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
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
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Democratization and the liberal paradigm in Africa



Professor Goran Hyden



The global wave of democratization that has swept Africa along in the 1990s has been largely based on the premises of the liberal paradigm. It includes all the features that are typically associated with democracy in the West. It has virtually become "the only game in town". Progress at the global level is being measured in terms of how well individual countries perform according to liberal democratic indicators, whether these are provided by the Washington-based Freedom House, or any other competing think-tank controlled data base. While this notion that every country is now participating in the same game has its charms "and maybe also some practical political payoffs" there is also a risk inherent in this tendency, notably the pressure to make countries comply regardless of the socio-economic or political conditions prevailing there. Nowhere is this risk greater than in sub-Saharan Africa where dependency on external powers is particularly high.

The purpose of this commentary is to look at the political legacy of the majority of African countries and assess the experience to date of efforts to bring to the continent a greater dose of liberal democracy. It will end by discussing some measures that may deserve greater attention in the future if the liberal paradigm is going to stand a chance of taking root in Africa.

The legacy of the weak state

One of the recurrent themes in the study of African development has been the weakness of the state in these countries. In the early days after independence this was typically identified in terms of shortage of trained manpower or low "absorptive capacity".

Over the years, however, this problem has been redefined as political: an unwillingness on the part of government ministers to respect legal and rational principles underpinning a functioning state.

It is not surprising that the state came to play a particularly important role in managing development after independence in Africa. The latter had been achieved by nationalists gaining control of the principal instruments of colonial rule – the state. Africans were used from colonial days to seeing the state as hegemonic and serving the interest of those in power. It became an almost instinctive reaction when they came to power, therefore, to consolidate control of their countries by promoting the growth of the state. The colonial rulers had used the state only sparingly for the purpose of fostering social and economic development. For them, it was first and foremost a means of upholding law and order. After independence, however, the general expectation both in Africa and elsewhere was that the state would serve a constructive role also in development. African leaders had an interest in demonstrating to their followers that the post-colonial state would be different.

This emphasis on "developmentalism" among African leaders, which was also broadly shared by the international community, meant that this popular end got used to justify virtually any means. African leaders used it to accelerate "indigenization" or "Africanization" of the public services, thus opening up the phenomenon which in subsequent years has been referred to as patronage politics, ie giving jobs to those who support you or are related to you. They also used it to muzzle the opposition. To speak out against government policy was not just heresy; it

was tantamount to treason. Foreign governments that supported African countries with foreign aid were no better. They tended to support African rulers regardless of what they did either because they had a national interest in doing so or because they naively respected the principle of state sovereignty and therefore refrained from critical comments on the way these leaders ruled.

Since the 1980s, there has been a change of tune. Not only has the international community ceased regarding the state as engine of development. Africans themselves have come to realize the limitations inherent in the state-centred strategy. A particularly powerful critique has come from intellectuals associated with the continent's own social science research council "Codesria", based in Dakar. Much of this has focused on the dysfunctional role of the state. It started off with a critique of its capricious behaviour in the human rights area and has more recently been extended to such issues as the criminalization of the state. Common to these concerns and others expressed by many institutions around the continent is the corrupt nature of the state. The state may be an instrument of sustaining oneself in power, but it does not serve the objectives associated with a legally and rationally constituted public institution.

Since the democratization wave first hit Africa in a significant way in 1990, this weakness in the African state has been primarily attributed to the monopolization of power under the aegis of the one-party system or the military junta. In other words, it was the absence of a critical voice that contributed to the institutional atrophy that came to characterize the public realm in African countries. Now that we have

a few years of experience with competitive, multi-party politics, it is time to examine this issue again. What difference to governance has the attempt to politically liberalize African countries really made?

The re-communalization of African politics

While one must be sensitive to the viewpoint that democratization is a long-term project, it is nonetheless possible to discern a few things that should serve as signals of where Africa may be heading as the democratization wave continues to sweep over the continent. Foremost of these is the communalization or re-communalization of African politics.

This manifests itself, among other things, in political parties becoming increasingly identified with a particular ethnic group or alliance of such groups. Those making up the new political opposition are typically representatives of groups that had a marginal or vulnerable position in the previous one-party setup. Their calculation has been that chances of having access to state power and resources would be greater if they were to break away, form their own party, and try to win the presidency and enough seats in the legislature. This calculation proved successful only in the case of Zambia in the 1991 election, when an alliance of 'northern' and 'western' groups defeated Mr Kaunda after he had lost his ability to serve as a successful patron for all. It was a partial success in Malawi where groups that had been marginalized under Banda's dictatorial rule got a chance to gain control of state power. It failed, however, in countries like Kenya and Tanzania. The Kikuyus and the Luos in Kenya were unable to unseat Moi, to a large extent because of internal squabbling. Although the picture was somewhat more complicated in Tanzania, because ethnicity has never had such salience in politics there, the attempt by the leading opposition candidate, Mr Mrema, to win the presidential election in 1995 fell short because he could not mobilize enough support outside his 'ethnic core', the Chagga and related groups in northern Tanzania.

Multi-party elections in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s have euphemistically been referred to as 'census' elections, the argument being that the ethnic map of the country is very closely reflected in the pattern of voting. Communalism, as Patrick Chabal has

argued, implies that political representation must be through someone from one's own community. Only an insider can be held accountable. Similarly, only an insider can be counted upon to deliver public goods and services. This way of reasoning has been reinforced by the logic of multi-party elections.

The consequence of this tendency is that the liberal paradigm, which served as justification for such elections in the first place, is being threatened. Competitive elections have polarized many African countries and exacerbated the inclination to treat politics as a zero-sum game, in which the winner takes all and the loser gets nothing. The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) is one recent example of where the liberal democratic political dispensation could not be sustained. Many other countries, such as Kenya and Zambia, have manifested the same symptoms.

The importance of constitution making

The point I am trying to make here is not that Africans should abandon the liberal paradigm but that, based on the experience in the first half of the 1990s, there is reason to see whether there are other ways of bringing it about. Multi-party elections, as suggested above, have not proved to be the "founding event" that so many analysts and supporters of democratization had hoped. One experience that is worth more attention is that of countries which decided that a broad-based constitutional review process is a prerequisite for introducing a liberal version of democracy. These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Africa and Uganda.

Top-level representatives with leading roles in the constitution-making process in these countries shared their experience with participants from other countries in eastern and southern Africa at a workshop organized earlier this year by the Africa Institute. The various papers presented at the workshop will be published in an edited volume in 1998. In the meantime, it may be worth indicating some of its findings. One is that the constitution-making process provided an opportunity for people to understand what democratization really implies. Secondly, it allowed people to acquire a sense of ownership of the democratic project. Thirdly, it brought people together across ethnic boundaries. Fourthly, the exercise helped legitimize both regime

and government. Although each country ran into certain difficulties in realizing the full objectives of democratization, there is little doubt that these countries have laid a stronger foundation for the longer-term realization of a liberal form of democracy than countries which 'rushed' into holding competitive elections without having gone through a broad-based constitutional reform process.

South Africa and the liberal paradigm

Finally, a few comments about South Africa. The liberal paradigm has stronger roots here than in other African countries, as demonstrated by the fact, for example, that communalization is treated as a policy issue in the name of affirmative action. No other African country has thought of dealing with the consequences of inequity in distribution of opportunities and benefits in these terms. It seems that "affirmative action" becomes an acceptable concept only when such inequities are between racial categories of people and when policy-makers can handle it within a liberal discourse.

Other African countries never had to really consider affirmative action, because the white rulers, including administrators, left at independence. Africanization in that context was not a contentious issue. Dealing with this problem in South Africa is likely to prove much more sensitive, because those who are being replaced under affirmative action policies are other South Africans, categorized as whites, coloureds, and Indians. It has the potential of becoming more controversial than in the United States, since those who are being favoured by affirmative action are not a minority but a majority. Giving jobs to an increasing number of black South Africans, therefore, does not imply tinkering with appointments only in the margins of public and private corporations but really at the very core of their personnel establishment.

How South Africa will be able to handle this issue in the years ahead is likely to have important repercussions for both its economic prosperity and the future of the liberal paradigm in this country. Given the position South Africa has in the world as a beacon for the rest of Africa, it is likely to bear also on the extent to which the current threats to the liberal paradigm in other African countries may be reduced.

Conflict in Sudan

The Peace Agreement of April 1997

Heather Deegan, of Middlesex University, London, explores the context in which the Sudanese Peace Agreement was signed on 21 April 1997, in Khartoum.

Over the past months Colonel John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has gained a stronger military position in a civil war that has raged, apart from a brief respite during the Jaafar Nimeiri period, since 1955. The conflict is estimated to have cost 1.3 million lives. A Peace Agreement was signed on 21 April 1997 between the Sudanese government, under the leadership of President el-Bashir, and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), comprising the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Equatoria Defense Force and the South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG). Although the Agreement does not include the government's chief opponents, the SPLA, or the leader of the exiled Umma Party, El-Sadiq el-Mahdi, it does outline a number of political issues which, if resolved, could provide the basis for a move towards conflict resolution.

Ethnicity and religion are seen as integral factors in the war: a predominantly Arab-African, Muslim north against an animist or Christian black African south.¹ Certainly ethnicity and religion are major contemporary factors, but their origins are historic. The 1962 Missionary Act prevented the spread of Islam to the south of the country and forged a religious tension within the country. By 1983 and with the institution of *sharia* law, tensions were exacerbated. From that time, State Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Roric believes, minority rights became confused with religious rights.² Yet it would be erroneous to generalize about the conflict in such terms as "the North-South Conflict", or "Islam versus Christianity", or "Arabism versus Africanism".³ In Sudan, the issues of nation formation, regionalism, ethnicity, religion and economic justice "have been left to accumulate over time, without being resolved".⁴ Inevitably, religion becomes more complicated

when involved in politics, although Foreign Minister Roric manages to carry out his dual roles of Christian Bishop and Foreign Minister separately and without apparent contradiction.⁵ Roric believes the conflict must be resolved through a process of negotiation. This raises the question of finding legitimate and effective strategies that can be identified as such by the parties to the dispute.

An attempt was made by the United Nations General Assembly in 1992 to develop new international norms under a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.⁶ The Declaration expected states to adopt appropriate legislative or other measures to protect the existence of minorities within their territories and to encourage conditions for the promotion of their identity. It also recognized the right of persons belonging to minorities to participate fully in decisions that affected them. The Declaration was not a legally binding document, and carried a moral force only. The United Nations is limited and overloaded in terms of what it can deliver. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has a conflict resolution unit which has discussed the war in Sudan but the structure of the OAU is problematic, with too few people involved and too few meetings taking place. The divide between the political, military and logistical spheres further inhibits its work. For such an organization to be effective it would need constant dissemination of information and consultation between member states, both of which require resources and efficient administration. Attempts have to be made to create a national culture within Sudan that is capable of uniting ethnic, regional and religious forms of identity. This also requires the construction of political structures strong enough to withstand parochial or primordial demands, yet at the same time flexible enough to allow for popular participation. Although Foreign Minis-

ter Roric concedes that international support can at times be instrumental in acting the role of a conciliatory mediator, it is important that undue pressure should not be exerted.⁷ President Bashir maintains that his government is committed to finding a lasting solution to the conflict under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative which began in 1993. The IGAD initiative involved several of the countries bordering Sudan: Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, but no real peace breakthrough has been achieved in recent years, partly because of the deteriorating relationship between Sudan and other IGAD member states. However, at an IGAD meeting in Nairobi in July 1997, the Sudanese government accepted a declaration of principles which it hoped would provide the basis for further peace negotiations, although the SPLA were not present. The April Peace Agreement was presented as documentary evidence of the adoption of comprehensive principles which could meet the aspirations of all the people in southern Sudan. President Nelson Mandela was called upon to exert his influence in calling for a cease-fire. It seems clear that any peace process in Sudan is unlikely to succeed without cordial relations between Sudan and its IGAD neighbours.

The civil war is essentially concerned with two fundamental issues: firstly, the identity of the Sudanese state and secondly, the question of who gains control over the natural resources of the south. Because of the area's reserves of oil, hardwoods and minerals and vast tracts of unexploited land, the economic potential of the south has been seen as the key objective for all parties. Yet ethnic diversity is complex in Sudan. The 1996 census reported a population of 27 million people; according to an earlier census conducted in 1955/56, the only one that included ethnic origin, there are 19 major ethnic groups. These groups can be further divided into 597 smaller

sub-groupings, speaking over 100 different languages. Around 60% of the population are Muslim; 15% are Christian and the remainder adhere to traditional religions.⁸ The demographic composition has altered through years of civil war and ecological disaster, but one of the important aspects of the April 1997 Peace Agreement is that it attempts to address some of these socio-ethnic imbalances through its federal structure.


Table 1 Main ethnic groups in Sudan

| | |
|---------------|------|
| Arabs | 59% |
| Northerners | 30% |
| West Darfur | 9% |
| Beja | 6% |
| West Africans | 6% |
| Haba | 6% |
| Nubians | 4% |
| Furj | 1,7% |

Source: 1993/96 Population Census, Sudan.

The Peace Agreement, April 1997

The general principles contained in the peace agreement signed on 21 April 1997 aim to attain a "just and lasting peace". The document declares that "only a sustainable peace based on justice, equality, democracy and freedom can lead to a meaningful development and progress which would assist in the solution of the fundamental problems of the people of Sudan."⁹



Concerning the basic issue of the relationship between religion and the state, the agreement states that

Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. Islam is

the religion of the majority of the population and Christianity and the African creeds are followed by a considerable number of citizens. Nevertheless, the basis of rights and duties shall be citizenship, and all Sudanese shall equally share in all aspects of

Republic of Sudan

Independence: 1 January 1956, former Anglo-Egyptian condominium.

National Day: 1 January (Independence Day)

Leader: Pies Omar Hassan al-Bashir (1993, since 1989)

Capital: Khartoum (largest city (International airport))

Other major towns: Port Sudan (main seaport)

Area: 2 505 813 km²

Population: 29 m (1995)

Population growth: 2,7 %

Urbanization: 25 %

Languages: Arabic (official), English and Nilotic languages (southern Sudan).

HDI rank: 158

Life expectancy at birth: 51 years.

Adult literacy rate: 45 %

Gross enrolment ratio (all educational levels): 31 % (1994)

GNP: \$10 100 mn (1991).

GNP/capita: \$390 (1991), latest data.

Currency: Sudanese pound (Sd) 1\$ = 50(1440.11996)

Radio sets per 1000 persons: 258 (1994)

TV sets per 100 persons: 2 (1994)

Background

Sudan's territory is the largest in Africa and its 29 million population more or less as big as those of Algeria, Morocco, Kenya and Tanzania. Sudanese society is culturally among the most diverse in Africa and it

steadily divided into a Muslim north (and centre) and a non-Muslim south, where both Christianity and traditional ethnic beliefs have firm adherents.

Measuring over 2 000 km from south to north and more than 1 500 km across its broadest part, Sudan consists largely of low-lying land, dissected by the Nile River and its great tributaries, the White and the Blue Nile, which join at Khartoum to form the main river. The Blue Nile, rising in Ethiopia's mountains, flows through the heart of Sudan and is utilized for vast irrigation schemes south of Khartoum. The White Nile forms the Sudd Swamps south of the river part of Malakal, which marks the natural border between the well-watered south and the semi-arid, but agriculturally most productive central region. North of Khartoum, annual rainfall becomes minimal and the landscape turns into what is known as the Nubian Desert.

Most people live in central Sudan and along the Nile and its tributaries. The major concentration of population is in and around the triple cities of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, which has some 2,5 million inhabitants. Port Sudan, on the Red Sea, is the second largest urban area (over 200 000 inhabitants), while Juba (over 80 000 inhabitants) is the largest town in the south.

About one-third of this vast country is suitable for some form of agriculture, but only about 10% of the arable land is utilized. Cotton is by far the most important export product, followed by sesame seed, sorghum, groundnuts and gum arabic. Livestock and livestock products are important foreign exchange earners too. Mining activities are of minor importance, though substantial oil reserves exist in the south. As a result of the war, only a fraction of this is extracted at present.

Continued on page 166

Dying to go to school

Ashley Shearar

"Dying to go to School" is an exhibition of artwork, music and stories by children affected by armed conflict and displacement in southern Sudan, illustrating their courageous journey across their land in search of education and celebrating the strength of the young survivors. The exhibition was hosted in seven venues around South Africa in 1997.

Not long ago I was sitting on a log in a newly established camp for displaced persons in one of the most hidden corners of the world, in southern Sudan. I was interviewing a twelve-year-old unaccompanied boy in an attempt to begin tracing his family. Finally I asked him to list all the places he had been to since he had left home, five years before. By the time he had reached the end of his list he had cited seventeen places.

When I asked the boy what his reasons were for leaving home he said that he had left because of the war ... and in search of education.

In southern Sudan around 20 000 unaccompanied children have become displaced. Their movement started in the early years of the war with a mass exodus of young boys between the ages of five and eighteen towards refugee camps which were being set up along the borders of Ethiopia. After an agreement between the main rebel faction and the Ethiopian government at the time, they had been persuaded that they would find security and schooling. They forfeited the protection of their families and the traditions of their homes for the sake of education.

During their journey, which was for the most part barefoot across miles of swampland, hardened cotton soil and desert, from areas as far away as northern Bahr-el-Gazal, the children of the south were exposed to incredible hardships. Hundreds died crossing the rivers. Others were attacked by wild animals hiding in the forests and in the wilderness, or caught in the crossfire of battles or directly targeted by frenzied militia. Hundreds more died of hunger, thirst and disease. Not one was exempt from suffering. And those who did survive these treacherous obstacles and managed to reach Ethiopia were only faced with the shock of discovering that the schools which they had been dying to reach were not schools where they could learn how to read and write, but military training centres. Only the most vulnerable of

the survivors, those who were too weak to fight, or fell below the average age of eleven or twelve, would be given a token education which would equip them with basic literacy and numeracy. They were the lucky ones — until the fall of the existing regime in Ethiopia, when hostilities flared up between their hosts and the refugees, violently forcing them back into their still insecure land, scattering thousands amidst the chaos. Since then splintered groups of children have been moving without direction, but never without hope, in their search for education. Aerial views show pockets of unaccompanied minors spread out in sparse camps for the displaced, or within the borders, or in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, or lines of children moving to find a place to settle where they might at last fulfil their dreams.

A select few have managed to return to their homes and to their families, some by retracing their journey on foot, others with the help of organized airlifts and family reunification programmes set up by concerned NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) including the ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross), Unicef (United Nations Children's Fund) and Radda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children).

I began working in southern Sudan in February 1995. I had been summoned to a family reunification programme, set up jointly by Unicef and Radda Barnen, where my initial responsibility was to follow up a group of reunified children in villages around Western Upper Nile. I knew little then about the children of southern Sudan. The background to the ongoing civil war, which has been largely unpublicized in the outside world, was quite unfamiliar to me, despite my vain attempts to gather as much information as possible from bookstores, libraries and newspapers around South Africa before embarking on my journey. However, I realized once I was there that southern Sudan is something of a "no-entry zone" for media and tourists.

The lack of infrastructure, development and technology and the generally harsh environmental conditions (fluctuating between floods during the 6-8 month rainy season, and droughts during the remaining dry season), have made it almost inaccessible to foreigners, other than those who have been recruited as aid workers (most of whom operate, as I did, under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan's Southern Sector).

My first encounter with the children was in a village near the centre of Western Upper Nile called Leer. I walked over to a group of small boys who were spinning an old, dry shell on the hard clay ground like a top. In the distance I heard the rhythmic beating of an African drum, blended with the jubilant pitch of young voices. Hypnotized by my new environment, I followed the sound of the music until I reached a group of young boys and girls, singing and dancing around the drum. Before I knew it, I found myself in their circle. Despite their virtually naked, weightless bodies, I was overcome by their overwhelming sense of joy and unity.

I was flattered by my warm welcome, but was also somewhat confused, as these children seemed nothing like the deeply traumatized victims I had been expecting. I was sure that they could not be within my target group.

However, when we later started the standard interviews for the follow-up of reunified children, I found that most of the children I had met around the drum were amongst them. As the interviews, however, focused mainly on how the children were coping since their return, they offered very little insight into their past experiences. When asked very generally about their experiences as part of the interview, the children matter-of-factly mentioned attack, disease, thirst, drowning and wild animals; the facts rolled off my pen without much thought as to what lay behind each of them. This disturbed me; I felt that although I was working

more and more closely with these children, I had little understanding of what they had gone through.

This is where expression therapy began to bridge the gap. It started as part of our joint follow-up programme as a way of helping the children to overcome their distress through various means of creative expression such as art, music and drama, allowing them to release the burden of their memories in a less painful way than openly and directly speaking about them. Without any lessons, the children who joined the programme were given paper and crayons and asked to draw some of their experiences. As they began returning the drawings and describing their content, I was jolted into realization. Totally absorbed by each one, I felt myself being guided through the horrors, like the woman with bound hands and the soldier's gun pointed at her back. Bodies mutilated by lions, wading into colourless shells from hunger and illness, shattering under bomb-blasts, dislocated by gun-shots, decaying whilst being feasted on by vultures, raped at knife point — each are recurring themes in many of the drawings.

However, also present in most of the drawings is the image of a young child holding a school book, a constant reminder of how they have never lost sight of their goal. Suddenly the empty words from the initial interviews took on meaning. For the first time I could reconcile the image of the children around the drum with the same children in the various contexts of the drawings. From then on I found it much easier to encourage them to speak directly about their experiences and tell their stories.

For the children who have returned, fighting their memories is a constant battle. No matter how much they may take their past for granted, they are still aware of its pain — a suffering which they believe those they have returned to cannot comprehend. They seek support from each other, laugh and play and sing in groups but, as Gabriel Makoué told me with a fading grin, "When I am with the others it is okay, I don't worry ... but when I am alone, it is like I am back there in the desert".

Even more forlorn are those who have not returned home, some in over ten years. The mention of a local village in the "minor's section" of the refugee camp will bring children flocking around with questions and letters to be taken back to their families to let them know that they are still alive. The small huts which they have built themselves are decorated with

tattered posters bearing their most cherished subscript from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child — "All children have the right to a family". At night they group around small fires, singing softly, "Oh my home. Oh my home, when shall I see my home again ... my mother is there, my father is there, my brother is there, my sister is there. When shall I see my beautiful home? I shall never forget my home", the words evoking different images and perceptions in each of their minds. But if you ask them if they have heard from their parents, common responses are, "No, my parents were killed during the cattle raid", "My family all died of Rab-azar" (also known as Leishmaniasis or the black plague — a fatal disease which wiped out entire families in the Upper Nile from the mid- to late 1980s), "My father died in battle", "I lost them during a bombing when we all scattered, I don't know, maybe they are still alive".

Nevertheless, many are certain that home is better than where they are now. They no longer want to be refugees — especially those who reside in the largest minor's camp, situated in Kakuma, a settlement in the "dust bowl" along the northern border of Kenya. With the halving of their food rations towards the middle of last year, which now allows them only the bare minimum for survival (without accounting for the general woe endured by the average refugee), children are now looking for an opportunity to get out. If they cannot make it back home, they will seek any alternative. Some have even found ways of getting as far as South Africa and Egypt, others are willing to join armies and die in battle if they must.

I recall an occasion when a young, reunited boy, John Thaker, described his particular journey. After speaking of the deaths from hunger, attacks by wild animals which mauled his friends in front of him, wallowing for days through the relentless desert past the bones of his predecessors, losing direction, fighting disease, he hesitated and said, "We became very, very ...". He paused to search for a word, while I tried to think of adjectives which could fill the gap, like "angry", "frustrated", "exhausted"; finally with a sigh of relief he finished with "... patient people."

Today their struggle continues. Whether reunited with their families, displaced within their borders or trapped as refugees in a foreign land, these children, who are more than mere survivors, exemplify hope as they join hands to conquer the horrors of their past, the desperation of their present and the uncertainty of their future.



Continued from page 165

life and political responsibilities on the basis of citizenship.¹⁰

Table 2 outlines the other clauses included:

Table 2 Religion and the state

- The freedom of religion, belief and worship shall be guaranteed.
- A suitable atmosphere shall be maintained for practising, worship and preaching.
- No citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion.
- There shall be no legislation that would adversely affect the religious rights of any citizen.
- *Sharia* and Custom (African traditional law) shall be the sources of legislation.

Source: The Sudan Peace Agreement, Khartoum, April 1997

The status of *sharia* is arguably the most contentious constitutional issue and its repeal has continually been called for by the SPLA as a conditional step if negotiations are to take place between the SPLA and the government. On the crucial issue of *sharia*, the parties to the April agreement decided on a complex formula. Laws of a general nature that were based on general principles common to the states would apply at the national level, provided that the states had the right to enact any complementary federal legislation on matters peculiar to them. In other words, *sharia* would not be abandoned at national level but it was not to intrude into the governance of the regions. The states would have powers which they could exercise on matters designated as falling within their jurisdiction, including the development of customary law.¹¹ In the opinion of Foreign Minister Roric, the "rights of all people in the country should be respected".¹² It was appropriate, therefore, that the Agreement should include a section devoted to Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.

As Table 3 illustrates, the terms of the rights and freedoms accorded to every person are wide-reaching and would not be out of place in a liberal democracy. Yet Hasan Turabi asserts that the emphasis in the Sudanese model of Islam is on "rights and obligations" in which there is no coercion but equally "no freedom of will in the Western sense".¹³ So perhaps it is unwise to read too much of the precise Westernized understandings of certain words such as *freedom* into such a document. Having said that, however, it is important to acknowledge that the Agreement refers to the need for immu-

Table 3 Fundamental rights and freedoms

- Under the concept of the rule of law the following basic human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed:
- the right to life and the inviolability of the human person
 - the right to equal treatment irrespective of gender, race, colour, religion or origin
 - the right to family life and privacy
 - the right to freedom of thought and conscience
 - the right to property
 - freedom of expression
 - freedom of movement
 - freedom of the press
 - freedom of association and assembly as shall be regulated by the law
 - immunity from arbitrary arrest, detention and torture
 - freedom of religious worship, preaching, proselytization and religious propagation.
 - freedom of expression and development of cultures and languages.

Source: The Sudan Peace Agreement, Khartoum April 1997

nity from arbitrary arrest, detention and torture, all of which are widely recognized as the by-products of conflict and violence. All sides in the dispute have been accused of violating the basic human rights of local populations.

The relationship between religious identity, citizenship and the state is critical. Particularly significant is the idea of religious freedom based on the principle that affords the individual not only the right to choose for himself/herself but also to protection against any compulsion. In a sense, this right grants the general population individual freedom. It also represents a commitment on the part of both the state and organizations within civil society to ensure and enhance political rights. Sudan's political system has organized structures and processes of decision-making. The National Congress meets every two years and groups are invited to attend. There are multi-layered elections of individuals at the constituency level, and then at council, provincial, state and national levels. There are 50 000 candidates in the National Congress, which operates a pyramid structure of representation. In order to be eligible to stand as a candidate, a person must be 18 years of age and a Sudanese citizen. Dr Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, the Secretary-General to the Congress, describes the system as containing the "bare rudiments of a democratic system".¹⁴ The Western pluralist model is seen as too divisive but the Sudanese system does involve a range of representatives: trade unions, profes-

sional associations, tribal chiefs and so on, who tend to become involved at state level. Ideas can be individualistic without party discipline but this structure is regarded as more democratic than previous governments with political parties which "were never representative".¹⁵ The National Assembly has 400 seats, 125 of which are filled by using the quota system and 275 elected directly by eligible voters, who have to be Sudanese nationals resident in a constituency but not in rebel areas. Outside those strictures anyone can stand as a candidate and there are now no fees required as in the past. The 125 seats based on quotas represent groups which include Women, Lawyers, Diplomats, Trade Unions, Intellectuals/Cultural and Social and the Military (Regular Forces). In February 1997 there were 14 female parliamentary candidates and 60 non-Muslim representatives in the National Assembly. Members have a four-year term of office.¹⁶

Table 4 Democracy

- Participatory democracy shall be realized through National congresses.
- In promotion of participatory democracy the congresses and national convention shall be organized:
 - (i) to accommodate forums for all citizens
 - (ii) to discourage all forms of intolerance and totalitarianism
- The parties to this Agreement shall be guaranteed full participation in the political and constitutional processes in Sudan.

Source: The Sudan Peace Agreement, Khartoum, April 1997

One cause of conflict within the country has been identified as regional inequity with regard to the distribution of "productive assets, and educational, health and social services".¹⁷ The Peace Agreement contains a section dealing with wealth-sharing, one clause of which states:

The federal government shall lay down a comprehensive economic and social plan to develop the country in general and to bridge the gap between the various states in particular, so that within a definite period, a parity in provision of basic needs such as security, employment, water, food, education, health and housing could be reached.

In order to consolidate the economic policies, Sudan's economy is moving towards a free market focus, with the Federal Bank assuming responsibility for regulating the internal and external value of the Sudanese currency. Hassan Turabi refers to the country's privatizing economy as one which aims to be more effi-

Table 5 The remit of the Coordinating Council

- to assist, repatriate, resettle and rehabilitate the displaced and the returnees;
- to reconstruct the war-devastated areas;
- to remove obstacles of war by clearing mine-fields, opening up roads and waterways;
- to promote reconciliation, peace and confidence building amongst the Southern citizens;
- to draw development plans for the Southern States and solicit funds from national, regional and international bodies and institutions for implementation of the Peace Agreement;
- to draw a political transition plan to strengthen peace and unity in different parts of the country;
- to strengthen the federal role in the Southern States;
- to reassemble and train manpower in order to re-establish the public service in the Southern States;
- to strengthen the capacity building of the people in the Southern States to become self-reliant. In this regard plans shall be drawn to receive support for vocational, health, food security and social services institutions;
- to educate and mobilize the people of Southern Sudan on the process of referendum;
- to provide adequate security in the Southern States in order to create a conducive atmosphere for the referendum;
- to participate in referendum exercises in the Southern States;
- to assist in registering voters for the referendum.

Source: The Sudan Peace Agreement, Khartoum, April 1997

erient, and a Stock Exchange has been established by ex-Finance Minister and former Baraka Bank employee, Abdel Rahim Hamdi.¹⁵ An emphasis is now placed on the productivity of farmers and agricultural improvement and the government has given the production of food for domestic and regional consumption priority status. Women are encouraged to cultivate their land, grow food and exchange and barter in cooperative stores. As women become more productive in home agricultural pursuits such as growing food, keeping chickens and so on, large-scale acreage can be devoted to growing cash crops which earn foreign currency through exports. Women are being given incentives to adopt this scheme, which emphasizes a grassroots approach, and the International Muslim Women's Union believes it will be successful in developing regional production.¹⁶ Agriculture is regarded as the motor for the economy and it is

hoped the country will achieve self-sufficiency as regards food.¹⁷

The country, however, faces difficulties in looking towards an expansion of its productive base when previous productivity has been low. The lack of basic commodities such as petrol holds back efficient production. In addition, there have been major problems in gaining foreign investment since the Gulf War and the country's deteriorating relationship with the IMF. Sudan looks to the Middle East, China and Malaysia to provide external funding, but that may not be quite so readily forthcoming now that the economies of south east Asia are in trouble.¹⁸ More generally, some Sudanese commentators suggest that liberalizing the economy is undesirable and may fuel "old fears of ethnic exclusion from positions of power and wealth". As El-Battahari cautions: "The government must be cautious in its privatization programme. Otherwise disposing of commercial enterprises will give undue advantage to capital-rich, better-positioned and well-established Northern merchants and industrialists whom, rightly or wrongly, non-Northerners in the South, East and West consider to be responsible for their economic miseries and whom they eye with a lot of suspicion and jealousy."¹⁹ The Peace Agreement has recognized that development projects are crucially important in "promoting and maintaining peace and stability among the people of Sudan."²⁰ Major federal development projects and large mining and oil projects are to be considered as national wealth and managed on that basis, provided that the regions participate in the management of those projects and that recruitment and training of local people take place. The Agreement also allows for a Revenue Allocation Commission to be established which would recommend a revenue-sharing formula for the whole country. Less-developed regions would be given priority in the establishment of projects and the effect of the project on the basic needs of the area would be taken into account. A balanced relationship between development, density of population and the environment must be established.²¹ As regards the rehabilitation of the war-affected areas, the federal government and the Coordinating Council (the body which will oversee the Agreement's arrangements) intend to attract loans and aid from regional and international sources in order to reconstruct war-affected areas and resettle returnees or displaced persons. Although the Agreement is for an interim

period of four years, it can be shortened or lengthened according to recommendations from the Coordinating Council. The remit of the Council is broad, as Table 5 demonstrates.

The Coordinating Council is responsible for supervision, socio-economic planning, confidence building, peace nurturing, policy making, administration and political mobilization. It is accountable to President el-Bashir and provides a link between the government and the Southern states.²² In terms of the Council's legislative functions, it has the authority to request adjournment of any legislation tabled in the National Assembly which it deems may adversely affect the interests of the Southern States, until such time as the Council itself presents its opinion. This ability actually provides the Council with a degree of power and legitimacy. Nevertheless, in order for it to be viewed as non-partisan and impartial, its composition must reflect an appropriate balance between the different parties in the conflict.

The security arrangements during the interim period of the Agreement are particularly important in establishing the basic elements of conflict resolution. The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) will remain separate

Table 6 Composition of the Coordinating Council

1. President of the Council
2. Vice-President of the Council and Minister of Local Government Affairs and Public Security
3. Minister for Cabinet Affairs
4. Minister for Economic Planning and Financial Affairs
5. Minister for Education and Instruction Affairs
6. Minister for Legal Affairs
7. Minister for Public Works and Labour
8. Minister for Information, Culture and Social Affairs
9. Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources
10. Minister for Health Affairs
11. Minister for Peace and Political Mobilization
12. Minister for Wildlife Conservation, Tourism and Environmental Control
13. Minister for Engineering Affairs and Public Utilities
14. Minister for Governmental Affairs and Rehabilitation
15. Minister for Commerce, Supplies and Industry
16. Governors of the Southern States

Source: The Sudan Peace Agreement, Khartoum, April 1997

from the National Army and will be stationed in their locations under their command. However, police, prisons, civil defence and public security in the Southern States will be drawn from the people of the area and the presence of the Sudanese armed forces will be reduced once violence has stopped. A joint Ceasefire Commission is to be established to monitor Ceasefire violations and the disengagement of troops in Southern States. The Agreement also accedes to the right of the people of Southern Sudan to "determine their political aspirations and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development" through the process of a referendum to be held before the end of the interim period.²⁶ The options contained in the referendum will present a choice between either unity or secession. The referendum will be conducted under the auspices of a Special Referendum Commission (SRC), which will be formed by a presidential decree in consultation with the Coordinating Council. To ensure free and fair conduct of the referendum, the SRC will invite a range of observers from: the OAU, Arab League, UN, religious bodies, national and foreign NGOs, and the national and international media. The Agreement's final provision is for the government to endeavour to develop languages other than Arabic and English.

Conclusion

For some time it has been argued that "marginalized ethnic groups should have the right to some autonomy, to cultural facilities to preserve their identity and ... to have a position in the commanding heights of the economy in order to participate fully and equally in the economic development of the country".²⁷ However, the perennial conflict in Sudan has hardly created an environment conducive to the remedying of economic disparities and social injustice.

The dispute continues because it represents the political ambitions of John Garang, the SPLA, and the rather different agenda of Sadiq el-Mahdi. The Peace Agreement of April 1997 is, of course, only partial, in that its signatories represent a segment of the range of oppositionists within the country. Nevertheless, the Agreement has been

recognized as a diplomatic initiative that declares Sudan to be a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country where fundamental rights are protected. Self-determination for the south can be decided by a referendum after a ceasefire and a four-year breathing space. The central question is how likely is it to result in a measure of success? Obviously there has to be a willingness from all sides of the conflict to resolve some of the issues and to move towards a more conciliatory approach. Most commentators agree that the war can only come to an end when all parties agree to lay aside their arms and negotiate a lasting political settlement. As Dr Atabani, Secretary-General of the National Congress, asserts, "Government is not divine. The government is accountable to the people ultimately." In a sense, the 1997 Agreement has gone some way towards demonstrating an understanding of the problems confronting different groups within Sudan and identifying a number of key political aspects, all of which could help lessen tensions and offer the possibility of a "sustainable peace" for all people.²⁸

Interviews

As indicated in the notes below, I was granted a series of interviews with senior figures in politics, finance and civil society during a research visit to Khartoum in February/March 1997:

- Professor Suad Albadawe, Secretary General, International Muslim Women's Union.
- Dr Ghazi Salhuiddin Atabani, Secretary-General, The National Congress.
- Abdel Rahim Mahmoud Hamdi, Chairman, Khartoum Stock Exchange.
- Einayet Abdel Hameed, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly.
- Mohammed Zain Abdel Rahim, Deputy General Manager, Agricultural Bank of Sudan.
- The Right Reverend, Right Hon. Gabriel Roric Jnr, Bishop of Rumbek Diocese, Episcopal Church of the Sudan and State Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- Dr Hasan Turabi, Leader of the National Islamic Front.

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- 2 Interview with the Right Reverend, Right Hon. Gabriel Roric Jnr, Bishop of Rumbek Diocese, Episcopal Church of the Sudan and State Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1997.
- 3 Adlan Ahmed Al-Hardallo "The quest for a permanent constitution for Sudan", in Hassan M Salih (ed), *Federalism in the Sudan*, Khartoum University Press, 1995.
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- 5 Interview with Gabriel Roric, 1997.
- 6 UN Resolution 47/135.
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- 8 Atta el-Battahani, "Ethnicity and economic development in federal Sudan 1989-1994", in Hassan M Salih (ed), *Federalism in the Sudan*, Khartoum University Press, 1995, p 245, and C Peters, *Sudan: A nation in the balance*, Oxford: Oxfam, 1996, p 6.
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- 11 Sudan Peace Agreement, Khartoum, April 1997.
- 12 Interview with Gabriel Roric, 1997.
- 13 Interview with Dr Hasan Turabi, Leader of the National Islamic Front, 1997.
- 14 Interview with Dr Ghazi Salhuiddin Atabani, Secretary-General, The National Congress, 1997.
- 15 Interview with Dr Atabani; interview with Dr Turabi.
- 16 Interview with Einayet Abdel Hameed, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly, 1997.
- 17 Atta el-Battahani, *op cit*, p 245.
- 18 Interview with Dr Turabi; interview with Abdel Rahim Mahmoud Hamdi, Chairman, Khartoum Stock Exchange, 1997.
- 19 Interview with International Muslim Women's Union, 1997.
- 20 Interview with Abdel Rahim Hamdi.
- 21 Interview with Abdel Rahim Hamdi.
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Botshabelo's changing housing landscape

A critical analysis

*Lochner Marais, of the Department of Geography at Vista University's Bloemfontein campus, examines Botshabelo's changing housing environment and puts forward a few principles that may guide future housing investment.**

An analysis of housing development in Botshabelo must be viewed against the fact that Botshabelo was established to accommodate the population growth of Mangaung (Bloemfontein) and as a place of resettlement for the Sotho people from Thaba Nchu after the "independence" of Bophuthatswana.¹

The idea was therefore to make Botshabelo a drawcard for settlement and to make Mangaung appear as unattractive

Although the legacy of apartheid will remain with Botshabelo and its nearly 200 000 residents for years to come, the city now faces changing dynamics. Although the analysis in this article will focus on specific issues, the following underlying aspects should be borne in mind.

- Housing should be viewed not only in terms of physical structure but also in a functional context, taking into account such aspects as

Botshabelo is dependent on a government-subsidized transport system. In the past, it was also largely dependent on subsidies to industries. Both mechanisms were put in place in order to reduce the distance or travelling time between the place of residence and the place of employment.

A physical housing analysis

There are a total of 40 873 housing structures in which households reside in Botshabelo. The formal houses (houses built with bricks) can be subdivided into ordinary formal dwellings and up-market houses, with a market value of between R40 000 and R70 000. The latter are mainly to be found in H block and are owned by middle-income and high-income residents. Of the 22 679 formal housing structures, 1 117 (5%) fall into the up-market category. This is 2,7% of the total housing stock of Botshabelo. Informal housing structures are usually built with corrugated iron and mud. The housing structures in informal settlements and most of the backyard shacks are also built of the same material. Informal housing structures in Botshabelo, including those in informal settlements and backyard shacks, number 18 194.

Table 2 gives the percentage of permanent structures in Botshabelo between 1989 and 1996, while Figure 2 represents the current situation of formal housing structures per block. (Table 2 and Figure 2 do not take into consideration housing structures in informal settlements and backyard shacks, and therefore focus only on housing structures on formally planned




Figure 1 The Bloemfontein-Botshabelo-Thaba Nchu region, 1996

five as possible by comparison. No family units were erected in Mangaung between 1968 and the mid-1980s. Instead, Thaba Nchu was earmarked for this purpose, until Botshabelo took over this role in 1979. The government also made a considerable effort to make houses in Botshabelo more attractive by means of low-interest loans and infrastructure subsidies.

access to employment, transport, economic opportunities and important services.

- Botshabelo is historically an extension of Mangaung.
- Residents of Botshabelo have links with economic centres outside Botshabelo (especially Free State Goldfields and Bloemfontein).
- The sustainability of housing in

* Acknowledgement is made to the Free State Government's Botshabelo Investment Study (BIS) for which the author was a consultant.

Table 1 An analysis of the physical nature of structures in Botshabelo, 1996²


| Type of structure | Number | Percentage |
|--|--------|------------|
| Formal houses on serviced sites | 22 679 | 55,5 |
| Informal houses on serviced sites | 14 983 | 36,7 |
| Housing structures in informal settlements | 3 061 | 7,5 |
| Households in backyard shacks | 150 | 0,3 |
| Total | 40 873 | 100,0 |

and serviced sites; the degree of service differs throughout Botshabelo.)

Although different statistical methodologies may give slightly different results, which is the main reason for the variation between the 1995 figures, the following conclusions can be drawn from Table 2 and Figure 2.

Table 2 The change in the physical nature of housing structures for Botshabelo in 1989, 1991 and 1995³

| Year | Percentage of permanent housing structures |
|-------|--|
| 1989 | 54,6 |
| 1991 | 60,0 |
| 1995a | 61,3 |
| 1995b | 59 |

**Figure 2** Percentage formal housing structures per block in Botshabelo, 1995

- There has been little increase in the percentage of formal housing structures since 1989.
- The lowest percentage of permanent structures is found in the newer blocks. Households in blocks A, B, C, D, and E have occupied their houses for an average

of 14 years, while the average for blocks U and W is 9,3 years.⁴

- Although there are a number of reasons which may explain the slowness in upgrading of housing structures, it should be noted that since 1989 at least 3 000 serviced sites have been occupied. The new residents will probably have had a negative influence on the formal housing percentage because they are likely to have started with non-permanent housing structures. The bond boycott which resulted in the withdrawal of financial institutions from Botshabelo (apart from Block H) has also played a role.
- Block H was earmarked for up-market housing but has only 57,3% permanent structures in place — this is due to the fact that provincial officials who were being intimidated were resettled in the eastern part of the block during 1990. The resettlement was done to guarantee the safety of the officials during the uprising and to consolidate them into one settlement.

Despite the presence of a number of financial institutions, approximately 60% of the houses were constructed through the incremental house-building process. This process is, however, hampered by the fact that a large percentage of the residents work outside Botshabelo; in fact only 25% of households in Botshabelo are totally dependent on Botshabelo for income. As a result, most residents either have to spend long hours every day in commuting, or spend long periods away from Botshabelo, and this factor can be correlated with the lack of maintenance. Although it could be argued that it is mainly the people who work outside Botshabelo who have the financial capacity to obtain formal housing finance,⁵ commuting by homeowners disadvantages the incremental house building process in the following ways: firstly, the time spent commuting per day (an average of 2 to 3 hours every working day to and from

Bloemfontein) could have been used to maintain, consolidate or expand the housing structure,⁶ and secondly, the money spent on transport could have been used to the same end (transport costs for households earning less than R500 per month would be 20%–40% of their income, depending on their destination in Bloemfontein). The distance of 55 km between Botshabelo and Bloemfontein, linked to transport costs, is therefore one of the major problems. A bus ticket increased from R12 per month in 1983 to R58 per month in 1989 and R126 per month in 1996. It is unlikely that the monthly income of residents has increased in proportion to the transport costs.

Apartheid's intentional policy of creating distance between place of employment and place of residence has thus had a huge impact on the housing landscape in Botshabelo and will continue to do so in the future.

An overview of informal settlements in Botshabelo


Housing structures in informal settlements provide living space for 7,5% of Botshabelo's households. The location of informal settlements in Botshabelo represents the resistance of people to the uneconomical layout of the city. Figure 3 and Table 3 provide an overview of the number of households in informal settlements as well as the location of these settlements.

The following conclusions can be drawn:

- The majority of dwellers in informal settlements can be found in the northern third of Botshabelo.
- No informal settlements exist in the southern (D/L/M/N) and south-western blocks (W/U/S). (Both these conclusions probably point to residents' need to be closer to places of employment within Botshabelo, and a need to be closer to transport routes, thereby reducing transport costs and time spent away from home.)
- Dwellers in the informal settlements in section H are apparently invaders from Block H, most of whom are people who wish to live on their own.
- 79% of dwellers in informal settlements have been living in Botshabelo for more than 5 years.⁷ This confirms the theory that informal settlements arise mainly as a result of internal migration and not urbanization.

Table 3 Number of households in informal settlements in Botshabelo, November 1995

| Block | A | B | C | E | F | G | H | J | K | T |
|-------|----|-----|-----|----|-------|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| No. | 30 | 130 | 201 | 31 | 1 058 | 313 | 51 | 307 | 636 | 314 |

**Figure 3** Informal settlements in Botshabelo, 1995

- There seems to be resistance by settlers to moving into unoccupied sites. A possible reason could be historical ties to specific sections where land invasions occurred, while choice of optimal location is also a factor. The fact that residents have to pay for formally planned sites and other political considerations could also contribute to the resistance. Another factor which might play a role is that, although no housing structures have been built on these vacant sites, it is impossible to determine whether a specific vacant site belongs to an owner or not, owing to the lack of a town register. In other words, one cannot simply assume that empty sites do not have owners.

It seems therefore that the location of informal settlements in Botshabelo has resulted from urban sprawl and may indicate the residents' resistance (ie voting with their feet) to the uneconomic urban layout of Botshabelo, which located many of the houses far away from transport, work opportunities and other amenities. So some residents were even prepared to settle in the northern sections of the town in an informal structure with no services, rather than in the south where they might have had a formal housing structure and better access to services.

Demolished houses

Various claims were made by interested parties in the early 1990s that people were leaving their houses in Botshabelo to move to Bloemfontein and other areas. The claims arose from two observations: firstly, the fact that a number of housing structures in Botshabelo had been totally demolished; and, secondly, evidence that people formerly from Botshabelo were living in informal settlements in and around Mangaung.⁸ In a survey of vacant stands in Botshabelo during April 1993, it was found that 68 houses had been demolished and that the original residents were no longer living there. In a survey taken during January 1996, 653 units were identified as having been occupied at an earlier stage. There is evidence of 200 demolished housing structures on formally planned sites. Possible reasons for this phenomenon could be that residents:

- left Botshabelo in order to live closer to their place of employment outside Botshabelo. This is supported by evidence that people from Botshabelo have settled in informal settlements in and around Mangaung;
- left their original place of settlement to be closer to their places of employment within Botshabelo or closer to public transport routes. This argument is supported by the fact that people in informal settlements within Botshabelo are reluctant to be resettled on existing open sites elsewhere and that 79% of the inhabitants in informal settlements have been living in Botshabelo for at least 5 years; or
- left because they were no longer able to repay mortgage bonds and saw the evacuation of their homes as the only route of escape from their responsibilities; or
- were legally forced to evacuate the houses.

Either residents took some of the building materials with them, or the house was stripped after the original owners had left. The reasons for abandonment of dwellings might be a combination of the above possibilities. It appears that the two underlying problems are economic (lack of financial

capacity to pay) and due to location (distance between place of residence and place of employment).

Housing finance and grants

Various agencies were involved in low-income housing finance. The following section will evaluate their contribution.

Department of Development Aid

The Department had two methods of financing housing. The first method, which was used before 1988, was to provide residents with building materials to the value of R2 500. Approximately 4 500 of these loans were allocated. Whether 4 500 houses were actually built is difficult to determine because of difficulties experienced by the authorities in managing the system. An investment of approximately R10 million was made towards financing housing prior to 1988. In terms of replacement costs, this investment would be worth approximately R45 million.

Owing to the management problems, the system was changed in 1988. Under the new scheme, a resident could apply for a loan of up to R5 500, provided that he/she had a plan drawn up, and a signed contract with a contractor. According to officials in the housing department, 4 500 loans were allocated in this second scheme. An amount of approximately R20 million was invested. The 1996 replacement value would be approximately R48 million.

With the establishment of private ownership of former government-owned houses, a R7 500 discount was provided by the government in 1993. Houses in Botshabelo which had been financed by the Department of Development Aid were also considered for this discount. Approximately 2 000 applications were processed (worth about R6 million); and another 4 000 applications (worth about R10 million) received. Efforts have been made to reach clients who have not yet applied.

The South African Development Trust Corporation

The South African Development Trust Corporation's investment in Botshabelo was approximately R10 million. Between 1984 and 1990, 2 200 houses were financed. Loans were made available to residents earning less than R6 000 per year at 1% interest per an-



New housing development, Block H.



Upmarket house in Block H.



House financed by SA Development Trust.

num. From discussions with interested parties, it appears that according to the Corporation policy prospective homeowners would only be assisted with housing finance after rejection by private financial institutions. To replace the houses financed by the Corporation would cost about R33 million.

Khayaletu Homes

Khayaletu Homes (with its parent company, the South African Housing Trust) financed 3 000 mortgage bonds in Botshabelo at an average of R12 000 per bond between 1989 and 1992. This is an investment of about R36 million in housing in Botshabelo, with a current replacement value of more or less R55 million. The bonds were made available at an interest rate of 8%–13% per annum. They have since risen by an average of 5% per annum. A person who received a bond from Khayaletu Homes was able to build a four-roomed house (approximately 40 m²), which included two bedrooms, a lounge, and a kitchen.

Private financial institutions

Private financial institutions (with the exception of the Permanent Building Society) were only prepared to finance housing in Block H. Private sector investment in Block H probably amounts to a minimum of R40 million. In terms of replacement value this could be as high as R80 million. Block H is currently the only area in Botshabelo which has clearance from the Mortgage Indemnity Fund (MIF). This has opened the door to a new middle- and high-income housing development which is presently being undertaken.

Reasons for the bond and rent boycott

Politics, although a contributing factor to the bond and rent boycott, was not the only factor involved. During 1992/1993 a housing audit by Khayaletu Homes indicated that 70% of bond holders were either not in a financial position to pay or were no longer living in the house (it had been occupied by a new owner — without the knowledge of Khayaletu Homes). No distinction was made between the two categories. The other 30% assessed in the audit were the original owners and were able to pay their bond instalments.

This lack of financial capacity can

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be attributed to a general decline in the economy since the houses were first financed. The inability of the company to track down the original owners could have been due to the fact that the owners had simply migrated, or that they wished to avoid action being taken against them by the financial institution.

The poor quality of houses built by the contractors is another reason which community organizations used to justify their call for a boycott. There are a number of reasons for the poor quality of the houses. Contractors (usually not based in Botshabelo) tried to maximize their profits and in so doing failed to uphold building standards. The Free State Development Corporation (the former South African Development Trust Corporation) mentions that the corporation did not perform its duties regarding quality control. A third possible reason could be the condition of the soil. A report by Ninham Shand⁹ for Khayaletu Homes in 1991 regarding cracks in house No F 1612 cited two main causes for the cracks — the active nature of the underlying soil condition, and the fact that this had not been taken into account by the contractors when laying foundations.

Housing expenditure

In the following analysis of housing expenditure, a comparison will be made, where possible, between the expenditure patterns in 1988–1989 and those in 1996. With respect to housing expenditure in Botshabelo during 1988–1989, Du Preez¹⁰ notes that:

- An amount of R10 840 million (43%) was spent by residents on housing and housing accessories within Botshabelo.
- An amount of R14 537 million (57%) was spent by residents on housing and housing accessories outside Botshabelo.
- Expenditure on housing accessories constituted 52% of all expenditure with regard to housing, while rental and bond payments accounted for 48% of expenditure.
- Of the money spent on housing accessories, 82% was spent outside Botshabelo (presumably in Bloemfontein and Thaba Nchu).

These figures show that little infrastructure exists within Botshabelo to provide residents with either housing accessories or housing funding from fi-



Informal settlement in Botshabelo.



Demolished house in Botshabelo.



House financed by Khayaletu Homes.

nancial institutions. It also confirms Botshabelo's dependence on Bloemfontein and, to a lesser extent, Thaba Nchu.

Social Surveys¹¹ have shown the following regarding housing expenditure in Botshabelo (see Tables 4 and 5):

- The major portion of money spent on housing is spent on formal housing bonds in block H.
- Expenditure for the upgrading of non-permanent structures appears to be low.
- Expenditure on housing in the northern suburbs, blocks G, J, K and F, is higher than in the other sections. This is despite the fact that no major differences exist between the average income of households. One possible reason might be that the northern suburbs are better located than the southern suburbs as regards transport and work-related and other opportunities. As a result, people from the northern suburbs feel comfortable in investing in their housing.
- Whereas bond repayments comprised 48% of expenditure on housing and housing accessories in 1988–1989, this proportion dropped to 25% in 1996 (probably as a result of the bond boycott).
- Although expenditure by households on permanent housing accounts for nearly 98% of the total expenditure on housing, it drops to 66% of the expenditure on furniture and household appliances.
- It is also apparent that households in informal settlements are not spending money on the upgrading of their houses — probably because of lack of tenure and services.

It is evident that the amount of money spent on housing has dropped significantly since 1988–1989. Although differences in statistical methods may have had some effect on the results, the drop is even more significant when inflation is taken into account.

Households entitled to subsidies according to policy

In determining the number of households which are entitled to subsidies according to the low-income housing policy,¹² the following was assumed:

- No household which lives in a permanent housing structure is entitled to any further housing subsidy.

- Only households living in non-permanent structures or informal settlements are entitled to subsidies.

Table 6 analyses the possible allocation of housing subsidies to Botshabelo in view of the above assumptions. It is clear that an amount of about R233 million would be necessary to "solve" the housing problem in Botshabelo. As this is approximately 60% of the Free State housing budget, it does not make sense for a once-off subsidy to be allocated. Other aspects, including Botshabelo's historical connection to Bloemfontein, should be taken into account when housing subsidies are allocated.

Comparing the housing situation with that in other urban areas

One of the major problems facing the Provincial Government is how to divide 6 100 subsidy allocations between Bloemfontein and Botshabelo. A comparison between the housing situation in Mangaung and Botshabelo provides vital background information on this problem (especially as Botshabelo was historically seen as an extension of Mangaung). Table 7 is an attempt to compare the two.

From the table it is clear that past expenditure and planning focused on Botshabelo (displaced urbanization) and this resulted in a huge housing problem in Mangaung. Furthermore, population growth in Botshabelo appears to be zero, while that in Mangaung is growing by 5–8% per annum. Surely reconstruction planning as regards housing should be focused primarily on Bloemfontein. An allocation of at least 70–85% of the subsidies to Bloemfontein might be appropriate.

Conclusion

Although initial trends in the upgrading of housing structures in Botshabelo are evident, very little change has taken place since 1989, ie during the transitional and post-apartheid era in South Africa. The housing policy under apartheid employed numerous low-income housing finance methods in order to make Botshabelo attractive. Today a comprehensive bond boycott exists, with basically no housing investment outside block H. The opening up of other settlement options for black South Africans in the 1990s has caused many residents to reconsider their commitment to invest in housing in

Botshabelo. The following statements reflect the current situation:

- Very little, if any, progress has been made in the incremental upgrading of houses since 1991.
- Low-income housing finance and low-income housing construction by contractors have not, from an investment point of view, been effective.
- Locating Botshabelo 55 km away from Bloemfontein, resulting in high transport costs and travelling time, has had a negative impact on housing consolidation in the really low-income households as well as on the sustainability of housing finance in Botshabelo.
- The fact that much of Botshabelo's labour force is employed outside the area makes housing finance dependent on economic fluctuations in other areas, such as the closing of gold mines in the Free State.
- All housing investment by Khayalethu Homes and the private sector is linked to Bloemfontein.
- Most of the housing investment in the past appears to have been linked to government investment in Botshabelo, either directly (through subsidies or low-income loans from governmental organizations) or indirectly (through expansion in the private sector, such as schools).
- The housing problem in Botshabelo does not seem to be on the same scale as that in Bloemfontein.

Future housing investment in Botshabelo will have to take into consideration the following aspects:

- The larger part of housing funding should be redirected from Botshabelo to Bloemfontein. This could play a vital role in reconstruction planning.
- Measures to counter urban sprawl should be devised.
- New residential developments outside the existing borders of Botshabelo should be avoided.
- Blocks R and V should not be developed.
- Double subsidization might occur if any new funding is allocated to Botshabelo.

Notes and references

- 1 D S Krige, "Die transformasie van die Suid-Afrikaanse stad", Town and Regional Planning Occasional Paper no 10, Bloem-

Table 4 A comparison of expenditure on housing between the different types of dwelling units in Botshabelo, 1996 (per month)

| Variable | Botshabelo | Permanent | Non-permanent | Informal settlers |
|--|------------|------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Expenditure on housing p.m. | R764 324 | R768 341 | R45 883 | R0 00 |
| Percentage of total expenditure spent on housing p.m. | 2,9% | 4,47% | 0,2% | 0% |
| Percentage of total expenditure on housing p.m. | 100% | 97,9% | 2,1% | 0% |
| Expenditure on furniture and household appliances | R2 518 251 | R1 659 418 | R700 672 | R158 162 |
| Percentage of total expenditure on furniture and household appliances p.m. | 9,3% | 9,65% | 8,74% | 8,44% |
| Percentage of total expenditure on furniture and household appliances | 100% | 86% | 28% | 6% |

Table 5 A comparison of expenditure on housing between different zones in Botshabelo, 1996 (per month)

| Variable | H | ABCDE | GJEF | IMNT | LWS |
|---|----------|---------|----------|--------|---------|
| Expenditure on housing p.m. | R539 800 | R45 801 | R125 114 | R9 857 | R63 645 |
| Percentage of total income spent on housing | 15,02% | 0,75% | 1,64% | 0,2% | 1,31% |
| Percentage of total expenditure on housing | 69% | 6% | 16% | 1% | 8% |

Table 6 Households entitled to housing subsidies in Botshabelo, 1996

| Variable/criteria | R0-R800 (R15 000) | R801-R1 500 (12 500) | R1 501-R 2 500 (9 500) | R 2501-R3 500 (R5 000) |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Households in non-permanent structures (formally planned sites) | 46,5% | 34,3% | 12,9% | 3,1% |
| | 6 907 | 5 139 | 1 933 | 465 |
| Households in informal settlements | 82,5% | 14,3% | 1,9% | — |
| | 2 519 | 444 | 40 | — |
| Total | 9 426 | 5 583 | 1 982 | 465 |
| Amount | 142 290 000 | 69 787 500 | 18 829 000 | 1 325 000 |

Table 7 A comparison between Mangaung and Botshabelo as regards population and housing attributes, 1996

| Attribute | Mangaung | Botshabelo | Average for townships in South Africa ¹⁵ |
|--|---|----------------|---|
| Population | 220 000 (Total for Bloemfontein 550 000) | 195 000 | — |
| Population growth | 5%–6% | approaching 0% | — |
| Percentage of households in informal settlements | 31% | 7,6% | 24% |
| Percentage of households in backyard shacks | 10% | 0,4% | — |
| Units available | 0 | 3 500 | — |
| Replacement value of government or semi-governmental investment in rep structures, 1979–1990 | R0,00 | R130 million | — |
| Replacement value of government or semi-governmental investment in infrastructure, 1979–1990 | Not available but not more than R50 million | R370 million | — |

fontein: UOFS, 1988, p 103; and D S Krige, in A Lemon (ed), *Homes apart South Africa's segregated cities*, Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1991, p 109.

2 (Table 1): L Marais, Botshabelo housing report — phase I. Unpublished report of the Botshabelo Investment Study, Bloemfontein, 1996, p 1.

3 (Table 2): 1989 figure from W J van H Botha, T J de Vos and J H Theron, "in Ontleding van grondgebruik en infrastruktuur", Bloemfontein: Institute for Social and Economic Research, UOFS, 1990, p 141; 1991 figure from P H du Preez, "Omvattende ontwikkelingsbeplanning vir Botshabelo", Bloemfontein: Institute for Social and Economic Research, UOFS, 1990, p 72; 1995a figure from Africa, "Voter registration information", Unpub-

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4 Social Surveys, "Botshabelo social survey", Unpublished report for the Botshabelo Investment Study, Bloemfontein, 1996.

5 L Marais, *op cit*, p 3.

6 J G L Marais, "Behusingskonsolidasie in informele nedersettings — "n Mite?" Freedom Square (Bloemfontein) as gevallestudie", *Journal of Dietetics and Home Economics* vol 23, no 1, 1995.

7 Social Surveys, *op cit*.

8 L Bates, S Krige and J Wessels, *Informal settlements in Bloemfontein: A study of*

migration patterns, socio-economic profile, living conditions, and future housing expectations, Bloemfontein: Urban Foundation, 1991, p 17, and J G L Marais, "Erfen-diensskema as wysie tot behusingsvoorsiening, Freedom Square en Nambisa Square (Bloemfontein) as tydrumtelike gevallestudie", Unpublished MA thesis, Bloemfontein: UOFS, 1994, p 194.

9 Ninham Shand, "Investigation of cracking house no F1612-Botshabelo", Unpublished report on housing conditions in Botshabelo, Bloemfontein, 1991.

10 P H du Preez, *op cit*, p 80.

11 Social Surveys, *op cit*.

12 Department of Housing, "A new housing policy and strategy for South Africa", White Paper, 1995, p 60.

13 (Table 7): Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993.

Improving economic development in greater Soweto

The role of local government

*Ronald Mears, Professor of Economics at Vista University's Soweto Campus, considers ways in which the new democratic local government could promote economic development in Soweto.**

Local authorities in South Africa served the interests of the apartheid state for over forty years, enforcing a policy of separate development for the different racial groups. Most of the local authorities in areas such as Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow had little if any financial basis, political legitimacy or ability to administer their areas. Therefore they were not in a position to address developmental issues. Many protest actions against the racially based local government structures took place. Such actions included rent and service charge boycotts, and contributed greatly to the deterioration of the already financially vulnerable local government system. After the establishment of Black Local Authorities in 1982, the civics focused all efforts on abolishing them and on promoting negotiations for single municipalities.

Until the 1995 local elections, the municipalities of Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow formed part of Greater Soweto. After the elections of 1 November 1995, Greater Soweto was divided into three more or less equal parts. They fall under three of the four Metropolitan Sub-Structures (MSS) of the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMC). As a consequence of these changes the largest dormitory town in South Africa obtained a significant say in the management and finances of the GJTMC.

The objective of this article is to examine ways and means that could be employed to improve employment and promote the economic development of Greater Soweto. The topic is so wide that only a few aspects can be dealt with. This article concentrates mainly

on the role of the new democratic local government as an instrument for promoting economic development in Soweto. It starts by analysing the relationship between economic development and the quality of life in general. The characteristics of the population of Greater Soweto are analysed. The transformation of local government and the initiatives taken by central government and the GJTMC to promote economic development are also discussed. The article then focuses on the promotion and development of small and micro-enterprises (SMEs), because of their significant potential for creating employment. In conclusion, the article identifies some issues facing the GJTMC before coming to a few findings and recommendations.

Relationship between economic development and quality of life

There are three major views of development and each enjoys some support somewhere in South Africa. These are the growth-centred, the state-centred and human or people-centred approaches.¹

The *capitalist or growth-centred version of economic development* emphasizes the importance of economic growth and the free-market system as instruments to enhance the quality of life. It enjoys support amongst the business community, whose interests it has served well. Although it has contributed significantly to the overall material progress of many countries and benefited many millions in the West, the Soviet Union and the Asian countries, it has not solved the problem of

poverty for the majority of the world's population; in some cases it has worsened it.² It has also led to large-scale global ecological degradation and is therefore seldom sustainable in either human or ecological terms.

The *Marxist or state-centred version of economic development* was inspired mainly by a deep concern for social justice. In South Africa it is still strongly supported by the communist members in the ANC alliance in particular. It centres on traditional Marxist ideas supporting the hypothesis that capitalism should be transformed and not reformed through state intervention in the private enterprise economy.³ However, such ideas have empirically been shown to have little merit or relevance.

Human-centred development has as its ultimate objective long, healthy and creative lives for all people. It weaves the development processes around people rather than weaving people around the developmental processes.⁴ The human-centred development approach is the combined responsibility of government, organized business, labour and civil society. No society has been able to promote and sustain the welfare of its people in the absence of economic growth, which is mainly a function of the rate of investment by a strong entrepreneurial corps backed by a motivated and skilled work force. However, in the long run it is human growth that matters most, not economic growth. The human development approach attempts to widen the range of choices for all South Africans by expanding their skills, abilities and opportunities to use these qualities productively.

Todaro⁵ defines a new economic

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view of development. Development economics is mainly concerned with the efficient allocation of scarce or idle productive resources and their sustained growth over time. In addition, it also deals with the economic, social, political, and institutional mechanisms, both public and private, that are required to bring about rapid and large-scale improvement in the standard of living of the masses of poverty-stricken, malnourished and illiterate peoples.⁶ Development economics concentrates on the requirements needed to effect rapid structural and institutional transformation of entire societies in a manner that will most efficiently bring the fruits of economic progress to the broadest segment of their populations. Government involvement and its economic decision making should be directed towards such a transformation.

The heterogeneity and diversity of developing countries have shown that there is no single or universal development recipe that can be applied in all cases.⁷ The meaning of the concept *development* has changed over time, from an almost exclusive concern with aggregate economic growth to a broader interpretation that encompasses questions of redressing poverty, inequality and unemployment. If all three of these factors show a decrease, development is taking place. However, if one or more of these basic ills intensifies, there is not development, although per capita income may have doubled.⁸

The challenge of development is therefore to improve the quality of life of all the people, especially those in the rural areas. A better quality of life generally calls for higher incomes for all, but in developing countries it involves much more. It encompasses better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equal opportunities, greater individual freedom and a better cultural life.⁹ Development must therefore be seen as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and international relations, as well as accelerated and sustainable economic growth, reduced inequality and the alleviation of poverty.¹⁰ Development is a process of moving away from circumstances widely perceived as degrading towards socially, materially and spiritually improved circumstances.

Sustenance, self-esteem and freedom are common goals sought by all

individuals and societies.¹¹ These three core values of development serve as a conceptual basis and practical guideline for understanding the inner meaning of development. Sustenance is the ability to meet the basic human needs for food, shelter, health and protection; if any of these is absent or in critically short supply, underdevelopment prevails. A second universal requirement for human dignity is a healthy self-esteem: a sense of worth and self-respect rather than being exploited by others to serve their own needs.¹² Freedom from servitude, or human freedom, means the ability to choose from a range of opportunities. Increasing per capita incomes, eliminating absolute poverty, broadening employment opportunities and lessening inequalities in income are necessary, but not the only, conditions for development, whereas the three core values are essential. Economic growth is required as a first requisite to implement human development strategies. However, there can be no sustainable economic growth without developing human resources in a meaningful manner.¹³

The essential characteristic of the human-centred approach is that it is an holistic process, which aims to expand the practical ability of individuals, communities and other collectives to initiate, execute and manage their own development. Moreover, the whole process is to be influenced and guided by the people themselves.¹⁴ The human development index (HDI) combines indicators for life expectancy, education attainment and income in an innovative way to provide a more comprehensive index of progress in human development than by using figures for GDP alone. In some ways this amounts to measuring the quality of life. The level of human development is measured by evaluating people's freedom to choose. In order to make more informed choices they must have some basic human capacities and a reasonable range of opportunities. The HDI uses people's life expectancy and adult literacy as an indication of their capacities. Income is used to symbolize their opportunities.¹⁵ In 1991, South Africa's HDI was 0,677, ranking 86th out of 191 countries.¹⁶ The HDI reflects the conditions of the "average" person and subjective considerations are not taken into account. For urban areas the HDI was 0,807 compared to 0,466 for the rural areas. Females have a higher life expectancy than males, but their education attainment is a little

lower and their per capita income is only 38% of that of their male counterparts. The unemployment rates are worse in those provinces in greater need of human development. These inequalities must be attended to urgently in South Africa.

Some socio-economic characteristics of the population in Greater Soweto

A broad analysis of the status quo in Greater Soweto may give some insights into the quality of life of its inhabitants. The nature of the organization of life in a low-income township determines the subjective wellbeing of the community and reflects their demographic characteristics.¹⁷ The unemployment rate in Greater Soweto was 40,0% at the beginning of 1993.¹⁸ Altogether 45,7% of the women and 33,6% of the men were unemployed.¹⁹ Of the population sampled 25,8% were formally employed, 4,6% were employed in the informal sector, 19,5% were unemployed and 50,1% were economically non-active in Greater Soweto (see also Table 4). The high dependency ratio and unemployment rate and their effects on the income and morale of the unemployed persons significantly affect the quality of life in many households and the community in general.

At the beginning of 1993, the Employment Research Unit of Vista University analysed the demographic characteristics of the population of Greater Soweto. The number of households varied between 1 and 11 per site and the number of persons per site varied between 1 and 35, with an average of 6,52 persons per site.²⁰ Although only 40 of the 800 sites surveyed, ie 5% of the total, accommodated an average of 15 or more persons, these accommodated in all 790 persons, ie 15% of the total. Therefore, some 15% of the population live on sites accommodating 15 or more persons, indicating the shortage of land and accommodation. The number of separate occupied houses/living units varied between 1 and 14 per site with an average of 1,7 structures per site. The number of persons per household varied between 1 and 21, with an average of 5,25 persons.²¹ In 1995 the average household comprised 5,2 persons (see Table 1). It varied from 6,6 persons in the Zondi area to 4,1 persons in the Protea Glen and Protea North areas. This is indicative of the wide discrepancies between the

Table 1 Selected data on households per suburb in Greater Soweto, in January 1996

| Suburb | Average size (Persons) | Average income (Rand) | Years at current address | Inside supply of infrastructure | | | Electrical appliances | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | | | Running water % | Electricity % | Sewerage % | Fridge % | Stove % | TV set % |
| Diepkloof | 5,6 | 1 650 | 24,0 | 84,5 | 90,0 | 80,5 | 75,2 | 74,4 | 76,9 |
| Orlando West | 5,5 | 1 950 | 29,7 | 71,3 | 88,7 | 24,7 | 97,3 | 88,7 | 94,0 |
| Meadowlands | 5,2 | 1 950 | 25,7 | 63,4 | 85,5 | 30,6 | 91,8 | 86,5 | 88,8 |
| Dobsonville | 5,0 | 3 100 | 4,4 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 97,0 | 89,9 | 88,9 |
| Naledi | 5,3 | 1 850 | 23,1 | 77,4 | 97,1 | 63,3 | 85,6 | 82,8 | 85,7 |
| Zondi | 6,0 | 1 250 | 27,5 | 91,6 | 98,8 | 92,8 | 81,5 | 88,0 | 81,9 |
| Mofolo | 5,8 | 1 700 | 23,8 | 60,0 | 80,2 | 32,2 | 76,1 | 77,1 | 81,5 |
| Jabavu | 5,7 | 1 700 | 22,4 | 80,1 | 98,5 | 66,4 | 82,4 | 80,2 | 87,0 |
| Mapeta | 4,8 | 1 900 | 24,9 | 47,1 | 90,6 | 30,3 | 87,6 | 82,0 | 86,5 |
| Chitwelo | 4,7 | 1 600 | 15,5 | 57,5 | 65,2 | 48,8 | 61,4 | 54,6 | 73,9 |
| Protea G/N | 4,1 | 1 200 | 5,2 | 98,1 | 97,8 | 99,5 | 96,8 | 98,6 | 97,5 |
| Eldorado Park | 4,7 | 3 300 | 12,0 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 97,8 | 100 | 98,3 |
| Klipfontein | 5,3 | 1 730 | 10,3 | 75,1 | 78,7 | 71,3 | 69,4 | 74,1 | 75,1 |
| Pineville | 5,9 | 2 100 | 16,0 | 92,7 | 100 | 90,0 | 84,0 | 85,5 | 85,3 |
| Total/Average | 5,1 | 2100 | 18,6 | 79,4 | 92,4 | 66,7 | 85,7 | 82,7 | 85,3 |

Source: D Prinsloo and B Van Graan, *Greater Soweto: Urban and Rural Survey* (Urban-Rural Action Development Studies, 1995)

different suburbs in Soweto. Table 1 shows a close correlation between average income per area and household size. The Zondi area had the lowest average income per household, that is R1 250 per month, compared with Protea, which had the highest average income, that is R4 200. In January 1995 the average household income was R2 100. The newer suburbs of Protea Glen, Protea North and Dobsonville had average household incomes of more than R3 000 per month. In total, 26% of the households in Soweto earned less than R1 000 per month, 32% earned between R1 000 and R2 000 per month, while 33% earned between R2 000 and R5 000. In total some 8,4% earned more than R5 000 per month.²² The income of

the people in the different suburbs of Soweto is important as an instrument for the filtering and upgrading of services in the township.

Age and gender profiles of the population in Greater Soweto

Table 2 (see also Figure 1), shows the different age categories for both males and females of the sample population and the estimated total black population. The sample consisted of 48,5% males and 51,5% females. This corresponds to the figures for the estimated total black population. The corresponding figures of the Central Statistical Service²³ for Greater Soweto were 52,8% male and 47,2% female. The difference of -4,3% for male and +4,3%

for females between the sampled population and the figures of the CSS is significant, especially since both estimates were done at approximately the same time. The difference is accounted for by the fact that the census figures were adjusted for an alleged undercount. In the adjustment the composition as in previous censuses was taken into account. Historically in cities the percentage of males is higher than the percentage of females. The Soweto research indicates that the population composition has changed significantly since 1985.

The population pyramid in Figure 1a does not show a normal distribution of the population. It is surprising that the percentage in the age group 'birth to 5 years' should be smaller than the per-



Table 2 Age and gender profile of Greater Soweto in 1993 compared with total estimated black population in 1996

| Age category | GREATER SOWETO POPULATION IN 1993 | | | TOTAL ESTIMATED BLACK POPULATION IN 1996 | | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--|-------------|-------------------|
| | % males | % females | Total frequency | % males | % females | Total frequency |
| birth-5 | 4,2 | 4,0 | 544 | 7,2 | 7,5 | 4 695 827 |
| 6-10 | 4,6 | 4,8 | 395 | 6,4 | 6,4 | 4 086 872 |
| 11-15 | 5,2 | 6,0 | 308 | 5,8 | 5,8 | 3 696 731 |
| 16-20 | 5,8 | 5,9 | 491 | 5,2 | 5,3 | 3 350 310 |
| 21-25 | 5,1 | 6,5 | 479 | 4,5 | 4,7 | 2 975 106 |
| 26-30 | 5,6 | 5,8 | 479 | 3,8 | 4,2 | 2 568 603 |
| 31-35 | 4,1 | 4,1 | 383 | 3,4 | 3,7 | 2 293 388 |
| 36-40 | 3,0 | 3,1 | 372 | 3,0 | 3,2 | 2 008 784 |
| 41-45 | 2,4 | 2,6 | 264 | 2,1 | 2,6 | 1 598 797 |
| 46-50 | 1,8 | 2,8 | 171 | 1,9 | 2,0 | 1 248 449 |
| 51-55 | 1,8 | 2,1 | 162 | 1,4 | 1,6 | 982 194 |
| 56-60 | 1,8 | 1,8 | 151 | 1,1 | 1,4 | 799 061 |
| 61-65 | 1,7 | 1,7 | 118 | 0,9 | 1,1 | 611 740 |
| 66+ | 2,2 | 2,6 | 190 | 1,1 | 2,1 | 1 128 637 |
| Total | 48,5 | 51,5 | 4 197 | 48,1 | 51,9 | 32 046 499 |

Source: Chief Directorate Population Development, 1996. Data provided and reported by M H Moolenaar, Pretoria, Department of Welfare.

centage in the age group "6 to 10 years". Figure 1a shows that there has been a significant decrease in the birth rate during the past 15 years. This could be an indication of economic development and an improvement in the quality of life in Greater Soweto. A

Figure 1 Age and gender profile of the sample population in Greater Soweto compared with total black population



Source: Table 2.

rise in incomes and better education levels would seem to encourage families to practise birth control. One of the reasons for the lower figure could also be that some households send their younger children to family in the rural areas, or it could simply be ascribed to the international tendency amongst households to under-report small children in surveys.²⁴ Whatever the reasons may be, there is an apparent demographic change in Gauteng's metropolitan areas. Figure 1a would seem to represent a more Westernized age profile, with the younger age categories representing a smaller base, whereas developing countries have as a rule a broad juvenile base. Figure 1b shows the estimated total black South African population in 1996. The bell-shaped pyramid is characteristic of developing countries or communities. The comparison would seem to indicate that the level of development, and therefore the quality of life, in Soweto is better than that estimated for the black population as a whole.

Education levels of preschool children, pupils and students

Table 3 shows the percentage of preschool children and the percentage of pupils and students receiving education. The relative decrease in the percentage of the population below 15 years of age is starting to affect the school population. The enrolment for Sub A to Standard 5 was lower than that for Standards 6 to 10 in 1992. Many preschool children attend

crèches outside Soweto because local child-care services are either of a poor quality or non-existent. Although there could be other explanations for the decrease, this is nevertheless an encouraging trend. This confirms that human capital development is taking place in Greater Soweto and that the natural population growth rate is declining.

Table 3 shows that 39.5% of the pupils receiving education were enrolled for secondary education. Some 2.6% of this group were receiving tertiary education, that is approximately 1% of the sampled population. A significant number (14.2%) of "children" between the age of 21 and 25 still live with the family.²⁵ This is largely due to the high unemployment rate prevalent in this age group.

Number of people not attending school or having completed their studies

Table 4 shows the qualifications of the persons in the population sampled who had already left school and those who had completed their studies. Of the total sampled, 6.9% had no qualifications, while 12.9% had a Standard 2 or lower qualification. It also shows that 476 of the total sample of 4 197, ie 11.3%, had matric, while 161 or 3.8% had a tertiary education. These figures compare well with those of the Johannesburg area.²⁶ The level of education for Johannesburg indicates that 14.7% of the urban population have passed their matric.

Table 4 shows the economic activity

Table 3 Pre-school children, pupils and students in Greater Soweto

| Standard | Frequency | Percentage | Cumulative percentage |
|--------------|-----------|------------|-----------------------|
| Preschool | 334 | 30.8 | 20.7 |
| Sub A | 112 | 9.0 | 29.9 |
| Sub B | 103 | 6.1 | 36.0 |
| Standard 1 | 89 | 4.2 | 40.3 |
| Standard 2 | 22 | 1.6 | 42.5 |
| Standard 3 | 33 | 3.9 | 47.4 |
| Standard 4 | 70 | 4.7 | 52.1 |
| Standard 5 | 60 | 5.6 | 57.8 |
| Standard 6 | 104 | 6.1 | 64.0 |
| Standard 7 | 161 | 8.1 | 72.1 |
| Standard 8 | 157 | 9.3 | 81.4 |
| Standard 9 | 125 | 7.4 | 88.8 |
| Standard 10 | 146 | 8.0 | 97.4 |
| Diploma | 25 | 1.9 | 98.9 |
| Degree | 15 | 0.9 | 99.8 |
| Postgraduate | 3 | 0.2 | 100 |
| Total | 4 696 | 100 | - |

Source: T. Dada, J. J. Jones and M. L. van der Linde, *Profile of the employed and unemployed in Greater Soweto* (2000), Research Report No. 44, Soweto Employment Research Unit, Vista University, 1994, p. 28.

Table 4 Qualifications of sample population not attending school or having completed their studies

| QUALIFICATIONS | FORMALLY EMPLOYED | | INFORMALLY EMPLOYED | | UNEMPLOYED | | ECONOMICALLY NON-ACTIVE | | TOTAL | |
|----------------|-------------------|------|---------------------|------|------------|------|-------------------------|------|-------|------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| None | 21 | 3,0 | 11 | 6,0 | 30 | 1,8 | 119 | 22,4 | 172 | 8,9 |
| Sub A | 4 | 0,4 | 1 | 0,5 | 1 | 0,1 | 0 | 1,6 | 16 | 0,8 |
| Sub B | 1 | 0,1 | 2 | 1,3 | 5 | 0,5 | 8 | 1,6 | 16 | 0,8 |
| Standard 1 | 12 | 1,1 | 5 | 2,7 | 14 | 1,8 | 17 | 3,5 | 48 | 2,9 |
| Standard 2 | 15 | 1,4 | 2 | 1,1 | 16 | 2,1 | 33 | 6,7 | 66 | 3,9 |
| Standard 3 | 29 | 2,8 | 8 | 5,0 | 28 | 3,3 | 28 | 4,7 | 93 | 5,2 |
| Standard 4 | 57 | 3,5 | 12 | 6,6 | 43 | 5,5 | 25 | 5,1 | 117 | 6,7 |
| Standard 5 | 88 | 8,4 | 15 | 8,8 | 78 | 10,0 | 50 | 10,2 | 231 | 13,3 |
| Standard 6 | 131 | 12,5 | 27 | 14,7 | 112 | 14,4 | 68 | 13,9 | 338 | 19,5 |
| Standard 7 | 96 | 9,3 | 9 | 4,9 | 80 | 11,6 | 21 | 4,7 | 188 | 11,5 |
| Standard 8 | 175 | 16,7 | 38 | 20,7 | 131 | 16,8 | 41 | 8,4 | 385 | 23,4 |
| Standard 9 | 89 | 8,5 | 31 | 16,4 | 27 | 3,9 | 20 | 4,1 | 207 | 12,8 |
| Standard 10 | 255 | 24,3 | 34 | 18,5 | 191 | 26,4 | 46 | 9,4 | 476 | 30,0 |
| Diploma | 91 | 8,7 | 2 | 1,1 | 9 | 1,2 | 20 | 4,0 | 112 | 6,5 |
| Degree | 20 | 1,9 | 1 | 0,5 | 5 | 0,6 | 6 | 1,2 | 41 | 2,6 |
| Post-graduate | 8 | 0,8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0,1 | 1 | 0,2 | 8 | 0,5 |
| Total | 1 049 | 100 | 184 | 100 | 778 | 100 | 450 | 100 | 2 501 | 100 |

Source: IT (Dalla, 48 Moss, and M. Levin, *A profile of the employed and unemployed in Greater Soweto—1993*, Research Report no. 14, Towns Economic Research Unit, Vista University, 1994, p. 19.

of the sample according to qualifications, under formally employed, informally employed, unemployed and economically non-active. Of the formally employed, 61,6% had a Standard 8 or higher qualification, compared with 52,2% of the informally active, 46,7% of the unemployed and 25,3% of the economically non-active. These percentages show a direct relationship between the level of education and the employment success of the population. Only 2% of the formally employed had no qualifications, compared with 22,4% of the economically non-active. This relationship becomes even more pronounced when looking at those with four years and less of formal education (functionally illiterate). Among the formally employed, 5% had a Standard 2 qualification or less, compared with 11,4% of the informally employed, 8,7% of the unemployed and 36% of the economically non-active. This is an indication of the great need in South Africa for more skilled workers, that is, the need for human development.

Household preferences for services and perceptions of accommodation

The legacy of the apartheid system is that there are significant discrepancies between the former white and black urban areas. The white municipal governments functioned with revenue sources more or less sufficient for executing their functions. Black local authorities, by contrast, are faced with

large backlogs in infrastructural services, coupled with a limited tax capacity.²⁷ Some areas within the GJTMCA are therefore much less developed than others (see also Table 1). The pooling of the resources of the former high- and low-income municipalities in the present MSSs may significantly improve services in Greater Soweto. This will depend not only on a larger contribution by those who use the services, but also on breaking the culture of non-payment.²⁸

According to households in Greater Soweto the services provided were generally satisfactory. Of the sampled group, 757 households (95%) indicated that they had water on site. Some 709 households had their own water supply, and only 91 indicated that they shared a tap with others. Only 95 households (12%) indicated that their quality of life would improve if water supply were improved.²⁹ Table 1 shows that 21,6% of all households have no running water inside their homes, 7,6% have no electricity and 33,3% no sewerage systems inside their houses. The need for running water and sewerage systems inside homes is the highest in Mapetla, Chiawelo, Mofolo, Meadowlands and Orlando West. The two areas with the most urgent need for electricity are Chiawelo and Klipspruit.³⁰

Of the total respondents, 743 households (93%) had flush toilets and only 87 households shared a toilet. Only 61 households (8%) indicated that their quality of life would improve if they

had better toilet facilities. The fact that 85 households (10,6%) occupied informal dwellings indicates that in some cases they too had their own flush toilets.³¹ However, according to the 1995 survey, the quality of the service differed significantly in the different suburbs. Dobsonville and Eldorado Park had a 100% service, while the people in Orlando West, Mapetla and Meadowlands mainly used outside toilets (Table 1).

Preference with regard to services was gauged by asking which facilities or services households would prefer in order to improve their quality of life. To help them to prioritize their needs they had an imaginary R50 in multiples of R10 to allocate to these services. Table 5 summarizes the responses of the 800 households. The author acknowledges that the methodology used in this section may present some problems.

The first column of Table 5 lists ten different municipal services. It shows that street lighting is preferred by households as the most important service to improve their quality of life. Second is tarred roads; third high-mast lighting; fourth electricity on site and fifth, water on site. The fact that better lighting would improve security is probably the main reason for the high priority given to this service. Although the rest of the services were perceived by most respondents to be of a relatively fair standard there is, in most cases, room for improvement. Over the last decade poor maintenance and

Table 5 Preferences for services in Greater Soweto in 1993

| Service | Already available | | Amount willing to spend from an available R50 | | | | | Order |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-----|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| | Yes | No | R10 | R20 | R30 | R40 | R50 | |
| Water on site | 757 | 43 | 68 | 25 | 2 | — | — | 5 |
| Sharing a tap | 91 | 709 | 12 | 10 | 2 | — | 2 | 9 |
| Flush toilets | 743 | 57 | 43 | 15 | 2 | 1 | — | 7 |
| Sharing a toilet | 87 | 713 | 10 | 2 | 1 | — | — | 10 |
| Bucket toilet | 50 | 750 | 10 | 4 | 1 | — | 1 | 6 |
| Electricity on site | 739 | 61 | 32 | 58 | 12 | 2 | — | 4 |
| Paved street lighting | 544 | 436 | 127 | 107 | 13 | 12 | 81 | 1 |
| High mast lighting | 505 | 295 | 56 | 31 | 22 | 6 | 43 | 3 |
| Tarred roads | 513 | 287 | 49 | 36 | 70 | 44 | 10 | 2 |
| Gravel roads | 268 | 532 | 7 | 9 | — | — | — | 6 |

Source: J. R. Meir, M. Levin, and J. W. Pienaar. *Income and expenditure patterns of households in Greater Soweto 1993*. Research Report no 43, Soweto Employment Research Unit, Vista University, 1994

administration have resulted mainly from political and other non-economic developments. The rent and services boycotts and the general lack of funding have contributed greatly to the deterioration of these services. Although 64% of the households had tarred roads most of such roads were worse than gravel roads.

Respondents' perceptions of their present accommodation showed that the majority of them were dissatisfied. They felt that the houses were of an inferior quality (66%), the services available on the site were inadequate (62.4%) and the services and bond payments were too high (62.3%).³¹ According to their own perceptions, 98% of the households were in need of subsidized housing. Although only 2.1% of the respondents felt that they could afford to pay R501 or more per month for housing, 19.4% would have preferred a house worth R1 000 or more. This would seem to indicate that some respondents have higher expectations than they can afford.

In 1995 just over 50% of the respondents indicated that they paid rent on their houses. The average rent was R71 per month. The average monthly repayment per household on a bond or loan was R752. Almost 26% of the households in the survey had a mortgage loan.³² Some 17.6% of all households received housing subsidies averaging R465 per month. Households receiving a subsidy on their mortgage bonds were subsidized by an employer (52.1%) or the state (47.7%).

Interestingly, 64.3% of all respondents preferred serviced sites with a view to erecting their own dwellings.³⁴ This is an important finding for the planning of low-income or subsidized housing. Quality of life is also im-



Photographs by Cedric Nyoni

Working on township infrastructure: large numbers of households have neither sewerage, running water nor electricity inside their homes.

Less than 40% of the children receiving education are enrolled in secondary schools.

proved if one has a choice as far as housing is concerned.

Local government transition

For decades the socio-economic quality of life in Africa has been of major concern. Almost no projects initiated from outside the continent could solve problems of quality of life.³⁷

In South Africa, for over forty years local authorities mainly served the interests of the apartheid government with its outspoken commitment to a



policy of separate development for the different racial groups.³⁶ Urban whites were entitled to political, social and other rights in these areas, while urban blacks were denied those same rights.

The events at local government level have contributed in many ways to changes in South Africa in recent years. Many shortcomings of the old system had their origin at this level. Few local authorities had the financial basis, political legitimacy or administrative ability to govern their areas. This meant that they were not in a position to address development challenges.³⁷ There were many protest actions at local level against racially-based local government structures. These actions included rent and/or service charge boycotts, which contributed to the deterioration of the already financially vulnerable local government system.

In future local communities will have to take charge of their own socio-economic development needs, because the only real development is self-development. Government and big business are essential for giving support, but local initiative is the engine driving such development. Wealth is created by people adding value to raw materials and not by government. The transformation process, like all development, is a matter of choice and trade-offs between alternatives.

In terms of the Local Government Transition Act³⁸ the transition will take place in two phases. The first is the pre-interim phase which commenced with the promulgation of the Act and ended with the community elections for local government on 1 November 1995. The second is the interim phase, starting immediately after the first municipal elections and running for three to five years. The present phase in local government is an extended one of rationalization and capacity-building.³⁹

Once established, each local authority can determine its own priorities, set up its own policies and pass its own by-laws within the framework set by the higher authorities.⁴⁰ The new system differs from previous ones in that representatives from political and civic structures participated in formal local government and co-signed the agreement underpinning the transitional order. The racially-based structures of the past are being phased out, either through new amalgamation and new non-racial local authorities, or more gradually through the coordinating committees.

Local authority boundaries needed to be redefined because many black and small local authorities had proved to be unviable and local authorities were politically illegitimate.⁴¹ When racially-based boundaries were redrawn, careful consideration was given to ensuring viable structures. The institutional capacity to manage local structures and development was considered, as well as some socio-cultural factors such as local identity and historical boundaries.

In the demarcation process, socio-economic functionality was also taken into consideration. This includes economic activity, with GDP per capita as indicator; the provision of social and physical infrastructure; spatial considerations such as commuting, migrancy and labour dynamics; and the flow of goods and services.⁴² Economic functionalism, rather than full spatial equality, was considered when determining an adequate economic and financial base. Whereas areas had formerly been separated and managed in terms of racial categories, the demarcation of boundaries now concentrated on geographical and spatial cohesion. The new approach focuses on links between places of work and residence, employment patterns and land use patterns, the utilization of open spaces and the potential revenue bases of the areas.

The development and reconstruction efforts include micro- and macroeconomic policies aimed at making the economy more equitable, efficient and sustainable over the longer term. Managing and planning the amalgamation of local authorities may improve the success of service delivery, as well as financial and administrative issues. This will impact on the development and quality of life of the citizens.

Greater Soweto consisted of the three municipalities of Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow until the 1995 local elections. Since 1 November 1995, Greater Soweto has been divided into three roughly equal parts. These sections were incorporated into three of the four Metropolitan Sub-Structures (MSS) of the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council.⁴³ One part of the former Soweto falls within the Southern MSS (Johannesburg), another, comprising Dobsonville, Meadowlands and a portion of Orlando, within the Western MSS (Roodepoort), and Diepkloof and a large part of the former Soweto under the Northern MSS (Randburg).

Through these changes the biggest dormitory town in South Africa has obtained a significant say in the management and financing of the MSSs.

Initiatives to improve the quality of life at local government level

This section concentrates mainly on the role of local authorities in promoting and developing small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs). Estimates show that in 1994 there were more than 800 000 SMMEs in South Africa. They absorbed about a quarter of the economically active labour force of 15 million people. This was in addition to about 3,5 million people involved in some or other type of survivalist enterprise activity.⁴⁴ The small business sector plays an important role in efforts to meet basic needs and help marginalized groups. These include female heads of households, disabled people and rural families, the elderly and the youth.⁴⁵ The government is committed to structuring its SMME support in such a way that special attention is given to the problems facing disadvantaged enterprises. The success of the SMME sector may therefore have a significant impact on the quality of life of millions of South Africans by creating new employment.

Since the elections of April 1994, economic empowerment and growth have been placed high on the agenda of the Government of National Unity. Facing the problem of millions of unemployed and underemployed people across the nation, the government had to attend to job creation and generating sustainable and equitable growth. SMMEs represent vehicles which may address these challenges.⁴⁶ Throughout the world SMMEs are playing a significant role in absorbing labour, penetrating new markets and generally expanding economies in creative and innovative ways.

South Africa needs a sustainable growth rate of over 5% per year in order to address unemployment and poverty.⁴⁷ In October 1994, the official unemployment rate of the RSA was 32%, or 4 656 076 persons. The corresponding figure for October 1995 was 29,3%, or 4 204 000 persons. The figures varied between 36,9% for black people and 5,5% for white people. In the case of black people the unemployment rate was 28,9% for males and 46,9% for females.⁴⁸ More investment in human capital, machinery and

civil engineering is necessary to create higher and sustainable growth rates. More public investment in transport, telecommunications and basic services is urgently needed in order to improve the living conditions of the country's work force.

The impact of the global economic recession on unemployment has been exacerbated by unique factors inherited from the previous local government system. Local Economic Development may provide a partial solution to the prevailing socio-economic difficulties. For example, community groups and civics need to take on a more pronounced development and job-creation focus.⁴⁹ The government needs to permit, facilitate and encourage the fostering of cooperative agreements among all the major stakeholders in a local society.

South African local authorities realize that they are lagging significantly behind their counterparts in other parts of the world, where most local authorities actively participate in their local economies through policies of municipal entrepreneurialism, that is, direct employment initiatives and economic strategies. They also facilitate local economic development through strategies such as reduced rates, subsidized premises, loan guarantees, business advice, relevant research and local purchasing policies.⁵⁰ They are more directly involved in catering for the daily social and economic needs of their communities than has been the case in South Africa.

Local Business Service Centres (LBSCs) are regarded as key mechanisms to support small businesses by providing information and advice, mentorship contacts, information on training and networking information about development opportunities, and by facilitating subcontracting.⁵¹ LBSCs are locally based and locally managed in order to meet and respond to local needs and requirements. Saco⁵² states that a fundamental paradigm shift is needed, from a service-orientated approach to one in which the local authorities become key social agents. It is now accepted that access to higher-quality business support is a key requirement in South Africa's programme of local, and therefore national, economic development.⁵³

The next section shows that micro-enterprises have received little attention in Johannesburg and even less in Soweto.

Initiatives of the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council to develop and manage SMMEs

Although street-trading has been a feature of Johannesburg's Central Business District from its earliest beginnings, it was actively discouraged and restricted until the early 1980s.⁵⁴ By 1976, there were fewer than 200 black traders legally on the streets of Johannesburg's CBD. During 1979 and 1980 there were still between 200 and 250 hawkers working daily in this area.⁵⁵ During the 1980s and early 1990s, large numbers of people from the rural areas were migrating into urban areas in spite of restrictive legislation. Numerous micro-enterprises were started and certain reform measures had to be introduced.⁵⁶ The Johannesburg City Council responded to these changes with large-scale deregulation and greater tolerance of street-trading. From fewer than 200 licensed traders in 1976, the number increased to 1 004 licensed traders in 1987.

Strict enforcement of the "apartheid-era" by-laws on street trading was relaxed from around 1989. Fewer and fewer prosecutions were issued and followed through. The reasons were manifold, and included the difficulty of tracing persons, the personal risk to the official issuing the fines and the loss of interest by staff who anticipated the removal of most restrictions on street trading. In addition, the Sandton Town Council opened the way for traders to operate in their areas in 1989, encouraging hawking to take place free of restriction.⁵⁷

Street-trading has proliferated across the city centre of Johannesburg, and has increased with the growing unemployment. This has put great pressure on pavement traffic, as streets which carry high volumes of pedestrians also attract the street-sellers.⁵⁸ Crime and environmental deterioration have created a negative attitude towards the city centre.

In 1992, the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) established an Informal Trading Task Group, representative of hawkers' associations, service organizations, business and the City Council. The priority agreed on was to coordinate different perceptions of the problem and arrive at a joint policy, as well as practical and creative solutions. This involved joint negotiation and consultation aimed at adding value to city life, not detracting from it. The

Central Johannesburg Partnership assisted street sellers in obtaining better trading sites through the establishment of informal markets as well as in upgrading street pitches, storage and toilet facilities, electricity and water.⁵⁹

With the promulgation of the Business Amendment Act no 186 of 1993, all previous hawking restrictions fell away on 29 June 1994. This necessitated a more concerted effort at improvement, and therefore appropriate management, of informal trading, with traders included in the decision-making. In January 1994, the CJP established a joint negotiating forum specifically to address the need for new street trading by-laws, to be determined jointly by the City Council, the hawkers' associations, business and formal retailers. The aim was to create a self-policing working framework to successfully manage informal trading and spell out agreed principles of trading and a code of conduct agreed to by all hawkers' associations.⁶⁰ The forum met on a fortnightly basis, and negotiations were concluded and consensus reached in mid-April 1994. The resulting by-laws, with schedules, were approved at the end of April 1994. However, the Council has had limited success in instituting its SMME policy.

The Johannesburg and Sandton Councils put into place processes to create new by-laws in line with the requirements of the new legislation in 1994. However, these were never brought to finality, and in January 1995 the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council resolved to start the process again.⁶¹ A portion of the street trading by-laws was accepted on 8 January 1997, in Provincial Gazette no 311. The second portion will only be promulgated in 1998.

Micro-enterprises have benefited from the lack of by-laws and restrictions since 1994, although the Council generally did not actively manage and promote SMMEs. However, some encouraging developments have since taken place. Two Local Business Service Centres were fully accredited and are active in the Greater Johannesburg area — one in Soweto. The Baralink Development Framework has received R4,2 million from RDP funds for studying of projects in Soweto.⁶² The first Business Improvement District was initiated in August 1995 and is working closely with the informal traders in the area. It has created employment opportunities for a security force of 40 members and a cleaning crew.⁶³ Micro-enterprises

are thus in the process of developing in Gauteng, inclusive of Soweto.

Research by the CJP⁶¹ in 1993 estimated the number of informal traders at between 4 000 and 4 500 in central Johannesburg, inclusive of Hillbrow and Braamfontein. These numbers vary according to time of day, location, day of the week and time of the year. Transportation nodes, such as Park and Westgate stations, the taxi termini around Noord and Wanderers streets and Kazernie, are the most intensive trading areas. Heavy trading also takes place around the Jeppe Street Post Office, the northern end of Diagonal Street and down Eloff Street.

Since the local government elections of 1 November 1995, not enough time has elapsed for an objective assessment of the GJTMC's success in developing and managing SMMEs. Although the policy is in place at central government level, it has still to be implemented at provincial and local level. Soweto is receiving increased attention but much more needs to be done. The following section will consider some of the remaining challenges facing the Council.

Some challenges facing the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council

The best starting point for the Council is to review existing local ordinances, by-laws and regulations to ensure that they go beyond deregulation towards actively promoting the development of micro-enterprises. The Council can assist by supporting the Local Business Service Centres and bringing organizations in the area together into an active framework. It can supply information on the types of services each organization provides to micro-enterprises generally, and street-traders in particular.⁶⁵ Referral to specific organizations for services would then be possible.

Overcrowding on pavements may be diminished by encouraging the vertical movement of micro-entrepreneurs. Businesses with the potential to develop must be assisted to do so. Micro-enterprises that have already expanded beyond survival must be encouraged to move off the streets onto semi-formal or formal business sites.⁶⁶ There are basically two approaches to assisting the owners of such micro-enterprises to overcome the present barriers and constraints: firstly, interventions which would assist the indivi-

dual by improving his/her capacity, and secondly, interventions that could alter the situation or environment in which the business functions. These include the removal of legal restrictions or the provision of infrastructure. Hirschowitz, Orkin & Jennings remark that both individual and larger-scale environmental interventions are needed to help street-trading or micro-enterprises to develop and move beyond being a marginal activity.⁶⁷

Developing the micro-enterprises into successful enterprises is the shared responsibility of government (central, provincial and especially the GJTMC), organized business, labour and civil society. Both the private and public sectors are agents of change and development,⁶⁸ but this principle implies more than participation by big business only. The SMME sector has a large stake in economic reconstruction in South Africa; it forms part of the productive public and private sector partnership. SMMEs operating on their own cannot survive the competition from established firms because of their size, but the support of the Council in conjunction with other relevant agencies may enable cooperation between firms of similar size. Whereas central government took the initiative and developed the National Small Business Enabling Act, local government must now play a more active role, forming partnerships with SMMEs and increasing initiatives to create an enabling environment that will improve the quality of life of all citizens of Greater Soweto.

Active intervention by the Council could include:

- providing more accommodation, sites and premises, including semi-formal structures;
- promoting better understanding of the needs and problems of micro-enterprises by law enforcement agents;
- supplying appropriate infrastructure, including hand-washing facilities, toilets and dustbins;
- encouraging micro-enterprises to become more organized;
- promoting co-operative ventures such as collective buying and bargaining;⁶⁹ and
- establishing facilities for training and educating small businessmen and businesswomen in the essentials of the business world.

In the final analysis, a major factor in the success of micro-enterprises will be their involvement and participation

in local government affairs. In this regard they need improved organization to obtain better representation.

Summary of main findings

The objective of this exercise was to investigate how the new local government system could improve the economic development and quality of life in Greater Soweto. The fact that an unequivocal answer to the question remains elusive, at least at the present stage of South Africa's economic and political development, is an indication of the complexities involved.

The pooling of resources by the former high- and low-income municipalities in the present Metropolitan Sub-Structures could significantly affect the improvement of services in Greater Soweto. This will depend not only on a larger contribution by those who use the services, but also on breaking the culture of non-payment.

Local communities have to take charge of their own development needs. Government and big business can give support, but local initiative will be the driving force in solving local development problems and improving the quality of life of the people. Local authorities must, therefore, become more directly involved in the daily socio-economic needs of the community. High-quality official support to small and micro-enterprises is a key requirement in South Africa's programme of local, and therefore national, economic development.

The Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) has done more in a few months than the City Council did in years to promote negotiations and joint policies aimed at adding quality to city life. However, although central government has put in place some national policies, local and provincial governments have had limited success in instituting their policies. This is understandable, given the fact that local government is still in an extended phase of rationalization and capacity building.

Although some encouraging developments have taken place recently, much more has to be done. Eliminating discrepancies between districts of Soweto, and between Soweto and other suburbs, is one of the challenges facing the Council, while increasing employment opportunities by encouraging micro- and small-business development will greatly improve the quality of life of the Sowetan people.

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Democracy and human rights

A paradox for migration policy

In this article Lloyd B Hill, of the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch, discusses the implications of regional and interregional migration for democracy and human rights and explores possible alternatives to the present policy.

We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to — Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations”

Extract from the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (italics mine).

The purpose of this article¹ is twofold. Its first aim is to provoke a debate on an apparent tension between two of the guiding norms of the new order — democracy and human rights. This tension results from a discrepancy between the levels at which the two concepts operate, and this will be elaborated on in due course. This tension can be observed in a number of foreign and domestic policy contexts, but a full examination of all of these is beyond the scope of this article.² The second purpose is thus to explore this tension within the context of a specific policy issue: transnational migration. Migration is an issue which — perhaps more than any other — is situated within that precarious nexus between domestic and foreign policy. For this reason trends in regional and international migration hold important implications for the choice of appropriate migration strategies, and for the impact

of these within the domestic context of democratic “nation building” and the broader context of Southern African “regional development”.

Over the last three years, migration policy has been criticized for failing to conform to the norms and demands of the new dispensation. The criticisms tend to take one of two forms (or else to be a combination of both). The first is what can be termed a procedural critique; it focuses attention on specific procedural aspects of current policy, without questioning the overall structure or framework within which migration policy is formulated.³ Over the last few years there have been numerous criticisms of the procedures employed by the Department of Home Affairs, as well as the actions of members of the Department.⁴ The second is a more fundamental critique that focuses on the underlying structure of regional migration, and the extent to which this is reflected in migration policy. It is this second critique with which this article is primarily concerned, for here the choice of appropriate policy is related to what Zolberg⁵ has termed the “choice of entity in relation to which the calculus of costs and benefits is to be made”. In other words, this critique is primarily concerned with the construction of an *alternative migration regime*.

The problem associated with the construction of migration regimes in general will be analysed in terms of the historical development of democratic states. Following this, specific attention will be given to the issues raised within migration policy debate in South Africa since 1994. The article will also include a brief analysis of the Draft Green Paper on International Migration.

Over the last few years a number of South African writers have argued that current migration policy:

- is a racist relic inherited from the apartheid regime;⁶
- is attributable, wholly or to a great extent, to the fact that the Minister of Home Affairs is not a member of the majority party;⁷
- is ineffective (specifically the policy of repatriating undocumented migrants);⁸
- is responsible for “dangerously high” levels of xenophobia in the country;⁹
- incorrectly assumes that migrants (including undocumented migrants) cost the country money and undermine the Reconstruction and Development Programme;¹⁰
- focuses too heavily on the prerogative of state sovereignty rather than on the developmental needs of the region;¹¹ and
- is contrary to the Government’s stated commitment to democracy and human rights.¹²

On the grounds of these criticisms, many writers have called for current migration policy to be overhauled and replaced by a more human-rights orientated approach. The first five points vary in accuracy; they will be dealt in the concluding section. The fundamental error that pervades much of the debate on migration, however, is revealed in the last two points, and can be summed up in two broad arguments. Firstly, much of the analysis is based on a superficial understanding of states and state sovereignty. It is too often assumed that states are *passé* and that a process of regional development can proceed by simply constructing a more appropriate transcendent regime. The problem with this type of analysis is that it tends to focus predominantly on the economic interdependence of the region, while ignoring the historical role that states have played in producing organizational capacity and dis-

crete patterns of identity, authority and value distribution. Most significant has been the failure of most recent contributions to address the relationship between democracy (ie popular sovereignty) and immigration policy. The second argument is derived from the final statement, and focuses on what can be described as a tension between democracy and human rights, or more accurately, between competing conceptions of democracy and human rights. Within the context of migration policy, this latter point can best be articulated as a tension between the human rights of migrants and the reconstruction of democratic citizenship. The argument will proceed after a brief analysis of the two key concepts.

State-based democracy in the modern era

The term *democracy* is difficult to define, for it has entered modern lexicons as a powerful legitimating principle in a myriad of differing contexts. The essence of the term can nevertheless be understood by distinguishing between two modes of democratic discourse which, although conceptually distinct, tend to merge in popular parlance. Direct or participative *Democracy*, the etymologically correct notion which has been inherited from the Ancient Greeks, has entered the modern era as a powerful normative invocation of the principles of consent and equality.¹³ The notion of "power to the people" pervades popular culture both as an expression of universal humanity and the ideal of maximum participation of affected people at *all levels* of decision making. In contrast with this, liberal or representative *democracy* is a thoroughly modern concept, developed in the wake of the American and French revolutions, and describes a system of institutional government where decisions are made by elected representatives *on behalf of the people*.¹⁴ In this sense, *democracy* is more of a method than an ideal — a means of effective decision making within a particular context.¹⁵ Defined as such, *democracy* is manifestly *not Democracy*, for it restricts the participation of the people to just *one* periodic decision — whom to elect to rule on their behalf. This conceptual bifurcation of the term helps to explain much of the confusion surrounding its use in popular discourse, where appeals for democracy vacillate between the *Democratic* ideal



It is rather commonly assumed that migrants from South Africa's neighbouring countries harm the economy and undermine the RDP, creating fiercer competition for scarce local resources.

(Photos: Paul Blokland)

of greater participation and the *democratic* reality of institutional limitations. The dominance of *democratic* political institutions in the modern era, while decried by some as a perversion of the ideal, is more probably a reflection on the failure of *Democracy* as an institutional mode of organization in

complex societies. Nevertheless, the continuing normative appeal of *Democracy* is evident from the extension of democratic and quasi-democratic modes of decision making to many sub-state sectors of society. Notions of "grassroots" *Democracy* also facilitated the rise of social *democracy* during the

early part of this century, and the concomitant development of social welfare programmes to contain the socio-economic inequality inherent in the capitalist mode of production.

This conceptual distinction is, however, not sufficient to demonstrate the tension between democracy and human rights. For this we require the empirical observation that the context for the historical development of modern *democracy* is the state. Here the state is defined, in the Weberian tradition, as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”¹⁶ Although this is not empirically true of all states in the global state system, it is true of the most successful states, and is the aspiration of the rest. To the extent that modern states vary in sophistication, they are best defined in terms of organizational capacity, and the most significant historical characteristic of states has been their capacity to *penetrate society, extract resources, regulate* relationships and *appropriate* resources in determined ways.¹⁷ In this sense the modern state precedes the notion of a nation, in that the state is first and foremost an agent of authority within a specific territory, which is invariably legitimized *ex post facto* — both externally, through the acquisition of international sovereignty, and internally, through the extension of its organizational capacities and the construction of an internal ideology of legitimation.¹⁸ The process of extending and legitimating the authority of the state is in effect a nation-building project, and the strategies that have historically been employed to this end vary from genocide to assimilation.

The significance of *democracy* within this context is that it is but one among a variety of historical strategies that have been employed by states in the process of nation building. Alternative strategies of internal legitimation, most notably appeals to divine and traditional authority, have in most parts of the world been replaced by

the currently dominant value system of Western liberalism [in terms of which] a satisfactory answer to the question of territorial legitimacy requires that the population (or at least the great majority of it) should voluntarily agree to live within the state concerned, an agreement which in turn is ideally achieved through a sense of nationhood which binds members of the population to one another, and to the state to which they all belong.¹⁹

While the ascendance of *democracy* over the last two centuries represents the graduation of a particular legitimation strategy and the repudiation of prior strategies, it is — except under conditions of secession or state disintegration — invariably premised on the continuation of the state-building project. Hence the paradox of modern *democracy* is that it can never be instituted *democratically*. A recent paper articulates this point well:

[The] democratic principle does not define the framework within which it operates. For example, a vote for self-determination, a democratic act *par excellence*, takes place within a framework previously established by undemocratic means and principles, generally by tradition, corrected or confirmed by force.²⁰

A good example of this was the transition²¹ to *democracy* in South Africa, which saw a marked change in the composition of the electorate and consequently, the composition of the institutions of government. Far less dramatic has been the impact of the transition on the structure of the state, ie bureaucracy, security forces, legal system and — most obviously — the borders. The advent of *democracy* in South Africa therefore represents the symbolic repudiation of the racism inherent in the colonial and apartheid “nation-building” projects. On another level, however, it is by no means a blanket repudiation of the statecraft that occurred during the previous dispensations. The state has in effect been re-appropriated, and in many spheres is being gradually adapted to address the needs of a *democratic* constituency — it is not being reconstructed *ab initio*. In this sense it is clear that, to the extent that *democracy* has established itself as the dominant political legitimation strategy at the close of the twentieth century, it remains essentially a state-centric phenomenon.

Citizenship and the rise of international human rights

The state-centric nature of *democracy* contrasts sharply with the ideal of a transcendent human rights regime — an ideal embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice. Reitzes has, for example, argued that “classical liberal human rights transcend state boundaries, and consist of a set of “natural” rights which coincide with

the negative civil and political liberties of first generation rights granted to citizens of states.”²² This definition, which is clearly derived from the natural law tradition, emphasizes the importance of human rights as a moral phenomenon — a set of extant universal imperatives to be used when scrutinizing the actions of states. The natural law tradition is, however, *only one* strand in the history of the modern human rights tradition. The following section will trace the history of three additional sources of this universal conception of human rights, all of which derive from the liberal tradition:

- The first is the notion of citizenship, which has evolved from the traditional liberal conception of the state as an essentially negative entity, ie the state as the guarantor, but not the progenitor, of rights. This *laissez-faire* approach to rights is anachronistic in the context of twentieth century political and economic developments, but continues to register significant support in modern liberal democracies.
- The second is the growth of human rights traditions within the industrialized democracies, which are in turn largely the product of judicial activism, ie the tendency of the judiciary, particularly within constitutional democracies, to counter the populist and nationalist inclinations of national legislatures.
- The third is the growth of an international human rights juridical tradition (in the form of the United Nations, the World Court and, specifically in terms of migration, the development of refugee law), which ostensibly represents a move towards a transcendent human rights authority. It will be argued that although during the latter half of this century we have witnessed the development of an international human rights regime, this is largely the product of a highly institutionalized and hegemonic consensus among advanced liberal and democratic states, and as such represents a patchy approximation of international consensus on human rights issues. This is particularly evident in the development of the global refugee regime.

Each of these trends will be dealt with in succession.

Citizenship, employment and migration

Although numerous moral traditions have helped to forge contemporary notions of human rights, the codification of these rights is a relatively recent phenomenon which coincided historically with the rise of liberal democratic states, and the concomitant development of democratic citizenship and civil rights. As Du Toit has argued:

[Civil rights] which comprise a range of privileges, claims, duties and obligations individuals hold against the *state*, emerged not in abstract, but from specific conflicts in the process of European state-building (original italics).²⁵

The notion of civil rights as an essentially negative construct emerged from the kiln of nineteenth century European nationalism and industrial development — an age in which liberty, not equality, was the leitmotif of newly industrialized societies. Citizenship, to the extent that the notion is applicable, was at this time the privilege of the industrial bourgeoisie. It was a commonplace among classical liberals of the period that democracy (ie the extension of the rights of citizenship to the working class) was incompatible with capitalism.²⁴ For this reason negative rights in the bourgeois state meant non-interference with bourgeois factors of production — not the least of which was untrammelled labour mobility. Freedom of movement for the urban proletariat meant little more than the right to seek a better pittance in the mines, mills and dockyards of the bourgeois economy. The twentieth century witnessed a growing awareness of a fundamental paradox in the classical liberal conception of labour: how can an individual be both a commodity in an unregulated labour market, and a citizen of the liberal state, entitled to civil, social and political rights?²⁵ This contradiction was heightened by the economic and political crises that beset Europe during the first half of the century. In the wake of these crises, two fundamental changes were made to the notion of citizenship. The first was the gradual change in the composition of citizenship, as the working classes were gradually incorporated into the framework of bourgeois democracy. The inclusion of the working classes gave greater impetus to claims for equality and social justice, which in turn led to a broadening of the scope of citizenship, through the addition of socioeconomic rights to the

civil and political rights that had defined citizenship in the nineteenth century.²⁶

Thus, as the *laissez-faire* state gave way to the welfare state, a new notion of social *democratic* citizenship was forged around the expectations of domestic populations for specific economic entitlements. This has been one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, and has fundamentally altered both the nature and function of the modern *democratic* state. Most important in this respect was the development of the state's capacity for effective appropriation, ie the provision of welfare benefits to all citizens. In the states that constitute the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, government expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product grew from less than 10% before World War Two to 28.5% in 1955. Welfare spending became the most important component of Government expenditure.²⁷ Concerns for welfare expenditure and increased sensitivity on the part of democratic governments to the employment needs of the domestic population both served to sharpen the distinction between citizens and non-citizens. E H Carr described it well:

The middle-class governments of the 19th century, concerned with the importance of cheap and abundant labour to swell the tide of production and profits, had been under no political compulsion to give prior consideration to the wage-levels and standards of living of their own workers... Now the prohibition was imposed, contrary to the patent interests of employer and capitalist, almost without opposition.²⁸

The development of social democracy is therefore historically associated with the first significant attempts on the part of states to regulate the influx of non-citizens. Thus, the era of unrestricted economic migration ended after 1919,²⁹ as all major industrial countries closed their national borders to large-scale immigration.

In addition to the exclusionary effects of citizen politics, it has become clear that twentieth century economic developments have had a similar impact on global migration. Persistent unemployment has been an abiding feature of capitalist development in the latter part of this century — particularly within developing states.³⁰ Most significant has been the decline in manufacturing employment, and the inability of the "post-industrial" sector to compensate for this. In addition to

this, the stratification of employment in modern economies has had a differential effect on migration. Specific shortages often occur in new industries, but the skills levels required for new technologies outstrip existing educational and training provisions.³¹ The effect has been the sensitization of governments to the human capital needs of the state *and* the employment concerns of the citizenry.³² Different levels of development and employment have resulted in a conflict between the migration agendas of receiving and sending states. Richer countries strive to restrict the influx of unskilled labour, while poorer countries — which host most of the unskilled and unemployed workers — tend to adopt labour export policies. This, it will be argued, is increasingly true of Southern Africa.

Legislatures, courts and rights in industrial democracies

While most analyses of international migration draw heavily on global disparities between states to explain growing population movements, it has been argued that North-South imbalances are significant factors, but not sufficient to explain recent immigration trends. An important additional factor has been political developments within the major receiving countries — particularly the growth of rights-based liberalism. The development of human rights policies has served to undermine the traditional notion of citizenship, and has thereby limited the migration strategies available to states. A recent comparative study of immigration argues as follows:

It is the confluence of *markets and rights* that explains much of the contemporary difficulty of immigration control in Europe and the United States... Recent efforts by democratic states to regain control of their borders all point to a gradual recognition that effective control of immigration requires a rollback of civil and human rights for non-citizens.³³

The growing emphasis on human rights in the industrialized democracies represents a shift in the arena of political conflict from elected legislatures to courts. This is particularly evident in the United States (in the aftermath of the civil rights revolution), but has also been evident in a number of European states (notably France and Germany).³⁴ This liberal trend has helped to mitigate xenophobia in many receiving

states, although it has not resolved the paradox that migration presents to democratic states. A recent comparative study of migration trends and policies in a number of receiving states makes the following observations:

- There is a growing similarity among industrialized labour-importing countries in terms of policy instruments, efficacy of control, social integration policies and general-public reactions to immigration;
- there is a growing gap between the *goals* of immigration policy and the results of policy, leading to greater public hostility to immigrants in general.³⁵

As policy is traditionally the domain of elected democratic legislatures and executives, the policy gap referred to above suggests an intra-democratic conflict between (and within) popular institutions (eg legislatures) and rights-orientated institutions (eg judiciaries). This in turn suggests that international migration is forcing most of the industrial democracies to revisit a classical theme in the history of liberal democracy: the tension between the rights of majorities and minorities. Current evidence suggests that migration is less of a political issue in democratic states with pluralist political cultures than in states with strong majoritarian and assimilationist traditions.³⁶

Human rights and the international refugee regime

Critics of the state-centric approach often refer to the growing tendency on the part of modern states — particularly during the latter part of this century — to cede significant areas of sovereignty to transnational regimes. They point to the growing interconnectedness of the global economy: “globalization” has produced expansive and expanding networks of transnational trade and industrial organizations. Transnational regimes, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, facilitate the relatively free flow of capital and goods across national borders. It cannot be denied that on many fronts the traditional autonomy that the state has enjoyed within the international economy has been eroded, and yet it is noteworthy that the one sphere in which most states have actively striven to retain their autonomy is perhaps the most significant — the sphere of mi-

grant labour.³⁷ Why is this so? If states are increasingly ready to countenance liberalized traffic in other factors of production, why hold out on labour? The concept of free movement of labour, as has already been noted, is not unprecedented. The so-called “immigrant nations”, in particular, allowed unrestricted movement of labour during the formative years of nineteenth century capitalism. Isn’t that what made America great? The answer seems to be that unencumbered labour migration played a definite role in the development of states under the conditions of early capitalism, as explained above, but that subsequent political and economic changes have fundamentally altered the profile of migration in the late twentieth century.

When states attempt to resolve the liberal paradox, when they begin to assert the political rights of workers (and people in general) over and above their status as factors of production in the global economy, then the stage is set for a dramatic change in the structure of international migration. To state it more specifically, the liberal paradox reasserts itself at the level of the global economy when democratic states seek both to extend the sphere of rights to their own citizens and promote global consensus on the need for transnational human rights, while simultaneously failing to accept the full economic consequences of this endeavour. The most significant implication of an incomplete international human rights regime (ie one that defers to the demands of states, rather than individuals) is that people will tend to move from a rights-abrogating *region* (be it an oppressive state or anarchic territory) to a rights-respecting (and invariably democratic) *state*. The consequent desire on the part of the rights-respecting states to contain the perceived costs of transnational migration leads to the creation of a mechanism for prioritizing and screening rights applicants. In the aftermath of World War Two such a screening mechanism was developed, and premised on the distinction between economic migrants and political refugees.

The second major wave of transnational migration took the form of an exodus of refugees from Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.³⁸ World War Two witnessed death, destruction and population dislocation on a scale that was unprecedented in history. A concern to prevent the repetition of conflicts on this scale led to a number of

transnational initiatives aimed at moderating the conflict potential of nationalism. In the field of migration the most significant development of this period was the crystallization of the notion of “refugee”. A refugee is defined by the United Nations Convention as:

a person who, owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.³⁹

This prevailing definition of refugee remains essentially state-centric, inasmuch as it places emphasis on the “country” as the primary agent of persecution or protection.⁴⁰ The reasons mentioned in the definition are also essentially political, as the UN Convention makes no provision for economic refugees. The rationale that informed the decision to adopt this definition during the post-war period was clear: migration of the period was largely political and the creation of an international refugee regime (in the form of the UN High Commission for Refugees) was designed to facilitate the reconstruction of the ravaged European state system. When this regime was ultimately extended⁴¹ to include refugees from outside Europe, the intention was to make the status of refugee exceptional.⁴² The logic of this decision seems to be that the survival of an international refugee regime — which is premised on the maintenance of the international state system — is contingent upon the political and economic support of the rich industrial democracies. Thus despite the growth of liberal human rights cultures in the industrial democracies, and the overflow effect that this has had on the international system, the global state system remains essentially illiberal. Despite the impact of economic globalization, therefore, the global state system remains primarily a process of regulating economic migration, ie states sustain the structure of global inequality.⁴³ Largely for this reason, there exists no international migration regime, and the refugee regime that does exist remains very exclusive.

Economic migration in Southern Africa

In a recent work, Bill Paton⁴⁴ has argued that most current approaches to

the study of Southern African migration are “too structural”, tending to ignore the role of the state in generating and regulating population flows. Paton argues that the historical record of the last century shows a “radical gain” in state autonomy with respect to labour export, and that this is particularly evident in the labour-exporting policies of many Southern African states. This contrasts with the demand-centric model of regional migration that has been fostered by numerous writers,⁴⁵ wherein extraterritorial labour migration is attributed almost wholly to the rapacious demands of the South African mining sector. Interstate complicity during the apartheid era is never seriously contemplated, and the result is the tendency to assume that neighbouring states are virtually powerless with regard to control of migrant labour.

Paton outlines a three-stage progression towards autonomy in labour-export policy making. During the first stage regional administrations owed their allegiance to the colonial state or, as in the case of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the British South Africa Company. During the first half of this century two migration regimes were in operation. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia served as labour reserves for the mining economy of Southern Rhodesia, while the High Commission territories supplied the mines of the Witwatersrand. Mozambique was split along the 22nd parallel, with Southern Rhodesia recruiting in the North and South Africa recruiting in the South. The second stage saw a shift in the orientations of regional administrations towards the interests of internal capital. During these two stages the functions of the incipient states were almost wholly concerned with taxation and migration, with the former being used to induce/force Africans to join the European economy. Both stages occurred under a condition of regional labour shortage, when the coercive efforts of colony and company had not yet succeeded in producing the free flow of labour required for industrial development. The third stage was reached when a region-wide surplus of labour at given wages led to a significant level of unemployment. Regional administrations were freed from the responsibility of distributing labour among competing employers, and began to formulate labour export policies to suit the concerns of the emerging governments.

Labour surplus occurred in the late 1950s, and in the 1960s many of the newly independent states began to restrict the inflow of foreign labour. Labour surplus and the resultant unemployment shifted the balance of negotiating power in favour of the employing state. South Africa remained the only country to actively recruit foreign labour, thus heightening the sense of regional dependence. Many governments emphasized the need for self-reliance, but the official positions belied the reality of a more nuanced *modus vivendi* between South Africa and the region. Countries with a history of labour supply sought to maximize their revenues from migration. The most noticeable example is Mozambique, which has historically derived much revenue from the system of deferred pay. Paton also argues that the international politicization of labour supply during this period has served to emphasize the internal politics of labour migration. Nowhere is this more evident than in Lesotho, where the legitimacy of the state is owed largely to its position (and administrative function) within a broader labour supply regime. Examples such as these demonstrate the extent to which sending administrations played a significant part in maintaining the system of oscillating migration.

The tendency towards labour exportation can also be seen in recent SADC immigration initiatives. In 1995, just prior to South Africa's admission to SADC, the organization announced a *Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons*. The hopelessly optimistic document called for the phased dissolution of state borders within SADC over a period of ten years. The drafters of the Protocol made the assumption that free movement of people is a necessary prerequisite of regional integration and development. Nevertheless, as the experiences of regional integration initiatives elsewhere in the world have shown, freedom of movement is a long-term product of effective regional integration — which has thus far only been achieved in the European Union. This year, once it had become clear that South Africa would not ratify the Protocol, it was replaced by a more moderate *Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community*.⁴⁶ The 1995 initiative seems to have been drafted more out of a concern to redistribute regional unemployment than from a clearly de-

fining process of regional development. What this process has demonstrated is the extent of the migration policy gap⁴⁷ between South Africa and neighbouring states in the region. This gap is the product of both structural features (eg colonialism and apartheid) and state features (eg organizational incapacity, failed policies and corruption in regional governments).

Illegal immigration in South Africa

A failure to fully appreciate the role of the state also seems to pervade many of the recent analyses of South African immigration policy since 1994. Many South African writers have been quick to criticize the dynamic of continuity in migration policy over the last three years, but few have seriously tried to explain it. Some have presented current immigration policy as an unfortunate aberration — a glitch in a series of otherwise progressive policy achievements on the part of the newly elected Government. In particular, the policy of controlling borders and repatriating illegal immigrants has been portrayed as a violation of the Government's commitment to human rights and democracy. Simplistic moral critiques nevertheless belie the complexity of migration issues in the post-apartheid period, and the dilemma facing policy makers in the new Government. Current migration policy, when seen in a comparative and historical perspective, is anything but an aberration. Rather, it conforms to the general trend among receiving states to control the flow of transnational economic migrants. This may be interpreted as a breach of human rights (although this is not self-evident), but it is certainly not inconsistent with *democracy* (particularly the model of *democracy* that is based on a majoritarian electoral process, and which emphasizes government accountability to a core constituency). What we are currently witnessing in South Africa is the consolidation of the new democracy, and this process is essentially concerned with the reconstruction of citizenship. This process entails the extension of the rights and obligations of citizenship, where the former are defined in terms of civil and political rights, and the provision of equal benefits to the population from the goods and services generated by society: wealth, income, education, health, housing, information, leisure time, etc.⁴⁸ The lat-

ter is particularly important in dealing with the question of illegal immigration.

One of the most common criticisms of current immigration policy (cited above) is that it assumes that illegal immigrants place a financial burden on the economy. While it is probably impossible to devise a methodology that would effectively measure the economic impact of illegal immigration, three international trends (which are particularly strong in Southern Africa) suggest that this assumption has at least prima-facie validity.

- Illegal immigrants are invariably unskilled and therefore tend to compete with South Africans in the informal sector, as well as economically active South Africans who are unemployed.⁴⁹
- Illegal immigration, for reasons described above, is largely attributable to varying levels of unemployment between countries. This is particularly true of Southern Africa, where a region-wide labour surplus has persisted since the 1960s.⁵⁰ Regional unemployment is perhaps the most significant factor influencing the conflicting migration agendas of states and regional organizations.⁵¹
- The impact of illegal immigration on the economy of the receiving state is not just a function of differing wage levels and unemployment, but also stems from differences in the provision of *public goods* between countries.⁵²

This last point has been neglected in many recent analyses, and goes to the heart of the tension between a rights-based immigration policy and the demands of democratic citizenship. Maxine Reitzes has, for example, argued that the state should consider reserving second-generation (socioeconomic) rights for citizens, while extending first-generation (civil) rights to all people, irrespective of citizenship. This, she says, will do away with the need for restrictive border and repatriation measures.⁵³ The problem with this argument is that when a state adopts a comprehensive social democratic programme, such as the RDP, in which a significant proportion of fiscal expenditure is channelled into public or indivisible goods (such as improved infrastructure, public welfare facilities, free education etc) it becomes extremely difficult to make a practical dis-

inction between first- and second-generation rights. An operative distinction between the rights of citizens and denizens would be feasible only if the state were to significantly decrease its current level of public spending, but this would be inconsistent with the Government's commitment to a social democratic model of development.

Coming to America

Immigration in the twentieth century, unlike that in other periods, is more transregional than transcontinental. Any attempt to analyse and prescribe migration policy within the context of a democratic South Africa must therefore be grounded on a comparative analysis of the migration strategies that have historically been employed by different receiving states. In the wake of the Green Paper debate, South African migration policy has become a fiercely contested terrain, although many of the policy critiques have been conspicuous for their lack of comparative content. Given the relatively weak state of comparative migration research in South Africa, many of the critiques are implicitly based on assumptions drawn from the experiences of countries prominent in international migration literature, particularly the immigrant nations,⁵⁴ such as the United States of America. One of the more comprehensive comparative studies that has appeared to date argues explicitly that "South Africa has more to learn from the immigration history and policies of the United States than from European history and practice."⁵⁵ There are indeed a number of contextual similarities between the United States and South Africa, the most salient of which are the following:

- a colonial history in which migration discourse forms part of a broader debate on national identity;
- demographic pluralism, where issues of race, culture and class feature prominently in migration debates; and
- contrasting histories of legal and illegal immigration, where the latter takes the form of clandestine economic migration which is largely the product of economic disparity between adjacent states.

The latter is particularly relevant to the debate on South African policy. In terms of legal immigration, the United States has one of the most liberal mi-

gration policies in the world — admitting about 850 000 immigrants annually. The United States also has a history of attempts to control, through border patrols and repatriation, the flow of illegal immigrants across its southern border. Like other democracies, it has experienced growing difficulties in implementing this policy. One of the key reasons is the growth of rights-based liberalism (referred to earlier) and debates on whether more immigrants should be allowed into the country. While many argue that immigrants in general benefit the United States, others argue that the existence of a liberal tradition of *legal* immigration necessitates measures to counteract *illegal* immigration.⁵⁶ It is argued that if the US has failed to effectively control illegal immigration, this is partially the result of "benign neglect" on the part of US policy makers. One of the most significant reasons for this is that the American economic and social system, unlike that of other industrial democracies, tends to defer the integration costs of immigration. Among the industrial democracies the United States has one of the weakest social democratic traditions, which makes it easier to argue that the benefits of immigration outweigh the costs.⁵⁷ The relatively weak trade union tradition and the powerful influence of American business on the formation of immigration policy are indicators of this.⁵⁸ This is a crucial difference between the situation in the United States and in South Africa, which indicates that attention should be given to the social democratic experiences of other receiving states. One of the most interesting comments on South African immigration has been attributed to a Zairean national:

We are here to remind South Africans that they live in Africa, not America: although if this place wasn't a lot like America, I doubt many of us would be here.⁵⁹

This statement poignantly captures the paradox facing migration policy makers.

Immigration and democracy: a dilemma for policy makers

The dilemma facing migration policy makers in South Africa can now be demonstrated by revisiting the criticism levelled at current policy. The claim that current migration policy was inherited from the apartheid regime is true inasmuch as the Aliens Control

Act was passed prior to the 1994 elections. However, given that one of the essential features of the democratic transition was legislative continuity between the old and the new orders, the existence of the Aliens Control Act alone does not justify the argument that current policy is an artefact of apartheid. This argument also fails to account for the fact that the recent Aliens Control Amendment Act, which essentially tightens existing immigration controls, was passed by the democratically elected Parliament. Policy is made up of more than the legislation upon which it is based and it has become clear over the last three years that current migration policy is the product of factors inherited from apartheid and anti-immigration orientations within the new Government.

Similarly, the argument that attributes current migration policy to the fact that the Minister of Home Affairs is not a member of the ANC is simplistic. In a study conducted under the auspices of the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch, questions relating to migration were put to opinion leaders in a number of key South African sectors.⁶⁰ A factor analysis⁶¹ of the 15 questions on migration produced two distinct patterns of response:

- A refugee factor (questions referring to refugees fleeing political and religious persecution, civil war and poverty), and
- An illegal immigration factor (questions referring to the impact of illegals on the economy, border control, repatriation and the penalization of employers that hire illegals)

These questions were then used to compile indexes based on the two categories of migrants. The results of a cross-tabulation of these indexes with political party affiliation are presented in Table 1, which demonstrates that with the exception of the ANC, all of the listed parties are negatively disposed to both illegal immigrants and refugees. The relatively high level of opposition to illegal immigrants in all the parties is noteworthy, and mirrors similar trends at grassroots level. From Table 1 it is also clear that the ANC⁶² is the most liberal towards both categories of immigrants. This clearly indicates a higher normative commitment to the subcontinent among the ANC leadership — a fact which is also reflected in ANC responses to statements

Table 1 Percentage positive response of opinion leaders⁶⁰ to refugees and illegal immigrants (negative response in parentheses)

| | Refugees | Illegal immigrants |
|-------|-------------|--------------------|
| ANC | 68.9 (6.7) | 18.5 (65.0) |
| DP | 5.1 (74.9) | 3.6 (75.2) |
| IFP | 14.2 (66.6) | 9.3 (75.0) |
| FF | 2.0 (86.2) | 1.0 (99.0) |
| GP | 39.8 (38.2) | 8.2 (81.1) |
| Other | 20.0 (57.1) | 5.7 (88.2) |

referring to SAIC in Table 2. It is often speculated that this may be influenced by the experiences of former exiles in neighbouring states, although controlling for exile status produced no significant differences in the attitudes of former exiles and non-exiles. Nevertheless, the most significant finding is the contrasting attitudes of ANC respondents to illegal immigrants and refugees. This can be seen in both tables above. This pattern of response seems to indicate two things:

- firstly, ANC respondents are committed to a distinction between the categories of illegal immigrant and refugee, and
- secondly, ANC respondents are relatively divided on where to draw the line between illegal immigrants and refugees.

The latter point is particularly significant when one considers that a key aspect of the migration debate in South Africa is the extent to which illegal immigrants (read economic refugees) can (or should) be distinguished from refugees. The first and second statements in Table 2 correspond with the conventional UN and OAU definitions of *refugee*, cited above. It is clear from the table that the overwhelming majority of ANC respondents are in agreement with these. Not so for statement

5, which shows a slight majority of respondents in favour of extending protection to economic refugees. A similar lack of consensus can be seen for the statement on 'free movement of people', while the final statement demonstrates a clear majority in favour of repatriating illegal work seekers. This lack of consensus on appropriate strategies is no doubt an important factor influencing current immigration policy. One cannot deny that current policy is also influenced by the division of labour within the Government of National Unity — the IFP⁶³ is clearly a lot more conservative on immigration than the ANC. Nevertheless, conservative statements from high-ranking ANC members⁶⁴ and the relatively small number of significant debates on illegal immigration during the last three years seem to suggest that policy has been the result of a *modus vivendi* between the two remaining parties within the GNU.

The growth of negative sentiment towards illegal immigrants among the general population has probably also had a significant impact on current policy. A number of recent studies have found that the majority of South Africans favour stricter control of illegal immigration — and this holds irrespective of race or political party.⁶⁶ In conjunction with the lack of consensus within the ANC, the high level of popular opposition to immigration has probably also had an effect on current policy. Given the high priority that the ruling party places on our relationship with the region, its reluctance to act is understandable in the face of what seems to be a clear constituency for immigration control.

Popular opposition to immigration has been cited in much of the recent literature as an indication of rising xenophobia in South Africa. The term

Table 2 Responses of ANC Respondents to selected migration issues

| | Agree | Unsure | Disagree |
|---|-------|--------|----------|
| 1 SA should provide refuge to people who are fleeing civil war and ethnic conflict | 85.2 | 9.6 | 5.1 |
| 2 SA should accommodate people who are fleeing political and religious persecution | 83.0 | 8.1 | 8.1 |
| 3 SA policy on immigration should concure with the policies of regional organisations such as SADC | 71.1 | 29.0 | 7.8 |
| 4 SA and its neighbours should adopt a policy of free movement of people | 38.5 | 39.7 | 49.9 |
| 5 SA should provide refuge to citizens of neighbouring states who are fleeing conditions of poverty | 35.0 | 21.7 | 40.7 |
| 6 SA should use a non-lethal electrical fence to control the influx of illegal immigrants | 43.0 | 19.3 | 37.1 |
| 7 People that cross SA's borders illegally in search of work should be repatriated | 65.2 | 14.8 | 20.0 |

itself is seldom clearly defined or operationalized, but is generally used to represent an aggregation of “negative” attitudes towards illegal immigration, ranging from a qualified support for immigration control to indiscriminate violence directed at foreigners — irrespective of their legal status. It is by no means obvious that this spectrum-conceptualization of xenophobia is valid,⁶⁷ but let us assume for the moment that it is. If xenophobia is defined simply as a negative attitude towards foreigners, then it must be accepted that a minimum level of xenophobia is a quintessential feature of democratic citizenship — particularly in social democratic states where a government strives to appropriate resources to counteract inequality *within* a defined population. Given region-wide disparities in wealth, democratic citizenship represents a claim for greater redistribution *within* a state, and can only be effectively achieved if relative inequality *between* states is held more or less constant. For the population, democratic citizenship is in a sense a collective claim to the resources of the state. For the government, the democratic citizenry is the source of the prevailing mandate and the ultimate judge of the successful implementation thereof. Both have a vested interest in ensuring that the constitution of citizenship does not change too dramatically.

This brings us to the last few unresolved criticisms of South African migration policy. One of the most common criticisms is that immigration control strategies are ineffective, that is, they ultimately fail to keep migrants out. There are at present numerous shortcomings in current policy — some of which are dealt with in the discussion on the Draft Green Paper. Nevertheless, here again one must clearly define what is implied by the term “successful immigration control”. If by effective one means the ability to prevent all prospective immigrants from entering the country, then the criticism is clearly valid. Nevertheless, a true estimation of the relative effectiveness of control strategies would require a comparison of migration trends before and after a significant relaxation of immigration control (which in turn would require consensus on a methodology for counting illegals). In other words, if the South African Government took a decision to suspend immigration control completely, would it lead to a significantly greater influx of people from neighbouring states? This

question cannot clearly be answered, although the intuitive assumption of governments — based on the reality of economic disparity between states — is that it would.

The Draft Green Paper on international migration

This brief analysis is based on the Draft Green Paper on International Migration, which was released in May 1997.⁶⁸ The overall impression gained is of a genuine attempt to deal with international migration more proactively than has been the case during the course of the last three years. Three aspects of the paper are worthy of special mention in this regard.

- Firstly, the recommendation that separate policy frameworks be constructed for dealing with immigrants and refugees brings South Africa into line with international practice and is the logical corollary of our earlier accession to the UN and OAU Refugee Protocols.
- Secondly, the recommendation that the Department of Home Affairs focus specifically on matters of citizenship and immigration (and hence be renamed the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Services) should help to prioritize and streamline immigration administration. Aspects of immigration policy are, however, invariably shared by numerous departments, and the new Bill should clearly define these competencies. The recommended institution of an Independent Review Board should enhance the overall transparency of the system.
- Thirdly, the recommended introduction of a points system for screening potential immigrants would be a significant improvement on the current practice of evaluating persons individually on the basis of perceived market need. The points system has been adopted by numerous receiving states as a means of maximizing the human resource needs of the state while simultaneously minimizing the applicant's risk of being subjected to the arbitrary discretion of an immigration official.

There are a number of weaknesses in the Draft Green Paper, but it is important that these be prefaced with a few

remarks about the process employed in the drafting of the document. The document was drafted by a task group drawn from various sectors of South African society, and in drafting this paper the team had access to numerous submissions from local and international academics. By far the most contentious issue in the South African migration debate is the issue of undocumented or illegal immigration, and there have been reports that this has been a matter of considerable contention within the task group as well. As indicated earlier, there is clearly a considerable lack of consensus on the issue of illegal immigration within policy circles, and the Green Paper's treatment of the matter clearly represents an attempt to reach a compromise on an extremely vexing policy issue. It is clear from the choice of nomenclature that the drafters of the Green Paper are keen to downplay the issue of undocumented immigration. If the watchword of the old migration dispensation was “control”, then that of the new dispensation would seem to be “plan”. The intent seems to be to redefine those who have historically been controlled (illegal immigrants) in terms of some socially more acceptable category (planned temporary migrants). Although this is in keeping with the stated commitment to the construction of a human rights-orientated policy, it would seem that in much of its analysis of immigration the Green Paper has semantically side-stepped a number of important problems facing the implementation of such a policy framework. A few examples will suffice:

- Firstly, the Green Paper bases much of its analysis on the tenuous distinction between temporary transnational “migrants” and permanent “immigrants.” The intention seems to be to create a conceptual framework to allow “controlled temporary access” for SADC workers. Nevertheless both domestic and international trends suggest that the distinction will blur with time. The distinction between permanent and temporary immigration in South Africa was in the past a product of discrimination (as the Green Paper has also pointed out): temporary migration was restricted to black males in a limited number of industries. Now that the Green Paper seeks to relegate these forms of discrimination to history, how will we make this operative distinction? A migration

policy premised on a practical distinction between permanent and temporary immigration in the new South Africa seems analogous to the German *gastarbeiter* programme, which turned out to be a lot less temporary than was intended.⁶⁹ Comparative experience suggests that temporary migration strategies in rights-respecting receiving states tend to fail, owing to the development of internal migration networks (eg through friends and family reunification).⁷⁰

■ Secondly, while the policy framework is clearly based on a distinction between skilled and unskilled immigrants, the Green Paper downplays the significance of this distinction. What should, for example, be read into the following statement? "Furthermore, we recommend that SADC citizens should have freer access to South Africa, but in very specific and well-regulated areas. While new immigration policies would apply to SADC also (ie the point system and proactive skills immigration) we are wary of actively raiding the skills of Africa which are valued, necessary for domestic development and already depleted. Instead, we argue that the primary means of access to South Africa of SADC citizens should be temporary, where there is a clear mutual benefit, and does not violate South African labour laws and employment standards."⁷¹ This section demonstrates a clear conflation of the issues. The points system is patently intended to prioritize skilled immigrants and screen out unskilled immigrants, irrespective of country of origin. Temporary access (through quotas) on the other hand represents a concession to a limited number of unskilled immigrants from SADC. International migration accounting in the late twentieth century classes skilled immigrants as an asset and unskilled immigrants as a liability. As the regional receiving state, South Africa stands to benefit from the former even as it struggles to control the latter. The Green Paper therefore evades the problem of competing migration agendas on the subcontinent.

Conclusion

The paradox alluded to in the first part

of this paper can be rearticulated as follows. Modern *democracy* requires a conceptual and institutional base, and for better or for worse, the unit of *democracy* at the close of the twentieth century remains the state. There has been a clear correlation between the historical development of democracy and the rise of an international human rights tradition — and this is particularly evident in the role that *democratic* states have played in fostering a transnational human rights regime (South Africa is a relatively new novice in this club). Nevertheless, the international system remains premised on the sovereignty of states, not *democratic* states, and a number of these states have particularly pernicious human rights records. The solution, proffered by many, is to rein in the rogue states through international measures and institutions designed to limit the adverse effects of sovereignty. In order to do this without abrogating the normative precepts of *Democracy*, states need to be incorporated into a larger (and ultimately global) unit of *democracy*.

The problem with this process is that *democratic* states tend to be as protective of their sovereignty as non-democratic states — and with good reason. The most advanced *democracies* in the world tend to be relatively developed and affluent social *democratic* states, imbued with both the normative commitment *and the capacity* to serve the interests of a defined citizenry. These interests have been defined historically in terms of civil, political and socioeconomic rights. In the presence of other states less committed and/or less capable of looking after the rights of their domestic populations, social democracies tend to attract foreign nationals — and this in turn tends to produce a constituency for immigration control.

Recent trends in both immigration and popular reaction to immigrants suggest that South Africa fits the general pattern of a receiving state outlined above. This in turn suggests that an overly ambitious human rights approach to migration will invariably come into conflict with the exigencies of the new democracy. To adapt a metaphor used by Wilmot James, the choice of appropriate human rights software must be determined by the capacity of the newly acquired institutional hardware.⁷² One of the most pressing problems facing both South Africa and Southern Africa today is that of building institutional capacity. Ab-

stract and for the most part ahistorical notions of human rights do not facilitate this process. In the formulation of domestic policy, the rights of non-citizens need to be carefully specified and evaluated in terms of the state's capacity to deliver.

This then is the paradox that migration presents to South African policy makers. Human rights and democracy are not intrinsically contradictory notions — indeed, the notion of human rights is a logical extension of the rights ethos that developed within modern liberal *democracies*. It reflects the normative ideal of *Democracy*, and is derived from a broader humanist project — the quest for a transcendent human identity. The tension is therefore a contemporary phenomenon: the incompatibility of transnational human rights and the prevailing organizational logic of *democracy* — the logic of the state.

Notes and references

- 1 The financial assistance of the Centre for Science Development (HSRC, South Africa) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the Centre for Science Development.
- 2 For a nuanced critique of human rights in foreign policy, see R Suttner, "Foreign policy and the promotion of human rights and democracy", *Towards Democracy*, First Quarter, 1996, pp 16–18.
- 3 A very good example of this is Jonathan Klaaren's detailed analysis of immigration procedures within the Department of Home Affairs. Klaaren's paper seems (justifiably) to have had a significant impact on the first draft of the International Migration Green Paper. See Jonathan Klaaren, "Institutional reform and immigration management", located at http://www.anc.org.za:80/govdocs/green_papers/migration/klaaren.html, 1997.
- 4 Particularly significant has been the number of reports of corruption on the part of Departmental officials.
- 5 Aristide Zolberg, "The next waves: Migration theory in "a changing world", *International Migration Review*, vol 23, no 3, 1989, p 424.
- 6 Jonathan Crush, "Apartheid's last act", *Democracy in Action*, vol 10, no 2, pp 12–13.
- 7 Rob Davies, "Illegal aliens: The danger of witch-hunts", *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 23 September 1994.
- 8 Stephen Friedman and Maxine Reitzes, "Rights for all?", *Democracy in Action*, vol 10, no 4, p 19; Jonathan Crush, *op cit*, p 12.
- 9 Jonathan Crush, *op cit*, p 13.
- 10 Jonathan Crush, *op cit*, p 13; Maxine Reitzes, *The migrant challenge to Realpolitik: towards a human rights-based approach to immigration policy in South*

- Africa*, Foundation for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper no 7, January 1997.
- 11 Jonathan Crush, *op cit*, p 13; Maxine Reitzes, *op cit*, p 3.
 - 12 Paul Pereira, "SA aliens live in the shadows", *The Star* (Johannesburg) 30 December 1994; Stephen Friedman and Maxine Reitzes, *op cit*, p 19.
 - 13 Pierre Manent, "Democracy without nations?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol 8, no 2, 1997.
 - 14 For a more detailed conceptual treatment of democracy, see Anthony Arblaster, *Democracy*; Stony Stratford: Open University Press, 1987, and G Sartori, *Theory of democracy*; Jersey: Chatham House Publications.
 - 15 Perhaps the most well-known modern definition is that of Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democracy as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961, p 273.
 - 16 Max Weber, "Politics as a vocation", in David Held *et al* (eds), *States and societies*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
 - 17 Joel Migdal, *Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
 - 18 C F Strong, *Modern political constitutions*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972, p 6.
 - 19 Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p 10.
 - 20 Pierre Manent, *op cit*, p 95. This point is well established in the literature on democracy. Two well-known quotes are Ivor Jennings' "... the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people" and Robert Dahl's "... we cannot solve the problem of the proper scope and domain of democratic units from within democratic theory" (both cited in Pierre du Toit, *State-building and democracy in Southern Africa: A comparative study of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe*, Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 1995).
 - 21 It is significant to recall at this point claims made during the transition that the National Party had acted outside its 1989 mandate when it unbanned the ANC. Similarly, the ANC's decision to enter into dialogue with the Government — followed shortly by its decision to summarily suspend the armed struggle — was criticized on the grounds that the ANC was breaching its own conditions for democracy laid down during the 1980s. Of course both criticisms were technically correct: a transition to democracy is by definition undemocratic, in this case legitimated *ex post facto*, in the form of a referendum victory for the NP and a national democratic electoral victory for the ANC.
 - 22 Maxine Reitzes, *op cit*, p 5.
 - 23 Pierre Du Toit, *op cit*.
 - 24 G Therborn, "The rule of capital and the rise of democracy", in David Held *et al*, *States and societies*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
 - 25 Perhaps the most well-known attempt to articulate this paradox was Karl Polanyi's *The great transformation*, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944. See also James Hollifield, *Immigrants, markets and states: The political economy of post-war Europe*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
 - 26 T H Marshall, "Citizenship and social class", in David Held *et al*, *States and societies*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
 - 27 S J Terreblanche, "Sosiale demokrasie?", in W P Esterhuysen, P V D P du Toit and A A van Niekerk, *Moderne politieke ideologie*, Johannesburg: Southern Publishers, 1987, p 97.
 - 28 E H Carr, *Nationalism and after*, London: Macmillan, 1967, p 22.
 - 29 This coincided with the establishment of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and attempts to harmonize the working and living conditions of workers throughout the world. See W R Bhning, *Studies in international labour migration*, London: Macmillan, 1984, p 5.
 - 30 Michael Todaro, *Economic development in the Third World* (Fourth Edition), New York: Longman, 1990, p 272.
 - 31 John Salt, "The future of international labour migration", *International Migration Review*, vol 26, no 4, 1992, p 1082.
 - 32 This point is commonly overlooked in the South African literature. For example, Ann Bernstein, Lawrence Schlemmer and Charles Simkins ("Migrants: Is 'get tough' the way?", in the *Cape Times*, (Cape Town), 27 October 1997), argue that the country's focus on unskilled migrants has "drawn attention away from the real crisis issue — the enormous and growing shortage of managerial and other skills which undermines the prospects for sustained economic growth." The point is that these are equally distinct crises associated with modern economic and political development. Business suffers from a lack of unskilled personnel, but in the context of global, unemployment/underemployment an influx of unskilled immigrants alters the socio-economic profile of the population and this places strain on the welfare capacity of the state. For a discussion of immigration and the problems of "hour-glass" demography, see Philip Martin, "The United States: Benign neglect towards immigration", in Wayne Cornelius *et al*, (eds), *Controlling immigration: A global perspective*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
 - 33 Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*, p 10.
 - 34 James Hollifield, *op cit*, pp 160–176.
 - 35 Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*, p 3.
 - 36 James Hollifield, *op cit*, pp 176–179.
 - 37 For an overview of migration policy trends in traditional receiving states, see Gary Freeman, "Migration policy and politics in the receiving states", *International Migration Review*, vol 26, no 4, pp 1144–1167, 1992; John Salt, *op cit*, pp 1077–1111; Anthony Richmond, *Global apartheid: Refugees, racism and the new world order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*, and Myron Weiner *et al*, *People on the move: Lessons from international migration policies*, Centre for Development Enterprise Paper no 6, June 1997. The paradoxical role of labour in "globalisation" has most recently been argued by Noam Chomsky (*Mail and Guardian*, 16 June 1997): "Gross measures of globalisation don't indicate anything dramatically new. There are changes, however. One has to do with the free movement of labour — a crucial tenet of free-trade theory. There was a considerable amount of free movement of labour in the early part of this century. That's not counted, because it involves people, not profits. But if we break the rules, there's been a serious decline in globalisation."
 - 38 James Hollifield, *op cit*, p 30.
 - 39 The full title is the *Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951*.
 - 40 The OAU broadens this definition by including "reasons of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order".
 - 41 By the 1967 New York Protocol.
 - 42 Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from violence — Conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world*, New York: Oxford University Press, p 25.
 - 43 See Anthony Richmond, *op cit*, and Rogers Brubaker, "Are immigration control efforts really failing", in Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*.
 - 44 Bill Paton, *Labour export policy in the development of Southern Africa*, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995.
 - 45 Paton cites Francis Wilson, David Yudelman, Alan Jeeves and Wilmot James.
 - 46 For a more detailed critique of the process see Hussein Solomon, "Towards the free movement of people in southern Africa?" paper no 18, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997.
 - 47 The argument is more fully developed in H Kotz and L Hill, "Emergent migration policy in a democratic South Africa?", *International Migration*, vol 35, no 1, 1997.
 - 48 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, p 12.
 - 49 Anthony Minnaar and Mike Hough, *Causes, extent and impact of clandestine migration in selected Southern African countries with specific reference to South Africa*, Centre for Sociopolitical Analysis (Human Sciences Research Council) and Institute of Strategic Studies (University of Pretoria), 1995.
 - 50 Bill Paton, *op cit*, p 299.
 - 51 Two recent examples are Malawi's President Bakili Muluzi, who has stated that "If I had the means, I would say: 'No passport — Let the people come over'" (*Sunday Argus*, 5 March 1995), and Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano, who has argued that "Our citizens know no boundaries. They regard themselves as an integral part of each of our countries. Therefore they do not feel like aliens" (cited in Ann Bernstein *et al*, *People on the move: A new approach to cross-border migration in South Africa*, Centre for Development Enterprise Policy Paper no 7, June 1997, p 7). ANC MP Desmond Lockey has expressed the South African Government's concern about regional unemployment as follows: "The attitude of Governments in neighbouring states has not helped either. At a Southern African Summit Conference in Midrand in 1995, the message to South Africa was that as the most powerful neighbour it would have to accept illegal immigrants

- from poorer neighbours." (Desmond Lockey, "Perspectives from Parliament: Policy options and directions". Paper presented at the Conference on Migration and the Rainbow Nation: Human Rights Challenges for Migration Policy in South Africa, University of the Western Cape, 28–30 August 1996.
- 52 Aristide Zolberg, *op cit*, p 409.
- 53 Maxine Reitzes, "Citizenship issues". Paper presented at the Conference on Migration and the Rainbow Nation: Human Rights Challenges for Migration Policy in South Africa, University of the Western Cape, 28–30 August 1996.
- 54 The immigrant nations are the United States, Canada and Australia.
- 55 Ann Bernstein *et al*, *op cit*, p 25. Bernstein *et al* argue that migration is central to the character of the South African nation. While this is historically true, it remains unclear to what extent the "new nationalism" that is in the process of being crafted in the post-apartheid state will be imbued with a migration ethos. This will be an important migration research terrain for the future. For an analysis of the distinction between "country of immigration" and "nation of immigration" see James Hollifield, 1994, *op cit*.
- 56 See Philip Martin, "The United States: Benign neglect towards immigration", and David Martin, "Disentangling the strands of US immigration policy reform", both in Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*
- 57 Philip Martin, *op cit*, p 83.
- 58 See Kitty Calavita, "US immigration and policy responses: The limits of legislation", in Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*.
- 59 Cited in Ann Bernstein *et al*, *op cit*, p 12.
- 60 The study formed part of a broader project entitled "A longitudinal study of South African elites and their attitudes regarding political change", which was conducted by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch between 1990 and 1995.
- 61 Factor analysis is a means of data reduction, ie a means of examining interrelationships among variables and determining whether the observed correlations can be explained by the existence of a smaller number of hypothetical variables. The factors in this particular study were extracted using oblique rotation. The eigenvalue for factor one (refugees) is 2.944, while that for factor two (illegal immigrants) is 2.631. The percentages of variance are 58.9 and 43.8 respectively. Based on the factor analysis, a five item refugee index and a six item illegal immigration index were constructed, with reliabilities of 0.82 and 0.81 respectively. A third factor, seemingly reflecting attitudes to contract migration, was discarded owing to a low reliability score.
- 62 The figures for the PAC and the ACDP are not listed as the response rate was too small to be of any significance.
- 63 The largest proportion of ANC respondents came from Parliament (43.7%). When controlling for sector, the ANC Parliamentary response showed some variance from the figures quoted in the text: illegal immigrants, 13.6 (67.8) and refugees, 78.0 (1.7). Parliamentarians and labour respondents are more sympathetic to refugees than ANC members in the bureaucracy, academia, business, media and church leadership, while the pattern for illegal immigrants remains largely the same.
- 64 This observation is based more on statements made by IFP leader and Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, than on the data quoted above. The IFP response rate (12 respondents) was too low to allow for accurate inductions from the data.
- 65 Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, is reported to be in favour of using the Defence Force to curb illegal immigration. See "Heading South", in *Africa Confidential*, vol 38, no 15, 18 July 1997, p 5. According to Jakkie Cilliers, there are plans to transfer responsibility for border control from the Department of Home Affairs to the Department of Defence (Paper delivered at the Conference on the Green Paper: International Migration, 17–19 September 1997, Cape Town).
- 66 See Chris De Kock, *Perceptions of current sociopolitical issues in South Africa*. Centre for Sociopolitical Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1995. The most recent survey was conducted by MarkData in October 1996; see R W Johnson, "Parties, issues and political fragmentation", in *Focus*, published by the Helen Suzman Foundation.
- 67 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines xenophobia as "a *deep* dislike for foreigners" (*italics mine*). This would seem to denote an irrationally negative attitude towards foreigners, which *may* in turn lead to indiscriminately negative behaviour directed at immigrants. When so defined, the term does not seem appropriate in contexts where human movement is curtailed in terms of some rationally defined legal criterion. The migration literature of recent years has used the term somewhat uncritically, and I am not aware of any attempts to operationalize a measure for it.
- 68 The Green Paper can be found at: http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/green_papers/migration_migrate.html.
- 69 See Philip Martin, "Germany: Reluctant land of immigration", in Wayne Cornelius *et al*, *op cit*.
- 70 See Wayne Cornelius *et al*, "Introduction: The ambivalent quest for immigration control", and Philip Martin, "The United States: Benign neglect toward immigration", both in Wayne Cornelius, *op cit*.
- 71 Green Paper on International Migration, Section 243.
- 72 Wilmot James and Jonathan Crush, "Overview: Migration trends in the region", Paper presented at the Conference on Migration and the Rainbow Nation: Human Rights Challenges for Migration Policy in South Africa, University of the Western Cape, 28 – 30 August 1996.

Encouraging regional sustainable development

A role for South Africa as a "JI Intermediary"

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This proposal is launched against the background of the emerging global climate change regime. Consequently, to provide the appropriate context, some information about that regime must be presented, and I do that in the first main section (below) of this article. The proposal itself is laid out in the second part, while some possible problems associated with it are explored in the third section. Alternatives for action that could follow are laid out in the fourth and final section of this article.


Setting the scene: the global climate change regime

Scientists now believe that increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxides being the key human-produced ones) are causing an increase in average global temperatures. With this "global warming", the world could well experience rising sea levels, shifting climatic zones, and a range of environmental and socio-economic consequences arising from the same.¹ Given that most of these would be undesirable, the international community has agreed that the world's people should be trying to reduce emissions of these gases by, for example, curtailing the use of fossil fuels in electricity production, transport and industry, as well as curbing deforestation. As the industrialised world is responsible for the largest part of the

problem, most agree that it must take the lead in response. Most tangibly, this means making an effort to ensure that industrialized countries' emissions of greenhouse gases in the year 2000 are no higher than they were in the year 1990.²

Even if achieved this would not, however, ensure climatic stability. Further reductions would be needed, and negotiators are presently considering the appropriate targets for beyond

the year 2000. As part of these negotiations, the concept of "joint implementation" (JI) is being discussed. JI refers to the means whereby one country could meet some reduction obligation by undertaking action in another country. Indeed, the possibility of implementing policies and measures "jointly" was recognised in the international treaty guiding action on the issue (the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which came into force



**The author would like to thank Richard Jerram, Gordon Mackenzie and John Turkson for assistance with an earlier draft of this article.*

in March 1994).³ Moreover, at the first major meeting reviewing this treaty, negotiators agreed to establish a "pilot phase" for JI. During this period, JI will proceed among any countries (both North and South) that so choose. However, no "credits" will be forthcoming — that is, no country will be able to meet its "year 2000" commitment by activities implemented jointly. Furthermore, parties agreed to "take into consideration the need for a comprehensive review of the pilot phase in order to take a conclusive decision on the pilot phase and the progression beyond that", before the year 2000.⁴

The fundamental premise behind JI is that the costs of reducing emissions and/or enhancing sinks will be different in different parts of the world. In the global scheme of things, the argument continues, it makes the greatest sense to pursue the most cost-efficient measures first, irrespective of where they may be located. It makes no difference to the climate as to whether one kilogram of carbon is emitted in Almonte or Athens, Accra or Ahmada-bad — they will all contribute to the global phenomenon in the same way, and to the same extent. Because the marginal costs of reduction are lower in many parts of the developing world (parallel efficiency gains that have been made in the North have not always been realised in the South), much attention is focused upon how Northern action in the South could help to meet global climate goals. To illustrate with an example, if a Northern country had a commitment to reduce emissions by x million tonnes, a JI scheme might permit it to do so by financing activities in the South that would reduce emissions by x million tonnes. These x million tonnes would be the Northern country's "climate credits".

The debate about JI is heated.⁵ On the one hand, some view it as crucial — a globally cost-effective strategy that will ensure the commitment of all to the goal of climatic stabilisation. On the other hand, some see it as a potential nightmare; a tool of international business designed to condemn the developing world to the role of "carbon colonies".⁶ Interest in JI is substantial, with various government officials, businesspeople, NGO representatives and others considering the role that it might play in meeting the challenge of global climate change. Moreover, actual activity on JI is considerable — not only in terms of conferences and



studies, but projects as well. Significant, however, is the fact that much of this activity has apparently bypassed Africa.


A full report on present JI activities in Southern Africa can be delivered rather concisely — for of the 32 projects reported to the Climate Change Secretariat in 1996, none came from the 12 countries usually constituting "Southern Africa".⁸ Indeed, only one project came from sub-Saharan Africa as a whole — that is, an afforestation project in Uganda.⁹ Additionally, in the more-recent third "tranche" of activities under the JI Initiative of the United States (the largest national programme in the world), none of the seven involves Africa.¹⁰ Finally, under the umbrella of the WBCSDs (International Business Action on Climate Change) — probably the broadest JI programme, which, however, includes numerous preliminary proposals¹¹ — only six of over 100 projects have an African focus.¹²

South Africa as a "JI" intermediary

In the face of this apparent vacuum, I would like to propose what could be a highly desirable JI arrangement for Southern Africa. Before I sketch it out, let me first lay out a few assumptions upon which it is based. Some of these assumptions are tenuous and I shall re-

turn to them in the third part of this article below. Nevertheless, at this point, I present an initial defence of each.

- **Foreign investment is generally desired by leaders in the region:** A number of countries in the region have made foreign investment a high priority. Many — for example, Zambia and Zimbabwe — have set up "one-stop investment shops" to facilitate the same, and conferences have further promoted the attractions of the region for international investment.¹³ Granted, not everyone is supportive of this stance — even some national leaders appear to have split views on it — but the general sentiment is in favour of pursuing development-promoting investment for Southern Africa. In this way, the region is following the continental,¹⁴ nay even global, trend.
- **Climate-related foreign investment opportunities exist throughout the Southern African region:** The relatively low absolute level of foreign investment in Southern Africa (Angola and South Africa excepted; see Table 1) might lead one to believe that there are few investment opportunities in the region. Alternatively, recent interest on the part of potential investors (as evidenced not least of all by the



kinds of meetings noted above) suggests that whatever disincentives to foreign investment there might have been are steadily being brought down.¹⁵ What is beyond question is that much of the investment potential that does exist is related to climate change — that is, it involves activities that could serve to decrease the emissions of greenhouse gases and/or augment or preserve sinks of the same (from what they otherwise would have been). One prime example is the large hydropower potential in the region,¹⁶ particularly along the Zambezi and Kafue Rivers.¹⁷ Another is the prospect for larger markets in energy efficiency devices or renewable energy technologies that would arise from greater regional integration.¹⁸ Yet an additional one is the improvements in transport efficiency that could result from co-ordination of national policies, improvement of existing infrastructure, and/or expansion of the same.¹⁹ The fact that international investors have not been attracted in droves to such projects is not incompatible with the statement that opportunities nevertheless still exist.

- **OECD investors are generally more likely to invest in South Africa than in other Southern African countries:** Those things

that investors are looking for — for example, government commitment and stability, functioning infrastructure, human capital, macro-economic stability, low transaction costs, transparency in dealings, strong domestic financial institutions, revenue convertibility and transferability and an adequate legal framework²⁰ — are much more likely to be found in South Africa than in the other Southern African countries. Indeed, evidence supporting this is both quantitative and qualitative. Table 2 reveals that of the 12 SADC countries, South Africa was, in March 1997, ranked “best” in terms of “country risk” by *Euro-money* magazine.²¹ Anecdotal evidence also suggests that OECD investors’ interest in the region focuses upon South Africa: “multinational companies increasingly see South Africa as the gateway to the continent. A number have moved their African headquarters to Johannesburg, while others have handed control of the sub-Saharan region to their South African operations. For some, opening a South African office is a first tentative step in testing the African market. For others, like Coca-Cola, a return to South Africa has given new impetus to the way they view the rest of the continent.”²²

- **South African investors are more likely to invest in the rest of Southern Africa than OECD investors are to invest in the rest of Southern Africa:** For South African investors, the Southern African region is its “neighbourhood”. Accordingly, all else being equal, South Africans will find it less costly to do business there than those thousands of kilometres away in OECD countries. Why? Simply because the transactions costs of doing business (particularly the search costs and the monitoring costs)²³ will be cheaper for the South Africans, by virtue of their geographical proximity, their cultural similarities and so on.²⁴

Added to this is the reality that high GDP growth rates in many neighbouring countries have attracted the interest of South African capitalists: success stories from “the north” make it back to Johannesburg more quickly than they do to London or New York. Indeed, the Economist Intelligence Unit recently reported that: “South African companies are fast making inroads into Africa increasingly filling the vacuum left by European and US companies which have become disillusioned with the continent’s many problems... Africa is closer to South Africa and far less competitive than other markets; it is seen by some South Africa firms as a natural extension of their domestic market, offering them the chance to increase their economies of scale.”²⁵ For their part, there is some evidence that Afri-

Table 1 FDI statistics for Southern Africa, annual average for the period 1991–1995

| Country | FDI inflows, millions of US\$ |
|--------------|-------------------------------|
| Angola | 401,0 |
| South Africa | 273 |
| Namibia | 61,4 |
| Swaziland | 59 |
| Zambia | 53,1 |
| Mozambique | 29,4 |
| Zimbabwe | 24,2 |
| Mauritius | 18,7 |
| Lesotho | 13,4 |
| Tanzania | 12,4 |
| Malawi | 5,1 |
| Botswana | -55,0 |

Source: UNCTAD, *World investment directory on Africa*, New York: United Nations, UNCTAD, 1997, Annex Table 2

Table 2 Country risk rankings for Southern African countries, March 1997

| Country | Rank (of 179) | Score |
|--------------|---------------|-------|
| South Africa | 48 | 69,88 |
| Mauritius | 49 | 67,82 |
| Botswana | 57 | 61,76 |
| Swaziland | 68 | 53,36 |
| Lesotho | 87 | 46,35 |
| Zimbabwe | 95 | 42,00 |
| Namibia | 115 | 33,46 |
| Malawi | 121 | 32,44 |
| Tanzania | 139 | 28,49 |
| Angola | 148 | 24,64 |
| Mozambique | 152 | 22,87 |
| Zambia | 157 | 21,84 |

Source: *Euromoney* (March 1997).

can businesspeople would rather do business with South Africans than with "other 'imperialist' multinational companies".²⁶ Philip Clayton of the Standard Bank Group, finally, reports that "South African investors have been major investors in the region — since the end of apartheid, 39 South African companies have invested R9bn in Southern Africa".²⁷ It is certainly the case that regional trade — much of it pivoting around South Africa — has increased considerably during the past couple of years.

- **A regime for JI will soon be forthcoming:** This is the most tenuous of the five assumptions outlined here. As noted above, a "true JI" scheme does not presently exist, and no one can say unequivocally that one will be forthcoming for the period beyond the year 2000. What is clear, however, is that JI is on the negotiating table — indeed, it is near the centre of the table.²⁸ It is supported by many entities, and a range of proposals for action beyond the year 2000 makes use — sometimes extensively — of JI. Indeed, many believe that JI will be necessary to ensure the continued participation of large Northern countries (particularly the United States) in the climate change regime.

This, however, does not lessen the sheer reality that JI is not now in place. Nevertheless, I make the assumption that it will soon be forthcoming, and base the subsequent proposal upon its fulfilment. Given, however, its more specula-

tive nature, it is the first issue to which I return in the third part of this article (below).

Having laid out the five necessary assumptions, I now turn to my proposal.

Imagine a situation in which there exists an investment opportunity in what I will call Rosa (for the Rest of Southern Africa — that is, those countries in the region apart from South Africa). Given my second assumption above, this is a fair bet, and it could take the form of, for example, the development of a hydropower dam or the construction of a facility to produce energy-efficient products. Let us call it "Project A", and assume that it is costed by both potential OECD investors and potential South African investors.²⁹


On strict financial terms, the OECD investor evaluates the long-term annualised financial flows as, for example, 100 units of benefits and 120 units of costs. In the absence of any other information, therefore, she/he would not pursue it. However, Project A would generate climate change benefits, and thus under some kind of JI scheme (assumption 5 above), the OECD investor would be able to reap some additional benefits — perhaps 10 units in terms of "climate credits". Even, however, under this revised system, the investment is still not attrac-

tive to the OECD investor, for the benefits (110 units) are less than the costs (120 units).

Consider the perspective of the potential South African investor. She/he could also foresee 100 units of benefits flowing from the project, but might well only see 105 units of costs associated with it. A lower estimate of costs is justified by assumption 4 above.³⁰ Nevertheless, the project still remains on the drawing board, because the costs (105 units) are greater than the benefits (100 units). (As a developing country, South Africa, I am assuming, has no reduction commitments under the terms of the Climate Change Convention, and, as such, is not able to reap the 10 units of climate credits associated with the project.)

It would appear, therefore, that all potential investors would discard consideration of Project A at this point, and move on to consider another candidate. This is a shame, for it would be nice to realise Project A for the sake of development in Southern Africa, as well as for the sake of the global climate. With, however, South Africa acting as an intermediary in a three-way JI transaction, it may be possible to realise the project, and gains forthcoming to all involved.

The arrangement would involve an OECD investor paying a South African investor at least five units to "take on"



Project A. For the South African, therefore, benefits would have increased to at least 105 units, and, now covering costs, would indeed prompt him/her to take on the project. The OECD investor, meanwhile, would not simply be engaging in charity, for she/he would be willing to transfer up to 10 units to the South African, as long as the OECD investor were able to collect the "climate credits" (10 units) associated with the project. Because the South African is not able to collect them, it is certainly conceivable that the climate credits could flow back to the OECD investor. Therefore, the final balance sheets for each individual would look like this:

| | OECD investor | SA investor |
|-------------------------|--|---|
| Benefits | 10 units (climate credits) | 100 units (output of Project A) |
| | | 5-10 units (payment from OECD investor) |
| Costs | 510 units (payment to SA investor) | 105 units (costs of Project A) |
| Net benefits | 0-5 units | 0-5 units |

The exact share of the benefits accruing to each of the OECD and South African investors would depend upon the particular arrangement worked out between the two. Nevertheless all should be happy: both the OECD and South African investors because they have taken on activities that have positive financial returns; the government and people of Rosa, because a new project in line with their broader developmental aspirations has been initiated; and the international community, because fewer greenhouse gases will be emitted. Call it what you will — a "three-way JI transaction", a "cascading JI arrangement", or simply the use of a "JI intermediary" — the arrangement would appear to advance everyone's interests and welfare.

Potential Problems

Is this too good to be true, or might there be some hidden problems associated with this arrangement? In this section, I attempt to anticipate some of the criticisms of this scheme, to see if they successfully undermine it, or simply remove a little bit of the lustre.

As noted above, the first issue that must be addressed is this assumption that a JI scheme will be forthcoming. The position I take is that the mere fact


that there is a good chance that a scheme will be forthcoming merits some consideration of it. Indeed, this position is given even more weight considering the range of conceivable consequences arising from the emerging climate change regime.³¹ So, to begin with, note that the prospects for some kind of JI scheme are large enough to merit preliminary discussion now.

Critics might well suggest, however, that, even if a JI scheme were put in place, the kind of arrangement that I have laid out here — that is, one involving a "JI intermediary" — would never be acceptable within any larger scheme. I would immediately wonder "Why not?" Given that acceptance of JI would mean an implicit acceptance of the principle that action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the most cost-effective manner is desirable, then surely this arrangement would warrant consideration — it involves a reduction of emissions that would otherwise have taken place, and in a way that must be cost-effective, for private business is willing to take it on. Granted, it is not necessarily "automatic" that this kind of scheme will be permissible in any JI scheme, but, again, because learning about JI is at a relatively early stage, it is certainly conceivable that the some kind of "cascading-JI" could be accepted.

A second concern could relate to the way in which the arrangement laid out

above may appear to some to be an unreserved endorsement of any and all foreign investments. This is not the case, for it is not a precondition for the arrangement's success. Indeed, implicit in the proposal is the position that only those investment opportunities that have been determined to be consistent with the country's own developmental aspirations would be offered to potential international investors. In this sense, the ongoing work on climate change options in the region³² is valuable not least because it serves to stimulate debate about the relative priority (in national terms) of different options. Thus, let it be clearly stated here that the proposal I lay out in the second section above is not meant to apply to *any* investment proposal, but only those that receive the endorsement of the region itself.

A final reservation could well be to do with the implications of such an arrangement for South Africa-Rosa relations. At present, they are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, Rosa countries have been keen to involve South Africa in regional affairs: they coveted the country's membership in the Southern African Development Community, and appeared to be thrilled when it chose to join the regional organisation in 1994 (and apparently at the expense of the rival Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa).³³ On other hand, some Rosa countries



have expressed disappointment that South Africa has not engaged in regional affairs as constructively as they would have liked.⁵⁴ Were South Africa to serve as a JI intermediary, then such feelings could be exacerbated.

Though there is a danger that South Africa could act, in its role as a JI intermediary, in a cavalier manner, there is nothing that dictates that this has to be the case. Alternatively, such an arrangement might serve to further engage South Africa constructively in the lives of its neighbours. Thus, international interest in Southern African — most of which will inevitably be concentrated upon South Africa — will be more immediately diffused throughout the region. Moreover, by creating new regional business, governmental and civil society links with such an arrangement, it can only serve to spur the broader efforts at regional co-operation.

Again, it is not my position that all will inevitably be positive. Instead, it is simply the case that the arrangement I outline above has the potential to generate considerable benefits for Southern Africa. As such, it is worthy of at least some attention.

Alternatives for Action

If the argument has withstood the challenges in the previous section, the next

question is, obviously, “How might this vision be translated into reality?”. Though no one is under any illusion that a benign wave of foreign investment, prompted by global concerns on climate change, will soon be forthcoming, there is enough evidence here to suggest that modest action to encourage some international activity might eventually result in handsome dividends. As a consequence, some relatively modest, no-risk proposals are advanced here.

First, South Africa should ratify the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC).⁵⁵ As the country continues to be outside of the process, it is not able to take part in the FCCC-sanctioned “pilot phase” on JI, nor is it able to participate directly in the review of the same. Consequently, any knowledge that might be gained from JI projects involving South Africa will not formally form part of the “experience” of the pilot phase. Perhaps even more importantly, South African views on how any “full JI scheme” should operate will not be fed into the process. As a consequence, the kind of “cascading-JI” I describe in this article may not be part of the agenda. While it is nevertheless accepted that ratification brings obligations as well as opportunities, I would still voice strong support for any effort that encourages ratification in a transparent and partici-

patory manner.

Additionally, the one-stop investment shops that are presently operational in the Southern African region should be sensitised about the issues raised in this article, for it may make their jobs that much easier. Though “climate credits” are not necessarily forthcoming during the JI “pilot phase” that we are presently in, foreign investors may still be able to gain additional benefits by associating their proposed project with JI. Not only would it allow them to influence the shape of the JI “pilot phase”, but it would also give them the chance to generate public relations kudos (by reporting on the “green” investments that they are developing). Additionally, in some countries (for example, the United States and The Netherlands), their investment in Southern Africa may be worth tangible “climate credits”, for some national schemes are already in operation. Granted, not every investment opportunity in Southern Africa will be climate-relevant, but for those that are, drawing attention to the benefits of JI-association (something that the potential investor could well not be aware of) can only serve to increase the prospects of “closing the deal”. Therefore, JI offers these one-stop investment shops yet another carrot with which they can encourage foreign investment.

Finally, consideration of how regional activity might be undertaken within the framework of the international climate change regime should also be undertaken, perhaps by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (Following up this recommendation is, of course, dependent upon full South African participation in the international negotiations.) Within the FCCC, there is allowance for the participation of “regional economic integration organisations”.⁵⁶ To date, this has basically been a euphemism for the European Economic Community — presently the only non-state entity to be a party to the Convention. However, there may well be some advantage for Southern Africa to participate, as a unit, in the global climate regime. Thus, investigation into how Southern Africa as a unit might negotiate should be carried out.

Indeed, it is my assertion that even if the scheme proposed in the second part of this article is not viable, the recommendations laid out in this fourth section are nevertheless beneficial. First, ratification of the Climate Change



Convention would allow South Africa to be on the "inside" of the process, thus increasing the chances of its interests being represented in the emerging regime. Second, linkage to the climate change regime by Southern African investment authorities can only serve to increase the interest of potential investors in the region. And third, exploration of regional action would serve to bolster broader efforts at regional integration currently on the SADC agenda. As such, therefore, I hope that the proposal in this article serves to stimulate imaginative thinking about how benefits for the region could be generated. Moreover, I also hope that the recommendations for a more pro-active approach to climate-related issues at the international level have been shown to be unequivocally beneficial: even if they do not generate the primary intended benefits, a range of secondary benefits will be forthcoming regardless.

Notes and references

- For further information about the climate change issue, see the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's three working groups, particularly their *Second assessment report*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Art 4.2(b) of the *Framework convention on climate change*. This document is subsequently referred to as "FCCC" and is reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, vol. 31, 1992, pp 84\N3.
- Ibid.*
- FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add 1, Decision 5/CP.1, "Activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase" During the "pilot phase", when no "climate credits" will be forthcoming, the phenomenon will be called "activities implemented jointly" (AIJ).
- See, for example, the sources cited in the bulletin *Joint Implementation Quarterly*, published by Foundation JIN, Groningen, the Netherlands.
- This term is taken from R S Maya and J Gupta (eds), *Joint implementation: Carbon colonies or business opportunities? Weighing the odds in an information vacuum*, Harare: Southern Centre for Energy and Environment, 1996.
- For an investigation into JI from an African perspective, see *Report of the African regional workshop on activities implemented jointly under the UN framework convention on climate change*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997.
- These are the 12 countries that are members of the Southern African Development Community: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- FCCC/CP/1996/14/Add.1. "Review of the implementation of the convention and of decisions of the first session of the conference of the parties. Activities implemented jointly: Annual review of progress under the pilot phase", 4 June 1996.
- <http://www.ji.org/usiji/usiji.htm> (viewed 15 April 1997).
- Peter Zollinger and Roger C Downer, *Private financing for global environmental initiatives: Can the climate convention's 'joint implementation' pave the way?*, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1996.
- <http://www.wbcsd.climatechange.com/tasdsform/ByRegion.html> (viewed 15 April 1997).
- There was, for example, a "Southern Africa Trade and Investment Summit" in Harare sponsored by the *International Herald Tribune* (23\N24 October 1996) and a Confederation of British Industry (CBI) meeting in London on "Zimbabwe – An investment opportunity" (5 March 1997).
- "Foreign direct investment is welcomed and, in fact, actively sought by all African countries . . ." (Unctad, *Foreign Direct Investment in Africa*, New York: United Nations, Unctad, Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment, 1995, p 37).
- Further evidence of a change in attitude is given by the fact that, according to the Institutional Investor Index, country risk in almost all of the countries of southern and eastern Africa has fallen more quickly than in the rest of the world (quoted in David J Donaldson, Frank Sader and Dileep M Wagle, *Foreign direct investment in infrastructure: The challenge of southern and eastern Africa*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Occasional Paper 9, February 1997, p 13).
- Only 5% of the region's hydropower potential has been exploited. Given the fact that climate-friendly hydro could serve to displace existing and/or planned climate-altering coal, the "climate gains" from investment in hydropower facilities could be considerable.
- For information about investment opportunities in electricity in Southern Africa, see, SADELEC AND MEPC, *Electricity in Southern Africa: Investment opportunities in an emerging regional market*, London: Financial Times Energy Publishing, 1996.
- The 12 nations of the Southern African Development Community committed themselves, in 1996, to the development of a regional free trade area within eight years.
- National and regional studies have estimated (and are continuing to estimate) the level and cost of "greenhouse gas" savings that could result from projects like these. For further information, see, for example UNEP/Riso, *Climate change mitigation in Southern Africa: Methodological development, regional implementation aspects, national mitigation analysis and institutional capacity building in Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe*, Roskilde: UCCEE, August 1995.
- See, for example, David J Donaldson *et al*, *op cit*, pp 15–17.
- Nadeem Ul Hague, Donald Mathieson and Nelson Mark, "Rating the raters of country creditworthiness" *Finance and Development*, vol. 34, no. 1, March 1997, pp 10–13.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. *South Africa: Country report*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, first quarter, 1996, p 22.
- For a discussion of transactions costs in the context of JI arrangements, see Daniel J Dudek and Jonathan Baert Wiener, *Joint implementation, transaction costs and climate change*, Paris: OECD, 1996.
- Paul R Krugman, *Geography and trade*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, *op cit*.
- Tony Hawkins, *The New South Africa: Business prospects and corporate strategies*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, August 1994, p 100.
- Philip Clayton, "Southern Africa: The easy road to riches, outlook and choices", paper presented at the International Herald Tribune, Southern Africa Trade and Investment Summit, Harare, October 1996, p 2.
- See the negotiating text for December's major climate change meeting in Kyoto, Japan (FCCC/AGBM/1997/3/Add.1, "Proposals for a protocol or another legal instrument", 22 April 1997).
- I am assuming here that Project A is not attractive to domestic (Rosa) investors, because perceived estimated costs are higher than perceived estimated benefits.
- The South African might view more than 100 units of benefits, for positive externalities generated by a regional development project include greater peace and wealth in the region.
- "The Norwegian research institution Econ has recently completed a study of the market perspectives for 2020. Even under moderate commitments, the global market for carbon . . . may involve [US]\$40 billion. Stronger commitments would result in substantially larger trading volumes." (Eivind Tandberg, "Building global markets to reduce climate change", *Environment Matters*, Winter/Spring 1997, p 23.) Again, though by no means definite, markets involving large quantities of resources could potentially arise.
- UNEP/Riso, *op cit*.
- For more about the two organisations, see Ibbo Mandaza, Gilbert Mudenda and Chinyamata Chipeta, *The Joint PTA/SAADC Study: On harmonisation, rationalisation and coordination of the activities of the preferential trade area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)*, July 1994.
- One commentator on SADC's 1996 consultative conference reported that: "South Africa was publicly accused of repeatedly making verbal commitments to regional solidarity, but in practice continuing to look after its own interests, exploiting its neighbours' trade liberalisation policies while keeping its own economy closed and sidelining regional organisations. Some conference delegates said that South Africa had been arrogant and bullying in its attitude to its regional partners." (Economist Intelligence Unit, *Zambia: Country Report*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, second quarter, 1996, p 19.)
- For a broader argument supporting this position, see Ian H Rowlands, "South Africa and global climate change", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1996, pp 163–76.
- Articles 18, 20, 22, 23, FCCC, *op cit*.

South African peace support in Africa

Challenges and considerations

Dr Theo Neethling, Senior Researcher of the Gauteng Branch of the Centre for Military Studies of the University of Stellenbosch, examines the role that the South African military is able and likely to play in peace support operations on the continent of Africa in future.

The end of the Cold War has not resulted in worldwide peace and stability. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar and multifaceted world has indeed reduced the risk of conventional inter-state wars, but has on the other hand seen several intra-state armed conflicts with an even higher risk of regional instability. The conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and, more recently, the former Zaïre have all proved that when a state collapses as a result of internal conflict serious turmoil can be experienced across the entire region.

Increased regional conflicts and the resurgence of global activism have led to a dramatic growth in peacekeeping requirements since the end of the last decade. While there has been growing support for the notion of peace support operations¹ worldwide, a clear international message has emerged — particularly since the ending of the Cold War — indicating that Africans should begin to take charge of their own peacekeeping requirements. The arrival of a new constitutional order in South Africa has also created new opportunities for security cooperation between the Southern African states, and within Africa as a whole.

In South Africa President Mandela himself has eventually endorsed the possibility of a future peace support role in Africa for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Other policy statements related to defence have repeatedly emphasized that South Africa's security policy complies with and adheres to international law, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the policy guidelines emanating from the UN Security Council, while

also taking the policy of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into account. To demonstrate its commitment to peace support operations, the country contributed a substantial amount to the UN to help pay for international peacekeeping in Africa. At diplomatic level, South Africa edged closer to committing its forces to involvement after virtually guaranteeing "safe corridors" for the return of Rwandan refugees in November 1996.²

Against this background it is expected that, sooner or later, the South African military will play a leading role in the security requirements of Southern Africa and even the entire African continent. The Department of Defence has consequently taken steps to anticipate policy and developments in future peace support operations, although some questions remain to be clarified.

This article will assess the anticipated future role of the South African military in peace support operations by focusing particularly on recent developments and on the conditions on the continent that need to be taken into account. It will, accordingly, touch on the regional institutional framework created for the management of peace initiatives and cooperative security within Southern Africa, after which it will address some of the perils and challenges of peacekeeping, with special reference to the African context.

General challenges to peace support operations

The successful conduct of peace support operations needs prompt, effective and sustained action, without loss of momentum through a lack of re-

solve. The elements essential in this regard include the following:

- **Clarity and consensus:** The primary effect of enforcement powers should be a deterrent one. This is possible only if a mandate with clear goals exists, together with appropriate and transparent criteria, so formulated that the precise nature of the response can be determined on a case-by-case basis.
- **Resources:** A credible deterrent and enforcement capacity depends on the reliable availability of adequately equipped and trained forces. Such a capability must be provided by all participating parties and member states.
- **Political resolve:** A lack of staying power in the face of adversity severely weakens the credibility of international enforcement. For collective security to be effective, a credible force must be mustered, with adequate financing from states that have sufficient political resolve to stay the course.
- **Command and control:** Unity of command and control must be assured to meet the overriding concerns of mission integrity and the maximum safety of personnel.³

In addition, the following four issues can be listed as requirements for effective action during peace support operations:

- sound information gathering;
- interaction between the peace mission and the media;
- the training of peacekeepers for peace support operations; and
- clarity on the status of civil-military relations during peace missions.⁴

The institutional framework for cooperative security in Southern Africa

Success in any peace support operation depends upon a broad political process. Such missions never comprise military exercises only. In fact, military operations play a distinctly supportive role, and may even have little obvious effect on the outcome. Of importance is the broad political apparatus and institutional framework created to manage cooperative security and to coordinate peace missions.

The success of peace support operations is thus critically dependent not only on the political will of participating member states, but also on the extent to which international authority underpins such operations. This kind of authority is necessary to reduce political pressure on the countries responsible, avoid international isolation of the participating countries if the operation 'goes wrong', and prevent the overextension of any country's armed forces.⁶ Such political apparatus and institutional framework entail a complex amalgam of political, diplomatic, military and economic measures.

Conflict prevention and cooperation in Africa and Southern Africa

Significant steps have been taken towards creating an institutional framework for peace support operations in

Africa and Southern Africa in particular. Such a framework would be provided in an overarching capacity by the OAU and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. At regional level the idea of an all-African Crisis Response Force, staffed and commanded almost exclusively by Africans, is increasingly favoured as part of a broader series of political and diplomatic initiatives on the continent.⁶ At subregional level the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its relevant structures, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), could provide a future framework for assistance for peace support operations in Southern Africa. This partnership is to include the 12 contiguous member states of the SADC, as well as Mauritius and Seychelles as island partners.⁷

This model should be viewed against the realization that African states and organizations will have to accept an increasing burden of responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent, and that this could best be achieved by cooperation at subregional level.⁸ Security should thus be regarded as a holistic phenomenon, managed by a 'common security regime' within the Southern African region.⁹

Suggesting that regional organizations should be primarily responsible for dealing with their own security pro-

blems does not imply that this responsibility should subvert UN guidance and control. Regional organizations and arrangements on the one hand, and the UN system on the other, should endeavour to share the responsibility for maintaining peace. The UN and regional and subregional organizations should form and maintain partnerships, and act decisively and speedily when framing new approaches to crisis prevention, management and resolution. However, the UN, with its cumulative experience, should remain the pre-eminent international authority responsible for dealing with international peace and security, as well as with internal crises that threaten regional stability, particularly in Africa.¹⁰ This approach therefore assigns peacekeeping responsibilities to regional or other organizations subject to current UN policy.¹¹

In graphic terms, the partnership between the UN and the OAU, together with its subregional organizations, may be viewed as a pyramid structure. The UN, which is the world body and the supreme organ responsible for peace and security world-wide, is at the top of the pyramid. In the middle is the OAU as a regional entity for conflict management and below it are the subregional organizations.

Advantages and disadvantages of (sub-)regional peace support operations

The greatest advantage of positioning a regional organization midway in the hierarchical model is that the organization is neither too far from, nor too

Exercise Blue Hungwe, the multinational peace-support operation held in Zimbabwe in April 1997.



close to, theatres of conflict. It is ideally positioned to coordinate all activities relating to conflict management. The OAU was entrusted with the responsibility for promoting the unity and solidarity of African states and ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration, and has had this responsibility for peacekeeping since its inception in 1963. The OAU has thus dealt with many and varied forms of conflict.¹² However, the OAU, like the UN at the top of the pyramid, is now experiencing financial problems as recalcitrant members refuse to pay their dues on time.¹³

As argued by Cilliers and Malan, a devolution of responsibility from the UN to regional or subregional organizations such as the SADC could alleviate financial problems for the cash-strapped UN by relieving it of some of its peacekeeping responsibilities. Another advantage of using subregional organizations is that they are likely to have a particular knowledge of, and responsibility for, their region. Furthermore, subregional organizations have great potential to act as building blocks which could provide stability in a volatile part of the world.¹⁴

These defence analysts¹⁵ are nevertheless convinced that the "advantages of regional peacekeeping are negated by the complex nature of contemporary peace support operations". It is argued, *inter alia*, that a regional organization, though operating under UN auspices, will inevitably be viewed as less impartial than a multinational force. It is therefore suggested that neither Africa nor Southern Africa at any stage attempt to act as sole peace

brokers on the continent. The point is that peacekeeping in Africa can work only if it occurs in very close collaboration with the UN and with the international community, with whom African armed forces should be prepared to cooperate.

It is furthermore argued that "the risk of the perception of domination by a regional hegemon" has always existed, and that South Africa could easily be subjected to this perception in Southern Africa. Another matter of concern is that in cases where the UN hands over authority and jurisdiction to a non-UN multilateral force, the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General could lose control of the operation. It is also argued that "neither the OAU, the SADC nor the ISDSC have, as yet, the capacity to manage, coordinate or direct anything beyond observers and diplomatic missions at this stage."¹⁶

Future model for peace support operations

Notwithstanding the validity of the above arguments, a possible future model for peace support operations in Southern Africa is the following: firstly, that such operations be undertaken by the SADC as a subregional organization. Secondly, that such efforts be politically and morally fully sanctioned and supported by the OAU, with the UN providing the necessary international support and endorsement.

Such an approach would, in fact, be in accordance with current UN policy, as was the case with the involvement of the Economic Community of African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) in

Liberia.¹⁷ The UN has also come to share responsibilities for peace support operations with regional organizations, for example with the Russian Federation in Georgia, and with a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁸

Pursuant to its leadership role in Southern Africa, South Africa initiated discussions with its counterparts in the ISDC on certain issues in 1995. These included:

- responsibilities of various countries as regards geographical location
- doctrine and standard operations procedures
- command and control
- training
- tasks
- standardization of equipment
- logistic support
- medical services
- communication and signals.¹⁹

In addition, the armed forces of eight Southern African countries (including a contingent of the SANDF) participated in *Exercise Blue Hungwe*, a multinational peace support exercise held early in 1997 in Zimbabwe, assisted and facilitated by British military experts. With this exercise the subregion came closer to sharing peace support responsibilities on the African continent.²⁰

The South African decision-making framework

As far as the South African decision-making framework for undertaking peace support operations is con-



cerned, it should be briefly noted that, when South Africa is requested to participate, the following will apply:

- Any request for participation in peace missions will be channelled through the Department of Foreign Affairs. That Department will liaise closely with the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and the Department of Defence.
- Any additional agreements on matters relating to the determination of the mission and objectives of the operation will be negotiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the SANDF.
- The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence will advise Cabinet on the matters referred to above. Cabinet is responsible for final decisions and, in terms of the Constitution, the deployment of the SANDF requires the authorization of the president.²¹

The Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Department of Finance, has to finance peace support operations in cases of SANDF participation.²²

The perils of conflict management and peace support operations

In the Southern African context South Africa can be regarded as the leading state. Inevitable responsibilities stem from its position of economic and military strength. The enthusiasm of SADC members for creating a regional standby force of peacekeepers largely depends on the South African capacity and political will to become involved in peace support operations. This being so, the South African government has to carefully consider and anticipate the pitfalls of peace support operations.

Peace missions generally involve many challenges and potential problems; in Africa even more so. In fact, the challenges and perils experienced by UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola have apparently led to an increasing unwillingness on the part of the major powers and traditional peace support contributors to deploy their forces on the African continent any longer.

Both past and current peace support operations have brought to light cer-

tain lessons that require careful analysis and study, in order to identify appropriate and feasible planning and implementation measures for the future.

The nature of conflict in Africa

It is an indisputable fact that Africa is the continent most plagued by conflict: not so much conflict between nations as conflict within states. Such conflict is rooted in one or more of the following:

- religious and ethnic differences or tensions
- religious fundamentalism
- disputes over traditional boundaries and scarcity of resources
- inequitable distribution of political and economic power
- struggles for the reform and democratization of political and economic systems
- negative legacies of colonial rule
- ethnic competition stemming from the collapse of the old patterns of relationships that once provided a framework for collaboration among ethnic groups.²³

Civil wars, fuelled by deep-seated hatred and involving armed factions and the availability of weapons and ammunition (as often experienced in Africa) present peacekeeping forces with serious challenges and a difficult operational environment.²⁴ In such volatile situations, peacekeeping mandates must provide for sporadic change in the nature of peace missions and the action to be taken on the part of peace forces.

Mandates and parameters of engagement

In the light of the above, the issue of clear mandates and rules of engagement is relevant. A survey of the UN's involvement in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia clearly suggests sharp differences in the nature and circumstances of the operations undertaken: a mixture of international and civil war involving radicalized ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia, the implementation of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia and the collapse of governmental authority in Somalia. The experience of the UN forces in each of these theatres highlights a critical issue concerning the challenge of peacekeeping in contem-

porary internal conflicts, namely the problem of formulating mandates whose humanitarian and political objectives are effectively understood and reinforced by the peacekeeping forces.²⁵

In Somalia, for example, there was confusion even at political level in the US over the exact parameters of the UN mission. Although initially a peacekeeping mission, the operation in Somalia swiftly evolved into a combat operation. This appears to have caused confusion and a lack of understanding between the UN and the participating member states, resulting in the US decision to withdraw from Somalia.²⁶

The involvement of the US-led coalition forces in northern Iraq in 1991 clearly demonstrated that peacekeeping forces could rapidly find themselves involved in extremely dynamic, fluid situations. At first the forces were involved in a constant offensive manoeuvre in order to evict the Iraqis from an expanding security zone. After a month of constant movement, the operations assumed the more familiar form of static peacekeeping.²⁷

Many analysts maintain that no effective mechanisms or appropriate doctrine have yet been devised for responding to what is regarded as a "grey zone" in peacekeeping, namely the volatile area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.²⁸ A lack of clarity on this issue could have disastrous consequences. In the Southern African context it is thus essential to determine what courses of action are appropriate for the SADC forces to take. A lack of agreement or clarity on what exactly is meant by "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement" could result in the forces engaged in such missions attaching their own national or operational perspectives to each situation.²⁹

Command-and-control arrangements

Furthermore, it needs to be made clear that states participating in an international peace support operation will retain their autonomy and sovereignty. Such contending national priorities could translate themselves into problems as regards command-and-control, rules of engagement, disciplinary measures and personnel procedures. Differences of opinion in a volatile situation may lead to political differences and disagreements between the participating states.³⁰

Since the effectiveness of any military operation depends on the quality of its in-theatre command-and-control arrangements, all Nato member states have worked to establish Nato "Stagnags" (or memoranda of agreement covering joint tactics, operations and techniques). This has resulted in a "certain level of comfort" among Nato allies.³¹ In the Southern African context it is thus most important that the military planners working together in the ISDSC should succeed in standardizing operational procedures.

The implications of financial constraints

The issue of finance is another serious issue. Africa is apparently unable to provide the necessary resources itself, and desperately needs financial assistance for peace support operations, especially for the transportation of troops and material.³² Provision of such assistance is hampered by the reluctance of many of the major powers to become directly involved in African peacekeeping. It follows that whoever funds such operations will have a significant influence on the objectives and conduct thereof.³³

Financial constraints mean that many African defence forces experience logistic and organizational problems and training difficulties, and are hampered by obsolete and worn-out military equipment.³⁴ Effective logistic support, as an essential element of peace support operations, cannot be overemphasized: its absence leaves soldiers feeling abandoned and incapable of operating optimally. Inadequate logistic support for African peacekeepers has possibly been their most crucial handicap, and has affected, for instance, the Ecomog forces in Liberia since their deployment in 1991 and a number of African contingents deployed in Rwanda in 1994.

Yet, with poor and failing economies, many African states, including certain member states of the SADC, can hardly meet their own domestic demands, let alone provide any substantial support for peace support operations.³⁵

Quality and standard of Southern African forces

Since the undertaking of peace support operations is a daunting challenge in any terms, proper standards of training, quality and the professionalism of

soldiers can hardly be overemphasized. During the Bosnian peace operation, for example, combatants constantly tried to manipulate the UN force into supporting one side at the expense of the other. This usually involved firing mortars at civilians or the UN force itself to make it appear that the other side was responsible for the firing. One of the major challenges therefore was to try to remain emotionally detached from the conflict itself, since an error of judgement could destroy the credibility of the peacekeepers as an impartial force.³⁶ It is thus imperative that professional armed forces, commanded by professional officers, properly trained for their primary mission and well-disciplined, should be the only forces to be deployed for peace support operations.³⁷

It has been pointed out that on the whole there are vast differences between the level of skills, training and education of African forces and those of the developed world. It would appear that many individual members of the African armed forces "are not volunteers who are carefully selected and psychologically tested. ... Instead ... they are more likely to be run-of-the-mill soldiers ... poorly trained and educated by international standards, and extremely conscious of their tribal and ethnic identity".³⁸ This is a serious situation, particularly in view of the prudence required and the need for the highest quality of leadership, even at the lowest tactical level.

The factor of public opinion

The factor of public opinion can also be decisive. In Somalia, for example, the American-led UN forces encountered bloody engagements which resulted in the loss of 18 American soldiers and more than 350 Somalis in 1993. This led to the effective withdrawal of the US troops. The experience was a turning point in American contributions to peace support operations. The cost in lives and blood far exceeded what the American public was willing to pay.³⁹

In contrast, it can be pointed out that in South Africa public opinion has not in general played a significant role in considerations of foreign policy thus far. The country has yet to experience the impact of public opinion on foreign policy matters. This situation of *carte blanche* for policy makers could, however, rapidly change in the face of

a full-scale involvement in future peace missions.⁴⁰

Transformation processes in Southern Africa

Future multinational peace support operations in Southern Africa should also be assessed in the light of the process of force transformation in several SADC member states. While Namibia and Zimbabwe are in an advanced stage of force transformation, South Africa and Mozambique have a long way to go and major challenges still lie ahead for both. Angola has to run the full course of post-conflict transition. Four of the largest armies in the subregion are thus facing internal challenges in the course of political change.⁴¹

On the positive side it must be noted that a number of African countries are currently contributing troops to peace support operations, or have previously done so. They include Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Kenya and Congo (Brazzaville). Of SADC member states, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania have previously participated in peace support operations. A pool of experience is therefore building up within Africa and particularly in the Southern African region.⁴²

Problems of linguistic diversity

The effective command and control of any military operation depends heavily on communication capacity. This is necessary in order to keep authorities at all levels abreast of events and to direct and coordinate all activities at ground level.⁴³

In Africa, the military of the various states have all inherited the languages of the former colonial powers, as well as their various military cultures. Previous problems in command-and-control during multinational peace support operations in Africa were often related to linguistic diversity.⁴⁴ The problem of language and sound communication was also evident during *Operation Blue Hungwe*, the multinational peacekeeping exercise held in Zimbabwe in April 1997.⁴⁵

However, it could also be argued that a peace support mission from Africa or any of its subregions will have a decided advantage over European troops or troops from Asia, as far as their cultural background, language and knowledge of the continent are

concerned. African culture, customs and traditions are often incomprehensible to people from other continents.⁴⁶

For a peace support operation to succeed, the diverse civilian and military cultures of the troop-contributing nations will need to be harmonized in order to ensure smooth coordination. Anticipating and avoiding serious problems of command-and-control, harmonizing joint action, providing training opportunities and holding workshops, seminars and conferences can all be instrumental in ensuring that all the role-players collaborate successfully.

The need for efficient intelligence services

Contemporary peace support operations have shown that politically fluid and militarily complex situations may require more advanced resources and procedures for collecting, assessing and distributing intelligence. Information on the military power and disposition of forces, the location of minefields, the level of violence and other features in a deployment area is essential for planning and conducting peace missions. Recent international experience underscores the need for developing local intelligence sources.⁴⁷

Problems of control during peace support operations are often related to a lack of adequate intelligence. In almost all African peace support operations, troops have been dispatched to mission areas with inadequate information on the local inhabitants, their culture, beliefs and customs. Even basic geographic information has been a problem, as few African countries have up-to-date maps, especially maps providing the detailed geographic information essential for efficient military planning.⁴⁸

The need for sound civil-military relations

Although military forces have proven capabilities in humanitarian operations, recent experience has revealed an urgent need for improved civilian-military coordination in relation to the distribution of essential supplies, the management of refugee movements and the organization of medical support. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) have certain financial and material resources that peace forces do not have and sometimes play a valu-

able role worldwide in the saving of lives. In many instances, however, friction has developed between the peacekeepers and NGOs.⁴⁹

In Cambodia, Somalia, Angola and Bosnia military and civilian operations were juxtaposed. In Sarajevo and Bosnia there were approximately 112 NGOs serving in one or other capacity. Some of them were most proficient in their duties, while the role of others resulted in strained relations with the peacekeeping forces.⁵⁰

The growing prominence of juxtaposed military and civilian operations has often resulted in major command, control and coordination problems, for which neither contingency planning nor doctrinal guidance really existed. Problems of this nature have been particularly acute in areas of ongoing conflict.⁵¹

The deployment of a peace force also marks a delicate and critical relationship with the host government and other parties to the conflict, such as the local population. In the case of the deployment of the UN operation in Mozambique (Onomoz), the inability of the Mozambican government to draft and pass laws generated frustration and was an additional factor to be dealt with. In the urban areas, where the Onomoz forces frequently mingled with the local population, several incidents of sexual child abuse, rape and physical aggression by soldiers against civilians were reported. This underscores the sensitive nature of any type of third-party intervention in situations of internal conflict.⁵²

The fact that members of a peacekeeping force come into frequent contact with the local population calls for a great deal of caution and prudence on their part to avoid misunderstandings, tension or even collusion. They will be called upon to use diplomatic skills, seek compromises by means of negotiation and show tolerance of others. Such situations add another dimension to the professional attributes expected of a soldier.⁵³ The need for qualified interpreters to liaise with local people is likewise relevant — as the UN, for example, acutely experienced in the Somalia peace mission of 1992 and 1993.⁵⁴ It is suggested that problems relating to civil-military relations be addressed through coordinated training, conferences, seminars and workshops for the benefit of multicomponent missions, as well as for those who are to be the beneficiaries of peace support operations.⁵⁵

The role of media coverage

Peace forces must be seen to be efficient and effective. Positive media coverage can enhance such a perception among both the peacekeepers themselves and the people in whose area they are deployed, as well as among the public at large. An ability to deal with the media is crucial in determining how peace initiatives are perceived.⁵⁶

Friction between the military components of peace missions and the media has often been experienced in the past. Military commanders often unwisely choose to ignore the media and their ability to inform and to educate.⁵⁷ When strategically dealt with, the media can be very powerful instruments for commanders in a stressful and desperate situation.

In Bosnia the role of the media in communicating the situation had a substantial impact on the process of keeping the peace and reducing the level of atrocities, perhaps even more so than the role of the actual peacekeepers.⁵⁸ In Rwanda, a land-locked country where borders were sealed off and airports closed, the peacekeeping forces would have been completely stranded had the media not portrayed the conditions under which the peace support operation took place.⁵⁹ In the case of Angola, the problem of countering hostile propaganda, which usually took the form of unverified allegations made by one side against another, was dealt with by cooperation between the civilian and military media components. The military also took the responsibility of caring for civilian journalists during field trips.⁶⁰ Senior military and civilian personnel who deal with the media should clearly understand the necessity for a cooperative response which will promote the cause of peace.

Conclusion

It is now widely accepted that African leaders, as represented in the OAU and the various subregional organizations, have to accept an increased burden of responsibility for conflict resolution and management on the continent. In the light of this, the South African government has more than once clearly demonstrated its commitment to peace on the continent and, in particular, to participation in future multinational peace support operations.

From a political and military point of view, the conduct of peace support operations needs to be prompt, effective and sustained; momentum must not be lost through a lack of resolve. Such operations necessitate a system or enforcement capacity with adequately equipped and trained forces, credibility and adequate financing, and unity of command and control.

To this end, it is necessary to incorporate the common interest of the community of nations. The Southern African community has recently made progress in this respect, particularly in creating an institutional framework that will contribute to sharing the responsibility for conflict management and peacekeeping with the UN and the OAU.

However, it is clear that undertaking peace support operations in Africa is by no means a simple task. Africa is a continent that is steeped in conflict, the sources of which are both endemic and diverse. Moreover, past and recent experiences in conducting peace support operations worldwide, and in Africa in particular, have indicated that such operations present serious challenges and a hostile operational environment to forces assuming a peace support role.

From a South African political and military viewpoint, this overview of conflict management and peacekeeping has highlighted a number of factors to be taken into account when future peace support operations are undertaken. South Africa, if it is to play its expected leadership role in the subregion and the continent, and other members of the African community will have to carefully consider their responsibilities before taking steps towards genuinely improving the conditions for peace and stability on the continent.

Notes and references

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An assessment of economic reform programmes in sub-Saharan Africa*

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Joseph Muzulu (Chief Economist of Zimbabwe Holdings Limited) and John Robertson (managing director of his own consultancy, Robertson Economic Information Services), evaluate the sub-Saharan African experience of structural adjustment programmes.

Introduction

Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) are in vogue, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where development stands out among the problems facing the international community as a critical unresolved human issue. SAPs entered into international parlance in 1980 with the World Bank's introduction of Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) as a new type of credit.¹ Before that, in response to longer term adjustment needs, the IMF had in 1974 introduced the extended fund facility (EFF) as a new policy instrument under which Fund programmes could last up to three years rather than the usual one year.

In 1986, the IMF introduced the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), which was augmented by the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987. These facilities provided balance of payments assistance on concessional terms to low-income developing countries. By the end of the 1980s, most SSA countries were implementing at least one of these programmes.

This paper evaluates the experience of SSA with SAPs. The first section briefly chronicles the onset of the crises; the second discusses their causes, and the third evaluates SAPs in SSA. The final section consists of some concluding remarks.

The onset of the economic crises in sub-Saharan Africa

SSA witnessed severe external shocks in the mid-1970s which emanated from, *inter alia*, the quadrupling of oil prices and a general decline in terms of trade. The second oil shock and the arrival of the world economic recession towards the end of the 1970s plunged most SSA countries into recession as their export receipts dwindled due to low commodity prices internationally.

Economic growth that had averaged 6.4% per annum between 1970 and 1974 fell to 2.5% per annum between 1975 and 1979, and further to 1.3% per annum between 1980 and 1984. Furthermore, the private capital flows that had been partly responsible for the nascent recovery following the first

oil crisis dried up, leading to a widening current account deficit — from an average of 2.8% of GDP between 1970 and 1974, to 5.2% between 1975 and 1979, and further to 5.3% by the 1980–84 period. Consequently, external borrowing to fund these current transactions increased. The proportion of external debt to GDP in SSA, which stood at 27.4% in 1980, rose to an average of 92.1% between 1985 and 1991 (Table 1).

Of the 40 countries classified as heavily indebted, 33 are in SSA.²

It was against this background that African countries reorientated their economic policies by adopting stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, formulated largely by the IMF and World Bank.³ By the end of 1992, some 30 African countries were implementing economic reforms sup-

Table 1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Some macroeconomic indicators (%)

| | 1973–80 | 1980–93 | 1990–93 |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| GDP growth | 3,7 | 1,9 | 0,7 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2,5 | -2,0 | -2,7 |
| Inflation | 13,8 | 16,1 | 14,0 |
| Merchandise exports | 1,0 | 2,5 | -0,4 |
| Merchandise imports | 3,2 | -2,2 | 1,9 |
| Savings (% GDP) | 23,6 | 19,0 | 16,8 |
| Investment (% GDP) | 24,2 | 18,7 | 16,7 |
| Trade balance (% GDP) | -3,6* | -3,8 | -5,4 |

* Average for 1975–79

Source: World Bank tables (various) and World Bank, *World debt tables*, 1995.

*Thanks are due to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, for whom this survey was compiled.

ported by the IMF. Because the problems afflicting SSA countries appeared to be more deep-rooted, the IMF support was "pushed beyond the traditional emphasis on demand restraint, which was appropriate for relieving temporary or cyclical balance of payments difficulties."¹ The Baker Plan of 1985, which emphasized adjustment with growth, also had the effect of pulling the IMF and the World Bank together. Normally, for a country to have a World Bank SAP, it would need to have agreed to an IMF facility beforehand. In this regard, "the Fund and the World Bank are increasingly working in tandem to plan medium term programs to support outward-oriented structural adjustment".⁵

Causes of the crises and recommended policies

The issue of identifying the causes of the crises in SSA has been the subject of considerable debate which was sparked off by the World Bank's analysis.⁶ The Bank attributed Africa's poor performance mainly to internal causes, namely inappropriate domestic policies. External factors related to declining terms of trade and those associated with the vagaries of the weather were given less prominence.

The IMF and the World Bank asserted that over-expensive, inefficient and largely unproductive public sectors were the root cause of the crises in SSA. According to the Bretton Woods institutions, the problem stemmed from excessive public sector spending. The World Bank⁷ argues that government consumption as a proportion of GDP averaged 15% between 1975 and 1986, exceeding that of other regions by around 5 to 6 percentage points. In addition, the use of state-owned enterprises to provide goods and services was criticized as these parastatals turned out to be inefficient, with their products priced at levels far removed from cost considerations, leading to the need for government subsidies.

Krueger summarizes the concerns of the IMF and World Bank neatly when she argues that:

governments have kept the prices of public sector services, including utilities, transport, and outputs of public enterprises, constant in an effort to "control inflation". In the presence of an underlying inflationary process, of course, the budget deficit induced financial losses of these activities tends to intensify inflationary pressures further,

while simultaneously increasing the degree of distortion in the economy arising from regulated prices.⁸

Government intervention in SSA was also accused of having imposed barriers to factor mobility, such as through the imposition of labour regulations that prohibited the firing of workers, thereby limiting possibilities for factor substitutability in production even when price incentives become favourable.⁹

The policy advice given is aimed at reducing the public sector deficit to a level compatible with internal and external financing as well as with the normal increase in the demand for money at a low rate of inflation.¹⁰ To rationalize and reduce public sector expenditure, adjustment programmes usually address four broad areas — namely the size and allocation of public investment, public sector institution and the fiscal burden of public enterprises.

The World Bank¹¹ argued for a vigorous screening of expenditure proposals from spending ministries as well as increased use of policy analysis. On the issue of parastatals, the World Bank made several proposals ranging from revision of the objectives of these enterprises to divestiture. Indeed, the privatization of these parastatals was seen as highly essential to the reduction of large budget deficits.

Governments were advised to "get out of activities where competing private firms could do a better job (as in manufacturing and marketing)".¹² It is in this context that the IMF advised that "... excessive government intervention ... impeded adjustment and often needed to be addressed for an adjustment program to be sustained".¹³ The reduction in the budget deficit is also seen as a necessary condition for the reduction of the current account deficit.¹⁴

Adjustment programmes have also typically included tax reforms aimed at enlarging the revenue base while, at the same time, reducing distortions and fraud associated with complex and inefficient tax systems.

Perhaps the most cited and debated case is that of exchange rate policy. The accusation that was levelled against SSA countries was that they maintained over-valued exchange rates. It is argued that as a consequence, exchange rates failed to provide adequate incentives for agricultural production as well as for exports. The options adopted by most governments of imposing exchange

controls and other restrictions on international transactions were criticized on a number of grounds.

Firstly, it was argued that exchange control measures forced producers to rely on high-cost domestically produced inputs. This made exports expensive in international markets. Secondly, it was contended that exchange controls tended to suppress rather than deal with the underlying balance of payments problems,¹⁵ and that their imposition entailed expensive administrative machinery that could increase government spending and also encourage rent seeking activities.¹⁶ This made it difficult to remove them once they were in place. Thirdly, over-valued exchange rates were argued to encourage import substitution rather than efficient export expansion.¹⁷ This is because controls tend to discriminate against exports by keeping the profitability of exporting below what it would be with a lower exchange rate.¹⁸

It was further argued that the protection given to industry through trade policies gave no incentive for growth in productivity.¹⁹ The infant industries, for which protection was originally justified, tended to remain infants.²⁰

The World Bank concludes that "... many of the most wasteful investments have been oriented towards sluggish (or declining) and heavily protected internal markets. Those that have been export-oriented have often been made unsuccessful by overvalued exchange rates".²¹

These arguments formed the basis of the recommendations to devalue and liberalize foreign exchange transactions. The main purpose of trade reform is seen as raising the overall productivity in the use of resources by eliminating discrimination against efficient export-oriented and import-competing industries and by removing the distortions of incentives across tradable activities.

The policy reform enunciated by the Bank and the Fund encompasses the reduction of quantitative restrictions on imports accompanied by the reform of the administrative procedures.²² Furthermore, it entails the reduction of tariffs and their dispersion as well as making protection more transparent.²³ These trade reforms are believed to lead, eventually, to the establishment of more efficient export-oriented industries compared to the import-intensive controls and overvalued exchange rates.²⁴

Another economic policy issue which attracted the attention of the IMF and the World Bank related to the conduct of interest rate and financial policy. Controls on the financial sector were seen as highly distortionary. An IMF staff research paper argued that many countries kept interest rates at unrealistic levels out of the desire to: (i) increase the level of investment; (ii) improve the allocation of investments; and (iii) keep financial costs down so as to avoid possible inflationary effects of interest rate liberalization.²⁵

However, low interest rates were seen as harmful because they became insufficient to mobilize the level of savings needed to finance investment,²⁶ leading to credit rationing. The World Bank and IMF believe that where there is rationing and controlled lending rates, financial intermediaries are unlikely to provide funds according to a ranking of rates of return on investment.²⁷

As a result "... a policy of low interest rates not only inhibits investment, but also tends to reduce the average rate of return on investment below the maximum attainable rate".²⁸

The policy implication of this was for countries to undertake financial sector reforms, of which the liberalization of interest rates was very important. The main theoretical underpinnings of financial liberalization in general and interest rate liberalization in particular are those postulated by McKinnon²⁹ and Shaw.³⁰ According to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, the economy is financially repressed by "... distortions of financial prices including interest rates and foreign exchange rates" and, consequently, this reduces "the real rate of growth and the real size of the financial system relative to nonfinancial magnitudes ...".³¹ In their model, financial liberalization is expected to "increase rates of savings, improve savings allocation, induce some substitution of labour for capital equipment and assist in income equalization".³²

As a complement to interest rate liberalization, IMF-supported adjustment programmes typically insist on strict credit restraints, especially to government, as a way of controlling growth in money supply and inflation.³³

As regards investment, the McKinnon-Shaw model holds that investment is principally constrained by lack of funds, due to the low rates of savings. An increase in savings arising from high interest rates is, therefore, ex-

pected to result in high investment levels. However, even in cases where savings do not increase substantially, such that investment fails to rise in volume terms, high interest rates are expected to raise the average efficiency of investment. In this case the level of investment rises through a quality rather than a quantity effect.

Given the way in which the crises in SSA were perceived as well as the main policies recommended by the Bretton Woods institutions during the 1980s, the rest of the paper assesses the extent to which SSA economies responded to the implementation of these policies.

Evaluation of experiences with SAPs in SSA

There is general agreement that policy adjustments in the external sector have been implemented more than progress regarding internal adjustments, and especially the pace of institutional reforms.³⁴ This is because devaluation was considerably easier to implement "... compared to sacking civil servants and marketing board employees, removing the power and patronage of those who appointed them, and cutting the costs and raising the prices of other forms of parastatals".³⁵

According to Humphreys and Jaeger,³⁶ considerable progress has been made in realigning exchange rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, with nominal devaluations averaging almost 50% since 1980–82. This resulted in a real depreciation of the exchange rate such that in 1989, it was about a quarter below the peak in the early 1980s and lower than in early 1970.

With regard to performance, most World Bank and IMF sponsored studies point out that, on average, countries where reforms were implemented performed better than those where no reforms were implemented.³⁷ According to Camdessus,³⁸ countries that have been implementing far-reaching reforms with the support of the IMF for several years, such as Ghana, Gambia, Malawi, Togo and Senegal, were showing positive results and were forecast to continue yielding important long-term benefits. Even those countries which had implemented reforms for a shorter time were argued to be producing positive results as well.

These results are collaborated by those of the World Bank,³⁹ which studied 29 countries in SSA. According to the World Bank, the group of countries

that instituted the most extensive reforms between 1981–86 and 1987–91 enjoyed a median increase of GDP per capita growth of almost 2 percentage points, while those countries that did not undertake reforms saw their median per capita GDP growth decline by 2.6%.

In spite of this, evaluations by independent analysts appear to dispute these positive results.⁴⁰ Cornia⁴¹ suggests that SAPs have not removed the obstacles to long-term development, even though he agrees with IMF evidence that shows that micro-economic efficiency is usually improved by the reform efforts. He argues that countries that concentrate on primary commodity production coupled with import liberalization and public expenditure cuts have been pushed further away from needed self-sufficiency that might have been better supported by stimulating growth in manufacturing capacity and more diversified exports.

Stewart agrees with these sentiments, arguing that "... in many respects the policies are pushing African economies away from a desirable long-term structure especially because they are dampening local capabilities, reorienting economies towards heavy specialization in export agriculture or primary products, and are not permitting a build-up of dynamic comparative advantage in non-traditional agriculture and industry".⁴²

Other analysts, including those within the Bank and the Fund, have pointed out that the improvement observed in reforming countries may have been made possible by increased multilateral and bilateral aid flows⁴³ rather than from the effect of policy reforms *per se*. According to Nsouli, the international community "provided substantial resources, including debt relief, to support growth-oriented adjustment programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa".⁴⁴ Humphreys and Jaeger⁴⁵ contend that between 1986 and 1987, official creditors increased the annual amount of debt relief for reforming countries by some 50% compared with the previous six years, while virtually eliminating it for non-reforming countries. Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to attribute improved performance to adjustment policies *per se*.⁴⁶

Criticisms have also been levelled against the "before and after" approaches used to evaluate the policies. While the method is relatively easy to employ and seemingly objective, it is inadequate because it assumes that all

other things would have remained constant in the absence of a programme. The method introduces biases since it incorrectly attributes all of the change in outcomes between the pre-programme and programme periods to programme factors.

The IMF usually prefers to compare the actual outcomes with some targets for variables specified by the authorities, with success being measured by the extent to which the targets are achieved. However, as Toye argues, such a method is "inadequate because of imperfect foresight in the setting of targets".¹⁷ In addition, this approach sheds little light on how the country's macro-economic performance was affected by the change in policy, because failure to reach a target does not imply, for example, that the policy change did not have an independent effect on the outcomes.

To correctly assess the contribution of adjustment programmes, one needs to compare the actual situation of the country after adjustment was undertaken with an estimated counterfactual, described as the situation that would have prevailed without the programme but with the same exogenous influences. When the World Bank used this latter technique, it found that "... the annual average rate of GDP growth of [early intensive adjustment lending] EIAL countries was not different from that of all the other countries when measuring changes between 1970–80 and 1985–88".¹⁸

In addition to GDP growth, most SSA countries are argued to have registered strong export performance early in the programmes. However, such strong export growth faded towards the end of the programme period, and in fact for many countries, growth in export volumes in 1992 was no higher than before the arrangements.¹⁹ Such findings are consistent with earlier work by Roberts whose review of nine SSA countries revealed that in the African situation "... where there is relatively low short-run supply elasticity in the economy, devaluation tends to be deflationary rather than expenditure — switching, in the first instance".⁵⁰

Helleiner⁵¹ also contends that in spite of major devaluations in most SSA countries, there has been no major export response. He argues that "major non-price constraints continue to limit supplies of traditional exports, ... and nontraditional exports take much longer to develop". In fact, some World Bank economists have gone further to

note that in some African countries, improvements in resource balance (which are also reported in the study by Schadler *et al*) came from import compression rather than from export expansion.⁵²

With regard to investment, evidence appears to suggest that SAPs do not result in higher investment levels.⁵³ In fact implementation of SAPs appears to have been accompanied by declines in investment.⁵⁴ The high interest rates associated with financial sector reform have had a negative effect on the volume of investment in most countries implementing SAPs. This has been exacerbated by failure to reduce domestic inflation rates in most SSA countries. In addition, the depreciation of currencies often recommended under SAPs appears to have had a negative effect on investment.⁵⁵

Even the World Bank now admits that the burden of adjustment fell heavily on investment. In its earlier evaluation of SAPs, the Bank contends that since the early intensive adjustment lending countries undertook real depreciation of exchange rates, "... the relative price of investment goods rose. So, the effect of the programs was an even larger average reduction — 5.6 percentage points of GDP — in the constant price ratio of investment to GDP between 1970–80 and 1985–88".⁵⁶ An IMF staff research paper came to the same conclusion, arguing that investment did not improve significantly, although it is contended that private investment rose as public investment fell.⁵⁷

Lessons for future programmes

From this analysis, it would appear that, in general, most SSA countries did not register any significant supply responses to SAPs during the 1980s and early 1990s. Per capita income also declined during the same period (Table 1). It is, therefore, not surprising that the 1980s have been described as "a lost decade for Africa";⁵⁸ "... a disastrous decade by any reasonable standard".⁵⁹ The question to be answered is why this was the case in spite of the pervasiveness of SAPs in SSA.

(a) Early or late response to the need for economic reform

It has been noted that countries often leave it too late to change their economic policies before the economies

deteriorate into disaster.⁶⁰ However, there are a number of reasons why this happens. Firstly, it is often difficult for countries to ascertain whether a balance of payments problem is temporary or permanent. This is because if the shock is expected to be temporary, "... it is usually sensible (if feasible) to finance a current account deficit rather than force the economy into rapid adjustment that will later be reversed ...".⁶¹ After all, it was the attempt "at Bretton Woods to safeguard against global deflation that countries were only expected in the IMF rubric to take corrective actions in the face of *permanent* disequilibrium".⁶²

Secondly, interest groups that might be expected to push for reforms may be weak or unorganized, or may not have enough influence on government. The governments of some countries have also remained too isolated from business interest groups that might otherwise have pressed for reform. Instead, governments effectively represented urban consumers, civil servants and protected manufacturers. This obviously delayed the implementation of necessary reforms.

Thirdly, the costs of adjustment are immediate and certain, while at best the benefits can be expected to come later, if at all. Consequently, even those interest groups that stand to gain from reforms may not lobby for changes in policy. In spite of these reasons to delay reforms, there is a growing body of evidence showing that governments that respond early to the need for economic reform do relatively better, when the response is sound, than those that leave it late.⁶³

(b) Commitment to reforms

Ajayi also acknowledges "the allegation that some African countries have pursued some of the policies in a half hearted manner, thereby making the full realization of the positive effects of adjustment impossible", but his own assessment for the 1980s is that most programmes were fully or substantially implemented in Africa and therefore poor compliance cannot be presented as the main cause of poor performance.

However, his view is not fully shared by Mosley *et al*,⁶⁴ who claim that political pressures have caused widely different levels of commitment from various governments, some implementing almost all the policy condi-

tions, others achieving about half and some almost none at all. They also draw attention to the fact that significant degrees of adjustment were successfully accomplished by a number of countries that were not on official programmes, countries engaged in adjustment procedures not directly linked to compliance with IMF or World Bank conditions.

It is now generally agreed that if economic reform programmes are to be implemented on a sustained basis, they must be owned both technically and politically by the government responsible for their implementation. Ownership of the reform programme should also be broadly based, rather than the province of a few. Case studies show that most of the adjustment programmes were conceived and formulated by a narrow group of technocrats and politicians who often did not consult with or invite inputs from others.⁶⁵ There is clear evidence that open discussion and interaction involving diverse groups offer the only feasible ways to internalize the necessary commitment and make programmes acceptable among those from whom support is vital.

If they are to be effective, reform programmes should also be carried out within an atmosphere of agreement on the direction in which the economy should move. Those who have the responsibility for carrying the programme forward should also have clear goals and objectives in mind; without known targets they would find it difficult to achieve reforms when they have to have support from wide-ranging groups, such as private businesses, professionals, political parties and labour movements.

Husain and Faruqee found that in many of the African countries studied, trade union leaders often made the point that if they were consulted about the justification for various policy measures and informed about the likely consequences and objectives, they would always have been in a better position to make constructive contributions to both the diagnosis of problems and the prescription of solutions.

Civil servants have been found to be unwilling to enact pay scale reforms or cutbacks in employment levels, though evidence shows they were less inclined to oppose reforms if these lessened or removed the legal restrictions on their participation in private economic activities. Also, because of the strong probability that personal issues

rather than national objectives motivate public servants most of the time, threats that the country could lose donor support or funding from international financial institutions if public service conduct falls short of expectations usually carry very little weight.⁶⁶

Private interest groups are likely to respond differently to reforms, with industrial concerns supporting trade reform to escape from import restrictions and shortages of foreign exchange, and export-oriented farmers accepting that they would be direct beneficiaries of devaluation. Producers of domestic food crops and their traders have also welcomed the lifting of price controls and marketing restrictions. However, private sector operators who were dependent on the government favouring them with foreign exchange allocations, licences and project approvals before the reforms were put in place have typically opposed structural adjustment programmes, and some have sought alternative affirmative action mechanisms to restore themselves to their former privileged positions.

(c) Importance of political analysis

Closely tied to the issue of commitment is the need to undertake an impact analysis of economic reforms at the designing stage. This is because there are losers and gainers from the various policy changes. In situations where the losers wield considerable political influence, it becomes difficult for the government to implement reforms. According to Nelson,⁶⁷ the sustainability of structural adjustment programmes depends on the political acceptability of the measures being implemented. This usually extends beyond simple "political will". To Nelson, "serious outside attempts to anticipate political and administrative obstacles ... are more likely to be constructive and practical".⁶⁸ Thus, the notion of political will needs to be replaced by that of political base through an analysis of constituencies, pressure groups and political leverage that could be mobilized for reform.

Since most programmes to date have failed to undertake such political analysis at the designing stage, Nelson concludes: "In country after country, internal political pressures — and the politicians' fear of such pressure — have led governments to postpone corrective action until the economic crisis is acute or to dilute or abandon programs before the necessary eco-

conomic adjustments are accomplished".⁶⁹

Although the IMF and World Bank argue that they do not want to do political analysis because it could be construed as political interference with their members' internal affairs, Harvey has argued that "If economic analysis can show who is likely to lose and gain from a change in policies, then it is irresponsible not to supply that analysis".⁷⁰ In recent years, however, the IMF and the World Bank have increasingly included policies designed to protect the most vulnerable groups in society, but only after the intervention of UNICEF.⁷¹

(d) Identification of policy conflicts

It has been observed that some policy recommendations may be potentially conflicting. For example, while the correction of the balance of payments deficit (the major objective of a stabilization programme), by reducing demand for imports and releasing resources for exports, is consistent with a successful stabilization programme, with structural adjustment, however, weak domestic demand may be a hindrance to investment necessary for the long-term strength of the balance of payments.

A further possible contradiction arises from the recommendation to reduce aggregate government expenditure. It is argued that this could amount to disincentives that impinge on the expansion of supply.⁷² The argument is that adjustment requires more and not less government spending because public sector investment crowds in rather than crowds out private investment. Such contradictions are never highlighted at the designing stage. Yet as Mosley and Teye argue, it is crucial that any "... potential conflicts be acknowledged *ex ante*, rather than be allowed to manifest themselves in the form of internally inconsistent advice".⁷³

(e) Sequencing of policies

Another important aspect in the design of SAPs is the proper sequencing of policy instruments.⁷⁴ It is important that changes in policy are implemented in the right order. In the first instance, a stable macroeconomic framework is absolutely necessary for adjustment policies to take root.

Adjustment policies are not only likely to fail in an unstable macroeconomic environment, but they could

make matters worse. For example, failure to control budget deficits and financing them through borrowing from the monetary banking sector often results in high rates of domestic inflation as well as a precipitate decline in the value of domestic currencies.

This in turn feeds back into higher rates of inflation through higher import costs.⁷⁵ In the case of trade liberalization, the World Bank typically advocates the earliest and fullest possible liberalization, beginning with the replacement of quantitative restrictions by tariffs, and gradually reducing the levels of these.⁷⁶ However, the timing and sequencing are left out of the formulation.

The political economy of the reform process usually dictates whether the adjustment should be rapid or gradual. Some countries may have the political base to sustain reforms over a long period and may find a gradual improvement in performance satisfactory. Other governments, particularly new ones, may need to front-load the political pain of adjustment by making rapid reforms to take advantage of an initial wave of support and generate economic benefits that will help consolidate their political support in the longer term. In economic terms, however, more rapid reforms, assuming that they are within the implementation capacity of the government and politically sustainable, are likely to be preferable to slower ones because the benefits of adjustment will tend to be realized faster, and because rapid implementation will reduce the chances of the process being hijacked by sectional interest groups.

On the administrative capacity to implement reforms, some types of reforms are capacity saving in that they reduce the demands on government's limited administrative capacity. Others are capacity using and thus complicate economic management. This distinction applies both to different categories of reforms and to alternative designs of specific reforms. Across reforms, abolishing price controls and foreign exchange allocation systems is capacity saving, whereas privatization and civil service reform are initially capacity using. Within reforms, replacing non-tariff structures, gradually phasing out excessive protection through declining import surtaxes, and abolishing marketing boards is capacity saving compared with trying to restructure and run the boards better.⁷⁷

Each reform and the entire reform

programme must be within the implementation capacity of the government. Radical reforms such as abolishing marketing boards and adopting a uniform tariff may often be easier to implement administratively than gradual reforms, but might be politically tougher to adopt. Capacity-saving and capacity-using reforms affect both core ministries and the specific line ministries concerned.

Although the administrative capacity saved in the core ministries may be fungible, it may or may not be possible to use administrative capacity saved in one line ministry to help implement reforms in other areas. The objective, however, remains to reduce or eliminate the fiscal deficit and impose a comprehensive hard budget constraint on public enterprises. Government-sponsored credit programmes also need to be brought under control at the same time.

To win strong private sector support, the first phases of reform programmes should focus on areas that can bring quick results. Reforms are often necessary partly or wholly because of excessive government spending that is directly related to over-staffing in the civil and military services. Early successes make the reform programmes more sustainable and also help in promoting the growth upon which subsequent public sector retrenchment exercises depend.

Public enterprise reform, civil service reform and financial sector reform are particularly difficult areas in the adjustment process and require more time. However, the linkages between import liberalization and the usually necessary reforms to public enterprise, government finance and the financial sector make it essential that all these are tackled at the same time.

To their cost, many countries have found that rapid import liberalization reduces the profitability of domestic manufacturers that are not given time to become competitive with imports. If producers are indebted and the changes coincide with high or rising interest rates, their shrinking sales and declining ability to service debt can become major threats to their viability. Lower profitability also impacts upon government tax revenues and makes early progress in bringing about public sector spending cuts all the more important, while the country's required commitment to positive real interest rates makes recourse to increased deficit spending and bor-

rowings particularly difficult to manage.

The process of privatization of viable public enterprises must also be started, but for this to succeed, an economic environment in which individuals can more easily start and develop private enterprises of their own must be fostered.

In Africa, a common requirement almost throughout the continent is the support of a structure of legal rights and obligations that will establish property rights for the mass of the population and allow individuals to buy and sell property easily.⁷⁸

Shleifer⁷⁹ argues that the absence of formal property rights makes contractual obligations unenforceable. Rights over the physical use of property do not convey the same status as do legal rights that can be enforced by a court of law. Making physical rights legal and legal rights physical therefore has to be part of the process of establishing property rights.⁸⁰

Numerous attempts have been made to substitute country-specific or tailor-made rural credit schemes for formal banking arrangements in Africa. While many, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have made a significant difference to the effectiveness of farming communities, few have succeeded in elevating the targeted groups to the status of independent, individual commercial farmers who, from the viewpoint of lending institutions, can be safely expected to run their farming enterprises along business lines.

Too many instances of government-backed debt forgiveness, or government protection for loan defaulters, have undermined fledgling finance schemes, making their further development towards formal banking status improbable, and in most cases it appears that the purpose of the schemes was to lift the farmers only slightly above subsistence levels. Important as this has been for many millions of peasant farmers, it falls a long way short of turning the land into bankable collateral, or the farms into businesses that are fully in the marketplace and subject to the disciplines of market forces.

(f) *Unforeseen exogenous shocks*

Analysts have also attributed failure of SAPs to unforeseen external circumstances.⁸¹ This is mainly because information upon which policy is based is always imperfect. This problem is

made worse by the fact that "... expectations as to the temporariness of the shock and availability of external finance are both particularly crucial and particularly difficult to get right ... [due to] the difficulties of forecasting the future in circumstances of extreme uncertainty".⁸²

Although the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) was created to cater for the unforeseen circumstances by providing low-conditional-loan loans,⁸³ the facility is now argued to have been turned into another upper credit tranche agreement.⁸⁴ As Nelson⁸⁵ argues, the IMF's response to new unforeseen problems is to insist on more austerity.

Ajayi⁸⁶ (1994) argues that compensatory policies have to be adopted to mitigate the negative impacts of exogenous shocks, such as the severe deterioration in SSA's terms of trade in the 1980s. In this regard, he contends that new financing should have been made available to offset the deterioration in terms of trade in affected countries.

(g) Assumptions underlying policy advice

Another reason for the failure of structural adjustment programmes in SSA is attributable to the wrong assumption that fully competitive markets already exist in SSA. In the area of financial liberalization for example, it is assumed that high interest rates will stimulate savings, add to total saving, and thus boost investment. The ECA⁸⁷ has argued that most SSA economies do not respond to such price incentives as interest rates due to some structural constraints that require more, and not less, government intervention. Indeed, the problems of market failure that gave rise to government intervention in the first place do not disappear because governments in Africa have failed dismally. What is crucial is to understand why some countries (notably in South East Asia) intervened and succeeded while African governments failed.

In recent years, however, both the IMF and the World Bank have admitted that the effects of high interest rates in less developed countries are uncertain. Khan and Knight,⁸⁸ for example, argue that "... despite the amount of research expended on the interest responsiveness of savings in general, and in developing countries in particular, it is still uncertain whether an increase in interest rates will, on

balance, raise the savings rate".

Similarly, the World Bank observed that "... whether financial variables affect the savings rate is still an open question ... The effect of higher interest rates is ambiguous ...". Even McKinnon who was one of the major protagonists of financial and interest rates liberalization, has recently changed his views after observing its failure in Latin America. He now admits that "... the government should probably impose a ceiling on standard loan (and deposit) rates of interest"⁸⁹ in order to overcome the banks' moral hazard. According to Stiglitz and Weiss,⁹⁰ immature bank-based capital markets in LCDS that were the main cause of financial repression impose limits on the level to which interest rates can be increased without incurring undue "adverse risk selection" among borrowers.

(h) Development of capabilities

In addition to getting most fundamentals right, public support of efforts to make firms more efficient is also urgently needed. The development of institutional capacities, for example, is crucial to stimulate supply response in most SSA countries. Indeed, policy advice given under most SAPs appears to assume that the countries concerned have got the necessary infrastructure and capacities to fully implement the reforms. With regard to the need to expand exports, for example, traditional trade theory recommends policies as if "... marketing of manufactured products does not constitute a separate determinant of success with exporting ...".⁹¹

While marketing barriers are common to all forms of industrial goods, they are particularly acute for SSA, not only because of its relative distance from major markets and inexperience, but also because of the lack of local institutional support.⁹² It is in the setting up of the institutions to help the private sector that the state can still play a role. According to Datta-Chandhuri,⁹³ the state in India set up sales outlets for products from the cottage industries, and disseminated new techniques of production and new designs to the producers as well as introducing some quality control. This boosted exports from these small rural producers. In the case of South Korea, similar functions were/are still performed by ten trading companies formed by the state in the late 1960s.⁹⁴ In Datta-Chandhuri's view, the "... phenomenal suc-

cess of Korea in exporting manufactured goods cannot be fully understood without appreciating the role played by these trading companies".⁹⁵

In addition to the establishment of institutional support, the private sectors' responsiveness to price incentives could be enhanced by building industrial capabilities in the form of providing technical effort and skills.⁹⁶ According to Lall, no firm can achieve and *sustain* international competitiveness unless there is a conscious effort to acquire and assimilate technology. Firm-level research in South East Asia has shown that investment in the successful assimilation and adaptation of technology is vitally important in the development process.⁹⁷

As Lall observes, African industry "... suffers from ... small technological capabilities for the efficient exploitation of existing physical capacity and the dynamic build-up of new areas of competitiveness ... [and unless] the base of capabilities is improved, no amount of tinkering with incentive structures will produce sustained export growth".⁹⁸ This is because competitive advantages arise from "... deliberate efforts to build industrial capabilities rather than 'given' factor endowments"⁹⁹ since price quotations do not always carry sufficient information for economic decisions.¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, with the continued development of technology, international investors are becoming interested in high productivity rather than low labour costs. Consequently, government assistance is required in upgrading labour skills. By its very nature, the upgrading of skills entails risks and externalities which may lead firms to under-invest in human resource development. In this regard, the state needs to intervene to enhance special training in new skills. This entails going beyond the provision of general education.

(i) Capacity to control

Another basic problem in much of Africa is that, although many governments insist on retaining control, at the same time they sometimes lose the capacity to exercise control with any degree of efficiency. Some have come to suffer from what is effectively administrative paralysis. From this, new unofficial ground rules have emerged and, sometimes with the complicity of officials, alternative methods of dispensing

public services have emerged. In a number of countries, smuggled goods become freely available at prices cheaper than domestic substitutes, and scarce government services are allocated by functionaries on the basis of political and family connections and bribes. According to Husain & Faruqee:

A major factor inhibiting the growth of business is the generous inflow of smuggled goods allowed by customs officials, who collect rents for themselves rather than import duties for the government. Domestic industries have to pay all kinds of taxes — for example, import duties on inputs and raw materials, and taxes on sales profits and dividends. They also have to bear the higher costs of inefficient public utilities, and they face harassment and pressure from local and state government officials.¹⁰¹

These writers also point out that although the visible buoyancy of agriculture and the urban informal sector in almost all adjusting countries provides ample testimony to the entrepreneurial skills and capacities of private economic actors, the growth of a large private sector has been stunted in most African countries by the direct interventions of the state. But a distinction needs to be made between an unproductive rent-seeking private sector in which certain individuals or companies earn profits due to the favours and patronage of the government, and a productive private sector in which individuals or companies compete on a level playing field without special favours or concessions.

What Faruqee and Husain term “administrative decay” in Africa is said to be rooted in “pervasive clientele politics”. They believe that unless there is a fundamental restructuring and professionalization of the civil service in these countries, the prospects for building implementation capacity will remain bleak — whatever the pressures from outside.

In attempting to explain why Africa is in such crisis conditions, Chabal¹⁰² says these problems have been often explained in terms of what the continent had to endure during colonial rule and in terms of neo-colonial exploitation since independence. “But this will no longer do. We must face the facts of Africa’s crisis if the facts involve trying to explain (rather than explain away) what is happening now. To do that we must cease to search for the ‘necessary’ extra-African cause of Africa’s crisis.” He also says:

My point is simple: to satisfy ourselves with simple-minded explanations about post-colonial African policies is not to take Africans seriously. It is in effect to patronize them . . . to provide cover for those who are actually responsible for what is happening in Africa . . . and to betray the aspirations of the millions of Africans who long for some improvement in their everyday life.¹⁰³

While he accepts that African rulers submit to enormous pressure from the West because of the conditionalities for receiving aid, he feels that unless the process of greater accountability is generated and sustained by Africans themselves, the present transition to formal democracy now apparently taking place might not be completed. “In the end, it is not possible to dictate the democratization of African politics from the outside.”

Concluding remarks

One of the most consistent threads running through the evidence available on reform programmes is that the needed changes are carried forward more vigorously when broadly based private sector interests are respected and geared to help advance them. The evidence strongly suggests that this is the line of thinking that is most deserving of support.

There is no escaping the basic requirements of a country that wants to get onto a growth path that will be sustainable long enough for its population to become at least moderately prosperous, and then to hold onto its prosperity. These requirements could be put in many ways, but they come down to ensuring:

- that various forms of sustainable production can be established and developed;
- that the products can generally be sold for more than they cost to produce;
- that private and public enterprises invest the funds needed to provide for the new flows of human and physical capital that are essential for the required economic growth and the gainful employment of a reasonable proportion of the country’s population;
- that borrowings are invested to produce returns that are more than sufficient to repay lenders;
- that getting most policies right and none of them hopelessly wrong is better than wasting time trying to get all policies right.

These conditions, when backed by sound, respected legal structures and good governance, will form a firm base on which to build a successful country. None of them can be considered optional without at the same time compromising the pace, nature, direction and potential of the country’s development, and structural adjustment programmes are therefore designed to adjust existing structures to bring them into conformity with desired structures.

Special compensatory finance after events such as a weakening in the terms of trade should be made available only after acceptable plans have been made to recover from balance of payments problems if the exogenous shock turns out to be of a permanent rather than a temporary nature.

In essence, it appears that two of the main problem areas for Africa are:

- the absence of widespread private and formal property rights; and
- the consequential limited reach that the reforms can have into the traditional or peasant sectors because of their isolation from financial services.

It is our assessment that by not attending to property rights issues, those countries in which most of the land is state owned will continue to have limited chances of success even when in other respects their prospects are more promising. This is partly because the increasingly large peasant or informal economies in African countries are now very seriously undercapitalized and because they will remain undercapitalized while the land upon which the people live and work has no market or collateral value.

The peasant status of the majority of the population of nearly all the countries examined is locked in place by the absence of property rights, and the attendant outmoded system hinders progress by keeping the people isolated from the financial support offered by each country’s formal banking system. They also have no motivation to invest in their own future security or to protect the fertility of the land because in most cases the system offers no security of tenure and no right to bequeath the land they have worked to their own children.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the discussion is that structural adjustment programmes are necessary but not in themselves sufficient in fostering development in sub-Saharan Africa. There is certainly need to get

the fundamentals right. After all, the lesson of the 1970s was that macro and sectoral policies are ignored to the peril of programmes for addressing basic needs. However, "one of the lessons of the 1980s has been that a single-minded focus on structural adjustment is equally perilous for these programmes".¹⁰⁴ Issues of long-term sustainable development are now back in vogue, with emphasis being given to issues of capability building, the empowerment of individuals and good governance.

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$$S - I = CA$$
 where *S* represents gross national savings, *I* represents total investment and *CA* represents the current account. With a fall in the budget deficit, *S* increases. If *I* remains constant then the current account will improve by the improvement in *S*.
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Zambia: Solo effort



Early on the morning of 28 October, listeners to Zambian state radio were startled to hear an announcement from a "Captain Solo" that the government of President Frederick Chiluba had been overthrown by a group calling itself the National Redemption Council. Reports were later filed with foreign news agencies saying that small-arms fire had been heard on the streets of Lusaka and that tanks had been seen deploying. "Captain Solo" claimed that the coupists had been motivated by the chaotic situation of the country in which crime and corruption were rampant.

Loyal military elements soon dislodged the insurgents from around the radio station and State House, however, and arrested the ringleaders, including "Solo", whose identity was established as Captain Steven Lungu. President Chiluba, evidently shaken by events, subsequently went on radio to celebrate the suppression of the coup and to announce his intention of dealing firmly with the miscreants. The aftermath of a failed coup is seldom a comfortable time for the stated opponents of a regime, and Chiluba immediately made clear his intention of dealing firmly with his rivals. His anger and shock were evident, and were probably aggravated by the fact that many of the members of his government had taken flight on hearing of the coup, and that had "Solo" and his associates not begun a premature celebration, he might indeed have been ousted.

As matters are developing, however, Chiluba's reaction may yet provoke the result he most fears. When one overtightens a screw there is a danger either that the screw will break or that the thread will strip the wood, making the exercise counterproductive. This is what may also happen when leaders over-react in their relief at their survival of a crisis and their determination to extirpate its roots.

Disaffection in the ranks of the Zambian military is nothing new. The rule of Kenneth Kaunda (1964–1991) saw many claims of foiled coup plots, and there were frequent rumours of dissatisfaction in the ranks of the security forces. The rounding up and evident torture of several army officers is as likely to sow panic as it is to confirm the loyalty of the security forces. Likewise the declaration of a state of emergency and detention of a wide range of suspects, the most prominent of whom among the initial batch was the defeated candidate in the 1996 presidential elections, Dean Mung'omba, leader of the Zambian Democratic Congress, is likely to destroy any residual confidence in due process of law.

Not only was Mung'omba denied access to his lawyers, there were credible accounts that he was being tortured, along with other detainees. Indeed, one unnamed army source later claimed that Lungu and a number of other suspects had died as a result of their maltreatment, which was denied by police. Mung'omba's deputy, Azwell Banda, went into hiding following a police raid on his home, and wrote to President Mugabe to seek external intervention to defuse the political situation. Other prominent opposition figures, Kenneth Kaunda and Roger Chongwe, who had been leading a public disobedience campaign, decided to extend their overseas itineraries.

Kaunda returned home in December, and was detained on Christmas Day, eventually to be accused of having helped plan and finance the plot. According to the State, Chongwe and Kaunda were jointly implicated in the plot by confessions extracted from military prisoners. The State also made the improbable allegation that Kaunda had paid Lungu and his men \$270 each to overthrow the government and had agreed to pay the officers an additional \$13 000 in the event of success. According to this account of events,



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Head: African Security and
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Midrand*

the army would then have ruled for three months before handing over to Kaunda.

Kaunda's arrest and incarceration focused the thoughts of many African and international leaders, and following the personal intervention of Tanzania's ex-president Julius Nyerere, Kaunda was released into house arrest, whence he continued to goad the government, especially once his military accusers apologized, claiming that the incriminating and false evidence had been extracted under torture. It will be remembered that Kaunda had been prevented from running for presidential office in the 1996 elections by legislative sleight of hand that went a long way towards undercutting the democratic process for which Chiluba had once fought. One cannot rule out the possibility that under these circumstances elements within Kaunda's

party were indeed willing to consider extra-constitutional means to oust Chiluba's government. There was speculation that they may have received encouragement in these ideas from Angola, whose government had already registered its anger at Zambia's connivance in the continued supply of weapons to Unita. Certainly, under the circumstances, Kaunda's much-publicized return to Lusaka may be seen as well-calculated political defiance which successfully pushed a regionally unpopular government to ill-considered action and incidentally returned Kaunda himself to the spotlight.

Though he came to power in the wake of widespread popular demonstrations for multiparty elections and the ousting of Kaunda's United National Independence Party, Chiluba's popularity soon waned after his initial victory in 1991 in which he took 76% of the presidential vote. Public expectations of a rapid improvement in the country's economic circumstances were unrealistic, particularly in a policy environment dominated by the strictures of the IMF and the World Bank. In addition severe differences arose in the ranks of the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which proved to be an umbrella organization for disaffected politicians and businessmen rather than a political party. In particular, certain political leaders were displeased with what they saw as the president's inclination to favour politicians from his own region.

As a result, the number of opposition parties proliferated. It was the return to the political stage of Kaunda that seemed to constitute the greatest threat before the elections of 1996, however. Accordingly the constitution was altered to prevent his candidacy, and the hopes of a unified opposition front were dashed. Chiluba chose to reject the advice of other regional leaders, most notably President Mandela,

that he was treading a dangerous path, and that space had to be left for a loyal opposition to operate.

Fundamentally though, these latest developments indicate that whatever the failings of Chiluba's administration, from lack of presidential control to corruption and mismanagement, the underlying difficulties of manoeuvring a fragile economy through the policy channels marked by Washington leave an ostensibly de-



Kenneth Kaunda


mocratic government dangerously exposed to popular discontent and institutional challenge. The ways in which it seeks to meet that challenge may exacerbate rather than solve its problems of legitimacy.

In the meantime, the economic situation continues to cause alarm. Some sources estimate that some 80% of Zambians now live below the poverty datum line. Infant and child mor-


tality rates are climbing and the number of deaths from AIDS-related causes continues its demoralizing upward spiral. Economic growth was estimated in 1996 at 6.4%, though from a very low base. In 1997 it was hoped that 5.5% might be achieved, though this seems doubtful given the onset of possibly the severest drought in living memory. Already in the 1996/97 season maize production had fallen by 32% over the previous year, to 10.7 mn 90-kg bags, ironically the consequence of excessive rains. Zambia's annual consumption is 12 mn bags. *El Niño* seems almost certain to aggravate the already considerable distress of the average Zambian.

The government's handling of its opponents will be subject to intense scrutiny from the donor community, whose assistance remains crucial to the continuation of the economic reform programme. Future funding and assistance will now be hostage to the ending of the state of emergency and the fate of the accused. Certainly, though, the early indications are that the government has little intention of following a course of prudent restraint. Indeed the arrest on 28 January of Princess Nakatindi Wina, head of the MMD's Women's League and wife of the MMD's party chairman suggested that Chiluba intended to make as many enemies as fast as possible. She, too, was accused of having had prior knowledge of the plot.

In short, whether the Solo coup was a drunken prank or a serious attempt is now largely immaterial to a government now facing some of the most crucial decisions since it came to power. Whether the Chiluba administration has the calibre to understand the nature of the challenge and to act in the national interest rather than in that of a narrow and corrupt clique will be a question for which we may soon have an answer.



Bookshelf



Handbook of regional organizations in Africa, by Fredrik Soderbaum, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika institutet, 1996. 161 pp. ISBN 91-7106-400-1

The proliferation of intergovernmental organizations in Africa today can confuse the student or researcher. This publication aims to provide a user-friendly, annotated reference guide on the subject.

The organizations are listed under their English title and each entry gives information on the aims, history, activities and publications of the organization, as well as the address of the headquarters and a list of member countries. The book is divided into two sections: the first lists "Main regional organizations in Africa" in considerable detail, the second gives briefer entries on other organizations. A useful list of acronyms is included.

The introduction warns the user that some of the information may not be completely up to date owing to difficulties in obtaining feedback from all the organizations. Nevertheless, this will be a useful reference work for those needing basic information on African regional organizations.



Trade marks in Africa. [Pretoria]: Adams & Adams, 1996. 82pp.

A neat, well-produced volume which lists one African country per page in alphabetical order. Each page illustrates the country's geographical position, and gives a few vital statistics followed by information on Trade Mark law and requirements in the country and regulations for marking of goods. An appendix lists the Nice International Classification of Goods and

Services, and the Pre-1938 British Classification of Goods. A useful reference for those wishing to expand their markets into Africa.



Overcoming rural poverty in Africa, edited by Stephen A Breth. Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 1997. 145pp. ISBN 2-940192-00-6

This well-produced and thought-provoking volume represents the proceedings of the ninth in a series of workshops that have explored measures for improving sub-Saharan Africa's food security and other issues relevant to economic progress in the region.

Speakers, who included representatives from the World Bank and the agriculture ministers of Uganda and Ghana, urged governments and donors to learn from the mistakes of the past. While a number of success stories were described, several speakers estimated that about half the World Bank's projects have failed in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, while there tend to be too many small, disparate donor-driven projects which are not integrated with the local economy. There was a general consensus that in future focus should fall on agricultural production and on the education and empowerment of women in Africa, who could hold the key to the future.

The workshop was sponsored by CASIN, the Sasakawa Africa Association and the Global 2000 Program of the Carter Center.



Trading on development: South Africa's relations with the European Union, edited by Rachel Houghton. Johannesburg: Foundation

for Global Dialogue and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1997. 213pp. ISBN 1 919697 16 0

The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1993, created the international machinery to advance the cause of global free trade.

South Africa's negotiations with the European Union on a free trade agreement take place against this background. The protracted nature of the negotiations underscores deep differences in perspective between the parties over substance, interests and philosophy. This volume represents the proceedings of a workshop held by the FDA and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in October 1996. The various explorations of the respective negotiating positions are illuminating, while they reflect the complex and contentious nature of the issue.



Keeping house in Lusaka, by Karen Tranberg Hansen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 228 pp. ISBN 0-231-08143-X

The book is based on the author's research spanning 20 years (between 1971 and 1989, updated by shorter visits in the 1990s) in Mtendere, a settlement on the outskirts of Lusaka. It aims to give an insight into how "one of the most dramatic economic declines in Africa in the postcolonial period", accompanied by rapid urbanization, was experienced by people who lived through it.

The individual case studies and examples of strategies adopted by specific households in Mtendere (often the women of the household) illuminate and bring to life the author's research and the central issues of housing, work, households and gender rela-

tions. This is a graphic and specific study of urbanization and development in Africa. The book has an extensive bibliography and an analytical index.

The long march: The story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa, edited by Ian Liebenberg, Fiona Lortan, Bobby Nel and Gert van der Westhuizen. Pretoria: HAUM, 1994. 259pp. ISBN 0-7986-3237-2 (pbk)

The four editors must have worked very hard to put together the formidable line-up of authors, liberation struggle veterans and academics who wrote these twenty-three chapters of varying length, strengths and weaknesses. It would be a mammoth task to review each of the chapters of this highly informative volume, which everyone interested in the past, the present and the future South Africa should read. The book is, in my opinion, a rich source of material on the nature of the struggle for South Africa, providing the reader with a background to developments in the New South Africa today. The editors admit that the style and format of the book are not strictly consistent with academic requirements and expectations. It is more a popular reader than an academic exposition and analysis of the struggle for South Africa. Academics will, however, find this book immensely valuable, for it is rich in accurate historical information on many aspects of the liberation struggle.

With so many contributors, ob-

viously each writing independently of the others, the book runs into the usual problem of repetition of some of the events that may have been common to two or more groups under study, or may have affected more than one group at a given time.

The perceptions and emphasis of the various authors are, however, different and give different perspectives on the events. A minor flaw of the book is the lack of a list of abbreviations among the preliminaries of the reader. Historical and political writings are notorious for using abbreviations, and such a list would be useful in this reader. Indeed, there are several abbreviations which are not given in full anywhere in the book, such as AZANYU and AZAZM. While these terms may be obvious to most South Africans, they may mean very little or nothing to other readers of this book.

The wide range of groups and movements studied is clearly impressive by any standards, emphasizing the point that the struggle for the liberation of South Africa was not waged by one group or a selected few, but by many civic and political groups which found apartheid abhorrent and decided to do something about it. Most impressive, however, is the chapter on MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe) by Rocky Williams, which gives the reader a regional perspective, since MK was involved in the liberation struggles for other countries in the region such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This is important because the armed wings of liberation movements are rarely studied and analysed. This usually suits the political elites, who quickly push the military elements back into the barracks soon after the raising of the new flag and

the playing of the new national anthem.

The frankness with which some of the papers are written is refreshing. Joe Slovo's analysis of the history of the SACP (South African Communist Party) tops the list on this score. The virtual enslavement of all so-called communist political parties by the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) before Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* led, according to Slovo, to a degree of intolerance, exclusiveness and elitism from which some of the political parties in Southern Africa are still suffering. The ruling ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe is a case in point.

The book effectively demonstrates the role played by people of all colours in South Africa in resisting and fighting against apartheid. The role of the church is also given its rightful place. But in all of these chapters the role of the people of South Africa as a whole is underlined. This emphasis alone makes this reader a popular rather than an academic publication.

Finally, with so many contributors writing on such a wide variety of topics, it would, perhaps, have been useful to include both a select bibliography and an index at the end of the reader. This book, of all books on South Africa's liberation struggle, deserves to have a comprehensive bibliography on the subject, and an index could have been useful for easy reference to the twenty-three papers on selected topics or issues. Nevertheless, this is certainly a book more than worth reading from cover to cover.

John Mkumbe, Dept of Political & Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

Africa Institute news

African Studies news

Africa Institute

Seminars and visiting scholars

Several meetings were held in the Institute's ongoing series of African studies seminars: **Dr Raymond W Copson**, Head of the Europe, Middle East and Africa Section, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, United States gave a talk on 24 July 1997 on "African conflict and US policy: From Mogadishu to Freetown and beyond"; **Dr Emeka Nwokedi**, Reader in the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria conducted a seminar on 20 August 1997 on "The fragility of democracy in West-Central Africa" and on 26 August 1997 on "The causes of conflict in West Africa: An assessment"; **Dr Keith Hart**, Director of the African Studies Centre, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom gave a talk on "The future of African studies: Dawn of a new partnership" on 21 August 1997; and **Dr Richard Joseph**, Director of the African State and Democracy Program, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States presented a paper on "Perspectives on democracy in Africa" on 22 September 1997.

From 6 to 31 August 1997, **Dr Emeka Nwokedi** (Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria) was based at the Institute as a visiting foreign research fellow, servicing a co-operation agreement with the Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire de Bordeaux, France. He conducted research on the processes of democratization in Africa. **Dr Heather Deegan** (School of History and Politics, Middlesex University, London, United Kingdom), visited the Institute from 10 to 12 September 1997 to continue her ongoing research work on Sudan; and **Prof Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja** (Department of African Studies, Howard University, Washington, DC, United States) conducted an inter-

view session at the Institute on 19 September 1997 for a UNDP consultancy.

Research fellow

Recently, **Dr Emeka Nwokedi**, Reader in the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria was invited to become a research fellow of the Institute.

Study/liaison visits abroad, lectures

Dr Denis Venter (Executive Director and Head, Academic Programmes) visited St Petersburg, Russia from 24 to 30 September 1997. He presented two seminars in the Centre of African Studies, Department of African Studies, St Petersburg University: "South African foreign policy in the African context" on 26 September 1997, and "A political and socio-economic perspective of the 'new' South Africa" on 29 September 1997. He also conducted a number of interviews with academics in the faculties of Oriental Studies and of International Relations.

Other activities

Dr Denis Venter was invited to join the scientific and programmes committee of the international conference on "Defence economics and security in Mediterranean countries and in sub-Saharan Africa" to be held at the National Defence Institute, Lisbon, Portugal on 5 and 6 June 1998.

Staff Movements

Richard Cornwell (Head, Current Affairs) left the Institute at the end of August 1997. Because of continuing pressures on the Institute's financial and human-skills resources, the following internal restructuring was effected: **Pleter Esterhuysen** (Head, Publications) took on the added responsibility for library resources; **Kenneth Kotelo** (Head, Communications) had information services added to his portfolio;



*Dr Denis Venter,
Executive Director and
Head of Academic
Programmes, Africa
Institute of South Africa*



and **Norman Aphane** (Information Officer) was promoted to current affairs specialist. **Madeline Lass** will again edit *Africa Insight* on a part-time, contract basis; and **Hermann Hanekom** was appointed on a part-time, contract basis as a current affairs specialist to handle enquiries and requests for comment from the printed and electronic media.



African studies

Forthcoming conferences/congresses/workshops

An international workshop on "Gender, culture and professionalism", organized by the **Pan-African Consultancy and Productivity Institute, Mbabane, Swaziland**, is scheduled for 19 to 21 February 1998. For more information, contact N Nyimpa-Benyaw, Pancop, Private Bag, Mbabane, Swaziland; tel: +268 40508; fax: +268 40548; e-mail: pancop@realnet.co.sz.

The **5th International Conference on Health and Human Rights**, on the theme "Conflict, health and social reconstruction", will take place in Cape Town, South Africa from 8 to 13 March 1998. For further details, contact Umesh Bawa, Department of Psychology, University of the Western Cape, Private Bag x17, Bellville 7535, South Africa; tel: +27 21 959-2283; fax: +27 21 959-3515; e-mail: ubawa@chs.uwc.ac.za.

The 24th annual conference of the **African Literature Association**, on the theme "Multi-culturalism and hybridity in African literatures", will be held in Austin, Texas from 25 to 29 March 1998. For further details, contact Hal Wylie, French Department, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712; tel: +1 512 471-5531; fax: +1 512 471-8492; e-mail: hwylie@uts.cc.utexas.edu.

The 6th congress of the **International Society for Ethnology and Folklore**, on the theme "Roots and rituals: Managing ethnicity", will be held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands from 20 to 26 April 1998. For more information, contact the Institut für Volkskunde des Universität Wien, Hanuschstrasse 3/IV, A-1010 Vienna, Austria; tel: +43 1 512-3837.

The 2nd conference on the theme "Africa and globalization: Towards the millennium", organized by the **African Studies Unit, Department of Social Studies, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom**, will be held from 24 to 26 April 1998. As we approach the millennium, it is time to take stock of political, economic and cultural developments in Africa. Potential panels, discussing the historical and contemporary experiences of the continent and its peoples, include: politics and transitions, state and civil society, conflicts and conflict resolution, prospects for democracy, Africa and the African diaspora, African culture and literature, youth and social movements, rebuilding war-torn societies, gender and identity, structural adjustment and beyond, regional security and African unity, ethnicity and development, agrarian transformation, refugees and non-governmental organizations, and international relations. For further details, contact Tunde Zack-Williams, African Studies Unit, Department of Social Studies, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, United Kingdom; tel: +44 1772 89-3970; fax: +44 1772 89-2966; e-mail: t.zack-williams@uclan.ac.uk.

The 14th biennial conference of the **Society of African Archaeologists** will take place at Syracuse University, New York from 21 to 23 May 1998. For more information, contact Christopher R DeCorse, SAfA Secretary and Conference Organizer, Department of Anthropology, Syracuse University, 209 Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, New York 13244; tel: +1 315 443-4647; fax: +1 315 443-4860; e-mail: crdecors@maxwell.syr.edu.

The 17th biennial conference of the **International Peace Research Association**, on the theme "Human needs in a co-operative world", is scheduled for Durban, South Africa from 23 to 26 June 1998. For further details, contact the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Fredericksgrade 18, DK-1310 Copenhagen, Denmark; tel: +45 33 32 64 42; fax: +45 33 32 65 54; e-mail: bjoern@dk-online.dk.

The next biennial conference of the **African Studies Association of the United Kingdom (ASAUK)** is scheduled for 14 to 16 September 1998 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The ASAUK Council has resolved that it would be best not to have a theme of too great a specificity, since it is anxious to attract papers from across the

broad range of Africanist scholarship. However, "Comparisons and transitions" was agreed upon as an overall theme which would encourage Africanists to examine particular topics, whether local/regional or thematic, in the light of comparisons across either/both space and time. Through this it is hoped to underscore the importance of Africa as a comparative framework for the questions that are explored in all local and particular studies. For more information, contact J D Y Peel, c/o ASAUK, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, London WC1H 0XG; e-mail: jp2@soas.ac.uk.

New journal

The Department of Development Studies, University of Fort Hare, Alice is producing a new periodical publication, the **Journal of Development Economics for Southern Africa (Jodesa)**. The Editor-in-Chief is inviting contributions in the form of articles and book reviews for the next issue on "Globalization and southern Africa". Articles on this theme may deal with sub-Saharan Africa as a whole within the context of the "new world order", or they may focus more generally on globalization and the developing world. Contributions may also deal with the following topics: regional economic integration, macro-economic policy in southern Africa, trade liberalization, exchange rate reforms, the political economy of growth, private capital flows, poverty and income distribution, the debt crisis, governance and democracy, and regional security and stabilization. For more information, contact Prof Sipho Buthelezi, Editor-in-Chief, *Journal of Development Economics for Southern Africa*, c/o Department of Development Studies, University of Fort Hare, Private Bag x1314, Alice 5700, Eastern Cape Province, South Africa; tel: +27 4060 22202; fax: +27 4065 31007.

Africa Wall Map and Fact Sheet

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Democratisation and demilitarisation in Lesotho

The general election of 1993 and its aftermath by Roger Southall and Tsoeu Petlane (eds)

In April 1993 Lesotho completed its first multiparty election since independence. The kingdom's return to civilian rule under the government of Dr Ntsu Mokhehle was to be fraught with difficulty, however, as first the security forces and subsequently the leading opposition party and the royal house threatened Lesotho's fledgling democracy.

In this book a group of Lesotho specialists supply the background and analysis essential to an understanding of these dramatic events in this tiny mountain kingdom. They also provide a fascinating insight into the origins and aspirations of Lesotho's political class, and the obstacles they face in satisfying popular expectations as they attempt to guide this impoverished democracy through its "second liberation".

Price: R60 (\$30)
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Democratisation and demilitarisation in Lesotho: the general election of 1993 and its aftermath



Edited by Roger Southall and Tsoeu Petlane

Southern Africa: Prospects for Economic Development

by Erich Leistner and Richard Cornwell

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Erich Leistner and Richard Cornwell turn the spotlight on the 12 SADC member states, discussing their prospects for economic development and political stability. Their studies are based on the latest available information on economic policies, production, infrastructures, public and private finance and external economic relations. In addition, overviews of human resources and development are included.

The following countries are examined: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

These country studies supplement previous Africa Institute publications on regional economic cooperation in Southern Africa by providing essential background material on the individual countries involved.

The book consists of 271 pages (A4 format, soft cover) with simplified monochrome maps of each country.

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Realising democracy in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa

by Kenneth Good

(Associate Professor of Political Studies, University of Botswana)

The struggle for democracy in Africa may have taken giant strides in recent years but is far from over. The author analyses political development in three multiracial states – one long-established, the others new fledged – and finds that there are many serious inadequacies regarding participation in and control of the democratic process.

ISBN 0 7983 0133 3 – 1997, 163 pp, A5 format, soft cover

Price: R80,00 (US\$ 40,00)

Development, participation and democracy in Africa – Four essays

by Sadig Rasheed

(Director of Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa)

A joint project of the Africa Institute and the Foundation for Global Dialogue – the essays deal with: (1) A new Africa in the 21st century: what agenda, what conditions? (2) Poverty eradication and participation in Africa: prospects and policy implications. (3) The democratization process and popular participation in Africa: emerging realities and the challenge ahead. (4) Corruption, ethics and accountability in the African civil service: challenges and agenda for action.

ISBN 0 7983 012 9 – 1996, 148 pp, A5 format, soft cover.

Price: R50,00 (US\$25,00)

Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Transitions, elections and prospects for consolidation

by Willie Breytenbach

Are elections sufficient to consolidate emerging democracies? Professor Willie Breytenbach analyses Africa's 'second liberation' in the light of its disappointing experience after the first wave of elections in the 1990s. He concludes that the 'second liberation' may also prove abortive and considers ways in which democracy might be successfully consolidated.

Professor Willie Breytenbach teaches political science at the University of Stellenbosch and has published widely in the field.

The book consists of 105 pages in A5 format. This is the second (1997) edition.

Price: R90,00 (incl VAT) US\$25,00

AFRICA INTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA

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Africa Institute of South Africa
Box 630
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