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Comment

- Will Africa's democracy survive? — *Simon Baynham* 182

Politics

- The Horn of Africa: Consequences of insurgency — *Christopher Clapham* 184
 Land reform in South Africa: An overview — *Hennie Kotzé* 190
 Africa in transition towards democracy 1990–1993 — *Pieter Esterhuysen* 198
 The role of chiefs in a future South African constitutional dispensation — *J C Bekker* 200
 The foundations of ethnicity and some of its current ramifications in Namibia — *Johan Malan* 205

Economics and development

- British aid to Southern Africa: The role of the commonwealth development corporation — *C M Rogerson* 209
 Migration of high-level African manpower to South Africa — *Erich Leistner* 219
 Reconciling structural adjustment and reconstruction — *Stef Coetzee* 225
 Urban planning and employment creation — *M Levin* 232
 Socio-cultural constraints to family planning in Swaziland — *Gugulethu Gule* 240

Religion

- The numbers game: Independent Churches — *JJ Kritzinger* 246

Urbanization

- Urbanization in colonial Africa— *Tertius Chandler and James D Tarver* 250

Bookreview

- Bernard Gxwensa and Ruben Xulu— *reviewed by Elizabeth Rankin* 255

Bookshelf

257

Will Africa's democracy survive?

Dr Simon Baynham, Director of Research, Africa Institute

The dramatic shift towards a global *novus ordo* has had profound repercussions for Africa – albeit somewhat later in the day than elsewhere. The present era of catalysing demands for democratic pluralism and for an end to single-party hegemonic domination has been dubbed Africa's "second liberation". An emboldened and deeply disillusioned civil society is confronting and ousting many of the continent's military and one-party dictatorships.

This unprecedented opposition to the authoritarian yoke has been underpinned by the OECD countries who regard the implementation of multiparty politics and open government as a *sine qua non* for financial assistance and improvements in the economic sphere.

As a consequence of these triple external and internal pressures (collapse of the USSR and its Eastern European empire, Western pressures for democratic reform, internal opposition to authoritarian government), in the period 1991 to October 1993 no less than 11 African leaders lost their positions – the highest turnover since the OAU was created in 1963. More widely, political changes since 1989 had led to the trebling of the functioning *de jure* multiparty states (with elections in almost all of them) from 10 to 31 towards the end of 1993. (See page 198.)

These developments have raised real hopes for better governance in Africa which, in turn, is fundamental to any chance of sustained economic recovery. But the surge towards democratization and the medicine inherent in structural alterations to the economy will inevitably mean a painful and extended period of adjustment – with parallel problems relating to domestic and regional security.

The dynamics *behind* the new African *modus vivendi* are relatively easy to quantify. However, the crucial questions remain: will Africa be able to sustain the drive towards representative government? Is it possible to control, contain and end violent conflict? In short, can democracy be nurtured to survive?

For Africa, the superpower *rapprochement* of the late 1980s and the subsequent conclusion to the Cold War represent something of a mixed blessing. To be sure, the end of major power confrontations on the continent with the waning of Africa's geopolitical significance has brought some measure of comfort. But the relaxation of East-West tensions has ushered in well-founded fears that Africa is drifting off the

map of world concerns and that sub-Saharan Africa in particular has become peripheral to the international agenda. In addition, competition for resources has never been greater and countries that cannot demonstrate that they are utilizing aid effectively – and that means transparency and sensible economic policy – will lose it.

Of course, the West has long-standing historical and ethical commitments to Africa. In addition, there are signs of a growing cultural and political awareness of the continent among African-Americans. And as far as South Africa itself is concerned, there is a genuine West European desire to see the RSA fully resuming its natural role as the engine-room for the growth and regeneration of a dying continent.

The changing criteria for economic developmental assistance – the new conditionalities – clearly suggest that the outside world will *not* disengage so long as the contentious, but necessary, principle of linkage between foreign assistance and political/economic reform is maintained.

To sum up, it would seem that – so long as African governments embrace externally encouraged programmes/guidelines for democracy, human rights, security expenditures and open accountable government – the dire predictions for a massively marginalized Africa will not in fact come to pass. The main emphasis, however, will continue to focus on good governance as the vital factor in sustaining economic reform.

However, this is not to say that Western donors are intent on imposing immutable yardsticks and specifications irrespective of local circumstances and conditions. In this regard, the West is already showing a degree of flexibility in its approach to Africa.

But for all the above, and despite the promising reforms, formidable obstacles remain to the spread of democracy on the continent.

Political freedom has taken on the profile of a panacea for all the causes of popular discontent. Herein lies the danger. If democracy fails to deliver material prosperity, there could be a rapid return to the disenchantment that leads logically to the re-establishment of dictatorship. The economic underpinnings of democracy therefore remain crucial.

An additional problem is that even if the democratic process does produce competent, honest and open administrations, the

The Horn of Africa: Consequences of insurgency

Professor Christopher Clapham, Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University and a Research Fellow of the Africa Institute of South Africa, examines what actually happens when guerrillas succeed in capturing and overthrowing the previous regime in the light of the recent experience of the Horn of Africa.

The threat to governments in sub-Saharan Africa has changed. Whereas not so long ago, African regimes appeared to be secure against almost everything except a military *coup d'état*, the danger now comes from demands for multiparty democracy on the one hand, and from guerrilla insurgent movements on the other. Africa's movement towards multiparty democracy has attracted a great deal of attention, but the consequences of insurgency have been much less widely explored. Yet the question of what actually happens when the guerrillas succeed in capturing the capital and overthrowing the previous regime has become a vital one. The recent experience of the Horn of Africa, in Ethiopia, Somalia and the newly independent state of Eritrea, goes some way towards providing the answers.

The classic picture of successful insurgency, derived from Mao Tse-Tung's concept of "people's war" and illustrated by China, Vietnam and Nicaragua, was one in which a highly organized and disciplined guerrilla army, with a clearly articulated Marxist ideology and usually a close association with the Soviet bloc, succeeded after years of warfare in ousting a regime associated with the West. Such movements characteristically had a clear idea of what they wanted to do, and this involved the imposition of a brutal but effective and hierarchical Leninist single-party state, with a centrally planned economy. It is paradoxical that insurgency has only become a major concern in Africa, apart from guerrilla independence movements directed against recalcitrant colonial powers in territories such as Algeria, Angola and Mozambique, as the Marxist-Leninist model of political and economic organization has collapsed. Even in the former Portuguese territories and Algeria, moreover, as indeed in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the insurgents did not ultimately have to fight their way into the capital, but were able to take over under negotiated settlements with incumbent regimes which had had enough. The first seizure of power by an insurgent group in modern Africa of which I am aware was in Chad in 1982, though since this effectively

involved little more than the displacement of one of that country's innumerable factions by another, it did not result in the installation of a recognizable post-insurgent state. The first of these was Museveni's NRA regime in Uganda after 1986, an interesting case which has attracted much less attention than it deserves. Liberia in 1990 correspondingly provides the first example of post-insurgent collapse, when the overthrow of the Doe regime was followed by the disintegration of the state, as the insurgents fell into a welter of competing factions.

As Liberia and also Angola help to show, there is no magic about insurgency. It does not automatically lead to disciplined and efficient, let alone communist, government. The belief that long years of fighting in the bush or the mountains will forge a force of battle-hardened and ideologically committed warriors who will provide the backbone of the new government is little more than myth. The nature of the regime that the insurgents are fighting against is clearly one factor: when, as in Liberia, it is brutal, inefficient and corrupt, no very well organized or ideologically coherent force is needed to overthrow it. The society on which the insurgent movement is built must also make a difference: one cannot assume, as the partisans of insurgent warfare readily tend to do, that "the struggle" will make new men and women out of its participants, creating new identities and a sense of common purpose. Rather, the insurgent movement will have to make do with the material at its disposal; and when the society is weakly organized, or riven between classes or ethnic groups, the same problems will be all too likely to plague the guerrilla force. Though some insurgent movements, in Africa and elsewhere, have shown astonishing levels of leadership and organizational capacity, they cannot escape from the soil out of which they have grown.

Insurgents in the Horn

Recent developments in the Horn of Africa have been admirably surveyed in a recent article for *Africa Insight* by Peter Woodward,¹ and there is no need to repeat them here.

As a result of its own peculiar pattern of historical development, the unrepresentative and often brutal nature of its domestic regimes, the ready availability of sophisticated weaponry supplied by major powers (notably the former USSR), and the tendency of conflicts in one state to infect its neighbours, this region has experienced a level of insurgency far greater than any other part of the continent.² Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and even the tiny microstate of Djibouti have all been badly affected.³ Neither the SPLA in Sudan nor the FRUD in Djibouti have been able to seize state power, and so they are excluded from this discussion. In both Ethiopia and Somalia, however, the insurgents have been successful. In the Somali Republic, the United Somali Congress (USC) of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, aided by a variety of other groups, managed in January 1991 to oust President Mohamed Siyad Barre; a few months later, in May 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) which had led the fight against Barre in the former British Somaliland in the north of the country, declared this territory's separate independence as the Republic of Somaliland. In the same month, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized control of Addis Ababa, while almost simultaneously the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) took control of Asmara and established the provisional government which led in May 1993 to the internationally recognized independence of Eritrea. The former united Ethiopia and Somali Republic thus provide three and perhaps four governments which between them illustrate the widest range of consequences of successful insurgency.

The Somali disaster

The tragedy of Somalia is in some respects too current and too vivid to call for much description. Along with Liberia, it provides the classic case of a regime whose indiscriminate brutality prompted a reaction which led not only to the fall of the incumbent government, but to the collapse of the state itself, and to intervention by a multinational peacekeeping force which, in seeking to maintain a basic framework of order, has itself been ensnared in the conflicts which it had sought to resolve. More than any of the other conflicts in the region, the Somali experience reveals the difficulty of separating an insurgent movement from the structure of the society in which it is rooted. This is indeed a case where there was no insurgency in the modern sense of an organized movement directed towards the seizure of the state, so much as the continuation of a historical process of factional and clan conflict, aided by large quantities of modern weapons.

Somali politics is endemically factionalized, characteristically on a clan basis, and a very strong sense of Somali identity and cultural nationhood has failed to provide the foundation for an effective national government.⁴ The Somali state has been chronically weak, for a number of reasons. First, Somali society itself, based in nomadic pastoralism, has lacked any historical tradition of organized statehood; second, the Somali Republic was formed from the union of the former Italian and British Somalilands, and could draw only to a limited and

ambivalent extent on the legacy of colonial rule; third, the impoverished state lacked access to the economic resources which might have been used to bind Somalis to their central government. As a result, the Somali state has depended for a national mission on the dream of Somali unification, and for state power on the one resource which it has been able to gain in abundance, armaments.

The most systematic attempt to build an effective Somali state was in the early years of the Siyad regime, between 1969 and 1977, when strong Soviet support and massive arms imports were allied with the attempt to achieve the national mission which culminated in the Ogaden War of 1977–1978. Once that had failed, the basis for internal unity fell apart, and the regime found itself having to fall back on traditional clan alliances.⁵ Its problems were made worse by the loss of its Soviet patron, and by the support for armed opposition movements provided by Ethiopia. At the same time, it contributed to its own difficulties, firstly by a counter-productive attempt to respond to opposition by force, exemplified by the bombing of the city of Hargeisa with massive civilian casualties in 1988, and secondly by distributing arms to supposedly friendly clan militias which then turned against it.

The structure of insurgency in Somalia is vividly demonstrated by the proliferation of guerrilla movements, each claiming a resounding title in which the words "Somali", "national", "democratic" and "united" figure prominently, which actually amounted to no more than the armed representatives of a particular clan or sub-clan – and, increasingly, to the clan-based following of a particular warlord. The United Somali Congress represented the Hawiye clan of the Mogadishu area, but broke apart between the Habar Gadir sub-clan of Mohammed Farah Aidid and the Abgal sub-clan of Ali Mahdi Mohammed. The Somali National Movement represented the Isaaq clans of the north. The United Somali Front represented the Issas of the north-west. The Somali Patriotic Front was run by the Majertein clan and the Somali Democratic Alliance by the Gadabursis. Siyad himself, after being ousted from Mogadishu, formed the Somali National Front from his own Marehan clan. These groups did not form state-capturing insurgencies because there was no state for them to capture. They fought instead to maintain the power of their bosses, the autonomy of their clan followings, and a cut from the international aid which their own activities and the resulting destitution of the Somali people had attracted to the country. The consequence of insurgency in Somalia was thus a reversion to clan warfare, exacerbated by sophisticated weapons and by the breakdown of the social conventions which had traditionally helped to contain it.

Insurgency in Ethiopia and Eritrea

As the insurgent forces came ever closer to Addis Ababa in April and early May 1991, the example of what had happened to Mogadishu earlier in the year was on every observer's mind. In fact, the two situations were very different, and the consequences of insurgency were different likewise. Ethiopia, unlike Somalia, has a strong and ancient tradition of state-

hood. Easily the oldest independent state in sub-Saharan Africa, it was governed until 1974 by a succession of emperors culminating in Haile-Sellassie. With its core in the Christian northern highlands, but greatly expanded in the later nineteenth century, this state was certainly founded on conquest and domination, and had severe problems of internal unity. But its hierarchical social order, in contrast to the anarchic egalitarianism of the Somalis, at least provided the basis for effective government.

Insurgencies arose, first under emperor Haile-Selassie but to a much greater extent under the successor Marxist military regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, because the central government sought to impose control to an extent that fomented regional opposition. Under Haile-Sellassie, by far the most important of these was in Eritrea, a former Italian colony federated with Ethiopia in 1952, which had an autonomous identity and a set of institutions which the central government immediately sought to subvert. The Mengistu regime, with a much more rigid and ruthless policy of centralization, backed by virtually limitless Soviet weapons, was in some respects highly efficient: massive programmes of land reform, villagization and resettlement were implemented.⁶ But the attempt to impose socialist central control had a devastating effect on the economy, especially on agriculture, and exacerbated rather than resolved the problems of ethnicity and national identity. The result was a series of insurgencies which even an army of about half a million, backed by a superpower, was unable to contain. Indeed, as the wars continued and the regime's authority declined, one of the main effects of Soviet weapons shipments was merely to enhance the capabilities of the opposition; huge quantities of armaments, extending even to substantial numbers of tanks, were captured from demoralized and defeated government forces and used against the regime; air power, the one weapon which the insurgents could not match, was – as often happens in insurgent wars – politically counter-productive, since it served to cement the alliance between the insurgents and the local populations under air attack. In May 1991, with the insurgents getting daily closer to Addis Ababa, Mengistu fled and his regime collapsed.

The EPLF in Eritrea

The Mengistu regime was overthrown by two insurgencies, which subsequently set up separate regimes of rather different kinds. In the northern region of Eritrea, secessionist movements had fought against the central Ethiopian government for nearly thirty years before victory in 1991. From the mid-1970s, the struggle for a separate and independent Eritrea had been dominated by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which developed into one of the most impressive insurgent movements, not just in Africa but in the world. It succeeded in holding, and subsequently defeating, a powerful and well-armed regime; and a multitude of foreign observers have testified to the extraordinary infrastructure of underground weapons workshops, hospitals and schools which it developed in its base areas during the war, and to the dedication and organization of its fighting cadres. Not least of its

achievements is that it succeeded in the extremely difficult task of building such a movement in an ethnically diverse community: Eritrea is an artificial territorial unit, which owes its existence entirely to Italian colonialism, and is divided along religious, linguistic and socio-cultural lines.

The major problem in assessing both the past successes of the EPLF and the prospects for an independent Eritrea is that there is virtually no information about how this organizational miracle was achieved. Coverage of the EPLF's activities in wartime Eritrea was for the most part uncritical, and readily accepted at face value the EPLF's own heroic mythology, according to which the movement forged a new Eritrean nationalism, capable of incorporating and absorbing all of the disparate groups within the territory. The reality is likely to prove more complex and less inspiring; and although the EPLF has taken great care to emphasize its multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature, a disproportionate part of its leadership certainly comes from the Tigrinya-speaking Christian highland community – that part of Eritrea, paradoxically, which has historically been most closely associated with the Ethiopian state.

There can be no question that the EPLF forms a classic, centralized, state-creating insurgency, analogous to those in Vietnam, Cambodia or Cuba. In many respects, too, and especially in terms of its internal organization, it can likewise be regarded as a communist one; even though it abandoned any formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism in the mid-1980s, it maintained a Leninist internal structure, with a central committee and politbureau, a division between political cadres and military commanders within the armed forces, and an adherence to the Stalinist concept of nationalities.

The problem that it faced, on taking over the whole Eritrean territory in May 1991, was how to convert this extremely impressive military organization into an effective government for an independent state, in a world in which the classic way forward – through revolutionary socialism – has spectacularly failed. In the aftermath of victory, the EPLF promised to establish both a capitalist economy and a liberal multiparty political structure, the second of which was to go into effect only after the achievement of formal independence. This would, however, entail the dissolution of the command structure which had operated with great efficiency during the war period, and the dissolution of the EPLF itself – an act of political suicide which could scarcely be expected of an organization which had just achieved a triumphant victory after twenty years of costly struggle. Not only would the introduction of a genuinely capitalist economy require the regime to loosen one of its major sources of control; the introduction of a multiparty system would raise dangers of division along precisely the ethnic and religious lines which the EPLF had been intent on suppressing.

The EPLF's first step after taking over was to form a Provisional Government of Eritrea and institute a two-year transitional period leading to full independence. This meant that much could carry on as before. The EPLF extended its control over the area – largely confined to the capital, Asmara – which it had not already occupied, and kept its armed forces

in being on an unpaid and ostensibly “voluntary” basis to maintain security and provide a backbone for reconstruction. Arrangements were negotiated with the new Ethiopian government, which announced that it would not oppose Eritrean independence, over access to the vital Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa. A large number of Ethiopians were expelled from the territory, and a nationality law was promulgated to distinguish Eritreans from their former co-nationals in Ethiopia. The major difficulties arose over foreign relations, since Eritrea was not formally recognized as an independent state, but the provisional government was nonetheless extremely sensitive about its separate status.

This was formalized in May 1993, following a referendum the previous month in which 99,8 per cent of the electorate voted in favour of independence. There is no need to treat this result with the cynicism which such figures often arouse; the vote, extensively monitored by external observers, was a foregone conclusion, and even those groups and individuals who may have favoured continued association with Ethiopia would have been unlikely to draw attention to themselves. The EPLF leader Isaias Afewerki immediately became president. Just a few days before independence, however, the potential fragility of the political situation was revealed when the government announced that the EPLF armed forces would continue to serve for a further two years without pay; this was a foolish move, since soldiers who had endured many years of fighting had already been denied the fruits of victory while political cadres and former exiles had established themselves in government and business, and immediate protests forced the regime to back down rapidly. The first crack in the apparently monolithic solidity of the EPLF had appeared. In Eritrea, nonetheless, insurgency led to the creation of an effective independent government with a high level of initial support, even though the difficulties which this faces in running a small and impoverished state in a volatile region are already becoming apparent.

The EPRDF in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which took over in Addis Ababa at the same time as the EPLF in Asmara, is certainly closer to the EPLF than to any of its Somali counterparts. Both movements are closely derived from the Tigrinya-speaking Christian peoples of the northern tip of the Ethiopian plateau, the heartland of the ancient Ethiopian state. The core of the EPRDF, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), was formed in the later 1970s in close association with the EPLF, which – despite occasional serious differences – aided it in their common struggle against the Mengistu regime. The two leaders, Isaias Afewerki of the EPLF and Meles Zenawi of the TPLF/EPRDF, are commonly said to come from villages only a few miles apart. The TPLF never attained the formidable organizational structure of its Eritrean counterpart, but nonetheless fought a classic insurgent war, and developed the military discipline to go with it: in striking contrast to the shambles of Mogadishu, the EPRDF takeover of Addis

Ababa took place without any looting or excess violence by the insurgent forces. The TPLF was also more explicitly Marxist-Leninist than the EPLF. It formed a vanguard party within the movement, the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, and whereas the EPLF abandoned Marxism in the mid-1980s, the TPLF continued until 1989 to maintain a bizarre commitment to communism along Albanian lines.

But the paradox of the TPLF/EPRDF is that it was not so much a state-creating or state-strengthening insurgency, as a state-dissolving one. Originating as a Marxist movement, fighting in the mountains of Tigray against a Soviet-supported regime, it had no plausible case for secession (unlike the EPLF), since Tigray had formed part of the Ethiopian state since the very earliest times, while the Mengistu government was already following the classic Marxist path of revolutionary socialism. Tactically, the TPLF was forced to uphold the principle of regional autonomy within a “democratic” Ethiopia, which in turn was ideologically sanctioned by invoking Stalin’s principle of national self-determination for different ethnic groups (or “nationalities” as they were called) within the country. This principle has, of course, been used as a figleaf for ruthless centralization by Marxist-Leninists, including Stalin himself. In the hand of the EPLF and the Mengistu regime, both of which claimed to uphold it, it was no more than a sop by a centralist government seeking to consolidate control over a territorial state with a multi-ethnic population. In the hands of the TPLF, however, it was central, since it could be used as a basis both for consolidating their own control within the ethnically fairly coherent Tigray region, and for seeking alliances among other ethnic movements opposed to Mengistu’s centralization. These alliances were consolidated in the EPRDF, a multi-ethnic movement dominated by the TPLF, but including the Amhara Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), and eventually a plethora of others.

When it captured Addis Ababa, the EPRDF blueprint was thus an Ethiopia composed of a loose confederation of autonomous nationalities; but it rapidly discovered that bringing this about from the perspective of a central government was a very different matter from envisaging it in the distant mountains of Tigray. For one thing, this scenario was by no means as universally popular as the EPRDF leadership had expected. It had easily assumed that ousting the hated Mengistu regime would give it overwhelming popular support; but though the regime’s fall was welcomed by all but its immediate beneficiaries, support for its successor was muted and ambivalent. For one thing, Ethiopia has a long history of state formation on a multi-ethnic basis, which is rather more than a simple pretext for Amhara domination, and which has created a substantial group of people, especially in the central region of Shoa, with an interest in the maintenance of an Ethiopian state; and what looked like an oppressive central government from Tigray could look like Ethiopian nation-building from Addis Ababa. One of the most bizarre features of Ethiopia after May 1991 was that political organization was permitted *only* on an ethnic basis. Whereas virtually every African government has been

desperately anxious to play down ethnic affiliations in the quest for nationhood, the EPRDF sought to create and encourage them, while denying the legitimacy of any national Ethiopian political organization. Among people who were accustomed to think of themselves first and foremost as Ethiopians, this aroused deep unease.

Furthermore, the ethnic building blocks from which the EPRDF sought to construct its new multi-ethnic Ethiopia were not like the TPLF at all. The TPLF had fought a long war, and built up a powerful organization, in almost total isolation from the rest of the country. In their efforts to expand their political base, they found themselves creating movements which had little local support and were readily dismissed as puppets. This was most important in the case of the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromo, where the OPDO, created by the TPLF largely from Oromo prisoners captured from the Ethiopian army, soon came into conflict with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which claimed to be the authentic representative of the Oromo people. While the TPLF viewed itself as an agency of liberation, moreover, from the viewpoint of southern Ethiopians it represented part of the northern highland Christian community associated with the imposition of the Ethiopian empire. The paradox of resistance to centralization in Ethiopia is that it has come from peoples who historically formed part of the Ethiopian state, and not from those who were conquered by it in the late nineteenth century.

As the EPRDF continued to struggle with the problems of ethnic politics, so the dangers of ethnic federalism became increasingly apparent. For one thing, ethnic politics rapidly becomes reduced to a numbers game, in which the relative size of each group is the most important consideration. In these terms, the largest group in Ethiopia are almost certainly the Oromo, closely followed by the Amhara, each with about 30 per cent of the population.⁷ Tigray, by contrast, account only for some 10 per cent, and whereas both Oromo and Amhara are fairly centrally placed, Tigray is far from the centres of power in Ethiopia. A further problem is that Tigray produces virtually no marketable surplus, and cannot normally even feed its own people; the major centres of food and export crop production are in central, south and western Ethiopia, disproportionately in the territory of Oromo and other minority southern peoples. If ethnic autonomy means that each nationality gains control over its own economy, then Tigray are the major losers.

In short, the attempt to introduce a politics of ethnicity to Ethiopia looks likely to rebound on those who have initiated it, and as it struggles to cope with the legacy of its takeover, the EPRDF regime has been pushed into increasingly desperate measures to cling on to power. Regional elections in June 1992, intended to provide the first step towards democratic government, were blatantly managed by the EPRDF and did more to discredit than to establish the regime's democratic credentials. Movements which failed to follow the EPRDF line have been expelled from the transitional council which forms the nearest thing to a national representative body. Progressive intolerance of dissent, though not approaching the brutality of the Mengistu regime, has resulted in the purging of academics

from the university and of many of Ethiopia's most efficient civil servants. Even though there is no immediate alternative to the EPRDF, and the TPLF army continues to maintain control, the attempt to create a viable new political system in Ethiopia appears to have failed.

Conclusion

The wave of insurgency now affecting an increasing area of Africa provides no magic formula for more effective government, nor does it inevitably result in bloodshed and disaster. The most important consideration is the level of discipline and organization within the insurgent movement itself, and especially the degree to which it is able to overcome the endemic problems of ethnic diversity. Some movements, such as the EPLF and EPRDF, and indeed Museveni's NRA, have proved capable of taking over national governments, and of running them – even in the case of the EPRDF – with a greater measure of decency and consent, even if not full democracy, than was present before. The nature of the underlying social structure, exemplified by the contrast between egalitarian Somali pastoralism and the settled hierarchical societies of northern Ethiopia, is evidently an important factor in helping to account for the relative levels of discipline and governing capability in different movements; but much must also depend on leadership and deliberate organization and training within the guerrilla force. When, as in Liberia or Somalia, such forces are no more than the followings of particular warlords, or the militias of one or another clan or ethnic group, they are likely to lead only to chaos. Much depends, too, on the existence of a viable government which the insurgents can take over. In Liberia and Somalia, the government had effectively been destroyed by Doe and Siyad Barre, even before it was overthrown by their opponents; Mengistu's Ethiopia, for all its brutality, nonetheless maintained a structure of government which survived the transfer of power. The contrast is analogous to that between Zimbabwe and Namibia, where the new government could inherit the administration established by the previous minority regime, and Angola and Mozambique, where it inherited only the residue of a departing Portuguese colonialism. Even when they are able to establish effective regimes, however, the former insurgents are still subject to all the problems and difficulties of running an African state, and their survival will ultimately depend on the skill with which they are able to meet them.

Notes and references

- 1 Peter Woodward, "A new map of Africa? Reflections on the Horn", *Africa Insight*, vol 23, no 1, 1993, pp 6–15.
- 2 For a survey of conflicts in the region dating from before the recent changes, see John Markakis, *National and class conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; I have attempted an overview of these conflicts in Clapham, "The political economy of conflict in the Horn of Africa", *Survival*, vol 32, no 5, 1990, pp 403–419.
- 3 For a discussion of developments in Djibouti, which rarely attracts much scholarly or media attention, see Peter J Schraeder, "Ethnic politics in Djibouti: From 'eye of the hurricane' to 'boiling cauldron'", *African Affairs*, vol 92, no 367, April 1993, pp 203–221.

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- 4 See David D Laitin and Said S Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in search of a state*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
- 5 See I M Lewis, "The Ogaden War and the fragility of Somali segmentary nationalism", *African Affairs*, vol 88, no 353, October 1989, pp 573-579.
- 6 For a survey of the policies of the Mengistu regime, see Clapham, *Transformation and continuity in revolutionary Ethiopia*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988, 2nd ed, 1990.
- 7 These proportions are taken from the 1984 census, and are hotly disputed by Oromo nationalists, who implausibly claim anything up to half of the total population as Oromo; the Tigray figure may well be an underestimate, but includes Tigray people in now independent Eritrea.

Asia-Africa Forum

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Land reform in South Africa: An overview

Professor Hennie Kotzé and Mr Francois Basson, of the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University, present the results of a survey of the opinion of the South African élite on land reform.

The land problem in South Africa can be seen as the most pressing political question to be resolved during the constitutional reform process. The reasons why this should be so are multiple. Decades of legalized racial discrimination in securing land and countless forced removals to facilitate the social engineering of apartheid, have resulted in a landless majority. Sweeping reform to rectify this situation is an obvious need. The question of land reform also elicits extremely strong emotional reactions as can be expected when taking into account the important position that land holds in South African society. If South Africa is to succeed in its reforms and return to political stability and economic growth, the land problem will have to be addressed in the process of negotiations and by the transitional government.

The aim of this article is to present an overview of the land reform debate in South Africa, with special emphasis on the position and role of the country's élite. This article is divided into three sections. In the first, a brief overview of the land problem in South Africa is given. In the second, the position of the South African élite on land reform is presented from data collected in an opinion survey in 1992. A third section considers the role of this élite in land reform during the transition period and the democratization of South Africa.

The nature of the land problem in South Africa

The essence of South Africa's land problem can be found in the situation that was brought about by land segregation policies and exacerbated by the system of apartheid. Under the latter, a majority of South Africans were excluded, on account of race, from participating in virtually every aspect of political life. One of these areas of exclusion was ownership and/or use of land.

South Africa's land problem can be defined as follows. The distribution of agricultural and other land is fundamentally racial in nature by virtue of the fact that approximately 14

per cent of the land is owned by the black majority, while approximately 86 per cent is owned by the white minority.¹ This extremely skewed distribution of ownership is due to the apartheid system's laws of racial discrimination against blacks. While the majority of the people were excluded from owning land, the white minority were advantaged to such an extent as to create the abovementioned maldistribution.

Ownership of land was not the only area in which blacks were discriminated against. Racial discrimination also extended to other aspects of the land situation, notably ownership status, access to land, land allocation, access to state support and access to support services such as marketing, credit, subsidies and research. This discrimination was an extension of another type of discrimination in as far as commercial farming was preferred by the white government to subsistence farming. This amounted to gross discrimination against black farmers as they were by and large the biggest group of subsistence farmers.²

The nature of the land problem in South Africa is thus a racially skewed maldistribution of land brought about by racial discrimination and exclusion of blacks from participation in the agricultural sector.

The origins of South Africa's land problem can be found in the migration of Europeans to the continent in the 1600s. As was the case elsewhere in the world, the Europeans had distinct advantages in technology and weaponry and thus proved victorious against the indigenous peoples. As colonists they believed that victory entitled them to annexation of the contested land.³ Wars of conquest continued in this fashion, bringing about the alienation of black land by a succession of Dutch, English, Voortrekker and Afrikaner governments. When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, most of the land was in the hands of white farmers with blacks reduced to labourers or tenants.⁴

The exclusion of blacks from access to the land was reinforced with the introduction of the 1913 Land Act which prohibited "natives" from owning, renting or acquiring land

outside the scheduled "black" areas. This bill's function was to ensure a division of agricultural land on racial lines. The 1913 Act can also be seen as the first "segregation" act in setting aside scheduled black areas where the land was inadequate.⁵ The 1913 Land Act thus introduced compulsory separation by placing legal restrictions on the acquisition of land by blacks outside certain areas.

The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act was a further cornerstone of the racial discrimination that typifies the land problem in South Africa. This bill provided for so-called "released" areas for black settlement. In fact it was just an addition to the land provided for in 1913, without any change in the quality of it. The introduction of this bill also heralded the start of the government's programme of forced removals. The removal of "black spots" meant that land that was owned and/or occupied by blacks outside the scheduled or released areas was confiscated by the state.⁶

The year 1956 saw the introduction of the Group Areas Act, which divided the country into racially defined residential areas and forbade ownership of property across racial lines. The Indian and coloured communities were the most severely affected by this law as large numbers were forced to sell their properties and move to proclaimed group areas.⁷

Racial discrimination was taken a step further with the introduction of the Verwoerdian policy of "separate political development". To facilitate what ended up as six autonomous self-governing states and four independent states, the rate of forced removals was stepped up to change the map of South Africa from a "grey one to a black and white one".⁸ This policy also led to a further unequal distribution of land, gross overpopulation, impoverishment and agricultural degradation of black areas. It has been estimated that 3,5 million people were displaced to accommodate the white government's discriminatory laws. Among these as many as 1,2 million blacks were affected, 670 000 "black spot" removals took place and 834 000 people were displaced under the Group Areas Act.⁹

When seen in perspective it is obvious that successive white governments' land policies were geared towards the implementation of the system of apartheid and the strengthening of that system's inherent social engineering precepts.

As can be deduced from the historical summary provided above, land reform is one of the most important issues that needs to be addressed if the legacy of apartheid is to be eradicated in a democratic South Africa. Land reform is, however, not the only problem area that begs urgent attention and therefore it would be more effective to include it in a much wider and more comprehensive constitutional reform process. The constitutional reform process in its turn will not be completed or successful if land reform is not included in the transition to democracy. The rationale for this study is to investigate the impact of land reform on the process of democratic transition in view of the important role that élites play in the success or failure of transitions.

A further motivation for this study is the contention of various political organizations that land reform is central to regaining political power.¹⁰ This would seem to indicate that the land question is an emotionally charged issue. Land

reform is thus obviously conflict-laden because of the emotions involved, and the implications for a successful transition to a democratic South Africa need to be investigated.

Élite positions on land reform

In this section our aim is to report the attitudinal position of the South African élite on selected land reform issues. This will be done by presenting empirical data collected in 1992 by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch. The attitudes under investigation include those concerning ownership of private property, redistribution of agricultural land, political contestation on land reform in a democratic South Africa, compensation for alienated property, expropriation of white-owned land, the introduction of a land claims court and access to state-owned land for black farmers.

An important question that must be answered is why we study élites. Why are they important and what is their function? The answer lies in the contention that élites are the societal agents through which broader forces such as ethnicity, class, religion, etc are filtered to ordinary people. In most countries élites have played crucial roles in transitions toward democratization and can indeed be seen as the "switchmen of history".¹¹

Most social scientists are convinced that a consolidated and stable democracy is possible only if there is a high degree of consensus among the élite on the "rules of the game" and if they are "unified in defence of democratic institutions".¹² The importance of élites in the process of transition is expressed as follows by Higley and Burton:

We urge those who study democratic breakdowns and democratic transitions to look first at elites and to investigate basic patterns and transformations of elite relationships. This approach is decidedly not monocausal however. We recognise that religion, class, ethnicity, technology, demography, geography, economic development, and the 'demonstration effects' of other countries' politics may affect elite relationships and the forms of political regimes. But we deny that such forces lead inexorably to democratic breakdowns or transitions. Instead we see national elites as filtering these forces with each type of elite giving a predictable thrust to the functioning of political regimes.¹³

In the literature on democratization it is emphasized that the "values, skills and decisions" of previously disunified élites make a significant contribution to the success or failure of the process of democratization.¹⁴

Against this background, élites may thus be defined as follows: "Elites are those persons who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organisations and influential movements, and who are therefore able to affect strategic decisions regularly".¹⁵ Individual members of an élite are called opinion-leaders, opinion-makers or policy-makers, depending on the nature of the institution.¹⁶

The most important agents in the South African transition are the political leaders – an important part of the élite. In recent studies on transition and pact-forming, the role that "powerful actors or élites" play in this process and the end product, a democratic system, is increasingly emphasized.¹⁷ The South

African élite is overwhelmingly made up of white males. In our survey, whites accounted for 72 per cent of the respondents, while men comprised 96 per cent of the respondents.¹⁸ The reason for the skewed racial distribution of the sample is a reflection of the preferential treatment that whites enjoyed under apartheid rule.

The following report is based on a survey conducted by means of postal questionnaires in the middle of 1992. A positional sample¹⁹ of 2 282 individuals was selected. Data-gathering took place in a structured way. The mailed questionnaire was followed up by interviews with a small number of respondents in key sections of society. Three waves of questionnaires were used to push up the response rate. Two follow-up postcards were sent to respondents after the first wave of questionnaires. In the end a response rate of 44,1 per cent was achieved, which makes reliable and valid deductions from the data possible.²⁰

Table 1
Composition of the sample

Sectors	Composition of the sample
Agriculture (99)	Ch-persons: SAAU, producers' committee & control boards
Labour (129)	Genl secr & pres: Cosatu, Nactu, Sacol, Fedstal and independent unions (+10 000)
Bureaucracy (200)	Directors-generals, Dep DGs & Chief Directors: govt departments
Business (190)	MDs, CEOs & directors: Top 100 companies, Sacob, AHI, Stokvels
Academic (148)	Rectors, principals, professors: All SA universities & technikons
Right-wing (99)	Leadership: HNP, AWB, Oranjewerkers & Afrikaner-Volkswag
Legislative (361)	Members: Parliament & President's Council
Local politics (156)	Mayors & ch-persons: local authorities – all population groups (selected according to official rating)
Extra-parliamentary (310)	NECs: ANC, SACP, IFP, PAC & Azapo
Media (140)	Editors & leading journalists: printed media. Officials: SABC. Members: Media Council & Publications Appeal Board
Parastatal (94)	Persons elected to national statutory bodies, eg CSIR, IDC
Codesa (139)	Delegates to Codesa II (not included in legislative & extra-parliamentary sectors)
Church (143)	Leaders of all major denominations
Military (74)	Selection of general and brigadiers
TOTAL (2 282)	

The first issue that will be investigated is the position of the élite on the policy of providing access to state-owned land for black farmers.²¹ Respondents were asked to indicate their attitude to this variable on a five-point scale ranging from “highly desirable” to “highly undesirable”. As can be seen from

Table 2, the élite show definite support for this principle with 50,5 per cent indicating the desirability of providing access to state-owned land for black farmers. Another 17,2 per cent responded in the “highly desirable” category. Very little opposition is noted; in fact only 12,5 per cent found the idea “undesirable” and 5,6 per cent “highly undesirable”. The élite would thus appear to support the policy option of providing access to state-owned land for black farmers.

Table 2
Providing access to state-owned land for black farmers

Categories	% (n)
Highly desirable	17,2 (173)
Desirable	50,5 (509)
Uncertain	12,7 (128)
Undesirable	12,5 (126)
Highly undesirable	5,6 (56)

Having established the élite's support, it is necessary to see how their opinions are crosstabulated with their political support.²² Table 3 provides this breakdown. What is immediately clear is that the participants in the tricameral parliament prefer the “desirable” option. This is the case for the NP and the DP. In the case of the extra-parliamentary organizations stronger support is noted in the “highly desirable” category. This observation holds true for the ANC and the PAC supporters, with the only exception being the IFP, showing stronger support in the “desirable” category. PAC supporters are most strongly in favour of access to state-owned land for black farmers with 62,9 per cent indicating thus. Supporters of the CP are the only ones who do not support the item, with 32,9 per cent in the “undesirable” and 42,9 per cent in the “highly undesirable” categories respectively. One other organization that shows a meaningful measure of opposition with 16,4 per cent of their supporters in the “undesirable” category is the National Party.

Table 3
Access to state-owned land by party support

Party	Highly desirable	Desirable	Uncertain	Undesirable	Highly undesirable
NP	7,4	56,0	15,7	16,4	4,5
DP	21,6	57,4	14,2	6,1	0,7
CP	-	10,0	12,9	32,9	42,9
ANC/SACP	46,3	42,5	5,0	1,3	-
IFP	25,5	60,8	2,0	3,9	3,9
PAC	62,9	20,0	8,6	2,9	-

N = NP (470), DP (148), CP (70), ANC/SACP (80), IFP (51), PAC (35)

It is obvious, however, that a majority of the respondents find the option of providing access to state-owned land for black farmers either desirable or highly desirable. This would appear to indicate sufficient consensus among the participants in the decision-making process on land reform to ensure sustainable success. It would also appear to bode well for multi-party co-operation after the transition to democratization is completed. If such high levels of convergent opinion can be maintained, it would probably lead to a decrease in the potential for conflict, at least among the opinion-leaders. Opposition from the conservative right should also be accommodated if the potential for conflict is to be further reduced.

Expropriation of white-owned land²³ is an extremely contentious issue if the strong emotional ties to land are kept in mind. In our survey respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement on this issue on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Table 4 reports the findings. It would appear that strong opposition exists to expropriation, with 40,4 per cent and 32,8 per cent of the respondents indicating "disagree" and "strongly disagree" respectively. Only minor support (11,5 per cent and 5,0 per cent) is noted. If the composition of the élite – 72 per cent is white – is taken into consideration, this finding would appear to be no surprise.

Table 4
Expropriation of white-owned land

Categories	%	(n)
Strongly agree	5,0	(50)
Agree	11,5	(116)
Uncertain	9,7	(98)
Disagree	40,4	(407)
Strongly disagree	32,8	(331)

Table 5 reports the findings of a crosstabulation with political support. The first noteworthy aspect is the fact that the parliamentary parties are opposed to expropriation, while the extra-parliamentary organizations are in favour of it, with the exception of the Inkatha Freedom Party, which shows 41,2 per cent opposition. What is significant in this regard is the 15,5 per cent of the DP supporters who are in favour of expropriation. While it is not a majority, this group of DP supporters would appear to indicate that there is a section of the party's supporters that prefers a stronger stance on this issue. Of further note is the extremely strong opposition that supporters of the CP indicated. A very high 81,4 per cent responded in the "strongly disagree" category. This would appear to correspond with the emotional responses that the issue of expropriation elicits from the conservative right.²⁴ Expropriation of white-owned land would undoubtedly affect many of the CP's constituency directly and indirectly. Their strong response to the threat of expropriation probably reflects that fear. It also indicates that the rightwing's opposition to expropriation of white-owned land significantly increases the potential for conflict.

A further significant finding concerns the ANC/SACP supporters. While 40 per cent indicated agreement with expropriation, 28,8 per cent disagreed with it. This is particularly significant if the 17,5 per cent who responded in the "uncertain" category is taken into account. If this is done an accumulated 46,3 per cent of ANC/SACP supporters are either not in favour of expropriation or not prepared to commit themselves at this stage. This split of opinion on expropriation of white-owned land would appear to suggest a lack of clarity on future policy directions. It could also point to a certain amount of moderation on this conflict-generating issue.

Table 5
Expropriation by political support

Party	Strongly agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree
NP	0,9	2,8	7,0	46,0	43,0
DP	0,7	15,5	16,9	45,9	20,9
CP	1,4	1,4	-	15,7	81,4
ANC/SACP	10,0	40,0	17,5	28,8	2,5
IFP	7,8	21,6	15,7	41,2	11,8
PAC	51,4	31,4	8,6	8,6	-

N = NP (470), DP (148), CP (70), ANC/SACP (80), IFP (51), PAC (35)

Supporters of the IFP are also divided on expropriation with 41,2 per cent and 11,8 per cent indicating "disagree" and "strongly disagree" respectively. This finding falls outside the pattern of support for expropriation from extra-parliamentary organizations. What is of significance is the finding that 21,6 per cent of IFP supporters show agreement with expropriation. This would appear to point to a sizable contingent who are proponents of stronger, more drastic approaches to land reform. The PAC's supporters show the strongest support for expropriation with 51,4 per cent indicating "strongly agree" and 31,4 per cent "agree". This finding is in line with the radical land reform programmes proposed by the Pan Africanist Congress.²⁵

What is evident from the findings on expropriation is a lack of consensus among the political opinion-leaders when a crosstabulation is done along party-political lines. While the overall findings indicate opposition to expropriation, the breakdown of these findings signal divergencies of opinion between the political leaders, especially since supporters of the ANC/SACP and PAC are in favour of expropriation. It is thus obvious that further negotiations are needed on this issue in order to attain a reasonable consensus. The fact that divergencies of opinion occur within some of the organizations, notably the DP, ANC/SACP and IFP, appears to leave room for negotiations.

Payment of compensation is another issue in the land debate that needs to be investigated. In our survey respondents were asked to respond to the following statement: "If the state alien-

ates property, this must always be accompanied by full compensation at market prices." Respondents had to select their preference on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Table 6 reports the findings. It would appear that payment of compensation received the majority of support, with 43,8 per cent of the respondents indicating "strongly agree" and 44,7 per cent "agree". Only negligible opposition is noted in the 5,2 per cent who showed disagreement with the statement.

Table 6
Payment of compensation

Categories	%	(n)
Strongly agree	43,8	(441)
Agree	44,7	(451)
Uncertain	4,7	(47)
Disagree	5,2	(52)
Strongly disagree	0,9	(9)

Table 7 reports the findings of a crosstabulation of the statement on compensation with political support. All the political organizations who received a measure of support from the respondents, show evident preference for the payment of full compensation. The only exception is the PAC supporters. Strong support is visible from the supporters of the NP, DP, CP, ANC/SACP and the IFP. Conservative Party supporters show the strongest support with 67 per cent responding in the "strongly agree" category. In the case of ANC/SACP supporters it is noteworthy that a majority support payment of compensation. At the same time, the second-highest measure of opposition (20 per cent) can also be found in this group. It is possible that these supporters represent the hardline faction within the ANC/SACP.

Table 7
Payment of compensation by political support

Party	Strongly agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree
NP	46,2	49,6	2,1	1,3	0,4
DP	47,3	48,0	0,7	4,1	-
CP	67,1	28,6	2,9	1,4	-
ANC/SACP	15,0	43,8	12,5	20,0	5,0
IFP	33,3	51,0	9,8	3,9	-
PAC	8,6	22,9	34,3	28,6	2,9

N = NP (470), DP (148), CP (70), ANC/SACP (80), IFP (51), PAC (35)

What is of particular interest is the findings for the supporters of the PAC. A strong division of opinion is evident. Surprisingly, a strong measure of support for compensation is

found, with 22,9 per cent in agreement. A further 8,6 per cent show strong agreement. On the other hand, 28,6 per cent indicated their opposition. If the support and opposition halves of the scale are aggregated, it appears as if equal measures of agreement and disagreement are attained (both halves show 31,5 per cent). This finding is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that the PAC foresees no payment of full compensation.²⁶ This division of opinion could possibly point to a group of PAC supporters who realize that conflict-generating policies are counterproductive in the democratization of South Africa. What is of equal importance is the fact that the largest group of PAC supporters responded with uncertainty (34,4 per cent). It would appear that this group is awaiting the outcome of negotiations and the establishment of the constituent assembly before registering their support or opposition to the payment of compensation. As can be seen from the findings, very little strong opposition exists among PAC supporters. This would appear to indicate a certain divergence between ideological sloganeering and practical implementation of workable solutions to the land problem.

In conclusion, it would appear that strong support exists for payment of full compensation among South Africa's opinion leaders with the exception of PAC supporters. This convergence of opinion will possibly facilitate the achievement of an equitable solution during negotiations.

Present patterns of land ownership in South Africa show a definite lack of available land for disadvantaged blacks, while the demand for land is huge. One of the methods of dealing with demands from blacks is to institute a special land claims court. This proposition was included in our survey. Respondents were asked to indicate their position on the following statement: "The creation of a special 'land court' which can give finality on land demands by blacks is necessary." Responses were measured on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Table 8 reports the findings. The majority of the respondents, 42,7 per cent, supported the creation of a land court. The "strongly agree" option elicited 12,3 per cent support, while 18,2 per cent indicated uncertainty. Measures of opposition can be found in the 16,9 per cent who disagreed and the 9,1 per cent who disagreed strongly. It can thus be stated that the creation of a land court to deal with land demands by blacks enjoys strong support among opinion-leaders, although indications of opposition are noted.

Table 8
Creation of a land court

Categories	%	(n)
Strongly agree	12,8	(124)
Agree	42,7	(430)
Uncertain	18,2	(183)
Disagree	16,9	(170)
Strongly disagree	9,1	(92)

In order to investigate opinion-leaders' attitudes in conjunction with their political support, a crosstabulation was done. The findings can be found in Table 9. It shows that the creation of a land court enjoys support among the supporters of the NP, DP, ANC/SACP, IFP and the PAC. What is of particular significance is the high measures of uncertainty to be found among supporters of the NP, DP, IFP and the PAC (11,4 per cent). This could point to a "wait-and-see" approach on the composition, functions and procedures of the proposed court. In the case of the PAC supporters it could point to an attitude of irrelevance as the organization propagates wholesale expropriation of land combined with state allocation.²⁷ Such a policy obviates the need for a land court. Inkatha Freedom Party supporters show the highest level of agreement (51 per cent), while ANC supporters show the highest level of strong agreement. This is higher in both cases than PAC supporters who responded with 34,4 per cent in the "strongly agree" and 28,6 per cent in the "agree" categories respectively.

Table 9
Creation of a land court by political support

Party	Strongly agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree
NP	4,9	45,1	20,9	22,3	6,6
DP	13,5	50,7	21,6	11,5	2,0
CP	-	5,7	8,6	28,6	57,1
ANC/SACP	45,0	46,3	5,0	1,3	-
IFP	13,7	51,0	23,5	7,8	2,0
PAC	34,3	28,6	11,4	11,4	8,6

N = NP (470), DP (148), CP (70), ANC/SACP (80), IFP (51), PAC (35)

What is significant is the opposition of CP supporters to the creation of a land court. A high percentage (57,1 per cent) indicated strong disagreement, with a further 28,6 per cent signalling disagreement. This finding is in line with the CP's stated position of maintenance of the current pattern of land ownership.²⁸ Of further note is the measures of opposition to be found among supporters of the NP and DP – 22,3 per cent and 11,5 per cent respectively. This might indicate a certain amount of suspicion directed at a land court. It is possible that they feel that vested interests might come into play or that an escalation of the potential for conflict is possible if competing claims to land are not resolved to the satisfaction of all the involved parties.

In conclusion, it is possible to state that meaningful support for the creation of a land court exists among the supporters of the main political players in the transition, the notable exception being supporters of the Conservative Party.

It would be fair to say that the majority of South Africans are in favour of a democratic system of government. There are also those who believe that political stability should be maintained at all costs. In order to achieve this, they are of the

opinion that certain issues should not be contested – in other words disputed – in the future democratic South Africa. This would mean that these issues be removed from public debate after national agreement is reached on them when the new constitution is drafted. The constitution should thus prohibit the use of these issues in party-political propaganda for mobilization purposes.

In our survey, respondents were asked if a variety of issues should be prohibited from being raised in public debate. We report on two of these issues, namely private ownership and redistribution of agricultural land. Respondents were asked to indicate their views on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly favouring prohibition" to "strongly against prohibition". Table 10 reports the findings on private ownership. It is clear that the majority of the respondents are against prohibition, with 35,9 per cent responding in the "against prohibition" category and 34,1 per cent with "strongly against prohibition". There are, however, smaller measures of support for prohibition with 13,8 per cent "strongly favouring prohibition" and 12,5 per cent "favouring prohibition".

Table 10
Private ownership

Categories	%	(n)
Strongly favouring prohibition	13,8	(139)
In favour of prohibition	12,5	(126)
Uncertain	2,5	(25)
Against prohibition	35,9	(362)
Strongly against prohibition	34,1	(344)

A breakdown of the respondents' support for political organizations by their opinion on private ownership is provided in Table 11. Supporters of all organizations indicate strong opposition to prohibition, with ANC and IFP supporters signalling the strongest opposition. What support there is for prohibition is to be found among supporters of the NP, DP, CP and PAC. It could be that these supporters believe that contestation on this issue would have a negative effect on the stability of any future democracy. It could, however, also indicate opposition to any further contestation after an agreement had been reached. At the same time it presupposes that a favourable agreement was reached and that, having achieved their principle aims, the parties feel no need to endanger their vested interests by engaging in any further contestation.

As far as opposition to prohibition is concerned, it could indicate a willingness to engage in democratic contestation even after an agreement had been reached. This could point to an unwillingness to remove the issue from public debate in case that could lead to a loss of support among the powerbase of the particular party. It could thus be an indication of reticence to limit themselves to the position necessitated by an agreement without having the option of attempting to change

that agreement or utilizing the issues in question to win popular support. This could prove to be the case in the face of pressure from the "grassroots" level.

Table 11
Private ownership by political support

Party	Strongly in favour of prohibition	In favour of prohibition	Uncertain	Against prohibition	Strongly against prohibition
NP	18,9	16,2	2,1	35,1	27,4
DP	8,8	12,8	1,4	35,1	39,9
CP	20,0	7,1	2,9	24,3	40,0
ANC/SACP	1,3	5,0	2,5	52,5	37,5
IFP	3,9	3,9	3,9	33,3	52,9
PAC	11,4	20,0	8,6	37,1	22,9

N = NP (470), DP (148), CP (70), ANC/SACP (80), IFP (51), PAC (35)

Table 12 reports the findings on the issue of redistribution of agricultural land. From this it is possible to state that the majority of the surveyed opinion-leaders is against prohibition, with 38,6 per cent indicating opposition and 26 per cent strong opposition. Considerably smaller measures of support for prohibition are noted in the 11 per cent who showed strong support and the 13,6 per cent who were in favour of prohibition. It is clear, however, that most of the respondents are against prohibiting public debate on the redistribution of land after a national agreement is reached.

Table 12
Redistribution of agricultural land

Categories	%	(n)
Strongly favouring prohibition	11,0	(111)
In favour of prohibition	13,6	(137)
Uncertain	8,9	(90)
Against prohibition	38,6	(389)
Strongly against prohibition	26,0	(262)

Table 13 reports the findings of a crosstabulation between respondents' opinions and political support. From this it is clear that supporters of the ANC/SACP and the PAC are most strongly opposed to prohibition – 52,5 per cent and 48,6 per cent respectively. Further opposition is made up of supporters of the NP, DP, CP and IFP. What is of particular interest is the split of opinion that is evident among CP supporters, where comparable measures of support and opposition are found.

In conclusion, it is evident that strong opposition to the prohibition of public debate on private ownership and redistribution of agricultural land, as a measure to limit the policy

agenda in a transitional phase, exists among opinion-leaders. This could point to a commitment to democratic contestation in future on all issues even if an agreement had been reached. It also indicates an unwillingness to entrench the agreement, thereby eliminating future policy options.

Table 13
Redistribution by political support

Party	Strongly agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree
NP	13,8	18,1	10,6	41,5	14,9
DP	4,1	9,5	10,1	44,6	29,7
CP	32,9	15,7	2,9	14,3	28,6
ANC/SACP	3,8	5,0	2,5	36,3	52,5
IFP	5,9	11,8	11,8	27,5	41,2
PAC	5,7	5,7	2,9	34,3	48,6

N = NP (470), DP (148), CP (70), ANC/SACP (80), IFP (51), PAC (35)

Concluding observations

As stated at the beginning of this article, South Africa's land problem begs urgent attention if it is not to be a stumbling block in the path of democratization. In order to avert this, an equitable land reform programme needs to be implemented as a matter of priority if all vestiges of apartheid discrimination are to be removed.

In the light of the present position in multi-party negotiations, this report was prepared to present the position of the country's opinion-leaders with regards to certain areas of the land debate. Our survey ascertained that little divergence of opinion exists among the élite on the following issues: making state-owned land available to black farmers, expropriation of white-owned land, payment of full compensation in cases of property alienation, implementation of a land claims court and political contestation on private property and redistribution of agricultural land.

This apparent convergence of opinion would seem to indicate that an equitable and sustainable solution to the land problem is reachable. If sufficient consensus can be attained – and the signs are that it is possible – South Africa's leaders would have gone a long way towards strengthening democratization. It also bodes well for the sustainability of a democratic political order after the transition is completed. Of course, there are still those who withhold their co-operation, and it would be wise to include these divergent positions and attempt to accommodate them if the potential for conflict is to be decreased so as not to threaten future political stability.

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- 22 The preponderance of whites in our sample reflects the preferential treatment they were accorded in the heyday of apartheid. The effect of this skewed distribution is that little proportionality is evident. We used the crosstabulation method to achieve a higher measure of representativeness and to enable us to analyse the parties individually.
- 23 For a summary of the major South African political organizations' stance of the issue of expropriation of white-owned land see *Barometer on Negotiation*, vol 5, no 1, February 1993, pp 3–19.
- 24 *The Argus* (Cape Town), 6 June 1991.
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Africa in transition towards democracy 1990–1993

Compiled by Pieter Esterhuysen

Sierra Leone: The preparations for free elections were disrupted by a military takeover in April 1992.

Algeria: Constitutionally a multiparty state since 1989, but the transitional process was disrupted through government intervention after the Islamic fundamentalists won the first round of multiparty legislative elections in December 1991. Since then the country has been under military rule.

Sudan: The military rulers (in office since 1989), tend to support non-democratic fundamentalist religious aspirations.

Eritrea: Independent since 24 May 1993, Africa's latest (53rd) independent state is at present ruled by a government composed of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front whose leaders have promised to introduce a multiparty system in 1997.

Liberia: Constitutionally a multiparty state since 1985, at present under interim government, but transition has been delayed by civil war and continuous instability.

Libya: There have been no successful challenges to the present non-party system (in operation since 1977).

Chad: A mutiparty interim government, estblished in April 1993 and reconstituted in June, will rule the country untill free elections can be held, probably in 1994.

Ethiopia: Free elections for a constituent assembly (at present under interim multiparty government) have been postponed until 1994.


Guinea-Bissau: The single-party parliament adopted electoral legislation in February 1993 to prepare for multiparty elections, which are expected in 1994.

Somalia: Armed conflict among political and ethnic factions have been impeding the restoration of central authority since January 1991.

Nigeria: A two-party federal assembly was elected in July 1992. The military government annulled the presidential election, held in June 1993, and transferred power to a civilian interim government on 26 August. Following the resignation on 17 November of the interim president, Chief Shonekan, the country returned to military rule under Gen Sani Abacha.

Uganda: Elections for a constituent assembly likely to take place in 1994. A non-party system is favoured by the government.

Rwanda: The Government of National Unity's term has been extended to allow a former rebel group, which has recently joined, to participate in the transitional process. As yet no date has been set for multiparty elections.



Angola: Constitutionally a multiparty state since 1992, but the transition was disrupted as a result of hostilities between the government and the main opposition party following the first round of the first free presidential and legislative elections on 30 September 1992.

Tanzania: Although the restrictions on opposition parties were lifted in July 1992, multiparty elections are not expected to be held before 1995.

Zaire: The transition has been slow and difficult as a result of a power struggle between Pres Mobutu and the multiparty High Council of the Republic (interim parliament).

Malawi: Following a referendum on 14 June 1993 in which 63 per cent voted in favour of change, the country is preparing for multiparty elections in May 1994.

Swaziland: Increasing challenges to the virtual unlimited royal authority have prompted the king and his advisors to investigate constitutional reform.

Mozambique: Constitutionally a multiparty state since November 1990, preparations are under way for the first multiparty elections. Because of procedural delays, the elections are not expected before October 1994.

South Africa: The Multiparty Negotiating Forum has set 27 April 1994 as the target date for the election of a representative constituent assembly – the country's first to be based on universal franchise – to be followed by the installation of a Government of National Unity.

Multiparty African countries before 1990

Regular multiparty elections have been held since the dates indicated.

The Gambia	(1965)	Egypt	(1977)
Botswana	(1966)	Zimbabwe	(1980)
Morocco	(1972)	Tunisia	(1981)
Mauritius	(1968)	Comoros	(1987)
Senegal	(1977)	Namibia	(1989)

Multiparty systems adopted, 1990 to December 1993

First multiparty elections in year indicated.

Gabon	(1990)	Djibouti	(1992)
Côte d'Ivoire	(1990)	Kenya	(1992)*
Cape Verde	(1991)*	Niger	(1992)
Sao Tomé	(1991)*	Lesotho	(1992)
Benin	(1991)*	Burundi	(1993)
Zambia	(1991)*	Seychelles	(1993)
Burkina Faso	(1991)**	Togo	(1993)**
Mauritania	(1992)**	Central African Republic	(1993)
Cameroon	(1992)	Republic	(1993)
Mali	(1992)	Equatorial Guinea**	(1993)*
Congo	(1992)*	Guinea**	(1993)*
Ghana	(1992)	Guinea	(1993)
Madagascar	(1992)		

* Government defeated in election.
(In Mali, Niger and Lesotho military governments transferred power to elected civilian governments.)

** Elections boycotted by principal opposition parties.

ELECTORAL CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT SINCE 1991

Country	New president	Former president	Date of change
Cape Verde	Mascarenhas Monteiro	Aristides Pereira (since 1975)	Feb 1991
Sao Tomé	Miguel Trovoade	Manuel da Costa (1975)	March 1991
Benin	Nicephore Soglo	Matthieu Kerekou (1975)	March 1991
Zambia	Frederick Chiluba	Kenneth Kaunda (1964)	Oct 1991
Mali*	Alpha Konare	Lt-Col Toure (1991)	March 1992
Congo	Pascal Lissouba	Denis Sassou-Nguesso (1979)	Aug 1992
Madagascar	Albert Zafy	Didier Ratsiraka (1975)	Feb 1993
Niger*	Mahamane Ousmane	Ali Saibou (1987)	March 1993
Lesotho*	Ntshu Mokhele**	Maj-Gen Ramaena (1991)	March 1993
Burundi	Melchior Ndadaya***	Pierre Buyoya (1987)	June 1993
Central African Republic	Ange-Felix Patasse	Andre Kolingba (1981)	Oct 1993

* Restoration of civilian rule. ** Prime Minister in a constitutional monarchy. *** Ndadaya was killed in an abortive military coup in October 1993; government continued under Prime Minister Sylvie Kinigi.

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The role of chiefs in a future South African constitutional dispensation

Professor J C Bekker, of the Faculty of Law, Vista University, considers the future of traditional leaders.

Chiefs have been campaigning for a share in the much-discussed new South Africa. The Conference of Traditional Leaders of Southern Africa (Contralesa) has made its voice heard and so has the Transkei Traditional Leaders Association (TTLA) and other groups of chiefs. None of them has, however, so far made any specific demands nor has anybody come forward with definite proposals. It would seem though that the matter cannot be left in abeyance indefinitely.

There is unfortunately no literature nor research upon which coherent planning can be based. In executing its homeland policy the National Party was virtually obsessed with chiefs and tribes. Tribal and ethnic units formed the cornerstones of what came to be known as national states (cf the Tribal [later Black] Authorities Act 68 of 1951 and the National States Constitution Act 21 of 1971, later called the Self-governing Territories Constitution Act).

In the heyday of apartheid official and academic ethnologists (the ethnologists were actually of a particular brand, namely those that supported the ideology of apartheid) fed the government with a plethora of information in the form of books, reports and research findings on the nature of chiefs and tribal government. This stream of information has dwindled and, since the demise of official apartheid, has died down entirely. There are therefore virtually no guidelines according to which chieftainship could be restructured for its future role.

The politicians' dilemma

Chiefs were used by the colonial authorities to rule the indigenous populations and latterly in South Africa to make apartheid work. But they do not fit into a modern democratic system. They can nevertheless not be thrown overboard. They will still be needed, even if only to phase out the system of homeland rule. Chiefs will also be needed by politicians to ensure that votes are cast in an election. African politicians

are moreover dependent upon chiefs to maintain the aura of cultural identity, African tradition, values, and to some extent, African religion. All this is not fully compatible with democratic government. Many chiefs, by no means all of them, are still uneducated and therefore unable to promote development in their areas.¹

This then is the dilemma of African politicians.

Chiefs and democracy

The institution of chieftainship is not in accordance with the precepts of democracy. A chief's title is hereditary. They are not elected. Although legislation could provide that a chief may be deposed for misbehaviour, it is almost impossible to get rid of an incompetent one. Secondly, chiefs are mostly men, succeeding on the basis of primogeniture. This is in conflict with the ideal of having a non-sexist society. Thirdly, only Africans can become chiefs, which goes against the grain of having a non-racist society. Fourthly, chieftainship perpetuates tribalism, which is divisive and may hamper the creation of a unitary state. Lastly, in colonial Africa and in South Africa chiefs have been appointed by the governments and have to a large extent become no more than government agents. If this system is perpetuated, future governments could continue to manipulate chiefs to do their bidding.

All these factors make it a formidable task to democratize chieftainship.

Moreover no government can ignore the possibility of intertribal wars for dominance. Africa has had its share of warfare, both before and after colonialism. As explained by Radcliff-Brown:²

... wars of conquest have been important in Africa, as they have been in Europe. When such a war is successful it establishes one people as conquerors over another who are thus incorporated into a larger political society, sometimes in an inferior position as a subject people.

The National Party Government

The National Party Government has not yet announced its plans with chiefs, expect that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has proposed that chiefs nominate three to four members from each region to form a college of traditional leaders. The college could, according to the minister, make proposals to the multi-party conference to give effect to the role and position of chiefs in a new constitution.³ One may, however, glean the government's line of thinking from indirect evidence. First, there was an attempt in 1990 to rationalize and consolidate existing laws on chieftainship. The emphasis was broadly to maintain the *status quo*, but to clothe chiefs with extended powers of local government.⁴

Secondly, in the White Paper on Land Reform,⁵ chiefs were granted indirect recognition by the decision not to interfere with the traditional land tenure system.

This was, by the way, part of an effort to solve the land issue. It did not have regard to the fact that chiefly control of land is the real problem of rural land tenure and development.⁶

African National Congress

Clause (c) of the ANC's *Constitutional Guidelines*⁷ states:

The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution.

The organization has not published any plan or framework for chiefs. Its line of thinking can perhaps be gleaned from a paper delivered by Skweyiya.⁸ He says, *inter alia*, that "a significant number of the rural population remained loyal to the institution, hence the call for the restructuring and redefining of its role in the future".⁹

He deals at length with the ethnic factor of chieftainship, but does not make any proposals about restructuring or democratization of the system.

It is true that the colonial authorities and the South African government artificially created chiefdoms, filled vacancies with people who did not belong to the lineage or intervened in appointments, but that did not totally transform the institution. The governments' appointments were, with a limited number of exceptions, merely seals of approval and recognition of hereditary chieftainships. To this day chiefs are generally born – not made.

In the meantime all major political role players have obviously decided that traditional leaders should be accommodated in a new constitutional dispensation. (See the heading "Multi-party negotiating process" below.) But it is not clear yet how they should fit into a new constitution.

Chiefs in Africa

The experience in Africa can obviously provide some guidance. Despite the precariousness of their position in some countries they have more than merely survived the processes of colonization and decolonization.

Traditional political structures, though often greatly altered or transformed, remain in place in most parts of the continent. Chiefs, paramounts, or other traditional officeholders still control much land and have access to communal labour. These authorities allocate shares of jointly owned lands to kin groups and define community holdings. They may still levy taxes, collect other forms of revenue, and serve as judges and arbiters of local disputes.¹⁰

It is not possible to deal with the full range of functions still performed by chiefs in Africa. I shall confine myself to the role given to them in the political systems of some African countries.

In fact the position of chiefs hardly changed at independence. They continued to perform administrative functions as they had done under colonial rule; they served as a link between the government and the people; they performed ceremonial and religious functions; and chaired tribal courts.¹¹ Indeed, as shown below, chiefs play a more prominent role in some African countries than before.

Zimbabwe

The House of Assembly comprises 150 members, of whom 120 are directly elected, 12 are nominated by the president, 10 are traditional chiefs and eight are provincial governors.¹²

Section 111 of the Constitution provides that there shall be chiefs, appointed by the president, to preside over the tribes in Zimbabwe. Also, there shall be a council of chiefs. It shall consist of such number of chiefs elected by the chiefs from each of the various areas of communal land. The manner of election is to be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. An Act of Parliament may provide for the establishment of two or more councils of chiefs for separate areas of communal land.

Botswana

Botswana accommodated its chiefs in a House of Chiefs. It consists of the chiefs of the eight principal tribes of Botswana as *ex officio* members, four members elected by subchiefs from their own number, and three members elected by the other 12 members of the House. Bills and motions relating to chieftaincy matters, customary laws and alterations to the constitution must be referred to the House, which may also deliberate and make representations on any matter.¹³

The Gambia

Legislative power is vested in the unicameral House of Representatives, comprising 50 members: 36 elected by universal adult suffrage, five chiefs (elected by the Chiefs in Assembly), eight non-voting nominated members and the attorney-general.¹⁴

Lesotho

Lesotho, like Swaziland, is a traditional monarchy. In terms of article 44(1) of the Revised Draft of a Constitution for Lesotho:¹⁵ "There shall be a King of Lesotho who shall be a constitutional monarch and Head of State."

Chiefs will have a large share of the new Parliament. The Senate shall consist of the 22 principal chiefs and 11 senators nominated by the king on advice of the Council of State.¹⁶ A principal chief may designate any other person to be a senator

in his place, either generally or for any sitting of the Senate.¹⁷

Chieftaincy also figures in the Council of State. A principal chief nominated by the Council of Chiefs is a member of the Council.¹⁸

There shall, moreover, be a College of Chiefs, consisting of the 22 principal chiefs.¹⁹ The Council of Chiefs has two specific functions, namely to designate when called for by the occasion in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho, a successor to the office of king and regent.²⁰ The College of Chiefs "shall also have such other functions as may be conferred on it by any other law".²¹ It is naturally not yet known what the latter will entail.

The principal chiefs are listed in schedule 2 of the Constitution.

Zambia

The Constitution provides for a House of Chiefs. The House of Chiefs is an advisory body which may submit resolutions to be debated by the National Assembly. There are 27 chiefs, four each from the Northern, Western, Southern and Eastern Provinces, three each from the North Western, Luapula and Central Provinces, and two from the Copperbelt Province.²²

Sierra Leone

There are altogether 147 officially recognized chieftaincies in the country. The three provinces are subdivided into a total of 12 districts (local administrative units), each headed by a paramount chief. These chiefs are selected by the Chieftain Council in each district, which is, in turn, elected by the district's voters. The 1991 constitution (suspended in April 1992 after a military takeover) introduced a multiparty system and abolished the 12 parliamentary seats formerly reserved for the paramount chiefs. The new constitution, nevertheless, provided for a State Advisory Council composed of the 12 paramount chiefs and ten other citizens designated by the president.²³

Malawi

Chiefs play no role in central government. Section 6 of the Constitution merely provides:

The institution of Chieftaincy shall be recognized and preserved in the Republic, so that the Chiefs may make the fullest contribution to the welfare and development of the country in their traditional fields.²⁴

Nigeria

The 30 states constituting the Nigerian federation are subdivided into a total of approximately 450 Local Government Areas, each with an elected Council. In recognition of the role and importance of traditional rulers in the local government system, the House of Assembly in each of the states may establish a Traditional Council for any Local Government Area (or group of such Areas), presided over by a traditional ruler. The functions of the traditional councils allow the traditional rulers to advise the elected councils on affairs within their domain.²⁵

Namibia

In terms of article 102(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia:

There shall be a Council of Traditional Leaders to be established in terms of an Act of Parliament in order to advise the President on the control and utilization of communal land and on all such matters as may be referred to it by the President for advice.

In the meantime, in 1991, the President of Namibia appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to Chiefs, Headmen and other Traditional or Tribal Leaders. The Commission brought out an extensive report²⁶ covering all aspects of the matter. The Commission, *inter alia*, recommended that:

- a Council of Traditional Leaders be established as provided for in the Constitution of the Republic;
- the membership of the Council should be confined to the leaders of the identifiable communities as defined by law; and
- the powers, duties and functions of the Council should be defined by Proclamation of the President or by Ministerial Notice in the Government Gazette.²⁷

The Council has not yet been established.

The Commission also pointed out that the traditional system is in conflict with four provisions of the Constitution, namely:

- The Preamble, which provides that "the people of Namibia ... desire to provide amongst all of us the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Namibian nation ...". The concept of an ethnic group may be in conflict with the ideal of unity and integrity.
- Article 102(2) provides that "[t]he delineation of the boundaries of the regions and Local Authorities ... shall be geographical only, without any reference to the race, colour or ethnic origin of the inhabitants of such areas". A conflict lies in the fact that the areas of jurisdiction of most traditional leaders are ethnically determined.
- In terms of article 102(5) "[t]here shall be a Council of Traditional Leaders ... in order to advise the President on the control and utilisation of communal land ...". This too recognizes ethnicity, because all communal land is ethnically determined. Land claims and advice to be given to the president are therefore bound to be ethnically motivated.
- Lastly, article 21(1)(h) provides that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to reside and settle in any part of Namibia" and article 19 provides that "[e]very person shall be entitled to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language tradition or religion". Settlement, residence and cultural activities in tribal areas are based on membership of a particular tribe. The two sections quoted foresee an admixture of citizens of Namibia. Also, some members of a tribe will reside and settle in Namibia outside tribal areas and there is no provision for a link between them and tribal leaders.²⁸

It is not known whether the framers of the Constitution were aware of these conflicts. If they were, they probably ignored them because they thought that tribalism or ethnicity would not be an overriding factor. The Commission itself stated categorically: "The concept of Nation must prevail over that of a tribe or ethnic group."²⁹

Swaziland

The independence constitutions of African countries created parliaments in the Westminster mould. African nationalist leaders won the first free elections, but once in power the leaders entrenched themselves in power by the creation of one-party states or by harshly suppressing all opposition. Chiefs were tolerated by the political leaders, or crushed in the same way as political opponents.

In Swaziland only one election was held in 1973 in terms of the independence constitution. Dissatisfaction over the election of an opposition member, Thomas Ngwenya, led to the King suspending the constitution in 1973 and assuming all judicial, executive and legislative authority himself.

Subsequently, in 1978, the King, by an Order-in-Council, proclaimed a new constitution purportedly based on traditionalism. Parliament consisted of members indirectly elected by the Tinkhundla. The system has been criticized for being undemocratic, and, although it has been amended, the principle has remained the same.

In terms of the "new" (1992) constitution the Parliament consists of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The Senate consists of 30 members; ten must be elected by the House of Assembly; and twenty are appointed by the king to include chiefs, *Bantfwabenhosi* (chiefs' sons, princes). The appointment of chiefs to Parliament must take account of regional interests and shall be made on a rotational basis.³⁰

The composition of the House of Assembly is based on the Tinkhundla system. The Tinkhundla (singular Inkhundla) are regional committees established by the king. They continue to perform all the traditional functions of the Tinkhundla.³¹

The House of Assembly does not consist of a fixed number of members. The country is divided into as many Tinkhundla as may be recommended by the Delimitation Commission.³² Each Inkhundla elects one member to the House of Assembly. Election of these members is conducted at what are called primary and secondary levels. At primary level persons who are registered as voters in an Inkhundla or polling division elect one candidate. The secondary elections take place at Tinkhundla centres at which the persons elected at primary level are the candidates. Thus each Inkhundla elects one candidate to become a member of the House of Assembly.

Multi-party negotiating process

The Negotiating Council of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process has granted traditional leaders a fair share. In a draft constitution tabled in the Negotiating Council in July 1993 the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues recommended that an SPR³³ shall be entitled to the allocation of legislative and executive competencies in the area of traditional authorities and indigenous law.³⁴ Paragraph XII of the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 1 provides as follows:

The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution. Indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognised and applied by the courts subject to the provisions of the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing specifically therewith.

Also, the Transitional Executive Council Bill provides for the establishment of a Subcouncil on Regional and Local Government and Traditional Authorities.³⁵

The Council shall, "for the purpose of attaining its objects", have the following powers to be exercised through its Subcouncil on Regional and Local Government and Traditional Authorities:

- (a) To acquaint itself with and monitor developments, policy objectives and targets in relation to regional and local government, relevant organizations active in the field of local government and traditional authorities;
- (b) to make recommendations to the appropriate institutions and authorities on –
 - (i) legislative and executive measures, either existing or proposed, which may affect traditional leaders' powers during the transition;
 - (ii) matters of material concern to traditional leaders and their communities; and
- (c) to approve any amendment of the terms or conditions of, and any diminution of or increase in, the remuneration of traditional leaders.³⁶

These proposals will of course become concrete as the negotiations continue. It has, for example, been agreed in the Negotiating Forum, in November 1993, that a council of 20 elected traditional leaders would be established at the national level to consider legislation pertaining to indigenous law and customs.

Uganda

Prior to the election of a constituent assembly for the drafting of a democratic constitution, the government, in July 1993, passed legislation for the restoration of the country's four traditional monarchies abolished in 1967: Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro. Although the government insisted that the revived kingdoms would have no geographical boundaries and that their significance was merely ceremonial and cultural, and that allegiance to the kings would be a matter of personal choice, the government undoubtedly yielded to considerable pressure on the part of the traditionalists who seek the full restoration of old powers and prerogatives.

Speaking at the coronation of the 36th king (Kabaka) of Buganda, President Museveni emphasized the role to be played by traditional cultural institutions in transforming African countries into modern states. Traditional institutions, he said, could mobilize communities for socio-economic development.³⁷

Conclusion

Judged by the role provided for them in African countries, the best chiefs in South Africa can hope for is a House of Chiefs. It is sometimes said that that would create a precedent upon which other cultural and interest groups would ask for a similar part in government. I don't agree that chiefs are in the same category as cultural and other interest groups. Chiefs have traditionally been part and parcel of government in Africa. They are still relevant for people in rural areas and have a limited (mostly cultural) relevance for people in urban areas.

However, they have to be taken out of the political arena. They have in fact already lost too much credibility by having been involved in homeland politics.

As for administration, including administration of justice, they could simply be allowed to carry on as before, subject to better control.

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The foundations of ethnicity and some of its current ramifications in Namibia

*Professor Johan Malan, of the Department of Anthropology at the University of the North, discusses the impact of ethnicity on the attempts at nation-building in Namibia.**

The significance of ethnicity in Namibia, and in particular its strong post-independence ramifications, coincides with a world-wide resurgence of ethnic allegiance. When a community becomes unstable as a result of changing or disintegrating geo-political structures, economic recession, or for whatever reason, people tend to revert to their groups of origin and take refuge in them against escalating tension, ideological polarization and uncertainties of any other kind in the larger community.

Depending upon the prevailing circumstances in a country or region, two basic movements may take effect: the one is the creation of superstructures in which ethnic groups become submerged in the interest of national or regional unity, while the other constitutes a renewed emphasis on ethnic groupings in the face of dissension and collapsing superstructures. Many examples of the latter kind are to be found in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Isaacs refers to the "present pervasive condition of group fragmentation in all our current politics, post-colonial, post-imperial, post-revolutionary and – in the United States – post-illusionary. This condition amounts in effect to a massive retribalization running sharply counter to all the globalizing effects of modern technology and communications".¹ He adds that most people still live within ethnic structures, and describes the significance of these structures as follows:

It is the refuge to which great masses are retreating and withdrawing in the face of the breakdown or inadequacy of all the larger coherences or systems of power and social organization. To get some better understanding of its tremendous power of survival and persistence, it was necessary ... to sort out and examine the elements of which it is made, to see ... what it is that gives it its extraordinary strength. If this seems elementary, it could be because our past awareness of this phenomenon of basic group identity has clearly not prepared us for the shapes and roles it has assumed in our present affairs.²

Ethnicity and national unity

Countries with an ethnically heterogeneous population find it hard to establish national unity, and many of them are compelled to institute a form of regionalism that allows ethnic groups a significant degree of self-determination. Parsons says: "...the problem of ethnic diversity and the threats it poses to some kind of 'national unity' is a ubiquitous problem in almost all the new nations".³ Glazer and Moynihan confirm the phenomenon of ethnic conflicts in independent states, but add that despite this problem political boundaries do not easily change:

Since World War II almost every new nation, and they far outnumber the older nations, has come into existence with a number of serious ethnic conflicts waiting, as it were, their turn to be the focus of post-independence political life.... Add to this the fact – still given surprisingly little attention – that in a world in which each society becomes ethnically more diverse, we have had, since World War II, a surprisingly strong prejudice against adjusting any boundary, for any reason.... Since 1948 remarkably few international frontiers have been altered, and those that have remain very unstable.⁴

Manifestations of ethnicity in Namibia

I will now review the extent to which this generally occurring problem of the impeding of the national geo-political identity of a country as a result of internal ethnic divisions, also influences the socio-political scene in Namibia. The territory gained

* Financial assistance was given to the author by the University of the North to conduct ethnographic research in Namibia during October 1993. This work is a continuation of a research project pursued over many years.

its independence on 21 March 1990. After three years of nation-building, aimed at fostering a corporate Namibian identity, several ethnically based claims for kingships and land rights have emerged. The following are among the most important:

- The 18-member Committee for the Restoration of the Kwanyama Kingdom announced that it would install a king for this tribe on 16 October 1993. Owing to disagreement about the successor of King Mandume who died in 1917, the installation was cancelled and the matter is now being investigated.⁵
- On 6 November 1993, Justus Garoëb was installed as king of the Damaras.⁶
- San groups claim vast land rights in Namibia, including the Etosha National Park, in order to “go back into the bush to regain independence and self-sufficiency”.⁷
- The Rehoboth *Bastergemeente* applied to have their title deeds under the former colonial dispensation restored. The formalizing of land rights is part of a move towards greater self-determination as a distinct cultural group in their own territory.⁸
- The Herero and Mbanderu expressed their desire to install kings to reign over them. They also demand more land.⁹
- The Mbunza and Shambyu communities in Kavango are engaged in a tribal land feud.¹⁰

Media reaction

The media reaction to the sudden spate of ethnic claims was highly divided and in many respects quite surprising. At the one extreme of the opinions expressed, these phenomena are condemned as they pose a real threat to Namibian unity. At the other extreme, ethnicity and traditional leadership are defended as traditional African institutions that survived the long period of colonial rule in the country. The official recognition of ethnic rights during the colonial era is still regarded as the malevolent manifestations of a policy of *divide and rule*, but the resurgence of demands for the same rights under the independent Namibian regime is regarded as the legitimate claims of pre-colonial African communities. This ambivalent attitude is clearly expressed by the official newspaper of the Namibian Government. In an editorial of *New Era* the following analysis of the situation is made:

The question of kings and chiefs has become a controversial issue in Namibia. Since independence, the different local tribes have been in the running for their own chiefs and kings.... Conflicting opinions have begun to surface among Namibians about the monarchical institution, its role and that of those who man it. Among others, those opposed to chieftaincy or kingship cite its potential to rekindle tribal fires as a major reason for their rejection. It is also being alleged that having chiefs or kings would lead to the fragmentation of the country. Let us for the record state that traditional authorities, whether you call them chiefs or kings, are rooted in the African culture and society. They represent its very fabric and order. They are an important measure of their civilisation and social advancement.

Chiefs or kings represented and continue to represent authority in given communities and this goes down the lane to headmen, their councillors, indunas or the village elders. They are an important power block that has traditionally demonstrated the capacity to maintain social stability, law enforcement and peace. Imagine what

would happen in a small village where there is neither government official or police station. The necessary cohesion would disappear. Disorder and chaos would reign. It is, thus, unrealistic and even dangerous to suggest that whole tribes should exist without their traditional leadership.

While we agree that tribalism has to be fought tooth and nail, we do not regard chieftaincy as a manifestation of tribalism. Chieftaincy in Namibia epitomises our rich cultural heritage and diversity....

Chiefs played a very important role during Namibia's independence struggle. Their power did not escape the attention of the South African colonisers who set out to try and woo them to their side. Where this failed, the South Africans set out to interfere openly by installing their own stooges. All this was in recognition of their power and capacity to influence developments....

Today, chiefs and the institutions they represent still wield this power and have used it positively to contribute to the country's development efforts. Some have also used it negatively to polarise relations among people. Clearly, therefore, chiefs and kings can be the nucleus around which whole communities can be galvanised for action in our endeavour for development. They are an important link between government and communities and should not be seen to be in competition with it. The fallacies of the colonial legacy, however, are still with us and this is what needs to be addressed when it comes to chieftaincy. We need to depoliticise and democratise the system of chieftaincy. We need to educate tribal authorities on the protection of basic human rights in keeping with the Namibian constitution. This newspaper does not believe in token powers for chiefs. We believe that chiefs should be strengthened where possible to deal with real issues. One such issue is crime, as long as they act within the confines of our constitution....

We trust that when the parameters of the powers of chiefs are finally defined, the valuable contribution they made and are capable of making will not be swept under the carpet for fear of tribalism.¹¹

The opposition press¹² places the responsibility for the ethnic polarization in the country squarely upon the shoulders of the government. According to them, the way in which Swapo rules the country is not instilling confidence among people, hence they seek stability and security within their ethnic groups of origin. The elevation of the political status of these groups is regarded by themselves as an improvement of their functionality and capacity to bargain for more land and other concessions from the central government. Swapo is also accused of nepotism and the strengthening of its own power base; consequently other groups feel threatened and now mobilize themselves around a symbol such as a king in order to safeguard their interests which are being ignored or jeopardized by the Swapo government of Namibia.

Government's reaction to ethnicity

The lively public debate on the claims by various ethnic groups has given rise to a conference with the theme *Ethnicity, nation-building and democracy in Namibia*. The conference was held from 15 to 17 October 1993 at the Mokuti Lodge and organized by the Namibia Institute for Democracy and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. At this conference the Prime Minister of Namibia, Hage Geingob, lashed out against ethnicity as a harmful and dividing factor in Namibian society. He agreed to a very subdued role for ethnicity, but hastened to indicate that it is fraught with problems:

Ethnicity as diversity, nation-building as an objective to improve the life of all citizens, and democracy as our chosen political system could be perceived as three important strands that shape a nation.

No doubt, these elements could be directed towards national development but at the same time, some elements can be conflict-ridden and we will need to guard against them. The concept of ethnicity falls into this category.

Ethnicity is one of the most misunderstood and misused concepts. Its scope may be that pertaining to race, tribes, minorities or specified racial, linguistic, etc., groups. Whatever the scope of this word, most nations realise that ethnic distinctions... provide diversity to national ethos, and at the same time have in them a dormant seed of discord, disharmony and tragedy. History has witnessed the tragedy on all the continents through all the ages. Even today, ethnicity has torn asunder Yugoslavia in what must be the bloodiest civil war since World War II. Ethnic civil wars continue to take their toll in Georgia and many other republics after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Similar conflicts can be seen in the Middle East.... Here, in Africa too, we have had, and continue to have, many problems emanating from playing up ethnicity....¹³

Mr Geingob openly expressed his dismay and disappointment at the dividing of the Namibian nation by the rise of ethnicity:

Regrettably, there is evidence today that there are centrifugal forces at play in our country that work towards tearing the nation apart. They are dividing people along ethnic lines. See, for instance, how the so-called kings are being imposed upon the various population groups by some vested interests. These vested interests know well that where there are kings, there have to be kingdoms, and where there are kingdoms there have to be territories, and where there is territory, there are boundaries, and where there are boundaries there is the imperative to protect them, if need be, by force.¹⁴

Despite all these problems, the desirability of ethnic allegiance wasn't ruled out entirely. In his speech, the Prime Minister clearly tried to accommodate a controlled and scaled-down version of ethnicity on condition that it is always superseded by the ultimate objective of a Namibian identity for all the country's inhabitants:

Don't misunderstand me, I realise that tribalism is a world-wide phenomenon... all of us need a sense of belonging, the need to belong to a local community. This, however, does not mean that we need kingdoms. What we need is a sense of belonging in the social and cultural context. With this focus, the need to belong to a culture is not in contradiction with the need to belong to a nation. Thus, you can be a Herero and Namibian, or Owambo and Namibian, or Nama and Namibian. I myself am proud to be Damara and Namibian. Conflicts arise only when these two concepts become incompatible....

For too long we have thought of ourselves as Hereros, Namas, Afrikaners, Germans, Owambos. We must now start to think of ourselves also as Namibians. This emphasis needs to be brought in at both political and economic levels. Unless we begin to think in this way we could reduce the political and economic life of this nation to chaos.... This requires that we have a national identity which supersedes all other identities. In this sense, therefore, we need to ensure that ethnicity is never allowed to be played up to replace national identity as the most important identity.¹⁵

The whole issue of traditional leadership in Namibia is not yet finally resolved. Mr Geingob said that in due course legislation will be drafted to deal with the question of traditional authority.

Opinions of academics

Prof Joshua Bernard Forrest of the University of Vermont was invited to attend the conference on ethnicity. He indicated that ethnic mobilization is a logical point of convergence for people, and warned that the government oppression of ethnicity may lead to violent outbursts. He suggests that traditional leaders should be consulted and involved in the process of nation-

building. Andrew Murray, a sociologist of the University of Namibia, cautioned against a one-sided approach by imposing only Western development models on Namibia. Cognizance should also be taken of the characteristics and needs of the Namibian society, he felt. The economist, Mr Nelson Murangi, drew attention to the fact that ethnic differences are emphasized during difficult economic times. According to him the government should, therefore, address the economic problems of the country if it wishes to avert ethnic divisions.¹⁶

Feasibility of ethnic studies

From this review it is quite obvious that ethnicity is a fact and a force to be reckoned with. Objective research within the theoretical framework of cultural anthropology and other social sciences should be conducted unabated in order to cast new light on this dynamic field of study. Cultures have the capacity to change when they are exposed to acculturative influences. In order for the members of a group to survive under drastically changing conditions, culture change is indeed a necessity. The need for change certainly does not suggest that ethnicity has become redundant and that people should be detached from their traditional cultures and become globalized by being introduced to a vaguely defined and eclectic world culture. Processes of modernization should be set in motion within the constituent cultural groupings of a community.

In an ethnically heterogeneous country like Namibia, the objective of nation-building must be well calculated and well executed. If it is pursued at the expense of ethnic institutions, this policy may soon find itself on a collision course with the leadership structures and vested interests of the traditional groupings it wishes to supersede. If, however, a geo-political nationalism is fostered with the concurrent advancing of the interests of its constituent ethnic groups, harmony between the two forms of identity may well be achieved. This course of action presupposes a clear approach towards regionalism, thereby creating suitable structures for the safeguarding and development of the ethos, language and life-style of every cultural group. In this way the various groups do not have to feel threatened, but instead should be more likely to accept the challenge to fulfil a complementary development role *vis-à-vis* other groups in promoting national interests outside their own local interests.

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British aid to Southern Africa: The role of the commonwealth development corporation

Professor C M Rogerson, of the Department of Geography at the University of the Witwatersrand, examines the “geography of aid” with specific reference to the Commonwealth Development Corporation.¹

Over the last decade several studies have been highly critical of the channelling and effectiveness of British aid flows.² In particular, the British aid programme was faulted for neglecting environmental considerations and subordinating the objectives of development in the Third World to those of political considerations, commercial interests and the business lobby. Furthermore, the geographical allocation of Britain’s aid was criticized for neglecting the poorest countries and the poorest groups in those countries. More recently, however, a re-assessment of the practices of British development assistance has been put forward defending the balance between idealism and self-interest in aid allocations³ and rejecting notions of the “commercialization” of aid.⁴

The objective in this article is to examine an aspect of what is be called “geography of aid”.⁵ More specifically, the aim is to investigate an aspect of British aid in Southern Africa, viz, the activities and investments of the former Colonial Development Corporation, which was founded in 1947 and re-named the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) in 1963. By statute CDC is required to pay its way and therefore the agency does not make grants, but instead offers financial investments. The CDC represents a vital element in British development assistance, viewed as “a sort of private sector arm of the aid programme”.⁶

The article is organized in terms of three sections of discussion. First, an historical approach is adopted to the formative years of CDC operations between 1948 and 1969 when certain key statutory constraints were laid down affecting the agency’s activities. In the second section, the historical approach is maintained, describing and analysing CDCs changing evolution through a phase of major growth and geographical extension. Finally, in the third section, the focus narrows to Southern Africa, situating CDC’s regional activities in the global context

and presenting an analysis and description of its regional operations. The material drawn upon in this research includes two official company histories of CDC,⁷ annual reports of the organization from 1948 to 1991, and archival material held at the Public Records Office (PRO) in London.

The early evolution and scope of CDC operations 1948–1969

The CDC was founded in October 1947 as an instrument for British colonial development policy.⁸ Britain’s post-war economic crisis of food and raw material shortages and the convertibility crisis of 1947 underlined the weakness of sterling against the American dollar. One element in restoring Britain’s economic independence was through encouraging production in the colonies of non-dollar sources for food and raw materials.⁹ The basis of this strategy for economic recovery was to increase exports of primary products from British colonies to the USA and other dollar areas and correspondingly to reduce imported manufactures from these areas.¹⁰ To spur colonial production, the British government passed the Overseas Resources Development Act (ORDA) of 1948 which sanctioned the founding of two public corporations. The first was the Overseas Food Corporation, which was dissolved in 1954 after the debacle of the Tanganyika groundnut scheme. The second was the Colonial Development Corporation mandated for the general encouragement of development schemes to expand colonial enterprise and “for improving the standard of living of the Colonial peoples by increasing their productivity and wealth”.¹¹

In 1948 the CDC set about its task of stimulating colonial production in the cause of British economic independence. Although it would be crude to argue that CDC was founded

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with the explicit task of “exploiting” the colonies, it was admitted officially that the organization “was not intended to finance schemes from which this country (Britain) would derive no benefit direct or indirect”.¹² At the outset CDC’s developmental objectives were somewhat ambiguous, being neither those of corporate profitability nor of colonial production but of vaguely defined propensities for dollar saving.¹³ Overall, the idea behind CDC’s establishment “was that there exist avenues for investment in the colonies which, because of high risks and low prospective yields, are unattractive to private enterprise, but which could be undertaken with advantage to the inhabitants of the colonies, and which could, taking one with another, and offsetting gains against losses over a wide range of investments, yield a modest return on capital”.¹⁴ Within the financial constraint of breaking even in its operations, the major policy considerations regarding project selection included, “the economic need of the Colony for the proposed scheme”; the potential for projects contributing to “reduction of dollar imports, the promotion of dollar exports or the supply of commodities in short supply in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth”; and, significantly “a measure of equitable geographical distribution of projects of development over Colonial territories as a whole”.¹⁵

As laid down by ORDA 1948, CDC’s operational mandate was broad in respect of both its functional and geographical range of operations. The Act was flexible as to CDC’s method of operations, not restricting the organization to purely financial investment but allowing it to participate also in association with other bodies by providing management and technical services, a “partnership” in colonial development.¹⁶ Functionally, the CDC was to be involved primarily in the sphere of primary products as well as diverse secondary industrial and commercial undertakings. Initially excluded from its operations were provision of social services and public utilities, which were deemed the responsibility of colonial governments.¹⁷ Spatially, the organization was empowered to undertake development projects throughout the British colonial and dependent territories with the important exclusion of the newly independent nations of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.¹⁸ Funding for CDC activities was to be procured by loans sanctioned and advanced by the Secretary of State for the Colonies with Treasury approval.¹⁹ In its initial scope and undertakings CDC was to act directly in the role of finance capital to support productive capital in various ways to raise colonial output especially of agricultural produce and secondary industry.²⁰

Between 1948 and 1955 the early years of CDC operations were fraught with the problem of reconciling colonial development to the imperative for making commercial profits, albeit if only on a break-even basis.²¹ The CDC’s aptly-styled “false start”²² involved a series of failures in over-ambitious or mismanaged agricultural, fisheries or mining projects which included such bizarre projects as a sealing venture in the Falkland Islands, a camel abattoir in British Somaliland, gold mining in Tanganyika, and egg and poultry production in The Gambia.²³ A litany of failure precipitated considerable tension between the CDC and the Colonial Office and, against

the backcloth of the collapse of the Overseas Food Corporation, growing questioning of the utility of state enterprises for the task of colonial development.²⁴ The CDC survived this critical phase during which the organization’s continued existence was openly debated. Nonetheless, it was forced to undertake a major restructuring of its operations in order to ensure that survival.

As early as 1952 the organization’s Annual Report asserted that “new projects must be taken up only on a strictly commercial basis” and because of this policy shift “the chief casualty is likely to be agricultural settlement schemes”.²⁵ By the mid-1950s CDC would no longer engage in unilateral financing and managing schemes on virgin ground; rather, CDC was transformed into an agency of finance capital which advanced loan finance to established enterprises and/or supervised production in conjunction with other forms of public or private enterprise.²⁶ A key factor in CDC’s re-organization was the devolution of responsibility for scrutinizing new projects from London to a series of regional offices situated at Kingston (for the Caribbean), Singapore (for Asia), Lagos (for West Africa), Nairobi (for East Africa), and Salisbury (for Central Africa). The regional office for Southern African operations was located in Johannesburg and remained there until 1980 (when it was transferred to Mbabane, Swaziland).

Treading a tightrope between “welfare” and “commercial” ventures, in the early 1950s the organization began to shift a growing share of financing into “safer” ventures such as housing and infrastructural provision. Beyond considerations of commercial profitability, the changing structure of CDC sectoral financing was facilitated in 1952 by the end of Britain’s dollar shortage which relieved CDC from its immediate burden of seeking projects with a dollar saving potential.²⁷ By 1956, however, the Colonial Office was criticizing the now financially sound CDC for “playing too safe” in its choice of projects which had markedly veered towards housing, power and water provision as opposed to directly productive ventures.²⁸

The continued growth of CDC operations was threatened by the appearance of a new factor during the 1950s, namely the advance of political decolonization. When ORDA was passed in 1948 no consideration had been given to the question of whether colonial territories within the operational area of CDC would remain in it after their accession to independence. This question became of serious concern with the impending independence during 1956 of Gold Coast and in 1957 of Malaya.²⁹ Although CDC assumed that it would continue operations in these territories after independence this comfortable belief was shattered by a British government announcement that CDC was debarred from embarking on new schemes in territories after independence. The organization would only be allowed to continue existing projects and invest more money in them if that was shown to be necessary.³⁰ With moves towards independence in Nigeria, Singapore, Central Africa and the Caribbean, CDC faced the prospect of a serious run down of its activities because of the excision of the core of its operational area.³¹ With Malayan independence in 1957 the British government re-asserted that

CDC should concentrate on the diminishing rump of colonial territories, stressing that “independent countries in the Commonwealth must rely primarily for economic development on private enterprise supported by institutions such as the World Bank”.³² During the years 1957–1961 the CDC continued to press its campaign for a reinstatement of its former operational area arguing that “emergent territories would continue to need economic aid of a type which neither private enterprise nor the international economic aid agencies could give, but which CDC had shown that it could provide”.³³ In 1962, however, the British government announced the restoration of CDC’s former operational domain, which was formally enacted in the Commonwealth Development Act of 1963. Nevertheless, the amending legislation still retained the exclusion on CDC involvement in India, Pakistan and Ceylon, viewed “necessary because of the enormity of demand for capital on the Indian sub-continent”.³⁴

The period between 1963 and 1969 was one of steady rather than spectacular growth for the CDC, owing both to the financial downturn in the British economy which squeezed available monies for operations and to unfavourable political conditions in many of CDC’s leading areas for investment. Nonetheless, the period was notable for three specific developments. First, CDC began to change the balance of its project commitments towards the innovation of smallholder agricultural schemes attached to nuclear estates, investment in local development companies for industrial development and “mortgage companies for the prospective house purchaser”.³⁵ The smallholder nucleus estate development³⁶ and housing finance were claimed to be areas of particular CDC expertise.³⁷ Second, CDC managed to secure acceptance from the British government of the principle that it could obtain subsidized rates of interest on treasury loans in order to enable it to continue its business of development. Third, having successfully obtained access in 1967 to larger quotas of funds on favourable terms, CDC urged that it be given facilities for a new geographical extension of its operations, allowing it to play a full and integral part in Britain’s aid programme. CDC was redefining its future in the field of aid “where it quoted with understandable pride the view of others that its work was ‘as effective a form of aid as any in the world’”.³⁸ In 1969 the ORDA Act abolished the restriction of CDC’s area of operations to Commonwealth territories, allowing it to contemplate activities in any part of the developing world subject only to ministerial approval.³⁹

The growth of CDC global operations 1970–1991

The post-1970 period witnessed the growth, extension and international diversification of CDC activities.⁴⁰ By 1970 total CDC commitments worldwide were £169 million, almost half of which was accounted for by its involvements in the sectors of housing, power and water (see Fig 1). The initial focus for CDC projects was in renewable natural resources which in 1950 accounted for 56 per cent of the organization’s commitments. By 1970, however, the proportion of CDC commitments in renewable natural resources had declined to only 18.3 per cent




Fig 1: Sectional allocation of CDC commitments 1950–1991 (Source: CDC Annual Reports 1950–1991)

as a consequence of large commitments made to new projects in power and water and housing development.

Since 1970 another remarkable shift has taken place in the volume and proportion of CDC capital commitments. Overall commitments between 1970 and 1991 escalated almost nine-fold to reach a total of £1 331 million. In terms of sectoral financing, the major development has been the re-establishment of renewable natural resource activities as the principal sphere for CDC activities. As Fig 1 illustrates, the massive shift of CDC funding into renewable natural resource projects post-1970 was accompanied by de-emphasis upon financing for other schemes especially in the sectors of housing, secondary industry, and the funding of local development companies. A high level of CDC participation was retained, however, in the sphere of water and power development, which constituted a commitment by 1991 of £294 million or 21 per cent of all CDC funding. In addition, a new sectoral focus for CDC commitments was opened in the late 1980s with several telecommunications projects attracting funding.

Behind this post-1970 changing balance of CDC operations was the re-thinking by leading international donor agencies concerning “appropriate development” in the Third World. Until the early 1970s development practice was informed by modernization theories which suggested that economic development could be achieved by massive capital injections and the replication or adoption of the Euro-American development model.⁴¹ This comfortable paradigm was thrown into crisis by attacks from an ascendant school of neo-Marxist and dependency theories and from widespread recognition that the economic growth achieved by modernization policies had accompanied stagnant, if not falling income levels among the poorest




Fig 2: The geography of CDC commitments 1950–1991 (Source: *CDC Annual Report 1991*)

groups.⁴² Under the influence of modernization thinking most development assistance programmes, including British aid, had done little to reach the poorest groups through their development projects.⁴³ During the mid-1970s the major development agencies began new “reformist” initiatives to realize equity objectives and to target aid at the poorest groups.⁴⁴ In Britain the changing context for development practice was evident in the launch during 1975 of a new poverty-oriented aid programme, heavily focused on rural-development and which sought to “ensure that a higher proportion of British aid should directly benefit not only the poorest countries but the poorest people in those countries”.⁴⁵

The expansion of CDC’s international operations after 1970 clearly were affected by this re-thinking of development policy and practice. Indeed, as an outcome of discussions held with the Ministry of Overseas Development, CDC announced that it “would aim to place its new commitments during the five years 1975–1979 into the poorer countries and into renewable natural resources”.⁴⁶ Under this new poverty-oriented mandate for British development assistance CDC poured over 60 per cent of its new funds between 1975–1980 into renewable natural resource projects. An official review of CDC operations in 1980 concluded that the “CDC plays a valuable and distinctive role in overseas development and in particular possesses the special skills needed for the development of natural resources”.⁴⁷ This positive review led to a renewed CDC commitment during the 1980s to a poverty-oriented and rural-focused development practice. Indeed, between 1980 and 1991 renewable natural resource projects, the major focus of CDC funding, absorbed 48 per cent of new commitments. Nonetheless, by the early 1990s a downward

trend again was a feature of the renewable resource sector, particularly as new large agricultural projects increasingly became “difficult to find”.⁴⁸

Accompanying the growth in volume of CDC activities after 1970 was a geographical spread of operations to new operational regions within the Commonwealth (most notably a growing involvement in the Pacific) and beyond its boundaries.⁴⁹ The general principles surrounding the organization’s spatial extension of its operational domain were enunciated as “a natural extension of its existing organisation through the regional offices and to countries where conditions are broadly similar to those of the countries in which the Corporation is already operating”.⁵⁰ By 1980 ministerial approval had been secured for CDC to operate in 13 non-Commonwealth countries, most importantly, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Thailand, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Philippines, Honduras and Liberia. A key factor in facilitating CDC’s thrust into non-Commonwealth territories was growing informal co-operation and formal joint funding arrangements between CDC and other international and national development agencies.⁵¹ By the early 1980s approximately one-third of CDC new commitments were undertaken in terms of joint co-financing arrangements with the World Bank or its affiliates.⁵² After Britain’s 1973 entry into the European Community, CDC began to extend its operations through growing co-operation with a group of other European development agencies, forming a joint working group (Interact Group) to shape co-financing arrangements in the developing world.⁵³ Indeed, during the 1980s, CDC began to construct a closer relationship with the European Community’s aid programmes rather than only the British aid programme.⁵⁴




Fig 3: Countries in CDC's operational areas with no projects, 1991 (Source: CDC Annual Report 1991)

The increasing extent of inter-agency co-operation between CDC, the World Bank and the group of European investment agencies underpinned the spatial extension of CDC operations worldwide. By 1991 the map of CDC's global commitments reveals that the agency has projects in fifty different countries or territories (Fig 2). Now as an integral part of the UK aid effort CDC functioned to "fly the flag" for Britain in many parts of the world, most notably sub-Saharan Africa, where British investment often was in decline.⁵⁵ By 1991 the leading seven countries for CDC commitments were Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Jamaica, Zimbabwe, India and Kenya. Of great significance in terms of the future geography of financing was the sanction given by ministerial approval for CDC in 1986 to commence operations in both India and Pakistan, two countries which hitherto were excluded from the organization's mandate.⁵⁶ Other notable additions to CDC operational area in the 1980s were Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Vanuatu and Mozambique, the latter a major newcomer to the list of leading recipient countries for British bilateral aid during the late 1980s.⁵⁷ That said, it should be noted also that by 1991 Mozambique was among a group of countries where CDC was empowered to operate yet had made no project commitment (see Fig 3).

CDC operations in Southern Africa

Africa has been the favoured region for CDC projects throughout the organization's history. At its inception CDC proclaimed

the belief that Africa "was the most promising field for large-scale development".⁵⁸ and by 1950 had committed as much as 61 per cent of its funding to this region. As Figure 4 shows, Africa retained its prominence for CDC activities over the four decades of the agency's existence. In relative terms the peak of CDC's involvement in Africa was reached in the period 1960–1962 when it accounted for almost 69 per cent of all global commitments. During the 1960s, however, operating circumstances in many African countries became difficult for CDC owing to political turbulence and the emergence of governments hostile to the "imperialism" of aid.⁵⁹ As CDC increasingly turned its attention to expanding operations in Asia and the Caribbean, the share of Africa in total CDC funding fell to 58 per cent in 1970 and 52 per cent in 1976.

An upturn in CDC's African activities occurred between 1975 and 1980 in the wake of the new development focus on poverty and rural development; by 1980 again Africa was enjoying 60 per cent of all global commitments. Nonetheless, as a result of mounting debt problems, Africa has not been a particularly attractive region for CDC investments since 1980 and its share of global funding had fallen markedly to 48 per cent by 1985 and to 40 per cent by 1991. This figure represents the lowest share of CDC funding ever recorded in Africa and reflects the agency's growing involvement in the South and Southeast Asian region. Despite CDC claims that it "continues to concentrate much effort on Africa",⁶⁰ a clear trend is a de-emphasis on the former significance of Africa.




Fig 4: CDC commitments on a regional basis
(Source: *CDC Annual Reports 1950–1991*)




Fig 5: CDC commitments in Africa
(Source: *CDC Annual Reports 1950–1991*)

Early developments in Southern Africa

Figure 5 divides CDC's African commitments between the four operational areas of West, East, Central and Southern Africa. The Southern Africa region (constituted formally in 1955 with the opening of the Johannesburg office) comprised the three High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. During the period of British trusteeship, colonial neglect resulted in capital starvation and undeveloped conditions in these three territories which made them potentially attractive areas for CDC development in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially CDC investigated a range of projects in these areas including sisal plantations, a creamery and an abattoir.⁶¹ Political considerations strongly favoured a major CDC presence in Southern Africa because the British government was sensitive to mounting South African criticism of its developmental neglect of these territories.⁶² Bechuanaland and Swaziland became significant early foci for CDC activities and together the two colonies accounted for 38 per cent of CDC's all global commitments in 1953. The substantial degree of CDC involvement in these territories was partially explicable in terms of the opportunities offered in Bechuanaland for cattle ranching projects and in Swaziland for large-scale forestry and sugar schemes.⁶³ Nonetheless, it was inseparable also from the political objective of creating "models of how Colonial territories should be run so that the Union has no cause for criticism".⁶⁴

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s CDC continued to provide extensive development assistance to several projects in Swaziland. The volume of CDC commitments in Swaziland grew from £4 million in 1950 to £13 million by 1960 and reaching £24 million at the close of the 1960s (see Fig 6). Operations began in 1949 with CDC's establishment of the Usutu Forest plantation.⁶⁵ This was followed in 1950 by the purchase of land to be used for large-scale sugar and rice cultivation under irrigation.⁶⁶ CDC's early successful involvement

in Swaziland nurtured a belief in the mid-1950s that the country was "ready for great development".⁶⁷ After an uncertain start, by the end of the 1950s the Swaziland irrigation scheme, geared to sugar production, was "the largest, most diversified and most satisfactory in sheer development terms of all the Corporation's projects".⁶⁸ Accordingly, during the 1960s CDC progressively concentrated its Swaziland efforts on sugar, expanding on existing developments and innovating in 1960 the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms as a smallholder settlement scheme.⁶⁹ In the decade 1950–1960 Swaziland absorbed the largest share of all new CDC development finance and by 1960 was not only the most important country for CDC African operations but also the leading country in global terms.⁷⁰ This privileged position as number one favoured site for CDC activities was maintained until the mid-1960s. Undoubtedly, at this time, CDC was "the biggest and most dynamic influence for development" in the Swaziland economy.⁷¹ At independence in 1968 CDC heralded Swaziland as "more likely than most of its near contemporaries to attain, within the foreseeable future, a take-off into self-sustaining growth".⁷²

As in the case of Swaziland, colonial Bechuanaland also was an early favoured site for CDC operations. Emphasis during the 1950s was upon establishing a series of cattle ranching schemes and setting up the country's first modern abattoir. These schemes were deemed as likely to yield economic benefit to the territory but were also linked to the goal of tempering South African criticism of British colonial administration of Bechuanaland.⁷³ The scale of CDC's involvement in Bechuanaland led to warnings being sounded that it was attempting "to develop too fast in a wild and little known area" and "committing itself to a very large programme of agriculture in arid country with a most erratic – and certainly unrecorded rainfall".⁷⁴ In 1950 further criticism was drawn to the unequal geographical distribution of CDC capital commitments as proposed schemes in Bechuanaland and Swaziland

together represented one-fifth of all the agency's financing. Indeed, during 1950 this concern over the channelling of a high proportion of CDC funds into Bechuanaland and Swaziland led to proposals for imposing a temporary ban on new approval of funds for these territories.⁷⁵

By the late 1950s, despite its "clumsy entry" into cattle ranching, CDC effectively controlled the economy of Bechuanaland and had laid the foundations for the emergence of independent Botswana as a major exporter of meat products.⁷⁶ The agency's operations in the territory were, however, plagued by several problems during the late 1950s and 1960s. These problems underlie the limited new operations which CDC undertook in Bechuanaland until 1972 (Fig 6). A strained relationship developed between CDC and both the colonial and independent governments of Botswana. Tensions rose as a result of the poor management and unsuccessful results of some of the cattle ranching schemes⁷⁷ and the colonial administration's belief that CDC had overstocked and permanently damaged the rangeland in the three ranches that it abandoned.⁷⁸ In addition, the pricing practices of the CDC abattoir tended to favour white farmers and white middlemen and disadvantage African farmers. Beyond these issues, Jones⁷⁹ argues that "personalities and local politics played a very important role", especially in the pre-independence period. It was noted that Bechuanaland was "a much more radical place" than Swaziland and that the colonial administration perceived the local CDC personnel (many of whom were South African residents) as exhibiting "excessively 'colonial' attitudes".⁸⁰ CDC's personnel in Southern Africa "included a number of key people with South African or old-style colonial backgrounds who could operate quite happily in the South African political and racial atmosphere but had failed to adapt to political change in the rest of Africa".⁸¹

New expansion and diversification

Over the period 1970–1991 it is evident that the Southern African region has been attracting a decreasing relative share of new CDC allocations (Fig 5). Nonetheless, CDC did expand further its Southern African projects commitments to a level of £71 million by 1991 (Fig 6) as a result of continuing growth in Swaziland and Botswana and initial entry into Lesotho after many years of searching for suitable projects.⁸² In both Botswana and Swaziland CDC diversified markedly its portfolio of local investments.

The greatest net growth of CDC funding in the region was recorded in Botswana where expansion of £9 million took place between 1970–1980 and a further £17 million after 1980. New CDC initiatives in Botswana began in 1972 amid a fresh political atmosphere following the difficult period of the late colonial and early independence years.⁸³ CDC has continued its long history of involvement with Botswana's important ranching and meat producing industry, albeit no longer in its former capacity of having outright control.⁸⁴ Diversification of CDC operations in Botswana occurred in 1972 with the first of several funding commitments to assist the Botswana Housing Corporation, which was involved in new




Fig 6: CDC commitments in Southern Africa
(Source: CDC Annual Reports 1950–1991)

shelter development especially for lower-income groups. This was followed by a number of large funding commitments into infrastructural schemes, most importantly assistance to the Botswana Power Corporation for extension of its electricity plant. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that during the period when CDC was emphasizing a global commitment to natural resource projects, in Botswana (a country where CDC's initial focus had been in agriculture), the balance of the organization's operations shifted away from renewable natural resources into infrastructure schemes. Especially during the 1980s, CDC concentrated its emphasis in Botswana on infrastructural funding. New project commitments included assistance for developing water supplies, further expansion of electrification and a major involvement towards upgrading the Botswana telecommunications network.⁸⁵ In the 1990s this change in the balance of the Botswana project portfolio was reinforced by an involvement in the hotel sector and substantial new assistance for housing finance.⁸⁶

In Swaziland CDC involvement has remained a consistent and significant factor in shaping the national economy.⁸⁷ During the 1970s the Swaziland sugar sector attracted considerable new CDC funding for further irrigation and the construction of a new sugar mill complex which began crushing in 1980.⁸⁸ Other natural resource projects with CDC funding included the long-established forestry scheme and projects for the production of citrus and pineapples. Also linked to natural resource projects was the CDC's Mananga Agricultural Management Centre which was founded in 1973 as a specialist business school for agricultural project managers in the developing world. Nonetheless, as in Botswana, a phase of diversification of CDC's Swaziland portfolio occurred through involvement in hotel schemes, infrastructure expansion (electricity supplies) and several industrial projects, including a pineapple cannery, brickworks, packaging plant, abattoir and textiles spinning.⁸⁹ Finally, in Swaziland a shift in the portfolio balance resulted from a policy of bringing local interests into ownership of established CDC ventures. This policy of the disposal of CDC holdings into local institutional ownership, which affected projects in sugar, pulp and

forestry, accounts for the overall picture of stagnation in total CDC funding to Swaziland after 1980 (see Fig 6).

Outside of the traditional heartlands of CDC activity in Southern Africa, the agency extended its operations into Lesotho. Even prior to independence, CDC sought to become involved in development assistance to Lesotho undertaking a series of unsuccessful project investigations. As far back as 1955 the CDC Annual Report noted that "CDC has no interest in Basutoland and wishes it had";⁹⁰ in 1967 the picture was little changed and it was stated "CDC has long regretted the failure to find a suitable investment prospect in Lesotho".⁹¹ A breakthrough in Lesotho occurred after the Prime Minister nominated CDC's regional controller to a position of a director of the national development corporation, an appointment which it was hoped would "produce opportunities for CDC investment".⁹² As a result of this contact CDC began operations in Lesotho through a small funding for a housing development in Maseru. Throughout the 1970s CDC's total financial commitment to Lesotho remained extremely small (less than £1 million) and confined to the housing sector. Moreover, in the 1980s a brewery project was the only addition to the project portfolio. New prospects opened for a major CDC involvement in Lesotho in the 1990s with the launch of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which involves water provision and power development. CDC has announced its backing for this project and its willingness to grant significant levels of development assistance.⁹³

Finally, a number of noteworthy recent developments concerning a spatial extension of CDC operations indicate a future upturn in activities in the Southern African region. First, CDC currently is exploring several new investment opportunities in Mozambique, a country which is a major focal point for British aid flows⁹⁴ and where CDC was empowered to operate by ministerial approval in 1987. In 1989 it was announced that CDC's first commitment in the country would be made in early 1990.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, as of end-1991, the continuing civil conflict in Mozambique had hampered CDC's efforts to make firm decisions on several possible investment opportunities investigated in hotels and in agriculture.⁹⁶ Newly independent Namibia is a second new zone for potential CDC activities. Permission was granted for CDC operations in Namibia in 1990 and an operating conditions agreement concluded between the agency and the Namibian government in 1991, paving the way for project investigations to go ahead.⁹⁷ Under investigation by CDC in Namibia are proposals for their involvement in a fruit and vegetable irrigation project and in restructuring the country's financial development institutions.⁹⁸ Finally, the emergence of a new political dispensation in South Africa opens the possibility of CDC seeking to incorporate that country within its operational area. During 1991 a CDC mission visited South Africa "to help clarify future investment needs" and CDC's possible role in aid for the "new South Africa".⁹⁹

Concluding remarks

Questions surrounding aid flows and the spatial impact of aid are worthy of considerable research attention, especially in the

context of the developing world. Indeed, today there are many African nations where, owing to the disengagement of large private business enterprises,¹⁰⁰ the activities of development finance agencies (such as CDC) increasingly represent the major sources for new investment funds. This study of the unfolding and workings of CDC's operations in Southern Africa underscores the complex set of economic and political factors which can affect the volume and detailed patterns of development assistance. The overall picture is, however, that the region of Southern Africa has lost its former status as a key site for CDC operations owing to a mixture of factors which led the agency progressively to shift the balance of its programmes of development assistance to other regions of the world economy.

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Migration of high-level African manpower to South Africa

Dr Erich Leistner, Resident Fellow at the Africa Institute, considers some of the implications of the African brain drain towards South Africa.

For more than a century, migratory manual workers from African countries have played a significant role in South Africa's modern economy. In recent years, however, growing numbers of professional and other highly skilled people from all over sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have also found employment in the country – often on a permanent basis – and many more are likely to follow once a new political order is in place.

Traditionally, the brain drain from Africa was directed mainly towards the highly developed countries of the northern hemisphere. Since, however, these countries are clamping down on immigration from the less-developed world, South Africa is bound to feature increasingly as a haven for economic refugees from the continent.

The Republic clearly would stand to gain from this inflow, more particularly if its economy takes off while indigenous skills decamp. Though welcome, this brain gain could be only marginal to South Africa's needs. For the countries losing these skilled migrants, however, the impact on economic prospects could be disastrous – and turmoil in its economic hinterland inevitably affects South Africa's own long-term stability and prosperity.

In the interest of all concerned, the implications of the African brain drain towards South Africa should therefore be considered as a matter of urgency.

One can distinguish three broad groups of African people likely to migrate south.¹ First, returning exiles – South Africans, or people of South African origin, now able to return home. A second group is from the large expatriate communities working in most African countries and includes people from Western and Eastern Europe, North America and India as well as Ghana, Uganda and other African countries. While the third group – nationals from southern African countries – concerns us most in the present context, we can discuss it only within the broader framework of Africa's brain drain *per se*.

The magnitude of the brain drain

The number of highly qualified African people leaving their home countries to work elsewhere may seem relatively small.

But considering that they belong to the cream of their countries' manpower – and even disregarding the significant investment in terms of money and endeavour that they embody – their departure may actually condemn their home countries to cultural, political and economic decline.

The continent lost approximately 27 000 highly skilled persons to the industrialized world between 1960 and 1975, and a further 40 000 between 1975 and 1984. In 1987, an estimated 70 000 high-level executives from SSA – representing 30 per cent of Africa's skilled manpower stock – were officially resident in the EEC.²

Many of these people had studied at overseas universities and stayed there after completion of their studies. The government of Mali, for example, has estimated that at least 15 per cent of its students in France will remain there after graduation. Towards the end of the 1970s, there were some 104 500 African students registered in educational institutions in six Western European countries. Assuming that 20 per cent of them did not return to work in Africa after graduation, the continent lost about 21 000 skills.³

On average, only half of the 40 Gambian students with scholarships for study abroad, return home after graduation. Between 1972 and 1980, 2 700 Ghanaians received scholarships to universities abroad, but only 800 nationals with diplomas from foreign universities were recruited into the civil service.⁴ Angola is looking for assistance to bring back 10 000 of its nationals who graduated abroad during the civil war.⁵

In 1985, Guinean, Algerian, Madagascan and Beninese doctors and teachers working in France outnumbered the total expatriate personnel in the respective fields in these countries. In the same year, only 38 per cent of Congolese doctors were working at home.⁶

The total number of Africans with high-level skills working overseas must now be well over 100 000. This compares with a virtually identical figure for foreign expatriates employed in Africa at a cost of approximately US\$4 billion a year – that is, an average of \$400 000 each.⁷

The RSA and Botswana are the pre-eminent destinations

for skilled persons from countries in Southern Africa. The situation in Zambia, for example, has recently been described as follows:

Lured by the Pula and the Rand, the bulk of Zambia's professionals have migrated to Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Some have also sought employment in the 'nominally independent' homelands.

...doctors, university professors, teachers, engineers, accountants have all packed their bags for greener pastures. The national airlines ... has also lost about 10 pilots to Zimbabwe and Ethiopia.⁸

The brain drain has had a particular impact on Zambia's two universities. Over 200 lecturers have left the country since the early 1980s. At the end of 1992, some departments were on the point of closing. At the law school, for example, only five lecturers from an establishment of 21 were still there; in the humanities and social sciences, only three out of 13 remained; and the business and psychology departments had already closed because of the staff crisis.⁹

In 1991, when the University of Botswana had a total academic staff of 345, this included 209 expatriates of whom 59 were Zambians.¹⁰ Because of poor working conditions, Zimbabwe, too, has become a training ground for countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Large numbers of skilled whites had left the country after 1980, and the massive investments in education and training made by the Mugabe government have to a large extent been vitiated by the emigration of those trained. In the key sectors of health, education, engineering and technical services, the impact of the brain drain has been devastating.

Since 1985, 75 per cent of Zimbabwean graduate veterinarians have left. Among the more than 200 specialists who have left the Department of Research and Specialist Services – the leading agricultural research body – since 1985, were at least 54 technical and research staff. In 1991 alone, 200 Zimbabwean doctors migrated to South Africa and Botswana.¹¹

Eight out of ten Malawian students remain abroad after training. It is estimated that from 1980 to 1989, more than 300 qualified Malawian doctors, lawyers, teachers, journalists, engineers and administrators remained and worked abroad after completing their training. Of 120 doctors in government institutions in 1992, only 30 were Malawians. In fact, more Malawian doctors are said to practice in Manchester, England, than in the whole of Malawi.¹²

In his study, *The Bantustan brain gain*, Kwesi Prah has estimated that a total of about 7 000 skilled persons from the rest of Africa were working in the South African homelands – approximately 3 000 from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as well as about 3 500 Ugandans, Ghanaians, Zambians, Zimbabweans and Mauritians. Ghanaians and Ugandans formed about 60 per cent of the total.¹³

Prah also found that in 1987/88, the Transkeian Department of Education employed 226 Ghanaians, 89 Ugandans, 19 Basotho and nine from other African countries. The Transkeian Department of Health had 49 Ugandan and 23 Ghanaian doctors and dentists in its service. Six qualified Ugandan veterinary surgeons also worked for Transkei. The University of Transkei's academic staff from other African

countries increased from eight in 1983 to 37 in 1987.¹⁴

Comparable figures are not available for the other homelands, but it is known that Bophuthatswana in particular has attracted appreciable numbers of Ugandans and Ghanaians. In only one hospital in Thaba Nchu (Bophuthatswana), seven of the 18 medical officers and paramedics were Ugandans in 1987.¹⁵ According to another source, more than 5 000 Ugandan citizens worked in South Africa in 1988, mainly in the homelands.¹⁶

The causes of the brain drain

An expert from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) graphically describes the conditions giving rise to the brain drain from African countries:

Conditions of living in Africa have become so oppressive that those who can, have fled the continent in search of more comfortable environments where they can work, live decently and feel professionally fulfilled. Over the last eight years [that is, since about 1980], as Africa suffered through a devastating socio-economic crisis, the widespread deterioration in human welfare has propelled the drift of all types of Africans – men and women, unskilled, semi-skilled and highly skilled alike – to countries where they hope to find a better life.¹⁷

More specifically, one can distinguish four principal causes for skill migration:

- low salaries and falling real incomes,
- unsatisfactory working conditions,
- unemployment, and
- an adverse political and social environment.

Differences in salaries between South Africa, Botswana and Namibia on the one hand and some other African countries on the other, are considerable. The following figures come from an unpublished report and reflect the US dollar equivalents of national currencies. Other sources indicate much larger salary differentials.¹⁸

In 1992, the maximum annual salary of an associate professor compared approximately as follows; Botswana \$30 700; South Africa \$26 800; Lesotho \$19 200; Swaziland \$18 300; Zimbabwe \$13 100.

A top civil servant in Uganda is reported to have earned the equivalent of merely \$10 a month in 1988 whereas his compatriots in South Africa averaged more than \$800 per month – in other words, the former needed about seven years to earn what the latter received every month.¹⁹ A senior Tanzanian civil servant's monthly salary of \$134 in 1992 compared with \$1 000 to \$3 000 for his counterpart in Namibia. Qualified medical doctors in Malawi and Ghana earn about \$200 and \$80 per month respectively.

The above salaries may be compared with the average cost of overseas expatriates in Africa quoted earlier on, that is, \$400 000 pa. Even though the expatriates are usually paid by overseas donors, the vast discrepancies in earnings cannot but cause dissatisfaction among qualified local people.

On top of everything else, inflation and the depreciation of currencies have seriously reduced the real purchasing power

of salary and wage earners in most countries. Many qualified persons have lost their jobs because of rationalization in public administrations and parastatals. Many find political interference in their professional duties intolerable. Political persecution has compelled many to flee their home countries – Uganda under Idi Amin being an outstanding example.

Worsening economic conditions frustrate research and scholarly work everywhere. The *cri de douleur* of a university spokesperson quoted by *West Africa* of 12 September 1983, aptly illustrates the vexations that scientists, medical personnel and other specialists across the continent have to contend with:

For several months now, we have been expected to run a physics laboratory without electricity, perform biology and zoology experiments without water and get accurate readings from microscopes blinded by use and age. Chemicals are unimaginably short. The result of all this is a chemistry laboratory that cannot produce distilled water and hundreds of 'science graduates' lacking the benefits of practical demonstrations.²⁰

Colin Legum writes of a Ugandan doctor working in Canada, who, upon being asked when he would return to Uganda, replied that he did not want to go "and become a liability by stealing medicine from Mulago Hospital because I have to make up for my salary in order to live".²¹

The replies of respondents in the BLS countries as well as in Ghana and Uganda whom Prah asked why skilled persons would migrate to the homelands, showed a surprisingly similar pattern. Everywhere, the rank order of perceived reasons was the same:

- 1 Higher salaries/Benefits/Quality of life
- 2 Lack of local jobs
- 3 Political and social reasons
- 4 Poor working conditions locally
- 5 Local corruption, nepotism, etc
- 6 Other reasons²²

Prah reports that over 55 per cent of respondents in all five countries felt that for the reasons given, "it was all right to seek employment in the bantustans".²³ By far the greatest weight was accorded to the first and second of these reasons.

This brief overview of the reasons for emigration probably suffices to indicate that the conditions inducing high-level personnel to seek more congenial environments abroad are intimately bound up with SSA's fundamental problem of economic retrogression – for which a solution has yet to be found.

Implications for the home countries

Unctad uses the "imputed capital value of skills flow" approach to estimate the cost of the brain drain. The essence of the approach is that anything that yields a stream of real income over time is capital; and that the value of a migrant's worth as a productive asset per period, is the marginal product in this period. The human capital embodied in a migrant measures the present value of his productive capacity over the rest of his life by discounting expected future earnings.

Using this approach, Unctad estimates that the value of one highly skilled migrant aged 25–35 would be in the region of

US\$184 000. Most African migrants fall into that age group. Assuming that conditions in the continent keep them away until they retire, and that their present number remains constant, one would arrive at a figure of US\$12,6 billion (at 1979 prices).²⁴

The true cost to Africa of the brain drain, obviously, cannot be determined by calculations such as these, nor can it be found by calculating the cost incurred by employing overseas experts instead of local ones.

Three decades of so-called development aid and armies of expatriate "technical advisers" have left most African countries worse off than at independence. The critical missing factor has been the growth of indigenous human capital.

No society can be "developed" from outside. Development has to originate in the minds and motivations of its own people – and in this process, the role of its brightest and best educated is indispensable. They who must help to introduce and indigenize modern concepts, techniques and institutions. A B Zahlan has formulated it aptly:

...only when knowledge is internalized can a community hope to transform creatively its cultural heritage into modes and lifestyles unmistakably related to its past, at the same time making full use of all available knowledge. The scholar, scientist or engineer rooted in his culture and institutions is the natural and only instrument for effecting this role. A nation that imports 'modernity' pays a high price: it is cultural suicide.²⁵

Edward V K Jaycox, the World Bank's vice-president for Africa, has acknowledged that the various development approaches in Africa have all failed to incorporate as a central feature the building of indigenous capacity. The contrast with Asia and Latin America, where indigenous capacities were in fact developed, goes a long way to explain why Africa is lagging so greatly.²⁶

The countries of SSA clearly cannot hope to escape from their present crisis unless they establish conditions that make it worthwhile for more skilled indigenous people to work in their home countries.

The implications of a brain gain for South Africa

For reasons similar to those elsewhere in Africa, South Africa is also experiencing a brain drain; poor economic conditions; violence; an uncertain political future; and, more particularly, the fear that the country faces a destiny similar to that of SSA. To the extent that this emigration continues, or accelerates, while the economy improves, opportunities to fill the vacancies will increase for trained people from Africa.

These considerations apart, one can expect that once South Africa is fully accepted into the community of African states, this in itself will draw growing numbers of highly skilled Africans from the rest of SSA as well as from overseas. However, as the foregoing shows, a worsening haemorrhage of their human resources is bound to harm the countries of origin.

More specifically, a major exodus of skills towards the Republic will weaken these countries' economic stability and

prospects – and deteriorating social and political conditions in the region inevitably affect South Africa in many ways, too.

Administrative measures to counter the outflow of skilled people

Efforts to counter the outmigration of skills may conveniently be divided into direct constraints and other administrative measures on the one hand and, on the other, steps aimed at creating environmental inducements to stay.

In Cameroon, any person leaving the country to study abroad must deposit a heavy guarantee repayable on return. Ghana has introduced a bond system for scholarships to study abroad. The government grants scholarships only on condition that applicants undertake to complete the course for which the scholarship was authorized and to change neither establishment nor course without the government's consent.

Applicants in Ghana must also undertake to return home on completion of their studies and to place themselves at the government's disposal for a minimum of five years. In the event of breach of contract, students have to reimburse the total amount of the scholarship plus 5 per cent interest for every year they studied. Furthermore, before leaving, they must provide the name of a solvent guarantor who will be responsible for repayment should they fail to return.

This system of bond scholarships, with minor variations, has been adopted by few countries, and even Ghana has never really enforced it.²⁷

As far as possible, full university courses abroad are avoided in order to discourage students from settling permanently in the receiving country. Preference is given to those attending short courses of higher vocational training, since experience has shown that the longer young people study abroad, the more likely they are to stay there.

A further measure would be to set up a mechanism to find jobs for returning nationals who have qualified abroad or otherwise to facilitate their entry into the labour market.²⁸

It has also been proposed that countries losing an important segment of their highly trained manpower through brain drain, should be entitled to financial compensation from the countries benefitting from the migrants.

Thus, amongst others, Unctad has suggested a "modest contribution" by host developed countries in the form either of direct assessments or of tax-sharing arrangements under an agreed formula, supplemented by the possibility of the migrants making voluntary, tax-deductible contributions to charitable organizations in their home countries and of earmarking, again on a voluntary basis, up to 10 per cent of their income tax payments for developmental purposes.²⁹

Not surprisingly, nothing has yet come from these and similar proposals. As a World Bank study observes: "Policies to prevent emigration of highly skilled personnel are seldom particularly efficacious."³⁰ Apart from everything else, the vast salary differentials between South Africa and Botswana on the one hand and the rest of the region on the other, underlines the considerable difficulty of trying to restrict the outflow of skills.

Efforts to stem the brain drain by improving the working environment

Poor salaries obviously are the principal reason why skilled people leave their home countries. However, high-level scholars and professionals also tend to value the quality of their working environment. This includes adequate accommodation, facilities enabling them to maintain academic and professional standards – such as access to learned journals, books, international conferences, and suitable apparatus – but also freedom of thought, freedom from political harassment, recognition for the relevance of their work, fair treatment by their superiors, and so forth.

The words of the Ndegwa Commission in Kenya (1972), arguing for an increase in the salaries of senior civil servants, are equally valid in respect of other high-level manpower:

...these are the people upon whom successful Government and development depends; it is their skill, resourcefulness and dedication which will shape the future of the country. There is a need for rededication to the tasks ahead – while this is obviously not just a question of money, it is difficult for even the most dedicated man to meet his commitments without it. If he is to give of his best, he must feel that he is being fairly treated and that his worth is recognized.³¹

The widely acknowledged need to create a favourable environment for the promotion of indigenous professional talent has given rise to calls for regional and sub-regional centres of excellence and networks across the continent. These would enhance the overall policy analysis, management and research capacities of individual countries and of SSA as a whole.³² At the same time, they would provide incentives for the highly skilled to stay – if not in their own countries, then at least in the region.

A major impediment to the creation of such centres of excellence is the tendency of African governments to interfere with academic freedom by means of political appointments and conditions and by restricting open debate. It will therefore be of more than passing interest to see how the University of Namibia (Unam) will succeed in its endeavour to function independently of government control.

In order to ensure that "voices will be raised around the world" if academic freedom is threatened, Unam is aiming at a substantial private funding base overseas, and is establishing formal ties with academic institutions abroad. Its Human Rights Centre, for example, was created with support from Utrecht University in the Netherlands and will also serve campuses in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.³³

Another novel approach to stopping the brain drain, as outlined in a recent OECD publication, involves successful private companies.³⁴ It combines close co-operation between the state and the private productive sector with substantial public investment in the development of market-driven skills and production know-how.

Dealing with Zimbabwe, the OECD study states that – thanks to efficient management and forward-looking investment schemes – the private sector of its economy had played host to a growing assortment of skills and productive know-how. The study concludes that certain sections of the private

sector can serve as models of indigenous skills and technology development.

In recent years, both the mining and agricultural service sectors of Zimbabwe have witnessed the emergence of new dynamic, locally-based companies – such as mining consultants Peacocke and Simpson – who export their services as far afield as Tanzania, establishing solid links into regional industrial structures while earning foreign exchange for Zimbabwe. Others, including several high-tech nurseries around Harare and the innovative agro-business key player, Hortico, have streamlined the domestic agricultural process and combined skills development with profitability.³⁵

Lastly, reference may be made to efforts to entice qualified African nationals home. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), an organization which assists refugees and skilled nationals to return home, has helped to resettle 1 053 qualified Africans since 1983. It finds jobs for them, pays their removal expenses and gives them a settling-in allowance in the first month of their return. The largest number of returnees who have benefited from the IOM programme are university lecturers, engineers, medical doctors, agronomists and biologists.

Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe have shown interest in a special IOM programme to facilitate the return of small-scale entrepreneurs who will benefit their countries through technology transfer and job creation. The IOM is to finance the purchase of equipment for some of the returnees or arrange loans for them from local lending institutions.³⁶

Conclusion

Once a new political order is in place, South Africa is likely to experience a growing inflow of skilled persons from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, not least from southern Africa. Should the country flourish economically and otherwise, certain African countries could suffer severely as a consequence of losing significant numbers of highly qualified people to the Republic.

Although any increase in South Africa's stock of skills would be welcome – especially if a significant exodus of skilled whites should occur – its long-term national interest is directly affected by anything that damages its neighbours in a major way.

In its own interest, South Africa should co-operate with neighbouring countries in seeking solutions to the problems of the intra-regional brain drain – or should at least try to alleviate these problems.

However, efforts to find solutions have little chance to succeed unless they deal with the root cause of the brain drain: persons with high-level skills that they can market internationally, have a powerful incentive to migrate if they perceive an opportunity to improve their position substantially by migrating to another country. As an ECA expert puts it:

Barring the application of repressive measures, it is conceivable that more skilled Africans will choose to leave...[their countries] unless an enabling environment is created for them to feel sufficiently comfortable, socially, economically, politically and professionally, to want to stay home.³⁷

Unless the economically weaker countries of Southern Africa manage to provide their highly qualified people with salaries and general working conditions roughly similar to those available in South Africa or Botswana – something very difficult to achieve – we can expect the brain drain to accelerate.

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Reconciling structural adjustment and reconstruction

*Dr Stef Coetzee, Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, puts forward an argument for a development strategy that incorporates both structural adjustment and reconstruction.**

South Africa is presently experiencing a period of fundamental change. The country finds itself in a highly precarious, and at times unstable, situation as we try to escape from an authoritarian and unjust societal order and begin to construct a new South Africa. For most of the population the new order promises to provide democracy, an improvement in material well-being and the undoing of much of the past damage.¹ There is a broad agreement that, in order to lift South Africa out of its present predicament, the highest priority must be accorded to negotiating a new constitutional order that will address the issue of political legitimacy. In addition, if we are to achieve a stable transition to a new political order and sustain political democracy, security and development issues will have to be addressed concurrently.² However, there does not seem to be a great deal of agreement on how to achieve these objectives.

One of the contentious issues in the debate is how to construct a process of accelerated development that would elevate the country to a higher plane of development and alleviate the socioeconomic backlogs and imbalances inherited from the past dispensation. The past three years have witnessed a shift in the positions of the main parties on how to expand the material base for development and make it possible for society to share more equally in the fruits of a higher level of welfare. However, there are still fundamental differences underlying these positions as embodied in the "growth plus participation" (structural adjustment) and "redistribution through growth" ("redistribution for growth" or reconstruction) approaches. Underlying these differences is the perceived conflict between growth and redistribution; the limited "trickle-down" effects under growth policies; and the perceived inability of distribution policies to expand the material base for development and to promote efficiency.

The view is presented in this article that, given the development problematic of South Africa, both structural adjustment and reconstruction are required for a development framework

that will transcend the boundaries of the present debate. It is also argued that South Africa has both a supply-side crisis and an urgent need to restructure demand in favour of the poor. This development perspective does not view adjustment and reconstruction (or growth and redistribution/human development) as mutually exclusive, but rather seeks to explain how they could support each other in a synergic way. If this position is accepted, policy choices become a matter of timing and sequencing rather than a choice of one to the exclusion of the other. Moreover, adjustment is not viewed as a strategy that can be transplanted indiscriminately from elsewhere to South Africa. It should be tailored according to our particular needs. The issue at stake is: "What should be the content of a structural adjustment programme for South Africa?" Fortunately South Africa can draw on the experience that other countries have gained in successful and unsuccessful attempts at reconciling the above objectives. A good starting point in designing a new framework for development in South Africa, is to agree on the nature of our development problems.

The nature of South Africa's development problems

The development scene in South Africa has been well analysed in a plethora of books and articles on the subject in the past few years, and it is not necessary to discuss them here. It must be stated at the outset that much of the present malaise, be it the socioeconomic development crisis or the inefficiencies and

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structural economic problems of the South African economy, has been caused by the political policies of the past. However, policy-makers should also keep in mind that South Africa is, according to international classification, a middle-income developing country³ and a medium human development country⁴ that displays most of the typical development problems of this group of countries.

Human development deficiencies and socioeconomic backlogs and imbalances

Given the size of the South African economy and its level of development, human development is inadequate and vast socioeconomic backlogs exist in the provision of education, health, housing and social pensions. The population growth rate of 2,4 per cent per annum exceeds economic growth, per capita income and living standards have been declining for nearly two decades and the demand for basic goods and services is rising rapidly, especially in the rapidly growing cities. Close to 40 per cent of the population is under the age of 14 and the dependency ratio is high. Some 17 million people have incomes below the Minimum Subsistence Level and 60 per cent of the adult population is illiterate.

Unequal patterns of development

The South African development scene is therefore marked by several inequalities: inequalities in access to political decision-making; the distribution of income, ownership of land and other assets (which are both aggravated by the degree of concentration in the economy); the access to resources and opportunities; and the levels of development and differences in per capita income between urban and rural areas. Poverty is aggravated by the high level of unemployment and the low labour-absorption capacity of the South African economy.

Unemployment

The average labour-absorption capacity of the formal sector of the South African economy has declined dramatically from 73,6 per cent in the 1960s to 12,5 per cent in the late 1980s⁵ and only some 7 per cent in 1993. The percentage of the labour force outside formal employment was some 41,9 per cent by the late 1980s. Unemployment has consistently risen during the past two decades, even during economic upswings, which clearly shows that it has assumed structural characteristics and that it would not be automatically rectified by higher rates of economic growth. It is also aggravated by illiteracy and a lack of basic skills among a high percentage of the population.

Rural underdevelopment and urbanization

Population growth is the highest in the peripheral rural (homeland) areas in South Africa and, given the limited economic base of these areas, the lack of opportunities and the inadequate provision for basic needs, increasing pressure on land is experienced. These factors and the income differential between urban and rural areas have given rise to a high rate of urbanization since the 1980s. Informal settlements and squatter

areas have mushroomed and inner-city decay is also discernable. Although urbanization is a natural phenomenon and holds many advantages for those who migrate to the cities, it also faces many crises: rapid growth of unmet socioeconomic needs; rising unemployment; inadequate and inappropriate urban planning; weak urban management; fiscal crises; and increasing violence and crime.

Threats to sustainable development

The pressure on land in rural areas and the rapid process of urbanization pose a threat to the environment and the possibilities for sustainable development. It is now widely accepted internationally that poverty is as much of a danger to the environment as overdevelopment. The scarcity of resources, the lack of opportunities and the struggle for survival in poverty-stricken areas lead to practices which are not environmentally sound. This calls for patterns of development and policies that could improve the scope for sustainable development.

The absence of sustained economic growth

South Africa's development problems are compounded by the fact that we have experienced a period of long-term economic decline since the 1960s. The average rate of economic growth declined to only 1,4 per cent in the 1980s, from close to 6 per cent in the 1960s. Per capita income has changed from growth to stagnation to decline (-1,2 per cent in the 1980s) over the above period. We have not succeeded in generating the new resources needed to finance as fundamental a transition as we have embarked upon during the past three years. The experience of countries that have been successful in making this kind of transition shows that a high rate of economic growth is a precondition for success.⁶ However, South Africa's international competitiveness and prospects for economic growth through exports have been constrained by the high rate of inflation since the late 1970s and it has only recently started to decline.

Policies to promote economic growth are hampered by a number of constraints and structural rigidities. General government expenditure has risen to 34 per cent and expenditure on education to 23 per cent in 1990.⁷ There is, therefore, not much scope for increasing government and social expenditure. Individual and company taxes are regarded as high by international standards, thereby limiting the scope for tax increases.⁸

Savings are not sufficient to sustain a 4–5 per cent growth rate. The gross domestic savings declined from 24,7 per cent in the 1980s to 18,8 per cent in 1991. Gross domestic investment relative to GDP declined to 16,3 per cent in 1991, compared to an average of 24,1 per cent between 1980 and 1989.⁹ South Africa therefore needs foreign loans to finance higher rates of economic growth, but this is in turn limited by the ability to service debt. South Africa's dependence on imported capital and intermediate goods causes serious structural difficulties for the balance of payments. Since import demand increases during upswings of the economy without a commensurate increase in exports, the current account worsens.¹⁰ The authorities have therefore at times resorted to growth management to keep the balance of payments in check.

In the past, South Africa has often experienced the windfall of a higher gold price, as has again been demonstrated recently. The contribution of mining and gold has, however, started to decline in importance in the past decade. It is doubtful whether gold could be more than a short-term windfall to the prospects for long-term sustained growth and reconstruction. The other windfall that is presently being hoped for is the peace dividend following the achievement of a negotiated political settlement. South Africa has recently successfully negotiated an IMF loan; the World Bank seems set to channel large amounts of development assistance to South Africa; and private companies in the USA and elsewhere are watching developments in South Africa before they invest in the country. However, given the large number of countries competing for development assistance and investment, it would be prudent not to expect too much from the peace dividend.

As was stated above, the prospects for economic growth and development will also depend on whether we make a stable transition to sustained political democracy. It will also critically depend on the policy responses to the above problems; the creation of a sound policy environment; and consistency in the execution of policies.

Responses to the development crisis in South Africa

Structural adjustment and reconstruction are two particular responses to South Africa's development crisis which are presently in vogue. Although structural adjustment programmes differ from country to country, they deal mainly with supply-side considerations. They include liberalization of both foreign and domestic trade to increase efficiency and bring about privatization and management/institutional reform to ensure that state enterprises respect the laws of the market and the lowering of tariffs.¹¹ Stabilization policies, which are prescribed commensurate with structural adjustment measures, are in turn aimed at restoring financial balances and reducing demand to decrease the exterior deficit. These programmes always involve cutting public investment, reducing current account expenditure (including wages), slowing the growth of money supply and devaluing the currency. There can be no doubt that structural adjustment and stabilization policies are directed mainly at improving the conditions for economic recovery and promoting sustained growth.

In South Africa structural adjustment, as proposed by the Normative Economic Model, is viewed as a process of "reforming the modern sector of the economy and restructuring the less developed socioeconomic sector" in an environment of macro-economic stability.¹² In the short to medium term the emphasis is on removing functional imbalances and market inefficiency that prevent or curtail export-led growth. In the long run "defects in our socioeconomic system" are seen to prevent "full participation in the growth process by the country's large developing community". Development is consequently defined as economic growth plus people's participation, but there is no doubt that growth and supply-side economics is the major thrust or "central feature" of this approach.¹³

From the above perspective the economy is approached as having a First World, modern sector that must be made more efficient to uplift the Third World or less developed sector. Since human development is not the central thrust of this approach, and people's participation is viewed as removing the factors inhibiting people's access to opportunities, one cannot avoid concluding that it supports economic growth in a rather top-down fashion.

In the above version of structural adjustment the market is chosen as the main instrument for an improved performance of the economy, more efficiency in its production functions and more equitable distribution functions. It is recommended that government should be less committed to intervene and should "let the markets work". Good governance, fiscal discipline and rationalization of expenditure are called for.

Reconstruction (or "redistribution through or with growth") implies more fundamental societal change and it literally means to rebuild or to form again. It includes:¹⁴

- a change in power relations between those who control or have access to power and the disenfranchised as an important way to bring about societal and economic transformation;
- a change in asset-based relations through measures to promote deconcentration in the economy, land reform, etc;
- a restructuring of institutional and industrial relations to improve worker participation;
- a restructuring of demand in favour of the poor mainly through policies to satisfy basic needs;
- a deliberate choice for the promotion of labour-intensive production; and
- affirmative action and nationalization of some key industries.

From the above rather cursory sketch of the reconstruction approach, it should be clear that development is viewed as a comprehensive process which requires more radical societal change than the evolutionary approach under structural adjustment. It sees the eradication of poverty and unemployment as being important objectives of development, and places less emphasis on economic growth. Whereas structural adjustment policies are aimed mainly at increasing efficiency or output, reconstructing policies are more concerned with changing power relations, redistribution (through or for growth), and justice for all – politically, economically and socially.

Another important difference between the two approaches concerns the role of the state in the economy. According to the reconstruction school of thinking, substantial intervention in the economy would be needed to undo past damage and to address socioeconomic backlogs and imbalances. The state is regarded as a very important, if not the main, agent in bringing about the desired changes. However, international thinking and the lessons from development experiences show that a strong, but not an over-extended, state is increasingly favoured.¹⁵ After an initial period of intervention and protection, the state may become counter-productive for growth. Reduced state intervention and indirect state support may be more conducive to growth in the later stages of development.

International experience with adjustment programmes

Adjustment programmes that have not promoted growth and equity

The effect on economic growth

Although it is often claimed that countries that have implemented SAPs have experienced higher rates of economic growth, the available evidence does not prove this beyond doubt. SAPs have been widely introduced in Africa. Of the 183 structural and sectoral adjustment loans granted since 1989, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 84.

However, Onimode¹⁶ notes that in Africa the rate of per capita GDP growth has fallen from 3,03 per cent in 1978 to 0,88 per cent in 1988, while the investment ratio has declined from 25,2 per cent to 15,5 per cent over the same period.

A recent study commissioned by the World Bank¹⁷ on the contribution of SAPs to economic reform is illuminating. All the countries in SSA and low-income countries were divided into three groups: the early intensive adjustment countries (EIAL) that received structural adjustment loans before 1986; the other adjustment lending countries which received loans after 1985 (OAL); and those countries that did not receive structural adjustment lending (NAL).

Analysis of the EIAL countries for the periods before and after SAPs started (ie comparisons of the periods 1981–1984 and 1985–1989 respectively), showed improvements in real GDP growth, export to GDP ratio, saving to GDP ratio and a fall in inflation. In the OAL and NAL countries GDP growth, investment to GDP growth and export to GDP growth fell between the above periods. The NAL countries experienced a large fall in saving to GDP ratio and a large fall in inflation.

However, the same study used an econometric methodology to determine the marginal contribution of SAPs to economic performance. In the case of countries in SSA there is a strong indication that SAPs have contributed to improving exports in a significant way, which is not surprising given the emphasis of most countries on exchange rate and trade reform policies. SAPs have not significantly affected economic growth and have led to a statistically significant drop in investment ratio.

SAPs and social development

Considerable progress has been made with human and social development in developing countries since the 1960s. However, the decline in economic growth since the late 1970s, the debt burden and the cutbacks in social spending under structural adjustment regimes have had a pronounced effect on human development in the 1980s. Between 1972 and 1983 government expenditure on education and health in low-income countries declined from 15,2 per cent to 4,2 per cent and from 6,1 per cent to 2,7 per cent respectively.¹⁸ Emmerij¹⁹ concludes that the impact of adjustment has been heavy on education, less important for health, and significant on public investment. He also points out that it is not only the “soft sectors” that have been hard hit, but also physical investments.

For most of Africa and Latin America the 1980s were a development disaster. In Africa poverty worsened and development goals gave way to the economics of survival, with the emphasis on debt servicing, domestic cutbacks and austerity.²⁰ Living standards in Africa are currently about 75 per cent below their 1980 level, while unemployment among school leavers is about 60 per cent. The growth of school enrolment fell from 8,7 per cent in 1975 to 2,9 per cent in 1987 and primary school enrolment declined in many countries under structural adjustment programmes. While the deterioration in social conditions cannot be fully blamed on SAPs, it should be clear that SAPs have not contributed to development in a more broadly conceived sense.

Successful economic reforms have reconciled growth and equity

The more successful economic reforms are those where developing countries have managed to achieve sustainable development through adopting policies which have reconciled economic growth and equity. Indonesia and Malaysia are cited as examples of countries where the combination of the productive use of the poor’s most abundant asset, namely labour, has been combined with the provision of social services to the poor.²¹ The latter strategy has brought about a substantial reduction in poverty, along with rapid improvements in nutrition, under-five mortality, and primary school enrolment.

It is important to note that the two elements of the strategy are mutually reinforcing and that one is not sufficient without the other. This is borne out by the experience of Brazil and Pakistan where growth has raised the incomes of the poor, but social services lagged behind. Countries such as Sri Lanka have stressed the provision of social services, but not enough new opportunities have been created as a result of inadequate growth.²²

Even in Mexico, which is widely hailed as a country that has vigorously pursued structural adjustment policies aimed at free market reforms of the state,²³ it is noted that economic reforms were implemented in conjunction with social investment.²⁴ In fact it was through the correction of fiscal disequilibria that the state’s capacity to provide basic social infrastructure, health and education improved. Social spending rose to 45,5 per cent of total expenditure or 8 per cent of GDP in 1991, from 32 per cent of programmable spending and 6 per cent of GDP in 1982 respectively. Korea also improved social welfare during economic adjustment.²⁵

Three important conclusions can be drawn from the above international experience with adjustment and social development:

- To “...avoid lasting damage to the human condition, macroeconomic adjustments are needed to restore growth that has fallen off”.²⁶
- Experience shows that it is indeed possible to allocate resources in favour of the poor, even under conditions of fiscal discipline. Successful adjustment could make more resources available for social development, especially if priority is given to meeting the basic social needs of the population.²⁷ It is

indeed possible to avoid reversals of human development if careful policy management is applied.

- The only way to avoid the costs associated with adjustment is to adjust before a crisis. As a recent OECD study on adjustment and equity points out,²⁸ the cost of not adjusting is often not accounted for, while the cost of adjusting, which is often confused with the cost of the crisis, normally receives due attention. Timely adjustment could avoid much of the cost of adjustment such as unemployment, budget cuts, and swelling of the informal sector.

Towards a framework for reconciling adjustment and reconstruction

The differences and relationship between growth and development

A discussion of the possibility of reconciling structural adjustment and reconstruction and the problems involved in attempting to achieve this within the context of a broader development framework, requires a clear understanding of the meaning of the concepts economic growth and development and the relationship between the two.

Growth has the more narrow objective of improving output or raising the level of per capita income. According to this line of thinking development is often defined to mean growth, plus structural change, plus the “trickle-down” of the fruits of growth. The problem with this approach is of course that, as Louis Emmerij²⁹ has stated, “trickle-down works, it just takes five generations!” Development is a more comprehensive process as can be gleaned from the definition by Korten:³⁰

Development is a process by which the members of society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to reproduce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations.

The relationship between growth and development is a complex one. For the purpose of this article it can be accepted that growth, as Fields³¹ has shown, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic development. Growth by itself will not bring about development, since it matters very much what kind of growth is promoted. If it does not materially change the situation of the poor and the unemployed, and if it does not lead to a better distribution of income, as Seers³² stated many years ago, one can hardly talk of development. It would seem that it is indeed possible to improve human development, through for example a reallocation of funds between budgetary votes, in at least the short to medium term without the necessity of a high rate of economic growth. However, in the long run it would be difficult to continue with such actions without creating sustained growth which expands the material base for development and generate new opportunities, as the experience of South East Asian countries has shown.

Reconciling adjustment and reconstruction: Towards a policy framework³³

It is pointed out above that the South African development scene is characterized by inadequate human development and socio-economic backlogs and imbalances, inequality, unemployment,

rapid urbanization, rural underdevelopment, a lack of sustainable development (ie threats to the environment) and a lack of sustained economic growth that could materially change the situation of the poor. It clearly suggests that *reconstruction is needed to address poverty, unemployment, inequality and to restructure demand in favour of the poor.*

On the other hand it is also clear that *the economy is presently not geared to provide the material base for such a reconstruction.* South Africa definitely faces a supply-side crisis too. Adjustment of the economy can therefore not be avoided.³⁴ The issue at stake is rather how this could be achieved commensurate with investment in human development and how to implement compensatory measures in favour of the poor under structural adjustment. If the latter measures are implemented timely, family living standards do not necessarily fall and may even improve as in Indonesia, Malaysia and rural areas of Ghana and Morocco.³⁵ These considerations should be borne in mind when designing a framework of options to promote reconciliation between growth and equity. The discussion below is by no means complete, and should merely be taken as examples of how it could be designed.

Investing in human development

After decades of human neglect, there can be no doubt about the importance of the pivotal role of investment in human development to propel us to a higher plane of development and to promote sustained and equitable growth and development. There are vast backlogs and imbalances that need to be rectified. *The problem is that, given the economic decline of the past two decades and the modest prospects for recovery in the short to medium term, this will have to be undertaken with limited financial resources.* In addition, government spending on education is already some 23 per cent of total government expenditure, with very little scope of either increasing expenditure or increasing taxes substantially. The only option left is a reallocation of funds within budgetary votes, a process which has already commenced in recent years.

The above situation clearly points to the need for appropriate policy options. It calls for “putting first things first” and giving preference to pre-primary and primary education, literacy programmes, technical training and skills improvement through *inter alia* youth development programmes, primary health care services and the provision of basic housing and “low-cost social and physical infrastructure” to mention but a few examples. However, owing to the scarcity of funds a new government may also have to improve cost recovery and/or seek international aid to raise additional income for social development; increase the efficiency and decrease the unit cost of social service delivery; earmark specific taxes for specific purposes (which may, however, lead to distortions); and resort to better targeting of resources to meet specific social sector needs.³⁶ However, it should be noted that the infirm and the aged among the poor may not benefit from the above policies, which points to the need for transfers and safety nets such as food pricing and distribution, public employment schemes and social security.

Promoting sustained growth

In the long run sustained economic growth is required to bring about higher levels of human development and to sustain political democracy. Political policies of the past have created a ceiling which kept economic growth below its potential level. A political settlement, a framework of basic human rights, the creation of a peace force, and conflict regulation are therefore needed to create a better climate for economic growth and to restore international and local investor confidence.

However, the peace dividend flowing from this will not be sufficient to create sustained growth. The above analysis shows that liberalization of the economy, deregulation and tariff reform are necessary to remove some of the barriers to export growth and the growth of the informal sector that is still inhibited by an outdated "First World" regulatory framework. The latter reforms could remove the institutional distortions which inhibit the participation of civil society, as the experience of Mexico has shown.³⁷ It would also seem prudent to maintain financial balances in conjunction with adjustment policies. But these policy choices should be exercised in a prudent and pragmatic way, taking into account the best interest of the country at any given point in time. The "right" policy options at the wrong time may do more harm than good. If this line is followed, it may even be necessary to reduce the size of the state to create a smaller but more capable and efficient state. In addition, incentives for investment in labour-intensive production and a shift of public investment from capital intensive ("strategic") projects to demand-driven infrastructure should be considered.

Employment-creating and equitable growth

Unemployment in South Africa is alarming and with the modest prospects for growth in the medium term, the situation is not expected to change significantly. Incentives for employment-creation could be complemented by urbanization and housing policies, support for micro-entrepreneurs, rural development strategies, small farmer support programmes, and special employment-creation programmes.³⁸

Improving the access to resources, assets and opportunities

An equitable growth and development path is also dependant on improving the access to resources, assets and opportunities. Access to credit and finance still remains one of the biggest problems of the poor, while the capacity problems of small entrepreneurs require institutional and management support programmes. Access to assets can be improved by land reform programmes; competition policy; and unbundling of conglomerates to combat concentration and to create an environment conducive to small business development. In addition, deliberate and more far-reaching attempts to promote economic empowerment and black advancement could improve the upward mobility of disadvantaged people.

An institutional framework for development

The above discussion has suggested that the development problems of South Africa cannot be resolved without public

investment in human, socioeconomic and infrastructure development. However, there are limits to what the state can do and developing countries have started to realize the importance for development of co-operation between the public and private sectors. In addition, the NGO sector is assuming a crucial role in development in South Africa and some of them are in need of further financial and technical support to strengthen their capacities. To ensure further community participation – and to design a social pact for South Africa, a Council for Socio-economic Development and Reconstruction is called for.

Finally, it needs to be stated that the development finance institutions (FDIs) in South Africa are in need of fundamental reform to avoid a duplication of functions and activities and to secure a more efficient delivery system. The development delivery system in South Africa lacks the capacity to structure development programmes and projects that could use the available funds in the country. The institutional structure for development assistance will have to be rationalized and strengthened considerably before it would be in a position to effectively use and apply existing and overseas funding.

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Urban planning and employment creation

*Professor M Levin, Head of the Employment Research Unit, Vista University, Port Elizabeth, argues that urban authorities should go beyond mere physical planning and should add a development perspective to their town planning.**

It is anticipated that urbanization in South Africa will accelerate rapidly in the 1990s. Over the next ten years more than a million people will be added to the urban populations of the major cities every year. To catch up with the existing backlog of 1,3 million houses and to provide an additional 298 000 per year to accommodate the growing population, a total of approximately 330 000 houses, accompanied by appropriate infrastructure, will have to be provided every year for the next 10 years. This is an enormous assignment, specifically at a time when all the major South African cities are already experiencing extremely high levels of unemployment and increasing levels of poverty, while a lack of revenue, because of continuously declining economic growth, prevents them from providing sufficient land and even the minimum of infrastructure and services.

This article argues that urban authorities (consisting of regional and local authorities) in South Africa should go beyond mere physical planning and should add a development perspective to their planning. This will make it possible to realize urban development in a manner that will lead to the creation of employment and the generation of income, which will enable urban residents to pay for the most needed services.

I will start off by briefly outlining the international experience of urbanization and planning. Thereafter the need for employment creation against the background of increasing urbanization in South Africa together with increasing poverty, is examined. In order to plan for employment creation and income generation, it is essential that urban authorities know what the potential in terms of employment creation of the different economic sectors and urban activities are. This is discussed before explaining that urban planners should incorporate the employment creation potential of the various economic sectors and activities in their physical designs, plans and management. Thereafter it is argued that South African cities will have to assume a new role, namely a development role, if they want to adequately meet the challenges of accelerated urbanization.

Urbanization and planning in an international context

This section outlines the international experience of urbanization and planning and points out that urban authorities in developing countries have been unable, in general, to cope with the demand for basic urban infrastructure.

The world has been urbanizing rapidly for a long time. More than 40 per cent of its population are urban dwellers.¹ However, the most dramatic urbanization over the past decades has been in developing countries, where population growth is twice that of the rural areas. In addition, the population growth of the urban poor is twice or three times that of the urban population as a whole.²

A fifth of the world's population lives in grinding poverty and the number of poor could rise to 1,5 billion by the year 2000, with the biggest burden falling on women and children. Out of a total world population of around 5,5 billion, 1,1 billion are now living in "absolute poverty", defined by the World Bank as living on \$420 (R1 260) a year or less. The problem is particularly acute in Latin America and Africa, where incomes have fallen sharply over the last 20 years. Sub-Saharan Africa has the bleakest prospects, with the number of poor expected to rocket from 184 million to 304 million under optimistic economic growth forecasts.³

Despite these deplorable conditions the World Bank⁴ anticipates that rapid demographic growth alone will add 600

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million more people to the 1,3 billion poor people in the cities and towns of developing countries during the 1990s, which comprises about two-thirds of the expected total population increase. Of the world's 21 megacities, which will expand to house more than 10 million people each, 17 will be in developing countries.

It appears that the basic aim of urban policies of recent years has in most cases been to try to provide, within the framework of scarce resources, the minimum basic services to the fast expanding city populations. It has been a difficult task and the results have been far from adequate. Services provided in almost all cases have been steadily deteriorating with the result that increasingly large parts of urban conglomerations are being turned into slums. Urban development planning efforts have therefore concentrated almost solely on the provision of minimum basic services and physical infrastructures.

It is therefore essential that urban planning and management go beyond the physical.⁵ They should unquestionably have policies to provide physical services such as transportation, waste removal, storm-water drainage, housing, land use, etc, but efforts to provide such basic services and to improve living conditions are impossible to sustain without adequate incomes being generated by those more in need of these services.⁶

Urban authorities should most importantly design plans and implement policies which will not only stimulate employment creation and generate income for households to enable them to provide in their own basic needs, but will also generate income for the urban authorities themselves so that they can provide the infrastructural services essential for a meaningful process of urbanization.

The need for urban employment in South Africa

The extent of urbanization in South Africa has similar tendencies to those in other developing countries. South African cities, nevertheless, show a significant divergence from typical spatial patterns of residential settlement elsewhere.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa⁷ estimated the *de facto* population of South Africa (including the TBVC countries) at 38,1 million people in 1990. Of this number 24 million, or 63 per cent, were urbanized. Table 1 shows the urban populations and urbanization rates for different race groups for the years 1990 and 2000.

From Table 1 it appears that urbanization in respect of Asians, coloureds, and whites will have reached saturation levels by the year 2000 and overall urbanization will be 75 per cent. However, black urbanization will increase from 47 per cent in 1990 to 62 per cent by the year 2000. The urbanization rate for blacks has been calculated⁸ at 4,84 per cent for the period 1990 to 1995 and at 4,96 per cent for the period 1995 to 2005. These are very high rates and it can therefore be rightly maintained that it is mainly blacks that are rapidly urbanizing at this juncture.⁹

Since the natural population growth rate of blacks has been calculated at 2,8 per cent per year¹⁰ for the period 1990 to 2000 it therefore appears that black rural/urban migration will

Table 1
Urban population of South Africa 1990 and 2000 ('000)

	1990			2000		
	Total	Urbanized	%	Total	Urbanized	%
Asian	1 012	992	98	1 177	1 130	96
Black	28 249	13 357	47	37 280	23 228	62
Coloured	3 320	2 923	88	3 802	3 417	90
White	5 471	4 995	91	5 480	5 194	95

(Source: Calculated from J H De Loor)

make up a substantial part of urbanization in the next decade. This will most likely have the effect that the rural black population will decrease from 14,1 million in 1990 to 11,7 million in the year 2000.

Urbanization in South Africa is starting to show the same characteristics as those of other developing countries. There is increasing evidence of informal and squatter settlements with a lack of basic services, infrastructure and shelter, and increasing levels of unemployment and poverty. Although poverty among South African blacks shows the typical rural/urban split, observed in many developing countries¹¹ an increase in urban poverty has been more conspicuous since the middle of the 1970s.¹² It was estimated that approximately 44 per cent (16 million people) of the total South African population was living in poverty in 1989. Simkins estimates¹³ that 32 per cent of black households in the RSA metropolitan areas and 51 per cent in homeland metropolitan areas, are living on an income which is below what is generally regarded as a minimum living standard.

Together with urbanization an increasing percentage of the labour force in South Africa has become unemployed. The Department of Finance¹⁴ has calculated that the labour absorption capacity of the economy has declined over the last three decades. During the period 1965 to 1970 the absorptive capacity of the formal sector was 73,6 per cent, during the period 1975 to 1980 it was 35,4 per cent, and from 1985 to 1989 it fell to only 12,5 per cent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)¹⁵ calculated that 42 per cent of the economically active population was without employment in the formal sector of the economy in 1989. Barker¹⁶ translated this percentage into a figure of 5,4 million.

Levin¹⁷ found an unemployment rate among blacks in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area of 46 per cent in 1990, and Slabbert and Levin¹⁸ found a rate of 35 per cent in the Vaal Triangle in 1991. It has been argued that periods of extreme township violence can be directly related to long periods of recession and increasing unemployment amongst blacks in South Africa.¹⁹ Unemployment and poverty therefore have a direct effect on social harmony.

Black migration in the coming years will be from slow-growing to fast-growing areas.²⁰ The removal of influx control in 1984 and the scrapping of the Group Areas Act in 1991, has and will most likely make the five major metropolitan areas Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV), the

Cape Peninsula, Durban/Pinetown, Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage and East London/Mdantsane²¹ the most obvious targets for migration.

The greatest challenge of orderly and successful urbanization in South Africa lies in the cities' ability to create employment for the ever-growing numbers of city dwellers.²² The black unemployment problem in South Africa is nevertheless not only a result of structural change, but also a result of poverty directly caused by the disenfranchisement of blacks for almost a century. The most devastating cause was the lack of property rights.²³ From 1968 no black was allowed to own a house in controlled urban areas and local authorities had many homeowners evicted. Where blacks did possess houses the local authorities were compelled to buy them out.

The alleviation of poverty requires specific strategies.²⁴ Access to land, credit, public infrastructure and services such as education, health and social care are vital ingredients to pull the poor into meaningful economic participation. Success with such policies will have a positive effect on employment creation and thereby strengthen the economic base of the economy and improve the tax and other income of the urban authorities.

There is a need for a total re-orientation of urbanization planning in South Africa. South African cities show a significant divergence from the typical spatial pattern of residential settlement elsewhere in the world²⁵ and are characterized by three distinct features.²⁶ First, they are sprawling and land-extensive with gross densities far smaller than those found in most cities elsewhere. It appears as if the pattern of growth of the major cities is not under control. Secondly, they display a basic pattern of separation. Land uses, urban elements, races and income groups are all separated to the greatest possible degree. Thirdly, they appear fragmented. The grain is coarse, because development had occurred in relatively discrete pockets or cells, frequently bounded by freeways, buffers and open spaces.

The repeal of the Group Areas Act and the emergence of non-racial local government structures creates an opportunity to reconstruct South African cities.²⁷ Not only can more compact, integrated, and accessible cities be redesigned and built, but the dynamics of the process, for the purposes of creating employment and generating income should be captured.

Characteristics of urban employment growth

In this section the employment growth of the major economic sectors of the urban economy is outlined both in terms of international experience and in terms of South African experience. In addition, it is pointed out that the low productivity of cities is the result of various urban inefficiencies both in South Africa and abroad.

Towns and cities worldwide came into existence not only because of trading and administration, but mostly because of manufacturing activities. The major growth of cities as manufacturing towns occurred in the nineteenth century.²⁸ But, although the manufacturing sector had been a strong initial force behind increasing urbanization, it became impotent with regard to employment creation²⁹ in the 1900s.

In South Africa, manufacturing's share in total employment increased from 12,4 per cent in 1948 to 19,1 per cent in 1990,³⁰ which is not spectacular. In fact from 1980 to 1990, employment growth in the manufacturing industry virtually stagnated at 0,3 per cent per year. One reason for this is that manufacturing in South Africa became very capital-intensive, specifically because of statutory low interest rates and statutory limitations on the employment of blacks in this sector.³¹

The relatively low rate of employment growth in the manufacturing industry has in many countries been partly compensated for by employment growth in the services industry.³² Horn presents a comprehensive analysis³³ of the employment growth of various economic sectors, including services sectors in seven countries and finds that a relatively high employment growth had been recorded in the services industry in these countries.

In South Africa employment growth in the services sector is shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Employment in the formal economy – RSATBVC ('000)

	1948	1970	1980	1990	% pa
Trade	349	737	944	1 017	4,6
Transport and communications	248	361	502	439	1,8
Finance, insurance, etc	50	190	292	448	19,0
Non-government services	75	182	262	319	7,8
Domestic services	620	881	853	802	0,7
Subtotal	1 342	2 351	2 853	3 085	3,1
Government	280	629	976	1 318	8,8
Total services	1 622	2 980	3 829	4 403	4,1

(Source: F S Barker)

It shows that employment growth in the public sector has been faster than in the other sectors. The decline in employment in the transport sector can be partly attributed to the commercialization of Transnet. The share of the services sector in total employment increased from 45,1 per cent in 1948 to 55,3 per cent in 1990.³⁴ Horn³⁵ also shows that the employment in the services sector in South Africa increased twice as fast as in the manufacturing sector from 1980 to 1989. However, in spite of the difference in employment growth, Horn³⁶ emphasizes the interdependent relationship through backward linkages, between the manufacturing and the services sector. He comes to the conclusion that a vibrant manufacturing sector is imperative for employment growth in the services sector.

Unemployment and poverty have produced what is commonly known as the *informal sector*. This sector started as a result of socio-economic changes mainly in developing countries.³⁷ Since the 1950s the effects of an increasing population growth has been compounded by a rapid acceleration in migration from the rural to the urban areas. These two factors have led to employment problems in both a quantitative (surplus numbers) and qualitative (skill levels) sense. Women played an important role in creating and sustaining this sector.

The informal sector accounts for a high percentage of employment in some countries. Amjad³⁸ is of the opinion that "micro-enterprises" contributed to between half to two-thirds of total employment in the major Asian metropolises in the early 1980s. In South Africa it is estimated that 2,8 million blacks, Asians and coloureds are involved in informal sector activities outside the TBVC states.³⁹ The importance of the informal sector lies in the fact that it addresses the problem of economic inactivity. The income earned in this sector is usually very low and the employment conditions are far from ideal. Although the informal sector, to some extent, helps to solve the problem of unemployment, it does not successfully address the problem of poverty. It, nevertheless, remains important because it also often serves as an entry point to the formal business sector.

The *construction industry* has in many instances been mentioned as a potential lead sector for economic growth and employment creation. The importance of the construction industry in South Africa has been emphasized in connection with housing by what was called "inward industrialization".⁴⁰ Construction has strong indirect stimulation effects through backward and forward linkages.⁴¹ Backwards it is linked to the building material industries such as stone, cement, bricks, iron and steel, processed wood and glass. Forward it is linked to transport, electricity, communication, furniture and other fixtures.

In other developing countries it was found⁴² that the rate of employment creation in construction was higher than that of manufacturing and much higher than the economy as a whole. Van Huyck⁴³ points out that construction is a particularly important source of employment for unskilled workers. In South Africa it is calculated⁴⁴ that for every R mil that construction contributes to GDP, some 146 employment opportunities are created. Construction's employment creation potential appears to be higher than that of the services industry, where 136 employment opportunities are created for every R mil contributed to GDP. In South Africa it is estimated that 330 000 additional living units would be required per year for the next ten years in order to provide for the increase in urbanization and to catch up the existing backlog of 1,3 million units.⁴⁵ It therefore appears that the provision of housing can form a strong economic base for stimulating economic growth and development in the national economy in general and the urban economies in particular.

Some developing countries are going through a *structural adjustment* process which is primarily aimed at increasing their international competitiveness and the efficiency of their domestic economies. The World Bank⁴⁶ lists four areas in which the productivity of urban economies can be increased, namely infrastructure deficiencies, regulatory policies, the weakness of municipal institutions both financially and technically, and inadequacy of financial services for urban development. These inadequacies limit the productivity of firms and households in producing goods and services. The cumulative effect is to reduce the productivity of the urban economy and its contribution to macro-economic performance.

Similar inefficiencies, described in slightly different terms are outlined in respect of South Africa by McCarthy.⁴⁷ First, there are parcels of disused land, which are located in central areas that otherwise might have been released and could contribute to compact urban growth. Secondly, there are land use mismatches as a result of the rigid sectoral structuring of residential areas. This has led to expensive commuting patterns between home and work. Thirdly, distorted residential property markets have been developed. An over-supply of white living units and an under-supply of black living units has been created. Fourthly, distorted commercial markets have been produced. This has led to a mismatch of optimal trading locations. Fifthly, a skew industrial land development occurred because it was restricted in some urban areas and subsidized in others. Sixthly, public sector inefficiencies were created because of a duplication of certain services and amenities.

In South Africa it is essential that past errors be addressed and that efficiency in urban economies be improved with the aim of increasing their overall productivity.

Planning for employment creation

This section outlines the influence of macro-economic policies on growth in general and urban growth in particular. It shows that growth in output in South Africa has not led to growth of a corresponding magnitude in employment. It is therefore imperative that planners incorporate into their plans the employment creation and income generation potentials that are locked up in the improvement of the economic base, the infrastructure and the social development of the urban people.

Macro-economic policies and performance are key determinants of the rate of growth of employment opportunities.⁴⁸ The overall growth rate of the economy, the existing price and incentive structure, the pattern of income distribution and ownership of assets are all important elements of the macro-economic environment, which has an important impact on employment creation and income generation. In many developing countries foreign trade policies with regard to tariffs, quotas and exchange rates, fiscal incentives for the use of capital, cheap credit policies and regulatory policies have all contributed to an incentive structure which has seriously impaired the economy's labour absorptive capacity.⁴⁹ It is therefore essential to keep in mind that the macro-economic environment and policies form an important background against which urban development policies must be formulated and executed.

Although macro-economic policies are important in creating growth and development, it is increasingly being realized that they are not in themselves a sufficient condition for either accelerating the pace of employment creation or generating sufficient employment to meet the supply pressures of a very fast growing labour force. This is very aptly illustrated in Table 3.

The direct link between output growth and employment growth is quite clear. Employment growth is lower than output growth and it appears in addition to be insensitive to output

growth. However, the figures in Table 3 do not illustrate, but imply a decreasing production elasticity of employment (which refers to the extent to which employment will change as a result of changes in production). Ligthelm and Kritzinger-Van Niekerk⁵⁰ have calculated that the elasticity of employment has declined from 0,64 to 0,46 in the 1980s. This implies, as can be observed from Table 3, that fewer employment opportunities are created for every percentage point of economic growth. This in turn may imply an increased productivity, but also reflect on the choice of appropriate (capital vs labour intensive) technologies.

Table 3
Real growth of GDP and employment in South Africa

	1948–1960	1960–1970	1970–1981	1981–1990
	%	%	%	%
Real GDP	4,3	5,7	3,5	1,0
Employment	2,2	2,6	1,6	0,4

(Source: F A Barker)

As illustrated above it is well known today that overall growth is not sufficient to absorb increases in the labour force⁵¹ and to reduce unemployment. Additional measures are required to stimulate growth of employment. On a macro-economic level these measures are focused on the supply of and demand for labour in general⁵² and include strategies such as early retirement, youth schemes, work sharing, short-time working, limiting migration, population development programmes, public works programmes, training and retraining, employment subsidies, income tax cuts, foreign trade, local initiatives and small business expansion schemes.

Just as economic growth and employment creation strategies depend on macro-economic policies, so does the performance of the urban economy affect macro-economic performance of growth, price stability, exchange rate stability and full employment.⁵³ Urban authorities' policies are therefore very important to strengthen the basic fabric which will result in the enhancement of employment growth and income generation.

Policies and programmes that will strengthen the ability of the economy to create more employment, to generate income and to create better living conditions for urban dwellers, and specifically black urban dwellers in South Africa, must be related to the improvement of the economic base, the supply of appropriate infrastructure, and the promotion of socio-economic development.

The *economic base* of urban areas is expressed by the presence and relative size of primary, secondary and tertiary sector activities in the urban and regional environment, together with the manifestation of the urban and rural informal sectors.

The *economic base* of a city very often resides not only in the city itself, but also in the city's physical *environment*. It is therefore not sufficient to base urban planning for employment creation and income generation merely on the urban manufacturing, services and construction sectors, but it is essential also to include the primary sector (agricultural and mining) of the rural hinterlands because their economic involvement can form

the basis for designing a strategy for the development of the overall regional economy.⁵⁴ The processing, upgrading and distribution of the products of the primary sector in the urban areas provide opportunities for employment creation and income generation and it is therefore imperative that they are duly considered and incorporated in town and development planning. Rural and urban development are interdependent and complementary. Applying the same argument, it can be said that where an urban area has a port, it is provided with a comparative advantage which must be duly incorporated and exploited in its development planning.

The employment growth characteristics of the secondary and tertiary sectors dictate specific approaches to their incorporation in development planning.

The relatively low employment growth characteristic of *manufacturing* emphasizes a capital intensive bias. However, in spite of this, its growth in production serves as a basic stimulant for the employment growth in the services sector. Modern manufacturing activities no longer require huge isolated and decentralized locations. Small industrial islands integrated into urban areas, near the labour force, supplied with all the essential infrastructural services will stimulate labour intensiveness and enhance productivity. In South Africa the existing urban area "gaps" in the form of buffers and open spaces are ideally suitable for light industries that do not cause air and environmental pollution. This view fits in well with the cities-within-cities concept.⁵⁵ Cities-within-cities are described as relatively self-contained areas with a diversified land use mix.

The *services sector* is labour intensive and therefore dictates spatial designs which blend it with the immediate living environment of those households supplying its labour force and making use of its services. For many decades in South Africa the location of only some segments of the labour force was considered important in city design and zoning. Black townships were developed into dormitories with households even today still making little use of the services of banks, building societies and insurance companies, and also supplying a negligible portion of the labour force of these and similar institutions. The objectives of employment creation and income generation would be well served if service institutions are situated nearer to both their labour supply and their markets. The cities-in-cities concept as well as the mixed use activity concept⁵⁶ – which emphasizes the mixed usage of corridors between dispersed parts of cities are of importance here. These corridors can serve as seams tying together the dispersed urban parts. Plans to utilize such corridors/seams will create conditions which will enhance productivity of capital and labour when they are implemented.

Imaginative urban planning is essential to ensure that maximum use is made of existing urban investment in infrastructure and especially *transport*. Transport is an important focus of forward linkage. A densification of urban areas of South African cities can contribute substantially to more intensive use of such and other infrastructures, thereby reducing unit cost and creating a basis for better urban productivity.

Urban economic activity depends heavily on *infrastructure*

facilities such as power supply, street lighting, roads and suitable accesses, water, sanitation, household waste water disposal, storm-water drainage, and drained land upon which dwellings can be constructed.⁵⁷ Inadequate provision and maintenance of infrastructures in less developed urban areas in South Africa hampers the sustained development of such areas. On the other hand, there is a relative under-utilization of infrastructures in most areas because of the sprawling nature of South African cities. Planners should endeavour to optimize the use of existing infrastructures through balancing current patterns of over-provision and under-utilization against those of under-provision and over-utilization.

A densification programme for South African cities together with appropriate planning and design standards will go a long way to serve the interest of the *informal sector*. This sector is largely supply-driven and proximity to people is its life blood. Infrastructural services, such as electricity, communication, water, housing and proper roads are vital for the livelihood of this sector. The mixed use activity corridor concept, is a very applicable kind of physical development to serve the unique requirements of the informal sector and should be pursued where possible. In general only a minimum of safety, health and nuisance standards must be enforced and these may be enforced on a differentiated basis in different areas. Urban authorities should also endeavour to encourage developmental relationships between the informal sector, smaller businesses, and business enterprises in general.

For the *informal sector* to operate properly and to be successful it requires a generally deregulated environment with emphasis on promoting and supporting emerging entrepreneurs rather than inhibiting and constraining them; the adoption of appropriate planning and design approaches and standards which facilitate rather than control development; and appropriate supportive infrastructure. High levels of services are unlikely to be sustainable in low-income urban areas in South Africa, and success will depend upon addressing the key issues of affordability and maintenance. The complex interaction between technical and social factors must also be considered. It is more effective to provide only the most basic level of service (primary level infrastructure) at the outset, which can subsequently be upgraded. Primary level infrastructures must be provided without cost recovery, with subsequent improvements being funded through loans to individuals and societies.

It is possible to elevate *construction*, as was pointed out above, as a new lead industry in South Africa in urban development and employment growth. A densification programme of South African cities to promote more compact cities is essential for various reasons. In achieving this objective the construction sector will benefit. In many areas higher densities must be allowed by relaxing strict regulations on coverage and subdivision. In other areas the upgrading of squatter housing, self-service housing, sites and services, prevention of urban decay and the implementation of urban renewal programmes all can stimulate the construction industry.

If urban housing can provide the point of departure for the stimulation of inward industrialization, then urban planners

must ensure that there is land available and that all sections of the community have access to such land; both formal and informal housing are provided for; tenure is secured; regulations and standards are appropriate and according to the income of the communities. It is easier both to recover costs from individual users, and to maintain individual plot service connections. However, installation costs and user tariffs must be affordable.

One of the major challenges for urban management in South Africa in the economic environment of the 1990s, is how to improve productivity of the urban economy while directly alleviating the growing incidence of urban poverty and also improving equity. *Social responsibility* is, in other words, a high priority.

There need not be a trade-off between strategies to promote economic growth and to reduce poverty.⁵⁸ Poverty reduction is possible in part through improving productivity at the individual household, business and urban level. This approach involves both directly increasing the labour intensity of productive investment and improving the human capital of the poor through better education, health and nutrition.

By increasing the economic base and simultaneously the tax base of the urban economy, employment opportunities for the poor will improve. In addition South Africa has a tremendous potential for the growth of its export industries. The fact that 60 per cent of the labour force is still accommodated by the formal sectors of the economy renders it extremely strong in relation to other developing countries. South African cities do not need to have 32 per cent of their households living in poverty. With appropriate macro-economic and tuned urban policies, poverty can be reduced to low levels compared to those of other developing countries.

Public work programmes are sometimes advocated as a means to provide employment to the poor. In developing countries most of such policies have been directed to the rural poor.⁵⁹ In industrial countries such schemes are not unfamiliar.⁶⁰ These programmes are useful for relieving cyclical unemployment but are nevertheless not recommended for addressing structural unemployment, in fact it may increase it.

New roles for South Africa's cities

In this section it is argued that South African cities must use their economic base in a restructuring process in such a manner that employment is created and income generated. They are encouraged to establish development departments which can focus on development planning; to improve financial management and accountability; and to reorientate their urban planners to follow a co-ordinated physical, economic and development approach.

From the analysis above it should be clear that urban management in South Africa must prepare itself to assume responsibilities which are different from those which it is used to. It will have to follow a development planning approach which is not only aimed at restructuring South African cities into fundamentally different physical forms, but also to create cities which will utilize their economic base in such a manner that income for restructuring is produced,

that employment is created and that poverty is effectively reduced.

This role does not consist of a passive administration of ordinances and by-laws but consists of creative thinking, innovative planning, imaginative fiscal actions and skilful financial management to realize meaningful urban economic development. To prepare themselves adequately for the new role as developers of their urban economies, urban managements will have to establish offices/departments of competent people to specialize in development planning. Such offices should identify strong and weak aspects in the economic base, identify strategies to exploit or overcome them and through aggressive marketing ensure that self-sustained urban economies with a significant revenue bases are created. Preparing feasibility studies which include various elements of subsidizing industrial location⁶¹ and the untiring search for suitable industries should become daily routine. They should also engage in researching methods to better integrate the formal and informal sectors, to identify ways to accelerate the provision and upgrading of basic services, institute skills training programmes, develop urban market information systems, and attend to social infrastructure needs and preferences.

Financial management is a second function that needs to be addressed to overcome basic inefficiencies. In pursuit of local fiscal autonomy, efficiency and equity the optimal mobilization of own sources of revenue through user charges, fees, local taxes and particularly property taxes should be seen as a priority. Their tax base should be broadened and the buoyancy of their tax bases increased by sharing the collected revenue from a common economic region. They should, however, not aim only at expanding their tax base, but also to enhance their financial accountability.

New roles for the cities also dictate new roles for their physical planning departments. They will have to complete the full cycle, from largely physical optimum land use planning to a co-ordinated physical, economic and development planning – which specifically emphasize employment creation and income generation. Together with the development office, they will interpret research data and translate such interpretations into plans of which the implementation can lead to successful policies, programmes and investments.

Conclusion

Urban authorities in developing countries have not succeeded in coping with the increased demand for housing and urban infrastructure over past decades. In South Africa the biggest challenge of urbanization, in an effort to provide adequate housing and infrastructure, is to create employment for the ever-growing number of unemployed urban dwellers. It appears that the construction industry has the potential to be developed into a new lead sector. However, urban inefficiencies, created by past policies, will also have to be addressed. Because economic growth of the past has, in South Africa, not lead to a corresponding growth in the magnitude of employment it is imperative that urban authorities add a development perspective to their urban planning.

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Socio-cultural constraints to family planning in Swaziland

Dr Gugulethu Gule, of the Department of Statistics and Demography at the University of Swaziland, discusses the constraints to family planning in Swaziland and proposes the incorporation of these factors into all programmes aimed at reducing Swaziland's population growth and fertility rates.

Swaziland's annual population growth rate of 3,2 per cent is among the world's highest, and is typical of growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of the high and relatively stable fertility, and declining mortality, the country's population growth rate has accelerated in the recent past from 2,8 per cent over the 1966–1976 intercensal period to 3,2 per cent between 1976 and 1986. Intervention programmes aimed at reducing fertility have had little success. This is evidenced by the only slight decline in the total fertility rate from 6,9 children per woman in 1966 to 6,4 in 1986, a decline of less than one child in two decades.¹ Mortality, on the other hand, has declined sharply. The infant mortality rate, for example, declined from 135 per thousand in 1976² to 99 per thousand in 1986,³ a decline of 3,6 per thousand per annum. This decline in mortality is mainly a result of the programmes mounted by the ministry of health, aimed at improving the general health of the Swazi people. These programmes *inter alia* include the Combating Diarrhoeal Diseases Programme, the Swaziland Expanded Programme on Immunization, the Water and Sanitation Programme and the Rural Health Motivators Programme.⁴

Though Swaziland has no explicit policy aimed at reducing the country's high population growth and fertility rates, the government has acknowledged that Swaziland has a population problem, and that the problem needs to be addressed urgently. This concern has been articulated in Swaziland's development plans.⁵ In addition, in his opening address of a Workshop on Population and National Development, the Prime Minister echoed the concern about Swaziland's rapid population growth rate when he stated:⁶

Like many other nations, Swaziland is gradually sliding towards a serious socio-economic problem which is mainly caused by the worsening imbalance between the country's population numbers and development resources that the country has at its disposal. We simply have a population that is growing too fast for the available development resources.

Despite the absence of a specific policy, Swaziland has run, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, a family planning programme since 1973, with, among others, the objectives of providing family planning services and information/education on family planning. The family planning programme integrates family planning (FP) services with maternal and child health (MCH) services, the aim being to improve the health status of mother and child through child spacing.

The government is the principal provider of family planning services, through its hospitals, health centres and clinics. However, the Family Life Association of Swaziland (Flas), which is a non-governmental organization, also provides important family planning services. After just over ten years of operation the wide range of services offered by Flas has become very popular. These services include family planning, youth and family planning counselling, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and family life education. The counselling services offered by Flas augment the often grossly inadequate or non-existent services offered by most government health centres.

While Swaziland's family planning programme has had considerable success in raising awareness and providing information about family planning methods, its impact on contraceptive use has been minimal. Consequently, the country's fertility level has declined only slightly. Most people know a great deal about contraceptives, owing to the successful dissemination of information, through a wide variety of channels, by the Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Departments of the Ministry of Health and also by Flas. The radio is the most commonly cited source of information about family planning.⁷

However, the 1988 Family Health Survey of Swaziland, which is the first comprehensive national survey to collect information on family planning, found a very wide gap

between knowledge and use (KAP-gap) of contraceptives.⁸ The survey found that 82 per cent of all women knew of at least one method of family planning, while only 17 per cent of all women reported currently using contraceptives. The survey also found a substantial discontinuation rate⁹ of methods, about 14 per cent of the women having discontinued the method of their choice. Subsequent studies in different parts of the country, as shown in Table 1, have also identified a large KAP-gap, ranging from 52 to 65 per cent.¹⁰ It is evident from these data that knowledge of family planning methods in Swaziland is not necessarily a predictor of contraceptive use and change in reproductive behaviour.

Though all the abovementioned studies have identified a wide gap between knowledge and use, they yield virtually no data to explain why people who know of contraceptives, some of whom even wish to use birth control, still do not use family planning. The existence of the wide KAP-gap prompted Flas to conduct a small-scale national study, which utilized focus groups, in 1990. The study, which is the first of its kind at national level, was aimed at identifying constraints to family planning in Swaziland. Because of the small-scale and in-depth nature of the study, Flas has received quick and useful feedback which is essential for effective service provision. As a sequel to this study, Flas has undertaken another study to evaluate its IEC Department, and recommendations have been made for its improvement.

Table 1
Percentage of all women knowing of at least one method of family planning and percentage currently using a method in Swaziland by area

Area (Year)	Knowledge	Use
Country (1988)	82,0	16,6
Malkerns (1991)	94,4	29,2
Industries (1991)	89,0	37,5
Siteki (1992)	88,6	35,9

Sources: Swaziland Ministry of Health, 1990, Tables V-1 and V-14; Gule, 1992, Tables 6 and 9; Mburugu and McCombie, 1992, Tables 5.1 and 5.4; Gule, 1993, Table 4.1 and 4.2.

The main objective of this paper is to discuss the socio-cultural constraints to family planning in Swaziland. These constraints, to a large extent, explain the wide gap between knowledge and use of contraceptives. The primary source of information is the Flas focus group discussion study.¹¹ Supplementary information has been obtained from interpersonal communication with various people.

Contraception and fertility

Family planning is a widely accepted concept in Swaziland because it is part of Swazi tradition and culture. It is mainly seen as a method of spacing births, the ideal birth interval averaging three years.¹² Hosein¹³ contends that:

Though the notion of a smaller family size is not yet internalized,

there seems to be an increasing understanding of the relationship between means and the ability to support a large family.

The descriptors *feed, clothe* and *educate* which are employed by the Ministry of Health and the Family Life Association of Swaziland in their IEC campaigns have been adopted by the majority of Swazis in defining family planning.¹⁴

Despite having the necessary knowledge of family planning, women that are in a sexual union or currently married make little use of contraceptives, which compares unfavourably with other countries in the Southern African region (except Lesotho's), as shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Percentage of currently married women currently using contraception and total fertility rates (TFR) in Southern Africa, 1992

Country	% using	TFR
Botswana	33	4,8
Lesotho	5	5,8
Namibia	26	5,9
South Africa	48	4,5
Swaziland	19	6,2

Note: The figure for currently married women in Swaziland includes never married women with children.

Source: 1992 World Population Data Sheet.

Fertility transitions experienced in many developing countries have also been associated with increased contraceptive use and improvements in women's education and status.¹⁵ For example, the recent decline in Botswana's total fertility rate from 6,5 children per woman in 1984 to five in 1988 has been attributed to an increase in contraceptive prevalence.¹⁶ In addition, Table 2 shows a high correlation between contraceptive use and fertility. The case of Lesotho is curious because the level of fertility is not an a par with the level of use. Lesotho's fertility is most likely inhibited by the high rate of male absenteeism owing to the South African mines' migrant labour system.

In the light of the observations made elsewhere, and the tendency for higher contraceptive prevalence areas in Swaziland to have lower fertility,¹⁷ one would expect that by increasing the country's contraceptive prevalence, fertility would decline. In fact, in a study of fertility determinants in Swaziland, Warren *et al*¹⁸ argue that: "... future decreases in fertility in Swaziland are most likely to result from increases in use of contraception".

Barriers to fertility reduction

It has been argued by Caldwell and others¹⁹ that socio-cultural constraints to fertility reduction are weakening in Africa. Though this is true to some extent in Swaziland, they are still very strong forces to contend with. The identification and

understanding of these forces is crucial and can facilitate the design and implementation of effective policies and programmes.

High infant and child mortality

The death of a child is greatly feared in Swaziland. It puts couples under pressure to have large families so that in case death occurs, there are still enough children surviving to adulthood. This is typical in most sub-Saharan countries. Consequently, reduced fertility has been associated with declines in mortality in these countries. For instance, the decline of the total fertility rate in Botswana and Zimbabwe had been associated with declines in mortality, the infant mortality rate being as low as 70 per thousand live births,²⁰ a level which is much lower than Africa's average of 99 per thousand.

Though Swaziland's infant and childhood mortality rates have declined sharply, particularly during the past decade, mortality levels have not declined to levels which can be appreciated by couples. The infant mortality rate of 99 per thousand still does not give parents the assurance that their children will survive to adulthood. This implies that in order for Swaziland to succeed in reducing fertility it has to invest in expanding health services, which should result in further declines in mortality.

Women's status

Culturally, a woman's status in Swaziland is tied to motherhood. A woman gains full status when she becomes a mother. Childlessness is not only considered a social and cultural handicap, but also carries a stigma. A childless woman is referred to as an *inyumba*, which literally translated means devoid of feminine qualities, not a woman, and this accords her an inferior status. Consequently, no woman in Swaziland would deliberately choose to be childless, as is common in many developed societies.

So great is the fear of childlessness or sterility (even secondary sterility) that the idea of contraceptive use is repulsive to many women. The fear of sterility among Swazi women was found by McLean²¹ to be one of the primary determinants for nonuse and discontinuation of certain contraceptive methods. Some women feel that they should prove their fertility before they can use contraceptives. This is tied to the belief that the use of certain forms of contraceptive, such as the pill, can result in sterility. One woman expressing her fear made the following statement:

I was afraid because I heard that some contraceptives travel in your body up to the ovaries and eat up all the eggs and you can become sterile.²²

It is not enough for a Swazi woman to bear one child. A woman is expected to produce as many children as God allows her to have. Swazi women view the practice of *lobola* (payment of bride price to the wife's family) as a cultural barrier to family planning.²³ They feel duty-bound to bear many children, or the number of children dictated by their in-laws. In fact, if a woman proves to be barren, the *lobola* may be recalled from her family. In lieu of returning the *lobola* the

parents of the barren woman may send a younger sister (*umlamu*) or a niece (*inhlanti*) to bear children for the husband. These children, however, will belong to the barren woman until such time that she dies. Though the practice of sending an *umlamu* or *inhlanti* to bear children is no longer very prevalent, it remains a nightmare to women. There is, however, an increasing feeling of threat among women of having co-wives. The fear emanates from the fact that the husband may either abandon the wife, or from the fact that meagre resources would be shared, thus lowering her standard of living.

It should be noted that although Swazi culture encourages large families, it looks down upon a woman who has closely spaced children. Such a woman is said to produce children like chickens (*uyachunchusela*), which is derogatory. A woman is expected to abstain from sexual intercourse for close to seven months after birth.²⁴ Thereafter, she should practice traditional methods of family planning, such as withdrawal and using certain herbs, to ensure that her children are properly spaced. As one woman stated: "It is a disgrace to send children to school who are the same size but not the same age."²⁵

Suffice it to say that it is not only the woman's status that is elevated by parenthood, but also the man's status. Having children presents evidence of masculinity.

Value of children

The Swaziland Government does not provide social security to the elderly. Consequently, parents must rely on their children for old-age support. Having a large family is thus necessary to ensure adequate and steady support from the children. Sons and daughters are valued for different reasons. The pressure to have at least one son stems from the fact that Swaziland is a patriarchal society, where male children are valued because they would continue the family name. A woman who has only girls is under pressure to continue giving birth until a boy is born.

The emphasis placed on male children does not mean that female children are less important. Girls are also valued because they are considered a source of wealth. The more daughters one has, the more cows, through *lobola*, one can expect. These days daughters are considered of greater value than they used to be in the past because they are considered to be more reliable and stable sources of support for their parents, particularly for their mothers, who in many cases are left alone after the death of their husbands. The high prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse among males has caused many of them to abandon their traditional responsibility of supporting their parents. There is even a saying that *intfombatane ayimlahli unina*, its connotation being that it is better for a woman to bear daughters because she is certain they will always be by her side whenever their help is needed.

In terms of this scenario, where the Swazi couple is under pressure to have both boys and girls, it is difficult to adopt family planning.

Kinship structure

In Swaziland children do not belong only to the biological parents, but also to the extended family, just as the woman

does not marry only the husband, but the husband's entire extended family. The couple can, therefore, not make independent decisions. All decisions, including the decision to use or not to use contraceptives, must be endorsed by the extended family. Women are under pressure to produce the number of children that is dictated by the in-laws. In the study by McLean²⁶ some women considered interference from in-laws in the decision-making process a deterrent to contraceptive use.

Failure to comply with the explicit or implicit demands of in-laws can result in a variety of problems, including being called all sorts of pejorative names. If in-laws are convinced that more children are needed, they may convince, or even push the husband to take another wife, which the first wife will want to avoid.

Is the cost of not having (enough) children therefore not too high in Swaziland? How can couples faced with such strong cultural values be expected to willingly adopt modern family planning? These are some of the questions which have to be adequately addressed if family planning programmes in Swaziland are to succeed.

Partner's²⁷ disapproval of family planning

A partner's disapproval is a significant constraint to contraceptive use in Swaziland. For example, the 1988 Family Health Survey found that 6 per cent of female nonusers were not using contraceptives because their husband or the father of their children disapproved of family planning.²⁸

Though women report that their husbands or partners are key decision-makers in family planning and family size matters,²⁹ McLean³⁰ found that "when it came to practice behaviors, women seemed to take matters into their own hands". This implies that some women will adopt family planning despite the disapproval of their partner, which is an indication of high motivation for use. For women who are not married, motivation is even stronger because in many cases these women's partners default in supporting their children, or in some cases they don't support them at all, hence they have to bear the burden of supporting their children on their own.

It is sad and disappointing to note that a significant number of maternal and infant deaths in Swaziland occur as a result of husband disapproval of family planning. These deaths, which result from complications during childbirth, could be avoided if husbands consent to their wives using contraceptives or being sterilized. What causes such insensitivity on the part of Swazi men? Is it mere ignorance? Or is it male ego coupled with other factors? Further research in this area could provide insight and direction on how to address this problem.

It should be noted that though male disapproval of family planning is more dominant, women have imposed similar restrictions. There is a tendency for women to have a negative attitude towards the use of condoms. Male condom users report that coping with the negative attitudes of women is the main problem with using condoms.³¹ Personal communication with a few industry-based distributors (IBDs) revealed that this phenomenon is also common in industries where a Family

Planning/AIDS Project is promoting the use of condoms for preventing AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy. In fact one IBD was calling for intensified education campaigns aimed at dispelling misconceptions and negative attitudes towards condoms among women.

McLean³² contends that disapproval is usually associated with ignorance about methods or with certain beliefs. For example, the use of the pill is associated with prostitution. Hence allowing one's wife or partner to use the pill implies condoning prostitution. The use of contraceptives is believed to provide a sense of security, thus leading to promiscuous behaviour. Some men fear that if women use contraceptives they will not age fast, consequently they will be admired by other men, which is a threat to their male ego. The fear that some contraceptives cause impotence, produce deformed children, and affect women's health is also associated with male disapproval of family planning. Sometimes men know so little about the concept of family planning that they feel threatened to discuss or even approve of a concept they know little about. Highly motivated women adopt family planning methods and hide the fact that they are using contraceptives from their partners. These women are not particularly happy to hide contraceptives from their partners because they consider it ideal for both partners to be aware.³³ The injection and IUD are the most popular methods among these women because these methods do not have to be taken every day and are easy to conceal. Women who are employed outside their homes also opt for the pill because they can keep supplies at their places of work. In her study, McLean³⁴ found that women who hid contraceptives did so because they feared physical abuse, being deserted once the contraceptive is discovered, and being linked to prostitution or promiscuity.

In the past little attention was paid to making men aware of their role in family planning. It is only recently that the Family Life Association of Swaziland has made efforts to motivate men to actively participate in family planning. In 1992 a Male Motivation Campaign was organized by Flas with key male leaders being at the forefront of the campaign. The campaign has been so successful that the slogan "We do it *Kanyekanye* (together)" has been coined and is now used to promote the involvement of both partners in decision-making, family planning being just one aspect.

Misconceptions about family planning

False rumours spread about the side-effects of contraceptive methods and ignorance about how methods work are also key deterrents to contraceptive use in Swaziland.³⁵

Some contraceptive methods are falsely associated with medical problems. For instance, the pill is believed to destroy the uterus and ovaries, resulting in sterility among women.³⁶ The pill is also believed to cause impotence in the man, and wetness in the woman, resulting in reduced sexual pleasure. People fear that the condom, if it comes off during sexual intercourse, may get lodged in the vagina and may "cause serious physical harm ... thus leading to female sterility".³⁷ The condom is also associated with reduced sexual pleasure. Of the condom it is said:

... If you buy sweets you do not expect to eat them whilst in the plastic. Instead, you have to remove the plastic so as to eat the sweets and enjoy them.³⁸

Access to family planning services

Since most family planning methods (excluding surgical procedures) are virtually free in Swaziland, the cost of buying contraceptives is unlikely to be a deterrent to their use. Rather, people may be constrained by transport costs if sources of supply are too far away. The "price" may be too high in terms of the time and effort required to get to the supply source, the amount of time spent at the service point, and in maintaining the method. The combination of these factors with fear of the side-effects of methods and partner's reaction may lead to personal inertia among women, ie, women not adopting family planning even though they see the need and desire to use contraceptives.³⁹

Poor quality of family planning services

Most government and industry clinics and hospitals in Swaziland are overcrowded and understaffed. As a result of being over-burdened with work nurses in these centres tend to give high priority to the sick. The healthy person seeking family planning is given low priority.

In these centres there is no proper counselling of clients, most probably resulting from overcrowding and lack of training. One lady who had stopped using contraceptives claimed that:

She (the nurse) told me that there are eight methods but was in too much of a hurry to relate them to me.⁴⁰

Clients need to be properly advised on the method that best suits them. They also need to be advised that if the chosen method does not suit them they have an option of switching to another method. In addition, proper instruction on how to use the method should be given. Lack of proper counselling, particularly during the initial stages, may lead to high discontinuation rates. The danger of lack of proper counselling is that people who discontinue using methods are likely to discourage potential users from adopting family planning methods with which they had problems.

Some people are deterred from using contraceptives by the negative reception given by health providers. Nurses in Swaziland are said to be judgemental, uncaring, unfriendly and impatient. Typical comments from disgruntled people include:

I don't go to a clinic, the nurses there are very proud – they ask you a lot of irrelevant questions tossing and turning you around, and sometimes they neglect you.⁴¹

When I go to the clinic for a resupply they ask me what am I going to do with so many condoms – that makes me reluctant to go there for a supply.⁴²

Negative attitudes by service providers towards contraception in general, and towards certain methods also deter use of contraceptives in Swaziland. Some nurses discourage, or even forbid teenagers to use contraceptives, even if they are sexually active. They may bend their "rules" only if the teenager already has a child, which defeats the national goal of reducing the high rate of teenage pregnancies.

Some nurses ridicule men who have opted for male sterilization. One male university lecturer was amazed by the barrage of questions from nurses when he went for a vasectomy operation at a major private clinic. Had it not been for his high motivation he would not have gone through with the operation.

Sometimes there are shortages of certain contraceptive methods in clinics. This results in switching of methods, or even discontinuation. It is common for women to switch from using the injection to the pill and *vice versa*.⁴³

Conclusion

The primary focus of Swaziland's Family Planning Programme has been to increase awareness and knowledge of family planning methods. In this regard the programme has been successful, as is evidenced by the virtual universality of knowledge about methods among both women and men. It is thus evident that little effort needs to be exerted in increasing knowledge. Rather, considerable effort, time and money should be spent on addressing socio-cultural barriers to family planning in order to increase contraceptive use and reduce fertility.

There is no doubt that the success of family planning programmes in Swaziland, success being measured in terms of increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility reduction, will be determined, to a large extent, by the degree to which barriers to family planning are incorporated into IEC strategies. These strategies should be designed in such a way that they are feasible in the socio-cultural context of Swaziland.

Very little has been done to address the socio-cultural barriers to family planning in Swaziland. The Family Life Association of Swaziland has just begun scratching the surface. Strategies that it has utilized to address these barriers are: the Schools Family Life Education Programme; Family Life Education in Communities Programme; Radio Programme; Videos for Teenagers and Men; Method-Specific Pamphlets; the Women's Empowerment Programme; and the Male Motivation Programme. Hosein⁴⁴ argues that more intense and focused efforts are required, and calls for massive, concentrated and repetitive treatment.

Deriving from the discussion above, the following recommendations are proffered:

- 1 There is a need for Swaziland to formulate an explicit national population policy which would provide a framework for systematically integrating socio-cultural constraints to family planning into all IEC strategies. The enunciation of a policy is necessary for two main reasons. First, the policy would indicate government's commitment in reducing Swaziland's high fertility and population growth rates, thus giving a green-light for embarking upon or strengthening existing population related activities. Second, the policy would not only facilitate the design, strengthening, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all strategies aimed at curbing the runaway population growth, but would also enable and facilitate collaboration among all sectors and departments involved in population issues.
- 2 It may not be worth the effort and money trying to change some culturally imbedded beliefs, values and practices,

though some aspects of culture, like the general acceptance of the concept of child spacing, may be capitalized upon. Rather, particular attention should be paid to addressing selected key barriers such as people's misconceptions and fears about contraceptive methods, fear of partner's reaction and poor quality of family planning services.

- 3 The quality of family planning services needs to be constantly evaluated to ensure that clients are provided with quality services. This can be done by soliciting views of current and previous users on different aspects of service provision. It could also be ascertained how well informed service providers are on the effectiveness, proper use and possible side-effects of various methods. Such information can assist in improving the quality of family planning services.

There is an urgent need to improve counselling services in all government and private centres that provide family planning services. This would reduce contraceptive discontinuation rates, and probably dispel many false misconceptions about family planning methods.

- 4 On-going efforts by Flas in sensitizing men about their role and responsibility in family planning and other related areas need to be intensified. The participation of men in family planning would assist in increasing contraceptive use, but would also assist in reducing both maternal and child morbidity and mortality which result from complications during childbirth.

- 5 As mentioned earlier, the analysis in this paper derives largely from the study conducted by Flas in 1990, based on focus group discussions. Focus group discussions can yield insightful and rich data on socio-cultural barriers to the use of contraception. It is thus recommended that such small-scale studies be utilized in conjunction with conventional demographic surveys to enrich knowledge of socio-cultural factors. The advantage of small-scale studies is that they not only provide useful information on why certain phenomena occur, but are also less expensive and provide quick feedback to policy-makers and service providers.

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The numbers game: Independent Churches

Professor J J Kritzinger, of the Institute for Missiological Research at the University of Pretoria, gives some insights into the problem of assessing how many Independent Church members there are in South Africa.

The one question that researchers are repeatedly asked about the African Independent Churches (AICs)¹ is: how large are they? How many people do they represent?

This interest is understandable because of the publicity given to the large Easter gatherings at the Zion Christian Church's (ZCC) headquarters Zion City Moria, near Pietersburg in the Northern Transvaal.² In addition, church leaders or organizations sometimes make public statements on sensitive issues, claiming to represent several million Independent Church members,³ and, naturally, people want to know whether these claims are correct. The extent of their support will obviously determine their importance to government agencies, political parties and other interest groups. Not only would they constitute an important sphere of influence but obviously they would also have to be taken into consideration in any policy-making process.

In addition to the above interest, church leaders belonging to the more traditional groupings would also like to have an idea of the extent of this movement, for obvious reasons.

The fact is that we do not have a clear-cut answer to this question. It is not difficult to see that most of the claims are exaggerated, because there simply are not enough people in South Africa to make all the claims possible. They must be taken for what they are: efforts to lend weight to pronouncements. It is almost impossible to obtain accurate statistics at this stage.

As I am one of those people who is interested in numbers I am, in spite of what I have just said, nevertheless going to try to enter this minefield.

Religious statistics

I am not going to try to summarize the membership lists of the churches. In the first instance there are just too many churches,⁴ and their records are usually inaccessible. Further: very few churches keep accurate records. Even the traditional (main line) churches admit that their statistics are not really

dependable. Sometimes figures are boosted for effect. People also move to other localities and lose contact with their church, or transfer to other churches without giving notice to the previous one. Thus one person may be claimed by more than one church. This duplication usually becomes known only at the time of the individual's funeral, if at all.

We are therefore dependent on the one source of statistics that endeavours to gather information about each individual, namely the government census.⁵ A great deal of information can be extracted from this source, but it is important to remember that this kind of information has serious limitations.

Information-gathering problems

Are statistics necessary?

First of all, one must question the relevance of numbers. The "church growth" school emphasizes the (numerical) growth of the church. They even regard it as the primary goal of mission. Statistics are necessary to measure the success of mission strategies, they say. But not all people agree with this interest in church statistics. Some church leaders vehemently dispute their importance, choosing rather to emphasize the relevance and contextuality of the church. They tend to feel that the interest in quantity necessarily implies a disinterest in quality. At best their view of religious statistics is: so what?

What statistics?

Another important aspect to keep in mind is the accuracy of statistics. There are at least four sources of religious statistics:

- The first and most inadequate is the government census. In the South African situation (at least up to recently) people were apt to call themselves church members, thinking that it was expected of them in "Christian" South Africa. The more prestigious denominations are usually named. This led to a generally high count of church members, as well as an inflation of the numbers of certain churches.

- The second level is the number of people on the books of the various churches. This figure is usually much lower than that obtained in the census.⁶ But even this is still inadequate. In every church there are those who never attend or contribute to the life of the church.
- There is therefore a third source: the active membership of the church. The most obvious way to measure this is by head counts in Sunday worship. This is again a significantly lower figure than those above.⁷
- Then, finally, all evangelical Christians will insist that not even all church attenders are committed (“born again”) believers. It is not advisable to even try to determine this lowest level - the parable of the weeds and tares warns us against this.

In short: for every 100 counted on level 1 there may be 66 on level 2, 33 on level 3, and maybe 20 on the final level! This is just an example of how inaccurate these figures are.⁸

South African government censuses

In spite of their superficiality I still think that the government census figures are extremely helpful in comparing different geographical areas or population groups, and in determining trends over time. We do not have anything that is nearly as dependable.

There are, however, some additional problems with censuses. Despite all the effort (and money) going into their execution, they are never a full count. There are always people who, for different reasons, dodge the official enumerators. Further: there are usually localities where an effective count is almost impossible.⁹ Undercounts are therefore accepted as a fact of life. In earlier years too little was known to correct the figures on a scientific basis, so the count was taken as the final figure. In 1980, however, scientists came up with, in addition to the factual count, corrected figures. This, among other things, I exposed some trends from 1970 to 1980 and again to 1991 that are difficult to explain. For the 1991 census only the figures corrected for undercounting were published.

We should also realize that it is certainly impossible to table each of the thousands of Independent Churches in the census publications. These churches are therefore all lumped together under one total. The only one to be tabled separately (since 1980) is the Zion Christian Church (ZCC).¹⁰ So we have to be content with a large group called “Other Black Independent Churches”,¹¹ together representing the largest religious grouping.

The problem with the 1991 census

We especially looked forward to the 1991 census, the first one since 1980 to include a question about religious affiliation. Unfortunately, for our purposes, respondents were explicitly informed that answering this question was “optional”.¹² The result was that almost 30 per cent of the respondents left out the answer to this simple question. What a blow to our expectations!

Is it possible for us to ascertain why people elected not to answer the question? I don't think so. I can think of at least

five possible reasons why the question was not answered:

- The first possibility could be that people were just being lazy.¹³ If so, the relative strengths of the groups would probably not be affected.
- A second possibility is related to the difficulty that the enumerators experience in soliciting the correct information in those communities where many are illiterate and the names of churches are difficult to obtain. In such a case the enumerators just left out this question. If this is the case, very little can be said about the effect this may have on the total picture.¹⁴
- There is a third possibility. In the published report there is no category for “African traditionalists”. Traditionalists would therefore have had difficulty in categorizing themselves, and may have declined to answer for that reason.¹⁵ In this case many of the “unclassified” people could therefore be traditionalists.
- The fourth possibility is that non-religious people did not answer this question. Two things militate against this assumption: would 30 per cent of the population be irreligious?¹⁶ And: there was the possibility of answering “no religion, no church”. Non-religious people could therefore have been specific.¹⁷
- A last possibility could have been a kind of boycott of this question. The census was politicized, so some people may have felt that religious matters should be left out of this “political” arena. It may even have been that they felt their privacy threatened. But these people would have been of all religious categories.

The point therefore is: we can say very little with certainty about the people who did not answer the religious question. In interpreting the results through calculating the percentages, we may therefore do one of two things: we may regard those who did answer the question as the whole population, and exclude this group of which we know nothing; or we could take the total number of enumerated respondents as the population. Table 1 gives an indication of the two results.

Table 1
Two ways of dealing with the 1991 RSA census statistics on the religious question

Religious grouping	Excluding non-answers		Including non-answers	
	Total ('000)	%	Total ('000)	%
All Christian churches	20 583	94,5	20 583	66,4
Hindus	390	1,8	390	1,3
Muslims	338	1,6	338	1,1
Other religions	95	0,4	95	0,3
No religion	373	1,7	373	1,2
Total responding to question	21 779	100,0	21 779	70,3
No response	9 208		9 208	29,7
TOTAL ENUMERATES	30 987		30 987	100,0

Source: RSA Central Statistical Services¹⁸

It should be clear that the first option (excluding the non-answers) doesn't lead to satisfactory results. It seems as if a large number of non-Christians are thereby excluded. It is simply not true that 95 per cent of the population is Christian, whether that status is taken in its biblical or traditional sense.

Likewise, the second alternative is also not really acceptable, because many (an unknown percentage) of the "no response" group are probably Christians. The figure of 66 per cent allegiance to Christianity doesn't tally with the 78 per cent of 1980.¹⁹

The truth probably lies somewhere between the 66 per cent and 95 per cent.

African Independent Churches (AICs)

When we turn to the AICs it will probably make more sense to focus on the information about the black population. Table 2 will give the essential information, adding the comparative figures from the 1980 census. (When making comparisons the notes above should be taken into account.)

Table 2
Some religious census results of 1980 and 1991, blacks

Religious group	1980		1991	
	Number ('000)	%	Number ('000)	%
Independent churches	4 959	29,3	6 821	31,5
Roman Catholic Church	1 675	9,9	1 780	8,2
Methodist churches	1 557	9,2	1 382	6,4
NG Church in Africa	1 100	6,5	1 050	4,9
Anglican churches	795	4,7	646	3,0
Lutheran churches	694	4,1	663	3,1
Other Christian churches	1 761	10,4	2 108	9,7
Total Christian churches	12 541	74,1	14 394	66,5
Other religions, object, no religion, or unknown	4 383	25,9	7 252	33,5
Total number of blacks	16 934	100,0	21 646	100,0

Sources: 1991: Same as for Table 1 above

1980: Kritzinger²⁰

- The AICs experienced a large increase since 1980. In contrast to all other religious groupings the AICs increased their share of the total population dramatically. From being 40 per cent of all black Christians in 1980 they grew to 47 per cent in 1991. They comprise at least a third of the black population.
- It is not possible to say how many of the 7,25 million blacks who didn't answer the question are also members of the AICs, but if another third of them are members, then the AICs can claim a total of some 9,2 million adherents. This is a formidable number in any language!
- As already mentioned, the ZCC is the only Independent Church which was separately named and tabled in both these censuses. In 1980 their number was about three-quarters of a million, and in 1991 the number was 1,5 million.

This significant number made them the fastest growing and presently the church with the second largest number of black members in the RSA, after the Roman Catholics. However, the reports of the meetings at Moria are either incorrect in respect of the numbers congregating there at Easter time, or we must accept that many of those visitors are not members of the ZCC.

Conclusion

These seem to be the main results that we can gather from the 1991 census. There is also more geographical and other detail that I would like to analyse, but the lack of information on other independent churches, and the great number of respondents who didn't supply their religious affiliation, seriously decrease the value of this census.

It is more important than ever to (a) petition the state to make available more detail in future reports, or co-operate with researchers in making available the raw material; and (b) continue with research on the ground, which may go a long way towards answering some of the crucial questions about the dynamics of the AICs.

Notes and references

- 1 I am not going to enter into the debate about terminology. We realize that the way in which these churches are described is not altogether satisfactory, but the same can be said of the alternative names such as African Indigenous Churches or African Initiated Churches.
- 2 The ZCC claims that more than 2 million attended their 1991 gathering.
- 3 I may quote a letter to a newspaper (*Beeld*, 10 June 1992) in which Dr Ed Cain, vice-president of United Christian Action, stated that his organization represents a number of groups, among which is Rica (Reformed Independent Churches Association), with 864 denominations and an adult membership of "just more than 4 million". My enquiries regarding this produced no further information.
- 4 How many Independent Churches are there? This is another very interesting question. People speak of 5 000 and even 6 000 in South Africa. There is a computer list, originating somewhere in government files, which indicates some 6 000. On the other hand I saw the list of names derived from the 1980 census returns and it comprised approximately 3 500 names. Many of them were counted only because of different (erroneous?) spellings, others would certainly in the meantime have ceased to exist, and through splits and mergers new ones would also have come into being. The latest (1991) census returns may provide more accurate information.
- 5 I am aware that the censuses are not based on head counts any more. They do, however, attempt to correct their counts by accepted statistical methods.
- 6 In a few localities where we could compare the government census figures with the known membership of some larger churches we found the figure to be a third lower (eg J J Kritzinger. *Die onvoltooide sendingtaak in Noord- en Oos-Transvaal. Deel 8: Venda*, Pretoria: Iswen, 1982).
- 7 This figure is not easy to come by. In the massive census which the Dutch Reformed Church (NG Kerk) undertook a few years ago (published as I J van Eeden and M Smuts, *Kerkspieël II*, Pretoria: NGKB, 1986, they found that on a given Sunday only about a third of their membership attends church. Is this a figure that can be applied to other denominations? Some years ago Dr H J Möller and associates counted all the church attenders in Diepkloof on such a Sunday. They found only 10 per cent of the population in church, although some 80 per cent claimed to be church members. H J

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Möller, *Die stedelike Bantoe en die Kerk. Deel IV: Die Kerk onder die stedelike Bantoe*, Report to the HSRC, 1974.

- 8 If this broad argument is acceptable the figures of Christians quoted in the past, and those to follow, could thus for convenience sake be divided into thirds: the first are the reasonably active Christians; a further third are technically members of churches, but only in name; and the membership of another third is dubious.
- 9 In the 1991 census this was especially the case. A campaign was waged against its execution at that time, because it was felt that all parties were not sufficiently consulted beforehand.
- 10 It is not even certain whether the two ZCCs are counted together or separately.
- 11 Analysis of the physical records would give us a clearer picture of the relative strengths of the different churches. However, because the officials adhere strictly to their promise of confidentiality physical examination of the records is not possible.
- 12 As a numbers person I found this very disappointing but the Director of the Central Statistical Services assured me that this was according to regulations.
- 13 It is well known that most people fill out questionnaires only when they have no choice.
- 14 However, as this situation would largely obtain in the rural areas, the exclusion of information from these areas would skew the results, because it excludes those churches active in the peripheral areas. These are also the areas where the majority of traditionalists are to be found.
- 15 This was the case also in the previous censuses. The only categories open to traditionalists were the "other, object, no religion" or "uncertain" categories, or they succumbed and called themselves "Christians". This is a serious flaw and indicative of the arrogant mentality of Christians in South Africa. This should be corrected.
- 16 It is often stated that there are no irreligious Africans.
- 17 Very few people made use of this option.
- 18 RSA Central Statistical Services, *Population Census 1991. Social characteristics of the population*, no 03-01-22, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1991.
- 19 The trend seems to be rather a growing percentage of "Christians".
- 20 J J Kritzinger, "South Africa's religious mosaic", *Africa Insight*, vol 16, 1986, pp 93-108.

Urbanization in colonial Africa

In the second article in our three-part series on urbanization in Africa urban expansion in the colonial period is discussed by Tertius Chandler and James D Tarver, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Howard University, Washington DC. Both authors have published books on the subject: Mr Chandler, Four thousand years of urban growth, and Prof Tarver, The demography of Africa.

The colonial period

Africa has undoubtedly been dominated and subjugated by external powers longer than any other major region of the world. In ancient times parts of the continent were annexed by various Asian and European conquerors and much later, in modern times, virtually all of Africa became part of different European empires.

During antiquity North Africa experienced, in succession, invasions by the Assyrians, Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans. The Romans were followed by the Vandals and the Byzantines. Christianity flourished until in the seventh century when the Arabs, bearers of Islam, introduced a new order that has endured until this day.

The earliest colonizers in Eastern Africa, including the Horn, were Semitic groups from South Arabia and the Merina from Borneo (Indonesia), in the course of the first millennium BC.¹ The Semites founded Axum in present-day Ethiopia, which eventually became Christianized and gave rise to the Amharic empire, while the Merina eventually drifted to Madagascar.² By the end of the first millennium AD Shi'ite Muslims from Oman and Sunni Muslims from Shiraz in the Persian Gulf area had settled in various places along the Indian Ocean seaboard between Somalia and southern Mozambique.³

At the turn of the fifteenth century the Portuguese discovered the maritime route around Africa from west to east. They were also the first Europeans in modern times to gain footholds along the African coast as they made their way to India. The Cape Verde Islands had been annexed as early as 1462 and trading posts were subsequently established on the West African, Angolan, Mozambican and East African coasts.⁴ The first Portuguese contacts with Africa heralded a period of European colonization in Africa that was to last until the second half of the twentieth century. During the colonial era and, especially in the course of the nineteenth century, Christianity established itself in the non-Islamic parts of the continent.

The Portuguese were followed by the Dutch who, besides competing with the Portuguese for trade, established the first European settlement in sub-Saharan Africa at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.⁵ Then, the British, having assembled the most powerful fleet of all the European powers, began to challenge both the Portuguese and the Dutch, as well as the French, for African spheres of influence. For example, during the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth century the British took over the Cape settlement from the Dutch and the St Louis settlement, which had existed in present-day Senegal since 1659, from the French. St Louis was returned to France, but the Cape of Good Hope became the basis for British expansion into the Southern African subcontinent. Britain's naval power also enabled it to take a leading role in ending the slave trade that had been flourishing since the fifteenth century.

In 1830 the French conquered Algiers and became the major colonizers in Northwest Africa. Using Senegal as a base, they spread their sphere of influence across West Africa into Central Africa and vied with the British for control of the continent in the second half of the nineteenth century. Germany, Italy, Belgium and Spain also acquired African spheres of influence.

The rivalry among the European powers for African territory strained relations between them. To bring order to what had developed into a "scramble for Africa", a conference was convened in Berlin in 1884. The ensuing treaty defined "right to occupation" and recognized various spheres of influence. As a result, the continent was partitioned among the European nations and the boundaries of the colonies were drawn. Those parts of Africa that had not been occupied until then were formally annexed by the various colonial powers in the years up to World War I. Thus the colonization of Africa after 1884 was quite different from that of ancient times as it embraced virtually the entire continent.

The colonial picture, as it existed in 1914, before World War I is shown in Figure 1. After this war the mandate system




Fig 1: Colonial Africa in 1914

Urban development in the colonial period

Several early coastal centres were strictly entrepôts for slave trading and existed for that purpose. Algiers, with a population in 1600 of about 75 000, was the largest African slave port. Zanzibar on the East coast was the second largest exporter of slaves. Elmina (Ghana), Gore Island (Senegal), and Luanda (Angola) on the West coast, were other major slave trading ports.

Some coastal and river ports, however, were engaged in international commerce by virtue of their charters and handled locally produced goods. Railroads were built to interior areas to transport products grown in inaccessible places and a few "European" centres were established, but only a nominal amount of urban growth occurred in different areas. (In fact, Africa's overall urban population declined somewhat between 1200 and 1800.⁷)

Most coastal centres, religious centres, and administrative capitals of colonies tended to grow slowly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One exception was renewed and rapid population growth in many North African cities, such as Alexandria, Cairo, Tunis and Algiers. In sub-Saharan Africa urbanization began to accelerate in a modest way, especially after World War II, during which time Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and others began vigorously advocating independence for the African colonies.⁸ Urbanization during the last part of the colonial period, was not as rapid as some urban population estimates for the period 1900 to 1969 would seem to convey.⁹

There was, however, very rapid urbanization in South Africa in the colonial period, which greatly altered the South African urban structure. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley during 1869–1971 and of gold deposits shortly thereafter in the Transvaal in 1886 brought thousands of fortune seekers. The profits from diamond mining were then used as capital in developing the gold mines in the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal. Mining camps sprang up near the gold mines and rapidly became towns and eventually cities. Thus, mining ushered in a period of urban population growth in South Africa that was unequalled in Africa.

Johannesburg, the centre of the Witwatersrand, was founded in 1886 at the beginning of the gold discovery and had a population of 155 000 in 1904; nearby Pretoria, at that stage the Transvaal capital, some 23 000; and Cape Town, then the main port, about 190 000. Rapid urbanization was well underway when South Africa obtained virtual independence from Great Britain in 1910. By 1951 Johannesburg's population had grown to 915 000, Cape Town's to 632 000, and that of Durban, now the largest port, to 500 000. Urbanization continued to accelerate and in 1985 the Cape Peninsula metropolitan area had more than 1.9 million inhabitants, the Durban metropolitan area well over a million and the Witwatersrand some 3.25 million. The latter urban agglomeration comprised Johannesburg/Soweto (1.6 million people), East Rand (over a million) and West Rand (about 650 000). Pretoria, the national administrative capital, had more than 800 000 inhabitants in 1985.

Nigeria is another remarkable example of rapid colonial urbanization, particularly the capital city of Lagos, which

was devised in terms of which the Allied powers administered, on behalf of the newly founded League of Nations, the former German colonies. Germany's African colonies were South West Africa (now Namibia), Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania), Togo and Cameroon. After World War II, in 1945, the United Nations replaced the League of Nations and the mandated territories became UN Trust Territories. A dispute between the United Nations and South Africa over the status and future of South West Africa was only resolved in 1988.

The only two areas excluded from colonial designation in Figure 1 were Liberia and Ethiopia. Liberia was founded in the early nineteenth century to resettle freed slaves and its independence was recognized in 1847. An independent monarchy has existed in Ethiopia since times immemorial, although the country was invaded by the Italians in 1935 and occupied for six years. Egypt attained sovereign independence from 1922 to 1956 and South Africa from 1910 to 1931.

The years between World Wars I and II were the heydays of colonialism. After World War II, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, most of the colonies and trust territories became independent. The first was Libya in 1951, followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan, in 1956, and Ghana in 1957. The last former colony to achieve independence was Namibia in 1990. With Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia, in May 1993, there are at present 53 sovereign independent African countries.

This rather brief and highly selective account has presented a few of the major features and structural aspects of colonial Africa.⁶ Hopefully, it provides a sufficient background to understand the growth of urban centres of Africa during the approximately five centuries of colonialism.

Table 1
Urbanization of African colonies during the colonial period: Agglomerations that reached 50 000 before attaining Independence

Urban agglomeration	Country	Date of independence	Estimated population	
			1950 '000	At independence '000
Cairo	Egypt	1922	2 410	1 200
Johannesburg	South Africa	1910	915	238
Cape Town	South Africa	1910	620	174
Tunis	Tunisia	1956	472	535
Algiers	Algeria	1962	437	975
Lagos	Nigeria	1960	288	763
Accra	Ghana	1957	251	350
Dakar	Senegal	1960	223	366
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	—	209	—
Antananarivo	Madagascar	1960	180	250
Rabat	Morocco	1956	174	235
Kinshasa	Zaire	1960	173	451
Luanda	Angola	1975	138	669
Harare	Zimbabwe	1980	110	590
Tripoli	Libya	1951	106	110
Maputo	Mozambique	1975	91	532
Nairobi	Kenya	1963	87	275
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	1961, 1963	78	180
Port Louis	Mauritius	1968	65	135
Brazzaville	Congo	1960	60	130
Bamako	Mali	1960	60	130
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	1960	59	180
Bujumbura	Burundi	1962	50	70
Monrovia	Liberia	1847	50	..
Freetown	Sierra Leone	1961	50	100
Mogadishu	Somalia	1960	50	90
Kampala	Uganda	1962	50	150
Bangui	Central Afr Rep	1960	40	90
Porto-Novo	Benin	1960	40	60
Lomé	Togo	1960	40	80
Ndjamena	Chad	1960	40	80
Conakry	Guinea	1958	39	100
Naimey	Niger	1960	30	60
Ouagadougou	Burkina Faso	1960	30	60
Yaoundé	Cameroon	1960	30	70
Lusaka	Zambia	1964	30	150

Source: Compiled from United Nations, 1989, 1991

increased its population from 288 000 in 1950 to 763 000 in 1960, the latter year being the one in which Nigeria became an independent state.¹⁰ Ghana, which also experienced pre-colonial urbanization, continued its urbanization during the colonial period, Accra in particular.

The national capitals in Africa have grown much more rapidly than other cities.¹¹ Remarkably, at least 50 out of 55 African capital cities are the most populous urban centres and the majority have grown into primate cities.

In Table 1, the large African cities, including capitals, are shown, along with the population of their urban agglomerations, at two stages: in 1950 and upon the date of independence in the case of each agglomeration that had at least 50 000 inhabitants when the country became independent.

Cairo, the capital of Egypt, had the largest agglomeration in 1950, followed by Johannesburg with 915 000 residents. Cape Town and Tunis were next, followed by Algiers, Lagos, and Accra, which were the next largest urban agglomerations in

1950. The next largest agglomerations of capital cities were Dakar, Addis Ababa and Antananarivo, with more than 100 000 inhabitants in 1950.

Africa's urban population developed some rather distinctive features in the colonial era. Despite urban growth in parts of the continent, the level of urbanization remained comparatively low. In 1950, near the end of the colonial era, Africa was the least urbanized major region in the world with only 15 per cent of its inhabitants living in urban centres.¹²

The colonial cities in Eastern and Southern Africa, particularly, were European creations and regarded as "white man's country" in which Africans had no right to permanent settlement.¹³ In contrast, Africans in the indigenous West African cities during the colonial period purchased urban property, erected city dwellings, and moved freely between rural and urban areas.¹⁴ Despite the restrictions on urbanization by black people in South Africa during the heydays of apartheid, the populations of the black dormitory townships outside the "white" cities grew apace. In addition, millions of blacks crowded into adjacent unserviced areas that soon became slums.¹⁵

By 1960 there were more than two million British in Africa. The majority were in South Africa with smaller numbers in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and other English-speaking countries.¹⁶ Apart from some one million English-speakers, South Africa's non-African population in 1960, the largest in Africa, included 1.8 million Afrikaners (descendants of the original European settlers of the seventeenth century), 1.5 million people of mixed descent and about 500 000 Indians. There were nearly two million French in Africa with about a million in Algeria, perhaps a half million in Morocco, 200 000 – 300 000 in Tunisia, and the rest in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and other French-speaking countries. Also, there were around one million Portuguese (including soldiers) in their five African colonies when independence was finally granted to their colonies. After the defeat of the Axis powers in Northern Africa in 1943 about 225 000 Italians left their African colonies for home. The bulk of the non-African populations were urbanized and when many of these people left Africa at independence, cities gradually lost their "European" character to become more "African".

Effects of colonialism

Was colonialism a definite asset to Africa? If so, in what ways? Or, did colonialism greatly aggravate the indigenous problems of Africans? Probably one of the greatest contributions of the Europeans was an improvement in health and medical care. The many bio-medical discoveries, particularly after World War II, were applied in the control of disease. For example, DDT was used to control malaria and yellow fever, vaccinations were used for a wide range of diseases, drugs, and other discoveries were used to save and prolong lives. Populations began to grow rapidly as infant mortality declined and life expectancy increased.

Greatly improved educational levels is another obvious important contribution. Education transformed preliterate societies, in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, to partially literate

ones. In addition, the teachings of Christianity (introduced by European missionaries), together with the impact of the colonial money economy and the requirements of the colonial rulers caused fundamental social changes in Africa's tribal communities. Although not all communities were affected to the same extent, traditional relationships in the close-knit, communal societies were disrupted. The powers of the chiefs generally declined and old customs were modified as educational and economic achievement rather than descent became the keys to political power and social status.

Colonialism introduced the phenomenon of political boundaries and, with the division of the continent among the European powers in the 1890s, set a pattern of colonial states that was to serve, virtually unchanged, as the basis of independent Africa's political subdivision. Enforceable boundaries severely limited the territorial mobility of tribes and confined them to the largely artificial states created by the European imperialists. In Eastern and Southern Africa the possession of prime land by Europeans (through negotiation, legislation, purchase, barter or conquest) brought a new dimension to the age-old competition among the indigenous communities for this valuable resource. Gradually a settlement pattern took shape where traditional communal land became interspersed with private property owned by whites. In South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the Kenyan highlands the reverse picture emerged of vast, consolidated tracts of white-owned property embracing fragmented tribal areas.

The demand for their labour, the requirement to pay tax, the need to acquire consumer goods available in the towns and cities, intermittent drought and famine as well as other factors motivated ever-increasing numbers of tribal people to sell their labour in the developing colonial economies. In due course, large black communities became an integral part of urban life. This trend continued after independence when increasing rural poverty accelerated migration from the rural to the urban areas, which were perceived to be offering opportunities for economic advancement.

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Bernard Gcwensa and Ruben Xulu

Christian Artists of Natal – Dina Cormick

Academica, Pretoria, 1993, 138 pp. Price R59.

In this attractively presented paperback book, Dina Cormick performs a signal service in retrieving the stories of two little known sculptors in Natal, Bernard Gcwensa and Ruben Xulu.

She tells of how Gcwensa, a man of little education who suffered from asthma and an affliction of the limbs, eked out a living by carving spoons and decorated sticks until he came to work in the service of the church at Hlabisa in the 1950s, when he was already about thirty-five years old.

He was to be joined there by the young Xulu, who had his hearing and speech seriously impaired after a traumatic childhood experience, but who had shown talent in arts and crafts classes at school. Dina Cormick traces their creation of a considerable body of fine carvings at the Church of the Good Shepherd at Hlabisa and elsewhere in Natal. Although their story does not have a happy ending in the conventional sense, in that their sculptural production ended tragically when Gcwensa could no longer carve after an assault and when Xulu died violently, the unfolding of their achievements in the face of disability and disadvantage, and the works that remain behind as a testament to them, leaves the reader with a satisfying sense of fulfilment.

Dina Cormick undertook the task of reconstructing the biographies of Gcwensa and Xulu with care, speaking to their family members, friends and mentors, and visiting the missions at which they worked to see and discuss their carvings. She writes the story in a warm and simple way that does not mask her personal sympathy with the artists and her enthusiasm for their works. But let us not be misled by the accessibility of her text. Embedded in it are many nuggets of information that reveal the author's deep interest in and

knowledge of Christian art, both through her study of theology and her own art. Coupled with the text is an illustrated catalogue of the works of Gcwensa and Xulu, grouped by the different Roman Catholic Mission territories. It clearly demonstrates the painstaking scholarship of the author, who must have devoted protracted periods of sustained research to this academic "detective work". Despite her modest disclaimers regarding its completeness, the catalogue is remarkably extensive, given the difficulty of tracking down works that have never been recorded systematically until now. It will be invaluable to art historians working in this area, but is of great interest to general readers also because it is so generously illustrated.

Looking at photographs, we see that Bernard Gcwensa was an adept storyteller, and seems to have been at his best when depicting sequential narratives like the Stations of the Cross. On the doors at Hlabisa he carved clear pictorial relief panels of Biblical stories, based, it is suggested, on the illustrations of the Zulu Bible (fig 2), but interspersed with scenes of local missionary activities and the building of the church, which must have been drawn from his own observation (fig 1). The figures are stocky and robust, occupying a shallow space with simple, flattish backgrounds, so that the communication of the story is not diluted with the myriad details of sophisticated naturalistic art, which sometimes seems as much concerned with the artist's skills as with the subject matter. The guileless directness of the carving is appealing. And, particularly in the mature work of Gcwensa's pupil, Xulu, who had imitated his teacher closely at first, the sculpture can achieve a compelling monumentality in its simple modelling and bold forms.



Fig 1a: Women collecting stones for the church



Fig 1b: Men mixing cement



Fig 1c: Nun taking choir practice



Fig 1d: Confirmation by the bishop



Fig 2: Paschal meal of the Israelites. Illustration from the Zulu Bible and the corresponding panel carved by Bernard Gwensa for the church of the Good Shepherd, Hlabisa.



Fig 3: Ruben Xulu: Nina weghawe Sikhulekele (Mother of the Hero). Cypress, 87cm

One of the most fascinating aspects of the works of Gwensa and Xulu is what Dina Cormick calls the “demythologizing” of Christian art in Africa “to bring the message of Christianity in its eternal reality into the daily lives of contemporary people”. She discusses how these artists gradually came to develop, with the encouragement of church patrons like Father Edwin Kinch, Christian imagery that reflected their own world and experience. It is interesting that there was resistance to the picturing of Biblical stories in Zulu form.

So completely had the European interpretation of Christianity been entrenched, that black congregations expected the “pink and white” effigies of popular Catholic imagery, and even “felt that it was a diminishment of Christ’s status if he was depicted as a black person”. Dina Cormick provides us with many examples of the innovative alternatives that Gwensa and Xulu created. It might be that a work like Ruben Xulu’s charming *Mary the Young Mother*, a youthful Zulu woman, barefoot and in a short modern dress and doek, carrying on her hip a lusty toddler who clutches a piece of sugar cane, would seem to some too plebian a representation of the Mother of God (although there are many “peasant” Madonnas sanctioned in Western art, in the paintings of Caravaggio and Rembrandt, for example).

But the image of Mary in traditional Zulu dress, as the principal wife of the chief presenting her firstborn in the guise of a diminutive Zulu warrior in *Nina weghawe sikulekele (Mother of the Hero)* at Njengabantu (Fig 3) gives the Madonna all the regal dignity of a medieval Queen of Heaven – in African terms.

Christian artists of Natal shows us that Africanizing religious art does not mean that the richness of the imagery has to be devalued in some way, although it does not have the established heritage of European Christian subject matter to draw on, but must invent its own forms. Not only can these forms communicate more directly with an African audience than obscure European iconography, but their inventiveness can impart a fresh vigour to old themes. For example, while it has been customary for Christian artists to couple the death and resurrection of Christ with time-honoured Old Testament proto-



Fig 4: Ruben Xulu: Jonah and the whale. Paschal candlestick. Oak, 134cm.

types (such as Jonah’s ingestion and miraculous “rebirth” from the belly of the whale), Bernard Gwensa presents an African analogy for the sacrifice of *The Crucifixion* when he couples with it a depiction of *The Uganda Martyrs* on the door panels of the chapel at St Peter’s Seminary, Hammanskraal. Neither are old themes neglected, but reinterpreted, as in Xulu’s triumphant Zulu *Jonah*, who emerges from the mouth of a vertical fish form to hold aloft the Easter candle at the Church of St Joseph, Seven Oaks (Fig 4).

Dina Cormick’s book with its profusion of illustrations offers us many wonderful examples like these to ponder on, and supplies careful documentation about each work and its whereabouts. I could have wished that she had supplied a map also, for this reader felt inspired, as I am sure others will, to retrace the author’s pilgrimage, and see the works for herself. Surely no greater compliment can be paid to the author and the artists.

(This review first appeared in the in the South African Catholic quarterly, *Trefoil*, no 3, 1993; P O Box 5141, Johannesburg, 2000.)

(Elizabeth Rankin)

BOOKSHELF

Aids in the world: A global report edited by Jonathan Mann, Daniel J M Tarantola and Thomas W Netter. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992, 1037 pp. ISBN 0 674 01266 6

AIDS in the World is the first analysis of the global confrontation with AIDS. By explaining the roots of individual and collective vulnerability to the pandemic, it sets the stage for a revolutionary personal, community and international response to the AIDS crisis. This book provides the data, projections and information critical to analysing where we are going – information basic to a new global vision for a world confronting AIDS.

Social structure and rural development in the Third World by Guy Berger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 186 pp. ISBN 0 521 39258 6

Rural development is linked crucially with social structure, though the latter is often difficult to analyse. This book analyses rural classes and the diverse relations between producers in order to understand the relationship between Third World farmers and the international economy, and the significance of this for development and underdevelopment. The author introduces a number of theoretical distinctions and devises a systematic framework which is applied to the analysis of a range of rural producers. The book assesses a number of strategies employed in planned development in the light of their implications for rural social structure, and thus for development in the Third World.

The end of superpower conflict in the Third World edited by Melvin A Goodman. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992, 188 pp. ISBN 0 8133 8046 4

In the aftermath of the Cold War, tensions between the United States and the former Soviet Union have eased as both superpowers pursue lower-cost, lower-risk foreign policies. Although there were examples of tacit co-operation between the two superpowers in the 1970s era of *détente*, that co-operation has now become explicit in the 1990s – as was visibly illustrated by the Persian Gulf crisis. Taking a region-by-region approach, this book examines the opportunities for settling conflicts in the Third World as the US and Commonwealth governments take the first steps toward a post-Cold War partnership. The book also assesses the impact of the abortive coup and the restructuring of the Soviet Union on the ability of Russia and the Commonwealth to play a major diplomatic role on the international scene.

Structural adjustment and the environment edited by David Reed. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1992, 209 pp. ISBN 1 85383 153 0

During the 1980s, over 60 developing countries underwent structural adjustment programmes as part of a major shift to policy-based lending by the World Bank and the IMF. Their economic and social consequences have been profound and controversial. However, one vital area that was not considered when the policies were devised, and not analysed since, is their impact on the environment and sustainable development.

In this book the first major attempt is made to examine the environmental effects of structural adjustment programmes. Through detailed case studies and global analysis, prepared with the help of the London Environmental Economics Centre, it evaluates the aims, methods and consequences of the adjustment programmes in terms of what they might contribute to human needs and environmental protection. According to the authors the results are far from encouraging – structural adjustment has failed both to protect the environment and to promote sustainable development. Nevertheless, structural adjustment remains the principal vehicle for restructuring struggling economies, and failure to appreciate its environmental impact will only help to perpetuate the social and economic trends that have already generated environmental problems of crisis proportions on the globe. This book argues instead for a thorough revision of development policy, including basic institutional changes, reforms in lending priorities and increased democratization of the development process.

Making a difference: NGOs and development in a changing world edited by Michael Edwards and David Hulme. London: Earthscan Publications, 1992, 240 pp. ISBN 1 85383 144 1

Today, NGOs are a major feature on the international development scene. Their number, size and influence continue to grow in response to increasing funding from Northern donors and the prominence given to the voluntary sector in current political thinking. Yet there is currently little information available on the implications of these changes and many NGOs have no clear view of how to maximize their contribution to the alleviation of poverty. *Making a difference* aims to enhance the effectiveness of the work of NGOs by encouraging them, their staff and their supporters to examine the different ways in which they can increase their impact. Comprising a range of essays from experts recognized for their experience in NGOs and the voluntary sector, it reviews the strengths,

weaknesses, problems and opportunities presented by the different options available to NGOs and illustrates them with a wide range of specific case studies.

Managing sustainable development by Michael Carley and Ian Christie. London: Earthscan, 1992, 303 pp. ISBN 1 85383 129 8

The emergence of worldwide environmental threats such as global warming and ozone depletion has brought a growing realization of the overwhelming need for “sustainable development”. But there is little discussion on how this elusive process might be achieved and *managed*. What kind of organization is best suited to the task of sustainable environmental management? How can consensus be forged on reconciling development and environmental quality? What kind of management is needed in a world where environmental problems spill across political, administrative and disciplinary boundaries?

This book examines the managerial and organizational dimension of sustainable development. It analyses the challenges posed by environmental problems to political culture and organizational structure in industrial societies, and identifies the roots of ecological problems in our economic and social systems. New approaches are needed, and the authors identify the action-centred network as a key innovation in environmental management. The book describes four initiatives in integrated environmental management, from the local to the national level, that show how the network approach can offer progress towards development that is sustainable.

Politics and economic development in Nigeria (African Modernization and Development Series) by Tom Forest. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, 254 pp. ISBN 0 8133 8096 0

Since the end of the civil war in 1970, Nigeria has struggled to build a stronger federal centre and to reduce conflicts that have arisen from uneven development and from ethnic, regional, class and religious differences. This book provides a comprehensive account of the dynamic interplay between the political and economic forces that have shaped government policies, institutions and the pattern of development in Africa's most populous country. In identifying the major issues and challenges in Nigerian politics, particular attention is given to the evolution of the federal system, patterns of political competition and the nature of ruling groups. The links among political demands and incentives, economic strategy and capitalist development are examined. A final section analyses the evolution of economic policy and performance, looking specifically at the impact of large oil revenues, agrarian policy and the programme of economic liberalization. The author concludes with a discussion of the structural adjustment programme and its relation to the transition to civilian rule.

Understanding the New World Order edited by Jide Owoeye. Ibadan: College Press, 1993, 300 pp. ISBN 978 2194 03 1 (Hc)

Twenty-one experts analyse the origin and consequences of the post-Cold War international order for the major countries, regions and blocs, both at the centre and peripheries of the new global configuration. Contributors: Butros Ghali, Zbigniew Brezinski, Bolaji Akinyemi, James Ritcher, Noam Chomsky, Young Whan Kihl, Benedict Anderson, Colin Legum, Yochi Funabashi, Christopher Coker, Kimberly Elliot, James Mayall, Morten Ougaard, James Schlesinger, Allan Henrikson, Arie Kacowicz, Jorgen Pederson, Francois Heisbourg, James Anderson, Walden Bello and Eric Blantz.

Nigeria in international institutions edited by Jide Owoeye. Ibadan: College Press, 1993, 200 pp. ISBN 978 2194 01 8 (Hc)

This volume explores how international institutions like the UN, IMF, Commonwealth, OAU, OPEC, ECOWAS, etc. of which Nigeria is a member, have been coping with challenges in the past. More relevantly, what diplomatic strategies has Nigeria employed to ensure that its national interests are protected as it participates in these multilateral agencies? And, in the more complex emerging post-Cold War world order, how will Nigeria deal with the new challenges in these international organizations and institutions? What domestic resources can it mobilize to register a more effective participation in international organizations? This and other questions are addressed very critically in this new book. Contributors: Humphrey Asobie, George Obiozor, R A Akindele, Tunde Adeniran, Amadu Sesay, Jinmi Adisa, Ogban Iyam, Sola Akinrinade, Said Adejumobi, Musa Abutudu, Nereus Nwosu and Okechukwu Ibeanu.

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
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