the banner of the Rwanda Patriotic Front in answer to Ugandan intransigence and the Rwandan government's lack of cooperation.[49]

In late 1995 after the UN's efforts to persuade one million Rwandan refugees in camps in Zaïre to return home had produced meagre results, the government, growing impatient, "took matters into its own hands". Within five days 14 000 Rwandans were escorted to the frontier. As a violation of international agreements, sharp criticism was drawn from around the world. Zaïre then backed down but insisted that the Rwandan government guarantee the refugees safe return.[50]

In South Africa the distinction, previously referred to, between refugees and illegal immigrants has generated two policy thrusts with regard to Mozambicans.[51] In 1993 the South Africa/UNHCR agreement on the recognition of refugees in border areas opened the way to voluntary repatriation. A more forcible policy involved the deportation of illegal immigrants by the South African Police Services. Both policies were regarded by Dolan as failures since the numbers repatriated and deported were comparatively small in relation to the total number of Mozambicans in the rural and urban areas of South Africa. Moreover, at least 100 000 of the 350 000 who arrived as refugees during the 1980s and early 1990s subsequently entered the migrant labour force and could therefore be reclassified as illegal immigrants. Dolan suggests that expenditure on deportation could be better used to create job opportunities in the countries from which the "aliens" come. In the interests of regional goodwill and stability, governments in Southern Africa are requesting some moderation on the part of the South African government over the issue of deportation. In 1991 an agreement between the South African government and UNHCR guaranteed the voluntary repatriation of South African returnees in complete safety and dignity following the struggle against apartheid.[52]

In contrast to any negative effects returnees may have on the home country, many may well have new skills to offer.[53] Research in southern Sudan yielded two conclusions. First, those refugees who had been exposed to new methods of farming could contribute to an improved agricultural output on return. Secondly, those refugees who participated in organized settlement schemes or who spontaneously settled in more economically advanced areas and achieved self-reliance are likely to be the most successful in reintegrating following repatriation. Those, by contrast, who were totally dependent on aid during their exile have significantly greater difficulty in readjusting to home conditions.

From earlier examples in Tanzania the desire to return home was stronger among Burundi and Angolan refugees who had lived in planned settlements than among the better integrated self-settled persons. Those comparatively few who settled in countries of third asylum, notably the industrialized countries, generally displayed little desire to return although their contribution could be substantial.

Conclusion

At its Addis Ababa conference in November 1995 the World Council of Churches painted a discouraging picture of the world's and Africa's refugee problem.[54] The "movement of people which already was a permanent feature

of human history was accelerating". Some 100 million people worldwide were now refugees, displaced persons or migrants constantly on the move across international boundaries. Moreover, governments in all regions, led by the industrialized countries, were imposing restrictive immigration controls to prevent the arrival of asylum seekers and migrants.[55] "There is a global turning away", the conference noted, "from taking responsibility and addressing both the causes and the consequences of forced human displacement". In addition, racist and xenophobic hostility accompanied by violence was rising against refugees and immigrants. As governments became more restrictive so were the churches challenged "to take the side of the uprooted". Nevertheless, as we have shown, kindred links across international borders are a powerful moderating influence in the acceptance and treatment of refugees in sub-Saharan Africa. It is the weakness of the economies and the infrastructure of host countries and the inadequacy of international aid that exacerbates the problem to which the only real solution is the ending of conflict in the source countries, and that calls for wisdom, tolerance and understanding on the part of Africa's leaders and the international community.

References

1   K Matthew and O Ibeanu, "Some reflections on human rights and refugees in Africa", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, vol 18, no 2, 1992, p 6; K Kalumiya, *Statement on the refugee crisis in Africa*, address to the African Studies Association of South Africa, 1 June, 1994.

2   Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *CSIS Africa notes*, no 117, October 1990, pp 1–2.

3   K Kalumiya, *op cit*, p 8.

4   A R Zolberg et al, *Escape from violence: Conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p 29

5   *World refugee report*, Washington DC: Bureau for Refugee Programmes, Department of State, July 1993, p 33

6   R P Winter, "Refugees, war and famine in the Sudan", *Issue*, vol 19, no 2, Summer 1991, pp 56–61.

7   "Eritrea: Repatriation, reintegration, reconstruction", *Courier*, no 146, July–August 1994, pp 15–20.

8   *World refugee report, op cit*, p 23.

9   T Hailu et al, "Resource depletion, famine and refugees in Tigray", in H

Adelman and J Sorenson, *African refugees: Development aid and repatriation*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.

10 N Cater, "Victims of violence", *Refugees*, no 85, May 1991, p 26.

11 P H Koehn, "Refugee settlement and repatriation in Africa: Development prospects and constraints", in H Adelman and J Sorenson, *op cit*, p 102.

12 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *op cit*, p 2.

13 T M Argent et al, "The need for assisted self-settlement: A proposed framework for refugee assistance in sub-Saharan Africa", *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol 8, no 1, Spring 1991, p 27.

14 World Refugee Survey, *1989 in review*, Washington DC: United States Committee for Refugees of the American Council for Nationalities Service, 1990.

15 J Hawley, "Malawi: Mozambican refugees", *Refugees*, no 78, September 1990, pp 19–22; and R F Gorman, "Refugee aid and development in Africa", in H Adelman and J Sorenson, *op cit*, p 238.

16 World Refugee Survey, *op cit*.

17 T Williams and E Hooper, "Mozambican refugees", *Refugees*, no 78, September 1990, pp 29–34.

18 J Crisp, "No place to settle down", *Refugees*, special report, no 76, June 1990, pp 6–10; and E Tison, "Liberia: Getting back to the land", *Refugees*, no 85, May 1991, pp 29–30.

19 S El Nagar, "Children and war in the Horn of Africa", in M Doornbos, *Beyond conflict in the Horn*, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1992, pp 17–18.

20 J Sorenson, "An overview: Refugees and development", in H Adelman and J Sorenson, *op cit*, p 179.

21 A Corbett and M Figueira, "Refugees in Namibia", *Namibia Brief*, no 16, March 1992, pp 24–27.

22 J Sorenson, *op cit*, p 179.

23 M Reitzes, "Alien issues", *Indicator SA*, vol 12, no 1, Summer 1994, pp 7–11; C Dolan, "Aliens aboard: Mozambicans in the new South Africa", *Indicator SA*, vol 12, no 3, Winter 1995, pp 29–32; M Hough, "Illegal aliens in South Africa", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, vol 17, no 1, May 1995, pp 1–25.

24 E Khiddu-Makubuya, "Voluntary repatriation by force: The case of Rwandan refugees in Uganda", in H Adelman and J Sorenson, *op cit*, pp 148–151.

25 A Purvis, "Zaire: Marching orders", *Time*, 4 September, 1995, p 27.

26 C McIvor, "Alienated generations", *Africa Events*, vol 7, no 10–11, October/November 1991, pp 29–30.

27 *World Refugee Report, op cit*, p 47.

28 T M Argent et al, *op cit*, p 26.

29 B Harrel-Bond, "A fresh approach", *Africa Events, op cit*, pp 25–26.

30 R Winter, "Ending exile: Promoting successful reintegration", in H Adelman and

J Sorenson, *op cit*, p 163.

31 H Hug, "Ethiopia: A critical situation", *Refugees*, no 85, May 1991, pp 20–22.

32 *World Refugee Report, op cit*, p 23.

33 R F Gorman, 1994, *op cit*, pp 228–229; P Daley, "Refugees and the NGO recolonization of Africa", *Africa World Review*, May/September 1994, pp 28–29; and J Crisp, "The high price of hospitality", *Refugees*, no 80, November 1990, pp 21–22.

34 T Kuhlman, "Organized versus spontaneous settlement of refugees in Africa", in H Adelman and J Sorenson, *op cit*, pp 122–125.

35 T M Argent et al, *op cit*, pp 32–33.

36 B Ammann, "Poverty, discipline and dignity in Malawi", *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, vol 39, no 10, January 1990, pp 29–31.

37 J Madeley, "Refugee enterprises pay dividends in Sudan", *African Business*, no 139, May 1990, pp 14–15; T Kuhlman, *op cit*, pp 128–129.

38 T Kuhlman, *op cit*, p 135; R F Gorman, *op cit*, p 236; and *Natal Mercury* (Durban), 19 January 1996.

39 E Hooper, "Living on the front-line", *Refugees*, no 78, September 1990, p 24.

40 E Hall, "Vocational training for women refugees in Africa", *International Labour Review*, vol 129, no 1, 1990, pp 91–107.

41 R F Gorman, *op cit*, pp 229–231, 237; and J Crisp, *op cit*, p 22; "The EU and the Mozambican refugees in Malawi", *Courier*, no 152, July/August, 1995.

42 R Winter, *op cit*, p 164.

43 J Crisp, *op cit*, p 10; and P H Koehn, *op cit*, pp 97–98.

44 *World Refugee Report, op cit*, p 11.

45 D Fair, "War and Africa's children", *Africa Insight*, vol 25, no 4, 1995; and P H Koehn, *op cit*, pp 97–101.

46 *Centre for Strategic and International Studies, op cit*, p 6.

47 "Eritrea: Repatriation, reintegration, reconstruction", *Courier*, 1994, *op cit*, p 16.

48 C Dolan, *op cit*, p 32; and M Reitzes, *op cit*, p 9.

49 E Khiddu-Makubuya, *op cit*, pp 150–151.

50 A Purvis, *op cit*, p 27.

51 C Dolan, *op cit*, pp 29–32; and M Reitzes, *op cit*, p 7.

52 Memorandum of understanding between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the UNHCR on the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of South African refugees, no 2814, *Southern African Record*, no 64, 1992, pp 1–28.

53 J Sorenson, *op cit*, pp 182–183.

54 World Council of Churches, Addis Ababa Conference, November 1995.

55 Note, for example, the new British Asylum and Immigration Bill targeted at refugees and new immigrants, effective from January 1996, despite concern raised by Amnesty International and the UNHCR, *Sunday Tribune* (Durban), 12 December, 1995, p 8.

International assistance to **refugees**
WHAT FUTURE?

a s the 21st century approaches, international refugee policy as expressed in UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) assistance faces a future of constant challenge. This challenge arises partly from the very success of the agency in carrying out its mandate to answer the growing needs of the world's refugees, and partly from the persistence of refugee phenomena originating predominantly in the Third World. To be coupled with these several factors is the current attitude of the more developed industrialized world that it should limit both its relief assistance and the levels of refugee admission. In the face of an uncertain future in which there is the additional likelihood of a massive outflow of refugees from the poorer half to the richer half, there must be a serious questioning of the viability of the agency's present refugee policy. Furthermore, the probability of "compassion fatigue" (however slight) in both donor countries and agencies also suggests new thinking if the coming century's refugees are to be spared some of the shortcomings and dilemmas experienced by their fellows of today.

In the first part of this article we survey the accomplishments of the UNHCR over the past three decades; in the second part we delineate some of the problems faced by the agency since its creation; and in the third part we put forward some of the programme strategies that may be appropriate in the coming century.

Accomplishments of the past four decades

Despite the stressful circumstances facing international institutions for refugee management, the UNHCR has in the last four decades scored a series of major successes. These include the successful voluntary repatriation, resettlement and integration of a good proportion of refugees in the World War II period, the institutionalization of emergency relief assistance, the standardization of legal identification for refugee groups, the voluntary repatriation of certain groups, their education, the standardization and legalization of refugee rights and state obligations, and the institutionalization of an international "refugee guilt".

First, since the agency's creation in 1950, the UNHCR has been involved directly or indirectly in arranging and/or overseeing the voluntary repatriation and successful resettlement of a sizeable proportion of the world's refugees: of the 60 million-plus refugees that have characterized post-World War II international life, only 10 to 12 million still have that status.[1] Much of this record cannot be attributed solely to the UNHCR. But it all undoubtedly has its roots in an international consensus of which the UNHCR is the brainchild. And, acting alone, the UNHCR has taken part in voluntary repatriation exercises involving refugees from Nigeria, the Horn of Africa, South East Asia, Zimbabwe, Argentina, Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda. The UNHCR can therefore fairly claim that it has successfully contributed to the decrease in, or management of, the global refugee problem.

Related to such voluntary repatriation have been UNHCR settlement and

Dr Elvis Ngolle Ngolle, Senior Lecturer in Comparative and International Politics at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon, considers the role of the UNHCR during the past 30 years and identifies a number of strategies that could be implemented in the future.

Photo: UN Chronicle

Refugees in Africa by countries of origin: 1995

1967 Protocol) relating to refugee rights and state obligations have been subscribed to by a majority of UN members. Of the 50 UN African states, 33 are signatories to the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 too. These instruments set universal standards for the treatment of refugees There have been violations at times. Nevertheless, much of the spirit and management of refugee problems relies on the principles embodied in these three instruments.[1] These principles deal generally with such issues as the right to public education, to gainful employment, to freedom of movement, identification documents for travel purposes, naturalization, freedom of religious worship and access to courts of law. Of this collective covenant between refuge seekers and the homeowners of this world, the UNHCR remains the symbol. And keeping the many actors in line, as the UNHCR has done, has been a remarkable feat of diplomacy and management which gives credence and value to the fact that the agency has twice been a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for humanitarian work.

Fourthly, and perhaps relatedly, the spirit of these instruments, and the UNHCR in its capacity as the Chief Protector of refugee rights, have successfully created what might be rightfully termed a "compassion ethic"; the refugee condition is not the fault of the refugee – the difficulty lies with all the others of the human race. We sense, inescapably, that much of this appeal (explicit or not) is directed at the human conscience, not at any rational faculty possessed by humankind. And heeding such ever-renewed appeals to conscience, not only has the human race, represented by state governments, assumed tremendous responsibilities for refugee problems but it has continually and dramatically increased its support with resources both moral and material.[5]

Despite these concrete successes, an alternative interpretation of the evidence suggests that policy is indeed in a crisis and much needs new ideas if it is to address itself adequately to the refugee problem in the century ahead.[6]

Challenges facing current refugee policy

Much of the programme focus of the UNHCR is derived directly from the provisions of existing instruments. The 1951 Statute gives the agency general authority to seek durable solutions to

resettlement programmes. Annually, the agency's almost entire operational budget has gone towards the settlement of refugees either in countries of first asylum or in Third countries or resettlement countries. There has been a pattern to this. In Africa, and in parts of Asia, much of the programme option has been settlement nearby in the countries of first asylum (which have always been African). In South East Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, resettlement has been in countries of third asylum, often the industrialized countries of North America and Western Europe.[2]

Second, despite difficulties, the UNHCR has succeeded in institutionalizing the administration of initial emergency relief. It is this that has often appeared to make the greatest impact on the despair, hopelessness and insecurity associated with the initial flight from what has always been "home". It is now recognized that refugees require more than makeshift shelters, blankets, medical supplies, roads, water from wells or pipes, food supplies and the like. However, the ideal is seldom reached and most of the refugees experience what appears to be a never-ending nightmare of congestion, confusion, epidemics, poor sanitation, emotional trauma and depression. Of today's over 10 million refugees, over 70% still endure extremely difficult conditions.[3]

Third, agency officials are to be commended for the institutionalization of refugee law, particularly concerning refugee rights, as a permanent norm of international behaviour. Since World War II, a variety of international instruments (the 1951 Convention and the

the refugee problem and promote international refugee protection. According to the Statute, only the administrative funds of the agency are borne by the regular UN budget. All other funds (including operational funds) are drawn from voluntary contributions by member states, organizations and individuals. The agency's programme budget has not always been matched by funds received. This unsatisfactory arrangement has lasted 46 years, as we write, and undoubtedly challenges both the spirit and scope of the very concept of institutionalized refugee management and of the UNHCR itself.

The first of these challenges relates to the failure of international refugee policy to achieve a durable solution to the global refugee problem. Conventional wisdom among refugee scholars and policy makers alike conceives of durable solutions as being voluntary repatriation to states of origin and/or resettlement and integration in countries of third asylum.[7] Throughout much of the history of the agency, however, much of the evidence indicates that this conception of durable solutions has been a failure, particularly in the matter of voluntary repatriation to states of origin. This normally presupposes an elimination of the conditions that precipitated flight in the first place; while resettlement and integration in some country of third asylum presuppose acceptance of the refugees by both the local populations of their new communities and conscious national governmental efforts to provide the newcomers with access to social and economic opportunities equal to that offered the local, native population. The evidence suggests that many refugees tend to remain in their countries of first asylum with little or no possibility of voluntary repatriation or integration elsewhere.[8] The difficulty here lies with the intransigence of the states of origin which fail to respond to their commitment to existing instruments or to UNHCR diplomatic overtures.

Secondly, much of the programme focus has neglected any treatment of the real causes of refugee flight. These may be internal or interstate political and military conflict, foreign intervention, human-made or natural disaster, and human rights violations or other governmental discrimination – all, or almost all, essentially political in nature. And here the UNHCR (itself a political creation) is bound hand and foot; for

Photo: UN Chronicle

nowhere in the 1951 Statute and other international instruments relating to refugees is the UNHCR authorized to engage in activities that are purely political.[9]

Thirdly, the authority given the UNHCR does not give it any power to make a national government fuse the principles of international refugee law with its national legislation. Hence, national governments often tend to give only secondary attention to the principles enshrined in international instruments (or exclude them outright) when drawing up national policies. Basic refugee rights such as freedom of movement, non-refoulement, equal access to the law courts, rights to education and employment and so forth are ignored by many members of the United Nations. Powerless here, the UNHCR cannot be expected to be effective. Diplomacy is therefore the UNHCR's only weapon with which to secure compliance with the principles of basic refugee texts. But the call of national sovereignty has often been louder than humanitarian appeals. Consequently, there are the very real problems of refugee employment and education, particularly in Third World countries of asylum whose economies are often too small and fragile to absorb any labour other than that of their own nationals.[10]

Fourthly, international refugee policy faces the problem of double standards in its conception or definition of the contemporary refugee. In contemporary usage, the term seems more restrictive in scope than it historically has been. Before the creation of the UNHCR in 1950, instruments provided

no general definition. They spoke of particular refugee groups – Russian, Armenian and so on. The limited definitional usage brought in by the 1951 Statute provided a Eurocentric definition for what would turn out to be a purely non-European problem. And even the modification to be found in the 1967 protocol has largely limited the scope of the definition to people who fit the European conception of an international boundary. Consequently, not only does international refugee policy face the question of what to do with the Third World's "internally displaced persons", but the UNHCR has had to walk a tightrope in attempting to accommodate these "non-Statutory or non-Convention" refugees.[11]

The existence of this class of refugee has posed the UNHCR the problem of determining actual refugee numbers and so made budgeting difficult. There is thus often a discrepancy between OAU figures (based on the broader 1969 OAU definition) and UNHCR figures (based on the 1951 and 1967 instruments); on the basis of this it has been suggested by scholars that a considerable proportion of African refugee populations tend to be excluded in the actual count. This population is therefore either unassisted or underassisted.[12]

Such findings do not augur well for the image of the UNHCR. There is, therefore, if the agency is to continue to operate in the century ahead, a plausible case to be made out in favour of a broader, universally based definition that would reflect the contemporary realities of the international refugee situation as expressed in its activities.

Fifthly and finally, international refugee policy, programmes and rights have been vitiated by the East-West ideological cleavage that has characterized much of 20th century international politics. Following Soviet Cold War policy, the communist world not only disputed the legitimacy of the UNHCR but systematically boycotted participation in, cooperation with or support for the UNHCR's programmes of assistance, thus leaving the agency at the beck and call of the industrialized Western bloc, Japan, and the Third World states.[13]

We can therefore understand that what has developed since 1951 has been the shouldering of the entire UNHCR refugee budget mainly by the West, with marginal assistance from the Third World. This burden-sharing is a characteristic feature of contemporary international refugee policy. We should add that, even in the West, some states contribute marginally while others provide only token support.[14] And from the Third World group of states the relatively better-off

Photo: UN Chronicle

provide a level of support that does not rhyme with their national resources. While the UNHCR does not appear concerned at this, its entire support structure for refugee programmes must obviously give rise to reflection from time to time. Could not the consistent budget gap be filled by increased funding by those who have in the past consistently boycotted UNHCR refugee programmes? Such challenges obviously ask for suggestions on future policy content and direction to prepare the UNHCR for the next century.

Future directions in refugee financing policy

We must first of all reshape the premise upon which international refugee policy is based. The idea that refugee problems are a temporary phenomenon in international relations seems as obsolescent (if not obsolete) as the idea that there can ever be a world without refugees at all. International political actors must therefore come to grips with reality and create permanent international structures with permanent mandates and authority. There is no avoiding the conclusion that a permanent world of

refugees poses a great challenge to current refugee policy and endangers the effectiveness and viability of institutions such as the UNHCR.

One useful area to focus on might be the revision of the UNHCR Statute to include a broadening of its mandate; a redefinition of the term "refugee" to accommodate new realities; and provision of the power to make political decisions that might provide sufficient leverage in UNHCR relations with national governments to negotiate binding agreements – powers similar to those enjoyed by such agencies as the United Nation's Commission for Trade and Development (Unctad) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

To sort out the long-standing budgetary difficulties associated with the UNHCR structure, a diplomatic conference on international refugee policy seems imperative. At the very least there would be a meeting of political minds. At practical level, this would improve chances for a more universally based funding structure and so an increased capacity for programming.

A more predictable arrangement such as a Permanent Refugee Fund (PRF) might also be worth consideration. It would rely upon the same logic as do the OAU, the UN or Unctad; members would not only sign conventions, but also put their signatures at the same time to a system of annual financial assessment. In the words of one refugee scholar, such a fund would provide for universal participation in the financing of humanitarian programmes *and* call for payment by all governments based on the current needs of refugees.

Such a PRF would be replenished by further assessed contributions; would eliminate recurrent financial crises; would eliminate the time lag between refugee outflow and receipt of donor contributions; and would better reflect donor resources. Assessments would allow for ability to pay, the extent of involvement in refugee problems, the utilization of refugee agency services by the subscribing country and so forth.[15] Above all, such a fund would be a recognition by the international community that refugee problems are a more or less permanent feature of the contemporary world.[16]

A last imperative would seem to be a change in the concept of refugee assistance to include a development

component. This is particularly important to Third World countries whose economies are highly dependent upon international aid. Traditionally, refugee assistance has not normally been included in the national development plans of many states, even when in some of these countries refugees constitute a substantial percentage of the population. (In Somalia it is estimated that the ratio is 1 to 3.) The objective of such a development-linked proposal would plainly be to raise the living standards of the refugees in a given area by employing the national development budget (which has factored their needs into its calculations) to improve the infrastructure and welfare opportunities of the entire refugee-affected area.

One strategy which agencies such as the UNHCR could adopt to further the cause we are pleading here would be to enter into an institutional arrangement with such development financing bodies as the OECD-DAC, the IMF, and the EEC to secure the inclusion of the "refugee factor" as a condition for advancing development aid to a country either affected by a refugee influx as are Somalia, Zaïre, Sudan or Uganda, or to one generating refugees such as Chad, Ethiopia, Afghanistan or Kampuchea. The former states would have to show proof of factoring refugees into their national development plans; and the latter states would have to demonstrate a willingness to enforce either policies discouraging refugee flows or policies inducing voluntary repatriation. Such institutional cooperation

would appear another element valuable in securing a durable improvement in international efforts to manage the refugee situation.

Conclusion

It seems obvious that a "world without refugees" represents a Utopian wish. What seems inescapable, inevitable is (a) a policy of realism, and (b) the will to overcome the challenges of international development. How far, and with what success, such a policy and such a mindset develop, will depend upon the international community's ability to learn from both the pride of its successes and the pains of the continuing challenges posed by increasing global refugee problems. This paper aims to stimulate both the policy and the mindset of our concluding paragraphs and has been called forth in response to the persistence of the global refugee problem with its potential for explosion in the century ahead.

Notes and references

1   Dennis Gallagher, "Introduction", *International Migration Review*, XX, no 2, 1981, p 141.
2   See US Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey*, New York: USCR, 1981.
3   For a discussion of these conditions, see W R Smyser, "Refugees: A never-ending story", *Foreign Affairs*, Fall, 1985, p 159.
4   For a review of these instruments, see UNHCR, *Collection of international instruments concerning refugees*, Geneva: UNHCR, 1979.
5   This degree of responsibility and support can be illustrated in the fact that in 1960 the budget of the UNHCR was less than US$6 million. In 1980, the budget reached almost half a billion dollars, governmental contributions providing most of this.
6   See W R Smyser, *op cit*, p 155.
7   For details of this definition, see Louise W Holborn, *Refugees: A problem of our time*, Metuchen NJ, 1975.
8   This is especially true of Third World refugees from Africa, Asia and Latin America.
9   For an analysis of the political status of the UNHCR, see E Ngolle Ngolle, "The political status of the UNHCR and patterns in its assistance to Third World refugees", *Cameroon Review of International Relations*, (forthcoming).
10   The OAU Bureau for the Education and Placement of African Refugees failed to redress this problem despite the good intentions of its creators.
11   In Africa and Asia for example, these groups have at times tended to outnumber those that have actually crossed the post-colonial international boundary.
12   See Robert Chambers, "Rural refugees: What the eye does not see", *Disasters*, 1979.
13   It should be noted that China and Yugoslavia were at one time an exception to this pattern of behaviour – but not for very long.
14   See E Ngolle Ngolle, "The international political structure of refugee financing: A study of governmental support for programs of assistance", (forthcoming).
15   For a similar idea, see John Thomas, "The UNHCR and relief operations: A changing role", *International Migration Review*, no 15, Spring–Summer, 1981, pp 16–19.
16   Charles B Keely, *Global refugee policy: The case for development-oriented strategy*, New York: Population Council, 1981, pp 45–46.

Regional integration

IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Dr Rainer Schweickert, of the Kiel Institute of World Economics, examines the main hurdles, disappointed hopes and the role of post-apartheid South Africa with regard to regional integration.

S ub-Saharan Africa's poor economic performance is not a recent phenomenon. The region has experienced decline since the mid-1970s and from 1980 to 1992 per capita income declined by 0,8% annually, compared with the 2 and 6% per capita income growth in other low- and middle-income countries and East Asian countries respectively. Among the policies which can be blamed for this rather bleak performance, trade policy deserves special mention. Most African economies followed an inward-oriented, import-substitution strategy, supplemented by the widespread use of tariff and non-tariff barriers to discourage external competition.[1] These policies create unproductive rents, ie income not achieved by productive activities, and divert real resources from their productive use into rent-seeking activities such as lobbying. Once rent-seeking activities become widespread, the inefficient trade policies are hardly to be reversed without provoking strong political resistance.[2] This explains why structural reforms have been implemented in African countries only if the declining unproductive domestic rents have been substituted by international rents, ie by an increase in foreign aid.[3]

How to escape this rent-seeking/ inward-orientation/economic decline trap? By regional integration? Looking at the numerous attempts to form regional groupings,[4] the answer given by African leaders seems to be a clear "Yes". There is, however, a large discrepancy between what has been approved on paper and what has been implemented. This discrepancy reflects the fact that any serious proposal for regional integration has first to clear two hurdles before implementation:

■ Gains from regional integration have to be sufficiently large to outweigh the disincentive effects of the availability of international rents. Countries improving their economic performance risk losing financial assistance that is at least sufficient to enable ruling elites to survive.

■ Gains from regional integration have also to be large enough to overcome the resistance of inward-oriented coalitions. While African leaders have always been eager to pay lip service to ambitious regional economic integration *targets*, these ambitious intentions have soon been qualified whenever implementation has challenged domestic suppliers.

But are there any significant gains to be made from regional integration of Eastern and Southern African countries? Does regional integration provide an opportunity for them to catch up with higher-income countries? In order to answer these questions one has to look at the options. Three basic strategies of integration must be distinguished:[5]

■ regional integration among low-income countries, ie south-south integration

■ regional integration among low-income and high-income countries, ie north-south integration

■ world market integration, ie unilateral integration

Nearly all Eastern and Southern African countries belong to the low-income group. Regional integration among them is, therefore, of the south-south type. The exceptions are Namibia, Botswana (lower-middle income), Mauritius, and South Africa.[6] While the first three countries are rather small and would not affect the south-south character of a regional grouping, South Africa clearly makes a difference. First, income in the white segment of the South African economy is dramatically higher than income in the black segment,[7] the average disposable income for white South Africans reaching nearly US$8 000,[8] which should be sufficient to place white South Africa in the high-income group. Second, South Africa is a regional giant. It has 14% of the population of Eastern and Southern Africa, ie the member states of the former Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA)[9] *plus* South Africa; 63% of its total GNP; and four-and-a-half

times its average per capita GNP.[10] Compared to Southern Africa, ie the member states of the former Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)[11] *plus* South Africa, South Africa's lead in per capita income is smaller (two-and-a-half times the regional average) but dominance in population (32%) and in total GNP (77%) is even more pronounced. Hence there are good arguments for labelling any regional integration that includes South Africa a north-south integration.

The working hypothesis of this article is that one must be rather sceptical of the potential of regional integration schemes for the development of Eastern and Southern African countries. The article attempts to prove this hypothesis by comparing the potential gains from different types of integration; by reviewing the experience of the PTA up to 1990, ie the experience with south-south integration; and by speculating on the potential of north-south integration in the 1990s as a result of South Africa's emergence as a new player in the regional integration game.

Regional integration: A worthwhile strategy for catching up?

In economic terms, the answer as to whether or not regional integration promises net welfare gains should be based on differences in the appropriately discounted benefits to be expected for all future periods. Hence, except for a very high time-preference rate, the dynamic effects of integration should weigh more than the short-term, static effects. In politico-economic terms, however, the static effects gain in importance because these results can be more easily related to integration policies and to the life cycles of the policy makers concerned. Moreover, if they find themselves to be negatively affected in the short-run, vested interests concerned with the subordination of government decisions to considerations of individual welfare may inhibit liberalization and true integration. Thus, both the static *and* the dynamic effects of integration are of importance.

Static effects

For regional integration to bear fruit, market driven integration between partner countries has to be expected. For there will no longer be trade barriers. Market driven integration, in turn, occurs only if the products of partner countries are at least as cheap as domestic products and as the products of non-partner countries (allowing for the external tariff). Transaction costs and the competitiveness of partner countries are therefore the keys to integration potential.

Transaction costs are determined by information costs, transport costs,

Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) became Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in December 1994

Founding date	1981
Member states	23
Population (1995)	314 mn
Area (km^2)	13,3 mn

in the transfer of capital between two countries. Given the technical progress in the banking sector, distance has no impact on the level of these transfer costs. However, the costs of capital transfers does depend upon the availability of an infrastructure providing market-making activities, ie a modern banking sector and international communication networks.

■ The risks of expropriation and default also add to transaction costs. Trading partners can direct their market-making activities through such channels as to increase the reliability of their transactions and reduce incentives for breaking contracts. This is effected through contractual arrangements which are much more complicated than trade at national level. Most importantly, such impersonal exchange with third party enforcement as we have mentioned, requires extensive legal cooperation between the authorities of both countries concerned. A precondition for such a cooperation is a bilateral adjustment of law codes and a willingness for political cooperation. Two substitutes for this arrangement are possible. First, exporters can set up subsidiaries in foreign countries and thus become multinationals, legally treated as domestic firms. This leads to an internalization of transaction costs. Second, banks of standing can set up various document-against-payment schemes. Trade can be expected to flourish when there are well-developed international banking systems in the home countries of the traders. Such financial systems encourage market-making activities and reduce transaction costs.

The determinants of transaction costs suggest that market driven integration is to be expected by geographic region.[13] Hence, regional integration policies should be more effective than world wide integration. However, the determinants of transaction costs also suggest that the chances of there being market driven integration are significantly lower for south-south than for north-south integration. This arises from the high proportion of raw materials and non-durables in south-south trade, the poor infrastructure and banking services, and the restrictive regulations for foreign direct investment in low-income countries.

The effectiveness of south-south integration is further impaired by a low po-

and the costs arising from expropriation and the risks of default:[12]

■ The processing of information facilitates an orderly decision-making process by the trading partners. Such processing is facilitated by cultural, social, religious and ethnic affinities.

■ The protective effect of transport costs tends to be lower for goods of a rather high value-added type, and those of low mass and small size, eg durable consumer goods and capital goods. By contrast, raw materials and non-durables show higher transport costs. Transport costs between two countries can also be extremely high if the infrastructure, ie railroad tracks, roads, and harbours, is not well developed.

■ The equivalent of transport costs in capital transfers are the fees involved

	Southern African Development Community (SADC)

	SADC
Founding date	1980
Member states	12
Population (1995)	138 mn
Area (km²)	6,9 mn

	Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
R	Common Monetary Area (Multilateral Monetary Agreement) (CMA) Currencies linked to SA Rand

	SACU	**CMA**
Founding date	1910/1969	1974
Member states	5	4
Population (1995)	50 mn	48 mn
Area (km²)	2,7 mn	2,1 mn

tential for specialization. Partner countries at a similar level of development and with similar resource endowments have little scope for inter-industry specialization; and partner countries with a relatively low level of development do not have the option of intra-industry specialization either.[14] Hence, the competitiveness argument suggests that possible gains from south-south integration will be significantly lower than from north-south or unilateral integration.

Assuming that a group of countries with a potential for market driven integration has been identified, the advantages of different strategies open to the group will be best seen in the effect they exert upon imports and exports. Considering import first, a complete, unilateral liberalization will be superior to all regional integration strategies if we are looking at economic wellbeing, the difference between the two strategies being equal to the trade diversion effect.[15] Among the regional integration alternatives, economic welfare effects are likely to be superior in north-south integration, because north-south integration allows for substantial gains both from inter-industry and intra-industry specialization.

Unfortunately, the reverse order appears when we look at vested interests.[16] First, the demand for protection in low-income countries is high, be-

cause those who invest capital reap high benefits if they invest in capital-intensive production which needs protection against products from high income countries. Second, the demand for protection will be easy to organize because capital is scarce and highly concentrated. Third, the high demand for protection meets supply because the government will have to switch from trade taxation to domestic taxation and will lose its discretionary power in the case of unilateral integration. Hence the resistance to integration can be expected to be significantly lower for south-south integration than for north-south or unilateral integration.

Because consumers are rarely organized, and then only with difficulty, the opposition to an "inward-oriented" coalition has to come from exporters. Their position may be strengthened by increased access to foreign markets. This may give an advantage to regional integration over unilateral integration, for staying outside a closed trading bloc, ie a customs union with a high external tariff, can become costly owing to the trade diversion effect.[17] If certain valuable trading partners of a country which stays outside are in the customs union, the possibility of increasing trade with other (non-partner) countries does not necessarily compensate for the decrease in trade with that country's original,

partner countries. However, the trading bloc argument constitutes an advantage of north-south rather than south-south integration over unilateral integration. It is reasonable to assume that exporters in low-income countries benefit more from market access to high-income countries' markets than from market access to other low-income countries' markets.

A discussion of the static results of manufactured goods markets integration suggests that:[18]

■ unilateral integration is clearly superior to regional integration in the absence of trading blocs but is impaired by pressure groups interested in import protection

■ fiscal reforms may overcome resistance by reducing the importance of trade taxation and public ownership

■ regional integration may overcome resistance by providing market access and strengthening the position of exporters

■ north-south integration is superior to south-south integration because it is more likely to be effective, and to produce economic gains from integration that outweigh political resistance

These conclusions suggest that south-south integration is hardly a viable option, because its net gains are too low for it to pass the hurdles erected by political resistance. The choice is, then, between north-south and unilateral integration.

Dynamic gains

The dynamic effects of integration basically stem from an increased market size. A first class argument in favour of dynamic gains arising from an increased market size is related to import substitution. Especially in developing countries, industrialization via import substitution strategies has figured high on the policy agenda and provided a main argument in favour of south-south integration.[19] When domestic markets have proved to be too small to allow efficient import substitution as the starting point of industrialization, the formation of a regional market has been seen as a way out of the impasse. However, a problem always associated with regional integration is that industrial imports from partner countries entail a sacrifice of

domestic industrial capacity.[20] Except for the rather unlikely case in which each country wishes to specialize in different products, the attempt to establish regional monopolies for domestic industries can be expected to provoke prohibitive distributional conflicts among partner countries.

A second class of argument refers to efficiency and competition rather than protectionism.[21] First, production will become more efficient if there are economies of scale internal to a firm which could be exploited only in a regional market and not in the domestic market because the latter is too small. Second, production will become more efficient if market integration increases the competition and, hence, the pressure for increasing productivity. Dynamic gains from market integration are therefore to be expected if domestic markets have been small enough to establish natural monopolies or oligopolistic competition and the integrated market has proved large enough to establish a certain amount of competition.

Recent theoretical contributions to economic geography point out that these gains may be unevenly distributed.[22] The models predict that market integration will lead to greater geographical concentration because of the reduction of transaction costs by the elimination of internal tariffs. This will allow for the exploitation of economies of scale. Better forward and backward links then provide incentives for manufacturing to locate itself near large rather than small markets. As a consequence, high income countries with larger markets will have an advantage when market integration starts. The concentration of production will even accentuate this advantage: larger markets will increase; smaller markets will decrease. But concentration will only occur as long as economies of scale can be exploited in a situation of oligopolistic competition. Increasing competition in an integrated market forces producers to move down the average cost curve to its minimum – to the point at which average costs equal marginal costs and economies of scale cease to exist.[23] Hence, (especially) small partner countries should go for the largest market.

A discussion of the dynamic effects of manufactured goods markets integration suggests that:[24]

■ a strategy to split up the regional market in order to allow domestic industries to expand is bound to fail because of distributional conflicts

■ regional integration needs a critical mass in terms of open markets *and* competition to lead to both significant dynamic gains and an acceptably even distribution of these gains

■ unilateral integration is again superior to regional integration because it provides the larger market – except, of course, for the existence of a closed, unilaterally negotiated trading bloc

In order to exploit its dynamic potential, regional integration needs a leading economy and a switch from protectionism to competition as a principle guiding domestic policy making in partner countries. South-south integrations typically lack both preconditions. The hurdles to be successfully taken to establish a competitive setting would be especially high in Africa, because African political leaders often depend on unproductive rents sufficient to pay for the allegiance of socially relevant support groups. "Some leaders could easily become kings without land, and Africa's political map could change"[25] if protectionism were ended.

PTA: Disappointed hopes in the 1980s

The development – better: the *non*-development – of the PTA in the 1980s provides a telling example of the difficulties involved in establishing south-south integration.[26] Speaking generally, the PTA has lacked a leading economy. Even the stronger partners – Kenya and Zimbabwe – belong to the low-income group of developing countries and have scarcely been able to provide a market of adequate size for regional integration to produce sizeable dynamic gains. Moreover, member countries have been clearly oriented towards countries outside the group and have therefore been unwilling to fulfil their role as providers of open markets and finance. Other partners have been more concerned about their relative position in external markets than they have been about medium-term gains from regional integration.

PTA interest in regional integration was not only limited at best but also ill-focused. Notwithstanding their

polar views about appropriate institutional settings for the state and the economy, partner countries shared a highly interventionist approach to economic policy. Hence, they tried to use the PTA as a vehicle for lowering the costs of their industrialization policies by extending national industrial monopolies into regional monopolies. As pointed out above, this strategy is bound to fail if more or less all the partners concerned aim to promote the same types of industry.

Starting these unfavourable conditions, it would be astonishing if the PTA partners succeeded in establishing free trade in the region. They did not. On the contrary, PTA institutions were never granted the significant legislative or executive power necessary to constitute a strong regional organization which would have been in a position to implement a minimum package of regional integration policies: the elimination of non-tariff barriers, and sizeable preference margins for products produced anywhere in the region (even if they compete with products produced "at home").

Such a promotion of integration through the market was clearly never in the interest of the PTA partners. The low importance of regional markets relative to the world market, the preference for interventionist policies, and the fear of losing ground in a competitive environment were all clearly reflected in the members' actual trade policies, which ruled out distributional conflicts.

■ Preferences were granted only if a country articulated an import interest which – of course – never happened if a product was produced at home.

■ Preferences were low for final products and high for "essential" intermediate and capital goods. This increased effective protection for the final products and maintained the isolation of domestic production from competitive pressures.

■ Preferences were lower if foreign capital was engaged in the production of goods, discouraging foreign investors from risking their money in the region.

■ Preferences were further marginalized by somewhat reluctant implementation efforts or even by the opting out of several countries.

■ Non-tariff barriers – especially import licensing – were never seriously dealt with.

As a consequence the PTA failed to provide either trade creation (which was never in the interest of the partner countries) or trade diversion (which they hoped to achieve). Intraregional trade remained at a low level.[27] But even if significant tariff reductions had been granted, only modest trade creation results could have been expected.

First the development of intraregional trade was blocked by the scarcity of foreign exchange which was allocated to "essential imports" mostly coming from OECD countries. Here is a crucial point: tariffs and other potential impediments to trade become redundant if foreign exchange is scarce because of grossly overvalued exchange rates signalling severe macroeconomic disequilibria. The curious fact is that in this instance the macroeconomic disequilibria stemmed from misguided trade policies in the past. On the export side, foreign exchange earnings during commodity booms were not sterilized but financed fiscal expenditure. On the import side, protectionism created industries highly dependent upon foreign capital and inputs. When export booms ended, it proved impossible to reverse fiscal expansion and create foreign exchange earnings sufficient to pay the costs of import protection.

Second, the trade policies of the past also led to the establishment of other non-tariff barriers, eg high transport and communication costs. Based on what has already been mentioned, it comes as no surprise that the physical infrastructure in PTA countries is in rather bad shape. If there is no potential for trade because it is blocked by governments, there is no incentive to build up an adequate infrastructure or a decent communications network. In other words, building infrastructure will not help very much unless regional governments adopt outward looking strategies.

Finally, political rivalry originating from the need to protect funds essential for the ruling elites to survive has not only blocked decision making but has also increased transaction costs. The result has been the sometimes prohibitive (non-tariff) costs of

crossing borders, or even border conflicts, especially in Eastern Africa.

Theoretical considerations and an evaluation of PTA history lead to the following conclusions:

■ Regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) offers – at best – limited gains which seem to be too low to compensate for losses in unproductive rents. In such a setting it is unlikely that partners will cooperate; and, even if they do, it tends to be unlikely that this will automatically lead to a positive growth path.

■ With respect to economic performance, it is more important to improve macroeconomic management and adopt outward looking strategies. At least, these are preconditions for thinking seriously about regional integration or integration with the world economy.

■ In the 1980s, Eastern and Southern Africa lacked an economy both large and sound enough to effect the building up of the core of a regional grouping likely to create trade and improve economic well-being.

The next question to be addressed is whether or not post-apartheid South Africa can play its desired role as an engine for regional integration and growth.

Post-apartheid South Africa: New hopes in the 1990s?

Any answer here involves a lot of speculation and it is notoriously difficult to speculate from outside. This article can only try to identify three important areas.

Demand for integration

The relative size of the country's economy compared to the rest of the region, and the extensive economic ties it already has – especially with other Southern African countries[28] – have led to South African involvement being widely seen as a potentially catalytic event which could give new momentum to a programme of regional integration. Therefore, both the SADCC and the PTA quickly responded to the breakdown of the apartheid regime by preparing for the possible accession of a democratic South Africa to their respective organizations. Even more

important, South Africa's choice between them was seen as decisive in ensuring victory for one organization over the other in their battle for survival.[29]

Both groups upgraded their integration efforts by planning each to form an economic community. The SADCC became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 1992. The PTA became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) in December 1994. Given the rather bleak performance of these groups with respect to their much less ambitious goals in the past, one can scarcely imagine that they will become more attractive as partners for South Africa when raising their sights higher. Their efforts, or overtures, however, can at least be interpreted as an attempt at integration with South Africa at the highest possible institutional level.

Incentives for integration

The next question is, of course, if such a demand for integration corresponds to incentives: what are the incentives of South Africa to join one of the two groupings? Joining the SADC – which has already occurred – seems to be the superior move because the relative weight of South Africa in this organization is larger, and because the possibility of shaping the organization is better because up to now only regional *cooperation* has been institutionalized. The sample of Comesa countries is much more homogeneous; the institutional shape is much more predetermined; and the possibility of reaching any consensus is much lower.

But it may be questioned if it is wise for South Africa to have become a member of either of the groupings. South Africa is already a member of the Southern African Customs Union (Sacu),[30] the only authentic example of a customs union in Southern Africa and a long-standing arrangement.[31] The same holds for the Common Monetary Area (CMA),[32] a close approximation to monetary integration in Southern Africa.[33]

The most obvious solution for South Africa, therefore, seems to be to respond to the demand for regional integration by following a strategy of open regionalism, ie by opening up existing integration schemes for new partners but at the same time defining

minimum conditions for entry, with countries not fulfilling such conditions becoming associate members. Alternatively, a multi-speed approach could be adopted by allowing different intensities of integration from free trade to an economic union.[34] It could be expected that such a procedure would make the SADC obsolete and shrink Comesa to an Eastern African grouping.[35]

South Africa's transformation as a precondition

Whether or not such regional integration (determined by South Africa) serves as a catalyst for Eastern and Southern Africa's development depends upon South Africa's economic policy. The country can act as an engine of growth for the region only if it is able to master enormous internal challenges. Much will depend on whether the general macroeconomic policy environment will be such as to engender investor confidence, stem the emigration of young skilled people, and enable the country to regain the high economic growth rates of the 1946– 1975 period.[36] Moreover, South Africa's trade and industrialization policies will determine the net gains of others who would like to join. The more restrictive South Africa's trade policy, and the more interventionist South Africa's industrialization policy, the higher will be the costs of trade diversion, and the higher the prices which regional importers will have to pay. At present, the future course of South African policy is highly uncertain because political structures and economic programmes are not well defined, reflecting the process of transformation from apartheid and autarchy to reintegration into the international community and structural adjustment.[37]

Economic policy is presently determined by the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme. On general principle of economic policy – interventionism/protectionism vs competition – this programme is a mixed bag:

■ Competition should be created and protected by antitrust law *but* the nationalization of enterprises is not excluded; a mixed economy is envisaged; a redistribution of income should take place in agriculture and mining; private financial institutions should allocate resources to sectors with a "basic need" for

them; and industrial policy should aim at a structure of domestic supply which satisfies the basic needs of the population at fair prices.

■ Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy should guarantee stable macroeconomic conditions, while trade policy should allow for an increase in productivity and competitiveness. *But* trade policy should also be used to protect infant industries, to avoid the bankruptcy of domestic enterprises, and to safeguard them against unfair competition. Moreover, foreign investment should be restricted in financial, agricultural, and natural resource sectors because of the country's strategic interests.

Such a programme is, at the very least, open to considerable government interpretation. Today's actual policy seems to indicate that its interpretation is a rather conservative one, giving priority to competition and restructuring rather than to protectionism and redistribution:

■ Fears that black majority rule would lead to heavy spending have been countered by fiscal and monetary discipline. From 1993 to 1994 the fiscal deficit was reduced from 7,7 to 5,8% of GDP and both years reported inflation rates below 10%.[38] As a consequence, economic decline was stopped and foreign investors regained confidence during 1994.

■ The government declined requests from the textiles and motor manufacturing industries to maintain protective tariffs on imports. It also refused demands for infant industry protection, and it plans to reduce tariffs more rapidly than required by Gatt.

■ The financial rand, which was available only to non-residents, was abolished by a unification of commercial and financial rates.

■ President Mandela strongly opposes ideas of quick handouts and jettisoning an agreement between the ANC and the former government which guarantees all (white) bureaucrats' jobs.

These signs have to be interpreted with great care. They are only small pieces of a large puzzle, and whether or not the complete puzzle will show an outward-oriented market economy

is still open to speculation. Moreover, the present policy crucially depends upon the personal influence of President Mandela within his party and whether, outside parliament, the radical opposition gains ground. Finally, the most important problems of economic policy still wait for solution: about 7 million people are homeless; employment declines and the unemployment rate is above 20% (including informal sector employment); unit labour costs are still high in international terms; an education system for the black majority has to be built up from scratch; and tax compliance within a black community accustomed to tax boycotts is rather low.

All in all, it seems too early to rely on South Africa as an engine of growth for the region. The country must first solve its internal problems; the decline of real per capita income must be halted and the dualistic structure of South Africa's economy – an industrialized economy and a subsistence economy – must somehow be bridged. The South African industrialized sector will, it is plain, have to serve as the engine of growth for the South African subsistence sector and will thus have its hands full dealing with the internal north-south integration problem.

Additionally, to the extent that South Africa does overcome its internal problems and kickstarts its engine of growth, regional integration may give rise to distributional conflicts.

■ Comparing trade figures for 1993 with trade figures for 1989,[39] South Africa's intra-regional trade increases, but South African exports to African countries grow faster than its corresponding imports. Moreover, African countries' structure of trade with South Africa shows a pattern similar to that of its trade with OECD countries: primary products are exported and finished products are imported.

■ Another critical issue is migration. Economic growth in South Africa is likely to suffer from a shortage of qualified labour. In a situation where adequate training facilities and basic education systems for the black majority are not available, there may be a brain-drain from neighbouring countries which then may fall further behind because of the loss of valuable human capital.

These scenarios indicate that the euphoria consequent upon the breakdown of the apartheid regime in South Africa must give way to realism. And the reality here is that South Africa has little to give away; that neighbouring countries will in the first place become a mere South African hinterland; and that they can only improve their position if they work hard at improving the efficiency of government policies. Whether or not Eastern and Southern African countries will accept this is open to speculation. It has to be remembered that the foundation of the SADCC was motivated not only by a rejection of South Africa's apartheid regime but also by the perceived threat of South Africa's regional dominance.[40]

Conclusions

As was indicated in the introduction, neither theoretical arguments, nor experience with south-south integration, nor the prospects for north-south integration promise an easy way out of Africa's economic malaise. More specifically, on the basis of the arguments put forward in the article the following conclusions can be drawn:

■ Regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa (*excluding* South Africa) is failing to overcome rent-seeking and an inward-orientation because it does not offer sufficient gains.

■ Regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa (*including* South Africa) can do better if South Africa maintains sound macroeconomic policies, implements outward-oriented policies, and does not become involved in PTA/SADC-type distributional conflicts but sets clear rules for the regional integration game in favour of maximizing competition. Opening up Sacu/CMA schemes for other countries would constitute a strategy consistent with these preconditions.

■ Without a region-wide consensus that sound macroeconomics, fiscal balance, and outward-orientation are essential for catching up, regional integration is bound to fail to improve economic welfare – even with South Africa's participation.

■ South Africa is the only country in the region with the potential to

promote such a consensus by setting the terms for entry into Sacu/CMA.

■ Regional integration in this sense can indeed be expected to improve at least *Southern* Africa's economic performance.

■ Regional integration in general is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ending Eastern and Southern Africa's economic decline.

Notes and references

1 Christine Jones and Miguel A Kiguel, "Africa's quest for prosperity: Has adjustment helped?", *Finance and Development*, vol 31, no 2, 1994, pp 2–5.

2 Anne O Krueger, "The political economy of the rent-seeking society", *American Economic Review*, vol 64, 1974, pp 291–303.

3 Rolf J Langhammer, *Wirtschaftsreformen in Afrika: Getragen von der Gunst der Geber?* Kieler Arbeidspapiere, no 666, Kiel: Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1995.

4 Rolf J Langhammer and Ulrich Hiemenz, *Regional integration among developing countries: Opportunities, obstacles and options*, Kiel Studies no 232, Tübingen: Mohr, 1990.

5 In the following, a detailed analysis of all trade related measures is avoided in order to draw on general arguments rather than on specific policies. The implicit assumption is that tariff equivalents can be calculated for all trade related measures. To talk about tariffs exclusively seems to be justified because there is a consensus in the literature that tariffs are superior to indirect measures. Therefore, the first step in each country's trade reform, the transformation of non-tariff into tariff barriers, is not here debated.

6 The World Bank, *World development report*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

7 Karl Wolfgang Menck and Bernd Schnatz, *Perspektiven der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Südafrikas. Chancen und Risiken für deutsche und europäische Unternehmen*, Hamburg: HWWA-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1994.

8 *Financial Times*, 27 April 1995.

9 Members of the PTA were: Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Comoros, Mauritius, and the SADCC members (see footnote 11) except for Botswana. The PTA became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) in December 1994. Comesa comprises the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia,

Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaïre, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

10 Gavin Maasdorp and Adrian Saville, *The SADC economies – Waiting for South Africa*, Occasional Paper New Series 2, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994, Table 2.1.

11 Members of the SADCC were: Tanzania, Angola, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland. The SADCC became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. SADC comprises the following countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

12 Torsten Amelung, "The impact of transaction costs on the direction of trade: Empirical evidence for Asia Pacific", *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, vol 147, 1991, pp 716–732.

13 Detlef Lorenz, "Economic geography and the political economy of regionalization: The example of Western Europe", *American Economic Review*, vol 82, no 2, 1992, pp 84–87.

14 Rolf J Langhammer and Ulrich Hiemenz, *op cit*, p 68.

15 Miroslav N Jovanovic, *International economic integration*, London/New York: Routledge, 1992; Ulrich Hiemenz and Rolf J Langhammer, "Liberalization and the successful integration of developing countries into the world economy", in G T Renshaw, *Market liberalization, equity and development*, Geneva: International Labour Office (ILO), 1989.

16 Torsten Amelung, "Zum Einfluß von Interessengrupen auf die Wirtschaftspolitik in Entwicklungsländern", *Die Weltwirtschaft*, no 1, 1987, pp 158–171; and Torsten Amelung, "The determinants of protection in developing countries: An extended interest group approach", *Kyklos*, vol 42, 1989, pp 515–532.

17 Jaime de Melo, Arvind Panagariya and Dani Rodrik, "The new regionalism: A country perspective", in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds), *New dimensions in regional integration*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp 159–193.

18 Rainer Schweickert, *Regional integration: A worthwhile strategy for catching*

up? Kiel Working Paper 623, Kiel: Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1994.

19 Jagdish Bhagwati, "Regionalism and multilateralism: An overview", in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds), *op cit*.

20 Rolf J Langhammer and Ulrich Hiemenz, *op cit*, pp 6–7.

21 Michael Emerson, *et al, The economics of 1992*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, Part D.

22 Paul R Krugman, "Increasing returns and economic geography", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol 99, 1991, pp 483–499; and Paul R Krugman, *A dynamic spatial model*, NBER Working Paper 4219, Cambridge MA: NBER, 1992.

23 Richard Baldwin, "The growth effects of 1992", *Economic Policy*, vol 4, 1989, pp 247–281.

24 Rainer Schweickert, *op cit*, p 10.

25 Rolf J Langhammer, "Integration 'through the market': High costs and risks of failure", *The Courier*, no 142, 1993, pp 56–59.

26 Rolf J Langhammer, Rainer Schweickert, Dean Spinanger and Volker Stüven, *Die 'Preferential Trade Area in Eastern and Southern Africa' (PTA). Ein Einstieg zur ersten groben Freihandelszone in Schwarzafrika?* München: Weltforum Verlag, 1990.

27 In 1987, intra-PTA trade accounted for 5,2% of total imports, and 7,2% of total exports. Compared to 1980 (5,6 and 7,1% respectively), these shares have remained fairly constant. Moreover, intra-PTA trade in absolute figures also remained constant (1980: US$649 million; 1987: US$644 million).

28 Trade relations are especially close with Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland which run a customs union with South Africa (see footnote 30). Additionally, South Africa is an important import source for Malawi (32%), Zimbabwe (25%), Mozambique (23%) and Zambia (20%). It also serves Zimbabwe as an important export market (10%). Figures are percentages of total imports and exports respectively and refer to the early 1990s (Maasdorp, Saville, *op cit*, Appendix).

29 Gavin Maasdorp, "The future structure of regional integration and development cooperation in Southern Africa", *Africa Insight*, vol 24, no 1, 1994, pp 5–10; and Rob Davies, "Approaches to regional integration in the Southern African con-

text", *Africa Insight*, vol 24, no 1, 1994, pp 11–17.

30 Sacu consists of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. Sacu arrangements include a redistribution scheme via a formula distributing total revenues from customs and excise taxes which favours the smaller partners.

31 Ngila Mwase, "The Southern African Customs Union in a post-apartheid Southern Africa", *Journal of World Trade*, vol 28, 1994, pp 119–130.

32 CMA consists of Sacu members except for Botswana. The CMA guarantees free movements of capital. Botswana runs an independent currency which is fully convertible and is linked to a basket of currencies in which the rand predominates.

33 Gavin Maasdorp, *op cit*, p 9.

34 Karl Wolfgang Menck and Bernd Schnatz, *op cit*, p 138; and Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, *Rethinking economic cooperation in Southern Africa: Trade and investment*, Occasional Paper, Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1993, p 41.

35 This seems to be happening anyway, because the SADC members which were members of the PTA have not up to now signed the Comesa treaty.

36 Gavin Maasdorp, *op cit*.

37 Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "South Africa's stability and cooperation with countries of Southern Africa", *Aussenpolitik*, vol 46, 1995, s 187–195; Karl Wolfgang Menck and Bernd Schnatz, *op cit*; and Economic Intelligence Unit, *Country report: South Africa*, First Quarter 1995, London: EIU, 1995.

38 International Monetary Fund, *International financial statistics*, Washington DC: IMF, June 1995. Not the government but the independent Central Bank is responsible for the tight monetary policy. There was, however, no attempt to touch the independence of the Central Bank in order to gain more flexibility for financing fiscal deficits.

39 Axel J Halbach, "Südafrika: Nach Aufhebung der Sanktionen rasch wachsender Afrikahandel", *Info-Schnelldienst*, Heft 25–26, s 34–37, 1994.

40 Karl Wolfgang Menck and Bernd Schnatz, *op cit*, p 75.

Macro-economic change in Zimbabwe

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Zimbabwe is South Africa's largest trading partner in Africa. Moreover, South Africa maintains a trade surplus with Zimbabwe. Thus trade with its northern neighbour contributes to economic growth, employment, and the availability of foreign exchange in South Africa.

With the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF, Zimbabwe recently embarked on an economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP). This ESAP will affect the country's trade and manufacturing patterns. Concurrently with this programme, Zimbabwe has started to re-negotiate its preferential trade agreement with South Africa.

In the light of these developments, the purpose of this article is to identify, for South Africa, the implications of the reform measures already undertaken by this neighbour, likely measures to be taken in the near future, and to attempt to identify Zimbabwe's likely aims and interests in any forthcoming trade agreement with South Africa.

The context

Until 1980 the Zimbabwean economy was essentially under siege. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the government faced stringent international sanctions, resulting in balance of payment problems. In reaction, it implemented import-substitution policies such as import controls and a strict allocation of foreign exchange. At independence in 1980, these controls and regulations were retained. They were in fact tightened between 1982 and 1990.[2]

One of the most significant controls was the system by which foreign exchange was rationed. This afforded substantial protection to domestic manufactures and indeed almost eliminated competitive imports.[3]

Protection, coupled with the absence of competitive imports, contributed to an increase in private sector savings, because the private sector had decided to postpone consumption. This made it possible for the Zimbabwean government to finance its growing fiscal deficits without high inflation or an increase in interest rates, a phenomenon which has been described as the "Zimbabwe Paradox".[4]

After independence in 1980, economic growth in Zimbabwe remained dismal; only in 1984–85 and 1987–88 did per capita income increase significantly.[5] And since the Zimbabwean economy was dependent on imported capital and intermediate inputs for economic growth and expansion of productive capacity, the shortage of foreign exchange became a binding constraint during the late 1980s. What was needed was an increase in exports to supply the foreign exchange for imports.[6]

Difficulties in increasing exports arose, firstly, from Zimbabwe's dependence upon five basic commodities (tobacco, gold, ferro-alloy, nickel and cotton lint) for more than 60% of its export receipts. The value-added components of these commodities are small and the potential for export expansion low. Secondly, as a result of the import-substitution policies followed in the past, the domestic manufacturing sector largely produces for the domestic market.[7] The

few manufacturing exports are directed mostly at neighbouring countries.[8]

In the light of such structural constraints on exports, the ESAP aims at their alleviation by creating incentives for a shift in the use of domestic resources towards the production of tradable goods, especially manufactured exportables.

The context to Zimbabwe's macro-economic changes has many elements

Prof Willem Naudé of the Department of Economics and Gencor Centre for Regional Development at the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, in South Africa, suggests that, notwithstanding Zimbabwe's desire to lessen its dependence on South Africa and its perception of South African exporters as a threat in the Southern African region, mutual dependence and the imperatives of Zimbabwe's ESAP suggest that many profitable opportunities may exist for South African firms beyond Beit Bridge.[1]

of manufactured exports. The first steps were taken in October 1990 with the relaxation of price controls, the scrapping of the foreign exchange allocation mechanism, and the abolition of import control. Since then, the ESAP has gone through three phases.

The first phase stretched roughly from October 1990 to the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar in August 1991. During this period, firms and consumers obtained greater access to imported goods. There was a net benefit to the manufacturing sector from this, since it acquired easier and greater access to the intermediate and capital inputs it required, while simultaneously a still overvalued currency afforded them some protection against significant foreign competition.

The increase in profitability (and expected profitability) of the manufacturing sector as a result of these reform measures caused an almost 46% appreciation of the industrial index on the Harare Stock Exchange.[11] Because the Zimbabwean dollar was still overvalued, however, firms and consumers started hoarding inputs and consumer goods (especially motor vehicles) in anticipation of an imminent devaluation. This eventually took place in August 1991.

The second phase lasted from September 1991 to April 1993. In contrast to the growth experienced during the first phase of reform, the manufacturing sector was now negatively affected by the following developments:[12]

■ The devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar in August 1991 reduced the implicit, hidden subsidy on imported inputs, while the accompanying reform of the foreign exchange allocation mechanism, which permitted the purchase of unrestricted foreign exchange, made possible increased competition from imports. However, a 1993 survey[13] asked manufacturing firms to identify their main source of competition. The vast majority reported that they either faced no competition, or that competition was mainly from other domestic firms. Competition from imports appeared significant only to respondents in the textile and metal industries sectors. This implies that unexploited markets for South African exports could well exist in Zimbabwe.

■ The drought resulted in a reduction in effective demand and the importation of food also reduced the foreign

in common with that of South Africa. Both countries faced international sanctions, both countries opted for import-substitution industrialization, and both countries currently aim to stimulate economic growth through export promotion.[9] This similarity in experience, as well as historical and cultural links, largely explains the volume of trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa.[10] These same considerations are, moreover, also likely to have implications for future trade and regional strategies in both countries. Some of these implications will become evident below.

Recent economic reform

It was pointed out in the previous section that Zimbabwe needs to increase its exports of manufactured goods in order to achieve sustainable economic growth rates, and that the ESAP aims to alleviate the structural weaknesses in the Zimbabwean economy hindering the growth

exchange available for manufacturing. The drought also resulted in an increase in the government's fiscal deficit, and the resulting inflation somewhat eroded the benefits of the August 1991 devaluation. As these benefits were eroded, the private economy expected a correcting devaluation, and responded by increasing imports for speculative hoarding purposes. The correcting devaluation occurred in January 1994.

- Domestic financial deregulation caused interest rates to rise to over 30%. For firms already in debt, and for those who needed credit for working capital requirements, this came as a setback. Many non-profitable firms were to be squeezed out of business. The financial deregulation, coupled with the exchange rate reform, had other important implications, especially for export-orientated firms. These will be discussed below.

The third period of reform started in May 1993 and continues to the present day. The drought (partially) ended and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) reduced nominal interest rates. Output levels have recovered during this phase. But they have not yet reached their levels prior to the ESAP because many parts of the manufacturing sector are intrinsically uncompetitive and are contracting. (This implies opportunities for South African suppliers.) Furthermore, there are still certain significant difficulties to be faced by Zimbabwean firms manufacturing for export. And since the whole aim of the ESAP is to shift resources into export production by making that sector profitable, and future growth in the Zimbabwean economy depends on successful export development, we must now consider in more detail the current problems faced by Zimbabwe's exporters. A number of opportunities for South Africa will be highlighted.

Constraints on manufactured exports

Financial factors

To understand how financial factors may constrain exports, it should be borne in mind that any increase in exports required more working capital from the manufacturer and exporter, since there are post- and pre-shipment lags between production and payment.[14]

Firms obtain most of the finance for this working capital from bank loans. However, banks need to assess the risks involved; and when this is perceived as too high, the much-needed finance will not be forthcoming. Indeed this might still be so in Zimbabwe at present[15] since when expanding into new markets there is inherent uncertainty involved; and banks have difficulty in screening applications for credit and so distinguishing between good and bad borrowers. "Adverse selection" and moral hazard problems come into play.

Before the reform of the exchange rate system, Zimbabwean banks did not need their own screening procedures, since those firms who had been allocated a quota of foreign exchange, or possessed an import licence, signalled in effect that they would be good borrowers, as by implication they had already been screened. Higher interest rates would not clear the market, since higher interest rates might lead borrowers to undertake riskier investment projects: high-risk projects might be the only ones that could enable them to pay the high interest on their loans; this is what is often referred to as the "adverse selection" problem. Another point here is that as a result of the liberalization of the capital account, a re-allocation of portfolios took place in Zimbabwe's financial sector, away from loans to other assets.

We should also note that, to add to exporters' woes, the higher incidence of bankruptcy associated with high interest rates also requires banks to divert a greater proportion of their loanable funds to the accumulation of reserves. The consequence of all these factors is to reduce the supply of loanable funds – unfortunately, precisely when export-manufactures need access to loanable funds for working capital.[16]

General policy uncertainty

For irreversible investment in export manufacturing to take place in today's Zimbabwe, investors must be convinced that the government will not renege on its current incentives for exports by reversing the trade liberalization programme or by allowing the exchange rate again to become overvalued.[17] What is at stake, thus, is the credibility of the government's macro-economic policies. And to be credible, a government's macro-economic policies must be both compatible, and time consistent.[18]

Zimbabwe

Republic of —

Independence: 18 April 1980; former British colony known as Southern Rhodesia or Rhodesia

National day: 18 April (Independence Day)

Leader: Robert Mugabe, b 1924, in power since 1980, President since 1988

Capital: Harare, largest city

Area: 390 759 km²

Population: 11,2 mm (1995)

Religions: Christianity (about 50% of population) and ethnic beliefs

Languages: English (official), Shona, Ndebele

Life expectancy at birth: 60 years

Foreign trade: Imports $1 680 mn; Exports: $1 900 mn (1994)

Principal exports: Tobacco (29%), gold and other minerals

GNP: $5 424 mn (1994)

GNP/capita: $490 (1994)

Currency: $1 = Zimbabwean dollars (Z$) 9,4 (Jan 1996)

Background: With the exception of South Africa, landlocked Zimbabwe has the most diversified economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Exports come from agriculture (especially tobacco and cotton), mining (including gold, nickel, asbestos, copper and chromium) and manufacturing (ferro-alloys, steel and clothing). Transport and other infrastructural services are well developed and the country has made great progress in expanding educational and health services. Economic growth has nevertheless been disappointing over the past decade and unemployment is rising. The country has sustained a multiparty system since independence but politics is dominated by the ruling party (Zanu PF), which won 118 of the 120 elective House of Assembly seats in the April 1995 general election. President Mugabe, who was the sole candidate in the last presidential election (March 1996), was returned to office.

Source: Pieter Esterhuysen, *Fact Sheet*, Pretoria: Africa Institute of SA, 1996

By "compatibility" is meant that the combination of policies adopted by a government must be consistent with the overall balance of payments constraint. For instance, a devaluation will be convincing for exporters only if the government can control its fiscal deficit. If it cannot, the inflation anticipated by apprehensive exporters will quickly erode the gains/incentives offered them by the devaluation.[19]

By "time consistency" is meant that the government should not create incentives for the private economy which will result in something impelling it (the government) to reverse those incentives.[20] For instance, if import taxes and controls are abolished, the private sector might react by importing more, thus *increasing* imports as a tax base. A point might come at which the government could decide to fill its coffers by once more taxing imports. In a case of time-inconsistent policy such as this, consumers and manufacturers will use the window of opportunity to import as much as possible and engage in speculative hoarding.[21] Such behaviour will also worsen any balance of payments effects of the increase in imports.

One of the ways in which a government can convince the private economy about its sincerity to maintain reforms, is for it to "bind its hands", ie restrict the likely options it can take in future. One way is by joining a trade block – the EC and Nafta are examples of this. Since Mexico is committed to the Nafta agreement, its exporters have greater faith that the current tariff incentives will remain in place. [22] Consequently, there might be important incentives or reasons for the Zimbabwean government to wish to strengthen its links with the sub-Saharan African region. The potential role of SADC, PTA and trade agreements with South Africa will be discussed below.

Lack of competition in important input markets

One example of successful export expansion in Zimbabwe is offered by horticulture. Zimbabwe has become the third largest source of imported cut roses for Europe and the fourth largest supplier of *all* imported cut flowers for that continent. Between 1986 and 1993 the tonnage exports of horticultural products increased by an average of 32% per year.[23]

For horticultural exporters, air freight is currently by far the largest cost. Air freight costs from Harare are significantly higher than from Johannesburg International Airport. The quality of service at Harare is so poor that some flower exporters are now regularly transporting their produce to Johannesburg International Airport for onward transport to Europe. Although a new airport for Harare is under construction, it will not be ready for another five years at least.[24] This gives South African freight handling firms an opportunity to capture the business of Zimbabwean producers.

The tax system and tax reform uncertainties

As far as the effect of tariff and tax reform for manufacturing and exporting is concerned, the following apply:

- The levels of protection still remain relatively high, even after five years into the ESAP. The system of trade taxes is discussed below.

- There is a high cascading effect in the domestic indirect tax system; the export sector has since January 1994 lost a 9% export subsidy, and still faces high rates of duty on some imported inputs, and pays cascading domestic indirect taxes.

- Export firms are burdened with an incomplete duty drawback system, receive negative protection, and are at a disadvantage in competing for resources with import substitute producers.

The Zimbabwean government is currently considering whether to introduce a Value Added Tax (Vat). Preliminary plans are to implement this from 1 January 1997 or soon thereafter. The disturbing implication here is that major adjustments to custom duties will be postponed so that they can be effected in conjunction with the introduction of Vat.

It is thus quite likely that the current constraints on Zimbabwean exports will remain for a number of years. These constraints provide pointers to ways in which South African firms could compete against Zimbabwean firms in the subregion. They also suggest that investment in Zimbabwean firms should preferably be made in firms that manufacture for domestic use. In this regard it is worth noting that since January 1994 foreign investors have been permitted to invest in listed and unlisted companies in Zimbabwe up to 35% of total equity, while dividend flows be remitted at a rate of 100%.

Regional imperatives of the ESAP

The broader regional picture from Zimbabwe's point of view

Zimbabwe prides itself on its regional connections. It is a member of

- The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), which has become (following a new treaty in 1993) the Community of Eastern and Southern Africa States (Comesa)

- The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Furthermore, the country is a signatory to the Cross-Border Initiative to Promote Private Investment, Trade and Payments in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (CBI). The CBI aims for completely free intra-regional trade by the end of 1996. Zimbabwe also has bilateral trade agreements with South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.

There are three principal reasons why Zimbabwe might wish to enhance its regional role.

- There are political pressures continent-wide for greater economic unity following the formation of the European Union (1992) and the recent Nafta agreement. Most fast-growing countries in the world belong to some strong regional grouping, with the exception of the countries of Southern Africa – especially Zimbabwe and South Africa. Although the Lomé Convention has in the past been quoted to support the case for Southern African regional cooperation, Africa's deal under Lomé is not a very good one;[25] and in addition the Lomé deal is only a temporary one.[26] Countries in Southern Africa, with South Africa in the lead, should negotiate towards some regional integration deal with Europe on the same lines as the deal Mexico secured from the US and Canada. Here cooperation between South Africa and Zimbabwe would be important, particularly from Zimbabwe's point of view.

- Since South Africa is Zimbabwe's foremost competitor in the region, it is important that Zimbabwe be included in any regional trade grouping of which South Africa may be a part; otherwise South African products might obtain preferential tax and duty treatment.

Zimbabwe

- Zimbabwe fears that its domestic manufacturing might suffer from competitive imports from South Africa, and that its exports in the region could not compete with South African exports, especially if South Africa articles enjoy subsidies, as are currently available under the Geis. However, within Sacu, South African exporters are not permitted this subsidy. It will therefore be in Zimbabwe's interest to get South Africa into a regional agreement so that the South African government can formally agree not to provide subsidies to any of its firms which export to the countries of Southern Africa.

Before dealing with the trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is necessary to point to the salient features of the latter's system of trade taxes.

There are currently three major types of trade taxes in place: customs duties; import taxes (essentially a sales tax); and a surcharge.

These three types of tax are collected under five different categories, depending on the origin of the goods – Botswana; Namibia; Comesa; South Africa; and general (all other countries).

Virtually all Zimbabwe's imports from Botswana and Namibia are free of customs duty and the surcharge, while 95% of all items pay 10% import tax only. Within the "general" category there are 23 separate ad valorem custom duty

TABLE 1 Trade tax revenue of Zimbabwe by source of imports, in Z$, January 1994

Region	Imports	Customs duty	Import tax	Surcharge
PTA	757 695	54 886	2 774	51 845
South Africa	27 766 049	1 708 989	8 183	4 181 920
Botswana	7 962 427	0	4 982	0
Namibia	1 582	0	158	0
General	677 378 653	41 646 284	13 966 522	42 987 813
TOTAL	**713 866 406**	**43 410 160**	**13 982 619**	**47 221 578**

Source: *Zimbabwe customs, tariffs and excise handbook,* January 1994

rates, based on CIF value and ranging from 0–75%. There are also 35 different specific rates of duty, although 91% of imports by value enter under 0%, 10% and 20% rates, producing 80% of the tax revenue. This suggests that a simplification of the system is necessary. Furthermore, and more importantly for the present purposes, only 31% of Zimbabwean imports from South Africa are currently taxed under the "South African" category label.[27] The reasons and implications for this are set out in the next subsection.

The trade agreement with South Africa

The fact that only about 31% of Zimbabwean imports from South Africa are currently taxed under the "South African" category is because the current trade agreement between South Africa goes back to 1964. Signed by what was then Rhodesia, it allows for:

- Duty-free trade in unprocessed food-stuffs under import licence

- A range of rebates on manufactured items, each listed in minute detail and each item carrying its own margin of preference on Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rates

No modifications to this trade agreement have been made since then, so that the much-increased trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa still has to go under the "general" category as far as trade taxes are concerned.[28]

The implication in terms of tax revenue earned by the Zimbabwe government is indicated in Table 1.

Table 1 shows that Z$47 221 578 was earned during January 1994 by the Zimbabwean government from trade taxes. The bulk of the income came from the "general" category in the form of customs duties. As stated in the previous section, imports from Namibia and

Botswana do not pay any customs duties. Should the current trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe be updated, and perhaps be structured similarly to that between Zimbabwe and Botswana/Namibia, the Zimbabwean government could face a significant revenue loss.

The importance of trade taxes from South Africa as source of revenue is further illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2 gives the data on imports and trade taxes from Zimbabwe's 14 greatest sources of imports. Only from the UK does the Zimbabwean government earn more trade tax revenue than it does from South Africa. Table 2 makes it clear that South African exporters to Zimbabwe will face their severest competition from European firms. In this respect it is necessary that an environment conducive for stimulating international competitiveness be created and maintained in South Africa.

Table 2 also suggests that when it comes to the importance of the taxes by *type*, customs duties and surcharges are the most important. The reason for this is that a large number of imports from South Africa are exempt from the import tax. It has recently been estimated that if these exemptions were to be scrapped, it might create an extra revenue of Z$2 997 673 for the Zimbabwean government.

The conclusion from the discussion so far is that Zimbabwean aims in negotiations with South Africa on a trade agreement could be the following:

- to prevent the widening of the agreement to include any further goods;

- if the above is not possible, then to eliminate the existing exemptions on import taxes.

The imperative for the Zimbabwean government is to keep its budget deficit as small as possible in order for its fiscal policy to be compatible with the ESAP. These considerations should be seen as part of the broader aim of the negotiations on trade agreements. The major reasons why the agreement with South Africa is currently being re-negotiated is in summary[29] that

- it is complicated;

- it is outdated;

- it applies to a positive list of goods which has been declining as a proportion of the total goods traded;

- there are some loopholes; one instance: South Africa is accused of invoking an anti-dumping clause to keep out Zimbabwean wheelbarrows;
- there have been complaints about arbitrariness and inconsistencies in the application of charges imposed by South African customs officials.

Because South Africa exports more to Zimbabwe than its imports from that country, it will probably have more to gain from an updated new trade agreement. South Africa will also be in a much stronger position to negotiate regional trade agreements if its own trade liberalization and tariff reform programme have been completed and clarified. For example, more important trading partners such as the UK might feel that if a more inclusive agreement with Zimbabwe is reached, and South Africa's trade regime becomes more protectionist in the future, that trade will be diverted from the UK towards South Africa. The South African government will therefore need to have a consistent, credible trade regime in place as soon as possible.

Summary and conclusions

Recent reforms in Zimbabwe have opened up a window of opportunity for South African exporters, manufacturers and investors.

Most importantly, the abolition of import control has now made it possible for Zimbabweans to import consumer goods; and they now have greater access to foreign exchange than ever before to pay for them. However, few foreign countries have so far exploited this situation and competition from imports only seems to matter in the textile and metal industries sector. Moreover, the domestic manufacturing sector is still relatively inefficient, so that foreign companies and their imports would be able to get a foothold relatively more easily than in other markets. Given that South Africa is itself liberalizing trade and might not yet be ready to face big international competitors head-on, an intermediate step might be to export to and invest in Zimbabwe – although international experience does suggest that such intermediate destinations seldom serve the objective of enhancing international competitiveness.

These opportunities come with a health warning. South Africa and Zimbabwe's relationship is not one of the most cordial in the region. In fact, the country sees South Africa to be a potential threat, because

- South African exports to the Southern African region have increased by over 200% over the period 1988–1994;

TABLE 2 Value of imports and trade taxes in Zimbabwe by selected individual countries of origin, January 1994, in Z$ millions

Country	Value of imports	Customs taxes	Import taxes	Surcharge
United Kingdom	99 549 347	7 854 960	2 523 996	9 400 825
South Africa	87 138 663	6 967 511	1 680 503	9 785 714
Saudi Arabia	61 737 907	2 301 624	0	0
Sweden	53 784 386	1 343 884	1 469 520	2 592 036
Germany	51 355 270	4 263 564	1 565 763	3 283 779
Israel	50 463 529	39 671	43 306	30 973
USA	49 273 412	2 659 248	2 939 074	3 214 139
Italy	41 138 114	718 452	1 031 163	1 243 711
Japan	39 333 912	3 552 043	191 339	3 620 384
Switzerland	19 995 555	1 455 016	412 334	1 399 938
Netherlands	16 605 376	1 881 936	321 222	1 694 537
Denmark	15 175 229	511 836	1 237 368	275 928
Pakistan	14 410 531	1 443 973	19	2 158 920
Botswana	13 023 276	34 289	5 143	35 810

Source: F Foroutan, C Jenkins and C Montenegro, *Zimbabwe's regional trade: An evaluation*, unpublished report prepared for the World Bank Trade Expansion programme to Zimbabwe, 1994

■ South Africa might attract foreign investment that could otherwise have gone to Zimbabwe;

■ as South Africa liberalizes its own trade regime (by abolishing quota restrictions and lowering tariffs), Zimbabwean firms will have to be competitive with suppliers outside the region in order to maintain their market share.

There may be some bitterness in Zimbabwe that more advantage was not taken of South Africa's isolation during the sanctions period. At a conference in London in May 1994, Mugabe was at pains to emphasize his country's advantages over South Africa and is reported[30] to have said that "There are certain advantages that we have over South Africa: we pride ourselves on a much higher level of education and skills among the black population. We also have greater stability ..."; and he added: "Zimbabwe is a member of both organizations [PTA and SADC], providing a well-supported base from which to supply the whole market". Zimbabwe is thus likely to compete with South Africa by marketing itself as having cheaper labour, better skilled low-income workers, a higher degree of political stability, and greater access to and familiarity with the region.

In addition to competing with South Africa for a regional market share, Zimbabwe is likely to attempt to lessen its dependence on South African imports and its use of South African port facilities. One point made in a recent report to the government of Zimbabwe ran: "We believe that it is in Zimbabwe's best interest gradually to change the focus of her attention from regional to global trade promotion. At present, too many resources and too much attention are devoted to regional issues".[31]

These considerations will all impact on the current trade negotiations between South Africa and Zimbabwe. South Africa will probably have more to gain from updating that agreement than Zimbabwe, since its exports to Zimbabwe exceed its imports. Zimbabwean aims in negotiations with South Africa could be either to prevent the widening of the agreement to include more goods or to eliminate the exemptions on import taxes.

We should note, however, that a number of constraints will hamper Zimbabwean exports in the near future and put a rein on the country's desire to lessen its dependence on South Africa. These constraints also indicate how South African firms might compete against their Zimbabwean counterparts in the subregion and suggest that investment in Zimbabwe should preferably be made via firms that manufacture for domestic use.

Looking at the big picture, Zimbabwe provides only 0,8% of South Africa's imports and absorbs only 2,8% of South Africa's non-gold exports. Although the scope for increasing exports to Zimbabwe certainly exists, and would be consistent with the RDP, Zimbabwe-South African relations take on a greater significance when wider, regional imperatives are considered. There are three reasons for Zimbabwe's possible interest in regional trade agreements: political pressures continent-wide for greater economic unity, the need to be included in any regional trade grouping of which South Africa is a part, and possibly the desire to limit the effects of incentives to South African exporters in the region.

In conclusion, the mutual dependence among the countries of Southern Africa, and the macro-economic imperatives facing Zimbabwe (from which it cannot escape, as the recent conflict with the IMF illustrates), suggest that many real opportunities await South African firms beyond Beit Bridge.

Notes and references

1   I am grateful to many friends and colleagues – especially Carolyn Jenkins and Chris Adam – at the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, for the many stimulating discussions we had on Zimbabwe during my period there as Research Officer.

2   See R Davies, J Rattso and R Torvik, "The macroeconomics of Zimbabwe in the 1980s: A CGE Model analysis", *Journal of African Economies*, vol 3, no 2, 1994, pp 153–198.

3   C Adam and M Ncube, "Financial liberalisation and trade expansion in Zimbabwe", unpublished report prepared for the World Bank Trade Expansion Programme to Zimbabwe.

4   R Davies, "Trade, trade management and development in Zimbabwe", in S Frimpong-Ansah, R Kanbur and P Svedberg (eds), *Trade and development in sub-Saharan Africa*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.

5   C Jenkins, *Economic policy and investment in Zimbabwe*, 1980–1990, Mimeo, Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 1995.

6   R Green and X Khadani, "Zimbabwe: Transition to economic crises, 1981–83", *World Development*, vol 14, no 8, 1986, pp 1059–1083.

7   See R Riddell, "Zimbabwe", in R Riddell (ed), *Manufacturing Africa: Performance and prospects of seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa*, London: James Currey, 1990.

8   F Foroutan, C Jenkins and C Montenegro, "Zimbabwe's Regional Trade: An evaluation", unpublished report prepared for World Bank Trade Expansion Programme to Zimbabwe, 1994.

9   See C Jenkins and W A Naudé, "SA and Europe: Free trade options", *Indicator SA*, vol 12, no 4, 1995, pp 43–49.

10 See F Foroutan, C Jenkins and C Montenegro, op cit.

11 P Collier, *Macroeconomic aspects of Zimbabwean trade liberalization*, Mimeo, Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 1994.

12 See *ibid*; and C Jenkins, op cit.

13 See J W Gunning (ed), *The manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe: Dynamics and constraints*, Amsterdam: Economisch en Sociaal Instituut, Vrije Universiteit, 1994.

14 C Adam and M Ncube, op cit.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 C Jenkins, op cit.

18 P Collier and J W Gunning, "Macro-economic compatibility and liberalization", unpublished report prepared for the World Bank Trade Expansion Programme to Zimbabwe, 1994.

19 S Edwards, *Real exchange rates, devaluation and adjustment: Exchange rate policy in developing countries*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989.

20 D Rodrik, "Credibility of trade reform: A policy maker's guide", *The World Economy*, vol 12, no 1, 1989, pp 1–16.

21 P Collier and J W Gunning, op cit.

22 See P Collier and J W Gunning, "Trade policy and regional integration: Implications for relations between Europe and Africa", *The World Economy*, vol 18, no 1, 1995, pp 387–410.

23 J W Gunning (ed), op cit.

24 *Ibid.*

25 See P Collier and J W Gunning, "Trade policy and regional integration ...", op cit.

26 See C Jenkins and W A Naudé, op cit.

27 F Foroutan, C Jenkins and C Montenegro, op cit.

28 *Ibid.*

29 See *ibid* for a discussion.

30 *Opportunity Africa*, November 1994, p 7.

31 F Foroutan, C Jenkins and C Montenegro, op cit.

South Africa and the UN

A NEW CHAPTER

South Africa has entered a new period in its exciting, often turbulent and troubled, history: 27 April 1994 not only marked the end of 46 years of apartheid but of 352 years of white minority rule. Today, almost forty years after Ghana achieved independence, the first African state to do so, the Republic of South Africa has been reunited with the rest of the continent. However, the emergence of a new democratic South Africa holds severe challenges to the country's leadership: illiteracy; great inequities of wealth along racial lines; high unemployment levels; increasing population pressures; and soaring crime rates. These local needs will have to be balanced against certain regional demands; and all this, of course, will have to be contextualized within certain international constraints.

This is also the time when the United Nations is celebrating its golden jubilee. It too is experiencing a period of intense introspection. The Cold War which plagued the world body through much of its fifty-year history is finally over. But the end of a bipolar world has raised several new problems, while reviving some older ones too. Calls for the expansion of the Security Council, the restructuring of the specialized agencies and the democratization of the entire UN system have grown more strident. New threats to world peace and security have emerged, and the UN is being called upon to act in ways never anticipated by its founders. Certain radical institutional changes may well be necessary to enable the world body to effectively respond to the challenges confronting it.

Thus it is that the post-apartheid South Africa and the post-Cold War United Nations are both trying to find their feet. And it is at their point of intersection that the thrust of this article lies. How can the UN assist South Africa in its domestic priorities? and what are the Republic's responsibilities to the world organization?

The history of South Africa's relationship with the United Nations

Dual relations

It is often argued that South Africa's involvement with the United Nations is as old as the organization. John Barratt begins a 1976 paper on "The United Nations and Southern Africa" with this paragraph:

> South Africa was one of the original 26 signatories of the Declaration by the United Nations on 1 January, 1942. At the United Nations Conference on International Organisations which began in San Francisco on 25 April, 1945, the South African Prime Minister, General J C Smuts, was one of the prominent world figures present, and he had personally prepared the first draft of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter which was submitted to the Conference for approval. The wording of the Preamble, as it stands today, is therefore mainly the work of a South African Prime Minister.[1]

This well described the official relationship between South Africa's white government and the United Nations-information. Another, ultimately successful, relationship existed between the United Nations and South Africa's people. In 1962 the General Assembly, by Resolution 1761 (XVII), established the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, the aim of which was to keep the country's racial policies under scrutiny and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly or the Security Council or both. In 1970 this committee was renamed the Special Committee on Apartheid, and in 1974 the Special Committee Against Apartheid. On both these occasions additional members were appointed to the committee.

The key to understanding the history of South Africa's relations with the world organization is the duality in this country's foreign relations.[2] There have long been two competing prisms through

Hussein Solomon, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, South Africa, examines various facets of the relations between South Africa and the UN.

UN headquarters, New York

The thought that there existed a fundamental distinction between oppressive government and oppressed people in South Africa is forcefully reiterated by Johnny McClain, Representative of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) and Regional Communication Adviser on Central Africa:

> Unesco's anti-apartheid activities are consistent with specific policy decisions of the international community and are not directed against a people, but rather against an inhumane policy which victimized other human beings because of the colour of their skin.[4]

The UN thus not only acknowledged the duality in South Africa's foreign relations but strongly supported South Africa's people in their struggle against the apartheid regime.

Through the impact of this dual process, South Africa's internationally recognized government gradually lost legitimacy, although it retained the right to represent South Africa's people. On the other hand the liberation movements, acting in the name of South Africa's people, gained legitimacy but had very little formal diplomatic representation. The key to understanding this duality lies in the balance of ascending and descending structures of power. How these structures came to be measured and understood takes us along the course of South Africa's diplomatic history. And to this we now turn.

The political system of white-domination was perfectly acceptable until the end of World War II. South Africa's formal status as an actor in the international system dated back to the mid-1920s fracas concerning the status of the dominions which predated the Statute of Westminister. By 1923 the United Kingdom had agreed "... that a dominion could enjoy diplomatic representation abroad, and that each dominion's parliament had to ratify treaties affecting that particular country".[5] It was the Balfour Declaration of 1926 that "gave South Africa the green light for the creation of a South African Department of External Affairs, of which the then Prime Minister Barry Hertzog assumed the portfolio on 1 June 1927".[6]

By the time that apartheid had become a serious concern, some thirty-odd years later, the minority-ruled state was well ensconced in the international community. It was, as Commonwealth buffs point out, a perfectly respectable

which South Africa's people have viewed the world and through which, correspondingly, the international community has viewed South Africa. One prism governed the ways in which the apartheid state and world governments saw each other; the other prism similarly transmitted the two-way views of South Africa's population and the peoples of the world beyond its borders. That the United Nations was aware of the contradictions permeating South African foreign policy is without doubt. Consider the following statement by Mustapha Tlili, Chief of the Anti-Apartheid, Palestine and Decolonization Section of the United Nations:

> What is triumphant today, in this great country (ie South Africa), is the will of its people, who wanted freedom, equality, justice and democracy for all. The United Nations was on the side of the South African people throughout their struggle, on the side of freedom, equality, justice and democracy, on the side of history. And history has triumphed.[3]

member of that organization[7] and, as we have seen, played an important role in the establishment of the United Nations.[8]

It is probable that South Africa's international status might well have continued had it not been for the massive political disruption of World War II. This set in motion a series of events both at home and abroad which was to end unhappily for South Africa's ruling minority. The tone and direction of the country's international relations was well set by the 1961 decision to leave the Commonwealth, and by the refusal of its credentials in 1974 by the United Nations General Assembly.

The determination of National Party politicians to pursue their racial agenda meant that the drift towards international isolation was inevitable. It was speeded by the fashion in which it was executed[9] and by the activities of its security forces. Thus the pro-sanctions lobby was strengthened by massacres such as Sharpeville in 1960, Soweto in 1976 and Langa in 1985. Indeed it was after Sharpeville in 1960 that South Africa's case was first brought before the Security Council, the Council adopting Resolution 134 of 1960 which noted that apartheid constituted a threat to international peace and security.[10]

Sharpeville marked the end of Pretoria's honeymoon with the international community and the beginning of numerous punitive measures against it. In 1962 the General Assembly urged member states to break off diplomatic relations with Pretoria and to close their harbours and airports to South African ships and planes. In 1963, the Security Council resolved to ban the sale of arms to South Africa; and the United States and the United Kingdom were the first to comply. In 1964, a conference in London debated the feasibility of imposing sanctions.[11] Under Resolution 418 of 1977 the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[12]

Sanctions were merely one weapon in the United Nations arsenal. Isolation was another. In 1973, the UN General Assembly (Resolution 3151 of 14 December 1973)

> requested all UN specialized agencies and other inter-governmental organizations to deny membership to the South African regime and to invite, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, representatives of the liberation movement of the South African people recognized by that organization to participate in their meetings.[13]

What followed can only be described as a snowball effect. South Africa had its membership of the following organizations abruptly terminated: International Labour Organization, Universal Postal Union, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, International Maritime Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Economic and Social Council, Executive Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Council on the UN Environmental Programme, Governing Council of the UN Development Programme, UN Population Commission, and the Economic

Commission for Africa. More importantly, the South African government's representatives were replaced by those of the liberation movements.[14]

The South African government tried to defend itself at two levels. First, it sought refuge in the principle of national sovereignty, claiming that the UN was barred from involvement in the country's internal affairs by its own Charter.[15] However, the UN's response was that the gross violation of human rights in South Africa was reason enough to involve the UN in this country's affairs. More importantly, the UN argued that South Africa's policy of regional destabilization underscored the fact that apartheid was an *international* threat to peace and security. At the second level, South Africa contended that it had not violated fundamental human rights in terms of the Charter as there was no internationally recognized formula for such rights, and that the Charter did not

UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Photo: UN Chronicle

define them. Member states, Pretoria argued, therefore did not have any specific obligations in this connection.[16] However, the UN decided to reject legal argument in favour of the human imperative. Apartheid's slide to isolation continued as before.

We might note at this point that the making of South African foreign policy was long an exclusively white affair. Until the 1980s, recruitment for the Department of Foreign Affairs was racially loaded and biased in favour of Afrikaner males.[17]

Additionally, South African diplomatic experience was somewhat circumscribed. The missions at the United Nations in New York and in Geneva were chiefly listening posts; and South Africa's exposure to the increasingly important field of multilateral diplomacy was restricted. With other pariah states – Chile, Taiwan, Israel – relationships were warm. It is doubtful whether the extent of these links will ever be fully understood.[18] Their effects will persist, however.

Formal relations with major Western countries were cordial but confined to dealing with apartheid and the international status of Namibia. Often, these discussions focused upon South Africa's latent nuclear capacity and attempts to secure its signature of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).[19] In some instances South Africa used its engagement with these powers to play in a higher international league.[20] South Africa's bully-boy tactics in its own backyard excluded it from membership of all African, and almost all Southern African, institutions. Even its hopes of establishing an economic group – the Constellation of Southern African States – were dashed.

From the mid-1970s, the conduct of regional policy came within the purview of South Africa's powerful military, whose interest deepened in the concept of forward-defence. This doctrine held sway from 1975 – the year when South Africa invaded Angola. Whether South Africa's foreign office supported the military approach to regional relations is not altogether clear. What is certain is that by the mid-1980s the distinction between hawks and doves in the making of regional policy had largely disappeared. The result was that security issues began to crowd South Africa's foreign policy agenda.[21] They relied upon a simplistic anti-communism which echoed the vulgar

rhetoric of the 1950s. In South Africa this approach to international affairs[22] was backed up to some extent by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. The United Nations, one must add, paid more attention at this time to Southern Africa than to any other sub-region of the world.

The politics of symbolism played an important role in the affairs of Southern Africa. The international campaign against apartheid – far and away the most successful international mobilization since World War II – rested to a large extent on the belief that South Africa was a symbol of the racial anguish experienced in the holocaust. And in the 1980s the countries of Southern Africa became symbols of resistance to policies based on race, exploitation and aggression.

The United Nations had of course a direct responsibility for its ward, Namibia, which further burdened their relationship. The equally contested status of the country now known as Zimbabwe also played a part in the relationship between South Africa and the United Nations: here, however, the relationship was less contentious since responsibility for Zimbabwe lay with the British, not the United Nations.

This, the above explanation of South Africa's trek to diplomatic isolation, is only one part of South Africa's rich political history. Another part begins with the resistance of the country's majority to racial segregation and ends with the formal demise of apartheid: it, too, is a tale that has long entangled roots in the international community.

Efforts by South Africa's majority to secure international support for their cause pre-dates the formation of the South African state in 1910 and South Africa's 1923 dominion status. Using their status as British subjects, peoples in the Cape Colony and Natal appealed directly to London: in 1909 a delegation under the leadership of Pixley Ka I Seme[23] protested at the exclusion of South Africa's majority from negotiations on what was to be the Union of South Africa. In 1914, a delegation from the South African Native National Congress (the forerunner of the ANC) also visited London, this time to protest at the passing of the Land Act which effectively stripped the majority of their rights to own land. And during the Peace Conference at Versailles, emboldened by Woodrow Wilson's calls for democracy, a delegation represent-

ing South Africa's peoples sought, once again, "to reverse the entire trend of Native policy".

It was not only the ANC which sought international assistance to isolate the South African state. In 1926, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) under the leadership of Clements Kadalie approached the British trade union movement for assistance. Working through Mabel Palmer, Ethelreda Lewis, Winifred Holtby and other such luminaries in the British trade union movement, Kadalie made contact with the Fabian Movement. He went on to apply for ICU membership of the International Federation of Trade Unions. In response to Kadalie's request for assistance, the British labour movement sent the Scottish trade unionist, William Ballinger, to act as financial organizer for the ICU.[24]

The ANC continued to be active. In 1927, the President of the ANC, Josiah Gumede – himself influenced by the writings of Marcus Garvey – provided an indication of the course that they intended to take. During a conference in Brussels to mark the 10th anniversary of the Russian revolution, he and a fellow South African, the communist James la Guma, put forward a motion which endorsed "the right of self-determination through the complete overthrow of capitalism and imperialist domination ... the principle of Africa for the Africans".[25] As the workerist tone suggests, African protest had by this time lined up with the unions through the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union and the South African Communist Party.

In the 1940s World War II[26] set the scene. The 1942 ANC conference mandated the ANC president, Dr A B Xuma, to study the Atlantic Charter and to draft a Bill of Rights to be presented to the Peace Conference at the end of the war: the result was a pamphlet called *African claims* which was adopted by the 1943 conference but rejected by the war-time government of General J C Smuts as unrealistic.[27] This document formed the basis of the Freedom Charter of 1955 which itself contained explicit clauses on the country's foreign affairs policies.

By the end of the war the die was cast. The formation of the United Nations and the deepening movement towards decolonization set liberation activities off on two tracks: internal resistance and external support. These

were to feed on each other in dramatic fashion and were with time to combine elements of political pressure, boycott, and a war of national liberation.

Attitudes of liberation movements began to harden by the late 1950s and early 1960s: more racist legislation had been followed by brutal police action, epitomized in the Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960 which left 69 peaceful protesters dead and a further 186 injured.[28] Detentions and bannings followed. In 1961, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth and on the 31 May became a republic. The liberation movements' response was seen on the 16 December 1961 when the ANC launched its armed wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation). Shortly thereafter the PAC established its own armed wing – *Poqo* (We go it alone).[29]

Strategic imperatives necessitated that the ANC and PAC have training camps and forward bases for their military operations. The ANC and PAC soon developed links with all the countries of the region. These ties were not motivated by military considerations alone. Political imperatives also played an important, if not determining, role. This is illustrated by the fact that both the ANC and the PAC established external missions in Lesotho and Tanzania in 1960,[30] predating by a year the formation of their guerrilla armies.

During the early period of its exile, the ANC built up contacts with the Soviet Union and with the successful Portuguese colonial resistance movements. It made common cause with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu) and participated in the latter's 1968 attacks in Matabeleland, where it was confronted by South African police as well as by Rhodesian forces.[31]

The PAC was not as successful as the ANC. Its links with Holden Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) availed little in view of that body's defeat at the hands of the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); and the PAC's courting of China was far less useful militarily than the ANC's approach to Russia. Although the PAC established a base at Maseru in 1962, the senseless bomb explosion inspired by its leader, Potlako Leballo, led to the arrest and extradition to South Africa of many of its members. In the next few years (1964–1968) the PAC was expelled first from Maseru and when

from Lusaka, and its attempt to send a few saboteurs into South Africa via Mozambique in June 1969 met with failure.[32]

Both liberation movements developed close ties with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Both participated in the African summit conference in Addis Ababa in May 1963 which led to the establishment of that body; and both enjoyed the patronage of the Organization's African Liberation Committee. Through it they began to exert pressure on the United Nations and the World Council of Churches, aiming at the moral isolation of South Africa.[33] This was eventually to culminate in South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations General Assembly on 12 November 1974 and the ANC's and PAC's being given observer status there.[34] They were greatly assisted in achieving this by the fact that the Afro-Asian element in the General Assembly had increased so dramatically – from 15 out of 50 in 1946 to 73 out of 125 in 1965.[35]

Gaining observer status in the UN Assembly was a great moral victory and produced some practical spin-offs: the ANC and PAC now received financial assistance from the world body.[36]

Another – some would argue, more important – arena was that of the world-wide anti-apartheid movement. This movement which started in about 1972 helped to internationalize the issue of Pretoria's racial policies and so helped to isolate the country.[37] The ANC assisted in the organization and coordination of the movement through the small, but competent, staff in its diplomatic offices in 22 countries (1988 figures).[38] In this way the liberation movements helped to shape the external milieu within which the government's foreign policy was being conducted. The success of this strategy can be seen in the fact that by 1989 90% of South Africa's export merchandise was subject to one or other form of sanction, and that one hundred countries applied restrictions on South African trade. Moreover, between 1986 and 1988 South Africa lost R18. billion in private capital disinvestment.[39] In the United States, by 1991, "...30 states, 120 cities and 150 universities had passed sanctions laws against South Africa".[40] By this time, of course, South Africa had been excluded from the Commonwealth for

37 years and had not taken up its seat on the General Assembly for 17 years.

By the mid-1980s South Africa's exiled leadership virtually enjoyed government-in-exile status. Even an obdurate supporter of South Africa like Britain's Margaret Thatcher, who had called the ANC "terrorists", received the ANC president, Oliver Thambo, at 10 Downing Street; she did the same for Nelson Mandela upon his release. Commenting on the events of the 1980s, an ANC leader put it succinctly: "We were never isolated, we could go almost everywhere; it was Pretoria that was shut out". In many ways, the United Nations itself came to symbolize this situation, one reason for the bad press the UN has had in this country. As early as the 1960s, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd went so far as to name the UN (with the English language press and the Liberal Party) as constituting a severe threat to South Africa's integrity.[41]

The turning point in UN–South African relations

The turning point in the United Nations' relationship with South Africa came during the negotiations leading to the independence of Namibia. The two suspicious parties were thrown together in a marriage of convenience to ensure a common objective: a stable and peaceful transition to independence. The marriage only just held together: short periods of relative peace and tranquility were disrupted by stormy sessions of finger-pointing and mutual accusations. But as with all marriages, it had its happy moments. Years of antagonism lost their sting as personal friendships developed. Upon hearing of Untag General Prem Chand's passion for Indian curry, Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha sent a South African Indian cook on detachment to the general's staff.

On a more serious note, opinion in New York began to experience a shift of emphasis. Namibian independence allowed UN opinion in certain quarters to turn favourably towards the pariah. It was argued that if the thorny question of Namibian independence could be settled, why could the vexing problem of apartheid itself not be resolved? This lobby, which could be termed the "give-Pretoria-a-chance-lobby" was considerably strengthened after the speech by then President F W de Klerk on 2 February 1990 which

served to unleash the process of political transition in South Africa and sounded the death-knell of minority rule. Hopes were immediately raised in the corridors of the UN of a peaceful transition to a democratic South Africa. The consensus was: let's hold the stick behind our back and rather offer Pretoria the carrot. The carrot took the form of a speech by the Secretary-General which eschewed violence as a means to ending apartheid. "Peaceful negotiations", he argued, "should lead to the resolution of South Africa's problems".[42] More importantly, the UN decided to adopt a more even-handed approach to all the South African role-players: after 1990, *all* political parties and interest groups in South Africa, including the Pretoria government, were required to submit an annual report to the Secretary-General on political progress.[43]

Faced with several recent failures (Angola and Somalia), the UN was desperate for a South African success story. As a result it was deeply concerned with the level of violence inside the country. Following the Boipatong Massacre, the Security Council passed Resolution 765 of 1992. This resolution condemned the violence and instructed that a Special Representative of the Secretary-General be appointed to recommend measures that would assist in bringing an effective end to it. Mr Cyrus Vance of the USA was assigned to the post.

Following Mr Vance's report to the Council, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 772 of 1992.[44] This resolution authorized the formation and deployment of a United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (Unomsa). Its tasks were not only to be present as observers at the elections, but to play an expanded role within the framework of the National Peace Accord. Furthermore, in accordance with its mandate, Unomsa undertook the task of coordinating the activities of the observer missions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), of the Commonwealth and of the European Union (EU).[45] By 20 April 1994 Unomsa consisted of 1 800 UN observers. These were augmented by 100 observers from the OAU, 70 from the Commonwealth, 324 from the EC and yet others from individual foreign governments.[46]

Unomsa was important for a number of reasons. Not least among

these was that it marked a radical departure from the UN's traditional stance towards South Africa. Angela King, the head of Unomsa, put it this way:

> The UN Observer Mission in South Africa represents a move from the position of confronting and isolating the system of apartheid to one of offering all the assistance the UN, together with the rest of the international community, can give in aiding the transition process to a democratic society.[47]

From September 1992 to January 1994, Unomsa provided assistance to the South African transitional process in two principal ways:

■ by examining areas of common concern such as violence, hostels, dangerous weapons, the role of the security forces and other armed formations, the investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct, mass demonstrations and the conduct of political parties; and reporting thereon to the Secretary-General;

■ by helping to strengthen the structures established under the National Peace Accord, so as to enhance their capacity in the building of peace and political tolerance, both in the present and the future.[48]

Unomsa's mandate was to expand even further. In December 1993, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) asked the UN to provide it with electoral assistance; and on the 14 January 1994 the Security Council passed Resolution 894 authorizing Unomsa to provide the necessary assistance through its structures.[49]

The contribution made by the UN to the democratization process in South Africa was generally well received by the people of South Africa, by the media and by the majority of political parties:[50] the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) who initially rejected the "outside intervention" of Unomsa, called upon it to investigate various acts of violence.[51] What greatly assisted the credibility of Unomsa was that, intentionally, it did not embark on a separate initiative of its own – it worked with local structures: on the diffusion of violence it worked with the National Peace Accord; and with electoral monitoring it worked with the Independent Electoral Commission.

So far, we have concentrated on the relations between the UN and South Africa up to the elections in

April 1994. But what of the two years since then? and what of the future?

The current state of play

One of the fears expressed by several commentators as the country passed through the 27 April watershed was that once apartheid became a non-issue, the interest in South Africa displayed by the international community would disappear; and that this country, together with the rest of the continent of Africa, would be marginalized economically, politically and socio-culturally. These fears appear to have been devoid of substance.

Upon re-entry of South Africa into the General Assembly on the 23 June 1994, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali charged the Special Committee Against Apartheid with refocusing the attention of the international community on assisting the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the people of South Africa to address the huge socioeconomic disparities resulting from decades of apartheid. He went on to say:

> At this critical time, the Government and the people of South Africa are deserving of the continuing support of the UN and its Member States in their campaign to establish a just and prosperous society.[52]

These were not empty words as the UN was quick to demonstrate: promises were followed by action. June 1994 witnessed the termination of the UN Trust Fund for South Africa.[53] The Fund's Committee of Trustees decided to transfer the balance of the Fund to the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa in order to assist South Africa in the development of its human resources.[54]

This was not all. The UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, with the London School of Economics, conducted a seminar entitled, "Sustainable economic growth and development in South Africa: Policy priorities for the early years of a democratic government". Over 35 economic, financial and other experts from South Africa, the African Development Bank, the Commonwealth, the European Union and the OAU participated in this seminar.[55] In addition, in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 48/159, the Secretary-General of the UN and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, with the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, completed

plans for an international donors' conference on human resource development for post-apartheid South Africa.[56]

Meanwhile, the various specialized agencies of the UN have not been slow to react to the changed situation in South Africa. The UN Economic Commission for Africa (Uneca), for instance, has made clear the functional relationship between political stability and equitable economic development in South Africa. Peace and stability in South Africa, it argues, is ultimately dependent on "sustainable economic growth and a more equitable and employment creating development path". Uneca offered to assist South Africa in meeting its many challenges:

> ... widespread unemployment; neglect of human development; a high illiteracy rate; closure of opportunities for acquiring human and physical capital for most South Africans; highly unequal distribution of wealth and income; inadequate health care; poor housing conditions; a high rate of violence and a vast web of market distortions and rigidities.[57]

Soon after the elections, the UN Development Programme established offices in South Africa and embarked upon development projects agreed upon with the Government of National Unity. It has also coordinated the entry and work of all the other specialized agencies operating here: the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef); the World Health Organization (WHO); the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); the International Labour Organization (ILO); and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco).[58]

Special mention has to be made of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank who seem poised to play an important role in this country's development. The World Bank, for example, has set itself the task of assisting the new government in four crucial areas: education, health, housing and job creation: in resolving the massive educational crisis, including the creation of a single education system and "rationalizing all available resources"; in removing all racial and economic barriers in the delivery of an access to basic health care services; adopting a national approach to the problem of a lack of affordable housing for the millions of homeless; and in developing a policy that will ensure

sustainable economic growth and employment.[59]

At this point it may be wise to call for a realism check. Can the UN really wipe out decades of apartheid backlogs (or for that matter, centuries of white colonial rule)? Can we really expect it to do this at a time when it is undergoing a period of introspection which is almost certain to lead to its radical restructuring? Can we expect it to assist post-apartheid South Africa (in the massive way they intend) when there are so many Somalias, Rwandas and Lesothos crying for its attention? Can we expect it to assist in such a massive way and not expect other Third World states to cry "Foul"? We think *not.* Moreover, such extravagant promises are sure to raise expectations inside South Africa as to what the UN can do. Should the UN be unable to deliver, it could lose credibility.

South Africa has, in turn, offered support for UN initiatives. Mr Alfred Nzo, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his speech to the General Assembly, stated:

> South Africa is ready to support the UN in all its efforts to promote peace and prosperity.[60]

South Africa has made available a number of armoured personnel carriers for use by the UN in strife-torn Rwanda, and has joined the international community in providing humanitarian assistance: a needs assessment (in consultation with the UNHCR and the WHO), followed by high-energy foodstuffs, water purification tablets, pharmaceuticals and blankets for refugees.[61]

South Africa has also embarked upon several regional initiatives. At the recent meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, Mr Nzo announced that South Africa stood ready to cooperate with its neighbours in establishing regional confidence-building mechanisms such as an Africa nuclear-free zone, as well as the promotion of a common security framework.[62] In addition, Mr Nzo has noted that South Africa is committed to policies of non-proliferation and arms control; the country is a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.[63] However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating – South Africa's lucrative arms industry could prove to be a veritable Achilles' heel.

We have looked carefully into the facts of the UN-SA relationship. But certain key questions remain unanswered. Why is the UN doing so much to assist the new South Africa? And what does South Africa expect to gain by maintaining close ties with the world body? Are there problems that might derail the honeymoon express?

Probable problem areas in the UN-South Africa relationship

The problem of unrealistic expectations

The first question to be asked is: Why is the United Nations doing (or does it intend doing) so much to ensure South Africa's political stability and economic development? Angela King has the following to say:

> ... the UN believes that if South Africa can rise above its past, never forgetting, but forgiving, and seize the goodwill and opportunities of the present to build an economically strong and unified nation, this country will soon become a catalyst for the rapid development of not only the southern African region but the rest of the continent.[64]

It would seem from this that the UN is hoping that the new South Africa will play a stabilizing role on the continent, checking the downward spiral of war and poverty. There are two basic reasons for this view. The first of these was voiced by Mr Ndam, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (Unido) representative. At a recent conference, Mr Ndam noted that South Africa was Africa's natural regional leader on account of its "massive natural resources, technological know-how and economic infrastructure" and that this country was "the gateway to Africa".[65] The second reason relates to the more assertive role the UN is playing in the post-Cold War world. Consider the following: from 1945 to 1988 the UN was involved in only 13 peace-keeping operations; but in December 1993 it was conducting no less than 17 peace-keeping operations at one and the same time, involving altogether 80 000 "blue-helmets".[66] The world body has too much on its plate and hopes that a new South Africa will share the African burden.

This reasoning is flawed for two crucial reasons. First, by investing South Africa with the mantle of

regional leader, one is not only assigning a passive role to other African states in vital matters, but reinforcing the vertical power relations which developed during the apartheid era. Such a development might be counter-productive. Consider the "Big Brother" role Nigeria announced for itself in West Africa and the level of acrimony which developed among other West African states.

But there is a second, more compelling, argument against the UN position. South Africa does not see itself as the regional policeman or regional economic catalyst. There is a pertinent paragraph in a recent document of the Department of Foreign Affairs:

> ... South Africa is a medium military power with limited resources at its disposal for use in the international arena, eg. for peacekeeping operations .... Although South Africa's foreign debt is low by world standards, the country's own development needs are such that South Africa could not possibly become a substantial donor of development assistance.[67]

The fact that South Africa intends to spend the bulk of its attention and resources on the home front was even more forcefully emphasized by Foreign Minister Nzo in his address to the General Assembly:

> Uppermost in our minds, however, are the responsibilities which our new Government of National Unity has towards the people of South Africa. Our primary goal is to strive to create a better life for all our people ... [as a result] ... South Africa will have extremely limited resources for anything which falls outside the Reconstruction and Development Programme.[68]

We thus arrive at the highly unrealistic expectations on the part of the UN. The world body sees this country pursuing an activist foreign policy in pursuit of noble UN objectives. South Africa sees itself primarily as attending to the domestic needs of its citizens. This is a source of tension which could cool UN–South Africa relations.

However, the problem of unrealistic expectations is an ailment afflicting South Africa too. South African policy-makers believe that the close relations existing between their country and the UN necessarily point to massive development assistance from the world body.[69] In particular, South Africa sees itself as playing "a leader-

ship role"[70] within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad).[71] Moreover, South Africa sees Unido as possessing, "... both the capabilities and expertise which would enable it to contribute substantially to the development of South Africa ...".[72] Why this is unlikely to happen has been explained. But these high expectations do persist, fuelled in no small measure by the UN's own extravagant promises (also set out earlier).

To avoid disappointment and strain, both parties must dispel these high expectations as speedily as possible. They must clearly and honestly inform each other of their exact expectations. Good communication between the protagonists is now essential.

The problem of "image"

In diplomacy, as in life, image is an important part of reality: apartheid South Africa deliberately cultivated a negative image of the United Nations through the media and school textbooks. The following extracts are from a Standard 10 history textbook currently used in our schools:

> The original founder members [of the UN] could not have known that by 1967 some 70 African and Asian states would become members. ... Today the Afro-Asian bloc holds the balance of power in the Assembly and is often able to use political blackmail on the bigger states for its own purpose. Thus, the Assembly is often misused for the benefit of smaller and poorer nations ....

> ... because the Assembly refused to recognise South Africa's credentials in the 1970s, this country also withheld her [financial] contribution. As a result, the UN experiences a shortage of funds at present ...

> ... the Assembly would only require a two-thirds majority of the votes. This ruling has been misused by the various power blocs. Moreover, the African bloc which represents one-third of the voting power in the Assembly, has succeeded in crippling it .... It has only been with regard to the White governments of Southern Africa that the Big Powers have found common ground.[73]

It is imperative (if we wish to continue to maintain good relations with the world body) that tomorrow's leaders be taught today the real history of the UN's dual relationship with the South African government and the South African peo-

ple. In our view, this can be done in a number of ways. A book could be devoted to setting the record straight. Textbooks need to be rewritten. Television and radio documentaries on the UN's relationship with this country could be produced. Fellowships could be organized for young researchers interested in studying the UN more closely. A UN University and a Chair in UN Studies could be established. There could be arrangements for South African journalists to visit the UN, so better informing the print media, and a UN Association in South Africa might be established.

Financial crisis

That the UN is facing a severe financial crisis is plain for all to see. From 1945 to 1989 the total UN peacekeeping costs amounted to US$3,6 billion. The recent insecurities of the post-Cold War environment have seen UN operations expanding at a phenomenal rate. From 1990 to 1995 alone, the peacekeeping operations costs totalled US$12,1 billion.[74]

Just as costs escalate, however, the UN finds it difficult to compel members to pay their membership dues and peacekeeping expenses. At present, 70 member countries owe the UN a total of US$3,2 billion (R11,7 billion). The United States is the largest debtor, owing the world body US$1,3 billion (R4,7 billion), and a Republican-controlled Congress is threatening to slash future contributions.[75] South Africa, itself, owes the world body US$120 million.[76]

This places Boutros Boutros-Ghali in a dilemma: either the UN slashes its budget or it devises innovative ways to compel member states to pay their dues on time. Cutting back on global UN activities could only have adverse effects for the world's marginalized. Take the recent decision by the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to slash its budget by US$100 million (R365 million).[77] This comes at a time when 1,4 billion people live in conditions of absolute poverty where a sack of grain from the FAO can make all the difference between life and death.[78] So much for budget slashing. If the UN goes on the other tack, however, it would mean imposing stiff penalties on states for non-payment: a non-paying member country could lose its right to vote in any or all of the UN organs and specialized agencies.

Could such penalties also be imposed on South Africa for non-payment of its apartheid years debt? This is certainly a possibility and might sour relations between the UN and South Africa. This looks all the more likely when we remember that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad was recently quoted as saying that South Africa is not liable for this debt, incurred as it was under the old illegitimate regime.[79] There might well be a compromise.

Multilateral diplomacy

In his talk on multilateral diplomacy, Jeremy Shearar noted that this type of diplomacy has seen the emergence of a new type of international civil servant.

> These functionaries took an oath of loyalty to the organization, ostensibly renouncing national allegiances. They are a new breed, developing a world-wide expertise and an invaluable data base.[80]

Shearar goes on to discuss the stuff of multilateralism:

> Trade, environment, ozone layer, disarmament, health, AIDS, human rights, the problems that transcend national boundaries, are the issues of the day. In dealing with them, multilateralists have to balance domestic needs, regional interests, and regional interests against global imperatives.[81]

In this crucial area of multilateralism, it is clear that the South African Department of Foreign Affairs has neither personnel in the field of multilateralism nor much knowledge of the stuff of multilateralism itself. Years of isolation and the *realpolitik* temper of apartheid's policy-makers reinforced the dominant bilateral paradigm.

South Africa must quickly acquire expertise in multilateralism if it is to contribute to the activities of the UN and the debates surrounding it. One solution would be to attach South African civil servants to the UN and its agencies.

The Security Council

There is a large degree of agreement among member states that the size of the Security Council should be increased. Three considerations are at work here.

■ Membership of the UN has gone from 113 in 1963, when the Council was last enlarged, to 184 in 1993.

■ The international order has changed fundamentally since World War II, and again following the end of the Cold War.

■ The fundamental imbalance between developed and developing countries, in terms of Security Council membership, needs to be addressed.[82]

In an attempt to tackle the thorny question of the restructuring (or democratization) of the Security Council, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on 3 December 1993 which established an "... open-ended, inter-sessional Working Group to consider all aspects of an increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council".[83] In July 1994 South Africa became an active participant in this Working Group.[84]

This may not be enough to satisfy some constituencies. Some African countries are pushing for South Africa to occupy a seat on the Security Council in order to present Africa's case to the international community.[85] Domestic constituencies have argued along similar lines.[86] This fits in with the thesis that South Africa is the natural or, at the very least, regional leader of Africa. We see problems here. There may well be fears of domination from certain other African states – and resentment from elsewhere in African, notably from Nigeria, which may covet the role of continental leader.

Where does South Africa stand on these matters? President Nelson Mandela has made clear that South Africa sees the democratization of the Security Council as imperative:

> It is the ANC's view that the United Nations' has a pivotal role to play in fostering global security and order. But to achieve this, serious attention must be paid to restructuring the organization. South Africa intends to play a vigorous role in the debate of this issue. The United Nations should not be dominated by a single power or group of powers, or else its legitimacy will continuously be called into question. We hope a mechanism can be found so that the Security Council can reflect the full tapestry of humankind.[87]

More recently, in his address to the UN General Assembly on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, Mr Mandela noted that the world body

... should truly reflect the diversity of our universe, and ensure equity among the nations of the world in the exercise of power within the system of international relations in general and the Security Council in particular.[88]

Building on these themes, the Department of Foreign Affairs Sub-Directorate on Global Security notes:

> Any enlargement of the Security Council must have as its fundamental basis the objective of achieving a more representative, democratic, transparent and legitimate Council.
>
> Any enlargement of the Security Council must be based on the principle of sovereign equality and must take into account the principle of equitable geographic representation.
>
> Any increase in the membership of the Security Council should take place in both the Permanent and Non-Permanent categories.
>
> Any increase in the Permanent Membership of the Security Council brought about by the addition of countries from the developed world must be balanced by the addition of countries from the developing world.[89]

Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad has carried the argument a step further:

> ... let me say that the restructuring and the reconstruction of the Untied Nations must not simple be seen as an issue of membership of the Security Council. We would like to believe in a new international relations' environment. We want to work towards transforming the United Nations, not to become an instrument of any major power, but to become involved in all the relevant issues, like the South-to-South relations, development, environment, the gender issue and other related matters.
>
> Our view of the UN is a broader and more holistic one. We believe that our membership of the UN, as part of Africa, can make a good contribution to transforming the UN to becoming an effective vehicle for the poor and downtrodden.[90]

We can infer that the ANC-led Government of National Unity

■ intends to actively participate in the democratization of the UN generally and the Security Council in particular;

■ sees this participation/involvement as in no way dependent upon South Africa's acquiring a seat on the Security Council;

■ intends that in this restructuring of the world body, South Africa will

come down firmly on the side of the "poor and downtrodden".

These are noble sentiments. Will they be translated into action? This depends upon which partner is dominant in South Africa's foreign policy.

Foreign policy duality

The duality in South Africa's foreign policy did not end on 27 April 1994. Its legacy will continue to influence the policy-making process and could adversely affect South Africa's relations with the UN.

Now we must look at a new set of questions. What happens, now, when the former opponents of the government become the government; and the former government remains part of the new government? Note that in South Africa, there currently obtains a situation in which both the Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs are members of the ANC; while the ministry itself from the Director-General downwards are from the old guard.

In an effort to marry the two parties and not to offend anyone – South Africa's foreign policy is trying to be everything to everybody, everywhere. Consider the following two extracts from a recent foreign policy document:

> South Africa's international relations are politically non-aligned and multi-faceted and leave ample room for the improving of relations with all regional organizations, blocs, groupings or traditional formations – whether the Commonwealth, the OAU, the ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement or the EC.[91]

> South Africa's foreign policy does not take sides in the North-South dialogue but endeavours to understand the difficulties and aspirations of both sides ... .[92]

A policy that aims to satisfy everybody, tends of course to satisfy nobody. In politics, you are either for or against – there is no fence. This black-white contrast (with no shades of grey) was starkly brought out by President Robert Mugabe when he recently addressed a joint sitting of the South African Parliament and urged this country "to spearhead an international campaign to democratize the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund".[93] In such a situation there is no middle ground – you either push for the democratization of the world body and its agencies or you do not. Either option could entail South Africa disappointing someone. But,

recognizing that the country's interests are intimately related to those of the Third World and Africa in general, and Southern Africa in particular, the question of choice could be resolved by a simple question: which course of action would be the less damaging to the long-term interests of South Africa?

We should perhaps step aside for a moment and remark that the duality in foreign policy is accentuated by the ambiguous position South Africa occupies in the North-South divide –

- the Republic's economy is characterized by both First and Third World elements;
- the dominant white minority shaped African conditions to meet European institutions, and the resultant Eurocentric cultural ethos has been largely absorbed by the emerging black elites, so that we may rightfully ask whether the country an African or a European state.

The dangers in foreign policy duality are to be seen in two recent areas: South Africa's position on the question of landmines and on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

At a recent conference on the abolition of landmines in Vienna, the South African government opposed its African neighbour, Mozambique, which supported a comprehensive ban on all mines. (Sadly, ironically, apartheid South Africa's destabilization campaign it was that contributed to the landmine total in Mozambique.) But South Africa supported many Western states in calling for a ban on "long-life" mines, at the same time encouraging the production of what are now known as "smart" landmines. These self-destruct after a period of time.[94]

In allying itself with the West, South Africa ignored the powerful arguments of its neighbours and of international and South African NGOs against smart landmines and for a total ban.[95]

Even more dramatically, it was in negotiations concerning the NPT that the conflicting traditions in South Africa's foreign policy struggled for mastery. The old guard won.

During May this year, delegates from 175 nations gathered in New York to discuss the future of the NPT. The widening gulf between those that possessed nuclear arsenals and those that did not was demonstrated in the competing resolutions. One resolu-

tion, drafted by Canada, simply called for the indefinite extension of the treaty. Its strongest supporter was the United States, who argued that anything less than an unconditional, indefinite extension would undermine the entire accord.

A counter-resolution was co-sponsored by eleven members of the Non-Aligned Movement (Nam) led by Indonesia, the current head of the group. This resolution called for the renewal of the treaty for fixed periods of 25 years. At the end of each period, signatories would decide whether to extend it. Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Nam, argued during the conference that a limited extension was the only way to ensure a more equitable relationship between the haves and have-nots. Without being called to account every 25 years, Indonesia argued, nuclear-weapon states would have no incentive to reduce (and particularly, eliminate) their strategic stockpiles.

But when these countries met in Indonesia's Bandung halfway through the conference to solidify their position, they found themselves divided by a counter-proposal from one of the Nam's newest members, South Africa. Pretoria advocated not only an indefinite extension, but also a strengthened mechanism for reviewing progress towards the goals of the NPT. Backed by the United States and other Western states, South Africa's proposal became the formula adopted by the conference.[96] South Africa's role in the NPT resulted in a great deal of acrimony directed way by members of the Nam – notably by Indonesia and India.

This type of situation is not unique. The Security Council has passed a number of binding resolutions against Libya.[97] South Africa has not yet implemented these. Will South Africa, as a loyal member of the United Nations, implement these punitive measures against Libya? or will it remember the assistance given to *Umkhonto we Sizwe* by Libya when more than one Western government regarded the ANC as terrorists? A good indication of things to come has recently been demonstrated by the furore which followed Justice Minister Dullah Omar's call for the lifting of the US blockade of Cuba. Supposing the Security Council were to pass a binding resolution against Castro's Cuba, what would South Africa do? Would it remember the ANC's deep-rooted ties with Cuba? The situa-

tion becomes even more complicated if we introduce South African domestic considerations. Black public opinion sees Comrade Fidel as a hero; the powerful white minority see him as a tinpot dictator.

These are not easy questions, but they deeply concern the very soul of South Africa's future foreign policy. Will South Africa pursue a policy more attuned to the tradition of the liberation movements? or will this tradition be absorbed into the culture and ethos of the old guard? It cannot be two things at once. It can either pursue the interests of the North or those of the South – it cannot be day and night! South Africa needs a clear foreign policy, with clearly stated objectives that will inform the type of relationship it intends to seek with the United Nations and with the international community generally. It cannot do this if it continues to suffer from a severe case of schizophrenia.

Notes and references

1   C J A Barratt, "The United Nations and Southern Africa", *Thesaurus Acroasium*, Volume II, Athens: Institute of Public Law and International Relations to Thessaloniki, Greece, 1976, p 177.

2   Peter Vale, "Welcome Address", *Seminar on the Image of the United Nations in South Africa*, hosted by the UN Department of Public Information and the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Somerset West, South Africa, 8–10 February 1994, pp 1–8.

3   M Tlili, "Introductory remarks", paper presented to the *Seminar on the Image of the United Nations in South Africa*, hosted by the UN Department of Public Information and the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Somerset West, 8–10 February 1994, p 2.

4   J A McClain, "The Image of the UN in South Africa as projected by Unesco", paper presented to the *Seminar on the Image of the United Nations in South Africa*, hosted by the UN Department of Public Information and the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Somerset West, 8–10 February 1994, p 10.

5   Deon Geldenhuys, *The diplomacy of isolation, South African foreign policy making*, Johannesburg: Macmillan, for The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p 2.

6   T R H Davenport, *South Africa: A modern history*, 3 ed, Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1987, p 290.

7   See Ameka Anyaoka, "The Commonwealth and South Africa", *The South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol 1, no 1, 1993, pp 1–8.

8   The best account of this remains C J A Barratt, *op cit*, pp 177–254.

9   Peter Vale, *op cit*, p 5.

10 C J A Barratt, *op cit*, p 186.

11 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, pp 480–481.

12 Kmdt C Nelson, "Geweldsaanbod verhoog wêreldprys vir vrede", *Paratus*, March 1993, p 24.

13 Department of Foreign Affairs, *Background notes on multilateral affairs*, Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1993.

14 *Ibid*, pp 3–4.

15 C J A Barratt, *op cit*, p 178.

16 *Ibid*, p 182.

17 Access to recruitment figures have, until recently, been restricted but these observations are certainly confirmed by personal impression. By the end of the 1990s, one woman had been appointed as ambassador; the first black ambassador (appointed to Copenhagen) – drawn from the country's "coloured" (mixed-blood) community – was appointed in 1991.

18 See Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's international isolation", *International Affairs Bulletin*, vol 11, 1987, pp 29–37.

19 The issue of South Africa's nuclear programme has recently come under scrutiny. This follows upon the country's accession to the NPT. See J W de Villiers, T Jardine and M Ries, "Why South Africa gave up the bomb", *Foreign Affairs*, vol 72, no 5, 1993, pp 98–109; Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearisation and denuclearisation in South Africa", *Survival*, vol 35, no 3, 1993, pp 154–173; David Albright, "South Africa: A curious conversion", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol 49, no 5, 1993, pp 8–11.

20 See Peter Vale, "Crocker's choice: Constructive engagement and South Africa's people", *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol 1, no 1, Spring 1993, pp 100–106.

21 There is a lively literature on this period. As a point of entry, use Stephen Chan (ed), *Exporting apartheid. Foreign policies in Southern Africa 1978–1988*, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp 374.

22 See the publications of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria throughout the 1980s.

23 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, p 261.

24 *Ibid*, pp 299–300.

25 Tom Lodge, *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*, Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1983, p 8.

26 There is a fine description of this period in Chapter 9 of Alf Stadler, *The political economy of modern South Africa*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp 141–160.

27 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, p 346.

28 Roger Pfister, *United Nations sanctions against apartheid in the period 1960–1990: A legal, historical and political approach*, Berne: University of Berne, 1992, p 13.

29 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, p 402.

30 Peter Vale, *op cit*, p 7.

31 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, pp 428–429.

32 *Ibid*, p 429.

33 C J A Barratt, *op cit*, pp 252–253.

34 Department of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*, p 2.

35 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, p 480.

36 Roger Pfister, *op cit*, p 40.

37 T R H Davenport, *op cit*, p 490; Deon Geldenhuys, *op cit*, p 29.

38 Tom Lodge, *op cit*, p 232.

39 H Solomon, *Change and continuity in South African foreign policy 1978–1991*, unpublished Masters Dissertation, University of Durban-Westville, 1994, p 30.

40 Cheetah Haysom, "Re-release Nelson Mandela", *Leadership*, vol 12, no 5, 1993, p 84.

41 A King, "Keynote address", Paper presented to the *Seminar on the Image of the United Nations in South Africa*, hosted by the UN Department of Public Information and the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Somerset West, 8–10 February 1994, p 3.

42 Kmdt C Nelson, *op cit*, p 24.

43 *Ibid*.

44 *Ibid*.

45 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, speech to the 48th Session, 95th meeting to the UN General Assembly, 23 June 1994, p 11.

46 A King, *op cit*, p 6.

47 *Ibid*, p 4.

48 *Ibid*, pp 4–5.

49 *Ibid*, p 5.

50 See David Willers, "The UN in South Africa", *South Africa Foundation Review*, March 1994, p 4.

51 *Ibid*.

52 Speech by the Secretary-General of the UN, Dr Boutros-Ghali, to the 48th Session, 95th meeting of the General Assembly; 23 June 1994, p 11.

53 This Trust Fund was set up in 1965 and has contributed to the elimination of apartheid by rendering legal, educational and humanitarian relief to the victims of apartheid.

54 Alfred Nzo, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs in a speech to the 48th session, 95th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 23 June 1994, pp 13–14.

55 A King, *op cit*, p 9.

56 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/48/159, 24 January 1994.

57 *On-going and Planned Activities of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in South Africa*, prepared by the Co-ordinator, UNECA-MRAG/Southern Africa Desk and Task Force, June 1993, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p 1.

58 A King, *op cit*, p 10.

59 *Ibid*.

60 Minister Alfred Nzo, *op cit*, p 13.

61 *Ibid*.

62 *Ibid*.

63 *Ibid*.

64 A King, *op cit*, p 8.

65 Mr Ndam, Seminar on the Image of the
United Nations in South Africa, hosted by
the UN Department of Public Informa-
tion and the Centre for Southern African
Studies, University of the Western Cape,
8–10 February 1994.

66 Cmdt C Nelson, *op cit*, p 21; *Background
Notes on Multilateral Affairs*, Department
of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1993,
Pretoria, p 4.

67 Undated memorandum written by Mr
Pierre Dietrichsen of the Department of
Foreign Affairs regarding South Africa's
foreign policy; Pierre Dietrichsen, "Views
from practitioners: A framework", in G
Mills (ed), *From pariah to participant:
South Africa's evolving foreign relations,
1990–1994,* Johannesburg: South African
Institute of International Affairs, 1994, pp
211–219.

68 Alfred Nzo, *op cit*, pp 12–13.

69 Pierre Dietrichsen, undated memoran-
dum, *op cit*, p 2.

70 Department of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*,
p 11.

71 Unctad is primarily concerned with the
promotion of international cooperation
in trade and development issues be-
tween countries at different stages of de-
velopment.

72 Department of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*,
p 12.

73 A P J Van Rensburg and F S G Oost-
huizen, *Active history: Standard 10,*
Cape Town: DeJager-Haum, 1988, pp
104–105.

74 "The UN at 50: Who needs it?", *Time
International,* 23 October 1995.

75 "Half of the UN's Geneva Staff do noth-
ing", *The Star* (Johannesburg), 19
October 1995.

76 "From Smuts to Mandela", *The Weekly
Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 20
October 1995.

77 *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 24 October
1995.

78 Peter Vale, "Engaging the world's mar-
ginalized and promoting global change:
Challenges for the United Nations at
fifty", *Harvard International Law Jour-
nal,* vol 36, no 2, Spring 1995, p 284.

79 South African Broadcasting Corporation,
The UN's 50th Anniversary, 24 October
1995.

80 Jeremy Shearar, *Understanding multilat-
eral diplomacy,* Paper delivered at the
University of the Western Cape, 26
November 1993, p 12.

81 *Ibid*, p 20.

82 Department of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*, p 5.

83 *Ibid.*

84 Speech by Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mr Aziz Pahad, to the National
Assembly, 8 August 1994.

85 Department of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*, p 6.

86 Aziz Pahad, *op cit*, p 13.

87 Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's future
foreign policy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol 72,
no 5, November/December 1993, p 89.

88 "Mandela calls for UN Reforms", *The
Citizen* (Johannesburg), 24 October 1995.

89 Fax from Mr Andre Dormehl, Sub-
Directorate: Global Security, Department
of Foreign Affairs, 4 October 1995, p 2.

90 Aziz Pahad, *op cit*, p 14.

91 Pierre Dietrichsen, undated memoran-
dum, *op cit*, p 2.

92 *Ibid*, p 8.

93 "UN slated: Mugabe rips into world
agencies", *The Cape Times* (Cape Town),
17 August 1994, p 1.

94 "'Smart' landmines?", *The Weekly Mail
and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 6 Octo-
ber 1995; Business Day (Johannesburg),
19 October 1995.

95 *Ibid.*

96 "Trick or Treaty? That depends on
whether you've got the bomb or not", *Far
Eastern Economic Review,* 25 May 1995.

97 Department of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*, p 4.

AFRICA FOCUS

> **Army** *(n)* – *A class of non-producers who defend the nation by devouring everything likely to tempt an enemy to invade.*
>
> *(Ambrose Bierce: The devil's dictionary)*

Around the turn of the year, soldiers again made their presence felt in the politics of a number of West African countries. Inside the space of three weeks, soldiers in Sierra Leone, Niger and Guinea took action against their political leaders. In Sierra Leone and Niger coups were successful, and in Guinea the government of Lansana Conté had a narrow escape. Some observers wondered whether this heralded the return of autocratic military rule, though the reaction of the international community suggested that new dictators in uniform would find themselves very strapped for cash. The case of Gambia seems to have been an abberation in this regard, possibly because of massive subventions from Taiwan.

Sierra Leone – A Bio-degradable election?

On 16 January Captain Valentine Strasser was ousted as Sierra Leone's ruler by his colleagues on the Supreme Council of State, and replaced by Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, his 31-year-old deputy and chief of the defence staff. The takeover was bloodless, and Strasser was subsequently flown to exile in Guinea.

Sierra Leone has been devastated by a civil war that has gradually spiralled out of control since the Revolutionary United Front launched its insurgency against the government of former president Joseph Momoh in 1991. The war has already claimed more than 10 000 lives and has forced more than half the country's population to flee their homes. The RUF, which began as the creation of Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, intended to distract Freetown's military effort away from Ecomog, remains a mysterious force, with no coherent ideology and a constantly changing composition. The RUF persistently refused to enter into negotiations with Strasser's regime, denying its legitimacy and demanding the withdrawal of Guinean and Nigerian troops assisting the Sierra Leonean government.

Despite the insecurity prevailing across much of the country, Strasser showed every intention of sticking to his promise that elections would be held on 26 February this year, prior to the withdrawal of the military from the political arena. Last September there were rumours of a dispute between Bio and Strasser over the wisdom of holding elections while the civil war is still being fought. There was also evident unhappiness at Strasser's insistence that military officers should stay out of the elections. In October, a number of younger soldiers were actually arrested in connection with a coup plot. It was surprising, therefore, when in defence of their actions, Strasser's colleagues claimed they had ousted him because he intended to pass a decree reducing the age limit for presidential candidates, to enable him to stand in the 26 February poll. In an address to the country on 17 January Bio promised that the democratization of the country would not be delayed by the change in government. He said that the military would not align itself with any of the contesting parties. He also renewed the offer of amnesty to the guerrillas and established a national commission for reconciliation.

On 20 January Bio announced the formation of a civilian-dominated government and a military-dominated national provisional ruling council. Some observers remarked that these bodies had been composed with surprising care, considering that the military's departure from power was supposed to be imminent.

Strasser wasted no time in denying the allegations that he had intended to manipulate the electoral process to retain power. Indeed, it appears more likely that it was Maada Bio and his confederates who urged Strasser to lower the age limit and announce his candidacy, ostensibly to avoid divisions within the forces over support for the army's surrogate, the National Unity Party, under finance minister John Karimu. A more plausible explanation of the events of 16 January would be that Maada Bio's faction wanted to delay or abort the electoral process, but manoeuvred Strasser into a position where they

*Richard Cornwell,
Head of Current Affairs
at the Africa Institute of
South Africa*

could represent themselves as the guardians of democracy, thus avoiding the wrath of the donor community.

It was not long before the viability of the elections came up for discussion. On 22 January the RUF announced a unilateral ceasefire and the withdrawal of preconditions for talks with the new regime of Brigadier Bio, but demanded a postponement of the elections due on 26 February. The electoral commission objected to any such idea, and its chairman, James Jonah, voiced the suspicion that the rebel movement was being used to put a stop to the electoral process. It also came to light that Bio's elder sister, Agnes Jalloh, is part of the RUF high command, having joined its ranks after she and her husband were kidnapped by rebels in 1993. This, too, gave rise to some speculation about the alignment of political forces in the country.

Bio subsequently visited Ghana, where President Rawlings also advised him to reconsider the election date, as peaceful voting would be impossible. He urged Bio rather to make use of the effective ceasefire to launch negotiations. On a visit to Côte d'Ivoire on 30 January, and following reports of closed meetings with RUF representatives, Bio hinted that elections might indeed be postponed. The following day the RUF threatened to break off talks unless Bio made an undertaking not to stand as a candidate. The RUF also demanded a government of national unity and an independent electoral commission.

On 5 February paramount chiefs and religious leaders in eastern Sierra Leone added their voices to those advising postponement. The RUF also rescinded its ceasefire after coming under attack from government forces supported by mercenaries. The elections were also threatened by the lack of donor funds to pay for them, and by delays in voter registration, not to mention the continued difficulties of overland communication through much of the country.

Against these trends, the UN expressed concern that any delay in the holding of elections could lead donors to reduce their assistance, a sentiment echoed by Britain and the USA. Bio now referred the issue back to the national consultative conference for a decision. On 12 February a large majority of the delegates insisted that the voting proceed as planned, though it was soon evident that neither the army nor the RUF were very pleased with this

outcome. Indeed, senior military men expressed doubts as to their ability to secure the polls against rebel attacks.

Talks between the military government and the RUF began in Côte d'Ivoire on 22 February. Central to the discussions was the rebels' sudden insistence that they would treat only with Maada Bio, and that they would refuse to acknowledge the outcome of the elections, which they would do their best to disrupt. What transpired in secret between the two delegations is open to conjecture, but in the event it was the army rather than the rebels who appeared to do most to intimidate the electorate on 26 and 27 February. Some 27 people lost their lives in violent incidents connected with the elections.

The first round of the parliamentary elections saw the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) take 36,1% of the vote, the United National People's Party (UNPP) 21,6% and the People's Democratic Party-Sorbeh (PDP) 15,3%. Other parties to cross the voting threshold for parliamentary representation were the All People's Congress (APC) 5,7%, and the National Unity Party (NUP) 5,3%. In the presidential race, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP took 35,8% of the vote in the first round, followed by John Karefa-Smart (UNPP) with 22,6% and Thaimu Bangura (PDP) with 16,1%.

In the second round, held on 15 March, Kabbah emerged victorious, taking 59,49% of the vote to his opponent's 40,51%. He had managed to form alliances with five other parties defeated in the first round.

The military junta has announced that in accordance with the constitution, it would relinquish power on 29 March. It also passed a decree providing members of the NPRC with indemnity for any actions since the coup of 1992. Rebels are due to hold direct talks with Maada Bio on 18 March, but the military government has promised that this will in no way affect the transition to an elected civilian government. This viewpoint may not be shared by the rebel RUF, however. They have indicated that they will refuse to recognize the new civilian government, and will abandon their ceasefire agreement if the new government takes office. The rebels have indicated, however, that they would be willing to meet Kabbah.

What will happen now? The people of Sierra Leone have demonstrated their eagerness to be rid of the sol-

diers, whose depredations are indistinguishable from those of the RUF. The electorate also rejected the army's political stalking-horse, the NUP. Will the military leave, only to return as the new administration proves incapable of ending the war? Certainly the soldiers retain the ultimate sanction, though this has to be disguised if the donor community is not to withdraw its essential support for this impoverished country.

Niger – Bid the soldiers shoot

On 27 January this year the army seized power in Niger, in what was probably one of the most popular coups in Africa's recent history. Despite the immediate adverse reaction from the international community, which demanded the prompt return to constitutional rule, the Nigerien public's response seems to have been largely favourable to the army's intervention.

Over the past year, since the disintegration of the presidential coalition, and the failure to restore this parliamentary majority in new elections, Niger's political and administrative system has been more or less paralysed by confrontations between President Mahamane Ousmane's supporters and those of his arch-rival and prime minister, Hama Amadou. Unlike the situation in France, where cohabitation between a socialist president and a conservative government proved viable, in Niger the constant disputes about rights and prerogatives made the business of government all but impossible. The president resisted attempts by Amadou to appoint his own nominees to head parastatals and government departments, and eventually, at the end of 1995, simply refused to pass the budget into law.

All this occurred at a time of unprecedented economic and social crisis, triggered by the fall in the price of uranium (which accounts for 70% of Niger's exports) and the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc at the beginning of 1994. The students and trades unions, who played such a key role in forcing Niger's military to introduce a multiparty system in 1993, again took to the streets to demand the payment of grants and salaries, now several months in arrears. The government was desperate to conclude a new structural adjustment package with the IMF and the World Bank, having taken great political risks to impose the required fiscal austerity, but at the last moment, the

Bretton Woods institutions postponed the agreement, which would have released $105 mn, on the grounds that social peace would first have to be restored. This decision was remarkable in that it denied the very means essential to the re-establishment of social peace, as must surely have been apparent to any banker dealing with a country dependent on foreign aid for 65% of its state budget.

Under these circumstances, the army decided to act. On 27 January Colonel Ibrahim Barre Mainassara, the chief of staff, announced that the president had been arrested, the government dismissed, the national assembly dissolved and all party activity suspended until further notice. A military council of national salvation would assume power. In defence of these actions the colonel blamed the politicians for their inability to rise above the chaos generated by ambition and intolerance. He emphasized that the army would restore power to an elected civilian government in a short time.

The coup was condemned immediately from abroad as a violation of constitutional government. France, the principal donor, announced an immediate cessation of aid and cooperation. The US and Germany quickly followed suit, and other West African governments, fearing the continuation of the trend, added their cries of alarm. Mainassara remained unmoved, but by the 29th was already promising a rapid transition. A council of wise men would be appointed to fill the role of the national assembly in the interim, drafting a reformed constitution to avoid a repeat of the deadlock that had precipitated the current crisis.

The following day he appointed a civilian prime minister, Boukari Adji, deputy-governor of the Central Bank of West African States, who then selected a civilian administration drawn from across the political spectrum, including seven of Hama Amadou's party and two followers of Mahamane Ousmane's. Niger's deposed leaders, released after a brief period of detention, stated publicly that they understood the reasons for the coup, acknowledged their removal from office and pledged their support to the new regime.

Attempts were continued to allay foreign concern. On 12 February Colonel Mainasarra named a 32-member consultative committee to replace the parliament. Among the members of the new body are former president Ali Saïbou and former OAU secretary-general Ide Oumarou. Less than a week later the junta announced that the transition to democracy was being shortened from 10 to 7 months. Elections would now be held between July and September. According to the new timetable, an amended constitution will have been drafted by 15 April, to be followed by a referendum in June.

Niger appears to present a stark contrast with its neighbour Nigeria, for there appears little reason to doubt the soldiers' genuine desire to restore republican constitutionalism as soon as practicable. The politicians had certainly brought the regular political process to a near-fatal halt, leaving the military as the only agent capable of breaking the deadlock. Niger's poverty is perhaps also its best guarantee against a prolonged return of military government. Unless the donors can be convinced that democracy has been anaesthetized only temporarily, to perform essential surgery, Niger will find its life-support turned off.

Guinea foul

Towards the end of January the government of Guinea, prompted perhaps by events in Niger, and fearing disturbances in the ranks of the military, considered plans to disarm certain units. Nothing had been done, however, by 2 February when two delegations of soldiers presented President Lansana Conté with lists of grievances concerning pay, rations and living conditions, including a demand that the minister of defence be sacked. Conté, himself once a soldier, who first seized power in a coup in 1984, and was elected president in 1993, listened sympathetically and promised to look into matters. By then, however, mutinous soldiers had already closed Conakry's airport and begun to loot shops in the capital. In an attempt to bring the situation under control, President Conté dismissed the defence minister, Colonel Abdourahmane Diallo, and announced that he was taking personal responsibility for the military. This failed to have the desired effect, and it soon transpired that some of the mutineers were trying to mount a full-scale coup.

Tanks and artillery shelled the presidential palace, in what was later alleged to be an attempt on the president's life. A group calling itself the Committee for National Salvation distributed leaflets denouncing the government's disorder, corruption and nepotism, and promising to fight on until final victory. On 3 February Conté announced that he had struck an agreement with the mutineers, whom he distinguished from the putschists. Details of the accord remained vague, but included a drastic revision of pay scales and an undertaking to pay compensation to the families of soldiers killed on active service in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Previously, families of soldiers killed in action received $50 and a sack of rice. They were also required to vacate military living-quarters almost immediately. Though the president appeared to have promised amnesty to the rebels, later events suggested that this had been reneged upon as the government gathered its wits.

On 21 February Conté made the first admission that he had defeated a fully-fledged coup attempt, and accused civilians inside and outside of Guinea of complicity in this. The opposition alliance, fearing that this foreshadowed the beginning of political witch-hunt immediately withdrew from the parliamentary enquiry into the mutiny. A week later preliminary investigations began into crimes ranging from threatening state security, to murder (some 50 people lost their lives during the insurrection), and armed robbery. A number of senior officers were rumoured to have been arrested, including the nephew and brother-in-law of Alpha Condé, leader of the opposition Guinean People's Rally (RPG) and Conté's principal rival for the presidency in the elections of 1993, which were widely considered to have been rigged. The government has obviously targeted Condé as the danger man in opposition ranks, and his connections with the military have long been the subject of conjecture. It does not require much imagination to anticipate a fairly sharp deterioration in the political climate in Guinea over the next few months.

Burundi – the margin of terror

There are, of course, other ways in which the military or, viewed more widely, people with guns, can impose their will upon political actors. Burundi provides a case in point. Here, for most of the period since independence, the determining fact of national life has been the balance of terror, either real or imagined, and the road back to the relative tranquillity of earlier times is proving difficult to find.

Despite denials, particularly from the Tutsi minority (who comprise some 15% of the population), Tutsi/Hutu rivalry has dominated the politics of independent Burundi. As René Lemarchand has noted: "Seldom have human rights been violated on a more massive scale, and with more brutal consistency, anywhere else on the continent. Whether the demons of regionalism and ethnicity can be exorcised long enough for democracy to put down roots remains an open question."

Ethnic massacres of varying magnitudes occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993, and are again in progress now. In June 1993 there was a profound shift in power in Burundi when the Hutu-dominated party, *Front pour la démocratie au Burundi* (Frodebu), won the presidential and parliamentary elections. A number of abortive coup attempts by the Tutsi-dominated army followed, including one in October 1993 in which President Ndadayé and many other leading Hutu were killed. Tutsi ambitions to reverse the results of the elections may have been held partially in check by the presence of neighbouring Rwanda's Hutu government, but the death of Rwanda's President Habyarimana and Burundi's President Ntaryamira in the air crash of 6 April 1994, and the genocide and RPF invasion that followed, dramatically altered the regional environment. For the first time since independence, Tutsi and Hutu nationalists could envision Tutsi domination of both states, and this lent urgency to their struggle for power in Burundi.

Frodebu is the party of President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. Since its electoral victory in 1993, when it took 65% of the vote in the presidential elections, and 65 of the 81 parliamentary seats in the national assembly its leadership has been severely weakened by violent death and exile. Thus, of the eleven-member Frodebu central committee which led the party in its electoral campaign, only one, President Ntibantunganya himself, remains inside the country; of the remainder, six have been killed, three are in voluntary exile – in fear of their lives – and one is an ambassador. (President Ntibantunganya's first wife was also among those murdered in October 1993.) Frodebu's enforced moderation has alienated many of its followers.

Though Frodebu retains the presidency, it has felt constrained by fears of another coup or genocidal civil war to concede an ever-growing share in government and administration to the Tutsi-oriented *Union pour le progrès nation-al* (Uprona) and other opposition parties. Uprona was formerly the only legal party in Burundi, and its defeat in the elections of 1993 came as a great shock to its followers.

The successful assumption of power by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in neighbouring Rwanda has merely emboldened Uprona and the Burundian army to reinforce their demands. The latest political agreement, brokered by the UN and concluded on 11 September 1994, stipulates that the prime ministership and 10 other cabinet posts (of a total 23) must go to the opposition parties. The defence and justice portfolios are to be held by political "neutrals", meaning a soldier and a judge (effectively Tutsi). Within the local administration and civil service, too, 45% of posts are reserved for opposition nominees. The agreement also deprives the National Assembly of the power to dismiss the government. It has introduced a National Security Council to which Frodebu and the opposition each nominate five members, and which has an effective veto over the executive. In short, the electoral victory of 1993 has been virtually nullified and the President prevented from reforming the army or administration or otherwise threatening what the Tutsi minority sees as its vital interests. Even this has been insufficient to deter Uprona's leader, Charles Mukasi, who remains outside government, from making additional demands aimed at emasculating Frodebu. In effect, Uprona seems determined to exploit the government's very reasonable fear of a complete breakdown in order, to recoup the loss of power suffered in the elections of 1993. This involves some very nicely-judged brinkmanship on the part of Uprona and the army, and could result in catastrophe at any time.

The army, together with the gendarmerie totals some 7 000. This force is 95% Tutsi, and exclusively Tutsi-led. It has repeatedly made clear that it would violently resist any attempt to dilute its ranks with Hutu appointments, and would also oppose any impartial investigation of its commanders' role in the abortive coup of October 1993. The army also objects to the deployment of foreign troops, which could well precipitate a full-fledged coup. Also ranged alongside the army and protected by it are a number of Tutsi militias.

Many Hutu and erstwhile supporters of Frodebu have become disillusioned with the President's policy of appeasement and agree with ex-minister Léopold Nyangoma's assessment of the

situation, that ultimately Uprona, the army and Tutsi militias will have to be defeated militarily if the Hutu majority is ever to enjoy the fruits of its electoral victory. Nyangoma leads the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie* (CNDD) and its armed wing the *Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* (FDD) from exile. He rejects the Frodebu/ Uprona accords of September 1994 as giving away too much to the Tutsi, and claims that he has some 30 000 FDD fighters who will target the "mono-ethnic army, which is an army in rebellion against the democratic institutions". He has also called for new elections, the deployment of a neutral, international force, the establishment of a national army and the holding of an international tribunal.

The ranks of the Hutu militants are now being augmented by fugitives from the old Rwandese army and by the thousands of Hutu refugees now encamped in Zaïre and Tanzania. Many of these are still well-equipped, and some possess weapons of South African origin, earlier supplied to Habyarimana's forces. Alarmed by the proliferation of weaponry, and the provocative activities of the Hutu militias, the President asked the army to restore order. This has given licence to Tutsi soldiers to prosecute a civil war in miniature, and has added to the alienation of the Hutu population from its elected political leaders, who are perceived as selling out.

Effective diplomatic intervention in the Burundian crisis seems as distant a prospect as ever, even as the country teeters on the brink of an ethnic holocaust. The operations of the army, ostensibly designed to disarm Hutu militias, particularly in the northern suburbs of the capital Bujumbura, have drawn comparisons with the infamous "ethnic cleansing" in former Yugoslavia. Hutu militias there and elsewhere, reinforced by others from the refugee camps of Zaïre and Tanzania, have waged their own deadly counter-terror.

By the end of 1995 the situation in Burundi had become ever more alarming, with the President publicly expressing the fear that the country could be on the verge of total collapse. Since early December clashes between government troops and rebel Hutu militias had recurred through suburbs of the capital Bujumbura and the surrounding mountains. A number of prominent Hutu politicians were also murdered in what appeared to be attacks by Tutsi death squads seeking once again to wipe out the Hutu élite.

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali now appealed to the international community to act to prevent a repetition of the Rwandan horrors, but his suggestion that a rapid reaction force be stationed in Zaïre was not supported by the Security Council, and was condemned by the Burundian military, which remains obdurately opposed to any foreign military presence. Some Security Council members have argued that stationing such an intervention force in Zaïre could precipitate the very situation it seeks to prevent, and there were suggestions that Boutros-Ghali had made the suggestion only to clear himself of blame should the situation deteriorate. For their part, of course, the permanent members of the Security Council have no intention of committing ground forces to prevent even a war of genocidal proportions in a Central African country of negligible strategic or international importance. They have also chosen to ignore the findings of a recent report indicting the UN for its withdrawal from Rwanda despite the clear indications that an ethnic cataclysm was imminent there.

Boutros-Ghali has been charged with formulating contingency plans should the situation deteriorate further. At present it appears that it is only the balance of terror between two armed groups that holds both back from wholesale murder. In the meantime efforts are under way to bring the opposing factions together for discussions to formulate a new political dispensation in which fear and hatred can be replaced by national consensus and security. The omens are not promising. One recalls only too well the words of the UN Special Representative Ahmadou Ould Abdallah, who in 1994 expressed his disgust to French radio about the delays in crucial talks: "The word 'negotiations' is in fact a euphemism: there are no negotiations.... There is a deadlock for reasons I can only describe as incomprehensible. This is childish behaviour ... when the population is in a really desperate situation."

Angola – disarming tactics

Angola provides another instance where the ultimate sanction over the political process and its resumption is retained by people with guns. Some of these are soldiers in the national army, others are members of a long-standing rebel movement, and a third group consist of soldiers of fortune whose allegiance is determined by

private contract. Angola illustrates an important problem in contemporary Africa, and one that may well be repeated elsewhere: how to secure the disarmament of substantial numbers of people when many of them have every financial and personal interest in perpetuating a living under arms?

The implementation of the Lusaka peace accords, though still slow, has gained some momentum as both sides seek to assuage an increasingly impatient international community and assure the extension of the mandate of the UN's Angola Verification Mission (Unavem III). This mandate was eventually extended by only three months on 8 February, half the period requested by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The UN Security Council emphasized its concern about the delays in implementation by insisting upon a monthly report on the Angolan situation. A cash-strapped UN is concerned that an operation costing at least $1 mn a day should not continue indefinitely.

Towards the end of November the UN began disarming Unita fighters and encamping them prior to incorporation into the new Angolan defence force or demobilization. Reports at the time suggested that the disarming and confinement of Unita's 70 000 troops would take two months. Scarcely had the process begun, however, than Unita announced it was suspending the quartering of its forces pending the cessation of government attacks near Soyo, in the north of the country. By this time a few hundred Unita troops had been encamped, but no weaponry of any consequence handed in.

The international community now sought reassurances that the disarmament process would resume, and President dos Santos found himself under some pressure on the subject of cease-fire violations when he arrived in Washington on 7 December on his first state visit to that country. The timing of the clashes in northern Angola gave rise to speculation that it was Unita that had provoked the fighting to embarrass Dos Santos during a visit that was bound to raise sensitive issues. The Republican-dominated Congress is still not enamoured of Dos Santos, and contains some long-serving Savimbi admirers, and the Angolan president

was at pains to offset their influence by cementing relations with the heads of the American companies exploiting the profitable Angolan oilfields.

The Angolan president made a number of concessions to US demands, agreeing to withdraw from certain contested areas, to terminate the contract with Executive Outcomes, to release prisoners of war and to confine to barracks the controversial paramilitary police. Other reports suggested that the Angolan government had concluded contracts with a similar company in the USA, however, and that Executive Outcomes personnel were being re-hired by other concerns in Angola. This ensured that Unita's grievances about mercenary activities remained unresolved.

Early in January Unita and the government resumed talks on the quartering of forces prior to the formation of the new national army, following fresh pressure from the UN, but hostilities continue to flare from time to time. Eventually, on 12 January Unita and the government agreed to a timetable to get the peace process moving once again. It was conceded that Unita would contribute 26 300 troops to the new Angolan army, in addition to the 2 550 incorporated following the Bicesse Accord. The number of command positions allocated to Unita remained in dispute, the government offering only a quarter of what Unita demanded.

Unita held its 15th annual conference in Bailundo from 17 to 24 January. That the discussions ran on for a week instead of the scheduled two days reflected disagreements within the organization about the merits of quartering and disarming its forces. Many delegates feared that a demobilization of their troops would leave them too vulnerable to a repeat of the massacres of September 1992, when some 10 000 Unita supporters lost their lives in Luanda. Others expressed doubts about the ability of Unavem to provide adequate shelter, food, water and medical assistance for so large a body of people, and also voiced concern that no provision had been made for the families of the combatants. Eventually, however, under renewed diplomatic pressure, consensus emerged that a substantial number of troops would be

encamped, and Savimbi promised that 16 500 of his troops would report to quartering areas by 8 February, when the Unavem mandate came up for review in New York.

In the event Savimbi's undertaking was only partially fulfilled, but he convinced observers that this was not his fault, but that of Unavem, which was unable to handle the logistics of the troop movements in time. Nevertheless, it was noticeable that following the renewal of the Unavem mandate, the flow of Unita combatants slowed once more to a trickle. There were also allegations that the fighters encamped consisted principally of the under-aged and the old, and that the weapons handed in were obsolete or unserviceable.

In his conclusion to the Unita conference, Savimbi emphasized the need to begin political discussions with the government before the completion of the disarmament process. He is of the opinion that the mandate of the present parliament, elected in 1992, expires on November 1996, and that it should then be replaced by a transitional government of national unity, which would be responsible for running new elections in one or two years time. This seems to amount to a substantial revision of the Lusaka Accord of November 1994, under which Unita was to receive a minority of posts in an MPLA-directed government.

On 1 March Savimbi and Dos Santos finally held their frequently postponed meeting in Libreville to repeat their commitment to the peace process. They agreed to complete the integration of the armed forces by June 1996 and to establish a government of national unity and reconciliation by July. This appears to fall far short of Savimbi's demand for a transitional government, and as Dos Santos has previously rejected the idea of terminating the life of parliament in November, there still seems a great deal of room for "misunderstandings".

In the next edition of Africa Focus we will look at the spate of elections in Africa since the beginning of the year, and consider the prospects of those to come.

BOOKSHELf

Mozambique: The troubled transition – From socialist construction to free market capitalism by Hans Abrahamson and Anders Nilsson. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995. 285 pp. ISBN 1 85649 323 7

In the wake of the agreement between the Government and Renamo, Mozambique may at last be on the threshold of an unprecedented period of peace in which serious attention can now be paid to development. This book proved an analysis of the socioeconomic and political experience of the past twenty years. In particular, it documents the extraordinary historical transition in which Frelimo, originally intent on meeting people's needs by building socialism, is today trying to rebuild a war-ravaged economy by means of market capitalism.

The authors explore a number of relevant questions: What happened to Mozambique's development? How have international, regional, national and local factors interacted to shape policies and outcomes? What are the implications for people's livelihoods of this transition to market capitalism? What are the prospects for pursuing such a strategy in a country with almost no indigenous capital-owning and entrepreneurial class? Are there lessons to be learnt for other impoverished Third World societies?

Male daughters, female husbands: Gender and sex in an African society by Ifi Amadiume. (4th impression) London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995. 223 pp. ISBN 0 86232 595 1

Challenging the received orthodoxies of social anthropology, Ifi Amadiume argues that in precolonial society, sex and gender did not necessarily coincide. Examining the structures that enabled women to achieve power, she shows that roles were neither rigidly masculinized nor feminized.

Women could play roles usually monopolized by men and were then classified as males for the purpose of power – a classification facilitated by women's independent economic resources and the existence of a strong goddess-focused religion.

Economic changes in colonial times undermined women's status and reduced their political role and, Dr Amadiume maintains, patriarchal tendencies introduced by colonialism persist today, to the detriment of women.

Critical of the chauvinist stereotypes established by colonial anthropology, the author stresses the importance of recognizing women's economic activities as an essential basis of their power. She is also critical of those western feminists who, when relating to African women, tend to accept the same outmoded projections.

Gender, environment and Development in Kenya: A grassroots perspective edited by Barbara Thomas-Slayter and Dianne Rocheleau. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. 247 pp. ISBN 1 55587 419 3

Linkages among poverty, gender roles, resource decline, and ecological degradation challenge development policy and practice in many parts of the world. This book provides an analytical framework for understanding these linkages, then examines them empirically in six very different communities in rural Kenya.

This focuses on ways in which community institutions – specifically women and their groups or organizations – respond to changing resource conditions and on their strategies for regulating access to resources for themselves and others and for gaining control of critical resources such as soils, water and woodlands. The authors also examine the impact of these responses on local decision making, changing gender roles, rural stratification, community relations and other variables within the broader social and political environment.

Agricultural development and gender issues in Malawi by Anita Spring. Lanham: University Press of America, Inc, 1995. 316 pp.
ISBN 0 8191 9958 3

This volume interweaves two topics. The first concerns general themes and issues on women in development. The second deals with specific research findings, data sets and activities in Malawi that emanated from the Women in Agricultural Development Project (WIADP) that was designed and directed by the author in the early 1980s.

The WIADP concentrated on accumulating data and disaggregating by gender various agricultural data sets to counter the lack of data in this field, which in turn would counter the oft-used arguments by decision-makers, project designers and implementation teams carrying out development programmes for not providing assistance for women farmers and for thinking about them as dependants or mere helpers.

The culture of politics in modern Kenya by Angelique Haugerud. African Studies Series 84. 266 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Once the major success story of a troubled continent, Kenya came in the early 1990s to be regarded as its fallen star. This book challenges such images of reversal and the analytical polarities which sustain them. Based on several years of research in Kenya, the analysis ranges from telescopic to microscopic fields of vision – from national political culture, oratory, and the staging of politics to everyday struggles for livelihood among people in one rural locale during the past century. This sliding scale of analysis allows the author to experiment theoretically with a number of themes informed by contemporary analytical tensions among post-modernist "chaos", historical contingency, and structural regularities. The result is a study which combines many disciplines and perspectives to give a rich and varied picture of the culture of politics in 20th-century Kenya.

Human rights and African customary law under the South African Constitution by T W Bennett. Human Rights and Constitutional Law Series of the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. Cape Town: Juta and Co, Ltd, 1995. 174 pp. ISBN 0 7021 3544 5

South Africa's 1993 Constitution introduced both a political and a legal revolution. For the first time in the country's history the personal law of the vast majority of South Africans, African customary law, enjoys equal standing with customary law. Ironically, this is also a time when African culture faces its greatest challenge. It must now compete with a regime steeped in western legal thought: a bill of rights. It faces a particular rival in the principle of non-discrimination, the equality of man, woman and child. This book explores the manifold conflicts between the African legal tradition and human rights, suggesting means for the resolution of these conflicts and identifying circumstances in which one regime should prevail over the other.

Fiasco in Somalia: US-UN intervention by Mohamed Dirye Abdullahi. Occasional paper no 61. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1995. 47 pp. ISBN 0 7983 0125 2

This paper sketches the background to the Somali crisis and provides clues to an understanding of the failure of American and subsequent UN intervention.

The author argues that the Somalia crisis has its roots in the suppression of democratic rights under the US-supported Siad Barre regime and the ensuing struggle for democratic rights.

Africa Institute

Visiting scholars

Dr Heather Deegan (School of History and Politics, Middlesex University, London, United Kingdom) conducted preliminary research on the role of non-profit organizations, and the November 1995 local government elections in South Africa, while visiting the Institute from 2 to 8 February 1996. Her research is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council in the United Kingdom.

Dr Philippe Schmitter (Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, California, United States) presented an internal seminar at the Institute on 12 February 1996 on "Emerging democracies/democracies in transition". Professor Schmitter, who is a well-known authority on the processes of democratization and transition in Third World countries, visited South Africa under the auspices of the United States Information Service.

Mr Jacques Colom (Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Justice Constitutionnelle, Université d'Aix-Marseille III, Aix-en-Provence, France), spent three weeks at the Institute from 20 February to 2 March 1996 to undertake research for a PhD thesis on the role of the South African Constitutional Court in settling controversial legal disputes (such as the abolition of the death penalty, and the devolution of powers from central government to the provinces).

Dr Wilfred A Ndongko (Senior Regional Advisor, Multidisciplinary Regional Advisory Group (MRAG), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (Uneca), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) held a public seminar on 18 March 1996 on "The international economic environment and its impact on Africa's long-term economic development". Dr Ndongko visited South Africa under the auspices of the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD),

Johannesburg, and his work deals mainly with macroeconomic and policy reforms, economic planning and development, regional economic cooperation and integration, and international trade and economic relations.

Fellows and research fellows

Recently, **Dr Daniel Bach**, Director of the Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire de Bordeaux, France; **Mr Arnold Hughes**, Director of the Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom; **Dr John Makumbe** of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare; **Dr Massimo Micarelli** of the Istituto per le Relazioni tra l'Italia e i Paesi dell'Africa, America Latina e Medio Oriente (Ipalmo), Rome, Italy; and **Professor Kings Phiri** of the Department of History, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, Zomba accepted appointments as *research fellows* of the Institute.

Research visits/ conferences/lectures

Dr Simon Baynham (Research Specialist) paid research visits to Kenya (26 to 30 November 1995) and Namibia (12 to 18 February 1996) to work on current political and regional security developments. He presented a lecture on "British-South Africa relations" to the Joint Staff Course, Defence College (SANDF), Pretoria on 29 February 1996.

Richard Cornwell (Head, Current Affairs) conducted training courses for senior diplomats at the Foreign Service Institute, Pretoria on 25 January and 1 February 1996.

Dr Denis Venter (Executive Director and Head of Academic Programmes) attended two workshops: on "South Africa and the Indian Ocean Rim: Obstacles and opportunities", organized by the Foundation for Global Dialogue

*Dr Denis Venter,
Executive Director and
Head of Academic
Programmes, Africa
Institute of South Africa*

(FGD), Johannesburg, and the East Asia Project, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, on 23 November 1995 in Johannesburg; and on "South Africa within Africa: Emerging policy frameworks", convened by the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (Acdess), Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria; the Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA), Johannesburg; and the Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS), University of the Western Cape, Bellville, held from 24 to 27 January 1996 in Johannesburg.

He addressed the Western Cape Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on "Regional security in sub-Saharan Africa: What role for South Africa?" on 31 January 1996 in Cape Town; and attended the conference on "Understanding contemporary Africa: India and South-South cooperation", jointly organized by the India International Centre (IIC), New Delhi and the Department of African Studies, University of Delhi, held from 15 to 17 February 1996 in New Delhi, India, where he read a paper on "Africa and the new world order: From marginalization to regeneration?"

Publications

Dr Simon Baynham published "Zimbabwe: Pax Africana?", in *African Security Review* (vol 4, no 3, August 1995); "The fourth horseman of the Apocalypse: Drug trafficking in Africa", in *Africa Insight* (vol 25, no 3, 1995); "Drugs for Africa" (special supplement on crime and conflict), in *Indicator SA* (vol 12, no 4, Spring 1995); "US security strategy in sub-Saharan Africa", in *Africa Institute Bulletin* (vol 35, no 5, September-October 1995); and "Narco-trafficking in Africa: Security, social and economic implications", in *African Security Review* (vol 4, no 6, December 1995).

Richard Cornwell wrote articles on "South Africa and Africa: A vital partnership", in *Marketing Mix* (August 1995); "Keeping faith", in *Africa Insight* (vol 25, no 4, 1995); "Swazis struggle to marry tradition with demands of modern life", in *Saturday Star* (27 January 1996); and "Heart of darkness", in *Finance Week* (January 1996).

Dr Denis Venter contributed a chapter entitled "Malawi: The transition to multi-party politics", in John A Wiseman (ed), *Democracy and political change in sub-Saharan Africa*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, and an article "O novo enquadramento internacional da RAS", in *Exportar* (no 37, December 1995).

Other activities

Dr Simon Baynham was appointed external examiner for the 1996 Defence Management Programme, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Richard Cornwell was external examiner for the BA (honours) course in development studies at Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, and for the under-graduate course in African politics at the University of South Africa, Pretoria.

Dr Denis Venter was external examiner for the under-graduate course in African politics at the University of Natal, Durban; for an MA dissertation in international politics at the University of South Africa, Pretoria; and for a PhD thesis in politics at the University of Natal, Durban.

African studies

Conference and call for papers

The **39th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association (ASA)** in the United States is due to be held from 23 to 26 November 1996 at the Hyatt Hotel in San Francisco, California. The National Panels Chair for the conference is Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin. The conference theme, "The challenges of renewal in Africa", draws attention to African realities and to the consideration of how these have been anticipated, or how they are to be understood in terms of the theories and assumptions developed in various disciplinary fields. While successes have been recorded in Africa, crises and failures are common. Barely 30 years ago, at the

independence of most African countries, there were high hopes of reversing African dependency in the global economy and of creating prosperous, politically stable and socially cohesive national entities, but now despair and destitution prevail in many African countries and others are threatened with disintegration. The time is therefore opportune to take stock of epistemological choices and directions, and to rethink fundamental premises. Has the current predicament or its magnitude in any way been anticipated? Were the perspectives of the African "founding fathers" conditioned by unrealistic optimism or fundamental ethnocentrism? What have been the successes and limitations of perspectives on Africa? Might the perspectives of Africans themselves on contemporary social, economic, cultural, and political developments not yield useful insights?

In addition to many theoretical issues, a central place should be given to such areas of activity as: the role of popular religious movements; the issues of refugees, displaced persons, migration and the African diaspora; the development of new commercial networks (some, perhaps, reactivations of ancient ones); the redistribution of wealth and of resources, including access to land, education and health care; the endemic nature of corruption and violence; the perceived role of sorcery in national and local politics; the reasons for political instability; the role of popular literature and the arts in shaping public opinion; the role of the writer in a season of anomie; the future of protest literature; the role of music and folklore in nation-building; the restructuring of knowledge as traditional universities decay; the continued tension between unitary and federal forms of state; and the success of economic enterprise and development in a select few countries. Perhaps these topics, and others, should be seen as central features of significant readjustments which will take a long time to mature and whose outcomes may be quite surprising.

In the end, probably no amount of scholarly rethinking is likely to have much impact on the "African reality", but it is clear that the

African crisis is epistemological as well as socio-political. The challenge of renewal in Africa is, therefore, by implication also the challenge of epistemological renewal in African studies.

Section sub-themes for the conference are:

- Section A: neglected issues in the study of religion in Africa
- Section B: the visual and performing arts in Africa
- Section C: African challenges to philosophical paradigms
- Section D: indigenous African institutions
- Section E: cultures, cultural forms, and cultural change in Africa
- Section F: from modernization to post-modernism: rethinking paradigms
- Section G: African literatures and languages
- Section H: the African diaspora in global perspective
- Section I: the state of African historiography
- Section J: sociological and anthropological perspectives in African studies
- Section K: questions of urbanization in Africa
- Section L: the role of African women in development studies
- Section M: the economic development of Africa
- Section N: Africa in the electronic media
- Section O: science and technology, medicine, and the environment in Africa
- Section P: contemporary politics and democratic transitions in Africa
- Section Q: human rights and current conflicts in Africa
- Section R: independent panels and proposals

All individuals proposing panels or papers should designate the section for which the proposal is most appropriate. If the proposal can be included in two or more sections, please indicate first and second choice sections. If none of the sections is appropriate for the proposed panel or paper, or if there is uncertainty as to the right section, designate Section R. All proposals

will be reviewed by a section chair who will make recommendations to the Panels Committee.

The deadline for submission of all panel and paper proposals is 15 March 1996; three copies of all proposals must be sent to the Programme Coordinator, African Studies Association, Credit Union Building, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322; tel: 1+404+329-6410; fax: 1+404+329-6433; e-mail: africa@emory.edu. Panel and paper proposal forms can be found on pages 17, 18 and 19 of the January/March 1996 (Vol XXIX, No 1) issue of **ASA News**; *do not submit proposals by fax or e-mail.*

New journals

The **Journal of Research Methodology and African Studies** is a biannual periodical which offers a comprehensive, systematic treatment of the scientific approach to studying African events and phenomena. The emphasis is on the relationship between theory, research and practice, and the integration of various quantitative and qualitative research activities in an orderly framework.

The **Journal of African Languages and Linguistics** is published biannually and is interested in reflecting all facets of African languages and linguistics. Abstracts, articles, reviews, and translations relating to African languages, literature, literary history and literary criticism, and various aspects of linguistics are welcomed.

For publication guidelines and information on subscriptions, contact The Editor, The African Institution, 7532 Eighth Street NW, Washington, DC 20012; e-mail: bangura@boe00. minc.umd.edu.

Award

Marlene van Niekerk's novel, **Triomf**, published in 1994 by Queillerie Publishers, Pretoria, has been named the winner of the 1995 Noma Award for publishing in Africa. This is the first time in the Award's 15-year history that a work in Afrikaans has been selected as the prize winner. The book was cited by the Noma Award jury as "a capti-

vating and innovative novel by a masterly story-teller, which breaks new ground in describing the ways in which poor white Afrikaners, too, were victims of oppression, and thus ushers in a wholly new way of addressing the past as a prelude to the new".

Forthcoming conferences/workshops

The **22nd Annual Third World Conference** on "Reconceiving the meaning of emerging global changes into the 21st century" will be held from 27 to 30 March 1996 at the Swissotel, Chicago, Illinois. Contact Roger K Oden or Winberg Chai, 22nd Annual Third World Conference, Suite 305, 1507 East 53rd Street, Chicago, IL 60615-4509; tel: 1+312+241-6688; fax: 1+312+241-7898; e-mail: r-oden@asc.gsu.bgu.edu.

An interdisciplinary conference on "Beyond 'primitivism': Indigenous religious traditions and modernity", hosted by the **African-American and African Studies Program**, and **Religious Studies Program, University of California at Davis**, will take place from 28 to 31 March 1996 in Davis, California. Contact Jacob K Olupona, African-American and African Studies Program, University of California, Davis, CA 95616; tel: 1+916+752-1548; fax: 1+916+752-9704.

The annual conference of the **African Studies Program, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC** on "Traditional conflict medicine" will be held on 29 and 30 March 1996 in Washington, DC. Contact William I Zartman, Director, African Studies Program, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036-1984; fax: 1+202+663-5683; e-mail: tsimmons@mail.jhuwash.jhu.edu.

The **27th Annual Conference on African Linguistics** will take place from 29 to 31 March 1996 in Gainesville, Florida. Contact Paul A Kotey, P O Box 115565, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-5565; tel: 1+904+392-7015; fax: 1+904+392-1443; e-mail: acal27@aall.ufl.edu.

The **20th Annual Conference of the New York African Studies Association** on "Understanding contemporary Africa" will be held on 12 and 13 April 1996 in New York City. Contact Eudora Chikwendu, Black Studies Program, College Hall-F, State University of New York (SUNY), New Paltz, NY 12561.

The **Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS)** on "Africa 1996 Afrique: Crisis and Renaissance et Crise" will take place from 1 to 5 May 1996 in Montreal, Canada. Contact Loy Denis, CAAS Secretariat, Centre d'Etudes de l'Asie de l'Est, Université de Montreal, C P 6128, Succ. Centre Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7, Canada; tel: 1+514+343-6569; fax: 1+514+343-7716; e-mail: denm@ere.umontreal.ca.

The 1996 Summer Institute on "Social science methods and African studies", hosted by the **Center for Afro-American and African Studies, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor** will be held from 24 June to 16 August 1996 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Contact 1996 Summer Institute, Center for Afro-American and African Studies, 200 West Engineering Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1092; tel: 1+313+764-5513; fax: 1+313+763-0543; e-mail: caasinformation@umich.edu.

The **13th Biennial Conference of the Society of Africanist Archaeologists** on "The archaeological heritage of Africa: Management and challenges" and "The impact of past human activities upon Africa's natural environments" will take place from 3 to 6 September 1996 in Poznan, Poland. Contact Lech Krzyzaniak, Poznan Archaeological Museum, ul Wodna 27, 61-781 Poznan, Poland; tel: 48+61+526-430; fax: 48+61+525-306.

The 1996 international workshop on "Transformations of power and culture in Africa", hosted by the **Center for Afro-American and African Studies, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor**, will be held in Ann Arbor, Michigan from 11 to 20 November 1996. Contact 1996 International Workshop, Center for Afro-American and African Studies, 200 West Engineering Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1092; tel: 1+313+764-5513; fax: 1+313+763-0543; e-mail: caasinformation@umich.edu.

The **Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association** on "Human rights" will take place from 2 to 5 January 1997 in New York City. Contact Margaret Strobel, Women's Studies Program, Office of Social Science Research, B-110 BSB, 1007 W Harrison, University of Illinois at Chicago, IL 60607-7136.

AFRICA INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA

(Company registration number 61/00002/08)

- An independent non-profit association, the Africa Institute has established itself as an internationally recognized research and information centre concerned with African affairs.

- The Institute's mission is to collect, process, interpret and disseminate information on African and especially Southern African affairs. It focuses primarily on the political, economic, international and developmental issues facing contemporary Africa.

- Information is made available through publications, a specialized reference library, conferences and non-Institute media. A small research staff answer enquiries and provide comment on topical developments. Apart from their regular studies, the researchers undertake commissioned research.

- In addition to its own researchers, the Institute appoints associates in the field of African studies, runs a programme for visiting researchers, and conducts seminars and workshops. While serving the public as a whole (both professional and lay), the Institute devotes particular attention to educational institutions as well as decision-makers in the business and public sectors.

- The Institute was established in 1960 and is controlled by a council composed of representatives of the South African universities and other experts. Because it therefore has a broad-based academic character, the Institute is funded mainly through a grant from the Department of National Education.

Membership

Membership of the Institute is open to everyone who supports its aims and functions, and entails the following advantages:
- Receipt of *Africa Insight* (incorporating *AI Bulletin*)
- Discount on *other Institute publications*
- Access to the reference library
- Consultation with professional staff
- Invitations to conferences
- Participation in Annual General Meetings

Membership fees

Individuals and schools: South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R80 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US$40 or equivalent, per annum)

Institutional membership: (*Academic bodies, libraries, governmental and non-governmental organizations and embassies*) South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R200 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US$100 or equivalent, per annum)

Corporate and donor membership: (*Companies and organizations not included under individual or institutional membership*) South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R500 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US$250 or equivalent, per annum)

Reference library

The library holdings, consisting of some 60 000 books and many thousands of periodical articles, are indexed on computer. In addition, newspaper and periodical articles on current African affairs, supplemented by an international news service, are kept on readily accessible country and subject files. The library is open to members and students on weekdays from 08:00–16:00, and on Saturdays by appointment from 9:00–12:00.

Institute publications

Africa Insight (incorporating *AI Bulletin*); (quarterly)
Africa at a Glance (two-yearly)
Irregular series of research and occasional papers

Subscription to Africa Insight

Africa Insight is also available on subscription to non-members. Annual rate for South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R70 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US$35 or equivalent). Overseas airmail rate: US$80 or equivalent.
Single copies (also back copies) available at R15 or US$7,50 outside South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland.

Application for membership/subscription to Africa Insight

The Secretary
Africa Institute of South Africa
Box 630
0001 PRETORIA

I/We support the objectives of the *Africa Institute* and undertake to pay the annual membership for individual/institutional/corporate/donor members. I/We wish to subscribe to *Africa Insight*.

Enclosed herewith the amount of .... being the membership/subscription fee for the first year.

Surname .... Title and initials ....

Organization* ....

Postal address** ....

.... Postal code ....

Signature.. Date ....

* Institutional/corporate/donor members only
** The postal address must be exactly as you wish it to appear on the Institute's mailing list.

AFRICA