SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY

The African continent is showing a growing appetite
for democracy - but much work still lies ahead

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Africa Insight

p48

Sustainable peace and security

Africa Insight

The past year has seen positive moves on many fronts in African countries, despite various setbacks and challenges. In the area of peace and governance in particular, new hope is being born for the continent as an increasing number of countries begins to comply with the ideals of NEPAD and the African Union.

In 2002, 17 African countries held elections, and for the most part, these proceeded peacefully. There is still a problem of credibility in some countries, owing to a reluctance among certain governments to allow real competition and opposition. As in the past, these shortcomings all too often lead to election boycotts and post-election disputes and disruptions. However, there is no doubt that the holding of regular elections has become institutionalised in much of Africa over the last decade.

At the same time, some of the seemingly intractable conflicts on the continent appear to be nearing resolution. This is all cause for hope and indeed for celebration.

But, as several of the articles in this issue make clear, the coming of peace and the election of a legitimate government should be seen as a beginning rather than an end in itself. Only once peace is established and a government of the people begins to implement policies and initiate reforms can development take place. As a recent UN report noted, only peace can stop human rights violations. Years of conflict and corrupt government in certain countries has led to a social environment in which men abuse women, and children become "instruments of war". The destruction of infrastructure and obstacles to agricultural production have resulted in food insecurity, malnutrition and high mortality rates, leading to a lack of food security in southern Africa, in particular. In turn, this puts populations – both displaced and internal – at greater risk of disease, at a time when HIV/AIDS is still making advances. Without stability, governments and ordinary people cannot even begin to turn this situation around, let alone to make progress and achieve economic growth.

Crucial to sustainable peace is the involvement of civil society, both in the peace process and afterwards. Civil rights activist and Open Society country representative Rafael Marques notes that, "The role of civil society in sustaining peace is more fundamental than ever before. In the lead up to the elections it is civil society who will assess if there has been a democratisation of the state." Civil society are also in a position to monitor human rights violations and progress in protecting the vulnerable.

Positive moves towards democratisation should be encouraged throughout the continent. In the meantime, though, human rights monitoring and advocacy should be a central priority of the international community.

Elizabeth le Roux
Editor

The State, Traditional Rulers and "Another Democracy" in

POST-COLONIAL CAMEROON

On the one hand, they respect their traditional chiefs. On the other, they want to have the right to choose their leaders. Nantang Jua probes the growth of democracy in Cameroon.

Liberal democracy is privileged as a form of governance because it creates an enabling environment for sustained development. Proof of this is the development of Western economies that embraced this mode of governance in the wake of World War II. Given their track record, and by contrast the poor performance of the Socialist economies, liberal democracy is now prescribed as the panacea for most developing countries. Its introduction and consolidation in Africa, it is argued, will liberate public space that had been circumscribed by the state, which will lead to an increase in the rate of production (of both goods and meaning).

In this paper, it is contended that the promulgation of the Liberty Laws of 1990 in Cameroon was supposed to lead to the revalorisation of Cameroonians, thereby enabling their participation in the production of meaning. Given people's psychological involvement in politics, this was important in renewing their sense of political efficacy, and it could help reconfigure power relations in society. While any change in the balance of force is always contested, I would examine the efforts that have been adopted by the state to stymie this shift. It is argued that, since the state used traditional chiefs[1] to mediate state-civil society relations in the monolithic party era, this authority could still play this role in a pluralistic political environment.

This conviction was proof that the state was more interested in promoting "another democracy"[2], that is democracy that would fit local conditions as defined by it, rather than liberal democracy. But revalorisation and a transformatory consciousness can be considered Siamese twins. The latter helped to empower people. Consequently, they were extremely reluctant to be considered mere "standing reserves" to be used for instrumental value.[3] As such, they have resisted incursions by traditional rulers into the realm of modern politics. Given this variance in perception, I will look at the strategies that some of these chiefs have adopted with a view to maintaining their powers.

Traditional Power under the Monolithic Party
Realising that traditional authority was one of the rare local institutions that maintained its performative powers, the colonial as well as the post-colonial state harnessed it to help to impose their authority. To this end, they granted recognition to this authority in the Grassfields where it already existed and insti-

tuted it, in the form of warrant chiefs, in the coastal areas. The powers of this institution were based on the perception of it as sacred, which enabled it to function uncontested.

Contributing to this was the prevailing belief in the logic of fetishistic inversion, whereby rulers were seen as already having power whereas in reality they are invested with power only because they are treated as such.[4] The colonial authorities thus realised that they could adopt indirect rule through the chiefs for the purposes of normalising and disciplining the "subject" in the Foucauldian sense. Thus, they occupied the interface of state-society relations. But, since the colonial state was a new social formation that sought to displace and replace those of the pre-colonial era, it had to recondition the African. Only this new individual as an artificial social construct could pay allegiance to the colonial state rather than to traditional authorities.[5] In other words, a belief in the traditional authority had to give way to a consciousness that the state had a monopoly over the use of force.

Despite challenges to this institution, it retained its performative powers. This caused the leaders of the struggle for independence (the new elites) to ally with it against the colonial state, and seek to harness it in the search for hegemony in the post-colonial state.

This caused the post-colonial state, in its search for legitimacy as well hegemony, to seek to co-opt the chiefs. Proof of the latter is the promulgation of Decree No 77/245 (15 July 1977), recognising the traditional authorities as auxiliaries of state administration. As auxiliaries of the administration, traditional rulers served as intermediaries between the administration and the people, helping to execute government directives and recover state taxes within their domains. Giving them a formal role helped to arrest the downward slide in the powers of the traditional rulers that had been under siege since the advent of colonialism.[6]

Independence may have accentuated this trend, especially as it led to an increase in the opportunity structures available to the new elites to the detriment of the old ones. And, given the prevalence of the monetary economy, the decree sought to insert them into the capitalist economy by putting them on the payroll of the state. As a sign that their powers would henceforth be predicated on statutes, the decree prescribed military-like uniforms for them.

CAMEROON

MAP: ELIZE VAN AS/ABA

Whereas the chiefs appreciated the economic value of this decree, the refusal of some of them to wear this uniform testifies to their unwillingness to predicate their powers solely on the statutes.

President Ahmadou Ahidjo, in promulgating this law, was not necessarily driven by altruism or state interest. Rather, he was preoccupied by the will to power. Northern lamidos had posited the promulgation of this law as a minimal condition for their continued allegiance to him.[7]

Furthermore, he had to soothe the Anglophone chiefs who were irked by the abolition of the West Cameroon House of Chiefs in the wake of the May 1972 "Peaceful Revolution" that ushered in the United Republic of Cameroon. This contributed enormously towards the symbolic efficiency of chiefs in this state as opposed to the colonial era.[8]

Article 2 of the Decree set out a classification of chiefs. First-degree chiefs were those with second-class chiefs under their jurisdiction and within the territorial limits of a division. Second-degree chiefs had to have the allegiance of at least three third-degree chiefs, and their jurisdiction could be no larger than a sub-division. The jurisdiction of third-degree chiefs was limited to a village or "quarter" in a rural or urban area.

However, intent on manipulating these chiefs, Article 4 gave discretionary powers to the administrative authorities in the postcolonial state to classify a chiefdom as first, second or third degree on the basis of the nebulous concepts of demographic or economic importance. An overemphasis should not be placed on classification; the important point to note is that this decree gave the chiefs access to the state, which is seen as a resource in itself. Their ability to add value to this resource was enhanced by the fact that they were also co-opted into various instances of the monolithic party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU), that were set up in their areas of jurisdiction.[9]

Secondly, it also led to an inflation in the number of chiefs, especially as third-degree chiefs were reproduced in towns as a result of their "ruralisation", symbolised by their division into "quarters".

Access to the state was a resource as administrative democracy was in vogue. This was underlined by Ahidjo, who emphasised that "as much as possible, all big investment projects under study should incorporate the opinions of the interested population" and that "ministers could obtain this opinion through administrative authorities who would in turn be asked to contact the representatives of the people (parliamentarians, economic councillors, municipal administrators, officials of the party at the local level and traditional chiefs)".[10]

Big investment projects were important not only because they helped to channel state resources into the area but also because of their multiplier effects, that is the employment opportunities that they provided to the local population. The capacity of the chiefs to influence decision-making in this realm, in their double capacity as *bona fide* chiefs and as *ex officio* members of the party executive, therefore thrust them to the center stage of their various communities. Several anecdotes attest to this fact.

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For example, it was claimed that the decision to construct Bamenda airport at Mankon, an area that is surrounded by hills, which makes takeoff and landing difficult, rather than in Bambui, was as a result of pressure from the Fon of Mankon. Decisions such as these reinforce the belief that the chief who in traditional cosmology is already perceived as having imaginary powers over the means of reproduction also has power over the means of production in the post-colonial state.

Participating in the process of allocating resources gave them credit to use in effecting symbolic violence, that is "the gentle, invisible form of violence which is never recognised as such".[11] In effect, it earned them gratification as people developed personal loyalty, confidence and obligation towards them simply because of their ability to access the state.

Empowering the chiefs was seen as a cost-effective approach to capture the population. Thus, recalcitrant chiefs were induced into compliance using sanctions that were set out in Article 29. Just the threat of suspending their emoluments, as per Article 22, was often enough to bring them into line. Moreover,

sinecures were promised in exchange for cooperation. A case in point includes the appointment of the Fons of Bali and Bafut as members of the Management Board of the North-West Development Authority (MIDENO). In addition, chiefs falling under the jurisdiction of government parastatals were appointed to serve on their Management Boards. Failing that, the state, with its monopoly over the use of legitimate force, could threaten non-complying chiefs with the possibility of destitution. Early evidence of the latter was the forced abdication of the Lamido of Ngaoundere.[12]

Generally, prior to the introduction of the Liberty Laws (1990) ushering in the democratisation process, the fact that chiefs co-operated with the government was not contentious or contested. Consensus formation was easy under the monolithic party. Without willing compliance on the part of the population, the state possessed instruments that it could use to effect forced compliance. For example, not only did the 1967 Law on Associations make it mandatory that associations be registered, but it also permitted security officers to attend their meetings.

As Bayart points out, the most obnoxious proviso of this law was Article 4 which proscribed associations from supporting an illegal cause, those contrary to the laws of good behaviour and those which would threaten national integrity or the form of government. These stipulations, precise yet broad enough to be all-inclusive, rendered evident the extra-textual intentions of the legislators: their determination to resist any counter-hegemonic practice. The prerogative of naming those involved in this oppositional politics devolved on the administration and ipso facto its auxiliaries. In some areas of the country where the administration is absent, this task reverted automatically to the chiefs.

The fact that chiefs had been co-opted by and had penetrated the state was accepted as the culture of politics, that is, "political practice that is culturally legitimated and societally validated by local knowledge". But the advent of oppositional politics, symbolised by the launching of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in Bamenda in 1990, unsettled the culture of politics in post-colonial Cameroon and posed another challenge to traditional authority. As stakeholders in the system, it was almost inevitable that in any struggle that pitted civil society against the state, the chiefs ally with the latter. This was especially true of chiefs who were imposed on the local population by the central administration.

To illustrate, the Minister of Animal Husbandry, Hamadjoda Adjoudi, installed Bia Hamadou as the third-degree chief of Touriningal (Adamoua Province), instead of the regent El Ahmadou Abbo who had ruled this locality for three years before the death of their chief. Unlike Abbo, Hamadou was a client of the minister and a member of the CPDM.[13]

As such, the new chief was beholden to the minister. The population petitioned this appointment, threatening to seek legal redress to make sure that tradition and their sovereign will were not subverted. Seen through another prism, this is a claim by civil society that as stakeholders, they should be involved in the appointment of chiefs. In organised societies where tradition is still strong, the participation of civil society in this process is important as the powers of chiefs emanate not from the state but from tradition, even if this be invented.

And insofar as chiefs possess power not only over temporal but also spiritual affairs, perceiving them as defenders of the hegemonic state was bound to have repercussions in the labour of truth among their subjects. Playing this role of honest broker was the challenge that confronted the chief in 1990 following the passage of the Liberty Laws that signalled the advent of multiparty politics.

The 1990 Liberty Laws

Among the Liberty Laws was Law no 90-56 of December 1990 relating to political parties. Whereas Section 2 of this law allowed individuals the right to form political parties, Section 3 stipulated that "nobody shall be forced to belong to a political party". And Section 3.2 stated that "nobody shall be harassed because he belongs or does not belong to a political party". Putting the individual on centre stage was meant to contribute to a revalorisation of human rights. However, as Foucault argues, the juridification of these rights is also a means of their proceduralisation and therefore contributes to the surveillance and disciplining of the individual. Insofar as human freedoms and rights cannot be "guaranteed" by laws, the Liberty Laws put in motion relations of domination and not of sovereignty.[14]

Furthermore, legal pluralism was the norm in Cameroon as modern law co-existed with traditional law. Delineating public space into "traditional" and "modern", however, was not relevant in the view of the chiefs who appropriated extensive powers for themselves. They could not make the cultural adjustment necessary for the acceptance of this delineation. For example, the press abounds with stories of chiefs visiting their subjects who live in the city to offer advice on politically correct behavior. These prescriptions took the form of injunctions in some instances. Given this perception of their power, their subjects were still bound to the precepts that regulated traditional public space, in spite of the 1990 Liberty Laws.

However, the participation of chiefs in this project designed to lock the individual into "traditional" public space could only unsettle his belief in their powers, producing negative repercussions on their social capital. For he would cease to defer to any traditional ruler that tries to impose his idea of political correctness on him. Thus, in the context of party pluralism, chiefs could maximise or maintain their power only by adopting the "most favoured politician" clause, that is granting all politicians the same treatment they reserve for their favoured politician. However, the reaction of the chiefs to the introduction of political pluralism was ambivalent as they had been captured by the state while also believing that their powers were grounded in tradition. Caught as it were between Scylla and Charbydis, chiefs responded differentially to the passage of the 1990 law on political parties.

The Lamido of Rey Bouba

The system of indirect rule established under the colonial state had granted autonomy to the lamidat of Rey Bouba. In 1960, Ahmadou Ahidjo, who had been construed by most of the northern elite including the lamido of Rey Bouba as a young Turk, moved to curb some of the powers of the latter.[15] Ostensibly, the reforms introduced to this effect were prompted by a concern for state construction that involved a quest for hegemony. But, while claiming that it had a monopoly over the use of legitimate force, the state condoned the practices of the lamido because it did not have effective control over this area. The lamido therefore retained his performative powers from the (pre-)colonial era. For instance, the lamido required that each adult male living in the lamidat pay a special contribution of 1 000 francs (CFA) while the women had to pay 500 francs. Failure to pay could result in capital punishment as in the case of Ninga Michel, a pastor in Laoudjougue.[16] Thus, similar to the era of absolutism in Europe, law in this lamidat could be seen mostly as a system of commands meant to guarantee the infantilisation of the individual and was at variance with the notion of popular sovereignty and people's rights on which the 1990 Liberty Laws were grounded.

The conflict between these two systems of law became obvious in the run-up to the municipal elections in January 1996. Though the law allowed for political pluralism, the lamido, who was a member of the CPDM, barred other parties, especially the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP), from holding political rallies in his lamidat. Intent on enforcing his injunction, he attacked two NUDP parliamentarians.[17] The state and courts have still not taken judicial notice of this crime. Undoubtedly, this attack was meant to install fear among the ranks of the opposition. The Lamido wanted to stop the NUDP from participating in elections for fear its victory would unsettle the order that reigned there.

That a NUDP victory in this election would not portend well for the lamido was already evident from the impact of its victory in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Mayo-Rey comprises a pop-

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ulation of circa 200 000 that is mostly illiterate; thus, following NUDP's victory in the parliamentary election, it embarked on a political education program. And since all education awakens consciousness and therefore suggests emancipatory possibilities, it was not surprising that the lamido proscribed the NUDP. Not seeing his lamidat as dynamic, that is incapable of generating change internally, the lamido believed that insulating it would enable it to remain the same. The lamido's reading of everyday life was mistaken, for, as Paulin Hountondji observes, pluralism is inherent in every society and does not necessarily come from the outside.[18] Already, resistance to demands imposed upon his subjects was evidence of a change in their mode of knowing. Thus, the value of the NUDP efforts was restricted to translating this existential opposition into political action.

With a view to maintaining power relations in the lamidat, the lamido even sent the NUDP parliamentarians that represented this region in the National Assembly into exile. Use of his *dougurous* (militia) to enforce this command and the failure of the gendarmerie to respond to the complaint of the NUDP is evidence of the weak capacity of the state in Mayo-Rey. Antonio Gramsci draws an analogy between a weakened state structure and a flagging army. In circumstances like this, he argues, commandos or private armed organisations are activated to make use of illegal means, while the state remains within legality and thereby helps to reorganise itself.[19]

It is this role that the lamido's militia played by pre-empting the opposition parties from participating in elections in the lamidat. Seemingly, only this could guarantee victory for the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). Victory was important for this party at this historical juncture, as this was the first municipal election since the introduction of a liberal-democratic system. NUDP had won the founding elections, that is the parliamentary elections in 1992, and the only way for the CPDM to re-appropriate symbolic ground was to win this election.

Subsequent interventions by the state to restore the rule of law in Mayo-Rey show that the capacity problem was only to cover up the interest of the CPDM regime in electoralism, that is an interest in the outcomes rather than the procedure of elections. As such, the weakness was contrived rather than real. Symptomatic of this is its resolve to grant protection to Koulanga Nana during a visit to his constituency, in spite of opposition from the lamido who had declared him *persona non grata* follow-

ing the parliamentary elections in 1992. This parliamentarian successfully sought the mediation of the divisional officer to enable him to return to his constituency. The command banishing Koulanga from the lamidat was suspended for a 24-hour period but, doubting the good faith of the lamido, the administration took the precaution of providing armed guards for Koulanga. Believing that he had outmaneuvered the administration, the lamido sent his dougourous during the night to request that Koulanga accompany them to his palace. When this request was rejected, an altercation ensued between the forces of law and order and the lamido's *dougourous*.[20]

Successful enforcement of public order in this instance is proof that the state was not weak in this locality. Plausibly, it may have been prompted into action because the NUDP berated it for granting the status of a suzerain to the lamido of Rey-Bouba. It therefore had to be seen as exercising effective control over its domain. Furthermore, as the gross abuse of human rights in this lamidat focused the gaze of the international community on it, the state – ostensibly committed to implementing good governance as part of its Structural Adjustment Plan package – had to react. Having deflected criticism for condoning absolutism, the state has now once more reverted to its nonchalant attitude towards the excesses of the lamido.

Evidence of this is the callous disregard of a petition calling for a parliamentary investigation into the abuses of human rights in the lamidat. The state continues to adopt an ostrich-like posture as the lamido, who is suspected to have commandeered the assassination of Haman Adama, has not been indicted. As a result, the probability of adopting a new mode of representation in the lamidat under the present CPDM regime is rather slim.

The Muddled Responses of the North-West Fons

Political consciousness in the North-West province, that was at the forefront of the movement calling for the introduction of participatory democracy in Cameroon, is high. Hybridity is the norm in this province, despite a strong respect for tradition. The power of the fons or chiefs inheres from this respect for tradition rather than from the 1977 Law. Thus, fons found themselves in an ambiguous situation with the advent of liberal democracy. Siding with their subjects, who were enunciating an oppositional discourse, could incur the wrath of the state that could cut off or suspend them from its payroll. But siding with the state could lead to "disidentification" and an erosion of their power base, especially as it signals an end to the unquestioned

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functioning of the logic of fetishistic inversion. Only dexterity could enable the fons to negotiate this passage. It required that they adopt the "most favoured politician' clause *vis-à-vis* all parties.

Initial efforts to stay out of the political fray led to the formation of the North-West Fons Conference (NOWEFCU). Modelled on the South-West Chiefs Conference that was a strong lobbying group, this association was an added voice working for the development of the province. Consensus however ended with the acceptance of this broad principle as a split developed over the procedural approach to be adopted. The Steering Committee of the association opted for an apolitical approach, but some fons wanted it to be a pro-CPDM Association. Sparring between the two factions erupted when the latter faction insisted that the

Prime Minister, Simon Achidi Achu, be invited to attend their conference. This request was given an unfavourable review by the Steering Committee, which argued that he was not a fon. This disagreement reached a climax when Doh Gwanyim formed a breakaway association and sought to sabotage the first assembly of NOWEFCU in November 1995. This initiative was not well received. The position of most of the fons was summed up thus: "The pro-CPDM faction is only out to divide us. If not so, why should they lure us with envelopes to attend their own meeting and not that of the Steering Committee. Since all our subjects support the Steering Committee, we shall go to Nkwen come November 4."[21]

Undaunted by this lukewarm reception, the pro-CPDM faction, now purportedly sponsored by the regime, enlisted the support of the Prime Minister. He lobbied and even blackmailed fons to join the pro-CPDM faction. For example, he sent an envoy to Fon Ngufor II of Nkwen who was treasurer of the North-West Fons' Association "requesting our fon to quit (this association) and join the pro-government Fons' Conference and declare his support for the ruling CPDM". In exchange for this support, the fon was promised a seat in the Senate provided for in the new constitution.[22] The fon reported this attempt at blackmail to NOWEFCU's executive. The latter in turn indicated that it would be compelled to seek an audience with President Paul Biya after the municipal elections "to report the havoc that the Prime Minister has caused by splitting the North west fons for personal and political ends".[23]

From the state's perspective, winning the support of the fons was important because of the dual belief that they were metonymic of their people and determined their political views. Their power could not be contested. Political iconoclasts suffered from what they considered disproportionate punishment, whether it be in terms of fines or ostracism. And the effects of this punishment were magnified by the fact that space was localised or bounded. But this received representation of culture glossed over the hybridity of the people of this province. Thus, on the one hand, they conceded their fons a surplus of trust that gave them an aura of infallibility in issues of native lore, that is in "traditional" public space. But on the other, their belief in egalitarianism in "modern" public space was unconditional. Their desire to have a voice whenever their fons entered this space was demonstrated by their support for the NOWEFCU as opposed to the pro-CPDM North-West Fons' Conference. Thus, erasing the divide between these two spaces for a political utility function leads to a misrepresentation of reality.

However, under constant pressure from the regime, the policy of the fons on issues of state politics became muddled. In spite of having declared their neutrality, many of them became candidates on the CPDM list for the elections or campaigned actively for it. For example, the Fon of Nkwen hosted meetings of the Steering Committee and caused it to unleash its ire on the Prime Minister, yet, yielding to pressure from the latter, he accepted that his name be put on the CPDM list. He avoided joining the CPDM campaign caravan most of the time and reputedly advised his subjects to vote with their consciences.

If the Fon of Nkwen tried to retain an aura of neutrality in politics, despite being a candidate for the CPDM, others like Fon Dohsang Ganyonga III of Bali threatened to abdicate during one of the campaign rallies, vowing that "If you do not vote for me, I risk resigning as Fon of Bali."[24] Evidence of historical discontinuity, the Fon added that he "was not afraid of anybody or criticism". North-West Fons, it should be pointed out, are held in check by fear of the sanctions of the *kwifon*, a powerful lodge that can be compared to the Constitutional Court in the modern state.

Plausibly, the phenomenology of power, that is, those that wield it do not see why others should complain, can be used to explain the fon's stance. But his claim that "the people were willing to go in any direction with their fon" gave it another spin. Essentially, this represented them as his "standing reserve". As if to call the fon's bluff, the SDF captured 85.5% of the votes in Bali and the people chanted songs of jubilation enjoining the fon to "resign as you promised in your campaign speech."[25]

In all, 18 fons contested the elections on the CPDM list in the North-West Province, but only Fon Doh Gah Gwanyim of Balikumbat won. This phenomenal defeat scarred the institution of the fondom. Overlooking provisions of the 1990 laws on the freedom of the individual and his right to adhere to any political party, the fons had guaranteed the regime that their subjects would take their political cues from them. The reverse had

> The European emphasis on individual human rights and liberties impinges on the African view. This has implications for the perception of traditional authority ...

obtained. Defeat consummated the divorce between these subjects and their fons and threatened even to lead to a questioning of the mystical foundations of their authority/power in traditional space. Conscious of this, the fons now sought to reconcile with their people. In Bali, for instance, the Fon accepted the "most favoured politician" clause belatedly and pleaded with his people not to use politics to undermine their custom. This led the victorious SDF to pay him a courtesy call, noting "that he was the link between the Bali people and their ancestors and still deserved to be seen as custodian of their culture".[26] The defeat suffered by the fons was evidence that another logic based on a different consciousness reigned in "modern" public space. Here, it was not culture but political convictions that mattered. And the "modern" political space was occupied by the SDF.

But this party was still aware of the utility function of the grounding in culture. It is this belief that led its North-West Chairman to appeal to the population to forgive their fons while by the same token warning that any fon that engaged in partisan politics would face the wrath of the masses.[27] The seriousness of this warning was evident from treatment meted out to recalcitrant fons who refused to acknowledge their participation in the elections as a political blunder. In Oku, for example, Fon Samuel N. Ngum who is in charge of the spirit medium is supposed to have suffered from a mild stroke when he crossed the "traditional rope" prepared by two of his advisers who were sympathetic to the SDF. Following what the Fon considered as their defiance of his authority, he ordered that they be stripped of their traditional *Kwifon* titles and exiled from Oku. He also complained to the gendarmes who arrested and detained these two advisers.[28] This contravened the provisions of the 1990 law that gave the individual the right to belong to any political party. Moreover, the fon became so unpopular among his subjects that he was forced to go to the gendarmes in March 1996 to ask for the release of the advisers.

Isolation as an instrument of power or a mode of disidentification has also been used in the case of Kom. The fon of Kom invited the Chairman of the SDF, Ni John Fru Ndi, to his palace. Here, he revealed to Fru Ndi that whereas he was a CPDM militant, most people at the palace were SDF militants and there was even a SDF ward in the palace. Asked why the *ilaah* looked so deserted, he complained that most people now convened not at the palace but at Sobo's place (the residence of the Mayor of Fundong Rural Municipal Council).[29] In essence, the fon was

developing a culture of complaint in the face of his isolation. This can be attributed to a failure to recognise the hybridity of his subjects and the fact they are adept at skillfully synthesising various epistemologies. Moreover, one must grant that some interference occurs as knowledge from the European world view with its emphasis on individual human rights and liberties impinges on the African one. This has implications for the perception of traditional authority, especially when it intervenes in the "modern" public space. It subverts it.

The Sawa Chiefs and the Forging of a New Sawa Solidarity

The landslide victory of the SDF over the CPDM in the South-West and Littoral Provinces in the January 1996 municipal elections thrust to the fore once more the use of the terms *autochtone* (indigenous) and *allogene* (settler) in Cameroon's political grammar. The victory was seen as the collective defeat of the *autochtones*, who are mostly CPDM members, by the allogenes who are predominantly members of the SDF. Seeing political debate through this prism that privileges essentialism and binary opposites, attests to the fact that despite the Liberty Laws, the people still lacked a democratic culture that respects difference. Against this backdrop, the Sawa (coastal people) traditional chiefs are seen as representatives of the "direct descendants of the people that created the localities that comprise the present day Littoral and South-West regions, part of the South, Center and Western regions, before the different invasions, the European colonisation and the formation of the Cameroonian state" created Sawa.[30] Thus, it was an essential medium for reclaiming and redefining the people's collective memory.

According to the chiefs, the SDF victory led to their exclusion from the governing process in their own local municipalities. In Douala, the economic capital of Cameroon, four of the five elected mayors were Bamileke, while only one was Douala or an *autochtone*. Prince Douala Manga Bell stated their grievance explicitly when he indicated that at least three of the Mayors should be Sawas. However when he communicated this to Fru Ndi, the Chairman of the SDF, he was shocked at the insistence that the mayors be democratically elected.[31] Sawas saw the protests against the nomination of government delegates in Douala, Limbe, Kumba, Nkongsamba and Edea as part of a "diabolic and dangerous scheme" hatched and carried out under the auspices of official political and cultural organisations to assure their political disappearance.[32] A hermeneutical reading of this declaration reveals that the chiefs were mainly indicting the SDF that they saw as the vehicle for "Bamileke hegemony". However, this overlooked that fact that Section 3 of the law on political parties gave everyone the right to adhere to a party of his own choosing and that Section 9 proscribed parties that "undermine the territorial integrity, national unity, the republican character of the state, national sovereignty and national integration, in particular through any type of discrimination based on tribe, province, linguistic group or religious denomination." Since the SDF was an authorised political party, it must have fulfilled the prescriptions described in Section 9.

Intent on manufacturing a consensual past for the ethnic groups or autochtones in the lived reality of a divided present, the chiefs overlooked the fact that the concept of individuality had evolved. Thus each Sawa like his allogene counterpart was free to join any political party of his or her choice. Membership in a political party is a prerequisite for running for public office in Cameroon, as only political parties can field candidates for elections. But Sawas who did not buy into the SDF philosophy refused to join this party. Not being in the party, they could not

expect the Bamilekes to invite to take over the reins of power. Blind to this political reality, Chief Essako Ekwalla of Deido instead blamed their absence from municipal power to cultural fascism when he observed that "Sawas are at war! And our problem is not an ethnic matter, but the political power which our Bamileke brothers from the Western Province have grabbed and are using their numbers to dominate the Sawa minorities."[33] No doubt, this was a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that Bamilekes constitute the dominant population in the Littoral. Granting this and the principle of one man one vote, Sawas may have committed a tactical blunder in not allying with them. Failing this, they had to submit to the will of the majority.

If Chief Ekwalla's analysis was representative of that of the Sawa chiefs, then these chiefs were in effect denying that elections be used as a mode of access to power. Prescriptively, he resorted to the culture of complaint. Victory by Bamileke candidates in elections during the one-party era had elicited a similar reaction from the Doualas who protested against what they deemed as the monopolisation of all important posts in the CPDM party in the province by Bamilekes.[34]

Against this backdrop, the creation of Sawa by the traditional chiefs was a mobilisational strategy. Nationalism is born of negative moments of resistance. In this case the Bamilekes, whom the chiefs had indicted for hatching a plan for the extermination of the Doualas, could easily serve as a *ficelle* (an organisational device) to explain everything to the *autochtones*.[35] In charging the Bamilekes with collective liability, the chiefs ignored the fact that some Bamilekes and Sawas worked together for the CPDM. The threat had to look real, ominous and nefarious for Sawas to display the kind of social cohesion that is alien to atomistic societies. In their perception the collective interests of Sawas could best be defended through their culture.

To this end, the chiefs appealed to all Sawas or *autochtones* to henceforth support their customs and traditions so as to save themselves. And, in the absence of a pan-Sawa structure, the chiefs created the Sawa Chiefs Conference. If the Sawas could be made to subscribe to the logic of fetishistic inversion, then the chiefs hoped, this would increase the bargaining power of their Conference as the people would accept their political cues from them. For this to obtain, the boundaries between traditional and modern public space had to be collapsed. Several factors, among them the fact that respect of traditional rulers is not strong in the acephalous regions of littoral Cameroon, threatened the realisation of this project. With a view to overcoming this, culture had to be invented.

This can be held up as proof that the encounter between the *allogenes* and the *autochtones* has led to a productive cultural contact. Some Sawa chiefs tacitly acknowledge this by, for instance, asking their subjects to emulate the "nturu wearing people" (i.e. naked people, which means they are uncivilised) in paying them the same homage that they give their fons. In essence, the call for Sawas to unite under the aegis of tradition in the face of their electoral defeat can be seen as an attempt by the chiefs to find in the victory of the SDF in the municipal elections a new enhanced status for themselves among their people. What Antonio Gramsci said about the military that their "so-called neutrality only means support for the reactionary side" is also applicable to culture.[36]

Given that hegemony is limited in time and space, it is plausible that they hoped that a re-invention of their tradition and custom, similar to that of the *allogenes* would enable them to challenge the hegemony of the latter in their territory. The fact that Sawas have consistently failed to turn out for protest marches called by the chiefs does not portend well for this project.

As a homogenising discourse, the Declaration was also made with a view to enhancing the bargaining position of the chiefs *vis-à-vis* the regime. The new Constitution of Cameroon promulgated into law in January 1996, stipulated in its preamble that "the State shall ensure the protection of minorities and shall preserve the rights of indigenous populations in accordance with the law". It is to this end that the chiefs asked the state to take prompt and adequate measures to assuage their fears and solve their problems. The state could be seen as responding to this request when it named Sawas or autochtones as government delegates in metropolitan towns such as Douala, Nkongsamba, Limbe and Kumba in the Littoral and South-West Provinces. Since these delegates, who are members of the CPDM, serve as the managerial authority in towns that had been won by the SDF in the municipal elections, their nominations sparked a wave of protests.

However, Sawa chiefs, guided more by expediency than by logic, failed to see the *raison d'être* of the protests. Article 55.2 of the same constitution that they were invoking for the purpose of protecting minority rights, states that local authorities "shall have administrative and financial autonomy in the management of regional and local interests" and "they shall be freely administered by councils elected under conditions laid down by the law". Acceptance of Dworkin's notion of law as integrity meant that the government had to act in "a principled and coherent manner toward all its citizens." It could not on the one hand repress uprisings in some municipalities and on the other apply the provisions of the same law at the behest of another group.

Insofar as this variable practice enhanced the power of the Sawa chiefs in the eyes of their subjects, the state could be seen as being involved in the production of culture. This is a requisite for class hegemony. Gramsci underlined that the state is only the "outer ditch behind which there (stands) a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks", a network of cultural values and institutions not normally thought of as political.[37] The tacit alliance between the state and Sawa chiefs was in furtherance of the structured oppression of allogenes in the Littoral and South-West Provinces.

This homogenising discourse was also an attempt by the Sawa elites to promote their vertical political concerns through increased access to the state. The Union des Populations du Cameroun (MANIDEM) exhorted Sawas not to fall prey to the "manipulations of the CPDM barons".[38] Most CPDM candidates had lost elections in their constituencies, this being a sign of their declining political fortunes. Fear that the President would dismiss them from his government abounded. Intent on increasing their bargaining power even in the context of diminishing returns, these candidates played an instrumental role in the creation of

> ... it was said that the people of the grassfields had "vomited" (President Paul) Biya by voting overwhelmingly for the opposition, even in their own provinces.

SAWA. It was therefore a form of strategic ethnicity. Already speculation among Sawas was rife that the new head of government in the imminent cabinet reshuffle in the wake of the January 1996 election would be a Sawa. As a justification, it was said that the people of the grassfields had "vomited" Biya by voting overwhelmingly for the opposition, even in their own provinces.

The Sawas as a lobbying group seemed to have imposed their view of politics on Paul Biya, who named Peter Mafany Musonge from the South-West Province (Buea) as Prime Minister. He replaced Simon Achidi Achu from the North-West

Province, seen as the fiefdom of the SDF. The Douala chiefs who had been complaining that the South-West Chiefs had captured their initiative were demobilised as a result of this appointment, especially as Douala Motume, who was Minister of Justice, was dropped in the cabinet reshuffle. The rift between these two factions became overt when Musonge named Mukoko Mbonji as his Director of Cabinet instead of a South-Westerner as had been popularly expected. While Mbonji is a Sawa from the Littoral Province, this did not placate the South-Westerners who argued that it was standard practice that the Prime Minister chose someone from his province to serve in this capacity. Basically, protests from the South-West Province were proof that the Sawa identity is contingent rather than immanent.

But for this discourse to attain its maximum mobilising capacity, it had to appeal to the common man. Overwhelmed by the challenges of everyday life, it was difficult for all to be seen as stakeholders in a project meant to promote the vertical political concerns of the elite. Material insecurity was the norm. Achille Mbembe argues that, in this context, the struggle to overcome this scarcity becomes the site *par excellence* for the construction of the economic and the political subject.[39]

If the vertical political concerns of the Sawa elites led them to emphasise the political meaning of Sawa, the common person focused more on the capacity of this discourse to arrest downward mobility. Thus, the appointment of Musonge as Prime Minister ushered in a propitious environment for the achievement of this agenda. Early signs of a determination to seize this window of opportunity was the *chasse aux allogenes* in Douala. This was initiated by *autochtones* in Bonamouang (Douala) who decided to chase away *allogenes* who had ostensibly occupied their land without compensation.[40] Thus at this confluence of circumstance where the Sawa chiefs had decried the *allogene* plan to drive them into the sea and the appointment of a Sawa as head of government was imminent, capacity was shifting in favor of the Sawas.

The State, Chieftaincy and Democracy

Raymond Williams observes that since any hegemony is continuously contested, its vitality lies in its ability to adapt and recreate itself. Ordinarily, this contestation is from below. But in the case of African post-colonial states like Cameroon which depend on the international system for their continuity, change can also be conditioned by this intervening variable. In the case of Cameroon, the push for the introduction of a liberal-democracy from civil society was supplemented by a pull from the Bretton Woods institutions that insisted on cross-conditionality. Thus, good governance is an intrinsic part of any structural adjustment programme.

It was with a view to satisfying this condition that the regime promulgated the "Liberty Laws" of 1990. As indicated above, this smacked of a juridification of rights. But rights are essentially practices and their juridification is already a restriction as it points to their proceduralisation. Proceduralisation is a trait of disciplinary societies.

Besides proceduralisation, the post-state has sought to restrict political rights through the incorporation of chieftaincies whose performative powers carried over from the pre-colonial era. These chiefs supposedly have imaginary powers not only over the means of production but also reproduction. Thus, incorporating the chiefs into the state could enable the state to operate as a *de facto* monolithic party state, despite its embrace of liberal democracy at the de jure level. In order to lure the chiefs, the state has provided them with both financial and logistical support. In the case of the Lamido of Rey Bouba, for example, a jeep in the convoy of vehi-

cles that transported the *doungourous* that attacked Koulanga Nana, the member of parliament from the region, was traced to the Directorate of Presidential Security.[41] If as Gramsci states the weakened state structure sometimes uses private armed organisations to perpetrate illegal activities while it tries to stay within the boundaries of legality, the seizure of this vehicle foregrounded the role that the state is playing within these organisations. By the same token, it helped to fray any boundaries that might have existed between the legal and the illegal.

Similarly, in the littoral areas of Cameroon, where the creation of Sawa by the chiefs in the wake of the municipal elections led to an outburst of ethnic tension between autochtones and allogenes, speculation was rife that the state had enabled this through the use of symbolic violence.[42] Given the state's monopoly over the audiovisual media and that announcements are vetted to make sure that they promote its hegemonic quest, Cameroonians saw the wide publicity given to Sawa as evidence of complicity. Believing that the chiefs could effectively determine the political views of their subjects, it also tried to penetrate the North-West Fons' Association. Failing this, it sponsored the creation of a rival group, the North-West Fons' Conference.

Seen from below, the supposition that the chiefs have control over the imaginary means of production and reproduction was an attempt to freeze a hegemony in time and space. Consequent to colonisation, the individual was no longer only a consumer but was actively involved in the production of meaning. Endowed with another consciousness, Cameroonians today are intrinsically different from their pre-colonial counterpart. Symptomatic of this is their hybridity that is attributable to what Ali Mazrui has referred to as a "triple colonial heritage" – Cameroonian, European and Muslim.

Cameroonians imbued with a European consciousness have resisted attempts by the state and their chiefs to collapse the boundaries between "traditional" and "modern" public space. As a result, values from the one have not permeated the other. The possibility of delineating these two spaces accounts for the apparent disregard of the people of the North-West Province towards their chiefs in the realm of modern politics. This attitude is in contradiction to the surplus of trust that they accord these same rulers in the "traditional" public realm.

In the North, where contact was with the Muslim world, there exists a culture of docility. As a result of this culture, the common man who sees the lamido as infallible has not seized the initiative to make the distinction between "traditional" and "modern" public space. Consciousness in this society does not therefore pose a threat to extant power relations. It is this "pristine" quality that guarantees continuous infantilisation that the lamido seeks to safeguard.

Given this, the politics of protest has not become a pervasive feature in the lamidat, despite the obstinacy of the lamido to pre-

> Cameroonians are still willing to respect the authority of their traditional rulers in "traditional" public space, but resent any attempt by these rulers to invade "modern" public space.

vent his people from enjoying the rights granted them by the 1990 Liberty Laws. But the apparent political quiescence in the lamidat should not be interpreted as evidence of a lack of social communication between the people in this area and other Cameroonians. Social communication with the latter should result in productive cultural contact. Thus, resistance by various communities to the *doungourous* points to a sprawl in the politics of protest.

Also with a view to fostering the acceptance of "another democracy" among the population, some chiefs have gone to the extent of creating groups like Sawa which serve as a vehicle in the reclaiming and defining of their people's collective memory of the past. But the collective memory of the past of any people cannot be reawakened and nurtured in the absence of a historical memory. In the absence of this memory, it is not surprising that Sawa has been perceived by most people as a ruse. Consequently, it has remained an elite-powered movement.

Though negotiating an exit from traditional into modern political space may not be problematic for chiefs and may even be an imperative of changes in the mode of production, its implications can be disturbing. The latter is liminal space where the state is supposed to have a monopoly over the use of legitimate force. As a result, chiefs become weak like any other citizen, incapable of using the law insofar as it is considered a weapon of the strong.

Some of the consequences of this were brought into relief with the sentencing of the Fon of Menouet in a civil matter.[43] This jolted the chiefs and with a view to pre-empting a recurrence of this, they asked for immunity. Chiefs being mere auxiliaries of the administration, granting this would lead to contradictions that the state cannot resolve. Even immunity would not insulate them from popular law, in furtherance of the democratic process. As the process is being frustrated by the non-registration of voters

and thus disenfranchisement, the SDF has resolved that all officials helping to put this bottleneck in place should be lynched.[44] Should this obtain, it would change the way the common man perceives his chief.

Conclusion
On the whole, the involvement of traditional chiefs in the democratisation process, insofar as it has been sponsored by the state with a view to introducing "another democracy" rather than its liberal version, involves the collapsing of the boundaries between traditional and modern public space. This requires that the ordinary Cameroonian be successfully refused the role of agency. However, this fails to recognise that Cameroonians are hybrids, endowed not only with an African but also with a European consciousness that emphasises individualism. Individualism is intrinsic to liberal democracies that celebrate not only the principle of "one man, one vote" but also believe that this vote has to be free. Given that Cameroonians have bought into this logic, it is not surprising that whereas they are still willing to respect the authority of their traditional rulers in "traditional" public space, they resent any attempt by these rulers to invade "modern" public space where the rules of the game are different.

Nantang Jua is based in Buea, Cameroon.

Notes & references

1 The terms *traditional authority, chiefs* and *fons* are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
2 This concept is coined on the basis of and is informed by "another development" that has been promoted by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation.
3 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question of Technology', *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Questions*, New York: Harper, 1977, p 18.
4 Slavoj Zizek, *Looking Away*, Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993, p 36. Note, however, that deference to authority is not particular to African society.
5 Cf Valentin Mudimbe's concept of the colonising structure in *The Invention of Africa*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988.
6 Terence Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in Eric Habsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p 239. Ayissi Mvodo, the Minister of Territorial Administration, corroborated this when he said that the aim of the decree was "to restore the dignity of the chief". Cited in Jean-Francois Bayart, *L'Etat au Cameroun*, Paris: Presse de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1979.
7 JF Bayart, 'The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime', in Richard Joseph (ed), *Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo*, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978, p 53.
8 For an analysis of the role of traditional authority in colonial Cameroon, see EM Chilver, 'Native Administration in the West Cameroons, 1902-1954', in Kenneth Robinson and A Frederick Madden (eds), *Essays in Imperial Government Presented to Margery Perham*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963; Nantang Jua, 'Indirect rule in colonial and post-colonial Cameroon', *Paideuma*, 1995.
9 Circular No. 1/UNC/BPN/SO of 1 June 1969.

As Bayart notes, this provision, though not statutory, was renewed by another circular on 25 November 1975.
10 *Ibid.*, p 271.
11 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p 192.
12 Bayart 1978, p 54.
13 *La Nouvelle Expression*, no 326, 19 July 1996, p 8.
14 Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures', in Colin Gordon (ed), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Interviews*, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1990, pp 95-96.
15 Bayart 1978, pp 52-53.
16 See extracts of petition submitted by the National Union for Democracy and Progress to the National Assembly in *Le Messager*, no 557, 4 November 1996, p 5.
17 *La Nouvelle Expression*, no 330, 4 August 1996, p 8.
18 Cited in Hecht and Simone 1994, p 40.
19 Antonio Gramsci, *Selection From Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, 1978, p 232.
20 *Le Messager*, no 557, 4 November 1996, p 5.
21 A Fon from Wum sub-division cited in *The Herald*, no 255, 2 November 1995, p 2.
22 Fon's subject cited in *The Herald*, no 270, 25 December 1995, p 1.
23 *Ibid.*, p 3.
24 Cited in *The Herald*, no 275, 11 January 1996, p 1.
25 *Ibid.*
26 *The Herald*, no 284, 12 February 1996, p 2.
27 Andew Akonteh, *The Herald*, no 295, 21 March 1996, p 3.
28 *The Herald*, no 293, 14 March 1996, p 2. The nature of this complaint was not made public.
29 Conversation with Mr Soho, the Mayor, during the SDF Fourth Ordinary Convention, Buea, 12 December 1996.
30 See Sawa Traditional Chiefs, 'Declaration

of 15 June 1996', *Challenge Nouveau*, no 045, 27 June 1996, p 5.
31 See interview in *Ibid.*, p 6. Prince Bell also failed to acknowledge the fact that SDF attempts to ruin Soup Lazare, who had been elected Mayor of Douala III, contrary to party instructions that this post be reserved for an indigene, were being frustrated by the CPDM regime.
32 *Ibid.*, p 5.
33 Cited in *Cameroon Post*, no 0007, 8 May 1996, p 1
34 Collectif "Changer le Cameroun", *Le Cameroun Eclate*, Yaounde: Editions C3, no date.
35 For a more detailed analysis of this use of this concept coined by Slavoj Zizek, see Nantang Jua, 'Spatialization and Valorization of Identities in Contemporary Cameroon', (mimeo), 1999, pp 15-16.
36 Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, 1971, p 212.
37 *Ibid.*, p 238.
38 Cited in *Challenge Nouveau*, no 026, 22 February 1996, p 5.
39 Achille Mbembe, 'Une économie de predation', *Foi et Developpement*, no 241, March-April 1996, p 1.
40 *La Nouvelle Expression*, no 318, 25 June 1996, p 5.
41 *L'Expression*, no 78, 30 December 1996, p 7.
42 Between 12 July 1995 and 15 November 1995, the state-owned oil company, SONARA, paid out the sum of 13 400 000 CFA to the South-West Chiefs' Conference and the Kupe Muaneguba Chiefs. See *Cameroon Post*, no 0042, 28 January 1997, p 8. Since chiefs are in no way connected to this outfit, this act must be seen as one of neo-patrimonialism.
43 *Le Messager*, no 1054, 14 April 2000.
44 *The Post*, no 0171, 8 May 2000, p 6.

TO PRIVATISE

As part of World Bank and International Monetary Fund-inspired Structural Adjustment Programmes, many countries in Africa have started or are in the process of reforming their parastatal sector and state-owned enterprises, usually through privatisation. This paper provides a glimpse into Africa's privatisation experience by examining aspects of Zambia's privatisation programme.

To appreciate the position of those who call for the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa, it is important to look at where those SOEs have come from, and why they exist in the first place. To describe Zambia's case, a brief background description of Zambia's industrial sector is provided, and the country's nationalisation programme is discussed. Much of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general arguments for and against privatising state owned enterprises, a subject that is high on the Bretton Woods conditionality menu. The second half of the paper is a case study of Zambian experiences.

The Industrial Sector in Zambia

Industrial and formal administrative activity in Zambia during the transition to independence was largely characterised by insignificant – almost non-existent – indigenous participation. This area was the exclusive preserve of the private, white settler minority. Lall points out that African industrial growth was launched primarily by foreign companies (or resident non-Africans) to serve local markets or process raw materials for export.[1] But several factors conjoined at independence to create favourable conditions for increased local participation.[2]

The dissolution of the 1953-63 Federation of Rhodesia (Southern and Northern) and Nyasaland and the acquisition of independence from Britain in 1964 meant that the system of inter-territorial transfers of (copper) revenues came to an end. (Southern Rhodesia subsequently became Zimbabwe, while Northern Rhodesia is present-day Zambia. Nyasaland became Malawi).

Zambia, which lost much of its copper revenues during federation to Zimbabwe, partly due to a larger presence of white settlers in that country, recovered the right to formulate its own industrialisation policy objectives and instruments. The latter was manifested in the power to impose effective protective tariffs upon cheaper imports from Zimbabwe and South Africa. The return of buoyancy to the world demand for copper, upon which Zambia depended for over 85% of its foreign exchange, coincided with the recovery of the main mineral rights from the British South African Company (BSA).

Later, between 1965 and 1975, other factors emerged to make manufacturing one of the most rapidly growing sectors. One of these, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Zimbabwe in 1965, added urgency to the import-substitution industrialisation programme and also to the effective degree of protection that local manufacturers obtained as import licensing progressively prevented the purchase of goods from Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The 1968-69 Mulungushi/Matero Economic Reforms

In a bid to indigenise control of Zambia's socio-economic destiny, President Kenneth Kaunda's government in 1968 announced it would place in state hands – i.e. nationalise – all vital industries from mining, transport, utilities, education and health to manufacturing. This came to be known as the 1968/69 Mulungushi/Matero Economic Reforms, and gave birth to Zambia's parastatal sector. Initially, the nationalisation involved government assumption of 51% ownership in about 25 firms.[3]

The 1968-69 nationalisations placed 80% of the Zambian economy under government control, largely through the giant Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). INDECO itself was later placed under a new holding conglomerate, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). The other 20% remained in private hands, hence the long-standing view of Zambia as a mixed economy. There is general agreement that in Zambia's case direct state participation in industry through INDECO brought about the establishment of a broader industrial base than could perhaps have been achieved under private enterprise alone. By the 1970s, domestic manufacturing was larger than that of other country in the sub-region except South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe.[4]

Reasons for Nationalisation

Among the major official reasons for the above nationalisation advanced by the government, four have received the widest coverage in the literature.[5] First, there was a desire to control the "commanding heights" of the economy with a view to dictating the pace and direction of development. Second, there was concern over the dominance of foreign investors and their lack of interest in re-investing in the Zambian economy as manifested by massive repatriation of profits.

President Kaunda was particularly concerned with what he called "our friends who have kept only one foot in Zambia in order to take advantage of the economic boom, the other in South Africa, Europe, India or wherever they come from, ready to jump when they have made enough money, or when they think that the country no longer suits them".[6]

Third, there was a desire to break up the monopoly pricing cartels, which were thriving at the expense of the Zambian people. Finally, there was a strong desire to indigenise the Zambian economy by promoting local entrepreneurs. The absence of indigenous entrepreneurs was initially to be made up for by the state's own involvement.

)R NOT? The case of Zambia

As the privatisation debate of state-owned enterprises in Africa rages on, **Binta Abubakar and Gerry Nkombo Muuka** focus on how Zambia is dealing with the issue.

Table 1: Reasons for Privatisation in Africa

Country	Reduce fiscal burden	Develop private sector	Broaden ownership	Increase economic efficiency	Reduce administrative burden	Develop capital market	Access markets, capital and technology	Raise revenue for treasury	Others
Benin	X				X				X
Burkina Faso	X	X							
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X					X		
Ghana	X	X		X	X				
Kenya	X	X	X						
Lesotho	X		X	X	X				
Nigeria	X				X	X			
Madagascar	X		X						
Mozambique	X	X		X	X	X	X		
Senegal	X							X	X
Tanzania	X	X	X			X	X		X
Togo	X	X	X						
Uganda	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Zambia	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Source: OC White and A Bhatia, *Privatisation in Africa*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1998, p 22.

It is vital to mention, at this point, that the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the re-opening of Zambia's southern route with the latter in 1978 brightened the future for the industrial sector in terms of easier and cheaper access to and from the sea – Zambia is a landlocked country. Coupled with other favourable factors such as good copper prices, import substitution spurred rapid growth in manufacturing in the period between 1964 and 1982. As Karmiloff points out, the pattern of manufacturing sub-sectoral growth was generally uniform in expanding to the watershed year of 1974, led by chemicals, plastics, and rubber, followed by metal products and other manufacturing.[7] Together these sub-sectors accounted for about 40% of total manufacturing output.

Further evidence of the important role of manufacturing in Zambia can be seen in the fact that, as of 1982, Zambia's manufacturing sector was large compared with that of other African countries, contributing over $600 million to Gross Domestic Product and employing nearly 60 000 workers.[8] The 18% share of manufacturing in GDP was higher than any other country except Zimbabwe; and only Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire had higher per capita GDP originating in manufacturing.

Furthermore, although Zambia ranked 19th among sub-Saharan African countries in population and 12th in total GDP, its manufacturing output ranked sixth. This high ranking can be attributed to a number of factors, including the huge demand generated by the local mining industry, the natural protection afforded by its land-locked position, and the pattern of industrialisation, with industrial production became increasingly diversified, moving from a predominance of consumer goods to a greater share of output in intermediate and capital goods and with increasing contributions from previously negligible branches of industry. A fourth reason was the high tariff levels and import licensing, with state-controlled enterprises receiving additional support from cross-subsidisation.[9]

Nationalisation-Inspired Rigidities

With the 1968-69 Mulungushi-Matero reforms, the Zambian government set itself the task of decentralising industrial location away from the line of rail towns from Livingstone to Mufulira; encouraging labour-intensive techniques of production and small-scale industries using domestic materials; and promoting import-substitution of intermediate products and essential consumer goods. But, as Karmiloff observes, these politically determined objectives were not realised for want of

feasible strategies to attain them.[10] Two fundamental issues were not addressed: how to develop an alternative source of financing new manufacturing investment, as opposed to the historical, copper-generated investment, and how to promote manufacturing activities that would be net earners of foreign exchange. Further industrial diversification was also discouraged by high exchange rates between convertible currencies and the Zambian Kwacha, as well as what Karmiloff calls the stringency of price and foreign-exchange controls.[11]

It is against the backdrop of such nationalisation-induced rigidities that parastatals have been criticised, and arguments made in favour of their privatisation. In the section that follows, we look at the general arguments in favour of privatising state-owned enterprises.

Why Privatise in Africa?

Table 1 summarises the official reasons advanced for privatisation in 14 of Africa's 53 countries. Although a reduction in the fiscal burden and development of the private sector are the two most prevalent reasons given, there are clear differences in some of the other motivations advanced.

White and Bhatia make the important point that the choice of enterprises for priority privatisation, the lack of transparency in some countries, the poor dissemination of information about the process and outcome of transactions, and failure to report on the actual use of proceeds suggest that governments in Africa have rarely adopted privatisation exclusively for the reasons publicly stated.[12] It is also true that privatisation objectives can and do change over time, in the face of new political and socio-economic realities.

Table 1 shows that objectives vary across countries but that all of the countries listed identified fiscal deficit reduction as a principal objective. Despite this, evidence suggests that the desire to reduce fiscal deficits has not prompted privatisation. If that had been the case, then priority would likely have been given to divesting the largest enterprises that are dependent on government support, principally the utilities and railways, which offer the greatest scope for improving economic efficiency.[13]

Evidence of this "strategic reluctance" can be seen in a number of countries, including Zambia. As of April 2002, Zambia Railways, the country's utility companies, such as Zambia Electricity and Supply Corporation (ZESCO), and the major telephone company (ZAMTEL) had not yet been privatised, despite the country's vigorous ten-year privatisation programme.

PHOTO: GUY STU

The Real Reasons for Privatisation in Africa

The accumulated knowledge and actual experience in Africa suggests the following as some of the real reasons for privatisation in Africa.

1 Political change

The "democracy wave" sweeping much of Africa needs no further elaboration. In Zambia, the 1991 change of government from Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) to trade unionist Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) saw a complete change in economic philosophy from a *dirigiste* (government-directed approaches to economic development), semi-commandist and socialist, but mixed economy, to Chiluba's strict adoption of, and adherence to, the Neoclassical Counter-revolution Model. The latter emphasises the beneficial role of free markets, open economies, and the privatisation of inefficient and wasteful public enterprises. [14]

Soon after assumption of office, Chiluba boldly declared that "...the SOE-subsidy honeymoon is over... selling soap and foodstuffs is none of my governments' business." In December 2001 Zambia elected Chiluba's successor, President Levy Mwanawasa, whose government is already having to deal with the thorny issue of the privatisation, and re-nationalisation, of one of the country's largest copper mines. Konkola Copper Mines (KCM). This was after Anglo-American PLC, the South African conglomerate that had bought the mine as part of Zambia's privatisation, announced they were pulling out of KCM for financial reasons. They found the mine to be unprofitable.

2 Pressure from International Financial Institutions

As the late World Bank Vice-President for Africa, Edward Jaycox, used to say, African governments approached the World Bank and IMF because their (economic) backs were against the wall: no chalk in classrooms, no medicines in hospitals, no implements and other requisites for the agricultural sector. In return for money borrowed by these governments to meet internal budgetary shortfalls and to address critical educational, health, and internal infrastructure needs, the Bank and IMF imposed structural adjustment programmes. One of the most vigorous of those conditionalities has been the insistence that African governments should privatise state-owned enterprises.

3 The precarious state of some public enterprises

There is evidence that the parastatal sector in Africa has not always performed effectively or efficiently. In Zambia's case, the need arose to halt cross-subsidisation among parastatal companies, a practice whereby profit-making SOEs propped up and supported the high employment levels and general inefficiency of loss-making SOEs via holding companies. Cross-subsidisation was usually facilitated by the holding company ZIMCO.

4 Nature of the Privatisation Process
These are the stages in the country's privatisation programme:

4.1 Selection of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to Privatise
A Divestiture Sequence Plan (DSP) is first prepared in accordance with Section 8 (2) (e) of the Zambian Privatisation Act of 1992. The DSP has to be approved by the Zambian Cabinet upon the recommendation of the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA), which is charged with carrying out Zambia's privatisation programme. The ZPA is an autonomous agency, whose function is to plan, implement and control the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, in cooperation with the government, by selling them off to those who are competent to run them and who have the required capital to do so.[15] The factors considered in sequencing the divestiture are the SOE's size in respect of sales volume and number of employees, the type of business (trading, agricultural, manufacturing, mining, etc.), the presence of minority shareholders, the perceived ease or difficulty of divestiture, and anticipated mode of privatisation.

4.2 Selection of Mode of Privatisation
The ZPA then recommends to Cabinet the most appropriate method of sale of each SOE to be privatised. The modes of privatisation specified in the Act include public offering of shares, private sales of shares through negotiated or competitive bids, offer of additional shares to dilute the state's shareholding, sale of selected assets, reorganisation or breakup of the SOE, management or employees of the SOEs offering to buy out the government's interest, lease and management contracts, and any other method ZPA considers appropriate.

4.3 Gazette Notice and Invitation to Participate
The names of SOEs are published in the Government Gazette, requesting any party with an interest (e.g. minority shareholding, pre-emptive right, creditor right, or any other legal right) in a SOE to register their claim with ZPA. These claims are taken into account in the sale process.

4.4 Pre-qualification
Potential investors submit an application to ZPA to pre-qualify as SOE bidders. They are provided with the pre-qualification procedures and criteria, an application and questionnaire appropriate to their legal status, a summary company profile on the SOEs in which they have expressed interest, and a confidentiality agreement. The intention of the application is to make an assessment of the investor's financial resources, management resources, and industrial and business experience, to eliminate inappropriate contenders and to make the process reasonably manageable from an administrative perspective.

Information on the SOEs is then compiled and provided to pre-qualified potential investors in a tender package. The package for each SOE consists of a set of tender instructions and a Confidential Information Memorandum. The CIM provides information about the SOE for due diligence investigations. Four to twelve weeks are allowed for this.

4.5 Receipt and Valuation of Bids
ZPA ensures that each SOE is sold for its market value. To assist ZPA in determining whether prices offered meet this standard, the valuation of SOEs is performed by independent valuers who issue a certificate of valuation. The SOEs are valued either as going concerns or as non-operating entities. ZPA also contracts specialised firms to provide certificates of valuation on the fixed assets of each SOE. This method is used for asset sales, as well as for residential properties, which are negotiated separately even when an SOE is sold on a going concern basis.

4.6 Short-listing
ZPA reviews the secretariat's bid evaluation reports and approves which bidders to short-list. Bidder's characteristics include managerial, technical and marketing expertise; financial stability; reputation and track record; Zambian nationality; existing shareholders with pre-emptive rights; and whether a management buyout or employee buyout is being contemplated. Short-listed bidders are invited to enter negotiations.

The remaining bidders are informed that their bids are unsuccessful or have been placed on a reserve list. Then ZPA forms special teams to negotiate the sale of each SOE. Negotiating teams include a team captain (someone not affiliated with ZPA) and a lawyer from a law firm. The ZPA Secretariat prepares a paper on negotiation strategies in respect of each SOE, as well as a checklist of items relative to negotiations in general. These are circulated to each negotiating team member.

4.7 Sales Agreement
Once negotiations are concluded, the sales agreement is reviewed by ZPA and submitted to the Attorney General for final review. Section 36 of the Act requires the Minister responsible for finance to sign the final sales agreement to transfer shares to the selected bid.

4.8 Gazette Notice on Privatisation
Finally, once an SOE is privatised, ZPA publishes in the Gazette the names of bidders and bid prices, the successful bidders and reasons for their selection, the price of shares and any other special conditions of the sale of shares.

Criticisms of SOEs and the Case for Privatisation
As a definition, privatisation describes a range of different policy initiatives designed to alter the balance between the public and private sectors, whether it is referred to as de-parastatalisation, de-subsidisation, de-nationalisation, divestiture, or de-monopolisation of SOEs.[16] A change in the ownership of an enterprise from the public to the private sector is the most common form. The following are some of the strongest general arguments against SOEs, and for privatisation.

Firstly, privatisation, in its various forms, is likely to play a role in packages of economic reform in those developing countries such as Zambia whose economies are highly state-dominated, and where there are clear failures of policy design (for exam-

> **If public enterprises are to play a constructive role in economic development, features such as the widespread tolerance of inefficiency and corruption clearly have to be tackled**

ple, on the public-private mix) and of implementation (inefficiency and/or corruption).[17] In some developing countries, the nature of the political system generates additional features which are not only undesirable in themselves but also obstruct policy reform. Public enterprises can become the vehicle for corruption of various forms: embezzlement and bribery for personal aggrandisement, often at the expense of aid-financed projects; the development of cronyism through patronage at high levels; the siphoning-off of money and resources for party, political or factional purposes; and the packing of public enterprises at lower levels with supporters of the ruling political party, however unqualified they are and without regard for genuine manpower requirements.

Table 2: Zambia's Privatisation Programme

	Number	Percentage
Privatised:	252	
Negotiations Complete:	5	
Heads of Agreement:	0	
Companies/Units Privatised:	257	91.8%
Companies Ready/Under Negotiation:		0.4%
Companies Under Preparation:	22	7.8%
New GRZ Policy Guidelines:	0	
Total Working Portfolio	280	100%

Source: Zambia Privatisation Agency, Status Report as at 31st December 2001, Lusaka: ZPA, 2002.

Table 3: Modes of Privatisation in Zambia

Privatisation Method	No of Companies	Percentage %
Competitive Tender	123	54.5
Lease by way of Competitive Tender	36	15.9
Preemptive Minority Rights	17	7.6
Handed back to Previous Owners	14	6.3
Management Buyouts (MBOs)	10	4.4
Asset Sale	5	2.3
Company Closed and Wound Up	4	1.8
Privatised for not being in Operation	4	1.8
Competitive Tender and later MBO by Cabinet Decision	3	1.3
Lease by way of Right of First Refusal	2	0.9
Voluntary Liquidation	1	0.4
Industry Promotion Arrangement	1	0.4
Mortgaged to Financial Institution	1	0.4
Employee Buyout	1	0.4
Preemptive Rights and Competitive Tender	1	0.4
Shareholding Dilution	1	0.4
Public Flotation	1	0.4
Privatised Through Joint Venture	1	0.4
Total	226	100%

Source: Compiled from details contained in ZPA Progress Report, no 15, for the period 1st July 1999 to 31st December, 1999. Reflects details for 226 out of 257 privatised companies.

Heald argues that if public enterprises are to play a constructive role in economic development, features such as the widespread tolerance of inefficiency and corruption clearly have to be tackled.[18] Otherwise there will be significant rethinking about the role which actual, rather than idealised, SOEs can play.

Moreover, by selling assets, the government "cashes in" the future income they generate, just as an investor will sell a stock certificate for a price based on its anticipated income. Butler is of the view that privatisation does more than this.[19] Such sales, he argues, are more likely to yield a better price than the present value of the government's probable income from the asset. The reason is that managers of publicly owned assets are subject to constant political and budget constraints. They also lack the positive incentives influencing private sector managers as they are often hamstrung in their decision-making by political realities.

An overriding factor leading to privatisation is cost: the competitive market may provide routine services more cheaply than a government department. De-monopolisation or deregulation may lead to more competition, lower prices, improved customer services and choice, and may cut the government budget by reducing the need for government provision of a service. Butler, and Heller and Schiller argue that, in addition, this form of privatisation hastens technological change in the previously cartelised industries, and bolsters the competitiveness and efficiency of the economy as a whole.[20]

This is because industries experiencing deregulation get thoroughly shaken up, with the result that their efficiency and ability to respond quickly to changing technologies and customer preferences improve substantially. The process can be painful for many established companies that depend on regulation for guaranteed markets.

By liberalising price controls and permitting competition, the deregulation revolution can also allow entrepreneurs to find the most profitable ways of serving customers. Proponents of SOE-reforms argue that public ownership obstructs liberalisation reforms, and that private ownership will help facilitate their implementation. They argue that governments support SOEs for socio-political ends, and that this leads to various costly subsidies.

In a comprehensive report on the regeneration of Tanzanian industry, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) observed that in a world increasingly dominated by accelerating rates of technical change, shorter product life-cycles and rising research and development costs per unit of output, the policy issue for Africa becomes the capacity of public enterprises to adopt and adapt imported technology. UNIDO doubts that African SOEs in their present form can be effective innovators as they are so often net consumers of state revenues.[21] A critical constraint on the development of innovative capacity, the report argues, is the non-availability of high-level scientific and engineering manpower. Once state enterprises are locked into a downward spiral based on insufficient working capital and rates of re-investment, low capacity utilisation and over-manning, they inevitably have difficulty in rewarding their high-level manpower sufficiently to retain them.

Heller and Schiller advance two further arguments, suggesting that privatisation can reduce the productive inefficiencies arising from public ownership and management.[22] First, they argue, by reducing the frequently high degree of political interference in public enterprise operations, privatisation can improve the quality of managerial decision-making. Second, by making managers responsible to profit-seeking shareholders rather than civil servants, privatisation may further improve managerial incentives.

When a state firm runs losses that take government funds away from critical national needs, it could also make sense for government to "give" the firm to its employees, on the grounds that the workers would have an incentive to cut costs and improve efficiency. Moreover, such "worker control" could be politically attractive in countries trying to combine free enterprise with a collective ideology.[23] The World Bank sees improvements in the economic environment of Third World countries as an essential component of any strategy for private-sector development. Its policy-based lending has placed increased emphasis on policies designed to ensure efficiency and competitiveness of the private sector and the economy as a whole. The World Bank argues that improvement should not only take place through macro-economic and sector policy reform, but also through legal and regulatory reforms (most notably cuts in red tape and the streamlining of regulations), revisions in commercial codes, and reform of investment and export rules and incentives.[24]

World Bank-initiated SAPs increasingly support programme-country policy, regulations, and legal reforms directed

specifically at improving the environment for private-sector development. Removal of barriers to entry and exit, revisions in labour laws to reduce distortions and the excessive costs of job creation, simplification and improvement of the tax system to make it more transparent and less distortionary, changing titling laws and procedures to make it easier to establish property rights, improving antitrust legislation, streamlining procedures for registering and licensing businesses, reducing the role of public monopolies, improving business accounting and auditing practices, strengthening governments' capacity to regulate, and encouraging competition and initiative are all high on the World Bank's menu. In addition, SAP countries are being told to address the barriers and constraints facing foreign investors in their respective countries.

Figure 1: Privatisation Methods Applied in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: White and Bhatia 1998, p 74.

Privatisation: Methods and Progress

This section addresses the dual questions of what methods of privatisation have been employed in Africa so far, and the extent of privatisation initiatives. White and Bhatia point out that of the 2 689 reported privatisation transactions in Africa that took place between 1988 and the end of 1996, 1 891 (just over 2/3) were concentrated in ten countries: Mozambique, Angola, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Guinea, Madagascar, Nigeria, and Uganda.[25]

By December 1996, 16 methods of privatisation had been employed in Africa, with 32% of all transactions involving the sale of shares by competitive tender. Figure 1 summarises these privatisation methods, while Tables 2 and 3 go into some detail regarding the latest privatisation figures in Zambia and the modes of privatisation used in that country.

Of the companies privatised by the end of 2001, the majority (54.5%) were sold via competitive tender. This is much larger than the 32% prevalence of the competitive tender method among African countries in general. ZPA makes it clear that the method used for offering shares depends on the type of company for sale.[26] For example, smaller companies to be sold as a single entity will go under public tender, while larger complex organisations may be publicly floated. Other options include the Management Buy Out system, which gives option of sale to management staff that may or may not work with other partners to secure ownership. The establishment of the Privatisation Trust Fund has also opened the doors to ordinary Zambians to own shares and invest in enterprises being privatised through the buying of shares on the stock exchange.

General Criticisms against Privatisation of SOEs

Firstly, the privatisation issue does touch on certain political imperatives, in practice. It may prove politically infeasible to privatise even the most wasteful SOEs and programmes. The reason, as Butler makes clear, is that a tight coalition forms around such programmes, that favours government control.[27]

This coalition may consist of beneficiaries, those who service these beneficiaries, the political and bureaucratic constituencies whose careers depend on the programmes' existence, organised labour, and civil servants. When a programme is challenged, therefore, this coalition has a strong vested interest in preserving it in the public sector. It may not be possible to completely eliminate such programmes.

Secondly, there is debate on a whole range of issues regarding foreign investment in less developed countries, so that placing the issue this side of the privatisation debate is by no means conclusive. And, because the conditionalities on privatisation do not preclude (indeed encourage) foreign investment in the public offerings, this merits at least passing comment.

The issue arises in a number of variants: in the context of debt-equity swaps; in the context of proposals for joint ventures between SOEs and foreign enterprises; and in the context of proposals for portfolio investment by foreigners.[28]

A principal problem with foreign direct investment (FDI) particularly germane to import-substituting industries is that domestic markets are often so highly protected as to offer the foreigner the opportunity for monopoly profits. Another is that profits may be siphoned off through transfer prices.

Moreover, when profits are repatriated they may constitute a drain on the economy that exceeds the value of the technology and capital provided by the foreigner. The transfer pricing problem is also applicable to export industries where, as Vernon observes, inputs to the subsidiary and exports by the subsidiary may be priced at levels that generate a net drain on the economy.[29] In addition, the reluctance, on the part of proponents of privatisation, to recognise the non-economic goals of SOEs is significant. It is indeed true that, in the Third World, the reasons for creating public sectors were not only economic, but, equally importantly, social and political. Burki has suggested four sets of circumstances that have led governments to set up public enterprises in various parts of the economy:

i Public enterprises have followed revolutions; once revolutions were successfully concluded, there was the need to transfer ownership of various types of capital from private to public control. In these revolutionary situations, public

sector enterprises operate in economies that are centrally managed.

ii In the case of "partial revolutions", when a deep change is brought about in society, some parts of the economy are transferred to public control largely on the grounds of equity and/or exercise of political control.

iii Public enterprises may be established to move capital into areas where the private sector is afraid to venture, but that are politically important. A number of SOEs have in this way had important beneficial consequences for the private sector: they were able to provide the private firms that followed them with trained manpower, and they often introduced technologies which, because of their expense, would not have interested private entrepreneurs. In other words, in many situations SOEs helped modernize the industrial and commercial sectors, as in Zambia.

iv Finally, public enterprises may be set up when the managerial and entrepreneurial capacity is so weak that, left to itself, the private sector would not enter into very many activities. This is best illustrated by the case of post-colonial Africa, when the only way of assuming control of the enterprises relinquished by the colonialists was to have them transferred to public ownership. It was not politically feasible to keep ex-colonialists active in the economy, as the case of Zambia indicates.[30]

Thus, public ownership *per se* does not lead to poor performance, in the same way that private sector ownership is no guarantee of good performance. Indeed, unsatisfactory performance under public ownership may be apparent, but leaping from this point to a conclusion that private owners cannot do worse is hardly a serious argument.[31] There are examples of success stories in both sectors, as well as miserable failures. The determinants of a firm's success or failure, argue Wortzel and Wortzel, are not who owns it:

...rather, the firm's success or failure is a function of to what extent, and in what direction its owners exercise the authority that comes with ownership and its managers carry out their jobs. Simply stated, enterprise success, regardless of ownership, is a matter of developing a strong, appropriate culture within the firm, of hiring the right managers and seeing that there are appropriate control and motivation mechanisms in place to properly guide their behaviour.[32]

Addressing the ownership question, the UNIDO report concurs with the view that it takes much more to improve efficiency than mere conversion of a public monopoly into what might well become a private monopoly.[33] Unfortunately, Africa's economies are usually oligopolistic in structure and heavily protected, a situation that poses a dilemma for economic policy advisers.

Private buyers may need "sweeteners" in the form of protection from competing imports or tax breaks to entice them to invest in ailing SOEs. And therein lies the problem: that the ensuing protection may well create a policy environment in which private investors have no more interest in economic efficiency than had their predecessors.

Some critics of privatisation have also argued that its impact is likely to weigh disproportionately on certain groups of the population, and that these groups will typically be the relatively underprivileged in society.[34]

The potential distributional impact of privatisation is twofold. First, SOE-employees may be affected if, subsequent to privatisation, the firm goes bankrupt, government operating subsidies decrease, or there are layoffs by the new owner.

Second, the poor and vulnerable will be affected if the goods and services provided by the SOE become less accessible to them. SOEs providing social services of a public-good nature such as transportation, health and education may service groups which a private sector provider may not find sufficiently profitable.

Post-Privatisation Experience: The Case of Zambia Breweries PLC

In the October 1991 Presidential elections in Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda's 27 years in power came to an end. The new government, led by trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, made a major ideological shift in which they argued, among other things, that "the business of our government is not to govern business". And so began perhaps the most aggressive privatisation programme ever seen in Africa. As of January 2001, the Zambian privatisation program was almost complete, save for a few public utilities.

A glimpse is provided of Zambia's post-privatisation experience by looking at the case of Zambia Breweries. It should be noted, however, that this may well be atypical of privatised SOEs in Zambia, by its very nature.

Zambia Breweries had a monopoly over bottled beer in Zambia. It was 75% state owned (via ZIMCO, the parastatal holding company) with a 25% minority shareholding by Anglo-American Corporation. At the time of its privatisation in August 1991, the brewery was split into two companies.

Zambia Breweries remains the principal supplier of bottled lager beer (as opposed to traditional African beer) to the domestic market. The new company is 45% owned by Anglo-American; 45% by Indol international (the South African Breweries holding company), and 10% by the Zambia Trust Fund which placed these shares on the Lusaka Stock Exchange.

Liberalisation under the Structural Adjustment Programme has allowed some new entrants to the main domestic market, e.g. Namibia Breweries. However, a combination of cost advantage for locally produced beer and the fact that the potential foreign competitor is a major shareholder in Zambia Breweries has left the company in a dominant position.

Cost data supplied by Zambia Breweries for the nine months to the end of 1995 compared to the five months prior to privatisation suggest a small decrease (4%) in production costs per unit of output. According to Zambia Breweries, labour costs were some 10% of operating costs in 1995. Turnover in volume terms fell just before privatisation, remained depressed during 1994 but regained 1993 levels by 1995, the latest date for which data on the company was available.

According to senior management the principal cause of the reduction was the uncertainty and fear of job losses that preceded privatisation. Productivity has risen steadily since privatisation. This partly reflects the removal of "dead-wood" as total employment has fallen from 690 at privatisation to around 550 post-privatisation, while turnover has regained its pre-privatisation level. However, the productivity of remaining staff has also increased, for a range of reasons.

No retrenchment has taken place but a combination of voluntary retirement, deaths and resignations has reduced managerial employment. New job responsibilities have been introduced for managers, resulting both in greater autonomy and faster decision taking.

Prior to privatisation, decisions on operating issues such as the price of beer had to be referred to the ZIMCO Board. While managers work the same hours as previously, they believe they are working harder and, assisted by a newly introduced management information system, more effectively and efficiently. Management responsibilities have certainly become more focused on commercial issues post-privatisation in contrast to the paternalistic role of management under state ownership.

Previously, for example, in the event of the death of a worker or family member, managers had to organise the coffin and help an employee arrange food and drinks for the gathering at the funeral. Now the company simply pays a fixed funeral fee.

Real wages for all grades have remained broadly comparable to pre-privatisation levels, as wage increases have been based on the consumer price index. The way in which basic pay is calculated has also changed little, with the majority of staff (65%) remaining on union collective agreements and the remainder having personal contracts with clearly specified pay scales. Profit-related incentives were introduced for senior management but due to difficult market conditions it was impossible to meet the profit targets. Consequently, this was withdrawn and a new system of bonuses for senior managers is planned for the future.

The major change in the pay package has been the consolidation of allowances. Prior to privatisation, staff (particularly managers) were entitled to a large number of allowances ranging from transport to Christmas beer. Their value often exceeded their basic salary. Consolidation has resulted in a small number of basic allowances with a similar real value to those previously received. This has reduced the administration cost associated with allowances but has not led to an increase in basic salaries.

Conclusions

Developing countries like many in Africa need to look beyond SAPs for restructuring their economies, i.e. adopting such objectives as raising the level of income, employment, industralisation, and export activities for its people. Governments in developing countries need to develop national economic plans designed democratically to expand the domestic financial resource base, incomes and markets, and consequently reduce their extreme dependence on foreign debt.

The International Monetary Fund warns that with the threat of recession over, the western world needs to focus on tackling the structural imbalances that threaten future world economic growth, and this is even more urgent for developing countries.[35] If developing countries in Africa are to benefit from exposure to the international global market, they will need to identify and develop niche markets in which their levels of technology, nature of resource endowment and policy formulation and implementation capabilities make them viable operators.[36]

The IMF declares bluntly that in countries where recovery is most advanced, attention will need to turn towards reversing earlier monetary policy easing. There is a need for African managers to act decisively to rebuild investor confidence in their countries. The World Trade Organisation also has a role to play, with its latest trade round needing to focus above all on reducing the barriers to exports from developing countries particularly in agriculture, textiles and clothing.

An attempt has been made to address African privatisation experiences, and specifically the experience of Zambia, from the standpoint of why they privatised, what has been the nature of their privatisation programmes, and what forms and methods of privatisation have been employed. It is worth mentioning here that there are numerous examples of cases where privatisation has its limitations and has failed in Zambia, especially in the mines and manufacturing sector.

The growing concern of privatisation reducing manufacturers and their livelihood to a shadow of its former self does make matters complicated. However, these are areas for possible future research in this field. It is also certainly true to suggest that more and broader studies of post-privatisation experiences in Africa need to be carried out if a firmer grip is to be obtained of the realities, challenges and potentials of privatisation on the continent.

Binta Abubakar is with the Swinburne University of Technology. Gerry Nkombo Muuka is with the Murray State University, Kentucky, USA.

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Globalisation, social values and human rights NGOs in

NIGERIA

Globalisation has brought new levels of human rights awareness to Nigeria - but in many other ways, it may be more of a curse than a blessing. By Edlyne E. Anugwom

Globalisation as a social phenomenon has assumed a compelling dimension in the last decade. In this sense, it has been seen as the variable underlying most efforts towards development, especially in the developing nations. The massive spread of globalisation and globalising influences has removed the boundaries between nations and aided the spread of values from one end of the globe to the other. In spite of the ubiquity of this phenomenon, African countries have as usual been seen as late starters. Therefore, the idea of the unevenness of globalisation is often used in describing the experience of African countries in this regard.

Globalisation as a process involves a grand or widespread social change across national boundaries. In other words, it is a socio-political and economic process of change, interchange and interaction between various nations.[1] The phenomenon of globalisation in this context should be seen as narrowing the socio-geographic boundaries between nations.

Thus, globalisation is significant in view of the impact it has on spatial reality, largely through decreasing the distances between places. The impact of globalisation in this regard has been made possible by the tremendous improvements in information technologies as well as the dominance of a development orthodoxy supportive of this process of intense interaction and deepening of relations on a global scale.

Opinions differ as to the benefits of this increased scope of interaction. A view that is somewhat accepted in the corridors of the international financial institution and multinational concerns and their sympathisers argues that globalisation can generate genuine economic growth and development, and thus provide a better quality of life for a larger number of people.[2] However, some radical scholars like Ghai see globalisation as worsening economic inequalities and further entrenching the domination of the developed nations.[3] In fact, this argument had been taken further to depict globalisation as implying the hegemony of capitalism and the triumph of imperialism.[4]

However, the crucial fact is that globalisation has affected almost all spheres of life in the developing nations. This includes not only the tangible aspects of life but also the attitudes and values of people in the world. The influence of globalisation has therefore affected the value orientation of people and how they respond to things in their socio-political environment. For this reason, it may be instructive to pinpoint the influence of globalisation on social values in a country such as Nigeria. What dominant social values have been affected by globalisation, and how has globalisation structured such values in Nigeria?

It is important to realise that globalisation is a largely contradictory phenomenon. Thus, while preaching some consensus it gives vent to dissension. In fact, Cerny underlines this point by arguing that globalisation is a much contested concept.[5] Globalisation all the same aids the spread of influences from the West or developed countries to other regions of the world.

The advent or prominence of globalisation in Nigeria can be dated back to the mid-1980s, following the introduction of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). This was the era of liberalisation and privatisation, when massive influences and pressures from the West permeated the otherwise repressed Nigerian

O: GUY STUBBS

society, suffering after years of military mismanagement. It was also this period that boosted the spread of ideas of human rights, human dignity, and democracy.

It is against this background that I attempt in this paper to ascertain the influence of globalisation on social values, focusing specifically on the human rights non-government organisations in Nigeria. In other words, this study seeks to establish a relationship between globalisation and the phenomenal growth of human rights NGOs in the past 15 years in Nigeria. The study makes use of a combination of documentary and questionnaire methods in describing a sample of 14 human rights NGOs in Nigeria.

Clarification of concepts

Globalisation, as I have already hinted, is a highly contested term. This mires its usage in both policy and academic circles in controversy. The idea of globalisation ordinarily implies the notion of a unified world or what political scientists would probably label a uni-polar world. In other words, the idea of globalisation derives from the much older notions of the global and globalising.

Despite this, globalisation as used in contemporary discourse denotes more than the mere notion of a world that is coming together or exchanges and flows between nations of the world. Used in this sense, globalisation has only been around for about two and a half decades. It is therefore unsurprising that Mittelman sees globalisation as the key to understanding contemporary international political economy.[6]

Be that as it may, the novelty of globalisation should be evaluated primarily in terms of the alarming widening of scope of interaction between different nations. Globalisation has under-

mined the physical constraint imposed on interaction and exchange between different nations.

Accordingly, globalisation is not necessarily about the absence or dissolution of physical boundaries between nations but about the reduction of these barriers and the opening up of new spaces and new times with new boundaries. The impact of globalisation in this regard has been made possible by the tremendous growth in technologies, especially in the areas of information, general communication and finance that have virtually merged hitherto distinct boundaries.

In this technology-driven age, boundaries are becoming less relevant in terms of interaction, flow of goods and services and communication between different interests in different countries. The era of globalisation and its dominance has been boosted equally by the existence of a development orthodoxy (and this is crucial in the case of the developing countries) that has linked development and economic development to international interaction or trade. In this regard, it is argued that the opening up of national boundaries principally through a regime of liberalisation would ultimately guarantee the development of the developing countries of the world and reduce poverty worldwide.

This orthodoxy, that has a compelling finality, posits that apart from this route, there is no hope for the developing countries. The orthodoxy of globalisation-driven development (for want of a better name) has been championed by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), who see it as a reliable blueprint for development.[7] In spite of the spate of criticisms levelled against the WTO's role in this regard in the developing world, the orthodoxy has been seen as particularly useful to the developing world.[8]

Globalisation as both a process and a concept has drawn a variety of reactions from scholars. These reactions vary along the continuum of myth and reality. Hence, some writers have seen globalisation as more of a vague expression and a fad that will fade with time, and which represents essentially nothing new or distinct.[9] In contrast, there are those who see globalisation as denoting something novel and distinct both in contemporary development discourse and in relationships between nations of the world.[10]

This paper adopts the perspective of the latter, seeing globalisation as expressing a distinct and new phase in the continuing interaction between nations. In this regard, I share the view of Held and McGrew that globalisation should be conceived of as having two interrelated dimensions: both the increasing scope and heightening intensity of interaction between nations.[11] Therefore, the novelty of globalisation can be conceived in the new scope and degree of intensity that characterise it. In this light, globalisation can also be seen as creating new cultural and social values.[12]

However, apart from technology the role of the international financial institutions and the WTO has been instrumental in spreading globalisation in the developing regions. Also, capital has been the pivotal mark of globalisation in these regions, particularly Africa. The role of capitalism in the globalisation enterprise has drawn the criticism of scholars and led to the notion that globalisation represents more than anything else the triumph of capitalism or the expansion of capitalist hegemony in Africa, especially since the advent of SAPs.[13] The capitalist expansion under globalisation has often obscured the much more fundamental impact of the process on cultural and social values and images all over the world. To fully appreciate this fact, it may be in order to interrogate the meaning of the concept of social values.

According to Nwabuisi, social values can be seen as ends, not means, and their desirability is either unconsciously taken for granted or seen as a direct derivation from one's experience of some external authority. In this sense, values are closely related to attitudes, informing our affinity or dislike for situations, events

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and persons in our environment. But more than this, social values inform our general attitudes. It is also crucial to see values as a type of belief centrally located within one's belief system.[14] Implied in this idea is that social values are products or properties of the social group that informs the attitudes and behaviour of individuals in the group. As Williams has effectively demonstrated, values are abstractions from the individual's and group's immediate experience.[15]

What is really significant is that our attitude to situations and challenges in our environment is determined by our values. However, values are of different orders of importance, with some seen as more fundamental than others. For instance, in the traditional African society the freedom of the individual and human life were of a high value. Thus, the taking of life in such societies was punished with severe penalties including banishment. This is also related to the fact that banishment or exile was the greatest infringement of human freedom and could only be used for severe crimes.

Furthermore, Eyo has made an insightful distinction between negative and positive values.[16] Positive values that are cherished by the group are beliefs about what objects and actions

are good and desirable, and what ought to be, while negative values refer to beliefs about what objects and actions are bad and undesirable, and therefore ought not to be. This distinction is very important in the context of this paper.

Thus, the human rights of members of society or the creation of a society where individual rights are guaranteed can be seen as based on beliefs about positive values that contribute to the well-being and growth of that society. In this connection, it should be understood that Western education and formal government have impacted on traditional Nigerian values.[17]

The respect for individual freedom that characterised traditional African society became mitigated as individuals surrendered their authority to a central government that, in the case of Nigeria, and especially during the long reign of the military, violated this trust and infringed on the rights of the individual at every turn. The notorious violation of human rights by the military in Nigeria was driven by the selfish need to use repression as a tool to perpetuate power.

Globalisation, social values and human rights

The impact of globalisation on the human rights scene in Nigeria can be seen in terms of creating both the awareness and support for a determined bid by civil society for a return to a society marked by the guarantee of the freedom of the individual. This globalisation was able to achieve through its impact on culture and social identities around the world. Particularly of significance is the influence of the media and new information technologies that have consistently put across an image of a world in which human rights are taken for granted.

The main source of this influence is from the West, which prides itself on having a social environment with no constraints on the freedom and rights of individuals. Its is important to understand at this point that the guarantee of individual rights is related to the idea of liberalism and the free flow of goods and ideas from one end of the world to another that is the cornerstone of globalisation.

In the words of Sawyer, "given the essentially unidirectional flow of images and information, a strong tendency towards homogenization of culture and thinking has become manifest".[18] This is really the basis of any argument on the impact of globalisation on social values. Liberalisation viewed in this way has informed the massive spread of human rights support and ideologies from one end of the globe to the other, including Nigeria. The media, as I have pointed out, has been the conduit of these global social values and identities. In fact, Rosow goes as far as arguing that globalisation is produced within the new media and popular culture.[19]

> It is a fact that the mass media play a big role, not only in the process of globalisation but in moulding values as well as the ways existing values are interpreted and used as the basis of action and interaction by members of society. The influence of the mass media in this case can be expected to be massive in the developing societies where some of the programmes of the media are not only novel but also attractive to the general public.[20]

More than this, as Robertson has succinctly argued, globalisation has created a cultural process in which people's perception of themselves as subjects or citizens of a particular nation is undermined by the crystallisation and dissemination of global images and identities. In this sense, one can talk about cultural globalisation or a situation where people's ideas and attitudes as well as reactions to obviously domestic situations are influenced by global images.

But even in this process of unification, globalisation has been seen as creating a global village that is not just characterised by a unified culture but an intensely speeded up world in which cultural fragmentation is seen as undermining all grand narratives and socio-political projects from below rather than from above.

This means essentially that globalisation, apart from a cultural unification, also decomposes individual cultures and obstructs the construction of a consistent universal cultural image or identity. But this obviously does not seriously contest the reality that even in the process of both unification and fragmentation pulling in different directions, some crucial uniform social values become consistently related to a liberal globalised world.

This is the context in which I locate the relationship between globalisation and social values or human rights in Nigeria. This is especially plausible when its is recognised that globalisation even in the promises of a better tomorrow has created marginalised individuals especially in the economic and political spheres. Globalisation, according to Cerny, creates an enterprise state.[21] This erodes the social embeddedness of the state and leads to a ruthless triumph of economic rationality.

In response to this situation, some groups will arise, ironically drawing impetus also from globalisation to try to alleviate the impersonal acts of the state and safeguard the rights and privileges of the individual in the face of such an affront. It is mainly in this guise that I see the human rights project in contemporary Nigeria. Therefore, the strong emergence of human rights associations in the period of globalisation in Nigeria can be viewed as a positive social value resulting largely from the culture of liberalism, freedom and democracy characterising the era.

Globalisation and human rights NGOs in Nigeria

Human rights agitations in Nigeria, that peaked in the 1990s, can be seen as representing positive values spawned largely by globalisation influences. The emphasis on liberalisation, democracy and freedom is one aspect of the globalising trend across the world. Against this background, I set out to discover how much of an impetus the human rights NGOs draw from the international arena.

In the case of Nigeria, the globalisation project became prominent in the late 1980s following the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), that was the flagship of globalisation in most of Africa. The human rights associations in Nigeria can be perceived as organisations that arose largely out of the desire to achieve the human rights agenda of the United Nations recognised all over the developed world. These associa-

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tions, which are mainly NGOs, recruit their members from and depend on the larger society, international human rights NGOs, international development agencies, the UN, governments of the developed countries and so on.

The human rights agenda can be broadly located within the Declaration of Human Rights. However, as Mutua observes, the regional African human rights system is also based on the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, otherwise known as the Banjul Charter, which came into effect in 1986.[22]

Mutua characterises the African Charter as an innovative human rights document, which departs substantially from the narrow formulations of other regional and human rights instruments. It weaves a tapestry that includes the three generations of

rights: civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and group and people's rights. With this as background, my examination of the relationship between globalisation and the human rights NGOs in Nigeria will focus on the external influences since the mid-1980s that have shaped the human rights environment in the country.

Table 1 shows that most human rights organisations do not predate globalisation in Nigeria, but rather the other way round. Moreover, the majority of these organisations were founded in the early 1990s, which coincides with the wave of international indignation over human rights atrocities in the country. Therefore, these organisations arose out of the favourable coincidence between domestic turmoil and international responses to it. Given the military dictatorship then in power in Nigeria and the impossibility of getting directly involved, many international agencies and countries saw the use of NGOs operated by local people as a reasonable means of negotiating the domestic situation and maintaining some presence as well as creating in the process the much desired peaceful and stable environment for economic activities by international interests.

A look at activities of some of these NGOs reveals that apart from covering the gamut of human rights issues, they also concern themselves with matters that hitherto were not of much importance to Nigerians. A global wave of human rights awareness directed at the developing world helped in waking up Nigerians to the reality of human rights.

For instance, before the emergence of PRAWA, most prisoners and their families were unaware of the extent of the rights a prisoner was entitled to and the fact that prisoners are supposed to be treated as human beings. These organisations also got involved in such 'novelties' as women's rights and empowerment, youth rights, legal advocacy, and so on, that were previously considered Western practices. All the same, the role of external influences in the emergence of these organisations and the cultivation of values conducive to their growth by Nigerians cannot really be over-emphasised.

Table 2 reveals that these NGOs depend to a large extent on external sources for funding. Such external funds come under different guises, including donations, grants, aid and sponsorship. The most important fact is that these external sources of finance are instrumental in the realisation of the objectives of these associations. However, most of the funds are tied to specific projects or activities of the NGOs. This is especially the case when it comes to sponsorships.

But it is necessary to state here that human rights activism, especially in the developing world, depends heavily on external funding. This results directly from the poor state of the economies and the anti-human rights posture of some governments on the continent in the past two decades.

It is also fair to note that some of the NGOs in Nigeria drive substantial funds from internal sources, and hardly any of them now depend exclusively on external funding. Thus, some make money from membership dues, while others make money from charity or the sale of products. All the same, the external sources of funding remain a vital and significant part of the funding mix for most NGOs.

Table 3 reveals the international organisation to which the various Nigerian NGOs are affiliated. It should be noted here that most of the human rights NGOs were reluctant to divulge their international affiliations. Quite a number raised the legality of the question, arguing that affiliation is quite different from collaboration. This point was conceded, but they were still uncomfortable with the question. However, based on what data could be found, the table shows that the majority of the organisations are affiliat-

Table 1: Distribution of organisations by year founded and major activity

Organisation	Year founded	Activity
Shelter Rights Initiative (SRI)	1995	Socio-economic
Human Rights Law Service (HURI-LAWS)	1997	Legal rights
Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA)	1994	Penal reform
Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEE)	1998	Education; legal rights
Media Rights Agenda (MRA)	1993	Press freedom
Good Shepherd Community (GSC)	1993	Penal rights
Constitutional Rights Project (CRP)	1990	General rights education
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR)	1989	Advocacy
Legal Research and Resource Development Centre (LRRDC)	1990	Education; legal rights
Women Law and Enforcement Centre Nigeria (WLDCN)	1992	Women's rights
Committee for the Protection of People's Dignity (COPPED)	1995	Youth rights
Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO)	1987	All rights
Universal Defenders of Democracy (UDD)	1992	Democratic rights
Centre for Development and Civic Education (CDCE)	1997	Civic rights
Human Rights Agenda (HRA)	1988	All rights

Source: Author's fieldwork.

Table 2: Distribution of organisations by source of funding

Organisation	Source of Funding
SRI	Grants / donations
HURI-LAWS	Not available
PRAWA	External / internal
CLEE	External
MRA	Donor / international agencies
GSC	Charity
CRP	External / internal
CDHR	External / internal
LRRDC	Grants / internal
WLDCN	External / internal
COPPED	Donations, grants and dues
CLO	External / internal
UDD	Sponsorship / membership
CDCE	External / internal
HRA	Grants

Source: Author's fieldwork.

Table 3: Distribution of organisations by peak year and external affiliation

Organisation	Peak Year	Affiliation
SRI	1998	Habitat International
HURI-LAWS	1997/8	-
PRAWA	1999	PRI, London
CLEE	1998	OMIT
MRA	1999	Article 19, London
GSC	1993 and beyond	Ashoka, New York
CRP	1990s	-
CDHR	1993-99	-
LRRDC	1992 and beyond	ICJ
WLDCN	1997-2000	Various; at least six
COPPED	1998	Youths for Environ. Sanity
CLO	1989/90	Amnesty International
UDD	mid-1990s	Various
CDCE	1999	-
HRA	1991	GERDES Afrique

Source: Author's fieldwork

ed to international associations in various parts of the developed world. This affiliation is important to their development and growth, as affiliation tends to guarantee funding, logistical support, networking, sponsorships and training, all of which are key capacity variables in human rights NGOs.

In addition, the table shows that the activities of these organisation peaked between 1997 and 1999. This is to be expected since this period was the most crucial in Nigeria's socio-political history in contemporary times. The period tallies with the height of the pro-democracy and human rights campaigns, which culminated in the eventual introduction of a democratic government. The human rights organisations, usually working in loose coalitions, were in the forefront of the democratic struggle.

This period also witnessed massive support from the international community for the activities of these organisations. Apart from any genuine altruistic motive, the international community was fed up with the atrocities and unpredictability of the military in Nigeria.

In the view of the organisations studied, three main factors account for the huge increase in human rights NGOs in Nigeria. These factors are the authoritarian and oppressive military regime, the unprecedented human rights violations, and pressure from the international community both within and outside Nigeria. In fact, these three factors came up in almost all of the interviews with the NGOs studied as being responsible for the proliferation of human rights associations in the country.

The NGOs also pointed out that considerable changes have taken place in the organisations themselves, especially in terms of their strategies, over the last three years. They see themselves as having expanded in scope, recognition (nationally and internationally), and in networking, among other things. In addition, a few mentioned that they have abandoned confrontation and embraced dialogue and constitutional approaches in light of the new democratic spirit in the country.

Support from the international community

The human rights NGOs studied were unanimous in acknowledging the support of the international community and external influences, especially since the 1990s. Such support goes beyond funding to include in some cases logistics, training and sponsorship in other forms. The response of these NGOs typically ranged from "providing technical assistance, training, texts, funds", to "support and encouragement", "very useful in providing grants and training" and "unflinching support through aid and grants".

The Constitutional Rights Project was somewhat modest in its response, granting that the international community has been useful "to the extent that they offer some financial support and help pressure government to accept policy changes or reforms as recommended by the NGOs". But the response of the Media Rights Agenda was particularly insightful:

> They have been of great help by providing training for numerous human rights activists, funds for numerous projects and other such helps as collaborative efforts to handle various human rights abuses.

Furthermore, the Civil Liberties Organisation was quite impressed with the external support and help they received. For this body, the international community had been very encouraging, as they had "provided funds and sundry support, they have been wonderful".

This, coming from the CLO which is one of the oldest and best established human rights NGOs in Nigeria (and in fact the oldest of those we studied), lends credence to the argument that the international community and external influences have provided invaluable impetus for the Nigerian associations. Thus, while the focus of these organisations has been on alleviating domestic socio-economic and civil problems, the enabling capacity to pur-

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sue these noble objectives has been drawn largely from the international community.

In relation to globalisation, it must be emphasised that the entire human rights issue should be seen within the context of efforts towards liberalisation in all sectors of national life. The human rights situation has been a key factor in the globalisation process in the developing world. It is easy to understand that a hostile domestic environment and a tyrannical or autocratic leadership can hardly facilitate the spread of capitalism or attract foreign investment.

The Bretton Woods institutions have tied the growth of the economy (through liberalisation) to the emergence of civil society and multi-party democracy. Thus, a high degree of respect for human rights is becoming synonymous with democracy and development.

The limits of globalisation and development in Africa

In assessing the relevance of globalisation to development in Africa, Mengisteab argues that the rise to a hegemonic position of a neo-liberal ideology has spawned a development approach that is essentially based on two basic propositions.[23]

On the one hand, integration within a global economy through globalisation is seen as the most effective development approach, while on the other the less the state intervenes in the economy, the greater the development. As he rightfully posits, these assumptions were made clear with the imposition of structural adjustment on many developing countries. Yet structural adjustment and other features of globalisation, including the emphasis on liberalisation and privatisation, have not really boosted development in Africa.

The point has been made that there is not enough empirical evidence to support the assumption that openness or the triumph of market forces through the reduction of the role of the state achieves considerably or significantly more development. History shows, rather, that this assumption has not been proved

true time and again, in countries as diverse as Britain, the Netherlands, Russia, Japan, China, and the Asian Tigers.[24]

Similarly, scholars such as Okolie and Anugwom argue that, in the case of Nigeria, the process of the non-involvement of the state and privatisation does not guarantee economic growth or the good of the greatest number.[25] Keeping this in mind, the role of globalisation should be re-appraised in Nigeria.

While the non-intervention of the state may be food for economic growth at least in theory, the rate and scope of this non-intervention policy should be carefully weighed in the case of developing nations where the state still remains the provider of the last resort and where crude capitalism can easily take root. Therefore, globalisation as it is presently structured, in spite of the positive social values it promotes (including human rights and democracy), has been more of a detriment than a blessing to Nigeria.

A thorough examination of present trends in economic and social values would reveal that Nigeria has not benefited significantly from the process of globalisation, starting from the structural adjustment period in the country. In this case, globalisation represents an extreme monetarist response to Africa's development crisis and, as Ihonvbere argues, a very high degree of human suffering, disillusionment, anger, alienation, rural decay, urban dislocation, suicide, marital crises, prostitution and crime have accompanied monetarist responses to the African crisis.[26]

This notwithstanding, the role of the US Department of State, the UK's DFID (overseas development agency), the United Nations Development Programme and other bodies in monitoring human rights support of the governments in Nigeria, and providing logistics as well as, more importantly, funding, cannot be over-emphasised in the globalisation push for respect for human rights. The human rights groups in Nigeria overwhelmingly arose in the context of the struggle to unseat the military and install multi-party democracy.

Conclusion

The proliferation of human rights NGOs can be seen as emanating from the acquisition of new social values from outside by Nigerians. The nascent origin of these organisations shows that they are relatively new phenomena in the social history of Nigeria. Moreover, their roles in society have been very positive for the growth of the nation and the coping capacities of the individuals who live there.

These organisations were invaluable in the fight for democracy in Nigeria as well as the restoration of human rights and the sensitisation of Nigerians to the full extent of their rights as captured in the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Banjul Charter. In sum, these organisations can be seen as part of the spread of positive values arising from the increasing narrowing of the world occasioned by globalisation.

The advent of globalisation created an awareness among Nigerians that a society could be built on respect for human rights. The proliferation of human rights NGOs can be seen as the product of a coincidence between domestic realities (a resilient civil society and a repressive military government) and external or international impetus.

Globalisation enabled the permeation of the Nigerian environment by a heightened awareness of the fundamental importance of human rights and provided the crucial means (through logistical and financial support) for the actualisation of human rights.

It is equally relevant to note that the impact of globalisation on the human rights scene in Nigeria can be seen as part and parcel of the drive to create a conducive environment for the intro-

duction of acute capitalism, which can only be assured through a free and unencumbered civil society and democracy. Therefore, globalisation brought respect for individual freedom and rights back to the fore of Nigeria's national values by recreating a value system seriously eroded by years of military rule and human rights abuses. After all, the fundamental rights enshrined in the human rights declarations of the UN and Banjul Charter are consistent with social values identified as characteristic of traditional Nigerian society.[27]

Edlyne E. Anugwom is with the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

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Elizabeth le Roux
Editor: Africa Insight
Africa Institute of South Africa
PO Box 630
Pretoria 0001
South Africa
Email: beth@ai.org.za

Prof Abebe Zegeye (guest editor)
Dept of Sociology
Unisa
PO Box 392
Pretoria 0003
South Africa
zegeya@unisa.ac.za

Pietro Toggia (guest editor)
Dept of Criminal Justice
& Social Work
Old Main, Room 27
Kutztown University
of Pennsylvania
Kutztown, PA 19530
USA
toggia@kutztown.edu

Melakou Tegegn (guest editor)
Director
Panos Ethiopia
PO Box 6826
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia

melakou@hotmail.com

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LEARNING-LED COMPETITIVENESS

A Challenge for South African Development[1]

South Africa has to respond to globalisation - and education, training and development will be central elements in that response. **By Kenneth King, Simon McGrath, Christian Rogerson and Kobus Visser**

For some, globalisation offers real possibilities for the eradication of world poverty; for others it is at the root of problems of poverty and inequality globally. Our position in this paper is that whilst it is possible to see real benefits within the broad and complex trends associated with globalisation, much of globalisation remains biased towards the interests of the North.[2] Nonetheless, in this paper we shall work from the assumption that, whatever its problems, globalisation is here to stay for the foreseeable future.

Thus, the development challenge is to work to reduce its threats and increase its opportunities for countries, enterprises, communities and individuals. In our analysis, we seek to engage with this challenge by looking at South Africa's experiences in selected sectors since 1994 and by considering how they measure up to the challenge of responding to globalisation.

The choice of sectors is influenced by our own professional backgrounds but is also driven by current trends in thinking about development and competitiveness, both North and South. The growth in theoretical and policy interest in globalisation in the 1990s was intertwined with the emergence of new arguments about the centrality of learning and knowledge to economic success.[3] These debates were also interconnected with arguments that smaller enterprises were best positioned to respond to these new challenges.[4]

This emphasis on micro and small enterprises also articulated with the ascendancy of neo-liberal thinking and a stress on entrepreneurship as vital to economic success. Thus, there appear to be strong reasons for looking at the points of intersection between education, training and enterprise development as a node for responses to globalisation. This is the focus of this paper.

At the heart of this focus is our main theoretical assumption: the importance of what we term "learning-led competitiveness".[5] We argue that strategies to improve individuals' and enterprises' levels of knowledge and skills are likely to be important elements in enabling them, and countries as a whole, to respond to the challenge of competitiveness under conditions of globalisation. As we shall see, this is a theme that has often been present in South African policy thinking.

There is a mass of literature on globalisation, which we do not propose to review. Nonetheless, it is important that we sketch briefly what it is that we mean when we use the notion. Globalisation's characteristics include:

- an increase in the quantity and speed of flows of goods, services, capital and knowledge;
- the growth of the range and importance of global networks;
- an increased intensity of relationships within these networks;
- the emergence of new institutions of globalisation, such as the World Trade Organisation;
- the development of a new infrastructure of globalisation, centred particularly in the emergence of new information and communications technologies (ICTs);
- the growth of trans-national product assembly;

■ a significant (but not complete) decline in the power of nation states to develop and conduct their own economic, financial, fiscal and industrial strategies.[6]

For many analysts, knowledge production, dissemination and utilisation are now at the heart of national competitive advantage. Competitive advantage is seen as having shifted away from considerations of high volume to those of maintaining high value.[7] However, others continue to argue that Africa's best hope under globalisation is to focus on its existing resource endowment and comparative advantage, which in any case will be difficult to change quickly.[8] Given the abundance of land and cheap labour, this argument points to the logic of African specialisation in agriculture, food processing and minerals extraction and processing.

This latter argument appears flawed. In spite of the World Trade Organisation, there is continued protectionism in the North in areas such as textiles, clothing and food. The clothing and textile industries of countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa have been seriously undermined by the dumping of second-hand clothes. Moreover, the supposedly safe "low technology" sectors are not entirely low technology in reality, given developments in areas such as biotechnology.

Cooperation as well as competition is emphasised in much of the writing on the new economy. This highlights the importance of networks, linkages, sub-contracting and clustering, as well as trust and communications. Moreover, there is a growing sense that the large African diaspora in the North could be made an engine of development in a similar way to that which is credited to the Indian diaspora in the emergence of Bangalore as an important centre in the global software industry. In this context, the large numbers of South Africans in the IT sector of many Northern cities could be a powerful resource if they could be attracted to reinvest their skills and capital in South Africa.

One of the weaknesses in some accounts of globalisation, particularly positive ones, is that they downplay the importance of context. We believe that both geographic and historical contexts are vital to an understanding of how globalisation operates and how responses to it are framed and understood. For this reason, it is important to look at the South African experience in education, training and enterprise development.

What is the legacy of South Africa's past?

South Africa remains powerfully framed by the legacy of the past. Many of the policies developed since 1994 have focused both symbolically and practically on redress and reconstruction after the damage done to the nation by Apartheid. Democratic South Africa has inherited one of the world's most skewed income distributions. Infrastructure and social services are massively distorted in provision and extremely inadequate in many parts of the country. Poverty is endemic. Average education and training levels are below what should be expected of a country with South Africa's level of per capita income. The economy is massively structurally distorted towards large firms and capital-intensive production. There is a legacy of underinvestment and a poor savings ratio.

Under Apartheid, black education was underfunded, with this underfunding itself being differentiated according to race, ethnicity, gender and location. Although African enrolments did increase markedly from the early 1970s, major failings in educational quality and quantity were evident by 1994. In the training sector, African advancement was also seriously obstructed by the raft of Apartheid legislation, and accompanying racist attitudes and behaviour. Africans could only legally become apprentices after the Wiehahn Report of 1979 and the number of African arti-

sans never became particularly significant as the apprenticeship system declined during the 1980s and early 1990s. African access to vocational education and training was historically poor. Moreover, where it was available, it was often treated with mistrust as part of a state or mission attempt to keep Africans in blue collar work. The emergence of the Bantustans did lead to some

> It appears as if South African education is being reconstructed around a conscious attempt to respond to globalisation. However, there are major concerns with this reading.

training for local needs but urban Africans remained particularly disadvantaged. Whilst the racial classification of skills erased the high level of tacit skills of many black workers, this should not blind observers to the very real, racially-based skill disparities that existed in Apartheid South Africa.

Historically black institutions are also often affected by poor public transport and levels of crime and violence, which prevent full utilisation of facilities outside normal school hours. Moreover, they have often been the worst affected by the often heated process of governance transformation.

However, the historical problems of South African training go further than a simple racial divide. Technical colleges were established as part of a system of day/block release for apprentices. As such, they were set up to concentrate on theory. As apprentice numbers declined, colleges survived by recruiting private candidates who needed to get some practical training. This has led to a major challenge for colleges in resourcing adequate training facilities; in getting work experience placements for their students; and in producing employable graduates.

The Apartheid regime in South Africa had little interest in small enterprise development until it was in crisis. Prior to this, its primary political and economic focus was the upliftment of Afrikaners, which was to be achieved through the development of Afrikaner monopoly capital and a large state sector providing privileged access to employment to Afrikaners. At the same time, much of Apartheid legislation sought to limit African economic activities, with African urban enterprises being particularly harassed.[9] However, as the state sought to reform in order to survive during the 1980s, it drew on big business calls for deregulation and broader neo-liberal thinking from the OECD countries. These both resulted in a greater tolerance of SMME development. Historically, the ANC was also sceptical about the benefits of SMME in keeping with broader socialist thinking.

These elements of South Africa's past form an important backdrop to the discussion of reforms since 1994. We shall now turn to those reforms. Although mindful of the importance of inter-sectorality, the easiest way to examine these is sectorally.

How has South Africa responded to competitiveness through reforms in the education sector?

Interestingly, the three countries in our larger study have responded to this challenge in three different ways at the level of curricular reform. In Ghana, the emphasis has been largely on the reform of vocational and technical subjects to make them more able to respond to new economic challenges. In Kenya, the curriculum is in the process of being radically narrowed: technical subjects and Business Education will no longer be examinable and the emphasis will be heavily on English, Mathematics and Science. This is influenced by an argument that good quality basic education is the best preparation for employment under globalisation. South Africa, however, has taken the same theoretical position as the Anglophone

economies of the North, and has sought to develop a unified system of education and training.

The two key structural elements of South African education, the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) and Curriculum 2005, are strongly influenced by the need to strengthen South Africa's response to globalisation. For all the language of pupil-centredness and the adoption of the mantle of People's Education, Curriculum 2005 is constructed around a set of economically-oriented outcomes. Curriculum 2005 is explicit about the challenge of developing meta-learning, learning how to learn. This is seen as a key element for an education to succeed in the putative knowledge economy of the future. Curriculum 2005 also places considerable emphasis on a series of "critical cross-field outcomes", which reflect the influence of thinking in the developed Anglophone countries about education-economy relations. These outcomes were intended to be the core of the learning outcomes experienced across all the eight designated learning areas and provide a unifying principle for the Curriculum 2005 system. There is a clear sense of the importance of skills over knowledge. Moreover, it is a notion of skill that has its roots in the new concept of generic skills for a new economy rather than in an older form of technical skills for an industrial system.

Similarly, the eight levels of the NQF and its 12 fields of learning emerged historically from a process in which organised capital and labour were far more powerful than (typically rather disorganised) education. This is reflected in a view of knowledge that is largely constructed around the needs of the economy rather than the logic of the academic disciplines.[10]

Thus, it appears as if South African education is being reconstructed around a conscious attempt to respond to globalisation. However, there are three major sets of concerns with this reading. First, there are questions about whether the policies are based in a sufficiently detailed and accurate reading of the economic challenges. Second, the relationship between policy and implementation is still controversial. Third, tensions between the economic and social rationales for and impacts of education policy remain.

Education and the economy

Although a globalisation and competitiveness focus is implicit in the key reforms and explicit in a number of other policy documents, it can be argued that this has not resulted in an adequate reading of what specific economic opportunities exist for South Africa and its citizens. Rather than a model which addresses the fractured nature of South Africa's economy and society, the Department of Education has done little more than borrow a Northern model of education for a Northern vision of a knowledge economy, with a bolted-on language of redress.

This is a vision of where South Africa might aspire to be and, hence, is useful in terms of long-term aspirations. However, it is not an adequate starting point and route map for transformation of rural subsistence or urban SMME economies through education. Whilst acknowledging the crucial role of the former in the current South African economy, we turn now to a brief consideration of the weaknesses of education policy with respect to the latter.

Both in the critical cross-field outcomes of the initial Curriculum 2005 model and in the specific learning area outcomes of Economic and Management Studies there is a place for entrepreneurship. Whilst acknowledging this, it is important to question what this means in South African policy terms. The discovery of the importance of entrepreneurship appears significant in terms of the ANC's historical suspicions about the notion, reinforced as they have been by the strong ideological and practical concerns of its Communist and trade union alliance partners. However, this remains largely a vision of a formal and relatively wealthy small and medium enterprise sector rather than an acceptance of the existence, and rapid growth, of a micro and informal enterprise sector. Rather the latter is characterised as "survivalist" and our interviews with departmental staff often gave the sense that they would have wished this sector out of existence if this could be done. Our intention is not to celebrate survivalism, although the hard work and initiative of many "survivalists" is to their credit. Rather, it is to restress the earlier point that South African policy is too focused on where it wants to go to start from where it is now.

Strikingly, none of the documents linked to the FET policy process between 1997 and 1999 made anything more than the occasional mention of the needs of micro and small enterprises. In the first five years of democracy, there was no sense in the official education policy that there were possibilities for emergent SMMEs or for positive linkages with larger firms, and the implications of globalisation and the new economy for the importance of SMMEs were not grasped.

Remarkably for an African strategy in this area, the "National Strategy for Further Education and Training" made no mention of self-employment whatsoever.[11] The Department does appear to have shifted its viewpoint since 1999. However, the reforms in the FET sector are too early in their implementation to judge the realities of any shift towards a self-employment focus.

Policy and implementation

There are long-standing academic debates about the nature of policy that make it clear that it is more than simply about the development of a vision and a blueprint for practice. However, this does not undermine the relevance and importance of questions about the relationship between policy and implementation.

Clearly, much has been achieved in transforming South African education away from the practices and structures of Apartheid education. However, it has suffered from overambition. For instance, it sought contemporaneously to reduce budgets, retrench staff, examine the conditions of the remaining teacher, transform governance and implement radical curricular reform.[12]

Moreover, the attempt to construct a new education and training system has been hampered by the decision in 1994 to keep separate the control of education and training under the Departments of Education and Labour, respectively. The relationship between provincial education departments and the national department has also been a factor in implementational weaknesses. Under the constitution, the national department comes up with policy; but the provincial departments have to implement it.

Although South Africa is a wealthy country by African standards, there are major resource constraints that weaken implementation. The most recent survey of South African schools shows some improvements since the first "Register of School Needs".[13] However, it still raises serious questions about the environment in which teaching and learning is supposed to take place. There was still a 40% shortfall in the number of classrooms; 34% of schools had no access to water and 17% of learners continue to be without toilet facilities; 34% of schools still had no telephones in 2000. Moreover, the biggest decline in this period has been in the number of schools in excellent and good condition, with at least 12 000 buildings in need of repair. To these inadequacies in physical resources must be added the effects of the massive retrenchment programme of the late 1990s, which led to the loss of a disproportionate number of well-qualified and experienced teachers.

Provincial departments are also very weak in terms of human and financial resources. Education delivery has proceeded while the new departments and administrative systems have been under construction. As the Curriculum 2005 implementation began in 1998, the provinces were faced with a major budgetary

crisis. Such was the state of provincial budgets during 1999 that officials complained that they could not afford to attend interdepartmental coordination meetings and were, in Gauteng – the richest province – barred from making telephone calls to the other provinces.[14] It appears that the fiscal conservatism of GEAR is clashing with the equity and competitiveness imperatives of the educational reforms.

Some of the problems with implementation lie with the level of participation in the process. While the Department of Education has portrayed the process as participatory, and this is certainly an improvement on the old dispensation, policymaking is still too far away from practitioners.[15] Large numbers of other stakeholders have also felt excluded.[16] Inevitably, low teacher morale has also played a part in the weakness of implementation.

It is argued that the reforms are insecurely grounded in the realities of classrooms, teachers and students.[17] The system still seems to be struggling to overcome the dual crises of Apartheid under-resourcing and the educational resistance of the 1980s. In

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spite of the Department's efforts, a new culture of learning, teaching and service is proving difficult to develop.

Economic and social rationales for education

South African education policies have been critiqued as inadequate in their treatment of issues of equity and redress. At the outset of this process, Badat cautioned that equity and growth inevitably are incompatible and, where tensions occur, growth will win out over equity.[18] Others raised early concerns that the NQF could undermine a focus on the redress of racial and gendered disadvantage.[19]

Eight years after the coming of democracy to South Africa, the NQF is difficult to define concretely in terms of either pedagogy or content. In spite of claims by some supporters, a pupil-centred, progressive approach to teaching and learning cannot simply be read off from the decision to implement outcomes-based education. The outcomes-based approach is not about an official corpus of content, although decisions about specific outcomes clearly can have profound content implications.

It is emerging practices, and the broader socio-economic context, that will be the determinants of the inclusivity of the NQF as experienced. The claim that the new system will produce a more integrated kind of learning and hence empower individuals to take better control of their lives may or may not be true. Debate continues internationally about whether the actual form of competencies and outcomes actually reinforces the compartmentalisation and fragmentation of learning. Though policy commitments will serve to shape practice, individuals, interests and structures will also be vital actors in that shaping.

How successful has South Africa been in its attempts to construct a new skills development system?

The South African constitutional settlement continues to affect the coordination of skills development plans and activities. The responsibility for skills development is shared between the Departments of Labour and Education. Moreover, the most important group of provider institutions, the technical colleges, is under the direct authority of the nine provincial education departments. To complicate matters even further, the Department of Trade and Industry, particularly through its agen-

cy, Ntsika, has a strong concern with skills development for SMMEs.

The Department of Education has developed a policy for what it calls the Further Education and Training (FET) Band.[20] This puts great stress on the importance of increasing institutional responsiveness and quality of provision. There is a strong emphasis on improving institutional and stakeholder involvement in management, as the system seeks to move away from the authoritarian approach of the past. In mid-2001 attention began to return to the issue of mergers as a key element in improving institutional effectiveness. By the end of 2002, the approximately 150 public colleges should have been merged to form 50 "mega colleges". It is intended that these will have greater management capacity and the resources needed for specialist management tasks such as market analysis and student follow-up.

New quality assurance mechanisms are being introduced as part of the activities of the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). It is intended that providers' market responsiveness be promoted by their involvement in the Department of Labour's learnership programmes and in their relationship with the Sector Education and Training Authorities, which finally came into effective existence in 2001. Equally, there is an emphasis on the development of new information systems for student tracking. The policy seeks to increase competition among providers through the registration of private providers and the introduction of an outcomes-related element to the funding of public providers. Special funds also will be made available for innovation and basic needs.

Recognition of prior learning (RPL) and multiple entry and exit points should greatly improve responsiveness to students' needs, particularly among non-traditional clienteles, although the introduction of RPL remains very slow.

The role of the Department of Labour in the skills development system lies in its focus on demand-side concerns. Its key document in this regard is the Skills Development Strategy of 1997.[21] Although this document had a principal focus on medium and large firms, it also had a significant concern about the needs of smaller enterprises.

Learnerships are the centrepiece of the Department's new approach. They are designed to meet the skills needs of all enterprises and of community development. They are intended to replace the declining system of apprenticeships; to enrich their content; and to expand the approach across all economic sectors. Learnerships seek to combine high quality theoretical preparation with rigorous work-based learning and students are assessed through a competency-based modular approach in both settings. Moreover, learnerships are intended to be available at a wider range of education and training levels than was the case for apprenticeships. However, the slowness in establishing learnership programmes has meant that the decline in numbers in structured dual site training has been slow to be reversed. This is potentially serious for South Africa's broader attempts to increase international competitiveness, given the centrality of skills development to economic success.

Are technical colleges becoming more responsive to demands?

The slowness of NQF implementation and FET policy development has held up technical colleges' attempts at becoming more responsive to their new environment. As noted already, the centralising tendencies of the Apartheid state have made colleges poorly suited to pro-active decision making and it is hardly surprising that principals adopted a "wait and see" approach for the most part.[22]

Colleges have had little experience in curriculum development. The slow pace of curricular change in the past has not encouraged them to keep up to date with either equipment or staff development. Equally, it has made them poorly suited to respond to labour market changes and the needs of local employers. Thus, the kinds of responses needed to address the new policies are not readily available. Moreover, provincial departments are weak and are of little help to colleges with regard to curriculum development. Where more entrepreneurial colleges have sought to anticipate the NQF, it has too often been through buying British or American competency-based materials and courses off-the-shelf as a short to medium-term strategy whilst the NQF is developing. Rarely has this been linked with a real philosophical understanding of the possibilities or limitations of the new approach.[23]

This negative account of college responsiveness is not the whole story, however. Our research has found the introduction of new programmes and facilities in low-cost house construction in townships and educare.[24] In KwaZulu-Natal, other research has pointed to expanded provision in educare, health and tourism.[25] Equally, links with higher education institutions, particularly technikons, are increasingly common. Significantly, these include work on new information and communications technologies. Other technical colleges are engaged in providing higher education courses, owned by universities and technikons, supported by lectures over satellite links and online course materials.

Greater self-reliance also appears to be emerging within the college sector. In a number of cases, students and staff are engaged in maintenance and development projects, both on campus and in the community. This may have the spin-off of partially addressing the work experience crisis.

Does the skills development strategy deal adequately with the challenges of enterprise development and self-employment?

We have already critiqued the inadequacies of the Department of Education's policy documents in this area. In the Department of Labour, learnerships may also be criticised at present for their heavy bias towards the formal sector. The minimum education and training level for access to a learnership programme is NQF level 1 – the equivalent of nine years of formal schooling. Moreover, as already noted, RPL is not yet in full use. Thus, the minimum educational requirements for access to a learnership are in danger of excluding more than half of those

The two key elements of South African education, the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) and Curriculum 2005, are influenced by the need to strengthen South Africa's response to globalisation.

who are potentially economically active. However, the Department has been increasing its emphasis on micro and small enterprises over time. The National Skills Development Strategy of 2001 showed a stronger emphasis than previously on skills development for SMMEs.[26] By the middle of 2001, relationships between the Department and the Department of Trade and Industry had developed to the extent that a joint three-day workshop plotted out the respective roles of different agencies, with the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency given the role of lead agency.

Interest in supporting skills development for SMMEs has clearly grown in the more dynamic training providers. The Western Cape Education Department encouraged an alliance between its colleges and the Foundation for Economic and Business Development to work on NQF piloting, including a

considerable enterprise education component. The new construction and educare courses on offer at a number of colleges are focused primarily on new SMME niches in these and surrounding townships.

At one large urban college, courses in interior design and photography, formerly packaged as leisure interest offerings for white middle-class women, have been reworked to focus on new entrepreneurial opportunities across the divides of race and gender. In KwaZulu-Natal, a number of colleges have begun to offer short courses aimed at self-employment in bricklaying, computing, fitting and machining, plumbing and carpentry. There is also growing evidence of linkages with the corporate sector and a range of new initiatives at colleges are supported by external funding. Nonetheless, Kraak and Hall raise the concern that these are too often motivated by corporate responsibility rather than a more economic logic.[27]

In this paper, when we review business linkages more generally, we argue that innovative practices are less likely to emerge from corporate responsibility than from economic partnerships, although there is a possibility of a shift over time in relationships from the former rationale to the latter. Possibilities also seem to be present for colleges in the growing South African interest in various forms of inter-firm cooperation.[28] This development may offer new market niches for colleges as providers of specific training products and might also help colleges in more successful outreach to SMMEs.

How healthy are South African micro and small enterprises?

There is sometimes a tendency towards polarity in writing about the SMME sectors of Africa between an account which stresses their entrepreneurial successes and another that emphasises the abject poverty that exists within their bounds. In South Africa, as elsewhere, there appear to be elements of both experiences. Where entrepreneurs have found viable niches, with significant barriers to entry, then incomes are likely to be relatively high and sustainable.

However, for those in low valued markets with low barriers to entry, the picture is much less positive. The generally rising levels of education in the sector cannot have a major impact in an environment where poverty is endemic amongst consumers. Thus, survival rather than entrepreneurship is the norm for those in "petty" trading and areas of production wedded to outdated technologies. For these "survivalists" movements into new areas of production or trade are common but reactive rather than proactive.

Macro-economic factors have a major influence on MSE health. It appears the survivalist MSE segment is largely anti-cyclical, expanding in numbers as the overall economy declines. However, the more sustainable segment is pro-cyclical, being dependent on higher incomes for market expansion. To the extent that the South African economy is growing, there should be a concomitant growth in higher value MSEs.

There has also been controversy over the impact of neo-liberal policies on SMMEs. Their proponents have argued that they promote growth and open up new spaces for SMME activity. However, critics argue that the result of these policies has been declining per capita incomes, thus undermining the upper segment of the SMME sector. This debate has not been resolved, with effects appearing to be differentiated by sector and enterprise. However, it can be argued that better education and training, and the ability to access higher value niches, are crucial to successful responses. Moreover, it appears that the effects of privatisation and liberalisation are heavily dependent on the sequencing of these reforms.

The current pace of technological change also has major impacts on SMMEs. Shifts from glass and metal to plastic packaging, and the computerisation of cars and a wide range of electrical goods both threaten existing MSE production and maintenance activities. In some cases, such as computerisation, there is the potential for upskilling. In others such as the shift to plastic, there is little scope for any response other than identifying a new product to develop. Any successful response to technological change is likely to be heavily knowledge-based.

Infrastructure is seen as a major problem by entrepreneurs. Lack of communication undermines cooperation and business more generally. Inadequate roads and electricity are also major constraints. Equally, trust and violence are important. Weak levels of trust undermine business, whilst strong collaborative relationships in South Africa are often based in shared ethnicity. High levels of crime have had a negative impact on the development of many SMMEs.

Enterprise health is also highly dependent upon their own characteristics, which affect the probability of enterprise success. Capital is typically seen as the most important of these. It is widely identified as the major constraint on enterprise performance. Higher levels of initial capital appear to be positively linked to enterprise success.

Gender is also important. South African male entrepreneurs tend to be more successful than their female counterparts. Partly, this is due to greater prevalence of male entrepreneurs in more successful markets. Evidence also suggests that women are more risk averse; reinvest less; and are less profit-oriented.[29] This highlights the importance of taking into account the gendered nature of opportunities, constraints and goals within the sector.

Location also has some significance to enterprise chances. On average, home-based SMMEs are less successful than those with separate premises. It is best to be located in formal urban areas. Location is strongly linked to arguments about the advantages of clustering, as proximity appears to increase learning opportunities.

Are South African enterprises becoming better at cooperating with each other?

Vertical linkages between enterprises of different sizes appear to be growing, although with considerable sectoral variation. Examples are common in the construction and building industry; clothing; retailing; catering, office cleaning; transport and footwear and often include large corporations.[30] These linkages are driven by commercial and social responsibility concerns. In some cases, sub-contracting is an attempt to circumvent health and safety regulations and trade unions, and to suppress wages and costs. However, there are also more positive outsourcing reasons that can lead to healthy relationships between larger and smaller enterprises. Indeed, there appears to be a "high road" of upskilling, quality-conscious vertical linkage as well as a "low road" of cost-cutting and union-busting present in the current South African experience.

However, another powerful force is at work. Many large corporations were deeply implicated in the Apartheid system and they are widely perceived as having benefited from the system, at least indirectly. This, and a genuine desire to be good citizens, has led to a wide range of social responsibility activities designed to show that large corporations are serious about issues such as black empowerment and poverty eradication. Sub-contracting has been an important element of such strategies.[31] This is a poor basis for successful sub-contracting although some social responsibility programmes have evolved into more genuine linkages.

The Department of Trade and Industry is also seeking to promote sub-contracting through its procurement policy, which seeks to support SMME access to public sector procurement. The government has sought to simplify tender procedures; to organise tenders into suitably sized segments to target SMMEs; to set appropriate standards, delivery dates and contractual obligations; and to introduce elements of price preference for targeted SMMEs.[32] The establishment of Tender Advice Centres, where information about tenders is available and tender advice and counselling support services are provided to emerging SMMEs, is also intended to contribute to SMME development. However, SMME awareness of tendering possibilities and processes and successful tendering, remains very limited.

Although clustering has received international attention as an important element in enterprise development, there appears to be widespread misunderstanding and suspicion regarding the concept in South Africa, and little evidence of strong clusters emerging.[33] The weakness of social capital and the continued high levels of crime and violence appear to be major constraints here. Moreover, South Africa is weaker than most of Africa in terms of associations among groups of small firms.

These weaknesses in cooperation are important, given the growing international evidence on its key role in enterprise success. Nonetheless, some positive examples can be found, such as in the jewellery industry and the West African clothing cluster, both in Johannesburg. The West African clothing cluster merits further examination as it illustrates many potential benefits for other clusters in South Africa. Rogerson argues that the act of clustering in the Johannesburg city centre has been crucial to success.[34] Supply-side joint actions in the Johannesburg clothing cluster include the ad hoc borrowing and lending of basic tools and raw materials. Inter-enterprise collaboration also occurs through subcontracting. In the case of the cut, make and trim businesses, all the enterprises in our sample were wholly engaged in production for retailers, wholesalers or other producers. Marketing joint actions are also taking place. Several firms reported sharing information about new products, ranges or design techniques with suppliers or buyers. In addition, there was regular telephonic contact between producers to share market information. Lastly, there were strong linkages between inner city producers and street hawkers in terms of marketing the outputs of clothing SMME producers. This linkage with hawkers is significant as one of the few types of cooperation that crosses a racial divide, between Asian producers and black hawkers.

How has SMME policy supported enterprise development?

In 1995, South Africa produced the White Paper on a National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business in South Africa. This listed the following objectives for policy:
- Create an enabling environment for small enterprises;
- Facilitate greater equalisation of income, wealth and earning opportunities;
- Address the legacy of apartheid-based disempowerment of black business;
- Support the advancement of women in all business sectors;
- Create long-term jobs;
- Stimulate sector-focused economic growth;
- Strengthen cohesion between small enterprises;
- Level the playing fields between bigger and small playing fields, between bigger and small business as well as between rural and urban businesses;
- Prepare small businesses to comply with the challenges of an internationally competitive economy.[35]

This policy closely reflects international best practice. Its objectives are indicative of a policy that is seeking both to provide a more enterprise-friendly regulatory framework and maintain a major proactive role for the state. The policy also shows a

strong concern with target constituencies of historically disadvantaged groups: blacks, women, youth and rural people. However, there is also a strong concern with competitiveness, as illustrated by an interest in linkages, tendering and procurement, developed in the White Paper and subsequently, and in the Danida-supported development of Manufacturing Advisory Centres. These MACs focus on clusters of more dynamic enterprises and have a powerful learning focus.[36] The initial piloting of this approach in Port Elizabeth and Durban was being extended nationwide in 2001 and 2002.[37]

The policy has been criticised for having too many objectives and, thus, too little focus. In particular, although survivalists are seen as the largest group, the state's strong views about the undesirability of survivalism seem to preclude adequate attempts to understand and act upon the needs of such enterprises.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have argued that globalisation needs to be addressed by South Africa, whilst remaining mindful of its potential costs. We argue that knowledge is an important element of any possible response and suggest the notion of learning-led competitiveness as a way of thinking about the challenge. We suggest that there is a need to go beyond the rhetoric

of addressing competitiveness to a deeper analysis within individual sectors. We also stress the importance of working cooperatively between sectors. This is something that South African departments have been far better at talking about than doing. Implementation continues to lag far behind the ideas expressed in policy documents. Opportunities seem to lie in points where practical collaboration between sectors can be realised. For instance, skills development could be usefully linked to business linkages and local enterprise development. Above all, it is clear that South Africa must continue to work to respond to globalisation and that education, training and enterprise development will be central elements in that response.

Kenneth King is Professor of International and Comparative Education and Director of the Centre of African Studies in the University of Edinburgh. Simon McGrath is Director of the Research Programme on Human Resources Development at the Human Sciences Research Council but was a research fellow at the Centre of African Studies at the time of the research. Christian Rogerson is Professor of Human Geography at the University of the Witwatersrand. Kobus Visser is a senior lecturer in the Department of Management at the University of the Western Cape.

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The Economics of Urban Regeneration in Africa's Financial Capital

JOHANNES

Rapid intervention is needed to save
Johannesburg's Inner City from steady decay.
By John Luiz

Africa's financial centre is in serious decline. The dramatic decay of the Johannesburg Inner City, especially in the past decade, contrasts with the extraordinary beginnings of this city. Its impressive initial growth at the turn of the 19th century was unparalleled. However, its rapid deterioration has been equally astonishing and it is in danger of becoming irreversible. Fortunately plans are underway to ensure that this does not happen and the benefits of these plans are already apparent.

The City of Johannesburg has a population of approximately three million people and is the economic core of South Africa, contributing 16% to the national GDP. But the city has been losing its dominance and this loss has been concentrated in the Inner City. The problems of the Inner City reflect the wider socio-economic and political realities of the country as a whole: namely the

dichotomy and contradictions of being both First and Third World and the inability to resolve this tension related to identity. This presents enormous challenges to the City Managers.

This paper outlines the rise and fall of the city which was initially built around the gold industry. It begins by briefly describing its startling growth and development and its transformation from a gold producer to manufacturing and finally to Africa's foremost service centre.

This is followed by an account of the metamorphosis of the Inner City from Johannesburg's premier business centre to an African trading centre. This change was accompanied by the mass exodus of businesses from the City Centre to decentralised nodes and the result was decay in the former zone. Lastly, it discusses various strategies for the regeneration of the Johannesburg Inner City.

BURG

The development and growth of Johannesburg

The discovery of gold in 1886 precipitated a frenzied gold rush and led to the establishment of Johannesburg. Within the first five years there were 30 000 people in the town and by 1896 the population had crossed the 100 000 benchmark.[1] The relatively large population provided a significant market allowing Johannesburg to become a centre of mass consumption.

The gold boom triggered enormous capital inflows, attracted labour, encouraged trade and led to related developments. Transport nodes developed around the city with extensive rail and road investments linking it with the rest of the country and its harbours.

The Johannesburg economy's dependence on gold began to wane during World War II when industries engaged in the war effort began to diversify. This trend continued after the war, with gold mines becoming less and less important to the city and the gradual closure of many mines in the region as the gold industry shifted to the Orange Free State. By the mid-1940s, the Johannesburg CBD had become the financial and commercial hub of the country housing more of the country's leading company headquarters than any other city in South Africa.

After 1945 there was a steady decline in the number of residents living within the CBD with many of its former residents moving to the flatland of Hillbrow just to the north. The physical outward expansion of the CBD had come to an end before the 1940s but the growth continued unabated in an upward direction and soon the city skyline was said to resemble that of Manhattan.[2] The 1920s and 1930s saw the beginnings of skyscrapers in Johannesburg's CBD, primarily housing major banks and mining houses. The massive construction boom culmi-

nated with the Carlton Centre in 1972 (an office block and hotel) which is more than 200m above street level.[3] However, due to shortages of space in the crowded CBD, businesses started to look elsewhere and the slow exodus to Johannesburg's northern suburbs began innocuously at first. This trend has speeded up considerably during the past decade as businesses leave to avoid rising crime and grime. Only a few big businesses have shown their commitment to the Inner City. For example, three of the largest banks have increased their investment there by expanding their headquarters.[4]

The Inner City also faced the brunt of apartheid pathologies. It is located in the centre of Johannesburg, with Soweto (the largest black township) to the south-west, the manufacturing locus to the east, the elite white suburbs to the north, and now increasingly most businesses in the northern suburbs too. All public transport originates in the Inner City, which thus acts as a vital link between the various regions comprising Johannesburg, in

> **The outward migration of residents and businesses has resulted in urban sprawl and the result is that the greater Johannesburg region covers an area exceeding 500 km² – an urban planner's nightmare.**

particular linking Soweto with the rest of Johannesburg. The Inner City still sees much through-movement but fewer people see it as a destination.

The gradual erosion of apartheid during the 1980s saw the Inner City and the flatlands of Hillbrow become increasingly more cosmopolitan as these areas became racially more integrated as the authorities gave up enforcing certain aspects of racial separation.[5] Crankshaw and White report that in the mid-1970s only a very small percentage of Inner City residents were black.[6]

By 1985 the proportion of black tenants was estimated at around 30%, by 1988 it had risen to 46% and by the end of 1991 it stood at 68%.[7] By 2001 only a very small percentage of the residents was white.

The central location of the Inner City and the flatlands was particularly attractive to the working black classes who migrated there *en masse*. The result was a cosmopolitan centre with a mix-match of cultures. It is important to emphasise that although the racial desegregation of Inner City flats has been associated with overcrowding and structural decay, the issue is one of economics and not of race.

North American scholars have attempted to explain why Inner City decay there has been accompanied by racial transition and most agree that this is simply because black Inner City residents are usually poor and thus it is fundamentally about the changing class composition of the residential population.[8]

Landlords start to neglect their properties which leads to a vicious circle of overcrowding and rent boycotts.[9] The cycle has a common denominator, namely the age of the apartment buildings. The older buildings need extensive renovations but are located in undesirable areas where property values are low and which financial institutions have red-lined. These apartments attract the poorest residents who are more likely to overcrowd their residences and thus put more strain on the decaying services. Landlords react by withdrawing their maintenance and direct administration of their properties.[10]

Illegal immigrants from the rest of Africa poured into these regions in the mid-1990s as a result of the police's inability to control these areas. As crime and grime spread, businesses reacted by following the white residents to the north.

(It should be mentioned that the emerging post-apartheid black elite is as unreceptive to the Inner City as their white coun-

terparts. Big black business has located itself in the northern suburbs too.) For example, only three of the seven largest accounting firms retain their head offices in the Inner City. Likewise, in 1981, seven of the top fifteen advertising agencies were based in the City Centre, but by 1994 there were none.[11] Even the Johannesburg Stock Exchange recently moved out of the City Centre.

Although 76% of the top 100 companies have head offices in Gauteng, only 7% are located in the Johannesburg CBD, compared with at least 26% in late 1993.[12] The outward migration of residents and businesses has resulted in urban sprawl and the result is that the greater Johannesburg region covers an area exceeding 500 km² – an urban planner's nightmare.

The decay of the Johannesburg Inner City

The Johannesburg economy is undergoing major changes.[13] There is a broad shift away from mining to manufacturing and more recently to the service sector. The finance and business sector contributes about 30% of the city's economy. Recently there has been a proliferation of the IT, media and related services sectors, particularly in the northern suburbs. These trends indicate the need to redirect the composition and skills levels of the current labour force to complement these new trends. Critical challenges face the city and need to be addressed to transform Johannesburg into a world class city:

- Significant change in its economic base
- The rapid growth in urbanisation
- Urban sprawl coupled with spatial inequalities
- Changing nature of the Inner City and the CBD in particular
- Declining levels of municipal service provision and maintenance
- Lack of an extensive public transportation system.[14]

Manufacturing[15]

The manufacturing sector has been one of the worst affected sectors in the Inner City. Employment losses have resulted from closures and relocations to newer industrial areas in the greater Johannesburg region. The flight of manufacturing away from the Inner City of Johannesburg can be explained by a combination of factors:

- The unsuitable character of the area's multi-storeyed industrial property to the needs of modern industrial processes;
- A lack of investment by developers in new forms of industrial space;
- Growing problems of crime and violence;
- The pull of new industrial townships that have opened in both the inner and outer zones of the Witwatersrand.

The greatest employment losses between 1980 and 1994 occurred in the sectors of clothing, food, fabricated metals and jewellery manufacture (bearing in mind that in 1994, nearly two thirds of the area's manufacturing base were in clothing, printing, textiles and jewellery).

In 1980 the Inner City had an estimated 232 clothing factory establishments with nearly 15 000 employees; but by 1999 this was reduced to 111 offering only 9 000 employment opportunities. However, despite this decline, the clothing sector still represents the single largest industrial sector in the Inner City, contributing nearly one-third of manufacturing employment.[16] The bulk of the formal production occurs in factories owned by Asian entrepreneurs, most of whom have been in this business for long periods and are therefore well established.

However, there has also been a recent surge of informal clothing manufacturers dominated by black entrepreneurs,

Figure 1: Vacancy trends for A&B grade property in the CBD and Braamfontein since 1996.

— Vacancy Rate A - CBD   — Vacancy Rate A – Braamfontein

increasingly foreign. The clothing sector is one of the major growth points in the emerging SMME economy of the Inner City.

Jewellery is also an important sector in the Inner City. There are currently attempts to revive the industry through the establishment of Jewel City, a cluster of manufacturing and retail activities. The jewellery sector has been hit by both national and local factors, including negative perceptions of the Inner City, crime levels, and the decline in international tourists visiting the Inner City.[17]

The retail mix of the Inner City has shifted to serve the African consumer with the departure of many companies to the Northern suburbs (especially to suburban malls) and the fundamentally restructured racial mix of the Inner City working and residential population. General dealers with links to the informal sector have replaced high order retail outlets as a result of the extremely rapid growth of informal traders.[18] It is important to note that the retail sector is not collapsing but rather changing and the vacancy pattern remains low.

In 1994 the Inner City comprised 428 wholesaling establishments and this has risen as more retailers shifted towards serving hawkers. More than half of the wholesaling establishments are represented in textiles, footwear and clothing (one fifth), machinery and equipment for industrial and business purposes, precious stones, jewellery and silverware, and books and stationery.

In 1994 there were 1 250 retail establishments in the Inner City. The most prevalent forms of retail activity are general outfitters, dealers in furniture and household appliances, grocers, men's outfitters, and jewellers. Tourist shoppers from Southern Africa reportedly contributed R1.4 billion to Johannesburg's retail turnover for export purposes in 1998.[19] New research shows that around R10 billion was spent by African retail tourists in the city in 2001, which is double the amount of R4.7 billion for 1998, and the Inner City is the primary beneficiary of this phenomenon.[20]

Since 1993 there has also been a noticeable rise in the number of black-owned microenterprises establishing within the Inner City. Several pull factors are responsible for this, including enhanced market access, proximity to suppliers, agglomeration

benefits, transport facilities, and the availability of space. Disadvantages of the Inner City are high rentals (relative to the townships), excessive competition, hawkers and crime.[21]

This demonstrates the tremendous changes which have occurred in the nature of businesses active in the Inner City. An enormous number of people still frequent the City Centre and undertake their shopping there but these are now almost exclusively from the lower income groups.

Property market[22]

The CBD remains the most important office block area in the country with 3 million m² of office space, representing a R19 billion investment. Much of it faces decay and under-utilisation. The interests of property owners are of critical concern as regards the sustainability of the Inner City as their decision to maintain or abandon property can determine the future of the city.

Aside from the sale of the Carlton Centre (Johannesburg's tallest skyscraper) to Transnet (a parastatal), which is expected to bring several thousand workers into the area with the accompanying spin-offs to adjacent areas, CBD office brokers report that the node is seeing little new activity although enquiries are on the rise. Top CBD gross office rentals achieved for A-grade space are approximately R32/m². In contrast, in the wealthy northern suburbs such as Sandton, A-grade office rentals are twice those of the Johannesburg CBD.

> The retail mix of the Inner City has shifted to serve the African consumer with the departure of many companies to the Northern suburbs (especially to suburban malls)

The latter also has the lowest CBD office rentals when compared to other major South African cities. The Sandton node continues to experience high levels of demand and brokers are starting to report an under-supply of premier office space although a number of new luxurious office blocks are soon to be constructed which will considerably alter the dynamics.

With regard to retailing, a JHI survey of the Inner City in 1999 found that 65% of shoppers interviewed reported a gross monthly income of less than R3 999, while 52% indicated their race group as black. This underpins the move towards goods aimed at lower-income, black shoppers and a growing preference for cash-based retail businesses.

During 1998/99 just over half of new property projects in greater Johannesburg were aimed at the office market, 27.2% at the retail, 12.6% industrial, and 9.7% hotel market. Disconcertingly, only 0.97% of these new projects were located within the Johannesburg CBD, whilst Sandton attracted 32%, the East Rand 19.4%, the northern suburbs 10.7%, and Midrand (a rapidly growing area between Johannesburg and Pretoria) 9.7%.

Vacancy rates (A&B) in the CBD have been showing a rising trend since the mid-1990s reaching an apex in December 1999 at 24.8%, but it is encouraging to note that the trend is now stable. The CBD remains the most important office block area in the country.

Inner city views

Tourist shoppers: approximately 500 000 per annum

Number of dwelling units: 42 721

Number of businesses: 8 704

Informal traders: 10 000 (a recent study estimated this sector's turnover to be worth R4.2 billion a year)

Value of investment: office buildings represent a R19 billion investment, R1.2 billion capital investment in housing

Office space: 3 million m^2 (57% of that available in Durban, Cape Town and Pretoria combined)

Resident population: 217 000

Daily commuters through the Inner City: 800 000.

Crime and grime are overwhelmingly the greatest concerns. The BID areas are clearly working because people went out of their way to single them out as successes. Interestingly, people do not just want a clean, sterile city but want the city buzz. This links up with the need for a cultural strategy which introduces a vibrant street culture; 85% of respondents were of the opinion that there was not enough entertainment in the City Centre. People also lamented the absence of street cafes, bookshops and quality merchandise. They felt that these would lure tourists back.

The overwhelming perception of the Inner City is that it is unsafe: 70% of respondents did not feel safe outdoors although they pointed out that they felt quite safe in the BID areas. Current policing efforts were felt to be inadequate even with the introduction of closed circuit television.

Inadequate lighting, litter and graffiti were also seen as problematic by more than two-thirds of the respondents. Linked to this issue is informal trading and mini-bus taxis, as 90% felt that the relocation of these to designated areas would have a very positive impact on the City Centre.

According to SAPOA the total office rentable area m^2 in the CBD of A and B grades amounts to 1 723 806 whilst Braamfontein has a further 427 788. By way of comparison, the Sandton area has 1 064 691m^2 of A and B grades for rent.

When examining the vacancy trend in the CBD it is important to keep new office developments in Johannesburg in mind. The reality is that we are seeing many new developments which are bound to affect existing areas negatively. The CBD thus appears to be holding its own. The average take-up of office space in Greater Johannesburg between 1991 and 2000 has been in the order of 170 000 m^2 whilst the average annual supply has been around 277 000 m^2, suggesting that on average there has been around 60% more supply than take-up.

The over-supply of property in Johannesburg tends to affect B-grade property more severely and thus the trend in this category tends to be more volatile, while A-grade property in the City Centre is demonstrating a stable and declining trend from its peak in 1999. A major problem in the Inner City is that, effectively, operating costs like rates and taxes are still payable, even if there are no tenants in the building. Thus, even in buildings with high vacancies, the investor carries the burden of additional costs. This leads to enormous neglect of buildings which then infects the surrounding area. Part of the regeneration efforts are thus linked to the razing of strategic neglected buildings.

Figure 1 illustrates the vacancy trends for A&B grade property in the CBD and Braamfontein since 1996.

Perceptions and attitudes of Inner City businesses

This section presents the primary results from a survey that was conducted among formal businesses operating in the City Centre. It should be borne in mind that significant efforts and plans have been in place for a few years now in the Inner City, including Business Improvement Districts. The results show that there is a lot of goodwill towards the CBD amongst businesses in the City Centre. The people that have remained are committed to making it work. They want it to succeed and clearly see strong, visionary management as the key to its success.

would have a very positive impact on the City Centre. Encouragingly, it appears that people are not against the concept of informal trading and mini-bus taxis, but are anxious about the lack of control regarding this sector. Concern was also expressed about the lack of hygiene associated with food stalls and the litter. There were calls for quotas to be introduced, laws to be enforced, and generally for this sector to be better managed and regulated.

Businesses were asked which single attribute of the City Centre has the most positive effect on their business and similarly what draws most people to the area. Some of the responses include: transport hub, convenience of public transport for both employees and customers, easy highway access, variety of shopping/facilities available for people in the township, increased security of late relating to the BIDs, significant foot traffic, and the black trade.

As regards the most negative effect on their business, some responses were: lack of white trade, crime (the most frequent response) and grime, unmanaged informal traders leading to congestion, and taxis and hawkers (second most frequent response).

Almost everyone felt that media coverage of the City Centre did not reflect the reality. The media only focused on the negative and little had been said about the improvements via the BIDs and positive developments like Gandhi Square and the pedestrianisation of Main Street at Anglo American. Lastly, respondents were asked to rank the issues of most importance in relation to the City Centre.

They were in order of importance: safety and security; litter, cleaning and grime; public environment; street and pavement lighting; mini-bus taxis; social issues; and marketing. These priority issues should inform the regeneration plans for the Inner City.

The survey of businesses indicates that although the situation deteriorated dramatically at one stage, it is now starting to turn. Less than a third of respondents felt that the management, cleanliness and orderliness of the City Centre had not improved over the previous year. Again less than a third were not optimistic about the prospects for the Inner City. This indicates that there is

still much goodwill amongst residents and businesses that can be capitalised upon in the regeneration of the area. The steps associated with the BIDS have already borne much fruit and the future plans hold much promise for real development.

The regeneration of the Inner City

Johannesburg has several key competitive advantages which should underlie a strategic framework for the economic development of the city and its Inner City. These include:

- Johannesburg is the economic centre of South Africa and contributes 11% to national GDP;
- It is the financial capital of sub-Saharan Africa with the largest concentration of foreign banks of any city, and houses Africa's largest stock exchange;
- Greater Johannesburg is the largest city in South Africa with a population of around four million people, surrounded by a densely populated industrial hinterland;
- Johannesburg is a truly international city with a variety of international organisations, multinational corporations and global financial intermediaries;
- It is the prime tourist and shopping destination for South Africa's 5.2 million annual tourists (4.1 million from Africa): 83% of all tourists who fly into South Africa do so through Johannesburg International Airport and 66% of those spend three days or more in the city;
- Johannesburg has by far the busiest airport on the African continent and services all major international destinations – it is becoming the gateway to sub-Saharan Africa;

The central location of the Inner City and the flatlands was particularly attractive to the working black classes who migrated there en masse. The result was a cosmopolitan centre with a mismatch of cultures.

- Johannesburg is the provincial capital of Gauteng (the economic powerhouse of South Africa), and hosts the provincial government;
- It is the locus of higher education in Africa with a large number of universities and colleges, both local and international;
- It is widely regarded as the cultural hub of South Africa with a large number of theatres, museums, galleries, dance, drama, instrumental and vocal companies, and other entertainment venues;
- Johannesburg is the most important information technology centre in Africa.

Within Greater Johannesburg, the Inner City represents the city's most vibrant and cosmopolitan asset – it is the heartland of the city.

The Inner City is the economic pulse of Johannesburg. It is the link between all Johannesburg's constituent parts and Greater Johannesburg relies on its well-being. A recent report by the Centre for Development and Enterprise in fact implies that too much attention has been focused on the Inner City.[23] However, this underestimates the importance of this area for the well-being of the rest of the city's economy. Also, the CBD is not being revived at the expense of the northern suburbs.

The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC) has long recognised the critical importance of strengthening local economic development in the city, and has included the Inner City as one its planned Priority Intervention Zones. Furthermore, it acknowledges the need for public sector-led intervention in areas of significant municipal and provincial importance, or where substantial council or provincial assets exist.

Given the importance of economic growth in assisting Johannesburg to achieve its target of attaining 'African world-city status', the city needs a new vehicle (such as an urban development corporation) that can carry out development activities more efficiently and effectively. The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) is the city's response to these challenges.

The JDA provides an activity focus for the partnership of stakeholders who have an immediate vested interest in the economic well-being of the city.

These partners include the GJMC, the Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG) and its investment arm Blue IQ, the private business community, the non-governmental organisation sector, and educational and cultural institutions. The City Centre focus will also capitalise on the past three years of building relationships, formulating and implementing projects with the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) and Johannesburg Inner City Business Coalition (JICBC), and facilitate the maintenance of future linkages.

Specifically, the purpose of the JDA is to:
- Promote economic development for the City (in the form of jobs and wealth creation) as its prime objective;
- Use City assets as inputs (especially under-utilised assets, land, property);
- Use City leverage as inputs (especially regulatory powers and finance);
- Create a formal link to the private sector to facilitate the establishment of Public-Private Partnerships;

Among the various regeneration projects which hold opportunities are the upgrading of the Inner City's railway stations and environs, including development of an inter-modal transport interchange and manufacturing, market and commercial retail opportunities.

- Respond to private sector preferences that necessitate the creation of a separate entity for sustained and/or increased partnership and involvement.

By vesting developmental responsibilities for certain projects, areas and sectors in the JDA, the new GJMC core administration will be able to concentrate on getting the basics right – institutionalising the new unicity governance structure, and ensuring equitable and improved service delivery across the city.

The *raison d'être* of an Inner City Urban Development Corporation (UDC) is developmental. There are specific areas where it has the potential to perform better and add more value than other options, namely promotion, co-ordination, customer focus, finance, independence, complex projects and programmes, fast-tracking decisions, asset development and management, and speedier timeframes.

In other words, it can act outside the bureaucratic parameters of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC) and respond more effectively to business needs. There are a number of critical design principles and expectations that should underpin the design of an Inner City UDC: a high performance organisation structured for high productivity; incentivised staffing remuneration; lean 'core' administration supported by technical expertise; flexibility in operations built around a multi-disciplinary team; and tight monitoring and evaluation of activities, projects and programmes against agreed targets and indicators.

As an urban development corporation, the JDA's project development roles will include the following:

- Project packaging, facilitation, management and leadership, including formation of public and/or private partnerships for large scale projects;
- Establishing Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and/or associated companies to carry out specific projects, limit risk and meet project financiers' requirements;
- Acting as developer on catalyst projects, to be either sold on or held within the JDA's portfolio to provide income streams;
- Marketing, promotion and communication for projects, sectors and locales;
- Co-ordination of public, private and civil society elements;
- Provision of venture capital and development finance, and taking returns on investment commensurate with risk;
- Acting as an agency on behalf of the GJMC, the Gauteng Provincial Government and other stakeholders to provide transactional and asset management services.

There are two specific projects that are of strategic importance in the revitalisation of the City Centre. The development of the precincts at Constitution Hill and Greater Newtown will be flagships of the JDA's project programme in terms of their national and international profile, their levels of public and private investment, and their contribution to boosting the confidence and image of the City Centre. Blue IQ, the Gauteng Provincial Government's multi-billion rand infrastructure development vehicle, is a partner in both these initiatives.

Constitution Hill Precinct

The Constitution Hill Precinct is located between Braamfontein and Hillbrow (just to the north of the CBD), and comprises up to 95 000 m² of publicly owned land and properties. It hosts important heritage buildings, including the Old Fort, Section 4

> South Africa is only now becoming aware of the potential role of culture in economic development. Cultural industries have played an important role in urban revitalisation in Europe and America.

and 5 ('Native Gaol') and the Women's Prison. Part of the site is to be developed for the new Constitutional Court. A significant proportion of the site has good potential to be developed for commercial office use. The largely vacant historic buildings have to be preserved and given uses that complement and enhance the possibilities of this important site. Given its historical significance it has potential as a tourist site.

Capital finance has been allocated from the Department of Justice for the Court, and the Gauteng Provincial Government for infrastructure. GJMC has programmed a capital allocation for precinct development subject to budget approval.

The JDA will be initially responsible for creating an integrated strategy, programme and development vehicle for the precinct. By structuring the correct development vehicle, the project can accrue the benefits of private sector investment through developing commercial offices in the precinct, increasing the city's rates base, creating jobs and increasing its development impact. Depending on how the project is structured and phased, the private sector development component of the precinct could realise investment of between R240–R400 million. The JDA will then manage the project via the special purpose vehicle until completion.

Greater Newtown Precinct

Considerable effort has gone into planning and providing infrastructure to realise the potential of the Greater Newtown

precinct. The JDA will initially be responsible for creating a development vehicle for the regeneration of the area and creating a viable cultural and creative industries precinct. This structure will form the channel for capital investment, development of Council and (potentially) privately owned land and properties, urban management, infrastructure development and management, and marketing and promotion. Capital finance has been programmed from the GJMC for public infrastructure and the GPG.

Newtown has an immense role to play in the regeneration of the Inner City as the cultural and creative hub of the city. It currently houses the world famous Market Theatre as well as numerous museums and musical venues. It is in severe disrepair but its strategic location adjacent to the banking and mining houses makes it a pivotal point in the redevelopment of the city.

South Africa is only now becoming aware of the potential role of culture in economic development. Cultural industries have played an important role in urban revitalisation in Europe and America. Cultural industries also have large multiplier effects which benefit restaurants, retailers and so forth. By way of example, the theatre industry in New York City, centred in Times Square, contributes over $2.3 billion to the economy of NYC and supports over 25 000 jobs. The spin-off effects are immense, with one fifth of New York City's hotel rooms to be found in Times Square, as well as 277 eateries and major retailers.[24]

Key themes or areas for potential cultural tourism in South Africa include ethnic tourism, political tourism, arts and crafts, food and drink, and heritage circuits.[25] Johannesburg is uniquely positioned to exploit all these facets with the Newtown Cultural Precinct representing the focus of such a programme. Ethnic and cultural tourism can be exploited in the area around the Mai-Mai bazaar, while Pageview/Fordsburg offers opportunities in political tourism. The potential for heritage tourism can be found in the numerous Art Deco buildings in the Inner City, gay tourism centred around Braamfontein, and sports tourism around Ellis Park.

The Newtown project also entails a number of mixed-income housing projects to create middle and working-class housing, underpinned by a social housing programme. These projects have proved to be enormously successful with 100% occupancy rates. The JDA wants to see about 5 000 units in the Newtown area within a couple of years. This is an essential element of creating a 24-hour city. Residential vacancy rates are on the way down in many parts of the Inner City and residents have voiced their approval of attempts to clean up the city.

In addition there are various other regeneration projects where the JDA could, in terms of its specific mandate, be responsible for development co-ordination to realise opportunities in:

- Upgrading Faraday Station and environs, including development of an inter-modal transport interchange and manufacturing, market and commercial retail opportunities.
- Upgrading Jeppe Station, with associated transport, market and retail facilities, and linked housing opportunities.
- Supporting the expansion of Jewel City and Garment District, by facilitating integrated development, introduction of a City Improvement District and environmental upgrade. Jewel City comprises 40 000 m² of factory and office space, housing 80% of Gauteng's diamond and jewellery industry.
- Strengthening the Wits-Braamfontein Corridor, a partnership between the University of the Witwatersrand, Braamfontein stakeholders and community, as well as facilitating the establishment of a City Improvement District. The JDA will also support the development of the Wits Cultural Campus to strengthen connections to the Civic Theatre and Constitution

Hill, and to Greater Newtown. The long-term vision is to create a cultural arc from the constitutional precinct to the immediate north, the civic theatre to the immediate west, the university's cultural precinct just to the west, the gay heartland adjacent to the university, and then through a new bridge to the Newtown cultural precinct to the south.

These are some of the ambitious plans to turn the City Centre around. Another important dimension is the intention to extend the BID areas to cover the entire JDA geographical area. To ensure its success it is essential that the JDA set clearly defined performance criteria against the goals outlined by the Founding Shareholders:

1 To create jobs, development and housing opportunities in the City Centre;
2 To increase the rates base of the City Centre;
3 To boost Johannesburg's image as a place to live, invest and visit through national and international recognition of the transformation of the City Centre;
4 To respond to and realise the aspirations of the whole population of Johannesburg as regards the quality of services and opportunities provided to them in the City Centre.

It is critical to continually monitor what progress is being made towards achieving the vision of urban renewal. A clear set of relevant key performance indicators will be utilised in the setting of performance targets for the JDA. These indicators are in line with the goals outlined by the Founding Shareholders. The management of the JDA will be accountable to ensure it fulfils its founding goals and vision and needs to keep these key performance indicators in mind throughout its operation.

Conclusion

The African renaissance is heavily dependent on South Africa's development performance, which cannot happen without Johannesburg's success, and this is unlikely without the regeneration of the Inner City. The decay of the Inner City has been dramatic and rapid and the intervention needs to be likewise. There are many international examples of cities which have faced the same predicament as that of Johannesburg and which have, with concerted effort, becoming thriving centres again. However, this cannot happen without substantial intervention because it appears that the market has dismissed the Inner City.

The regeneration plans outlined are not intended to deny the city's 'Africaness' but rather to make sure that it is a flourishing, well-managed, 24-hour centre. This in fact necessitates that we exploit and market its very 'Africaness'. Johannesburg has the potential to be Africa's great city and the JDA will be the custodian of this vision.

John Luiz is with the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. This paper builds upon work undertaken by the author together with Steve Topham and Daniel Manyindo.

Notes & references

1 *Johannesburg — One Hundred Years.* Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1986.
2 Johannesburg was often referred to as 'Little New York' and the 'Wonder of the Empire'. Ibid.
3 The construction boom is partly accounted for by the increasing isolation of the South African economy as a result of the growing unrest in the country following the riots at Sharpeville. The government resorted to increasing foreign exchange controls as well as import and export controls. This meant that there were few avenues available for investment. This saw the rise of very diversified conglomerates which were the main investors in the construction boom.
4 Unfortunately these same banks have red-lined these areas and are reluctant to make loans for property in the Inner City.
5 Already by the late 1970s landlords in the Inner City were finding it difficult to fill their apartments with white residents and many apartments stood vacant. In fact in 1985 it was estimated that there was a surplus of 20 405 dwellings for whites in Johannesburg whilst a tremendous backlog existed for blacks. Landlords, in an attempt to remain solvent, started flouting laws prohibiting black residents in white areas and the Inner City became a mixed area. Cited in O Crankshaw and C White, 'Racial desegregation and Inner City decay in Johannesburg', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol 19, no 4, 1995, p 629.
6 Ibid., p 628.

7 This is partly accounted for by the lack of adequate housing in the townships and the large influx of migrants from the rest of Africa.
8 K Bradbury, A Downs and K Small, *Urban decline and the future of American cities*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1982; R Taub, D Taylor and J Dunham, *Paths of neighbourhood change: Race and crime in urban America*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
9 There are 35 000 residential apartments in Central Johannesburg which used to be for an occupancy of 60 000, but in 1995, the same number of apartments accommodated 110 000 people as a result of overcrowding. AL Mabele, 'Impact of change of economic activity on planning for the environmental regeneration of central Johannesburg city: A case study of a Third World metroplex', MSc in Development Planning, University of the Witwatersrand, 1999, p 27.
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12 Cited in DC Stainer, 'A tale of two cities: A comparison between the Detroit and Johannesburg urban experience', MSc in Building, University of the Witwatersrand, 1999, p 39.
13 See IGoli 2010 Partnership: Business Plan.
14 There has been much written about the nature and definition of world cities. This lies beyond the scope of this paper but suffice it to say that Johannesburg was initially classified as a world class city of secondary status by one of

the foremost experts on the subject, John Friedmann, who subsequently withdrew his classification. The result was that no city in Africa qualified for world city status. See P Knox and P Taylor, *World Cities in a World System*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; F Lo and Y Yeung, *Globalization and the World of Large Cities*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998.
15 This section is based upon Tomlinson and Rogerson 1999.
16 C Rogerson, 'Inner-city economic revitalisation through cluster support: The Johannesburg clothing industry', *Urban Forum*, vol 12, no 1, 2001, p 57.
17 Tomlinson and Rogerson 1999.
18 Trade liberalisation has been the catalyst for this trend as it has led to a flood of cheap clothing imports which is aimed primarily at the informal markets.
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22 Derived from *The South African Property Report 2000*, Johannesburg: JHI, 2000; *Office Vacancy Survey*, Johannesburg: SAPOA, 1996-2000.
23 Centre for Development and Enterprise, *Johannesburg: Africa's World City — A Challenge to Action*, Johannesburg:CDE, 2002.
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South Africa's military potency:

TOO LEAN, OR TOO MEAN?

What price is South Africa prepared to pay for its security in a potentially unstable neighbourhood and global community? **By Theo Neethling**

During the early 1990s South Africa saw the demise of the apartheid political system. At the same time the country, like most of the world, witnessed a reduction in defence expenditure: the defence budget was cut by 50% in real terms between 1989 and 1997. This is widely believed to have had serious implications in terms of the maintenance of bases and equipment and for the ability of the military to perform its primary and secondary functions – and ultimately for force readiness.[1] Yet, some analysts and commentators still see South Africa as "relatively highly militarised" with a "large military strength".[2]

In particular, the announcement in November 1998 that Cabinet had approved a two-phase weapons purchase programme requiring an initial payout over eight years of R21,3 billion, with the option of spending an additional R8,5 billion by 2004, sparked a debate on the necessity of spending taxpayers' money on defence requirements. The following statement was typical of the reaction on the part of anti-militarist groupings: "The Cabinet has its priorities very screwed up, to spend R29-billion on armaments while it is cutting back on essential services such as health, education and the police".[3]

The beliefs and efforts of pressure groups must be viewed in the broader context of international initiatives to exert pressure on developing states to cut back on military spending and inventories. This also forms part of post-Cold War initiatives in the international community to encourage progress in the demilitarisation of global politics. For many people, at the end of the Cold War there was hope for peace, stability and a stronger focus on human development rather than on military power. The concept of defence conversion also became a prominent issue on the international agenda with the idea that the redundant military resources could now be converted for civilian use.[4]

But while some individuals and role-players have been critical of the acquisition of new military equipment, other commentators came out in support of the defence acquisition package:

> Generals are at least as talented at inducing apocalypse as they are at presenting themselves as the only defence against it. So it is not always sensible to believe their dire predictions. Yet, in the case of the SANDF, our generals appear to have a good case. Almost everyone with a claim to some military expertise – from military commanders to security analysts and opposition defence spokespeople – agrees that the SANDF is woefully inadequately equipped and underfunded.[5]

Ultimately, the question that needs to be addressed is whether excessive or unnecessary military spending prevails in South Africa – spending that detracts from the nation's financial health and its prospects for economic advancement. To this end, this article reflects upon South Africa's military potency in a regional and international context. Specifically, it provides a perspective on South Africa's declining military potency in the 1990s and assesses the country's military power against the background of tendencies and trends in other African states and further afield.

Background to South Africa's military potency

A continuous decline in military spending has been a major feature of South Africa's budgeting over the past decade. In fact, where the defence budget was at 4,6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1989/1990, it decreased to just 1,6% of the GDP in 1999/2000.[6] Currently, the country's defence expenditure is at 1,7% of the GDP.[7] In order to ensure sustainability, the defence budget allocation, according to policy outlined in the

ALL AIR, NO FORCE? *Because of ageing equipment and shortages of spares, the SA Air Force is battling to maintain an effective deterrent and a minimal fighting component in the air.*

South African Defence Review of 1998, should be approximately R18.5-billion. However, the defence budgets of the past years have been fixed at figures somewhat below this.[8] In an overall sense, due to cuts in defence spending, there has been a down-scaling of the military and as a result a number of bases have become redundant.

The declining defence budget has also translated into a cut in the personnel budget of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). As a result, plans were tabled to reduce SANDF personnel from 93 000 to 70 000 by the end of 2001.[9] In May 2002, Deputy Defence Minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge announced a 'new' human resource strategy for the SANDF – specifically that the SANDF would only be 60 000 strong. This figure would include civilian and support staff, as the force of 70 000 was "neither sustainable or affordable".[10]

It should also be said that the final years of apartheid saw increasing civil disobedience and low-level guerilla activity in South Africa's townships. Therefore, budgets were shifted to favour the army, police and counter-revolutionary social spending. Consequently, the main equipment of the South African Navy (SAN) and the South African Air Force (SAAF) was allowed to run down. In a similar vein, it became evident that the SAAF desperately needed rejuvenation by way of new equipment.[11]

The navy, whose task it is to patrol our long coastline, is barely functional. But the non-availability of spare parts

internationally for South Africa's three ageing submarines makes keeping them serviceable so expensive that, at any one time, only one submarine is seaworthy. Moreover, two of six strike craft and at least five mine hunters and minesweepers have either been decommissioned, placed in reserve or cannibalised for spares in recent years.

The air force's difficulties are similar. Because of the age of the equipment and shortages of spares, the air force is battling to maintain an effective deterrent and a minimal fighting component in the air. A significant proportion of attack craft – about 12 Impala fighters/trainers, 22 Mirage fighters, and 14 Cheetahs (South African-built variants of the Mirage) are out of commission or have been scrapped.[12]

Against this background Cabinet decided in 1998 that South Africa would procure the following military equipment:

- 9 dual-seater Gripen and 12 Hawk aircraft from British Aerospace/SAAB to replace the SAAF's Cheetah and Impala Aircraft. A further option was taken on the balance of the 12 Hawk Aircraft and 19 single-seater Gripens.
- 30 light utility helicopters from the Italian helicopter manufacturer, Agusta, which would replace the Alouette helicopters, which have been in service since 1962.
- 4 patrol corvettes from the German Frigate Consortium to replace the present ageing strike craft of the SAN, which have been in service since 1979.

- Three submarines from the German Submarine Consortium, which would replace the Daphne submarines, which have been in service since 1971.[13]

The cost of the equipment package was estimated at R21,3-billion over a period of eight years. If the option to procure additional equipment were exercised, the total cost would rise by R8,5-billion to R29,9-billion over 12 years. Cabinet's decision was based on the Defence Review, which determined that the specific force design required for South Africa should be a high-technology core force, sized for peacetime, but which could be expanded to meet an emerging threat. Importantly, the deal was combined with certain offset arrangements spanning a variety of industrial sectors and underpinning the government's industrial strategy.[14] Yet, immediately after the announcement of the government's plans to equip the SANDF with new military hardware, anti-militarist lobby groups accused the government of having its priorities "very screwed up".[15] As one journalist remarked:

> Pressure groups argue that the military industry has no role in post-apartheid SA. They say that the 21,3bn spent on arms could have been put to better use in developing projects.[16]

Today, many questions still hang in mid-air as regards the merits of defence spending at a time of desperately needed social spending in South Africa – questions which are difficult to clarify in the dust of the battle. Unfortunately, the merits of the procurement of new military hardware have been further clouded as a result of allegations that there were conflicts of interests and ethics violations in the concluding of contracts. Also, an acknowledgement on the part of the government that South Africa could eventually pay more than R50 billion, compared with the initial R29,9 billion estimated in 1999 (mainly due to the depreciation in the rand towards the end of 2001) did not help much in bringing sobriety on the issue.[17]

Responding to never-ending conflict and insecurity

If ever a government feels the need to waste a large amount of money it can resort to military spending to do so, for there are few items as expensive as modern military hardware. Recruiting, training and equipping modern armed forces constitutes a very expensive burden for nations all over the world. Therefore, anti-militarist bodies in South Africa can rightfully claim that they would like to see resources used for more productive purposes.

Yet, from a security perspective, it should be borne in mind that the world will never be free of the threat of war or insecurity. When the Cold War ended in 1989, it appeared reasonable to contemplate a serious new look at prospects for demilitarising international relations. Cold War rivalry – which had fuelled military budgets and powered the search for new weapons technologies – was over, and it seemed that a new era of global harmony might be possible.

However, the ending of the Cold War saw ethnicity replace ideology as the engine of conflict, notably in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Militant religious groups, as in Afghanistan, Algeria and the Philippines, were further agents of instability. In addition, the availability of military hardware and guns in the aftermath of the Cold War has been instrumental in the growth of warlordism and fierce fighting in collapsing or collapsed states.

In fact, more than 60 armed conflicts scarred the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall, ranging from Guatemala to Cambodia, and from Sierra Leone to Sudan and Sri Lanka. Most of these conflicts did not involve only states, which by century's end had lost their monopoly on organised violence, but also irregular armies, tribal or ethnic militias, warlords and political organisations. Moreover, with chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons within the close reach of so-called rogue states, maverick groups and millenarian sects, it would be unrealistic to claim that war had been forever banished to the margins of mankind's existence.

Conflict comes in different guises but the danger escalates. The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York and the ramifications of this event have underscored the fact that the world has not been freed of conflict or from the threat of war and violence. The intensification of conflict following 11 September has also proved that even a superpower may be targeted and experience the harsh effects of insecurity.

However, military power cannot solve all problems of insecurity and the situation sketched above does not imply that South Africa necessarily needs a large, modern armed force or to spend on defence at relatively high levels. Therefore, the government should be commended for its minimalist approach by not adding the replacement of South Africa's present inventory of main battle tanks to the arms procurement package.[18]

Also important is the fact that the intended weapons purchase programme has been the result of a drawn-out, consultative process in which considerable emphasis has been placed on favourable terms, facilitated by soft loans, with long-term repayments, at low interest rates and backed by credit guarantees.

Of course, investment in the local industrial sector has also been considered. It is also encouraging to note that there has been healthy dialogue between the Ministry of Defence and anti-militarist lobby groups since 1994. It has been reported earlier that the military and anti-militarists managed to agree on certain fundamental issues, including

- concern for human security and for meeting the socio-economic needs of South Africans;
- a commitment that military force would be used only as a last resort.[19]

TORPEDOED: *The non-availability of spare parts internationally for South Africa's three ageing submarines makes keeping them serviceable so expensive that, at any one time, only one submarine is seaworthy.*

Table 1: Military Potency Index, 1998

Rank	Country	1996	1997	Rank	Country	1996	1997
1	United States	10,11	10.08	26	Argentina	6,55	6,61
2	People's Rep. China	8,63	8,65	27	Iraq	6,63	6,55
3	Russia	8,68	8,43	28	Netherlands	6,73	6,52
4	France	8,29	8,25	29	Kuwait	6,28	6,51
5	United Kingdom	8,24	8,24	30	Oman	6,47	6,49
6	South Korea	7,99	8,00	31	Greece	6,48	8,45
7	North Korea	7,9)	7,99	32	Burma	6,44	6,43
8	India	7,83	7,90	33	Malaysia	6,39	6,38
9	Saudi Arabia	7,64	7,73	34	Canada	6,43	6,34
10	Japan	7,61	7,58	35	Norway	6,33	6,27
11	Israel	7,43	7,42	36	Mexico	6,27	6,26
12	Italy	7,47	7,41	37	Poland	6,37	6,26
13	Taiwan	7,50	7,39	38	Vietnam	6,69	6,24
14	Germany	7,42	7,33	39	United Arab Emirates	6,30	6,19
15	Brazil	6,80	7,22	40	Sweden	6,45	6,17
16	Pakistan	7,28	7,20	41	Ukraine	6,18	6,11
17	Iran	6,79	6,96	42	Chile	6,11	6,10
18	Turkey	6,77	6,78	43	Portugal	6,00	6,04
19	Egypt	6,78	6,75	44	Yugoslavia	6,37	6,03
20	Spain	6,87	6,75	45	South Africa	6,36	6,03
21	Austria	6,69	6,71	46	Belgium	6,12	5,93
22	Indonesia	6,64	6,71	47	Switzerland	6,00	5,91
23	Singapore	6,45	6,67	48	Romania	5,87	5,88
24	Syria	6,81	6,66	49	Finland	6,02	5,87
25	Thailand	6,71	6,66	50	Morocco	5,72	5,83

support for it. Although the index is said to be a fairly subjective evaluation, it nonetheless has some validity and confirms what many analysts have maintained since the mid-1990s. South Africa's defence status was directly related to its defence budget, which had seen many years of consecutive cuts. Note the first 50 positions in Table 1.

Out of the more than 180 countries surveyed in the index, South Africa – with a rating of 6.03, compared to 6.63 in 1996 – ranked 45, just above Belgium. When compared with other countries South Africa's decline in military potency was second worst on the African continent, with war-ravaged Sudan in the first place. Globally the country's decline was fourth worst after Croatia, Belarus and the former Yugoslavia. A closer look at South Africa's rating in the African region reveals an even clearer picture.

From the government's viewpoint, in the words of former Deputy Defence Minister, Ronnie Kasrils, it was not a "guns or butter – houses or corvettes" issue, but rather "guns, butter, peace and security".[20] However, there are indications of ongoing dissatisfaction on the part of certain anti-militarist pressure groups. The impression is created that these groups have not settled for a comprehensive outlook, but stick to an either-or "guns or butter" position. Against this background it is interesting to view and appreciate South Africa's military potency in an international context by comparing some relevant indicators. The following section expands on this with a view to clarifying whether excessive military spending or a militaristic ethos currently prevails in South Africa.

South Africa in international context

In today's community of nations, South Africa can be regarded as a 'middle power'. Between Denmark and Indonesia on the one hand and Thailand and Finland on the other, South Africa ranks number 29 in terms of GDP (size) in the international community.[21] The country seems to align and present itself as part of that consortium of countries that includes developed states such as Norway, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, and developing countries such as India, Cuba and Brazil.[22] Furthermore, South Africa has certainly shown a remarkable ability to engage in and contribute to multilateralism and middle power diplomacy in recent years.

From this perspective, South Africa's military potency in the international community is of particular interest. The military potency index published in London in the New International Security Review of 1998 made it clear that the country's military power was on the wane.[23]

The index is compiled by measuring data such as force numbers, defence spending in dollars, defence spending per capita and the defence budget as a portion of Gross Domestic Product. Furthermore, these figures are married to subjective concepts such as the government's commitment to defence and popular

South Africa in the African context

It is evident from the military potency index that there was no country in Southern Africa which came close to South Africa's potency in 1996. With a measure of just more than six points, the countries closest to South Africa's potency were Angola and Zimbabwe with 4.88 points each. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia all scored below four. In sub-Saharan Africa, the only country that came close to South Africa was Nigeria with a score of 5.46.[24]

However, the consequences of the drop in South Africa's potency in the 1990s seem significant when this is compared with other Southern African states in the period 1998–2000, as indicated by Table 2.[25]

Although it is important to note that South Africa has a smaller force in terms of military personnel, it has a vastly superior force in terms of numbers of heavy weapons.[26] However, what is significant is that South Africa's rating dropped to a score of below six in 1998, while Angola moved to a score of over five. This should be seen against the background of the fact that with-

Table 2: Southern African military potency, 1998–2000

Country	1998	1999	2000
South Africa	5,82	5,76	5,77
Angola	5,54	5,28	5,17
Zimbabwe	4,69	4,83	4,66
Botswana	4,01	4,04	3,98
Zambia	3,60	3,77	3,69
Namibia	3,43	3,38	3,58
Madagascar	3,06	3,08	3,09
Mozambique	2,41	3,82	2,83
Malawi	2,45	2,49	2,53
Lesotho	2,38	2,34	2,20

Source: The Rusi Index of Martial Potency

in Southern Africa, South Africa's drop in potency between 1996 and 2000 had by far been the worst, with Mozambique, Malawi and Lesotho reporting only marginal declines.

Further afield, it is interesting to note that Nigeria and Sudan moved up to scores of 6,00 and 4,88 respectively in 2000 (the most recent year for which comparable data was available), while Egypt and Morocco have reported figures of 6,72 and 5,79 respectively.[27] This means that three African states, namely Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco, now rank above South Africa's score of 5,82 on a global scale, with Sudan only marginally behind.

It should be realised that since the advent of a new dispensation in South Africa, expectations in Africa and elsewhere have steadily grown regarding South Africa's potential role as a peace broker in African conflicts. Observers in South Africa often argued in the past that South Africa should be an African leader and that inevitable responsibilities and commitments flow from its position of economic and moral strength.

It has likewise been said that most Southern African states eagerly look to South Africa for moral and material leadership, and that it is in South Africa's economic interest to do all it can to stabilise the region. In view of this, it can be stated that the SANDF has regional responsibilities and that the country there-

UP THE CREEK: *The SA Navy has six Minister-class missile-armed strike craft as the country's only surface combatant force after three vessels were decommissioned in recent times. And the Navy currently has no ships in the patrol corvette/frigate class, having lost its destroyers and frigates in the past two decades owing to obsolescence.*

fore needs a core military capability and competence that will allow the SANDF to take action in the region when required to do so. After all, South Africa's economy and socio-economy *vis-à-vis* Southern Africa display the following profile:

- Although South Africa is home to only 39% of the region's total population, it is responsible for 80% of the region's GDP;
- South Africa's economy is more than four times larger than the total of all the other economies in the region;
- South Africa produces 90% of all manufactured goods in the region;
- The Northern Cape province (the smallest economy in South Africa) has a larger economy than Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland;
- Only one country in the region has a larger economy than that of the Free State (the fourth smallest provincial economy in South Africa);
- South Africa has the highest Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in the region.[28]

Although one may argue that South Africa should not be concerned with the relative military strengths of its neighbours and other African states, but should rather focus on its own finan-

cial situation, domestic budgetary needs and national interests, it is nonetheless interesting to compare South Africa in the African context as regards GNP, population figures and total (active) members of the armed forces. Note, for instance, South Africa's relative position in 1999 pertaining to African states with armed forces of 35 000 and above in Table 3.[29]

Although Table 3 does not take into account types of capabilities that are maintained, nor the threat perception and regional conflict potential of any state, it is evident that a substantial number of African states have fairly big defence forces – many of them much larger than that of South Africa. Also, only Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) show lower figures than South Africa as regards percentage of members of the armed forces in relation to total population figures. South Africa's figures are even commendable if it is taken into consideration that South Africa is the only African state that ranks among the world's 50 top nations as regards size in GDP, while the size of its defence force is less than that of a significant number of other African states.

In fact, the country's spending on defence can certainly be regarded as low in the African context since only Madagascar, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali had a lower defence expenditure per capita in 1999. Whereas South Africa is indicated as spending 1.4% of its GDP on defence in 1999, the overwhelming majority of African states, i.e. 31 of the listed 50 African states, were spending more than 2% of their GDP on defence. In fact, a number of states were spending more than 5% of their GDP on defence – a figure that is exceptionally high in any terms.[30]

In Southern Africa, six of the nine states listed by *The Military Balance 2000 2001* spend more than 4% of their GDP on defence with only Malawi and South Africa showing figures of less than 2%. When Africa's average defence spending of 4.3% is compared to figures for other regions in the international community, it becomes evident that Africa is third highest as a region with only the Middle East (8.5%) and Central and South Asia (5.3%) spending more per average on defence as a proportion of their GDP. In this context, South Africa's figure of 1.6% compares very well, in fact, with that of non-NATO Europe (3.2%), East Asia and Australasia (3.7%), NATO Europe (2.3%), the Caribbean and Central and Latin America (1.3%), as well as the United States (3.1%).[31]

Assessment and conclusion

It has often been argued in the past couple of years that the confrontation between India and Pakistan and that between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been the only inter-state conflicts recorded recently. With a global decrease in the commitment of Gross National Product for defence purposes, there has been a strong urge for demilitarisation in South Africa and much hope that the government would focus more on human development than on the military.

For some, the government's decision to purchase new defence equipment effectively meant that the 'peace dividend' has not realised. From their point of view, human security is less about procuring arms and building military

strengths, and more about strengthening the social fabric of societies and improving their systems of governance by means of poverty alleviation and human development programmes. For anti-militarists,

> ... the new leaders rapidly latched on to the importance of a military and issues such as the peace dividend and defence conversion took a back seat. ... Despite the restructuring and transformation of the military in South Africa, defence conversion, though important, remains a neglected issue. Its true potential has not been embraced ... since 1998, the hope of defence conversion driven by the government seems to be fading especially in the light of the R43 billion rearmament package that was announced by the government.[32]

In governmental circles on the other hand, spokespersons were always swift to point out that in 1989, defence spending was 4.5% of the GDP and that it dropped to 1.4% in 1999. These reductions, from their point of view, have enabled government to shift substantial resources to socio-economic upliftment, providing an "impressive peace dividend".[33]

Be that as it may, a commentator once argued that spending on arms will always look idiotic when the only arithmetic applied is the kind that says that for the price of one corvette the South African government could build, say, 20 schools. Furthermore, it can be argued that, irrespective of the low frequency of inter-state wars in the current global order, the impact of external military aggression is so severe that defence against such aggression should remain a primary objective for a country such as South Africa. In the case of the SANDF, defence planners appear to have a good case with the rearmament package. The SAN, for example, operates two of its original three Daphne-class submarines. These submarines are more or less 30 years old and at the end of their economical service lives. In fact, it is said that only one submarine is oper-

Table 3: Africa's Armed Forces

Country	GNP	Population	Armed Forces	Percentage of armed forces / population
Algeria	$46.4-billion	30 700 000	122 000	0.40
Angola	$4.6-billion	12 410 000	112 500	0.91
Burundi	$0.9-billion	7 232 000	40 000	0.55
DRCongo	$5.4-billion	49 000 000	55 900	0.11
Egypt	$79.2-billion	62 100 000	450 000	0.72
Eritrea	$0.8-billion	4 099 000	200 000	4.88
Ethiopia	$6.2-billion	59 000 000	325 500	0.55
Libya	Not available	5 401 000	65 000	1.02
Morocco	$34.2-billion	30 155 000	196 300	0.65
Nigeria	$36.4-billion	116 000 000	94 000	0.08
Rwanda	$1.9-billion	7 200 000	47 000	0.65
Somalia	Not available	6 680 000	50 000	0.76
South Africa	$136.9-billion	40 500 000	70 000	0.17
Sudan	$8.2-billion	33 194 000	94 700	0.29
Tunisia	$19.2-billion	9 465 000	35 000	0.37
Uganda	$6.6-billion	22 261 000	40 000	0.18
Zimbabwe	$7.2-billion	12 286 000	39 000	0.32

Source: The Military Balance 2000 2001

Table 4: Spending on Defence

Country	% of GDP
Algeria	8.8
Angola	16.5
Botswana	5.2
Burundi	6.4
Djibouti	5.0
DR Congo	7.8
Eritrea	44.4
Ethiopia	3.1
Liberia	3.3
Rwanda	6.3
Zimbabwe	6.1

ational at any given time. Furthermore, the SAN has six Minister-class missile-armed strike craft as the country's only surface combatant force after three vessels were decommissioned in recent times. And the Navy currently has no ships in the patrol corvette/frigate class, having lost its destroyers and frigates in the past two decades owing to obsolescence.

The SA Air Force's difficulties are similar. It has already been said that because of the age of its equipment and shortage of spares, the SAAF is finding it difficult to maintain an effective deterrent and a minimal fighting component in the air. A significant proportion of attack craft is out of commission or has been scrapped. Furthermore, the SAAF needs more helicopters to move men and materiel around quickly and easily.

Therefore, the package of arms purchases put together by the Ministry of Defence has been arrived at to address the most pressing shortcomings in our defence profile. At the same time, one should realise that the much debated and hotly contested investment in defence equipment of approximately R30 billion (the original figure announced in 1999) is supposed to be a long-term procurement process that will take several years – a figure that compared relatively modestly with the education budget for 2001/2002 of R58 509 billion.[34]

Moreover, the fact that the defence budget for 2001/2002 has been set at R15,8 billion for 2001/2002 and just over R18 billion for 2002/2003 is a clear indication of the government's spending priorities and bears testimony to the point that belt-tightening rather than spending on the military is the current government strategy or outlook.[35]

But – importantly – far more than deterrence and a fighting capability are at stake. A significant number of African states have been and are still gripped in ongoing conflicts, the blowback of which has seriously impacted on Central and Southern Africa. South Africa's requirements for military equipment are not only set by a threat and task assessment, but are also concerned with the pursuit of its national interests in respect of regional security. Thus if the government believes that it is in the national interest to play a significant role in United Nations peace missions and

that the SANDF has to actively assist in multinational peacekeeping operations with regard to conflicts on the African continent and even further afield, it seems sensible to equip the military appropriately.[36]

If not, this could leave South Africa not being able to shoulder its responsibility in the region and even exposed to serious instability to the north of the country and the negative spill-over effects thereof. It could leave South Africa with inadequate means to help enforce decency in a future genocide on the continent, but also leave the SANDF without the force necessary to defend its legitimate interests against those who hold them in contempt.

In view of this, it is important to take cognisance that the authoritative London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies has recently reported that "morale (in the SANDF) has been lowered by financial constraints" and that restricted flying and parachute-training jumps in the SANDF, for instance, are the order of the day in the light of budgetary restrictions.[37] It has also been reported that the SANDF is currently battling with unbudgeted expenditure – mainly in connection with support to the SA Police Service as regards internal stability tasks for which the SANDF may not budget.[38]

To this end, the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, announced in Parliament in May 2002 that the SANDF's new military strategy would see the phasing out of internal deployments in support of the SA Police Service over the next six years.[39]

The question remains: What price is South Africa prepared to pay for its security in a potentially unstable neighbourhood and global community? In view of the foregoing and given the fact that the current defence budget amounts to less than 2% of the GDP, it can be argued that if South Africans compare what they are paying for the military, they will find that they are paying far less than most other nations.

Theo Neethling is with the Subject Group Political Science, Faculty of Military Science, Centre for Military Studies, US.

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ANGOLA'S TOR

From New York to Lusaka and beyond:

[TEDI]OUS ROAD TO PEACE

Convincing Angola's former warring parties to exchange the bullet for the ballot is going to take some time.
By Hussein Solomon

There have been various attempts to end Angola's long-running civil war. Each of these attempts has been met with failure. With the death of National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) leader Dr Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, many have felt that Africa's long-running civil war has finally come to an end. Such optimism, it will be argued, is misplaced. Much needs to be done if violence is not to be revisited upon Angola's long-suffering people. The purpose of this paper is to provide a broad overview of the Angolan conflict, as well as to provide some input as to why the various agreements have failed to end the conflict. Understanding past failures is imperative if current efforts to secure peace in this war-ravaged country are not to flounder.

The Road to War

For nearly forty years, Angola has been in a state of almost continuous war. In 1961, a bloody armed struggle from Portuguese colonial rule began. By November 1975, independence was granted. Even before the former colonial power had withdrawn from its erstwhile colony, however, war broke out amongst the various politico-military formations of Angola: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). Holden Roberto's FNLA was largely destroyed in the ensuing war. At the political level, too, support was switched by regional backers such as President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire from the FNLA to UNITA. According to a United States Institute for Peace (USIP) report during 1975, more than 50 000 people

> For what can War, but endless war still breed?
> **JOHN MILTON**
>
> There never was a good war, or a bad peace.
> **BENJAMIN FRANKLIN**

died in the fighting and 300 000 Portuguese fled Angola, taking much-needed skills out of the country. In addition, tens of thousands of Angolan refugees fled into neighbouring Namibia and Zambia.[1]

Angola's political situation was further complicated during the Cold War, when all world affairs was seen through the lens of the titanic struggle between the capitalist United States and the communist Soviet Union. Thus the internationalisation of the Angolan conflict witnessed the Marxist MPLA of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos receiving assistance from Moscow and Havana whilst Jonas Savimbi's formerly Maoist UNITA, which was now portrayed as pro-Western, received support from the United States and apartheid South Africa.[2]

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent ending of the Cold War released the world from the constraints of global bipolarity and world politics seems to now be following a more turbulent trajectory. In Angola, this has meant that both the MPLA and UNITA have embraced the free enterprise system, but this has resulted in more obstacles than opportunities for peace. Thus what was once regarded as an ideological struggle has now been transformed into an ethnic one.

ANGOLA

MAP: ELIZE VAN ASWSA.

Savimbi, for instance, portrayed himself as the representative of the largest ethnic group – the Ovimbundu – and the Chokwe; whilst characterising the support base of the MPLA as being Mbundu and Mestico (those of mixed descent).

The Elusive Peace

Since 1988, various attempts have been made to end the Angolan conflict – peace, however, has proved to be elusive.

The New York peace accord of 1988 was agreed upon amid a changing global scenario. The Cold War was winding down and the superpowers' interest in the Angolan conflict between UNITA and the MPLA was waning. The New York accord made provision for the complete withdrawal of South Africa and Cuba from Angola, the expulsion of the African National Congress and the South West African Peoples' Organisation from Angola and the independence of Namibia.[3] This removed the external players from Angola, and it was hoped that this could provide the breathing room for peace amongst domestic actors. But this was not to be, as each belligerent saw the departure of the other's external supporters as a means to prepare a fresh military offensive. In addition, years of fighting against each other resulted in a tremendous mistrust and such disharmony was not conducive to prospects for sustainable peace.

The Gbadolite agreement of 1989 was then brokered by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko and provided for a cease-fire which was to begin on 24 June 1989. According to Knudsen et al, Mobutu was more concerned with gaining international prestige than with finding a viable and workable agreement between the two parties.[4] Moreover, UNITA and the MPLA came to the dis-

cussions with differing agendas: UNITA wanted a government of national unity, multiparty elections and a cease-fire, while the MPLA wanted a one-party system, the exile of Savimbi and an end to US aid to UNITA. Behind closed doors, Mobutu told each party that the other had agreed to its demands, and when they found out that Mobutu had misrepresented the facts, any chance of an agreement broke down. In addition, the distrust between the parties increased.

The Bicesse accords of 1991, brokered by Portugal, the Soviet Union, the USA and the UN, were seen as the most promising accord by far. These provided for multiparty elections, with UNITA and the MPLA recognising each other as legitimate political parties. Bicesse also provided for a cease-fire and the disarmament and demobilisation of soldiers on both sides, with the United Nations Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II overseeing the process. The formation of a national army was also agreed upon, with the MPLA taking charge of government until the elections that were set for 29-30 September 1992.

Things began to go wrong even before the elections, however, with accusations of reneging on the cease-fire being hurled from both sides. The MPLA accused UNITA of trying to create instability before the elections. In April 1992, UNITA defector, General M N'Zau Puna, claimed that 20 000 UNITA soldiers, hidden near Lucusse, would be mobilised should UNITA lose the elections. Savimbi denied all claims and both parties assured anyone who would listen that if they won the elections, they would create a government of national unity. But Savimbi lost the elections. As a result, soon after the elections had taken place, Savimbi accused the MPLA of rigging the elections, although

observers declared it relatively free and fair with any irregularities being the result of inexperience as opposed to any deliberate attempt at electoral rigging.

When the results came out, there was no longer any hope that the Bicesse accord would be adhered to. Dos Santos won 49.57% of the presidential vote, just short of the 50% required to avoid a second round of elections, and Savimbi won 40.07% of the vote. In the legislative elections, the MPLA received 53.74% of the vote (70 seats) and UNITA 34.10% (44 seats). Ten other parties shared the remaining sixteen seats.

Savimbi went back to war, refusing to take up UNITA's seats in parliament or take part in the government. In defiance of their leader's will, in February 1993 ten of the seventy UNITA members of the National Assembly took their seats, "choosing peace and dialogue over war". In March 1993, the UN Security Council accused UNITA of being solely responsible for the resumption of the conflict and UNITA was pressured to accept the results of the elections. Despite numerous attempts to reach agreement between UNITA and what was now recognised as the legitimate Angolan government, the civil war raged on.

The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 was finally reached after numerous 'agreements' and provided once again for a cease-fire, recognition of the election results, a timetable for incorporation and disarmament and demobilisation as well as quartering of UNITA soldiers, all overseen by the UN, national reconciliation and the continuation of the electoral process.

Almost immediately accusations of violations of the cease-fire were recorded, but, despite sporadic fighting, things finally seemed to be coming together. Savimbi was offered a Vice-Presidency, which he seemed willing to accept. In September 1995 the government and UNITA issued a joint declaration on the free movement of people and goods, an expansion of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. Unauthorised checkpoints were to be removed. At a donors' conference in Brussels, hosted by the European Commission, Dos Santos and Savimbi together pleaded for international financial support to rebuild Angola's war-ravaged economy. Pledges totalling US $1 billion in aid and reconstruction were made.

On 1 March 1996 President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi met in Gabon and agreed to form a Government of National Unity within four months. The two men also discussed military demobilisation and the formation of a unified armed force.

By 1996, however, UNAVEM III was growing considerably more anxious over the slow process of implementation of the Lusaka protocol, especially with regard to UNITA's troop demobilisation. By May 1996 the United Nations had accused UNITA of dragging its feet as, since November 1995, fewer than 23 000 of the 63 000 UNITA troops had moved to the quartering areas and demobilisation camps. On 28 May 1996, UNITA radio reported that the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) were violating the Lusaka Protocol by not returning to barracks. Although both the government and UNITA had reached the targets set for reducing their armed forces – a quarter of the forces had been demobilised by 18 June 1996 – there had been consistent reports that elite forces from both sides had been kept out of the process, together with heavy arms.

By October 1996, relations between UNITA and the government were becoming strained, with Savimbi having refused the vice-presidency and casting doubts on the guarantee of his safety in Luanda. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, on a visit to Angola, stated that the US would not tolerate any resumption of conflict by UNITA. He placed the onus firmly on Savimbi, but also criticised the government for not confining to quarters a feared paramilitary force known as the Rapid Intervention Police.

The much delayed Government of National Unity was finally sworn in in April 1997 with Savimbi given special status as leader of the opposition – but even this could not stem the tide of UNITA aggression. Despite reports that UNITA members were very active within government and the FAA, Savimbi started a purge against senior colleagues who joined the government. As a result, UNITA split between moderates and hard-liners, with the hard-liners remaining with Savimbi. Moderates found themselves in Luanda engaging with government and calling themselves UNITA-Renovada.

In June 1997 it was reported that 90% of Angola's 2 500km border with the Congo was still under UNITA control. At a conference, a colonel who had deserted from UNITA warned that UNITA maintained 75% of its forces outside the quartering areas and estimated that the total number of troops at Savimbi's immediate disposal was 60 000. In July 1997, it was reported that UNITA was planting mines on roads recently opened or cleared by the UN. By 1998, the cease-fire broke down irrevocably and all-out war resumed.[5]

Prospects for Peace After Savimbi

On the afternoon of 22 February 2002 Jonas Savimbi's bullet-riddled corpse was put on display by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) after a fierce gun battle between UNITA and FAA forces in Moxico province. Shortly after the shock announcement of Savimbi's death, there was more bad news for UNITA when on 6 March the death of Savimbi's deputy – General Antonio Dembo – was announced.[6] Militarily defeated, severely weakened by malnutrition and demoralised by the deaths of their leaders, the remaining UNITA leadership sued for peace.

By 4 April 2002, the surviving leadership of UNITA, now constituting itself as the management committee until the next UNITA congress, signed a ceasefire agreement entitled Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol with the government. Under the terms of this agreement, both parties accepted the 1994 Lusaka Protocol as the legitimate framework for peace in Angola. In addition, the ceasefire agreement made provision for an amnesty law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict, and the demobilisation of UNITA military forces, some of whom were to be integrated into the FAA. Others were to be provided with vocational skills and reintegrated into civilian life.[7]

At first glance the agreement reached seems to represent a milestone in Angola's tortuous path to peace. In addition, the fact that by the end of July there were over 80 000 UNITA troops in the quartering areas together with 300 000 of their family members provides room for optimism.[8] Whilst both the ceasefire agreement and the rapid pace of the demobilisation process need to be welcomed, one needs to be mindful of lessons learned from earlier failures to secure peace in this troubled land. Three immediate problems confront Angola's peace process and need to be overcome in the short term if peace is not to falter.

One of the lessons learned is that the inability to implement the Bicesse and the Lusaka Accords as a result of limited capacity often undermines trust and exacerbates acrimony amongst the belligerents. One of the problems in the demobilisation process

> One of the lessons learned is that the inability to implement the Bicesse and Lusaka Accords as a result of limited capacity often undermines trust and exacerbates acrimony amongst the belligerents.

has been that there are problems of food supply to the quartering areas where UNITA troops and their families reside.[9] By early May 2002, analysts were already warning that the government's inability to provide for UNITA troops and their families could undermine the demobilisation process.

Shortly thereafter, their dire prediction seemed to come true when the Catholic station, Radio Ecclesia, reported that the lack of supplies in cantonment areas in Kwanza-Norte province had led to UNITA troops stealing from surrounding villages.[10] Indeed, since then various humanitarian agencies have reported incidents of spontaneous looting and banditry all over the country committed by starving UNITA troops, arguing that this may be their only option if they are to meet their basic needs and those of their families.[11]

It is also clear that the inability to materially support UNITA soldiers and their families in quartering areas is undermining the broader peace process – UNITA's management committee has even argued that the inability to properly cater for UNITA forces is a violation of the terms of the agreement signed between the government and UNITA.[12] Clearly, this situation needs to be rectified if sustainable peace is to be achieved, and the support of the international community is crucial here.

In this respect the 125 million Euros provided by the EU and US $497 000 provided by Canada for food assistance is to be welcomed, especially in the context of the drought and famine which is currently afflicting much of Southern Africa.[13]

Another problem that continues to beset the current Angolan process, as it has frustrated earlier peace efforts, is the lack of trust between the parties. Two incidents underline this problem well. In April 2002, groups of UNITA troops in southern Angola walked for two weeks and hundreds of kilometres to cross the border to Namibia to surrender to the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) rather than to the FAA.[14] This incident highlights the fact that fear, rather than trust, currently characterises the relationship between UNITA and the MPLA/FAA. That this is so, is hardly surprising given the decades of enmity between these protagonists. But it is also clear that if peace is to be sustainable, then Angola's leadership needs to act soon and decisively to bridge these divides of fear, enmity and distrust.

This distrust can be shown more graphically and more ominously in the allegation that UNITA may still be in possession of large numbers of sophisticated weapons – as it was in the run-up to the 1992 election.

According to Joao Porto, "...concerns have been raised pointing to a worrying discrepancy between the number of troops in assembly areas and the number as well as the quality of weapons that have been handed over. ...Observers of this process fear that UNITA may be delaying the surrender of weapons to guarantee that the process will be dealt with properly, meeting its needs. ...Eyewitness accounts of the situation in the camps also indicate that some of the armaments handed over are obsolete and do not represent UNITA's real armaments."[15]

If violence is not to be revisited upon Angola's people, all arms caches need to be surrendered and destroyed. Once again, given the capacity problems of the Angolan state, the international community needs to step in to ensure the success of the demilitarisation process.

In this regard, the decision by the United Nations Security Council to support UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for an expanded UN mandate to provide vital support to ensure the success of the peace process and to strengthen humanitarian assistance needs to be welcomed. This new mission is called the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) and would focus on two broad areas.

First, it would cover political, human rights and military aspects, and secondly humanitarian, economic recovery and development issues.[16] Whilst this is a positive development, the six-month mandate given to UNMA from 16 August 2002 to 16 February 2003 may be too short to accomplish a complex task that needs to be seen as a long-term project. For those who raise the question of costs in relation to donor fatigue, it should be borne in mind that the world threw an estimated US $25 billion worth of bombs on a small corner of south-eastern Europe in 1999 within three months.[17] From a moral perspective, why

> The current UNITA management committee simply reflects its military structure ... if UNITA wants to remain a force in the Angolan political landscape then it needs to have more political visionaries ...

could not a fraction of this amount find its way into a vast corner of south-western Africa? Many are asking, are Angolan lives cheaper than those of Kosovars?

The third problem confronting Angola's peacemakers is intimately related to both the demobilisation process and the economy. Of the over 80 000 UNITA troops in the 35 cantonment areas, only 5 000 are to be integrated into the FAA. The overwhelming majority, then, together with their 300 000 family members, are to be provided with vocational skills and reintegrated into civilian life.[18] The chances of these actually finding employment in a depressed, war-torn economy such as Angola's is, however, remote.

Given the fact that for the majority of these former UNITA rebels war-making skills may be the only ones that they have honed and that many may still have access to arms caches, there are fears that a large number could turn to banditry rather than face unemployment. It is for this reason that the restructuring and revitalisation of Angola's economy is of such vital importance for the future of Angola's peace process.

In addition to these three problems in the short-term, there are two additional problems that need to be overcome in the medium-term. The first of these relates to whether the UNITA leadership can successfully transform itself from a rebel force into a political party. Two recent events, however, suggest that this is far from happening.

First, both Eugenio Manuvakola, the leader of UNITA-Renovada, and Abel Chivukuvuku, the former leader of UNITA in parliament, have been sidelined by UNITA's management committee.[19] Both these men have the necessary skills to transform UNITA into a viable political party and yet they have been sidelined by UNITA's management committee under the leadership of General Paulo Lukambo "Gato".

Second, the current constitution of the UNITA management committee simply reflects UNITA's military structure. In addition to General Gato, the committee consists of generals Kamorteiro, Samy, Dachala, Sakala, Chitombi, Black Power, Kisanga and Chiwale; and commanders Antoninho, Calias, Samavuka, and Mulato.[20]

Clearly if UNITA wants to remain a force in the changing Angolan political landscape then it needs to have more political visionaries in its senior leadership – people who can articulate an alternative and attractive political programme to that of the MPLA in the run-up to the elections scheduled to be held in the second part of 2004.

The second problem that needs to be overcome in the medium-term is the plethora of other actors involved in the Angolan civil war. Amongst these is the burgeoning private security industry in Angola that can be extremely influential. Both UNITA and

Figure 1: Key Dates in Angola's Recent History[28]

1956	MPLA founded to end 300 years of Portuguese colonialism
1961	Armed struggle begins
1962	US-backed northern-based FNLA founded
1966	UNITA founded
1975	Independence
1976	Alleged attempted coup fails but results in bloody reprisals
1979	President Agostinho Neto dies, replaced by Jose Eduardo dos Santos
1989	Gbadolite peace accords brokered by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, but soon collapse
1991	Bicesse peace accords brokered by Portugal
1992	UNITA rejects results of multiparty elections won by MPLA and returns to war
1994	Lusaka peace accords brokered by UN
1998	Cease-fire breaks down, Angola returns to state of war
2002	Savimbi and Dembo killed by the Angolan Armed Forces.
	Ceasefire is signed between UNITA and government on 4 April

the MPLA used such private security companies (PSCs). They have been involved in specialised training to the combatants; VIP protection; mine-lifting and training; intelligence and counter-intelligence; rapid reaction services (such as co-called hot extraction, casualty evacuation and medical emergency services); arms procurement; transport and protection of personnel and cargo; and protection for diamond mines and oil fields.

Some of the private security companies known to be operating in Angola include Saracen International; Sterling's Mat Tech International; Santex; Gray Security Limited; Ibis Air; Alpha Bravo Associates; Alpha 5; Tele Service Sociedade de Telecommunicacoes Securanca e Service; Mamboji; Gurkha Security Guards; Special Gurkha Services Limited; Military Professional Resources Incorporated; Vinell Corporation; Betac Corporation; DynCorp; Ronco and Science Applications International Corporation; AirScan; International Defence and Security Limited; International Security Consultants; and Eurisc Limited.[21]

These PSCs are the wild cards in the Angolan peace process. They can, as the case of Executive Outcomes in Angola between 1993 and 1995 revealed, radically alter the military balance of power. If the current military balance of power is changed, it could adversely impact upon the prospects for sustainable peace in Angola. Some private security companies may also have a vested economic interest in the perpetuation of war. This relates to the fact that some PSCs have been paid with lucrative oil and diamond concessions and may be fearful that any change in the current status quo may threaten their assets.[22]

In the longer term, if sustainable peace is to be realised in Angola, economic and political restructuring of the country needs to occur as a priority. At the economic level, Tony Hodges in his book, *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism* refers to an economic system that "...cultivates cronyism and arbitrariness and requires opaqueness in the management of state resources".[23] Such a system results in a tiny economic elite linked to the ruling party benefiting from state resources whilst the overwhelming majority of citizens are poverty-stricken.

As a result whilst Angola received some US $3.18 billion in total oil revenues for 2001, it still ranks only 146th out of 162 countries in the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index. Commenting on these social contrasts, a recent IRIN report noted:

> While the vast majority of Angolans remain poor, sick and out of school, a tiny elite has amassed huge fortunes through

oil, diamonds, weapons, forex and other business deals... In Luanda, the contrast is obscene. An army of street kids, amputees and destitute people sleep on the broken pavement amid heaps of rubbish while the latest models of Mercedes Benz, BMW and Porsche zoom by; their cellphone-holding drivers nattily dressed in French and Brazilian couture. On Mussulo island, luxury speedboats and jet-skis compete, while picnickers bring hampers with twenty-year old whisky and cold lobster.[24]

Such economic injustice cannot continue indefinitely without breeding resentment, leading to social instability and violence. As such, good and responsive economic governance is essential within the broader rubric of post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable peace.

The need for a radical political restructuring stems from two inter-related reasons. First, the political system of Angola is extremely closed and repressive with scant respect for human rights. In its annual review of human rights, the US Department of State has this to say of the ruling MPLA government:

> The government's human rights record continues to be poor, and it continues to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens have no effective means to change their government. ...Members of the security forces committed numerous extra-judicial killings, were responsible for numerous disappearances, and tortured, beat, raped and otherwise abused persons ...[T]he government took no effective action to prevent security personnel from supplementing incomes through the extortion of the civilian population. ... The judiciary, subject to executive influence, only functions in parts of the country, and does not ensure due process.[25]

As a result, the restructuring of the political order would need to result in a government responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens where human rights as opposed to oligarchic interests become the measure of a stable polity.

Second, and concomitantly, international observers often make the mistake in their analysis of focusing their attention solely on the MPLA and UNITA whilst ignoring the existence of other political formations in the country. Though these are, for the moment, minor players, given the fluidity of the political context in Angola, they are by no means marginal. One such actor is the

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While the vast majority of Angolans remain poor, sick and out of school, a tiny elite has amassed huge fortunes through oil, diamonds, weapons, forex and other deals ... In Luanda, the contrast is obscene.

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Whilst small in numbers they cannot be discounted given the strategic importance of Cabinda, where approximately 90% of the country's oil exports emanates from.[26] The fact that FLEC has recently increased their attacks on oil targets in the Cabinda district highlights the point that they need to be accommodated within a more inclusive political structure.

Moreover, there are other political players that, while having no military wing, are increasingly extending their influence. One

of these is the opposition Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). The party has been staging various sit-ins and other forms of peaceful demonstration in the capital Luanda and is rapidly increasing its popular support. Other parties include Alexandre Andre's Pajoca Party and Bengui Pedro Joao's Social Democratic Party. Furthermore, May 2000 witnessed the further consolidation of opposition politics when 17 opposition parties united to form the United Front for Change.[27]

These initiatives need to be supported by the international community. Ultimately, support for a bipartisan system consisting merely of the MPLA and UNITA is politically and morally irresponsible given the decades of death, despair and destitution these two parties have brought on Angola's people.

Conclusion

The cease-fire agreement of 4 April 2002 is certainly a step forward on Angola's tortuous road to peace. Obstacles, however, do exist and these need to be identified and overcome in the short to medium-term with the assistance of the international community, if history is not to repeat itself in the form of the failures of Gbadolite, Bicesse and Lusaka.

In the process, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) also need to involve themselves more constructively in the search for Angola's peace alongside the existing troika of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States. These external actors would do well to remember that, given the length and complexity of Angola's civil war, they need to see their involvement in Angola as a long-term project.

As such, over and above the measures outlined above, a great many other issues need to be addressed:

- Encouraging a culture of human rights and respect for the rule of law. This can be done at various levels from ensuring media freedom to training members of the security forces about their responsibilities to citizens.
- Bridging the ethnic, class and urban-rural divides at all social, economic and political levels.
- Demining needs to continue so as to open up fertile land for farming, while the use of fertilizers and crop rotation needs to be encouraged so that agriculture can become economically sustainable. This will help to prevent a situation where 200 Angolans starve to death every day.
- Fostering trust and reconciliation within and between communities by using churches and NGOs whose membership cuts across the divides.
- Training a corps of mediators to impart mediation and dispute resolution skills to local community leaders, as components of a more holistic peace process.
- Demilitarising Angolan politics, as no political party should have an armed wing.
- Building institutional capacity to meet the needs of ordinary people. In this way, good governance can itself become a conflict resolution mechanism.

Closely related to this is a radical restructuring of the political system of Angola, with the emphasis on decentralisation and power-sharing, so that all feel part of and no section of the populace feels alienated from the political system.

A concomitant of the latter point is that members of political parties need to be trained in the art of politics so that ultimately the politics of the ballot is seen to be superior to the politics of the bullet.

Hussein Solomon is with the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria and is a Research Associate of the Africa Institute of South Africa

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VOTING FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN SIERRA LEONE

Reflections on the May 2002 General Elections

Sierra Leoneans have shown a healthy appetite for peace and democracy, but much work lies ahead to entrench these values. **By Mohamed Jalloh**

The May 2002 general elections represent a significant step forward in Sierra Leone's elusive search for peace and democracy after several years of bad governance and a devastating armed conflict. Though the elections did not result in a change of government, they were generally hailed as free, fair and peaceful. The participation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the elections signalled a commitment to both peace and the democratisation process. Moreover, the level of civil society and public involvement in the electoral process coupled with the peaceful nature of the campaign stages further signify a clear trajectory towards stable electoral democracy in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the electoral process does reveal signs of inherited practices of neo-patrimonialism, weak political parties and a narrow representation. This raises fundamental questions regarding the relevance of electoral processes to post-conflict democracy.

The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the May 2002 general elections, and to highlight the reasons for hope and concern in Sierra Leone's quest to build a peaceful democratic polity. Three basic issues underlie this paper. The first deals with the Sierra Leonean crisis and the background to the elections. The second is the dynamics of the electoral process. This involves a detailed analysis of the elections, the campaign process and the political parties. The third is an evaluation of the relevance of the elections for peace, democracy and political reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

The data for this work is drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Interviews were conducted with voters, government officials, political parties, local and international observers, and civil society organisations as well as senior officials of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Newspapers, reports, press releases, official documents from NEC are also used.

Analytical overview

In the rapidly expanding literature on democracy in Africa, much focus has been placed on elections as a major feature of how the democratisation process unfolds. One can relate this to Huntington's common-sense definition of a political system as democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all adult populations are eligible to vote".[1] In theory then, elections provide the arena for the broad participation of the citizenry in the legitimisation of public authority.

In view of this basic definition, the May 2002 elections, like most second elections, can be seen as a yardstick to measure the democratic gains made since the transfer elections of 1996.[2] In addition, post-war electoral arrangements are more about ending civil war and promoting reconciliation than about entrenching democracy.[3] In this regard the conception that post-war elections are a means to replace violence as a form of participating in governance through broad-based participation holds true for the Sierra Leone case. The assertion that the fragile peace process in the country depends on the realisation of a free and fair election was clearly expressed by the executive secretary of the National Electoral Commission (NEC).[4] It is largely within these contexts

that we are going to situate the May 2002 general elections in Sierra Leone.

The Sierra Leone crisis

To fully grasp the dynamics of the 2002 elections, it should be explained in the light of the quest to consolidate both the peace and democratisation process. The case of Sierra Leone is not only "a sad story of a lost paradise" but an example of a state that had collapsed under the weight of bad governance and conflict.[5] At independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was one of the brightest states in the galaxy of new African states. After nearly two decades of bad governance and a decade of a devastating civil war, the country's future as a stable let alone a democratic state has become increasingly doubtful. Recent political developments in Sierra Leone are now overshadowed by the many years of armed conflict, which have cast serious doubt on the prospects for peace and democracy in the country. By the time the civil war broke out in 1991, the Sierra Leonean state had collapsed as a functional entity, which relates to the general inability of states to exercise powers of decision-making that can guarantee such elements as security and operational institutions.[6]

This to a large extent provided the incentive for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to launch an armed struggle with the aim of unseating the All Peoples Congress government.[7] The war was characterised by an unprecedented violence that has not only devastated the country but has left the entire population traumatised, prompting Kaplan to describe Sierra Leone's descent into violence as heralding the dawn of a new barbarism.[8] The RUF engaged in a war of terror against unarmed civilians, committing violence and widespread atrocities in the country.

Sierra Leone has organised two elections since the renaissance of the third democratic wave that swept across the continent's political landscape. The incumbent Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) won the first election in 1996 to end four years of military rule. The 1996 elections came in the wake of several years of one-party and military rule, which had altered to an extent the electoral landscape in the country. This election was perceived as a transition from war to peace. It was hoped that it would help accelerate the peace process and open a window of opportunity for broad-based participation. Though the 1996 elections were competitive, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) did not take part in the elections.[9] As a result, intense violence marked the period leading up to the second elections scheduled for May 2002. The 2002 general elections attracted much attention both at home and abroad largely because they came at the end of a successful disarmament and demobilisation programme, which formally marked the end of the civil war. The RUF, newly transformed into the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), took part in these elections.

The Electoral Process

The elections were an endorsement of the ruling SLPP party. Unlike the 1996 elections, where only 50% of the 1.6 million registered voters actually voted, there was a huge voter turnout

Table 1: Results of presidential elections

Political Party	Candidate	Total Votes	% votes
All People's Congress (APC)	Ernest Koroma	426 405	22.4
Citizens United For Peace & Progress (CUPP)	Bamidele Thompson	9 028	0.5
Grand Alliance Party (GAP)	Raymond Kamara	11 181	0.6
Movement for Progress (MOP)	Zainab Bangura	10 406	0.5
Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)	Johnny P Koroma	57 233	3.0
Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP)	Pallo Bangura	33 074	1.7
Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)	Tejan Kabbah	1 336 423	70.1
United National People's Party (UNPP)	Karefa Smart	19 847	1.0
Young People's Party (YPP)	Andrew Turay	3 858	0.2
National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	—		
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	—		

Source: National Electoral Commission

Table 2: Distribution of parliamentary seats by region

Regions	APC	GAP	MOP	NDA	PLP	PDP	RUFP	SLPP	UNPP	YPP	Total
Northern	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	40
Eastern	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	—	—	24
Western	5	—	—	—	2	—	—	9	—	—	16
Southern	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	32	—	—	32
National	27	—	—	—	2	—	—	83	—	—	112

Source: National Electoral Commission

in the May 2002 elections.[10] Out of a total of 2 348 567 registered voters, 1 907 455 valid votes were recorded, indicating an impressive turnout of 81.2%. The Eastern and Southern regions alone recorded a turnout of over 90%. President Tejan Kabbah won the presidential elections, securing 70.1% of the votes, and thereby avoiding a run-off (see Table 1 for the full presidential election results).

The district block system was used for the parliamentary elections. This system was a middle path between the constituency and proportional representation system.[11] With this system, parties are expected to meet a 12.5% threshold in order to win a seat in each of the 14 electoral districts. The main contenders in the elections were the APC and the SLPP. The APC won a total of 27 seats in the National Assembly from the Northern and Western regions, while the SLPP garnered the bulk of its votes in the Southern and Eastern regions, capturing all the parliamentary seats in these regions. Altogether, the SLPP won 83 out of the 112 seats in Parliament, thus giving them an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. The PLP came third, securing two seats in the western region, while the RUFP secured 33 074 votes, but could not break the 12.5% threshold in any of the districts to win a seat in the National Assembly (see Table 2).

Party System

A total of eleven political parties took part in the general elections. Ten of these stood candidates for the parliamentary elections, with the exception being Citizens United For Peace and Progress (CUPP). The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) did not stand candidates in the presidential elections. They instead supported the candidacy of the incumbent president, Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).

The political parties can be divided into three broad categories. The SLPP and APC belong to the first-generation parties, whose origin can be traced to the independence era. The SLPP led the country to independence and governed till 1967 when it was defeated in an election by the APC. It was returned to power following the 1996 multi-party elections. The strongholds of the SLPP are considered to be the Southern and Eastern regions, that are largely inhabited by the Mende tribe. The APC, which is the second oldest surviving party, first came to power in 1968 follow-

SIERRA LEONE

ing a victory in the controversial elections of 1967. The APC later transformed the country into a one-party state and continued to rule until 1992, when the government was removed from power following a military coup. The party is popular in the Northern region, that is predominantly a Temne region, and the Western area.

The second-generation parties came to the fore during the multi-party era. They include the NDA, YPP, PDP, UNPP, GAP and CUPP. A former APC politician, Thaimu Bangura, founded the PDP, while a veteran politician, John Karefa-Smart, leads the UNPP, which was the main opposition party following the 1996 elections.

The third category is the so-called reactionary parties, the PLP, RUFP and MOP. Johnny Paul Koroma, former head of a military junta that ousted the democratically elected government of President Kabbah in a military coup in 1997, leads the PLP. He was forcefully removed from power by a Nigerian-led ECOMOG contingent, but later realigned forces with the RUF and also took part in the Lomé peace talks. The RUFP is an outcrop of the RUF. Its leader, Foday Sankoh, could not participate in the elections because he is currently facing trial for attempted murder and atrocities committed during the civil war. He was replaced by Pallo Bangura, a former university lecturer who was also a minister in the Government of National Unity under President Kabbah. The MOP is led by Zainab Bangura, the first woman to contest a presidential election in Sierra Leone. She is a former activist and coordinator of an NGO, Campaign for Good Governance.

Structurally, most of these parties are weak. They lack social roots in that most do not serve as bridges between the voters and the political elites. Though the APC and SLPP are popular, they are also far from building a strong national base. The overwhelming victory of the SLPP can be deduced from certain factors. First, the cooperation strategy employed by the party in bring on board certain key opposition members who hailed from the Northern and Eastern regions was fruitful. This explains partly why the party won seats in all the electoral districts in these regions. Another advantage was the personality of President

Kabbah, tied to the considerable benefits in terms of material and human resources available to the party. Though the party list system gave safeway to parties over individual candidates, most of the parties struggled with questions of organisation and limited resources. They lacked solid organisational structures that could reach out to the rural areas where the bulk of population are concentrated. The RUFP, for instance, was confronted with the task of transforming itself from an armed group into a political party. Added to that, the party was also hampered by a leadership crisis wherein most of the field commanders preferred Foday Sankoh to lead the party instead of Pallo Bangura.

The Campaign Process

One of the remarkable features of the 2002 elections is the level of public engagement and the peaceful nature of the campaign process. Civil society and public involvement in the electoral process is unprecedented in the history of elections in the country. This is evident in the high levels of voter turnout, political consciousness, tolerance, songs, rallies and media involvement that characterised the entire process. The opening of the political space, active civil society involvement, an improved security situation and the nature of political competition largely account for this trend. Since the country was returned to multi-party rule in 1996, electoral participation has improved, in contrast to the one-party regime where elections were characterised by violence, vote rigging, voter apathy and intolerance. Multi-party rule allowed for many groups and parties to participate thereby giving the electorate a wider choice. Since then there has been the perception in Sierra Leone that a return to multi-party politics would lead to peace, good governance and better socio-economic opportunities. This perception has to a large extent impacted on the nature of public engagement with the political process. Linked to this is the improved security situation in the country. The formal end of the war and the establishment of government authority in most parts of the country further encouraged people to engage fully with the process.

Another factor that enhances electoral participation is the role of certain institutions and the active involvement of civil society in the process. The government-established National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights was instrumental in managing the electoral process. They initiated debates to discuss issues relating to the elections and also engaged in voter education.[13] The Forum for Democratic Initiative and the National Democratic Institute established a resource centre for political parties. This centre provided support to political parties in the form of training for women candidates, finance to cover the costs of party polling agents, and the printing of party manifestos and posters.[14] Added to this, the elections provided new challenges for civil society groups.

Many NGOs were actively involved in the electoral process from the start. They played an active role in the voter registration process, voter education and mass campaigns. Most NGOs organised training workshops at national, regional and local levels on voter education. The objective, as the national co-ordinator of the Civil Society Movement (CSM) noted, "is to encourage as many people as possible to exercise their rights to vote, to choose the government of their choice".[15] In addition, a coalition of local organisations set up an umbrella organisation called the National Election Watch (NEW) to observe the polling process.

and a total of 1804 election observers were deployed throughout the country to observe the voting and counting process.[16] Another feature was the increased number of women who contested the parliamentary elections. This may be linked to the campaign by women's organisations like Fifty-Fifty and the NDI that provided immense support to aspiring women candidates.

Media input was equally instrumental in ensuring a free and fair election. The local media covered the electoral campaign extensively. The Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), both radio and television, KISS, SKY, BBC, UNAMSIL radio stations, Radio Democracy and newspapers were instrumental in providing information to voters. One of the popular radio stations, Radio Democracy, established quality programming on the elections with the aim of providing information on how the electoral process unfolds. They designed jingles that carried different messages on voter education, emphasising the need for a change of attitude.

Added to this, Radio Democracy also hosted talk shows, 'Election Tok' and 'You En Di Election'. These programmes provided updates on the elections and also gave the electorate the opportunity to interact with aspirants. They also gave thirty minutes free airtime to all the political parties to relay their manifestoes to the electorate.[17] The newspapers also offered diverse views of the campaign and published both the lists of parliamentary candidates and profiles of presidential candidates.

The campaign process was relatively peaceful throughout the country. It mostly took the forms of political rallies, songs, media programmes and public discourse. Many rallies were organised throughout the country by various political parties and social groups. These provided avenues for presidential candidates to address the public and equally relay their programmes. Most of these rallies took the forms of dancing and singing, where supporters attacked the personality of the various presidential candidates through songs. Supporters were often seen wearing t-shirts displaying the photos of their respective candidates and party symbols.

Several public discussions were held in the country, particularly in the capital Freetown. Some of these discussions were held as radio discussion programmes while most were held in public places. Public discourses on the elections were heard in market places, public transport, the media and religious sermons. Local radios organised phone-in programmes to allow people to express their views regarding the elections. The media also provided an opportunity for political parties to relay their manifestoes to the public. Tied to this is the level of tolerance shown by the public. Members of the same family could support different parties and would canvass to each other. Supporters of different political parties could sing and dance alongside each other without recourse to violence. All these marked a decisive break from the past where the level of tolerance was very low.

The voting itself was also peaceful and orderly throughout the country, with no instances of violence reported. This is remarkable for a country that has just come out of a violent and devastating conflict. Most voters I spoke to saw the elections as an opportunity for lasting peace. For many people the elections symbolised the end of the war and the beginning of a new era in the politics of the country.[18] As such, the vote signifies the people's enthusiasm for peace as well as democracy.

Prognosis

The 2002 general elections were hailed by the Carter Observer Team as "a victory for peace and democracy in Sierra Leone".[19] To what extent does the electoral process reflect the victory that the elections seemed to portend? The relatively peaceful nature of the electoral process particularly given the background against which the process unfolded reveals the country's determination to embrace peace and democracy. The participation of the RUF in the electoral process, coupled with the active involvement of civil society and the establishment of certain democratic institutions, further laid credence to that determination. All these clearly signify that elections will remain the only institutional arrangement for ensuring representation in Sierra Leone. However, such a determination will come to depend on the government's capacity to meet public expectations both in terms of delivering the public 'goods' and fostering national reconciliation.

The majority of Sierra Leoneans are hungry, displaced, unemployed and traumatised by the war. For electoral democracy to be meaningful in that kind of situation and, even more,

> For electoral democracy to be meaningful ... and, even more, become a recipe for stability, it must "take up the challenge of development where dictatorship has failed".

become a recipe for stability, it must "take up the challenge of development where dictatorship has failed".[20] As Kandeh rightly argues, "victory for civil society can no longer simply be measured in terms of the competitive election of political leaders but also on the basis of whether or not those elected can translate their popular mandate into tangible benefits for impoverished masses".[21]

Another concern was the marked reoccurrence of inherited practices of neo-patrimonialism in the electoral process. This was evident both in the campaign process and voting patterns. Ethno-regional voting preferences remained a feature of these elections, although not as marked as in the 1996 elections. For example, the SLPP won all the seats in the Southern and Eastern regions, which are considered to be the stronghold of the party largely because of its Mende predominance.

The APC and the other parties fared poorly in the Southern and Eastern regions, where they could not win a single seat, but received many votes in the Northern region, which is largely populated by the Temnis. Comparatively, voting was more competitive in the Northern and Western regions than in the South and East. Unlike in the 1996 elections where the SLPP performed poorly in the North, this time it was able to make a breakthrough, winning a total of 18 of the 40 seats, in a region that traditionally appeared to be the stronghold of the APC party. The APC, SLPP and PLP were able to capture seats in the Western region.

Another issue that raised concern is the security forces vote (Police and Military). The majority of the members of the security forces who happened to vote on the special voting day voted for the PLP. This became a concern for many Sierra Leoneans including the government, given the fact that the leader of the PLP was a former military junta leader.[22]

Added to this was the marked absence of programmatic appeals in the elections. Most of the parties had almost identical manifestoes, most of which are also not easily comprehensible to the majority of voters. Most of the voters I spoke to were not familiar with the programmatic discourse of the various parties. Most of the parties relied on patronage and ethno-regional strongholds to mobilise votes. As such they traded programmatic appeals in favour of clientelist support. This clearly explains why the APC was able to garner enough votes only in the Northern region while the SLPP on the other hand maintained an overall hold on the Southern and Eastern regions.

Also, it did not come as a surprise that the bulk of the military voted for the PLP while the MOP relied mainly on the

women's vote. This explains why parties other than the APC and SLPP could not make a breakthrough, particularly in the provinces. This reinforces Van De Walle's point that African "parties do not really serve to aggregate interests – rather they serve a representative function in a context of clientelistic politics".[23] It is clear that the intensity of the electoral competition may not be directly related to the number of parties or programmatic discourse but more to the ethno-regional nature of electoral competition in Sierra Leone.

This is mostly the case where elections are reduced to ethno-regional competition over the capture of the executive. As a result, though the 2002 elections offered a wider choice of parties and candidates, it was more limited to a struggle between the APC and the SLPP, which further underscores the North-South divide in the political landscape in the country.[24]

Another concern was the ability of the electoral process to promote political competition and reconciliation. Most observers questioned whether the process did in fact provide an opportunity for broad-based participation.[25] For instance, they complained that the 12.5% threshold may have been too high for a country that had just emerged from conflict. They also made mention of the numeric strength of the opposition.[26]

Out of the eleven political parties that took part in the elections, only the SLPP, APC and PLP are represented in the National Assembly, with the opposition accounting for only 27 seats. Interestingly, even the former main opposition party, the UNPP, could not win a single seat. The RUFP, that secured the fourth highest number of vote's nationwide in the elections, could also not obtain a seat in the National Assembly. This deprived them of a political platform to participate in governance.

Apart from the fact that the 12.5% threshold was considered unreasonable, it dealt a further blow to the already existening crisis of most of these parties. The fear is that most of these parties, including the RUFP, will collapse since few enjoy basic stability and coherence.

The fact that even GAP, an outcrop of a coalition of opposition members, could not make any impact further shows the extent to which the opposition parties are fragmented. Added to this, most of the parties where crippled by the limited time frame of the electoral process, which did not provide enough room for adequate organisation. All these factors exemplify the limits of the electoral process to enhance broad-based representation, which relates to Manning's views that the greatest challenge to constructing democracy in any post-conflict society "is to balance the divisive tendencies of electoral competition with the ongoing need for political reconciliation and accommodation".[27] It is still uncertain how the government hopes to engage the RUFP and other stakeholders that are not represented in the institutional decision-making process.

This is becoming an increasing necessity, particularly in light of recent political developments in the country as reflected in the cautious optimism of the European Union Observer Mission to Sierra Leone that "the peaceful 2002 elections mark the first step to return to democracy in Sierra Leone, but the peace and the democratic process remain fragile".[28]

Conclusion

From all indications, the May 2002 election marks a decisive step towards consolidating the gains of both the peace and democratisation process in Sierra Leone. The peaceful nature of the campaign process, high voter turnout, the establishment of new institutions and civil society involvement are indicative of the democratic progress the country has made since 1996. However, the nature and outcome of the electoral process to an extent reveal the limits of broad-based representation and democratic practices in the country.

Given the case of Sierra Leone, free, fair and peaceful elections can only be of instrumental value to post-conflict democracy if they are geared towards initiating a new political order rooted in broad-based participation and representation. Thus far, Sierra Leoneans have demonstrated remarkable enthusiasm for peace and democracy. But in view of the concern and hope generated by the entire electoral process, it remains to be seen whether peace and democracy can become entrenched in Sierra Leone.

Mohamed Jalloh is a post-graduate student at the Centre for African Studies, University of Bordeaux.

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Challenges facing the newly restructured SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security

By Gina van Schalkwyk

The conceptual framework on peace and security of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) implicitly recognises the new approach to security which emphasises the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security and regards development as essential to security.[1] This is in line with the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) process that underscores the search for security on a continental level (through NEPAD and the African Union) and also with contemporary academic rhetoric and global trends.

In an environment where conflict and political instability continue to characterise African states and global trends point towards the devolution of the responsibility for conflict management from the United Nations (UN) to regional and sub-regional levels, this poses a significant challenge to security arrangements such as the SADC OPDS.

Developmental and integration goals/objectives need to be reconciled with the unenviable tasks of peacekeeping, and even, at times, peace enforcement. Finding ways to achieve the right balance between human and military security is probably the greatest challenge faced by SADC and the OPDS.

The search for a common sub-regional agenda for peace, human security and conflict management is likely to encounter a number of obstacles along the way. Much has been written about these stumbling blocks, and it is almost too easy to submit to SADC/OPDS-pessimism in view of the failures of the Organ since its inception. This article is not, however, about the threats to its survival or mistakes made in the past, but

rather attempts to frame the challenges that the OPDS will be facing as opportunities to be exploited through a partnership between the public and private sector with the active involvement of civil society and the international community. In this regard a clear and explicit policy framework is not a luxury.

It is impossible to explore in depth the many challenges faced by SADC and/or provide any concrete recommendations within the scope of this article. Hence the focus will fall on the immediate short-term challenges and preconditions for progress from a perspective that is sensitive to current regional, continental and global realities; focuses on issues amenable to institutionalisation through policy formulation; and keeps in mind medium and longer term challenges that will have to be addressed in the future.

The Restructuring of the OPDS

The restructuring of the OPDS, that was formalised with the signing of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (hereafter referred to as Protocol) at the 2001 Blantyre Summit, at first glance appears to have resolved some of the major issues that had crippled the Organ since its inception in 1996. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that there are a number of challenges in the operationalisation and implementation of the structure and objectives set out in the Protocol.

The Organ is placed under the authority of the SADC Summit, but retains relative autonomy from other SADC structures.[2] The Chair of the Organ is appointed (by the SADC Summit) according to the Troika system that was accepted within SADC, rotates on an annual basis and may not be the same person as the Chairperson of

SADC. Provision is made for the retention of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) – the only functioning part of the Organ at present. The ISDSC is supplemented by an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), and such other sub-structures as may be established by any of the ministerial committees. These two Ministerial Committees are overseen by a Plenary Ministerial Committee and the Protocol makes provision for a Secretariat to be provided by the country that holds the Chair.

In principle, the Protocol appears to affirm a conflict management policy that favours political, rather than military solutions. It remains to be seen, however, whether sufficient political will exists to expeditiously establish an ISPDC with sufficient credibility and authority to counterbalance the long-standing and powerful ISDSC.[3] An immediate challenge will be the establishment of a mechanism to address the unresolved tension between the military-security establishment on the one hand and the foreign policy-conflict management community on the other hand. This necessitates a clarification of the structure of the decision-making process and the relationship between these two bodies and the amalgamated Committee of Ministers. The Committee consists of the same ministers and thus implies that ministers will have to report to themselves at a different level, an arrangement which may effectively render the Plenary obsolete since the ISPDC and ISDSC may in certain circumstances also report directly to the Chairperson. Cedric de Coning further argues that the Swaziland compromise "created a dangerous dualism by splitting the Political and Diplomatic Committee from the military, public

security and state security interest of the ISDSC".[4] As such the problem of differences amongst member states in the preference for either diplomatic or military solutions to problems in the region is not addressed through the restructured Organ.

Despite positive developments, the SADC OPDS still exists only on paper. By July 2002 only four member countries had ratified the Protocol (which will only come into force once two thirds of member states have ratified it). The only functioning institution within the OPDS remains the ISDSC with its distinctly military-security orientation. This does not bode well for the operationalisation of the human security approach in the region.

The SADC Protocol does, however, provide a benchmark against which to define the challenges faced by the OPDS in terms of the political and security realities in the region, and measure the success of the Organ in the years to come.

Regional Dynamics and the Lack of Domestic Security

Southern African countries posing the most daunting challenges to the SADC Organ remain the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe, while the Angolan peace process is not yet consolidated and the road to post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation is arduous and long. It is thus imperative that the Organ makes use of the window of opportunity that is provided by the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC to develop a coordinated political approach to the resolution of the conflict while continuing diplomatic initiatives and the provision of peacekeeping assistance under the auspices of the UN.

A coordinated SADC programme of action to assist in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction at all levels in Angola is equally important and the OPDS, as the SADC structure with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the region, has an important role to play in this regard.

The Zimbabwean situation is a little trickier and presents an instance of a lack of political stability, rather than open violent conflict as in the other two cases. If the concept of political stability were expanded to include principles of 'good governance', as implied by the Protocol, even more countries would fail the test. With due consideration for the developments at a continental level, the implication of the Zimbabwean situation is to compound the urgency of the need for the region to develop and agree upon a set of

minimum standards of good governance (such as fewer restrictions on press freedoms, no harassment of official opposition, and the like) and create a substructure to carry out reviews.[5]

This needs to be supplemented by the design of a mechanism to deal with signatories who do not comply with these minimum standards. Again, this should be coordinated with SADC and continental efforts. The Organ should, at the same time, set in motion the necessary processes for the establishment of a sub-committee on democracy and human rights under the ISPDC and the policy framework for the deployment of election observer missions to cooperate with the SADC Parliamentary Forum Election Observation Committee.[6]

The lack of domestic security is perhaps the gravest threat to peace and security within Southern African countries. Angola and the DRC are the most daunting examples, but human security is not a given in the majority of countries in the region. John Dzimba argues that the fact that most of the threats to the security of Southern Africa derive from internal rather than external factors paradoxically represents an advantage.[7] It places the region's destiny in its own hands.

Unfortunately this would only be true if all the threats were of a purely military nature, and if the region had the economic and social capacity to bring malevolent forces to justice. Most security threats, particularly within states, are, however, non-military, and a holistic approach to addressing these issues needs to overshadow any military considerations. This implies ever closer cooperation between SADC itself and the OPDS and also calls for the active involvement of civil society, the private sector and the international donor community.

Underscoring this dilemma is a persistent fallacy that security equals regime security, and the concept of human security has not historically received any attention within the region. This is a hurdle that may be overcome by concerted efforts from within the OPDS to involve civil society in its initiatives and consultation processes on an institutionalised basis. Perhaps a sub-structure needs to be created to this effect.

The Need for Conceptual Clarification

There is a pressing need for the clarification of a number of issues and con-

cepts within the Protocol, the Organ, and the collective memory of southern African states. The issue of continued conflict around political values amongst states in the region finds its way into almost all explanations of the failure of the OPDS and discussions of the challenges to the future of the Organ. Finding common ground is a matter of extreme urgency that would require open and honest dialogue complemented by a free flow of information and due consideration for the domestic conditions of different states.[8]

Certain aspects of the SADC Protocol are ambiguous and may lead to disputes on the basis of divergent interpretations if conceptual clarity is not achieved through additional consultation and, where necessary, agreements and amendments to the Protocol. Brief mention may be made of the apparent negligence to consider instances where con-

> The search for a common sub-regional agenda for peace, human security and conflict management is likely to encounter a number of obstacles along the way.

flicts do not conform to either the traditional definition of an inter or an intrastate conflict, but where the lines are blurred (such as the DRC). The mechanisms for dealing with inter-state war, as entrenched in the UN system and replicated in regional and sub-regional organisations, are not appropriate for resolving such conflicts, and the appropriateness of intervention into the internal affairs of a state appears to be judged post hoc and on political, rather than legal grounds at this point in time. The OPDS will have to clarify these issues in the regional context and agree upon decision-making and substantive procedures to be institutionalised.

It is also necessary that the SADC and the OPDS in particular obtain clarity as to the level of integration desired within the region as this has far-reaching implications.

Another potential source of contention in need of clarification is the exact use of, and meaning attached to, collective security and collective defence. Otherwise, as Anthoni van Nieuwkerk warns, the Organ may remain "an instrument in the hands of state elites who will use it to protect and advance their interests... The distinction between the two is crucial. The former is based on political and security protocols and co-

operation, whilst the latter entails a more ambitious commitment by states to defend each other against external attack."[9]

The Challenge of Implementation

The first and primary challenge is the establishment of all the committees and sub-committees envisaged in the SADC Protocol. This includes the ISPDC, an early warning system and the Secretariat.

According to the Protocol, the country that Chairs the OPDS will be responsible for providing the Secretariat. In the meantime, Article 10(a) of the SADC Treaty states that the SADC Secretariat shall provide secretariat services to the Organ. This is broadly interpreted as an interim arrangement – the ideal is the establishment of a permanent Organ Secretariat independent from the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. A roving secretariat presents problems of continuity and institutional memory that will have to be addressed at the earliest possible stage through the creation of relevant processes and policies to manage the transfer of control of the Secretariat, and perhaps even make provision for an amended arrangement.

The issue of funding presents another major challenge. SADC is financed by equal contributions from member states, and donations. In order to operate as envisaged, the SADC OPDS needs a sustainable source of revenue. Already cash-strapped member states may not be able to provide sufficient contributions to maintain a permanent secretariat, a peacekeeping training centre and other standing sub-committees, and reservations with regard to relying upon donor funding are justified. Various options for funding both within the overall SADC structure and independently need to be explored. Beyond the institutional requirements of the Organ, the issue of funding has implications for broad over-

all capacity and will specifically affect the capacity of the OPDS to coordinate and accept delegated conflict management responsibilities.

Communication and information sharing represents a historical challenge that could remain an impediment to coordination and integration if left unaddressed. However, "Inevitably national rivalries and suspicions have undercut any attempts at real information sharing at regional and international levels".[10] Communiqués issued at the end of meetings have been blunt working instruments, not allowing much insight into what really transpired.[11] This effectively excluded not only independent analysts, civil society and national constituencies from participation, but even kept average SADC ministers and officials in the dark. This unhealthy state of affairs was compounded by the fact that SADC did not have a functioning website until recently, and that even official legal documents (i.e. protocols and treaties) were difficult to get hold of. There is a need for the OPDS to change this situation, use the Secretariat to accurately record all meetings, including Summits, in order to avoid divergent readings, act as an institutional memory and vehicle for continuity, and allow for the broad participation of civil society and other stakeholders while assuring transparency and accountability. Attention to these kinds of issues should bode well for relations with the international donor community.

Training and capacity building should take place at various levels within the SADC OPDS structures. Extending from training the secretariat and SADC diplomats to the creation of an efficient and credible regional peacekeeping force and community level (peace) education, these activities should form a part of the core functions of the Organ, and might be overseen by a special representative or various subcommittees. There is a global recognition of the importance of educa-

tion and training for various purposes and the OPDS should also consider involving civil society capacity in these efforts.

While the issues addressed above represent pre-conditions for the success of the Organ, and are therefore primary, short-term challenges, the challenge of implementation will have to be addressed in phases with necessity and pragmatism as the guiding principles.

Conclusion

These challenges highlight some of the issues that will be faced by the proponents and drivers of the SADC OPDS in the near future. They are by no means exhaustive or representative of the complexity of the challenge of creating a well-functioning sub-regional security organisation. Only a few examples of those exist in the world.

Once the main problem, that of gathering sufficient political will, has been overcome, systematic and consultative efforts at confronting the remaining challenges should yield positive outcomes.

The global climate is characterised to a large extent by contraction and a loss of faith in international structures as the principal providers of security and well-being. This presents an environment that encourages regional integration and rewards political stability, good governance and fiscal responsibility.

With regard to security cooperation in Southern Africa, windows of opportunity have been missed in the past. At the advent of a new era in African affairs another opportunity is knocking, and there is justifiable cause for optimism that this time around the time is ripe for inclusive cooperation around the concept of human security that will improve the lives of all the people in Southern Africa.

Gina van Schalkwyk is an MA Student in International Studies at the University of Stellenbosch.

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1 The broader concept of human security to which the 1996 communiqué establishing the Organ had made specific reference represents a noticeable omission in the protocol.
2 While the SADC Sectors were replaced by four Directorates, the Organ in fact retained the status of a Sector, an issue that somewhat obscures and complicates its relationship with the rest of the SADC structure.
3 While this issue was on the agenda for the 2nd Meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the SADC OPDS held in Maputo, Mozambique in August 2002, no mention is made of a discussion or decision on the establishment of the IPDSC in the ensuing Press Release.
4 C De Coning, 'Breaking the SADC Organ

Impasse: Report of a Seminar on the Operationalisation of the SADC Organ', *ACCORD Occasional Paper*, no 6, 1999.
5 Note here the CSSDCA and the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
6 The SADC Parliamentary Forum is one of the few SADC structures that include a quasi-civil component in the form of opposition groupings from member countries.
7 J Dzimba, 'A Common Sub-regional Agenda for Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention: A View from SADC', in *Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa*, Proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting held in Pretoria, 23-24 July 2001.

8 Article 8 of the Protocol states that decisions in the committees will be taken by consensus.
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African Foreign Policy in a changing geo-strategic environment

By Francis Kornegay and Iqbal Jhazbhay

This analysis attempts to map out some key geo-strategic – political and economic – challenges facing Africa's foreign policy, taking into account developments around the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).[1] Below, we trace the ten principal challenges to African foreign policy.

'Soviet-American Condominium'? US-Russian Treaty and NATO-Russia Council

The American critic, Gore Vidal (relative of former US Vice-President Al Gore and the late Jackie Kennedy Onassis), who predicted an eventual 'Soviet-American Condominium', once characterised the US and Russia as the "two klutzes of the Northern Hemisphere", since "neither one of us can make a car anybody wants to drive. We're natural allies."[2]

How natural would only emerge once the Cold War was over. Even more perceptive in the post-Cold War period was former US National Security Adviser under President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who advocated "a trans-Eurasian security system" which "might involve an expanded NATO, linked by cooperative security agreements with Russia, China and Japan".[3]

Fast forward to 2003 and the new NATO-Russia Council complementing the US-Russian treaty to cut deployed nuclear warheads in "one of the most tangible pieces of evidence of the new relationship emerging between the former cold war enemies".[4]

What one might term 'Northern Consolidation' was a trend already well underway before the 11 September 2001

attacks on New York and Washington. If anything, one of the consequences of 9/11 has been an acceleration of this trend amid several other developments within the G-8 (itself a reflection of this trend, bringing together the G-7 powers plus post-Soviet Russia) and within the developing world that threatens to reinforce the imbalance of power between North and South, though not without major contradictions within and among the northern industrial powers.

In fact, the escalating moves towards an American military offensive against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, coupled with the growing salience of the international politics of oil, are placing these trends in sharp relief. Taking these developments into account, this international move towards Northern consolidation and Southern disarray forms a global back-drop that should inform African foreign policy calculations.

"The War on Terror": The New Organising Principle of Policy?

As the US/NATO-Russian alignment should indicate, many of the current trends in international relations, at the policy level have long been on the planning boards of Western foreign policy and strategic studies establishments. Pre-9/11, the foreign policy of George W Bush actually posed a threat to these calculations in their more mainstream liberal internationalist expression, as Bush Jnr's administration was headed in a strongly unilateralist direction with the backing of a Christian fundamentalist, neo-isolationist, and neo-conservative alliance within the Republican Party. Post-9/11 for a short time jerked Bush policy back towards the more multilat-

eralist centre of gravity dominated by the traditional bipartisan foreign policy/national security establishment.

The 'War Against Terror' became the new organising principle in Bush Administration policy. This was expressed in an uneasy accommodation between the more mainstream liberal internationalists and the Christian fundamentalist/neo-conservative alliance. By extension, in terms of the way other world powers are relating to Washington, this principle emerged as the dominant motif, though not nearly to the extent of the Cold War ideological motif that polarised much of the world into rival geopolitical camps. However, the Bush administration's determination to pursue a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein, linked to clear signs of its implementing a broader agenda relating to oil and trade, have introduced yet other considerations in need of analysis, starting with a more focused look at the domestic political dynamics animating the foreign policy of Bush Jnr.

The Neo-Conservative Civilian Coup

In terms of US civil-military relations, the 'war council' represents a civilian coup of committed unilateralists over a military establishment leery of any Iraq adventure. Occupying a post-Saddam Iraq for 30 years is not an endearing prospect to America's military brass.

The civilian warriors have been dubbed "Chicken Hawks" – public persons, "generally male, who (1) tend to advocate... military solutions to political problems, and who have personally (2) declined to take advantage of a significant opportunity to serve in uniform during wartime". They are considered to

comprise most senior Bush officials in their 50s who avoided the draft during the Vietnam War. They also represent an ascendancy of predominantly Jewish pro-Likud neo-conservatives within the national security apparatus and among key opinion makers, such as the likes of Charles Krauthammer, the "Reagan Doctrine" propagandist, Washington Post columnist George Will, New Republic and Commentary magazine. Within government, their point-men are Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, chairman of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's Defence Policy Board.

Neo-conservative ideologues within and outside the administration are allied with erstwhile anti-Semitic Christian fundamentalists, once shunned by American Jewry. They are anti-Oslo, supporting Israel as an essentially settler state via Ariel Sharon-Moshe Yaalon militarism. They favour 'Arab democracy' and 'regime change' for Palestinians and Saudis as well as Iraq. Breaking up Saudi Arabia as well as rupturing US-Saudi ties and toppling Saddam Hussein would ultimately marginalise the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Linked as this would be to the defence of Israel, a restructuring of the international oil market in the manner Bush hawks have in mind has significantly geo-politicised the American objective of reducing Middle Eastern oil dependency.

Hence, another dimension in this US policy-political cluster has aimed at persuading - unsuccessfully so far - Nigeria, the only sub-Saharan OPEC member, to quit the cartel, coupled with a new focus on the Gulf of Guinea as a vital US national security priority. Thus has 9/11 radically changed the global strategic environment enveloping African politics; a new environment being defined interactively between the emerging international politics of oil and the 'war on terror'.

4 Addressing North/South Imbalance: The Geopolitics of Redress and NEPAD

The 9/11 impact on African foreign policy has been disruptive. What has been muddled, was a new emerging trend that President Thabo Mbeki was navigating which placed South Africa in the forefront of what can be characterised as 'the geopolitics of redress'. This phenomenon describes a strategy of engagement within Africa and the Global South and between Southern forces and the industrialised North on primarily international economic issues. Underlying these dynamics are a

geopolitics aimed at redressing the imbalance of power between North and South.

The diplomacy leading up to NEPAD, with its origins in the OAU Algiers summit which gave South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria their marching orders on the debt issue was indicative of this trend, resulting in the African/Southern meeting with the G-8 last year in Genoa.

5 Globalisation's Trade Negotiations: The G-5 Counter-Alignment and South Africa's Co-Operation with the North

Closely related has been the multilateral trade negotiations in which South Africa has played a leading developing world role and which placed firmly on the table the South agenda for a transformed trading system within the WTO at the Doha meeting.

Here, South Africa's forging of an informal G5 grouping between itself, Nigeria, Egypt, India and Brazil has been a fitting complement to the inter-African NEPAD alignment. Africa's fate is intimately caught up in the fashioning of an international economic regime weighted towards the interests of developing countries, while South Africa's national interests are inextricably linked to the health of the African continent.

It is therefore logical that South Africa, given its 'gateway' geo-strategic positioning within the African continent and between the Asia-Pacific and Latin America, preoccupies itself with building a counter-alignment to the Northern consolidation while building bridges of negotiation and cooperation with the North. This is a complex task given other trends unfolding in the North and the geopolitical disarray of the South.

6 The Rise of Right Wing Movements: Europe and the US

While the US/NATO-Russian geo-strategy is unfolding as the super-structure of Northern consolidation, there are other trends underway, especially within the European Union (EU), that bear close watching and that may have unpredictable consequences for NEPAD. This is the anti-immigrant shift to the ultra-right in EU politics.

Given the prospect that the G8 partnership with Africa on NEPAD is likely to hinge more on the EU than on the US, there will be a need to closely monitor

and study this political trend to ascertain its possible policy impacts on Africa. On the one hand, anti-immigrant pressures would appear to justify greater EU trade, aid and investment in African economies as one response or at least as one of the incentives for EU delivery on NEPAD. On the other hand, given the right-wing ascendancy in the US, under the Bush Administration, a rightward shift in the EU could make Africa less of a priority with more attention focused on southern and eastern Europe and/or the north African Mediterranean.

Essentially, this anti-immigrant rightward shift within several EU countries reflects a new European crisis of identity as the EU seeks enlargement, in the process diluting its Atlanticist, northwest European character. The most recent and inevitable point of tension here, which has the potential to undermine NATO, is the issue of Turkey. The inclusion of predominantly Islamic Turkey holds out the prospect of transforming the EU into less of a European and more of a Eurasian geo-political/economic and cultural bloc amid the shrinking demography of the EU's European core.

Non-European Turkey becomes, demographically, the largest member of the EU, potentially reinforcing the identity crises feeding European xenophobic

> The civilian warriors have been dubbed "Chicken Hawks" — persons who tend to advocate ... military solutions to political problems, and who have personally declined to take advantage of a significant opportunity to serve in uniform during wartime

tendencies, though Europe's population decline poses potential economic challenges running counter to the anti-immigrant feeling. Turkey's Eurasian Islamic identity has generated an undertow of western European resistance to Turkey's entry into the EU. The US, on the other hand, for clear geo-strategic reasons having to do with the Middle Eastern conflict and the 'war on terror', is pressing for Brussels to open negotiations on Turkey's entry into the EU sooner rather than later.

While the issue of Turkey has the potential to undermine European unity, and thereby, threaten a counter-trend toward Northern consolidation, Turkey's integration into Europe has wider geo-political significance. This relates to Washington's need to consolidate a pro-

Israeli aligned periphery between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea to support an eventual refocusing of efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Then, there are implications for Central Asia that could add yet another dimension to the South's disarray. Turkey is a potential factor in the geopolitical reconfiguration of Central Asia as an alternative to its joining Europe. Central Asia is an unstable area of heightened fluidity as a result of the 'war on terror', bringing with it expanded US influence and jockeying for the region's petroleum reserves.

7 Trade and Political Tensions: US, EU and Japan

Furthermore, running against the grain of Northern consolidation are the trade tensions within the G8 between the US, on the one hand, and the EU and Japan. This could signal an instability that undermines multilateral trade gains in the Doha Round that Africa is looking for in terms of greater access to developed country markets. But trade tensions within the G8 are being reinforced by what appear to be increasingly more fundamental cleavages emerging from the 'war on terror' and the increasing focus of the Bush Administration on 'regime change' in Iraq. Namely, a polarisation between US unilateralism and EU multilateralism – although US Secretary of State Colin Powell has managed, thus far, to hold his own with the neo-conservative hawks by maneuvering US-Iraq policy into the constraints of the UN Security Council.

8 Israel, the Indo-Pakistani Conflict and the Red Sea

Meanwhile, the Middle East conflict has become ever more intractable. This is a function of the 'new' Bush policy which is seen as crystallising the US-Israeli alliance, compounded by the Indo-Pakistan confrontation over Kashmir. Indo-Pakistan tensions have a much greater impact in undermining Southern cohesion than is generally appreciated. But while this conflict simmers, a major strategic realignment appears underway in the area of the Red Sea where the US is incorporating a still unstable alignment of such states as Yemen and Djibouti as well as potentially Ethiopia, the Sudan and Eritrea, though the latter has become isolated while Sudan is undergoing an uncertain peace process. Geo-strategically, this alignment takes in east Africa as well, as reflected in the Al-Qaeda attack in Mombasa, highlighting the strategic role of Kenya.

Thus, within the new post-9/11 strategic environment enveloping Africa,

the eastern side of the continent is being incorporated as a major staging area in the war on terror and forms a potential backdrop for a consolidated periphery undergirding an eventual Israel-Palestinian settlement.

The problem, however, is that Africa's fragile stability can ill afford to accommodate a war on terror any more than it was able to accommodate the Cold War. This poses crucial policy challenges to the African Union in terms of refocusing on the notion of the Indian Ocean as a 'zone of peace' and expanding it into a broader doctrine defining Africa as a 'continental zone of peace' reinforced by an Afro-Arab dialogue on African security. However, this would have to be complemented by a revisiting of the 'Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic' to address the encroachment of the international politics of oil along the west African coast and US trade strategy in southern Africa and Latin America.

9 China, India and Latin America's Mercosur

The current South African geo-economic strategy of forging free trade linkages with major southern powers and regional blocs could be greatly helped by the consolidation of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) as a complement to progress with the Latin American Mercosur grouping towards an eventual South Atlantic Free Trade Area. However, this South-South consolidating is complicated by Argentina's economic meltdown and a clear preference by the US to incorporate the Latin American 'southern cone' into a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), to which there is considerable resistance amid the emergence of a new democratically elected left-wing regime in Brazil. (Complementing the US-FTAA strategy is Washington's focus in southern Africa aimed at drawing the Southern African Customs Union into a free trade area building on the African Growth and Opportunity Act to offset South Africa's trade and development agreement with the EU.) Otherwise, in the case of the Indian Ocean, the Indo-Pakistan confrontation has long retarded the potential for Southern geo-economic consolidation complementing South Atlantic interregional trade possibilities at a time when China is contemplating a Sino-ASEAN mega-free trade zone linking

with the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC).

Meanwhile, the renewed Indo-Pakistan confrontation, as one consequence of 9/11 geopolitics, has sucked both India and Pakistan into an American sphere of influence without any offsetting South Asian and/or Indian Ocean sphere of regional cooperation to balance the growing US hegemony in Southwest and Central Asia. Ironically, these geopolitical gains for Washington came without it having to do what it was allegedly aiming to do prior to 9/11: dump Pakistan for India in an attempt to contain China as a potential rival to US influence in Asia.

China, in effect, was set to replace the former Soviet Union as the 'Evil Empire' prior to 9/11 and the Iraq-Iran-North Korean 'Axis of Evil'. As it is, Sino-Indian relations have never fully recovered from China's humiliation of India in the Himalayas, which consolidated Beijing's control over Tibet. It is also possible that it contributed to the intractability of the Kashmir issue between India and China's traditional ally, Pakistan, in Beijing's own containment of New Delhi.

The result is a vacuum in terms of economic cooperation in the South Asian/Indian Ocean region which is a natural geo-economic point of linkage in Afro-Asiatic economic and trade relations. Plan B for (South) Africa is already unfolding now: the forging of separate bilateral FTZs with India and China in the absence of dynamism in the IOR-ARC, complemented by regional integration within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). These Asian contradictions also inhibit

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the consolidation of a 'G8 of the South' as a counter-alignment to Northern hegemony.

If the South is currently on the back foot, the long-term stakes are nevertheless compellingly in favour of a protracted strategy of engagement aimed at harmonising South-South political as well as economic relations. By mid-Century, Africa will be over the one billion mark in terms of population, joining India and

OPINION

China. All the more reason for a foreign policy focus on Africa's consolidation to overcome its own fragmentation. This is what the AU is all about. But, in the post-9/11 era of the global anti-terrorism war and an incipient bid by some factions in Washington to turn the US into an avowedly imperialist hegemony, the challenge confronting the major African powers will be to safeguard, indeed enhance, Africa's autonomy and non-alignment in the international system.

The international politics of oil and trade in the South Atlantic and the international politics of anti-terrorism in the Persian Gulf would tend to dictate the articulation of Africa's security status as a Continental Zone of Peace as a corollary to the onset of the new AU/NEPAD era. This should be accompanied by the AU's promotion of codes of conduct for foreign transnational companies investing in African mineral and energy resources.

10 AU / NEPAD and the Challenge of Egypt's Politics of the Nile River

A protracted African consolidation strategy revolving around the transition to the AU and the implementation of NEPAD would not only benefit Africa's interests, but would contribute more broadly to a Southern consolidation of geopolitical and economic interest, bringing about an eventual North-South balance of power along the fulcrum of Sino-Indian-African axis.

But there is a major African weak link in this chain (not to mention all the other African peace and security challenges): Northeast Africa, where Egypt's security concerns over the Nile Basin keep cropping up as a continuing factor of instability in and around Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somaliland and Somalia, with ramifications for the East African Community as well. Along with the Great Lakes conundrum, the geopolitics of the Nile is the next challenge in need of tackling by the AU.

Hence, the crucial importance of the Machakos peace process in the Sudan alongside the protracted inter-Congolese dialogue. Adding to the urgency of Sudan peace process is the fact that the Sudan's surrounding northeast African sub-region is in urgent need of stabilisation as it confronts the possibility of being sucked into a new phase of a protracted Middle East conflict which could hold unpredictable consequences for Africa's peace and security.

Iqbal Jhazbhay is Senior Lecturer at the University of South Africa. Francis Kornegay is a senior foreign policy analyst at the University of the Witwatersrand's Centre for Africa's International Relations.

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BOOKSHELF

ECOMOG in West Africa: Lessons for future Peace Initiatives

By George Mboya

Guided by an old African song, "Africa's shaped like a question mark; Africa's got the answer!" President Thabo Mbeki set in motion the idea of an African Renaissance.

Due to Africa's inaction the West has continued to paint a gloomy picture of Africa. Africa is now synonymous with bad news, and this thought is gradually being entrenched in our subconscious. Indeed, Africa is described as the centre of bedeviling civil wars, ethnic clashes and total failure by governments to bring about civil unity. As a result, it is only sober and necessary to ask whether anything good has come out of Africa.

The African Renaissance urges Africa to emerge from its slumber and to play a positive role in its own affairs. "Wake up, Africa!" presupposes that now is the opportune time to dispel the myth that Africa is a hopeless continent. Kwame Nkrumah echoes these sentiments when he opines that, "For too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others.

Now, what I have called an African Personality in international affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it through the voices of Africa's own sons (and daughters)." Africa is therefore urged to develop on its own terms,

hence creating an Africa for Africa and by Africa.

Adekeye Adebajo in this book has taken up the challenge and without dwelling on pessimism proceeds to show what Africa is doing to solve its own problems. The book has propagated a revival in African thinking. The West is now gradually being pushed behind as Africans take the reins to steer the continent out of this dull abyss. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) are the mechanisms in focus in the book under review. The author in penning the book seeks to assess the role played by these two institutions in the highly volatile West African region. Three countries – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau – are used as case studies to show the challenges posed by sub-regional intervention. The problems notwithstanding, ECOMOG serves as a benchmark on which other peace initiatives can be built by encouraging sub-regional security organisations.

The International Peace Academy (IPA), initiated in 1970, is working earnestly to enhance peace in Africa. The book under review is among their series of papers and it creates awareness on the part of the public of "peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in Africa". The IPA coor-

dinates a network of organs necessary for peace including the United Nations, governments and donors among other groups. The author reiterates that Africa needs help to solve its problems hence the importance of the international community. Thus the aim of the book is to provide a viable mechanism for building a "political, economic and secure community", incorporating relevant and diverse avenues. By encouraging optimism and embracing eclectism it is the ultimate hope of the author that Africa united with the international community behind it will solve its own problems.

The author acknowledges that the West African region is one of the most volatile in Africa. He also points out that in terms of promoting peace it serves as an example of how the state of turmoil that has gripped the rest of Africa can be quelled. As a result West Africa is building on the ECOMOG initiative as a security mechanism to stop future regional conflicts. In May 1975, ECOWAS was initiated at the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. Its main aims were vested in its five protocols heralding a vision of economic development and cooperation. This vision was impossible to achieve because of the region's instability, hence the need to first root out the problem before savouring the main dish. As time

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has gone by the problem has proved the bane of any initiative hence delaying economic development.

In its limited capacity ECOMOG has achieved both success and failure in the handling of the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Liberia was declared a republic in 1847 and was led by a group of freed American slaves known as the Americo-Liberians. Their style of government excluded the majority of Liberians, hence propagating discontent. When Samuel Doe took over it was expected that the situation would improve, but, amidst accusations of corruption, he did not ameliorate the situation. After Doe's death Charles Taylor emerged as the leader of Liberia. Nigeria, a major contributor to the ECOMOG and with a leader bent on improving Nigeria's image, half-heartedly accepted Taylor's

government. On the positive side ECOMOG initiated peace talks and acted to oversee the disarmament of the combatants. Through their efforts help came from across the world. The major shortcoming, though, is the ill feeling between the governments of Nigeria and Liberia. At one time this stand off threatened to derail the peace process when Charles Taylor denied ECOMOG the opportunity to restructure its army.

In Sierra Leone a similar scenario is encountered. The post-independence governments were accused of corruption and tribalism. Siaka Stevens, in the third government, ushered in one-party rule that has caused much hard feeling and trouble. In a show of how interconnected the region is, Liberian Charles Taylor started a rebellion in Sierra Leone to punish it for participating in a Nigerian-led West African intervention force which was acting against Taylor's government. Sensing a cross-border conflict, Joseph Momoh's government called for help from Nigeria and Guinea-Conakry.

The rebels, meanwhile, settled in the north-east of the country, calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Led by Foday Sankoh, their ambition was to overthrow Momoh's government. Through the efforts of ECOMOG elections were held in 1996 that brought Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. By initiating constant meetings with the RUF a ceasefire has been maintained. ECOMOG has been instrumental in removing the RUF from Sierra Leone. It also has the mandate to wage war against the rebels, trains the army and is credited with providing protection for UN personnel working in the country.

As the book points out, the dominance of Nigeria is a contentious issue in this region. ECOMOG's contigent comprises some 15 000 Nigerians, costing their country around US$1 million daily. The incompetence of ECOMOG was also brought to the attention of the public when it was accused of human rights abuses during a battle in Freetown in 1999. ECOMOG was similarly accused of engaging in looting in Liberia.

In contrast to the other case studies, a huge West African presence was severely lacking in the civil war in Guinea-Bissau. In its place was a small ECOMOG peace force supported by Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo that faced financial and logistical problems. In the end it took the assistance of France

to enable ECOMOG to intervene in Guinea-Bissau. Although this can be seen as the desire of France to maintain its influence over its former colonies, the assistance was necessary. What is revealing of the regional power dynamics is that, fearing a vendetta against the government, Guinea-Bissau did not want Senegal and Guinea removed from the ECOMOG peace force. According to Vierra, ECOMOG without these two countries could not guarantee him security. His opposition, on the other hand, distrusted an ECOMOG including Senegal, fearing its collusion with Vierra.

A number of key issues have arisen as a result of the three missions. Firstly, there is a need to supply ECOMOG with adequate equipment for their missions. What significant achievement is expected of a force of just 712 peacekeepers against an entire warring nation? Secondly, although Nigeria's presence has proved indispensable to the region a balance should be maintained so as not to create ill-feeling that will hinder peace. Regional intervention can be sensitive, especially if sides are taken, thus creating an impasse instead of peace.

A viable peace should incorporate all the actors, as the domination of one group can exacerbate a war especially when one group is favoured over another. Hence Nigeria's "arrogant unilateralism" cannot suffice to bring peace. Thirdly, the author recognises the biased efforts of outsiders. Of note is the position taken by the USA in Liberia. Finally, there is a need for recruiting qualified personnel. This will enable proper coordination between the secretariat and peacekeeping missions.

The West African region is considered one of the most violent places in Africa. Now, through the efforts of ECOWAS and ECOMOG, there seems to be light at the end of this dark tunnel. The book is refreshing and provides useful historical information that is required to understand the conflicts and to provide solutions. The material is well-researched and is clearly organised, making it easy to grasp the ideas expressed. Its specificity makes the salient lessons learnt relevant for other regions. The three case studies incorporated in the book should serve as the foundation for building peace and achieving economic prosperity in this millennium. The book in review seeks to steer this region in its realisation of a Pax West Africana or West African Peace.

George Mboya is a journalism student at the United States International University.

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