VIOLENCE AND XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA:

DEVELOPING CONSENSUS, MOVING TO ACTION

edited by Adrian Hadland

A partnership between the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the High Commission of the United Kingdom
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The editor of this report, Dr Adrian Hadland, is a director for the Democracy and Governance research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is a response to the outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008. It is based on a roundtable hosted in June 2008 in Pretoria that was attended by around 50 key stakeholders from government, civil society and from affected communities. It was the result of a partnership between the Democracy and Governance (D&G) research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the British High Commission of South Africa.

The roundtable and this report build on a rapid field study carried out by D&G in the immediate aftermath of the violence that left more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced. The study was entitled Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities, and was handed to Social Development Minister Zola Skweyiya on June 05 2008.

A number of recommendations were made in the study that were explored more deeply during the course of the roundtable. After a number of presentations from scholars and community representatives, these recommendations were debated, refined and recast as a set of consensual principles.

The underlying hope is that a repeat of the tragedy of May 2008, an experience that many countries have endured, will be avoided.

These consensual principles, together with some avenues for future research and exploration, are as follows:

CONSSENSUAL PRINCIPALS

- A national indaba on xenophobia is a good idea and must inform and support the lead local organisations.
- Dialogue is an essential part of the re-integration process and it is critical to ask local communities what they want on the agenda.
- Communication in general is needed to rebuild our communities but forums need to be given a broader focus than xenophobia and should look at activities such as tension monitoring and tension-management.
- Local community forums are an essential tool in the management of tensions and in the prevention of xenophobia and violence. Ideally, existing structures should be strengthened. Where these don’t exist, new structures need to be established. Migrant communities must be involved. Careful, sensitive facilitation is required to ensure that all stakeholders are included, that the agenda is depoliticised, that leadership and community representation are not narrowly defined, that the forums are sustainable, proactive and open to all views.
- Education programmes are necessary to address gender and xenophobia issues.
- Absent father households are understood to spark degeneration and may spawn the perpetrators of violence. If we want to rebuild communities, we need to focus on families and try to assist families to function more effectively.
- We need to develop and train locals in sustainable productive activities not only in towns but in rural areas. These productive skills should also be targeted
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at those communities likely to be hotspots of violence or xenophobia.

- Local councillors and officials need to be trained on development challenges and a public service ethos needs to be developed.
- We need mechanisms for reporting and detecting tensions earlier.
- Housing is an important trigger of frustration and violence, but there is a need for the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights including getting rid of the bucket system and expanding sanitation and access to clean water.
- Migration policy needs to be revisited urgently.
- There should be no blanket amnesty, but easy ways of gaining amnesty legally should be implemented.
- South Africans need to be educated around issues of migration. An education module needs to be included that reflects the ethos of the constitution and which addresses gender and xenophobia issues.
- Migrants should receive training and education around re-integration. The do’s and don’ts of living in South African communities should be explained to them along with a better understanding of indigenous cultures in South Africa.

Research Needs

From the discussions and debates at the roundtable, a number of opportunities or needs arise within which more work is required. These include the following:

1. The application of tension monitoring and/or tension-management skills in local community forums should be investigated.
2. South Africans need to be educated around issues of migration. An education module needs to be included in the school curriculum that reflects the ethos of the constitution and which addresses gender and xenophobia issues.
3. A survey of South African companies around the hiring of foreign nationals needs to be conducted with a view to making policy recommendations.
4. There is a need to develop and train locals in sustainable productive activities not only in towns but in rural areas. These productive skills should also be targeted at those communities likely to be hotspots of violence or xenophobia.
5. Political education of local councillors and government officials around development and xenophobia challenges. Build a public service ethos.
6. Migrants should receive training and education around re-integration. The do’s and don’ts of living in South African communities should be explained to them along with a better understanding of indigenous cultures in South Africa.
INTRODUCTION

Violence commonly viewed as xenophobic in nature erupted in South Africa in May 2008 leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands of people displaced in its wake. The outbreak sent shock waves through the country, the continent and across the globe. For almost 15 years, South Africa had enjoyed a reputation as an exemplum of racial reconciliation.

The story of the country’s transition in 1994 from apartheid pariah to human rights-oriented democracy was one that teemed with hope, possibility and the victory of just struggle. Now, in a week of madness, Mandela’s children were killing their neighbours. For many South Africans who had been welcomed into exile in the 1960s and 1970s in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and other states, xenophobia was a betrayal of friendship. How was it possible that those nations who had housed, fed and schooled our leaders and freedom fighters in their time of need, could suddenly become the enemy?

South Africa is not the first country in the world to be host to xenophobic jealousies, prejudices and even violence. It is one of the symptoms of a globalising world in which peoples migrate from country to country and from region to region, driven by the imperatives of survival or by the hope that a better life is to be found somewhere else. Neither was the May outbreak the first incident of its kind in South Africa. Episodes of xenophobic violence have occurred repeatedly in the country since the early 1990s, most notably in the murder of more than 20 Somali traders in Cape Town in 2005/6. More often than not, these outbreaks have been brief and geographically constrained to particular areas or towns. What was different about May 2008 was the wildfire character of the spreading violence. According to most reports, the attacks began in Alexandra then spread to other areas in and around Johannesburg, including Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hillbrow, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Cape Town soon followed.

How was it possible that those nations who had housed, fed and schooled our leaders and freedom fighters in their time of need, could suddenly become the enemy?

The smoke had barely settled when the Democracy and Governance research programme of the Human Sciences Research Council sent in fieldworkers, nervously at first, to begin looking for explanations. A series of focus groups were held in Tembisa, Alexandra and Mamelodi in Gauteng and in Imizamo Yethu in the Western Cape. The objective was to determine the attitudes and opinions of members of the four communities, each of which had been affected in different ways. The focus groups were divided both by age and by gender. Three focus groups were held in each location, each led by a facilitator in the participants’ first language. Structured, but open-ended questionnaires probed popular conceptions behind the possible causes of the violence, such as a third force, crime, migration, corruption, gender issues, jobs, housing and small business competition.

The scale and intensity of the attacks immediately raised a number of critical questions: why where foreign African migrants generally the targets of violence; how do we explain the timing, scale and locale (i.e. the violence was largely confined to informal settlements) of the
outbreaks? Was this a sudden and unexpected occurrence or the result of long simmering tensions? And what could be the main drivers behind this violence?

The report generated by the rapid response investigation, entitled Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities, was handed to Social Development Minister Zola Skweyiya on June 5, 2008 and, later that week, was tabled by Skweyiya at a meeting of the national cabinet. Various follow-ups have been scheduled, including a conference hosted by the Department of Home Affairs and a City of Johannesburg workshop on migration in mid-August.

The United Kingdom High Commission signalled soon after the violence erupted that it was keen to assist both the process of understanding what had happened in South Africa and in contributing to the formulation of strategies that would prevent a repeat occurrence. The United Kingdom too has endured its share of xenophobia in recent years that, at times, has also escalated into community tension and even violence. The High Commission offered to host a roundtable on the xenophobic violence with the HSRC that would bring together stakeholders to begin the process of understanding and responding to the events of May 2008.

The roundtable was duly hosted at the Human Sciences Research Council offices in Pretoria on Wednesday 23 July 2008. The event was supported by the UK High Commission and the High Commissioner, the Right Honourable Paul Boateng, opened proceedings together with the CEO and President of the HSRC, Dr Olive Shisana. Their important and thoughtful views on the topic are captured below.

Almost 50 delegates attended the roundtable, representing a number of stakeholder organisations including government (the Presidency, City of Johannesburg, departments of Social Welfare and Science and Technology), civil society (non-governmental organisations, political parties and faith communities), the academy and from community-based organisations and structures.

The conversations and debates of the roundtable were held under “Chatham House” rules to encourage openness and protect individual and organisation confidentiality. It was agreed, however, that both the presentations made and the consensual positions adopted by the roundtable would be published and circulated in the weeks following the event. This was with the purpose of informing ongoing debate and strategising around policy. The methodology and protocol of the roundtable was submitted to and approved in advance by the internationally
certified Research Ethics Committee of the HSRC, a prerequisite for work carried out by the statutory science council.

In brief, the programme of the one day roundtable was as follows:

The moderator, Professor Alwyn Louw from the Vaal University of Technology, introduced the methodology and objectives of the roundtable. The delegates were urged to look forward, to help think and strategise around policies or processes that would make a constructive contribution to alleviating tension and avoiding further violence in South African communities.

A session reminding participants of the events, causes and early consequences of the May violence was held in the form of a presentation by the Democracy and Governance research programme of the HSRC based on their rapid study. This was presented by Mr Suren Pillay, a senior researcher with the programme.

In the next session, four panellists gave their very different perspectives on xenophobia and violence both in South Africa and globally. Sally Sealey, a senior policy advisor in the United Kingdom’s Department for Communities and Local Government, presented some of the work she has been involved in, focusing on tension monitoring in communities at risk. Local scholar Loren Landau from the University of the Witwatersrand located the South African xenophobic violence in an African and global context. An important paper authored by Landau which highlights the debates and discourse around urbanisation in Africa is attached to this report as Appendix Two. The paper argues, in Landau’s words, that “politically and often economically marginal residents are shaping African cities through the pursuit of three objectives: profit, protection, and passage. In their cities, the challenge for sustainable human development is finding means of participation that interweave these aspirations — however temporarily — to promote a common and mutually beneficial future without suppressing people’s trajectories and intentions.”

Following Landau’s presentation, Man-o-man Nkosinathi Mazele, Chairperson of the Hout Bay-Imizamo Yethu Development Forum spoke of his experiences as the violence threatened in his area. Finally, Zethu Cakata of the University of Pretoria, who headed the field teams of the HSRC study, talked about her interactions with people in Alexandra, Tembisa and in Mamelodi in the days after the May attacks. Together, the presentations portrayed four very different perspectives, including both local and international, on the violence and the xenophobia which appeared to underpin it.

In the afternoon session, delegates were divided into four breakaway groups. Each group reflected a cluster of priority issues as identified in the HSRC report. They were each given a number of questions to consider which could either be used to prompt and frame discussion or, if agreed by the group, discarded in exchange for a more relevant or useful set of questions or issues.

The first group was entitled Structures for Dialogue and was established on the premise that a need existed for improved communication between all stakeholders, including communities, government and civil society. The group was...
reminded that the HSRC report called for a national indaba as a means of urgently airing and responding to grievances at a national level. The group was asked if this was a desirable or useful approach. Or, would something else work better? The establishment or use of local community forums to discuss issues that led to the violence was also called for in the HSRC report. The breakaway group was asked if this would improve communications between government and communities or exacerbate tensions further. Further, they were prompted to consider what other “structures for dialogue” might be created that would improve accountability and transparency in South African communities and allow for the genuine and fruitful expression of grievances and needs.

The second breakaway group gathered around the topic of violence and gender. The group was established on the basis that both violence and gender were considered by the HSRC report to be fundamental to the triggering and expression of xenophobia-based violence. The group was asked to discuss whether violence was endemic in South Africa, what strategies could be considered to address levels of violence and, in what way the gendered character of xenophobic violence could be understood and conveyed. The group considered what interventions might be considered to diminish violence and to ‘de-gender’ the conflict, what versions of masculinity appeared to be evident in the xenophobic conflicts and, if it was men in particular acting on xenophobic attitudes, how do we intervene in ways attempting to subvert these kinds of masculinities?

The third breakaway group focused on the economy and on service delivery. The key assumption for the group was that economic pressures and service delivery processes and obstacles were critical to the triggering and expression of xenophobia-based violence. The group was asked to consider to what extent had housing impacted on xenophobic attitudes and violence and how might this factor be diminished or managed better. They were asked if there should there be a minimum wage for casual/low skilled labour as was called for in the HSRC report recommendations. They were also asked to consider whether corruption had intervened in relations between ‘locals’ and ‘foreigners’, what kind of collaborative ventures might be created between locals and immigrants to facilitate better understanding and partnerships, and, how could we as South Africans better demonstrate the value of immigrant skills and contributions?

The fourth and final breakaway group considered the question of policy. The group was formed on the basis that the improvement and refinement of government policy was arguably the only truly effective way of dealing with xenophobia-based violence in South Africa. The group was asked to discuss how migration policy might be adapted to diminish the risk of xenophobia-based tensions and violence. Did South Africa’s borders need to be opened, or closed? Who should be South African? Will a limited amnesty period allowing ‘illegal immigrants’ to gain legal status help to reduce the vulnerability of non-South Africans to crime and violence? How do we encourage foreigners to bring their skills and experience to South Africa? What incentives should be provided? And, finally,
do we want or need these skills?

As might be expected, the complexity of many of these questions and the diversity of the participants generated far-ranging debate. The specific discussions will not be reflected in this report, as was indicated earlier. But the groups were asked to present a handful of their most important ideas and suggestions to their peers and colleagues in a lengthy plenary session. During this time, these ideas were honed and adapted by debate and consideration until a set of consensual principles were arrived at by the roundtable as a whole. These principles are reflected in the final section of this report. They are not credited to any individual or organisation but do represent the mutual agreement of a range of important stakeholders.

As such they amount to a useful platform from which the search for effective strategies can be mounted that will begin to address the attitudes and perceptions that underpin the violent episode of May 2008.

These strategies include the establishment or shoring up of community based structures, collaboration between locals and ‘foreigners’ as well as new areas of research that will provide the much-needed data to inform effective policy going forward.

This document, and the roundtable that it describes, is intended to build on the rapid, preliminary findings of the HSRC report of June 2008. We present the views of diverse experts and affected individuals on the subject of xenophobic violence in South Africa and beyond, and we also table a reflection of the consensual positions taken by the delegates on the way forward.

It should be noted that while representatives of the government of the United Kingdom were present at the roundtable, the recommendations and consensual principles arrived at and captured in this report do not necessarily reflect that government’s policies or views.

We do hope, by sketching the common ground arrived at by the diverse delegates, that useful avenues for the development of programmes and strategies will be mapped out that will help ensure the May 2008 violence is a chapter in South Africa’s history will not be repeated.
Messages of Welcome

Dr Olive Shisana, CEO and President of the Human Sciences Research Council

Xenophobia against our fellow brothers and sisters in the African continent is not new in South Africa. There is a derogatory term used against these Africans, Amakwerekwere, which is meant to separate them from South African citizens. For quite some time there was internecine conflict between South Africans and African fellows, especially those living in townships, where resources are limited. It was not a surprise when this year the conflict escalated across many communities. The root causes of these xenophobic attacks had to be investigated soon.

I commissioned the HSRC’s Democracy and Governance programme to undertake a rapid, qualitative study while the communities were in the middle of the conflict. The aim was to understand what sparked the attacks and make policy recommendations for government. Social Welfare Minister Zola Skweyiya came to the launch of the report and accepted it on behalf of the government. He had already mobilised resources from the South African Security Agency to support the victims of the xenophobic attacks.

Many South Africans, including government representatives and political parties condemned the violent attacks on our fellow Africans who had migrated to our country. Adverts were placed in various media to educate the perpetrators of violence and South Africans in general about the need to accept fellow Africans from other parts of Africa.

Dr Mzamo Mangaliso, head of the National Research Foundation, and I issued a joint statement where we condemned these violent acts against our fellow Africans. We argued that “many of the immigrants came into our country because of the political and economic conditions prevailing in their own countries. South Africans who engage in xenophobic attacks against them not only violate their human rights, but act in a manner that is contradictory to the African spirit of ubuntu or humaneness.

“We particularly felt concerned about this, partly because “many of the economic migrants and political refugees come from African countries that took care of exiled South Africans. During the height of the struggle for freedom, they isolated apartheid South Africa, contributing to efforts to free the country. Without the support of the African people it is very doubtful that we would have attained the freedom that we enjoy today.”

We concluded that “We must work together in our communities to initiate discussion groups in an attempt to rebuild the trust that is lost between South Africans and our fellow Africans from the neighbouring countries. “

We also urged South Africans to change our attitudes towards people from other parts of Africa. Is it appropriate to even call an African a foreigner? Maybe we should ask ourselves that. After all, we all migrated from somewhere to here. Too often I hear, even in my own organisation, people talking about how they will soon be “going off to Africa”. It seems there is a belief that we are
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a province not of this continent, but of Europe. I don’t know where this comes from. It is clear, though, that we need to do something about it. Perhaps we should start by questioning the appropriateness of the word “foreigner” and affirm the fact that we are all Africans first before we are South Africans. We all belong to the mother continent.

The recent attacks left more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced. Although this violence has subsided, there is some still underway. When you drive from Johannesburg to Pretoria you see the places where the displaced refugees have been housed temporarily. They are living in structures that look like igloos, like they should be covered in snow rather than by the side of the road in Africa. When you see those igloos you begin to ask yourself, what happened? What went wrong and what is it that we as South Africans are able to do?

This roundtable is an important initiative because it helps us to unpack views from South African communities. I am convinced this violence will happen again if we don’t do something. The holocaust of the 2nd World War happened because everyone was looking the other way and didn’t stand up to say something was happening. It was the same for the Rwandan Holocaust. We need to acknowledge and face up to what happened here in South Africa a few months ago and try, as hard as we are able, to make sure this doesn’t happen again.

I wish to also acknowledge the support of the UK High Commissioner, Honourable Paul Boateng for jointly convening this initiative with the HSRC.

I sincerely hope that we can come up with suggestions that will help to prevent these attacks from happening again.

The Right Honourable Paul Boateng, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

I was traveling by bus with my son in London recently. Bus routes from Euston in the city centre to West London traverse Notting Hill, home to some London’s large black communities and the site of the world renowned Notting Hill carnival that celebrates black culture in Britain. The black community is itself changing as newcomers from eastern Europe and Africa, from Somalia and Zimbabwe, are absorbed into the mix. But as we sat and looked around at our fellow passengers, I realised then what globalisation and empire actually mean. On that bus, you could actually count on the fingers of one hand at that moment who happened to have a great grandparent born in the United Kingdom. That is the nature of our country at this time and I was reflecting with my son whether you could ever have a similar experience in South Africa. We thought you probably could not.

South Africa is not a country where people of different backgrounds mix on public transport. Of course, we can’t pretend that just because that happens in the UK, it means there’s isn’t racism or xenophobia. The reality is that people from diverse backgrounds live alongside each other in London, people from Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Ireland. That doesn’t mean that everything is
hunky-dory, but people have come to a level of acceptance, to a degree of tolerance of difference. Tolerance is an undervalued virtue. It is actually quite something just to accept difference, because difference is deeply challenging. You are not going to find anyone soon who is not challenged by difference. We have to find a way of accepting, embracing and where appropriate celebrating our differences as a potential source of strength.

This, in part, helps to explain the success of the United Kingdom’s economy. It is because we accepted and welcomed difference and we invited people to bring their different skills, qualities and attributes in order to promote growth and economic development. This has not been without difficulties or violence or even civil uprising. Events of this kind have affected all cities in the United Kingdom. It has not been easy.

What I’ve come to know and recognise is that the only way you come to tackle these issues is by confronting them. Xenophobia and racism are problems. To pretend they don’t exist lies the road to rack and ruin.

One of the most alarming things for friends and guests of South Africa about the recent violence that shook the country was the denial that accompanied it. There was an attempt to cloak it as something else, to deny it for what it was. This was shocking and it is why I value the work of the HSRC. It was in this very room that I was first confronted by a detailed analysis concerning migration into South Africa. The HSRC has always been somewhere where you can place the truth out there, confront it, use it as the basis for analysis and the development of policy to make a practical difference.

What I have learned from our experience of racism and xenophobia is that the two are the same thing. In Europe there are endless discussions over whether something is xenophobia or racism. But, in truth, xenophobia is always about people who are different, usually identified by the colour or shade of their skins, who are given a rough time, discriminated against or even killed. Xenophobia is discrimination and disadvantage in its most extreme form. All of us have this issue to varying extents. The context is often one of economic disadvantage, social upheaval and societal change which brings to the forefront these different communities. There is an ongoing struggle to come to terms with multi-ethnic, pluralist societies.

We can certainly all learn from one another. I’m sure we can learn from the South African experience, just as you can learn from ours.

We must share and be determined to manage globalisation in ways that benefit us all. One of the reasons why the world was so shocked by events in South Africa, was because for us South Africa is a shining example of struggle. The world is desperate for models of reconciliation. We live in a shattered world, that’s the truth. There is a heap of a burden on you here in South Africa. You have already achieved a huge amount and South Africa shouldn’t beat itself up over recent events. You have been through an experience of transformation and reconciliation that no other nation in the world has been through.

Our action of sharing is an act of solidarity and it comes from warmth, affection, a sense of hope and inspiration that you and your struggle have given us. You have made us believe that it is possible to make the world a better place and for people to live together and to make a reality of that rainbow nation.
Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Developing Consensus, Moving to Action

Xenophobia, Violence and Citizenship

By Suren Pillay

A wave of violence and unrest took place across South Africa in May 2008, leaving more than 60 people dead and thousands displaced. More than 20,000 people in Gauteng alone were forced to find alternative living arrangements. According to most reports, the attacks began in Alexandra then spread to other areas in and around Johannesburg, including Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hillbrow, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Cape Town soon followed.

The scale and intensity of the attacks immediately raised a number of critical questions for government and analysts. The Human Sciences Research Council immediately commissioned a rapid study to explore the underlying causes of the violent outbreak, and to make recommendations that would assist policy makers in the development of a response to the violence.

The HSRC team considered a range of questions, among the most pressing were:

- Why where foreign African migrants generally the targets of violence?
- How do we explain the timing, scale and locale of the outbreaks?
- Was this a sudden and unexpected occurrence or the result of long simmering tensions?
- What could be the main drivers behind this violence? and
- What interventions could be made?

This paper reflects briefly on knowledge we had on the problem, the causes of the violence, themes which emerged from the case studies in the HSRC research, and concludes with a series of recommendations for policy makers.

The immediate aim of the government and civil society has been to stabilise the situation and address the humanitarian needs of the communities where violence has taken place; to reduce tensions and prevent further violence and bring those responsible for criminal acts to account. Longer term solutions will however have to be implemented in order to prevent a recurrence of what we have recently witnessed. These solutions will have to be informed by an understanding of the causes and circumstances under which some communities are turning to violent actions against those perceived as outsiders. There was therefore an urgent need to provide explanations to the current crisis, grounded in evidence-based research.

What do we know?

Two trends were immediately apparent to us from the literature that was available: firstly, there has been a steady increase in the expression of xenophobic sentiments at both the level of officials within the state, as well as in the popular discourse in the country. Secondly, and perhaps related to the first trend, there has been a steady increase in the number of actual attacks on foreign nationals since 1994. It is important to keep in mind that violence perpetrated against foreign migrants, and particularly Africans, was documented as early as 1994. A 1998 national public opinion survey conducted by
the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) using a sample of 3,200 found that the majority of South Africans are indeed xenophobic and that opposition to immigration and foreign citizens was widespread: 25% of South Africans want a total ban on immigration and 45% support strict limitations on the numbers of immigrants allowed (Neocosmos, 2005: 114). Large percentages of respondents opposed offering African non-citizens the same access to a house as a South African (54%) and 61% felt that immigrants put additional strains on the economy. In addition, 65% of black respondents said they would be ‘likely’ or very ‘likely’ to ‘take action’ to prevent people from other countries operating a business in their area (Crush, 2000: 125).

In the annual South African Social Attitudes survey (Figure 1. below), conducted by the HSRC, the growing number of South Africans who would not welcome foreigners is evident. The graph clearly shows a marked increase in anti-foreigner sentiment in urban informal settlements in particular, growing from 33% in 2003 to 47% in 2007.

While no government official has advocated violence against foreigners, Human Rights Watch (2000) noted a worrying trend from some state officials who were identifying foreigners as possible factors impeding developmental progress in South Africa. A former Minister of Home Affairs was quoted as saying that ‘if we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme’. Similar sentiments have emerged from members of the South African Police Service, who have isolated foreigners as responsible for violent crime in South Africa. The Financial Mail editorialised in 1994 that ‘the high rate of crime and violence - mostly gun-running, drug trafficking and armed robbery - is directly related to the rising number of illegals in SA’. As noted above, neither state officials nor the media have advocated violence. Anti-foreigner sentiment expressed uncritically in the media or from official channels can however contribute indirectly to the creation of an enabling environment within which anti-foreigner sentiment can flourish in the popular discourse (Neocosmos, 2008).

What were the causes of the violence?

Before attempting to answer the question of the causes of the violence, two patterns pertinent to the violence are generally acknowledged. Firstly, the violence was largely, although not exclusively, carried out against migrants from other African countries, and not all foreigners in general. A third of the deaths attributed to the violence were South Africans. The violence is however described as ‘xenophobic’ violence, which applies to groups of people who may be within or outside a society,
but who are not considered part of that society. Feelings of xenophobia can result in systematic prejudice and discrimination, mass expulsions, or in extreme cases, genocide. It does not, however, follow that feelings of hostility toward foreigners or immigrants always leads to violence or genocide. Anti-immigrant sentiments are widespread in many countries, including Europe and North America, and elsewhere in Africa but do not all necessarily end in outright violence on varying scales.

It is therefore important to understand the conditions under which differences of origin become so grave so as to result in violence against certain designated groups. It was evident that neither victims nor perpetrators were simply identified along these lines. There were consistent reports in media, and in our research, of South Africans also being victimised, of South Africans warning foreign neighbours of impending attacks, and of South Africans sheltering non-South Africans from attackers. It was also found that significant differences of opinion existed in the communities in which the violent attacks took place when it came to whether the violence was right or wrong.

While the causes of the violence are complex and multifaceted, three broad factors have emerged as underlying causes. Different analyses attribute different weight to each of these, and they combine economic and socio-political factors. The three are relative deprivation, South African exceptionalism, and exclusive nationalism.

- Relative deprivation

The relationship between xenophobic violence and socio-economic factors is widely acknowledged. However, what this causal relationship precisely is, the forms it takes and its actual contribution as a trigger to manifest conflict is a matter of interpretation, and scholarly dispute. As an explanatory variable to account for social attitudes and events, poverty in South Africa is best viewed against the backdrop of other socio-economic trends in South Africa, including levels of inequality and feelings of relative deprivation. By relative deprivation we mean a general sense of feeling deprived of something to which a person or groups feels entitled. This in turn leads to feelings of resentment and revenge.

It is important to understand the conditions under which differences of origin became so grave as to result in violence against certain designated groups.

The violence of May 2008, as noted above, occurred in informal housing settlements, characterised by high levels of poverty, unemployment and housing shortages. In a country where more than 50% of the population lives below the poverty line, the competition for resources amongst the poor is intense, and leads to a number of negative effects and practices. This competition occurs and is perceived to occur over access to jobs, commodities, and housing, and contributes towards crime. In addition, against the backdrop of a global increase in food and energy prices, the poor globally are experiencing increased levels of economic security. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in South Africa, Antonio Guterres argues that the violence reflected growing global tensions:

"The underlying factor is basically poverty, we are witnessing an increase in the number and intensity of crises that generate displacement.

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1 Talirand, C (1999) Xenophobia and Relative Deprivation. Crossings, June
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around the world. We are very worried. This view was underscored by Moeletsi Mbeki of the South African Institute for International Affairs, who argued that "treating the symptoms won't treat the underlying malaise." He has argued that the underlying problem is "the extreme and widespread poverty in South Africa, accompanied by homelessness and landlessness, and the lack of any way out of this." A study by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation further emphasised this causal factor concluding that 'the targeting of African foreigners is a product of proximity - they reside in areas where both poverty and frustration with a lack of government response to the economic situation is at its highest amongst South Africans.'

This point is elaborated on further below in our commentary on the focus groups conducted by the HSRC in its study.

- South African Exceptionalism

Whilst accepting that poverty is a major contributing factor to the violence, the sociologist Michael Neocosmos has argued that 'poverty can only account for the powerlessness, frustration and desperation of the perpetrators, but not for their target. After all' he asks, 'why were Whites or the rich or for that matter White foreigners in South Africa not targeted?' South Africa has a particular historical relationship to the West, and shaped by its colonial history. Some analysts suggest this may have led to a South African superiority complex in relation to other Africans, uniting black and white South Africans against other Africans. The Malawian scholar Paul Zeleza has articulated this view: 'this racialised devaluation of black lives is what we are witnessing in South Africa today in the xenophobic violence against African immigrants perpetrated by fellow Africans whose own lives were devalued during the long horrific days of apartheid. Racialised superiority and inferiority complexes continue to stalk us...', and explain why 'shades of blackness have become a shameful basis for distinguishing African immigrants among black South Africans'.

This view emphasises the lack of cultural and economic value that 'Africa' symbolises in South African popular discourse, and argues that the targeting of foreign Africans in particular, rather than foreigners generally, is the product of a devalued sense of the lives, cultures and histories of those from elsewhere on the continent, amongst certain South Africans.

- Exclusive citizenship?

The third causal factor, related to those above, is the particular form that nation-states take, and the ways in which nationalism can either create inclusive political communities, or exclusive political communities. How does South African nationalism, which has been promoted after apartheid to create social solidarity in a fractured society, ensure that it is open to the diversity of peoples from the region who will continue to be attracted to South Africa? Does the promotion of a South African national sensibility create exclusivist tendencies which could exclude others? Whilst

Shades of blackness have become a shameful basis for distinguishing African immigrants among black South Africans

References:
2 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/24/content_8240500.htm
6 Neocosmos, M (2006)
South Africa, particularly under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, has emphasised a pan-African institutional engagement, and a pan-African vision of economic development, these goals do not necessarily translate seamlessly into practice. Creating the conditions for the mobility of South African business corporations in the region might not lead to ease of movement for those seeking labour or economic opportunity at the lower ends of the economic scale.

**Case Studies**

The HSRC conducted focus groups in Alexandra, Mamelodi, and Tembisa on the East Rand. While the informal settlement of Phomolong in Mamelodi experienced violent xenophobic attacks in April this year, Alexandra and the East Rand rapidly followed suit. Focus groups in these areas allowed us to get an overview of the trajectory of conflict in Gauteng. These areas were contrasted with the informal settlement of Imizamu Yethu in Cape Town. The focus groups were divided according to gender and age in order to facilitate as open a conversation as possible and to be able to disaggregate opinion according to these two variables.

Six focus groups were conducted in Mamelodi, Tembisa, and Alexandra. The focus groups comprised an average of 6-8 people, and were divided by three age ranges: a young group of between 18-23; a middle group of between 26-33, and an older group of 33 years and upwards.

We used relatively open-ended questions to enable people to express in their own words their understanding of the situation and their sentiments towards migrants. These are the perspectives that often get lost in media coverage and even in the analysis of community leaders.

The focus groups were conducted in partnership with Professor Patrick Chiroro of the University of Pretoria, who oversaw a team of interviewers. Focus groups were conducted in the language of the participants where possible, and translated into English.

Conducting focus groups and interviews in the midst of a violent conflict poses a number of challenges.

A two-day area scan was conducted in the identified communities to ascertain whether appropriate conditions existed to conduct research, relating both to the safety of interviewers and interviewees. Venues were chosen mindful to allow participants maximum anonymity. It was communicated to participants that their participation was consensual, and voluntarily, that their identities were to be protected, and that there would be no direct consequences for them as a result of what they might communicate to the interviewers.

The aim of the focus groups was to get an “on the ground” perspective from residents of violence-torn townships of their understanding of the problem and its possible causes. From the discussions, the following general areas of concern emerged:

1. **The role of government and the ‘xenophobic’ violence**

   When respondents were probed about the role and/or actions of government in the recent ‘xenophobic’ attacks, a general sense of dissatisfaction was expressed about government’s handling of the conflict, as well as its indirect role in contributing to the escalation of an unhealthy environment between local citizenry and foreign nationals. The responses generally consisted of
three sub-themes: the ineffective communication and/or engagement with local citizenry around the violence and its underlying causes; the insufficient pace and processing of service delivery as contributing to tensions; and more directly perceived corruption and impropriety of government officials, especially in the police service, in their dealings with foreign nationals.

"...government waits for something to happen first and then it reacts and you find that it’s late by then"

Although not holding government directly culpable for the attacks on foreign nationals, a number of exchanges illustrated a general opinion that government bodies, especially at local level, had not been effectively communicating and engaging with residents on a variety of issues ranging from service delivery to probing the community’s thoughts and grievances about foreign nationals. Feelings were expressed about government officials ignoring channels through which residents raised general issues of concern (i.e. municipal infrastructure maintenance) and not sufficiently communicating with residents about their issues or concerns with foreign nationals in particular. In one case this took the form of a criticism with how the government responded to the attacks:

"...government waits for something to happen first then it reacts and you find that it’s late by then. Take Alexandra for instance, they knew that hostility against foreigners was brewing but they didn’t act, if only they can have a presence in the community and take these people out then it will be okay".

Other respondents illustrated concerns with how government communicated with residents about the attacks. They essentially argued that government had talked past communities on the issue of foreign nationals, instead of engaging residents directly about their concerns:

"The government officials must come down to the people ask what is wrong...instead of come up with words: they are going nowhere, ‘they are here to stay’.

“Government officials came here and went to the police stations where foreigners are kept, they never came to the people of Alex, why they don’t call a meeting to the FNB stadium and ask what the problem is.”

A second concern that residents expressed about the role of government in the recent attacks essentially pointed to the increased pressure that foreign nationals were creating on government’s ability to render much needed social and economic services to local populations. One respondent blamed the current electricity crisis on ‘overpopulation’ caused by foreign migration, stating that “… government has enough energy reserves but the problem is due to over population”.

In addition, in some cases foreigners and government agencies were criticised for the improper manner in which services were accessed by foreigners. This was perceived as impacting negatively on local residents’ access to these same services.

To illustrate the former case, one respondent exclaimed that: “yes they have built houses and toilets but that is not enough, they can’t handle the problems that we have now…” In other cases foreign nationals and government agencies were blamed for fraudulent access to identity documents. One respondent queried whether
officials in the Department of Home Affairs were “...getting money...” for giving people other people’s [married] surnames.

A final group of responses more directly criticised government agencies, particularly the police services, in aiding and abetting the illegal entry, residency or accessing by foreign nationals of South African identification. As one respondent explained,

“They bribe officials to issue them with your ID so that they can get jobs; how many scholars didn’t write their exams or who have written them but haven’t received their results because they don’t have IDs? The generation that is supposed to govern us in future is struggling to get IDs but an illegal alien from Angola has a South African ID, passport and driver’s licence, that is why I crush government’s call for these people to stay here, if they go South Africa will go back to where it was”.

b. Migration and ‘xenophobic’ violence

The issue of “migrancy” or “migration” was the subject of considerable discussion in the focus group sessions, where residents were heavily critical of what could essentially be described as poor “influx control” or regulation of foreign migrant entrance by South African government authorities. There were many references to the government needing to “tighten” and more effectively “patrol”, and “control” the country’s borders with neighbouring states, encapsulated in passages like the following:

“The influx of people has been out of control. The government has taken things for granted. Policies should be revisited - there are no people at the borders that are controlling the situation. Home Affairs should be looked at, controlling the influx of illegal immigrants. People are getting South African legal documents illegally”.

The emphatic sense in which respondents described a need to strengthen border controls in order to regulate the flow of migrants was, perhaps not surprisingly, coupled with a desire to regulate rather than bar entry to foreign migrants. A not insignificant number of respondents drew a distinction between the “illegal” and “legal” status of foreign migrants, where the illegal status of migrants was criticised for placing added strain on government resources and local economic conditions and dynamics: i.e. illegally operating businesses. The distinction between “illegal” and “legal” was also extended to the perception that illegal migrants were also more prone to engage in “illegal” or criminal activities, as described in this passage:

“Good foreigners are those who come into the country legally, with their passports and have a place to stay... The bad foreigners are those who come illegally, they engage in illegal activities and you won’t even know who they are. Hence I am saying there must be strict rules, we can’t have an influx.”

“Good foreigners are those who come into the country legally, with their passports and have a place to stay... The bad foreigners are those who come illegally.

An indication of the level of concern that respondents shared over the government’s management of cross-border migration and the threat posed by “illegal” migrants in particular was expressed in some residents proposing that communities themselves should take a more active and direct role in essentially rooting out illegal migrants. The following opinion describes this:
“...in every township we need CPFs [Community Policing Forums] to cooperate with the police to keep our areas on the straight and narrow, a foreigner should be here for a reason that way we can relax and breathe easily...we need an effective solution where they leave according to a timeframe and whoever comes back must do so lawfully...”

A similar opinion suggested that CPFs needed to come together and “…go into each and every house to do an audit on the number of foreigners that reside there and take them to Lindela for them to be deported, in a right manner not using violence”.

Overall, a worrying degree of latent resistance to illegally-resident foreign nationals came through in the focus groups, where although the respondents largely eschewed violent means of articulating their issues about these migrants, otherwise demonstrated that the planned re-integration of foreign migrants into communities will at some stage confront this resistance head-on. Given that findings elsewhere in this report demonstrate that the nature of the resistance to foreign migrants stems mainly from local economic and public resource competition, it is perhaps not surprising that in other respects respondents emphasised the spatial manner in which foreign migrants have settled in South Africa, i.e. integrated within existing and largely depressed communities, as opposed to references that South Africans exiled during apartheid in neighbouring countries were segregated from local populations, in “designated camps/locations”.

c. The effect of gender relations

What is evident from the focus groups as a whole is that the opinions of South Africans around the question of foreign nationals is differentiated by gender and age. This can undoubtedly be attributed to the differing social location of each of these groupings vis-à-vis the foreign nationals who have come to South Africa. It must be noted that, until recently, by far the majority of immigrants from Africa who have entered South Africa have been men. Thus, it emerges from the focus groups as a whole that it is men in the 26 to 33 age group in particular and from 33 upwards who appear to be the most overtly antagonistic towards foreign nationals. These men see foreign nationals as a source of direct competition, in a variety of arenas ranging from access to South African women, access to housing, access to local business opportunities such as spaza shops and access to formal employment. Foreign nationals are perceived to be able to leverage all these forms of access as a result of the fact that they were not “disadvantaged” in the past. In addition they come to the country with a certain level of skills and, importantly, cash or capital. As one focus group participant stated, “They have money so they gain access to everything”.

On the other hand this perception is contradicted by a concomitant resentment about the willingness of foreign nationals to take employment at low wages or to undertake small entrepreneurial activities such as selling tomatoes or fixing broken shoes on street corners.
group of men, whose consciousness has been shaped by the experience of apartheid, see the willingness of foreign nationals to engage in any economic activity however menial or ill-paid, as undermining the hard won gains of South African democracy, including a work environment regulated by labour laws and the ‘right’ of South Africans to do meaningful dignified work that will not ‘shame’ them in the eyes of their community. As one focus group participant explained:

“With these people one person takes on the workload of three people because they don’t know about the Labour Relations Act. I won’t work for peanuts but that doesn’t bother them because they know that they will break into your home and steal your possessions”.

This older group of men was particularly angry about what they believe to have been a government characterisation of them as lazy, recounting stories of menial labour and general servility under apartheid and a refusal to continue to live in such terms. One focus group participant argued:

“The government officials must come down to the people ask what is wrong, why are we fighting those people instead they come up with words ‘they are going nowhere, they are here to stay’ what is that? I don’t like the way the government said South African people are lazy”.

On the other hand, young women between the ages of 18-23, appear to regard the antagonism expressed towards foreign nationals as ‘backward’ and anachronistic in a modernising world. They see the men who resent foreigners as caught in a trap of ‘laziness’, entitlement, failure to take responsibility for themselves and a tendency to allocate the blame for their misfortunes outside of themselves - in this instance with ‘foreigners’. They argue that South Africans, for example, refuse to make the effort to acquire the qualifications to be able to access professional jobs or on the other hand to take whatever work is available in order to feed their families, instead protecting ‘pride’ at the cost of their families. As one woman explained:

“A local will first before accepting a job, look at what people would say and then only accept the job if it means his pride won’t be ruined. Instead of first thinking about his suffering children, the local wants a high paying job, with no qualifications”.

These young women admire foreign men for creating opportunities for themselves and being prepared to do whatever work is available in order to make a living. South Africans on the other hand are seen as materialist and acquisitive. As one woman expressed it:

“I think those people (foreign nationals) are hard workers, they will do anything for a job. They will work for minimum wages...We South Africans are trying to chase the fast, glamorous life; foreigners work in low positions, they get noticed by the employer for their hard work then they get promoted. Then South Africans get angry at that?”

“Instead of first thinking about his suffering children, the local wants a high paying job, with no qualifications”

d. Crime

In terms of crime, it appears that again men and women have different views of the role of foreign nationals. In general, foreign nationals are seen as being able to ‘get away’ with crime as well as engage in a range of other illegalities such as bribery of officials because they are
undocumented and hence untraceable. As one focus group participant explained, “those who come illegally, they engage in illegal activities and you won’t even know who they are”. However, there are differing perspectives on the relative responsibility of South Africans and foreign nationals in these corrupt relationships. While female focus groups tend to point out that South Africans are complicit in these interactions, some male focus groups emphasise the low levels of pay received by the police and therefore place the responsibility for corrupt interactions between foreign nationals and police with the government which fails to pay police enough to resist the temptation of bribes. They also argue that local South Africans who participate in crime with foreign nationals do so as a result of poverty and that this is ultimately the responsibility of government. One participant argued in this vein that:

“This partnership happens because of unemployment, poverty creates crime, were it that these locals have jobs the partnership wouldn’t have been there and crime would be low ... the government is causing this because it is not providing people with jobs”.

In general, there is a widespread perception

“They found crime here and maybe realised that this is probably how most people make a living here in South Africa, so they joined what was already there”

that Nigerians in particular are involved in high level organised crime, in particular drug trafficking, which draws in young people as partners to this crime and has led to an escalating problem of addiction and drug abuse. However, as one woman pointed out, those who are responsible for organising these types of crime are in fact affluent and do not live in the townships:

“They [South Africans] fight with them [foreign nationals] because they claim that they commit crime. I say they are torturing the wrong people, those who commit crime don’t live here [in townships] they live in town, renting flats. They have money, a lot of money”.

On the other hand, Nigerians involved in organised crime are differentiated from foreign nationals living in townships:

“They found crime here and maybe realised that this is probably how most people make a living here in South Africa, so they joined what was already there. It’s a rumour [that crime is committed by ‘foreigners’] these crimes are performed by locals, if you could only see how poor looking our foreigners from my section are... shame”.

On the other hand, men appear to see foreign nationals as posing a far more direct threat, arguing that foreign nationals are widely involved in crimes in the township ranging from housebreaking, to murder and rape, even arguing that foreign nationals are able to access ‘supernatural’ powers to bolster their capabilities. Foreign nationals are also seen as particularly brutal and violent as it is believed that they do not have social attachments to the people they live with. As one focus group participant explained:

“We are even afraid of taking guests out after a visit because we might come across people we don’t know (foreigners) and they will kill us, it’s unlike back in the day when we knew each other; we have become victims in our own country so it’s them we must fight against”.

The alleged failure of police to address crimes committed by foreigners reportedly because they are bribed to drop cases leads some men
to advocate violent forms of retribution against foreign nationals believed to be involved in crime. As one focus group participant explained:

“That is why we saw the need to take the law into our own hands… you find a foreigner who has raped a three year old girl being released…it’s better to kill these kinds of people and the police will want to charge us for murder, they discount the fact that this person raped a child and destroyed her future”.

As a consequence of these differing perceptions of the role of foreign nationals in contemporary South African society, there are significantly different perspectives regarding what should be done to address the problem or indeed whether there is in fact a problem at all. Younger women believe foreign nationals add value, creating economic opportunities and providing goods and services at affordable rates. Older women, although far less antagonistic to foreign nationals than older men, believe in the increased formalisation of the migration process, through documentation and control of migrants entering the country. On the other hand the view of older male South Africans is unambiguous. Contrast these two quotes from male and female residents of Tembisa:

Women
“Ok, I do not see problems with these people who come from outside to live in South Africa because these people have been here for so long why only now do people start have problems with them”.

Men
“...this thing [the recent attacks] has our support because we don’t want them here anymore; they must go back and come in a lawful manner...these ones are not here to make a living, they are here to steal, rape and murder. In fact they have destroyed our country”.

e. The issue of access to housing

One of the most consistent areas of friction in South African society relates to the access to low cost housing, and the dynamics that are unfolding in relation to housing delivery, ownership, and rental practices. The community leadership in Imizamo Yethu in the Western Cape, for example, made it very clear that foreign nationals, by law, are not supposed to benefit from or qualify for the low-income houses that the government has built for locals. The foreign nationals living in Imizamo Yethu stay in shacks which are built in backyards or in the adjacent shack settlement situated on the slopes of the mountain. They live with local people in these areas. The foreign nationals that live in formally built homes are renting from local people. Rather than isolating corruption in the housing administration, the community development leadership noted that the local people earn an income by renting their homes and backyard shacks to foreigners, as they are willing to pay the amounts owners want not only for a place to stay but also for electricity which is reportedly difficult for local people to do. This gave an impression that the foreigners are ‘overcharged’ for the accommodation and services they are receiving from the locals.

It was also reported that in Du Noon, in the Western Cape, one of the causes of violence was that the local MEC for housing sent an
investigation team to find out whether people were selling their low-cost houses. The locals resisted this and claimed that they had followed the legal procedure in selling their houses to foreign nationals. This they proved by having documents drawn up by lawyers. The investigation was initiated because the backlog in housing delivery appeared not to have been effectively addressed, partly due to the practice of those who were allocated low-cost homes going back to shack settlements, renting out the allocated houses, and reinserting their names on housing lists.

Respondents in Mamelodi and Tembisa identified a similar trend. As one respondent explained:

“On that issue [housing] South Africans are the problem, they get houses and rent them out to foreigners. They even sell them to foreigners. So the crime is committed by South Africans. And the people who are in charge of distributing these houses are also guilty because they accept bribes from foreigners because foreigners have money.

They always get houses first because they bribe the officials. This corruption is therefore instigated by South Africans”.

Some members of the focus groups strongly objected to this practice. One participant said that “…what is stupid about this is that the locals let their children stay in the squatter camps, whilst the foreigners are living in their homes”.

Another group in Alexandra identified the resentment that is caused when foreign nationals are seen to be occupying houses that South Africans have been on waiting lists for years to acquire. They blamed the government and corrupt officials for allowing people with mortgaged homes to qualify for low-cost housing. These locals then sell the RDP homes to foreigners. One of the participants had this to say:

“Even I don’t have a RDP house but go to Madalakufa you’ll find foreigners owning houses which they bought from South Africans … the community needs to learn that you get a house in order to use it, not to sell it for R20 000 as down-payment for a house in the suburbs”.

**e. The politics of economic livelihoods**

This section focuses on issues such as competition for resources including water, sanitation and health. It also looks at issues raised by the focus groups regarding jobs, employment and small business opportunities that have been created or taken by the foreign nationals.

**Employment**

Imizamo Yethu in the Western Cape has experienced tensions in the past with local people losing their jobs because of foreign nationals. This, according to the local leadership was caused by the employment of Namibians as fishermen and the firing of local fisherman, mostly living in Imizamo Yethu. This caused conflict and the local people threatened to chase the foreign immigrants away. The Namibians were chosen over the local labour because they were “cheap and affordable” for the employers and are better skilled. The Quaker Peace Centre was called in to help resolve the situation together with the leadership of the area by going to the people employing the fishermen and persuading them...
to re-employ the old staff and adjust payment in order for everyone to earn the same amount of money regardless of their nationality. Since this issue was resolved, there have been no problems with the fishing community. On the other hand, the local leadership said that there was tension in the area caused by locals feeling that they are losing employment to foreigners. These are mostly women that have been working in the surrounding Hout Bay areas as domestic workers and chars. The feeling was that “men” from other countries, specifically Malawi, are taking jobs previously performed by local women. They say that foreigners manage to secure these types of jobs because they agree to do anything, such as cleaning, laundry, looking after the children, driving the children to and from school and working in the garden. If a South African employer had to get a local person to do all of this, it would be expensive for them, but they prefer getting foreigners because they are cheap and willing to work hard.

One community leader commented: “They must visit these labour laws because our African brothers are being used … your wife used to work in the kitchen and they (employers) used to employ the gardener, these days, that African brother is going to do all these things, do the shopping because he can drive, painting only for R80”.

In Tembisa, the female group’s view was that foreigners find jobs easily because they are not as fussy as South Africans. To emphasise this, they mentioned that “… these people are hard working, they can do anything… the problem with us South Africans is that we want professional jobs yet we are not qualified”.

On the other hand a strongly competitive sentiment was expressed by male respondents in Alexandra, who argued, for example, that the government had failed to provide jobs for the local people. “The government has failed us; they (foreigners) are the ones getting jobs, not us”.

“The legacy of apartheid, which had deprived older male respondents of opportunities to acquire skills was strongly articulated as having placed local residents at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign nationals. One respondent argued: “Now we have the new government, but they never consider the fact that we were deprived the chance to acquire skills. The government must design the programme to give us skills so that if I get a hundred rands, I can make it a million tomorrow. Instead, foreigners came in with their skills and they took our jobs and our business … a foreign man can come and tell you that you are stupid, you don’t know how to use money. How would you feel?”

Competition for resources

It was also felt that the local informal business people are not happy with competition from foreign nationals. The local leadership in Imizamo Yethu, for example, said that the local business people do not like the competition of businesses run by foreign nationals particularly because they allegedly sold their goods more cheaply. On the other hand local South Africans do in fact benefit from business run by foreign nationals as they often rent premises from South Africans and South Africans themselves are able to buy goods cheaply from them.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were based "on the study team’s acknowledgement of the critically important role played by citizens of other countries, including from around the African continent and beyond, in South Africa’s economy and in our cultural and social life. Our country needs the energy, the capital, the knowledge, the experience and the diversity that foreign citizens bring, particularly those who are determined to contribute, work and live among us."

The study urged government to consider the following responses to the recent outbreak of violence commonly described as xenophobic:

- **A National Summit or Indaba on foreign nationals and immigrants in South Africa - towards social integration and peaceful co-existence**

  It is clear from the evidence heard during this study that many misperceptions, stereotypes and uncertainties exist surrounding the presence of foreigners in our midst. Most importantly, it appears that ordinary South African citizens would like to have their perspectives seriously considered or their voices heard on how to deal with the issues of the influx of foreigners in the country. It would therefore seem imperative that a National Summit or Indaba - hosted by the South African government, most notably the Department of Home Affairs and the Office of the President - be held to open space for participation by people at grassroots levels in the discussions around the sources of the recent xenophobic violence. Solutions should be sought for the management of immigrants and the development of a co-formulated migration policy which will have majority buy-in. In this way a full range of grievances and wishes will be canvassed in order to arrive at a national consensus on the future direction and scope of migration policy.

- **Establish and support local community forums on migration**

  Just as it is important to hold a national debate on the many dimensions and aspects of migration policy, so it is also critical for these discussions to take place at the grassroots level. The attacks on foreigners will not end nor will re-integration take place until communities have satisfied themselves that grievances have been addressed. Non-South African citizens need to be encouraged to participate in these forums.

- **Audit RDP Houses and develop a policy on their occupation, sale and rental**

  One of the most important triggers of the recent violence has been the occupation of national housing stock by non-South African citizens. RDP houses were constructed to enable South African citizens to reside in them. The sale or rent of RDP houses to non-South African citizens exacerbates the housing shortage, compounds the pressure on informal settlements and foments community tensions around housing. We call on government to conduct a national audit on the occupation of RDP housing and to take steps to ensure that only South Africans occupy this form of public shelter. Non-South African citizens are welcome to acquire property through the usual commercial means or to take temporary accommodation that should be provided in designated areas until such a time as they are able to move into a private residence. Government needs to establish places
of accommodation for refugees where they will be safe and protected prior to integration into communities.

- **Border Control and Citizenship**

It is essential that government move urgently and effectively to protect South Africa’s borders and points-of-entry. No migration policy or strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic tensions can be contemplated if the national borders are porous and people can come and go as they please. Such a lack of control leads to abuse, and corruption and heightens the vulnerability of people who reside in the country illegally. Regularising citizenship is naturally a long-term goal or objective and government’s role is central.

- **Consider a period of Amnesty to encourage illegal immigrants to come forward, under no threat of deportation, to apply for formal residency permits and legal identification documents.**

It is proposed that a period of amnesty is introduced. During this time, any one who is resident in South Africa should be able to claim formal residency, receive an identification card or document and be entered onto the country’s taxation and regulatory system. Within a certain specified period, everybody residing in the country should be registered, traceable and legal. [It is noted that since the publication of this recommendation, temporary amnesties have been implemented in parts of the country].

- **Implement a consistent and transparent program meto deal with corruption at home affairs, local Municipalities and within the SAPS**

There has been widespread perception as well as material recognition of corruption in the Department of Home Affairs. The current perception appears to be that corruption is not effectively punished and exists at all levels of the institutional bureaucracy, creating a cynical sentiment towards government.

If South African communities believe that they cannot rely on the designated government agencies to perform their line functions, then they are increasingly going to take responsibility for their own security and livelihood. The expulsion of foreigners in this wave of violence is one such reaction.

The difficulty of regularising the residency and legality of non-South African citizens has been greatly exacerbated by the apparently endemic corruption within both the department of home affairs, local municipalities and within some relevant divisions of the SA Police Service. This applies both to the issuing of false or corruptly acquired identity documents, bribing local government officials to access facilities but also to the monitoring of points of entry into South Africa. The study team calls on the government to address this as a matter of urgency.

- **Employment: minimum wage, employer responsibilities and skilling**

A recurring source of tension between locals and foreigners relates to the competition for jobs. Whilst foreigners have been shown to be creating jobs in certain instances, a major source of conflict between locals and foreigners relates to the competition for casual labour. It is well documented that immigrants are prepared to work for a lower wage. A nationally administered,
regulated and enforceable system of minimum wage principles will have to be implemented in order to reduce the competition for low paying jobs. Employee practices will have to be monitored in the areas of domestic labour and construction in particular.

The hiring of illegal non-South African citizens in some key sectors of the economy, such as in domestic work and in the construction sector, needs to be terminated. The only way of doing this is to make it the responsibility of the employer that all employees are registered, legal residents. In some countries, employers are fined for hiring illegal residents. We would suggest a similar strategy might pay dividends.

Poverty is clearly exacerbating tensions, so further efforts are required to assist with poverty alleviation through skills provision. Training in entrepreneurship, for instance, targeted at youth in the rural areas could be a productive strategy.

● **Incentivised Programmes to partner the skills of foreigners to assist locals in productive ventures**

There is a widespread perception in South African informal settlements that immigrants are more skilled, and better resourced. Programmes need to be developed at community level which foster partnership between locals and foreigners in order to combat the risk of conflict and enhance social cohesion. South Africans can benefit from the transfer of know-how and skills from foreigners.

Foreigners in return can benefit through obtaining certain benefits of citizenship in exchange for playing a developmental role in communities. This can apply to small business initiatives and to co-operative ventures.

● **Crime**

Much of the recent conflict was underpinned by perceptions of and, in some cases, the reality of crime and who is responsible for criminal activities. Organised criminals have apparently been opportunistic in taking advantage of the vulnerable, further deepening tensions and grievances. People living in South Africa illegally are vulnerable to coercion and violence, just as local citizens must bear the brunt of these activities. It is therefore imperative that any bid to improve community relations and stamp out xenophobia needs to be partnered by a serious and dedicated project to tackle crime.

● **Retention of skilled foreign workers**

A package of measures is needed aimed at inviting and retaining skilled migrants and their families, recognising the important role these people play in building and developing the country.

● **Cultural Interventions to foster a new consciousness and identity**

The effects of this initiative may take long to realise but will contribute to a lasting solution for the country. Media, through film, advertising and music; political parties, churches and schools should be encouraged to generate symbolic potrayals and images of Africans from outside South Africa, as ‘significant others’ rather than ‘dispensible others’, who can be killed and chased away. They need to be acknowledged and their importance in the life and development of our democracy underlined in cultural forms.
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PERSPECTIVES:
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL

ZETHU CAKATA
University of Pretoria, and head of the HSRC field team that conducted the June 2008 report into Xenophobia

I led a team of four researchers, two men and two women, who carried out focus groups in the midst of the attacks in Alexandra. At first, we weren’t sure how to approach people because they were suspicious and fearful. But we soon found a sense of eagerness to talk about these things that were going on.

Three respondents stick out in my mind. Whenever I think about the whole experience, I think about their faces.

Our initial group was a group of younger adults. I remember an 18-year-old woman, looking very traumatised, expressing how terrifying the whole thing had been. She was eager and open to talk about her experiences and about what we should do. The older women said yes, there are problems and it was time the government listened, but this didn’t justify the violence.

The people I spoke to expressed the need for government to take up issues and listen. People were keen to open up and talk. It was clear that current communications channels don’t work for them. There is nobody to listen, or to take up their issues. They need someone to be there, someone who they can tell about the corruption, about the housing problems.

“Please tell the government we are overcrowded,” they told me. “We need somebody to do something”.

They said that if somebody who is not South African is occupying a house, that creates anger. The issue of jobs came out strongly. They say people come in to the country and take whatever job comes their way. In South Africa, people are trade union members, they know their rights and they don’t want to be exploited. But foreigners don’t really care. If somebody gives them work, they take it. White employers have a tendency to take advantage. They offer work for very low wages. But there no proper channels to complain if they are exploited.

Many foreigners are vulnerable, even if they have lived in these communities for years. It is easy to attack someone more vulnerable. People don’t see the Chinese as foreigners, but as long as you’re black, you’ll always be vulnerable.

May was Africa month. Our televisions are full of slogans that celebrate difference and diversity: “Alive with possibility” says one of the TV stations. In spite of all these slogans and poems about Africa, we don’t live with these standards. It is important to start practising what we preach.

It’s unfortunate that in capturing data for research, you record the information but you don’t capture people’s words verbatim so there is no sense of the deep emotion involved when considering these questions.

Female groups were a bit embarrassed about what had happened. They took turns to apologise to all those people affected on behalf of their townships and communities. There is a need to move forward. People coming in to South Africa from elsewhere are multi-skilled and we should learn from them. They have technical computer
skills. We could really learn a lot while we accommodate them.

The government needs to control influx or anybody will come in and we don’t know who they are or whether they are criminals or illegal. The “bad foreigners” are not in our communities, they are in Johannesburg or Hillbrow. Our foreigners are here for socio-economic reasons and they have been among us for years. Attacking innocent people trying to make a living is not going to help us. We need to learn to live with people, learn who they are and where they come from. We need to stop corruption in government. If we can cap corruption we can control the influx and then we can start learning from them and learning to live together.

SALLY SEALY
Policy advisor, Cohesion and Faiths Unit, Department of Communities and Local Government. United Kingdom

South Africa is not alone in facing xenophobia. In the United Kingdom, xenophobia doesn’t often manifest itself in violence, but many of the same issues resonate.

The Cohesion and Faiths unit was set up in the wake of the disturbances in the Northern towns of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001. These areas have had large-scale migration from the Indian subcontinent. The disturbances were sparked by concerns, which turned to anger, around what was thought to be happening with the money intended for urban regeneration. It was felt that only the Asian part of the community was getting access to the regeneration money. This situation was exploited by political parties from the far right and resulted in conflict.

It is clear to me that the local context is a critical dimension both for registering and combating tensions. We are firm believers that change has to happen at the local level.

One of the key things we do to ensure that we are aware of any potential conflicts is tension monitoring. In communities where there is a lack of cohesion, tensions can arise which may lead to conflict. Local authorities need processes for monitoring and responding to these, on the basis that early intervention can make a real difference.

It is important to note that tensions can differ from one area to another and can include long-term residents versus new arrivals as well as the impact of international events. The best approach to tension monitoring is to ensure a multi-agency approach which includes the statutory and voluntary sector. These meetings can be used to discuss current and potential problems or issues and identify pro-active interventions. Meetings should be informed by quantitative data (police/intelligence) and softer qualitative data (community/neighbourhood wardens/community workers/casework local councillors/feedback from community meetings etc).

Local is key - the primary focus is always likely to be local but we always need to bear in mind that national and international events can have an impact on local tensions.

Key to our success is emphasising the importance of local interventions. We encourage local communities to deal with conflict themselves. We ask local organisations to establish a group that takes responsibility for monitoring tensions. They become the communities’ eyes and ears.
If they see a problem is developing, they have specially trained people ready to go in and deal with it from the start. If they need someone more skilled, we send in neighbourhood renewal advisors to facilitate meetings around conflict, work out a way forward, and assist in contingency planning.

In our experience, most people do not know the difference between asylum seekers, refugees or economic migrants and have no idea what laws/policies are in place regarding support.

The UK has experienced various levels of tension in different parts of the country around new migrants. There has been a lack of understanding by the host community and competition over limited resources. There have been serious issues around housing, access to medical care and education.

In the case of housing which resonates with the research carried out by the HSRC in South Africa, a new migrant may rent a house in the private sector but the local community will interpret this as government supplying housing for migrants at the expense of local people. In our experience, most people do not know the difference between asylum seekers, refugees or economic migrants and have no idea as to what laws/policies are in place regarding support.

In the UK, asylum seekers are mostly dispersed to areas where there is available housing. This is obviously different to South Africa where housing is a scarce resource. Before asylum seekers are dispersed, there are often meetings in the host communities. We explain the circumstances of why asylum seekers have left their countries of origin. Host communities have the opportunity to raise concerns. By the time asylum seekers arrive, most get a good welcome. There have been examples where people from the local community come out and share spare clothes and serve tea and make the new arrivals feel welcome.

A further initiative has been our work around myth-busting. A lot of tension is based on people’s perceptions. For example, migrants are stealing our jobs and houses, clogging up the health system. To counter this we have produced a series of fact cards that tackle these misperceptions. We don’t put the myth on the front of the card, and the facts on the back because research has shown that people are more likely to believe the myth and will not turn the card over for the facts.

We have fact cards on how migrants contribute to the economy. We try to make sure local communities are aware for example that migrants are not necessarily entitled to local housing. Britain’s health system would collapse if everyone not born in the United Kingdom left and I think the same is probably true for South Africa. You have many Cuban, Congolese and Nigerian doctors, for instance.

We also have programmes aimed at bringing people together, in our northern towns for example where many communities remain polarised.

Encouraging interaction in school is important and school linking is an important part of this approach. This is a programme by which we bring children from different backgrounds together to learn about each other. It has proved quite successful. In this way, different groups know more about each other before they meet in the workplace.

Our school curriculum also has a focus on different people and citizenship lessons are
included within the curriculum. We also have ‘meet your neighbour’ programmes, mainly centred on bringing people of different faiths together. These programmes don’t necessarily cost a lot of money. They are simple things taking place at a basic level. But they do seem to be effective.

Key to success is building the knowledge base of local authorities to deal with potential conflict. Tension monitoring is aimed at picking up issues before they degenerate into conflict and violence. This requires local authorities to map their communities and to always be one step ahead to prevent conflict before it happens.

LOREN LANDAU
Director, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand

One should always be wary of jumping to find solutions before one has had the chance to correctly identify the problem. The HSRC’s report was a representation of people’s impressions. As we know, this doesn’t necessarily mean that their impressions are a correct understanding of what is actually happening. As we move forward, we need to take a careful look at the building blocks we have - the nature of the society and the institutions out there. These are not only what we are trying to reform, they are also the tools we have for achieving a safer and more tolerant South Africa.

In doing this, there are at least three presumptions that we need to problematise and reconsider.

To do otherwise risks inappropriately importing models for immigrant integration from elsewhere in the world, particularly Europe and North America. We are an African country with African cities and the dynamics of building immigrant cities are different from those elsewhere.

The first of these differences comes from rethinking the very nature of integration. In “Northern” cities, it may make sense to speak of a self-defined and self-aware host community that needs to absorb newcomers. We simply don’t have that in South Africa: We don’t have one host community; we have hundreds of sub-communities engaging in multiple modes of living in and passing through the city.

If we take Johannesburg as an example, one can hardly speak of a dominant group. If one looks at the stats we collected on ethnicity (or mother tongue), the largest group are Zulu speakers, but they only account for about a third of the population. In terms of religion – an institution that is often critical in both inclusion and exclusion—the most significant group are Protestants (59%). But examined up close, this apparent dominance hides myriad smaller groups: everything ranging from Congolese Pentecostalism to the Dutch Reform Church. Where is the community here?

This point is only further illustrated when one looks at population dynamics. A community is knitted together with a mix of long and short-term relations and shared norms. To develop, there must be some degree of continuity within the community. And while there are people who have lived in the city for decades, the Apartheid legacy means that only a small percentage of the population has had the opportunity to do so. As a
result, less than a third (31%) of people living in central Johannesburg have been there for more than ten years.

The percentage may be higher in parts of Soweto or Alexandra, but are likely to be even lower in the informal settlements where almost everyone will have arrived in the post-Apartheid era. If this is so, then who is the host?

The second challenge I wish to levy is the presumption that once in the city – whatever one’s origins – a population will eventually stabilise. What we see in South African cities is that even after arrival, people are moving in and out at a rapid rate. The data we collected in inner-city Johannesburg indicates people move extremely frequently for a whole variety of reasons. Indeed, the average among South Africans was close to three moves since arriving in the city. For a population that didn’t arrive that long ago, this paints a picture of extraordinary fluidity. This vision is only further emphasised when you ask people where they intend to be in a couple of years.

Moreover, among new arrivals and even among people who have been around for a while, the intention is often not to stay in Johannesburg: it is a station not a destination.

Even among South Africans, Johannesburg is rarely understood as a place that people want to settle or educate their children. Only 4% of Johannesburg residents surveyed recently indicated they wanted to raise their children in the city, compared to 61% who preferred to raise their children elsewhere and 25% who planned to return to their countries of origin to send their children to school. Unlike in cities where people are permanent and have long-term plans, South African cities - and particularly those parts of Johannesburg where the violence has taken place - are transitory places filled with people planning on moving on. The social capital that planners might hope to build to combat xenophobia and encourage integration may not exist. People want to come in to our cities, live, work and get out. Any strategy that doesn’t take notice of this dynamic will be inherently flawed.

The third challenge I wish to raise is about who should be the primary agent for integration. In the development literature from the north, the state is often identified as a critical agent for promoting tolerance and rights to the city. But in South Africa, this is not necessarily the best or even a workable solution. Among many residents – both foreign and local – there are deep suspicions of state institutions (to say nothing of their serious capacity problems). It may not be helpful to view the very people who are part of the problem (i.e. the state) as being part of the solution.

Those who were rioting in May perceive the state as having failed them by not providing jobs, houses, or even basic human security. Why should they now listen when the state tells them to be kind to people from neighbouring countries? There is also a deep irony in asking the very councillors and policeman who not so long ago scapegoated or extorted foreigners to now promote the re-integration of those displaced during May’s violence.

Real sovereignty - the real agents that promote or restrict access to the cities - rests with the citizens themselves. And if 65% of South
Africans think there are too many foreigners coming in to the country, they are likely to do something about it. Of course, there are similar beliefs around too many South Africans coming in to their area. Indeed, attacks on Shangaans, Vendas, and Pedis illustrate that this exclusionary impulse is not aimed only at non-citizens. If we want to promote integration among these communities, our first step is to understand where these ideas are coming from and find ways of engaging the marginalised and disenfranchised.

What can work?

No strategy is going to guarantee a future of peace and tolerance. Until inequality is addressed within South Africa and among South Africa and its neighbours, the fundamental dynamics that led to the violence will continue. Despite what many have suggested, no degree of border control will address these tensions. They haven’t worked in Europe, or the US and they won’t work here. Border controls heighten exploitation and vulnerability.

But this does not mean that there is nothing to do. Clearly we must consider a broader agenda of reducing inequality through job creation, improving security through more effective policing, and heightening political accountability anyway we can. Only these long-term campaigns will help remove the tensions that led to the violence. But to do any of these effectively we must first understand who and what we are dealing with. This means developing new forms of service delivery that considers aspirations and intentions of people - who we are servicing, where they are, and the kind of services they need. More importantly, we must find ways of fostering political inclusion - of bringing locals and foreigners of all races, classes, and nationalities into common forums where we can debate what it means to live in a city and to promote pragmatic and realistic policies to our cities places where people might one day hope to raise their children.

MAN-O-MAN NKOSINATHI MAZELE

We embarked on a seven day walk from Khayelitsha to Du Noon. There, we had a meeting to talk and ask about how to integrate foreigners into the community

Chairperson of the Hout Bay-Imizamo Yethu Development Forum

Let me give you a bit of background first. In 1996, the same situation happened when some of our local fishermen clashed with Namibians and Angolans. They felt their jobs were being taken by their African brothers who were being used for cheap labour. What happened was, we were approached by a group called the International Network for Refugees and they asked us to take part in some discussions around the attacks. There had also been attacks in Philippi, Du Noon and in Khayelitsha. One of the major problems was around the question of jobs and also that women were being taken away by their African brothers.

It was proposed that we embark on a seven day walk from Khayelitsha to Du Noon. There, we had a meeting to talk and ask about how to integrate foreigners into the community. This worked. The community said that when it came to integration, they should also be involved through civic structures. In this way, ideas could shared and if there is a problem around misunderstanding, this can be dealt with. Those people in the structures can be used to communicate.
This community (Imizamo Yethu) is made up of about 18 000 people, or 4 000 families, living on a piece of land of about 18 hectares. This is a very small area considering the number of people living on it. Some of our white neighbours initially refused to accept that black people could be allowed to stay in that community. But with the help of people like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the government intervened and bought land to accommodate us.

We didn’t conduct a study in Imizamo Yethu following the trouble in May, but we are here to share our experiences. In May, we heard about the attacks on foreigners in Alexandra. It spread like when you put petrol on a fire. It caused panic, especially to some of our African brothers, but also to some of the employers. We have Zimbabweans, Congolese, Nigerians, Somalis, Chinese and Namibians living in Imizamo Yethu.

On the Friday, we saw lots of people especially those from Somalia and Zimbabwe moving out. Our community leaders asked them “what’s going on?” On Saturday, we phoned the police, the station commander, to convene a meeting to try to find out what was happening and why these people were feeling so intimidated.

There was a rumour that pamphlets or letters were being put under foreigners’ doors saying they must move. The police said they had been phoned by white employers saying they needed to move the foreigners out because they were going to be attacked on Friday. So the police told them they must pack their stuff and get out before they get attacked.

But we said: “Why didn’t you approach us as leaders of the community? We have people on our structures who are foreigners and we can discuss this thing”. But, by then, it was too late. The foreigners had already moved out. On Saturday, most of the Somali shops were vandalised and most of their stuff was taken. Their furniture was gone and people were already selling their stuff. The foreigners were loitering around, but there was nowhere to accommodate them. There were no tents at that moment. The same people who had been panicking, especially the employers, at last phoned us: “how are you going to accommodate these people?” they said.

We called a public meeting and went to the provincial legislature. We met the MEC Leonard Ramatlakhane and raised our concerns over the ignorance of the police. We met with the Premier’s office and consulted. Then we had a meeting to try to bring these people back to the communities.

While this was going on, some of the African brothers went to the shops to buy pangas so they can fight back if they are attacked. This didn’t help to calm things down. But, all in all, nothing much happened. The leadership tried to contain this panicking. The police tried to call all the foreigners to a public meeting, but our experience in Du Noon was that the police couldn’t control the anger and the meeting turned into a fight. You should not call a meeting when the situation is like this. They find out that people are using our African brothers who are desperate for jobs.

But how do we address the anger of the people? We tried to manage the anger. We should start these again these street committees.

It is easy to draft policy, but if we don’t involve the people who are directly involved, it can be nice
to look at in the book but it’s not practical. The only thing to do is to monitor the situation. Why did the violence spread to areas far from Alexandra?

Every day there it was, on TV, telling you people were attacked. Some of us were getting tired of this. For the thieves, this was a good opportunity to go around and do crime.

In Imizamo Yethu, most of the tension was around competition for business.

We let the Somalis in and accommodated them and they paid us rent. But they slowly took over all our businesses. Now there are no spaza shops that are run by locals. The Somalis run them all. Now our people have gone to open shebeens. After the attacks, some local people took back the Somalis’ shops.

All in all, nobody was attacked or killed in Imizamo Yethu. We were so lucky. Within three days, the 300 people who left were re-integrated and the situation was stabilised. Then we were approached by other communities to see whether we could help, but government is still busy coming up with ideas.

There are issues around housing delivery. Some people get a subsidy, and then sell the house.

The same people are in the front of the crowd when they come to attack these people. There are a lot of things that can be done in the communities.
PLENARY

GROUP 1: STRUCTURES FOR DIALOGUE

Discussion

There was general consensus within the group that a national indaba would be a good idea principally as a means of guiding and encouraging the more important local conversations that clearly need to take place. As the fundamental challenges exist at the local level, it is here where real interventions are to be made.

Whether forums are established or are existing ones that have been strengthened, whether police or community-based, they must include representatives of migrant or foreign groups.

Matters that may need to be addressed include mutual suspicions and disinterest from either or both parties. It can’t be assumed that migrants will want to participate.

The question of who speaks for communities may also be a complex matter in many areas. How do we deal with multiple voices?

There is also an assumption that everyone who needs to participate will be keen to take part. But some important stakeholders, such as the youth, may need particular strategies to ensure inclusion. The successful use of sport as a mechanism for encouraging youth participation was noted and may need to be replicated. Oral history projects have also worked well in some environments.

Young men in particular are a key factor in understanding poverty, competition for resources and xenophobic attitudes and violence. Creative strategies may be needed in order to encourage groups to participate who might not be interested in more conventional types of meetings.

Is dialogue inherently a good thing? It is possible we may be confronted by ideas we don’t want to hear or deal with. For instance, the data clearly indicates that many South Africans don’t want migrants in their areas. Dialogue also presents an opportunity for dealing with issues and pre-empting tensions.

Whether one creates or strengthens community forums, sustainability remains a critical element. The continuing participation of a range of stakeholders is vital. But how do you keep locally elected representatives interested beyond the crisis period? How do you accommodate and capacitate NGOs who are exhausted from responding to a protracted crisis? How do you create forums so local communities take them over and run them themselves, and become more self-sustaining? These were all deemed critical questions.

To be sustainable, community forums should not focus on one specific issue, including xenophobia. They need to have a general long-term usefulness and which can accommodate a diversity of challenges and issues.

Consensus

A national indaba on xenophobia is a good idea and must inform and support the leading local organisations. Dialogue is an essential part of the re-integration process and it is critical to ask local communities what they want to have on the agenda.

Communication in general is needed to rebuild our communities but forums need to be given a broader focus than xenophobia and should look at activities such as tension monitoring and tension-management.
Local community forums are an essential tool in the management of tensions and in the prevention of xenophobia and violence. Ideally, existing structures should be strengthened. Where these don’t exist, new structures need to be established. Migrant communities must be involved. Careful, sensitive facilitation is required to ensure that all stakeholders are included, that the agenda is depoliticised, that leadership and community representation are not narrowly defined, that the forums are sustainable, proactive and open to all views.

**GROUP 2: VIOLENCE AND GENDER**

**Discussion**

Very different perspectives from men and women were found in the opinions and attitudes of the focus groups involved in the HSRC study. Opinion was also divided within the breakaway group on the role of gender in the xenophobia and in the violence.

Some felt that customs and rural tradition had created a certainty about roles that has been lost due to urbanisation. Others felt these roles were inherently patriarchal and conservative and needed to be changed.

The group agreed that the way in which xenophobic violence played out was a reflection of broader gender relations in society.

**Consensus**

Gender was considered to be more of a dependent variable than a cause of the xenophobic violence. The economic environment and poverty were thought to be more powerful factors. Having said this, men’s roles in traditional societies include being the provider for the family and where this was threatened or undermined, this could predictably lead to frustration and ‘othering’. It was thought that education programmes were necessary to address gender and xenophobia issues.

The group agreed that absent father households spark degeneration and spawn the perpetrators of violence. If we want to rebuild communities, we need to focus on families and try to assist families to function more effectively.

**GROUP 3: ECONOMY AND SERVICE DELIVERY**

**Discussion**

Competition for jobs appears to be a critical trigger for tensions, xenophobia and violence. There does seem to be a connection between competition for jobs and resentment toward foreign nationals. Some of this resentment has been accented by employment practices, including those adopted by multinational companies as well as by small firms, which routinely prefer certain categories of workers with certain skills.

The feeling among locals is that there is a preference by employers toward foreign nationals.

There might be a need for regulation or monitoring of what goes on in some of these companies.

On the question of service delivery, there is ubiquitous disillusionment with the slow pace of delivery. This frustration and disillusionment is sometimes channelled into xenophobic tendencies. Our observation is not that no service delivery has taken place, or even that the pace has been too slow - there, in fact, has been quite a lot of progress since 1994 - but whatever is
happening is occurring in a context in which there are other challenges in the economy, for example around housing. Rural/urban migration undermines progress in housing and impacts on the number of people leaving schools and looking for jobs.

What we need are new forms of planning which deals with this, an integrated approach. We might even want to agree to a new development trajectory that is more suited to our reality.

On the housing front, there are clearly loopholes in the allocation of RDP houses. Selling and subletting is taking place and in places like Crossroads, the unemployed sublet their homes as a survival strategy and for income purposes. What we need is an intervention strategy that develops alternative means of survival rather than providing housing.

We need to empower locals and develop entrepreneurial skills so people can survive in the informal sector.

Skills are needed to improve the competitiveness of locals.

Greater consultation with local communities is needed with regard to planning and integrated development planning.

We need to train local government officials.

Consensus

What we really need is to develop and train locals in sustainable productive activities not only in towns but in rural areas. These productive skills should also be targeted at those communities likely to be hotspots of violence or xenophobia. Even in Alexandra, the reason violence is so intense is connected to the nature of the community itself and the level of poverty and overcrowding.

Local councillors and officials need training in how to cope with xenophobia challenges and with development in general while a public service ethos needs to be developed.

We need mechanisms for reporting and detecting tensions earlier.

Housing is an important trigger of frustration and violence, but there is a need for the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights including getting rid of the bucket system and expanding sanitation and access to clean water.

**Group 4: Policy**

**Discussion**

The government has enough policies in place, but these need to be improved and refined. There has been a history of poor implementation. Proper implementation of policy is in fact the only way of dealing with xenophobic violence.

A lack of capacity, vision and strategy from government contributes to the problems.

The Department of Home Affairs is the main culprit, though others (such as the Department of Health and the police service) are also at fault. Asylum applications are processed much too slowly, with some refugees waiting for between eight and 15 years, and still their applications are not being approved or even processed. This is clearly unacceptable. There are inconsistencies in the system and the Alien Act is unfriendly and problematic.

Migrants should receive training and education around re-integration. The do’s and don’ts of living in South African communities should be explained to them, along with a better understanding of indigenous cultures in South Africa.
The Immigration Act and Alien Act need to be revisited. South Africa still lacks control over the movement of visitors, both temporary and permanent. Questions need to be asked over the desirability of form of these controls. It is impossible to physically close South Africa’s borders. Also, our economic and democratic values would prohibit that. The issue is again regulation. The whole thrust should be to manage migration not close borders. For instance, traders who come across to South Africa on a daily basis from neighbouring countries should be issued with trading permits, rather than have to go through the whole bureaucratic process of trans-national travel every day.

There need to be legitimate, easy ways of getting entrance and/or residence to South Africa. If not, people will find ways to get in anyway. They will apply for political asylum, even though they are not really asylum-seekers. They will compromise the credibility of the system. SADC protocol should be implemented and certain visa conditions should be enforced.

A distinction needs to be made between refugees, asylum-seekers and socio-economic migrants. There needs to be regulations and rules along these lines.

South African immigration and naturalisation policy did not anticipate a huge influx of people from the continent. Improvements and refinements of policy are evidently needed.

Consensus

Migration policy needs to be revisited urgently. South Africans need to be educated around issues of migration. An education module needs to be included in the school curriculum that reflects the ethos of the constitution and the human rights charter of South Africa.

Foreigners should be encouraged to bring their skills to South Africa. NGOs and civil society organisations should be assisted by government to develop programmes in this area.

A major shortcoming and gap in policy is around the utilisation of skills within the foreign community. We need to capture these skills right at the outset when applications are made for asylum. There should be regulation allowing people to apply to come to South Africa and train locals in their field of expertise, if and when required.

Future Research Possibilities

From the discussions and debates at the roundtable, a number of opportunities or needs arise within which more work is required. These include the following:

1. The application of tension monitoring and/or tension-management skills in local community forums should be investigated.
2. South Africans need to be educated around issues of migration. An education module needs to be included in the school curriculum that reflects the ethos of the constitution and which addresses gender and xenophobia issues.
3. Absent father households may spark degeneration and could spawn the perpetrators of violence. If we want
to rebuild communities, we need to focus on families and try to assist families to function more effectively.

4. A survey of South African companies is needed around the hiring of foreign nationals with a view to making policy recommendations.

5. There is a need is to develop and train locals in sustainable productive activities not only in towns but in rural areas. These productive skills should also be targeted at those communities likely to be hotspots of violence or xenophobia.

6. Political education of local counsellors and government officials around development and xenophobia challenges is needed. A public service ethos must be built.

7. Migrants should receive training and education around re-integration. The do’s and don’ts of living in South African communities should be explained to them along with a better understanding of indigenous cultures in South Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

There are three elements to the crisis of xenophobic violence in South Africa: matters that are implicit (such as culture and attitudes), the circumstances that create a conducive environment (such as slow service delivery, poverty and unemployment) and the specific triggers that catalyste the actual violent action.

A strategy that hopes to tackle xenophobic violence successfully and over the long-term needs to take account of each of these factors.

A starting point is to manage the triggers, start to look at the circumstances and begin to address the implicit issues as well.

A number of critical issues remain: We have become so dependent on policy and on formal structures, we seem to have lost our humanness and our sense of community. Formal structures cannot simply become society. We need to be sensitive in the way we create new initiatives to ensure we start to grapple with the broader value system.

A number of consensual positions have been articulated. These form a body of recommendations emanating from a representative roundtable of stakeholders and which should inform planning and thinking on the issue of xenophobic violence. To recap, they are as follows:

- A national indaba on xenophobia is a good idea and must inform and support the lead local organisations.
- Dialogue is an essential part of the re-integration process and it is critical to ask local communities what they want on the agenda.
- Communication in general is needed to rebuild our communities but forums need to be given a broader focus than xenophobia and should look at activities such as tension monitoring and tension-management.
- Local community forums are an essential tool in the management of tensions and in the prevention of xenophobia and violence. Ideally, existing structures should be strengthened. Where these don’t exist, new structures need to be established. Migrant communities
must be involved. Careful, sensitive facilitation is required to ensure that all stakeholders are included, that the agenda is depoliticised, that leadership and community representation are not narrowly defined, that the forums are sustainable, proactive and open to all views.

- Education programmes are necessary to address gender and xenophobia issues.
- We need to develop and train locals in sustainable productive activities not only in towns but in rural areas. These productive skills should also be targeted at those communities likely to be hotspots of violence or xenophobia.
- Local councillors and officials need to be trained on development and xenophobia challenges and a public service ethos needs to be developed.
- We need mechanisms for reporting and detecting tensions earlier.
- Housing is an important trigger of frustration and violence, but there is a need for the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights including getting rid of the bucket system and expanding sanitation and access to clean water.
- Migration policy needs to be revisited urgently.
- There should be no blanket amnesty, but easy ways of gaining amnesty legally should be implemented.
- South Africans need to be educated around issues of migration. An education module needs to be included in the school curriculum that reflects the ethos of the constitution and the human rights charter of South Africa.

- Foreigners should be encouraged to bring their skills to South Africa. NGOs and civil society organisations should be assisted by government to develop programmes in this area.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

Representatives from more than 80 organisations, government departments and institutions were invited to attend the roundtable. The following sent representatives:

Government
- Office of the President, South Africa
- Ministry of Social Development
- City of Johannesburg
- Department of Provincial and Local Government
- British High Commission
- Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom
- Home Office of the United Kingdom
- United Cities of Local Government
- South African Police Service

Civil Society
- Institute for Security Studies
- Human Sciences Research Council
- Institute for Democracy in South Africa
- South African Migration Project
- Azanian People’s Organisation
- His People Church
- South African Jewish Board of Deputies
- South African Human Rights Commission
- University of Pretoria
- University of the Witwatersrand
- Institute for Justice and Reconciliation

Community Organisations
- Hout Bay-Imizamo Yethu Development Forum
- Community Development Workers from various communities
- Somali Association of South Africa
- Zimbabwe Exiles Forum
- ZIPOVA
APPENDIX TWO

PASSAGE, PROFIT, PROTECTION AND THE CHALLENGE OF PARTICIPATION: BUILDING AND BELONGING IN AFRICAN CITIES

LOREN LANDAU
Director, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand

I have been here for six years, but I don’t think any right thinking person would want to be South African... They are just so contaminated.

Sotho migrant in Johannesburg, 2005
Author Interview

African Urbanization and the Meaning of Belonging

Amidst the heterogeneity of African cities, shifting and overlapping systems of exchange, meaning, privilege, and belonging are emerging from a history of mobility and marginalisation (Zlotnick 2006). These dynamics include heightening disparities of wealth and ever more diverse language, ethnic, and national affiliations crosscut by shifting gender roles, life-trajectories, and inter-generational tensions. Through geographic movement-into, out of, and within cities – urban spaces that for many years had only tenuous connections with the people and economies of the rural hinterlands are increasingly the loci of economic and normative ties with home villages and diasporic communities spread (and spreading) across the continent and beyond (Geschiere 2005; Malauene 2004; Diouf 2000).

In many ways these patterns echo those seen elsewhere in the globalising world (see Sassen 2002; Castells 2004). But while there are parallels, the starting points are often significantly different, the sources of change dissimilar, and the potential developmental outcomes even less certain (see Horner 2007, Jackson 2006; Wa Kabwe Segatti and Landau 2007). This paper argues that politically and often economically marginal residents are shaping African cities through the pursuit of three objectives: profit, protection, and passage. In their cities, the challenge for sustainable human development is finding means of participation that interweave these aspirations – however temporarily – to promote a common and mutually beneficial future without suppressing people’s trajectories and intentions.

Despite our limited knowledge of African urban realities, planners and scholars continue to adopt analytical and policy tools drawn from European, North American, and (to some extent) Latin America (Simone 2004). These are valuable reference points, but amidst these cities of constantly ‘shifting sands’, to borrow Bauman’s term (2000), they often lead us to overlook African cities’ varied historical trajectories and systems of symbolic and material exchange (see, for example, Winkler 2006; Landau 2006; Diouf 2000; Sommers 2001; Tomlinson, et al, 2003; Simone 2001).

Given how quickly new social formations are being fashioned and remade by geographic and social mobility, it is unclear what forms of inclusion, solidarity or mutual recognition serve as the bases for social and institutional engagement. Until we understand how people live, it is difficult
to begin an ethical discussion of what cities ought to be.

This paper tries to address this challenge. Accepting that successful ‘development’ is premised on a population’s participation in a collective undertaking (see Evans 2002b), we must first understand the interactions and ambitions of those we would assist. The forms of these engagements and mutual recognition are not something we can will on communities as local government planners have so often done (Potts 2008; Evans 2002b: 141). Rather, we must throw ourselves into what Kabeer (2005:1) argues is an ‘empirical void’ where:

. . . the views and perspectives of ‘ordinary’ citizens are largely absent. We do not know what citizenship means to people - particularly people whose status as citizens is either non-existent or extremely precarious - or what these meanings tell us about the goal of building inclusive societies.

Given the lack of systematic accounts from across the continent, this paper uses evidence and anecdotes I have collected in Southern Africa to open space for further empirical and conceptual investigations. It works from the starting point that to further our discussions of belonging within African cities, we must look outside policy frameworks and deductive theoretical frameworks to understand how belonging and inclusion are being negotiated, the actors’ trajectories, and the motivations for participation. Instead of theory testing, the novelty of these emerging social forms require a willingness to induce: to build a conceptual vocabulary of belonging reflecting practices of those living in and moving through Africa’s cities. Only after doing this will we have the building blocks for further debate.

To these ends, this paper sets out to achieve a pair of modest, interrelated objectives. First, to highlight the distinctiveness of African cities, it empirically challenges three premises typically informing discussions of belonging and inclusion in cities: the presence of a dominant host community and political order; that cities are the termini for migrant journeys; and that states are the primary source of exclusion and the most potent tool for fostering inclusion and collective endeavour. The second set of (more speculative) arguments explores the meaning of inclusion (and policies for inclusion) where the presumptions outlined above do not hold. Through this, I point to transcendent forms of belonging that span ethnic, national and transnational boundaries in ways that seek to trump virulent nativism and restrictive immigration and anti-urbanisation regimes. This ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ negotiates partial inclusion in transforming societies without becoming bounded by them. Rather than a coherent philosophy, it is a dynamic mish-mash of rhetorical and organizational tools drawing on a diversity of more established discourses and value systems. The paper ends by briefly outlining the challenges this raises for planning models premised on sedentary populations.

Reading and Revealing Urban Inclusion

This essay draws on an ecumenical set of data in illustrating sub-national and transnational migration dynamics and the socio-institutional responses to them. Most of the information reflected here stems from migration-related research in Southern and Eastern Africa—beginning with Johannesburg in particular—undertaken between 2002 and 2008. This includes new survey research complemented
by formal and informal interviews with migrants, service providers, advocates, and local government representatives.

The 2006 iteration of the migration survey (first undertaken in 2003) is a collaboration involving Wits University (Johannesburg), Tufts University (Boston), the French Institute of South Africa, and partners in Maputo, Lubumbashi, and Nairobi. This essay draws on data from three of the four survey cities: Johannesburg, Maputo, and Nairobi. The national backgrounds of the respondents and the neighbourhoods where we conducted the samples are included in Tables One, Two, and Three.

These data are by no means representative of the country’s ‘migrant stock’ or of the city’s population. In all instances we sampled in areas with significant migrant populations, a factor that undoubtedly points to heightened transience while excluding wealthier, more settled communities. However, within the sites selected for the surveys we used standard sampling techniques to ensure reasonable levels of representativity. For this reason, the data provide critical illustrations of trends and challenges associated with human mobility.

They also highlight the value of comparative work on experiences of migration highlighting similarities and differences among international and domestic migrants and more sedentary population groups.

This is critical as transient populations—those who commute regularly into the city or who see their true lives as elsewhere—are not often considered true city residents even when they represent a visible minority or majority in particular neighbourhoods.

Reconsidering Belonging in Africa’s Cities

Before turning to the forms of belonging that are emerging in African cities, I wish to first challenge three of the primary premises that inform discussions about inclusive cities and, more broadly, inclusive citizenship.

Given the confines of a short essay, what follows is a schematic review.

Further inquiry in Africa and elsewhere, coupled with more nuanced explanation, will reveal the degree to which my criticisms are justified.

Table One: Johannesburg Sample by Nationality and Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Other non-SA</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>Non-SA</th>
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n 253 202 186 15 191 648 847

Table Two: Maputo Sample by Nationality and Neighbourhood

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<td>5.5</td>
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n 152 89 195 144 29 648 609

Table Three: Nairobi Sample by Nationality and Neighbourhood

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<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Other non-Kenyan</th>
<th>Total non-Kenyan</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zimmerman</td>
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<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n 159 291 145 148 14 484 755
The Presence of a Self-Identified Host Community or Dominant Culture

Much of the writing on migration and urbanisation explores how a pre-existing and self-conscious host community makes space – or does not – for the poor, minority religions, migrants, immigrants, and disempowered genders, ethnicities, and racial groups. Recent Canadian concerns around ‘reasonable accommodation’ are examples of this, *par excellence*. Underlying these debates are presumptions of a set of identifiable, dominant values and institutions that are being challenged, reformed, and occasionally dismissed in the face of heightened diversity. Without denying the existence of self-identified host communities within African cities (or parts thereof), one must be wary of ascribing undue social coherence to Africa’s primary urban centres where ethnic heterogeneity, enormous economic disparities, and cultural pastiche are the empirical norms, not exceptions (see Larkin 2004; Mbembe 2004; Simone 2004).

Data from the 2006 survey is illustrative of the degree to which the urban population is also a ‘new’ population. In Johannesburg, only 14% of the non-citizens we surveyed had been in the inner city for ten or more years. Perhaps more surprisingly, the majority of South Africans (56.2%) had also arrived within the past decade. And most of these longer-term, citizen residents had come only in the last fifteen years. Only in Maputo do we see more than 50% of the ‘host’ population having lived in the city for more than a decade (see Table Four). In all three cities, there are relatively small differences between the length of time foreigners and hosts have occupied the city. Even in Maputo, the most stable of the three, the average length of residence for nationals was 13 years (see Table Five). Equally important, both citizens and non-nationals move frequently after coming to the city, tracing and precipitating changing neighbourhood dynamics and their own economic fortunes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Four: Percentage of Nationals Born in the City or Resident for More than 10 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hosts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Five: Average Length of Time in City among ‘Host’ Populations and Non-Nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hosts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although these figures reflect a dynamism that is partially inflated due to apartheid’s restrictions in South Africa and the war in Mozambique, rapid rates of urbanisation and international migration are common across the continent. In many places, the almost utter collapse of rural agriculture has resulted in urban growth rates of outstanding proportions. While many of these are domestic migrants, they may have as little in common with the people they find in the city as those coming from across international boundaries.

In Lubumbashi, for example, long-term residents may be more welcoming to co-ethnic Zambians than to Congolese citizens from elsewhere in the country. In Johannesburg, the bases for commonality are remarkably limited. When asked, 29.9% of the citizenry mentioned Zulu as their mother tongue, 19.9% Xhosa, 11.5% Sotho, 7.9% Tswana, 6.8% English, and
2.6% Afrikaans. While Protestantism initially suggests some basis for commonality (59.7% of Johannesburg’s citizenry reported being protestant compared with 18.5% having no religion; 14.1% Catholic; 6.8% Muslim) a closer look reveals enormous diversity and, occasionally, hostility among the city’s protestant sects that range from Anglican and Lutheran to myriad charismatic and born-again churches. Similar, if less extreme, patterns exist in the other cities.

Cities as Termini:

The rapid growth of cities across the African continent, as elsewhere in the world, is often taken as evidence of ever-growing urban communities. While millions are moving to cities, we must not assume that the first move will be the last. There are three primary trajectories that give cause to question presumptions of a single move followed by stabilisation within an urban area: repeated movements within the city; oscillating movements between rural and urban areas; and passage through one city en route to another.

Movement, in all of its forms, presents challenges to institutions charged with tracking and responding to their urban populations. Presumptions of a sedentary population only make it more difficult to respond effectively to a population that, as Tables 6 and 7 indicate, move with considerable frequency. Perhaps more importantly, regular movement heightens people’s emotional distance from their neighbours and the physical space they occupy. At the least, this retards the formation of the kind of Putnumian social capital much of the development literature identifies as a prerequisite for development.

Although people move with varying degrees of frequency - again, Johannesburg tops the chart - it is difficult to speak of a stable and potentially coherent community.

| Table 6: Average Number of Moves Among Non-Nationals Since Coming to City |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Johannesburg               | Maputo                      | Nairobi                     |
| 3.1                         | 1.8                         | 1.5                         |

| Table 7: Average Number of Moves Among Nationals Since Coming to City |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Johannesburg               | Maputo                      | Nairobi                     |
| 2.0                         | 1.8                         | 2.0                         |

Part of the reasons behind population instability in urban areas relates to how people shift between rural (or peri-urban) and urban areas. For many of those who move to city to find work, the primary motivation is profit - a desire to extract money from urban areas to subsidy ‘home’ life elsewhere. Although this kind of oscillation may decrease as time passes, it remains a significant force in shaping urban realities. The South African (and to some degree Southern African) migrant labour system helped generate these behavioural patterns, although they continue relatively unabated today. In Johannesburg, both domestic and international migrants often live in the city for nine or ten months a year while remaining closely connected to a ‘homeland.’ Indeed, in many instances spouses and children remain elsewhere while single men and women earn money in the cities to sustain them. Although they may establish urban families, in many instances these social ties prevent full social integration into urban communities. Even where people do not return regularly to rural homelands (‘shags’ in Kenyan slang), they often minimise financial and emotional investments in urban areas in preparation for retirement.

In other instances, significant numbers of foreign-born population - or non-local citizens - have arrived in the city seeking protection from
violence and xenophobia in south africa: developing consensus, moving to action

conflict and persecution. In Luanda, Lubumbashi, and Kampala and, to some extent Maputo, urban growth has significantly accelerated as people have sought refuge from wars elsewhere in the country. Cities like Nairobi, Johannesburg, and even Dar es Salaam have also received large numbers of international migrants fleeing conflicts in their home countries. As with other migrants, refugees often see cities as temporary alternatives to camp-based living. When the war is over in their home countries, many will return to their communities while others will stay on in urban centres or move elsewhere.

The final challenge to the notion of cities as termini comes from the degree to which people see (and to a lesser extent use) a given urban area as a gateway to sites elsewhere, both local and international.

The data in Tables 8 and 9 indicate how fluid urban populations are and how cities are, in Castells’ (2004) words, places of flows. Once again, Johannesburg tops the tables, with just less than 15% of the foreign population and 13% of the citizenry expecting to still be in the city in two years.

Although many people will be unable to make lives elsewhere, the orientation to extra-local sites remains.

Even in Maputo, far and away the most stable city, significant numbers of people — both citizens and foreign — wish their children to be raised elsewhere (see Tables 10 and 11). If the one the best indicators of a population committed to a city is its desire to see their children raised there, then there are strong reasons to reconsider how dedicated many urban populations to stay in and improve their cities of residence. This is not to judge them, for they are likely only responding to their cities’ hostility and danger. Nevertheless, these intentions underscore the degree to which urban residents see cities as points of passage to sites elsewhere.

Refugees are all the more likely to use cities as trampolines. Many of those we have spoken to in Lubumbashi, Maputo, Johannesburg, and Nairobi hope that by moving to the city they can gain the resources or connections to resettle to a ‘third safe country’, usually in Europe or North America. The central point here is that even though these populations may remain in the city for ten or more years, their reasons for coming mean they are unlikely to invest in it (or its policies) the way international migrants and

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1. It is worth noting that in the 2003 iteration of the survey, 24.7% of the foreign-born population expected to be in a third country within two years. It is not clear what accounts for the rapid decrease between 2003 and 2006. Given the recent violence around Johannesburg in May 2005, it is reasonable to expect that the percentage will have climbed again.
refugees have in the United States, France, or Britain.

Given the population’s volatility, social networks within cities are spread thinly across many people and places. It is little surprise then that people sampled in the Wits surveys show remarkably low levels of trust between ethnic and national groups and, surprisingly, within them. There are ethnic and immigrant networks, but these are typically limited to assisting others only to overcome immediate risks, when there are direct, mutual returns, or if a corpse needs returning to a country or community of origin (Madsen 2004; Anderson 2006). Even among citizens, levels of social capital — trust of each other and public their institutions — are remarkably low (cf. Putnam 2006). Among neither migrants nor the nominal host population can we speak of a community or set of overlapping institutions that can be opened (or is being forced open). This heterogeneity allows for a *de facto* degree of permeability and co-existence, but without an enacted or articulated collective awareness.

**State-Primacy as the Locus of Exclusion and Belonging**

Throughout much of the policy-oriented literature on urban inclusion and belonging among immigrants, the state, its agents and civil society fight, collaborate, and negotiate patterns of inclusion and exclusion. This model assumes a state that is deeply embedded in the social, economic, and institutional lives of those it ostensibly governs. Such approaches may be appropriate in Europe, North America, and some Latin American countries where the state gradually centralised power in the hands of elites before slowly discharging power and authority — albeit unequally — to individuals and corporate bodies (Bendix 1977; Marshall 1950; Dean 1996). In almost no case has this history of incorporation been replicated in Africa or, indeed, elsewhere in the colonial world. Although Africa’s colonial and post-colonial cities have been the one geographic site where the state’s powers are most evident (Herbst 2000; Hyden 1980; Bratton 2006), an effective, centralised authority has rarely governed residential or commercial activities within the continent’s urban centres.

Even in South Africa, arguably the continent’s ‘strongest’ state, such rule required the constant application of force to discipline the populations within urban conglomerations. State weakness is not usually due to centralised opposition to its rule — organised crime, revolutionary social movements, or powerful religious organs — but is instead due to the form of post-colonial political consolidation that has occurred across the continent (see Bayart 1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Where formal laws and institutions exist, their power rarely extends systematically beyond the central business districts, government bureaucracies, and wealthy residential suburbs. And even here, effective power is often shared in *ad hoc* ways with private security firms and condominium committees designed to intentionally fragment and delimit rights to urban space (Dirsuweit 2006; Ballard 2005; see also Caldeira 1996). As the recent violence in and around Johannesburg so dramatically and tragically reveals, it is mobs and mafias who are often the true sovereigns of African city streets (see Landau and Monson 2008).

Elsewhere, urban governance regimes are characterised by patronage politics, irregular policing, and neglect (benign and otherwise). That so many are new to the cities — the one
space where African states have historically been visible in citizens’ daily lives — means that residents’ expectations for the state may also limit their interests in engaging with it or the skills and organisational capacity necessary to do so. Given a long history with one or more of the continents’ predatory states, one can hardly blame them for wishing to avoid it. Lack of finance and institutional capacity further limits the states’ relative autonomy and relevance. This is especially so at local levels where, despite ostensible devolutions of political authority; local officials are both under-capacitated and beholden to their political superiors not the local population.

For these and other reasons that can not be detailed here, the state’s position as the centre of policy formation, protest, and service delivery is far from assured in Africa’s cities. Consequently, many urban residents effectively live in the ‘brown areas’ beyond its direct influence (cf. O’Donnell 2004). These are not necessarily spaces outside the realm of government influence, what Scott (1998) terms ‘non-state spaces’. They are rather areas where state action has only indirect or partial influence, influence that is often evident only by efforts to elude or hinder policy. This may come as no surprise to anthropologists, but perceptions of state-centrality continue to inform an undue amount of policy relevant and sociological work on Africa. It is also deeply frustrating for those wishing to promote integration and tolerance, as there are no obvious policy tools for doing so.

### Modes of Belonging and the Challenge of Participation

Through various means, the previous section illustrates how cities are sites of profit, passage, and protection. Although these do not necessarily exclude the possibility of people investing in the cities in which they reside, in practice the forms of belonging they create are often at odds with the kind of participatory models on which contemporary development schemes are premised. The remainder of this essay outlines some of the forms of exclusion and inclusion that are being forged in African cities. This is by no means an exhaustive review. Rather, it is intended to illustrate the fundamental challenge of building inclusive and responsive planning mechanisms in an environment of rapid urbanisation and transit.

### Fragmentation and Marginalisation as Exclusion

Africa’s urban centres undeniably exhibit socio-economic and political fragmentation, marginalisation, and violent exclusion. As a result, millions of people live in slums with tenuous access to the minimum requirements of survival (UNHS 2003). This poverty, violence, exploitation, and political marginalisation increasingly shape the activities, expectations, and ambitions of cities’ new comers and long-term residents (Simone 2004; Mbembe 2001). But despite the traumas, trials, and marginalisation they offer, Africa’s cities are not only sites of exclusion. If they were, growth rates would have stabilised or declined: people would stay ‘home’, return to their countries and communities of origin, or move elsewhere. But for reasons of choice and compulsion, the populations and geographic reach of cities continues to grow. This expanding
presence of an ever-diversifying population suggests a kind of de facto inclusivity in which most people are able to meet their survival needs. These are rarely fair or just cities by any normative metric, but they are nevertheless forms of settlement that accommodate and sustain tens of millions. Through their movements into cities, people are incorporated (and in turn transform) systems of ethics, social engagement, and the exercise of power and authority at local, national, and global levels. Moreover, what at first appears to be exclusion — social, legal, or political marginalisation — may be the result of novel strategies of inclusion. I discuss these further in the remainder of this paper.

My efforts are intended to reveal at least two dimensions of inclusion and belonging that are noticeably absent in my review of the planning literature (although they do appear, albeit under different labels, in sociological and anthropological literature on migration and cosmopolitanism). The first continues the reasoning outlined above by challenging the mutual exclusivity of inclusion and exclusion. Here we see emerging form of conscious self-exclusion reflected in the statement made by the Basotho migrant included as an epigram preceding this text. This is at once a form of self-alienation — often in response to ascribed alienation — and inclusion.

Whereas ‘non-indigenous’ plants, for example, cannot survive for long periods without somehow taking root or becoming an integral part of their ecosystem (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2001), Johannesburg and a growing number of other African cities host alien populations that are shaping their own idioms of transient superiority; a means through which they actively resist transplantation. Clinging to the status afforded those belonging to the ‘mobile classes’ (see Baumann 2000), migrants hover above the soil by retaining loyalties to their countries of origin and orient themselves towards a future outside their country of residence. This emerges from a combination of both original intent (i.e. why people came to a given city), and a counter response to the hostility or exclusion they face when they arrive. Whatever its origins, many migrants deny ever having held aspirations of assimilation or permanent settlement (i.e. total inclusion). Others claim they would refuse such opportunities were they available. For them, status as allochthons is not a badge of shame, but is instead a self-authored form of inclusion into a world that is somehow far greater and more valuable that the city in which they live. So instead of transplantation and legibility to the society and political systems in which they live, many foreigners and newcomers alike strive for a kind usufruct rights: a form of exclusion that is at least partially compatible with social and political marginalisation.

The second point emerges from my earlier interrogation into what, exactly, people are seeking or becoming included. In African cities — as elsewhere — inclusion is something more than claiming a ‘right to the city’ or becoming part of a stable, urban community. We must avoid assuming the existence of such communities, but also recognise that for many domestic and (especially) international migrants, the process of moving to the city — or towards larger more networked cities — is also, if not primarily, a step into a global ‘imaginary’. Through urbanisation,
they not only hope to access a place to stay or work, but also global youth culture, new universal urban lifestyles (however understood), or, more concretely, opportunities for onward journeys. Whether they ever realise these ambitions, the city is nevertheless a space where one can access trading and travel opportunities unavailable in rural settings or even in the capital cities of less economically networked countries and communities.

But for relatively poor migrants, the global cultures they wish to join are not always the same as those described by Ong (1999) and Sassen (2002). These may colour their imaginations, but the networks they join are also those shaped by their diasporas of kin, co-ethnics, co-religionists, and co-nationals. As primary nodes of communication, banking, and cultural exchange, the movements of people into cities represent what Portes (1997) terms a ‘globalisation from below’. Within these networks, migrants themselves become conduits of information, money, and values: go-betweens tying home villages and local communities to their city of residence and urban centres around the world. Inclusion in these networks may also facilitate an initial relocation and provide the resources (material and otherwise) needed for business formation, sustenance, and onward travel. Where integration or inclusion into a city of residence is either impossible or undesirable, inclusion into this decentered, largely unregulated, globalised networks may represent a far more significant form of membership. Even when not achieved, it may continue to serve as an aspirational ideal that shapes other more localised strategies and struggles.

Tactical Cosmopolitanism as a New Form of Belonging

The characteristics I have just described – the desire for usufruct rights, self-alienation, and global membership – are all visible in what Haupt and I have termed ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ (Landau and Haupt, Forthcoming). As non-citizens encounter and attempt to overcome opposition to their presence, they draw on a variegated language of belonging that makes claims to the city while positioning them in an ephemeral, superior, and unrooted condition where they can escape localised social and political obligations. The remainder of this paper explores the content of this fragmented and heterogeneous discourse. In doing so, it illustrates foreigners’ agency in mitigating xenophobia’s effects by at once inserting themselves into city life and distancing themselves from it.

Before describing tactical cosmopolitanism’s empirical manifestations, it is worth noting that this is not a coherent or self-conscious collection philosophy or set of tactics. Unlike theoretical or ‘high’ cosmopolitanism, these are not necessarily grounded in normative ideas of ‘openness’ or intended to promote universal values of any form. Rather, migrants practically and rhetorically draw on various, often competing, systems of cosmopolitan rights and rhetorics to insinuate themselves, however shallowly, in the networks and spaces needed to achieve specific practical goals. Unlike transnationalism, which is often about belonging to multiple communities
or shuttling between them – these are more ‘decentred’ tactics that emphasise individualism, generality and universality, all ‘central pillars’ of cosmopolitanism (cf. Pogge 1992:48; also Roudometof 2005:121). However, they do so variably, and often contradictorily, in relation to their very personal current needs, interests and rights. Although it may exist, we do not claim this as evidence of a stable, inclusive ‘cosmopolitan consciousness.’ This leaves them, in Friedman’s words, “betwixt and between without being liminal ... participating in many worlds without becoming part of them” (in Vertovec 2006:3-10; cf. Simmel 1964).

There are three particular illustrations of tactical cosmopolitanism I wish to discuss here. The first again draws attention to patterns of self-exclusion and transient superiority that distances this group from national projects and cultural assimilation.

The second focuses on the particular rhetoric migrants use to claim membership - a varied mix of pan-Africanism and other liberation philosophies. (The examples I use here are largely from the South African case where I have been able to conduct more extensive fieldwork.)

The third, and most critical to the tactical component of our argument, is in how they organise to avoid the ethics of obligation to other migrant groups and their home communities. It is this mix of atomisation and fluid association that is unique to this form of life: it is not an alternative way of belonging, but a use of cosmopolitan rhetoric and organisational forms to live outside of belonging while claiming the benefits of it.

Where this self-alienation is successful, planners are left with a population for which they are responsible but which they can not communicate.

**Rhetoric of Self-Exclusion**

In response to the violence, abuse, and discrimination many foreigners experience in Johannesburg, they have developed a rhetoric of self-exclusion that fetishes their position as the permanent outsider or wanderer in such a way that ‘distances him or her from all connections and commitments’ (Said 2001:183; see also Malauene 2003; Simone 2001). So rather than striving to integrate or assimilate, non-nationals’ extended interactions with South Africans is leading to a reification of differences and a counter-idiom of transience and superiority. Whatever the source of exclusion, only 45% of foreigners we surveyed felt they were part of South African society: 38.6% among Congolese, and 54.1% among the Somali population (95.7% of South Africans felt they were ‘in’). (In Maputo, 60.3% of foreigners felt they were part of Mozambican society. In Nairobi, the figure fell below Johannesburg at 42.8%.) Expanding on the quotation used earlier, one migrant from Lesotho who has lived in Johannesburg for four years reveals many dimensions of a discourse of non-belonging:

*I don’t think any right thinking person would want to be South African. It’s a very unhealthy environment. South Africans are very aggressive, even the way they talk. Both black and white. I don’t know what’s the word, it’s a degenerated façade they are putting up ... They are just so contaminated.*

Ironically, foreigners often brand South Africans with the same flaws levied against them: dishonesty, violence, and vectors of disease. Few trust South Africans and the minority speaks of close relationships with them. All
this is further complemented (and justified) by a sense that South Africans are uneducated or do not appreciate the opportunities they have for education (or other social services); are promiscuous (female promiscuity is particularly jarring); overly tolerant (especially regarding the acceptance of homosexuality); and unreligious.

Imagining themselves as superior and worldly, they look down on the communities around them. While many more foreigners would like their children to learn English or another South African language, they remain wary of them ever considering themselves South African.

Rhetoric of Rights: Inclusion without Membership

Kihato’s (2007) work on migrant associations in the inner-city described Awelah, a group that rose phoenix-like from the ashes of an Ivorian association that had collapsed after an internal power struggle. Unlike most of the city’s previous organisations that are based on ethnic or national foundations, Awelah offers up a new kind of Pan-Africanism. In the words of its founder, quoted at length in the paper:

We want to shift our patriotism to the continent, not to a country. We Africans share a history together; we are bound together by a neo-colonialism. When you dig up these feelings all Africans have the same history. This is the link that we have got now, we are African even though we butcher each other but we are African. In our day-to-day living we are all confronted with problems of nationality, ethnicity and so on. But when you have this [broader African] perspective you do not see these problems any more.

But there is more to this than a desire to build a community of all Africans as an end itself. Rather, the evocations of Pan-Africanism—drawn both from 1960s liberation philosophy, Mbeki’s notion of African Renaissance, and the rhetoric of Africa’s World Cup to be played in South Africa in 2010—are particularly designed to erode the barriers that separate foreigners from South Africans. By helping South Africans to realise connections to their continental kin they undermine the legitimacy of any barriers to inclusion that South Africans may erect in front of them. Ironically, the foundation for such mobilisation remains firmly rooted in a transnational articulation of Ivorian identity as most of the new members come from there. Through this rhetoric and tactics—tactics we are only beginning to explore—migrants adopt a de facto cosmopolitanism that demonstrates a willingness to engage a plurality of cultures; openness to hybridity and multiple identities (cf. Hannerz 1990: 239).

This is not, however, openness without boundaries: but rather one that draws on multiple identities simultaneously without ever accepting the overarching authority or power of one. Importantly, their rhetoric is distinctly non-transnational. Nowhere does this new language speak of maintaining ties to a specific location. Rather, it is a tactical effort to gain access to the city, but without a view of becoming exclusively or even partially bound to it or any other concrete locale.

Elsewhere, migrant groups have used South Africa’s relatively liberal—inconsistently applied
— asylum laws and its Constitution to provide rights of residence and work. However, few refugees use an abstract language of refugee rights to justify their position in the country. Rather, they call on norms of reciprocity-claiming rights to the city (and the country) based on their countries contributions to end Apartheid. Nigerians, for example, will often claim (with some substantiation) that ANC activists were given full university scholarships in the 1970s and 1980s, opportunities that were not always available to citizens.

Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, and even Namibians claim that they personally suffered from wars tied to South Africa's anti-communist campaign and efforts to destroy ANC or MK strongholds within their countries. If they did not experience the war first-hand, then they were deprived by an economy that had been destroyed by years of fighting. Others plausibly argue that because South African business derives so many profits from investments in their countries — in the past and now — that they have a reciprocal right to South Africa's territory and wealth. In this way, South Africa's own transnationalism — past and present — serves as justification for transcending national residential restrictions. Although these are peculiarly South African examples, migrants in other cities refer to ill-defined ideas of *ubuntu* or African fraternity to legitimise their presence.

Perhaps the most powerful mode of transcendent belonging comes from religion. The ever-expanding pool of foreign run, Pentecostal churches operating within Johannesburg's inner-city (and elsewhere on the continent) appear to be fashioning an organisational form that at once bridges barriers with South Africans (and South Africa) while preparing people for a life beyond South Africa. Indeed, in many cases, the churches prepare people for a life beyond any territorially bounded nation.

Many of these offers up that 'health and wealth' promises seen elsewhere in evangelical communities, promises that offer an alternative to the material deprivation many migrants experience. There is not space here to reflect the diversity of testimonies and preaching included in even one five hour 'mass', but almost all reflect the lived experiences of people in the city. In some instances, the preaching bares only the faint influence of biblical pronouncements, instead addressing contemporary challenges and generalised evangelical Christian philosophy.

The promises and guidance offered within such oration also bring in South Africans to the community, generating one of the rare common transient spaces between nationals and foreigners. The promises and guidance offered within such oration also bring in South Africans to the community, generating one of the rare common transient spaces between nationals and foreigners in the city.

Although the Churches often speak of helping to build strong communities in Johannesburg and are often presumed to do so by outside observers (see Winkler 2006), the practices are often quite the opposite. In many churches, the South Africa representation is small and also disaffected. Where larger numbers do attend, the solidarity achieved during the service is short-lived, with nationals and non-nationals quickly dividing on the pavement after the service. Moreover, many church leaders seem to head the call to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" and stay out of local politics.

Like the their parishioners, many Church
leaders also see their presence in Johannesburg as part of their passage elsewhere. With their strong links to communities in Nigeria, Ghana, and the United States, the churches rely heavily on connections out of the country. For many of the churches’ founders, South Africa is primarily a place where they can enter global discourse and influence the lives of people across the continent and beyond. In the words of the Nigerian Pastor at the Mountain of Fire and Miracles church, ‘Africa is shaped like a pistol and South Africa is the mouth from where you can shoot out the word of God’. And, consequently, anyone doing the work of God has divine right to South African territory. But this right and his charisma comes not from embedding himself within South Africa, but from remaining above it.

While Church ideology may potentially generate community, the new rapidly growing Charismatic churches are far too flexible to offer a coherent, stable alternative organisational form. Instead, the churches are often functional units, helping people to find jobs, transcend boundaries, or find ways (physically or spiritually) out of Johannesburg’s hardships. If successful, these resources often physically help people out of the city (or at least the inner-city) and onto more prosperous grounds.

**Organisation and Atomisation**

Migrant organisation and mobilisation in Johannesburg - and to some extent elsewhere on the continent - has never taken the form of ‘rights-claiming’ that it has among the French *Sans Papiers* or similar movements elsewhere. For one, few people in any of the cities surveyed report belonging to any form of secular organisation or movement. When they do belong, they are careful to avoid the mutual obligations and politics that come from close association with other ‘exiles’ (see Mang’ana 2004 and Misago 2005). Although there are instances in which migrant groups assert a collective (usually national) identity, these are often based on instrumental and short-lived associations. Amisi and Ballard’s (2005) work on refugee associations throughout South Africa, for example, finds an almost universal tendency towards repeated reconfiguration and fragmentation.

As Götz and Simone suggest, ‘these formations embody a broad range of tactical abilities aimed at maximising economic opportunities through transversal engagements across territories and separate arrangements of powers’ (2003: 125). They are not associations founded on preserving identity or claiming a permanent place in the city. Rather, they use combinations of national, ethnic, and political affiliations for tactical purposes.

In many instances, even people from the same country carefully avoid close association with other ‘exiles’ or cling to multiple points of loyalty that allow them to shift within multiple networks.

These act as resources provide the weak links needed to gather information while allowing them to shift affiliations and tactics at a moments notice (cf. Granovetter 1973). In doing so, they avoid capture by friends, relations, and the state while inadvertently reshaping the city’s social and political dynamics.

The one exception to this is Somalis who are currently organising in the shelters set up following South Africa’s recent spate of xenophobic violence. But the organisation here is not to claim rights in South Africa. Rather, they have in instances rejected food provided by South
African aid agencies as a stark illustration that they will never feel safe in the country. They are also demanding that the camp management be handed to the United Nations, a move they feel will facilitate their resettlement elsewhere.

Rather than integrating or assimilating, the form and rhetoric of organisation reinforces their position as the permanent outsiders in ways that ‘distances him or her from all connections and commitments’ (Said 2001:183).

As Simmel notes, these strangers are not fully committed to the peculiar tendencies of the people amongst whom they live. They can, therefore, approach them with a kind of scepticism, ‘objectivity’, and self-imposed distance. This is a kind of necessary cosmopolitan for, as Hannerz (1990: 239) predicts, many demonstrate a great, personal ability to ‘make their way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting’ as well as through carefully developed skills for meandering or manoeuvring through systems of meaning and obligation (c.f. Nyers 2003).

Conclusion: Belonging and Participation in African Cities

The forms of belonging we see in many African cities are, as Beck (2004: 134) suggests, often ‘side effects’ of efforts to achieve other economic, social, and even political goals. As such, they are not unified, counter-hegemonic or ‘strategic’ movement seeking to create an alternative, articulated order. Rather, they are a motley collection of actions undertaken by groups that are often fragmented by language, religion, legal status, and mutual distrust. They are, however, able to swiftly combine disparate segments of the population according to current necessity and do in ways not premised on their moral worth necessarily being realised through national membership (cf. Bowden 2003: 239).

Despite their short lived, contradictory, and often ineffective practices, these expressions of belonging are nevertheless a powerful force. Even when failing to deliver the intended goals, cosmopolitan tactics occasionally elicit strong reactions from more strategic actors: the police, the business community, or frustrated citizens.

It is in these counter-reactions to migrants’ tactical activity that their greatest power lays. Like the marginalised populations that developed Christianity, Islam, and other forms of transcendent, deterritorialised membership, migrants in African cities may pioneer forms of membership that reshape how we understand our relationship to each other, space, and institutions.

This may take on the form of ‘common norms and mutual translatability’ (Cheah and Robbins 1998: 12) that help overcome the legacy of the national project. Whatever their long-term potential for generating new categories of membership, they remain largely incompatible with existing models of promoting participation and local investment.

Indeed, the discussion of inclusion for those who may be seeking ‘usufruct’ rights or opportunities for transit raises broader questions about the issues of rights and duties associated with belonging. Much of the philosophical literature on cosmopolitanism and participation – a form of inclusion that recognises if not celebrates diversity – demands mutual recognition and a set of at least minimal reciprocal obligations among all residents. While many authors focus on state obligations to build inclusive societies while others speak about countering xenophobia or other forms of discrimination, these imperatives...
typically stem from a model of political community comprised of those who wish to be part of it and where parties at least minimally recognize each other’s legitimacy and right to space. In environments where significant elements of an urban population – citizens and alien – exist outside states’ cognition or in direct opposition to its stated policies and to each other, the terms of engagement are significantly altered. Without the presence of an alternative moral authority, there are increasingly heterogeneous normative frameworks operating within Africa’s urban spheres.

There are difficult ethical and institutional issues to be addressed in translating the processes and trends described in the previous pages into planning prescriptions. If building cities means facilitating some form of participation among all urban residents, domestic and international migrants intentions and ways of living present an acute challenge. On the one hand, they are reshaping urban centres while on the other many do not see themselves as part of them. In this context, we must generate new ethics of duty and responsibility that correspond to the lives and aspirations of those most directly while shying away from the unpalatable (and impracticable) task of imposing a single set of ideals, values, and behavioural codes. Unfortunately, given the degree to which state institutions are discredited, marginalised, or exclusive, we have few tools with which to work.

Selected Citations


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