

AFRICA

vol 26 • no 4 • 1996

ISSN 0275-2874

Reg. No. 61-0002308

INSIGHT

an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa.

R20,00 (VAT included)



Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)



ISSN 0256 2804

© Copyright reserved

Africa Insight (incorporating the *AI Bulletin*) is published quarterly by the Africa Institute of South Africa, an independent study centre concerned with African affairs.

The Institute does not necessarily subscribe to the opinions of contributors.

For information about the Institute, membership and subscription rates see inside back cover.

Contributions and subscriptions should be sent to:

The Editor

Box 630

PRETORIA, South Africa

0001

Telephone: 27 + 12 + 328 6970

Telefax: 27 + 12 + 323 8153

e-mail: africain@iafrica.com

Council

Dr Siphon Buthelezi, Prof Charles Dlamini, Mr Bongani Khumalo (Chairman), Prof Tom Lodge, Dr Enos Mabuza, Dr Subithra Moodley-Moore, Mr Noam Pines, Dr Chris Scheffer, Mr Bob Tucker and Prof Marinus Wiechers

Advisory Panel on Publications

Fellows

Dr Adebayo Adedeji, Prof Sam Asante, Dr Louis Emmerij, Prof Denis Fair, Amb Ahmed Haggag, Prof Goran Hyden, Amb Bethuel Kiplagat, Dr Erich Leistner (resident), Amb Edouard Maunick, Dr Thandika Mkandawire, Mr Olara Otunnu, Dr Sadig Rasheed, Mr Douglas Rimmer and Prof Richard Sklar

Research Fellows

Prof Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, Dr Daniel Bach, Prof Willie Breytenbach, Prof Patrick Chabal, Prof Fantu Cheru, Prof Christopher Clapham, Dr Christian Coulon, Prof Sam Decalo, Prof André du Pisani, Dr Stephen Ellis, Prof Richard Haines, Prof Jeffrey Herbst, Mr Arnold Hughes, Prof Edmond Keller, Prof Guy Martin, Prof Gavin Maasdorp, Prof Colin McCarthy, Dr John Makumbe, Dr Massimo Micarelli, Mr Patrick Ncube, Prof Wilfred Ndongko, Prof Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Prof Kings Phiri, Prof Louis Picard, Dr Oliver Saasa, Prof Peter Vale and Prof Margaret Vogt

Senior Staff

Executive Director
Administration and Finance
Communications
Current Affairs
Publications

Dr Denis Venter
Mr Bernie Fisher
Mr Kenneth Kotelo
Mr Richard Cornwell
Mr Pieter Esterhuysen

Editor: Madeline Lass

Guest editor: Jill Swart-Kruger

Cartographer: Elize van As


Cover by William Steyn

Layout by A1 Graphics

Printed by The Rustica Press

Contents

incorporating


 Africa Bulletin


What strategy for Africa's economic development Comment <i>Erich Leistner</i>	306
African Independent/Indigenous Churches in the social environment: A empirical analysis <i>Gerhardus Oosthuizen</i>	308
Casting shadows on SADC: Aids policy in Southern Africa into the next century <i>James J Zaffiro</i>	325
From destabilization to peacekeeping in Southern Africa: The potential role of South Africa <i>Jakkie Cilliers</i>	339
Debates about Lesotho's incorporation into the Republic of South Africa: Ideology versus national survival <i>F K Makoa</i>	347
Export Processing Zone strategies, national development and regional cooperation in Southern Africa <i>Dot Keet</i>	354
Zambian politics and eastern sectionalism <i>Stephen Rule</i>	363
The economic context of democratic transition <i>W A Ndongko</i>	375
The European Union – Africa (ACP) Lomé convention: Expectations, realities and challenges of the twenty-first century <i>S K B Asante</i>	381
Africa Focus: The Great Lakes <i>Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja</i>	392
Bookself/Book reviews	395
Africa Institute news/Africa studies news <i>Denis Venter</i>	397
In memoriam: Claude Ake <i>Guy Martin</i>	400

What strategy for Africa's

*Erich Leistner, Research
Fellow, Africa Institute*

More than three decades after the countries of sub-Saharan Africa became independent, much controversy remains about the strategy they should follow to develop their economies. Pertinent aspects of that debate are addressed in two articles in this issue of *Africa Insight*. Professor Asante analyses the impact on African economies of cooperation with the European Union in terms of the Lomé Convention, and discusses the future course of this cooperation. Dot Keet's focus on Export Processing Zones (EPZ) leads her to a critical assessment of the influence of EPZs on efforts to promote regional integration; from there she goes on to argue that globalization, and more particularly multinational corporations, undermine the less-developed countries' (LDC) development efforts and their ability to determine their own destinies.

The Lomé Convention, associating the 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) with the 16 member countries of the European Union (EU), was once hailed as an ideal instrument to develop LDC economies. However, decades of privileged relationships under four Lomé treaties have not produced notable change. The Convention had been expected to help restructure the ACP's economies and, by promoting local industries, rendering them less dependent on the sale of unprocessed agricultural and mining commodities to the industries of the northern hemisphere. Today, the ACP economies still overwhelmingly depend on primary exports and, despite privileged access to the EU market, their exports to the EU have grown more slowly than those of non-ACP countries, with the result that their share in the EU market has declined. Both the EU and ACP are disillusioned. Everything points to the current treaty – which expires in 2000 – being the last. Instead of one overarching treaty, the EU is contemplating separate arrangements with the various geographical groupings.

Asante seems to imply that this disappointing outcome is the result of the EU's lack of commitment to the treaty. By quoting President Kaunda's blunt statement made in 1977, he suggests that the EU is not actually anxious to promote the

industrialization of ACP. In his view, the Lomé rules of origin do not notably benefit the ACP, while the main EU exporting companies are "the principal beneficiaries of the trade provisions". He points out that the underfunded Stabex scheme has failed to stabilize the ACP economies, and actually discourages their industrialization. His article leaves no doubt that, thanks to the EU's changed priorities, the ACP has to expect a less accommodating attitude in future.

According to Asante, the working of Lomé has retarded the economic integration of African states – the strategy he clearly accepts as the foremost requirement for the continent's development. Thus, without expressly saying so, he suggests that the Lomé pattern may not be in the best interest of Africa. He leaves it open whether or not he prefers the African Economic Community (AEC), to which African states are committed in terms of the 1991 Abuja Treaty, as an inward-looking alternative to Africa's closer integration into the world economy. In this context, it may be noted that since the early 1990s, LDC regionalization schemes such as Mercosur, Afta and Nafta have been directed towards greater participation in the world economy.¹

In light of the poor record of African integration schemes, such as the Common Market of East and Southern African States (Comesa) and the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), Africa would probably become yet more marginalized if its free participation in the world economy had to wait for the day when the continent will be united in the AEC – a process that is bound to take quite a few decades.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Lomé Convention, the question remains whether ACP – and African member countries in particular – could not have made more of the opportunities offered by the arrangement. On the face of it, the fact that primary-exporting non-ACP countries could increase their share of the EU market at the expense of ACP indicates that they did more to raise the quality and volume of their export products and paid more attention to the opportunities available in the EU, while ACP were content to continue with things as they were.

economic development?

As the Lomé Convention in its present form is on its way out, the question of its contribution to development is becoming academic. Interest will now focus on the future pattern of ACP-EU relations – how will this affect the continent's efforts to unite economically? Will it benefit Africa's development? At any rate, there is little doubt that further economic decline can be avoided only if African countries are fully integrated into the world economy. To that end, they need market-oriented and investor-friendly economic policies. External investment in particular is necessary to provide the technical, managerial and marketing know-how that is indispensable if Africa is to produce a more diversified range of goods for international markets.

While Asante questions the EU's commitment to ACP development, Keet is convinced that LDCs are deliberately prevented from following policies that clash with the interests of the "rich and powerful" countries, and more particularly the interests of transnational corporations (TNC). As the TNCs vast scale of production demands integrated global markets, the rich countries actively discourage the regional integration of LDCs. As an example, the author refers to the European Commission, which prevents South Africa from joining its fellow SADC members in Lomé and, instead, encourages Pretoria into a bilateral reciprocal free trade agreement with the EU. The national self-interest of the less-developed countries, no less than their regional groupings, are said to stand in the way of the globalization that the TNCs demand. More than anything else, the survival-of-the-fittest system imposed on the weaker countries in the name of the free market, is held to be responsible for the marginalization of Africa.

Keet is vague as to whether she ascribes Africa's declining share of direct foreign investment to a deliberate design to promote marginalization. She is, in any event, distrustful of the World Bank "and other such institutions" which impose hurtful conditions on LDCs and encourage "[s]uch active-ly divisive policies" as the creation of

Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which are claimed to hinder the formation of regional groupings.

She does not advocate integration for its own sake, but as a means to help Africa define its actual needs and formulate policies that serve the interests of its own people. Several such groupings could combine to challenge and change the new liberalized global order.

Like Asante, Keet is concerned with the question whether a country's development is best promoted by opening its economy to global market forces or by combining it with neighbouring economies in a such a way as not to prevent it from following the domestic economic and social policies of its own choice. The state should follow an interventionist policy that entails regulation of domestic and foreign investment in accordance with government priorities; allocation of investments between regions and countries in the interests of equity; and generally a "comprehensive and integrative approach".

While, obviously, there must be no illusions about the very difficult position of economic dwarfs such as ACP in a world dominated by a few giants, it is open to doubt whether the weak can become a significant force and promote their economic development by joining together in regional groupings such as AEC. All the countries of sub-Saharan Africa put together, bar South Africa, have a national income smaller than that of the Netherlands (\$286 billion against \$316 billion in 1993). Independent sub-Saharan Africa's experience with the interventionist policies favoured by Keet and the striving towards regional integration advocated by her and Asante does not encourage much hope that in the foreseeable future these approaches will be more successful than hitherto. In this regard, one may call to mind the fact that in the 1950s, sub-Saharan African countries had roughly the same, or even a higher, level of development than many Asian countries which in the meantime have left even South Africa far behind.

With all its unavoidable drawbacks, and for the time being, a future post-Lomé alliance with the EU may still offer the best prospects for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. For some countries, even something like the scheme suggested by John Kenneth Galbraith in 1960 in response to the meagre results of the USA's aid efforts, may be needed.² His plan entails entrusting the development of a given LDC to an outside authority which is able to provide factors missing or in short supply in that country, especially technical know-how and capital. For the sake of development, the country effectively would have to transfer much of its national sovereignty to an outside agent.

Galbraith proposed a Planning and Development Authority consisting of about equal numbers of representatives from the USA and the LDC, which would become a *de facto* development ministry to whose overall direction the other development-related ministries would be subject. It would focus attention on the barriers that inhibit progress in the country and establish targets and the steps to achieve them. Galbraith's scheme can be called neo-colonial and was written in a time when the experts still believed that development was inevitable if only sufficient inputs of capital and know-how were available. Yet, given the tragic predicament of so many African countries, unorthodox measures would not be out of place.

Notes and references

- 1 H Proff and H V Proff, "Effects of world market oriented regional integration on developing countries" *Intereconomics*, vol 31, no 2, March/April 1996, p 86. The membership of these organisations is as follows:
 - Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
 - Afta: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam.
 - Nafta: USA, Canada and Mexico.
- 2 J K Galbraith, "A positive approach to economic aid", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 39, 1960/61, pp 444–457.

Independent/indigenous churches in the social environment: An empirical analysis

Professor Gerhardus Oosthuizen, who is Director of NERMIC (A Research Unit for Indigenous/Independent Churches and New Religious Movements), explains the growth of the African independent/indigenous church (AIC) movement by examining the social environment in which they operate.

Introduction: Challenging the stereotype of the AICs

Using the yardstick of numbers of people involved, the AIC movement is probably the single most significant form of civil society institutionalization in South Africa. Far more people are involved in AICs than in either the labour unions or the civic movements, the two forms of civil society mobilization traditionally of most interest to scholars of social movements. The focus of social scientists upon these two forms of mobilized civil society has meant that the AICs have hitherto attracted the attentions only of ethnologists and comparative theologians, but there is evidence that this is changing.


In part this recognition that the AICs are a major sociological phenomenon, rather than an ethnological or theological curiosity, has been occasioned by the extremely rapid growth in the size of AIC congregations. It may still be usual for comparative theologians and ethnologists to contrast the AICs to the “mainstream churches”, as though AIC membership were an aberration from the Christianity practised by most South Africans, but this is an incorrect perception. If there is a Christian mainstream in South Africa – a form of Christian worship and belief which is dominant in terms of the numbers of adherents it has attracted – then it is no longer the Christianity brought to Africa by the missionaries of Europe which can claim this role. The real mainstream of Christianity in South Africa is that of the independent and indigenous churches. This has profound implications for the future of Christian theology and missiology in South Africa.

One in every five black South Africans in 1960 was a member of an AIC. Within 30 years, this number has almost doubled.¹ That it is the proportion that has changed indicates that the growth of AIC membership is not merely a side-

effect of natural increase: people are changing their religious affiliations to join the AICs. This growth in voluntary conversion to the AIC movement has occurred during the period of the decline and fall of apartheid. This alone suggests a correlation: the increase in membership figures in the AICs is closely connected to the social, economic and political travail over the same period.

Hitherto it has been assumed that the popularity of the AICs can be attributed to their reactionary nature: they have provided a safe haven for people caught up in the throes of social and political change. This viewpoint stigmatizes the AICs as passive rather than dynamic, reactive rather than proactive, conservative rather than transformational. Recent research has indicated that this is a caricature of the AIC movement, and that, rather than being merely passive by-products of colonial and apartheid disempowerment of black people, the AICs are a positive shaping force in black South African civil society. As much as the AICs are reactions to social forces, so too are they active social forces themselves:

- Rather than dissuading their members from involvement in struggles over material advancement, the AICs play an important role in promoting small-scale capital accumulation, through the promotion of small businesses, and informal savings and credit institutions.²
- Though they are sometimes dismissed as “otherworldly” groupings which reject all temporal power struggles as irrelevant, AICs are in fact actively promoting black self-empowerment and freedom from dependence upon outside sources of aid and assistance. This has many important developmental and political consequences.³
- Despite the widespread belief that the AICs have remained uninvolved with the major modernizing forces



which have transformed black South African society, the AICs are in reality important actors involved in the migration and urbanization processes, and may at present be the single most important factor facilitating the migration process for many households.⁴

These and similar studies have suggested that the AICs are best seen as civil society mobilizations of the poor which are addressing the issues of poverty and underdevelopment through a holistic strategy combining social support with tangible development intervention. The AICs are thus a proactive social movement with a strong potential for involvement in wider social and economic development issues.⁵

In order to understand how AICs play a substantial role in their communities, it is necessary to understand the roots of the AIC movement, and to examine the social environment in which the AICs operate. This article therefore turns first to a consideration of the history of the AICs, and then to an analysis of the role of the AICs in their social environment.

The origins of the AIC movement in South Africa

From the first, the AIC movement has not merely been a by-product of the history of colonial expansion in Africa, but also an important force determining the outcome of that history. In order best to understand this history, it is first useful to draw some distinctions between different types of AIC.

Firstly, a distinction needs to be made between independent and indigenous churches. Some AICs were formed when congregations split off from mission churches: these are usually referred to as the "independent" churches, whereas churches that were indigenously initiated are categorized as "indigenous".

Secondly, there are important theological differences between different AICs. Broadly speaking, the AICs can be divided into three categories:

- Ethiopian churches
- Apostolic churches
- Zionist churches.

These are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories, and in many in-

stances there is an overlap between those churches which would regard themselves as Apostolic and those which are Zionist churches. Within these three categories, the most striking characteristic is the simultaneous coexistence of literally thousands of small churches, with few significant theological distinctions discernible between, say, one Apostolic church and the next. There are a few exceptions to this "small church" model, for example, the Zion Christian Church, which meets at Moria every Easter, the St John's Apostolic Faith Mission, and the *iBandla lamaNazarethba*, all of which have adherents numbering in the tens of thousands. But most AICs are small, with congregations of 100 members or even fewer. As will be seen below, the rapid

form of organization for African religious movements. As the charismatic leader acquires more and more followers, the second form may arise:

the familiar pattern of church life in local congregations linked together in some wider district or national organization. This may be called the congregational type.⁷

The third type of church identified by Turner is that which manifests itself in

new villages (which) have been founded and (where) a Christian communal life has developed.⁸

The attraction which such churches offer is that they constitute, in Eberhardt's phrase, "total" societies of a theocratic-charismatic nature.⁹

Some AICs have established what they call "Holy Cities", of which the best-known is Ekuphakama, which was established by Isiah Shembe in Inanda and which is the headquarters of the *iBandla lamaNazarethba* (see below). The fourth type of AIC is the

"clientele" form that consists of patients attached to a practitioner renowned for his healing powers, and sharing in the religious exercises and teaching that are part of the treatment.¹⁰

In some cases this form of sociological order within the AIC movement may also take the form of geographical communities in small villages: Turner mentions the example of the Bethesda community, described by Sundkler¹¹ as an example of just such a "therapeutic community". Turner also notes that this latter type is the only one where there is any correlation between the religious emphasis of the church and the form of sociological order.

This sociological dimension raises important questions about the AIC movement and its role in traditional African society. As will be seen, AICs replicate in the anomic contemporary South African environment the traditional black rural social order.

Although there are different types of AIC, what unites these churches into one movement is their reaction to what may be designated the "establishment" or "missionary" churches: the churches which originated in Europe and were brought to South Africa under colonialism by proselytizing missionaries. Though the later involvement of some of the missionary churches in the struggle against apartheid is commendable, in the early colonial era these churches often



expansion of the AIC movement may be important in explaining the large numbers of small AIC congregations.

There is thus a further level of categorization for understanding the AICs. Turner's typological analysis of AICs is based on the different sociological aspects of the AICs. Turner identifies as the first of these types:

the more inchoate and unorganized prophet movement, which influences a large number of people in varying degrees without necessarily offering them any new or alternative religious community, and which depends only on the influence of the charismatic leader.⁶

It can be argued (as Turner does), that such churches represent the original

collaborated in the dispossession of black South Africans. By contrast, the churches in the AIC movement have from the outset been indigenous expressions of faith in God, and have often therefore become channels for black South African self-expression.

Three important influences shaped the birth of the AIC movement. The first of these was a response to colonialism: the AICs permitted African Christians to practise a Christianity divorced from the political and cultural hegemony of European colonialism propagated by the orthodox Christian mission churches. The first African "separatist" church was established in 1884 by a Methodist minister sympathetic to the Thembu nationalist cause, Nehemiah Tile. The Thembu Church placed an emphasis on black liberation and "a conception of common blackness",¹² and on the acceptance of African cultural traditions within the Christian context.

The second was Afro-American "Ethiopianism". Because Ethiopia had never been colonized, it became a symbol of liberation during the Afro-American struggle to end slavery during the 19th century. The founder of the Ethiopian movement was Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican born in 1887, who prophesied that a Black King would be crowned in Africa as a sign of deliverance, and campaigned for the return of all people of African ancestry living outside Africa to that continent. In 1917, two years after the formation of the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan, Garvey founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association in Harlem: two years later, when Afro-Americans returning from service in the First World War met with renewed discrimination and racism, Garvey was instrumental in establishing the "Negro Renaissance", the slogan of which was "Africa for the Africans". Garvey founded the largest Pan-African organisation in history under the slogan of "One God, One Aim, One Destiny".¹³ In 1893, Moses Makena Mokone brought to South Africa these Pan-African notions, particularly the symbolism of Ethiopia as an icon of black liberation from white colonialism, when he founded the Ethiopian Church of South Africa.

The largest and most influential of the Ethiopian churches among Zulus (with followers among other ethnic groups as well) is the Nazareth Baptist Church or *iBandla lamaNazaretha*. The church, founded by Isiah Shembe in 1911, may be described as a "liberation

movement", although not in an overtly political sense. Instead the *iBandla lamaNazaretha* concentrates on empowering its members in their everyday lives. A close friend of John Dube, first secretary and co-founder of the African Native National Congress (later renamed the African National Congress), Isiah Shembe preached that a reversion to the Old Testament Sabbath was a prerequisite for the restoration of the sovereignty of the Zulu nation. The beliefs of the *iBandla lamaNazaretha* synthesize a respect for traditional Zulu ways of life with Christian and Mosaic teachings. This is evident if one considers the prayers included in the church's hymnal, most of which were composed by Shembe. The church places a profound emphasis upon environmental resource



management, diligence, sobriety and faithfulness between people as a means to promoting self-reliance and independence from white South Africans. Special contributions levied from the congregants provide the church's main source of income, though this is supplemented by rentals from properties owned by the church.

The third major influence on the South African AICs was American pentecostalism, particularly those aspects which focused upon the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The significance of spiritual beings in the beliefs of many AICs is largely due to the importance placed upon spirits in traditional African beliefs, a belief which was able to be easily harmo-

nized with pentecostal teachings about the Holy Spirit and about the dangers of attack by hostile and evil spirit beings. For the AICs, spirits – and the Holy Spirit in particular – are of paramount importance, and are active agencies, for both good and ill (the Holy Spirit exclusively for good), in the world.¹⁴

This American pentecostal influence is most evident among the Zionist and Apostolic types of AIC. Though these churches have become so indigenized that they do not resemble their American parent churches, the origins of these churches can be traced to pentecostal churches founded in the USA in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The modern pentecostal movement originated with the Apostolic Faith Church, based in Azusa Street, Los Angeles. In 1908 the Apostolic Faith Mission was established in South Africa by John G Lake and Thomas Hezmalhalch: both Lake and Hezmalhalch had witnessed the “outpouring” of the Holy Spirit at Azusa Street which heralded the birth of the modern pentecostal movement. These churches emphasize the role of the Holy Spirit and are wary of traditional African religious beliefs, particularly in regard to the role of the ancestors. The belief in spiritual forces however is strong, both because of the pentecostal emphasis on spiritual forces and because of the strong belief in spirits in traditional African religion. As with the *iBandla lamaNazaretha*, these churches prioritize the independence of their members from outside assistance.

The Zionist churches derive their name from their original association with the John Alexander Dowie’s Christian Catholic Church in Zion, which was founded on 22 February 1896 in Chicago, Illinois at Zion City. Born in Scotland and raised in Australia, Dowie was a faith-healer and crusader against drugs, alcohol and tobacco. As evidenced in his publication, *Leaves of Healing*, within a year of the establishment of the Christian Catholic Church in Zion, there was already an offshoot in South Africa. The person responsible for this was an ex-minister of the Congregational Union of South Africa, Rev J Buchler.¹⁵

Buchler was active among the Zulus and Swazis of the Wakkerstroom area, and soon had made many converts. He resigned from the leadership of the church in 1900, but his task was



continued by Pieter le Roux, who led a delegation of South African Zionists to America in 1902. Le Roux concentrated his efforts among black South Africans, and the church continued to gain converts, but in addition there were a number of converts among the Boers, and it was these people who spread the church to Sri Lanka and India while they were detained there as prisoners of war during the second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Le Roux later left the church to join the Apostolic Faith Mission, but his work was continued by, among others, the Rev Bryant who arrived with his wife Emma Dempcy Bryant, an elder in the church, from Zion City in 1904. It was Emma Dempcy Bryant who took charge of proselytizing amongst the black South African population. Her strong emphasis on communal support found an echo in the consciousness of black South Africans, since mutual aid and support formed an important part of the traditional social fabric of black South African society. Thus it was that a strong emphasis on “practical Christianity”, which is one of the main characteristics of the South African Zionist movement, came to be so pronounced:

[the Christian Catholic Church in Zion] assist(s) members in earning a living.[...] Inculcating a work philosophy and utilizing one’s possessions in the context of the community are emphases which made an impact on the African mind where the sense of community is so strong.¹⁶

This emphasis is one which runs deep in traditional African society. *Ubuntu* is the name given to the ethos of mutual support whereby individualism is harmonized with social responsibility, which underlies the fabric of traditional African society. But in the AICs, *ubuntu* finds a complement in Christianity: not the secularized Christianity which has become a feature of the developed world, but the mutualism and communal sharing which was a characteristic of the early Christian church, as documented in the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament. In the AICs, a pre-colonial social order has been carried through into the post-apartheid era by legitimizing it using Christian teachings. The basis of *ubuntu*, the extended family network wherein individuals found self-expression through their support of the rest of the household, has been severely eroded

by colonialism and apartheid, both of which tore the extended family apart in order to secure on the one hand cheap labour and on the other the social reproduction of labour at low cost.¹⁷ But the extended family survives as a template for the AICs: small congregations under the authority of a respected leader, whose members offer each other support in times of crisis.

The Zion Christian Church, the most widely-known AIC, with the largest membership, was founded in 1926, and shares many characteristics with the *iBandla lamaNazaretha* but also a few differences. Both have holy centres – the Zion Christian Church's "Holy City" is Morija – both celebrate Holy Communion, both have great veneration for their leader, both reject pork, medicine, alcohol and tobacco, and to both certain animals and birds are taboo. However, the Zion Christian Church observes Sunday as the Sabbath, whereas the *iBandla lamaNazaretha* celebrates the Old Testament Sabbath, with its own Sinai (namely Nhlankakazi, a mountain in the Ndwedwe district). The Zion Christian Church however does not place as strong an emphasis on the Holy Spirit and "filling with the Spirit" as some of the smaller Zionist Churches.

In both the cases of the pentecostal and Afro-American churches, their initial Protestant fundamentalism has become modified through contact with indigenous African religious beliefs. The emphasis of the pentecostal churches on the actions of both malign and benevolent spirits, and the strong message of community and mutual support conveyed by Christianity, found echoes in traditional African religious thought, and facilitated the assimilation of African religion and fundamentalist Protestantism in the emergent AICs; while the Ethiopian message of divine sanction for liberation from white colonial oppression was in harmony with the emergence of black South African nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century. Today's South African AICs therefore have their roots in American pentecostalism, and in Afro-American religious movements of the last century (which, like the AICs, were responses to poverty and disempowerment), but, as the next section will indicate, their development in South Africa has been shaped by a history of racial oppression.



The "weapons", the cord, the rope around the head, the colour of the gowns (yellow has become a popular colour with some), the crosses and the star

Dispossession and the growth of the AICs in African communities

From the outset the South African AIC movement has combined a strong theme of independence from white colonialism (and white colonialist Christianity) with an emphasis on social action and compassionate support. This has proven to be a major attraction, and in no small measure accounts for the growth of AIC membership in the 20th century. The AICs have found themselves in the vanguard of those mobilizations of civil society which have addressed directly the material and psychological consequences of racial oppression.

When the Natives Land Act was proclaimed in 1913, black South Africans were dispossessed of their land. This precipitated major social upheavals, since it compelled the black South African population to

enter the workforce of the country's emergent capitalist economy:

By restricting the area of land for lawful African occupation, and by stripping African cash tenants and sharecroppers of their land, the Act ensured that henceforth most African people would have to go out and work for others if they were to live.¹⁸

The Act (and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936) led to a marked increase in migration of rural people to urban areas in search of wage employment. Though some saw the best solution to be the creation of a black bourgeoisie with urban property rights, the recommendations of the Stallard (Transvaal Local Government) Commission of 1922 became the basis for black urbanization policy:

the native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the

needs of the White man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister.¹⁹

The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 embodied Stallardist principles, and began the process whereby the urbanized black South Africans were condemned by legislation to an impoverished lifestyle on the perimeters of towns and cities.

A post-war housing crisis prompted the ruling United Party to try to remedy the situation, but the large concentrations of informal settlement which were emerging by that stage in urban areas were one of the elements used by the National Party in their "*swart gevaar*" campaign which led to their election in

lands was even worse. Population pressure on the land resulted in the slow collapse of the rural productive economy, with the consequence that rural poverty became endemic. Few black South African rural households today have the economic means for self-sufficiency, and most are dependent upon remittances from household members residing in urban areas, or on state pensions, to meet the needs for household reproduction. Both urban and rural areas were periodically subject to the traumas of forced removal, which damaged local economies beyond repair, while transferring the responsibility for development to unrepresentative, badly resourced and often poorly skilled homeland bureaucracies, and usually resulted in no development – social, economic or infrastructural – taking place. The growing poverty and underdevelopment in the areas of South Africa where black South Africans were allowed to settle did however serve as fertile soil for the growth of the AIC movement.

In the same year as the introduction of apartheid, Sundkler's pioneering study of the AICs appeared. The coincidence is fortuitous, but misleading. As Sundkler notes in the foreword to the second edition of the book,

when "apartheid" arrived, the [...] AIC movement [...] found itself already apart.²¹

The reference is to the culture of exclusivity which the AIC movement had long cultivated. This desire to be "separate" was in many respects a political decision: the AICs sought to assert their status as "independent" churches, not subject to white rule, and so distanced themselves from the mission churches which whites had brought to South Africa. At the same time, one of the unintended consequences of apartheid's disempowerment of black communities was to increase the determination of black South Africans to assert control over their social, economic and political destinies. In this sense, apartheid social engineering created the material circumstances in which social movements such as AICs, with their own practical social action, motivated by a fusion of an indigenous mutualist ethos with a Christian concern for alleviating poverty and providing social support for the poor, while at the same time avoiding dependency upon outside aid, were able to flourish.

On the other hand, unlike the labour and civic movements, which en-



The special coffin: Ministers with their gowns and academic headgear, burying their archbishop

1948 and the implementation of apartheid. The apartheid system deemed that South Africa's urban areas were for white South Africans only, and black South Africans were merely temporary sojourners in urban areas, obliged to remain in their rural homelands if not in wage employment in the formal economy. Poorly developed formal townships on the edges of South Africa's towns and cities were designed to house the urban black population. Services and housing standards were kept to a minimum, so that the costs for the social reproduction of labour would remain low, and would mostly be met by the pre-capitalist rural productive economy in the "Native Reserves", or "homelands" as they now became.²⁰ The situation in the home-

tered into alliances with national political liberation movements, the AICs steered clear of involvement in party politics. Although Ethiopianism and African nationalism were important political factors which shaped the emergence of the AIC movement, nearly all AICs have tended to dissuade their membership from direct political activism. The AICs tend to see political affiliation as a divisive force which is anathema to the ethos of social unity which they espouse. This needs to be distinguished from a total indifference to the hardships caused by national political agendas. Members of AICs do become involved in community-based structures which are aimed at addressing the poverty of their communities, as recent research has demonstrated; moreover, while in many instances these may not be actual church-affiliated structures, AICs support actively those forms of social organization which allow the poor and disempowered to work communally to address their needs.

Moreover, increased politicization of all aspects of black South African life has increased the pressure on AIC members to affiliate to political groupings, while fundamental changes in the social fabric compel groupings within the AICs – notably women and youth – to assume new roles within the churches. As South Africa changes, so too do the AICs: but equally, the AICs are potential instruments of change themselves.

The AICs, as Kieman and others have argued, are churches of the poor for the poor, providing the poor with a sense of "reconstituted order" and of upliftment and empowerment. Another important aspect of the AICs which may be attractive to the black South African urban poor is their patriarchal and hierarchical structure. With authority clearly and unambiguously vested in a prophet/leader, the AICs resemble the traditional extended family, which was the basic unit of the pre-colonial social order, and indeed the model along which traditional South African society was organized. The erosion of the extended family in the urban and peri-urban zones of South Africa has therefore worn away the basic societal unit within which *ubuntu* occurred.

Because they typically act like and are structured along the same lines as the extended family, the AICs have been able to act as a substitute social order which both looks back to tradi-

tional society and renews it.²² Within an AIC congregation, an individual can not only find identity as a member of a specific group who all share the same beliefs and the same forms of worship, but can also – in terms of *ubuntu* – find identity as an individual as well. In this sense, small, human-scale church congregations might be expected to proliferate as society continues to secularize, creating problems of depersonalization.

The role of the independent churches is therefore also partially to carry forward the humanity of the older African society into the industrial and post-industrial context, holding to the model of family relations to structure a caring enclave in the impersonal urban



world. Networks of mutual support can consolidate new interpersonal ties into long-term exchange relations. Church membership therefore enables disparate individuals to be in effect adopted into an urban family idiom.

Indigenous church formation is thus as much driven by the need to respond to alienation as it is by anything else. Responding to alienation, the AICs offer a buffer to the stresses which follow from rural-urban migration, and create a psychic zone within which the uprooted and disorientated individual can adapt. By offering value systems which are closely modelled upon traditional values, and by replicating in the church structure and in its rituals and operations many aspects of the extend-

The St John's Apostolic Faith Church in Claremont near Durban. This is one of the largest churches in South Africa originally founded by a woman, referred to as MANKU during the 1903s



Dancing in a circle gives spiritual power

ed family and chiefdom structure, the AICs are able to act as a stabilizing force within urban and peri-urban areas.²³ The AICs are therefore able to thrive at the point of interaction between traditional South African black society and the modernizing influence of urbanization.

This replication of the extended family into the contemporary, atomic social order has had major repercussions for black South African society, particularly in the fraught urban and peri-urban environments. It is here that the major struggles against apartheid were fought, and that the current disorientation experienced by many in post-apartheid South Africa is most keenly felt. For new migrants entering town from rural areas, the loss of the family and communal support systems of rural communities may be traumatic; the cross-pressures of competing political movements, the problems of overcrowding and underdevelopment, and the fierce competition for scarce footholds in the urban economy all carry with them the potential for severe psychic stress.

In such a climate, even the established mainline churches struggle to be relevant to the immediate needs of people. The AICs, on the other

hand, are at their most active in these strata of contemporary South African society, acting as information networks to new migrants about possible accommodation opportunities, providing food and money to the most needy, and shelter to those displaced by violence.²⁴ Traditional healing practised by the AICs provides therapy for those suffering most severely from the effects of stress. And AIC-founded mutual aid systems, such as stokvels, burial societies and other savings clubs, allow the poor to mobilize their scarce resources around their immediate basic needs. These are important areas where the AICs can be seen to be intervening directly in transforming their social environment. The next section will discuss some of these interventions in detail.

AIC intervention in the social environment

This section of the paper will investigate the role of AICs in the social environment in regard to the following issues:

- activities directly related to the improvement of the economic and material circumstances of their constituencies;

- activities which relate to the social and psychological circumstances of community members;
- the forces which constrain greater direct AIC involvement in transforming the social environment.

It will be seen that AICs tend at present not to be directly engaged in activities which are aimed at improving the infrastructural resource base of the communities in which they live, but that they are involved in promoting an attitude towards the community and towards community-wide problems which is developmental.

AIC activities relating to economic and material upliftment

The involvement of AICs in direct economic and material development can be summarized under the following headings:

- organization of economic activities (such as informal trader groups, co-operatives, welfare groups, stokvels and burial societies);
- participation in social groups (youth and old-age groups);
- involvement in education (such as membership of school committees, literacy groups, and teachers' and study groups);
- participation in organized community activity (e.g. in civics or area committees);
- assistance with migration;
- emergency relief work.

Organized economic activities

Organized economic activities such as informal trader groups, burial societies, stokvels, rotating credit associations and small businesses constitute activities which are development-related in the most direct sense. They enable community members to utilize their own limited resources in a manner that promotes the growth of those resources, without having to depend upon outside assistance.

Informal economic activities probably account for most of the economic activity occurring in informal settlements in South Africa, despite the fact that they are normally under-reported in surveys.²⁵ Levels of formal employment are low throughout the informal settlements of the Durban Functional Region, which implies that increasingly households are relying on informal



Girls of the church of the Nazarites dancing at Ekuphakament. Before these dances they first have a prayer session

earnings (and upon transfers in the form of pensions) to survive.

There is evidence that AIC members are more likely to be involved in informal trader groups than non-AIC members. This may not be widespread throughout all AICs. Although survey evidence suggests that such activities are less frequent among members of the *iBandla lamaNazaretha*,²⁶ at a workshop held to discuss the survey findings with AICs, it was suggested that this was due more to under-reportage of informal sector activity than to non-participation in the informal sector.

Survey evidence also shows that AICs are not directly involved in the sponsorship of such activities.²⁷ This is no doubt due to the low resource bases which AICs experience themselves, as churches of the poor for the poor. The correlation between AIC membership and involvement in informal trader groups therefore needs some explaining. It would appear that the attitudes fostered by AICs – with their strong emphasis on mutual aid, and on encouraging an individual to develop his/her own potential – are encouraging their members to engage in such activities, though without the direct assistance of the church.

In addition to containing individuals who are involved in small businesses, a number of the independent churches have started money-generating activities such as rotating credit associations and stokvels, and especially burial societies.²⁸

Burial societies

The members of burial societies contribute regular sums to a pool which is used to meet the burial expenses of members or their immediate families. These expenses involve not only the cost of the coffin, service and grave site, but also the cost of the funeral meal. Their developmental function, though limited, is important: they allow community members to meet the costs of funerals, as well as promote unity through the social dimension of the funeral.²⁹

Most independent churches operate burial societies, or allow their members to join burial societies organized by non-members. Increasingly, however, the exclusivity which is a hallmark of many AICs appears to limit the role of these burial societies.³⁰ In some cases membership, of AIC-sponsored burial societies is limited to members of the supporting church: there is a concern that open-

ing the burial society to all members of the community may have a negative effect upon church unity and identity. Exclusive burial societies are seen as a way of promoting adherence to church practices and beliefs. Similarly, members of AICs may join burial societies not affiliated to the church – but this may be discouraged, as in the instance of one branch of the *iBandla lamaNazaretha* in Folweni which attempts to draw its members into participation in its own burial society by actively criticizing the behaviour and practices of the organizers of other burial societies.³¹

Stokvels and rotating credit associations

Stokvels are informal credit associations which operate on a pattern widely encountered throughout Africa. In essence, a stokvel is

a type of credit union in which a group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pool weekly, fortnightly or monthly. Then, depending on the rules governing a particular stokvel, this money or a portion of it may be drawn by members either in rotation or in a time of need.³²

The developmental function which is normally attributed to stokvels is that they make credit capital available to households who would be unable to qualify for loans from formal lending institutions.³³ In addition, stokvels promote the well-being of a group rather than of single individuals. They require some degree of skill and organization in management, and can thereby promote the formation of organizations in civil society with capacity for involvement in development. On a small scale, stokvels embody the sorts of development-related activity that can be expanded to benefit a larger number of people.

Some AICs run stokvels as a way of reducing the need for a burial society run specifically by the church members.



Ukukhanga Mission of Apich. After sweeping the church yard at Mphendle in the Drakensburg where they gather for fourteen days every year, they raise the brooms as a sign of victory that Jesus Christ has given his life so that their sins are taken away. The red uniforms symbolises the blood of Jesus.

However, AIC-sponsored stokvels for church members appear to be rare. For this reason, it appears that most members of independent churches seeking informal credit are obliged to join stokvels run by other members of the community.³⁴

Although independent churches which do not operate stokvels and the like are also those which interact most with the entire community, these churches indicate that they would like to implement more church-orientated economic activities. These are seen to contribute both to church unity and to greater financial well-being.³⁵

Small business development

Small businesses are seen as sites for capital formation, and thus as ways of engaging community resources in development. Members of independent churches are often active in small business, though they need not be members of an organized small business group; one instance where this is true is the *iBandla lamaNazaretha*.³⁶ Survey evidence suggests that, while small business groups are not usually formally aligned to AICs, independent church members are frequently involved in small business groups.³⁷

In some instances, however, church groups catering for women and youth participate in the informal sector, retailing clothing and foodstuffs, while successful small business participants may contribute financially towards assisting poor members by making donations to church collections and creating employment. In such instances, small business involvement contributes not only to an improved quality of life for the church members involved, but also leads to a return to the church funds of profits which are realized.³⁸

AIC members studied have formed co-operatives, some of which have extended their sales networks as far as Transkei. In one instance a co-operative member who is a successful salesperson of used and new clothes plans to expand her activities and to offer training workshops which can impart skills to employees while furthering the commercial success of the co-operative.³⁹

Nonetheless, greater participation in organized small business activity is constrained by both a lack of time and a shortage of financial and organizational management skills. Again, survey evidence indicates that the low resource base of AICs constrains their activities in this regard, and the most important contribution which the AICs are making is in the fostering of attitudes which are developmental. Where direct aid is forthcoming, it may be conditional on some kind of pay-back. One respondent in a recent survey of AIC support for small business noted that:

The church assisted me by lending money, but stipulated that it would have to be paid back as the money would be used towards making a profit.⁴⁰

Such an instance in fact confirms the ethos of mutualism in the AICs: financial aid is seen as a resource which must be constantly renewed. Similarly,

respondents in the same survey note that assistance for small business activity may be forthcoming when the enterprise undertaken can contribute towards the well-being of the church. One respondent noted that the church offered assistance in setting up a small catering service, in return for which "I do the catering for church functions",⁴¹ while yet another respondent noted that "the church gave a small contribution towards a sewing machine in the hope that I would make uniforms for them".⁴² It must be emphasized, however, that such direct assistance with small business development is rare.

Social groups

Social groups such as youth groups and old-age groups play an important role in allowing these demographic categories to mobilize the resources available to them to meet their needs. As such, they enable their participants to make a meaningful contribution towards the improvement in the quality of life of all community members.

Rates of participation in social groups are higher among independent church members than any other sector of the population.⁴³ The importance of AICs in the formation of such groups clearly indicates that this is a major developmental contribution which AICs make.

Møller and Nkosi⁴⁴ have studied the sociological function of old-age "excursion groups". They have concluded that social activities for the elderly play an important role in promoting well-being and a sense of psychological worth among a sector of the population who are usually marginalized.

Social groups for youth appear to be an important potential channel for development-related activity.⁴⁵ Membership of an AIC appears to be a factor encouraging youth to become involved in social and economic group activities. The economic activities of social groups appear to be as important as their social activities. Most AICs have youth choral groups which enter into competitions with similar groups from other churches, and in some cases use these opportunities to generate revenue for other youth activities, such as expeditions and outings. However, the extent to which youth actually do raise funds varies from church to church. In the *iBanda lama-Nazaretha*, small-scale food and handicraft selling does generate some income; in other AICs this kind of activity has

been mooted, but does not seem to take place on any scale.⁴⁶

A further importance of this kind of activity is the training which it offers to people in managerial and organizational skills. Leadership in these groups has however at times been critical of the main church leadership.⁴⁷

Education-related activities

The developmental role of educational activities is self-evident: apart from conveying skills which can be used for income generation, education conveys a sense of personal empowerment. Involvement in community-based activities aimed at improving access to education also enables community members to challenge the hegemonic pater-



nalistic structure of formal education in South Africa.

For the independent churches, the need for training and education in other types of activity, most of all economic empowerment, appears to supersede literacy and formal schooling education in importance. There is little AIC involvement in school committees and other related activities.⁴⁸ Instead, the focus of AIC activity in this regard is on educational activities which will facilitate either finding a job or personal income generation through small business activity.

The AICs are profoundly cognisant of the fact that unemployment leads to

social problems for the entire church. They therefore advocate that employed members should help the unemployed to find jobs or offer financial support to the destitute. Recognizing however that the unemployed cannot be sustained in this way indefinitely, they look to skills training to assist the more impoverished and the unemployed to attain self-sufficiency. Consequently, they identify a need for training in manual skills on demand in the formal job market (bricklaying or dressmaking, for example), as well as skills to promote the formation of viable organizations.⁴⁹ The importance of education for self-sufficiency is obviously a major concern for AICs.

This is not to imply that illiteracy is perceived to be a disadvantage, but rather that potential employability is seen to be paramount. Literacy is often interpreted in the AICs to be important in regard to issues involving church activities such as Bible-reading or financial management.⁵⁰

The *iBandla lamaNazaretha* attempts to link its religious principles to an educational need:

the church wants to start its own agricultural technikon, both in order to avoid dependency on state education and also to refrain from dealing with unclean or taboo animals that the students would be forced to use during their studies.⁵¹

The Ethiopian Church in Zion has combined a job creation programme with skills training for its members and market development for the products created. Candles made by church members are sold to spazas, for retail to members and non-members. In this way, members' money is "protected". The church is also exploring market opportunities as far afield as Mozambique.⁵²

Involvement in organized community activities

As noted above, significant development activities are undertaken by other organs of civil society, though members of AICs appear averse to participating in them.⁵³ But political affiliation is held to be an individual matter when it does not affect church activities, and church members remain aware of social and political problems in their communities. For this reason, if involvement with political groupings seems limited, participation in civil society organizations concerned

with the regulation of community life, such as civics and area committees, does occur, albeit in a limited fashion.

Where individual AIC members do become active in community organizations, this may help to reconcile AIC neutrality with necessary self-interest, and thereby facilitate contact between churches and community bodies.

It may be that the non-political stance of AICs militates against their being able to access service and development organizations, especially where these organizations have aligned themselves overtly to political parties. Extremely exclusivist churches such as the *iBandla lamaNazaretha* experience a problem of increased dependency upon the church for assis-

institution presently available to the urban poor. Although their long-standing ethic has prohibited involvement with issues of urban power, the changes noted above do seem to draw them into engagement with civic issues. They are in a good position to offer both material and spiritual support to their congregants.⁵⁵

Two hypotheses explain the role of the independent churches in the urbanization process. Firstly, it is argued that the independent churches represent a reception institution for individuals and households moving into the urban environment from the rural districts. Secondly, it is suggested that the nature of the churches is essentially social, and that their value is to sustain rural traditions of mutual reliance into



St Johns Apostolic Faith Mission. The leader and ministers in front; the flock at the back. They come to the beach for cleansing i.e. for inner renewal

tance in dealing with social and political crises which could be countered by greater involvement in community-based development structures.⁵⁴

Assistance with migration

An important area where AICs play a role is in regard to facilitating the urban migration process. Disadvantaged households involved in moving between informal settlements or from rural areas to town need to establish effective small-scale organization at grass roots level capable of helping build reliable mutual support. Evidence suggests that the AICs are the most generally available and most consistently effective non-political local level

the impersonal urban context. Research supports both these explanations.⁵⁶

Contemporary rural-origin migrant households appear to adapt better to the urban environment than previous generations of migrant households. The greatest need is thus in regard to continual on-migration through the informal settlements. Evidence from the Durban Functional Region suggests that the population of informal settlements is spatially unstable, and engaged in constant on-migration.⁵⁷

Assistance may take the form of help in locating a site or house, financial assistance, building supplies, labour and home furnishings. In addition, the independent churches also

provide a social network for reception of new migrants into the area. This type of assistance is most important at the time of the move, but continues while the household remains affiliated to the church.⁵⁸

Emergency relief work

Research has demonstrated the importance of AICs in providing support for households in times of crisis, such as flooding, the burning of a homestead as a result of violence or accident, as well as the hardship resulting from the death of a family member. During such crises, AICs provide material support and assistance to both member and non-member households, treating the latter occasions as opportunities for proselytizing. Support may take the

Church leadership and spiritual groups promoting social unity

One important aspect of AICs is their emphasis on spiritual direction coupled with social action. This provides an important support base, promotes community unity, and can act as a social resource on which members can rely in times of need. This aspect may be crucial to any future involvement of AICs in development.

Groups which appear not to have a directly developmental function, such as organized ministers' groups, church committees and prayer groups, may in fact be crucial in this regard because of their performance of such functions.

In times of family crisis such as death, both individual members of AICs and organized AIC prayer groups

hostility, and by mass violence. Disadvantaged households have very little control in relation to this anomic and harsh environment. In this context, the spiritual healing and promotion of mutual commitment promoted by the churches provides an important form of stress management. Anxiety is reduced to a manageable level, enabling individuals to continue living and working in a dangerous and demoralizing urban context.⁶¹

Survey evidence suggests an interesting interaction between the stress management-related aspects of AICs and the more directly economical forms of development aid. In a number of instances, small business entrepreneurs claim to have received spiritual assistance in setting up their economic enterprises. The following instance is typical:

For two years I could not get a job. One evening I had a dream of my grandmother who told me that she had heard of my problem, and told me that I must be independent, I must not be employed elsewhere. I had no money but in the dream I was walking on lush green grass and just ahead of me I saw a purse. When I picked it up, I found that it contained ninety rand, and a female voice said "This is the beginning." The following morning I went to town and as I entered the toilet, I saw a wallet lying there which contained two hundred rand.⁶²

Leaving aside the circumstances by which this respondent managed to mobilize some starting capital, what is significant in this instance is the emphasis placed by the dream on independence, and on starting one's own source of income-generation rather than relying on formal employment. This would appear to be where the AICs are making their greatest contribution towards development: they foster an attitude of self-empowerment, which appears to manifest itself in self-employment. The contribution AICs make to development in this regard is far greater than that which comes from their direct intervention in developmental and income-generating activities.

Summary

The AIC movement is the largest form of civil society mobilization in South Africa, with nearly two in every five people currently belonging to an AIC:



• Saint Ezekial Church of Zion, South Africa. In the middle is Umf. S. Seme from Newtown, Inanda with flag and "shepherds" stick/staff

form of food, clothing, shelter, or assistance with finding a new home if needed.⁵⁹

AIC activities relating to social and psychological support

In addition to activities which are overtly related to development, AICs provide other services which contribute indirectly to the emotional and psychological upliftment of the populations of informal settlements. These are discussed under two headings:

- church leadership and spiritual groups
- stress management.

offer support through form of prayer to all members of the broader community, whether or not these are church members themselves. Again, these activities have a proselytizing function. Collections of money may be taken up for bereaved families regardless of church affiliation where burial societies are not in operation, or to supplement the pay-outs from such societies.⁶⁰

Stress management

The independent churches offer a significant service in the urban context in the form of stress management. Informal settlements are often characterized by conflict over resources, by real

far more than are involved in either labour unions or civics, this has resulted in a reassessment of their role in South African society. The rapid growth in AIC membership has taken place during the last 30 years, suggesting a correlation to the social, economic and political travail of black South Africans during the struggle against apartheid.

This is not, as conventional AIC scholarship has suggested, because of the reactionary nature of the AICs: far from being conservative "safe havens" from the forces of change and modernization, the AICs have been a positive shaping force in black South African society. They represent a form of mobilization of the poor to address the problems of poverty and under-develop-

port – resonates deeply with the traditional African ethos of *ubuntu*. This is the traditional African ethos of mutual support whereby "individualism" is harmonized with social responsibility. The AICs derive their programme of social activity from a recognition that *ubuntu* resembles closely the mutualism and communal sharing of the early Christian church.

This has proven to be the major drawcard for the AICs, located as they are within the context of the struggle against colonialism and later apartheid. Both colonialism and apartheid have created a social environment for black South Africans which is fraught with material and psychological stresses. Though the AICs have remained unaligned with national political liberation movements, this is not be confused with a total indifference to the hardships caused by racial oppression. On the contrary, the AICs are intimately involved in confronting these problems. This suggests that the AICs need to be seen – as are other social movements – as groupings of poor people tackling the issue of poverty with a communal, mutual strategy.

Moreover, it can be argued that the AICs reproduce into the urban environment the structure of the traditional South African extended family, which formed the basic unit of the pre-colonial social order, and was therefore the arena within which both individual and group identity were defined in terms of *ubuntu*. A major attraction of AICs is therefore probably that they permit members to define their identities in an urban environment which is otherwise alienating and anomic. This allows the AICs to act as a stabilising force within urban and peri-urban areas,⁶³ and allows the AICs to meet needs that the establishment/mission churches are probably not even aware of.

The AICs appear to be relatively rarely directly involved in economic and infrastructural development, but are involved in promoting an attitude towards the community and towards community-wide problems which is developmental. It is as a result of this ethos that organized economic activities, such as informal trader groups, co-operatives, welfare groups, stokvels and burial societies are frequently organized under the aegis of AICs. They encourage formation of church-aligned youth and old-age groups, and their members become involved in school committees,



Purification at the sea. The St Johns Apostolic Faith Mission.

ment through a holistic strategy which combines social support with tangible development interventions.

The AICs have from the outset been a response to a history of racial oppression. Their roots lie on the one hand in a challenge to the political and cultural hegemony of European colonialism propagated by the orthodox Christian mission churches, and on the other in the potent symbolism of Ethiopia as adopted by the African-American liberation movement, and the strong emphasis upon spiritualism of the pentecostal movement. This emphasis – and that of Christianity upon social sup-

literacy groups, teachers' and study groups, and civics. AICs appear to play a leading role in facilitating the urban migration process, and are often quick to offer relief aid in times of emergency.

Possibly most importantly, AICs provide other services which contribute indirectly to the emotional and psychological upliftment of the populations of informal settlements. Their emphasis on spiritual direction coupled with social action promotes community unity, and provides a social support network on which members can rely in times of need. The major area of intervention in the social environment however is probably in the realm of stress management. The spiritual healing which the AICs offer helps their members to deal with the psychological pressures inherent in urban life.

It is possible that the AICs have still to perform their most valuable function in transforming a social environment ravaged by apartheid. The various forms of social support listed above are all undertaken in the absence of substantial financial aid from outside their ranks. This is of considerable significance for the success of the Government of National Unity's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). One of the major problems which confronts the RDP is the fear that aid to underdeveloped communities from outside the community may promote dependency, with communities coming to rely on constant inputs from outside their ranks in order to survive.⁶⁴ In the face of this concern, there is a growing belief that communities need to mobilize their own resources in a communal fashion in order to effect development without creating dependency. The AIC movement has been doing just this for several decades, and consequently may be able to offer to the RDP an eminently useful model for societal transformation.

Notes and references

- 1 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clarke, "Out of the wind: The African independent/indigenous churches and youth urbanization in metropolitan Natal", unpublished report, Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1993.
- 2 G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and stokvels: Entrepreneurship activities with a religious dimension*, forthcoming, 1996.
- 3 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *Rise up and walk: Development*

and the African independent/indigenous churches in Durban, Durban. Report by Rural Urban Studies Unit and NERMIC, 1992; G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and small business: Spiritual support for secular empowerment*. Forthcoming, 1996.

- 4 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, p 23.
- 5 M Schoffeleers, "Ritual healing and political acquiescence: The case of the Zionist churches in Southern Africa", *Africa*, vol 60, no 1, 1991, pp 1-25; P M Zulu and G C Oosthuizen, "Religion and world outlook", in G C Oosthuizen and I Hexham (eds), *Afro-Christian religion at the grassroots in Southern Africa*, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991; C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 36.
- 6 H W Turner, "A typology for modern African independent religious movements",



Journal of Religion in Africa, vol 1, no 1, 1967, pp 1-34.

- 7 *Ibid*, p 11.
- 8 *Ibid*, p 23.
- 9 Quoted in H W Turner, *op cit*, p 26.
- 10 H W Turner, *op cit*, p 26.
- 11 B G M Sundkler, *Bantu prophets in South Africa*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- 12 C Saunders, *Tile and the Thembu Church: Politics and independence on the Cape Eastern frontiers in the late nineteenth century*, Cape Town: The Abe Bailey Institute of International Studies Reprint, no 3, 1971.
- 13 A Jacques-Garvey, *The philosophy and opinions of Marcus Garvey (1924-1926)*, Vol II, reprinted in New York. Arno Press, 1969.

The older women in their outfit dancing during the July festival at Ifkuphakama

- 14 G C Oosthuizen, *Societal anomie and the proliferation of the African independent/indigenous churches*, KwaDlangezwa: University of Zululand, 1993.
- 15 E Mahon, "The formation of the Christian Catholic Church in Zion and its earliest contacts with South Africa", in G C Oosthuizen (ed), *Religion alive: Studies in the new movements and indigenous churches in Southern Africa*, Cape Town: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986.
- 16 G C Oosthuizen, *Religion alive ...*, *op cit*, pp 223-245.
- 17 H Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa", *Economy and Society*, vol 1, no 4, 1972, pp 425-6.
- 18 L Platzky and C Walker, *The surplus people*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985.
- 19 Quoted in A Lemon (ed), *Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1991.
- 20 H Wolpe, *op cit*, p 11.
- 21 B G M Sundkler, *op cit*, p 4.
- 22 G C Oosthuizen, *Societal anomie ...*, *op cit*, p 11.
- 23 *Ibid*, p 36.
- 24 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, p 13.
- 25 See C Cross, C Clark, N Bromberger, S Bekker and P Christiansen, *The informal population of the Durban functional region: An overview*, unpublished report, Durban: Town and Regional Planning Commission, 1993.
- 26 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 25.
- 27 G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and stokvels ...*, *op cit*, p 24; and G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and small businesses...*, *op cit*, pp 35-36.
- 28 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, pp 40-43.
- 29 *Ibid*. See also G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and stokvels...*, *op cit*, p 18-65.
- 30 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, pp 66-88.
- 31 *Ibid*, p 84.
- 32 A K Lukhele, *Stokvels in South Africa: Informal savings schemes by blacks for the black community*, Johannesburg: Amagi Books, 1990.
- 33 *Ibid*, p 1.
- 34 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, pp 36-37.
- 35 *Ibid*, p 25.
- 36 G C Oosthuizen, "Development in the traditional Afro-Christian context with special reference to developmental attitudes and small scale business", unpublished document, 1990; and C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 36.
- 37 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 39.
- 38 *Ibid*, p 41.
- 39 *Ibid*, p 42.
- 40 G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and small businesses*, *op cit*, pp 56-58.
- 41 *Ibid*, p 48.
- 42 *Ibid*, p 57.
- 43 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, pp 23-24.
- 44 V Møller and L Nkosi, *The benefits of excursions for seniors: A consumer survey*, Cape Town: HSRC/UCT Centre for Gerontology Discussion Paper, 1992.
- 45 V Møller, *Lost generation found: Black youth at leisure*, Durban: Youth Centre Project South Africa, 1991.
- 46 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 15.
- 47 *Ibid*. See also C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, p 50.
- 48 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 15.
- 49 *Ibid*, p 42.
- 50 *Ibid*, p 39.
- 51 *Ibid*, p 44.
- 52 *Ibid*, p 56.
- 53 J P Kiernan, *The production and management of therapeutic power in a Zulu city*, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991.
- 54 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 45; C. Cross, C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, p 56.
- 55 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, p 39.
- 56 *Ibid*, pp 66-69.
- 57 C Cross, C Clark, N Bromberger, S Bekker and P Christiansen, *op cit*, p 23.
- 58 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, p 69.
- 59 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 36; C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, pp 40-44.
- 60 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen, S Bekker and J Evans, *op cit*, p 42; C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, pp 50-59.
- 61 C Cross, G C Oosthuizen and C Clark, *op cit*, pp 50-59.
- 62 G C Oosthuizen, *African independent churches and small business...*, *op cit*.
- 63 G C Oosthuizen, *Societal anomie...*, *op cit*, p 15.
- 64 C Cross, S Bekker and C Clark, *Coming clean: Community development funding and the politics of accountability*, Durban: Indicator Press, 1995.

Casting shadows on SADC: AIDS policy in Southern Africa into the next century

Introduction

After nearly a decade of organized efforts by African governments to address the AIDS pandemic, there are still very few cross-national, comparative policy studies. Strategies, innovations, common problems and challenges faced by different states need to be analysed and shared. As the crisis deepens, regional cooperation and policy coordination are especially important.

This paper updates and expands upon an earlier study of national AIDS policy in the Republic of Botswana.¹ It offers cross-national comparisons between Botswana's AIDS policies and those of other states in the region, particularly South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. An argument in support of greater regional cooperation within the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is advanced.


Botswana is one of Africa's few success stories, with the continent's third-highest per capita GNP (\$2 530), an average life expectancy of 68 years, and infant mortality rate of 36 per 1 000, the latter two statistics the best in Africa. Yet, despite one of the best National AIDS Control Programmes on the continent, the AIDS epidemic continues to worsen.² In the absence of a timely, affordable vaccine or cure, the success of AIDS education and prevention efforts at national and regional levels will dramatically influence the health of the next generation of peoples and regimes in Southern Africa. According to the World Bank, AIDS is now the leading cause of mortality among people between the ages of 15 and 39 in Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.³ Clearly, AIDS has the potential to delay, disrupt, even destroy regional development objectives: economic integration, grass-

roots political democratization, regional peace and security.

An important cross-national variable for comparing the relative effectiveness of national AIDS policies is degree of cultural diversity. Within the SADC region, the larger, more culturally-diverse states, Zimbabwe and South Africa, will have a more difficult task in designing effective AIDS prevention and education strategies than smaller, more homogeneous ones, such as Botswana and Swaziland. All states face common problems and can benefit from cooperation.

Towards a coordinated regional AIDS policy agenda

Despite the vast differences and disparities among the SADC states, a strong argument can be made in favour of creating mechanisms for greater HIV/AIDS policy integration, coordination, sharing of knowledge and information. The basic logic underlying the creation of the original Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), 16



Dr James J Zaffiro, of the Department of Political Science at Central College, Pella, Iowa surveys the policy approaches of SADC governments confronting the ravages of AIDS in the region.

years ago, is most appropriate in facing this common regional challenge.

Some regional networking among NGOs and ASCs (AIDS service organizations) is occurring across the sub-region through the Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organizations (Sanaso) which was created in 1990 when representatives of National AIDS programmes from 10 states came together in Harare and established Sanaso "to allow NGOs in the Southern African region to learn from each others' experience, build solidarity, and explore opportunities for further cooperation, in order to develop a more effective service in the struggle against

- How do cultural definitions of AIDS impact on efforts by governments to formulate, implement, and evaluate national AIDS strategies in SADC states?
- Have some countries been more successful in coping with AIDS than others? How should "success" be defined?
- Is success related to financial outlay? External aid? Policy coordination and decentralization? Administrative efficiency?
- Are some states more effectively reaching high-risk groups, especially rural women, than others? How are they doing it?

technical expertise in developing, implementing, and evaluating HIV/AIDS initiatives.

The socio-cultural demographics of AIDS in SADC

Are SADC states succeeding? How successful have national AIDS strategies been in reaching high-risk, low-power groups, especially rural women? Well-endowed financially from diamond revenues, and with a population which is 80-85% Setswana-speaking and mainly concentrated along a narrow line of road and rail in the eastern third of the country, Botswana would seem to be in a relatively favourable position to formulate and deliver an effective AIDS policy. Indeed, on paper, through the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government response to the AIDS epidemic was comprehensive, humane, and effective. After a slow start, the Ministry of Health proved flexible and innovative, accepting the need to encourage decentralized, integrated, culture-sensitive AIDS education and prevention messages. Concerted efforts have been made to involve a cross-section of social, religious, and traditional groups, as well as national and international NGOs.⁶

And yet, with an estimated 120 000-180 000 HIV-positives, or nearly 15% of the national population, Botswana is fast losing ground in the fight against AIDS.⁷ Rates of new infections continue to double every 12-15 months.⁸ By 1999, there will have been 63 000 AIDS cases of whom 57 000 will have died.⁹ The Minister of Health recently projected 330 000 HIV infections and 60 000 cases of full-blown AIDS by the year 2000.¹⁰ Botswana's National AIDS Control Programme Director cites UNAIDS figures which reveal that the country ranks second worldwide in the rate of spread of new HIV infections. He predicts that by 2000 one quarter of the population will be HIV-positive.¹¹

Many Botswana still see AIDS as a distant or foreign problem.¹² Sentinel surveillance studies continue to show a high level of knowledge about modes of transmission, so much so that the national AIDS Programme has decided to stop doing the annual surveys and put the money into prevention programmes instead. Given the high mobility of the population because of growing car ownership and the



and control of HIV and AIDS.³ Research in the region is being promoted and shared through the Network of AIDS Researchers in East and Southern Africa (Naresa).⁵

Under the leadership and guidance of the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone and the national AIDS control committees of the member states, and with the help and support of the United Nations AIDS Programme (UNAIDS), it is proposed that a regional conference on HIV/AIDS be organized and convened in 1999, as a prelude to launching a standing SADC AIDS Directorate during the year 2000. Regional NGOs, universities and research institutes, health, education, local government, culture, and foreign affairs ministries, mass media, social and educational groups from member states should be encouraged to attend, as with the 1992 UNCED held in Rio de Janeiro.

Some important questions which such a conference might address include the following:

- What is the relationship between AIDS and regional cooperation for development?

- What policy evaluation and assessment mechanisms exist to more effectively monitor success or failure of prevention and education strategies?
- What is the optimal mix of government/NGO AIDS cooperation? How can it be facilitated and strengthened via SADC?
- How can state and commercial mass media be more effectively used in AIDS education and prevention?
- How can SADC member states more effectively coordinate and integrate official and unofficial anti-AIDS efforts?

SADC foreign ministries and departments of external affairs already have a comparative advantage in liaising with one another, and with states and international organizations world wide. Together they will better be able to mobilize support from the donor community for HIV/AIDS initiatives and use their diplomatic communications and opportunities for the exchange of

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

country's well-developed and expanding network of roads, the risk of widespread diffusion of HIV infection to smaller towns and villages, even remote settlements and cattle posts, is high.¹³ Indeed, rural women now constitute the most vulnerable risk group.

Zimbabwe, by comparison, with a larger, more culturally diverse and geographically dispersed population, has an even more serious problem.¹⁴ By 1990, 16,5% of pregnant women and 40,6% of STD patients tested HIV positive.¹⁵ Health Minister Dr Timothy Stamps estimates that 1,5 million Zimbabweans, more than 15% of the national population, already have the virus. Harare is suffering from a growing shortage of burial space, as the number of deaths has doubled in the last three years.¹⁶ By the end of 1996, fully 250 000 people will have died from AIDS-related illnesses, out of a population of 11,5 million. Nearly one quarter of the dead will be children under the age of five, infected by HIV-positive mothers. There are already 60 000 AIDS orphans in Zimbabwe.¹⁷ The United Nations estimates that by 2005 AIDS will be responsible for an additional 520 000 deaths, with "an astounding 27,4%" occurring in people of prime working age (25–49 years).¹⁸

The tiny, land-locked Kingdom of Swaziland, even more culturally homogeneous than Botswana, and with a population fast approaching one million, has a serious AIDS problem as well.¹⁹ With one of Africa's highest annual rates of population growth, 3,8%, and nearly 50% of the population under the age of 15, the problem is due to worsen in the near future.²⁰ There is a strong link between poverty and HIV infection, as returning male migrant labourers put wives and unborn children at risk from sexual encounters abroad.²¹

The most frightening scenario in the region is that in South Africa. With 11 official national languages, great racial and ethnic diversity, a rapid influx of poor rural immigrants from neighbouring states, and a large population of 43 million, South Africa presents perhaps the most challenging AIDS prevention problem in all of Africa. National HIV prevalence has increased tenfold in the past five years.²² KwaZulu-Natal province, the poorest and most strife-torn area of the country, has the highest prevalence. By 2011 more than a million

people in KwaZulu-Natal Province alone could have AIDS.²³ The number of new HIV infections is doubling every 15 months.²⁴ A Unicef study of sexual knowledge and attitudes found that large numbers of young people are at risk for contracting HIV.²⁵ A model of incidence and spread of AIDS projects 970 000 new HIV infections by 1995, rising to 4,1 million by 2000, and reaching 6,4 million by 2005, with cumulative death estimates reaching 2,5 million. Another study estimates 2,5 million (best case) and between 4–6 million (worst case) HIV-infected persons by 2005.²⁶

The social and economic costs of

the right to make critical decisions are taking the hardest punches in the struggle to beat the HIV challenge.³⁰

At the Seventh International Conference on AIDS in Africa meeting in Yaoundé in 1993, Jonathan Mann argued that HIV prevention in Africa had been altogether unsuccessful to date because it had failed to address gender issues.³¹ Policy planners are working with little or no reliable information about "normal" sexual beliefs and behaviours. Research seldom takes into account local cultural norms and social structures governing sexuality. Gender relations, a crucial element of societal responses to all aspects of HIV/AIDS,



such scenarios are staggering.²⁷ There is no indication that infection rates in any SADC states have peaked. The long lag period between infection and disease, and the non-specific nature of its opportunistic infections, continue to mask the reality of AIDS from the general population of these states. It is the poor who are suffering most from AIDS, as it robs them of their only resource – their labour.²⁸ What is needed is a more holistic development ethos which places AIDS strategy within overall rural economic and social development policies.²⁹

SADC women and AIDS

AIDS in Africa cannot be detached from the problems associated with the patriarchal cultures and traditions which continue to underpin most societies, accompanied by female subordination, oppression and exploitation. AIDS has thrown into sharp relief the inequalities of power and decision-making between men and women. Those with least access to information, choices, health services, or

must be recognized and better understood before effective policies are possible.

The fact that health professionals have tended to emphasize symptoms of the disease as it manifests itself in men has further served to reinforce the unequal relationships of power/powerlessness surrounding AIDS in Africa.³² SADC women are bearing the brunt of the epidemic, as victims and as caretakers of afflicted family members.³³ Causes of AIDS among women in these states reside at the community level. It will be impossible to succeed without greater attention to the wider socio-cultural context of women.³⁴

Botswana, unlike most of its neighbours, had a good women's health infrastructure in place at the start of its AIDS crisis. The government recognized the need to work through institutions that reach rural women – schools, health centres, village development committees, and local governments – using them rather than allowing foreign relief agencies to take charge and develop their own organizations.³⁵ Botswana has closely



linked its programmes to control sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) with AIDS prevention and education. Zimbabwe's approach is similar.³⁶ Perinatal AIDS transmission is a growing concern. A quarter of reported AIDS cases are children under the age of five, most of whom die before their third birthday.³⁷

In Swaziland, even in cases where women have achieved awareness and might be willing to change behaviour, men are the ones who dictate the terms of sexual behaviour. No matter how much a woman can be made aware of the issue of safe sex, the husband has the authority to overrule behaviour changes, such as condom use. The cultural practice of polygyny also promotes spread of HIV/AIDS, again placing women at the mercy of husbands.³⁸ Research on males and family planning in Botswana reveals many of the same disturbing patterns.³⁹ Nearly 2 million condoms per month have been distributed, yet there is little evidence they are being used by single men surveyed.⁴⁰

The politics of AIDS in SADC states

People in all SADC states are affected by the same complex of socio-economic factors that have been shown to influence transmission of HIV/AIDS.⁴¹ Political instability, rapid population growth and urbanization, refugee influx, deepening poverty,⁴² labour migration,⁴³ squatting, homelessness, un-

employment, poor education, an inferior social position for women,⁴⁴ national diversities in language and culture, and under-funded, inadequate health and social service infrastructures. In the words of a South African AIDS worker, "the virus thrives in situations where the social and cultural norms which provide a stable framework for social relationships have been destabilised."⁴⁵

In South Africa, the National Party (NP) policy response through the early 1990s was limited by a range of factors, chief among them bureaucratic intransigence, and a health apartheid agenda which ascribed lower value to serving the needs of those most at risk during the early stages of the epidemic: gay white males and marginalized, disenfranchised blacks.⁴⁶ Government ministers accused ANC "terrorists" of bringing in AIDS from host states. The ANC responded with a Charter on AIDS in 1990, and support for a regional conference in 1991.⁴⁷

Until the creation of the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (Nacosa) in 1992, AIDS work in the country had been characterized by "violent distrust between NGOs and the State."⁴⁸ This had the net effect of blocking development of effective education materials and severely limited coordination of efforts. Government's failure to take a leading role led to the creation of Nacosa. Inclusion of a variety of public and private sector representatives, including community-based organizations, allowed a wide range of knowledge and experience

to go into its efforts to design and carry out integrated AIDS policies.⁴⁹

By the mid-1990s, however, under the Transitional Government of National Unity, a deeper understanding of the seriousness and widespread nature of the epidemic was coming to be reflected in more effective policy formulations, not only at the national level but provincially as well. Special attention was being given to KwaZulu-Natal by Nacosa and the National Advisory Committee on HIV/AIDS.⁵⁰

In 1996, the HIV/AIDS Directorate of the Department of Health received detailed recommendations on establishing an interdepartmental AIDS programme at the national and provincial levels from the national AIDS Council. If implemented, every ministry and department of government would establish a policy to target its own employees and other populations under its jurisdiction.⁵¹

As is the case in all SADC states, South Africa's government is the largest employer in the country. In 1995 it officially acknowledged that "to control and prevent the further spread of the virus a combined effort is needed from all sectors of society within and outside of government." Each sector has a comparative advantage that could impact on the epidemic. Government should take the lead and serve as a role model for other employing bodies.⁵² Departments will be responsible for allocating a portion of their budgets to AIDS-related activities.

In Botswana, until the mid-1980s, there was official silence concerning AIDS. Beginning in the late 1980s, with some urging from external NGOs, especially the World Health Organization (WHO), visible support grew among top national leaders for treating HIV/AIDS as a pressing national problem to be dealt with at the highest levels of government. President Masire opened the door with remarks urging greater attention to AIDS education, prevention, and behaviour change during his speech at the State Opening of Parliament in 1991.⁵³ From then on, the Minister of Health began making regular, detailed presentations on AIDS policy to the National Assembly.

By 1993, an official AIDS policy document had been approved and adopted as a Presidential Cabinet Directive. It was based on the premise that "only a national response which engages all sectors of society mean-

ingly in AIDS prevention will slow down the epidemic".⁵⁴ The policy forms the basis for a multisectoral national strategic plan and sectoral plans by all ministries, and serves as a code for all NGOs and CBOs (community-based organizations) in the AIDS area. The Office of the President is to "provide political leadership for the national response to the AIDS epidemic, and ensure that all sectors are mobilized and become involved, by mobilizing policy-makers and advocating the provision of public and private resources."⁵⁵ Other key ministries are Health, Local Government, and Education.⁵⁶

Since 1992, the Botswana Government has been providing close to 50% of the budgetary support for the National AIDS Control Programme. Nearly 60% of total budgetary allocations go to supporting prevention and education efforts.⁵⁷ The efforts of the NACP have gone increasingly into widening the involvement across all sectors and levels of government and administration, while incorporating and supporting efforts of private sector groups, especially employers.

The private sector has been slow to actively respond to the AIDS crisis. A turning point was reached in 1995, however, with a national "AIDS in the Workplace" conference sponsored by the Ministry of Health.⁵⁸ Since then, over 200 private sector personnel managers and executives have approached the National AIDS Control Programme for help in setting up prevention and education programmes for their employees.

Coordination at the central level has also been emphasized, with attention to growing international NGO involvement.⁵⁹ Despite these trends, only in early 1996 was a National AIDS Council actually formed.⁶⁰ The problem seems to have been unwillingness on the part of the Health Ministry to assume a leadership role. This role has now been assumed by the UNDP.

Botswana is one of very few African states with a functioning national legislature. Because of the budgetary and human resource implications of AIDS, and owing to the fact that MPs have been hearing from district and village councils in their constituencies, there has been some significant discussion of AIDS in the National Assembly.⁶¹ The 1996 debate focused on civil liberties of victims, and on calls

for more effective education and prevention strategies to counter the negative impact of AIDS on national development.⁶² Disagreement frequently centres on funding levels and where to locate overall administrative authority and policy control.⁶³ All political parties acknowledge AIDS as a major development threat and the three main parties have taken steps to make their members and followers more aware of the dangers associated with HIV/AIDS.⁶⁴

Botswana's state strategy has emphasized central government authority at the expense of local legitimacy throughout its post-independence political development. Limited traditional authority survives in a somewhat tense, subservient relationship with the political and administrative centre. This could compromise AIDS prevention and education programmes.

Zimbabwean political leaders have been less open in acknowledging the severity and proximity of the AIDS crisis, so much so indeed that even cabinet ministers have died of AIDS, taking their secret with them to the grave rather than using their positions in government to warn others of the risks.⁶⁵ The main responses to date have come through the Health Ministry, although the Ministry of Education is promoting AIDS education in primary and secondary schools. The Social Welfare Department is also becoming involved, as the number of orphans and infected children in residential care grows.⁶⁶ The First Medium Term Plan and National AIDS Control Programme were established in 1988-89 but the real turning point came in 1990 with the appointment of Dr Timothy Stamps as Health Minister, with a determination to make HIV/AIDS awareness a top public health issue. Under Stamps, the NACP has improved coordination and communication with government ministries and NGOs. The Second Medium Term Plan came into force in 1993, emphasizing improved surveillance, control, coordination, counselling, home care, and support measures. However, the work of the Zimbabwe NACP has been hampered by lack of funding and severe staff shortages. Top leaders have not given AIDS policy the support it needs.⁶⁷

AIDS hits hardest at the same powerless groups across all SADC states.⁶⁸ An important socio-cultural dimension of powerlessness correlating with vulnerability to infection is



lack of access to knowledge, information, and communication resources.⁶⁹ As earlier AIDS surveys in SADC states have already graphically demonstrated, however, even tertiary education is no guarantee of AIDS knowledge or awareness which is effective and leads to behaviour change.⁷⁰ Indeed, one survey of University of Botswana students revealed that 65% of those sampled believed traditional medicine could cure AIDS.⁷¹

Improving AIDS education and prevention strategies in the SADC

Botswana's Assistant Minister for Local Government and Lands once noted that "factors affecting the spread of AIDS are rooted in the social dynamics of communities".⁷² AIDS education and prevention policies stand a chance of succeeding to the extent that messages sufficiently "localize the (attitude-behaviour) change process", articulating information in such a way that audiences at the local level can believe in the possibility of sustainable change in sexual behaviour. In culturally diverse societies, this means decentralized, community-based design, production, dissemination and evaluation of materials, from posters to T-shirts, from community video and comics to radio spots.

Gaining working knowledge and understanding of community-based culture constitutes a necessary starting point for anti-AIDS strategies. More fundamentally, the "most vul-



nerable" social groups need to be perceived as communities, rather than as disconnected individuals or rigid socio-economic categories.

Communities most threatened by HIV/AIDS in SADC states today are those most depressed in social and economic terms. Rural development strategies which address deep-seated problems at the village or district level become synonymous with fighting AIDS: by definition, rural development policy is anti-AIDS policy and must be seen as such. Bringing about change – slowing the rate of spread of the virus – succeeds if development goals are attained, particularly rural health and education objectives.

Within the SADC region, in-

equalities in community access to education and mass media need to be addressed before such an integrated anti-AIDS policy approach is viable. In the meantime, national policy-makers and "development communication professionals" need to disabuse themselves of the notion that "top-down" messages work. Indeed, research strongly supports the opposite view.

In South Africa, lingering aspects of health sector apartheid all but guarantee that the majority of citizens, rural black women and children, will remain vulnerable well into the next century. Official policy response remains limited and hindered by a culture of popular mistrust in government generally. The state appears, in the words of one

author, to be stunned into inaction by the implications of the disease.⁷³ The South African budget for AIDS education in 1994–95 was R42 million, or R0,63 per person. More money is spent on advertising a single brand of local cigarettes. By 2004, AIDS could account for anywhere between a third to three quarters of the total national health budget of South Africa.⁷⁴ Under the Transitional Executive Council, efforts were begun to restructure health care delivery and to raise the priority of AIDS education and prevention. The Reconstruction and Development Programme contains this commitment:

... active and early treatment at all health facilities, plus mass education programmes which involve the mass media, schools and community organizations. AIDS education for rural communities, and especially for women, is a priority.⁷⁵

The ANC government has increased funding for AIDS programmes and embraced many strategies put forth by Nacosa.⁷⁶ Recent AIDS policy plans, such as the one for KwaZulu Natal Province, are better integrated in design and orientation.⁷⁷ A key assumption is community involvement. One initiative by the Red Cross is Masibambane, begun in 1995. The overriding goal is to "ensure that each community 'owns' the project, that the community is the effective decision-maker regarding intervention mechanisms, and finally, that the community is empowered to continue the process itself." Each community process will be monitored and advised by a national Masibambane Forum comprising a wide array of community representatives and national leaders.⁷⁸

In Botswana, there is a great fear that a second generation of AIDS victims is now developing among the nation's children of primary school age. The formal education sector, especially rural primary schools, is a key element of the strategy of policy integration and coordination. Indeed, the irony of Botswana's attainment of near universal primary education may be that this has now become a vehicle for widespread transmission of HIV. Yet schools have great potential for effectively transmitting AIDS education messages, especially through aware, committed local teachers.

In 1991 the University of Botswana organized workshops on AIDS education for Science and Maths teach-

ers at 10 locations around the country. The programme benefited from close cooperation between regional and local health authorities and field educational officers for Science from the Education Ministry. Regional workshops led to local workshops and "AIDS Days" at some schools. A total of 450 teachers were reached, potentially contacting 100 000 students,⁷⁹ quite a high figure in a country with a population of 1,3 million.

In 1992 Science teachers in Botswana decided to form the Association of Teachers Against AIDS (ATAA), to organize AIDS training for teachers, produce educational materials, and publish a newsletter to promote professional exchange in AIDS education efforts. Science education is compulsory at all levels. Teaching about AIDS at the primary school level has been incorporated into family life education, and frank presentations on STDs and AIDS have become standard in secondary schools.⁸⁰

Yet there are limits. AIDS education in schools has succeeded in presenting students with a lot of information but because it is covered in the Science curriculum the social, cultural, economic and ethical aspects of the disease have not received much attention. Teachers Against AIDS (TAA) and the Education Ministry AIDS Committee have been working to formulate a more comprehensive approach for primary and secondary teachers.⁸¹ With financial support from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Macmillan Botswana and the Botswana Red Cross produced three story booklets designed for classroom use to raise youth awareness and educate teens about the dangers of AIDS.⁸²

Radio Botswana has intermittently been an important part of the Government's national AIDS education campaign. For example, daily broadcasts to schools of a Red Cross AIDS quiz began in November 1992.⁸³ One 1987 Ministry of Health Survey found that 75% of the respondents had obtained their information about AIDS from radio and about 25% from newspapers.⁸⁴

Specialized publications and newsletters targeted at key risk groups, and written mostly in Setswana, have begun to appear with greater frequency. AIDS News, a jointly-published quarterly newsletter of the Health Ministry and private sector employers, has carried



useful and interesting information to youth via distribution to schools. A key aspect is interviews and features where youth are allowed to speak for themselves, and to one another, sharing their questions and concerns.⁸⁵ Cartoons, a write-in column, and interviews with credible radio and sports figures are included. The newsletter is also not centred solely on Gaborone but regularly carries items from youth in towns and villages country wide.⁸⁶

In Swaziland, in 1989, a Schools HIV/AIDS and Population Education (Shape) was set up, in collaboration with the National AIDS Programme (Snap). The programme runs concurrently with existing primary health care education efforts in primary and secondary schools nation wide. By 1993, 14 secondary schools had organized anti-AIDS clubs, under the guidance of Shape. These clubs work with local primary schools to promote awareness and knowledge, and to provide peer support and education about HIV/AIDS risks and behaviour change options. A report on knowledge, attitudes and practices on School Health Education in Swaziland shows that levels of knowledge on HIV/AIDS in primary schools are very low.⁸⁷ Swazi radio dramas on AIDS themes aired over SBS were not well received by some audiences surveyed. Most complained that the plays were boring.⁸⁸

In the SADC context, there is considerable evidence emerging in support of using community-based, participatory action via dramatic por-

trays on audio-visual media.⁸⁹ Policy evaluations consistently cite the benefits of using a wide range of media simultaneously to promote complementary dissemination of AIDS education information. Research from rural Zambia suggests the benefits of a multi-media approach in raising levels of knowledge about AIDS.⁹⁰ More coordination of national and regional media activities is also necessary.

Since 1994, South African AIDS media developers and evaluators have advanced this concept farther than any other state in SADC.⁹¹ The DramAidE project, begun in 1992 and funded by the KwaZulu Natal Department of Health, uses participatory drama as an interactive educational and life skills training experience to control the spread of HIV and STDs through personal and community empowerment at the level of secondary schools and communities.⁹² Programme organizers have characterized results as something more closely resembling a social movement than the standard action research project originally envisaged. By 1996, more than 800 schools, 500 000 pupils and 2 million people had been reached. Evaluations have been very encouraging. The complexity and subtlety of this approach allow young people to genuinely explore their values, attitudes and beliefs while accommodating a wide range of cultural differences. The link with oral tradition makes it especially appropriate. Teachers and pupils have consistently demonstrated enthusiasm and talent for the use of

drama, dance, music, and poetry as a way of responding to information about HIV/AIDS.⁹³ Evaluators recommend that the concept be extended to other provinces in South Africa.⁹⁴

Another successful example, Soul City Two, a private, South African multi-media health education campaign of the Institute of Urban Primary Health Care, launched in July 1996, is an excellent example of a community-based, HIV/AIDS education strategy designed to empower young women in lower income groups.⁹⁵ Television, radio, newspapers, public relations and advertising, and formal education approaches are integrated into an ongoing package. Extensive pretesting is undertaken to ensure that messages remain appealing, relevant, and accessible, and that unintended negative messages and offensive material are eliminated prior to use. Qualitative evaluation research, including representative national sampling, survey research, and focus groups, was undertaken following the first Soul City. Funding came from South African commercial sponsors and from a wide cross-section of national and international NGOs, including the EU and Unicef. Soul City will be broadcast in Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya.

Swaziland's anti-AIDS efforts have also increasingly employed a complementary multi-media strategy. SNAP, in collaboration with local NGOs, has designed education and prevention messages by radio, interpersonal communication (focus groups), posters (used more than any other medium), books, leaflets, newsletters, T-shirts, press workshops for local journalists to promote responsible AIDS reporting, public service announcements on Swazi Television, drama, documentaries, advertisements, and news items.⁹⁶

SADC Mass Media and AIDS

World-wide, media reporting of AIDS has exposed the fears and taboos related to "death associated with sex".⁹⁷ Coverage has been characterized by denial, fear, blame and fatalism. African media reporting has reflected these trends.⁹⁸ Initial government mandates that media not address the issue were reversed when epidemics and their devastating effects could no longer be ignored:

The gatekeepers, who had kept the gates closed, now open them, allowing

information once deemed unfit for public consumption to flood the nation. Media may be the engine that drives coverage and influences audiences but government is the engineer, deciding what track to take and when."⁹⁹

Centrally-controlled, state-run African mass media have been self-consciously tailored to produce and send "top-down" messages. It seems a reasonable assumption, therefore, that state radio, television, and press outlets will not be the most effective AIDS education and prevention tools, especially in rural areas.

Set amidst the turmoil of post-apartheid social and political transformation, the South African experience with AIDS media development is an extreme case of a general Southern African condition: multiple, isolated efforts with unclear objectives, inconsistent messages, top-down message design, poor or nonexistent evaluation, inappropriate languages and culture symbols, inattention to audience needs or contexts. As South Africa has by far the largest commercial media sector, and since over 90% of South Africans have access to radio, 76% to television, and 55% to newspapers, all three media hold promise as vehicles for effective AIDS education and prevention messages. Other SADC states are not so fortunate.

Initially, Botswana's media-borne AIDS education messages emphasized foreign ideas, images and concepts rather than local or regional ones.¹⁰⁰ Social, cultural, and economic factors underlying sexual attitudes and behaviours among different groups in the state are little known, let alone the manner in which they may support the spread of HIV/AIDS. The style and manner of reporting "the facts" largely failed to take into consideration the dynamics of community values and beliefs and the socio-economic structures that reflect them.¹⁰¹ In addition, nearly all AIDS reporting, education and prevention messages were created and disseminated in English rather than Setswana, the language of 80% of the people. This has slowly changed.¹⁰² More Setswana anti-AIDS posters and billboards are appearing and the national AIDS policy document was translated into Setswana in 1995.¹⁰³

Until recently, government has mainly delivered its AIDS prevention messages and reports in the same "top-down" way that agricultural de-

velopment initiatives have been delivered from as early as the mid-1970s. Radio plays a key role.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, somewhat ironically, one anthropologist reports hearing people speak of AIDS as the "radio disease" during a visit in 1989, implying that the message, at least to some extent, was getting through via Radio Botswana.¹⁰⁵

While Botswana mass media have succeeded in exhaustively cataloguing elite speeches, exhortations, and reports of official anti-AIDS efforts by government, NGOs and social and religious groups, media themselves are playing a pitifully insignificant role in actually carrying AIDS education and prevention messages to people who need them most. Many journalists freely admit and lament this, citing the difficulties of generating culturally-intelligible, socially-acceptable messages about matters involving sex.¹⁰⁶

And it is not only government media that are under-utilized but commercial ones as well. Botswana has one of the most open private press sectors in all of Africa.¹⁰⁷ From the start, private papers carried even less AIDS news than the government press, though Mmegi, the leading private paper, has carried some strong editorials.¹⁰⁸ In 1992 journalists formed an AIDS Subcommittee composed of representatives from Radio Botswana, the national news agency (BOPA), the Daily News, and the private press "to help bridge some gaps which exist between health officials and local media, especially the private press".¹⁰⁹ Government is now making a concerted effort to sensitize, train, and support journalists to enable them to play a more significant educative role in the anti-AIDS fight.¹¹⁰

Swazi Radio has been used extensively for AIDS drama presentations, quiz shows, talk shows, and advertisements. Most people have access and report regular listening. The press (Times of Swaziland and Swazi Observer) reach mainly urban, English-speaking audiences. National Television (STBC) is also urban-centred and has produced programmes like "Youth and AIDS" and "Swazi View".¹¹¹

AIDS and arrested development in Southern Africa

The relationship between social and economic development and the health

and illness of a nation is a complex one.¹¹² Racism, paternalism, and historic relations of economic dependence have shaped the cultural, political, and economic environment within which the AIDS epidemic in Africa is progressing.¹¹³ AIDS thrives on the destructive legacy of Southern Africa's externally imposed, family- and village-destroying work culture of male migrant labour, urbanization, and sexually transmitted diseases. How will the growing AIDS crisis influence the course and relative success of development in the SADC region? SADC's capital intensive and cash crop- and mineral export-driven economies form pathways along which AIDS, and policies designed to deal with its disastrous consequences, must travel.

In Botswana, the greatest damage from AIDS to development plans is the same as for other SADC states: loss of the most productive, well-educated, creative, and energetic of the nation's people, in government, education, and the small but important commercial sector. Education and training have always represented the most precious, expensive development ingredient for Botswana. In the words of Mrs Prisca Tembo, coordinator of the AIDS in the Workplace campaign, "even without AIDS Botswana does not have enough local engineers, architects, accountants and business managers".¹¹⁴ As the administrative and professional élite fall ill and die, governments' capacity to deliver essential services dies with them.

External support for SADC AIDS policy

National AIDS programmes in SADC were started with significant external intervention and support. Beginning in 1987, the World Health Organization (WHO) and bilateral donors pledged financial and technical support for AIDS control and education programmes. To receive funds, countries had to form national AIDS committees, inter-agency groups with representatives from ministries of health, education, labour, information, social services, doctors, other health professionals, as well as the chief executive.¹¹⁵ This support was supplemented by bilateral donors and private voluntary organizations.

Botswana received substantial support from the Canadian-supported



project "Southern Africa Fund for AIDS Education (Safe)", as well as Norad, Sida, and USAid.¹¹⁶ NGOs have been invaluable in establishing community-based activities for HIV/AIDS prevention and care, particularly the Red Cross, Association of Medical Missions, YWCA, Reetsanang Community Theatre Group, and Emang Basadi, a womens' group, and various traditional health practitioners' associations.¹¹⁷

Botswana is less dependent on and constrained by external agencies in formulating AIDS policies than most

African states, given its financial resources and record of administrative efficiency. Its excellent macro-economic performance and aid utilization record with multilateral and bilateral donors make it an attractive candidate for AIDS-related external assistance. Costs are high and growing. Estimates for AIDS-related hospitalizations alone will reach \$50 million by the year 2000.¹¹⁸

The long-term viability – not only financial but administrative – of such initiatives ultimately rests with SADC governments themselves. Pre-

vention and education are substantially less expensive than health care for HIV/AIDS patients – to say nothing of wider economic costs associated with the epidemic. Regional cooperation is a cost-effective strategy for sustaining AIDS education and efforts.

NGOs have carried the burden of the fight in South Africa. Organizations involved in anti-AIDS activities range from the National Medical and Dental Association and South African Health Workers Congress, to UNAIDS. A strong tradition of democratic participation evolved out of the struggle against apartheid and these groups are more self-conscious in trying to tap into it in their design and execution of programmes. There is much more consultation and engagement with local communities than is the case with government health policies. Yet continuing violence inhibits opportunities for community-based initiatives, particularly in the areas most at risk.

Much of the NGO work reflects the spirit and decisions of the Maputo Declaration of the Fourth International Conference on Health and Welfare (1990) which called for community-based campaigns with the involvement of credible political leadership, something only recently available to a majority of South Africans, particularly at the national level.¹¹⁹

Where there is money, there is politics. In mid-1996, it was disclosed that R14,7 million in foreign assistance from the EU pledged to South Africa's Ministry of Health had been misappropriated in the production and distribution of *Sarafina 2*, a controversial anti-AIDS drama.¹²⁰ Opposition party condemnation led to an investigation and to calls for the resignation of Dr Nkosazana Zuma, ANC Minister of Health, and Ms Qarisha Abdul-Kareem, head of the AIDS Directorate.¹²¹ Following Parliamentary debate, the government voted to cut ties with the production company and private donors initially came forward to assume remaining costs.

One of the lessons of *Sarafina* is that coordination with NGOs on more controversial AIDS education strategies is a good idea. The *Sarafina* débâcle is a good example of what can go wrong when government ministries fail to "benefit from the collective wisdom and experience available in civil society". The National AIDS Convention of

South Africa (Nacosa) the main NGO responsible for monitoring implementation of national AIDS policies, was never consulted. It also claims the play itself is ineffective and "a setback for fighting the epidemic".¹²²

Swaziland offers a good example of the benefits of close, ongoing government policy coordination with civil society groups in the fight against AIDS. NGOs play key roles. Under the coordination of SNAP (Swazi National AIDS Programme), the Family Life Association of Swaziland (FLAS), the Salvation Army Clinic (Mbabane), Swaziland Hospice at Home, World Vision, Swazi Red Cross, AIDS Support Centre, and Traditional Healers Association have joined with the Ministry of Health, via its AIDS Task Force (ATF) in designing education and prevention strategies and serving people already seropositive.¹²³

In Zimbabwe, a growing number of NGOs and civil society groups have developed programmes for HIV prevention and support, including the Catholic Development Commission, Women's Action Group, and the Zimbabwe Red Cross. The national AIDS Control Programme is increasingly supporting NGO initiatives, particularly through the Zimbabwe AIDS Network (ZAN), a forum for coordination of initiatives at the national level. New NGOs focusing solely on AIDS, or AIDS service organizations (ASOs), include the Family AIDS Caring Trust (FACT) and the AIDS Counselling Trust (ACT). Both have produced a wide range of informational materials on AIDS and have developed educational training, counselling and home care programmes. ASOs are gradually being established all over Zimbabwe with assistance from the World Health Organization, the NACP, or other international donors. NGOs are now included on the National AIDS Council. An organization for women, the Women and AIDS Support Network (WASN) has also been established and is a member of the Africa-wide Society for Women With AIDS in Africa (SWAA) of which the late Sally Mugabe, wife of the President, was a patron.¹²⁴

Conclusions

SADC states' response to AIDS comes at a time of economic crisis, in the midst of crushing debt obligations and structural adjustment policies which

mandate privatization and cutbacks in government services. Some have argued that such IMF-World Bank measures are actually responsible for the spread of HIV, by hastening the demise of rural subsistence economies, shrinking social services, and encouraging urban migration. AIDS policies treat the effects rather than the global, neo-liberal economic "causes" of AIDS.¹²⁵ Under such conditions regional cooperation is more essential than ever.

Despite the promises of decentralization, there continues to be a need for even greater centralized planning and coordination of these efforts across ministries. AIDS should be accorded a higher place in national development planning than it is receiving in SADC countries. In 1992, Botswana's Minister of Health announced that future national AIDS control programmes must ensure that each ministry has a focal point, be it a working group, committee, or individual.¹²⁶ This will help bring about better AIDS policy coordination and more useful evaluation. South Africa has also made advances in interdepartmental and central/local policy coordination via the efforts of the Department of Health's HIV/AIDS Directorate.¹²⁷

Creation of a standing AIDS Policy Directorate based at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone – with the capacity to bring together policy-makers in and out of government, researchers, NGOs, and communities from member states – would go a long way towards fostering regional policy coordination. The potential for sharing of resources, knowledge, experience and ideas is great. Such a process could begin with a Regional HIV/AIDS Summit sponsored by SADC-UNAIDS,¹²⁸ modelled on the UN Earth Summit in Rio.

More attention needs to be paid to responses of communities to AIDS in their midst. Understanding such responses is a vital prerequisite for successful education and prevention policies. Peoples of the SADC region are evolving social and economic attitudes and behaviours and making cultural adjustments to cope with the presence of HIV/AIDS. These must be studied, taken seriously, and integrated into policy planning and evaluation models. Successful AIDS policy is not just a matter of getting the mes-

sage out and changing behaviours. Beyond that lies the even more challenging task of supporting and sustaining changed group behaviours over time. Ongoing, integrated efforts at the community level are needed.

UNAIDS has estimated that for every 1% increase in HIV infection, 4–5 years of development are lost.¹²⁹ The message is clear. Isolation of AIDS policy from wider development efforts must end. Instead, specific objectives must arise from and form part of well-conceived development objectives. Anything less will not ultimately have the desired effect. Measures designed to promote rural health, education and social services generally, particularly those addressed specifically to rural women and young children, need to be thought of as integral parts of national AIDS prevention and education strategies.

In states with weak or limited civil society, NGO resources and infrastructure are pivotal for constructing a sustainable, supportive social framework to support community-level behaviour change. For example, the Botswana Red Cross has an HIV/AIDS counselling and testing centre in Gaborone. It is an easily accessible place where people can go for information, counselling, a free AIDS test, and free condoms. The Centre provides valuable psychosocial support to people with HIV/AIDS and their families. It has also been instrumental in setting up support groups and lobbying Government to pay more attention to home care issues and survivors' needs.¹³⁰ NGOs have also been a key part of education and communication efforts, sponsoring the publication and distribution of books and pamphlets in schools.¹³¹

NGOs, working at the grass roots, can more effectively advocate the rights and needs of HIV/AIDS affected people than governmental programmes. In 1992 the Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (Bonaso) was formed¹³² and AIDS Action Trust (ACT) was set up, to coordinate some of these efforts with the National AIDS Control Programme (NACP).¹³³

Besides education and prevention, SADC must confront the growing need to formulate policy in response to the tragic, irreversible medical and social consequences of AIDS.¹³⁴ Conditions and standards of care and ser-

vice in hospitals and clinics are deteriorating as AIDS patients overburden capacity. People with AIDS-related conditions constitute the majority of admissions.¹³⁵ Botswana hospitals report 12 700 HIV/AIDS admissions in 1995, more than double those of the previous year.¹³⁶ Manpower shortages at all levels of the health system are the main constraint faced by the government in its AIDS efforts.¹³⁷ Home-based care and hospices have not yet arrived to any significant degree.¹³⁸ Even financially sound governments cannot cope with the AIDS crisis alone. Botswana's Second Medium Term Plan for AIDS (1995–2000) still does not provide for orphans.¹³⁹ Zimbabwe will have an estimated 620 000 AIDS orphans in less than four years. NGOs like Children in Distress (CINDI) are taking the lead on the orphan issue in Zambia, as government and extended families are stretched beyond breaking point.¹⁴⁰ Treatment, support, orphan care and survivor benefits must be planned and budgeted for.¹⁴¹

Victims' rights and needs must also be addressed, certainly in a country with the human rights, political democracy, and economic means possessed by Botswana. There is evidence that these are being included in national AIDS policy planning. In 1995, with finance from Norad, Ditshwanelo and the Botswana Centre for Human Rights and the Red Cross drew up an HIV/AIDS Human Rights Charter with the theme "Shared rights and shared responsibilities".¹⁴² NGOs have urged government to enact legislative protection for people with HIV/AIDS.¹⁴³ Government and private sector officials have been speaking out more frequently in support of patients' rights. President Masire gave an emotional speech over Radio Botswana calling for the nation to be supportive "to all those who struggle in silence and loneliness with the reality of having HIV".¹⁴⁴ An even more advanced legal and human rights-centred debate is in progress in South Africa.¹⁴⁵

The private sector, in particular employers, must play a bigger part in the campaign. There are encouraging signs that this is at last beginning to happen with increased government budgetary support for AIDS in the workplace programmes.¹⁴⁶

African women are the cornerstones of community survival and de-

velopment. They are the backbone of rural life, producing food, raising children, trading, teaching, nursing. Family dependence on women as bread-winners – or bread-growers – weighs heavily on HIV positive women, as it should on African governments. The AIDS pandemic provides political leaders with opportunities for attacking the subordinate position of women, promoting empowerment, awareness and involvement in national development.¹⁴⁷ Traditional community mechanisms for coping with illness are no longer adequate. AIDS attacks and weakens families, not only individuals. Whole affected communities need to be involved in designing effective policies which link the health and social dimensions of the disease.¹⁴⁸

Women alone cannot effect widespread AIDS prevention. AIDS prevention and education programmes which target women must go beyond focusing on sex workers and prenatal women.¹⁴⁹ What are needed are redefined, renegotiated gender roles as well as fundamental changes in the conditions which have caused AIDS to explode in the region. Socio-economic constraints on behavioural change cannot be ignored by policy makers at any level, whether individual, community to country-wide. The condition of women, culturally constructed gender roles, and concepts of personhood are key socio-cultural variables.

What is required is a fundamental change in the economic and social status of women. Women's economic independence, personal autonomy and control over interpersonal relations, including their power to negotiate sex, must be increased.¹⁵⁰ Organizations such as the Society For Women and AIDS in Africa Botswana (SWAAB)¹⁵¹ and the recently inaugurated Society of Men Against AIDS in Botswana (SMAABO)¹⁵² represent positive trends in changing attitudes and behaviours.

A USAid/AIDSCAP-sponsored initiative at the July 1996 Vancouver International Conference on AIDS brought participants from 25 countries together to discuss ways to encourage better communication between the sexes in formulating and carrying out more effective AIDS policies.¹⁵³ This process should be repeated at the regional (SADC) and national levels.

The battle is about to commence. Coordinated, integrated, multisectoral

strategies are now within reach. Human resource shortages, funding limitations, and ineffective evaluation mechanisms remain serious obstacles. South Africa, with the best-developed mass media, public relations, evaluation research and education infrastructures in SADC, has many initiatives with region-wide potential.¹⁵⁴ International NGOs have acknowledged the need for a coordinated, multisectoral approach in their support for national anti-AIDS efforts, as recent creation of the Joint UN Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) demonstrates.¹⁵⁵ Bilateral and multilateral donors are also working better with each other, with recipient countries, and local NGOs.¹⁵⁶ There also appears to be more inclusion of sub-national community organizations.

In the words of Botswana's President Masire, "Unprecedented partnerships need to be formed between our countries, organizations, and individuals in an attempt to halt the spread of the HIV virus".¹⁵⁷ SADC should take the lead.

Notes and references

- 1 See James J Zaffiro, "Facing up to a crisis: the politics of AIDS policy in Botswana", *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*, vol 13, nos 1-2, 1993, pp 79-111.
- 2 Alan Whiteside, "Country focus: AIDS and HIV in Botswana", *AIDS Analysis Africa*, vol 3, no 6, 1993, pp 5-6.
- 3 World Bank, *The World Bank and HIV/AIDS*, 1995 [online]http://www.worldbank.org/html/hcoup/head/aids.html.
- 4 Sanaso, *Report of the Southern African NGOs conference on AIDS*, Harare: 14-16 May 1990.
- 5 Helen Jackson, *Action against AIDS*, Harare: AIDS Counselling Trust, 1992, p 249.
- 6 See Republic of Botswana, *Working document for the Botswana National AIDS Control Programme, 1993*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1992.
- 7 Dr Saw Naing, *Fourth HIV sentinel surveillance in Botswana*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, August 1995.
- 8 Dr K O Wathne, *Third HIV sentinel surveillance in Botswana*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, June 1994.
- 9 Dr K O Wathne, *Current and future dimensions of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Botswana*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1994, p 16.
- 10 Hon Chapson Butale, as quoted in Mmuso Tidimane, "180 000 people infected with HIV", *Botswana Daily News*, 6 March 1996, p 1.

- 11 Author interview with Dr Saw Naing, Director, Botswana National AIDS Coordinating Agency, Gaborone, 10 July 1996.
- 12 *Young people, sex, and AIDS*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1994.
- 13 Rapeland Mantu, "Movement of people leads to spread of HIV cases", *Daily News*, 27 August 1992, p 6.
- 14 Alan Whiteside, *HIV infection and AIDS in Zimbabwe*, Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research, 1991.
- 15 National AIDS Control Program and Health Information Unit, Ministry of Health, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1990.
- 16 "Graves crisis", *Botswana Daily News*, 15 June 1994, p 4.
- 17 "Health Minister mourns as AIDS kills thousands of Zimbabweans", *Daily News*, 16 February 1996, p 4; and R Hore, "AIDS and medical societies in Zimbabwe", *AIDS Analysis Africa* (Southern Africa edition) vol 2, no 4, 1991.
- 18 United Nations, *AIDS and the demography of Africa*, New York: Department of Economic and Social Information, 1994, p 66.
- 19 See M Obaso, *External review report of Swazi National AIDS Programme*, Mbabane: 1995; Government of Swaziland, *Short-term plan for AIDS prevention and control in Swaziland*, Mbabane: Ministry of Health, 1987; *Medium-term plan for prevention and control of AIDS in Swaziland, 1988-91*, Mbabane: Ministry of Health, 1988.
- 20 Government of Swaziland, *Swazi population projections 1986-2016*, Mbabane: Central Statistics Office, 1986, p 5.
- 21 World Health Organization, *AIDS: Images of the epidemic*, Geneva: 1994, p 49.
- 22 Tessa Marcus, et al, "AIDS and the highways: sex workers and truck drivers in KwaZulu-Natal", *Indicator SA*, vol 13, no 1, 1995, pp 80-84.
- 23 Alan Whiteside, "Planning for AIDS", *Indicator SA*, vol 13, no 1, 1995, pp 75-79.
- 24 "Interdepartmental Committee on AIDS", *National Advisory Committee on HIV/AIDS*, Department of Health, South Africa, May 1995, p 3.
- 25 Pamela Sherriffs, "Sex, lies and videotape: attitudes of SA teens", *Natal Witness*, 10 June 1996, p 9.
- 26 Josie Row-Setz and Mike Freedman, *Masibambane: communities against AIDS*, South Africa, 1996, p 4.
- 27 See Alan Whiteside, *Facing up to AIDS: the socio-economic costs in Southern Africa*, London: Macmillan, 1992; J Broomberg, *Economic impact of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa*, Report to the Economic Trends Research Group, Dept of Community Health, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg: 1991; M Crew, *AIDS in South Africa*, London: Penguin, 1992; and R Davies, "The political economy of AIDS in Zimbabwe", unpublished paper, 199-.
- 28 Lynn R Brown, *The potential impact of AIDS on population and economic growth*

- rates, Washington, DC: IFPRI, 1996, p 19.
- 29 See Alan Whiteside, "AIDS, poverty, and structural adjustment: towards a pro-poor development strategy", *AIDS Analysis Africa*, vol 4, no 1, 1994, pp 10-11.
- 30 Patricia McFadden, "Sex, sexuality and the problems of AIDS in Africa", in Ruth Meena, (ed), *Gender in Southern Africa*, Harare: SAPES, 1992, pp 157-95; Maria de Bruyn, "Women and AIDS in developing countries", *Social Science and Medicine*, vol 34, no 3, 1992, p 249.
- 31 G Seidel, and L Vidal, "The gender and policy implications of AIDS discourse: examples from South Africa and the Ivory Coast", in C Shore and S Wright (eds), *Anthropology of policy*, London: Routledge, 1996.
- 32 See: Brooke G Schoepf, et al, "Gender, power, and risk of AIDS in Zaire", in Meredith Turshen (ed), *Women and health in Africa*, 1991, pp 186-203.
- 33 Meredith Turshen, "Women and health issues", in M J Hay and S Stichter, (eds), *African women south of the Sahara*, (2nd ed), London: Longman, 1995, pp 247-249.
- 34 See P Ulin, "African women and AIDS", *Social Science Medical Journal*, vol 34, no 1, 1992, pp 63-73.
- 35 *Loneliness and poverty*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1994.
- 36 M T Basset and M Mhloyi, "Women and AIDS in Zimbabwe: The making of an epidemic", *International Journal of Health Services*, vol 21, no 1, 1992, pp 143-156.
- 37 Alan Whiteside, *HIV infection ...*, op cit, p 7
- 38 Maxwell Vusumuzi Mthembu, "An assessment of the effectiveness of radio information campaigns on HIV/AIDS awareness and behaviour change in Swaziland", unpublished MA thesis: Centre For Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban, 1995.
- 39 Mbulawa Mugabe, "Males and family planning in Botswana", *Research Notes* no 25, Gaborone: National Institute of Research, 1993.
- 40 Author interview with Dr Saw Naing, NACP Director; see also: *Men and sex: A report*, Gaborone: AIDS/STD Unit, Ministry of Health, 1993; and *Condoms for prevention of HIV/AIDS and other STDs*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1994.
- 41 See Alan Whiteside, "At special risk: AIDS in Southern Africa", *Indicator SA*, vol 10, no 1, 1992, pp.66-72.
- 42 See C Evian, "Poverty: The social basis of AIDS in South Africa", *Critical Health*, no 44, 1993, pp 6-10.
- 43 See C B Isselmuiden, "Knowledge, beliefs and practices among black gold miners relating to transmission of HIV", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 73, no 3, 1990, pp 520-523; K. Jochelson, "HIV and migrant labor in South Africa", *International Journal of Health Services*, vol 1, no 1, 1991, pp 157-173.
- 44 H V G Kustner, "Fourth National HIV Survey of women attending antenatal clinics in South Africa", *Epidemiological Com-*

reproduced by Sabimet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (aarec)

- ments, vol 21, no 4, 1994, pp 68-77; A S Karstaedt, "AIDS: HIV infection among adults at Baragwanath Hospital", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 82, 1992, pp 95-101; D Wilkinson, "Second HIV survey of women attending antenatal clinics: Hlabisa-Zululand", *Epidemiological Comments*, vol 21, no 4, 1994, pp 78-79.
- 45 Sham Ramburuth, in Warren Parker, "The development of community-based media for AIDS education and prevention in South Africa". Unpublished MA thesis, Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban, 1994, p 4.
- 46 See Warren Parker, *op cit*.
- 47 Tim McCaskell, "Double jeopardy: AIDS and apartheid", *Southern Africa Report*, (Toronto), December 1990, p 20.
- 48 Mary Crewe, *AIDS Bulletin*, (Johannesburg), vol 3, no 2, 1994.
- 49 Elaine Epstein, "Health education media, STDs, and HIV/AIDS in South Africa", Unpublished MA thesis, Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, 1996, p 6.
- 50 Nacosa, *KwaZulu-Natal provincial AIDS implementation plan, October 1994*; Elaine Epstein and Keyan Tomaselli, "Strategic media plan for KwaZulu-Natal", Rough draft, Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban, June 1996.
- 51 Dr Werast Sittitrai, "Recommendations on interdepartmental AIDS programme and central and provincial levels", (funded by British Overseas Development Administration, March 1996).
- 52 Government of South Africa, "Interdepartmental Committee on HIV/AIDS", Pretoria: 1995, pp 1,5.
- 53 "President Opens Parliament Session", *Daily News*, 12 November 1991, p 1.
- 54 Republic of Botswana, *Botswana National Policy on HIV/AIDS*, (Cabinet Directive CAB:35/93) (Gaborone: Ministry of Health, November 1993), p 1.
- 55 *Ibid*, p 7.
- 56 Author interview with Dr Saw Naing, (Gaborone: 10 July 1996).
- 57 *Working Document*, 1993, Annex 8, and p.3. For 1993, GOB provided \$US 1.16 million, out of a total budget of \$2.7 million.
- 58 "Leaders respond to HIV/AIDS: AIDS in the workplace" *Programme*, (Gaborone Sun, 11 November 1995).
- 59 Author interview with Dr Saw Naing, Director, Botswana NACP (Gaborone, 10 July 1996).
- 60 "AIDS council hold first meeting", *Daily News*, 2 April 1996, p 5.
- 61 "In Parliament: No separate facilities For AIDS patients", *Botswana Guardian*, 17 March 1995, p 10; "AIDS undermines achievements in health", *Daily News*, 26 May 1995, p 2.
- 62 "MPs contribute to Ministry of Health budget", *Daily News*, 22 February 1996, p 3; "House blesses budget for Ministry of Health", *Daily News*, 25 March 1996, p 2; "MPs comment on Ministry of Health budget", *Daily News*, 26 March 1996, p 3;
- "1996/7 budget for Ministry of Health discussed in Parliament", *Daily News*, 28 March 1996 p 2.
- 63 See: Republic of Botswana, *National Assembly Debates*, (Hansard 117, part 5), 24-28 July 1995, pp 125-6, 196, 213-15, 247; and Hansard 109, 16 November-4 December 1992, pp 8, 165-66, for examples of debates on AIDS policy.
- 64 "Three political parties heed the ministry's advice", *Daily News*, 30 June 1995, p 5.
- 65 D J Adamschak, "Male knowledge of and attitudes and practices towards AIDS in Zimbabwe", *AIDS*, vol 4, 1990, pp 245-50.
- 66 Helen Jackson, *AIDS action now*, Harare: AIDS Counselling Trust, 1992, p 245.
- 67 E. Marowa, *Report to the Zimbabwe AIDS Network Congress*, (Harare: 1991); Jackson, *op cit*, pp 246-48.
- 68 For regional studies of AIDS, see: Alan Whiteside, *AIDS in Southern Africa*, Johannesburg: Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1991; C Evian, *AIDS in the workplace in Southern Africa*, Russell Friedman Books, 1991; M Mhloyi, "AIDS transition in Southern Africa", *Progress: Reports on Health and Development in Southern Africa*, 1991, pp 44-49.
- 69 C. Matthews, "Knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about AIDS in township school students in Cape Town", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 78, no 3, 1990, pp 511-523; M. Galloway and E. Scheepers, "AIDS research in South Africa", *AIDS Bulletin*, vol 2, no 3, 1993, pp 1-5.
- 70 R L Naidoo, "A survey of knowledge about AIDS among students at the University of Natal", unpublished manuscript: Durban, University of Natal, 1991; R H Friedland, "Perceptions and knowledge about AIDS among students in university residences", *South African Medical Journal*, vol 79, 1991, pp 149-154.
- 71 G. Ahmed and Helge Brumberg, "Knowledge, attitudes, prevalence and prospects of AIDS in Botswana", (Unpublished paper read at Population Association of America, Annual Meeting, 1988).
- 72 Quoted in: *Botswana Daily News*, 10 December 1991.
- 73 Mary Crewe, *AIDS in South Africa: The myth and the reality*, London: Penguin, 1992, p 70.
- 74 Josie Rowe-Setz and Mike Freedman, *op cit*, p 4.
- 75 ANC, *Reconstruction and development programme*, 1994, p 48.
- 76 *Business Day*, (Johannesburg), 20 July 1994, p 1.
- 77 Elaine Epstein, "Strategic media plan for KwaZulu Natal" (unpublished MA thesis, University of Natal, Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, June 1996).
- 78 Josie Rowe-Setz and Mike Freedman, *op cit*, p 2.
- 79 Motlhaleemang Ntebela and Henk Frencken, "Botswana's science teachers take AIDS lesson to school", *AIDS Analysis Africa*, (London), vol 2, no 5, September/October 1992, p 10.
- 80 *Ibid*.
- 81 "Students sexually active - Sephuma", *Daily News*, 28 August 1992, p 1.
- 82 "AIDS books from Botswana", *AIDS Analysis Africa*, vol 2, no 2, August-September 1991, p 6.
- 83 "AIDS quiz to be aired regularly", *Daily News*, 5 November 1992, p 2.
- 84 Republic of Botswana, Ministry of Health, *AIDS update-I*, Gaborone: Government Printer, 1987.
- 85 For example: "Youth focus", *AIDS News*, vol 1, no 1, March 1993, p 2.
- 86 "Rap session", *AIDS News*, vol 3, no 2 July 1995, pp 4-5.
- 87 F D Maseko and P P Mthembu, "AIDS and STD education in Swaziland", (Unpublished paper, November 1994), p 3.
- 88 Maxwell Vusumuzi Mthembu, *op cit*, p 29.
- 89 *Dramaide: Evaluations of the DramAidE programme*, 1996.
- 90 Ministry of Health, *AIDS education and information in Zambia*, Lusaka: 1988, p 6.
- 91 Warren Parker, "HIV/AIDS and STD media strategy: Towards a medium-term plan", Department of Health, HIV/AIDS Directorate, South Africa, December 1995; "AIDS media research project: Billboard campaign strategy", SA Department of Health, May 1995; Warren Parker, "Changing media - Changing AIDS", Johannesburg: 1995, discussion paper.
- 92 Author Interview with Professor Eleanor Preston-Whyte, DramAidE Project Evaluator and Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research and Development), University of Natal, Durban, June 1996.
- 93 "Act alive: A new DramaId initiative", *Life skills education 1996*, Department of Media Studies, University of Zululand, 1995, pp ii, 1; and Sharon Ann Harpring, "An evaluation of the DramaId project", (unpublished paper, August, 1995); Gill Seidel, "DramaId: Towards a critical overview", (unpublished paper, October 1995).
- 94 See I Dalrymple and M K du Toit, "The evaluation of a drama approach to AIDS education", *Educational Psychology*, vol 13, no 2, 1993.
- 95 CASE, "Let the sky be the limit: Soul City evaluation report", Braamfontein.: Jacana Education, 1996, *Soul City One* aired in 1994; and Elaine Epstein, *op cit*, pp 16-18.
- 96 Maxwell Vusumuzi Mthembu, *op cit*, pp 13,18.
- 97 Kevin Williams, "AIDS stories covered up", *Media Development*, no 4, 1992, pp.9-11.
- 98 For examples, see: Francis P. Kasoma, "The Zambian press and the AIDS crisis", *Caecac Journal*, (Canada), vol 3 (1990-91); and M Pitts and Helen Jackson, "AIDS and the press: An analysis of the coverage of AIDS by Zimbabwe Newspapers", in: *AIDS Care*, vol 1, no 1 1989.
- 99 Malcom D Gibson, "AIDS and the African press", *Media, Culture And Society*, vol 16, 1994, pp 349-56.

- 100 For an overview of AIDS coverage in Botswana see: Peter Ubomba-Jaswa, "Mass media and AIDS in Botswana: What the newspapers say and their implications", *National Institute Of Development Research (NIR) Working Paper* no 63, Gaborone: University of Botswana, 1993.
- 101 Ubomba-Jaswa, *op cit*, pp.26-27.
- 102 *Information, education, communication*, Gaborone: AIDS/STD Unit, Ministry of Health, 1994.
- 103 "Setswana anti-AIDS bill-boards sought", *Daily News*, 2 May 1994, p 6; "Policy on HIV/AIDS to be translated into Setswana", *Daily News*, 6 April 1995, p 5.
- 104 See James J Zaffiro, *From police network to station of the nation: A political history of broadcasting in Botswana*, Gaborone: The Botswana Society, 1991, pp 46, 57 (note #63), for examples.
- 105 Benedicte Ingstad, "The cultural construction of AIDS and its consequences for prevention in Botswana", *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, vol 4, no 1, 1990, pp 28-40;
- 106 Bapasi Mphusu, "In search of friendly words", *Daily News*, 18 October 1993, p 5.
- 107 See James J Zaffiro, "The press and political opposition in Botswana", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol 27, no 1, 1989, pp 51-73; for a more recent view of the press see James J Zaffiro, "Media watch: Botswana", in *Rhodes Journalism Review*, no 5, December 1992, pp 52-4.
- 108 "AIDS", *Mmegi*, 6-12 December 1991, p 2.
- 109 "Don't be mute on AIDS, press urged", *Mmegi*, 11-17 September 1992, p 2.
- 110 Pako Sikulu, "Media called upon to contribute to fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS", *Daily News*, 19 June 1995, p 2.
- 111 Mthembu, *op cit*, p 18.
- 112 See Alfred J Fortin, "AIDS, development, and the limitations of the African state", in Barbara A Misztal and David Moss (eds), *Action on AIDS: National policies in comparative perspective*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990, p 221.
- 113 For a general discussion of this argument see: Charles Hunt, "Africa and AIDS: Dependent development, sexism, and racism", *Monthly Review*, February 1988.
- 114 "Spreading the word", *Daily News* (Gaborone), 4 April 1992, p 7.
- 115 WHO, Regional Office For Africa (Brazzaville), *AIDS Programme Managers' Meeting*, 1992.
- 116 *Working document for the Botswana National AIDS Control Programme*, Ministry of Health, 1993, p 15; and Panos, (1992), p 13.
- 117 "Govt., NGOs must join hands in the fight against AIDS", *Daily News*, 7 May 1996, p 2.
- 118 "Lets curb spread of AIDS - Moeti", *Mmegi*, 27 September-3 October 1991, pp 1-2.
- 119 Judith Head, "AIDS in South Africa: The democratic movement responds", *Southern Africa Report*, (Toronto), May 1993, p 27; Mary Crewe, "AIDS in Southern Africa ...", *op cit*, p 71.
- 120 Thami Ngidi, "AIDS play faces chop", *The Saturday Paper*, (Durban), 18 May 1996, p 1; Gaye Davis, "Star players in the financial flop", *Mail and Guardian*, (Johannesburg), 7-13 June 1996, p 4.
- 121 Susan Seger, "Crunch day for Sarafina", *Natal Witness*, (Pietermaritzburg), 5 June 1996, p 1; Brian Stuart, "Govt. Pulls out of Sarafina", *The Citizen*, (Johannesburg) 6 June 1996, pp 1-2; "Should quit", *The Citizen*, (Johannesburg), 5 June 1996, p 6; "Leon hammers ANC over Zuma", *The Mercury*, (Durban), 11 June 1996, p 2.
- 122 Susan Seger, "Sarafina saga 'Has set govt. AIDS plan back'" *Natal Witness*, 8 June 1996, p 3.
- 123 Mthembu, *op cit*, p 7.
- 124 Helen Jackson, *AIDS action now: Information, prevention and support in Zimbabwe*, Harare: AIDS Counselling Trust, 1992, pp 248-249.
- 125 Colleen O' Manique, "Liberalizing AIDS in Africa: The World Bank role", *Southern Africa Report*, July 1996, pp 21-24.
- 126 "35,000 Batswana HIV infected", *Daily News*, 27 March 1992, p 1; see also: "AIDS: Public awareness a concern", *Daily News*, 21 January 1991, p 4, which cites similar recommendations from the 1990 NACP Programme Review.
- 127 See Sittitrai, "Recommendations on inter-departmental AIDS programme at central and provincial levels in South Africa" (Unpublished report, British ODA, March 1996).
- 128 United Nations AIDS Programme, created as a partnership between Unicef, WHO, UNDP, UNFPA, Unesco, and World Bank became fully operational in January 1996.
- 129 Ministry of Health (South Africa), *UNAIDS*: December: 1995, p 1.
- 130 Author interview with Mrs Betty Kgathi, Director, HIV/AIDS Clinic, (Gaborone, 9 July 1996).
- 131 For example: *AIDS and our children: A guide for parents* (also available in Setswana), Gaborone: AIDS Action Trust, 1993; Bobana E Badisang, *Living with AIDS in the community*, WHO/Unicef, published by Macmillan Botswana, 1996.
- 132 "Organization plans to stage walk", *Daily News*, 1 December 1992, p 2.
- 133 Ernest Gaelesiwé, "Sabatier presents cheque to ACT", *Daily News*, 31 March 1992, p 3.
- 134 *Social consequences of AIDS: A study of the impact on children*, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1993; and Home-based care for people with AIDS in Botswana, Gaborone: Ministry of Health, 1992.
- 135 "Patients with AIDS, HIV related problems occupy a significant number of hospital beds", *Daily News*, 6 December 1995, p 3; Jeremiah Senabye, "Majority admitted in hospitals have AIDS-related conditions", *Daily News*, 23 March 1994, p 5.
- 136 "Govt urged to strengthen efforts to reduce spread of AIDS virus", *Daily News*, 2 April 1996, p 3.
- 137 Albert Ndebele, "Gov't to train more doctors, nurses", *Daily News*, 24 April 1995, p 2; "More doctors and nurses are needed", *Mmegi*, 17-23 July 1992, p 14.
- 138 "The hospice movement in Botswana", *Mokaedi Newsletter*, (Gaborone), April 1994, p 3.
- 139 "Policy does not provide for AIDS orphans", *Daily News*, 15 March 1994, p 2; Kitso Simon, "Govt urged to take care of children of AIDS victims", *Daily News*, 29 March 1994, p 2.
- 140 B J Kelso, "Orphans of the storm", *Africa Report*, January-February 1994, pp 50-54.
- 141 See: Yasantha Naidoo, "Caring for people with AIDS", *Sunday Tribune*, (Durban), 19 May 1996, p 10; "New HIV figures highlight threat to employee benefits", in *Ibid*, p B3.
- 142 Botswana Red Cross, *HIV/AIDS and Human Rights Charter*, Gaborone, 1995.
- 143 Kebonye Setsetse, "Govt urged to make law to protect people infected with HIV virus", *Daily News*, 2 June 1995, p 2.
- 144 "Be supportive of HIV carriers", *Daily News*, 1 December 1993, p 1.
- 145 Justice M Kirby, "AIDS and the law", *South African Journal On Human Rights*, vol 9, no 1, 1993, cited in *Position paper on confidentiality and openness*, HIV/AIDS Advisory Committee, Johannesburg: April 1996.
- 146 Adolphus Budulala, "Campaign against AIDS goes to the workplace", *Daily News*, 25 April, 1995, p 6.
- 147 Philip Thiuri, "The threat of AIDS to women and development", in P Thiuri and E Kalepeni (eds), *Cultural and demographic aspects of health care in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa*, Langley Park, MD: IAAS, 1996, pp 91, 106.
- 148 Ankrah, "AIDS and the social side of health" *Social Science and Medicine*, vol 32, no 9, 1991, pp 967-80
- 149 Carovano, "More than mothers and whores", *International Journal of Health Services*, vol 21, no 1, pp 131-42.
- 150 Brooke G Schoepf, *et al*, *op cit*, pp 186, 188, 201-03.
- 151 Mabel Kebosamang, "Number of HIV positive people who go public on the increase", *Daily News*, 28 June, 1995, p 2.
- 152 "SMAABO launched", *Daily News*, 28 April 1995, pp 1,5.
- 153 "AIDSCAP promotes dialogue between the sexes for HIV/AIDS prevention", *Daily News*, 5 July 1996, p 5.
- 154 See S S Abdool Karim and I Toms, "Framework for the evaluation of the HIV/AIDS and STD Directorate's programme", (unpublished working paper, May 1996).
- 155 "United Nations agencies form UNAIDS", *Daily News*, 18 April, 1996, p 2; "UN envoys define AIDS response", *Mmegi*, (Gaborone) 5-11 July 1996, pp 10-11.
- 156 "European Union avails funds for prevention of AIDS", *Daily News*, 11 May 1995, p 3.
- 157 "AIDS threat to society says Masire", *Daily News*, 2 September 1993, p 5.

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010)

From destabilization to peace-keeping in Southern Africa:

The potential role of South Africa

During April 1996, South Africa donated R12,6 million to the United Nations to help pay for international peacekeeping operations in Africa. The cheque, equal to about 80% of South Africa's regular UN budget assessment, was "over and above" other voluntary contributions. According to a spokesperson for the South African Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, the donation honoured an undertaking given last December by South Africa's permanent representative, Khiphusizi Jele, that South Africa would make a voluntary contribution. Mr Jele's promise followed the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 50/83, which absolved South Africa of its membership arrears accrued during the apartheid years.¹ While this contribution may temporarily have staved off South Africa's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, it cannot be long before this country finds itself requested, and morally obliged, to provide a troop contribution to the UN, the OAU or some other regional organization.

The termination of the Cold War at the end of the previous decade and the demise of the apartheid state in South Africa in 1994 have created the scope for enhanced security cooperation between the armies of Southern African countries. The 1990s have also borne witness to the renewed salience of ethnic cleavages in other parts of the African continent, as brutal civil wars raged in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia. The UN contribution to bringing peace and stability to such countries, while noble, has been far from effective. The "messy" nature of UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola have led to an increasing reluctance on the part of the major powers and the traditional troop-contributing member states to deploy on African soil. There has thus been a clear realization that African countries and organizations will have to accept an increasing burden of responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent, and that the capability to do so could best be created

through cooperation at the subregional level.

Southern Africa, particularly the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), will play a leading role in this regard. The discourse on regional integration and security cooperation has included a number of proposals for the creation of a regional peacekeeping capacity within the national armies of SADC member states. However, such proposals have

Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, of the Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand discuss the prospects for peacekeeping in Southern Africa



yet to crystallize into concrete action aimed at giving substance to the idea of regional cooperation for the purpose of actively keeping the peace through the utilization of the opportunities provided by the new partnership, which includes the 11 contiguous member states of SADC, plus the island partner, Mauritius. This is perhaps due to the complexity involved in determining the exact parameters of action for a newly created, disparate grouping of states, which happens to include both old friends and former foes.

Successful economic integration requires the existence of certain objective conditions, such as complementarity, similar rates of economic growth

Pakistani peace-keepers wait to board the last ship leaving Somalia on 2 March 1995, the final day for UNOSOM II withdrawal

and free movement of goods and labour. Successful security cooperation, especially that which includes third-party intervention to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts through the use of military forces, also involves the meeting of a number of basic requirements. While there are admittedly great quantitative and qualitative disparities between the armed forces of individual SADC countries, these should be far easier to address than the economic disparities of the region.

Following the rapprochement within the region, the institutional framework for peacekeeping in Southern Africa is provided by the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the newly announced SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

Commenting on the role of the ISDSC at a recent conference co-hosted by the IDP during March 1996, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations of the SANDF, Major-General F E du Toit, stated that:

Through the ISDSC Operations sub-sub-committee we have already started liaison for combined planning and exercises, which could also include combined exercises to prepare for participation in Peace Support Operations. It is now important for the members of the ISDSC countries to get together and decide on certain Peace Support issues, which include:

- Responsibilities of the different countries as far as geographical location is concerned.
- Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures.
- Command and control.
- Training.
- Tasks.
- Standardization of equipment.
- Logistic support.
- Medical services.
- Communication and signals.²

At an institutional level, developments within the SADC and ISDSC provide a framework for cooperation and assistance within Southern Africa without which peacekeeping and cooperative security would not be possible. The region has demonstrated a strong consensus on the need for security coordination, but, impressive as the organizational developments may appear on paper, it is important not to overstate the contribution that could be

made to peacekeeping, defence and security by either the SADC or the ISDSC in the near future.

In analysing the costs and benefits of the involvement of countries in peacekeeping operations in their own back yard, the spectre of Ecomog in Liberia and the Russian role in the CIS must inevitably cloud the picture. Two issues warrant elaboration in this respect. First, to what extent is it politically possible or practically advisable for the UN to devolve peacekeeping in (Southern) Africa to a regional or sub-regional organization? Second, to what extent will area-of-influence peacekeeping in Southern Africa inevitably degenerate into peace enforcement? These two issues are examined below, followed by a brief discussion of the motives for South African involvement in peacekeeping and a final section on the will and capacity of African countries to act.

Devolution of responsibility

The benefits and constraints of regional organizations' involvement in peace operations could be analysed on two levels. First, seen from the perspective of a cash-strapped UN, regional organizations offer the benefit of alleviating financial problems for the world body by assuming some of its peacekeeping responsibilities. Politically, such a devolution of responsibility for action threatens to subvert firm UN guidance and control, and thus the impartiality and legitimacy of the UN in the process. It could also further undermine the already parlous state of UN finances, should the UN look towards the region to carry at least some of the burden itself – which seems inevitable. As a result, if a country such as South Africa, Botswana or Zimbabwe was directly contributing to the peacekeeping activities of a regional organization such as the SADC or the OAU, it could readily complain that it was carrying an extra burden in addition to its assessments for UN peacekeeping.

Second, whereas peacekeeping missions during the Cold War era were exclusively UN affairs, the UN has recently come to share responsibilities in the field with regional organizations, such as in Georgia (with the CIS and OSCE), and with a military alliance (Nato), as in the former Yugoslavia. Although regional organiza-

tions such as Nato have greater operational force coherence than any multinational UN force, this does not apply in Africa nor within SADC, where there is little prospect of doctrinal, command and equipment coherence in the short to medium term despite the laudatory rhetorical commitments to this objective made by the ISDSC in Southern Africa.

A further complication arises in cases where the UN hands over authority and jurisdiction to a non-UN multilateral force, as happened in Somalia (from Unosom I to Unitaf), or where the UN takes over authority and jurisdiction from such a force (as happened in Haiti). These arrangements have complicated the role of the UN but also that of peacekeepers in general – a development exacerbated by the increased civilianization of peacekeeping. This development occurred largely as a result of the growth of UN involvement in second-generation peacekeeping, in situations where the humanitarian assistance and nation-building responsibilities of the UN have expanded dramatically in response to the collapse of normal state institutions.

But the most important and potentially most dangerous development is that the use of a regional organization in peacekeeping operations could lead to the loss of control of an operation by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General. While authority to establish a force rests solely on the sovereign powers of the overarching organ, the UN, authority to deploy is derived, in part, from the consent of the host country. The principle of consent and request by the host country is essential for the establishment of a peace support operation in any sovereign territory, except when the mandate of the responsible international organization indicates otherwise or where there is, effectively, no host government to which the UN can turn – as was the case in Somalia.

A regional organization could also, on the other hand, be so constrained by the UN resolutions which provided its mandate that it would not be able to operate successfully. Resolution requirements specifying modes of operation and principles of impartiality sometimes diminish the ability of a regional organization to be effective – and, as a consequence, tarnish its reputation. This is particularly

salient, given the limited resources that may be made available by the UN in a region such as Southern Africa, or that are available in the region itself.

A UN peace support force is strictly an impartial international force. In the sense of the UN Charter, such a force, authorized by the competent organ of the UN and operating under its supervision, is a subsidiary organ of the UN: in effect, a UN agency. Clearly the UN cannot easily abrogate its responsibility for execution of a particular mandate to a regional organization without ensuring that the practice will not undermine the UN and its integrity. This challenge is compounded by the requirement for clear command and control relationships. Regional organizations are often unwilling to fully cooperate with the UN mission and may differ in their recommendations of what action is required, placing them at odds with the UN. Yet command and control of an operation should be placed clearly in the hands of either the UN or the regional organization, not both. Therefore the UN may be hesitant to allow too great a degree of latitude for the regional organization. And as indicated above, neither the OAU, the SADC nor the ISDSC have, as yet, the capacity to manage, coordinate or direct anything beyond observers and diplomatic missions at this stage. This does not imply that such a capacity could not be developed over time, but that is very much future music at present.

Regional organizations, it could be argued, have a particular knowledge and responsibility for their region. In an area such as that of Nato, the regional organization is more likely to be militarily effective (and logistically cost-effective) because of its greater coherence and closer proximity to the theatre of conflict. But proximity does not imply enhanced effectiveness in a peacekeeping role and is no substitute for organizational competence. There can be little doubt that there are vast differences in the level of skills, training and educational levels between the individual members of the armed forces of the majority of African states and those of the so-called developed world. In contrast with some Scandinavian countries, peacekeepers from Africa are not volunteers who are carefully selected and psychologically tested – the cream of a highly educated military force.



A UN observer from Algeria

Instead – and at the risk of gross generalization – they are more likely to be run-of-the-mill soldiers, possibly infected with HIV, poorly trained and educated by international standards, and extremely conscious of their tribal and ethnic identity. Peacekeeping as practised and taught by the UN is a demanding task, particularly because of the restraint required and the need for the highest quality of leadership at the lower tactical levels. In this context the harsh reality is a vast difference in standards and quality between soldiers in Africa (including, increasingly, those of South Africa) and those of the developed world. It is sad to note that, with the expansion of the demands for peacekeeping in recent years, the Secretary-General had to lament that the UN has had to settle for second or third best – that many of the troop-contributing countries were simply not up to scratch.³

Finally, a regional organization operating under UN auspices (as it must) will inevitably be viewed as less impartial than a multinational UN force drawn from further afield. Further, there was always the risk of the perception of domination by a regional hegemon, a notion which could be applied to Nigeria in the case of the Ecomog operation in Liberia, the United States in the case of OAS, and Russia in the case of the CIS. There

can be little doubt that South Africa will suffer a similar fate in Southern Africa and perhaps even further afield on the continent. Therefore, the military effectiveness of a regional organization (such as SADC or the OAU) might be outweighed by a reduction in its political effectiveness.

This being said, there are, of course, two vital areas within which peacekeepers from the region will have a decided advantage. The first is that of local knowledge and language. African culture, customs and traditions are often incomprehensible to European troops or troops from Asia. This is a vital component. Equally important, a number of African countries have or are contributing troops to peacekeeping operations, including Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Congo. Within the SADC alone Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania have contributed troops. There is, therefore, also a considerable pool of experience built up within the region, even if larger capacities and support systems may be lacking.

A second advantage of regional involvement relates to the fact that it is often impossible to reflect upon the internal dynamics of any society, particularly in Africa with its notoriously porous borders, without looking at the larger, neighbouring and even regional situation. Few intra-state conflicts are entirely internal affairs. More often than not there is a willing neighbouring country or group which either actively supports a particular faction, is willing to close its eyes in silent consent or is incapable of effectively ensuring that its territory is not used as a refugee or support base by groups active in a neighbouring country. The most frequent reasons for involvement in other countries' problems are ethnic affinity and political sympathy. Recent examples of such involvement are that between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Ghana and Togo, and Sudan and Uganda. Within this context the OAU and SADC, working in tandem with the UN, will be able to bring considerable pressure to bear to reduce active support from neighbouring countries to a conflict or potential conflict situation.

The few advantages of regional peacekeeping are perhaps negated by the complex nature of contemporary peace support operations, and the

doctrinal dilemmas which they pose for a region such as Southern Africa.

Doctrinal dilemmas

No effective mechanisms or appropriate doctrine have yet been devised for responding to the challenge of the "grey zone" in peacekeeping, the slippery slope between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Confusion between peacekeeping and enforcement action, including the tendency to slide from peacekeeping to enforcement action and then back again, has proved to be very dangerous. This is essentially what was witnessed in the operations in Somalia, Liberia and in the former Yugoslavia (prior to Ifor), often with disastrous consequences. Typical situations that would be problematic are when peacekeepers are taken hostage, a "safe area" under UN protection is attacked or overrun by a party in conflict or factions forcibly attempt to redirect the distribution of humanitarian supplies in their own interests.

These situations are typical in a situation of ongoing armed conflict within a state in which several factions are contending for control, and when there is no general agreement about the role of peacekeepers or when initial cooperation has collapsed. It is typical of the situation that could be expected in many African countries where the peacekeeping environment may be akin to that approaching the characteristics of the now popular "failed state" psychosis. In such a situation the operational environment is that of factions, militias and armed gangs with rudimentary and unclear command structures and little discipline. Combatants (if they could be called that) are often indistinguishable from the local population, often part and parcel thereof; and women, children and the aged and infirm are more a target of violence than the armed opposition groupings. As a result there is no "front-line" or clearly demarcated or identifiable areas controlled by opposing forces, no existing systems of local government or a clear differentiation possible between the general populace and refugees, displaced persons and impoverished local residents. What remains of the security agencies is perceived to be partial and torn by factionalism – often acting and reacting with a callousness

and brutality which is breathtaking in its disdain for human life and suffering, as the world has so clearly seen recently in Liberia.

Highly trained and professional forces from the advanced countries have found it extremely difficult to respond in an appropriate manner to the challenges of peacekeeping in the grey zone. The UN has repeatedly found that the challenges of peacekeeping in the grey zone place peacekeepers in an untenable position in various ways. At the operational level, lightly armed peacekeepers normally lack the capacity for escalated armed response while their reaction inevitably undermines the moral authority conveyed by their multilateral presence. For peacekeepers to engage in a military confrontation with a particular faction is to compromise their impartiality and thereby forfeit their political usefulness in the conflict situation. In a situation characterized by a total collapse of moral authority even the forces from carefully selected, highly educated, well trained and equipped nations would find themselves tested to respond in an appropriately restrained manner. In a situation of doubtful or eroding consent, peacekeepers need to be better trained and equipped to defend themselves and their mission, and to be in a higher state of alertness, than in a situation of assured consent. When evaluating the potential reactions of African peacekeepers, the spectre of Ecomog abuses in Liberia are sure to haunt peacekeeping in Africa by Africans. Given these considerations, without considerable training, education and work, firm UN control, an infusion of more than nominal UN observers, commanders and lines of authority, peacekeeping by the member states of the OAU or SADC will inevitably slide down the slippery slope from peace making to enforcement action.

And finally the peacekeeping and donor fatigue so prevalent internationally has inadvertently strengthened the peace enforcement debate. Given limited resources – both manpower and material – soldiers and commanders are often tempted to replace consent with coercion, relying on greater force, as a force multiplier to compensate for lack of resources.

Notwithstanding such risks, there are some powerful reasons and mo-

tives for the move towards the creation of a Southern and South African capacity for greater involvement in regional peacekeeping endeavours.

The motives for involvement in peacekeeping

There are several reasons for countries to be motivated to participate in peacekeeping operations.⁴ South Africa ascribes to most, of which altruism is a first consideration. Until fairly recently, some of the "older" peacekeeping countries, such as Canada, Norway and Sweden, equated participation in peacekeeping with "good international citizenship". Recently, there are indications that considerations of altruism are on the wane, to be replaced by considerations of national prestige and own interest – particularly with the entry, since the late 1980s, of literally dozens of "new" peacekeeping countries to the peacekeeping domain. South Africa, aware of its human rights abuses under apartheid and the debt that it owes to the international community for helping to bring democracy to the country, has attempted to infuse its increasingly schizophrenic foreign policy with a particularly moralistic tone. And peacekeeping is literally the epitome of international morality. Participation in peacekeeping is, therefore, a way of repaying the debt that the ANC feels it owes the international community. But flirtations with leaders such as Gaddafi and Castro, and close relations with countries such as Iran, sit uncomfortably with appeals of morality in the capitals of the developed nations. The lack of focus of the new incumbents in the Union Buildings has seen the country flounder and rapidly squander the goodwill and prestige that it enjoyed in the wake of the 1994 elections. In fact, it would probably be fair to comment that South African "morality" is watched with increased alarm and irritation, due to its lack of consistence and equity, by the country's more important trading partners.

Public opinion is a factor which in South Africa has generally not played a consistent role in foreign policy consideration. With many citizens still numbed by the extent of internal conflict, death and atrocities, the country has yet to experience the impact of public opinion on government foreign policy in the face of a humanitarian tragedy such as that experienced in

Somalia. Thus far, even the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, visually displayed on South African television every night, could not raise much more than a murmur of concern. As a result, South Africa escaped involvement with little more than the token delivery of foodstuffs and the excuse that it was still too preoccupied with its own transition. This easy way out no longer exists, and parliament may find it increasingly difficult to ignore international pressure and domestic public opinion in the future. During 1995, for example, a nation-wide opinion poll, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council and the Institute for Defence Policy, indicated that almost two-thirds of respondents wanted South Africa to have a peace-keeping force that could be utilized externally to help other countries maintain peace. Support for such a force was particularly popular amongst supporters of the traditionally black parties, namely the ANC (72%), the PAC (71%) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (69%).⁵ This is a fair indication that South African public opinion may underpin the tone of international morality with which South Africa attempts to portray its foreign policy dealings.

But altruism can also serve national prestige and influence. Like Japan, Germany, Brazil, India and Indonesia, to name only a few, South Africa aspires to a seat in an expanded United Nations Security Council. With the expansion of the Council now firmly on the agenda, aspiring nations will have to practically demonstrate a firm and consequent commitment to international peace and security. This as yet unspoken ambition has been strengthened by the central role that South Africa has played in important international initiatives which support the international agenda for peace such as the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the finalization of the Pelindaba Treaty on Africa as a nuclear-free continent. Interestingly, these achievements were the result of solid work by Foreign Affairs officials, which stands in sharp contrast to the much more public and damaging forays by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Mandela into international trouble spots. The politicians charged with the responsibility for South African foreign policy have offered to mediate in Ireland, the Koreas, the two

Chinas, Cuba, Nigeria and Libya. There is thus a worrying dichotomy between officialdom and senior politicians in South Africa's foreign policy practice, which will surely undermine the prestige in which the country has basked since the early 1990s. Aspirations to international prestige and leadership necessarily make South Africa less resistant to international requests and pressure to fulfill its international obligations.

Security Council ambitions aside, South Africa is an African leader, and the dominant state in Southern Africa. Inevitable responsibilities and commitments flow from its position of economic and moral strength. Not only do the other SADC countries (with the petulant exception of Zimbabwe) eagerly look to South Africa for both moral and material leadership, but it is clearly in its own economic interest for South Africa to do all within its power to stabilize the region. South Africa cannot prosper in a sea of African poverty, anarchy and destitution. The country will inevitably be overwhelmed by the surge of populations fleeing their own desperate countries, by people trying to survive through trading in drugs, weapons and contraband – a lawless anarchic situation within which crime and criminals prosper. For South Africa, peacekeeping in Southern and even Central Africa may therefore be considered as action in direct pursuance of its national security and economic interests.

There are a number of other reasons why countries participate in peacekeeping operations. Fear of a regional hegemon may be one such reason. This is arguably why the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, participate, living as they do under the shadow of Russia. In effect their participation serves "as a down payment for the day when they themselves will need the assistance of the international community"⁶ (in other words, when Russia tries to reassert itself in the region). Yet another reason, often ascribed to Argentina, and possibly to Nigeria, is that peacekeeping is a means of keeping the armed forces gainfully occupied (rather than contemplating military intervention in domestic political affairs), as well as a means of infusing these forces with a professionalism and respect for civilian authority they may traditionally lack. It is difficult to estimate the influ-

ence that this consideration may have in South Africa, although the distrust with which the ANC views the security forces, still essentially under white senior management, is evident as it boils to the surface with increasing frequency. On 3 May 1996, for example, Deputy President and Presidential heir-apparent, Thabo Mbeki, again directly accused the security forces of being involved in organizing the violence in KwaZulu Natal,⁷ following closely on a similar accusation by Mandela himself. If the attitude of key ANC members of the parliamentary defence committee is anything to go by, the SANDF is still very much perceived as an instrument of racial oppression, intent on defying the wishes of the majority party in parliament at every turn. Interestingly enough, the traditionally white parties such as the National Party, the Democratic Party and the Freedom Front have a similar concern. In this case they do not distrust the white management, but are concerned that falling operational standards and affirmative action are creating a military that is less professional and more amenable to political involvement. Keeping the men and women in uniform gainfully occupied may therefore be a salient consideration in the party-political discourse on South African participation in peacekeeping operations.

More controversial motivations aside, it is a truism that participation in peacekeeping operations will provide the SANDF with invaluable experience in its new peacetime role. The SANDF would benefit from the inevitable cross-fertilization which occurs during multilateral operations, leading to enhanced interoperability practices, an injection of new doctrine. It also stands to demonstrate in practice that many of its operational systems, such as its wheeled mine-protected vehicles are, indeed, well suited to peacekeeping operations and deserving of close acquisition scrutiny by other countries.

For an SANDF forced to justify itself to a sceptical public and a hostile parliamentary defence committee, peacekeeping provides a politically correct *raison d'être*. Such a justification is certainly less ludicrous than the attempts by the Department of Defence to justify itself through recourse to its contribution to the Reconstruction and Development Programme. In time this consideration will surely replace the

view, prevalent among former SADF officers in the SANDF, that too much participation in peacekeeping may detract from the prime focus of the armed forces, which in their view should be preparation for defence against an external attack.

Yet another motive, often listed by UN officials when commenting on African participation in UN peacekeeping operations, is the desire to profit from the reimbursement for the costs of troop contributions. Not only do poor countries profit from this relationship, but their troops receive pay well in excess of their normal packages at home – and what they receive is regular. But admittedly, the manifest managerial incompetence and bureaucratic red tape of the UN and its agencies, compounded by the very real debt trap within which the UN finds itself, has over recent years dispelled this perception. In fact, the SANDF has repeatedly stressed the financial burden of peacekeeping and made it clear that the defence budget would not, at its present levels, be able to sustain anything but the most modest contribution. As a result, participation in peacekeeping operations will inevitably require additional defence or foreign affairs funding. The fear is great that South Africa will be forced to pick up a very large tab itself when participating in peacekeeping operations.

These considerations aside, the political will of national governments to contribute material and human resources to peace operations depends in no small measure on the orientation and advice of the military. In this respect the stance of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is critical. The SANDF seems to have accepted the inevitability of future involvement in peace operations, but remains cautious on the issue of troop commitment. For example, the Chief of the South African Army has stated that:

Peace operations is a priority area. As a regional and continental leader, and a country bestowed with moral credibility within the international community, South Africa will inevitably be called upon to participate in peace operations ... [however] it is not advisable for South Africa to field combat troops until such time as the integration process is completed.⁸

This last statement raises a number of issues on both the political will and

the economic and military capacity of South Africa and that of other countries in the region to create and sustain a viable regional peacekeeping capacity.

The will and capacity to act

The enthusiasm of SADC member states to create a regional standby capacity of peacekeepers is largely dependent on South Africa demonstrating the necessary will to become involved in peace operations, although it has as yet not provided troops for such operations. In contrast Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania have all previously contributed to peacekeeping operations. As the most powerful state in Southern Africa, South Africa has a strong international voice and will exert a decisive influence on the destiny of the region. Economic domination aside, South Africa has armed forces which number nearly twice as many as any other in the region, and (with the exception of Angola), spends 15 times more on defence than the closest SADC contender, Zimbabwe.

Thus far, South Africa has committed itself to utilizing conflict prevention and management approaches rather than peacekeeping. For example, South Africa was part of the Southern African triad (the two others being Botswana and Zimbabwe) that used diplomatic persuasion backed with a direct threat of military intervention to temporarily resolve the political crisis in Lesotho in 1994. The South African government has also been actively involved in OAU efforts "to reduce tension, prevent conflict and solve existing conflict situations elsewhere on the continent".⁹ A practical example is the role which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, played in visits to Burundi, Angola and other areas of conflict.

South Africa's attitude towards peacekeeping has been summarized by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Pahad as follows:

A fundamental objective of South Africa's policy must be preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance and disarmament. However, should international and regional consensus exist on the need for military involvement, the following considerations will have to be taken into account. South Africa should be satisfied that the

situation poses a real threat to world peace and security and to regional stability. Any action taken should be in conformity with the charters of the UN and the OAU. In this regard, the South African Constitution and Defence Act provide for the deployment of the SANDF for peace support operations outside the borders of the country at the discretion of the President. In the event of such a decision being considered, it should be discussed by Cabinet and in Parliament.¹⁰

In fact, it has been glaringly obvious that the Department of Foreign Affairs is decidedly less enthusiastic about South African participation in peacekeeping than their somewhat more gung-ho colleagues within the Department of Defence.

Furthermore, South Africa's past destabilizing influence in the subregion is undoubtedly an influencing factor towards a cautious approach. Suspicion and uncertainty by other SADC countries of South Africa's future foreign policy are still prevalent. Because of its unfortunate history, South Africa is hesitant about being perceived as a regional hegemon. But there are increased signs that the ANC wishes South Africa to follow an increasingly assertive foreign policy role, which is bound to include peacekeeping activities.

In preparation for this role, the South Africa armed forces have embarked on a steady learning curve in an attempt to get abreast of the international peacekeeping debate, from which it was effectively excluded by its past pariah status. Military officers are being sent on international courses, while peacekeeping has been included on all major military courses, and a number of large map and field exercises have been held. Several research institutes and non-government organizations have also become active in informing the debate and providing expertise on the subject of peacekeeping. South Africa is planning to escalate its inevitable involvement in peacekeeping in a cautious manner – ideally by first providing observers, then becoming involved in a non-combatant capacity (communications, logistics, etc.), and finally, as a last priority, by providing troop contingents.

Although the SANDF has no experience in participating in multilateral operations, nor in operating within the political constraints of UN peace-

keeping operations (strict Rules of Engagement, etc.), it is, by African standards, a highly competent and modern military. The SANDF also points to the fact that many of its vehicles, systems and equipment are tailor-made for deployment in the inhospitable African terrain, which is characterized by poor infrastructure, inadequate repair and maintenance facilities, and long distances. However, the SANDF has suffered constant and severe budget cuts since 1989 (about 50% in real terms), and it is involved in a process of dramatic downsizing and restructuring which will obviously impact upon its will and ability to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless the focus of the debate in South Africa is not if but where, how and under what circumstances the SANDF will engage in peacekeeping operations.

However, a fundamental problem which militates against the establishment of a viable regional peacekeeping capacity, is that some of the larger countries in Southern Africa are wrestling with the problem of controlling the military under conditions of fundamental and rapid domestic political change, conditions often associated with the revolution in the post-Cold War strategic environment. In a number of cases, political reform has entailed a complete break with the old political order, which necessitates the creation of entirely new civil-military relations. South Africa is a prime example of this phenomenon.

The process of force transformation is at an advanced stage in Zimbabwe and Namibia, although intra-military ethnic tensions are still evident in the former country. Mozambique and South Africa have barely completed the first phase of force integration, and the real challenges of creating effective and cohesive armies still lie ahead. Angola still has to run the full course of post-conflict transition under extremely adverse circumstances. Thus four of the largest armies in the subregion are at various stages of coping with the challenges of amalgamating diverse and previously adversarial armed forces into a single national military in the wake of rapid and fundamental political change towards popular rule and fostering loyalty to a new political order and incumbent regime.

It is not only the countries with large armies that are faced with fun-

damental challenges. Civil-military relations in Lesotho are volatile, and it remains to be seen how the Swazi Defence Force will react to the mounting pressures for democratization in their kingdom.

Repeated calls have been made by the OAU, by leaders such as the President of Botswana and the Executive Secretary of SADC for the establishment of either an African or a Southern African peacekeeping force. Given the obvious burden that this would place on South Africa, the South African government has thus far treated these suggestions with a great degree of caution and scepticism. Emotionally, South Africa leans towards focusing its efforts in Africa, despite the obvious risks that such involvement holds. Africa clearly cannot sustain an autonomous peacekeeping force of any significant capacity without substantial international assistance. With the exception of South Africa, no country within SADC can independently mount a complex peace operation into a directly neighbouring country – and even South Africa's capacity has been demonstrably cut in recent years. As a whole, the vast majority of African states lack the resources and experience to conduct peace operations independently of the international donor community. The real question is, in fact, to what extent the international community is prepared to materially support, fund and assist peacekeeping in Africa by Africans.

Conclusion

Globally, sympathy and support for Africa within the international community is declining. Donor fatigue has become endemic, big business is finding investment opportunities elsewhere, and Western governments and electorates are markedly more reluctant than in the past to commit peacekeeping forces (and Western lives) to African wars. Whereas the continent suffered from excessive international attention during the Cold War, the danger is now indifference. Yet, paradoxically, the new international security agenda comprises precisely those issues with which Africans are currently grappling, among them environmental degradation and dwindling resources, rampant poverty, infectious diseases, mass population shifts, traf-

ficking in arms and drugs, and the mushrooming of crime syndicates.

Clearly Africa has to accept that it will have to play an increased role regarding early warning and preventive action. It is important for Africans to accept this greater responsibility, not in isolation from the broader international community, but in partnership with its many friends and funders from across the world. Should Africa, and the OAU in particular, prove its commitment and ability to tackle African problems, both material and other assistance may be forthcoming.

There is no short-term answer to the multitude of problems that confront Africa. However, regional security arrangements could play an important role in stabilizing the continent, although such arrangements are only part of the recipe that will eventually enable sustainable development and stability.

Subregional organizations, such as SADC, have great potential to act as building blocks in a system of preventive action as well as early warning. Increased military cooperation in the region could diminish reliance on external assistance and provide additional stability in a volatile area.

Neither Africa nor Southern Africa can go it alone in providing the stability which is essential for development. The region does not have the means, in terms of doctrine, training, trained manpower, finances and resources. Most important, tentative democracies and *de facto* one-party states will find it very difficult to transfer the values of respect for human rights and impartiality to the armed forces of neighbouring countries, when they have been unable to inculcate the same within their own borders.

Should the international community attempt, in the near future, to delegate the international role of the UN in peacekeeping to either the OAU or a regional organization such as SADC, the result is entirely predictable. The consequences of such abrogation of responsibility have been aptly illustrated by recent events in Liberia, where peacekeeping, peace enforcement, military intervention and banditry have become synonymous. Despite the infusion of capacity and resources that South Africa has brought to the region, peacekeeping in Africa, by Africans, can only work if it occurs

in very close collaboration and collusion with the UN and the international community. This will remain the case for the foreseeable future.

African armed forces should, therefore, prepare to cooperate with the international community. In effect, the only feasible scenario for keeping the peace in Africa is the virtual creation of an internationally sponsored UN rapid reaction force in Africa, for Africa. Such a force should consist of designated units which are placed on standby and trained in their respective countries by the UN, for common deployment by the UN, in collaboration with organizations such as SADC or the OAU.

The bottom line is that regional and subregional involvement in peacekeeping by African countries, under the auspices of the UN, or even on the initiative of an organization such as the OAU or the SADC, is inevitable. This implies that Southern Africa must consider its responsibilities in this regard and put its own house in order. If the region is to take up its responsibilities it is essential that discussion, negotia-

tion, commitment and cooperation occur now at the level of the UN, OAU, SADC and individual countries, before the next major crisis erupts. If decision making bodies are necessary, if joint military ties must be established, if combined exercises must take place, then now is the time to start.

The major immediate challenge in Southern Africa is, however, not peacekeeping. It is the proper regulation of Africa's civil-military relations – to design mechanisms and practices that will effectively contain the destabilizing role of the security forces in their efforts to oust democratically elected governments, entrenching civil and legislative control over these forces, and inculcating a culture of accountability, transparency and professionalism. This challenge is of much greater importance to the region than peacekeeping, but will predictably receive much less attention.

Notes and references

1 Anon, "SA to donate R12,6m for African peace", *The Citizen*, 18 April 1996.

2 Quoted in "Training for peace", *Salut*, March 1996, p 26.

3 See for example his remarks quoted by T Findlay, "The new peacekeepers and the new peacekeeping", in T Findlay (ed), *Challenges for the new peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report no 12, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p 20.

4 *Ibid*, pp 7–10.

5 J Cilliers, B Sass, T Motumi and C Schutte, "Public opinion on defence and security issues", in J K Cilliers and M-Reichardt, *About turn – the transformation of the South African military and intelligence*, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995, p 225.

6 *Ibid*, p 8.

7 V Yoganathan, "Mbeki calls for probe of violence in Natal", *Saturday Star*, 4 May 1996.

8 Johan Pretorius, "Integration, rationalization and restructuring of the SA Army: Challenges and prospects", *African Security Review*, vol 4, no 1, 1995, p 27

9 Christopher Clapham, "A comparative assessment of OAU and ECOMOG peacekeeping", paper read at an IDP/SAIIA conference on *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Johannesburg, 13–14 July 1995, pp 14, 163.

10 *Ibid*, p 164.

Debates about Lesotho's incorporation into the Republic of South Africa:

Ideology versus national survival

Introductory background

With the recently announced changes in South Africa's immigration and labour policies, the issue of Lesotho's incorporation into its powerful neighbour comes very much to the fore. In terms of these policy changes, migrant workers who have worked in South Africa continuously for a period of five years qualify to become citizens or permanent residents of that country. This means that Lesotho will lose the life-blood of its economy: migrant earnings. As shown below, migrant earnings finance the kingdom's multi-million rand annual trade deficit with South Africa. More importantly, its subsistence farming, household consumption levels and government revenues are almost completely dependent on income from labour migrancy. Income from labour migrancy is used to buy agricultural inputs and vital consumer goods which are, in turn, a source of customs revenue because of their high import content.

As a result of this policy a large section of Lesotho's population could emigrate to South Africa, resulting in loss of both the income from labour migration and skilled manpower. Those qualifying for permanent residence in South Africa might take their families with them. Should this happen, the level of migrant remittances and of the deferred pay fund would either decline or stagnate, thus adversely affecting the kingdom's capacity to develop. Migrant workers' remittances and deferred pay provide a source of cheap funds which the Lesotho Bank or government can invest in various development projects. The levels of both deferred pay and remittances have fallen sharply since the government's decision in 1989 to reduce the amount to be deferred by miners from 60% to 30%. Remittances fell from M233,5 million in 1989 to just M19,7 million in 1991, while the deferred pay contracted from M242,14 million to M28,85 million.¹ It is thus probable that a greater portion of migrant earnings is spent in South Africa.

Indeed, among Lesotho's rulers and beneficiaries of state patronage, South Africa's new immigration and labour policy is undoubtedly less than popular. Because they enjoy the benefits accruing from their control of the state – which in turn is chronically dependent on labour migrancy – Lesotho's rulers want the status quo to continue.

Yet the above policy changes have not been motivated purely by altruistic considerations. The African National Congress (ANC)-led government has to fulfil the Freedom Charter's oft-quoted clause, namely that South Africa "belongs to all who live in it, black and white".² The Freedom Charter embodies the vision of its authors – the ANC and its allies – while also providing the framework for social policy in a free South Africa. Thus, after its adoption, it set the parameters and the tone of the liberation struggle. To the Basotho who have lived and worked in South Africa as migrants for a great part of their life, the policy constitutes not just the most charitable way of abolishing the pernicious migrant labour system – clearly an embarrassment for post-apartheid South Africa – but an opportunity to enjoy a stable life with their families. The policy innovations also guarantee a future for their children in terms of access to jobs and a share in the South African wealth and resources not available in Lesotho.

With the discovery of gold in South Africa in the last quarter of the 19th century, Lesotho was sucked into the South African political economy, becoming an integral part of the migratory labour

Dr F K Mako, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Sociology, National University of Lesotho, Roma, addresses the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of the Basotho nation state in relation to the debate on South Africa-Lesotho relations.



system. Britain's policies accelerated and deepened the territory's involvement in the system by encouraging the Basotho men to work as contract workers in South Africa in order to earn the money needed to buy "English goods".³ This greatly affected the enclave country, condemning it along with South Africa's black reserves, to transformation into a labour producing machine – indeed the mainstay of cheap black labour in Southern Africa. Following the reincorporation of the former Bantustans, Lesotho remains South Africa's only "inner periphery", albeit with the trappings of sovereignty. Yet it is clear, as indicated later in this analysis, that the kingdom's continued sovereignty critically depends on its citizens' access to jobs in South Africa. However, one of the key barriers to free access to these jobs is sovereignty, a phenomenon which is increasingly out of step with the region's geopolitics, particularly the new realities in South Africa and changing donor priorities.

This article serves a twofold purpose. First, it highlights the critical issues in the debate about Lesotho's incorporation into the Republic of South Africa, including the hurdles that the debate needs to overcome if it is to become part of a national agenda, while also reassessing the parameters of the arguments in the light of the recent changes in South Africa's immigration and labour policies, the nature and thrust of the liberation struggle and the demise of the apartheid system. Second, it attempts to show that in order to make sense to an ordinary Mosotho the incorporation debate will need to address the critical philosophical/ideological issues of sovereignty, including the place of the monarch or the sovereign and national survival, and their relationship, and argues that these do not depend on Lesotho being a separate geographical entity.

Nature, origin and framework of the incorporation debate

That Lesotho should be incorporated into or merge with South Africa has been a recurring issue, albeit often as a fad, since Britain granted independence to what became known as the Union of South Africa in 1910. A product of discrete and varied historical conjunctures, the issue has not been



King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho

able to "take off" and develop into a serious political agenda for the two countries. Indeed, even among analysts of South Africa/Lesotho relations the topicality of this issue has been a function of the changing parameters of the two countries' interactions. Of these parameters the most critical are economic, historical, political and social links. Thus the arguments for or against a merger between the two states have to varying degrees emphasized these links. However, most of the literature on Lesotho's dilemma and possible incorporation into South Africa presents economic links as the critical variable. Thus in the 1950s Lesotho's role and status in the South African political economy constitute the point of departure for the debate.

During apartheid's formative stages South African rulers placed more emphasis on the economic than the ideological and historical links as the reasons why Lesotho should join South Africa. As the Hertzog/Smuts coalition government argued in 1932, for example, control of Basutoland (Lesotho) ought to be transferred to the Union of South Africa because in terms of access to jobs and customs

union finances the Union treated this small British protectorate as one entity with South Africa.⁴

In the Verwoerdian era the incorporation of the enclave country was seen more in political/strategic terms. Lesotho ought to be incorporated into the Republic of South Africa as part of the latter's security policy. As Dr Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa until 1966, put it in 1961, "an independent Basutoland like the rest of British colonies edging towards independence could well become a danger to South Africa".⁵ Indeed, the 1960s heralded a drastic change in the perceptions and priorities of both South Africa and Lesotho. For South Africa the key priority was the protection of its apartheid rule against the challenge posed by the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Lesotho provided refuge for people fleeing oppression in South Africa while also serving as a conduit for the three liberation movements to the countries hostile to the apartheid regime.

Under the anti-apartheid Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the territory had established itself as the citadel of anti-South African agitation. The BCP linked the independence struggle in Lesotho with the emancipation of blacks in South Africa,⁶ and its interpretation of the political process in Lesotho further heightened the anxiety of the apartheid government.

However, notwithstanding its declared alignment with the cause of liberation in South Africa, the BCP – like its two rivals the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) – has always been virulently opposed to Lesotho's incorporation into South Africa. Indeed, its claim that its political struggles in Lesotho were linked with the emancipation of blacks in South Africa was later belied by its campaigns and attacks in the early 1960s against the ANC and the SACP. The BCP leader publicly accused the ANC exiles in Lesotho of "wanting to use the BCP as a vehicle for continuing the struggle against apartheid and Lesotho itself as a base from which campaigns could be mounted in the republic to achieve their objectives".⁷ One of the BCP's objectives, as spelt out in its constitution, is "opposition to Lesotho's incorporation into the Republic of South Africa".⁸

Arguably, for Lesotho's rulers and privileged classes the possibility of their country's incorporation into the Republic of South Africa may be not simply an irritant – a reminder of their country's precarious status – but a threat to their interests. In fact, while they are not united in their determination to protect their country's sovereignty, all three main political parties above have expressed the fear that South Africa's recently announced decision to grant citizenship and/or permanent residence to migrant workers might undermine the kingdom's economic development, thus forcing the Basotho nation to give up its independence. Yet this cannot be dismissed as the lack of vision on the part of the three political parties. They see themselves as rulers and future rulers respectively, and the guardians of the kingdom's constitution – a task for which they are legitimately competing. According to the kingdom's constitution – a brainchild of the élite group and the three main political parties – "Lesotho shall be a sovereign democratic Kingdom".⁹ Thus the incorporation debate has to contend with this ideological problem. However, as indicated above, the kingdom's political parties are not united in their stance on incorporation, suggesting that they may not be a decisive factor in the debate. Indeed, elements of the élite, especially those from the BNP and MFP with economic interests in South Africa, may feel that they have no direct stake in the state system in Lesotho. Hence they could easily be persuaded to support the incorporation option. Thus, viewed from this angle, the incorporation option cannot be dismissed as inconceivable.

I argue however, that for Lesotho's rural poor and thousands of Basotho migrant workers sovereignty has little or no relevance as the bulk of their income derives from South Africa. They know that their country has few or no opportunities. Unsurprisingly, they have long been fighting for unrestricted freedom to choose the jobs they want and to have permanent residential rights in South Africa. Attesting to this is their struggle in the apartheid era, albeit with limited success, to obtain residential permits under what used to be termed "Section Twelve" of South Africa's Bantu Administration Act. After being signed by the Chief



King Letsie III

The Argus

Bantu Affairs Commissioner, a certificate issued under the section entitled foreign blacks to settle and work in a prescribed area of South Africa without having to return to their countries to renew their contracts. Those working on the South African mines, on the other hand, have openly called, through the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), for the incorporation of Lesotho into the Republic of South Africa. The union vowed at its 24–27 April 1991 Johannesburg congress to end the status of aliens ascribed to Basotho in South Africa, which was deceitfully manipulated by the system of apartheid to restrict their rights and to subject them to severe exploitation by stepping up measures leading to Lesotho's political "incorporation into a non-sexist democratic South Africa".¹⁰

I have argued elsewhere that following the political change in South Africa, Lesotho's rulers are faced with a mammoth challenge: renegotiating their country's future and redefining its role and status in the South African political economy – for the issue is no longer Lesotho's relations with South Africa but rather the future of the Basotho.¹¹ We cannot be very opti-

mistic about this happening, however. As one analyst has argued, incorporation (or the debate about it) will be resisted by the élites who benefit from all the trappings of government: ministries, ambassadorial posting and control over the flow of government spending and foreign aid to reward followers and build constituencies.¹²

How long the debate on the merger between the two states can be suppressed will, however, depend on the continued flow of foreign aid, the amount of international investment capital, the country's economic performance, the élite's perception of its benefits and costs and the priorities of post-apartheid South Africa. But with the advent of majority rule in South Africa, hopes for sustained aid and increased flow of foreign private capital have faded. As the government of Lesotho lamented in 1989:¹³

With a changing political scene in South Africa, and major demands on aid resources elsewhere, there are few aid officials who maintain that current or increased level of support for Lesotho will continue.

The BCP government believes that the transformation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which includes South Africa, offers a solution to this dilemma. More importantly, it sees the SADC as a mechanism for circumventing the incorporation debate. The regime's view is that the new organization provides a greater scope for effective participation in and influence over the subregion's economic and political activities. This is implied in the Minister of Finance and Economic Development Planning's recent argument that any negotiation of the kingdom's role in the region must be based "on the principle of no losers".¹⁴ Thus, he argued, Lesotho should not negotiate itself out of the Southern African Customs Union (Sacu), labour migrancy and the Common Monetary Area (CMA), for these constitute the critical components of its national income and a means by which the country is able to participate in South African wealth.

According to the BCP regime, economic union with South Africa can be considered but only as the last option, after successfully completing the negotiations on Sacu, the CMA and

imperialism in Southern Africa (South Africa and BLS): that it brought the various national groups under a single and centrally managed economy. With their narrow focus, the BLS countries missed the essence of the struggle: the control of both the economy and the state that guaranteed its operation.

On the contrary, in South Africa the struggles were directed neither at restoring national pride nor at reinstating or preserving the pre-colonial systems, but rather at achieving more universalist values – democracy, racial and ethnic equality, control and equitable share of the nation's resources. Indeed, the liberation movements saw the realization of these broad values as one of the ways of releasing the country's economic development potential. A purely nationalist struggle would encourage secessionist tendencies, territorial disputes and ethnic conflict. Of course, the argument here is not that South Africans have achieved all the goals of their political struggles, but rather that they have developed a programme not for geographically and territorially delimited areas but for the whole of South Africa.

The BLS countries, essentially part of South Africa historically and economically, were physically and politically excised from it because of the reasons explained earlier. Independence confirmed their existing boundaries. But with independence the anti-colonial forces in the BLS countries became privy to the scheme denying their peoples political, economic and social rights in South Africa. Indeed, this is one of a myriad concomitants of BLS's independence. Thus, I argue that it is the ideology of national self-determination, used by Lesotho politicians to drive out colonialism, which has kept the incorporation issue off the Basotho nation's political agenda. Yet there is conflict between the interests of the majority of the people of Lesotho and the goals of political independence understood and practised in the present form, as I will show in the following section, which analyses the economic features of the Basotho nation-state.

Notwithstanding the above, Lesotho's independence played a crucial role in the anti-apartheid struggle, making it possible for the country to provide refuge for hundreds of South African exiles and solace to its migrant population subjected to racialism in South Africa. As opposed to their black colleagues in

TABLE 1 Share of gross regional product by country

Angola	6	NA	3	6
Botswana	NA	0,4	1	3
Lesotho	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,5
Malawi	2	1	1	1
Mozambique	8	NA	2	1
Namibia	NA	NA	2	2
South Africa	65	77	77	75
Swaziland	NA	NA	1	1
Tanzania	5	6	5	2
Zambia	6	8	4	3
Zimbabwe	7	7	4	5

Source: Adapted from J Herbst, "South Africa and Southern Africa after apartheid", in J W Harbison and D Rothchild (eds), *Africa in world politics: Post-Cold War challenges*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995.

South Africa, who enjoyed only limited or no land rights, the people of Lesotho had unrestricted access to land. As Perry has argued, land may be an insignificant factor in the economic life of the Basotho nation, but it has been of immense emotional, political and social significance for Basotho migrants. According to Perry:¹⁶

The laws of South Africa do not make it officially possible for a migrant contract worker to acquire residence rights. Likewise he cannot take his family with him. In this context, therefore, land means something to come home to, and assures a man of a place to live.

There is certainly no trade-off between these rights and incorporation into an apartheid-free South Africa. Incorporation could, in fact, mean that Basotho would be able to obtain better and bigger chunks of land in South Africa while also retaining their existing holdings.

The economic and political quandary

The structure and performance of Lesotho's economy suggest that the country may be of little utility for its 2,02 million inhabitants beyond being a home. Not only is the country unable to support the bulk of its population; it is barely capable of participating "meaningfully" in the regional economy. As Table 1 shows, the country's share of the region's gross regional product is abysmally low compared with the rest of the SADC countries. In addition the kingdom's net factor income from abroad, consisting mainly of migrant remittances, finances more than 50% of domestic expenditure.¹⁷ In 1992 migrant earnings, of which M347,4 million consisted of remittance payments, amounted

to M1299,06 million or about 87,4% of the country's gross national product (GNP). Its trade deficit stood at M2-931,53 million as against exports valued at just M310,91 million.¹⁸ More than 50% of government revenue in 1992/93 derived from customs union receipts. The country has a weak tax base, collecting just M218,4 million in income and company tax or less than half the customs union receipts at the end of the 1992/93 financial year.¹⁹ Foreign aid – grants and concessional loans – has always been an important component of the government's development budget, accounting for over 91,1% of capital expenditure in 1991/92.

The country has achieved very little in terms of job creation or the reduction of chronic unemployment (estimated at 43%). In 1991/92 its manufacturing sector could provide jobs for only 11 065 people, while the entire formal sector employed no more than 70 000 people.²⁰ This is certainly dreadful in a country in which more than 50% of the population have neither a pension nor a regular income, and promises a bleak future for its labour force of more than 600 000, increasing annually by more than 20 000 new entrants.²¹ Its predominantly subsistence agriculture, which is almost totally dependent on migrant earnings, is beset by formidable problems: atrophying land resources caused by erosion and population pressure and prohibitively high farming costs. The government warned in 1992 that only 9% of Lesotho's land was suitable for crop production.²² The mountain areas which traditionally supported livestock have been denuded of vegetation as a result of overgrazing.²³ Landlessness among the rural population has risen from 7% in 1950 to 26,4% in 1986.²⁴

That Lesotho has been able to survive is not surprising, however; small countries are able "to exploit *any* little openings and opportunities" that exist in the world system.²⁵ The enclave kingdom has used its links with South Africa, particularly that country's apartheid system, as a bargaining chip in its negotiations for international aid. It has also used its membership of Sacu and the CMA in its campaign to attract foreign capital, presenting these bodies as guarantors of a big market and easy access to foreign exchange, respectively. However,

with the smallest economy in Sacu the kingdom hardly has any influence over these institutions.²⁶

The above notwithstanding, Lesotho has done little to maximize the benefits accruing from its special relationship with the Republic of South Africa. For example, 61% of migrant workers' earnings are spent on South African manufactured goods, suggesting that the country would benefit from import-substitution strategies.²⁷ With these strategies in place, negotiations with South Africa would be extended to areas such as the share of the Sacu, particularly the South African market.

How much South Africa would be willing to concede in such trade negotiations is a matter for conjecture. In fact, there are indications that rather than opening its market to African goods South Africa has not only maintained protectionist trade policies but has also resorted to more aggressive export strategies. Its exports to Africa have been rising at the rate of 63% annually between 1987 and 1995, from R1,62 billion to R22,5 billion. Its imports from Africa were worth just R5,7 billion, leaving a trade surplus of over R11 billion. In 1994 Lesotho's trade deficit with South Africa amounted to more than R2,5 billion, the second highest of all South Africa's trading partners in SADC. Lesotho's exports to South Africa were valued at just R214,1 million, or less than 5% of the latter's imports from Botswana.²⁸

The South African government's decision to grant citizenship or permanent residence to migrant workers is bound to intensify pressure on the Lesotho élite to debate their country's merger with its giant neighbour. But the success in securing such a merger is entirely a different matter for all depends on South Africa's assessment of the costs and benefits of taking over Lesotho. The costs include the extra burden of impoverished people it imposes on the Republic, which has to grapple with the problem of improving living standards for 66% of its population currently living below the minimum living level.²⁹ Moreover, on the basis of the near-civil war conditions in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa may feel that accepting a politically unstable Lesotho is not a wise decision. On the other hand, the Republic would benefit from Lesotho's abundant water

resources and relatively skilled manpower. The incorporation of Lesotho would also obviate the need for maintaining border control posts and police patrols to stem the inflow of illegal immigrants into the Republic, a phenomenon which probably costs South Africa more than it would require to absorb the enclave country, and which is a potentially destabilizing factor for both countries. Recent studies show that illegal aliens constitute one of the major problems facing South Africa. In 1994 alone "1 118 aliens from Lesotho were arrested in South Africa having committed a serious crime".³⁰

Conclusion

Economic problems in Lesotho and the lack of viable alternatives justify a serious debate about the country's merger with or incorporation into the Republic of South Africa. Survival as a nation-state depending as it does on Sacu receipts, the CMA, foreign aid and labour migrancy over which it has no control, Lesotho should be ready for incorporation. It should, in fact, initiate the debate among its citizens lest these sources of funds dissipate when most needed.

Ideological considerations such as independence, nationhood and national sovereignty can only militate against the real goals of development: an improvement in the Basotho's living standards resulting from access to jobs and resources in a country (South Africa) which is theirs historically. In fact, ideology should not in itself be a problem, for there are more Basotho living in the Orange Free State than there are in Lesotho. Moreover, as argued above, sovereignty and national survival should not be a barrier to incorporation provided that these are not defined in chauvinistic and parochial terms. The debate must, however, include efforts at assuaging the king, the élite and other groups which benefit from the kingdom's current status, and inform the people of Lesotho about the consequences of their country's incorporation, especially the trade-offs that it entails.

As indicated above, the incorporation debate also directly affects South Africa. Hence that country must be sensitized to the need to get involved in the debate. South Africa has a special interest in the events in Lesotho as

an enclave and closest neighbour with a common history and deep cultural, economic and ethnic links.

References

- 1 F K Makoa, "Lesotho beyond elections", *African Studies*, vol 54, no 1, 1995, p 6.
- 2 T Lodge, *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*, Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1983, p 71.
- 3 Kingdom of Lesotho, *Third five year development plan 1980-1985*, p 11.
- 4 D K Kowet, *Land, labour migration and politics in Southern Africa: Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978, p 113.
- 5 Lord Hailey, *The Republic of South Africa and the British High Commission Territories 1945-1963*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p 108.
- 6 J E Bardill and J Cobbe, *Lesotho: Dilemmas of dependence in South Africa*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, p 32.
- 7 J E Spence, *Lesotho: The politics of dependence*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p 37.
- 8 G W Strom, *Development and dependence in Lesotho the enclave of South Africa*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976, p 53.
- 9 *The Constitution of Lesotho*, Maseru: Government Printer, p 13.
- 10 R F Weisfelder, "Lesotho and the inner periphery", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 30, no 4, 1992, pp 667-668.
- 11 F K Makoa, *op cit*, p 14.
- 12 J Herbst, "South Africa and Southern Africa after apartheid", in J W Harbison and D Rothchild (eds), *Africa in world politics: Post-Cold War challenges*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p 160.
- 13 Kingdom of Lesotho, "Environment and Development in Lesotho", a National Paper prepared for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Brazil, 1992, pp 5-6.
- 14 M P Senoana, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Maseru, 1995, p 2.
- 15 R Davies and J Head, "The future of mine migrancy in the context of broader trends in migration in Southern Africa", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol 21, no 3, 1995, p 439.
- 16 J A Perry, "Land and politics in Lesotho", *African Studies*, vol 42, no 1, 1983, p 58.
- 17 P Molapo, cited in the *Report of the proceedings of the national seminar on economic integration in Southern Africa*, Maseru, 1995, p 5.
- 18 Central Bank of Lesotho, *Quarterly Review*, vol XII, no 4, Maseru, December, 1993, pp 19-87.
- 19 *Ibid*, p 18.
- 20 F K Makoa, "King Letsie III's Short-Lived Coup", *Southern Review*, vol 8, no 7, April 1995, p 35.
- 21 Central Bank of Lesotho, *Annual Report*, 1989, pp 12-17.
- 22 Kingdom of Lesotho, *Environment and development in Lesotho*, 1992, p 6.
- 23 *The Courier*, no 154, November/December, 1995, p 5.
- 24 *Ibid*, p 31.
- 25 P Selwyn, "Room for manoeuvre", in P Selwyn (ed), *Development policy in small countries*, London: Croom Helm, 1975, pp 13-14.
- 26 J Herbst, *op cit*, pp 159-160.
- 27 *Sunday Times (Business Times)*, 8 October 1995, p 2.
- 28 *Ibid*.
- 29 M Ramphele, "New day rising", in Panos, *Restoring land: Environmental change in post-apartheid South Africa*, London: Panos, 1991.
- 30 Col B Van Niekerk, "The impact of illegal aliens on safety and security in South Africa", *ISSUP Bulletin 7/95*, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1995, p 1.

Export Processing Zone

Dot Keet, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, takes a critical look at the currently fashionable EPZ strategies, and their role in opening weaker economies to external competition rather than integrating them into the global economy on an equitable basis.¹

Export Processing Zones (EPZs), under a variety of designations, are either in the process of being introduced, or already operating, in at least six of the 12 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The more advanced of the new EPZ projects are in Namibia and Zimbabwe, although there have been long-standing EPZ programmes in Mauritius and Zanzibar. Such “special” or “free” industrial investment zones are also now either on the drawing-boards or enshrined in legislation in Mozambique and Malawi. They are also being proposed from a number of different quarters and under various designations within South Africa – particularly by some of the provincial administrations, such as those of the Western and Eastern Cape, and by provincial and local authorities in Gauteng.² What is less well known is that EPZs have been under discussion in South Africa since the early 1980s and – according to trades unionists – have been experienced in a very particular form in the homelands/bantustans under apartheid’s “industrial decentralization” incentive programmes.³

The recent study on EPZs commissioned by Satucc (the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council)⁴ illustrates that the effects of EPZs in Third World economies on employment and labour rights and conditions, as well as their broader social, economic, and environmental effects, are well documented. In all these areas the picture is complex,⁵ and contradicts the superficial claims made in support of EPZs – even in the case of the much-vaunted Mauritius “success story”.⁶ As devices for national economic development, EPZs are problematic;⁷ furthermore, other fundamental economic, social and political problems are evident when EPZs are assessed in relation to prospects for regional cooperation between the countries of Southern Africa, and in the context of the globalized world economy.

It is widely agreed in Southern Africa that development of closer cooperation between the countries of this part of Africa would be:

- a recognition of the existing operational/technical interdependence and the high degree of *de facto* (if not yet *de jure*) functional integration of the economies of the region;
- a prerequisite for beginning to alter the inherited disparities and inequities in favour of more balanced development across the region – for the progress, stability and security of all the countries in the region;
- a possible – and probably the only – effective basis on which the countries of Southern Africa, including even South Africa, could respond to the challenges of the new global economic order.

It is in this context that EPZs assume a broader significance. Some governments in the region are adopting EPZs as part of national liberalization programmes to open up and integrate their economies directly into the global economy. EPZs are seen to be devices to turn countries away from inward-looking import substitution industrialization (ISI) towards export-led growth. This is the argument of the World Bank,⁸ and it would seem to be the position, for example, of the Zimbabwe government.⁹ If this is the case for other governments as well, it clearly carries implications for their national development programmes. It could also impede regional programmes for more strategically conceived joint approaches by the countries of Southern Africa to achieve more advantageous (or even merely less disadvantageous) interactions with, and positioning in, the liberalized global economy.

If governments of the region are deliberately opting for unilateral national liberalization approaches, it raises questions about their (official) commitment to multilateral approaches to the challenges facing the region. Of course, joint regional approaches to development and security cannot preclude or disregard the reality of more narrowly conceived, nationally based policies. At this early stage of cooperation towards the integration of Southern Africa, the respective governments still

strategies in the context of regional cooperation and development, and a globalized economy

have specific responsibilities and problems to respond to within their national economies and societies. It is also entirely to be expected that there will be issues on which competing and even conflicting national interests will emerge and have to be accommodated – as in such integration processes everywhere. However, the creation of EPZs could exacerbate such tensions by fostering narrow national approaches and competitive relations between members of SADC. Such actively divisive policies differ from the kind of interim measures that take on board inherited differences and divisions – but with a view to reducing and removing them.

On the other hand, EPZs seem to have been approached by some governments in the region as something of an ad hoc “crisis management” device. In this approach, EPZs may not be viewed as the beginning of a broad process of export-led growth and generalized liberalization of their economies – the way the World Bank views them.¹⁰ Although the Bank promotes EPZs as one of the instruments for integrating African economies into the global economy, some governments in Southern Africa seem to be utilizing EPZs simply as an interim, supplementary measure to deal with some immediate problems – particularly pressing unemployment crises – while they wait to see what a broader integrated regional economy will deliver. Alternatively, governments in countries that have failed to attract foreign investment through national investment promotion plans resort to the creation of EPZ enclaves arguing that such foreign investment, despite the limited returns, is preferable to even lower returns – or none at all. Unfortunately, such short-term measures are also short sighted and could disadvantage, and even preempt, longer-term, more fundamental regional development.

In the context of current programmes and future prospects for Southern African economic cooperation and integration, the creation of EPZs could cause complications and even po-



tential conflict in three main areas: in each of them, EPZs are invariably the less propitious of the trade, investment and industrialization options facing the governments of the region.

Unilateral free trade enclaves – or a multilateral regional trade strategy?

Facilitating and actively promoting trade not only adds an important stimulus to existing productive activities, but also opens up possibilities for higher levels of economic development and diversification – if located within an appropriately designed policy framework. Within such a framework, trade stimulates greater production and higher productivity and is expanded, in return, in an integrated development dynamic.

Increasing and improving trade between the countries of Southern Africa would be:

- an expression of their already close economic interactions and infrastructural links, and the comparative advantage then proximate to one another's markets gives them over external traders;

- an opportunity for greater economic production and productivity through mutual stimulation of competitive and cooperative cross-border transactions in goods and services;
- the basis for a greater degree of self-sufficient and self-sustaining economic development and diversification, and at the same time a basis for more soundly based and less vulnerable external trade strategies.

Such intra-regional trade facilitation requires the rapid removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as uncoordinated standards and procedures, cumbersome and unnecessary bureaucracy, corruption and inefficiency (especially in customs

services), inadequate financial facilities and transport and other physical infrastructures. But the encouragement of trade, production and economic diversification will also certainly require the reduction and eventual removal of tariff barriers between the countries of the region, particularly

where they act as protection for inefficient industries in some countries to the direct detriment of more efficient industries in others.

The simple – and simplistic – neoliberal argument is that such protection distorts or impedes free operation of market forces based on the respective efficiency and profitability of competing industries, or the economic advantages of certain countries of Southern Africa over others. According to such an approach, the countries of Southern Africa should rapidly reach a full free trade agreement in the region and allow the operation of market forces to determine which areas or industries should survive and develop, and which should not.

A more strategic development approach, while encouraging efficiency and recognizing comparative advantages, goes beyond simple commercial criteria and narrow business profitability. Development strategies have to take on board wider economic and social considerations, and counter or compensate for the economic inefficiencies or waste,

social costs, and environmental damages that accompany the functioning of market forces. Specific economic, social and security considerations – in identified cases and for defined periods and purposes – have to be factored in. This would involve, for example, the temporary application of tariff regulations and the utilization of other financial, legal and technical instruments to promote certain economic regions, economic or social sectors, or even specific industries.

Complex processes of analysis and negotiation are under way between the countries of Southern Africa on facilitating and promoting intra-regional trade within a multilateral regional trade strategy.¹¹ The aim and end product of trade negotiations is seen to be the eventual creation of an integrated free trade region. How this process proceeds, however, will depend upon accommodating and coordinating a variety of national and sub-national interests, existing agreements, and government policies towards both intra-regional and international trade. Some countries have already adopted far-reaching liberalization policies within their domestic economies, in their cross-border regional relations, and in their international trade and investment strategies.¹²

To encourage the respective countries to move towards expanded forms and higher levels of cross-border trade and development, and to prevent the aggravation of existing imbalances between them, the facilitation and active encouragement of intra-regional trade entails:

- accommodating the different and sometimes conflicting national economic interests and policies of the participating governments;
- incorporating the many existing bilateral trade agreements between specific pairs of countries within the region, and possibly even some new ones;
- integrating existing subsets of countries or economic agreements, such as the Southern African Customs Union, into the broader Southern African multilateral trade framework;
- responding effectively to demands for interim exemptions and protection for specific products or industries in certain of the member countries – without, in the process, entrenching fixed and unsustainable protectionism.



All the above point to the necessity for transitional and variable preferential trade arrangements between the countries of Southern Africa, with the prospect and longer-term aim of moving – as rapidly and smoothly as the separate and common interests allow – towards a regional free trade area, possibly surrounded by a common external tariff.¹³ There is some urgency in the matter, however, as the new WTO (World Trade Organization) rules make such preferential intra-regional trade arrangements difficult to defend unless the regional grouping has been formally registered with the WTO under the special provisions for the regional integration of LDCs (least developed countries)¹⁴

The creation of EPZs could preempt, and will certainly complicate, the creation of such a multilateral intra-regional trade integration and promotion process.

- At the very least, EPZs with provisions for partial trade access to their respective host markets, and with inevitable “leakages” of goods out of the enclaves into local or regional markets, create possibilities – legal and illegal – for breaches of the trade and tariff regimes of both the host country and other members of a joint trade area.
- More importantly, there can be no doubt that many foreign companies will be attracted to EPZs in Southern Africa as platforms from which to export not only into international markets but also into the common regional market created by trade integration, thereby undermining the benefits of proximity, which is one of the few advantages local producers have within the region.
- Above all, the existence of free trade zones within a number of the SADC countries will complicate the creation of an intra-regional free trade area in Southern Africa. At worst, where EPZs are adopted as part of an externally orientated, general liberalization strategy, an effective regional economic grouping – with or without a common external tariff system – will be seriously prejudiced, if not totally preempted.¹⁵ Without such a regional framework agreement, South Africa, which is under pressure to extend existing bilateral trade agreements with its neighbours and enter into new ones, could find itself required – under WTO “non-discrimination”

principles – to extend the same preferential terms to other countries in the same category.

Competing foreign investment schemes – or coordinated regional investment strategies?

Regional economic cooperation and development would also affect the integration of the financial markets of Southern Africa. Research and discussions are already under way to eliminate procedures and bureaucracy which impede efficient cross-border financial operations in the region, and to improve physical infrastructure and personnel capacity.¹⁶

Full macroeconomic alignment and regional financial integration are a long-term prospect but, as with the process towards trade integration, transitional measures and the negotiation of multilateral arrangements will be required. In addition to the kind of technical requirements indicated above, more effective cross-border financial operations and regional investment promotion would include:

- facilitating, and perhaps eventually fully liberalizing, cross-border investment capital flows and currency movements between SADC member states;
- creating regional financial instruments, such as targeted investment incentives and development funds, to encourage better geographically balanced investment between member countries, into priority sectors, and even into more deprived regions;
- encouraging joint regional investment programmes, involving both public and private capital and from different member states, towards combined and mutually beneficial development;
- creating foreign investment promotion schemes and coordinated strategies, or common investment codes, with respect to foreign investment.

The adoption of EPZ programmes offering competing packages to attract





foreign investors – incorporating customs exemptions, locational and operating subsidies, tax holidays, generous profit repatriation and other financial inducements –¹⁷ could detract from such important collaborative strategies in Southern Africa on three main grounds:

- The first is that the preoccupation with attracting foreign investment, reflected in the recourse to EPZ schemes, draws attention and efforts away from the mobilization of internal investment resources. What is more, EPZs often actually function to the detriment of local enterprise by offering preferential conditions and a host of subsidies to foreign companies which are otherwise uncompetitive or even non-viable, subsidies that are – under liberalizing structural adjustment programmes – normally denied to uncompetitive or non-viable local companies.
- The second and even more serious problem arises from the downward pressures exerted on investment terms and other conditions in the EPZs, as countries underbid each other to attract foreign companies. This becomes particularly pronounced when footloose EPZ companies are prepared and able to undertake rapid relocations from one such EPZ to another offering more attractive terms.¹⁸ In this situation, the tactic of playing countries off against one another becomes a deliberate business strategy of such companies.
- By contrast, coordinated regional investment strategies between a number of cooperating countries could create the scale and sophistication of investment project nec-

essary to attract more worthwhile, longer-term foreign investment, which could incorporate more favourable terms such as skills and technology transfers. It is essentially such sizeable and more stable foreign investment that can be utilized to advantage within national and regional development programmes, in contrast to the quick-profit operations of fly-by-night EPZ outfits.

EPZ investment schemes reverse what should be the relationship between domestic development and foreign investment. Appropriate investment programmes, including foreign investment programmes, should be shaped by the economic and social potential and priorities of the countries concerned. It should not be the aims and interests of foreign investors – based on their own profit and sometimes other considerations – that decide which specific enterprises, industries and even entire countries will develop, and what direction that development will take.

Monoculture enclaves – or diversified and integrated production economies

The fundamental purpose of national and regional trade and investment strategies should be to develop and diversify production in all economic sectors within and across the countries of Southern Africa. Programmes of research and analysis are under way and some are quite well advanced within the SADC framework.¹⁹ These include perspectives and plans for:

- joint research and development programmes in key production sec-

tors, such as energy and water resources development, forestry and fisheries protection and agricultural and minerals beneficiation;

- combined and complementary production ventures in specific sectors between a number of cooperating enterprises in the different countries, such as the manufacture of iron and steel, motor vehicles, agricultural and mining machinery and other complex manufacturing processes;
- integrating the comparative advantages of the respective participants in complementary production which reflects their various strengths. Examples could be food production and security programmes combining the respective land and climatic conditions, and scientific and agricultural research capacities and inputs (chemical fertilizers and agricultural machinery) from a number of countries, instead of only one or two.

Multifaceted and multilateral strategies reflecting and reinforcing the relative strengths and needs of the different countries – and eventually even the more depressed areas within the respective countries – are the most effective way to produce transformative, balancing and stabilizing development between all the countries and subregions of Southern Africa. They could also help to achieve economies of scale and greater international competitiveness.

In comparison with such potential, EPZs appear to be a very piecemeal, hit-or-miss device. The type of production fostered in EPZs contrasts with such a comprehensive and integrative approach on three main grounds:

- The first is the very narrow range of low technology, low value-added industries, based mainly on simple assembly-type operations, which are typically attracted to EPZs. As has been noted in most EPZs, there is very limited industrial diversification even within such enclaves, let alone into the rest of the host economies. They are rightly called “industrial monoculture enclaves”.²⁰
- EPZ operations do not necessarily reflect or feed into actual and potential strengths in the host economies. They are notoriously ineffective in creating backward and

forward linkages, or technology and skills transfers.²¹ Nor do they respond to the need to overcome the "enclave" nature of industrial development in most of the countries of Southern Africa. In fact they will, by their very nature, reinforce the tendency for the industrial sectors to be unconnected to, and turned outwards and away from, the agricultural and even the mineral resource bases of these countries. EPZs are essentially physically located upon or artificially grafted onto the host economies. They do not develop organically out of the resources and needs of such economies.

- The creation of EPZs as a device to encourage countries to turn outwards with so-called export-led growth raises further problems. The first is that such production is turned away from meeting domestic needs towards production for foreign markets. Yet such EPZ exports bring in very limited foreign exchange gains, because of the generous transfers of profits and other financial inducements accorded to such companies. At the same time, EPZs are also ineffective in creating production and export linkages with domestic companies. A further development of "export-led growth" strategies is the superficial and sweeping dismissal of "import substitution industries" supplying domestic markets and – in the case of Southern Africa – the regional market.²²

The creation of EPZs in various neighbouring countries poses a potential problem for South Africa in particular. The "new" South Africa is already facing serious difficulties in persuading local business to restructure and transform industry in order to be more in tune with the economic demands and social needs of the post-apartheid era. The accessibility of EPZs not far from the borders of South Africa, offering various investment inducements and subsidies, and "favourable" labour and other conditions, could be an active disincentive to South African business to rise to the challenges of industrial restructuring at home. Businesses would be encouraged to evade new regulations in South Africa, including the new labour relations system, and yet be able to use such EPZs as their

production bases and platforms for exports back into South Africa. This would prejudice industrial development and employment creation within South Africa – yet very limited gains would accrue to the host countries. Once again, compared with the potential of comprehensive national and regional programmes, EPZs are a most inadequate device for industrial development.

In the case of the proposed EPZs or "special export zones" within South Africa itself, they could turn out to be based on different labour rights, standards and regulations than those obtaining in the rest of South Africa – given the new tendencies towards a more "flexible" labour market in this country. The other major issue is the kind of investment incentives, subsidies, and other financial rights and privileges that usually characterize such enclaves – and the implications these hold for companies operating in the rest of the country. Further considerations are the direct costs of such subsidies to the public purse, national and/or provincial, and the indirect financial losses through tax concessions and the expatriation of profits or forex transfer rights.

It is, however, once EPZs are located within the globalization framework and viewed within the context of the broader liberalization programmes being promoted in Southern Africa, that further and fuller problems and insufficiencies become evident.

Direct national integration into the global economy – or regional strategies towards globalization?

If the introduction of EPZs by various countries of Southern Africa reflects an acceptance of the World Bank view that such free trade and deregulated zones are an interim measure through which national economies are directly integrated into the globalized economy, then this has implications for the full potential global location of both the individual countries and the entire Southern Africa regional integration project.

In an era in which the integration of all countries within a globalizing economy is being promoted through national, regional and international liberalization programmes of many kinds, EPZs are, in fact, one of the

weaker devices. Other more sweeping liberalization processes are also being promoted in Southern Africa:

- IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) promote radical liberalization of investment and trade policies. SAPs have already had pronounced effects in opening up national economies to international trade penetration. They also encourage uncoordinated and sometimes deliberately competing trade and financial measures amongst neighbouring countries, such as frequent or extensive currency devaluations that exacerbate trade competition and complicate cross-border transactions.
- The regional Cross-Border Initiative (CBI), promoted by the World Bank in conjunction with the African Development Bank (ADB) and the European Commission, aims to reinforce and extend SAPs by encouraging unilateral liberalization of cross-border trade and investment by Southern African governments, and pointing them towards "generalized" external liberalization. This is in order to ensure that if a regional grouping does emerge in Southern Africa it will be under internal as well as external pressures to be externally open to international trade, services and investment.²³
- A more recent strategy pursued by the European Commission is to prevent South Africa from joining its fellow SADC members in Lomé. Instead, the EC is encouraging Pretoria into a bilateral reciprocal free trade agreement with the European Union. This has other serious implications for preferential trade and other multilateral economic agreements between South Africa and the other countries of SADC.²⁴

Relatively weak as they are, EPZs are part of such broader endeavours to encourage countries to integrate their economies directly into the global economy. All such programmes undermine the possibilities for the countries of Southern Africa to unite in order to be able to deal more effectively with what is a hostile global environment. Globalization is not some neutral or "natural" process that has somehow emerged spontaneously

from the technical demands of increasingly complex production processes and the development of technology. The globalization of production has certainly benefited from, and contributed towards, such technical/technological processes. It is, however, fundamentally the result, and expression, of the drive by transnational corporations (TNCs) to carry out their international production and investment operations under optimal conditions in order to maximize their profitability, competitiveness, and power relative to each other, and to the governments and other economic agents they deal with.

Starting from the horizontal extension and integration of production operations across the world, globalization is now also characterized by the vertical integration of related production processes within the same TNCs.²⁵ Furthermore, on the basis of the internationalization of their production activities, in search of the most favourable material resources, labour, skills and markets, the TNCs need greater freedom to locate, integrate or relocate all factors of production.²⁶ Corporate production strategies demand the liberalization or increasingly free movement of investment capital, capital equipment and goods, and technological/communication and other services. The vast scale of production of such TNCs demands integrated global markets. For unfettered and optimal operation they also require the reduction or removal of regulatory conditions or "interventions" by governments around labour, social, health and safety standards, environmental controls and so on. Such deregulation then provides an even more favourable environment for further globalization; hence the close identification of globalization with liberalization. Globalization is the substantive integration of economic processes, economic sectors and all economies, and liberalization provides the policy oils to smooth the functioning and advancement of that process.²⁷

Thus the world is now characterized by the integration of production processes, economic sectors and economies into a new internationalized economy. Of course, powerful governments and companies still use their national bases and political leverage to promote their strategic or economic interests. This is evident in the way in which the United States gov-

ernment protects its weaker industries/sectors by various protectionist devices, and through the creation of the North American economic block.²⁸ However, for weaker countries, liberalization erodes or severely narrows the policy-making space for national governments. National economic sovereignty is reduced. Governments have a much narrower base on which to formulate appropriate and differentiated national economic policies and enter into truly international relations. Globalization sweeps over – and requires the sweeping away of – national economic boundaries. Thus, the integration of what is a fundamentally interdependent world is not coming about through negotiated agreements on mutually beneficial terms between nations and peoples. In fact, globalization could be described as the transnationalization of the world economy because it is essentially created by the demands and in the interests of the TNCs.

The other corollary to the globalization of the world economy is the so-called marginalization of weak economies, on the continent of Africa in particular. This term and process also requires closer analysis. What marginalization usually refers to is the difficulty such countries have in accessing international investment and technology, and their limited participation in international trade. Africa receives a minute 1,4% of direct international investment (FDI) – and most of the US\$3,1 billion in FDI that flowed into Africa in 1994 went to half a dozen (mainly oil-producing) countries. Of the total world FDI flows of some US\$224 billion in 1994, a mere US\$1,8 billion came to sub-Saharan Africa.²⁹ Similarly, Africa's share in international trade has been steadily declining from about 3% in the early 1970s to little more than 1% of world trade in the early 1990s.³⁰ This is anticipated to worsen still more as the negative impact of the new post-Uruguay multilateral trade regime causes Africa to suffer further US\$ 2,6 to 3 billion losses by the end of the century.³¹

The desirable alternative then proposed for African countries is better integration into the international economy. However, closer examination of the way in which this is being promoted shows it to be not about Africa being integrated *into*, but sim-

ply opening itself *up to*, international trade and investment.³² What Africa needs is integration in the sense of more favourable terms of participation in, and access to, the global economy.³³ What is at issue is not integration itself but the aims, policy instruments and time-frames for that integration – and where the main benefits will accrue. Africa needs the space to develop its own modalities for "strategic integration". However, this demands changes, not only within Africa but in the policies of the rich industrialized countries, particularly by opening up their markets. And it requires changes in the international trade system which is biased towards the rich and powerful economies and companies.

Marginalization is not, as depicted by the World Bank and other such institutions, merely the result of "deficiencies" within African countries and cultures, or the "fault" of African governments themselves – although there is certainly truth in some of these assertions. More fundamentally, marginalization is the more extreme form of the polarization that neo-liberal policies impose on weaker companies, or regions, or entire countries. This is the essence of free market economies. The effects of a survival-of-the-fittest system are also evident in the increasing marginalization and subordination of disadvantaged individuals, communities, and sectors of the populations within the rich industrialized countries of the North – as much as in the polarization between the rich countries of the North and the poorest countries of the South. Marginalization and polarization are inherent in the functioning of the liberalized "free market" system, or (as it was once known) capitalism.³⁴

And finally, the most extensive programme to liberalize interactions in all sectors, between all the countries of the world, is now being enshrined in the post-Uruguay multilateral system of trade rules under the supervision of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This new regulatory trade regime is about much more than just international trade relations. Trade is important in itself, but it is also being used as the instrument by which to ensure compliance with liberalization of other international economic transactions and operations. Retaliatory trade sanctions can be authorized by the WTO if

member countries are found to have infringed any of the sub-agreements coming under WTO regulation. Trade in goods is being liberalized through Gatt – although the accommodation of the particular needs of the strong economies is the immediate outcome, while responses to the needs of the weak economies is only a long term prospect. In the meantime, the opening up of all countries to the operations of service enterprises (transport, telecommunications, insurance, banking, financial and others) is to be served through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Gats). On the other hand, Trips (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) will protect the patented inventions, processes, trademarks and related rights of the powerful corporations and cutting-edge industries such as the new information and bioengineering industries. The demands and interests of international investors are to be provided for through Trade Related Investment Measures (Trims) and the proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA).³⁵

The post-Uruguay trade regime is ostensibly designed to ensure that all countries abide by the same rules and regulations and compete on level playing fields. However, the global economy of gigantesque TNCs – many times richer and more powerful than entire poverty-stricken and dependent Third World countries – is not a “level playing field”. In such a grossly imbalanced world, the new international system reflects and reinforces the advantages of the rich and powerful countries, and is designed to secure the free and unfettered functioning of transnational corporations. Furthermore, there are indications that powerful countries are continuing to operate according to their own unilateral rules with little concern that trade sanctions could be imposed upon them.³⁶ Weaker countries could, however, find themselves suffering under insupportable trade sanctions should they be judged to have broken WTO rules.

Some conclusions

These new globalization-liberalization programmes seriously limit the possibilities for governments to create and shape their own economic policies in terms of their particular needs and the balance of interests within their societies. By extension, this poses new

challenges to national interest groups and social movements in influencing – or pressurizing – their governments to adopt appropriate policies. This is a serious erosion of the sovereign powers of governments and the democratic rights of peoples. Countries have to create the space and re-establish the right to shape appropriate national policies, and to enter into regional and international relations and institutions without having their hands firmly tied.

Governments and non-governmental forces in Africa, above all, need to strengthen their bargaining base in this difficult international environment. As members of an integrated regional economy the countries of Southern Africa could be much more effective players in this new global environment. Countries have greater opportunities to negotiate better terms for their international relations as members of stronger economic blocks. This is evident even in the case of much stronger economies such as Brazil, through its regional grouping Mercosur (“Mercado do Cono do Sur” – Market of the Southern Cone of Latin America) or Malaysia, through its promotion of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). It is equally important for weak and vulnerable economies such as those of Southern Africa – including even South Africa.

It is ill-conceived and self-defeating for any country in today’s world to be pursuing “solo” integration through national liberalization programmes into a global economy where countries are increasingly organizing themselves into regional blocks. It is, furthermore, not only the “emerging” economies of the South that are now working towards creating their own regional groupings. As is frequently observed, even the most powerful economies of the world, in North America and Europe, have created their own powerful regional economic blocks, the North American Free Trade Area (Nafta) and the European Union (EU) respectively. What is more, there are competitive neo-mercantilist battles emerging between these blocks which would completely swamp any small individual players.

The overall strategic need for weaker countries to band together into regional groupings is multifold, but there are two key advantages:

- In the first place, more comprehensive regional resource bases,

economies of scale in infrastructural investment and production, and larger internal markets provide them with a stronger base for self-sustaining integrated development programmes, as well as more competitive and effective interactions with the international economy.

- But equally importantly, it is on such bases – and in alliance with other similar groupings, especially amongst the countries of the South – that effective efforts can then be made to challenge and change the new liberalized global order that carries such dangerous implications for the weaker economies and peoples of the world – and, indeed the very stability and security of the world itself.

The ultimate paradox of various governments in Southern Africa trying, at this late stage, to use EPZs as a device for dealing with their economy problems is also twofold.

- On the one hand, they are entering a highly competitive – in fact ruthless – field in which there is in fact little prospect of any of the Southern African countries being able to offer the kind of terms, facilities, resources and prospects that will really attract international investment of the *type* and on a *scale* needed to make the kind of impact they are supposed to produce.
- Secondly, such countries are entering the field late in the day, when EPZs are being superseded by other more sweeping and favourable liberalization prospects for international investors. Serious investors do not need small export processing enclaves when they can, nowadays, have access to the labour, resources and markets of extensively liberalized economies throughout the world.

Rather than competing with each other for the crumbs to be gained from dubious EPZ ventures, governments in Southern Africa should be cooperating and combining together to create effective strategies that respond to the real needs on the ground in their countries, and building upon the real potential in their human and physical resources. Furthermore, rather than “adjusting” and subordinating their countries and peoples to the inequities

of the new liberalized global order, the governments of Southern Africa should be focusing their attentions and combined efforts on creating strategic programmes to secure more favourable – or simply less unfavourable – interactions with the global economy.

Notes and references

- 1 Based on a paper presented at an ILO sponsored workshop on EPZs with the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council, (Satucc) in Harare 28-30 March 1996. The writer is at present undertaking a broader research project on "labour perspectives on regional cooperation and development between the states of Southern Africa", with the support of a research grant from the MacArthur Foundation.
- 2 "Gauteng initiates its own talks on export processing zones", *Business Day*, Johannesburg, 21 February 1996; "Bid to boost economy on North East Rand with special export zone", *Business Report, SA*, 22 July 1996.
- 3 H Jauch, D Keet and L Pretorius, "Export processing zones in Southern Africa – economic, social and political implications", *Development and Labour Monographs*, no 2/96, Institute of Development and Labour Law, University of Cape Town, 1996. pp 34–38.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 A Abate, "A global overview of the development of export processing zones", a paper presented at ILO African workshop on EPZs, Johannesburg, 15-18 July 1996.
- 6 Which has proven to be much more variable and problematic in its effects than usually acknowledged by enthusiastic EPZ promoters: see presentation by Prof Vidula Nababsing, University of Mauritius, "EPZs in Mauritius: A review of employment, workers' rights, working conditions and labour relations", paper presented at ILO African workshop on EPZs, Johannesburg, July 1996.
- 7 H Jauch *et al*, *op cit*, pp 47-52.
- 8 World Bank, *Export processing zones*, Washington DC, 1991.
- 9 H Jauch, *et al*, *op cit*, p 30.
- 10 World Bank, *op cit*.
- 11 Southern African Development Community, *Draft protocol on trade cooperation in Southern Africa*, SADC/8/16, 1995.
- 12 Zambia is probably the most extreme current case in Southern Africa but others, such as Malawi, have also gone far in liberalizing trade and foreign investment policies.
- 13 Although the terms of the post-Uruguay multilateral rules-based trade system make such arrangements difficult to create – which is precisely the type of international problem that only joint approaches would be able to deal with.
- 14 Or, as it is often termed, ECDC – economic cooperation between developing countries – see below.
- 15 Under GATT Article XXIV, new tariff agreements between a number of countries have to be based upon a weighted average of the respective external tariff regimes in operation – which means that individual countries with very low external tariffs create downward pressures on any putative common external tariffs; see D Keet, "The neoliberal challenge to prospects for development cooperation and integration in Southern Africa", *Occasional Paper* no 11, IFAA, December 1994.
- 16 Southern African Development Community, "Finance and investment sector report to SADC summit", by the South African Department of Finance as the SADC sector coordinator, Johannesburg, 1995.
- 17 H Jauch, *et al*, *op cit*, pp 6-7.
- 18 As is already becoming evident in Southern Africa, as companies "hop" from one EPZ country to another.
- 19 See also the African Development Bank's 1993 study on "Economic integration in Southern Africa" for interesting proposals in these directions.
- 20 ILO and United Nations Commission on Transnational Companies (UNCTC), *Economic and social effects of multinational enterprises in EPZs*, Geneva: ILO, 1988, p 109.
- 21 H Jauch, *et al*, *op cit*, pp 19–22.
- 22 The problematic experience with import substitution industrialization (ISI) in Africa has resulted in a superficial and sweeping dismissal of ISI *per se*, whereas it has actually and almost invariably been a significant initial or transitional phase, and integral part, of the industrialization strategies of the much praised newly industrialized countries, such as Brazil and Korea. The real issue is not the limitations of ISIs *per se* but the ways in which inward industrialization strategies were planned and managed, and how such countries utilized or developed ISIs to move towards production for export as well.
- 23 D Keet, *op cit*.
- 24 R Davies, "Trade talks with EU are moving along two parallel tracks", *Business Day*, Johannesburg, October 1995.
- 25 UNCTAD's *World investment report* (1995) calculates that movement of goods and service transactions within and between TNCs accounts for about two-thirds of world trade in goods and services.
- 26 But not an equivalent free movement of labour.
- 27 D Keet, "Globalisation and liberalisation – alternative perspectives and proposals", presentation made at Parallel NGO Conference at UNCTAD IX, Midrand, SA, April-May 1996.
- 28 At the same time as it pressurizes the rest of the world to open up to the operations of its powerful TNCs.
- 29 UNCTAD, *World investment report*, New York, 1995.
- 30 B Coote, *The trade trap and global commodity markets*, Oxford, 1992.
- 31 OECD and World Bank estimate quoted in *Third World Economics* nos 88/89, 10 May 1994. See also UNCTAD, *Ad-hoc working group on trading opportunities in the new international trading context*, Geneva, October 1995, which puts the figure at US\$ 3 billion by the end of the century.
- 32 World Bank, *Long term perspective study (LTPS)*, Washington DC, 1988.
- 33 Coalition for Africa, "Trade barriers on exports from Africa", in *African social and economic trends*, Oxford, 1992.
- 34 The "gains", and the "challenges" or "risks" of globalization were the main focus of the debates during UNCTAD IX – with the USA as the most energetic defender of the "challenges" euphemism over the more problematized "risks" approach. What was also manifest, however, was that polarization within and between nations is becoming a source of widespread concern, and the hegemony of simple free market policies was constantly questioned by a very wide range of participants and in a number of directions.
- 35 With proposals from the OECD, in general, and the EU in particular, to create the right of entry and operation of investment capital anywhere in the world.
- 36 On the contrary, the United States is trying to impose its own trade and investment regulations on the rest of the world when it judges necessary.

Zambian politics & Eastern sectionalism

Introduction

Political tension increased in Zambia following the passing of an amendment to the Zambian constitution on 28 May 1996, which effectively prevented Kenneth Kaunda from opposing incumbent Frederick Chiluba in the presidential elections which were eventually called for 18 November.² The amendment prohibited "foreigners" from presenting themselves as candidates for the presidency, the definition of foreigners being extended to include not only persons born outside Zambia, but also those born within the country of non-Zambian parents.³ The parents of Kaunda, who was president from 1964 to 1991, were born in what is now Malawi, which thus disqualified him from seeking re-election in 1996. In order to confirm Kaunda's exclusion, the constitutional amendment added that candidates would have to be less than 70 years of age and to have served no more than two terms of office in the past. On both these counts, Kaunda would be ineligible.⁴ The amendment also excluded traditional leaders as well as persons who had not been continuously resident in Zambia for more than 20 years. This provision appeared to be aimed at the deputy leader of the United National Independence Party (Unip), Inyambo Yeta, among others.⁵

Ironically, it was only five years since the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) had won the first free multiparty elections held in Zambia since 1967. Yet, despite his party's massive electoral victory, Chiluba has faced fierce criticism since his strict implementation of a Structural Adjustment Plan, which has reduced the financial liquidity of all Zambian residents. Since taking office in 1991 he has also dispensed with the services of a number of cabinet ministers who have expressed opinions at odds with his own, on eco-

nomic or other issues. Those fired or demoted were Roger Chongwe (Legal Affairs), Emmanuel Kasonde (Finance), Arthur Wina (Education), Guy Scott (Agriculture) and William Harrington (Transport).⁶ Kaunda, whose party was defeated in the 1991 elections, taking only 25 seats to the MMD's 125, have sought political benefit from increasing levels of popular dissatisfaction with the ruling party and became more active in Unip's condemnation thereof. His perceived increase in popularity posed a threat to Chiluba who thus hatched plans to circumvent Kaunda's candidacy.

The controversial constitutional amendment was widely condemned by international aid donors, with Norway, Denmark, Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States all threatening to cut their donations to Zambian development projects. This would constitute a massive loss to Zambia. The largest donor, Norway, is currently the source of over \$40 million worth of financial aid each year.⁷

Dr Stephen Rule, Specialist Researcher at the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, Braamfontein, analyses the results of the controversial 1996 Zambian elections, in the context of historic support for Kenneth Kaunda's Unip¹



Kaunda reacted to the proposed amendment by proclaiming that "Chiluba is not a democrat at all. He is bending the rules to suit himself and his party",

to which Chiluba countered that the changes were "the will of the Zambian people".⁸ Two cabinet ministers, Dipak Patel and Simon Zukas, however, resigned their posts in protest against the amendment.⁹ The government press was used to blame certain violent incidents and student protests on Kaunda and a movement known as the Black Mamba group, which was said to be "bent on creating social disorder and imposing a government of national unity in Zambia".¹⁰

Unip eventually decided to boycott the 1996 elections in protest at the prohibition on Kaunda's candidacy for president. This prompted further international diplomatic efforts to persuade President Chiluba to use his influence to revert to the 1991 Constitution. Shortly before the elections, Chiluba visited Pretoria to consult with President Mandela, who urged him to postpone the elections.¹¹ Chiluba's response was that, in the first place, a postponement required parliamentary approval and, secondly that the cost of arranging the elections had already exceeded K24 billion.¹² Accordingly, the elections went ahead on 18 November, without the participation of Unip and despite of protests from within and outside of Zambia.

This article examines the outcomes of the 1991 and 1996 elections within the context of historical political sectionalism and regionalism, especially in the eastern area of Zambia.

Political sectionalism in Zambia

An analysis of the 1991 election results indicates a strong regional bias towards Unip in the east, an area dominated by Chinyanja- and Tumbuka-speakers of the Chewa, Ngoni, Nsenga, Nyika and other ethnic groupings. The majority of voters in 25 (principally eastern) of the 125 constituencies remained loyal to Kaunda's Unip. Ethnic political regionalism appeared to explain the continued loyalty to Kaunda of a sector of the electorate in 1991, when the rest of the country voted strongly against him.

Part of the methodology of exploring this phenomenon was to solicit the views of newspaper readers in respect of the eastern bias towards Unip. Although the sample obtained cannot be construed as being representative, it reflects a widely held set of perceptions about the existence of

political regionalism in Zambia, which were verified by personal interviews conducted by the author, on a visit to Chipata (Eastern Province) in 1993, and visits to Lusaka in 1993 and immediately after the 1996 elections.

The extent to which regional-based sectionalism impacts on political affiliation varies in different national contexts. Every electoral division or constituency within a state has a different relative position in the national economic hierarchy, a unique local history, and an electorate with a specific social and demographic character. The way in which these locality-specific factors combine determines both the degree to which the population participates in an election, and which of the political parties it supports. The political allegiances of groups and individuals are thus, at least partially, related to the specific spatial context within which their political socialization occurs, irrespective of other socio-economic variables.

Much critical social theory of the past has privileged economic determinism as a dimension of inordinate salience in the explanation of social processes and practices. Early Marxist theories, however, failed to recognize the significance of the spatial dimension. Marx dismissed geographical variation as an unnecessary complication in what he perceived as a human class struggle mediated by economics. However, Soja has highlighted the importance of a spatial perspective in his plea for "the demystification of spatiality and its veiled instrumentality of power" which he sees as a means of "making practical, political, and theoretical sense of the contemporary era". He further notes that the existence of the capitalist economic system "presupposes the sustaining presence and vital instrumentality of geographically uneven development".¹³ Among the regional variables under capitalism are rates of profit and productivity, wage rates, the organization of labour, the intensity of the class struggle and the costs of reproduction of labour power.

A study of Ghanaian and Sri Lankan elections concluded that Ghanaians tended to vote "as their ... sense of social identity suggested that it would be appropriate for them to vote".¹⁴ Invariably this was related to the cultural and ethnic affinity of each region, categories which were extensively used as a force for political

mobilisation.¹⁵ Politicians throughout the world compete to symbolize most clearly the social characteristics with which an electorate can identify. Alternatively, or simultaneously, voters are persuaded to see the economic rationality of perpetuating regional patron-client networks that existed during the pre-democratic era.

In the Zambian context, Molteno has argued that "geographic propinquity and linguistic unity" were more dominant than "ethnicity" in facilitating the "formation of sectional identification".¹⁶ "Primordial emotional attachment to kinship, religion, language or culture" was initially outweighed by "rational economic motivation" in determining voting behaviour in Northern Rhodesia's first universal franchise elections. It appears that widespread political consciousness and the invocation of ethnicity by politicians had generated an acutely defined political sectionalism in post-colonial Zambian politics. Molteno indicated, however, that:

Language ... separates most Zambians into several non-interacting groups, whose members perform their main roles within the social confines of their particular language group. It is obviously difficult for a sense of common identity to evolve among people who seldom interact across the boundary of language. It is not surprising therefore, that in Zambia the main political sections have been linguistic groups – for example, all Bemba-speakers regardless of provincial boundaries; all who understand Chinyanja as a lingua franca (largely in the Eastern Province); or the multitude of pre-colonial Ila-Tonga-speaking polities which now perceive themselves as having a common identity.¹⁷

Zambia's socio-political background

The Zambian population consists primarily of seven major language groups (each comprising one or more tribal groupings). Each group is domiciled primarily in a specific region of the country: Chibemba (north-east), Tonga (south-west), Chinyanja (south-east), the North Western group (north-west), Barotse (west), Mambwe (north-east) and Tumbuka (east) (Table 1).

The contemporary space economy is dominated by a core area along the line-of-rail from Livingstone to the Copperbelt, where most of the

TABLE 1: Zambian language groups 1980

Language group	Main tribes	Population	%
CHIBEMBA (north)	Bemba Lunda Lala Bisa Ushi Chishinga Ngumbo Lamba Kabende Tabwa Swaka Mukulu Ambo Lima	1 630 836	35,1
TONGA (south)	Tonga Lenje Soli Ila	693 312	14,9
CHINYANJA (east)	Chewa Nsenga Ngoni Kunda	834 338	18,0
NORTH WESTERN	Kaonde Luvale Lunda Mbunda Luchazi Ndembu	477 393	10,3
BAROTSE (west)	Lozi Kwanga Nkoya Kwandi Totela	388 226	8,4
MAMBWE (north-east)	Lungu Mambwe Winamwanga Wiwa		4,9
TUMBUKA (east)	Tumbuka Senga	199 153	4,3
Others		192 644	4,1
TOTAL		4 642 711	100,0

Source: Zambia, 1993. Monograph of language statistics transcribed from unpublished 1980 census data by Mr Joseph Zimba. Lusaka: Central Statistical Office.

economic activity is focused. Almost a century of mining has resulted in a large proportion of the population (56%) living in urban areas. The Copperbelt has a population in excess of 1,5 million, while Lusaka, the capital city, has 982 362 inhabitants. Migrant labourers to these areas, primarily males, have distorted the gender ratios to as much as 1 047 males per 1 000 females in the Copperbelt town

of Luanshya, in contrast to, for example, only 825 males per 1 000 females in the Kalabo district of the Western Province,¹⁸ adjacent to the Angolan border. Population growth rates in excess of 4% occurred in Kabwe, Ndola and Lusaka between 1969 and 1980 and in the latter two from 1980 to 1990. Policy shifts from an active repression of squatter settlements during the first 20 years after independence, to official

settlement upgrading schemes, has encouraged further rapid growth.¹⁹

Zambia's African National Congress (ANC) was formed in 1948 with wide backing from the Tonga and Barotse groups, from the Southern and Western provinces, respectively. During the late 1950s, strikes against poor wages and job reservation on the mines, and objections to incorporation into a political federation with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, politicized migrant miners from all over the country. When the ANC agreed to cooperate with a new constitution granting limited African franchise, this was interpreted by many party members as collaboration with the colonial regime.²⁰ Kenneth Kaunda then led a group which broke away from the ANC to form Unip. Many ANC supporters working in the Copperbelt Province began defecting to the new party, which refused to participate in limited franchise elections in 1959.

In 1962 Unip did participate in elections and won 12 of the 15 seats in which 92 255 African voters were eligible to vote, against the ANC's three seats.²¹ The latter were all situated in the south: Southern, South Western and Lusaka Rural. This early demonstration of political regionalism was to persist in the pre-independence elections of January 1964. On that occasion, Unip won 55 of the 65 main roll seats and 69,6% of the votes cast, and Kaunda became the first president of independent Zambia. The other seats, situated in the south, remained the domain of the ANC.

Integration into the new formal democratic system was, however, neither automatic nor unproblematic. For example, the small Nkoya group, which had been subjected to Lozi tribal rule in the west of Zambia (and to an increasing extent under colonial rule) perceived the support they gave to Unip to be an expression of their rejection of Lozi hegemony.²² It was only once a government-sponsored tobacco cultivation scheme created new local work opportunities, subsequent to the elections, that Unip became seen as a benefactor in itself.

In 1967 there was some resentment amongst the electorate of the Eastern Province because of the apparent collaboration of the two largest groups, the Bemba and Tonga, in ensuring their own dominance in the Unip hierarchy. An easterner, Reuben

Kamanga, was defeated in his candidacy for Vice-President by Simon Kapwepwe. There were suggestions of secession to join Malawi, with whom the Chinyanja-speaking easterners have a close cultural affinity. Kamuzu Banda, Malawian president at the time, even stated that the Eastern Province belonged to Malawi. An underground movement called *Umodzi Kum'mawa*, meaning "Unity in the East", was formed to resist dominance by Bemba-speakers.²³ It was in response to this development that Kaunda initiated infrastructural projects in the Eastern Province, which would buy the long term political support of easterners.

Unip's dominance persisted in the 1968 multi-party election, the ANC winning only 23 of the 105 parliamentary seats, in the Southern, North-Western and Central Provinces.²⁴ Regional tensions that had developed within the ruling party came to a head in 1971, when Kapwepwe left Unip to form the United Progressive Party (UPP) in the Copperbelt Province. Kaunda responded with unsuccessful attempts to persuade the UPP, as well as the ANC, to merge with Unip. Ultimately, legislation to establish a one-party state was passed in December 1972.²⁵

In the subsequent elections of 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988, therefore, all members of parliament in the Second Republic of Zambia had to be elected from among candidates approved by the central committee of Unip. Interestingly, these non-partisan elections were contested by far more candidates than the previous multiparty elections. In 1983 an average of 6,1 candidates contested each of the 125 constituencies, as opposed to the 1,7 in 1968, when 30 Unip candidates were returned unopposed.²⁶ Voter turnout in all but one province were in excess of 60%,²⁷ and as high as 72,1% in the Copperbelt Province and 71,7% in the Lusaka Province. Voters were also asked to vote for a single presidential candidate, Kenneth Kaunda. An overwhelming 93,8% of votes cast were in his favour in 1983. The range was from 79% in the Copperbelt's Kantanshi and Kanyoko constituencies, to 99% in the North-Western Province's Zambezi East, North and West.

Opposition to the one-party state

Kaunda's policy of Humanism failed to achieve material prosperity for the coun-

try. The local currency, the Kwacha, lost 58% of its value between 1982 and 1984, and a further 64% in the 1984-85 financial year.²⁸ The government failed to heed the advice of the IMF and continued to subsidize agriculture, bearing in mind the importance of a constant food supply for the electorate. The proportion of the national budget allocated to the servicing of foreign debts was unilaterally reduced.²⁹ When a new national development plan was implemented in 1989, price deregulation precipitated inflation levels in excess of 400% per year and voters, especially in urban areas, grew increasingly dissatisfied with the unchallenged rule of Unip. In spite of earlier attempts to silence the trades union movement, the MMD emerged as the political vehicle to mobilise opposition to Unip,³⁰ and as the obvious successor government.

The 1991 elections

Eleven political parties fielded a total of 1 750 candidates in the 150 parliamentary seats to be contested in the October 1991 elections. Apart from Unip and its primary challenger, the MMD, other parties included the National Democratic Alliance, the Movement for Democratic Process, the People's Liberation Party and the Christian Alliance for the Kingdom of God. Two thousand individuals presented themselves for nomination as MMD candidates alone, while 800 sought Unip nomination.³¹


The media, comprising two daily newspapers,³² a television channel and a radio station, was controlled by the government and dominated by Unip philosophy and propaganda. It was only after July 1991 that independent newspapers, including the pro-MMD *Daily Express* and the less partisan *Weekly Post*, started publication. A church-based bi-monthly, the *National Mirror*, also expressed views in favour of the MMD. An order by President Kaunda that all government departments and parastatals should withdraw advertising from the independent press served merely to increase the latter's popularity.³³ A visiting Swedish cabinet minister questioned the fairness of the election campaign coverage in the media, and former United States President Jimmy Carter, acting as an observer, said that if the government did not lift the state of emergency, he would be unable to declare the elections "free and fair".³⁴

During the election campaign, Kaunda was reported to have accused the MMD of "preaching tribalism".³⁵ Shopkeepers in Chipata, capital of the Eastern Province family base, were warned that their trading licenses would be withdrawn should they decide to support the MMD. In addition, some Unip-aligned tribal ritual leaders were reported to have told residents of their villages that "they would become sick if they attended MMD rallies".³⁶ Kaunda accused the Commonwealth Observer Group of being "imperialist agents" who sided with his opponents. The Law Association of Zambia, however, alleged that the Zambia Independent Monitoring Group had been "infiltrated by agents from the Special Branch of the Security Forces".³⁷

An outstanding feature of the elections was the low percentage poll. Only 45.5% of the registered electorate cast their votes.³⁸ The low poll was attributable to the fact that voters rolls had not been updated since the previous Unip-only election in 1988, as well as an alarming level of apathy amongst voters despite the high profile campaign waged by the MMD. This contrasted sharply with the 82.4% poll in 1988, the last multi-party elections prior to the institution of a one-party state.³⁹ Voters in the Central Province were apparently least enthusiastic and only 35% voted. However, the Copperbelt and Eastern Provinces each recorded 49% polls. Voters had been mobilized most successfully by the MMD and Unip in the two provinces that proved to be their respective strongholds. In the parts of the other seven provinces where slightly higher polls did occur, this was to the advantage of the MMD.

The extent of the electoral victory for MMD was vast. More than 40% of registered voters turned up at the polls to vote for the new party in 34 constituencies (Figure 1). In 20 constituencies it obtained more than ten times the number of votes received by Unip. The populations of all but one of these constituencies were characterized by the predominance of one specific language group.⁴⁰ Clear patterns of bloc ethnic voting for the MMD were thus evident amongst Bembas, Tongas and Barotse-speakers. In those specific contexts at least, therefore, MMD campaigns appear to have had mass appeal to the three specific groups.

In a further 63 constituencies, the MMD polled more than four times as



many votes as Unip. These areas were located primarily in the Northern, Copperbelt, Luapula, Western, Northern and North-Western Provinces. The electorates there were primarily speakers of the Tonga, Bemba, Barotse and North-Western languages, thus reinforcing the pattern evident from the above-mentioned 20 constituencies. The percentage of registered voters who supported the MMD ranged from 60.2% in the Copperbelt Province constituency of Nchanga to only 3.7% in Vubwa in the Eastern Province, and no votes in nearby Lamezi, the only seat which it did not contest.

An examination of the geographical distribution of support for the two major parties indicates a clear distinction between the Eastern Province and the rest of the country. Unip had its highest level of support in the Eastern Province's Chasefu constituency, where 55.9% of registered voters favoured Unip, in contrast to the mere 1.1% in Malole, Northern Province. The strong concentration of Unip support in the

FIGURE 1: Percentage of the electorate which voted for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the 1991 general elections.

Data sources: Zambia op. cit. Zambia (2000) map of parliamentary constituencies; Lusaka: Government Printer.




FIGURE 2: Percentage of the electorate which voted for the United National Independence Party (Unip) in the 1991 general elections.

Data sources: *Zambia, op. cit; Zambia*, 1:500000 map of parliamentary constituencies. Lusaka: Government Printer.

Eastern Province, and constituencies immediately adjacent thereto, in the Northern and Lusaka Provinces, enabled Unip to win 22 of their 25 seats in parliament. In the Eastern Province, the party managed to obtain the support of more than 40% of registered voters in five constituencies (Figure 2). Three-quarters of the population of that region speak the Chinyanja language of the Chewa,⁴¹ and most of the rest are Tumbuka. A number of smaller groups, including the Nsenga, Ngoni and Nyika, have adopted Chinyanja as their language, in spite of their diverse origins. Positive statistical correlations (Table 2a) existed between support for Unip in most parts of the country, and the presence of Chinyanja and Tumbuka-speaking voters.⁴² It is possible that residents of regions dominated by these groups voted Unip, irrespective of linguistic affiliation. In contrast, the largest single language group, the Bemba, was negatively correlated with Unip votes.

Unip also retained the support of the small Luvale and Luchazi groups in

the North-Western Province, as in the 1968 election, where it won three seats. Interestingly, 12% of votes in the Lusaka Province went to Unip, where government bureaucrats would clearly have had an interest in their patrons clinging to power.

Votes for Unip were negatively correlated with male-dominated constituencies in Lusaka and the North-West (Table 2a), reflecting a lack of popularity away from its rural Eastern Province stronghold, where there were only 934 males to every 1 000 females. On the other hand, MMD support and a male presence correlated weakly positively (Table 2b).

Eastern Province sectionalism

In order to further elucidate the reasons for continuing Unip support in the Eastern Province, a letter was written by the author to the editor of the *Times of Zambia* (published 21 March 1993), requesting readers' views on the topic. Fifteen responses were received, primarily from residents of Lusaka and the Copperbelt towns. Although people who write letters to newspapers are possibly eccentric and certainly not representative of national opinion, it was interesting that a significant degree of unanimity about the role of regional and ethnic particularism emerged. The sample was clearly biased in favour of literate MMD-supporters, at a time when the new government enjoyed a high degree of popularity, less than 18 months after it had assumed office.

A male resident of Luanshya, Copperbelt Province, stressed the parochialism of eastern voters, saying that "Unip managed to win in the Eastern Province because Betty Kaunda, the wife of former president is from that place." A Kitwe man explained Eastern Province sectionalism in purely ethnic terms:

Kaunda is a Tumbuka from Malawi but he was born in Zambia did all his education here in our country, he started politics in our country so he been a Tumbuka he is regarded as the son of eastern province in that people of eastern province are the same people who are in Malawi because eastern province is at the border with Zambia. For example if we have got people like the Tumbukas, Chewas, Nsengas, Ngonis who are also in Malawi so that is why the people of eastern province are behind the former presidents party.

The explanation offered by another Kitwe respondent was that:

TABLE 2a: Product moment correlations between Unip support and demographic characteristics

Province	BE	TO	NW	BA	NY	MB	TU	SI	MA
Central	0,5	-,3	-,5	-,6	-,3	-,1	-,4	-,4	-,3
Copperbelt	-,3	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,2	-,1	0,2
Eastern	0,3	-,4	0,0	-,4	-,3	0,0	0,3	-,3	0,2
Luapula	-,2	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,2	0,0	-,3	0,1
Lusaka	-,8	0,0	-,9	-,9	0,7	-,8	-,8	-,8	-,8
Northern	-,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,9	-,2	-,2
North-West	-,6	0,4	,05	0,2	-,4	0,0	0,0	-,8	-,6
Southern	0,1	-,3	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,2
Western	0,2	-,1	0,8	-,8	0,2	0,0	0,0	-,2	0,4
TOTAL	-,4	-,2	0,0	-,2	0,7	-,1	0,5	-,1	-,2

Kaunda has roots in Malawi because though he was born and brought up in Chinsali Zambia, his father and mother were bona fide Malawians from near Livingstonia Mission in Malawi and they were from a place called Bandawe Village. As up to now he has still got relatives in Malawi and some relatives trekked on foot from Malawi to Zambia immediately after independence on 24-10-64 to come and live with him in comfort.

A female respondent of Mansa, Luapula Province embroidered the ethnocentric view with her own prejudices:

The reason why the Unip government got more seats in the Eastern province was that the wife of our former president is from there and most people there are from Malawi, Mozambique. I mean the refugees they are settled there. And since the wife's relatives resides there, whilst he was in power he cleaned the place there and things were in order.

In contrast, a teenage girl in Lusaka, ignored the ethnic factor, her perception being that Unip had achieved a good result in the east for purely economic

reasons: "the people there have got plenty to eat and food is cheap."

A college lecturer at Kabwe, Central Province provided a slightly broader analytical context in social and economic terms:

... the Easterners saw the M.M.D. as a party of Bemba speaking people. The Easterners resent the idea of being ruled by a Bemba speaking person. In 1967 when Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe (a Northerner) defeated Reuben Kamanga (Easterner) for the post of Vice-President of the Party (Unip) and consequently the nation the Easterners advocated for the breakaway of Eastern Province from the rest of Zambia. They had an idea of linking Eastern Province to Malawi. We must not forget that Mr Kenneth Kaunda, the former President, is related to the people of Eastern Province through his marriage. His parents originally came from Malawi. Some of the people of Eastern Province have relatives in Malawi and vice versa. The above could explain the loyalty which Kaunda enjoys from the people of Eastern Province. Two of his eldest sons are members of Parliament. They won their seats in the Eastern Province. The other reason could be that

TABLE 2b: Product moment correlations between MMD support and demographic characteristics

Province	BE	TO	NW	BA	NY	MB	TU	SI	MA
Central	-,5	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,2	0,6	0,6	0,3
Copperbelt	0,0	-,2	0,3	0,3	-,3	0,1	0,2	0,6	-,2
Eastern	-,4	0,2	0,0	0,2	0,4	0,0	-,4	0,3	-,2
Luapula	0,2	-,2	0,0	0,0	-,1	-,2	0,0	0,1	-,3
Lusaka	0,7	-,4	0,7	0,4	-,1	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,3
Northern	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-,3	-,6	0,4	0,1
North-West	-,1	-,3	0,1	-,1	-,1	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,2
Southern	0,1	0,0	-,3	-,1	0,2	0,1	-,1	0,0	0,2
Western	0,2	0,3	-,9	0,9	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,4	-,2
TOTAL	0,4	0,1	-,1	0,1	-,5	0,1	-,5	0,3	0,3

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: BE=Chibemba, TO=Tonga, NW=North Western group, BA=Barotse, NY=Chinyanja, MB=Mambwe, TU=Tumbuka, SI=Size of constituency electorate relative to national average, MA=Proportion male population relative to national average. It should be noted that correlations do not necessarily imply relationships of causality.

the Eastern Province is one of the developed Provinces in the country. One would find an International Airport at Mfuwe apart from Lusaka International Airport. Mfuwe is the only developed airport in the rural areas of Zambia. Due to the above the people of Eastern Province were satisfied with President Kaunda ..."

A male Lusaka bank clerk and son of a Bemba father and a Tumbuka mother, echoed the dualistic explanation of culture and economic development.

Former President Kaunda's wife and indeed his own sons have invested heavily in the province. They own large farms and a transport company that serves the province. Culturally, the Kaundas have always been linked to the people of the eastern province. Popular Unip staunch stewards come from there. It is also the home of Kaunda's wife.

Apparently in an attempt to avoid being seen as partisan, however, he concluded that "Easterners after all have a right to choose a party of their own." A female in Lusaka took a similar line with her explanation that:

Unip won the parliamentary seats in the Eastern province as they felt that no change or rather no one else could rule them better. As you might know the wife of President Kaunda came from this province, it was well developed and I think the people did that out of appreciation and to date they're devout supporters.

A former Zimbabwean woman, who is a teacher at Chilanga, Lusaka Province provided examples of favouritism shown to easterners under the Kaunda regime:

"The Eastern province is the home of the former first Lady. She comes from Jumbe Village which President Kaunda flattered with an Electrical engine to illuminate just the Village where his mother-in-law lived. 3 top teachers at Jumbe Primary School were given person to holder cars by Panji Kaunda (col). These and other developments gave him the votes. Col. Panji Kaunda farms at Chadiza near Provincial H.Q. of Chipata.

Expressing pro-MMD sentiments, a respondent from Mambwe, Northern Province had a more jaundiced view of the development that had taken place in the east.

Unip couldn't win many Parliamentary seats outside of the Eastern Province because in some places, mostly part of Northern Province Kaunda never used to visit the people from 1964 up to 1991

when he started campaigning for his party. Some people just used to see his picture on money. In Eastern Province, is where he spent a lot of money for campaigning. He wasted millions of Kwacha."

A male laboratory worker at Mwami Hospital near Chipata expressed a different interpretation:

It is on record that the people of eastern province are slow in changing. The time the rest of the country was changing from ANC to Unip, the region remained the stronghold of ANC. It is only in this province were Unip is still enjoying support.

He introduced another dimension of the Unip victory in the province by stating that:

The other thing which contributed to MMD not getting a seat was the intimidations and threats of war the people were getting from Unip then in power⁴³

A Chipata shop owner, whose father had emigrated from Gujerat, said that a higher educational level in Chipata than in the surrounding parts of the Eastern Province was the reason that the MMD had achieved relatively strong local support.⁴⁴ He felt that educated urbanites use more rational criteria in their voting decisions. Nevertheless, Kaunda was still very popular because of his family ties in the area.

Other local opinions solicited, tended to support this perspective. A local Christian pastor felt that the residents of the Eastern Province were much "slower to change" than the rest of the country. His brother, a Chipata factory worker, more blatantly attributed the level of Unip support in Chipata to "Ngoni and Chewa tribalism and resistance to change". A Chipata history teacher expressed disappointment that the electorate of the Eastern Province had been reluctant to vote MMD, just as they had been conservative in the past.

The Deputy Town Clerk did not think that Chipata was disadvantaged by its Unip stronghold status in terms of receiving funds from the central government. On the contrary, Chipata received more money than some of the MMD-held towns of the Copperbelt because of its more "efficiently presented" budgets. He perceived that civic issues were discussed in a non-partisan way amongst the 19 Unip and

six MMD local councillors. The Mayor, Marcus Sakala (a Unip councillor), admitted that regional politics had resurfaced since 1991, having been suppressed under Kaunda. His interpretation was that Eastern Province voters had realized that they would have "much to lose" by voting against Unip. Easterners were against domination by Bembas, and believed it was "disgusting" that Bembas always wanted to be "number one". Similarly he felt that Lozis had a right to rule the west and north-west, and Tongas and Ilas the south. In his opinion, the MMD had been unsuccessful in advancing its ideas in the Eastern Province, in spite of attempts to organize among women's groups and in the agricultural sector. He attributed the victory of the MMD in five of the 25 local council wards to the intensive distribution of maize there during the drought, under the instructions of Deputy Minister Soko, an easterner seeking local support. A sixth ward won by the MMD was where the Unip candidate had been, in the Mayor's view, "under qualified".

An Ngoni factory manageress said that her observations during business trips to Lusaka and the Copperbelt did not make her feel that the Eastern Province had been disadvantaged by its rejection of the MMD. In her opinion, the major national problem was that there was a shortage of money, in spite of the proliferation of goods in the shops. This contrasted with the situation under Kaunda, when the money supply had been plentiful, but there had been very few consumer goods to buy. She articulated the political cleavage in the Chipata district as being between the town-dwelling "working class" who supported the MMD, and the "farming community" who sided with Unip.

In spite of a few factual contradictions, it is significant that consensus existed about Kaunda having privileged the Eastern Province in his development policies and thereby retained the support of easterners. An example of this was the maintenance of a uniform mealie price throughout Zambia, entailing higher subsidies for the remote provinces, of which the Eastern Province is one. Comparative advantages enjoyed by particular regions in respect of maize production were thus eliminated. Even when consumer and producer subsidies were

reduced in accordance with IMF requirements in 1986, transport subsidies remained.⁴⁵

It appears to be well known that the Kaunda family has roots in the Eastern Province and in Malawi, and generally held as an adequate explanation for the favouritism he displayed in dealing with the east. The beneficiaries of this development were clearly difficult to persuade to vote for the MMD, with its Bemba-speaking leader from the Copperbelt.

The 1996 elections

Between the 1991 and 1996 elections, support for the new National Party (NP) emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with the MMD, especially in the Western and North-Western provinces. The government had implemented economic and fiscal policy changes required by the World Bank and foreign donor countries to arrest inflation, which had peaked at around 400% prior to the 1991 elections. Zambians were affected by the resultant currency devaluations from 41 kwacha to the Rand in 1992, to K113 in 1994 and K270 in 1996. The ruling MMD suffered reduced percentage polls in by-elections, and losses to the NP in the Western Province's Mongu, Kalabo and Senanga, Solwezi East in the North-West and Bwenga, in the South.

As indicated in the introduction to this article, in the months preceding the November 1996 elections, the Constitution of Zambia was changed to the effect that Kaunda was disqualified from opposing Chiluba as president. As a consequence, Kaunda's Unip, along with certain smaller political groupings, decided to boycott the elections and in doing so alerted the international community to the potential effect this would have on the new democratic culture and the outcome of the elections.

Nevertheless, a number of other parties and independent candidates contested the elections. The Zambian Democratic Congress (Zadeco) was formed by disillusioned MMD parliamentarians and appeared to generate widespread interest around Zambia before the elections. Under the leadership of Dean Mung'omba, Zadeco nominated candidates for 135 of the 150 seats in parliament. Similarly, the NP fielded 94 candidates, hoping to

consolidate its inter-electoral gains. The other main participants were an unusually large number of Independent candidates (99), the National Lima Party (NLP) and the Agenda for Zambia (AZ). In the separate presidential elections, four candidates were nominated to oppose the MMD's Chiluba. These were Mung'omba of Zadeco, the NP's Humphrey Mulemba, the AZ's Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chama Chakomboka of the Movement for Democratic Process (MDP).⁴⁶

Student protests during the week prior to the elections led to the temporary closure of the campus in Lusaka, although the government dailies were quick to point out that there had been no political motivation behind the incident.⁴⁷ Diplomatic pressure notwithstanding, the elections went ahead and the Unip appeal to voters to boycott went unheeded in many parts of the country. The major exception was, not unexpectedly, the Eastern province stronghold of Unip. The exclusion of Kaunda appeared not to be a major issue to voters in many other parts of Zambia. In the constituencies contested by popular independent or other opposition candidates, percentage polls were significantly above the average of 53%.⁴⁸

After the elections, disputes arose amongst various groups of election monitors about the extent to which they could be pronounced "free and fair". The verdict of observers representing the OAU, Malawian churches and the local Patriotic Rescue Monitors (Paremo) was that no serious flaws had occurred in the process and that nobody had been coerced into any particular course of action or inaction. Paremo chairman Sidney Chellah stated that Paremo had "never exhibited any element of partisanship". He claimed that monitors had been volunteers from NGOs and Christian groups and that their sincerity could not be doubted. Significantly, however, he indicated that expecting the elections to comply with "so-called international standards was in itself a compromise of our sovereignty". Paremo accepted the constitutional change as binding on all citizens,⁴⁹ and did not recognize the issue of Kaunda's exclusion as being a factor influencing the legitimacy and fairness of the elections.

In contrast, the locally based Fodep (Foundation for Democratic

Process), ZIMT and CCC (Committee for a Clean Campaign) indicated that the broader conditions relating to the Unip boycott had not facilitated a climate of political freedom at the time of the elections.⁵⁰ The poor electoral performance of Zadeco, following its high expectations, led its leadership to state that it would not recognize the new government and to warn foreigners to leave Zambia because it intended to undertake a programme of civil disobedience and could not guarantee the outcome.⁵¹ The losing Zadeco candidate in Chipata, Andrew Banda, expressed disbelief that the MMD could have beaten him there after he had held numerous well-attended meetings in comparison with relatively few held by the MMD. Banda congratulated Unip for seeing previously what Zadeco had seen now. In an effort to justify his party's failure to join the Unip boycott, Banda explained that Zadeco "knew that the election process was fraudulent but participated in order to prove it on the ground". Unip reacted cynically but later entered into discussions with Zadeco on a joint future political strategy.⁵² Leaders of parties and organizations who were critical of the electoral process were either arrested or went into hiding in the days following the elections because of the government's stated intent to charge those who made provocative statements with treason.⁵³

The United States embassy in Lusaka issued a statement regretting the exclusion of Kaunda from the elections and appealed to President Chiluba "to begin demonstrating at the earliest possible time commitment to the political and economic reform process". The local government press interpreted this with the headline "US, ECU commend Zambians, but ...".⁵⁴

Chiluba was sworn in for his second term as president of the Third Republic on 21 November, once incoming election results had indicated his unassailability in the race. His nearest rival, Zadeco's Dean Mung'omba, obtained only 12% of votes cast, while Chiluba received the support of 70% of those who voted, representing 37% of registered voters, but in reality only 18% of the eligible electorate (Table 3). This was marginally higher than the 33% he received in 1991, when the absolute number of registered voters who participated in the elections was marginally higher.




FIGURE 3: Winning party in each constituency in the 1996 elections.

Data sources: *Times of Zambia*, *Zambian Daily Mail* (various issues, November 1996) National Commission (Mr. Doko), Lusaka.

The distribution of support for the MMD varied considerably between provinces (Figure 3). As in 1991, the winning party achieved high levels of success in the Copperbelt, Lusaka and Northern provinces, and some parts of the Southern province, where more than 40% of voters in many constituen-

cies voted for the MMD. In contrast, percentages voting for the MMD in the Unip stronghold of the Eastern province were exceptionally low. Although the MMD was victorious throughout the province, percentage polls were such that it managed to win seats with the support of as few as 11% of registered voters in some cases (Lundazi and Luangeni). In parts of the Southern, Central, Western and Luapula provinces, the MMD won many of its seats with the support of less than 30% of registered voters. In the Western and North-Western provinces, voters turned their backs on the MMD to the extent that the NP and independent candidates achieved their greatest successes there. Half of the parliamentary seats won by the opposition are located in these two provinces (Table 4).

The final results were an apparently overwhelming victory for the MMD, which obtained the highest number of votes cast in 132 of the 150 constituencies. Independents fielded winning candidates in nine constituencies, with the NP winning five and Zedeco and AZ winning two each.

Concluding comments

A political cleavage between core and periphery, and in particular the Eastern Province periphery, was evident in Zambia in the 1991 and 1996 elections. This is popularly explained in terms of the favouritism shown by Kaunda during his presidential term to the Chinyanja and Tumbuka electorate of the Eastern Province because of his personal and matrimonial links with the region. Residents of the Eastern Province would have been cushioned to an ex-

TABLE 3: Percentage of registered voters who participated, and seats won by each party, in each province, November 1996

PROVINCE	% POLL	MMD SEATS	OTHER SEATS
Copperbelt	86	22	0
North-Western	64	6	NP 4 Independent 2
Northern	62	18	Independent 3
Luapula	56	11	0
Southern	58	19	0
Central	55	13	Independent 1
Lusaka	54	10	NP 1 Independent 1
Western	48	11	Independent 2 AZ 2 Zedeco 1
Eastern	35	19	0
TOTAL	58	132	Independent 9 NP 5 AZ 2 Zedeco 2

Sources: *Zambian Daily News* and *Times of Zambia* (during week of 18-21 November 1996) and Office of the Electoral Commission, Lusaka.

tent from the grinding poverty in the rest of the economic periphery of Zambia, as a consequence of Unip and, more specifically, Kaunda's family investment there. The limited capacity of this form of clientelism would clearly have generated resentment amongst non-beneficiaries in other areas, a factor which opponents of Unip could exploit with ease in 1991.

The MMD government's political strategy of preventing Kaunda from contesting the presidential elections in 1996 had effects that were probably inadequately anticipated. Although the MMD captured all of the formerly Unip-held seats in the Eastern province, its success was tempered by high levels of abstention by aggrieved Unip supporters. MMD victories occurred on the basis of constituency percentage polls as low as 16% in one case. Widespread publicity and political conscientization was facilitated by the Unip-inspired boycott. Simultaneously, the MMD electoral gains were partially neutralized by haemorrhages of support to independents and other parties in five provinces, notably the West and North-West, where 18 seats were not won by the ruling party. MMD strongholds remained only in the major urban centres of Lusaka and the Copperbelt, as well as the rural areas populated by speakers of Chibemba or Tonga. The withdrawal of eastern political opposition perspectives from the elections constitutes a challenge to the inclusiveness and therefore, legitimacy, of the newly elected parliament.

Notes and references

- 1 This study forms part of a doctoral thesis on the electoral geography of southern Africa. I am grateful to Professor Tom Lodge for his comments on an earlier draft, and to Vista University and the Centre for Science Development for grants which partially financed the project. I should also like to express my gratitude to the Africa Institute for enabling me to visit Lusaka to update the material on the latest elections. The conclusions are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the above. The cartographic skills of Philip Stickler are also gratefully acknowledged.
- 2 *The Star* (Johannesburg), 8 June 1996.
- 3 B Latham, "Fears of violence in Zambia", *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 31 May-6 June 1996.
- 4 Z Geloo, "War with the NGOs", *New African*, no 392, June 1996.
- 5 *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 23 May 1996.
- 6 *Southern Africa Exclusive*. Undated copy in Africa Institute files, Pretoria.

TABLE 4: Percentage of registered voters who voted for each presidential candidate, November 1996

Candidate	Party	Number of votes	%
Frederick Chiluba	MMD	913 770	40,3
Dean Mung'omba	Zadeco	160 439	7,1
Humphrey Mulemba	NP	83 875	3,7
Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika	AZ	59 250	2,6
Chama Chakomboka	MDP	41 471	1,8
Rejected votes		66 248	2,9
Did not vote		942 329	41,6
TOTAL		2 267 382	100,0

Source: Fax received from Mr. J.D. Sikazwe, Acting Director: Electoral Commission, 29 November 1996.

- 7 *The Star* (Johannesburg), 8 June 1996.
- 8 *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 7 June 1996.
- 9 AFP, May 1996, Africa Institute files, Pretoria.
- 10 *The Star* (Johannesburg), 8 June 1996.
- 11 *Times of Zambia* (Lusaka), 14 November 1996; *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 15 November 1996.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 E W Soja, *Postmodern geographies: The re-assertion of space in critical social theory*, London: Verso, 1989, p 61.
- 14 J Dunn, *Political obligation in its historical context: Essays in political theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p 158.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 R Molteno, "Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics: A study in sectionalism", in W Tordoff (ed) *Politics in Zambia*, Berkeley: Manchester University Press, 1974, pp 62-63.
- 17 *Op cit*, p 86.
- 18 Calculated from Government of Zambia, *1990 Census of population, housing and agriculture*, Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 1990.
- 19 C M Rogerson, "Managing the decolonizing city in Southern Africa", *South African Geographical Journal*, vol 71, no 3, 1989, p 204.
- 20 L H Gann, "Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe", in P Duignan and R H Jackson (eds), *Politics and government in African states 1960-1985*, London: Croom Helm, 1986.
- 21 D C Mulford, *The Northern Rhodesia general election 1962*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1964, p 12.
- 22 W van Binsbergen, "Aspects of democracy and democratisation in Zambia and Botswana: Exploring African political culture at the grassroots", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol 13, no 1, 1995, pp 3-33.
- 23 R Kabali, "Ngonis hit back". *Search*, vol 2, no 7, 1992, p.25.
- 24 Government of Zambia, *Presidential and parliamentary elections: Summary of election results 1968 and the referendum-1969*, Lusaka: Elections Office, 1969.

- 25 Government of Zambia, *Constitution of Zambia Act, 25 August 1973, Part 1, para 4*, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1973.
- 26 Government of Zambia, *Presidential and parliamentary general elections: Provisional official election results*, Lusaka: Government Printer.
- 27 The exception was the Western Province, where the poll was only 47,2%. Lingering separatist sentiment in the former Barotseland accounted for this lack of enthusiasm to legitimize the Kaunda regime.
- 28 H O Sano, "The IMF and Zambia: The contradictions of exchange rate auctioning and de-subsidization of agriculture", *African Affairs*, vol 87, no 349, 1988, pp 563-577.
- 29 A M Mwanza (ed), *The Structural Adjustment Programme in Zambia*, Harare: Southern African Political and Economic Series, 1992, p 26.
- 30 E M Kashimani, "Labour and democracy in Zambia: From amity to enmity", *Africa Insight*, vol 24, no 4, 1994, p 259.
- 31 See E Nyakutemba, *New African*, October 1991; C K Tiyaanse, "Zambia: Election line-up", *Southern African Political & Economic Monthly*, 1991, Harare.
- 32 The *Zambian Daily News* and the *Times of Zambia*.
- 33 M Ham, "Post independence", *African Report*, September-October 1991.
- 34 E Nyakutemba, "Zambia: Electoral shenanigans", *New African*, November 1991. Unip politicians expressed resentment at the presence of Carter's group and a Commonwealth Observer Group in the country during the campaign (*Daily Mail*, Lusaka, 3 October 1991).
- 35 *Saturday Star* (Johannesburg), 19 October 1991.
- 36 *News Digest*, October 1991.
- 37 *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 28 October 1991; *Africa South*, October 1991.
- 38 Government of Zambia, *1991 Presidential and parliamentary election: Provisional official election results*, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1991.
- 39 C Baylies, and M Szeftel, "The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia" *Review of African Political Economy*, no 54, 1992, pp 75-91.
- 40 Eight of these were in the Copperbelt Province (50% Bemba), six in the Northern Province (85% Bemba), three in the Southern Province (85% Tonga), two in the Western Province (75% Barotse) and one in the Luapula Province (85% Bemba).
- 41 This is also the case with most residents of the adjacent Central Region of Malawi. Medical, educational and agricultural services provided by the Zambian state to the Ngonis and Chewas of the Eastern Province are often inadequate because they are effectively shared with their kin on the Malawi and Mozambique sides of the border. See S H Phiri, "National integration, rural development and frontier communication: the case of the Chewa and the Ngoni astride the Zambian boundaries with Malawi and Mozambique" in A I Asiwaju (ed), *Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa's international boundaries 1884-1984*, London: Croom Helm, 1985.
- 42 This does not necessarily mean that Chinyanja and Tumbuka speakers voted Unip *en bloc*, although it seems likely. In the Eastern Province itself, Chinyanja-speakers and Unip votes were negatively correlated, which was attributable to the high proportion of the electorate (51%) who did not vote.
- 43 In another attitudinal survey, a female resident of the Eastern Province expressed distress that the multiparty campaign had caused divisions and disturbances and destroyed Zambian "oneness". M Bratton and B Liatto-Katundu, "A focus group assessment of political attitudes in Zambia", *African Affairs*, vol 93, 1994, pp 535-563.
- 44 This and subsequent views were expressed to the author on a visit to Chipata in May 1994.
- 45 H O Sano, "The IMF and Zambia ..." *op cit*.
- 46 *The Monitor*, no 23, (Lusaka) 21-28 November 1996; *The Chronicle*, (Lusaka) no 5, 22-25 November 1996.
- 47 *Times of Zambia*, (Lusaka), 11 and 12 November 1996. The reports claimed that a hit-and-run accident involving a student was behind the protests. The arrest of ten students and the expulsion of the students' union executive seemed to suggest government reaction to political activism.
- 48 Only 2 267 382 voters registered, out of a potential electorate of 4 million eligible adults. *Zambia 1996: Voters by polling districts in the constituencies*, monograph, Lusaka, 1996.
- 49 News conference at the Intercontinental Hotel, Lusaka, 22 November 1996; ZNBC News 19h00, 23 November 1996.
- 50 ZNBC News, 20 November 1996; *Zambia Daily News*, 21 November 1996.
- 51 Press conference, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka, 21 November 1996.
- 52 *Zambia Daily News* (Lusaka), 23 November 1996.
- 53 *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 26 November 1996.
- 54 *The Chronicle* (Lusaka), 22-25 November 1996; *Zambia Daily Mail* (Lusaka), 22 November 1996.

The economic context of democratic transition in Africa

Introduction

Many African leaders dedicated the first twenty years of independence essentially to consolidating political power and national sovereignty. However, the instability which accompanied political independence in the early 1960s was aggravated by the persistence of socio-economic and political colonial enclaves which resisted and frustrated the general movement towards national sovereignty in the entire African continent.

This situation gave African countries a much-needed impetus to accord top priority to the economic, social and cultural dimensions of political independence – both individually, and collectively at the level of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is against this background that this paper attempts to examine the economic context of democratic transition in Africa.

The socio-economic situation before 1980

Between 1960 and 1979, the African continent was largely in a state of continuous economic and social crisis, without any well-defined policies for self-sustaining development. During this period, states in the African continent were more drastically affected than other Third World countries by counter-productive development policies and strategies. Consequently, by 1979 Africa had been unable to achieve any significant economic growth and development, or even satisfactory standards of living for its population.

To complicate the problem, Africa had the highest death and lowest life expectancy rates in the world. Approximately one fifth of African children died before the age of one year and, in addi-

tion, only a quarter of the African population had access to safe drinking water. The 98% food self-sufficiency ratio of Africa in the 1960s had dropped to 86% by 1980. The socio-economic problems of underdevelopment and unemployment were of alarming magnitude. Famine, illiteracy and abject poverty coexisted with a vast natural and human potential, owing to the extroversion of the African economies at political independence, the weakness of the production base and the undiversified economic system. These socio-economic structural deficiencies were aggravated by natural disasters and the decline in international commodity prices.

During the OAU/ECA Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development

Professor Wilfred A Ndongko, Senior Regional Advisor ECA-MRAG, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, analyses some of the paradoxes and economic constraints in Africa's attempted democratic transition.



Prospects of Africa Towards the Year 2000, held in February 1979, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, pointed out that by 1979:

the African economy was still basically underdeveloped; characterized essentially by low per capita income, a very high proportion of the population in agriculture,

low levels of productivity, a circumscribed and fractured industrial base, a high dependence on a vulnerably narrow spectrum of primary export commodities, a transport network geared largely to the export sector, a sharp bifurcation between the traditional and export sectors, a high degree of illiteracy, low levels of life expectancy and predominance of expatriate business enterprise in banking, commerce, finance, industry and management.¹

Thus, by 1979, Africa's GNP accounted for only 2.7% of the entire world product. At US\$365, the continent of Africa had the lowest average annual per capita income in the world, while its infant mortality rate of 137 per 1000 was the highest in the world. In the health sector, there was one doctor for every 672 people in the urban areas, while in the rural areas the average was only 1 per 26 000 inhabitants.² Worse still, Africa was largely dependent on other countries, even for food. International trade and commercial structures were invariably in a North-South direction – a colonial legacy which had fostered and perpetuated unequal exchange with consequent "deteriorating terms of trade, outward-oriented production, little domestic processing of raw materials and so on."³

By and large, African leaders found that 20 years after independence the political fragility of the continent was compounded by its economic, social and cultural decay. The failure of so many development policies and programmes, based essentially on the dominant role of international development aid and private foreign investment in the development process, as against domestic mobilization and rational utilization of national resources, was demonstrated by the results of many studies, notably the Pearson Report on the Development of the Third World, and various World Bank reports on world development in general and Africa in particular. For example, according to these reports, 23 of the 36 countries considered least developed by the World Bank in 1979 (63%) were African.

Nevertheless, there was awareness within the OAU that the dream of an Africa free from hunger, sickness, ignorance, unemployment and socio-economic inequalities, as well as external pressures and aggression, could only be realized if the continent be-

came self-sufficient and self-sustaining through self-perpetuating development with the free and effective participation of the entire population. Unfortunately, no rational policies and strategies arose out of this awareness.

The marginalization of the African people in the decision-making process

It has been argued by many African scholars, particularly those concerned with the issues of development, that more than three decades after the attainment of independence by most African states, the masses of the people have deliberately and systematically been excluded from contributing to the national development process, especially to those socio-economic activities that affect their very well-being and destiny.

Democratic participation by the majority of the population in essential and strategic socio-economic activities has become more and more limited. The unfortunate lack of democratic practice has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the populace to mobilize in favour of national socio-economic development, transparency and accountability from authoritarian regimes and one-party states.

Furthermore, the prevailing patterns of socio-economic differentiation and political organization in many African countries have tended to encourage and reinforce a rather narrow base for all decision-making, and there is little popular discussion of broad national development issues, policies and programmes. This continuous and deliberate practice of marginalizing the masses in the formulating, implementing and monitoring of public policies has had a tremendously negative impact on their aspirations, well-being and even their everyday survival.

There has been a growing tendency on the part of virtually all African leaders and governments to rely on foreign experts and international institutions to design their socio-economic policies and programmes. This bias has led to a tremendous increase in the role and influence of foreign experts, managers and international financial institutions in many African countries. Evidently this is the price to be paid by Africa for receiving external financial assistance from bi-

lateral and multilateral aid donors and financial institutions.

As has been clearly stated in the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP):

The unfavourable external factors such as the debt burden, have also constrained economic management. With the unending rounds of programme reviews and protracted negotiations on policy adjustments and debt rescheduling that many an African country has had to undertake with the donor community in general, and the international financial and development institutions in particular, as a precondition for balance of payments support and debt relief, the scope for independent policy-making and national economic management in Africa has gradually diminished and narrowed.⁴

This substantial loss of sovereignty over development policy-making and economic management has further marginalized both government and people in the development process. The conspicuous lack of involvement of the African masses in policy-making and the management of their national economies led the United Nations General Assembly, in its mid-term review and appraisal of UNPAAERD, to

[urge] that the participation of the African people in the recovery and development process should be broadened and made more effective, particularly through promoting access to development resources and benefits, creating favourable conditions for decentralized decision-making, encouraging greater entrepreneurship, individual initiative and private enterprise.⁵

There is no doubt that, as spelt out in UNECA's 1990 *Economic report on Africa*,

the democratization of the development process – by which we mean the empowerment of the people, their involvement in decision-making, in implementation and monitoring process – is a *sine qua non* for socio-economic recovery and transformation.⁶

Unfortunately, however, a number of internal and external factors have impeded the effective participation of the African people in determining, implementing and monitoring both short-term and long-term goals, policies and programmes which affect their day-to-day survival and well-being. Some of these factors are:

- the failure of many African governments to recognize the vital role of the people's participation in national efforts towards socio-economic recovery and sustainable development;
- the insensitivity of many African governments, and indeed of the international community and financial and development institutions, to the contribution that could be made by the African people to their own self-development;
- the failure of many African governments to define appropriate ways to promote popular participation in policy formulation and the planning, implementation and monitoring of development programmes; and
- the failure of many African governments, the United Nations system and public and private donor agencies to build an enabling environment in which people could effectively participate in the development process.

The above factors have aggravated the scope and depth of Africa's socio-economic decline in the 1980s. The gross and deliberate mismanagement of the African economies, massive capital flight, unproductive use of scarce resources, anti-rural bias, poor and ineffective resource mobilization, and distorted development priorities have been largely caused by the lack of popular participation in the decision-making process.

This has resulted in an unsustainable socio-economic crisis in all African countries – a crisis that has eaten away at the social and economic fabric of African society and led authoritarian regimes and one-party states to accept externally designed, short-term economic adjustment and stabilization programmes. The nature and impact of the socio-economic crisis and the adjustment policy packages designed for many African countries are discussed below.

The nature and impact of the socio-economic crisis

Some tangible gains which Africa made in the 1960s and early 1970s, as demonstrated by improvements in economic indicators such as manufacturing production, GDP growth and

standards of health, education and literacy, have been drastically reduced by the prevailing socio-economic crisis. The errors made in economic policy formulation during that period, particularly in the neglect of the agricultural sector – which is still the mainstay of the African economy – have become apparent as a result of the recession of the 1980s.

The 1980s have been regarded as a decade of retrogression in the history of African development, as reflected in the major socio-economic development indicators. Widespread disintegration of productive and infrastructural facilities and a rapid worsening of social amenities were aggravated by repeated droughts and accelerating environmental degradation. The unending socio-economic crisis was not just a negative factor in the well-being of the African people: in fact it threatened the very foundations of the long-term development prospects of the African continent. According to UNECA's 1990 *Economic report on Africa* incomes per capita decreased by 1,7%, yearly, against rises of 3% and 2,4% yearly in the preceding decades, respectively, while the investment ratio crumpled from 24,5% of GDP at the end of the 1970s to only 15,5 of GDP by 1989; hardly a sufficient amount to compensate for depreciation and widespread capital accumulation. Whereas developing Africa closed the 1960s and 1970s with trade surpluses of US\$1,8 billion and US\$29,1 billion, respectively, it suffered a massive deficit of US\$256,9 billion in 1989, and open and disguised unemployment increased significantly. Poverty became more widespread and income distribution more skewed.⁷

The socio-economic crisis was compounded by the external debt situation and its ever-increasing obligations, which had continued to worsen in 1989; the debt overhang remained the most serious constraint on economic recovery and renewed development in the continent. For example,

The stock of debt rose sharply and uninterruptedly from US\$138,6 billion in 1982 to US\$249,7 billion in 1988. And, even in 1989, it is estimated to have risen by about 2,9%, to reach US\$256,9 billion, amounting to about 93,3% of the continent's GDP.⁸

In addition to the unfavourable external debt situation, inflation rates re-

mained high, although notable variations did exist between subregions and countries. For example,

inflation rates of over 39% were recorded in Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zaïre and Zambia, whereas countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Congo, Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire, to mention only a few, enjoyed fairly low levels of inflation.⁹

The average rate of increase of consumer prices in Africa ranged between 10,2% in 1985 and 12,9% in 1987, but escalated to about 21% in 1988 and 1989, thus reducing considerably the purchasing power of the average African, since there were no corresponding increases in real incomes and wages during the same period.

The socio-economic outlook for Africa in the 1980s was critically influenced by both internal and external factors. Internally, there were (and still are) some dominant strategic factors which influenced economic policy and development in Africa. Such factors include lopsided socio-economic development and extreme disparities between the urban and rural areas; between the very poor and very rich; and between different socio-economic sectors and regions in the same country. Additional factors were the social organization of production, associated patterns of ownership and distribution, and other forms of social differentiation and cultural milieu.

There is also the political context of Africa's continental economy, reflected in the nature of democratic practices, decision-making processes and political leadership – all features of the post-colonial state. The institutional set-up has been dominated by bureaucracy and the poor internalization of norms and values of imported institutions. Equally important has been the gross inefficiency and mismanagement of the African economy which has been anchored to the predominance of a mixed economy. Other drawbacks have been poor accountability, policy discontinuity and uncertainty, inefficient use of resources and underdevelopment of human resources.

Furthermore, weaknesses in the production base, the predominantly exchange nature of the economy and its openness have perpetuated Africa's external dependence. One of the main

features of the African economy is the dominance of the external sector which has rendered the national economies highly susceptible to external shocks. Examples of such external shocks, which have been extensively discussed and analysed by African scholars, governments and international institutions concerned with the long-term socio-economic development of the African continent, are bad weather and droughts, declining world commodity prices, mounting external debt burden and servicing obligations, hostile international economic and political environment, drastic decreases in the inflow of foreign private investment, diminishing bilateral and multilateral development assistance and fluctuating international interest rates.

The foregoing internal and external factors precipitated the socio-economic crisis which damaged the entire fabric of the African society. The crisis fuelled the various struggles for a whole range of goals, including some not directly linked to the economy, such as human rights and ethnic identity. The socio-economic crisis brought to light hidden micro-inefficiencies and highlighted the blight of corruption which continues to provide enormous wealth to some while others are being called upon to "patriotically" shoulder the burden of austerity.

During periods of rapid economic growth, various forms of micro-economic inefficiencies in economic management were lived with and overlooked. They even received some theoretical justification as essential engines of capitalism's macro-economic dynamism, *à la* Schumpeter. However, in times of socio-economic crisis, these same sources of dynamism have become unendurable "distortions" which have been blamed for all that has gone wrong and cast light on a whole range of inadequacies that had hitherto been overlooked or condoned.

Structural adjustment policies and the process of political liberalization

Because of the failure of domestic economic policies to contend with the growing socio-economic crisis, many IMF- and World Bank-initiated and -sponsored short-term Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Programmes were introduced in over 30 African countries, with the objective of re-

moving the prevailing imbalances. These have contributed to the resurgence and cohesion of various movements not only protesting against the socio-economic effects of the adjustment policies but also calling for greater democratization of their societies, and greater accountability in the management of national affairs.¹⁰

These programmes have exposed the weakness and grossly undermined the legitimacy of the African state. At the same time, they have produced untold hardship for the population at large, in various ways. Firstly, the structural adjustment policies have led to considerable losses of post-independence gains in social and economic welfare, which were part of the nationalist development programmes. In particular, the working class has experienced a drastic reduction in real wages as a result of the removal of subsidies on wage goods, introduction of "user charges" on a number of public services, and widespread retrenchment in the parastatal sector. Some African governments have not been able to pay wages and salaries over considerable periods of time. This has been particularly true of some francophone countries, which belong to the Franc Zone where the state does not have any right to issue its own currency and therefore cannot resort to the printing of money to pay salaries.¹¹

Secondly, the adjustment policies have contributed markedly to the erosion of the populist programmes which the nationalists initiated after independence; this has substantially compromised the position of the African state as a symbol of national sovereignty. It has also revealed its weak and dependent character *vis-à-vis* foreign powers and institutions. They have in fact raised the question as to whom the state is accountable. The mounting presence of foreign advisers in strategic areas which have long been "indigenized" is a glaring manifestation of this process. Consequently, the African middle class has been pushed to the background when policy packages are being negotiated by African states with international financial institutions and bilateral donors.

Thirdly, although it was assumed during the early years of the introduction of structural adjustment policies that they would be unpopular and

would require regimes which had the "political will" and determination to implement them, there has been a sudden shift towards a position that links structural adjustment programmes with the process of political liberalization. Thus, in addition to the "economic" conditionalities that have brought many African countries to their knees during much of the 1980s, there are now "political" conditionalities. This sudden change of direction by the international financial institutions and bilateral aid donors has been influenced by the parlous state of authoritarian governance in Africa; economic mismanagement and corruption have eroded the very foundation for the rational allocation of resources. This regrettable situation has been blamed on the lack of accountability and transparency shown to the people by the authoritarian regimes.

The rising influence of human rights movements in the donor nations has also injected the human rights issue into both bilateral and multilateral aid programmes and has, therefore, called for some form of political conditionality. In some countries, governments have been obliged by these domestic social movements to link development assistance to better performance in the political arena, with the introduction of political and constitutional changes towards popular democracy. Within Africa itself, there have been political upheavals and social unrest. Consequently, a number of aid donors have come to realize that the authoritarian regimes they have been supporting are on shaky grounds. For this reason, some donors have had to make a sharp turn in their development aid policies towards Africa.

However, it should be pointed out that the commitment to democratization by bilateral aid donors in some African countries has already provoked serious disappointments. For example, the British have tended not to take the matter seriously, limiting themselves to "quiet diplomacy". On the other hand, France – after the Baule meeting in June 1990, when it made the commitment to democratization and denounced authoritarian regimes in Africa – has raised the most expectations and thus provoked the most disappointment among the leaders of the various social and democratic movements. This is particularly true in countries such as Madagascar,

Togo and Congo. This attitude of France can perhaps be explained by powerful private economic interests which exist in these countries.

The effect of political conditionalities in aid packages on the pace of democratic change has been bolstered by the rapid rise of social movements and frequent social and political upheavals. Those suffering under existing socio-economic inequalities have also brought pressure to bear on African authoritarian regimes, with the sole objective of forcing them to introduce meaningful political and constitutional reforms.

Considerata for a peaceful democratic transition

Creating a fresh impetus for Africa's long-term development depends on strengthening the role of popular participation in the economic, social and political life of the African people. There is no doubt that sustainable development depends on the existence of a stable political, social and institutional infrastructure in which economic growth can flourish. However, in Africa this has been lacking. In fact, many African countries have taken a path of development that has kept the decision-making machinery in the hands of a privileged few and has not encouraged dissenting voices to express any alternative views and opinions. The socio-economic structures which have resulted have tended to be inflexible, denying people any means of expressing their grievances.

Consequently, many African governments have lost touch with their own people. Instead, they have been engaged in implementing ill-conceived decisions in an attempt to catalyse overdue socio-economic and political reforms. This has sometimes caused extreme hardship – for example, when the prices of basic foodstuffs have risen, and eventually created the very social and political instability which governments most want to avoid. Certainly, under the circumstances, appropriate conditions must be established by African governments if there is to be any hope for a peaceful transition to democracy and multiparty politics in their respective countries.

However, any attempt to propose feasible preconditions for such a transition must address a number of crucial questions:

- How can African governments create an “enabling national environment” capable of mobilizing all the creative and productive forces within their respective countries? In other words, how can they restructure the relationships between the state and the people so as to ensure that all segments of the society have the opportunity of expressing their views and sharing in the national decision-making process?
- How can African governments open an effective dialogue among their people (the democratization process)?
- How can they evolve from authoritarian and central state systems to more liberal and participatory ones?
- How can they effectively decentralize the decision-making process so as to involve the non-bureaucrats (private entrepreneurs, informal sector, local communities, NGOs, etc) in the management of public affairs during the transitional period?
- Finally, how can they reconcile the expression of diverging aspirations and interests with the need for coherence, with limited resources and the necessity to both compete and cooperate with neighbouring countries (in the subregion) and powerful external partners (international financial institutions and bilateral aid donors)?

In view of the foregoing questions African governments must fulfil some very important conditions, which are essentially socio-economic in nature. Some of these are:

- All interest groups must be given the freedom to present their social and economic demands as well as the opportunity to discuss national development issues and priorities in open fora. This will encourage the formation of the stable social and economic environment which is essential for building a sound foundation for durable and peaceful transition to multiparty democracy in Africa.
- Because meaningful national development requires effective participation and dialogue, all important decisions must be supported by the people. This implies the existence of social, economic and political insti-

tutions which can guarantee the process of open debate involving the entire population, with full reporting of the discussions in the media. In other words, any solutions to Africa's socio-economic crisis must entail the creation of democratic systems where national development policies and programmes can be debated and agreed upon by the majority of the people.

- Successful socio-economic adjustments require strong institutions supported by the majority of the population. A major reason why African countries have seemed ill-prepared to take the strains of adjustment is the failure to develop appropriate mechanisms for popular involvement. A successful adjustment policy requires significant general agreement on its socio-economic objectives. During periods of extreme hardship, just as in times of high economic growth, there has to be widespread consensus that everyone is contributing fairly to the country's development efforts and that those most able to carry the burden are assuming their full share in the costs of adjustment.
- Finally, African leaders and governments must be accountable to the people and transparency must be the rule of day-to-day government actions and decisions. This is important because lack of faith in the fairness and incorruptibility of African governments is one of the main reasons for the erosion of popular support. Administrations which are fully accountable for their policies to the people can command the popularity and respect needed to take the country through a period of socio-economic adjustment. Consequently, Africa cannot afford anything less than the highest standards in government, if there is to be peaceful transition to democracy and multiparty politics in the continent.

Conclusion

If economic development and political liberalization are inextricably linked, the success of democratic transition in Africa requires effective integration of the unfolding democratization process with the national economies in a general framework. This is rooted in people-centred development, popular

participation in the national decision-making process and public accountability by the emerging political leadership.

Unfortunately, however, the transition to democracy in many African countries is being disrupted by crisis-ridden economies. The governments are also being saddled with economic conditionalities that are placing severe strain on their energies by undercutting their already fragile political base. Consequently, it is obvious that if the African governments pay the least attention to their domestic constituencies, they will not meet the stringent demands of their external constituencies, which are foreign financial institutions and bilateral aid donors. They will soon be seen to be lacking the "political will" to consciously ignore popular demands for participation in the socio-economic decision-making process.

Furthermore, the transition to democracy is taking place at a time when national sovereignty is being gravely compromised. To this extent, therefore, the democratization process in Africa faces the risk of obtaining external development assistance at the cost of restricting, if not completely

minimizing, its competence in both the economic and political arenas. This is not to imply the rejection of external solidarity and support for the process of political liberalization in Africa, but only to caution against any "political conditionalities" that would water down democracy by holding the present authoritarian regimes to both economic and political ransom.

Perhaps African countries and external aid donors can learn from the experiences of Romania and other East European countries. In these countries it was largely domestic or internal forces that unleashed the processes of political liberalization in reaction to undemocratic rule, gross violation of human rights, extreme socio-economic inequalities, and the deliberate mismanagement of the national economy by those governing the country. If the process of democratization is to be firmly implanted in African societies, then initiatives towards multiparty politics must remain in the hands of the internal forces; otherwise, democracy will only install governments and political regimes which will continue to serve external interests at the expense of the majority of the African people.

Notes

- 1 Adebayo Adedeji, "Perspectives of development and economic growth in Africa up to the year 2000", in OAU, *What kind of Africa by the year 2000*. Addis Ababa: OAU, 1979, p 59.
- 2 "Final report of symposium on the future development prospects of Africa towards the year 2000", in *ibid.* pp 13-14
- 3 *Ibid.* p 15.
- 4 UNECA. *African alternative framework to structural adjustment programmes for socio-economic recovery and transformation (AAF-SAP)*. Addis Ababa: UNECA. 1990. pp 7-8.
- 5 Adebayo Adedeji. *The African alternative: Putting the people first*. Arusha, 1990. p 8.
- 6 UNECA. *Economic report on Africa 1990*. Addis Ababa. April 1990. p 3.
- 7 *Ibid.* p 4.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 See Albert Borgi and Christian Caterna. *Le Printemps de l'Afrique*. Paris: Hachette, 1991.
- 10 It should be noted that the political and bureaucratic importance of regular payment of salaries – even monies whose value has been scandalously eroded – should not be undermined.
- 11 UNECA. *Economic report* . . . *op cit.* p 5.

The European Union – Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP), Lomé Convention: Expectations, reality and the challenges of the 21st century

Since the signing of the Lomé I Convention in 1975 and the subsequent Lomé II (1980), Lomé III (1985) and Lomé IV (1990) between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) (now European Union (EU)), there has been a continuing debate over whether Euro-African relations are best characterized as a process of decolonization or continuing dependency. A related question is whether the Lomé arrangement is an unmixed blessing, establishing a radically new relationship, based on partnership in place of the old, unequal ties. The conclusion of the mid-term review of the Lomé IV Convention in 1995 prompted a more fundamental debate on the future of EU-African relationships under Lomé. The review has clearly indicated that the partnership between Europe and Africa is under heavy pressure.

With the profound changes taking place in the political and economic world order, EU policies concerning international security, trade and development cooperation are being reassessed fundamentally. There are increasing demands for an end to the special relationships with the ACP states, regarded increasingly as of little significance to the EU in foreign policy and trade terms. It is generally stressed that the original foundations of the Lomé Convention have become very fragile. Most of the fundamental premises underlying the Lomé partnership have faded away. Lomé seems no longer to be a political priority for the EU, and its relevance and viability beyond Lomé IV are being questioned openly.

This article seeks to contribute to this exciting and intriguing debate on the Lomé system by examining critically the record of Lomé and the challenges of the future. It is divided into five sections. The first section provides a brief overview of Lomé, while the second looks at the development potential and constraints under the Lomé system. The third examines the implications of

Lomé for the self-reliant objectives of African economic cooperation and integration schemes. The fourth section highlights the marginalization of African (ACP) interests within the framework of Lomé, the fifth considers the future prospects for EU-Africa relations.

A brief overview of Lomé

The Lomé Convention, which succeeded the two Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, was no doubt an important event in world development cooperation. It was intended to symbolize a new era in relations between industrialized countries of Western Europe and the Third World – an era in which there would be a real cooperative partnership between the two parties. Hence Lomé has been hailed by many observers as a prime example of successful North-South cooperation. The scheme is much more comprehensive than either the Yaoundé Conventions or the Arusha Convention of 1969, for it covers a greater number of issues and for the first time brought together into a single negotiating bloc a group of developing countries with widely differing cultural, geographical, and political backgrounds. Between 1975 (Lomé I) and 1990 (Lomé IV) the Convention was renewed every five years, expanding the areas of cooperation, improving preferential treatment for exports and increasing the number of contracting parties. In the intervening period, the number of ACP countries benefiting from the Lomé Convention have grown from 46 to 70, while the EU has been enlarged from six to 15 member states. The current Lomé Convention, effective from 1990, is the first Convention to last ten years, although, as already mentioned, a fundamental review took place at its mid-term, in 1995.

The Lomé Convention is a wide-ranging arrangement which provides for ACP-EU cooperation in the development of all economic sectors, matters of cultural, social and regional cooperation and the protection of the environment.¹ Lomé's principal provision is trade co-

Professor S K B Asante, Senior Regional Advisor, ECA-MRAG, Cabinet Office of the Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, surveys the history and possible future of the Lomé Convention against the changes wrought in the international economy by globalization.

operation, which aims at developing trade relations between the ACP states and the EU and at supporting the industrialization of the ACP states in addition to the development of their agricultural sectors. Besides these objectives, Lomé promotes regional intra-ACP cooperation. Beyond specific trade preferences for products originating from the ACP states, it offers a large number of instruments for trade promotion, either in the narrow sense of facilitation or, more broadly, through development finance and non-financial assistance. Development finance cooperation “ranges across financing for micro-projects, co-financing of large projects, investing in private-sector projects, and support in debt and structural adjustment matters”. Stabex and Sysmin, as risk-reducing mechanisms to compensate for fluctuations in the earnings of primary commodities and minerals respectively, can also be viewed in the broadest sense as trade assistance policies, although they are financed from the ACP allocation in the European Development Fund (EDF).

As Davenport, Hewitt and Koning have recently emphasized, the aim of the Lomé trade provisions is to promote and diversify ACP exports to the EU in order to “decrease ACP dependence on primary exports (Art. 70)”.² To achieve this aim, preferential access to the EU market is offered as the main instrument. Traditionally, non-reciprocal preferences have been seen as a way of giving an initial boost to industrialization or, at least, as an incentive for further processing of primary products, to reduce ACP reliance on raw commodities. Preferences have also been seen as a spur to investment in new export sectors and a generator of employment opportunities.³

As specified under Lomé, approximately 97% of current ACP exports to the EU enter the market without any duty or non-tariff restrictions. Duty-free access is guaranteed for exports of manufactured products originating in the ACP states; for agricultural exports there are more constraints. Preferences for agricultural products take the form of concessions on duties and levies imposed on imports by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and, of more significance to the ACP, the guaranteed access given to specific quantities of

certain commodities under its protocols for sugar, rum, bananas and beef and veal exports to the EU.⁴

In many respects the Lomé Convention has acted as a pilot scheme for other forms of cooperation. It introduced such original schemes as Stabex or Sysmin; it also broke new ground in crucial areas such as the economic and political liberalization process – structural adjustment and democratization. The first human rights clause in an EU cooperation agreement is to be found in Lomé III (1985). Lomé IV (1990) contains the first contractual adjustment, making it the first international text ever to be negotiated on this subject.

Development potential and constraints

A careful analysis of ACP-EU trade patterns during the period of the Lomé regime suggests that the Convention has had little impact on ACP trade flows despite all the trade preferences that the ACP states have received during the past 20 years. Yet, at first glance, EU trade policies seem attractive and tend to suggest a paternalistic disposition towards African (ACP) countries. One can point to all the preferential treatments, the duty-free, low-tariff policies that should ensure development. The aim of the general trade provisions of Lomé IV, for example, is to “provide a firm and solid foundation for trade cooperation between the ACP states and the Community”, based on the principle of free access to the EU market for products originating in the ACP states, with special provisions for agricultural products and a safeguard clause. The signatories of Lomé IV reaffirmed the commitment made in the preceding Lomé Conventions to promote ACP development through duty-free access to the EU market.

What is evident to date, however, is that these measures fail to achieve the desired results of uplifting Africa’s (ACP) trade. In spite of the concessions provided, Africa’s trade with the EU has grown more slowly than the trade of non-ACP countries. The value of duty-free access to the EU is not as significant as might at first seem. In 1993, the EU Commission calculated that 63,4% of imports from ACP states would enter the EU duty free only, under the most-favoured-

nation provision and generalized system of preferences (GSP).⁵ Thus, duty-free access confers no significant preferential advantage on the African (ACP) states for almost two-thirds of their exports.

The ACP share of the EU import market has declined fairly steadily since 1975. In that year, the ACP countries accounted for about 8% of the Union’s imports; by 1990, the countries were supplying only 3,8% of these imports. The following are the main conclusions of a study on the subject by the ACP secretariat:

The structure of ACP/EEC commercial cooperation has not changed substantially since Lomé I despite the preferences given to over a third of all ACP exports to EEC. In some respects, it has even worsened. The ACP states, for example, have been losing their share of EEC trade. EEC total imports from ACP states have declined from 6,6% of total imports to 4,5% during the 1975–85 period. The items traded have also not been diversified. ACP exports to EEC continue to comprise mainly primary products. More serious, however, is that commodity prices have been falling in real terms during the period and in the early 1980s, they reached their lowest level in fifty years.⁶

Table 1 below indicates the overall evolution of ACP-EU trade from 1976 to 1992, comparing ACP performance with that of other developing countries, principally those in Latin America and Asia. In 1992, the EU imported 18 billion Ecu in goods and services from the ACP states, compared with 24,8 billion Ecu from Latin American countries, 30,3 billion Ecu from Mediterranean countries and 66,4 billion Ecu from Asian developing countries (Asia excluding Japan and Hong Kong). Over the period 1975 to 1992, the average annual growth in exports to the EU for each of these areas was respectively; ACP, 2,28%; Mediterranean, 5,87%; Latin America, 5,97%; and Asia, 11,7%.⁷ This comparison of ACP exports to the EU with those of other developing countries that have enjoyed less preferential access to the European market makes the deterioration in the ACP performance even more apparent.

It is quite evident, therefore, that the free access to the EU market is insufficient to ensure a rise in ACP exports, which, to a large degree, depends on trade promotion. Thus, al-

though in principle the Lomé Convention is committed to take positive action to ensure effective access to EU markets for the exports of the ACP countries, in practice market promotion for these products has so far proved to be disappointing.⁸ ACP-EU trade relations have thus become a source of concern, as forcefully expressed by Kenneth Kaunda, then President of Zambia, at the ACP council meeting in Lusaka in December 1977 when he claimed that the ACP states “negotiated the Lomé Convention in the belief that it would confer on (their) exports terms and conditions more favourable than those granted to the products of other countries. After some two years of implementation of the Convention, (they) now have many reasons to doubt that this is the understanding and policy of the Community”.⁹ The ACP states “clearly fear” that their vaunted special relationships with Europe have yielded few tangible results, especially in the area most important to them – boosting their exports to the EU. Indeed, extensive research into more detailed patterns of ACP-EU trade might well reveal that the principal beneficiaries of the trade provisions are the main EU exporting companies.

Success stories are scarce. Exports enjoying a relatively large preferential margin, such as textiles and clothing, canned tuna, and processed wood, have expanded, possibly because of their advantage in the EU market. Of most significance to ACP exports are the Lomé protocols for sugar, rum, bananas, and beef and veal, which offer guaranteed prices under agreed quotas. Also, studies of the experience of export diversification in Zimbabwe,¹⁰ Mauritius,¹¹ Jamaica, Kenya and Ethiopia¹² indicate that the Lomé preferences have helped to achieve expansion and diversification of their exports to the EU to a certain extent, although the authors warn that it is unlikely that their good performances can be attributed solely to the Lomé preferences. Expectations of the role of preferences in expanding ACP exports were probably too high. Experiences in other countries, however, suggest that there are other critical factors that, when they are either not present or are imperfectly aligned, restrict the accelerator role of preferences and limit the benefits that can be had from them.

TABLE 1: Trends in EC trade with developing countries, 1976–1992 (in billion of Ecu)

EC imports from	1976	1980	1985	1990	1992
ACP	10,5	19,4	26,8	21,9	18,0
Asia	6,7	16,0	26,0	50,9	66,4
Latin America	8,3	13,7	25,8	25,7	24,8
Mediterranean	9,6	16,4	32,3	29,8	30,3
Rest of the world	273,5	453,4	717,3	1 021,4	1 067,7
Total	308,6	518,9	828,2	1 127,8	1 207,2
EC exports to	1976	1980	1985	1990	1992
ACP	9,6	15,7	17,4	16,6	17,0
Asia	7,5	13,1	29,7	41,0	47,1
Latin America	7,7	12,0	13,5	15,6	20,4
Mediterranean	12,3	19,8	29,8	28,5	28,6
Rest of the world	255,1	414,4	721,4	975,3	1 023,9
Total	292,9	475,0	811,8	1 077	1 137
ACP-EC trade balance	1976	1980	1985	1990	1992
Imports-Exports	0,9	3,7	9,4	5,3	1

Source: Eurostat; calculations by CTA Economic and Export Analyst Ltd.

The lack of critical factors, such as adequate infrastructure, private investment, a well-developed financial sector, a good human resource base, limited awareness of Lomé preferences, complicated procedures and restrictive rules of origin, as highlighted below, may restrict the accelerator role of preferences and limit the benefits they provide.

The constraints on ACP trade development

It has become increasingly difficult for the Lomé Convention to contribute to ACP trade development because of a number of disturbing constraints. A case in point is that the potential for African ACP states to benefit from the Lomé Convention preferences depends on whether they comply with the rules of origin requirements. In principle, rules of origin determine the conditions under which a country may benefit from preferential treatment in the trade of exports goods: to meet the requirement of sufficient processing in a particular country or cumulatively in the ACP group. In the case of the Lomé Convention, EU and ACP content may be included in calculating the proportion of added value to satisfy the rules of origin.

The Lomé rules of origin are too stringent to confer much benefit on infant ACP countries while, on the other hand, a direct advantage is given to EU firms in setting up assembly or pro-

cessing industries, because, EU materials, like ACP inputs, are considered to be originating products. This undoubtedly creates an unfavourable bargaining position for the ACP countries. A restriction as high as 50–60% of the total value-added of the goods exported is, indeed, too stringent a qualification for products of ACP countries nearly all of which are at a very early stage of industrialization. Investigations by the Commonwealth Secretariat suggest that “few manufactured mineral products from Commonwealth Africa reach the required 50 per cent of value added”. Most of their processed and manufactured products do not benefit from the Lomé Convention’s free access provisions “because they have only between 20 and 48 per cent of value added as a proportion of their gross value”.¹³ McQueen and Stevens cite a number of clear instances where the rules of origin have obviously deterred exports.¹⁴ The rules of origin requirement in many cases cancels out the benefit of preferential access to EU markets and discourages the essential expansion of the value and range of manufactured goods from the ACP countries.¹⁵ While successive Lomé conventions have marginally liberalized the rules of origin applicable to the ACP states, the latter still perceive them as a constraint on their capacity to penetrate the EU market. Indeed, meeting the complex requirement may turn out to be more of a penalty than an advantage for trading with the EU.

Similarly, although the major contribution of Lomé has been export stabilization (Stabex), which has helped to some extent to insulate a large number of ACP states from the worst effects of instability in earnings from primary commodity exports, the scheme has been inadequate to cope with the scale of short-term instability in the commodity markets in recent years. The funds were virtually depleted midway into Lomé III, prompting urgent demands for further measures. While Lomé IV has maintained and extended Stabex and Sysmin (the special facility for mining products), the ACP countries have argued that the financial resources provided (about 62% above Lomé III) still fall short of requirements. It has been estimated that even with the increased resources, the funds will not be able to cope with the a repeat of the price instability experienced in the 1980s.

Besides, not only is the operation of Stabex too complex, but, unlike the common fund discussed at Nairobi during Unctad in May 1976, it “does not try to stabilize the price of commodities but merely to compensate for shortfalls in export earnings due to price fluctuations”.¹⁶ Stabex does not necessarily compare any more favourably than the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility, the main difference being that the latter is concerned with the broader questions of stabilizing dislocations in the balance of payments.

Significantly, too, Stabex gives a disincentive to the diversification of ACP export markets, as well as any diversification out of the particular export trade itself (strengthened by the non-cumulative coverage of the commodities exported). Because processed raw materials are not included in the overall calculations, related domestic industry is not encouraged, nor is domestic consumption. I agree with Lynn Mytelka that Stabex is at one and the same time “an incentive to maintain present levels of production” in the specific commodities listed under the scheme and a disincentive to diversify commercial agricultural production, process raw materials locally or developed domestic food production – all activities that would promote domestic economic linkages and bring the structures of demand and production more into line.¹⁷ In this regard, the Stabex scheme is designed to perpetuate inherited one-sided market structures. In

making use of the Lomé Convention for guaranteeing EU's sources of raw materials and energy resources and for assuring the Union a reasonable stability of prices for these commodities, the EU does no more than reconfirming the traditional role of the ACP states as the suppliers of primary products. To this extent, the Stabex scheme looks, indeed, like “stabilizing poverty”.¹⁸

Another major factor limiting the role of Lomé preferences is the extent of the awareness in Africa and the other ACP countries of their existence. As Antonique Koning has recently confirmed, in many ACP countries awareness of preferential access to the European market is limited to a few officials and large exporters.¹⁹ This suggests that information about the provisions has been insufficiently disseminated among local exporters and entrepreneurs. Information is often not available about marketing strategies and distribution channels to enable ACP exporters to target the market in the most effective way. All this has clearly contributed to the underutilization of the preferences.

Not only is lack of information on the trade provisions a problem, but the complexity of the rules and procedures that apply them also causes difficulties. As has been identified in other parts of the Lomé Convention, ACP governments, let alone small enterprises, often lack the capacity to interpret and therefore conform to these requirements.

Furthermore, the slow progress in export diversification in ACP states suggests that preferences for non-traditional exports are insufficient to stimulate this crucial process. Support for production is limited, marketing know-how and awareness of European demands and standards is scarce, while intimate knowledge of evolving distribution and transport channels is wanting.

Besides the restrictions encountered by ACP producers in their attempts to export to the EU there are other factors affecting the supply side. In many ACP countries the effects of natural disasters, drought, desertification, infrastructure inadequacies and insufficient production capacities mean that export supply is not competitive in the EU market.²⁰ Given these critical factors, most ACP states have found it difficult to create an at-

tractive climate that can compete with more promising markets in Asia and elsewhere. Apart from political and economic instability, government policies have not encouraged such investment with appropriate incentives. In success stories such as Mauritius, investment, both domestic and foreign, has been identified as an important factor contributing to trade development, not only because of the financial flows, but also for the embodied know-how in technology and marketing.

Another important factor is inadequate infrastructure. Exporters in many ACP countries face relatively high transportation costs when exporting to the European market. This is not only because of their distance from Europe, but also because they generally dispatch limited quantities of goods for which they cannot obtain competitive shipping prices. Air transport also causes problems in several ACP states as flights to Europe are limited and competition for space is high, pushing up the prices. Transport within the country is in most cases equally unsatisfactory for dynamic exporters.

Finally, there is the problem of weak human resource base hampering most ACP economies. Special technical training is often not easily available, but more important, entrepreneurial and management skills crucial to innovation and diversification in ACP economics are lacking.

Considered against this background, one cannot help but to agree with Davenport, Hewitt and Koning that the absence of these factors, which are crucial for expanding ACP exports and increasing ACP competitiveness, indicates that “it might well have been over-optimistic and unrealistic to expect that the Lomé Convention alone could deliver ACP export success”.²¹

The poor record of Lomé

Besides the constraints Lomé has placed on the development of the trade of ACP states, there is also the matter of the Convention's poor record as regards the challenges of African development. EU policies quite evidently have failed to stimulate African economic development, since the Lomé relationship has not focused sufficient attention on Africa. Neither African

ACP trade preferences nor long-term aid contracts have proved adequate to support Africa's fragile economic structures. In brief, the Lomé aid programme, in spite of its innovations, appears inadequate to meet the most pressing demands of the ACP states,²² considering the tremendous increase in the number of these countries, as reflected in Table 2 below, and the size of their populations, combined with the impact of world inflation. Thus even though Lomé IV increased the development aid package by about 41% over the Lomé III level, this is still considered far below the requirements of the ACP states.

Concern has also been expressed, not so much about the text of the Convention, but about the practical value of its provisions. Decades of privileged relationships have neither brought about development nor solved structural problems. African states remain trapped in processes of economic decline, adjustment, debt and poverty. These crucial problems, including those of commodity prices, are not addressed: the effectiveness of trade preferences is being eroded; and aid budgets are shrinking and subjected to a multitude of conditionalities. As noted above, Stabex is not only chronically underfunded; it also has a limited, if not actually counter-productive, impact on structural transformation. Within Europe, Africa's failures are increasingly viewed as endemic and indigenous. This has helped to foster a view throughout the EU that Africa's failure to demonstrate any kind of economic advancement has eroded the credibility of the previous special relationship. Inevitably, potential EU support is further weakened by the persistent denial of democracy and the failure to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms in most of the African ACP states.

On the whole, the Lomé Convention would seem to have become an empty shell. In the African countries, its impact and image are more problematic: it has tended to generate further inequalities rather than development. At best, Lomé provides poor African states with some financial oxygen. At worst, it has degenerated into a paternalistic and clientelistic system of rent-seeking. Thus, although the Lomé Convention celebrated its 20th anniversary in February 1995, for many African states, the instrument remains "a mystery", whose potential,

TABLE 2: Lomé conventions

Number	Date	Number of countries	Total aid (Ecu million)	
			EIB (a)	EDF (b)
1	April 1976	41	400	3 100
2	January 1981	57	700	4 700
3	May 1986	66	1 100	7 400
4	Spring 1990	68	1 100	10 700

(a) European Investment Bank
(b) European Development Fund

Source: *Africa Research Bulletin*, vol 26, no 12, Jan 31, 1990, p 9819.

both in the realm of aid and trade, remains largely untapped. Even more serious is the impact of Lomé on the process of African economic cooperation and integration.

The impact of Lomé on regionalism in Africa

Critically studied, the implementation of the key provisions of the Lomé system would seem to constitute one of the most important constraints, at least in the long run, on the degree of economic cooperation attainable in Africa. The linkages between the EU and African regional integration schemes within the framework of the Lomé Convention raise some fundamental questions. For example, to what extent do these relationships facilitate the realization of the self-reliant objectives of the Economic Community of West African states (Ecowas), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC)? Would the genuine transformation of these regional economic communities not be constrained in the long run by the logic of their continued dependent relationship with the EU under the Lomé system?

Overall import and export profiles reveal the heavy dependence of Ecowas, Comesa and SADC countries on trade with Europe, while intra-regional trade is relatively small. Hence promotion of intra-regional trade expansion with the consequent reduction of the colonial heritage of dependence on trade with Europe or outside economic blocs has thus become one of the major challenges confronting the economic communities in Africa. To meet this challenge,

Ecowas and Comesa have each adopted trade liberalization programmes aimed at promoting intra-regional trade expansion.

On the other hand, the Lomé arrangement is geared towards intensification or reinforcement of the existing pattern of trade links between Europe and Africa, thereby further discouraging intra-African relationships. Trade with EU is sustained by the Lomé Convention's special preferences. While these prevail the member states of the African economic communities have been hesitant to implement protocols and programmes on trade liberalization. Hence, the difficulty, among other things, in promoting collective self-reliance while the Lomé regime is critically geared towards the institutionalization of North-bound vertical orientation of the African economy or Euro-Africanism, symbolizing the continuity of an unequal division of labour between Europe and Africa. It is not surprising, therefore, that Shaw is pessimistic about the future: "Inter-African trade is unlikely to increase much, other than through smuggling and the black market, until the continent escapes from its colonial heritage of North-South links and produces goods with markets on the continent as well as outside."²³

The trend in the pattern of trade relations is reinforced by the impact of the Lomé aid and Stabex provisions. The tying of aid to procurement in the EU countries, and the restriction of Stabex payments to earnings from exports to EU, encourage increased economic transactions between Europe and Africa, a phenomenon running counter to the development of cooperation between the member states of African regional integration schemes.

Besides, although it is generally agreed that regional cooperation and integration is the field *par excellence* in which the EU could play a leading role, especially in Africa, the member states of EU – with the exception of France – have been reluctant to move into this area. Under Lomé IV, regional integration was seen as a key priority. Practice, however, lags behind theory. EU support for the SADC, for instance, has concentrated principally upon transport and communications. It has been less inclined to move into the more difficult area of regional integration, for instance, by placing a greater emphasis on investment in the productive sectors and trade development.

On the whole, although greater economic self-reliance is a necessity for regional integration schemes in Africa, since it enables the continent to escape from the historic dependency on the industrial centres in Europe and facilitates its development, the successful implementation of this strategy within the Lomé framework remains problematic. Lomé, in brief, represents a vertical Euro-African orientation, while Ecowas and Comesa reflect an interest in horizontal South-South links. Thus, if the main goal of existing economic integration schemes is greater autonomy and the creation of institutions as catalysts and nuclei for the newly established African Economic Community, then inter-regional North-South relations, as reflected in Euro-African (ACP) links, are counter-productive.

The marginalization of African ACP interests

By the early 1990s, it had become quite evident that the deep-rooted historical bonds and the solidarity on which the first Lomé Convention was founded were fast fading. The initial rationale which underlined the Africa-EU relationship is now hardly perceptible. The geopolitical focus on Europe and Africa that prevailed when the Rome Treaty was signed in 1957 and persisted for states such as France even into the mid-1970s, no longer commands the same allegiance. Whatever the rhetoric of the Lomé Convention, no realistic observer can dispute the marginalization of African ACP interests in EU policies during the mid-1990s. Notwithstanding the reas-

suring words of the EU spokespersons,

the advances of European integration and the results of the Eastern European move to market economies and democratic government do combine with the extreme African plight and the accelerated disengagement of black Africa from the global trading system to produce a serious threat to the EC-ACP bond.²⁴

Within the new EU the move towards common foreign and security policy and its implications for Union aid and trade policies seem likely to overshadow the previously protected special EU-Africa relationship.

It needs to be emphasized that the traditional forms of global interdependence that prevailed for many years in North-South relations have altered substantially. The end of the Cold War has ushered in changes of great magnitude, which have impacted adversely on the African ACP states, leading primarily to the gradual loss of the geopolitical significance of the South. The ACP countries now enjoy declining bargaining power and a corresponding diminution in external development funds. This is evidenced by the fact that several EU member states are no longer convinced of the relevance of the ACP-EU cooperation in its present form. Not only have they drawn attention to the fragility of cooperation based on humanitarian justifications; they have also shown an unwillingness or hesitation to provide resources. This illustrates the fact that the EU's view of foreign and security policies and development aid and trade is gradually changing.

We may now see a growing movement towards the marginalization of the ACP countries as the focus of the EU's geopolitical interests becomes directed increasingly towards other regions of the world. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the ACP was the major focus of EU development cooperation. Now, however, the EU has development cooperation programmes with five major groups of countries including the ACP. Until the mid-1980s, for example, cooperation with Latin America was neglected. From 1990 to 1994, Latin America received approximately 11% of EU's external financial assistance. The case of the Mediterranean countries is even more revealing. In the 1970s, EU financed development assistance pro-

grammes in the region averaged less than \$US30 million per annum. In the 1980s, the average had increased to \$US90 million per annum. This rose, in 1993 and 1994 to \$US526 million and \$US638 million respectively.

More significantly, since the demise of the Soviet Union and the liberation of the Soviet bloc, the priorities of Western Europe in general and Germany in particular have changed. Eastern Europe has become increasingly significant strategically and economically, and a growing amount of Western money is being allocated there. Before 1990, the EU had no development cooperation programmes in Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1990 and 1994, EU-financed development cooperation programmes totalled 6 022 million Ecu. Indeed, in 1994, the EU adopted an integrated approach in its strategies towards Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and Maghreb countries. The case of ACP countries has not been considered. There is thus little doubt that the ACP states no longer enjoy high priority on the EU agenda.²⁵ The EU is paying increasing attention to first, addressing the development needs of countries on its immediate borders; and second, developing economic and trade relations with faster growing regions of the developing world: Asia and Latin America.

Furthermore, with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (December 1993), the European Economic Area (January 1994) and the Single European Market (1993), ACP interests in the 1990s and beyond will confront a more competitive environment in Europe. Their fragile economic interests are unlikely to receive the special attention they need, as they will have to compete for attention with the economies in transition in Eastern and Central Europe. A number of internal EU issues will almost certainly have higher priority than ACP needs: the integration of the former East German economy; additional assistance for Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal; adjustments involved in bringing in new members such as Austria, Finland and Sweden; and the internal drama regarding the drive towards economic and monetary union, as well as a common foreign and security policy within the Maastricht Treaty formula.

The marginalization of African ACP interests was already evident in the European Commission paper to

the EU member states and the European Parliament entitled *Development cooperation policy in the run-up to 2000*.²⁶ This focused on financial flows and aid issues rather than trade, and failed to provide a clear focus or recommendations on how the European Union could best contribute to preventing the demise of the African ACP economies.

More serious are the implications of the Uruguay Round. In the first place, the EU negotiators in the Uruguay Round of the Gatt talks gave little attention to the trade interests of African ACP states. As the negotiations became increasingly difficult in 1993, the European Union focused on concluding deals with the United States and Japan.²⁷ The negotiations (concluded in December 1993) have resulted in a global trade deal expected to stimulate the world economy, with specific and substantial benefits going to the EU, the United States and Japan. As Carol Cosgrove notes, supporters of the Gatt agreement also “claim that it will be a windfall for developing countries, opening new markets and boosting foreign investment”.²⁸ Unfortunately, however, African ACP states are unlikely to be among the beneficiaries. For them, the substantial reduction in tariff preferences in the EU market seems likely to weaken their future trade performance.

One can identify four main sources of concern about the impact of the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements on Africa’s trading position in the world and the continent’s relations with the other trading blocs. First, certain assessments of the impact of the Round on Africa “show that the continent may lose up to \$US3 billion per annum during the initial years of implementation, while other trading countries share benefits that could amount to \$US5 billion per annum”.²⁹ The losses will result mainly from the erosion of the special preferences at present enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, as well as the increase in the food import bills of the net food importing countries. Under the new Gatt regime, there is little room for Lomé Convention-style privileges. Even if ACP states could demonstrate a causal relationship, there is no current evidence that the EU member states will be willing to consider substantial and continuing compensation for ACP states adversely

affected by the outcome of the Uruguay Round.

Second, theoretically, Africa should gain from the expansion of trade that would result from the lowering of tariffs in non-European markets, including those of the USA and Japan, not previously covered by special preferences. However, as noted above, it is unlikely that Africa’s competitive position will be strong enough to take advantage of this potential, unless special measures are taken at national levels to improve competitiveness and unless African countries can count on international technical and financial support for putting into effect such policy changes.

Third, African countries are poorly placed to take advantage of the opportunities in the new areas, such as services and intellectual property, while their dealings with foreign investors may be constrained by the provisions on Trims. Fourth, the Uruguay Round agreement is of such magnitude and complexity that it would require a far more effective mechanism for the management of trade policy than many African countries have at present. And, as Onitiri concludes, the principles of progressive liberalization and freer markets which the agreement seeks to underline “will obviously favour those countries that have been able to achieve a high level of productivity and competitiveness, and penalize those that still have a long way to go to achieve that status”.³⁰

In many respects, therefore, the expanding scope of EU development cooperation, the impact of the end of Cold War which has made the developing countries no longer of geo-strategic interest to opposing factions, the substantial implications of the Uruguay Round, the completion of the Single European Market project, the creation of the European Economic Area, the enlargement of the EU to include several new members and the ongoing and increasingly wide-ranging dialogue with the economies in transition in Central and Eastern Europe – all these factors have combined to marginalize African ACP interests. They have combined to undermine the basis on which Lomé is predicated, making it increasingly irrelevant to the African ACP states. Hence Lomé would seem to be “living on borrowed time”. And if the ACP and EU are unable to revitalize the

agreement, it is feared that the Lomé Convention may not survive the year 2000. What, then, should be done? How does the ACP see itself fitting in to the EU’s increasingly global agenda of concerns? What priority is to be accorded to relations between the ACP and the EU beyond the year 2000? Will there be another Lomé agreement when the current one runs out at the end of the century? And what will be the nature of relations between the EU and Africa in a world that has undergone dramatic changes since the first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975?

Looking to the future

Looking to the future and bearing in mind the results of the Lomé IV mid-term review negotiations, we would distinguish between two types of option open to the ACP states as the sequel to Lomé IV. The first option would advocate retaining Lomé but with a thoroughly redesigned framework which would take account not only of the shifting priorities and approaches of EU members, but also of the need to improve the competitiveness of what used to be Europe’s preferred partners – the ACP states – and make them more capable of facing today’s competitive trading environment.

On the other hand, considering the many changes which could have taken place by the year 2000, particularly on the trade scene, a second option would advocate an end of the so-called “privileged relationship” of the Lomé system and its replacement by an entirely different set of agreements between each of the ACP geographical groupings – Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific – and the EU.

This somewhat “revolutionary” option is based on the premise that with the shift in the world trade regime towards global liberalization and away from generalized and selective preferences, there appears to be little space or any practical instruments available to support preferences, whether for the ACP as the traditional EU-favoured group, or for poor or “least developed” countries generally. In the bleakest of all possible cases, the ACP might be left with highly eroded tariff preferences and strict rules of origin and interpretations of surges which fail to offer any significant stimulus to production and

trade for the EU market. This section attempts to examine each of the two options.

Option One: Retaining Lomé

Retaining Lomé as the first option would seem to raise some searching questions. What, for example, within the changed geopolitical context, are the common interests between the EU and Africa on which a more solid partnership can be built? What principles or mechanisms should be reserved if Lomé is to be radically redesigned at the end of the current Convention? And what can Africa realistically expect with regard to the coherence of EU policies?

Given the changed geopolitical context, this option would require a redefinition of new common interests as part of the new foundations for an innovative set of relations. In other words, the need to redefine common interests between Africa and the EU should be the first prerequisite in any effort to revitalize EU-African relations. Europe's declining support for Africa is a reflection of shifting geopolitical interests and the growing asymmetry in Euro-African trade and investment flows. Security concerns and market opportunities are perceived to be in Eastern Europe, North Africa and South-East Asia, and *not* in Africa. As Bossuyt reminds us, ethics alone will not generate interest in aid nor help to make progress in implementing long-standing policy recommendations on debt, coherence, access to markets, Rio and the famous 0.7% norm.³¹

What would be required in the current political climate is "reciprocal self-interest", which is likely to provide a more useful entry point that will convince politicians and public opinion in Europe of the need to invest in Africa. This implies a clear articulation of the community of interests that may currently exist between Europe and Africa. It will not be an easy task. Evidence suggests that simply referring to "new interdependencies" such as refugees and migration flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and rising levels of crime, which the ACP top officials would seem to constantly highlight,³² is insufficient to induce a positive reaction. A possible alternative is to make a detailed cost-benefit analysis of different policy options. Research and lobbying activities could be de-

veloped to "reactivate and to make visible the actual and future interdependencies between Europe and Africa".³³

There is also the need to ensure that the development agenda is African-driven. Since sustainable development cannot be achieved without recipient participation and ownership, African policy-makers and managers should put into practice, in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the redesigned Lomé Convention, the often-expressed view that Africans should have the primary responsibility for their own development. The twenty-plus years of donor-driven development cooperation, as in the Lomé system, would have to change. Both the Gatt negotiations and the mid-term review of Lomé IV have shown that Africa generally adopts a reactive rather than a proactive attitude. In the process of redefining Lomé, fresh ideas are needed from all kinds of African actors – governments, regional organizations, private sector, NGO's and academic communities. African countries should not limit themselves to defending the "*acquis*" of Lomé; they should also be more active in moulding change to their advantage. They have no alternative. Either they participate in the redesign of Lomé, or they leave this task to European policy-makers, with the risk that the "Convention gradually turns into an empty box".³⁴

In redesigning Lomé, a number of key issues would need to be addressed to enable Africa and the ACP as a whole to improve their competitiveness so as to derive desirable benefits from their cooperation with Europe. One crucial issue at which a fresh look should be taken is the concept of partnership which has been a central (almost magical) notion in successive Lomé Conventions. Partnership, no doubt, gives ACP countries a leading role in managing Lomé resources. In practice, however, the Lomé partnership has turned out to be difficult to implement. It is often not clear what partnership really means and who should be responsible for what. Local ownership is hard to combine with EU conditionalities and growing demands for efficiency, visible results and accountability. Several ACP countries do not have well-functioning governance and/or administrative systems to assume a leading

role. Non-state actors feel they are left out of Lomé. Over the years, the famous "Lomé culture" of partnership has lost much of its soul and practical effect. Yet partnership should remain an "intangible" element of any post-Lomé arrangement.

Given this background, it is quite evident that negotiations for post-Lomé IV would be faced with the question of defining a new approach to partnership. On what, for example, should a "modern" partnership be based? What should be its main building blocs? What original partnership principle (dialogue, contractuality, predictability) should be maintained and what new principles would need to be introduced, as for example, selectivity, differentiation, flexibility? And in reviewing management approaches to partnership, we need to examine how the principle of partnership – if it is to be maintained – can be reconciled at the operational level with the need for enhanced efficiency, recipient ownership and donor accountability. In addition, what institutional innovations will be needed to ensure a better balance between conditionalities and partnership?

The new Lomé should also clarify the European responsibilities in the new partnership. For example, what could be the specific role and added-value of European development cooperation compared with the contribution of other (bilateral) donor agencies and taking into account the capacities at Community level? Beyond the provision of aid, what can the EU do as a partner to defend the interests of ACP countries in international fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), Bretton-Woods, the Club of Paris? How can the question of policy coherence be integrated into the future partnership? What can be expected realistically at this level? Under what conditions can the idea of "development contracts" (based on mutual interests, common objectives and coherence) be operationalized? These are some of the crucial issues that should preoccupy the attention of ACP states as they negotiate for a new Lomé. They are issues needing thorough clarification.

One other key issue on which special attention needs to be focused relates to instruments of financial and technical cooperation, with which the Convention of Lomé is richly en-

dowed. This includes such instruments as Stabex, Sysmin, structural adjustment facilities and the like, as well as loan financing instruments (risk capital loans and own resource loans). In principle, this diversity should allow for considerable flexibility in adapting the support to specific country needs. In practice, however, it has generally been very difficult to utilize this panoply of instruments in an effective and coherent manner. Frustration is growing among Lomé policy-makers and practitioners on both sides. Improving the instruments of financial and technical cooperation will be a major issue in the redefinition of EU-ACP cooperation. On the basis of an evaluative assessment of current experiences, negotiations for a post-Lomé IV Convention should explore possible ways to adapt and/or radically innovate the instruments available for financial and technical cooperation.

To this end, observations can be made with regard to the practical value, management experiences and effectiveness of the main Lomé instruments for financial and technical cooperation. We would need to examine, also, how to overcome current management problems in the use of different instruments. How, for instance, can we improve local capacity for a coherent and integrated use of Lomé cooperation instruments? Looking to the future, what instruments of the Lomé IV Convention need to be preserved in any EU-ACP arrangement? What can be done to improve the effectiveness of non-programmable financial assistance such as Stabex or structural adjustment support?

In addition to reviewing current instruments and related management approaches, efforts towards redesigning Lomé should also explore which new instruments need to be developed in order to (i) reach out beyond government by providing (direct) support to non-state actors; (ii) ensure a more appropriate EU response in conflict prevention; and (iii) facilitate increased policy coherence in the new EU-ACP partnership.

Above all, a new Lomé should significantly reflect a new trade relationship between the ACP and the EU. As noted above, despite the preferential access to the EU market provided by the Lomé Convention, ACP export performance has deteriorated over the

last two decades. In the meantime the trade provisions have come under increased pressure and their value and existence beyond the year 2000 are now challenged. The general trend towards trade liberalization has reduced the value of preferences and has resulted in an international trade environment less generous towards preferential trade regimes. As already indicated, changes within Europe, such as the creation of the Single European Market, enlargement of the Union and the extension of improved access to the EU market for non-ACP exporters also affect the benefits of the EU-ACP trade agreement.

As trade is still thought to play a significant role in the development of ACP countries, it will be necessary, in redesigning Lomé, to examine the essential elements of a future trade agreement between the EU and the ACP, taking into account these realities and challenges. To what extent, we may ask, are preferences viable beyond the year 2000? If extended, what could be done to ensure a better utilization of the preferences and to maximize the benefits that accrue to ACP exporters?

But the crucial question relates to the problem of redefining mutual interests in trade cooperation to be reflected in the post-Lomé IV Convention. In this regard, one needs to search for new common interests of the EU and the various ACP regions in the area of trade cooperation. Closely related to this is the question of the extent to which the EU is still interested in the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions as outlets, sources for commodities and spheres of influence.

One other critical area is the problem of directions for future trade cooperation between the EU and ACP following the establishment of the WTO. We would need to examine the implications of the WTO regime for the acceptability of new trade relationships between the EU and ACP. However, as the existing Convention does not sit easily within current WTO rules, it may be necessary to consider the extent to which, if they acted together, the EU and ACP could mould WTO opinion to create an enabling framework more appropriate than Article XXIV for North-South accords between disparate states. In the final analysis, the new Lomé should contribute to the emergence of a framework of trade rules

that facilitate “fair trade” and ensure that trade contributes not just to growth but to development. But will there be a Lomé V?

Option two: Ending Lomé privileged relationship

By the year 2000 when Lomé IV runs out, several changes, as noted above, would have taken place, particularly on the trade scene. In the first place, given the steady liberalization of world trade, there is obviously going to be reduced scope for effective trade preferences in any new agreement. In addition, non-reciprocal preferences may become more difficult to justify under the revised Article XXIV of Gatt.

Besides, the process of economic integration in the three regions forming the ACP would have been further consolidated. In Africa, the African Economic Community would have advanced further in the process of implementation of the Abuja Treaty, which established it in 1991, and a number of continental protocols on trade, rules of origin, free movement of persons, and other issues would have been adopted. Already, the new Comesa Treaty of 1994, the SADC Treaty of 1992 and the revised Ecowas Treaty of 1993 have revitalized and adjusted the process of economic integration to the new realities of the 1990s. It is expected that by the year 2000 South Africa will be playing a major role in intra-African trade and cross-border investment; and other African countries, in particular Nigeria, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, may also be playing a much bigger role as development poles than they do at the moment.

In the Caribbean, the Caribbean ACP countries are thinking seriously about preparing to join the North American Free Trade Area (Nafta). Already at least two Caricom countries have expressed interest in joining Nafta if invited.³⁵ Nafta membership would give the Caribbean ACP countries a “safe” place in one of the large trading blocs into which the international trading environment is becoming divided despite multilateral trade liberalization. It is being argued that it is essential for the Caribbean ACP countries “not to miss the boat” while Nafta is growing, especially as some of the Latin American countries are now lining up to join. Similarly, in the Pacific, the Pacific members of the

ACP will undoubtedly be drawn into the Asian-Pacific Cooperation (Apec) orbit. In fact, Papua New Guinea became a member of Apec in 1993.

Furthermore, the forecast is that “East Asia’s importance as a growth pole in the world economy, will continue to rise”, as reflected in a recent World Bank study.³⁶ Indeed, if present trends continue, “it will constitute the most dynamic region in the world economy by the turn of the century”.³⁷ It will certainly be in the interest of African countries to expand their trade and financing relationships with this rapidly growing region within the framework of South-South cooperation as articulated not only in the October 1993 Tokyo Declaration on African Development but also the December 1994 Bandung Framework for Asia-African Cooperation.

Significantly, too, the globalization of world production would have gone even further than at present, with interlocking investment patterns and production structures.³⁸ And finally, the explosion of telecommunications technology would have brought the world even more closely together, and any country or region that is serious about becoming part of the global economy would have no choice but to gain access to the information highway. To improve telecommunications on a continental scale in Africa, a major proposal by one of the large telecommunications transnational corporations (TNCs), called “Africa One”, aims to build a regional telecommunications network encompassing the whole of the African continent that can be readily accessed by individual countries.

Against the background of these developments and of the fundamental changes in perceptions of Europe’s mission and of the fact that African ACP states no longer command priority on the EU agenda, to negotiate the old type of Lomé Convention, as Onitiri rightly puts it, “would be like putting old wine in new bottles”.³⁹ It certainly will not answer to the requirement of helping Africa to achieve the structural transformation that will enable the continent to participate more effectively in the global economy. What will be more in tune with Africa’s future needs would be an agreement that includes the following features⁴⁰ and:

- contributes substantially to Africa’s effort to create a single continental

market for goods, services, capital and labour;

- provides incentives for small African countries, most of them least-developed, to participate in, and benefit from such a continental market;
- supports Africa’s efforts to create a favourable environment for private foreign investment by expanding infrastructure, particularly transport and communications, promoting cooperation in energy development and utilization and improving the facilities for human resource development;
- contributes to on-going efforts to promote cross-border investment by African and foreign investors;
- restructures the provisions of industrial cooperation to encourage cross-border agreements between African countries and TNCs to exploit Africa’s natural resources for local processing, cross-border trade and exports; and
- provides incentives to encourage the growing ranks of Africa’s private sector to improve and extend their operations, particularly in cross-border activities.

An agreement with such features will be more likely to contribute to improved productivity and increased competitiveness in African countries, promote the inflow of foreign investment, and enable African countries better to face the longer-term challenges of diversification and increased participation in the world market. Thus the option to end the Lomé “privileged relationship” should be seriously considered, particularly by the African ACP countries, at the Summit of ACP Heads of State, the first of its kind, scheduled to take place by the end of 1997 in preparation for the Lomé negotiations due to commence in September 1998.

Conclusion

Since the conclusion of Lomé I in February 1975 ACP countries have enjoyed preferential access to the EU market. The four successive Lomé Conventions have committed this specially privileged group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, now numbering 70 states, and the European Union to achieving a “better bal-

ance of trade”. Nevertheless, despite all the trade preferences that the ACP states have received during the past 20 years under the Lomé arrangements, their trade performance has been disappointing. Part of the decline in the ACP share of the EU market has been caused by the erosion of ACP preferences over the last few years as a result of the extension of preferences to other developing countries and the liberalization of multilateral trade following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the World Trade Organization.

Apart from the constraints on trade development of the ACP states, the Lomé system has not, on the whole, made any significant impact in meeting the challenges of African development. In the case of the process of African regionalism, Lomé would seem to have become a disturbing obstacle to progress as far as trade liberalization schemes of African economic communities are concerned.

Looking to future relations between the ACP countries and the EU when Lomé IV expires in the year 2000, two options have been proposed: one that would like to see a radically redesigned Lomé aimed at improving the competitiveness of the African ACP countries to enable them to meet the challenges of today’s competitive trading environment. The second option advocates the end of the Lomé system and its replacement by new agreements to be established by each geographical grouping – Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific – with the EU. The ACP should also look to buoyant markets elsewhere, especially in Asia and in other regional groupings which offer them fewer words embodied in grand treaties but more action in the form of trade dynamism. The Caribbean and the Pacific ACP countries are in the process of pursuing this line of action.

Notes and references

- 1 This section has drawn heavily on Michael Davenport, Adrian Hewitt and Antonique Koning. *Europe’s preferred partners? The Lomé countries in world trade*. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1995.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p 1.
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 *European community 1993: The EC as a world trade partner*. Brussels: Commis-

- sion of the European Community, 1993, p 68.
- 6 ACP Secretariat. *Report of the working group on the evolution of ACP/EC Trade*. February 1987.
 - 7 Carol Cosgrove, "Has the Lomé Convention failed ACP trade?". *Journal of International Affairs*, vol 48, no 1, 1994, p 227.
 - 8 Ellen Frey-Wouters. *The European community and the Third World: The Lomé Convention and its impact*, New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1980, p 43.
 - 9 See ACP Council. ACP/365/77
 - 10 R Riddell. *ACP export diversification: The case of Zimbabwe*, ODI Working Paper, no 38. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1990.
 - 11 M McQueen. *ACP Export Diversification: The case of Mauritius*. ODI Working Paper, no 41, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1990.
 - 12 C Stevens. *ACP Export Diversification: Jamaica, Kenya and Ethiopia*. ODI Working Paper, no 40, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1990.
 - 13 Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, "Towards a new ACP-EEC Convention". *World Today*, vol 34, no 12, December 1978, p 479.
 - 14 M McQueen and C Stevens. "Trade preferences and Lomé IV: Non-traditional ACP exports to the EC". *Development Policy Review*, vol 7, no 3, 1989, pp 239–60.
 - 15 S K B Asante, "The Lomé Convention: Towards perpetuation of dependence or promotion of inter-dependence?", *Third World Quarterly*, vol 3, no 4, October 1981, p 666.
 - 16 See *West Africa*. 5 June 1978.
 - 17 Lynn Mytelka, "The Lomé Convention and the New International Division of Labour", *Journal of European Integration*, vol 1, September 1977, p. 74.
 - 18 Daniel Mloka, "Development with dependence". *Courier* 44, July–August 1977, pp 37–81.
 - 19 Antonique Koning. "Challenges to ACP trade with Europe after the Uruguay Round", *ECDPM Policy Management Brief*, no 1, July 1994, p 3.
 - 20 See Davenport, Hewitt and Koning, *op cit*, p 35.
 - 21 *Ibid*.
 - 22 For details, see Asante, *op cit*, p 666.
 - 23 Timothy M Shaw, "The revival of regionalism in Africa: Cure for crisis or prescription for conflict", *Jerusalem Journal of International Affairs*, vol 11, no 4, 1989, p 86.
 - 24 Carol Cosgrove and Pierre-Henri Laurent, "The unique relationship: The EC and ACP", in John Redmond. *The external relations of the European Community*, London: Macmillan, 1992.
 - 25 Carol Cosgrove, *op cit*, p 242.
 - 26 Commission of the European Communities, SEC (92) 915 Final, Brussels, 15 May 1992.
 - 27 *The Times* (London), 16 December 1993, p 1.
 - 28 Cosgrove, *op cit*, p 243.
 - 29 H M A Onitiri, "Regionalism and Africa's development". Study prepared for Unctad, November 1995.
 - 30 *Ibid*.
 - 31 Jean Bossuyt, *The future of EU-Africa development cooperation: With or without the Lomé Convention?*, ECDPM Working Paper 95–2, p 6.
 - 32 See, for example, the keynote address by Ambassador L Cumberbath of Trinidad and Tobago to the EDPM conference on future EU-ACP relations beyond Lomé IV, Maastricht, 12–14 June, 1996.
 - 33 Bossuyt, *The future of EU-Africa Development ...*, *op cit*, p 6.
 - 34 *Ibid*, p 7.
 - 35 Antony Gonzales, "Caribbean-EU relations in a post-Lomé world". Policy paper prepared for seminar on "The future of Lomé", Brussels, 10–11 June 1996.
 - 36 World Bank. *1995: Global economic prospects and the developing countries*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1995.
 - 37 H M A Onitiri, *op cit*.
 - 38 *Ibid*.
 - 39 *Ibid*.
 - 40 *Ibid*.

AFRICA FOCUS

Conflict In Eastern Zaïre

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja is former Vice President of the National Electoral Commission of Zaïre, President of the African Association of Political Science, and Professor of African Studies at Howard University

The restoration of the Mobutu regime, with the installation of the Kengo government in July 1994, came in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda and at the time of France's intervention there to erase the traces of its own role as an accessory to crime. Having supported the Habyarimana regime and trained its genocidal machine, including the extremist Hutu *Interahamwe* militia, the French were relieved to have in Kinshasa a regime that would let them permit the Rwandan killers, both soldiers and militiamen, to cross into Zaïre with all their weapons. The fact that these killers were now free to use Zaïrean territory to launch raids into Rwanda, and to slaughter Tutsi citizens and residents of Zaïre, is the immediate cause of the current fighting in eastern Zaïre.

The roots of this violent conflict lie deep in the history of the Great Lakes region as well as in the political alignments of the Mobutu regime nationally, regionally and internationally. There is in the first place, the question of whether or not people of Rwandan origin, or *Banyarwanda* (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa), can claim Zaïrean citizenship on basis of being native to Zaïre as of August 1885, when this country came into existence as the Congo Free State. If so, they would, as other indigenous people all over Africa, lay claim to ancestral lands in eastern Zaïre. In the second place, the conflict has to do with the consequences for Zaïre of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in both Rwanda and Burundi. In either case, the actions and decisions of the Mobutu regime since 1972 have helped to exacerbate tensions and to bring about the present crisis.

Rwanda and Burundi are two of the major precolonial kingdoms to have survived Western conquest and occupation as more or less viable political entities, with the monarchies being destroyed between 1959 and 1961 in Rwanda and between 1965 and 1968 in Burundi. The population of both countries is made up of three social groups traditionally distinguished on the basis of occupation: the Hutu (roughly 85%), the Tutsi (14%) and the Twa (1%). The Twa are a pygmoid people, who also have important settle-

ments west of the Great Lakes in the equatorial forest of Central Africa, including the nearby Zaïre's Ituri Forest. Contrary to colonially created myths, the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is not a centuries old struggle between "Hamitic" pastoralists (Tutsi) and Bantu agriculturists (Hutu). For the Tutsi are not "Hamites". They are a Bantu people who share a common Bantu culture with the Hutu, with whom they speak a common Bantu language, *Kinyarwanda* or *Kirundi*, depending on the country.

Immigration and settlement in eastern Zaïre by the Banyarwanda occurred at different moments, and for a variety of reasons. As in other parts of the world, the entire Great Lakes region constituted a commercial frontier for relatively powerful states like ancient Rwanda. And there is historical evidence that Rwandan agricultural colonies were established in the islands of Lake Kivu, now part of Zaïre, in the 18th century. In addition to this, a group of ethnic Tutsi claims to have settled during the 17th century in the hills they have named "Mulenge" between Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, or between Bukavu and Uvira in the South Kivu province of Zaïre. Accordingly, they call themselves *Banyamulenge*.

This oral tradition is hotly contested by other indigenous Zaïrean groups. One of these, the Bafulero, actually contests the right of these ethnic Tutsi to call themselves "Banyamulenge" on the ground that "Mulenge" is the title of a Bafulero chief whose land is located some 200 kilometres south of the area occupied by these Tutsi.

However true this dismissal of the Banyamulenge's oral history might be, it would be difficult to deny that some Rwandan settlements may have found themselves west of the colonial boundary as drawn in 1885. Moreover, the Banyarwanda who lived on Idjwi Island, the largest of Lake Kivu islands, became Belgian subjects in 1910, as did other Kinyarwanda speaking colonies in North Kivu, when Germany ceded the lands it occupied to Belgium, in a boundary adjustment between the two imperial powers.

The legal distinction between them and other Congolese became academic

after Belgium took over Rwanda and Burundi in 1920 as a League of Nations mandatory power and, in 1945, as a United Nations trusteeship authority. For all practical purposes, Belgium governed Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi as a single colonial entity known as, “*Le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi*”, with a single army, the *Force Publique*, a single governor-general in Kinshasa and two lieutenant-governors general in Lubumbashi and Bujumbura, respectively. As a teenager growing up in the Belgian Congo in the 1950s, it never occurred to me that these three territories were destined to become three separate nation-states.

Belgium moved thousands of Banyarwanda peasants to the eastern Zaïre districts of Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale in North Kivu between 1937 and 1955, for purposes of easing the demographic pressure in heavily populated Rwanda, and recruited thousands more for work in mining, transport and agricultural enterprises in Shaba, Maniema and South Kivu provinces throughout the colonial period. Most of these Banyarwanda voted in the first municipal elections of 1957–58, and in the general or independence elections of 1960. Representatives of their communities, albeit few, were also elected to public office in Zaïre. In spite of a new influx of Banyarwanda in 1959–61, mostly Tutsi political refugees fleeing their homeland as a result of the Rwandan Revolution, Zaïre continued to welcome them with open arms.

Problems began to appear when the numbers of Banyarwanda grew progressively due to both natural increase and clandestine immigration in the postcolonial period. In January 1972, under the influence of his Tutsi chief of staff Bisengimana Rwema, Mobutu signed a decree giving Zaïrean citizenship to all natives of Rwanda and Burundi who had settled in Zaïre before 1950. In addition to their success in professional and business activities, the Banyarwanda in general and the Tutsi in particular were now in a stronger political position to use their proximity to Mobutu for greater economic and social gains. This they did with gusto, using their financial means and their newly found political power to acquire more land in heavily populated North and South Kivu provinces. Needless to say, they could always find indigenous chiefs who were willing and even eager to privatize ancestral

lands in exchange for money and/or political favours. All this increased the resentment that other Zaïreans had towards them, which was partly based on the latter's distaste for the Banyarwanda's apparent social exclusiveness.

The 1972 decree was so unpopular that Mobutu himself accepted to sign a law passed by his one-party parliament in June 1981 invalidating the decree and defining Zaïrean nationality or citizenship on the basis of membership in an ethnic group known to exist within the borders of Zaïre as defined in August 1885. By this token, only those Banyarwanda who had actually solicited and obtained naturalization in Zaïre could be declared citizens. All those who were citizens by virtue of being descendants of pre-1885 settlements, of the 1910 boundary change, and of the pre-1950 migratory movements were automatically deprived of their Zaïrean citizenship. The question that this action raises with respect to international law and fundamental human rights, and the one that the Banyarwanda raised at the national conference in 1992, is whether it is legally and morally acceptable for a state to deprive a section or stratum of its inhabitants of their citizenship rights.

Stripped of their citizenship, Banyarwanda peasants are also denied land rights, as the land they occupy and use is being claimed as ancestral land by the indigenous groups among whom they live. The land question is at the heart of the conflict between them and other Zaïreans in both North and South Kivu. Before the genocide in Rwanda, thousands of people died in interethnic violence in 1992–93 in North Kivu. Instead of finding ways of resolving the conflict in a responsible manner, Zaïrean authorities added fuel to fire with xenophobic appeals, while soldiers and military officers became implicated in arms trafficking on both sides.

An example of this state-sponsored terrorism is the xenophobic campaign waged by the provincial authorities of North and South Kivu before and during the current war in eastern Zaïre. In September 1996, South Kivu Deputy Governor Lwasi Ngabo Lwibanji stated in a radio broadcast that if the Tutsi Banyamulenge did not leave Zaïre within a week, they would be interned in camps and exterminated. The

Banyamulenge's reply was succinctly put by a young fighter who told Chris McGreal of the *Mail and Guardian* that “we don't come from Rwanda and they cannot force us to go because we know how to fight and the army does not” (M&G, 25–31 October 1996). Being basically a praetorian guard, Mobutu's army was decisively routed in a very short time, as the Tutsi and their allies took control of Uvira, Bukavu and Goma, the major cities of the Kivu region.

At the present time, the plight of the Banyarwanda is inextricably linked to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi. The 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda; the assassination of the first democratically elected President of Burundi, the *Front Démocratique Burundais* (Frodebu) leader Melchior Ndadaye; and the genocide in Rwanda are part of the political background to the current conflict in eastern Zaïre.

Like Tutsi communities all over the world and in the Great Lakes region in particular, the Tutsi of Zaïre did raise funds for the RPF cause and send some of their young people to take part in the struggle as fighters. This participation in the RPF war effort, at a time when the Zaïrean government was supporting the Habyarimana regime, did raise questions as to the loyalty of Zaïre's Tutsi in particular and that of the Banyarwanda in general. To many patriots in Zaïre, this type of behaviour meant that the Banyarwanda were using their Zaïrean citizenship in an expedient manner – for purely political ends or pecuniary advantage – while their real heart and loyalty were elsewhere. However understandable such feelings are, they do not justify officially led or sanctioned xenophobic campaigns against all Tutsi. Statements broadcast by South Kivu Governor Kyembwa wa Lumuna and his deputy Lwasi were, according to McGreal, “remarkably similar to the extremist Hutu messages broadcast during the Rwandan genocide” (*Mail and Guardian*, November 1–7, 1996).

The Mobutu regime bears a major blame for the current situation, for having allowed the French through their *Opération Turquoise*, to assist Habyarimana's army and the Interahamwe to regroup in Zaïre for purposes of reconquering Rwanda. These killers then used the Zaïrean refugee

camps to raid Rwanda on a regular basis and to organize the slaughter of Zaïre's Tutsi. For two years and a half, Zaïre and the international community watched and did nothing to stop this, while the UN and the major powers continued to be more preoccupied with feeding refugees, including the killers, rather than searching for a solution to the whole crisis. Like any other responsible government would, Rwandan authorities have given military support to the Tutsi of Zaïre as a way of putting an end to the Hutu extremists' raids into Rwanda.

Now that the rebel alliance is doing the job that the international community failed to do, the only justification for humanitarian intervention in the Great Lakes region is to pursue and arrest all the remaining killers to bring them to justice for genocide, and to prepare an enabling environment for the resettlement of the returnees in Rwanda. There is no need for foreign military intervention in Zaïre. The UN-mandated intervention does not inspire confidence, because it was initiated by the French, whose motives are suspect. Jean-François Médard, a world renown professor of African affairs at the Institute of Political Studies

at the University of Bordeaux in France told *Newsweek* magazine in 1994 that "French policy in Africa is erratic and criminal", as his country's "government operates not on principle, but on cynicism" (*Newsweek*, November 21, 1994, p 30).

Finally, a word about the so-called rebel alliance. The Tutsi are not fighting alone. They have been joined by several non-Tutsi groups of rebels who have waged for years a low intensity and at times sporadic campaign of armed struggle against the Mobutu regime. The best known of these groups is the *Parti de la Révolution Populaire* (PRP), a remnant of the 1964 eastern front of the "second independence" movement, which is led by Laurent Kabila. For over 30 years, the PRP has maintained a maquis in the mountains of the Fizi-Baraka area near Uvira, and has not succeeded in playing its once expected role as a spearhead of the second phase of the national liberation struggle in Zaïre.

The alliance's administrative control over Goma, Bukavu and Uvira is the latest but much larger version of the state-within-a-state that the PRP has maintained for years over its Fizi-

Baraka enclave. Mr Kabila, the PRP chief, had for all practical purposes become a typical African warlord rather than a revolutionary guerrilla leader. If he and his allies are to be congratulated for once again showing to the whole world the bankruptcy of the Mobutu regime and, above all, for ending the Rwandan refugee problem in Zaïre, they are far from being the liberators they hope to be. A strategy of genuine national liberation requires the kind of political work that the PRP has not done, nor has the capacity to undertake.

Only a legitimate and democratically elected government can resolve the land and citizenship issues involving the Banyarwanda of Zaïre. The PRP-led alliance is part of the popular struggle for democracy in Zaïre, and needs to be brought into the ongoing process of peaceful change initiated by the democracy movement since 1980. As for the Great Lakes region as a whole, there will be no durable peace and security without democracy and social progress in Zaïre, on the one hand, and until a just and lasting solution is found to the problem of coexistence between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, on the other.

BOOKSHELF

■ **Rehabilitating Governments: Pay and Employment Reform in Africa**

edited by David L. Lindauer and Barbara Nunberg. Averbury The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1996. pp244. ISBN 1 85972 226 1

This book is an assembly of a group of essays that reflect the real-life trial and tribulations of designing civil service pay and employment reforms. These reforms seem to be spreading as by contagion from one continent to the other of the developing world. Hence, it was designed to reach an audience that is an amalgam of scholars, development practitioners, and government policymakers who are interested in both the analytics and the operations and who want to understand firsthand how these fit together. To achieve this objective, the authors sought out practical work on this topic, most of which comes from World Bank country and economic sector work, and evaluations or reviews of Bank lending operations.

The essays selected reflect the interdisciplinary approaches that characterise work on this topic, drawing on this topic, drawing on economics, political science, and management perspectives. The challenge was to transform these analyses - intended for quite different purposes - into a cohesive set of articles that could compose a unified volume.

■ **Sovereignty as responsibility: conflict management in Africa** by Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1996. 265 pp. ISBN 0 8157 1827 6

Sovereignty can no longer be seen as a protection against interference, but as a charge of responsibility where the state is accountable to both domestic and external constituencies. In internal conflicts in Africa, sovereign states have often failed to take responsibility for their own citizens' welfare and for the humanitarian consequences of conflict, leaving the vic-

tim with no protection or assistance. This book shows how that responsibility can be exercised by the state over their own populations and by other states in assistance to their fellow sovereigns.

The authors present a framework that should guide both national governments and the international community in discharging their respective responsibilities. They develop broad principles by examining identity as a potential source of conflict, governance as a matter of managing conflict, and economics as a policy field for conflict prevention. Considering conflict management, political stability, economic development, and social welfare as functions of governance, they also develop strategies, guidelines, and roles for its responsible exercise.

Approaching conflict management from the perspective of the responsibilities of sovereignty provides a framework for evaluating government accountability. It proposes standards that guide performance and sharpen the tools of conflict prevention rather than simply making *post hoc* judgements on success or failure. The authors demonstrate that sovereignty as responsibility is both a national obligation and a global imperative.

■ **Local Resource Management in Africa**

edited by J.P.M. van den Breemer and L.B. Venema. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1995. 245 pp. ISBN 0 471 96004 7

Managing natural resources locally has become a crucial issue in many African countries as the degradation of nature is advancing rapidly and governments are increasingly unable to cope with it.

This book examines the conscious and organised efforts by local groups and leaders to sustain and increase the regenerative capacity of their natural resources. The emphasis is not on recommendations but on detailing real experience of the local management of natural resources and

on the critical analysis of its success or failure, taking proper account of economic and political realities. Besides four theoretical contributions, with examples from all over Africa, this volume contains case studies of concrete attempts at local management in six African countries, of which some were successful, whilst others were not. Comparison of these case studies has provided various social and ecological conditions for future successful local management, as well as providing a direction for further research.

Book review

Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state sovereignty and regional security, edited by Edmond J Keller & Donald Rothchild. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 244 pp. ISBN 1 55587 632 5

This is one of those rather unsatisfactory collections that almost inevitably results from a conference with a large number of speakers. With fifteen contributions squeezed into just over two hundred pages of text, authors have little opportunity to develop any sustained argument, and there is no clear set of editorial priorities to guide their efforts. Together with an editorial introduction and conclusion, the collection includes four initial general studies, followed by seven case studies (three on North-east Africa, two on Southern Africa, and two on West Africa), and two papers on the superpowers. Most papers do address regional security, but none (to take the other promised theme from the subtitle) seriously rethink state sovereignty. There are no papers on any of the issues – such as structural adjustment, human rights, insurgent movements, or environmental management – in the context of which state sovereignty has been most explicitly challenged.

Given these limitations, there is all the more reason to signal those contributions (all of them in the case study section) which have something fresh and original to say. Anna Simons, dismissing as propaganda the claim that the Somalis constitute a “nation”, traces much of the origin of the Somali crisis to the “success” with which Siyad Barre was able to attract Western aid, after breaking with the USSR in 1977; though contestable at points, notably in the claim that Siyad’s collapse resulted

from the 1990/91 Gulf War, her analysis provides a new slant on a much written about subject. Denis Venter’s analysis of Southern Africa security starts from the observation that “security” in the region is more often threatened than preserved by states, and suggests that security requires a reduction of state power as well as an increase in governmental legitimacy; citing Porfirio Diaz’ famous plaint, “poor Mexico, so far from God, so near to the United States”, he argues refreshingly that regional security requires “ways to accommodate, manage, even curb South Africa’s superior strength”. And while two chapters on the Ecowas intervention in Liberia may seem excessive, both of them (by Robert Mortimer and Margaret Vogt) provide balanced and critical appraisals which do not seriously overlap with one another.

The other case studies, on Ethiopia, Sudan and South Africa, do not have a great deal to add to what has been said many times already, while the chapters on United States and Russian/Soviet policies towards Africa reflect the preoccupations of an American audience. Most disappointing, however, is the failure of the general papers to place the problems of post-Cold War Africa in any clear focus. The worst of the lot, by Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN, demands permanent representation on the Security Council, and condemns the “specter of marginalization” and the “paltry” aid given to Africa by comparison with eastern Europe: he would have done well to revise his paper in the light of Simons’ analysis of what aid has done to Somalia. Elsewhere, some strange misconceptions emerge from normally reliable authors: William Zartman, for example, believes that the 1993 election in Nigeria (p 55) “was accompanied by such disorder that it caused a sixth military coup”, whereas the elections were overwhelmingly peaceful, and were annulled merely because the military disliked the result; and that (p 59) “Ugandan insurgents ... supported by Libyan troops, overthrew the Ugandan government of Idi Amin”, when the Libyans actually fought on Amin’s side. But much more horrifying is the editors’ claim (p 3) that “in a matter of weeks, the 1994 civil war in Rwanda resulted in 500 000 deaths”; these deaths were the result, not of war, but of deliberate and systematic genocide, and if an American specialist on Africa’s international relations can so misrepresent them, the prospects for any improved understanding of Africa must be slight.

Christopher Clapham
Lancaster University, UK

Africa Institute

Seminars and visiting scholars

Several meetings were held in the Institute's ongoing series of African studies seminars. **Professor Wilfred A Ndongko**, Senior Regional Advisor, Multidisciplinary Regional Advisory Group (MRAG): Macro-Economics and Policy Reform, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia conducted a seminar on "Regional integration in southern Africa: The role of the Economic Commission for Africa" on 8 October 1996. **Professor Edgar S Dosman**, Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto (Ontario), Canada, addressed a seminar meeting on 14 October 1996 on "The Cuban role in Angola and Namibia: A critical re-evaluation". **Professor Sam Asante**, Senior Regional Advisor, Multidisciplinary Regional Advisory Group (MRAG): South Africa Desk and Task Force, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, gave a seminar talk on 15 October 1996 on "Economic development in Africa: Challenges, realities and the way forward"; and **Mr Neil van Heerden**, Executive Director, South Africa Foundation, Johannesburg, and former South African Ambassador to the European Union in Brussels, presented a seminar on "South Africa and Europe: Potential for a new partnership" on 19 November 1996.

From 1 to 13 October 1996, the Institute facilitated an advisory and training mission by **Professor Wilfred A Ndongko** (UNECA-MRAG), the main objective of which was to present a series of seminars to a variety of constituencies (government institutions, universities and research centres, and chambers of commerce) on topical African development issues, with an emphasis on macro-economic and policy reforms, economic planning and development, regional economic cooperation and integration, international trade and development, and international economic relations.

Conferences, study/liaison visits abroad, lectures

Richard Cornwell (Head, Current Affairs) gave a presentation on "Development Challenges in sub-Saharan Africa" to the Africa management team of Worldvision International on 3 October. On 20 October, he received a delegation from the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and briefed them on the latest developments in Southern Africa. On 20 December he visited Cape Town to discuss the contribution the Africa Institute could make to an information alliance established on the Internet by Mbendi (<http://mbendi.co.za>).

Kenneth Kotelo (Head, Communications) participated in a workshop on "Maximizing corporate risk in emerging African markets", held in Johannesburg from 16 to 18 October 1996, where he read a paper on "Political risk in southern Africa".

Dr Denis Venter (Executive Director and Head, Academic Programmes) spent the period from 9 October to 29 November 1996 on a visiting research fellowship at the Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden, The Netherlands. During his sojourn in Leiden, he conducted research for a book manuscript entitled *Malawi: From one-party rule to political pluralism*, gave a seminar on 5 November 1996 on "South Africa and its neighbours: The transition to multi-party politics in Malawi" in the Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, spoke on 13 November 1996 to a meeting of the Southern Africa Study Group, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London on "Regional security in southern Africa", and presented a paper at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association in San Francisco on 25 November 1996 on "South African foreign policy in a time of change: The African dimension".

Publications

The Institute published a monograph by **Professor Willie Breytenbach** on *Democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa*.



*Dr Denis Venter,
Executive Director and
Head of Academic
Programmes, Africa
Institute of South Africa*



Transitions, elections and prospects for consolidation (Research paper no 58, September 1996). The author is a Research Fellow of the Africa Institute and a staff member of the Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.

Dr Denis Venter published book chapters on "South Africa, Brazil and South Atlantic security: Towards a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic", in S Pinheiro Guimaraes (ed), *South Africa and Brazil: Risks and opportunities in the turmoil of globalization*, Brasilia: National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, and International Relations Research Institute, 1996; and "South Africa and Africa: Relations in a time of change", in Walter Carlsnaes and Marie Muller (eds), *Change and South African external relations*, Johannesburg: International Thomson Publishing, 1997.

Staff movement

Madeline Lass (Editor, *Africa Insight*), who worked for the Institute on a contract basis, left the Institute at the end of December 1996 to take up a position with the Independent Development Trust in Cape Town. "*Africa Insight* has established a high reputation among scholars of Africa", to quote Stephen Ellis of the Afrika-Studiecentrum in Leiden, The Netherlands, and this was in large measure due to her outstanding contribution.

Other activities

Richard Cornwell was external examiner for the Honours paper in Development Studies at the Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit.

Dr Denis Venter was external examiner for the under-graduate course in African politics at the University of Natal, Durban.

African studies

New journal/series on African studies

The new **Internet Journal of African Studies** began publication

in April 1996. It is being produced by the Department of Social and Economic Studies, University of Bradford, and can be accessed at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/research/ijas/>. The August 1996 issue contained papers from the 1995 Leeds African Studies Unit Conference on *Environment and development in Africa: Challenging the orthodoxies*. For more information, contact Garry Littlejohn (e-mail: G.Littlejohn@Bradford.ac.uk) or Ray Bush (e-mail: R.C.Bush@Leeds.ac.uk).

A new **Series on Cameroon studies**, under the general editorship of E M Chilver, Shirley Ardener and Ian Fowler of Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, is being launched by Berghahn Books, Oxford. This series features historical and anthropological works on Cameroon – Africa in microcosm. Its linguistic, cultural and ecological diversity, and its historical experience of the different German, French and British regimes, provide material pertinent to the wider continent. The aim is to pool in one series the best of new works of contemporary scholars and selected re-issues of classic ethnographic texts and translations of early German exploration and missiological literature. The first two volumes in the series are: Edwin Ardener, *Kingdom on Mount Cameroon: Studies in the history of the Cameroon coast, 1500–1970*, edited and with an introduction by Shirley Ardener; and Ian Fowler and David Zeitlyn (eds), *African crossroads: Intersections between history and anthropology in Cameroon*, both published in June 1996.

A new series of concise books, **African Issues**, dedicated to debating the most pressing questions facing the continent today, has been launched by the International African Institute (in association with James Currey Publishers, Oxford), with Alex de Waal as series editor. The first three titles in the series are: Melissa Leach and Robin Mearns (eds), *The lie of the land: Challenging received wisdom on the African environment*; Joseph Hanlon, *Peace without profit: How the IMF blocks rebuilding in Mozambique*; and Paul Richards, *Fighting for the rainforest: War, youth and resources in Sierra Leone*.

Forthcoming conferences/seminars/lectures

The **Sesquicentennial Conference of Saint Xavier University, Chicago**, on the theme of "Children's rights", is to be held from 20 to 23 March 1997 in Chicago. For more information, contact Children in the World Conference Committee, Saint Xavier University, 3700 West 103rd Street, Chicago, Illinois 60655 (tel: +1 312 298-3278; fax: +1 312 298-3272; e-mail: children@sxu.edu).

The annual **Couch-Stone Symposium of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction**, on the theme "Post-modern culture, global capitalism and democratic action", will take place from 10 to 13 April 1997 at College Park, University of Maryland. For more details, contact Harvey Brown, Couch-Stone Symposium Co-ordinator, Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1315.

A **Conference of the Department of African Languages and Literature, University of Wisconsin-Madison**, on the theme "Defining the field: African language learning and teaching", will be held from 10 to 13 April 1997. For further details, contact Antonia Schleicher, Department of African Languages and Literature, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1414 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive, Madison, WI 53706-1557 (tel: +1 608 262-2487; fax: +1 608 265-4151; e-mail: ayschlei@facstaff.wisc.edu).

The **23rd Annual Conference of the African Literature Association**, on the theme "FESPA-CO nights in Michigan: African film and literature", will be held at Michigan State University from 16 to 19 April 1997. For further information, contact Kenneth W Harrow, Department of English, Morrill Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1036 (tel: +1 517 353-7243; fax: +1 517 353-3755; e-mail: harrow@pilot.msu.edu).

The **African Studies Association of the United Kingdom (ASAUK)** will be holding a symposium in London in May 1997 on the theme "The relationship between African studies in the academy and in the applied sector". For more information, contact Nici Nelson,

Department of Anthropology, Goldsmith's College, University of London, London SE14 6NW (tel: +44 171 919-7804; fax: +44 171 919-7813; e-mail: anaoinn@goldsmiths.ac.uk).

The **4th International Sudan Studies Conference** will be held from 12 to 14 June 1997 at the American University in Cairo, hosted jointly by the Sudan Studies Association (USA), the Sudan Studies Society of the UK, and the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum. For further details, contact Cyrus Reed, Office of African Studies, American University in Cairo, P O Box 2511, Cairo, Egypt (fax: +20 2 355-7565; e-mail: CREED@auc-ac.s.eun.eg).

The **3rd Biennial Meeting of the African Studies Association of South Africa (ASASA)** will take place from 16 to 18 July 1997 in the Gencor Conference Centre at Broederstroom near Johannesburg.

It has been decided that the 1997 programme should assume a character in which two types of input are invited: in the first, scholars of eminence will each be invited to convene a panel and solicit papers on a theme (within the parame-

ters of the Association's focus) that they believe has considerable contemporary academic or continental salience; in the second, members and academics more generally will be invited to submit topics of papers for consideration by the programme organizing committee relating to their particular research interests. The committee will review progress closer to the date of the conference and if it turns out that there is a convergence of themes, an appropriate overall theme may be selected.

For more information, contact the ASASA Conference Co-ordinator, c/o Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Private Bag 3, Wits 2050, South Africa; tel: +27 11 716-2765; fax +27 11 403-7482; e-mail 064NJP@cosmos.wits.ac.za.

The **Oxford International Conference on Education and Development**, on the theme of "Education and geopolitical change" and sponsored by Elsevier Science/Pergamon (in association with the UK Forum for International Education and Training), will be held at New College, University of Oxford from 11 to 15 September

1997. For more information, contact Phillipa Orme, Elsevier Science Ltd, The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1GB (tel: +44 1865 843-691; fax: +44 1865 843-958; e-mail: p.orme@elsevier.co.uk).

Fellowships

Applications for **Women in Development Fellowships and Sabbatical Opportunities** are awaited until 1 March 1997. For further information, contact WorldWID, Office of International Studies and Programs, 123 Tigert Hall, P O Box 113225, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611 (tel: +1 352 392-7074; fax: +1 352 392-8379; e-mail: wrldwid@nervm.nerdc.ufl.edu).

Applications for the **National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers** on "Nation, state and cultural pluralism" can be submitted until 1 March 1997. For more details, contact, M Crawford Young, Department of Political Science, North Hall, 1050 Bascom Mall, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 (tel: +1 608 263-2040; fax: +1 608 265-2663; e-mail: neh@polisci.wisc.edu).

Claude Ake

A TRIBUTE

It is in the course of a conversation I was having with fellow political scientist Mahmood Mamdani – who recently took up a Chair in African Studies at the University of Cape Town – that I learned of the sudden and untimely death of Claude Ake, one of 142 passengers and crew of the ADC Airlines plane that crashed shortly before landing at Lagos Airport outbound from Port Harcourt on 7 November 1996. Claude was arguably one of the most brilliant, original and prolific of the new generation of African political scientists who emerged to prominence in the seventies. A product of Columbia University – yet firmly grounded in his Ogoni traditional society – he was one of the first scholars to openly challenge the conventional wisdom of modernization theory, which was then the undisputed paradigm in African studies and to propose instead a bold and innovative political economy approach for a better understanding of Africa's chronic economic, political and social crisis. A kind of intellectual testament, his latest book, *Democracy and development in Africa* (Brookings Institution, 1996) is assuredly destined to become a classic.

Not surprisingly, over the last ten years, Claude and I kept bumping into each other at various meetings of African social science organizations in

which we were both actively involved, principally the African Association of Political Science (AAPS), and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Codesria). Claude's presidency of Codesria's Council shall certainly be remembered as one of the most dynamic and innovative in the short life of the organization, which, under his inspiring leadership, launched a series of major research networks on social movements, ethnicity, democratization and gender in Africa. Again, we found ourselves together in New York in 1990–1991, him as visiting professor at Columbia, me as senior fellow at the International Peace Academy, and we briefly worked together on the IPA's Africa programme. When I left the IPA to take up a temporary position at The American University in Washington, DC in the Fall of 1991, I owed it, once again, to Claude, who had declined an offer to take up that same position to start his own *Centre for Advanced Social Science* (CASS) in his native Port Harcourt.

Perhaps better than anything else, this move exemplifies Claude's utmost professional integrity and profound moral rectitude, as well as his total and selfless commitment to the advancement of social science in Africa. Declining many lucrative offers from pres-

tigious academic institutions in the United States and elsewhere – or even occasional offers of lobbying on behalf of discredited African governments – Claude considered it his sacred duty to work in Africa to the development of the third generation of African (specifically Nigerian) academics. He did so first as professor, then Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Port Harcourt, and later as head of CASS. He literally died in their service. Africa has undoubtedly lost one of its intellectual luminaries and a world-class scholar. Claude Ake's sudden and untimely death will leave a void that is unlikely to be filled any time soon. May his memory and spirit live on, possibly through a *Claude Ake Chair* and/or a *Claude Ake Memorial Lecture* at a major African university, or through *Claude Ake Research Fellowships* for deserving young African scholars sponsored by a prominent African social science organization such as AAPS, Codesria or the SAPES (Southern Africa Political Economy Series) Trust.

Guy Martin, Professor of Political Science

Clark Atlanta University, Atlanta, and University of the Western Cape, Cape Town

AFRICA INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA

(Company registration number 61/00002/08)



- An independent non-profit association, the Africa Institute has established itself as an internationally recognized research and information centre concerned with African affairs.
- The Institute's mission is to collect, process, interpret and disseminate information on African and especially Southern African affairs. It focuses primarily on the political, economic, international and developmental issues facing contemporary Africa.
- Information is made available through publications, a specialized reference library, conferences and non-Institute media. A small research staff answer enquiries and provide comment on topical developments. Apart from their regular studies, the researchers undertake commissioned research.
- In addition to its own researchers, the Institute appoints associates in the field of African studies, runs a programme for visiting researchers, and conducts seminars and workshops. While serving the public as a whole (both professional and lay), the Institute devotes particular attention to educational institutions as well as decision-makers in the business and public sectors.
- The Institute was established in 1960 and is controlled by a council composed of representatives of the South African universities and other experts. Because it therefore has a broad-based academic character, the Institute is funded mainly through a grant from the Department of National Education.

Membership

Membership of the Institute is open to everyone who supports its aims and functions, and entails the following advantages:

- Receipt of *Africa Insight* (incorporating *AI Bulletin*)
- Discount on *other Institute publications*
- Access to the reference library
- Consultation with professional staff
- Invitations to conferences
- Participation in Annual General Meetings

Membership fees

Individuals and schools: South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R80 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US\$40 or equivalent, per annum)

Institutional membership: (*Academic bodies, libraries, governmental and non-governmental organizations and embassies*) South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R200 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US\$100 or equivalent, per annum)

Corporate and donor membership: (*Companies and organizations not included under individual or institutional membership*) South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R500 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US\$250 or equivalent, per annum)

Reference library

The library holdings, consisting of some 60 000 books and many thousands of periodical articles, are indexed on computer. In addition, newspaper and periodical articles on current African affairs, supplemented by an international news service, are kept on readily accessible country and subject files. The library is open to members and students on weekdays from 08:00–16:00, and on Saturdays by appointment from 9:00–12:00.

Institute publications

Africa Insight (incorporating *AI Bulletin*); (quarterly)

Africa at a Glance (two-yearly)

Irregular series of research and occasional papers

Subscription to Africa Insight

Africa Insight is also available on subscription to non-members.

Annual rate for South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland: R70 per annum (VAT *included*). (Elsewhere: US\$35 or equivalent).

Overseas airmail rate: US\$80 or equivalent.

Single copies (also back copies) available at R20 or US\$10 outside South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia & Swaziland.

Application for membership/subscription to Africa Insight

The Secretary
Africa Institute of South Africa
Box 630
0001 PRETORIA

I/We support the objectives of the *Africa Institute* and undertake to pay the annual membership for individual/institutional/corporate/donor members. I/We wish to subscribe to *Africa Insight*.

Enclosed herewith the amount of being the membership/subscription fee for the first year.

Surname Title and initials

Organization*

Postal address**

Postal code

Signature..... Date

* Institutional/corporate/donor members only

** The postal address must be exactly as you wish it to appear on the Institute's mailing list.

Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by Africa Institute of South Africa

