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CommentPost-Referendum South Africa and Africa — *Erich Leistner* 82**International affairs**The new world order: Regional and international implications for Southern Africa — *Dr Simon Baynham* 84Botswana's foreign policy and the exit of superpowers from Southern Africa — *Prof James Zaffiro* 95**Politics**The potential for conflict in Africa — *Prof Jeffrey Herbst* 105**NGOs**No perfect path: Co-operation for development — *Dr Robin Lee* 110NGO and the public sector co-operation: When there's a common will, there's a way — *Mary Honey* 116**Development economics**Development economics and policies to promote peace in South Africa — *Dr Stef Coetzee* 121**Urbanization**Size relationships in the urban system of Malawi — *Dr D W Myburgh and Prof J A van Zyl* 128**Forests**Africa's rain forests: Preserving Africa's rich heritage — *Denis Fair* 134**Famine**The political economy of famine: An African perspective — *Apollo Rwomire* 142**Africa monitor** — *Marita Snyman* 146

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Post-referendum South Africa and Africa

Erich Leistner

Several African states were very relieved at the outcome of the South African referendum on 17 March 1992. They had feared that a "No" vote would plunge South Africa into civil war, which, inevitably, would have had serious repercussions for them as well. The overwhelming "Yes" vote, however, will greatly speed up the normalization of relations between South Africa and the rest of the continent.

Developments that seemed unthinkable a few months ago, are now taking place:

South Africa is already officially represented in more than twenty African countries;

President de Klerk's visit to Nigeria in April this year has opened up the prospect of vastly increased trade and technical co-operation between the two foremost countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Even before this important visit, Nigeria had indicated a desire to include South Africa in a five-point continental economic power-grid once OAU sanctions are lifted;

South Africa and Kenya are about to lay the foundations for an Africa-wide consumer union, which, ultimately, is to become the continent's voice in international consumer matters;

the biggest exhibition ever of South African products abroad will take place at the end of June this year when South Africa will participate in the Contact Kenya show; from Mauritius it is reported that the Indian Ocean countries are keen to form an Indian Ocean Rim economic grouping, similar to that of the Pacific Rim, which apart from South Africa would include India, Kenya and other East African countries;

South Africa's Eskom has recently concluded an agreement with its Ivorian counterpart for the exchange of technical information and consulting services, and for co-operation in construction projects, maintenance and staff training;

Several Western countries have announced they will offer South Africa development packages to help it through the transition period.

These and other positive developments are likely to arouse euphoric expectations of profitable and cordial relations between a "new" South Africa and the rest of Africa.

No doubt there will be many opportunities to establish such relations. At the same time, however, closer contact can easily lead to friction and conflicts that could sour relations and deprive those concerned of the benefits of co-operation.

Potential areas of friction

Tension could arise from the widely-held belief that South Africa disposes of boundless wealth and could readily take over from Western countries the role of Africa's foremost purveyor of aid and investment funds. Frank communication will be essential to make it clear to other African countries that South Africa's resources are not even sufficient to meet the daunting social and economic tasks it has to address at home.

Trade is another potential source of friction. Many South African exports of manufactured goods may not be competitive on overseas markets but they could easily ruin a number of factories in Zimbabwe, Kenya and other African countries. Before long, African trading partners can be expected to complain about their persistently highly unequal balance with the Republic – in 1990, for example, South African exports to Africa amounted to about R12 billion (including at least R8 billion to members of the Southern African Customs Union) against imports from Africa of a little over R2 billion.

Even today, South Africa is attracting vast numbers of unskilled workers from neighbouring countries and highly trained people from all over Africa. Their numbers are bound to grow in years to come and may well lead to friction between South Africa and the countries of origin, which cannot be happy about losing skilled manpower. And, in view of the high level of unemployment in South Africa, the possibility of violence between local people and immigrants cannot be discounted.

Neighbouring countries fear that an internationally accepted South Africa will attract overseas aid and investment at their expense. Members of the SADCC in particular are well aware that to a significant extent the West's support for the organization served to retain a Western foothold in Southern Africa while close ties with South Africa caused international embarrassment. Besides, Western donors have become more openly critical of the SADCC's performance.

Lastly, close personal and professional interaction with independent African countries will be a new experience for many South Africans, an experience for which they have been ill prepared by three decades of isolation from most of Africa and four decades of apartheid at home. They must be wary lest, unconsciously, their attitude suggests that "We have come to help you to get things done at last".

Many actual or potential areas of friction can be avoided if one is aware of them. Some, however, are of a structural nature, notably those associated with economic relations, and call for a thoughtful approach. In respect of trade and cross-border labour issues in particular, it will be important to remember that South Africa, in its own interest, will have to make concessions to have prosperous and stable neighbours.

Preparing for new regional relations

Both the SADCC and PTA (the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa) expect the "new" South Africa to join them as members, and hope that South Africa will provide significant growth impulses to their member countries. Important Western interests, including the European Community and the World Bank, also hope that South Africa will play a significant role in promoting the development of the region.

It is against this background that South Africa will soon be faced with the need to institutionalize its political and economic relations with Africa generally and Southern Africa in particular.

South African government departments, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Africa Institute, the ANC and also the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and other organizations are studying the issue and preparing proposals.

Although these are still relatively early days, one can observe a growing consensus to the effect that the situation in Southern Africa is too complex to lend itself to grandiose, comprehensive schemes modelled on the European Economic Community. Even under less complex conditions such schemes have failed, or failed even to get off the ground, elsewhere in Africa.

At the same time, there is little doubt that if South Africa were to join the SADCC and/or PTA in their present form, this would cause more problems than it would eliminate. The situation calls for a highly pragmatic, step-by-step approach, beginning with an economic forum where the major regional players, assisted by experts from the EC, World Bank and ADB, would deliberate on institutional arrangements tailored to the region's needs. This could be followed by sectoral conferences to devise practical measures for co-operation in their respective fields.

In designing effective institutions, Southern African countries can draw on a great deal of pertinent experience gained by the SADCC, notably its Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), Sarccus (the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil) and many other formal and informal co-operation arrangements between South Africa and its neighbours.

The new world order: Regional and international implications for Southern Africa

Dr Simon Baynham of the Africa Institute looks at Southern Africa in the context of the new world order.

Although we often refer to the notion of an international system, we should never assume that this is in any sense a fixed or static entity. The briefest study of international politics over the past century or two, for instance, immediately illustrates its dynamic qualities. In the eighteenth century, the system consisted principally of a number of European states, all in search of a balance of power through a series of shifting alliances. The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of nationalism and political ideology, together with the collapse of some states and the birth of others.

The twentieth century has seen an even greater acceleration in the pace of such global change. World War I acted as a catalyst for nationalist aspirations and increased demands for self-determination; non-European states such as the USA, China and Japan became more important; and the USSR – founded on a new revolutionary ideology – emerged as a major world power. Since World War II, independence has been extended to the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, with the result that there has been a proliferation of new states from about 50 in 1945 to more than 170 today.

The post-1945 settlement: Cold War to détente

The bipolar international order that emerged from World War II, and that took its definitive military shape with the establishment of Nato and the Warsaw Pact, was characterized by systemic conflict – a stark contrast between two completely different socio-political and economic orders. This East-West dichotomy was at the heart of international affairs for more than four decades.

By 1946, relations between the Soviet Union and her former Western allies had already moved towards a state later to be described as the Cold War. There has been much disagreement both on the nature of the Cold War and when it actually began. However, most analysts agree that the term describes an ideological confrontation in which a

mixture of hostility, fear, suspicion and uncertainty comprised the basic ingredients, but where the adversarial relationship stopped short of direct military conflict.

Nevertheless, in practical terms, military prowess constituted the crucial element of the power equation. For as Winston Churchill – who coined the term “iron curtain” – noted in Missouri, USA, in March 1946:

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire as much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect than military weakness.

He then went on to urge the West to respond with firmness to Soviet pressure.

The result was an arms race in which Washington’s military superiority across the spectrum of deterrence in the 1950s and early 1960s gave way, incrementally, to virtual nuclear parity in the late 1960s (by 1967 both superpowers had developed an invulnerable second strike capability, marking a new era of strategic stalemate). In consequence, the concept of coexistence and détente emerged, but there was grave concern in some West European circles that détente was in fact weakening the West and proving to be a danger to security. As the 1970s wore on, the Americans became increasingly alarmed by the modernization of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and by the rapid build-up of the Soviet fleet (for instance, by 1976 Moscow had accumulated 188 nuclear submarines, 46 carrying strategic nuclear missiles).

These developments gave Moscow the confidence and the ability to project itself further afield – not least in Africa. In December 1975, with a Soviet naval escort, the first Cuban forces landed in Angola and in 1976 others moved into Ethiopia. There was alleged Soviet and Cuban involvement in the 1978 Katangan rebels’ offensive launched into Zaire from Angola; and in 1977/78 there was massive Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa on behalf of the Ethiopian regime. Growing Soviet influence in South-East Asia – and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 – reinforced the

view that Moscow had no intention of modifying its global designs in order to reduce real or potential conflict.

Ronald Reagan's election as president of the United States reflected a new popular view to forego détente and arms control in order to contain, confront and "punish" the Soviets. Soon after his inauguration, he reversed Jimmy Carter's decision not to deploy the MX missile and authorized the production of the B-1 bomber and the neutron bomb. A little later (in March 1983), he announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), immediately dubbed "Star Wars" by the world press. The new administration increased defence expenditure by 13 per cent in 1982 and a further 17 per cent in 1983. There was also talk in US military circles of "winning" a limited nuclear war in Europe, which – together with Reagan's description of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 – contributed to a further deterioration in relations between the two superpowers. In addition, on regional issues President Reagan (in what became known as the "Reagan Doctrine") stated quite firmly that Washington would support anti-communist guerrillas in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the serious deterioration in superpower relations, which saw the beginning of a new Cold War comparable with that of the late 1940s and early 1950s, gradually gave way to a second era of détente. It was presaged by Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary following President Chernenko's death in March 1985 and by a superpower summit in Geneva at the end of the same year. The cost of entering into a new technological arms race including SDI research – together with Moscow's serious and escalating economic problems – had forced the USSR back to the arms control negotiating table. The result was the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of December 1987, the first arms control agreement under which an entire system of weapons was banned. This laid the foundations for subsequent discussions on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and talks on a ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons which continue to this day.

Apart from the factors already mentioned, the collapse of the Soviet Union's empire in Eastern Europe, and the eventual disintegration of the USSR itself, was triggered by (and in a major sense can be dated to) the Politburo's decision not to take military action against democratic domestic reform in its Warsaw Pact allies as had occurred in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1981).

Southern Africa: War and peace

President Reagan's second presidential term coincided with a second era of détente that had an indelible impact on Southern Africa. For many years, of course, this region was a key arena of superpower competition and conflict. After patiently building up its political and diplomatic position in Africa during the 1960s, the USSR emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as the chief supplier of armaments to revolutionary regimes in Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, Soviet arms shipments to these two countries were only exceeded, in Africa, by those to Ethiopia. The massive communist arms build-up in the region was accompanied by an influx of East bloc military advisers and thousands of Cuban soldiers acting as proxies for Moscow.

On the other side of the battle-lines stood South Africa and the United States, who backed the rebels in Mozambique (Renamo), and especially Unita in Angola, with both covert and overt military assistance. By mid-1986, Pretoria's assistance to Unita alone reportedly totalled over US\$1 billion.

For as long as the Cold War bipolar international order persisted, the two major powers could be more or less relied upon to automatically take opposing sides in Third World conflicts – as they did in Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua. But the old world rivalry disappeared in the late 1980s: superpower military conflict gave way to diplomatic co-operation as communism began to die by its own hand. The collapse of centrally planned socialist structures in Eastern Europe, and changes in Soviet foreign policy, fundamentally altered the international context in which Southern African issues may now be (and are being) resolved.

By 1988 – and in a striking departure from previous policy – the two superpowers, in a new spirit of détente, at last concluded that the problems of Southern Africa could not be settled through foreign military intervention, but only through a combined international effort to seek peace through negotiations. As Joachim Krause and Klaus von der Ropp wrote last year:

In the second half of 1988, American, Soviet and British secret diplomacy successfully managed to persuade Angola, South Africa and Cuba to conclude the [December 1988 New York Accords].¹

This paved the way for the independence of Namibia in March 1990 and the subsequent withdrawal of all South African and Cuban troops from Angola.

Fourteen months later, just after Namibia's first anniversary of independence in March last year, another breakthrough was achieved when top US and Soviet officials brought their respective Angolan partners to the negotiating table – consequently bringing the 16-year-old civil war in Angola to a tentative end.

Three tendencies paved the way for the resolution of the inter-related conflicts in south-western Africa. The first and most critical of these was the growing convergence of interests between Washington and Moscow during the Gorbachev era of new thinking. Both countries decided it was in their mutual interests to extricate themselves from an increasingly costly adventure. The change in the Soviet approach was crucial. The new thinking stemmed from the domestic weaknesses of the USSR and Moscow's military overcommitments and setbacks overseas – not least in Afghanistan.

This superpower co-operation took place as it became increasingly obvious to Luanda and Pretoria that neither was going to emerge victorious. The MPLA (backed up by a Cuban force that numbered only hundreds in 1975 but which had steadily increased to at least 50 000 by 1988) gradually and grudgingly concluded that while they might contain, they could not defeat, the combination of Unita and its American and South African backers. Meanwhile, the SADF's military edge was being eroded as Cuban reinforcements moved south, protected against Mirage aircraft by a formidable combination of Soviet-supplied static and mobile radar, surface-to-air missiles and MiG-23 *Flogger* fighters. This deadly air-defence network – which enabled Angola to scramble MiG and Sukhoi interceptors with a generally superior performance to the bulk of Pretoria's warplanes – turned the tables on a South Africa severely handicapped by an

ageing fleet of fighters. This disadvantage was largely the consequence of the international arms embargo.² At the same time, Pretoria faced a stalemate in Namibia, where Swapo's political strength and military weakness were matched by South Africa's political weaknesses and military strength. Swapo was unable to break the South African grip on the territory but neither was South Africa able to destroy Swapo. In short, an escalating military-political stalemate existed in both Angola and Namibia.

Thirdly, and linked to the above, economic factors were taking their toll. For the MPLA (which was spending half of its revenues on security), the economic screws were tightened as the country – which earns 85 per cent of its export revenue from petroleum – watched global prices fall. Simultaneously, Washington effectively vetoed Luanda's access to the World Bank and IMF. A combination of financial setbacks was also at work in South Africa. Since 1985 the South African economy has been under severe strain, the consequence of sanctions and disinvestment, drought, low productivity, declining bullion prices and debt repayment obligations.

In any case, and to sum up, the astonishing pace of change in South Africa itself was not possible until the problem of Namibian independence had been solved. And *that* depended on stopping the undeclared war in Angola which, in turn, rested on a commitment by the Soviets and Cubans to go home. One tends to forget how utterly impossible all this seemed only four short years ago.

The new world order

So much for the recent and the not so recent past. What seems clear now is that the world of the 1990s is going to be a great deal more complex – and possibly a lot more unstable – than in previous decades when the Cold War imparted a clarifying logic in which international politics could be reduced to a zero-sum game we could all understand. Soon we may be looking back with fondness at the predictable days of the Cold War. In the early post-war years, the global landscape could be described as bipolar, divided between East and West with Moscow and Washington leading two hostile camps in what was for them an unprecedented era of peace enforced by the mutual terror of mass destruction.

Forty years later, the world has been transformed into something more akin to a multipolar system. A North-South conflict between rich and poor states has developed and widened to match and eclipse the old East-West rivalry. Moreover, individual nations such as China and Japan, economic bodies such as the European Community (EC) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), and also multinational corporations, have grown in importance, exerting influence regionally as well as world-wide.

It is ironic too that the defeated countries of 1945 (Germany and Japan) are currently making a successful bid to translate their economic power into a greater political say in world affairs. The Bundesbank's action on DM interest rates, and Bonn's bullying of its EC neighbours on the recognition of Croatia, are just two recent examples of this. Despite these developments, implicit in President Bush's September 1990 address to Congress – when he spoke of a world *novus ordo* – was the premiss that the USA is the sole superpower in the newly constructed international system.

In one study,³ Northedge sets out three criteria determining

the status accorded to states in the international hierarchy or "pecking order" of power. Firstly, there is actual and measurable strength, calibrated in terms of population, size of territory, economic resources and military might. Secondly, Northedge suggests that a nation's position or standing is determined by its interests or stake in the international system. Thus, an acknowledged superpower should have worldwide interests that other members of the international system are not in a position to ignore. The final criterion is recognition of that status by other members in the system.

Northedge goes on to explain:

The world system of states is essentially a continuous self-assessing process: states are all the time taking stock of each other, sizing each other up in order to determine what degree of recognition to accord each other. Recognition of power status is a process of according deference to another state depending upon the extent to which its wishes have to be taken into account in reaching one's own decisions.⁴

Against the criteria offered by Northedge, there can be little doubt that the USA is the only country in the world with the complete mixture of economic, military and diplomatic power to qualify as a superpower today.

The collapse of the old international system – especially the three layers of the Soviet bloc (the outer one of Third World protectorates, such as Angola and Mozambique; the inner layer of East European satellites; and the core of the USSR itself)⁵ – makes it very difficult to identify what issues will preoccupy the global village of the future.

According to Benjamin:

The problems of war and peace and major power rivalry, whilst still dominant, no longer monopolize the international agenda. Issues such as economic interdependence, the future of the environment, nuclear proliferation, population growth and international debt, once condemned to the periphery, have thrust themselves onto the stage of world politics.⁶

As such, and despite some arguments to the contrary,

...it may be postulated that the new international configuration will be one in which greater consideration [than before] is given to issues associated with the Third World.⁷

The end of the Cold War and its impact on the creeping peace process in Southern Africa has already been addressed at some length. But in addition to this, I intend to discuss a number of other international tendencies and developments that have already begun to make their mark on Southern Africa and other regions of the Third World.

African winds of change: Democratization and conditionality

A key development of course has been an apparent – indeed an inexorable – global shift away from authoritarianism, and a virtual end to the international ideological struggle as between political pluralism and Marxism-Leninism, in favour of democracy and democratization. Political and economic reforms in the former USSR, and the rapid replacement of seemingly entrenched and highly repressive regimes in Eastern Europe, have had profound repercussions for Africa, catalysing demands for democratic reform and an end to single-party hegemony. In an era without precedent, oppressed peoples across Africa are throwing off the authoritarian yoke against the backdrop of a global democratic renaissance – which still, of course, has a long way to go.

Nevertheless, the 1980s have been characterized – perhaps somewhat prematurely – as marking “the end of history”, the ultimate victory of liberal democracy and market values over totalitarian ideologies and bureaucratic central planning. From Equatorial Guinea to Ethiopia, and from Morocco to Madagascar, Africa’s military and one-party dictatorships are under unprecedented attack from an increasingly impoverished and deeply disillusioned populace.⁸ This process is now unstoppable, but it could also have serious destabilizing consequences for the continent.

As I have noted elsewhere, advocacy and cajolery for a radical shake-up has also emanated from the Western countries, who “regard the implementation of multiparty politics and open government as a *sine qua non* for structural adjustment and improvements in the economic sphere”.⁹ Put another way, the twin processes of political reform and economic recovery are viewed by the West as inseparable.

Nevertheless, conditionality is not being restricted to the execution of structural adjustment programmes or to improvements in the field of human rights and proof of a commitment to multiparty democracy:

With the relaxation of East-West geopolitical tensions and the apparent end of the Cold War era, a new ... criterion is beginning to make itself apparent as a proviso for external assistance. The new litmus test relates to military spending.¹⁰

The OECD countries and agencies such as the World Bank and IMF are now taking the view that the new international climate provides real opportunities for African states to reduce military expenditures so that resources can be reallocated towards pressing welfare and economic needs. If the global community is able to create an enabling environment to make this possible, “bilateral and multilateral conditionality may be able to catalyse socio-economic development without reducing national security”.¹¹ Whether or not this is likely or possible, will be addressed below.

Africa’s “second liberation”: Stability or chaos?

If one looks back on the convulsions in recent African politics, what is significant is that in the twelve months between the June 1990 and June 1991 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summits, no less than nine African leaders lost their positions – the highest turnover since the OAU was created in 1963. More widely, political changes in Africa since 1989 had led to a doubling of the *de jure* multiparty states from 10 to 20 by the end of 1991. Another two dozen have committed themselves to democratic reform.

But although these developments have raised real hopes for the better governance of Africa (which is fundamental to any chance of sustained economic recovery), the surge towards political pluralism, and the metamorphosis of African countries away from authoritarian rule, will inevitably mean a painful and extended period of adjustment – with parallel problems relating to domestic and regional security.¹²

In Somalia, for example, the downfall of Siad Barre’s harsh regime has been replaced by murderous non-rule by competing armies in a country that once again openly reveals the grim reality of deep-seated interclan rivalry and suspicion. Elsewhere on the Horn, in Ethiopia, the ousting of Mengistu may yet represent something of a false dawn: armed bandits plague the south-eastern region of the country and in the north

millions are threatened with starvation”.¹³ At the same time, thousands of refugees are crossing from Somalia into Kenya and Ethiopia, exacerbating the Horn’s problems and imposing severe security stresses on the entire region.¹⁴

In Southern Africa, the possibility of similar levels of chaos during the next 5 to 10 years is not in the least remote – especially in Zaire, Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, entire communities have *already* been internally or externally displaced – most often into marginal areas in the countryside or into huge squatter camps on the edge of towns where they aggravate local demand for food, water and services and where diseases like cholera and physical degradation of the land are intensified. For instance, more than a million Mozambican refugees (*deslocados*) have fled across the border into Malawi, which the World Bank lists as the fourth poorest country in the world. These people now make up more than 10 per cent of Malawi’s 8 million population. By way of comparison, it is as if 25 million refugees had entered the USA during the past four years. The consequences for Malawi have been devastating – in terms of cost, the transmission of Aids and deforestation.

If Mobutu (or someone else) is unable to secure a peaceful transition to a new government acceptable to the majority of Zaireans, and if the peace processes in Mozambique and Angola turn sour, the ensuing conflict would have enormous economic and security implications for the other countries of Southern Africa. Thus, the issue is not just a humanitarian one. For as the UN Commissioner for Refugees, Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway put it recently: People regard refugees and refugee work as charity. It is not charity. It is part of our own future security.

What makes matters potentially worse for Southern Africa for the remainder of the 1990s and beyond is the accumulated proliferation of basic infantry weaponry in the subcontinent. Military sources estimate that as many as 1.5 million *Kalashnikov* rifles are circulating in Mozambique. On the Beira Corridor, one foreign businessman was recently offered an automatic rifle for one kilogram of sugar. In South Africa itself, AK-47s are selling for as little as R150, where they are fuelling the violence in the black townships.

One problem for Southern Africa, closely linked to the availability of weapons, is the status of demobilized troops and rebels following the formal end of hostilities. For example, what will ultimately happen to the 70 000 Fapla troops and 50 000 Unita guerrillas, the majority of whom are being demobilized? A serious danger is that groups of guerrillas or ex-soldiers will feel let down and disappointed by the lack of employment opportunities, and that they will use their military training and guns to go their own way. The same uncertainties apply to Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, to Namibia and South Africa.

As these countries move towards democratic pluralism on a continent where free elections were, until very recently, few and far between, there is a risk that the so-called “second liberation” will change not just the continent’s autocratic regimes but also Africa’s inherited international boundaries.¹⁵ This is especially so given the global community’s new tolerance for nationalist/secessionist aspirations, as seen by the recognition, *inter alia*, of Armenia, Croatia and Estonia.¹⁶

The likelihood of state collapse and secessionism in Zaire, together with the possibility of two or more states emerging in both Angola and Mozambique, suggest that a separation

along the lines of the Bangladesh breakaway from Pakistan could very well manifest itself in one or more Southern African states. In addition, a disintegrating Zaire could trigger a Congolese grab for oil-rich Cabinda (which produces half of Angola's oil) just as political turmoil in Tanzania might see the secession of Zanzibar from the Union.¹⁷

In short, and to conclude this part of the essay, the worldwide tendency towards political pluralism, and the renaissance of ethnic/nationalist sentiment (together with the sacrifices inherent in economic reform programmes), almost certainly mean that Africa can expect continued, indeed heightened, levels of turmoil during the next decade and beyond.

Marginalization?: A checklist of global players

Earlier, the impact for Africa of reform in the former Eastern bloc was noted. The positive result of the super-power *rapprochement* that paved the way for Namibia's independence and raised prospects for the end of other conflicts in the subcontinent was also emphasized. Yet the East European revolutions, and the sensational developments that have occurred in the international system, may have far-reaching and *negative* consequences for Africa.

There are at least three reasons for concern. Firstly, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe is turning out to be infinitely more challenging for the West than was anticipated two years ago. The stand-off between a number of CIS countries (for instance, the row between Russia and Ukraine over ownership of the Black Sea fleet), and the civil war in Yugoslavia, are just two instances of these concerns. Secondly, West European states are intensely preoccupied with the growing demands of economic and political integration, and there are plenty of non-EC countries knocking on the door to get in. Thirdly, the aftermath of the Gulf War, and the continuing crises relating to both Israel and Iraq, have ensured that the industrialized countries will make the strategic Middle East region their overseas priority for some years to come. Together with the global economic recession, these tendencies and developments have contributed to the marginalization of Africa.

Nevertheless, it would be rash to generalize about the intentions and actions of the outside world as if such a world represented some sort of cohesive whole. With this in mind, the rest of this section will examine the potential role of a number of players that are likely to figure prominently in African, and especially Southern African, affairs.

USA

A year or more ago, one leading African newsletter made the point that it was unlikely that James Baker spent even 5 per cent of his time thinking about Africa – and most of that would be devoted to Egypt.¹⁸ But the end of the Cold War has all but eliminated Washington's interest in most of Africa, which was in any case mainly based on containing Soviet influence and activities.

As one American analyst noted:

We can disengage from Zaire or Kenya or distance ourselves from the civil wars in Liberia, Sudan, and Somalia without worrying about the Soviet gaining (or even wanting to assume) anything like our influence or support role.¹⁹

This is why Mobutu's importance to Washington, for example, has been greatly diminished. On the other hand, the same observer added that there were now two new

justifications for US involvement and aid. Firstly, "that aid should be used to promote 'core values' (usually defined as democratization)". Secondly, "that aid should be used to promote U.S. exports".²⁰

The process of democratization in Southern Africa is well under way and one can expect selective increased US economic activity, for instance in Angola, where American businessmen will find themselves increasingly in competition with their South African counterparts. And at this juncture it is important to remind ourselves that, despite there being no diplomatic relations between Washington and Luanda, the USA is Angola's main trading partner. In fact, Angola is second only to Nigeria among US trading partners in Africa.²¹ Luanda's importance lies, *inter alia*, in the fact that known oil reserves are at least 2 billion barrels. Moreover, exploration has yet to begin on Angola's estimated 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas.

On the military side, the recent (January 1992) joint field exercises between 200 US Airborne/Special Forces troops and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) – "Operation Silver Eagle" – together with speculation that the soon-to-be-completed air facilities in Botswana will be leased to the US Force, and the announcement earlier this month that Washington would assume some new responsibilities for training Zambian army officers – suggest that US disengagement from the continent is not being contemplated across the board. This need not be regarded as threatening, since the Western powers may be thinking in terms of regional security co-operation – with the armed forces of a future South African government taking a leading role.

But the peace dividend resulting from the relaxation of East-West tensions may also have unexpected economic costs for the region. I refer, for instance, to the February 1992 announcement from the Pentagon of its intention to reduce the \$9 billion stockpile of strategic commodities by \$2.4 billion over the next few years. These commodities include large supplies of chromium, manganese and cobalt. Such reductions (not forgetting the potential for similar re-evaluations on the part of former Warsaw Pact and Nato countries) might have a significant impact on the export earnings of especially South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zaire.

Another potential threat is that a post-apartheid South Africa will be regarded by black caucus members of Congress as just another African state. Indeed, in a recent major article entitled "Setting global priorities", the editor of the influential *Foreign Policy* journal, William Hyland, fails to even mention sub-Saharan Africa, let alone South or Southern Africa. India and Iran get a mention but, with the exception of North Africa, there is not a single reference to the rest of the continent.²²

The CIS

For several decades, Soviet aid to the continent was motivated, primarily, by geopolitical interests: Soviet-African relations were characterized by ideological and strategic objectives that had priority over economic and commercial considerations. The days when Soviet military assistance dominated Moscow's overall aid outlay are now over; but this does not mean that economic aid is in the ascendant. Far from it: "In Moscow, as in Washington, the aid budget has become a target of the deficit-cutting effort".²³ Given the economic crises confronting the ex-Soviet states, this trend

towards aid fatigue will in all probability continue, but Moscow and the other CIS capitals will attempt to pick up the pieces and keep African friendships alive – though not, of course, by giving weapons.

As far as Russia (and also Ukraine and the others) is concerned, there can be no doubt that Southern Africa is virtually the only focus of interest south of the Sahara. As one scholar at Moscow's Africa Institute noted last year:

Soviet diplomats worked hard to ... secure Namibia's independence ... [and the] success of the Namibian negotiations encouraged greater interest in cooperative efforts to achieve peaceful solutions to other conflicts in the region, including the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. In a striking departure from past policy, Moscow now takes the position that the civil wars in these two countries can be resolved only by political and not by military means.²⁴

However, the removal of military assistance could, paradoxically, create something of a power vacuum in the region – as has clearly already occurred on the Horn of Africa. In addition, the severe reduction of Eastern bloc funding for scholarships and training will have important skilled manpower consequences for countries such as Angola and Mozambique.

A third uncertainty relates to the negative economic and social consequences involved in the repatriation of migrant labour – especially of Mozambicans from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). This will add yet another burden to the problems of the unfortunate Mozambicans, with ramifications for other countries in the region – especially South Africa.

One can certainly expect growing political interaction between Moscow and South Africa but also a major reduction in the ex-Soviet states' role in Angola. Quite simply, the CIS is not in a position to compete commercially with the sophisticated Western enterprises that already have a foothold in Angola. Nor will it secure repayment of the \$3 billion debt owed by Luanda. For the same reasons, I am somewhat sceptical about the development of major trading links between the CIS and Pretoria. Nevertheless, one can anticipate limited co-operation in the fields of minerals, metals and mining and in the exchange of information concerning the conversion of military technological capabilities to civilian applications.

Lastly, although the CIS countries are keen to sell some of their huge arsenals of military hardware to cash-buyers in Southern Africa, the prospects for such sales seem very slim a topic I shall return to later in this essay.

India

Very sensibly, India has now abandoned socialism and its previous negative attitude to foreign investment for a market-friendly, outward-looking economic policy that is already opening India's market of 200 million middle-class consumers to the outside world.

The country's growing economic base is reflected in the current expansion of its navy, with the likelihood that it will launch its own locally-built "Charlie" class nuclear-powered submarine by the turn of the century. With the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean may become something of a power vacuum which India, as a potential great power, would be keen to fill. The possibility of an Indian Ocean Rim economic bloc – similar to but smaller than the dynamic Pacific Rim – (taking in India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa) is also very much on the cards in the medium to longer term.

Iran

Iran is also expanding its naval, air and ground forces, with major new purchases from North Korea, China and the CIS. Teheran has recently bought three new "Kilo"-class diesel-electric submarines from the former USSR, and crews are currently undergoing training at Riga in Latvia. It is already evident that Iranian Islamic influence in the Sudan (where Teheran is re-arming the Khartoum authorities), and also in East Africa, is growing. On a different tack, South and East African business prospects in the Persian Gulf offer huge potential – especially in the sale of foodstuffs and fresh fruit. In this sense, the prospects for mutually beneficial relationships between South Africa and the Gulf states look very promising.

Brazil

Although Brazil is going through an economically difficult time and a period of socio-political instability, Latin America's largest state is gearing up for a major push into Southern Africa. Brasilia's two-way trade with South Africa was \$260 million in 1990 and over \$300 million last year. By 1994, it will probably reach \$500 million – the level in 1985 when the period of democratization and civilian rule had led to a hardening of attitudes towards Pretoria.²⁵

For historical and linguistic reasons, Brazil is Angola's largest partner in terms of financial aid and co-operation, and the Brazilians are pushing to expand their business activities in Angola (especially in the agricultural sector and in the rehabilitation of the transport infrastructure) through the creation of joint ventures with Portugal. Lisbon will also use South Africa for development projects in Angola – in line with other countries using South Africa for development and investment in Southern Africa.²⁶

Given that a large amount of Brazil's oil comes around the Cape, and that a much larger proportion will in future come from Angola, one can expect to see a lot more of the Brazilians in a South-South bridging exercise, which will reflect their perceptions of the south-east Atlantic as their "African frontier".²⁷

China

The People's Republic of China is another leading Third World country that will increasingly have a greater voice in international issues. Already a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has been predicted (by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy) that by the year 2010 China may become the world's second largest economic power. Currently, the southern provinces of China constitute the seventh largest economic bloc in the world; and the reintegration of Hong Kong in 1997, together with the possibility of reunification with Taiwan, will serve as further catalysts in the modernization process.

However, the suppression of the democracy movement in Beijing in June 1989 has delayed the economic reorganization of the world's most populous country (1,1 billion people) and it might be more realistic to see China only as an influential *regional* power rather than as a global one within the next decade or so.²⁸

For these reasons, and because Beijing is so distant from here, China is unlikely to effect Southern Africa very much one way or the other. For the next 5 to 10 years, South African relations with the Tiger economies of the Far East (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and so on) will reap much greater dividends than will accrue from the People's Republic.

Japan

In contrast with China, Japan is going to have a much greater impact on this part of the world. Japan's success story, of course, reads like a financial fairytale. In 1960, Japan's share of world GNP was 3 per cent (to the USA's 36 per cent). By 1986, it was 12 per cent (to the USA's 23 per cent). In 1980, the USA was the undisputed world leader in every broad measure of economic power.²⁹ Today, the Japanese economy is roughly half the size of its American counterpart (and certainly the most dynamic) while its industrial production has risen to approximately three-quarters of the US level. If past trends continue, it will be about 85 per cent of the US level by the year 2000.

Additionally, Japan has become the world's largest source of capital and Tokyo has a growing rather than a declining economic aid programme (over \$10 billion) that is already larger than the figure for the USA's official development assistance. As William J Barnds put it:

... it does not take profound insight to reach the conclusion that as countries become more dependent on Japan for economic aid, technical and private investment ... the U.S. leverage over developments in these countries will decline.³⁰

In Africa, Japan is now the biggest bilateral aid donor to Kenya, Zambia, Ghana and even Nigeria. Overall, Japanese bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa now ranks fourth after France, Italy and Germany and is ahead of both the USA and Britain. However, most of Japan's aid remains predominantly a loan programme – unlike, say, Britain's which is mostly in the form of grants.³¹

As is well known, the Japanese constitution proscribes military activity overseas, so Tokyo offers increased aid instead. In the past, Japan appeared happy to hide under US skirts on all the major international aid policy issues (structural adjustment and conditionality, debt relief, environmental protection, and so on) but Tokyo is now adopting international responsibilities, using development co-operation as a means of gaining global political influence and sustaining markets.³²

It is also beginning to impose linkages between aid and policy reform. At the same time, Japan (which spends 1,6 per cent and not 1,0 per cent of GNP on defence as is commonly assumed) is building the technological infrastructure for a modern armaments industry and increasing its defence budget each year.³³ It is also interesting to note that proposed legislation is currently before Parliament that would allow Japan to take part in UN peacekeeping operations abroad.³⁴

Although Japan does not aspire to replace the USA as the world's Number One (Tokyo will be happy to stay Number Two), South African leaders would be wise to give careful consideration to Japan's increasingly important role.

While South Africa accounts for less than 1 per cent of Japan's trade, "SA is still one of the most important trading partners for Japan" according to Yoshiaki Murakami, Japan's ambassador to Pretoria.³⁵ This is because Japan has virtually no natural resources, other than its enormous reservoir of human skills, and relies on South Africa's raw materials.

On the other side of the coin, South Africa needs Japanese technology and investment if economic growth is to meet political aspirations. Five years ago, Japan was South Africa's largest trading partner. Five years from now, Japan will probably push Britain, Germany and the USA aside to resume that status. But much depends on an orderly reform process and on an end to both political violence and labour instability in South Africa.

More widely, Japan regards South Africa as the gateway to trade with the rest of the region and there are advanced plans to establish regional business headquarters here by the turn of the century.

Europe

The main points to emphasize with regard to Western Europe's future interests and influence in Southern Africa are the following. First, the population of the EC countries is larger than that of the USA and more than twice the size of Japan's; the EC's GNP is 250 per cent larger than that of Japan and comparable to that of the USA.

The EC is already an economic superpower (and an enlarged EC would be an economic and demographic giant); but at the moment it behaves like a political dwarf, because of disagreements between European countries in the early years of economic and political union and a preoccupation with internal matters before international economic relations.

The major exception, of course, is EC concern for the monumental task confronting Eastern Europe and the CIS republics, which has captured the imagination of Western decision-makers. Concern about Eastern Europe will take precedence over the Third World, since it is clearly one of the EC's priority interests to have stable rather than unstable neighbours. This suggests that there is a danger of "crowding out".³⁶ Also, and as noted earlier, West European aid will be increasingly conditional upon democratic behaviour, human rights and other criteria.

But in the longer term, "a rise in *per capita* eastern European imports to western levels could represent a significant improvement" for Third World exporters. "The benefits would tend to accrue mainly to ... sub-Saharan Africa ... as it is still heavily dependent upon the export of traditional primary products".³⁷

But how important is Southern Africa to Western Europe? What is remarkable is that this region of apparently second-rank importance has attracted (and continues to attract) so much attention. In economic and geopolitical terms, Southern Africa is of some, though limited, importance.³⁸

Nevertheless, the subcontinent "consistently attracts a higher level of attention from [Western Europe] than any other Third World area except the Middle East. The reasons are complex, and owe more to politics than economics".³⁹ But militarily, and especially economically, South Africa is the giant not just of Southern Africa but of black Africa as a whole (South Africa's GNP is 50 per cent greater than that of its nearest rival, Algeria, and 2,5 times larger than those of Nigeria or Egypt). Looking at the continent as a whole, South Africa accounts for one-third of Africa's GNP.

For these reasons, and because South Africa has attractions for foreign investors (including a functioning free-market economy, technical and managerial know-how, a world-class transport system and a superb financial infrastructure) the EC countries hope that South Africa's real future role lies in the regeneration of a dying subcontinent and as a catalyst for a regional economic renaissance.

No country is pushing for a greater South African role in promoting regional prosperity and peace than Britain, which has interests in, and connections with, the Republic and the region exceeding those of any other state in the international community. For this reason, British diplomatic and military activity in Southern Africa is going to be an enduring feature of the regional scene throughout the rest of the 1990s.

Finally:

To the extent that South Africa is seen as promoting stability and development in the region, it can count on attracting private investments as well as financial and other support from Western governments and international agencies. The more this takes place, the stronger will market forces become in the South African economy. No less important: the closer South Africa becomes integrated into international economic and other networks, the more secure will democracy and human rights tend to be in the future South Africa.⁴⁰

International organizations

Space precludes more than a short section on the future role of international organizations in Southern Africa, but it now seems quite clear that

... existing tendencies of prescriptive involvement in the internal affairs of the Third World by international and multinational organizations such as the [IMF, World Bank and UN] are bound to intensify. Since such involvement has now apparently come to reflect that of a single dominant value system, as opposed to the previous situation of competing ideological systems, such intervention will marginally reduce the requirement for armed forces, strengthen the growth of democracy and a respect for human rights and hopefully reduce regional tensions. However in this same process Third World states will be threatened with a loss of freedom of action and independence. [In short], the era of true neo-colonialism may be just around the corner.⁴¹

In the future, Africa will have to listen, more than ever before, to the prescriptions of the IMF, which has rarely been in greater demand. Already heavily committed in Eastern Europe, the IMF has emerged as the West's principal instrument for assisting the transition to capitalism in formerly centrally planned economies. Indeed, the IMF and the World Bank have become the most important external economic forces in Africa. This trend is bound to intensify for the remainder of the 1990s.

In South Africa itself, the Fund is already influencing the economic debate by stating that redistribution of wealth through increased taxes will wreck South Africa's growth prospects. Mr Mandela and the ANC are being told that the same sanctions that were applied to Pretoria will be applied to a future government should it commit itself to a socialist economy.

With reference to the United Nations, one can hardly disagree with Mr Sergei Plekhanov (Deputy Director of the Moscow Institute for USA and Canadian Studies) when he argues that the problems that the UN has dealt with in the past may look insignificant compared with the massive global agenda facing us today.

Let's take the problem of relations between the North and the South. I think the United Nations is the only mechanism that can prevent the confrontation between East and West from being replaced by a North-South confrontation. The gap is growing between poor and rich nations, and the situation is intolerable. Another time bomb is foreign debt. We must use the United Nations to resolve these problems.⁴²

The vertical and horizontal proliferation of ABC weapons (atomic, biological and chemical), and the means to launch them, also raise questions of collective security; and the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other key powers, have a common interest in preventing their proliferation. It is estimated that 15 countries could have the capability to manufacture ballistic missiles by the turn of the century. In the 1990s, therefore, we can expect a much tougher attitude on this question, especially from Washing-

ton, which sponsored the multilateral effort to stem this tide through the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Thus, the end of the Cold War does not mean a world at peace. On the contrary, there is still a security threat to Western countries from the retention of nuclear weapons by the CIS states and from the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology from them and others to unstable regimes in the Third World. There is also concern about over-stocked conventional military hardware in the former Warsaw Pact states finding its way to the world's conflict areas. For these reasons, there can be no doubt that the machinery of an American dominated UN will be heavily geared to increasingly interventionist anti-proliferation and arms control verification programmes.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the main target to feel the heat will be Armscor. But given the Corporation's importance to South Africa as an export earner, a solution of sorts might be found in a *quid pro quo* in which the armaments embargo against South Africa is dropped in return for a policy of responsible and open arms exports on the part of Armscor. More widely, the UN's threats of unspecified "serious consequences" – including the use of force – against Baghdad, will serve as a useful indicator of UN intentions and credibility in Third World hot-spots. Finally, South Africa's decision to sign the NPT – and the fact that no country in Africa (and this includes Libya) will be permitted to produce even a crude nuclear device in the next 15-20 years – suggests that the vision of a militarily nuclear-free continent will become a reality.

The threat

The final part of this article will focus on a variety of threats facing South and Southern Africa. Every state in the global system is confronted with a range of security dilemmas, but it is important not to conceptualize security in purely politico-military terms.

For most of the world's population, the term also embodies food security, job security, resource security and other associated aspects [in] the everyday life of human beings.⁴³

Such issues constitute the most basic threats to the health and very survival of many Third World populations and to the subsequent stability of these states and their neighbours. In addition, and because of the growing interdependence of the global system, local and regional disorders have wider repercussions for the stability of the world at large.

Modern states are threatened from without (by the possibility of external aggression) and from within (by the possibility of internal subversion). In the West, threats to the security of the state usually emanate from the international environment; but many developing countries confront both external threats to their sovereignty and security, and a variety of domestic challenges to their ruling élites and to their territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, a variety of threats in the modern world are common to both the industrialized countries and to the developing ones. Pandemic diseases such as Aids, international terrorism, the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, and environmental destruction, are just some of the ones that come to mind.

With this in mind, a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional menaces threaten South Africa and the region. But let me begin my ten-point list on an optimistic note, because the prognosis for the 1990s is not all gloom and doom.

- In a lecture two years ago, I pointed to the continuing danger of a sustained build-up, especially in qualitative terms, of high-tech (mainly Soviet) military hardware in nearby states.⁴⁴ That assessment now needs to be substantially revised with regard to the remainder of the 1990s. Even if the Russian and other CIS countries are willing to sell weapons for the hard currency they so desperately need, they will have considerable difficulties in finding markets in Southern Africa.⁴⁵
- On the other hand, the proliferation of small-arms in the subcontinent, and their use for political and criminal purposes, will represent a real threat to the region for many years to come. Within South Africa, the availability of such weaponry will continue to fuel ethnic and ideological conflicts as well as antagonisms between the haves and the have-nots. And an escalation of violent crime will increase the risk of white emigration, to the detriment of the economy as a whole.
- A third challenge relates to the arms embargo against South Africa, which, even when lifted, will almost certainly result in periods – perhaps prolonged – where specific categories of military equipment become obsolete. This is a very real security dilemma for South Africa.⁴⁶
- In terms of resources for the armed forces of the future, whereas one can be reasonably certain that more money spent on health services will improve the quality of life in a given area, it is less easy to demonstrate that higher cash allocations for defence will make a state more secure. Indeed, there may even be circumstances in which enhanced military capacity diminishes security by altering the regional balance of power. By the same token, too little spent on deterrence and defence may ultimately prove very costly. Just as South Africa wants to see stability across its borders, so a stable South Africa is in the security interests of its neighbours.
- Unfortunately, the continuing civil war in Mozambique – and the potential for increased political strife in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire (but also of course in Angola and Malawi) – all threaten South Africa's security. As discussed earlier, the borders of the world's states are not immutable and the international community is much more willing to contemplate (and be favourably disposed to) secessionist tendencies and self-determination than before, especially where it is apparent that the core is unable to sustain its regions. Croatia has been recognized and, *de facto*, so has Eritrea. So why not Shaba and other parts of Africa? Associated with this point are the social and economic problems that would (and, indeed, already do) spill over the borders into the Republic: rebel bands, refugees and the like. Just look at Malawi, where as previously noted, a tenth of its inhabitants are escapees from the economically ravaged territory of Mozambique. "Herein lies the potential for an even more fundamental Catch-22: political instability inhibiting economic growth, and declining economic performance exacerbating political instability."⁴⁷

The refugee threat is closely linked to demographic problems, threats to the environment, famine and poverty. Let me deal with these three interrelated issues in turn.

- Population growth is one of Southern Africa's biggest problems and the outlook must be considered very bleak

indeed. This is because several of the region's states cannot support their *present* populations, let alone greater numbers. Despite some encouraging successes in family planning, the populations of Southern Africa have a youthful profile and hence a built-in demographic momentum. Thus the period to the year 2000 could witness massively high levels of unemployment and enormous pressures from landless migrants – both inside the region's states and across the borders of Southern Africa.

For this reason South Africa – which will also have growing millions of nothing-to-lose dispossessed citizens – must ask itself a basic question: what are the prospects for future illegal immigration? A realistic outlook over the next 5 to 10 years is that several of South Africa's neighbours will be more impoverished than they are today. If economic decline, famine and political unrest continue (as they surely will), new waves of immigrants will flow southwards, adding to the havoc of uncontrolled population movements and to the Republic's instability and insecurity. These concerns also apply to a number of other states in the region.

- As we are becoming acutely aware, our planet is increasingly interdependent environmentally as well as economically. The fragile environment of Southern Africa is also a matter of great concern – not just aesthetically but also in terms of development and regional security. When overpopulation and environmental degradation stunt economic growth, all too often the result is civil turmoil and outright violence, either within a country or with neighbouring ones. For this reason, the linkage between environmental conservation and aid – which will be a major feature of international relations and conditionality in the 1990s – should be viewed as benign and not as a threat. This also goes for the protection of wildlife and the coastline, key factors in drawing tourists to Southern Africa, where the potential for the industry is enormous.⁴⁹

Although environmental conditionality will be regarded by many Third World countries as an unwarranted intrusion on their sovereignty, the 1990s will see the widespread use of outside environmental audits in South Africa as well as "debt-for-nature" swaps, as arranged for Mexico in 1991.

- I believe it is no exaggeration to say that, on the agenda of economic issues facing the global community, few challenges appear more daunting or less tractable than the festering problem of Third World debt. South Africa's debt is not large (the ratio of debt to GNP in 1990 was 19 per cent, the average for the Third World is 230 per cent) but it is in the South Africa's vital interests to push for debt relief for her neighbours. In a very real sense one keystone to South Africa's security is economic recovery in the subcontinent. Put another way, South Africa needs to boost the income-earning capacity of her neighbours through regional co operation for the benefit of all concerned.
- Intraregional competition for water resources could also materialize in Southern Africa. As early as the mid-1980s, the US intelligence community estimated that there were at least 10 places in the world – 4 of them in Africa – where war could break out over dwindling shared water.⁵⁰

Egypt, for instance, is threatened by Ethiopia, which controls the Blue Nile tributary that is the source of

approximately 80 per cent of the Nile water entering Egypt. Egypt has virtually no rainfall, but Addis Ababa has regularly asserted that it feels at complete liberty to divert up to 40 per cent of the Blue Nile's water for new settlements. Naturally, this prospect alarms Cairo; and as the then Egyptian foreign minister, Butros Ghali, stated: "The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not over politics."⁵¹

Frictions based on the competition for water in an overpopulated Southern Africa could also assume strategically-important proportions during the next decade.

- Ninth on the agenda offered here is the global problem of drug-use and drug-trafficking, which represents a serious challenge in this region and for South Africa in particular. The abuse of narcotics greatly affects the Third World, where up to 20 per cent of the world's 40 million illicit-drug users live.⁵² Already, considerable quantities of Mandrax are trafficked from India to South Africa; and cocaine – which until a year ago had not been a problem here – has the potential of becoming as big a crisis as dagga and Mandrax. Ever since the anti-cocaine war against the drug barons in Colombia, South Africa has been at the top of the list as an import area.⁵³

As two recent reports note,⁵⁴ as well as causing widespread suffering and deaths among addicts, the drug trade engenders corruption and violence, and many addicts resort to theft and prostitution to support their habit. It also diverts national resources away from other important social requirements. In some countries, it is destabilizing the entire economy, forcing the state to spend exorbitant sums on security and threatening the fabric of society and political security.

In addition, there is increasing alarm about the growing collusion between the international drug trade and terrorist organizations.⁵⁵ Also, in Southern Africa, much of the illicit drug trade can be attributed to currency devaluations which make money an increasingly meaningless medium of exchange. Drugs can do the job instead. Also, it should be stressed that a Southern African state heads the list of drug-trafficking countries on this continent. That country is Zambia.

The basic challenge for South African policy-makers, therefore, is to fashion a strategy that addresses both the demand and supply side of the equation in co-operation with the international community. No other approach will offer anything more than momentary relief. Finally, under this heading, it should be noted that heroin, cocaine, amphetamines and other drugs can be injected – a practice that when used with non-sterile needles presents a particular risk of infections, including the Aids (HIV) virus.

- On this question it has been argued that Southern Africa will not need a population policy in ten years time because Aids will do the job instead. But in a recent and much-publicized study, Professor Roy Anderson of Imperial College, London University, who has investigated the potential demographic impact of HIV in black Africa, concludes that Aids will not cause the population growth to turn negative until at least two or three decades after HIV has begun to spread in the populations.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, the world-wide impact of Aids – and the manifestation of this tendency in Southern Africa – could eventually have other very serious economic conse-

quences for this region. In Southern Africa (as in other parts of the Third World), the death of each working adult leaves proportionately more dependent children than in Western countries. In addition, the loss of key workers from sexually more promiscuous groups like the African monied élite, and in the migrant mining work-force of Southern Africa, leads to an impoverishment of the economy, so that scant resources are spread ever thinner. Also, Aids-related deaths are already affecting production in the rural areas, which account for a very high proportion of GDP in Africa – the only continent where food production per capita has been declining over the past 20 years.

Other susceptible professions, for instance the military, are also being decimated by the virus and by secondary illnesses such as tuberculosis and pneumonia. Indeed, serious gaps are already appearing in the leadership cadres of African armies, most noticeably in Uganda and Zimbabwe. This trend is set to continue throughout the 1990s. If the 1980s was the decade of HIV in Africa, the 1990s will be the decade of Aids in Africa. It will be the decade when the millions of HIV infections picked up in the 1980s will translate into chronic Aids.

Aids threatens to overwhelm not just South Africa (where the Department of National Health estimates 100 000 are already HIV positive, with an estimated figure of 200 000 by November 1992) but the entire subcontinent: the social dislocation and chaos that looks set to flow from disasters in these fields will almost certainly have far-reaching but unpredictable economic, political and security implications for this region. Indeed, one leading authority maintains that the problem will have effects comparable to those of a nuclear war.

In short – and to conclude this essay – the momentous challenges, risks and opportunities that seem likely to confront South Africa and its neighbours during the transition of the 1990s appear so urgent that it does not seem wise to allow events themselves to set the region's agenda. They need to be co-operatively addressed and faced up to now.

Notes and references

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- 2 For a more detailed discussion of these military developments, see S Baynham and G Mills, "Angola's land battle: A post-mortem", *Front File*, vol 1, no 9, December 1987.
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- 5 M Radu, "The political and strategic significance of changes in Eastern Europe", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, vol XII, no 1, May 1990, p 2.
- 6 L Benjamin, "The Third World and its security dilemma", *International Affairs Bulletin*, vol 14, no 3, 1990, p 15.
- 7 *Ibid*. On the same page, Benjamin goes on to say: "To continue to relegate Third World concerns to a secondary grade of international importance, would be to ignore its significance over the long term for the world at large."
- 8 Reaction to these pressures on the part of African ruling élites has been varied. The scoreboard might be divided into three categories. First, there are those leaders who have seen the writing on the wall and who have embarked, apparently genuinely, on the multiparty route, for instance Ghana, Togo and Nigeria. Second, there are other African

- leaders who have also seen the writing on the wall, but who are clearly attempting to "manage" the process so as to preserve single-party domination and keep themselves in office, as in Cameroon, Kenya and Zaire. In the third place, there is the group that might be labelled the "total recalcitrants" or the "die-hards": Sudan's military leaders in Khartoum seem to fit into this slot. For a more comprehensive analysis of these trends, see S Baynham, "Geopolitics and Africa's second liberation", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, vol 31, no 7, 1991, pp 1-2.
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 - 13 *Ibid*, p 266. For background analysis to the state of affairs in Somalia, see S Baynham, "Somalia: The rise and fall of Siad Barre", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, vol 31, no 5, 1991.
 - 14 *Ibid*.
 - 15 "That is something Africa may have to put up with. Peaceful secession, based on the freely expressed wish of a people, may be preferable to decades of debilitating civil war. It need not mean a wholesale redrawing of frontiers, or a licence to every prosperous pocket in the continent to copy Katanga. But after a generation of independence, Africa may have to shed some shibboleths to catch up with the rest of the world." *The Economist*, vol 319, no 7708, 25 May 1991, p 64.
 - 16 Eritrea is virtually recognized, *de facto*, as a sovereign state, and former British Somaliland has declared itself independent from the rest of Somalia.
 - 17 Zanzibar came under British protection in 1890, becoming fully independent within the British Commonwealth on 9 December 1963. A few months later, on 26 April 1964, Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar or, as it became known later in 1964, Tanzania. For a recent discussion of the Zanzibar challenge to the Union, see S Baynham, "Tanzania 1990: Economic and political developments", *Africa Insight*, vol 20, no 4, 1990, especially pp 259-260.
 - 18 *Africa Confidential*, vol 32, no 1, 11 January 1991, p 1. On the same page the article goes on to say "Africa remains a dismally low priority on the United States' foreign agenda. With the now less agonising exception of South Africa, it still commands less attention from Americans than any other part of the world, except, perhaps, among the 12 per cent of Americans - 31 million people - who trace descent from Africa".
 - 19 C Lancaster, "The new politics of U.S. aid to Africa", *CSIS Africa Notes*, no 120, 28 January 1991, p 4.
 - 20 *Ibid*, p 3.
 - 21 L Fituni, "A Soviet analyst's view of Angola's relevance in the 1990s", *CSIS Africa Notes*, no 116, 27 September 1990, p 4.
 - 22 *Foreign Policy*, No 73, Winter 1988-89, pp 22-40.
 - 23 S Shatalov, "Soviet assistance to Africa: The new realities", *CSIS Africa Notes*, no 112, 22 May 1990, p 3. Shatalov goes on to write: "Many parliamentarians echo the growing 'aid fatigue' of their constituencies. It is hard to defend an aid budget which is 20 times as large as the health budget at a time when the Soviet infant mortality rate is among the highest in Europe and rising."
 - 24 L Fituni, "New Soviet priorities in Africa", *CSIS Africa Notes*, no 123, 29 April 1991, p 2.
 - 25 *Southscan*, vol 6, no 34, 13 September 1991, p 287.
 - 26 A Leysens, "South Africa's military-strategic link with Latin America: Past developments and future prospects", *International Affairs Bulletin*, vol 15, no 3, 1991, pp 23-47.
 - 27 *Ibid*, p 29.
 - 28 W Kaltefleiter, "Political implications of the transformation in the international system", in W Kaltefleiter and U Schumacher (eds), *Conflicts, options and strategies in a threatened world*, Kiel: Institute of Political Science, 1991, p 45.
 - 29 W J Barnds, "Democracy, human rights and U.S. policies", *Freedom Review*, vol 22, no 5, September-October 1991, p 29.
 - 30 *Ibid*, p 30.
 - 31 ODI, *Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper*, March 1990, p 2.
 - 32 *Ibid*, p 3.
 - 33 Hyland, *op cit*, p 32. He goes on to say: "It seems likely that as Japan assumes more of its defense burden, it will insist on a stronger voice in East-West relations. This also should be easier for Washington to accept than Moscow."
 - 34 *The Economist*, vol 322, no 7745, 8-14 February 1992, p 61.
 - 35 *Sunday Times* (business section) (Johannesburg), 23 March 1992.
 - 36 ODI, *Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper*, June 1991, p 3.
 - 37 *Ibid*, p 4.
 - 38 S Baynham, "British policies towards South Africa: The regional context", *Africa Insight*, vol 19, no 3, 1989, p 130.
 - 39 R Martin, *Southern Africa: The price of apartheid*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988, p 1.
 - 40 E Leistner, "Towards a more 'African' South Africa", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, vol 31, no 11, 1991, p 2.
 - 41 J Cilliers, "The military in a changing South Africa", *South African Defence Review*, no 1, 1992, p 4.
 - 42 "Superpower cooperation in the U.N.: Dream or reality?", Roundtable discussion, *Freedom at Issue*, no 111, November-December 1989, p 15.
 - 43 J Martenson, Under-Secretary General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, at the Symposium on Global Security for the Twenty-First Century, December 1986, Florence, Italy. Quoted by Benjamin, *op cit*, p 20.
 - 44 Talk delivered at the Pretoria branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 14 August 1990 and published as S Baynham, "Defence and security issues in a transitional South Africa", *International Affairs Bulletin*, vol 14, no 3, 1990, pp 2-14.
 - 45 As one Russian military attaché and his American counterpart in a Southern African capital put it to me during interviews earlier this year, there are a number of reasons for this: (i) the regional threat perception of South Africa has diminished, (ii) there is an over-supply of Soviet armaments in the subcontinent, (iii) the states of Southern Africa simply do not have the money to buy much military hardware; the money is needed for other more pressing social and welfare programmes, (iv) the West is imposing military conditionality (see note 10), (v) Soviet kit, for instance air defence equipment, did miserably against Western state-of-the-art "smart" and laser-guided weapons in the Gulf War, and (vi) the CIS states - which are separate for Western aid - will be susceptible to Western pressures not to sell weaponry in Southern Africa.
 - 46 For further explanation, see S Baynham, "Defence and security issues..." *op cit*, pp 5-6.
 - 47 J Blumenfeld, "Caution on SA economy", *Front File*, vol 5, no 11, October 1991, p 4.
 - 48 N Meyers, "Environment and security", *Foreign Policy*, no 74, Spring 1989, pp 37-38. Meyers' observations, which relate to the situation in another Third World region (Latin America) apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Southern African area.
 - 49 Tourism accounts for only one per cent of the Republic's GNP; the world average is over 6 per cent.
 - 50 J R Starr, "Water wars", *Foreign Policy*, no 82, Spring 1991, p 17. The four countries referred to are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.
 - 51 Quoted by Meyers, *op cit*, p 32.
 - 52 Much of the background material in this section is derived from "Heroin in South-east and south-west Asia" and "Combating drug abuse in the 1990s", two *Background Brief* papers, both published in London by the FCO, August 1991.
 - 53 *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 22 March 1992.
 - 54 See sources given in note 52.
 - 55 *The Citizen*, 22 February 1992.
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 - 57 "Aids: The situation world-wide", *Background Brief*, London: FCO, August 1990, p 6.
 - 58 *Ibid*, pp 1 and 3.

Botswana's foreign policy and the exit of superpowers from Southern Africa

Professor James J Zaffiro, of the Department of Political Science, Central College, Pella, Iowa, looks at Botswana's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

Introduction

South Africa is on the road to non-racial democracy and international legitimacy. The Soviet Union is dead. The United States of America finds itself facing rising economic problems at home and new foreign policy challenges in Europe and Asia. Nonalignment seems redundant. Africa seems destined for even greater debt and economic peripheralization in the global political economy of the 1990s and beyond.

The Republic of Botswana, along with South Africa and nearly all the states of Southern Africa, finds itself at a foreign policy crossroads, and the country is faced with the prospect of change such as it has not experienced since the onset of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Cold War and anti-apartheid-inspired calculations of national interest and geopolitical constraints, which have driven Botswana's foreign policy since independence, have suddenly fallen away, soon to be replaced by a more complex but less threatening set of parameters.¹

The revolutionary nature of the regional transformation is fully in evidence in changing South African relations with the ex-Soviet Union. The two countries co-operated in a joint air-sea rescue of trapped Soviet scientists near Antarctica in August and seem destined for normalized diplomatic relations, broken off in 1956.

Ex-Soviet Union Ambassador to Botswana, Boris Asoyan, spoke recently of how Russia and South Africa have a lot in common as World War II allies and as countries that have survived long periods of social and political injustice: "Peoples of both countries long for democracy, justice and freedom and the whole world supports these aspirations. We pray to God that the transition from hate to love and from confrontation to peace will be as short as possible."²

Asoyan's words echoed those uttered in Gaborone just a few days earlier by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, on a visit to Botswana, which is rapidly becoming a diplomatic, economic and political bridge of understanding for states of the region as

well as in the eyes of outside powers.³ During the Persian Gulf War, Botswana sent a Red Cross medical team to Iraq.⁴ The country's President and Vice-President currently hold prominent leadership position within the Frontline States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), reflecting the confidence and trust that other states of the region place in Botswana.⁵ Newly elected Zambian President Frederick Chiluba visited Gaborone in December.⁶

The new world order and Southern Africa

Shifts in the relative distribution of power among regional actors and within individual states remains the key factor in describing, explaining, and to a limited extent, predicting the nature and likely outcomes of change and conflict in Southern Africa. As new opportunities present themselves and national capabilities grow for a few states in the region, even if not at the direct expense of local adversaries or allies, foreign policy interests and the range of options available for successfully pursuing them may be expected to increase. This is the case as far as Botswana is concerned.

For at least the remainder of this decade, Botswana will be more insulated from damaging economic trends than any other state in the region, provided that diamond prices do not fall on the world markets. Botswana's small population and relatively stronger economic position allows it certain advantages in the realm of foreign policy, such as the luxury of opening new embassies in Namibia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), at a time when most states are cutting back.

As long-reigning leaders such as Banda, Kaunda, Mugabe and Masire depart, enduring continuities in foreign policy may rapidly erode, giving way to far less predictable patterns and trends. Old reasons for seeking and giving aid, promoting development and expanding commercial contacts

no longer apply. New reasons must be found to preserve existing patterns of interaction and contact. Questions framing the birth of bilateral relations may need to be re-asked.

Globalist foreign policy interests and Cold War national security decision-making structures in Pretoria, Moscow and Washington effectively set the parameters for the development of bilateral relations with Botswana for over two decades. In the revolutionary 1990s such continuity is no longer a good idea for any of the partners, although recent changes have not yet significantly affected relations.⁷

The ex-Soviet Union and Botswana

The official death of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked the end of a two-decade relationship with Botswana. Looking back at the early history of bilateral relations, one might conclude that friendly relations were an unexpected outcome. Botswana and Soviets were mutually suspicious even before Botswana's independence. Moscow quickly recognized the new state in September 1966 but made no immediate move to establish diplomatic links.

Under Khrushchev, the Soviets had supported opposition parties in the Bechuanaland Protectorate prior to independence, particularly the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP), which propagated more hard-line, anti-apartheid policies and employed more socialist rhetoric than the electorally victorious Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) of Sir Seretse Khama. The Soviets viewed the BDP as being too close to Britain as well as being too soft on minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.

One Soviet writer in 1963 said "the BPP organizes and leads the progressive forces of the country. It unites the workers, peasants and the progressive strata of the African bourgeoisie. The BPP has to wage a stern struggle against both the feudalists (tribal leaders) and the reactionary party of the Bechuanaland bourgeoisie (BDP) ... who are trying to prolong the colonial regime".⁸ A year before that, another Soviet commentator said that "the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party was created by the British administration in order to split the popular forces and quench the fervour of the masses' revolutionary struggle".⁹ Under such circumstances, Radio Moscow observed three years later in 1965, "independence could easily become illusory".

During the early Brezhnev years attitudes in Moscow changed quickly. Following victory in the 1969 Botswana elections, Soviet commentators reported favourably on pledges by the BDP to "free the country from colonial domination". In December 1969, the Botswana Minister of State in the Office of the President led a delegation to Moscow and diplomatic relations were established in March 1970.

In the absence of a Gaborone embassy, Soviet interests in Botswana were handled through their embassy in Lusaka, Zambia.¹⁰ Even at this point all was not smiles, as Radio Moscow, in commenting on the Soviet diplomatic "initiative", pointed out that in no way did diplomatic ties signal that the USSR now condoned President Khama's "overly tolerant attitude towards South Africa and Rhodesia" but merely that all states were entitled to independence and diplomatic intercourse. Echoing Seretse Khama's own words, Moscow proclaimed that "Botswana's policies towards its neighbors were determined by geography not preference".¹¹

Establishment of relations did not lead to significant bilateral economic ties for a decade. Soviet scholarships were regularly offered but seldom accepted, partly because Botswana did not wish to alarm South Africa. Botswana was rarely mentioned in the Soviet media during the 1970s, but on those few occasions the remarks were generally more sympathetic than they had been prior to 1969 and reflected, at least in part, Soviet acceptance of the legitimacy and growing international reputation of the Seretse Khama regime. This is so particularly among Front Line States spearheading the Soviet-backed liberation struggles against minority regimes in Salisbury (Zapu), Windhoek (Swapo) and Pretoria (ANC). Although Botswana was still occasionally lumped together with Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi as "appendages of South Africa", the tendency after 1970 was to differentiate it and highlight Botswana's ongoing refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Pretoria. A Tass statement in September 1971 reflected this in asserting that Botswana had defied all predictions by following an independent foreign policy. A *Pravda* correspondent visited Botswana the following year and praised the government for its efforts to "raise the country from chronic backwardness".¹²

After the opening of the Soviet embassy in Gaborone in September 1976,¹³ Pretoria's fears of a Soviet-orchestrated "total onslaught" in the region went public and became the cornerstone of South African foreign policy for the next decade. During the 1980s, Botswana's trade agreement and limited technical co-operation with the Soviets went virtually unnoticed. However, its limited military co-operation was a different matter – in particular the 1981 Moscow visit of Botswana Defence Force (BDF) Deputy Commander Major Ian Khama, son of the then recently deceased President, which resulted in an agreement to purchase armoured personnel carriers and surface-to-air missiles, was trumpeted as proof of Soviet designs in the region.¹⁴

South Africa charged that the Gaborone embassy was a spy center for Soviet efforts to assist in the subversion of its regime via support for Umkonto we Sizwe – the military wing of the ANC – and also the PAC.¹⁵ Soon after, charges became threats and a series of military raids on alleged ANC targets in Botswana were carried out by the SADF, resulting in the killing of many innocent Botswana civilians and rapid growth in defence expenditure, mainly for arms purchases, to support expansion, modernization and training of the BDF. The Soviet Union played no role in this build-up, despite South African allegations to the contrary.

Amidst escalating South African military and economic pressures, the Botswana government expanded relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁶ By the mid-1980s, the Soviet embassy staff had grown to six diplomats. Botswana did not open an embassy in Moscow but its interests were represented by the Zambians and through its own mission in Stockholm.¹⁷ Ministerial level visits to Moscow increased in frequency, with one by Minister of Finance and Development Planning Peter Mmusi in 1988 and the Ministers of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs and Commerce and Industry, in 1990.¹⁸

During these years Botswana seemed untouched by the Cold War. The residences of the Soviet and American ambassadors were on the same street. Tennis courts and swimming pools were shared in the small, friendly diplomatic community in Gaborone.

Following the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 and the corresponding Soviet military disengagement from Southern Africa, relations grew even closer.¹⁹ Unlike many of the more openly militant Frontline States, Botswana did not suffer greatly with the loss of aid from the collapsing communist regimes of Eastern Europe. At a time when billions were still being poured into Angola and Ethiopia, with questionable results at best, Botswana was no financial burden on Moscow.

President Masire continued to send goodwill messages to his counterpart on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, right up to the end.²⁰ By 1990, Soviet Ambassador Victor Krivda's nearly six-year tenure made him Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Gaborone, until his replacement in February 1991 by Boris Asoyan. Before his posting Asoyan had been Deputy Head of African Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specializing in Southern African states.²¹ In a friendly display of new arenas for superpower competition the US and USSR embassies held a volleyball tournament in May of 1991.²²

In addition to signed and implemented agreements on trade and technical co-operation, negotiations were underway in 1991 on a cultural and scientific co-operation agreement. Moscow was supplying Gaborone with sewing machines and shotguns, in addition to about twenty scholarships per year for Botswana students, only about five of which were taken up.²³

The USSR and Botswana had common positions on the vast majority of international issues, especially on peace.²⁴ Both regimes remained resolute in their condemnation of apartheid, calling for a non-racial, democratic South Africa to be achieved by means of consultation and negotiation.²⁵ Botswana's leaders were cautious but genuine in their support for Soviet nuclear arms control initiatives and the resolution of regional conflicts, most particularly those in Southern Africa and the Middle East.²⁶ Botswana even sent a cash donation to earthquake victims in Armenia in 1989.²⁷ The Soviets sent a delegation to Botswana in April 1991 to study the country's democratic system.²⁸ Botswana Minister of External Affairs Dr Gaositwe Chiepe cheered the reappointment of her Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, in November 1991.²⁹

South Africa can no longer object to Botswana's unencumbered pursuit of relations with the non-communist governments of the new international actors, and South Africa itself is rapidly expanding ties with Russia. It is quite reasonable to assume that Botswana will seek to continue as broad a range of relations with Russia as its new leadership would desire, while making an effort to establish diplomatic relations with some of the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) republics, particularly Ukraine and Byelorussia, as these alone may be potential donors of aid, in the form of scholarships and technical training opportunities.

Botswana must realize, however, that even the relatively scant amounts of aid and assistance extended to them from the ex-Soviet Union cannot be maintained by the CIS or its constituent republics, given the massive economic, ethnic and security problems they face. Indeed, future bilateral relations may at times find Botswana on the donor side of the equation, with the devastated economic conditions of needy CIS states blurring the definition of "Third World developing nation" beyond any remaining usefulness. In many ways Botswana is economically better off than they are.

In particular, greater Russian-Botswana co-operation in the gem diamond production and export sector seems likely in the wake of the market reforms being launched by President Yeltsin. In June 1990, Minerals Minister Archibald Mogwe made a one-week visit to Moscow, at the invitation of his counterpart, Mr Valery Rudakov, chief of Glavalmazoloto, the Soviet diamond and gold ministry. A memorandum of understanding was signed.³⁰ Soviet regimes have been quietly working with De Beers for over three decades. Following the discovery of large quantities of gem-quality diamonds in Siberia, De Beers approached Moscow with an offer to purchase the entire Soviet production of gem-quality diamonds for a price that would be renegotiated annually. In 1957 a secret agreement was signed in Moscow, the full conditions of which have never been disclosed.³¹

Both states are not totally satisfied with their marketing arrangements under De Beers. Under terms of a 1989 agreement, the Soviets were permitted to sell only five per cent of their annual raw diamond exports outside of the De Beers Central Selling Organization (CSO). Botswana and Russia are studying options for setting up local diamond cutting and polishing operations, to gain a greater return than they now enjoy from export of uncut stones.³²

There has been no celebration of the demise of the Soviet Union by the Gaborone government. Indeed, President Masire expressed regret at its passing while hoping for continued close relations with the new Commonwealth of Independent States. The abortive hardliners' coup in August 1991 dealt a death blow to any significant future Russian role in Africa. A newspaper editorial upon the announcement of Gorbachev's survival noted that "the world needs a stable Soviet Union. Without stability in the USSR suffering will be prolonged in other parts of the world, southern Africa notwithstanding".³³ The break-up of the Union will encourage Gaborone to intensify efforts to look elsewhere for alternatives to traditional aid sources, particularly Japan and the PRC.³⁴

Botswana opened a new embassy in Beijing in August 1991, reciprocating China's establishment of a mission in Gaborone in 1975. The new embassy will also cover several other Asian countries, including Japan.³⁵ The much higher cost of opening a mission in Tokyo, compared with the PRC, was one factor in the decision. In September, President Masire made an official state visit to the PRC. Areas of co-operation that have been discussed include trade, railway construction and medical assistance.³⁶ National Development Plan VII (1991-1996) calls for the opening of three additional missions.³⁷

An even greater constraint than money is a continuing acute shortage of fully trained counsellors and other support staff.³⁸ External Affairs received a 30 per cent increase in its 1991/92 recurrent budget, to P18,3 million (US\$8,47 million). Until now, staff have been trained abroad, mostly in Great Britain, on an *ad hoc* basis in response to training offers extended to the government of Botswana. With British assistance, Botswana is moving toward establishment of its own Diplomatic Training Institute, which could also draw participants from other SADCC member states.³⁹

As it enters transformed regional and international arenas, Botswana must diversify its diplomatic and economic partners. This will allow it to gain leverage with traditional friends and allies, like Britain and the US, by demonstrating to them that it can go elsewhere for what it needs – as it did with the USSR and Eastern European states.

Botswana and the US: The road ahead

Changes in the Soviet Union have also affected US relations with Southern Africa. In the late 1980s Soviet statements on the region took on a new and encouraging tone, with conscious efforts to lay to rest many lingering US Cold War era fears. It also acknowledged areas of mutual interest and accepted Western claims of historic economic links with the region:

The positions of both the USSR and the US concerning the principal question – apartheid – are very close. This creates conditions to enable a common search for solutions of the (regional) conflicts, in which mutual interests would be attended to. Aware of Western economic involvement in southern Africa and of its reliance on the region's raw materials, the USSR has no intention of undermining industrialized countries' historic trade links with this part of the world.⁴⁰

Until the Soviet demise, Botswana leaders supported superpower co-operation on regional conflicts, calling upon the US and the Soviets to "exert influence in trouble-torn areas like our subcontinent",⁴¹ and on important transnational issues, especially arms control. Recognizing continuing US concern about the Soviet Union presence in Southern Africa, President Quett Masire made a special effort to reassure and cultivate good relations with the Bush administration on a personal level, from sending election day greetings,⁴² to his June 1989 White House visit.

By then Botswana could hardly be chastised for practicing the same new thinking in its dealings with Moscow that Washington, and even Pretoria, were engaging in. This was not new policy for Gaborone, however, as diversification of diplomatic support, sources of economic assistance and increased contacts with a variety of state actors have from independence been the cornerstones of continuity in its foreign policy strategy as articulated by Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana's first president.⁴³

By the end of 1989, Masire had won another presidential term and Eastern Europe had been transformed. February and March 1990 brought revolutionary changes in South Africa and Namibia, further eroding traditional US regional strategy but leaving relations with Botswana untouched. Economic assistance is increasingly being channelled to private enterprise and small business training and development.⁴⁴

During the late 1970s and 1980s, Botswana received US military aid from several components of the Security Assistance Program, including the Military Assistance Program (MAP), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Military Education and Training (IMET). The basic tenet was to strengthen proven friends at a time when it was perceived to be in the US national interest to do so. Militarily, Washington hoped that aid to Botswana would influence the BDF's character, combat capabilities, and future role, with particular emphasis on regional stability, border security and self-defence. Political and military aid was a symbol of US commitment, and ensured access to key leaders.⁴⁵

Botswana is concerned that new demands on US resources and attentions in Europe and Asia might lead to a loss of support for Africa. The US Ambassador, David Passage, has to date offered only general assurances.⁴⁶ Would further US military assistance indicate support for a more active and ongoing regional security role for Botswana, in the same way that arms and training provided to other African regimes, particularly Somalia, Kenya and

Zaire, seemed to signal US approval? With the end of the Cold War in Southern Africa, this would indeed indicate a major change in bilateral security relations for the decade of the 1990s.

Privately, some US officials express concern about the danger of a substantial Botswana military and police build-up eroding the democratic character of government and society. Ties between Botswana and the US will remain friendly in the decade ahead, as long as Botswana's leaders continue to believe the relationship is mutually beneficial, and so long as US policy-makers perceive some foreign policy utility in what, up to now, has been largely an aid-centered, donor-recipient relationship.

Botswana's leadership and bilateral relations

In the face of intensifying domestic economic pressures and mounting intraparty (BDP) political rivalries, South African, Russian and US Africa policy-makers should not assume that the democracy, stability, prudent financial management and the general atmosphere of pragmatism that has characterized Botswana's foreign policy for a quarter of a century are necessarily institutionalized, indestructible or protected from erosion.

Besides the demise of global communism and the exit of the Soviet factor in Southern Africa, the other crucial "wild card" in 1990s bilateral relations will be the impact of leader transition in Botswana, after the retirement of President Masire, or in the unlikely event of an electoral defeat of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has governed since independence in 1966. Masire, recently knighted by the Queen, has grown tremendously in international stature since becoming Botswana's second president upon the death of Sir Seretse Khama in 1980.⁴⁷

Khama and Masire are leaders of a moderate nationalist generation, which brought the country to independence without major conflict, division or bloodshed. Both have enjoyed a grudging respect in Pretoria and a special place in the eyes of the West, including the US. New contenders for BDP leadership further complicated the July 1991 party conference and the question of presidential succession was put off until the next party conference in 1993.⁴⁸

The next generation of national leaders is not likely to rule in so moderate and pragmatic a fashion and be able to generate and maintain so extensive and viable a consensus on national development and foreign policy goals, strategies and national interests, as its exceptional predecessors in State House. The declining fruits of rapid economic growth and greater contact with their compatriots in other African states will also lead to more division and disagreement about the proper course for the country as it moves beyond diamond-driven development and faces a less hostile, majority-ruled South Africa. Foreign policy decisions will become increasingly difficult as a result.

Botswana's strategic relations and changing regional realities

Botswana did not have an army until 1977. It was created mainly in response to serious border violations by Rhodesian security forces⁴⁹ during Zimbabwe's civil war and has remained small by world standards: a force of 4 300, of

whom 150 serve in the air wing.⁵⁰ By the mid-1980s, in the wake of South African Defence Force (SADF) destabilization, particularly repeated SADF commando raids into Botswana against alleged ANC targets, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) had assumed a higher profile and taken on increased significance. Calls from BDF commanders, members of parliament and the general public for expansion and acquisition of advanced weapons to deter further aggression grew stronger after the June 1985 raid on Gaborone in which several Batswana died.⁵¹

Despite the continuation of its time-tested diplomacy-from-weakness-but-moral-correctness approach, particularly after a second major South African Defence Force (SADF) airborne raid in January 1986, the Masire government and BDF commanders decided that, although Botswana could not hope to militarily repel or deter completely such actions, they could at least raise the cost, in terms of the potential for loss of South African lives and equipment, if it were to expand and upgrade the army, its air wing, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the regular police.

Facing the prospect of further military raids from Pretoria, the country began a modest expansion and upgrading of its military, including acquisition of air defence and antitank weapons, helicopters, a small squadron of ten used jet fighters,⁵² and two transport aircraft, to allow BDF forces to be moved to trouble spots faster. Rapid troop deployment was identified as the country's number one defence need. Botswana approached the US, Britain, India and others for military assistance.⁵³ The US offered training in counterintelligence techniques and seems to have become the preferred source, having provided more than \$20 million in assistance and US training for about 175 BDF officers since the late 1970s.⁵⁴

In pursuit of modern arms BDF Commander Merafhe travelled to Washington in June 1988, meeting with Pentagon and State Department officials. He enjoyed mixed success, prompting the Botswana government to remind the US that it could look elsewhere, "be it in the east or in the west".⁵⁵ They soon got much of what they wanted from the US, including promises to be allowed to buy three more Vulcan air defence systems, a lightweight 20-mm ground weapon for close-in defence against low-flying aircraft, to supplement the small quantity they received through foreign military sales.⁵⁶

Until the late 1980s, Botswana spent relatively little on police and defence compared to other African countries with less severe security threats. In 1987/88, approximately \$27,5 million was allocated to the BDF, or about four per cent of the budget.⁵⁷ Botswana's 1989 defence budget increased sharply, by 57 per cent, from P63 million (\$33 million) to P111 million (\$58 million).⁵⁸ The 1991/92 estimates show an increase of P30,5 million to P137,2 million, or more than 29 per cent, from 1990/91.⁵⁹ In addition, the BDF received P166,17 million of the Development Budget allocation to the Office of the President, under which it falls. The army is the highest expenditure item in the new National Development Plan VII.

Until 1990 steady and impressive growth in export earnings from diamonds and beef allowed these increases to be made with no requisite damage or cutbacks in domestic services or national development projects. This has now given way to the country's first deficit budget in a decade and

protests from opposition, BDP backbenchers and the general public about military spending levels in the new National Development Plan VII (1991-1996). Political and social costs of defence spending are for the first time being felt by the regime.

Despite the end of SADF incursions after the Mandela release and a generally diminished South African threat, the military build-up has continued unabated, indeed it has accelerated. Arms and diplomacy remain closely linked in bilateral relations with several states.

Botswana seems to have decided to go ahead and develop a credible military capability, despite positive political changes in the region. During the parliamentary debate on the 1991/92 security budget, Minister of Presidential Affairs Lt General Mompoti Merafhe, indicated that the BDF was being built into an organization which would be able to cater for "the type of situation faced in the past and those which may be even worse in the future". He ruled out early budget cuts in military spending because "we have not yet reached a position where it could be said the potential for conflict has been (sufficiently) reduced (and) there is confidence that most threats to the sovereignty of the country could be met".⁶⁰ The wisdom of current levels of defence expenditure, in the words of the *Southern African Economist*, must remain suspect.⁶¹

Global asymmetries and Botswana's diplomatic relations

Forced to choose between improved relations with a more democratic post-apartheid South Africa and their special ties with Botswana, Washington and Moscow may be expected to go with the former. With the Cold War over, asymmetries in relations are more threatening to Botswana in the 1990s than ever before, forcing its next presidential administration to place even greater emphasis on lobbying friends while seeking diverse regional and global sources of support.

With a diminished South African security threat, does Botswana need close relations with the US and USSR today as much as in the past? Botswana has been an aid-magnet for a wide range of donors, ranging from the Nordic countries and Britain to the USSR, the PRC and Libya. Similarly, from the US and ex-Soviet standpoint, what vital interests may be served in the decade ahead from continued efforts to maintain excellent diplomatic relations with tiny Botswana?

Answers to both questions lie in an accurate understanding of the motives behind establishment and maintenance of good bilateral relations up to this point. American support for Botswana's nonracial democracy formed the early basis of relations. A December 1966 State Department memorandum to the President spoke of "Botswana's dedication to non-racial democracy (as) a unique opportunity (for the US) in racially explosive southern Africa".⁶² During the 1980s Botswana leaders placed a great deal of emphasis upon encouraging Washington to take over the leading role of economic benefactor and diplomatic shield from South Africa, played by Britain prior to independence in 1966. Botswana needed aid and investment. America and the Soviet Union needed friends. All still do.

Botswana will need American diplomatic support for economic rather than strategic reasons, as new donor states, particularly Japan,⁶³ take aid-giving cues from the Americans,

and as more and more aid becomes conditional on donor-defined economic, social or political performance criteria. The ex-Soviet connection remains less vital.

Because Botswana shares a long border with Namibia and hopes that transport and trade links will develop with the evolution of friendly ties, Namibia will be viewed as an important proving ground for US diplomatic support in the 1990s at the regional as well as bilateral level. Botswana has already let it be known that it places a very high degree of importance on developments in Namibia. Of all the states in the region, Namibia is most like Botswana and it is hoped that diplomatic, political and economic relations will rapidly grow close.

Botswana's commercial relations

Southern Africa today is a more peaceful place than it has been for a long time. South Africa no longer militarily threatens Botswana. Given the improved climate, the 1990s should witness dramatic growth in the scale, diversity and relative importance of bilateral commercial relations. With the prospect of decreased aid looming, new opportunities for trade and investment are being cultivated.⁶⁴ In looking to Asia, Botswana will be moving in tandem with South Africa.

The 1980s were economic boom times in Botswana. As one of Africa's fastest-growing economies, Botswana's leaders spoke of the need to achieve diversified, balanced development and of attracting new investment before its mineral-powered growth slows in the next century.⁶⁵ Gross domestic product roughly doubled from 1984 to 1988, as did imports, on the strength of higher diamond prices in 1988. The country recorded its first balance of trade surplus in 1985. Exports tripled.⁶⁶ Revenues reached all-time highs in 1989.⁶⁷ In April 1989 the country's foreign currency reserves overtook South Africa's. Reserves of over \$US 2 billion were enough to cover three years of imports.⁶⁸

The debt service ratio is below three per cent. Annual growth averaged 12 per cent over the last decade. The government invests dollars earned from diamond sales in foreign banks and ventures.⁶⁹ Commercial bank credit to the private sector rose 8 per cent during the first quarter of 1989, and the bank of Botswana instituted policies to stimulate the demand for domestic credit and investment.⁷⁰ A local stock exchange was instituted in 1988.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, commercial banks and Botswana embassies abroad have all stepped up promotion and information activities. The United States, EEC, Nordic countries and South Africa have been targeted.⁷¹ Commercial attachés are now assigned to key posts in Washington, London, Harare, Brussels and Stockholm, and a Hong Kong-based consultant has been hired to seek and co-ordinate new Asian investment in Botswana.⁷²

President Masire has made promotion of expanded commercial relations the number one priority of his extensive schedule of international travel. Following his 1984 US visit, Botswana undertook its first commercial trade and investment mission to the US in September 1985.⁷³ Heavy promotional emphasis was placed on mining and exploration, cosmetics and agriculture. In September 1991, Masire undertook a major Asian trip, with emphasis again on commercial opportunities for Chinese and Japanese investors. In December Masire was in the United Kingdom, where economic themes again figured prominently in discussions.

Major economic problems loom, however, as capital intensive mining, particularly diamonds, the country's leading export earner by far, yields only 7.2 per cent of formal sector jobs, while manufacturing accounts for 7.3 per cent.⁷⁴ Botswana's leaders realize that massive unemployment could bring down the Botswana Democratic Party regime some day, threatening stability, democracy and economic growth in the process. Botswana desperately needs formal sector job creation and despite initial lack of success, still hopes to get some from foreign investment.

As of 1988, only 13 foreign companies were registered in Botswana, along with 21 local ones. According to economic forecasts by the government the formal sector will generate around 7 000 jobs per year while roughly 23 000 new job seekers and 7 000 rural migrants enter the market each year.⁷⁵ By the year 2000 as much as 42 per cent of the national labour force could be unemployed.⁷⁶

President Masire's June 1989 US visit placed a great deal of emphasis on following up initial interest shown by US firms. He was repeatedly praised by top American officials for spearheading efforts to strengthen private business and attract foreign investment. Deputy AID administrator Jay Morris called Botswana "a model in our eyes as to how development should work" and stated that "there is no finer evidence that your development schemes are working than the growing number of businessmen (going) to Botswana at their own expense to invest".⁷⁷ Masire's speeches and meetings around the country took American trade and investment in Botswana as their main theme.

The 1991 budget speech by Finance Minister Festus Mogae was self-consciously optimistic in linking the move towards abolishing apartheid and minority rule in South Africa with improvements in perceptions of overseas investors.⁷⁸

Botswana and South Africa: The road ahead

In the face of such momentous changes, Botswana's foreign policy continuity will necessarily erode, as its leaders and diplomats seek to adjust to new regional and global realities. In the course of this adjustment the possibility of significant changes in bilateral relations with a democratic South Africa became a reality in late December 1991, as the two countries agreed to establish reciprocal missions.⁷⁹

In an interview with a SABC reporter in Gaborone in early 1990, President Masire reiterated Botswana's long-standing policy of awaiting the emergence of a free and democratic South Africa before his government would move towards opening a mission in South Africa: "What remains is for that government to take steps to eliminate this obnoxious system. I am guardedly optimistic. President de Klerk has taken a bold step and we urge him to complete the process without delay."⁸⁰ Apparently the Botswana government now feels that sufficient progress has been made.⁸¹

South Africa is arguably the most important foreign policy issue on the country's agenda in the 1990s. For both states, economic relations are more important than political, diplomatic or security, but their successful expansion rests upon the ability of leaders and diplomats from both countries to make progress in these other traditionally forbidden or hidden areas. Decisions taken along the way towards normalization will affect Botswana's relations and prospects

with her other neighbours, as well as with states beyond the region and continent.

Botswana's successful, enduring non-racial democracy has always been something of a thorn in the side of South African leaders, a challenge to the credibility of the entire apartheid edifice. Over the past quarter of a century, as other regimes in the Southern African region resisted decolonization and majority rule, Botswana continued to serve up the example of its own social and political system.⁸²

Today, the pictures of multiracial constitutional talks and South African leaders speaking publicly of building their own non-racial, democratic system must be viewed by Botswana leaders with satisfaction and pride, a vindication and partial reward for years of suffering and sacrifice in the name of liberation.⁸³

Botswana leaders have been cautiously supportive of the De Klerk government's efforts, and President Masire's December 1991 decision to pardon and release 15 South African prisoners, including some involved in cross-border raids, was intended as a major gesture of support for the talks.⁸⁴

Until the December 1991 announcement, Botswana had studiously avoided South African pressures to establish normal diplomatic relations.⁸⁵ Botswana did not exchange ambassadors with Pretoria because it did not wish to legitimize the apartheid system. This policy included not only relations with the RSA but was applied even more vigorously to all official and semi-official contacts with the allegedly independent homelands.⁸⁶

Indeed, the Botswana government has interacted with South African officials only when the issue was perceived to be of direct benefit to central national goals of survival, security or economic well-being.⁸⁷ Prominent examples are the renegotiation of the Southern African Customs Union (Sacu),⁸⁸ periodic high-level consultations over alleged ANC infiltrations via Botswana, especially during the 1980s, and the SADF raids,⁸⁹ and on matters involving treatment of Botswana citizens working in or visiting the RSA. At times, the Botswana government was at pains to deny that negotiations or agreements were being undertaken, particularly on the signing of a Nkomati-type non-aggression pact.⁹⁰

There is also the question of South African membership of regional and continental organizations, particularly SADCC and the OAU. Botswana appears willing to lend its diplomatic support to membership petitions by a future non-racial, democratically-elected South African government.⁹¹ While applauding the move towards a constitutional settlement of the domestic political crisis in South Africa, Botswana has joined with its fellow SADCC allies in stipulating minimum conditions for possible future admission to the regional group.⁹²

With South Africa as its eleventh member, SADCC will not fade away but rather grow in importance, as international economic relations increasingly come to be played out between regional groupings. Indeed, creation of an African Economic Community (EAC) may be a logical extension of a larger, more inclusive SADCC before the end of the decade. In the mean time, there is a new SADCC headquarters building on the government enclave in Gaborone.

Bilateral economic co-operation must continue and the possibility of closer, more harmonious aid, trade, investment and commercial relations seems brighter now than ever

before.⁹³ Opportunities for collaboration in a wide range of fields – from mining, agriculture and the environment, to education, industrial and transportation development, an Aids policy, drought management, environmental protection and labour migration – should rapidly appear once normal relations are achieved.⁹⁴

Once again, however, as is true of relations with the external great powers, power asymmetries in bilateral relations will remain, and a certain amount of anxiety on the part of Botswana over lingering economic dependence, even after attainment of friendly relations, seems unavoidable.

The days of seeking economic and political alternatives to ties with South Africa are drawing to a close for Botswana. Diversification of dependence and disengagement may gradually come to be replaced by engagement and geopolitical logic as underlying themes in future bilateral relations. Botswana stands to gain more, in terms of its national development goals and objectives, and at a faster, more affordable rate, by looking south even at the expense of its carefully nurtured ties with its SADCC and Frontline States (FLS) partners, than it might by rejecting South African overtures for normal relations, or opposing full political and economic integration of the new government after the attainment of a nonracial democracy, as some FLS leaders may still advocate.

Any engagement strategy will have to take into account structural legacies of colonialism in both countries. Botswana's more promising political and economic condition and future prospects, along with proximity and an extensive, long-established series of informal networks of economic co-operation, also make it more attractive as a source of investment for South Africa, along with newly-independent Namibia, than any other African state. Economic asymmetries will not be wiped away when majority rule arrives in South Africa, nor is economic co-operation assured. Closer, diversified economic ties with a democratic South Africa may eventually offer Botswana the best way out of the coming economic slowdown as diamond-driven development slows in the early part of the next century, particularly if such ties lead to creation of employment-producing, self-sustaining engines of economic growth.

Proposals for foreign policy shifts of this nature would most certainly erode the domestic "multipartisan consensus" which has characterized Botswana's regional posture since independence.⁹⁵ More significantly, perhaps, is the prospect of it eroding foreign policy consensus within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party and future leaders. The leadership factor will remain paramount. Botswana's next president will in many ways have an even more difficult, certainly more complex, foreign policy task than his or her two illustrious predecessors.

Internationally, the regional and global capitalist political economy remains stronger, yet somewhat more divided than it has been, in the post-Cold War world. Multinational capital, based in South Africa or elsewhere, will still set structural limits beyond which any future regime in Gaborone cannot pass of its own volition. Majority rule, nonracialism and democracy do not change everything.

Botswana is not likely to abandon its efforts within the SADCC framework and it is placing great stock for future economic growth in close co-operation with Namibia.⁹⁶ A gradual economic engagement with South Africa, tempered

by maintenance of traditional alternative connections, bilateral and multilateral,⁹⁷ is the most likely scenario. In terms of new foreign investment from outside the region, particularly Japanese, EEC and North American, Botswana may actually suffer as a result of political changes in South Africa, which promises to become a more attractive venue.

In his first major post-independence foreign policy speech President Seretse Khama promised that Botswana foreign policy would be "dictated by reason and commonsense rather than by emotion and sentiment".⁹⁸ In 1966 Southern Africa, reason and commonsense provided a much narrower range of foreign policy options for a small, poor, landlocked state than they do in the decade of the 1990s. "Good neighbourliness" with regard to relations with South Africa⁹⁹ in a post-apartheid, post-Cold War, regional sub-system, will be even harder for foreign policy-makers to define precisely than it was a quarter of a century ago.

The issue of territorial realignment, with Bophuthatswana or any other, is an entirely different matter. Tswana ethnic nationalism and cross-border ties between populations in South Africa and Botswana are not of the same incendiary nature as Somali or other more irredentist African nationalisms lingering from the colonial era. Presidents Khama and Masire have consistently rejected any proposed union, association or federation with Bophuthatswana.¹⁰⁰ Minister for External Affairs Dr Gaositwe Chiepe has preferred to talk about Bantustan amalgamation with Botswana as "totally misplaced and unacceptable".¹⁰¹

Improved relations between the two states should result in greater ease of movement in both directions, for economic reasons above all else. Some of the over two million Tswana-speaking South Africans may choose to migrate northward in search of greater opportunities, rather than to the urban areas of their own country. If the numbers were sufficiently great, the Botswana government might have to address the issue more directly than it has up to this point, out of a fear of its already stressed employment, education and social service sectors being swamped.

Progress towards normal relations with a democratic South Africa in the decade ahead represents Botswana's best opportunity for continued sincere pursuit of its four cardinal national principles of democracy, development, self-reliance and unity into the next century. Basic continuities will remain. In President Masire's words to his own party congress last July: "As a small country, our future will to a large extent be influenced by events taking place around us."¹⁰²

Conclusion

When and under what conditions should Botswana agree to full, normalized diplomatic relations with South Africa? Why should America or Russia or the CIS provide economic and military aid to Botswana in the 1990s and beyond? Why should Botswana continue to seek special relationships with these states in the 1990s? Botswana's foreign policy continuity has generally been accepted as evidence of success. Beyond a certain point, however, as the Soviets painfully discovered in Eastern Europe, continuity may mask petrified, ineffective or marginalized policy; failure as well as successful adaptation.

In the transformed post-1989 international system, Cold War certainties and their resulting foreign policy constraints

are gone.¹⁰³ Asymmetries in bilateral relations, however, remain. Facing a transformed regional landscape, Botswana, South Africa, the US and the members of the CIS all need to re-examine foreign policy goals, national interests, and bilateral relations from a new vantage point, in order to take advantage of new commercial and diplomatic opportunities. In the words of one US Africa policy-maker, the US needs to link its vision for the region to the self-interests of the other parties.¹⁰⁴ To date this has seldom been the case in US regional policy.

US support for a more active regional leadership role for Botswana in security, economic development and diplomacy, is a welcome development. A stronger Botswana in the 1990s will benefit the region, if for no other reason than by the strength of its continuing success. As pressures for democratization continue throughout Africa, sweeping away rotten, US and Soviet-backed regimes in their wake, bilateral relations with tiny Botswana may become slightly less asymmetric. The US needs Botswana more than ever before, having lost or jettisoned clients like Mobutu's Zaire, as regional interests shift from containment of communist influence to promotion of pluralist democracy and market-led, capitalist-style regional economic and social development.

As regional dynamics continue their rapid evolution, South African and US foreign policy decision-makers will do well to invest more of the same care and sensitivity towards cultivating mutual understanding of foreign policy-making environment and processes that their Botswana counterparts have so skilfully and successfully done in 25 short years.

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- 98 Republic of Botswana, *National Assembly Debates*, (Hansard 19), 7 October 1966, p 11.
- 99 *Ibid*.
- 100 See G M Carter and E P Morgan, *op cit*, p 265; "No federation with the homelands, says Khama", *Mafikeng Mail*, 30 August 1974, p 1.
- 101 "Amalgamation talk: Botswana says NO", *Daily News* (Gaborone), 14 March 1990, p 1.
- 102 "Peace not just the absence of war", *Daily News* (Gaborone), 18 July 1991, p 1.
- 103 Epena Ngatangue, "Cessation of Cold War welcome development", *Daily News* (Gaborone), 10 July 1991, p 1; "Masire pleased with waning of Cold War", *Daily News* (Gaborone), 11 March 1991, p 1; "Botswana welcomes moves on reduction of weapons", *Daily News* (Gaborone), 17 October 1991, p 4.

The potential for conflict in Africa

*Professor Jeffrey Herbst of the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, looks at the destabilizing impact of liberalization on the African state system.**

The end of the Cold War, combined with the wave of political and economic liberalization sweeping the continent, heralds the beginning of a new era for Africa. While there is the potential for dramatic gains across Africa now that many countries are discarding self-defeating authoritarian economic and political strategies, the new era may also pose new dilemmas for African leaders and Western policymakers. This article will examine how the evolution of the superpower relationship combined with the dramatic domestic reforms now being contemplated will affect the stable system of boundaries that Africa has had for the last thirty years. The question of the future of Africa's boundaries is particularly important since, while many believe that the continent has experienced almost constant instability since the early 1960s, the secure system of boundaries has meant that there have only been a few attempts at secession and very limited interstate war.

Even questioning Africa's boundary system is something of a revolution. Since the dawn of independence in the early 1960s, one of the central goals of African countries has been the preservation of the inherited system of boundaries. Dedication to the state system created by the colonialists may seem paradoxical since there is a widespread consensus on the continent that many of the boundaries ignore local social groupings and guarantee the economic marginality of a significant number of countries. However, African leaders feared the chaos that widespread boundary changes might cause and were aware that dramatic changes in the inherited state system could be particularly dangerous to those who had succeeded the colonialists. Indeed, boundary maintenance has been the great, although unheralded, accomplishment of African foreign policy: since 1957 there has not been one significant boundary change that was not agreed to by all of the concerned nations.

However, the pressures for political and economic liberalization that are emerging in the 1990s will put enormous

pressure on the African state system. The end of the Cold War will make it far more difficult for African countries to find patrons should they face significant secessionist threats. Also, demands for democratization from Western countries and from African citizens may reignite fundamental questions concerning the desirability of the current nation-states for particular ethnic groups. The norm of sovereignty, which African countries successfully used as a cover to repress those who challenged the existing nation-states, is also now being threatened in a world increasingly concerned with self-determination. Finally, the demands for internal economic reform that became common in the 1980s may begin to challenge the fundamental basis of African nations. In particular, Western donors may come to the realization that some countries, as presently configured, are not viable under any set of internal policies that may be adopted. As a result, some African countries may simply drift apart until a local leader or warlord realizes that no national political authority exists.

The successful boundary-maintenance regime

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized that the borders drawn by the colonialists "constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension". The organization, and most African governments, believes that cohesive social groups were separated by the boundaries and that groups that had little to do with each other, or that were overtly hostile, were brought together in the same nation-state. However, the OAU also recognized that there was no simple way of redrawing the map of Africa. Africa's topography does not provide much in the way of natural frontiers and many social groupings are actually so fluid that it would be impossible to construct a set of boundaries that would assure ethnic peace. As a result, no African leader could be guaranteed when the dust settled after mass boundary changes that he would still have a country to govern. Since the OAU is fundamentally a leaders' club, it therefore declared that the inherited boundaries were a "tangible reality" and rulers pledged "to respect

* This article is based on a paper presented at the 1991 Topical Symposium "From globalism to regionalism – New perspectives on American foreign and defense policies", Washington DC, 14-15 November 1991.

the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence".¹

Several developments at international level helped the African leaders in their effort to continue the inherited state system. First, the international community in the post-World War II era has greatly elevated the norm of sovereignty. Especially since the advent of African independence, the world community has allowed any country, no matter how underdeveloped its political and economic institutions are, to enjoy the full privileges of sovereignty. In contrast, the norm of self-determination, which Africans relied upon in the struggle against colonialism, was largely ignored. For instance, it was felt that it would be a violation of an African country's sovereignty if the world community supported a dissident ethnic group which was disaffected with its government. The precedent set by the lack of international support for the Ibo during the Biafran war, despite their suffering and the fact that they could make a credible claim to being a viable national unit, solidified the practice of ignoring claims based on ethnic self-determination. In the post-World War II era, the norm of self-determination has applied only to people under colonial rule.

Secondly, the Cold War had the effect of providing African countries with patrons when their boundaries were challenged. The superpowers were concerned with cultivating clients in all parts of the world and were therefore willing to help African nations crush ethnic rebellions or threats from neighbours. Thus, Zaire won crucial aid from the USA in turning back the Shaba rebellions, Chad relied on France to retain its territorial integrity in the face of Libyan aggression, and Ethiopia was given critical military support by the Soviet Union in order to resist Somalia's irredentist claims. The superpowers were also attentive to African sensibilities concerning boundary maintenance. Indeed, not once did either superpower, or any other outside power, support an African effort to overturn an existing boundary.

More generally, the superpowers created a global environment between 1945 and 1989 that made any attempt at boundary change appear illegitimate. The superpowers made clear their preference for stability – symbolized by a bizarrely divided Berlin – over the potential chaos caused by ethnic self-determination in a multitude of ways. Indeed, while the superpowers were in competition, their relationship was also partially managed. One of the implicit rules was that supporting efforts to change boundaries was not part of the competition. Thus, between the end of World War II and 1989, the only forcible boundary changes that were not related to the end of colonialism were the creation of Bangladesh and the absorption of South Vietnam.² This was a remarkable development in a world where forcible boundary change was once a fairly common event. Indeed, the most stunning aspect of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was not that it happened but that this sort of armed effort did not occur more often in a world made up mainly of weak states that cannot defend their boundaries.

Thus, the interests of African leaders and those of the great powers were almost identical on the issue of boundary stability. The Africans and the global community provided not only the arms but also a legal framework in the form of international sovereignty to justify African leaders taking almost any step to crush local rebellions. The system also

greatly discouraged interstate war. Of course, few African countries even had the ability to invade their neighbours in the 1960s. However, as African militaries have become more sophisticated, the fear of war between nations has not increased dramatically. Rather, most of the weapons African countries have purchased were used to appease the military or were turned against local citizens. The overthrow of Amin in Uganda is the only example of an African leader being displaced by invasion and even in this case it was obvious that the Tanzanians did not have any territorial ambitions. Even South Africa, which during the 1980s showed little hesitation in attacking its neighbours and had a near monopoly on military power in the region, has never threatened the territorial integrity of any state in Southern Africa.

As a result, African boundaries have been unchanged since independence. This stability is especially remarkable given the domestic upheavals that have occurred in many nations. Indeed, boundary maintenance among so many weak countries for such a long period of time is an extraordinary occurrence in the history of international relations.

The end of the Cold War

After thirty years of boundary maintenance, powerful forces that threaten the African state system are now at work. First, the end of the Cold War means that African countries no longer have automatic patrons to turn to if they are threatened. The great powers no longer feel compelled to aid troubled African countries. Indeed, Gorbachev's pressure on Luanda to come to an agreement with South Africa in 1988 heralded a new era in which Moscow and Washington (and, now, Paris) are willing to let old allies that have received significant aid in the past, twist in the wind. As a result, in just the last two years, governments in Ethiopia, Liberia, Chad and Somalia, which had been able to attract significant security and financial resources from their patrons up until now, have been abandoned and quickly overthrown. These upheavals were unprecedented because, while African governments were routinely overthrown by their own militaries in the past, only Museveni in Uganda had been able to lead a successful insurgency from the bush in an already independent African country between 1957 and 1990.

The reluctance of the superpowers to aid African countries in trouble occurs at a particularly treacherous time for many governments. First, many states have atrophied after experiencing fifteen to twenty years of economic decline. The continuing fiscal crisis has meant that many governments do not have a significant presence in their countries outside of the major cities. Police, military, and even agricultural extension officers are not present in the countryside because they have not been paid or because the state lacks the transport and fuel to exhibit much of an institutional presence beyond the major urban areas. Thus, many governments are not capable of even detecting the development of a major insurgency in the rural areas, much less combat it.

Second, African society is becoming more militarized. It is now apparent that it is relatively easy for almost any group to collect several dozen machine guns in order to start an insurgency. Once the guerrilla movement begins, it can overrun local police stations and armouries to collect more weapons. The example of the successful insurgencies listed

above, as well as the MNR in Mozambique, indicates just how easy an armed threat to an African government can develop when the local army is underpaid, poorly equipped, and has low morale.

While the governments that recently fell were replaced by internal rivals within the context of the existing state system, there is little reason to believe that the great powers would intervene more forcefully if boundary stability was at stake. Indeed, the spectre of Assistant Secretary of State Ilerman Cohen welcoming the Tigrean movement into Addis, even though the rebel victory will eventually result in the independence of Eritrea, was an extraordinarily powerful indication that the superpowers are no longer unambiguous agents for boundary stability. Although the new world order may help prevent interstate war in Africa, the potential for successful secessionist movements has improved dramatically now that the Cold War has ended.

The re-emergence of self-determination

In addition to the changes at the international level, there are a number of processes at work which may serve to promote threats to boundary stability in Africa, especially from ethnic groups bent on secession. First, the historic memory of African populations is changing. The recognition that they had achieved an unparalleled peaceful transfer of power made African leaders and their citizens especially cautious in their approach to potentially chaotic boundary changes in the aftermath of decolonization. However, two generations have been born since independence in most African countries. Indeed, half the population on the continent was born after 1975. The vast majority of citizens therefore have no historic memory of the peaceful transfer of power but are aware of how political arrangements in their nations have failed to guarantee them an adequate consumption level or a democratic political life. They may therefore be much less committed to the idea of general boundary stability and more willing to commit to new national structures that might promise them a better life.

Second, the demands for political liberalization – from both African citizens and the international community – may be especially dangerous to the existing state system. In the West, political liberalization is equated with democratization because there is fundamental agreement concerning the nature of the nation-state. However, in Africa, questioning domestic political arrangements may have the effect of reigniting debates as to the desirability of the nation itself. The first issue that emerges when politics is liberalized is what the outlines of the political community itself should be. There are, in fact, many groups which may emerge in a more liberal political environment to demand that they be allowed to leave the existing nation, join another, or create their own political institutions. Already, in Central Europe and the Soviet Union, political liberalization has had the effect of reopening old ethnic conflicts, and, as a result, some nations are under tremendous strain. There is no reason to believe that many African citizens have a stronger commitment to their nations than people in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia.

Pressure for liberalization also affects the African state system in other ways. Most importantly, the international community, which for so long offered unreserved support

for the norm of sovereignty, is now less reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of African nations. Most noticeably, for almost a decade, the IMF, World Bank, and the bilateral donors have, through stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, played a very important role in what were previously considered sovereign economic decisions. There is substantial evidence that as donors become frustrated with the slow pace of democratization, they will also begin to make the provision of aid conditional on political changes. In addition, there is mounting pressure to make Western aid conditional on a host of other reforms (for example, decreasing military spending, promoting environmental protection) that at least some in the West find desirable. Thus, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that Western donors are close to micro-managing many aspects of African countries' domestic policies. In this context, it is hard to say exactly what the norm of sovereignty means.

Correspondingly, with the decline in the norm of sovereignty, new attention has also been directed towards the right of self-determination. The world, including the superpowers, has now focused on the need for certain ethnic groups to create their own national arrangements. For instance, German unification was widely perceived to be a question of self-determination and there was widespread support for the right of the Baltic states to secede. Most important for African countries is the independence that Slovenia has achieved in all but name. Baltic independence could at least be rationalized by African leaders as unique because these countries were simply regaining the independence that they enjoyed before the Stalin-Hitler pact. However, Slovenia is the first example of a new country based on ethnic homogeneity emerging from an existing nation that had once been widely recognized as viable and legitimate. Between 1945 and 1990 global boundary stability reinforced the case for not interfering with African boundaries. Now, the world is sending a different message.

Consequently, in the future, the world may offer much more support for African groups asserting their right to self-determination. For instance, the Biafran rebels might get a much better hearing in the 1990s, when the global community is increasingly concerned with democratization and self-determination and less fixated on the norm of sovereignty. Certainly, new concerns for political liberalization and democratization may make it much more difficult for African countries to physically repress those agitating for changes in the nation-state. Also, especially in conjunction with the strategic changes outlined above, it will be very difficult for African leaders to gain arms and other resources to suppress secessionist movements.

If African leaders and their citizens still do not understand that the world has changed, the imminent independence of Eritrea will serve as a clarion call for ethnic self-determination. Indeed, when independent Eritrea applies for membership to the Organization of African Unity, the era of African boundary stability may very well be over. It is, of course, true that the Eritreans have a better claim to independence than many because successive Ethiopian governments violated the United Nations agreement that was supposed to give the Eritreans autonomy. However, this legal distinction may not be salient to many other ethnic groups or potential leaders of insurgencies who feel that the nation that they live in is not viable.

Economic liberalization and the state system

In Africa, the main force behind economic liberalization has been the multilateral institutions which have promoted stabilization and structural adjustment programmes across the continent for the last decade. Most analysts focus on the contrast between these policies and those previously adopted by African countries. However, in one respect the neoclassical policies of the IMF and the World Bank are the same as import substitution, industrialization and all other policies pursued by African countries in the past: they assume that if African governments adopt the correct policies, economic growth and development is possible.

However, as donors expend more resources on aid and become increasingly engaged in day-to-day decision-making in African countries, it may soon become apparent to them that certain African countries are not viable, no matter what set of economic policies are adopted. Some African countries are simply too small (for example, Gambia, Burundi, Rwanda) while others are so bereft of natural resources (for example, the Sahel countries) that they may never be able to develop. Therefore, Westerners may decide that some countries will never progress and place them permanently on the international dole with the only expectation that famine will be avoided. If there is enough frustration, Europe and the USA may finally abandon countries that they do not view as viable. These signals from donors that some countries cannot develop may only further strengthen the sentiments of Africans who already believe that their domestic political arrangements must change.

The potential for abandonment of non-viable nations is increased because of the end of the Cold War. The fears that the entire African continent may be marginalized or abandoned are dramatically overblown. Those who believe that Africa as a whole will be abandoned ignore the long-term interest of the West in Africa's resources, the humanitarian impulse, domestic constituencies (for example, the Black Congressional Caucus) and the bureaucratic inertia in foreign ministries and the multilateral institutions that compel them to continue to deal with Africa. Instead of abandoning a continent, Western nations and multilateral institutions will devote far more energy to picking winners in Africa. Attempting to pick winners is the logical outcome of the increasing conditionality being imposed on African countries and is appealing to many who want to be involved in Africa, although not necessarily with every struggling nation. In addition, now that the strategic impulse which caused the USA to have some kind of relationship in every African country is over, the USA is free to try to decide which countries will be successful, and which will not, and act accordingly. Of course, the analogue of picking winners is that some nations are deemed to be losers.

Indeed, gradual abandonment of certain African countries points to the other threat to African boundary stability. It may be that African countries come apart not only because of direct secessionist threats but also because of gradual disintegration of the centre. In the context of continued economic decline, certain regions of some countries may simply drift away from the political centre until local leaders realize that they are the head of a *de facto* independent country. As in China, many African countries may retain some nominal degree of territorial integrity but suffer from

warlordism and continual clashes between subnational rulers who seek to occupy the political vacuum left by the disintegrating centre.

Conclusion

African boundaries have remained more or less constant since the turn of the century. However, there are now powerful forces at work to weaken the state system that African leaders have established. In this context, the end of the Cold War and political and economic liberalization may be the critical factors which finally brings about fundamental challenges to the state system. Should the African state system be overthrown, the continent may see a period of upheaval and chaos that makes the previous three decades seem tame by comparison. The potential for massive loss of life in new state creation is high. Indeed, the chaos in Liberia and Somalia may be a harbinger of the future if the boundary system in Africa is seriously threatened. Also, one of the inevitable products of new state creation is the large-scale movement of people. The potential for massive conflict on the African continent is therefore clear.

Finally, African efforts to mediate violent domestic conflicts will probably be ineffective and may cause disputes to spill over into other countries. Certainly, the Ecomog precedent does not suggest that African countries are particularly good at solving conflicts. Indeed, African militaries are not equipped to intervene in other countries and African diplomats do not have the necessary administrative structures, intelligence mechanisms, or resources to successfully resolve conflicts in other countries. However, Liberia does clearly demonstrate the potential for domestic disputes to spread to other countries because of ethnic groups that straddle borders. Also, just as there is currently a "democracy contagion" crossing Africa, many groups may be emboldened to challenge their national political leaders if there is a successful secession nearby. If the issue is boundary change, the potential for an entire region to become involved may be high.

This is not to say that political and economic liberalization are necessarily bad ideas. Indeed, boundary changes may be inevitable and liberalization may just accelerate the process. The problem is that it is probably impossible to know in advance if a boundary change will lead to a new, more viable national unit or simply cause an entire country to descend into chaos.

The implications for Western foreign policy should therefore be clear. In Africa, political liberalization in particular is not just a question of improving institutions or promoting democracy but, potentially, a fundamental threat to the entire state system. In the end, Western countries may decide that they still believe that liberalization should be pursued and the right to self-determination promoted. However, they should then be prepared for the consequences if the African state system is threatened. American diplomats, in particular, will be faced with extraordinarily difficult situations where, for humanitarian considerations alone, there may be powerful appeals for the USA to intervene. For instance, there was considerable pressure both within the USA and from our European allies to do something to prevent mass slaughter in Liberia.

It is probably impossible, at this time, to develop general

precepts by which American diplomats can react to the mass instability that may be caused by African boundary changes. Individual situations will probably vary too much to impose general decision rules. Certainly, the kind of flexibility that American diplomats exhibited in Ethiopia during the transition will be highly valuable. What can be done now is to recognize that many of the existing rules that have governed African politics are changing and that demands for political liberalization in particular may be highly destabilizing. Although the old practices were convenient for all the

governments concerned, reliance on the old standby of African boundary stability will no longer be possible.

Notes and references

- 1 Organization of African Unity, "OAU resolution on border disputes, 1964", reprinted in Ian Brownlie (ed), *Basic documents on African affairs*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, p 364.
- 2 Even Bangladesh could arguably be cited as a remnant of decolonization.

No perfect path: Co-operation for development

This article by Dr Robin Lee, of Robin Lee Associates, is based on the presentation he made at the conference "NGOs in development" hosted by the Department of Development Administration, University of Stellenbosch, in Stellenbosch, October 24 and 25, 1991.

"No one state, no one agency and no one NGO has found an ideal method, a perfect path.... All states and agencies and NGOs can and must learn from each other...." Delegate to World Conference on Education for All: March 1990.

Introduction

There is widespread agreement that South Africa is a state "in transition". As derived from the work of O'Donnell and Schmitter¹ the concept "transition" has a specific and, to some extent, normative content. However, many analysts have found it to be a helpful term in assessing the South African situation. Indeed, South Africa appears to be following a combination of the major transitions seen internationally after World War II. The specifically relevant aspects are:

- transition from authoritarian rule towards democracy
- transition from segregation to a non-racial society
- transition from inward-looking, import-substitution economic policies (now largely associated with low growth) towards manufactured-exports-led high economic growth.

In these circumstances, virtually all institutions and sectors of the society are also undergoing rapid change. This is no less true of the nongovernment (or nonprofit) sector. It is also developing a number of distinctive characteristics, as it reconsiders its own changing roles. This dynamic is especially visible in its relationships with a public sector under political pressure and a private sector under economic pressure.

It is therefore important to examine the various aspects of this vital "third" or "independent" sector. Nevertheless, we must also realize that only "interim" conclusions can be reached. The rapid and far-reaching dynamics of transition will continue for several years yet, and the nature of the nongovernment sector and the organizations within it will change too. Nongovernment organizations (NGOs) will continue to develop characteristics closely related to the specifics of the South African situation. But this article argues that all likely changes will take place within a broad set of international categories appropriate to the sector.

Apart from the dynamics of the South African transition, two other forces are driving our nongovernment system into the future. The first is the increasing commitment to "development" on the part of all actors. At present a wide range of meaning is attributed to development; from economic growth alone to an almost religious fervour or "secular religion" of "developmentalism".² The roles of all three economic sectors are being scrutinized for their capacity to "deliver" development and to do so at the speed required to underpin the political transition.

The second force driving the creation and growth of NGOs in South Africa is related to political events and has a negative and a positive dimension. Negatively, from a political standpoint, the growth of NGOs is seen to be the result of the collapse of statism and state-provided development throughout the world and especially in South Africa, when many public agencies have long been regarded as "illegitimate". In this approach NGOs are perceived to be able to pick up some pieces of that collapse. From a positive perspective, NGOs are also seen as strengthening "civil society" against future state domination of development, by providing structures through which people can develop themselves. Of course there are connections between the two perspectives, and some of the most ardent new supporters of NGOs in a civil society are those who have actively supported state control in the past!

These two forces have resulted in an increasingly high profile for NGOs in development in South Africa. They are one of the subjects of an as-yet-to-be-published government report (drawn up by a committee under Dr J de Loor). They have been studied by IMF and World Bank teams. With the start of operations of the Independent Development Trust (IDT) in August 1990, the largest tax-payer funded NGO came into existence and, by its policy of passing on funds to other NGOs, it have greatly strengthened them in the fields of literacy, pre-school education, health and housing. The Kagiso Trust (KT) is also refocusing its efforts to reach a wider range of NGOs and together with the IDT and the

Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) is actively raising loans abroad to finance development projects carried out by NGOs in South Africa.

NGOs are therefore an integral part of the political, social and economic transformation of South Africa. Yet, they are also influenced by international trends, arising from links with existing private and government donor bodies. Potentially they are also looking to support from government-sponsored funding agencies through bi-lateral agreements, as well as direct investment by the World Bank and other, regional development agencies, such as Accoda (International Association for Co-operation and Development in Southern Africa).

In this context, it is more important than ever to understand the nature of NGOs, their capacities and dynamics and their relation with other social, political and economic sectors in South African society. Among the wide array of possible topics presented by this analysis, I have chosen to focus on the dynamics between the NGO sector and the private and public sectors in South Africa.

Definitions

In a dynamic, new field of study it is quite possible for people to be using the same terms with very different meanings. For clarity, therefore, I define the main terms of my article as follows:

- Private sector: The sector of an economy consisting of individuals, firms and financial institutions that are not under government control.³
- Public sector: The sector of an economy consisting of all state-owned institutions. These include local authority operations, such as the provision of housing, schools, and the various social services, as well as the nationalized industries.⁴
- Development: A process by which members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations.⁵
- Nongovernment organizations: These are sometimes called “nonprofit” or “private” or “voluntary” organizations. This range of terminology indicates different emphases in the interpretation. “Nonprofit” (which is the preferred term in the USA) has several layers of meaning.⁶ The one I emphasize is the restriction on what an organization may do with any surplus (“profits”) it generates. The essence of this form of institution is that a nonprofit organization may not lawfully pay its profit to owners or to anyone associated with the organization. Along with this restriction, however, comes a variety of tax and subsidy benefits that influence a nonprofit’s actions.⁷

This strongly economic interpretation identifies four possible models to explain nonprofits as economic actors. These have been summarized by Rose-Ackerman⁸ as follows:

- (i) models that are relatively institution free and concentrate on voluntary provision as a response to government failure;
- (ii) models that see nonprofits as a response to information asymmetries and transaction costs in the private for-profit market place;

- (iii) models that focus on entrepreneurs and managers who view the nonprofit firm as a way to further their own goals; and
- (iv) models that emphasize the competitive interactions between nonprofit firms producing close substitutes.

The “private” or “voluntary” nature of NGOs comes from a different source. It has its roots in voluntary charitable activity, often altruistic in nature. This tradition, which is particularly strong in the USA, emphasizes both the dynamics of self-help and voluntarily helping others with greater needs. It can be shown historically that nonprofit concern and involvement in the identification and meeting of pressing social needs has often preceded and promoted vital government action:

Most of the recognised advances in American society owe their beginnings to ideas and actions generated within [the nonprofit] sector. The abolition of slavery, child labour laws, women’s suffrage and the civil rights movement all had their beginnings in the independent sector.⁹

The term “nongovernment” seems to be gaining general acceptance, despite being motivationally suspect – as are all activities defined as being “not” something else, for instance “nonformal” education. Its origins are in political studies and development theory. It emphasizes equally the “civil” nature of NGOs and the roles they can play in a specific kind of development. A vigorous literature and practice has sprung up around these concepts, in terms of which an NGO may descriptively be seen as follows:

private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interest of the poor, protect the environment or undertake community development.¹⁰

Korten¹¹ places NGOs in a political and normative context:

Conventional development practice ... argues that resolution of the dual crises of poverty and debt depends ultimately on increasing financial transfers. In practical terms this usually means increasing debt. The underlying theory of conventional practice suggests that placing responsibility for control and allocation of development resources in the hands of central government will result in optimal investment decisions. ... [However], conventional practice more often results in the use of development resources to maintain vast patronage systems and to build uneconomic showcase projects, the undermining of economic discipline, increasing dependence on external resources, and the stifling of local private initiative. In addition, it reinforced tendencies towards authoritarianism, and the concentration of wealth and political power. Calls for a more people-centred development practice emphasise the need to strengthen institutional and social capacity supportive of greater local control, accountability, initiative, and self-reliance.... A high priority is placed on the process of democratization.... NGOs are more likely to have a natural interest in democratization and face fewer organisational constraints in undertaking actions consistent with its achievement.

For practical reasons, this article examines NGOs defined as development agencies and does not pursue the theory and practice associated with other possible activities and roles of NGOs.

NGOs in South African today

We need to return briefly to current South African dynamics to sketch the environment in which development NGOs in this country are changing their roles. We must take account of dynamics within each organization and changes brought about in response to external circumstances. In order to do

this, we must take a look at the situation and strategies of the public and private sectors and at the identity struggles of NGOs themselves.

Present state strategies are attempting to achieve two objectives. First, to continue to pursue initiatives in "reform" and to try to persuade other parties to participate in these (for example, the Education Renewal Strategy or the implementation of VAT). Secondly, the state is genuinely negotiating with oppositional groupings on the constitution and on limiting and eventually eradicating violence.

In the field of socio-economic development, however, only the early beginnings of a negotiation are in hand. A mixture of disillusion by the state with its own efforts at development and a belief that NGOs can do it better has led to initial contacts between the sectors, as at the National Development Workshop, organized by the Consultative Business Movement in June 1991.

At the moment, private sector strategies are aimed primarily at survival. After a brief flirtation with "managing diversity" in the formation of conglomerates (for example, industry and mining in Barlow Rand) there is a return to single-focus businesses. After an even shorter flirtation with privatization of previous state enterprises and services, the private sector has returned to its profit-oriented role and is leaving increasingly large areas of service provision to NGOs.

Within this framework of change NGOs also face choices. By far the most difficult issue for almost all South African NGOs – whose very existence has been based in opposition to apartheid – is to re-organize from being "against" to being "for" something. The glue of simple opposition has to give way as an organizational principle to cohesion arising from positive developmental goals.

Linked with this is a shift from system-wide thinking (being "against" a whole system is quite feasible) to issue-focused development (as a single organization cannot possibly act across an entire system).

Finally, South African NGOs have to shift mindsets away from project management in a hostile environment (survival strategies) and conceive, design and implement projects with new policy implications and developmental potential (growth strategies). Associated with these shifts there is also the tough question of "going to scale".¹²

These factors also determine the patterns of co-operation and non-cooperation between NGOs and the public and private sectors in South Africa.

NGOs and the public sector in South Africa

South Africa has no formal public policy on NGOs. There is no coherent statement on this issue and no consolidated piece of legislation that expresses policy on the nonprofit sector as such.¹³

Secondly, though both government and NGOs could contribute to a dynamic society, conflict between them is often the outcome in South Africa, as elsewhere.

Even enlightened political leaders, who recognize the role of institutional pluralism in achieving development, are aware that the nonprofit sector may also produce political and economic competition.¹⁴

Thirdly, the South African government has long been a proponent of the growth-centred paradigm of development, which gives a central role to increasing economic output. This

tends to put NGOs concerned with people-centred development, in conflict with government. As Brown and Korten¹⁵ observe: "In the Third World, governments are inclined to assess NGOs more from a political perspective" rather than from their potential as developers of people. In the past, south African NGOs have concentrated their efforts on the struggle against apartheid,¹⁶ and government generally assessed them accordingly, a factor not conducive to co-operation. South Africa is no exception to Weisbrod's generalization:

Government simultaneously encourages and discourages nonprofits – subsidising them and restricting them, proclaiming their virtues and distrusting them.¹⁷

Rose-Ackerman¹⁸ highlights three ways through which government affects the behaviour of nonprofit firms:

- through the tax system;
- through direct spending programmes;
- through regulations.

If NGOs are to benefit the country as a whole, contact and discussion between the nongovernment and public sectors must take place to decide jointly on tax systems, spending needs and regulations, so that the nonprofit sector is neither stifled nor unjustly advantaged by these measures.

NGOs and democratization

For the rest of this decade, the introduction and maintenance of democratic systems will be crucial in South Africa. There is general agreement that NGOs are likely to have a strong interest in democratization and face fewer organizational constraints in undertaking actions consistent with this achievement. Korten¹⁸ suggests that increasing numbers of NGOs are giving attention to the definition and projection of a "people-centred development" vision that embraces democracy and a social transformation agenda:

This vision looks to justice, sustainability and inclusiveness as the defining principles of authentic development.... It looks to government to enable people to develop themselves.

Only people themselves can define what they consider to be improvements in the quality of their lives; if government is serious about the democratization process, as the current South African government claims to be, it should co-operate with NGOs to establish the idea of democracy and people-centred development at grass-roots level.

In preparation for this, and to realize their full potential, NGOs must ensure that their own structures are democratic. This is far from the reality at present. In a 1989 survey of NGOs in South Africa, organizations reported challenges in linking a democratic structure with effective management.

Most have entirely voluntary decision-making bodies, professional full-time staff and part-time volunteer workers. Finding a structure and style that accommodates these groups must reconcile democratic representation of views (and perhaps also the views of members and clients) with managerial effectiveness and efficient use of resources. Extensive opportunities exist for further research and co-operative actions in meeting this challenge.¹⁹

Current co-operation between the sectors

The 1980s saw a growing international rejection of the idea that government is the sole legitimate agent for development

decision-making and the management of development resources.²⁰ Currently governments are beginning to co-operate with the nongovernment sector, principally through economic policies, taxation practices, privatization and encouragement of donations by the corporate sector. In South Africa, co-operation has also included initiatives such as the establishment of the independent Development Trust²¹ and channelling some of the funds for poverty relief through NGOs. Public agencies can use the energies and advantages of NGOs in this way to further broad social goals.²²

Service provision: Public sector or NGOs?

As public sectors around the world cut public spending to contain inflation and control budget deficits, they find themselves increasingly confronted by growing complaints over the quality of services. At this point provision through NGOs becomes an option and the 1980s have seen the appearance of what Korten calls "public sector contractors".²³ These are NGOs "that function as market-oriented nonprofit businesses serving public purposes". In its relation to the public sector, South Africa's nongovernment sector is poised to enter this phase of growth, in line with the international trend:

It may be expected that during the 1990s there will be a substantial increase in demand from donors for legitimate, qualified public sector contractors to manage large scale implementation of social projects that government has proven incapable of handling.²⁴

Similar trends are visible in South Africa. Like other countries we are realizing that "... the tremendous resources of government are unlikely to reach the intended groups without NGO intervention..."²⁵

Similarly, while the ANC does not have a policy specifically dealing with NGOs, its broad approach appears favourable to these developments:

... the ANC believes that a democratic state will have a crucial role to play in building consensus around such a development plan. It will need to play a facilitative role by creating the kind of economic and development environment which encourages the involvement of the widest selection of society, including the business community and the organizations of civil society ... the ANC believes that it is not desirable for the state to attempt to control the overall process of development in society, but rather to facilitate a participatory development process.²⁶

Brown and Korten²⁷ agree that the state should not play a role of total domination in the development process:

Development is difficult to achieve in a society in which the state maintains total dominion over civil society. While the state must set the rules and framework, it is ultimately the civil society that must drive the development process ...

Government can benefit through co-operation with NGOs, having them test innovative programmes that government could not undertake until they are proven to be politically feasible.²⁸

Finally, the flexibility of NGOs is also a factor:

The public sector is the the institution of choice when consumer demands are homogeneous. The nonprofit institution is attractive in meeting heterogeneous demands from minorities ...²⁹

In South Africa, with its pluralistic nature, this valuable NGO role will become a crucial feature of development.

NGOs and public policy

Influencing public policy through innovative projects and direct advocacy is an increasing possibility for NGOs:

The NGOs have grassroots experience and a vast fund of practical knowledge of issues ranging from education curricula to welfare assistance to the impact of business and trade laws on the private sector. They would like to share this experience with the policy-makers in a constructive, informative mode, especially as South Africa enters a period of forming new regulations and policies which will affect activities for years to come. An understanding of different theories, techniques and methods for influencing and informing policy-makers is needed, as well as a forum for networking and developing their forces as instruments of change.³⁰

NGOs and the South African private sector

There is much research available internationally on the relations between NGOs and the private (or business, or for-profit) sector. Three main trends are visible:

- The nonprofit sector is perceived to exist (in part, at least) as a result of "market failure": that is, the inability of the for-profit sector to meet the needs of specific segments of the market. Weisbrod³¹ provides a full analysis of this perspective.
- The nonprofit sector is perceived as "complementary" to the business sector. Korten³² provides the best description of this:

It has been demonstrated throughout human history that, compared to the market, coercion is a severely limited means for creating new wealth. For wealth creation the predominant capability belongs to business. Similarly, the voluntary sector has the advantage in mobilizing voluntary social energy in the service of institutional and values innovation.

- Partnerships between private sector and nonprofit organizations are perceived to be a crucial feature of the new development paradigm, in which development achieves its goals through a state-initiated, but "market-friendly" approach. The partnership "model" is most clearly articulated by Brown and Korten.³³

All these trends co-exist in South Africa, but historically the major trend has been that of "market failure", though in this case the failure of both public and private sectors is involved. In this context, NGOs play an important role in identifying and operating in areas of social need that are not being met and in this way mediating the "blindness" of the market-alone approach.

Looking at this issue in greater detail, we see that South Africa shows five specific relationships that have and still do exist between the private sector and NGOs. These are:

- The private business sector has until very recently been by far the major financial supporter of NGOs.
- The private sector has recognized that there are areas of social or economic need in which commercial provision is inadequate or unaffordable to many (for example, career advice and guidance) and have funded NGOs to meet that need.
- The private sector has identified or, in some cases, actually created NGOs to try out innovative approaches to specific social problems and supported these with money and staff. The clearest examples in South Africa are the

various NGOs working in the field of in-service teacher education and training.

- In a development very specific to the South African situation, the private sector has collaborated with NGOs to launch programmes designed to achieve policy changes by research, advocacy and pilot projects. The activities of the Urban Foundation-initiated Private Sector Council on Urbanization in contributing to the abolition of influx control is a case in point.
- Finally, the private sector has provided voluntary assistance, sometimes in the form of professional services (for example, accounting and legal services) free of charge or seconded skilled staff to NGOs to assist in building the professional capacities of the latter.

It cannot be pretended that these relationships have always been positive. Research has shown that tensions abound in situations where the NGO believes that funding is being used as leverage to obtain support for a corporate image or the marketing activities of the donor, as well as situations in which the donor believes that the activities or public positions of the NGO run counter to its interests.³⁴

In some cases in South Africa and elsewhere NGOs have been held up as examples to the private sector as far as creating commitment from its own staff and volunteers, beyond that which commercial business can achieve.³⁵ This point of view is echoed by Brown and Korten³⁶ as follows:

Much of the literature on 'excellent companies' is focused on how to develop strong cultures that mobilize employee values and goals in the service of company strategies.

Despite these interesting complementarities, however, there are clear possibilities of tension and conflict between the private business sector and NGOs in the 1990s. The long-term trends in resource scarcity, environmental concern and the need to reconceptualize "development" itself are already forcing NGOs into critical stances *vis-à-vis* the private sector. Korten's People-Centred Development Forum is spear-heading these moves against what he calls the "economic growth-centred" model of development. He identifies two flaws in this model:

First, given existing economic and political structures, the majority of benefits of growth accrue to those who are least in need. Second, continuation of conventional patterns of growth will likely reduce the ability of the global ecology to sustain even the levels of economic output already achieved.... The critical development issue for the 1990s is not growth but transformation. Most of the institutions on which we rely for economic and social problem-solving are themselves creations of the growth-centred development vision and are therefore ill-suited to challenging it. To achieve this transformation, voluntary citizen action will be of the utmost importance. Business should therefore turn their attention towards the voluntary sector, finding ways and means to assist them in the transformation process, rather than cling to a growth-centred vision of development.³⁷

This tension between different models of development in the 1990s, and thus of the role of both private sector and NGOs, will be a major feature of the present decade.

Conclusions

Many other aspects of this topic could be developed if time and space permitted. Let me conclude by focusing on the message that this analysis has uncovered:

- NGOs are established in all development models as a sector quite equal in importance to the public and private (for profit) sectors.
- Public policy, state practice and the management of private sector initiatives must take into account the valuable role NGOs can play and leave to them the things that NGOs do best.
- Both political and economic change can be greatly facilitated by NGOs, which, in turn, strengthens the NGO sector and the valuable role it can play in creating and sustaining a democratic pluralism throughout the society and especially at the famous "grassroots level".
- The key to real development lies in partnerships, bilateral or tri-lateral, among the three sectors. Different models for these exist, ranging from dealing with complementary markets to defining areas of specialist competence and avoiding fruitless competition in these.
- In turn, the concept of "partnerships" in respect of specific initiatives links with the broad concept of a society built on the basis of a web of interlocking "social compacts", in which hitherto conflicting parties negotiate modes of compromise and co-operation.

We must see these as challenges and work on them steadily and with purpose. However, we must also be aware that not all change will be achieved by rational paths alone. As Korten³⁸ reminds us:

The breathtaking speed with which events were unfolding by the close of the decade (1980s) confirms that the beneficial transformation of imbedded institutions can occur more quickly than a rational person would have any reason to believe possible – if there is sufficient human commitment. The momentum has been established. It remains to be sustained and directed toward realizing the potentials now before us.

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NGO and public sector co-operation: When there's a common will, there's a way

This article by Mary Honey, Senior Consultant, Development Projects Division, Price Waterhouse Associates, is based on the presentation she made at the conference "NGOs in development" hosted by the Department of Development Administration, University of Stellenbosch, in Stellenbosch, October 24 and 25, 1991.

Introduction

World-wide experience shows that NGOs¹ have an essential role to play in the development process and that NGOs can do something government "cannot or will not do".² It is also accepted that the commonly cited strengths and weaknesses of NGO and public sector³ development programmes could complement each other.

The public sector credits NGOs with the capacity to support a people-centred approach to development and to mobilize and organize human rather than financial resources for development. They operate effectively at grass-roots level and reach the poorer segments of the population. Frequently, they are small and focused, therefore they can innovate and react quickly to changing situations. They can try and test alternative approaches. They attract committed staff who are willing to work under difficult circumstances.⁴

On the other hand, it is often perceived by the public sector that NGOs lack the institutional capacity to expand and replicate their innovations. Their planning and budgetary horizons are short and they may struggle to sustain activities because they lack funds. At times their activities fail to make substantial impact because they operate in unco-ordinated isolation and without reference to the larger policy and strategy context.⁵

In South Africa, despite widespread acceptance of the above, co-operation between public and private sector development agencies largely has been *ad hoc*, unco-ordinated and uncomfortable and has lagged behind the process of collaboration that has been taking place in other developing countries. The essentially political nature of development and the politization of development agencies has been a major cause for this non-cooperation.⁶

The macro political changes that currently are being negotiated are providing room for players in the development field to manoeuvre. This period of transition, together with the increasing realization of the enormity of the development task, is encouraging dialogue between public and private development agencies. Possibly this period is an appropriate time to facilitate the process of increased co-operation between the sectors.

This article focuses on issues which have hindered, and may continue to hinder, the practical process of the public and NGO sectors co-operating in a complementary and mutually acceptable manner. It also suggests steps which both sectors can take to facilitate this process. The article is divided into four sections. The first section sets out certain basic points of departure. The second section discusses some of the issues that appear to hinder the collaborative process. The third section explores the possibility of the South African public and NGO sectors achieving a mutually acceptable and sustainable collaborative relationship for development. The final section draws conclusions.

Departure points

The discussion on issues that appear to hinder co-operation needs to be considered in terms of two basic departure points:

- (i) People and organizations act interdependently only when there is a need for them to do so. Generally, the need for co-operation arises out of two situations. The first situation exists when there are common values and goals, in which case the co-operation is said to be rationally driven. In the second situation, mutuality of interest

arises because the organizations are reliant on shared resources. In the absence of either of these conditions, co-operation does not occur and organizations do not act interdependently. When the conditions necessary for co-operation exist, organizations negotiate a way around the obstacles to co-operation.⁷

- (ii) Owing to changes in the national political framework, all public sector services, including socio-economic development programmes, will be expected to respond to the demands of the majority of the constituent population. Private- and public-sector programmes will probably achieve greater congruence in terms of their goals, objectives and strategies.

These changes are beginning to be reflected in public organizations which are adopting more developmentally orientated policy and strategy approaches intended to service the needs of the majority of the population. For example, there is a movement away from top down service delivery for the élite few, to providing support services for actions identified and embarked upon by large numbers of local people. The adoption of farmer support in addition to commercial farmer settlement models for agriculture illustrates this.⁸ Simultaneously, NGOs are being stretched beyond their capacities to provide "development" and not just "political" services.⁹ Donors are requiring them to be increasingly accountable for their actions.

The resources necessary for socio-economic development are in short supply. This is promoting increased competition both within and between the public and private sectors and may lead to a rationalization of the public-sector agencies. These factors are increasing the necessity for co-operation between the sectors.¹⁰ The public sector will require the assistance of NGOs to design and implement appropriate support services which actually reach and assist people at grassroots level. NGOs, increasingly, may need the public sector and multilateral aid agencies for the substantial and stable, medium- and long-term funding that is required for building human and organizational capacity, being a basic ingredient for people-centred development.

This provides the gap for South Africa's "first and second generation" NGOs to evolve to "third generation" NGOs.¹¹ Korten suggests that in their first generation, NGOs tend to be relief and welfare orientated. Second generation NGOs tend to be small-scale, self-reliant, development orientated. Third generation NGOs are sustainable systems development orientated, thus achieving greater integration within the national development framework.

Understanding one another's organizations

Public sector and NGO development organizations often lack information about one another's policy, strategy, procedures, strengths and weaknesses. The historical and political reasons for this are now shifting. An understanding of an organization is required so that informed decisions can be made as to whether, and then how to negotiate as well as to the results that may realistically be expected from the process, which is time-consuming and expensive.

Formal and informal policy, strategy and decision-making processes

For the public sector and NGOs to acquire this knowledge they need to acquaint themselves with one another's formal and informal policy, strategy and operational decision-making processes. It may be easier for public organizations, which have a variety of resources and research facilities at their disposal, to acquire this knowledge about NGOs than visa versa. NGOs tend to be smaller, more focused and have limited resources and budgets.

It is particularly important for South African NGOs to acquire this knowledge about public organizations because of the polarized nature of our society and the heterogeneous and multi-disciplinary staff profile of many of the larger public entities. Frequently, different views held by different lobby groups within large, multi-faceted organizations result in the communication of mixed messages to the outsider.¹² If the outsider is informed, the chance of interpreting correctly is increased.

For example, the Development Bank of Southern Africa's (DBSA) Articles of Agreement, Annual Reports and official policy documents make specific provision for its involvement with development agencies other than public organizations. The documentation also emphasizes the importance of NGOs to the development process. A quick perusal of DBSA funding sources and organizational structure illustrates that it is almost exclusively funded by government and that, primarily, it finances development through the currently existing government structures.¹³ This obviously implies that any assistance to NGOs will require at least the support of the particular homeland government concerned. This factor alone could deter certain NGOs. If not, details of the nature of the assistance potentially available are required. The official documentation does not indicate or explain why, comparatively speaking, the DBSA has provided minimal financial assistance to NGOs for their development initiatives. To understand why, further information about the DBSA is needed.

This information will indicate that owing to the heterogeneous employee profile of large public funding organizations, the staff who are informed about the NGO sector and the practical implications of co-operating with NGOs are not always the decision-makers. In addition, the professional experience of many of the staff is public sector in orientation. This lack of experience in dealing with the NGO sector reflects itself in the unease with which many staff communicate and negotiate with NGOs. Increased understanding about the organization would also indicate that much policy that dictates decision-making is operational in nature. It arises out of the project cycle decision-making process. It is internally minuted and it shifts.¹⁴

The public sector can assist NGOs to understand its organizations by offering more relevant information in a user-friendly format to the NGO sector. Information booklets designed for this purpose have been published by many of the multilateral aid agencies, such as Canadian International Development Agency,¹⁵ World Bank¹⁶ and the United Nations Development Programme.¹⁷ The public organizations could also be more specific about what assistance, in terms of their own policy and strategy guidelines, they can and cannot offer. An upfront "no" is less frustrating and less expensive than a refusal six months down the line.

NGOs can assist this process by increasing their knowledge about the public organization before negotiations start so that they can strategically manage the negotiations and the possible on-going co-operative relationship. To acquire this knowledge, NGOs may need to pool and share information and resources by forming alliances.

The establishment of an on-lending non-government organization (ONGO) or umbrella body by NGOs and representing the common interests of NGOs as a mechanism for this resource sharing and possible co-operative ventures has been suggested to the NGO sector by a variety of sources.¹⁸ Such umbrella organizations exist in many countries.¹⁹ Owing to the heterogeneous and politicized profile of our society, one umbrella body that can represent and negotiate for all NGOs with South Africa's plethora of unco-ordinated public development assistance organizations may be a pipe dream. However, NGOs with similar interests could band together. A few umbrellas are better than no umbrella at all.

The international debate about how international and indigenous NGO's can structure their co-operation to be of mutual assistance to one another, is also relevant here.²⁰ South Africa has some sophisticated NGOs which could help their less sophisticated counterparts and community-based organizations (CBOs)²¹ to acquire knowledge about the public sector and gain assistance from it. For example, the DBSA receives applications for assistance from many small CBOs. The Development Bank of Southern Africa is a "wholesaler" of development assistance which it "retails" to formally structured intermediaries. It is not equipped to finance grassroots CBOs directly.²² NGOs could assist CBOs to obtain DBSA assistance by structuring an umbrella intermediary body through which the support could be channelled.

The nature of the assistance on offer

Should NGOs decide that they wish to deal with a particular public organization, the nature of the assistance on offer should be carefully researched and assessed. The form of assistance most obviously on offer and widely utilized may not be the only assistance available. It is difficult to negotiate for, adapt, or mix and match assistance to individual requirements, let alone influence the nature of the assistance on offer, without this information.

Types of assistance

Financial support is usually not the only form of assistance available. Many public organizations can offer technical advice, research facilities, regularly updated information, facilities for meetings and secretarial services.

Since these organizations usually do not operate for profit there is usually no, or minimal, financial charge for using these services. For example, these large organizations usually have a pool of staff skilled in any number of areas, who can offer expert advice on an *ad hoc* basis without having to charge for their time, such as skilled horticultural and marketing experts.

Time periods required for project approval

Many multilateral and public organizations have lengthy project approval processes that involve an in depth appraisal of the project. This is commonly referred to as the project cycle. Time periods varying from six to fifteen months, and from nine months to three years are cautiously cited by

DBSA and World Bank staff, respectively.²³ Many NGOs cannot withstand the lagtime between project application and flow of project funds. The public and NGO sectors need to negotiate around this issue.

Public organizations can assist by establishing different assistance programmes more suitable for NGO-type projects which short-circuit the lengthy project cycle and facilitate flexible and quick decision-making for small projects. Should this option be disregarded because it compromises the validity of the project cycle, a programme versus a project-funding approach operating within the project cycle could provide an alternative. Once certain principles are agreed upon, programme funding could flow through an ONGO or decentralized local body on which the various programme stakeholders are represented.

NGOs can assist this process by establishing their own ONGO through which long-term programme funds could flow. World Vision and Kagiso Trust are examples of NGOs which have been involved in such arrangements. NGOs can mix and match short- and long-term funding organizations. This will require them to plan systematically, phase action and apply to the "slower" public agencies for funding for the medium- and long-term programme phases.

Financing programmes

It is frequently stated that the financing programmes of public donors are awkward for and do not fit the requirements of NGOs.²⁴ The commonly cited major obstacle is that money is loaned not granted. In addition, capital costs are funded, while operational and overhead costs, which constitute project support costs, are not. Private sector donors also are reluctant to fund operational and overhead costs. This exacerbates the problem for NGOs.²⁵

NGO development action tends to be "people-centred", which involves building human and organizational capacity. Mobilization and organization-building requires a high quality support service which provides regular and effective assistance over extended periods of time.

The costs of providing an effective support service, consisting of items such as salaries, vehicles, training and extension, are allocated to "operational and overhead" categories, which are less frequently funded by both public and private sector donors. Provided both NGO and public sector representatives are familiar with donor financial policies and programmes and the practical implications thereof, there is usually room for manoeuvre. Innovative ways of breaking down and then parcelling financial packages may overcome apparent constraints.

For example, capital costs generally are considered to be those costs associated with the creation or acquisition of an asset. Both human and physical assets are required for development. The training of an NGO's trainers to train community leaders involves the creation of human capital and thus constitutes a capital cost for the NGO. While the training of many community leaders may constitute an operational cost to the NGO, it constitutes the cost of human capital creation for the individual community concerned. This concept is problematic and therefore negotiable because what constitutes an operational cost for an NGO may constitute a capital cost for the particular community concerned. Possibly NGOs could negotiate this concept to acquire funding for organization-building for both themselves and their targeted beneficiaries.

The public sector could assist this process by:

- supporting the formation of funding consortiums;
- assessing whether funding programmes give practical effect to stated development policy and strategy;
- setting up a funding programme to cater specifically for the requirements of NGOs as various international multilateral agencies have done. For example, Canadian International Development Agency,²⁶ German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation, the United Nations Development Programme²⁷ and the European Economic Community;²⁸
- facilitating the practice of contracting to NGOs by directly requesting NGOs to tender.

NGOs could assist this process by making greater use of the following mechanisms:

- Clearly identifying and breaking down the exact operational and overhead costs incurred by an NGO if it provides a support service to a project, and then allocating these costs directly to the capital costs of initiating sustainable project action.
- Mixing and matching capital and operational cost funders and loan and grant funders. This averts dependence on one source of finance.
- Using the public sector to guarantee private-sector funding.
- Utilizing matching finance principles to obtain beneficiary commitment. This formula is being used, for example, by the Independent Development Trust.²⁹
- Assessing whether soft-loan finance may provide a better investment option than grant finance if soundly managed.
- Offering services to the public sector on a contractual basis. Strategic negotiation and packaging of requests for finance is a particularly important service that an ONGO or sophisticated NGO could provide for its less-sophisticated counterparts and CBOs.
- Strategic lobbying for the financing of organization-building costs for NGOs and their clients, regardless of whether the costs are capital or operational in nature, is another service that an ONGO could render to the NGO sector.

Financial, administrative and reporting requirements of public donors

This mundane issue excites both NGOs and the public donors alike. In South Africa, it appears to be one of the reasons raised to excuse non-cooperation. Frequently NGOs are criticized for their short-term planning horizons, poor financial and administrative procedures and, importantly, poor project monitoring and evaluation procedures.³⁰

This criticism cannot be levelled at NGOs alone, but at many public development organizations.³¹ In South Africa the problem has been exacerbated by the political and ensuing legislative framework.³² Owing to the shifting political situation and the move away from protest mode to sustainable development, accountability requirements will receive more attention, particularly from international donors.³³

Both the public and NGO sectors could contribute to the process of co-operation by addressing the causes of these problems. With regard to NGOs, these problems are often caused by the lack of stable and long-term funding sources. A further consequence is that NGOs lack the organizational capacity and staff with the skills, expertise and time to

devote to monitoring and evaluating projects. Poor planning often results in a failure to include time for these two important activities to be undertaken in a project.

The NGO sector could negotiate for – and the public sector could respond by providing – funds for the upgrading of the organizational and management capacity of NGOs as required for project implementation. Both parties could negotiate for appropriate reporting and monitoring procedures to be built into project design and implementation. This could be approached in a participatory manner and would aid information flows and project evaluation.

“Third generation status”: Public and NGO sector collaboration

During the 1970s and 1980s, headway was made with the collaborative relationship between large multilateral and public sector donors and NGOs in many parts of the world. South Africa lags behind the trend because of the divisive nature of its politics.³⁴

International lessons of experience indicate that the issue is not whether collaboration can be achieved, but whether it can be sustained on mutually acceptable terms. More specifically, how can the collaborative relationship be strategically managed so that NGOs and large multilateral and public-sector donors are active partners in the development process and NGOs avoid becoming dependent “conduit pipes”. How is the relationship to be managed so that more South African NGOs can grow into “third generation NGOs”, which retain a measure of autonomy and are able to influence the policy-making process.³⁵

South Africa is well-placed to benefit from the international collaborative experience and to avoid the repetition of error for, *inter alia*, the following reasons:

- South African NGOs have a particularly fierce history of independence.
- South Africa has a strong private sector that has invested, and presumably will continue to invest, substantial funds into socio-economic development. This will allow NGOs to mix and match funding sources and avoid excessive dependence on any one source. This avoids the consequences of the maxim “he who pays the piper calls the tune”.
- The national and political changes which are being negotiated, hopefully will reduce the polarization that has developed between public and private development agencies. The conditions for co-operation, being interdependence of resources and common values and goals, are budding and if tended with care, may grow.

Conclusion

This article suggests that the shifting macro-political framework coupled with the growing realization of the enormity of the development task, is allowing the true conditions for co-operation between the South African public and NGO sectors to arise.

If true conditions for co-operation exist, being common values and goals and interdependence of resources, both international and local experience illustrates that despite obstacles, the interested parties will negotiate a collaborative way.

Both the public and NGO sectors may need to prepare themselves to strategically negotiate and manage the

collaborative process. Given the large size and complexity of public sector organizations in comparison to most NGOs, this process appears to be more daunting for the NGO sector. The possibility of NGOs with mutual interests sharing resources to engage effectively in this process has been emphasized.

South Africa is well-placed to benefit from the lessons of international experience and to achieve corroboration on mutually acceptable and sustainable terms. These terms should not compromise the autonomy of NGOs or their ability to contribute actively to the process of development policy formation, strategy implementation and evaluation.

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Development economics and policies to promote peace in South Africa

*Dr Stef Coetzee, Director of the Africa Institute, discusses the way in which a developmentalist approach to economics may promote peace in strife-torn South Africa.**

Introduction

By the end of the 1980s the need for democracy and peace in South Africa as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth and development was widely acknowledged by political economists. Although developments in the international economy since the 1970s have exerted an important influence on the outcome of events in South Africa,¹ the effect of political policies on the performance of the South African economy can be regarded as rather pervasive.² The South African economy has shown a persistent decline in economic growth since the 1970s and is characterized by a highly unequal distribution of wealth and income, rising unemployment, poverty and socio-economic imbalances and backlogs.

The quest for a democratic and more just economic society has therefore become the new driving force in the country. Moreover, given the effect of poverty and unemployment, in addition to the underlying political conflict, on the current cycle of violence in the country, peace and reconciliation will not be sustained without policies to attack poverty.

Analysis of the agendas of some of the main participants in the debate in South Africa suggests a shift in positions and a growing consensus on the importance of objectives such as economic growth; a better distribution of the fruits of economic growth; meeting basic needs such as education, health and housing; employment creation; and the alleviation of poverty.³ The major differences that still exist pertain to the way in which these objectives should be met as well as policy measures prescribed by different schools of thought.

The above shifts in position are also discernible with regard to such major issues as the role of the state and the market in the economy, with a growing school arguing in favour of a mixed economy and therefore a more balanced

mix of the state and the private sector. This school believe in a more pragmatic approach in order to promote consensus among a wide spectrum of classes and groups, the twin goals of economic welfare and economic equality and the elimination of economic domination.⁴ Le Roux⁵ regards this approach as the "uncomfortable compromise" that may eventuate from the process of negotiations in South Africa.

In view of the importance of reconciling growth and distribution in South Africa, this article presents an overview of the state of the art on the growth and distribution debate and discusses the developing countries' experience with growth, poverty and distribution. In the last section of the article policy options for South Africa are suggested.

Development economics and growth and distribution

The earlier theories of economic development regarded economic growth as sufficient for sustained economic development. According to Hunt⁶ this was to be achieved through an "expanding capitalistic nucleus", in other words through capital accumulation, industrialization, urbanization and mobilization of underutilized manpower. It was assumed that the fruits of economic growth would trickle down to all sections of the community and that distribution would be taken care of automatically. To the extent that inequality existed in developing countries, it was regarded as a necessary precondition for development. Deliberate policy interventions to address poverty and inequality were therefore in this view regarded as potentially undercutting economic efficiency.

The growth record of developing countries showed an impressive record,⁷ and their average GNP growth of 3,5 per cent in the first 25 years after World War II far exceeded expectations and even policy prescriptions.⁸ However, a similar improvement in socio-economic development did not occur in developing countries and the overall picture in

* This article is based on an inaugural address delivered at the University of South Africa on acceptance of a professorship in Economics, 19 March 1991.

developing countries and particularly in Africa remained rather bleak.⁹

From the above developments it became clear that economic growth was a *necessary but not sufficient* precondition for economic development and a clearer distinction was drawn between the concepts of economic growth and development. Also, the notion of income inequality in the early stages of development as a prerequisite to generate high saving rates, was increasingly questioned. If growth could not automatically promote distribution, could redistribution with growth promote the twin goals of growth and equality more successfully?

Chenery and Ahluwalia *et al*¹⁰ state that

... the principal element that is missing from existing theories is an explicit treatment of the distribution of the various forms of assets. A more general statement would recognize that the income of any household is derived from a variety of assets: land, privately owned capital, access to public goods, and human capital embodying varying degrees of skills.

Hence the scope for policy interventions goes beyond factor pricing and includes policy options such as a redistribution of current assets (for example, land reform or more radical variants such as nationalization), taxation of income and wealth, provision of public consumption goods or direct income transfers and the commodity composition of demand.¹¹

By introducing the importance of the distribution of assets, the redistribution-with-growth school also introduced the importance of economic and political power into non-Marxist analysis, which broadened the scope of development economics to embrace the field of political economy,¹² a dimension that Hettne¹³ found lacking in development theory. However, on account of measurement problems related to targeting for the poor, political resistance to implementation and the rather modest results with the strategy in low-income developing countries,¹⁴ the emphasis shifted towards the satisfaction of basic needs as a politically more feasible development strategy.

The basic needs approach was an attempt to attack poverty directly; to put "first things first" and address the immediate private consumption requirements of a family and essential public services of the poor such as food, shelter, clothing, education, health, water, sanitation and public transport in an attempt to raise their productivity and income and to change the pattern of economic growth in favour of the poor.¹⁵ By investing in the poor (that is, human capital formation) and meeting their basic consumption requirements the strategy set out to address growth and inequality concurrently. The basic needs approach was somewhat broadened by proponents of the Alternative Development School who, in addition to basic needs, emphasized the importance of self-reliant development, decentralized development and environmentally sound patterns of growth and development (ecodevelopment).¹⁶

On the basis of statistical analysis of a group of fast growing developing countries, Hicks¹⁷ concluded that meeting basic needs may contribute significantly to growth, but is not a sufficient condition for high growth. Therefore, a basic needs emphasis, far from reducing growth, can be instrumental in increasing it. However, some unsettled issues do remain,¹⁸ including problems relating to the definition of basic needs, targeting for the poor, the danger of attacking the symptoms rather than the causes of poverty

and the promotion of popular participation in decision-making, without implementing far-reaching political and economic reforms.¹⁹

In fact, it was the lack of sound governance and macro-economic management and problems such as the increasing debt, overvalued exchange rates, distorted factor prices and unrealistic tax regimes that prompted the drive towards implementing structural adjustment policies in developing countries. These policies did bring about important reforms, but largely to the neglect of poverty. The challenge is therefore how to bring about "adjustment with a human face",²⁰ in other words, to promote both sound macroeconomic policies and reforms and human development that will render the poor more productive.

An attack on poverty will therefore have to go beyond the efficient allocation of scarce resources and their sustained growth over time to address issues such as the access to and control over resources, the distribution of the benefits of growth to the poor and changes in the economic, social, political and institutional mechanisms to bring about a rapid and large scale improvement in the levels of living for the poor.²¹ In fact, policies to promote human development have moved centre stage in the 1990s in an attempt to improve the capabilities of people and to enlarge their choices, the most critical of which are a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living.²²

The above discussion indicates that economic development theory was informed by the particular conditions prevalent in developing countries. However, Toye²³ points out that the experience with development in developing countries shows a high degree of unpredictability, with some countries faring much better and others much worse than expected.

What lessons can we learn from international experience and the African context?

Economic growth, distribution and poverty: General findings

Results from World Bank research, undertaken by Fields,²⁴ on the interactions between economic growth, equity and poverty alleviation show that economic growth in 35 developing countries was nearly always positively associated with a reduction in absolute poverty. This suggests that the poor are rendered poorer by macroeconomic decline. Furthermore, no relation was found between a change in the rate of growth or the level of national income, and a change in inequality. This suggests that the kind rather than the rate of economic growth is more important for the reduction of inequality. Moreover, no significant relation was found between inequality in the distribution of income and economic growth. This suggests that an unequal distribution of income in the early phase of development is not necessary for rapid growth, as was quite often assumed in the past.

On the basis of the above findings it can be concluded that sustained economic growth remains a prerequisite for development. However, to change the pattern of growth to address the needs of the poor, a simultaneous reduction in the inequality of income and an improvement in the access to productive means will be necessary.

Specific country experience in promoting growth and addressing poverty

Analysis of the specific country experience show three types of countries:

Firstly, countries with a high rate of economic growth (6,0 per cent) such as Brazil and Pakistan, which have achieved no improvement in social indicators. These countries achieved growth without development. In a second group of countries social indicators improved without rapid economic growth such as was the case with Columbia (1971-1978) and Costa Rica (1971-1977). They achieved social development without sustaining the growth of new income and employment opportunities. Thirdly, countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia that seem to have achieved a balance between policies promoting economic growth and those enabling the poor to participate in growth. The latter countries achieved and sustained GDP growth rates of 6,0 per cent or more. This growth was relatively labour intensive, promoted agriculture and generated demand for the factors of production owned by the poor. They also provided for social spending, achieved universal primary education and their infant mortality rates are lower than many other similar countries with similar incomes, while the improvement in the skills and equality of the labour force enable the poor to seize the opportunities provided by economic growth.²⁵

Policies proposed by the World Bank²⁶ for poverty-reducing growth must firstly be attuned to economy-wide and sectoral policies to encourage rural development and urban employment. These policies also include moderate taxation of agriculture, relatively undistorted product and factor markets, public provision of infrastructure and improving the access of small farmers to technology. Secondly, they should focus on increasing the participation of the poor in growth through *inter alia* improving access to land, reforming property rights, improving tenancy, increasing access to credit, developing suitable financial institutions (for example, informal lenders) and improving access to infrastructure and technology. Thirdly, resource-poor regions characterized by environmental degradation, pressures on land and poverty should allow for outmigration to areas of greater potential, but may also require investments in basic needs such as education and training.

The World Bank *Report on poverty*²⁷ concludes that

... the countries that have been most successful in attacking poverty have encouraged a pattern of growth that makes efficient use of labour and have invested in the human capital of the poor.

These strategies enable the poor to use their most abundant asset, namely labour, improve their immediate well-being and increase their capacity to take advantage of their newly created possibilities. Those among the poor such as the infirm, the aged, people living in resource-poor areas and others vulnerable to personal disasters will however not benefit directly from the above approaches and require a system of well-targeted transfers and safety nets.

The African experience

The above proposals seem to have much relevance in Africa.²⁸ Studies on Africa show that economic growth has declined, population growth is high and exceeds the economic growth rate, social development has deteriorated,

institutional structures are crumbling and environmental degradation is alarming. Although adjustment programmes are showing the first signs of success, especially in some countries, the general outlook remains bleak and the pervasive lack of democracy and accountability negatively affects the policy environment. Although international economic events influenced the above outcome, the overwhelming body of evidence points to the fact that these problems are mainly attributable to internal problems.

Policy recommendations for Africa are wide-ranging and include improved governance, financial management and efficiency of public enterprises; strengthening of the production capacity and improving productivity of investment; human resource development; building technological capacity; a better balance between the public and private sectors; curbing military expenditure and redirecting expenditures towards the poor, export diversification and food self-sufficiency.

Although South Africa experiences many of the development problems of Africa, as will be pointed out below, the South African economy is not strictly comparable to many of the African countries. Moreover, a compromise on policy options in South Africa will be possible only if a common understanding of the nature of the development problems of the country is reached.

The nature of poverty problems in South Africa

The influence of political policies

Political policies of the past and the limited form of democracy in South Africa have had a pervasive effect on the economic development of the country both from efficiency and equity points of view. The costly duplication of apartheid structures certainly have had a negative effect on the efficiency of the economy, while government interventions in the economy such as those aimed at promoting strategic industries and import substitution have also served to undercut efficiency. The plethora of legislation to keep the political system intact has had a severe impact on the control over resources and access to opportunities. In addition, government expenditure has favoured the affluent minority, leading to a skewed allocation of resources. The above policy measures also led to increasing international economic isolation and perceptions about the country which did not create sound long-term investor confidence and conditions for economic growth.

A deteriorating growth record and a period of stagflation

The rate of economic growth as measured by the real gross domestic product has declined from an average of 5,5 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1974 to 1,8 per cent for the period 1975 to 1988. During the latter period per capita income declined by 1,0 per cent per annum.²⁹

The average inflation rate of 14,7 per cent between 1980 and 1989 has been far higher than the average of our main trading partners (5,2 per cent) which affected not only our international competitiveness, but also increased the burden of the large number of households in the low income bracket. Owing to the economic, social and political conflict in the country and structural economic factors such as

monopoly power and aggressive wage demand by trade unions, it is unlikely that the inflation rate will be reduced to below 10,0 per cent in the short to medium term.³⁰

A capital-intensive growth path and high levels of unemployment

The position of the poor has further been aggravated by the increasing capital intensity of the formal sector of the economy and the high levels of unemployment since the mid-seventies. The average labour absorption capacity of the formal sector of the economy has declined from 73,6 per cent for the period 1965 to 1970 to 12,5 per cent for the period 1985 to 1989.³¹ This implies that only 125 out of 1 000 new entrants per day to the labour market could be accommodated as full-term employees during the latter period. Between 1974 and 1989 the formal sector of the economy created only an additional 1,2 million employment opportunities, while the labour force increased by 4,7 million.

The so-called peripheral labour force, that is people involved in the informal/subsistence economy and the unemployed grew from 22,8 per cent to 28,7 per cent and from 7,2 to 13,2 per cent respectively from 1980 to 1989. The percentage of the labour force outside formal employment has therefore risen to 41,9 per cent. Moreover, it should be noted that unemployment has continued to rise even during upswings of the business cycle, which strongly indicates that unemployment has assumed structural characteristics.³²

The distribution of income and wealth

High rates of unemployment and the fact that a large percentage of the poor is unskilled has, among other things, added to the skewed distribution of income and wealth. South Africa's Gini coefficient (which is a measure of income inequality) was 0,69 in 1980,³³ which was the highest of any of the countries for which data are available.³⁴

McGrath³⁵ calculates that some 71,5 per cent of income accrues to the richest 20 per cent and 5,1 per cent to the bottom 40,0 per cent of the population in South Africa. According to McGrath³⁶ economic growth in the postwar period

... resulted in increased per capita incomes for all race groups, although relative inequalities between Whites and Blacks were increased over the whole period because White per capita incomes grew faster than Black per capita incomes. Coloured and Indian per capita incomes grew at a faster rate than White incomes and the disparities between the incomes of these groups were narrowed.

Also, the "white share" of personal wealth has been estimated to be over 80,0 per cent in South Africa,³⁷ while apartheid laws limited the access of blacks to land, property and business opportunities in central business districts.

Simkins³⁸ analysis shows that some 50 per cent of the total population was below the MLL (minimum level of living) in 1980, while the percentage of blacks in this category was estimated to be 60,5 per cent. Some 81,0 per cent of the population in the homelands was living in absolute poverty, and the total number of people living in poverty has increased during the 1970s and 1980s to some 16,5 million people. By 1980 those who were very poor in the homeland areas rose to some 1,4 million.

Socio-economic imbalances and backlogs

Vast inequalities also exist with regard to the provision of education,³⁹ health, housing and social pensions between

the major race groups. For instance, some 30,0 per cent of the black population is illiterate, while 38,0 per cent has very little or no education. The housing backlog is generally regarded to be more than one million units. Van der Berg's⁴⁰ estimates of the costs of the elimination of disparities between segments of the population in the above four fields show that the costs of parity at the 1986 white benefit level would imply an increase in social spending from 10,7 per cent of GDP (1986) to between 27,7 per cent (lower estimate) and 35,0 per cent (higher estimate). These findings have important implications for policy-making in the future and point to expectations among deprived people which could not be fulfilled in the short to medium term.

Urbanization

Many of the above socio-economic imbalances are prevalent in and around the metropolitan areas and cities. The Urban Foundation's⁴¹ research indicates that the metropolitan population will increase from 12,0 million to 32,0 million between 1980 and 2010, while the total number of blacks in the above areas will quadruple from 6,6 million to 23,6 million over the same period. By the year 2000 some 69,0 per cent of the total black population is expected to live in urban areas and some 31,0 per cent in rural areas. Two other important characteristics of urbanization pointed out by the Urban Foundation are the predominantly young population which can be expected in the urban areas and the rapid growth of informal housing conditions. They estimate that 42,0 per cent of the black population will be in the 0-14 age group, while some 7,0 million already live under informal housing conditions, 2,0 million of whom are in the PWV area.

While the urbanization process can generally be regarded as a positive force in economic development,⁴² the developing urban areas are also characterized by a limited "internal" economic base, high rates of unemployment, a skewed income distribution, weak urban management structures and an underprovision of public and private services, infrastructure and basic needs such as housing and education.⁴³ These development problems will certainly pose an enormous challenge to all parties involved in the urbanization process and place a further burden on our already strained resources.

Gloom or silent revolution?

The above analysis may lead us to construe a rather gloomy future development scenario for the country. Thomas⁴⁴ points out that the above trends do not necessarily signify a doomed economy, that our situation is not static and that they are signs of the process of transformation of a semi-developed country. He refers to positive changes such as declining fertility rates, land reform, urbanization, improving management training, education, foreign investment and an inflow of capital in the new South Africa, new decentralization policies and small business development.

Kane-Berman⁴⁵ asserts that a silent revolution is taking place in South Africa in the spheres of urbanization, education, manpower, income distribution, consumer spending, home ownership and the informal sector, (growth in the black taxi industry, shebeens, spazas, etc). Kane-Berman ascribes these events mostly to private initiative and development rather than action taken by authorities. Yet, in the 1980s many positive policy developments in the urbanization, housing,

regional development, labour and other fields were affected, which created a positive climate for economic development. In addition, the political changes expected to take shape in the 1990s may further contribute to the above developments in creating the environment for development.

Beukes⁴⁶ however warns that

... there are no grounds for thinking that our current problems are 'growing pains' which will disappear with time or as a result of the abandonment of apartheid. To master the transition successfully from a highly unequal, racially divided to a more balanced and stable developed economy, in accordance with meaningful democracy and popular demands will critically depend on appropriate policy making and implementation.

Towards policy options for South Africa

General

Given the nature of South Africa's poverty problems a package of policies will be needed to deal with poverty and the options discussed below should be regarded as preliminary in nature.

Resolving the political conflict

Towards the end of 1990 social scientists were again reminded of the interrelationship between political and economic forces in the country. From a development point of view the continued violence has had a severe impact on perceptions of both local and overseas investors, while the loss of many precious lives throughout the year has led to a loss of manpower, decreased productivity and a somber mood in the country.

A negotiated settlement therefore still tops the agenda as a matter of very urgent priority, determining to a very large extent the future prospects for peace, stability, overseas and local investor confidence and future prospects for economic growth. In addition, the limited form of democracy in South Africa has favoured the affluent (mostly white) minority and budgetary priorities have, until recently, almost exclusively favoured those who had access to power, while legislation such as the Land Act of 1936, Influx Control and the Group Areas Act have limited the access to opportunities of large sections of the population. Only through democratization of the development process and participation in decision-making would those people hitherto excluded from such processes exert an influence on policies toward addressing poverty and inequality.

However, a political settlement would not be a panacea for our development problems and could be regarded as a *necessary* but *not a sufficient condition* to resolve conflict in South Africa. But without a negotiated settlement, estimates⁴⁷ show that the decline in per capita income of 2,0 per cent per annum could continue, average income could decline by one third in two decades, no new jobs would be created over this period and life expectancy would remain at a low 60 years. On the other hand, consensus and stability and policies which stop or turn around capital outflow could increase average incomes by 80,0 per cent in two decades (that is, per capita growth of 3,0 per cent or average GDP growth of just over 5,0 per cent). Such a turn of events could create almost 6,0 million jobs in two decades, allow average life expectancy to rise to 70 years and dramatically increase resources for social expenditure.⁴⁸

Sound economic management: Creating the conditions for economic growth

However, the importance of "sound" governance and economic and financial "management" of economies during times of major transformations are borne out by the experience of many developing countries. This includes appropriate interest rate and exchange rate policies, flexible prices and wage policies, which reflect the scarcity of the factors of production, less direct controls on the economy and fiscal discipline.

The alleviation of historical backlogs and inequalities is bound to place increasing pressures on the fiscus and, as was pointed out above, it will not be possible to reach parity without absorbing an unduly large percentage of our already strained resources. Peace dividends such as scaling down of defence expenditure and expenditure on so-called strategic projects may well go some way toward releasing funds for human development and the poor. But these funds may still fall far short of what is needed and much emphasis will have to be placed on determining priorities and seeking appropriate policies to optimize outcomes under conditions of constrained budgets. The above backlogs and imbalances do require that a policy environment which is conducive to creating the underlying conditions for economic growth be established, since economic growth remains a *necessary*, although not *sufficient*, condition for economic development. However, to promote "adjustment with a human face", it would be crucial to change the pattern of economic growth in order to increase the opportunities for the poor, improve their access to and control over resources and to promote a more equal pattern of distribution.

Changing the pattern of economic growth

New opportunities for employment creation and income generation are most likely to arise from the urbanization process in South Africa, the provision of low-cost, affordable housing and infrastructure in urban areas and through self-help schemes. The growing urban markets will in turn create new opportunities for black entrepreneurs, builders, contractors and developers. In the rural areas a change in the pattern of growth is most likely to be effected through the adoption of human development and basic needs policies, small farmer development programmes and land reform policies. Off-farm opportunities are most likely to be promoted by suitable regional development policies that promote multi-sectoral development through capturing the comparative cost advantages of regions and subregions and their underutilized potential. However, the regional industrial development programme will have to be far more cost effective, be based on market signals and should promote concentrated urban development within the regional context.

The access to opportunities for the poor can be improved through access to finance and credit, making the poor more creditworthy,⁴⁹ and institutional support programmes to build out the management capacities and skills of emerging entrepreneurs and financial and technical support for non-governmental organizations in order for them to assume a more pronounced role in the development process and to promote people's participation. Land reform programmes to improve access to assets, and competition policy, which limits monopoly power and creates the environment for small

business development should be pursued. In addition, deliberate and more far-reaching attempts by the private sector to promote economic empowerment and black advancement could improve the upward mobility of disadvantaged people.⁵⁰

Sectoral policies

The above employment-creating growth path can be strengthened by policies and institutional support for micro-entrepreneurs both in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Considerable support is already rendered by the SBDC, DBSA and development corporations for such ventures, but this support should increasingly come to support those entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs coming from the ranks of the poor themselves.

Basic needs, social sectors and redirection of public expenditures

Promoting human development and investment in and maintenance of human capital could be regarded as a prerequisite for long-term sustained economic growth and development. It is pointed out above that strong pressures exist in South Africa to alleviate backlogs and inequalities amidst scarce resources to deal with these problems. This clearly points to the importance of appropriate policies to ensure optimum outcomes under conditions of scarce resources.

For the purpose of this article one example will have to suffice. In the education field, research has shown that cost-effective policies include the pursuance of policy options such as primary and pre-primary education which render the highest return on investment, training of schoolmasters to improve managerial efficiency of schools, double shifts, training of teachers in "scarce" subjects such as mathematics and natural sciences, making textbooks available and long-distance education.⁵¹

These policies notwithstanding, a redirection of public expenditure towards the poor is bound to take place. Since government expenditure in South Africa has consistently amounted to more than 20 per cent of gross domestic expenditure for many years,⁵² the "new" government may therefore have to raise additional incomes through cost recovery policies or international aid, earmark specific taxes for specific purposes (although this may lead to distortions), increase efficiency of social service delivery systems, target resources better to meet specific social sector needs (for example, primary health care, primary education, school feeding and nutrition programmes) and efforts can be made to reduce unit costs (for example, through introducing double shifts).⁵³ In addition, more pervasive attempts by the private sector to raise monies for socio-economic development would be required, such as recent initiatives launched by the life insurance industry. Further peace initiatives will improve the access to international capital markets and overseas sources of development aid. However, it is pointed out above that some people among the poor (the infirm, aged, etc) may not benefit from the above policies, which points to the need for transfers and safety nets.

Transfers and safety nets

Typical transfers and safety nets include (i) food pricing and distribution, (ii) public employment schemes, and (iii) social security.⁵⁴ All these categories will have to receive renewed attention and research in South Africa and the

initiatives taken in this regard by government are welcomed. A strong case exists for the creation of a food security fund which could be financed from the proceeds of value added tax on food, private sector contributions and overseas aid. For the purpose of this article the importance of special employment-creation programmes is emphasized. Only modest economic growth seems to be on the cards for the next few years, while the high rate of unemployment may aggravate the conditions in the townships and add to instability during the transition phase.

Special employment-creation programmes should make use of existing funds and be channelled through existing institutions, such as DBSA, be supportive of sustained economic growth and employment creation. They require a package of policies and constant monitoring to ensure success. The most immediate effect could be achieved through the budgets of public authorities and a scanning of all their projects to promote labour intensive projects and to build productive capacities amongst the poor and to create infrastructures⁵⁵ such as those created in the poor-white era of the 1930s, in order to promote long-term economic development.

The above approach will promote an employment creating growth path and human development, increase participation of the poor in the development process and will lead to a more direct attack on poverty in the country. Success with policies to alleviate poverty will also significantly improve the conditions for lasting peace in the country.

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Size relationships in the urban system of Malawi

Dr D W Myburgh and Professor J A van Zyl, of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Western Cape, look at urbanization in the context of Malawi's development planning.

Introduction

The population of Malawi is predominantly rural (89 per cent), approximately half of it being concentrated in the Southern Region. The population growth rate for the country as a whole is around 3,0 per cent, resulting in a rapidly increasing population density.¹ At the same time Malawi has maintained a significant economic growth rate and has continued to produce sufficient food for its people.² However, owing to such factors as its small land surface, high population density, lack of significant mineral resources, land-locked situation and climatic constraints, Malawi remains one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Economic growth is frequently articulated in and through a country's urban system, which in turn defines the scale and direction of growth in terms of the flow of information, innovations and ideas in that country.³ Some links have also been noted between economic advancement and a well integrated system of towns and cities.⁴ An examination of Malawi's urban system can serve as a framework for the evaluation of recent policy developments in the country and provide a basis for identifying future needs and planning directions.

This article highlights some of the problems that hamper the identification of the urban system of Malawi and examines the structure of the system in terms of the size relationships and functions of the settlements. It then reviews the identified structure within the context of the stated planning objectives of the country.

Components of the Malawian urban system

Officially the 1987 Malawi population census recognizes only 32 urban centres. These are the 24 district headquarters

plus the towns of Mzuzu, Mponela, Monkey Bay, Liwonde, Balaka, Zomba, Luchenza and Ngabu (see *Table 1*).

In Malawi there are hundreds of nucleated settlements of which the majority are rural villages with few or no urban functions. Villages grade into towns as the number of urban activities (with their visible physical structures) increases, giving rise to settlements that are transitional in character. These are small settlements consisting of traditional, rural houses, but containing perhaps a few small grocery shops, a bottle store, a tea-room and a little school as the urban component. On the grounds of the number of urban functions they perform, however, many small settlements not recognized as towns in the census deserve to be classified as urban. Short of visiting every nucleated settlement in the country, it is impossible to recognize all the components or elements of Malawi's urban system. One alternate source of information on the variety of functions occurring in the nucleated settlements is the Malawi Telephone Directory. Clearly, this source is not without its limitations. In contrast to South Africa and First World countries in general, many of the small business undertakings in Malawi, which serve a restricted local community, do not make use of the telephone since most of their customers do not have telephones. The telephone directory is therefore not the ideal tool for studying detailed functional patterns, but in the absence of any other source of data it does give an indication of the *minimum* number of functional activities within the listed towns. All the specialized or sophisticated undertakings are usually listed in the directory. So too are government departments and other administrative institutions. On this basis the towns with higher functional status may be identified with relative ease. Owing to the constraints of time and funds available for field work, the telephone directory was therefore used as the basis for a tentative functional analysis and identification of urban settlements.

All the towns in Malawi have some grocery stores, owned by small businessmen, and usually at least one tea-room, bottle store, school and church. Since many of these

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Table 1: Functional categories and population of Malawi

	Functional Categories	Population	
1	Blantyre	22	331 588
2	Lilongwe	168	233 937
3	Mzuzu	68	44 238
4	Zomba	9	42 878
5	Karonga	17	19 630
6	Dedza	17	16 735
7	Mangochi	20	15 329
8	Nkhotakota	14	12 149
9	Kasungu	24	10 848
10	Salima	16	10 606
11	Nsjanje	8	10 042
12	Balaka	19	9 081
13	Liwonde	11	8 685
14	Mzimba	13	7 735
15	Rumphi	9	7 147
16	Mulanje	13	7 112
17	Monkey Bay	8	6 868
18	Nkhata Bay	13	6 492
19	Ntcheu	12	5 806
20	Ngabu	8	5 678
21	Mponela	9	5 609
22	Chitipa	9	5 233
23	Luchenza	15	4 737
24	Mwanza	10	4 710
25	Mchinji	13	4 542
26	Chikwawa	9	4 344
27	Thyolo	17	4 251
28	Phalombe	9	3 530
29	Ntchisi	7	3 060
30	Dowa	5	2 704
31	Chiradzulu	5	1 456
32	Machinga	4	913
33	Chilumba	9	
34	Chipoka	7	
35	Chiromo	3	
36	Dwangwa	7	
37	Madisi	7	
38	Namitete	8	

Table 1: (continued)

	Functional Categories	Population
39	Namwena	9
40	Nathenje	
41	Nchalo	8
42	Ntaja	10
43	Embangweni	7
44	Bvumbwe	7
45	Chileka	6
46	Kaporo	6
47	Thondwe	6
48	Ruo	6
49	Nkhoma	6
50	Namadzi	6
51	Mtakataka	6
52	Migowi	6
53	Kasiya	6
54	Jali	6
55	Domasi	6
56	Chisemphere	6
57	Chinteche	5
58	Nambuma	5
59	Makwasa	5
60	Ekwendeni	5
61	Mlangeni	4
62	Livingstonia	4
63	Sinyala	
64	Mitundu	4
65	Mbabzi	4
66	Likoma	4
67	Kapiri	4
68	Tsangano	3
69	Mbalachanda	3
70	Lizulu	3
71	Champhira	3
72	Bolero	3
73	Enthini	3
74	Misuku	2
75	Hora	2
76	Njuli	2

undertakings do not have telephones, their number cannot be easily gauged. Since they are a common feature of all towns, their existence is simply accepted and they are grouped together as a single functional category. Settlements listed in the telephone directory displaying at least two functional categories in addition to this composite one are taken to be urban in character and as such to be part of the urban system of Malawi. Each specialized type of business or institution (such as banks, garages, post offices) is regarded as representing a distinct functional category. The number of categories per town rather than the number of undertakings per category are counted.

On this basis the entries in the 1988 telephone directory suggest that there are 76 nucleated settlements with urban

functions in Malawi. For the purpose of this study these centres, which include the 32 found in the population census, can be regarded as the components of the urban system (Table 1).

Functional hierarchy

The number of categories gives only a rough indication of the functional status of a town but, as pointed out earlier, data on the numbers within a specific category or the size and workforce of an undertaking or office are not available. In keeping with central place theory it is, however, reasonable to accept that a town with a large number of categories has a higher functional status than one with only a few categories.




Figure 1 Functional hierarchy

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the towns and cities where rank is plotted against the number of functions performed by each. Clear breaks are evident between three groups of towns: those with less than 25 functional categories, those with between 49 and 68 categories, and those with between 168 and 222 categories.

From the variety of functions performed, it is clear that Malawi's urban centres are arranged in a hierarchy of at least three classes: cities (Blantyre-Limbe and Lilongwe), large towns (Mzuzu and Zomba) and the rest of the towns.

Population size relationships

A further important step in the analysis of urban systems is an examination of the population size relationships among the various components of the system. Figure 2 shows the rank-size distribution of the urban centres listed in the 1988 census. Breaks in the distribution pattern, similar to those identified in the analysis of functional relationships, are clearly evident.

An expected rank-size curve based on the largest centre predicts far larger sizes of centres than are present in Malawi. The second city in the distribution (Lilongwe) is




Figure 2 Rank-size relationships

the only exception, though not deviating greatly. A very distinct step is present between the two largest and the two medium-sized towns, the latter being considerably smaller than the size predicted by a rank-size relationship. A further clear break exists between the medium-sized towns and the rest of the centres, which closely follow a rank-size distribution based on the fifth largest town with a population of 19 630. The population size of the two smallest towns in the distribution drops rapidly with decreasing rank.

As pointed out earlier, the use of population size of centres alone excludes many urban settlements not defined as such in the 1988 census. An analysis of the system in terms of population size relationships therefore has to be limited to that part of the system for which population size data are available. A clear correlation between the population size of an urban centre and the complexity of the array of functions it performs was established quite early in the formulation of central place theory,⁵ and has been assumed in much subsequent work. In this respect Malawi is no exception.

Association between the population size and number of functions of the urban centres listed in the 1988 census was measured using the Spearman rank method. A correlation coefficient of 0,5634 was obtained, indicating a significant correlation at the 0,01 level of confidence. Given this finding with respect to the towns identified in the census,

it would not seem unreasonable to assume that such a relationship also exists with respect to the unlisted centres. Such extrapolation lends further credence to the inclusion of the centres identified from the telephone directory, as part of Malawi's urban system.

Primacy

Although increasing urban primacy is a feature of the urban system of many Sub-Saharan countries, true primacy is not present in Malawi. Primacy is identified by the largest city of a country being super-eminent not only in size but also in national influence. In Malawi, Blantyre was by far the largest city until the establishment of Lilongwe as the capital. In 1966 the respective populations of the three largest towns, Blantyre, Zomba and Lilongwe, were 109 461, 19 616 and 19 425. At that stage Blantyre clearly occupied a primate position, with a population more than five times that of the next largest town. Today, with a population only about 42 per cent greater than that of Lilongwe, it no longer holds that position. Moreover, as the capital, Lilongwe is greater in its national influence.

The characteristics displayed by the curves representing size relationships in the Malawi urban system can be at least partly explained in relation to the low level of economic development of the country, its historical connections with its neighbours, and the uneven spatial distribution of its economic resources and population.

Economic development, history and distribution of resources

Malawi's natural resources are limited. It has no mineral deposits of any significance on which manufacturing industry can be based. In 1980 the manufacturing and construction sectors provided work for only 3 per cent of Malawi's labour force.⁶ A large proportion of the manufacturing industry is made up of the processing plants around Mulanje and Thyolo. A sizeable number of industries in Malawi therefore do not have urban locations. Little can be done to expand the forestry and fishing resources, while both make small contributions to the GDP. Agricultural products comprise nine-tenths of Malawi's exports. Most of the enterprises responsible for Malawi's mainly estate-based exports are foreign-owned. Privately owned farming estates occupy about 15 per cent of the arable land but provide four-fifths of the export earnings. They grow mainly tobacco, tea and sugar. Paddy rice is also produced under irrigation.

Smallholders produce enough staple foods (mainly maize) to feed themselves and the country as a whole, and they are not obliged to migrate to the cities in order to find a means of survival. Individual incomes are low but the attraction of the cities is further offset by the Government's low wage policy.⁷ Urbanization as a result of rural-urban migration has therefore been slower than in many other developing countries.

Low per capita income inhibits individual mobility. Few can afford a motor car of their own and people have to make use of bus services to reach destinations that are beyond pedestrian range. A proliferation of small centres at short distances apart is therefore a more efficient scheme for satisfying the local demand for goods and services than would have been the case had people been more affluent. The need for a greater number of larger centres is therefore directly




Figure 3 Agricultural potential of Malawi

related to the degree of economic advancement, both at the individual and national level.

This proliferation of small centres separated by the sharp break in the curve to the next level of middle-sized towns in Malawi is very well illustrated in the size distribution curves shown in figures 1 and 2.

Urbanization has also been retarded by the peripheral position accorded to Malawi in the economy of the region during the era of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Potis⁸ indicates that the local or international headquarters of many commercial and industrial firms were not in Blantyre but in Salisbury (now Harare). Further, Malawi's dependence on surrounding countries has resulted in its urban development being relegated to the lower end of a wider urban hierarchy, which has its top outside the country.




Figure 5 Distribution of towns and their functional hierarchies

The concept of developing secondary cities in the immediate future has not been incorporated into the planning of the urban system in Malawi. The two largest cities of the country are neither so big, nor is their growth so rapid that the diversion of migration to secondary cities is warranted.

Concluding remarks

Malawi has what can be regarded as an urban system in the making. The success of the policy of shifting development from the heavily populated South to the Central Region is demonstrated by the rapid growth of Lilongwe as the facilitating centre. Similar success in effecting development is evident in the growth of Mzuzu in the north. These successes are likely to promote the growth of regional subsystems as improved linkages enhance the incorporation of local service centres. Such regionalism is responsible for the step-like formation of the curve in figure 1, a characteristic which Harris⁹ has suggested is the result of a lack of full spatial integration within the national system.

The similarity of this curve to the rank-size distribution of the South African city system in 1904¹⁰ and the subsequent changes in the curve, suggest that economic advancement and attendant increased connectivity are the course that Malawi will have to follow before a more balanced urban system can emerge. This accords with the findings of Berry¹¹ and others¹² that a rank-size distribution is related to entropy associated with advanced, well integrated national economies.

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Africa's rain forests: Preserving Africa's rich heritage

In this second article, Denis Fair, Senior Research Fellow at the Africa Institute, examines the extent to which Central Africa's rain forests have been exploited and the steps now being taken to preserve them because they contain the continent's largest remaining areas of untouched primary forest.

The preservation of the world's tropical forests is vital to the stability of the global climate, to the prevention of global warming, to the continued existence of half the world's animal and plant species, to the maintenance of soil productivity and the prevention of erosion, flooding and the siltation of reservoirs. The tropical moist, or rain, forests, as distinct from the tropical open forests of mixed grass and woodland, are sought after not only for their hard cabinet woods such as mahogany, the softer woods such as *okoumé* – ideal for plywood manufacture – and many other multipurpose timbers but also for a range of useful products including latexes, resins, tannins, waxes and pesticides, rattans and bamboos for craft goods as well as plant foods and meat for forest dwellers.

Despite their environmental significance, but because of their economic value to loggers and the needs of farmers for more land, 40 per cent of the world's rain forests had been cleared or degraded by 1980. The rate of destruction having subsequently increased. Most of the remaining 800 million hectares are to be found in the Amazon basin and in the Central African forest mass.¹ One estimate (1985) puts the area of the latter at about 170 million hectares, equal to 80 per cent of Africa's remaining virgin or primary forest.² Central Africa's forests are located not only near the coast but also, and unlike West Africa, deep in the interior far from ports and large cities and where low population densities and difficult access have helped preserve most of them from the invasions of shifting cultivators, permanent farmers and lumbermen. Compared with West Africa, where the tree cover has been reduced to about 10 per cent of its original extent, the prospects for Central Africa are much brighter. While the annual depletion rate in Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria has been between 14 and 16 per cent, among the highest in the world, rates for Zaire, Congo, Gabon and the Central African Republic are all less than 0,5 per cent and a little higher for Cameroon.³ However, pockets of easily accessible timber near the coast in Zaire, Congo and Gabon have not escaped the axe and heavy exploitation of their more valuable woods has been going on since early colonial days.

The fragility of the rain forest environment is well known. Once the primary forest is removed its regeneration is a long, slow process that could take 100 years and more. In populated areas it is virtually impossible to regenerate it at all, except in protected reserves, its place being taken rather by inferior secondary growth.

The call for the conservation of the world's rain forests goes back much further than serious attempts to answer it. As late as 1985 the World Resources Institute, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were still drawing attention in their Tropical Forests Action Plan (TFAP) to the alarming rate of forest destruction.⁴ They claimed that there was not nearly sufficient political awareness of its negative impact on the environment and human welfare. Greater political will was necessary, they stressed, to mobilize both human and financial resources to do something about the problem. In Africa the crisis has certainly not been politicized to the extent it has been in Southeast Asia or Latin America. In Thailand, for instance, nothing brought home the destructive effects of deforestation so forcefully as the events of November 1988 when floods and mudslides buried whole villages and took hundreds of lives. Thailand had allowed its forest cover to be depleted from 53 per cent of the country's land area in 1961 to only 18 per cent by 1988. The message that the November devastation carried was so clear that outrage at grassroots level forced the government to defy powerful timber interests and to impose a total ban on logging. Similar disasters in the Phillipines have also had immediate, though less drastic, responses.⁵

International insistence on a protective as opposed to a productive approach to the rain forest is certainly now far more vocal and direct action is beginning to be taken in Africa on a more concerted scale. Organizations involved include the World Bank, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the European Community (EC), producer and consumer bodies such as the African Timber Organization (ATO) and the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), timber importing countries and a large




Figure 1 The natural extent of tropical rain forests prior to land clearing. (After L A Lewis and L Berry)

number of independent groups such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature and Friends of the Earth, now part of a world rain forest movement.⁶ At the tenth World Forest Conference in Paris in 1991, the French president added his voice to the call to halt the destruction.

The change in mood is well seen, for instance, in the criticism from conservationists which greeted the TFAP and which the authors have been obliged to review. The plan placed too much emphasis on timber production and too little on conservation; so much so that the World Bank's new approach has, in fact, reversed the previous procedure. It begins now by assessing the level of exploitation that the forest in each country can support and then determining the level of production that can be safely applied. Thus, the starting point is now "an environmental audit" rather than a national timber production target.⁷

Intentions have turned to action. In 1991 the World Bank indicated that it would no longer fund the commercial logging of primary forest but rather the cutting of plantation timber and areas of secondary growth.⁸ Then, too, in West Africa the Ghana government banned the export of 18 species of logs in 1989 and intends to cease the export of all raw logs by 1992 and those of sawn timber by 1994. The Côte d'Ivoire government has also signified its intention to ban, wholly or partially, the export of uncut timber once the country's finances improve and a more favourable economic climate materializes.⁹

Commendable as these actions are, they nevertheless highlight the policy conflicts confronting many poor developing countries faced, on the one hand, by the international pressures from conservationists and, on the other, by their heavy dependence on the foreign exchange earnings from their timber exports. Difficult social problems, too, have arisen in some countries from the prohibition placed on the use by forest dwellers of traditional resources and from their removal from their age-long forest homes.

These issues raise the question of whether those countries and agencies insisting on forest conservation in developing countries should financially compensate them for the economic sacrifices they are being urged to make (see below). Meanwhile, to assist poorer countries to finance their environmental protection efforts, 25 nations established the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1990.¹⁰ It is managed jointly by the World Bank, the UNDP and the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP). Early results will be presented to the UN conference on the environment and development to be held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The European Community, too, has recently approved, with the assistance of the International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN), a substantial programme "to promote the conservation and rational use of the Central African forest heritage in all its forms". It is the largest subsidy ever given to an environmental project outside the Community itself.¹¹

While growing conservationist pressures are causing Central African governments to reassess their production and export targets, they also have to cope with the uncertainties of a volatile market for tropical timber. In the past five years demand has varied between depressed and firm, depending on world economic conditions and events.¹² Thus, the Gulf crisis raised fears in some Central African countries of a fall in demand from Iraq, a major importer, while the exports of others were hit by the economic troubles in eastern Europe. Competition from southeast Asian countries has been particularly strong, especially during times when the relative rise in the value of the CFA franc against Asian currencies has had adverse effects on exports from the French franc zone to which most Central African countries belong. Then, too, often when demand for tropical timbers was firm, southeast Asian and Latin American producers were able to benefit more than African for a number of reasons, among them higher levels of productivity. More recently, world recessionary conditions have added to export uncertainties. Demands for different types of wood vary, too, of course. The market for *okoumé*, for instance, has been saturated, necessitating the cessation of cutting from time to time.

Zaire

Zaire's tropical forests are immense, comprising more than 10 per cent of the world's total. Its rain forests cover more than 100 million hectares or 45 per cent of the country's total area. Some 60 million hectares are considered economically exploitable. Lying mainly in the inaccessible heart of the Zaire River basin, most of it is undisturbed and free of the irreparable damage done in West Africa.¹³ But there is one exception. A small area in lower Zaire with easy access to the port of Matadi and overseas markets has been so over-worked for so long that restrictions had to be placed on the cutting of the sought-after *limba* tree as long ago as 1955.¹⁴

The output of timber will probably increase as the country attempts to diversify its exports away from copper and other minerals. In the late 1980s between 400 000 and 500 000 cubic metres (m³) of logs were produced of which about one-quarter was exported along with a much smaller amount of sawn timber. A West German group and a joint Zaire/Canadian concern are the major timber operators.¹⁵

The government has shown some concern in recent years for both the conservation and the more efficient use of timber. Some critics claim, however, that it has not adequately confronted the powerful timber interests.¹⁶ In 1985 regulations were introduced with a view to increasing the processing of timber by granting licences preferably to firms with the capacity to do so. But the response seems to have been limited and political interference in granting applications for export licenses is common.¹⁷ In 1987 the government levied a tax, to be paid into a reconstitution fund, for the purpose of promoting the reforestation of cut areas but the resources of the fund are still slender.¹⁸

The European Community's recently approved Central African conservation programme, as mentioned earlier, will benefit Zaire along with Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Sites have been selected in each country where measures will be taken to guarantee both the conservation

and the long-term exploitation of their forest resources. In line with some other African countries, Zaire banned the logging of *wenge* or black wood in lower Zaire in 1990, an action that loggers claim has cost them dearly in lost export earnings. Commendable has been the establishment over the years of seven national parks covering 7,7 million hectares, with three more being planned.

Congo

Congo has "a better chance than most countries of conserving the present extent of its rain forest", states the World Bank, especially since most of its only 2 million people are urbanized and its major source of income is oil. Moreover, not only are the World Bank, the European Community and other international agencies involved in promoting the new approach to forest management but the Congolese government itself is reviewing its forestry strategies.¹⁹

Tropical forest covers about 60 per cent of Congo's area, a rich and almost untouched rain forest of 15,5 million hectares occurring in the less accessible northern areas. Another 4,5 million hectares occur nearer the coast, its *okoumé* and *limba* species especially having been heavily exploited over many years, causing much of the forest's degradation to less productive secondary growth. Exotic eucalyptus plantations, in small measure, have replaced some of the worked-out areas. The intention was to establish a pulp and paper mill but it has yet to materialize.²⁰

Until 1975, when oil production began, timber accounted for nearly 50 per cent of total exports by value. Output then declined but recovered strongly to 400 000 m³ in 1989 and timber now constitutes 12 per cent of export earnings, mainly in the form of logs and sawn timber.²¹

With one eye on increasing the export of timber and its products and the other on the rising international concern for conservation, the government has turned its attention to the northern areas, on the one hand, and to instituting stricter controls over logging and regulations encouraging greater local processing, on the other. Reforestation, the establishment of processing plants at the forest site and the improvement of transport facilities by river and rail to the port of Pointe Noire are being pursued in the interests of production efficiency and the reduction of export costs and wastage.²²

Backing this up is the World Bank's funding for improved forest management, for the greater use of non-timber forest products and the encouragement of wild-life tourism. Complementing these efforts, the European Community's programme has demarcated three zones in Congo totalling 284 000 hectares in which felling will be limited to containable areas, villagers will be assured of access to traditional forest produce and encouraged to take part in the forest surveillance system. While Congo may now be unable to produce as much timber as the government had envisaged, the World Bank believes that "a truly sustainable forest industry" should emerge instead.²³

Gabon

Like Congo, Gabon has every reason to conserve and manage well its vast areas of rain forest. It has a small population of 1,25 million, a high proportion of which is urbanized, and its rich onshore and offshore oil deposits and its manganese

provide a sound economic base without undue dependence upon its timber resources. Forest covers 20,4 million hectares or 76 per cent of the country's domain. Out of 431 species of wood so far identified only some 30 are exploited. It was ebony that first attracted early European traders but today it is the valuable *okoumé* that accounts for 70 per cent of total timber production. As in the case of Congo, timber was Gabon's chief export earner, accounting for 75 per cent of the total, before the production of oil began in 1960. It now stands third, with manganese second.²⁴

Although Gabon's overall rate of deforestation is as low as 0,3 per cent per year, the coastal zone behind Libreville and Port Gentil has been exploited for over one hundred years and particularly since World War II. The result is that the better woods are becoming scarcer. It is here that the *okoumé* tree grows abundantly and where logs can easily be floated down the Ogooué and other rivers for shipment. The zone is now worked mainly by small Gabonese operators, the larger companies having moved inland to a second zone where access to new sources of timber and to export outlets calls for more financial muscle. A third zone for the granting of concessions and licences covers mainly the northeastern part of the country, sparsely populated and, until the opening of the Transgabon railway in 1986, remote and hardly touched.

After some years of decline in the 1980s, timber production recovered to 1,5 million m³ in 1990 but a one-month ban on the cutting of *okoumé*, which occurs widely, was announced in mid-1991 in order to reduce a substantial surplus that had accumulated.²⁵ Untreated logs account for 80 per cent of timber exports, indicating an immaturity developed and rather uncompetitive processing industry. However, the country possesses the Forest Timber Company's plywood factory at Port Gentil, the third largest in the world, and in which the government has the major shareholding. It is being privatized. In addition, there is a veneer plant, sawmills and a mill near Libreville, established in 1976, to cut sleepers for the railway then under construction. A pulp and paper mill was once considered but the idea was abandoned in 1983. Marketing of timber was a monopoly of the state-owned National Timber Company (SNBG) until 1989. In that year the government relinquished control except for *okoumé* and *ozigo* in an effort to encourage foresters to market other species. It is also eager to encourage investment in the industry generally and in processing in particular. Finland, Morocco and Yugoslavia have recently shown an interest.²⁶

The government's record in the field of conservation and reforestation is not particularly distinguished. Funds for the latter were reduced in the early 1970s and resulted in failure to reach the ambitious target of planting 3 000 hectares each year. Instead, a mere 370 hectares in 1984 and 500 in 1985 was achieved.²⁷ Critics point also to the government's failure to adequately fund the department responsible for the control of logging. Its budget was cut by 75 per cent between 1984 and 1987 and poor staff expertise and numbers rendered them incapable of carrying out the tasks required of them. Conservation policies and actions are also jeopardized by people in key government positions having vested interests in the industry.²⁸ Gabon is a recipient of the European Community's Central African subsidy and current international conservation trends are likely to force adjustments to its present forestry policies.

Cameroon

The rain forests of Cameroon once covered 22 million hectares in a belt 300 km wide across the southern part of the country. Today they cover about 17 million hectares of which 6 million are still largely undisturbed primary forest, much of it surviving in reserves such as Korup in the southwest and Dja in the southeast. About half the present 17 million hectares have been opened to some 120 registered forest enterprises, 68 per cent of which are financed by foreign capital. Production has remained around 2 million m³ in the 1980s, hampered by depressed markets and poor infrastructure. Exports are still overwhelmingly untreated logs, accounting for 9 per cent of the total value after oil (61 per cent) and cocoa and coffee (23 per cent). Processing plants are limited – 20 sawmills and 5 plywood factories and the only large enterprise, a pulp and paper plant, failed in 1982 after one year of operation. It is now being resuscitated by an Indonesian concern.²⁹

Following the collapse of the oil price in 1986, the World Bank recommended that other sectors, including forestry, should be given a greater role in the economy. As a result, a rapid increase in timber output to 3,1 million m³ was planned for 1991 but was not attained. In the early 1980s the main constraints on the industry were the lack of a national forest survey and inventory, antiquated methods of cutting and production, inadequate transport facilities and too heavy an cutting and production, inadequate transport facilities and too heavy an emphasis on a limited number of commercially valuable trees, thus "damaging the integrity of the forest for just a few species" as Melly puts it.³⁰

With the establishment of a single national forestry development office (ONADEF) in 1990 some of the earlier constraints are being addressed.³¹ A national inventory is to be carried out, forest laws are to be revised, monitoring of logging activities is to be improved and new production zones are to be opened up by building roads such as the one from Yokadouma, in the far southeastern corner of the country, 600 km to the port of Kribi.

But Cameroon has yet to achieve an effectively integrated production and conservation policy. Apart from inadequate investment in the timber industry and insufficient trained manpower, a serious difficulty is the "intense pressure on land" exacerbated by slash-and-burn peasants following in the wake of loggers and the inadequate means to control them. A lack of political will on the part of the government is another problem arising, in part, from the role of some politicians in the award of new concessions to logging firms.³²

With international support, however, some important conservation projects are now in place. They are aimed at promoting viable forest management systems and awareness of the need for forest conservation among the populace. The Worldwide Fund for Nature, the United Kingdom and the United States have projects underway in the ecologically-rich Korup National Park, established in 1986. A problem, now apparently solved, was opposition from villagers in the park to their resettlement elsewhere. Similarly, the European Community's programme is targeted at an area in the Dja forest reserve. It involves local villagers in forestry and agricultural activities on the periphery of the area, the planting of hardwoods, setting up a processing plant for growing and harvesting rattan cane, and improving the quality of

charcoal as a source of fuel. Gathering resistance in the international community is certain to put a damper on any ideas the Cameroon government is alleged to have had of becoming "the most important African exporter of forestry-based products from the start of the 21st century".³³

Central African Republic (CAR)

The CAR has 3,4 million hectares of tropical rain forest situated in the southwestern corner of the country. It is little affected by slash-and-burn agriculture and is under-exploited. Only 10 per cent of the forest can be reached by river transport and the routes to the coast are costly, whether by river and rail 1 500 km to Pointe Noire or by road and rail 1 000 km to Douala. Timber production began in 1947, expanded rapidly after 1968 to reach a high of 846 000 m³ in 1974. Since then production and export volumes have fallen considerably, the former to around 200 000 m³ at the end of the 1980s. As elsewhere, untreated logs make up the bulk of exports, timber accounting for 22 per cent by value of total exports in 1990. The fall in output is attributed to transport difficulties and to competition from major Asian producers as a result of the relative rise in the value of the CFA franc against Asian currencies.³⁴

Despite its small forest area, the CAR has an enlightened attitude and advanced approach to the utilization and conservation of its resources. In the early 1980s it was the only African state to carry out forest surveys prior to the granting of concessions and to incorporate basic principles of forest management into its agreements with timber firms.³⁵ *Abeçor*, an association of European banks, considers that the CAR's timber industry has great development potential.³⁶ But, while attempting to increase production, the government has also accepted the World Bank's new conservation-oriented package. This is a \$19 million environmental control programme which will strengthen the government's forestry department, prepare an inventory of forest resources and establish a national park to be managed by the Worldwide Fund for Nature. The forest code has also been rewritten.³⁷ Complementing the Bank's project is the European Community's programme. Two areas of 60 000 and 45 000 hectares have been selected with the aim of reconciling conservation of the forest with the long-term exploitation of its resources.

Equatorial Guinea

Almost all of Equatorial Guinea's timber comes from the small Rio Muni enclave, 80 per cent of which is forested. Some 800 000 hectares are commercially exploitable and half this area is leased to mainly foreign controlled companies. Production amounted to 160 000 m³ in 1990, nearly all of which was exported. *Okoumé*, now facing a saturated market, alone accounted for about 25 per cent of the volume of timber exports. Again, exports are principally in the form of untreated logs although processed timber accounts for 29 per cent of their value. But output is hampered by a government that gives little encouragement to producers. Taxes are high, financial incentives are lacking, fuel is expensive, transport infrastructure is inadequate and inefficient, handling facilities at the port of Bata are expensive and the concession period of five years is regarded as too short.³⁸

Although these constraints might have indirect effects benefitting conservation, more direct practices on the part of the government have been modest. There is no systematic replanting programme; 2 500 hectares of forest are cleared each year and not replanted and there is a lack of trained forestry staff. Thanks largely to the European Community, though, funds are being provided for staff training, for investigation into a replanting programme and for an improved forest management system. Clearly, pressures from foreign sources to conserve the country's forests, which could be depleted in 20 years, are increasing and the Economist Intelligence Unit reports that "any future investment of European Community funds in lumbering would be conditional on the government respecting a coherent policy of forest conservation within the framework of the Tropical Forest Action Plan for Central Africa".³⁹

Madagascar

Away to the east of the continent and catching the prevailing easterly winds off the Indian Ocean as they rise up the coastal escarpment of Madagascar is a narrow rain forest outlier running almost the length of the island (1 500 km). Madagascar is remarkable for its biodiversity – its rich plant and animal life – which alone makes it a world conservation priority. The island, with a population of nearly 12 million, is almost a continent in itself since, separated geologically from Africa 165 million years ago, 75 per cent of its plants and animals are found nowhere else in the world. This biodiversity is found mainly in its tropical forests; the moist rain forests in the east and the dry deciduous forests in the west.⁴⁰

Since the arrival of man on the island 1 500 to 2 000 years ago about 80 per cent of the forest cover has been destroyed by slash-and-burn agriculture (locally called *tavy*), permanent agriculture, livestock ranching, lumbering, wood burning for charcoal, and hunting, all exacerbated by a high rate of population growth. The result has been soil erosion – a problem of "immense proportions" – and the extinction of many species of birds and animals.⁴¹ Destruction of the rain forest has been so rapid that between 1950 and 1985 its area has been reduced from 7,6 million hectares to 3,8 million, and at this rate will have entirely gone by 2025.⁴² Degraded secondary growth now predominates over virgin forest. Eucalypt and pine plantations, over 250 000 hectares in extent, have been developed over the years to meet the need for building materials, poles and especially domestic fuel, 80 per cent of which is derived from wood and charcoal. As an export sector, forestry is of minor importance. Only 2 200 tons of wood and wood products were exported in 1988 yielding less than \$1 million compared with the \$200 million earned by the four main exports, coffee, vanilla, prawns and cloves.⁴³

It was only in 1988 that a serious forest protection drive was launched, financed by the World Bank with the support of the Worldwide Fund for Nature and the International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources. It was estimated that 150 000 hectares of forests and plantations could be destroyed within ten years if they were not replenished. The drive aimed, on the one hand, at improved forest management and the creation of a national park of 10 000 hectares near Antananarivo and, on the other, at increasing the production of wood for heating and building material.⁴⁴

This effort was followed shortly afterwards by a more comprehensive environmental action programme (EAP) supported by the World Bank, the UNDP, the Worldwide Fund for Nature and a number of other agencies and donor countries.⁴⁵ Sometimes termed “the single highest major conservation priority in the world” it is not surprising that the EAP is the first of its kind in Africa.⁴⁶ It is a 15- to 20-year programme estimated to cost between \$300 and 400 million and comprises seven highly interdependent components: protection and management of the biological heritage including its parks and reserves; improvement of living conditions for 100 000 rural families through soil conservation, agroforestry and community projects; establishment of protected areas; mapping and remote sensing to monitor environmental conditions and change; environmental research, education and training; and improved support services. The implementation of all these components is to be co-ordinated by the National Office for the Environment. An initial 5-year phase will cost \$85 million.

The programme is not without its critics, not because of its environmental advantages, which are readily accepted but because of the potential for rural social conflict arising out of the exclusion of peasants from protected areas (see below).

Some broader issues

If West Africa’s rain forests are “already well along the path to destruction”, clearly the same cannot be said of those of Central Africa, Madagascar excluded.⁴⁷ But, as environmentalists continue to stress, it is because of Central Africa’s large share of the world’s remaining rain forest that makes it all the more urgent that it be preserved from further destruction. The implications of doing so, however, touch on a host of issues beyond the purely environmental. As *Africa Analysis* cogently observes, “the continent is becoming a test bed to show whether economic development and conservation of the rainforest are really compatible”.⁴⁸

Martin Khor, co-ordinator of the World Rainforest Movement, in a recent paper to a preparatory committee meeting of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Geneva, indicated that solutions to the world’s deforestation problem could be found only in an interrelated package of measures, environmental, economic and social. We take each of his recommendations in turn and elaborate upon them.⁴⁹

First, regarding the environmental aspect, he recommends “a moratorium on all activities that destroy or damage primary and natural forests” while “already degraded lands and rivers must be regenerated and rehabilitated to maximize forest cover”. As has been noted, a few West African countries have banned, or intend to ban, the export of raw logs in favour of processed wood and wood products. The moratorium that Khor proposes, however, would be extremely difficult to enforce at present. As the World Bank itself points out, despite its approval of the ban, all forests in most countries are state owned, “yet the state lacks the manpower to protect them”;⁵⁰ and this, apart from the dependence these countries place on their forest resources for earning valuable foreign exchange.

But cutting the forest and regenerating it is another matter that is now seen as the acceptable long-term objective. It is no easy task, however, demanding “a drastic rethink of forest policy” and a set of new strategies.⁵¹ As we have seen, the

World Bank, the FAO, the European Community and other international organizations are now directing their efforts to creating systems of *sustainable* rain forest management, described by Melly as “cutting timber from a stable reserve of forest, like harvesting fruit from an orchard”⁵² or, as Lewis and Berry explain, devising a system in which “harvesting and planting are in phase with each other, thus allowing timber to provide a continuous source of wealth”.⁵³ Backed by the international community, the ITTO’s resolution of May 1991 succinctly states the new objective: “that by the year 2000, at the latest only tropical timber from forest areas in which sustainable forest management is being practised should enter the international market”.⁵⁴

Khor deals with some of the economic aspects in his second recommendation. “Since conserving the forests would benefit all humankind some compensatory mechanisms should be established to offset at least some of the sacrifices these (poor) countries are called upon to make” for “by leaving their forests alone, they will obviously be deprived of temporary economic gains from the sale of logs, minerals and agricultural produce”. Compensation, he adds, could cover direct financial aid and grants, retrenchment benefits for logging workers, debt relief, and increased prices for export commodities for countries adjusting from forest-destroying activities to ecologically-sound alternatives.

The issue of compensation was raised at the UNCED Geneva meeting when the countries of Europe and North America pressed for a legally binding International Forestry Convention to safeguard the forests.⁵⁵ But, in responding to this proposal, the developing countries immediately showed up the deep-seated differences that exist in the perception and relevance of the problem as between the developed countries and themselves. They pointed to global economic imbalances as the principal cause of Third World poverty which, in turn, promotes environmental degradation in the form of deforestation, overgrazing, shrinkage of arable land, dessication and so on.⁵⁶ And until this imbalance is redressed they insist on the payment of compensation by the industrialized countries, neatly contained in Brazil’s militant stance that “if the world needs the tropical rainforests of the Amazon so much, it should pay for their upkeep”.⁵⁷

The Global Environmental Facility, mentioned earlier, is a partial response as is a strong recommendation by a German government commission that an international trustee fund be established for the protection of tropical forests. In addition, that government is called upon to grant more debt relief to those countries that practise conservation measures and by 1994 to double the funds appropriated for conservation activities.⁵⁸ Whatever is done, the funds needed will be massive, say the experts.

Khor’s third recommendation touches the social aspects. “It is imperative that the rights of the forest and indigenous peoples, and of local communities living near the forests be protected. It is now widely recognized that being the original dwellers, the forest peoples have a legitimate stake and claim on the forest areas Any viable solution to the forest problem must protect and promote their land, economic and cultural rights.”

But rights, if they exist, are not always respected. Krishna Ghimire, a UN forestry programme co-ordinator, reports that, in Madagascar, in terms of the new Environmental Action Plan bush-fallow agriculturalists have been forced to

cease their activities and to vacate protected areas.⁵⁹ Peasants are also prohibited from hunting, grazing and collecting in park forests and from growing leguminous crops and fruits in reserve areas. Since these people's lives are being rendered precarious, they resort to vengeful acts such as burning forests and plantations. He predicts that "protected areas are likely to be one of the major issues of rural social conflict in many developing countries". This has been true also of Cameroon where conservation operations in the Korup National Park have affected 1 000 people living there in six villages. Their proposed resettlement in a support zone met with years of "stiff resistance" until compensation came from international sources and village leaders were persuaded to accept the move.⁶⁰ As *Africa Analysis* states, "in poor countries where land, or alternative employment, is in short supply, you cannot simply preserve the forest by closing it off, like a vast tropical Yellowstone Park".⁶¹

How hopeful can one be about the future of Central Africa's and the world's rain forests? The international conservation movement is clearly gathering momentum; Lewis and Berry say that "the destruction of the rain forest is not inevitable"; and the World Bank and others state that there is still "a strong basis of hope. Deforestation can be arrested and ultimately reversed".⁶² But sceptics, such as Melly,⁶³ see little sign that African governments have even begun to appreciate what is entailed in shifting their forestry strategies to an environmentally sustainable approach. And, in any case, he asks, is such an approach practicable in poor African countries faced with "enormous social pressures and a shortage of land, staff and money to police forest zones"? Is there sufficient will and determination, also, on the part of governments in a continent where "the environment has yet to reach the political arena"?

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The political economy of famine: An African perspective

Apollo Rwomire, of the Department of Sociology, University of Swaziland, shows how man-made rather than natural causes lead to widespread famine.

Introduction

Famine is the condition where there is an exceptional food shortage and people who can usually feed themselves, suddenly cannot. Nature acts only to trigger off famine. It does not create it – people do that.¹ This article subscribes to the view that although natural disasters such as climatic fluctuations, drought and floods may spark off acute food shortages, famine in Africa is fundamentally attributable to man-made causes, including skewed distribution of resources, misguided development policies, repressive government, civil war, rapid population growth and overurbanization.

According to Carter,² most African countries suffer from famine or are threatened by famine either regionally or nationally. Reports indicate that about 30 million people in 20 African countries require emergency food aid. Table 1 shows that countries most affected by famine.

Table 1: African countries threatened by famine

Region/Country	Affected population (millions)
All Africa	30,0
Sudan	7,7
Ethiopia	7,5
Somalia	2,0
Mozambique	2,0
Angola	1,9
Niger	1,8
Burkina Faso	1,5
Liberia	1,4
Malawi	1,0
Mauritania	0,9
Chad	0,5
Uganda	0,5

Source: UN World Food Programme

In 1989 Africa imported 35 per cent of its food.³ The World Food Programme estimates that unless 4 million

tonnes of food aid are provided, the disastrous famines of the 1984 to 1986 period may be repeated. A continent which had previously been able to feed itself is now increasingly dependent on food aid – why? The question cannot be answered simply in terms of the unprecedented rapid population growth or natural calamities. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the continent's fifty-two countries could feed three times their present population – despite the fact that Africa has the highest birth-rate in the world.⁴ Surprisingly, even in rich South Africa some two million people need aid.⁵ Aberrant climatic conditions are not the principal cause of Africa's food crisis because drought has always visited Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan region. Yet, famine has probably never occurred on the present scale before. Social, economic and political factors and the continent's relationship with other members of the world economy probably play a far more crucial role in bringing about famine in Africa. This view has led to the belief that famines in Africa are inadvertently (or advertently) man-made.

The colonial legacy

Some authors⁶ are of the view that the increasing inability of Africa to feed itself has historical origins. These authors lay the blame for Africa's food crisis squarely on the colonial and neo-colonial system. Proponents of this theory maintain that the effect of the colonial system was to completely alter the African way of life by eroding self-sufficiency in food and creating economies whose sole function was to provide raw materials for their colonial powers. Under the colonial system Africans who had lived under a system of subsistence agriculture and self-reliance were forced into the money economy as cheap labour for mines and cash crop plantations. The most fertile land was confiscated by the colonial regime for cash crop production. Africans still living on the land were encouraged or coerced into growing cash crops rather than food crops. Those who blame colonialism and neo-colonialism for Africa's food crisis maintain that at the

end of the colonial era a system of neo-colonialism took its place. Neo-colonialism is the result of economic, political and other manoeuvres by the former colonial powers to preserve the former colonies' basic function as suppliers of raw materials. As a result, Africa's economy is today paralyzed by the straight-jacket imposed upon it.⁷ The advocates of this theory therefore feel that the industrialized countries have a moral duty to redress the African economic situation, a solution which demands a change in attitude and a more favourable position for less developed countries in the world economy.

Others are not so kind and willing to let African governments and leaders off the hook. A good many post-colonial economies are in far worse shape than they were at the end of the colonial period, which suggests that greater damage was done in the latter period. Those who subscribe to this view argue that (with hindsight no doubt) the post-colonial African governments failed dismally to manage their economies, which was to the detriment of their people and food security. Proponents of this theory point out that, in many cases, when the European powers left, their place was taken by rich black élites who continued the oppressive policies of their predecessors. The numerous coups which became a common feature of African states were purported to be evidence of widespread corruption and mismanagement of economies.

The agriculture crisis

The problem obviously goes much deeper than the dishonesty and incompetence of some African leaders. At independence most African nations found themselves with economies dependent on one or two export commodities and an urgent need for foreign exchange to purchase goods such as oil, machinery and fertilizer, which they did not produce themselves. It was often necessary to accept loans in the form of aid from the richer countries. Interest had to be paid on these loans. There was really little choice but to continue and expand cash crop production to facilitate loan repayments and development.⁹

Ayittey contends that competition from cash crops has not hindered food production, since Africa has been exporting both cash and non-cash crops. Instead, he blames Africa's agricultural crisis on the defective agricultural and economic policies of postcolonial governments. He argues that after independence many African governments experimented with "state socialism", which was pursued at the expense of "the rich tradition of economic freedom – free markets, free trade, respect for private property – that allowed Africans to prosper in the precolonial era".¹⁰ Thus, African peasants have been denied genuine freedom, for they have been systematically exploited for the benefit of the governing élites.

Experts on the African economy are generally of the view that the policies of African governments, particularly their agricultural policies, have been disastrous. According to Eicher,¹¹ the misguided development plans and priorities pursued by African states since independence can be attributed to faulty advice from expatriate planning advisors and the introduction of Western modernization and macro-economic models not suited to Africa. The dominant neo-classical models of that time emphasized the industrial sec-

tor as the driving force of development and the need to transfer rural people to the industrial sector. African states were therefore misled into according the agricultural sector low priority and developing an urban bias in their development strategy. This course of action did nothing to alter the basic economic structure imposed by colonialism. African development is consequently characterized by a drive towards industrialization which has fostered urbanization and rural neglect. Agriculture in Africa has been viewed merely as a means to other developmental aims. Experts believe that Africa has and is being farmed the wrong way. Agricultural systems are divorced from the nutritional needs of the people and are skewed in favour of export production. The reality of the African agricultural system is that cash crops are grown on the best land. Food crop farming does not pay well. There is conclusive evidence that many African countries are maintaining low official prices for food and livestock in order to placate urban consumers who constitute the politicians' power base.¹² Politics also plays a role in determining how some governments deal with the problem of famine and the distribution of food aid. In the words of a relief worker in the Sahel:

Starve the city-dwellers and they riot; starve the peasants and they die. If you were a politician which would you choose?¹³

The impact of government negative pricing policies has been to provide little incentive for the African farmer to improve farming techniques and produce food for domestic markets. Worse still, imported food is often cheaper than local produce, which tends to further discourage the local population from growing food for themselves. The result of government agricultural policy has been a decline in food self-sufficiency. According to Hopkins,¹⁴ food productivity in Africa is the lowest in the world and variability in production is high. The volume of food imported by all African countries increased fifteenfold between 1970 and 1980.¹⁵ At the eleventh regional conference on Africa in June 1980 the director general of the FAO said that the average African had had to make do with 10 per cent less food than in 1970.¹⁶ In Africa, the agricultural sector employs 50 to 95 per cent of the labour force,¹⁷ but has been afforded low priority and is characterized by low incomes. In addition there is widespread poverty and increased susceptibility to famine.

Population explosion and ecological degradation

To a considerable extent, Africa's per capita food production has declined because of its rapidly expanding population. During the past decade, the continent's population growth rate has averaged three per cent annually – the fastest growth rate in human history. If the current growth rate persists, Africa's population will double over the next three decades.¹⁸ The population crisis stems from problems such as limited resources, pervasive poverty, illiteracy, poor health delivery systems, women's low social status, civil strife and political instability.¹⁹

The rate of population growth had already overtaken agricultural output when an exceptional drought ravaged Africa between 1982 and 1984. This drought was considered to be the most severe and longest lasting drought since the start of the century.²⁰ It appears that droughts in Africa

are becoming more severe and prolonged. Experts believe this may be due to ecological deterioration in the region. With limited or no means to improve farming techniques and increase food productivity, rural farmers have responded to the need to feed their large families by eliminating the fallow period between cropping. Unsuitable land has been brought under cultivation. These practices have led to soil deterioration, especially where additional farmland has been obtained by the clearing of forests. Deforestation has also been hastened by the fuel needs of an ever-increasing population. Trees are significant in reducing the effect of drought and flash-flooding. Twenty years ago, 20 per cent of Ethiopia was under forest. Only two per cent remains today.²¹ The competition between crop-land and grazing land has intensified in many parts of Africa with systems of transhumance breaking down. There has been an increased incidence of overgrazing, resulting in further ecological deterioration. Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the Sahel region, is drought prone. The consequences of climatic variations are believed to have been aggravated by soil erosion and deforestation, leading to desertification in the region. Desertification exacerbates the impact of drought though it is itself hastened by a persistent lack of rain. Across the Sahel the desert appears to be moving south. Between 1935 and 1985 the desert invaded an area of previously productive land around the Sahara equivalent to twice the area of Spain.²² However, Africa's agricultural practices are not the only factor presently upsetting climatic conditions in the region. Changes in world climatic conditions as a result of global warming caused by increased levels of carbon dioxide in the air are also the cause of drought.

Food aid, debt burdens and donor fatigue

According to Sasson,²³ it is logical to lay considerable blame on the malfunctioning of the international economic system for Africa's food crisis. Most less developed countries find themselves relying on substantial food imports – a problem that has increased with the rapid growth of the African population. The food security of less developed countries hinges on their ability to pay for their food imports in foreign currency, an ability which is not assured and not within their control. Most African economies are dependent on some principal agricultural export commodities which are not included in major international agreements and are subject to wild price fluctuations on the international market. The international market for agricultural products and foodstuffs is dominated by 25 countries that produce 50 per cent of the total supply of these commodities. These countries can and do influence prices on the international market by manipulating commodity stocks. The agricultural policies of the United States, which is a dominant producer in the international agricultural market, have been perceived as discouraging less developed country food production. Through Public Law 480, which is a foreign policy tool, the United States has been able to secure access to foreign markets and raw materials by encouraging poor nations to abandon policies directed towards self-reliance and thus make optimal use of poor countries as consumers of United States agricultural and industrial goods.²⁴

One of the major criticisms of cheap food-aid has been that it tends to discourage the local population to grow food

for themselves. The implication here is that even when the United States appears to be acting on humanitarian grounds all too often food-aid is seen as a political and economic tool. Food aid is often tied to a number of political and economic conditions that must be fulfilled by the recipient country. For example United States legislation forbids aid to countries that have fallen into deep arrears.²⁵ Recent political events in the Gulf and the end of the Cold War have pushed Africa and its problems into the background. As Africa's food situation continues to deteriorate with no short-term solution, donor fatigue and events elsewhere in the world have resulted in declining food-aid. Despite plentiful global stocks and numerous appeals, only two million tonnes – about half of Africa's required emergency food aid – had been pledged by early 1991.²⁶

African nations are faced with ever-worsening terms of trade. According to the secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), the average increase in the value of exports changed from 8,7 per cent between 1966 and 1980 to 4 per cent between 1980 and 1984.²⁷ This deterioration was largely caused by protectionist measures adopted by the industrialized countries for imported primary products. Many African countries responded to the loss in exchange entitlements by incurring further debt. A high proportion of the debts incurred were to finance imports of food.²⁸ African countries are unable to grow food crops for their own populations if they are constantly having to expand their cash crop production to gain foreign exchange. To pay off debts, more cash crops are needed and so the cycle of poverty continues. Often the famine stricken countries are those too deeply in debt to be able to mobilize the necessary resources to buy food. It is not unheard of for a country, in a bid not to upset its financial standing abroad or to avoid political upheaval on the home front, to deny the existence of famine in their country and refuse outside help.²⁹

Political instability and war

As Sen³⁰ has observed, there is no such thing as an apolitical food problem. Repression and civil war have played a major role in the creation and perpetuation of famine in Africa. Indeed, since the mid-1970s, the correlation between famine and war has become obvious. The most acute food shortages have been occurring in countries embroiled in civil war, notably Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan. These are countries that are currently experiencing or have recently been afflicted with civil strife.³¹ Fighting has greatly disrupted agriculture in these countries with food often being used as a weapon.³² In most cases, political unrest and war – for which Africa is notorious – have led to disruption of food production and distribution and destruction of infrastructures.

Conclusion

Natural calamities sometimes do trigger famine. However, contrary to conventional beliefs, drought, floods, earthquakes and the like are not the principal cause of famine in Africa. At any rate, natural disasters are not confined to Africa and other developing regions. In the developing world, where crop yields are low and food reserves are non-existent, it is

relatively easy for natural disaster to translate into famine. In contrast, the industrialized economies are well equipped to deal with natural hazards and basically maintain food production and consumption. The so-called food crisis facing Africa is deeply rooted in the continent's political and economic circumstances. The colonial legacy, political immaturity, bad planning, burdens of debt and trade, an inadequate agricultural base, explosive population growth and hyperurbanization, have all combined to produce Africa's plight. Nature has simply provided the knockout blow.³³ In the final analysis, since independence, Africa has been underdeveloped rather than developed and the serious task of developing the continent has yet to begin. As for solutions:

If there is the political will to invest in rural and agricultural development, the political ability to shift food surpluses not only within countries but between them, and a desire to cooperate in promoting stability and the reduction of poverty and suffering, real progress can be made.³⁴

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AFRICA MONITOR



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NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

The first round of voting in Algeria's first ever multiparty parliamentary elections took place on 26 December. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) took 188 seats and the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) only 15. The Socialist Forces Front (FFS) led by Ait Ahmed won 25 seats and independent candidates three seats. The turnout was 58,55 per cent of the registered voters.

On 2 January at least 100 000 people marched through Algiers to protest against the election victory of the fundamentalist FIS. The Constitutional Council announced on 11 January that Pres Chadli Bendjedid had resigned. Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghazali also said that he had asked the National People's Army to take "preventative steps" to protect public security. On 13 January Algeria's High Security Council cancelled the second round of parliamentary elections scheduled for 16 January in the 199 constituencies where no candidates had won an overall majority. Algerian TV announced on 14 January the formation of a **Higher State Council**, a five-member body that would exercise all the powers of the president of the republic, as stipulated by the constitution. The leader of the FIS Provisional Executive Bureau, Abdelkader Hachani on 15 January described the events in Algeria as a "coup against the Islamic State, a coup against the Algerian people". Hachani was arrested on 22 January. On 22 January the new military government announced a ban on political activity at mosques. (ARB 31/12; SWB 28/12, 1/1, 13/1, 14/1, 16/1, 17/1, 24/1; C 13/1, 15/1; S 23/1)

Chad

The government announced that the Chadian army would be reduced in size from 47 355 to 25 000 by the end of 1992. Only a month later, on 1 January, army reinforcements had to be sent to Lake Chad, where forces loyal to deposed president **Habré** launched a new attack from the Nigerian border. The French

government also airlifted 450 troops to reinforce its 1 100-strong Chad garrison. The attack had begun on 22 December to coincide with the Paris to Cape Town rally and take advantage of the international attention focused on the area. On 3 January the government claimed to have defeated the rebel onslaught and a few days later began reprisals against Habré's former ministers and members of the opposition, killing ten. Following severe criticism for these actions, the Chadian government on 24 January announced the release of political prisoners, including those accused of involvement in a coup attempt in October 1991 (see previous Monitor) and also announced its commitment to democracy. However, the Chadian League of Human Rights said in a statement that 15 prisoners were still held in connection with the October incident.

The fighting flared up again at the end of January, leaving many dead. On 17 February Pres Deby held bilateral talks with Pres Babangida of Nigeria on that country's role in the rebel activities. The Nigerian government asked at the beginning of the month that all Chadian dissidents intending "to carry out subversive actions" against Chad leave the country immediately. (SWB 18/11, 3/1, 11/1, 19/2; ARB 30/11; K 1/92; C 3/1, 3/2; AED 13/1; JA 16/1; WA 19/1, 9/2, 16/2; AC 24/1; ACon 27/1)

On 25 December a 79-member commission was created to prepare for a **national conference** for May 1992. Two days later 10 opposition parties condemned the over-representation of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) on the commission. (K 12/91; WA 8/12; SWB 28/12)

Egypt

On 22 November the deputy prime minister, **Dr Butros Ghali**, was nominated as **UN Secretary-General** to succeed Dr Perez de Cuellar on 1 January 1992. In an interview in Bonn, Germany, Ghali described his election as a diplomatic victory for Arabs, Africans and the Third World. On 19 December Ghali announced his resignation from the Egyptian cabinet to assume his new UN position. (C 23/11; SWB 23/11; S 20/12)

Libya

On 14 November the Lord Advocate, Lord Fraser, Scotland's chief law officer, issued warrants for the arrest of two Libyans – Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah – on murder charges arising out of the 21 December 1988 bombing of the Pan Am Flight 103 over **Lockerbie**. A demand was made to Libya to hand over the men for trial. The Libyan government issued a statement on 14 November denying involvement in the incident and demanding its "right to defend itself before an unbiased and neutral court and before the UN, the International Court of Justice and others". Diplomats representing US interests also formally presented Libyan officials with legal documents accusing the two Libyans in the bombing of the Pan Am flight. On 21 January the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution demanding that Libya agree to extradite the two accused to the United States or United Kingdom. If the demand was not met, the US, UK and France would seek UN endorsement for **sanctions**. (C 15/11, 25/11; S 15/11; SWB 16/11)

On 28 January the German magazine *Stern* reported that Libya was trying to employ Russian **nuclear** scientists and offering them annual salaries of \$100 000. (C 29/1, 22/1)

Morocco

On 15 November the UN Secretary General announced modified criteria for eligibility to vote in the **referendum** in Western Sahara. A person would be considered a Saharawi if included in the 1974 Spanish census, or was a close family member – those with a Saharawi father born in the territory, and those who had resided there for 6 consecutive years or 12 years intermittently before the census. Between 30-40 000 Saharawis could therefore be added to the list of 74 000 on the census list. The Polisario Movement accused the UN on 17 November of pro-Moroccan bias. (ARB 11/91)

On January 15 the European Parliament blocked \$600 mn development aid as a protest against Morocco's **human rights** record (K 1/92)

Sudan

Sudan's leader, Gen Omar Hassan al Bashir, on an official visit to Ethiopia in November, signed a **co-operation agreement** with interim Pres Meles Zenawi. The accord provided for the intensification of relations in all domains. A joint ministerial committee would be formed to draw up reports on matters of mutual interest to the two countries. The two countries also intended to co-ordinate surveillance along their common border. (ARB 11/91; ION 2/11)

On 16 November al Bashir announced that he had taken over the Culture and Information portfolio and vowed to render the Sudanese information and media an advocate of Shari'ah and virtue. Bashir also ordered women in the civil service and in schools to wear **Muslim dress**. (ARB 11/91; SWB 18/11)

On 13 December Iranian Pres Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani paid an official visit to Khartoum. Since al Bashir came to power in 1989, Sudan had become increasingly Islamic and the growing Iranian influence over Sudan had raised fears in the West that it might become a base for **international terrorism**. Egypt and Tunisia claimed that fundamentalists from Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and the Gulf states were being trained in Sudan. The United States government warned Khartoum that it risked being added to the US list of states that support international terrorism. The six states listed were Libya, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, North Korea and Iran. The latter was supplying the Sudanese government with military aid amounting to \$20 mn following the signing of a military co-operation agreement. (ION 18/1; T 16/1; AC 20/12; DT 18/12; ARB 11/91)

On 1 January al Bashir announced the formation of an appointed **transitional parliament** to pave the way for democracy. He said that parliament would have the power to propose and pass legislation, to ratify treaties and to veto decisions of the ruling military council. On 4 January he announced that parliament would consist of 300 members, including all 11 of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a number of RCC advisors, the governors of the country's nine states and representatives of the trade unions and the army. The Transitional National Assembly was formed on 13 February under the chairmanship of Col Mohammed al-Amin Khalifah and met for the first time on 24 February. (K 1-2/92)

WEST AFRICA

Benin

On 18 December the Paris Club agreed to reschedule up to 50 per cent of Benin's external debt. (AM 1/92; JA 8/1; AA 10/1; AED 13/1; ARB 15/1)

Burkina Faso

On 2 November, following violent anti-government demonstrations, the government **banned** political marches and protests. Pres Compaoré himself, although the sole candidate for the presidential election on 1 December,

conducted an active campaign, travelling the country despite calls by the opposition parties for a popular boycott of the election in protest at the government's refusal to hold a national conference. Eventually only 25 per cent of the electorate actually voted, while 42 polling stations were reportedly attacked. On 9 December one of the opposition leaders who called for the boycott and former second-in-command to Compaoré, Clement Oumarou Ouedraogo, was assassinated. Another opposition leader, Tall Moctar, was seriously injured in a shooting incident. Shortly after these incidents the government announced the indefinite **postponement** of the parliamentary elections originally scheduled for 12 January 1992.

On 7 January Compaoré met the leaders of 42 political groupings to discuss the National Reconciliation Forum. The opposition Co-ordinating Committee of Democratic Forces (CFD) demanded a guarantee of safety for its leaders and that the commission of inquiry into the December killing be allowed to function independently. Compaoré announced that he would apply the resolutions of the Forum and opened the Forum on 11 February. He then left for visits to Libya and Mali and on his return to Burkina Faso, indefinitely suspended the Forum on the issue of whether or not to allow live radio coverage of the plenary session's deliberations. (C 4/11, 11/12, 13/12; SWB 4/11, 11/12, 4/1, 11/1, 24/2; ARB 30/11; AM 12/91; S 2/12; TS 11/12; WA 15/12, 22/12, 26/1; AED 16/12; K 1/92; AB 2/91)

Côte d'Ivoire

Parliament passed a new press law on 3 December, under which a national commission on **press freedom** was set up, seven of its eight members to be appointed by pro-government officials. Opposition groups saw the move as an attempt to curb press freedom, and a number of violent incidents were reported. (S 4/12; SWB 7/12; WA 22/12)

A commission of inquiry into an incident on 17-18 May 1991 during which soldiers allegedly raped students, recommended on 29 January that those responsible should be punished. The report also identified the army chief, Gen Robert Guie, as responsible for the soldiers being on the Yopougon residential campus at the time. Pres Houphouët-Boigny dismissed the report, saying steps against the army chief or the soldiers would split the army. **Demonstrations and strikes** by angry students followed, and the university was subsequently closed for two days. A total number of 205 people were arrested during the unrest. (C 31/1; SWB 1/2, 4/2, 7/2; AC 7/2; JA 12/2; WA 14/2; TS 17/2)

The Gambia

In early December Pres Dawda Jawara announced his intention to **retire** at the end of his term in April 1992. He was, however, persuaded by his People's Progressive Party to rescind this decision and to stand again in the presidential election. Jawara, who is 67, became prime minister at independence in 1965 and president when the country changed

to a republic in 1970. Only Pres Houphouët-Boigny and King Hassan have been in office longer than Jawara. (ARB 31/12)

Ghana

Amnesty International reported in December that hundreds of people were being held in gaols without proper trial, including the editor of the *Christian Chronicle*, George Naykene, since October 1991, and Major Courage Quarshigah and five other officers, since 1989, for alleged subversive activities. Some detainees had been in prison since the early days of the present military government, which seized power in 1981. The report accused the Rawlings government of using political imprisonment to silence and intimidate its opponents in the "interests of national security". The London-based Democratic Alliance of Ghana condemned the arrest and torture of John Ndeburge, one of the leaders of another political party, the Movement for Freedom and Justice, for not paying proper respect to the Ghanaian national anthem. The Alliance pointed out that despite Rawlings' pledge to Western donors to democratize the country "flagrant **abuse of human rights** and denial of civil liberties continue to escalate". (ARB 31/12)

An electoral commission responsible for the demarcation of constituencies and supervision of the elections scheduled for late 1992, was established in December. It replaced the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) whose scope of operation had been limited to educate the public and to create greater awareness of civil rights and obligations in view of the transition to democracy. Since the lifting of restrictions on the press at the end of 1991, many periodicals had appeared, most of them critical of the government. (ARB 31/12; NA 3/92)

Guinea

Students demanding an increase in their **scholarship payments** and who had staged demonstrations for several months, ambushed Pres Conté's car on 15 February and set fire to it. He narrowly escaped injury. The University of Conakry was closed down on 13 February following the students' strike. (SWB 17/2; TS 17/2)

Guinea-Bissau

On 18 December, during the fifth congress of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGCV), it was decided to transform the PAIGCV into a **mass party**, relaxing the process of admitting new members. (ARB 12/91)

On 27 December Pres João Vieira carried out a major ministerial reshuffle and re-established the post of **Prime Minister** which had been abolished in 1984. Mr Carlos Correia was appointed in the post. (ARB 12/91)

Liberia

The United Liberation Movement for Democracy (Ulimo) reached agreement with Ecomog on 18 November to co-operate in accordance

with the Yamoussoukro peace accord of 31 October (see previous Monitor). Based in Sierra Leone, Ulimo consists mainly of Liberian soldiers who fled there after Pres Doe's defeat in 1990. **Cross-border clashes** between Ulimo and the forces of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) had delayed the peace process in Liberia and caused havoc in Sierra Leone. (ARB 30/11)

Prince Yormie Johnson, leader of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), said on 8 November that he would return to the interim government under Dr Amos Sawyer. Johnson had withdrawn a week earlier because he was not invited to the Yamoussoukro talks. (ARB 30/11)

When it became clear in February that little progress had been made in disarming the NPFL in terms of the Yamoussoukro accord, Pres Sawyer offered Taylor the post of **vice-president** in the interim government. Taylor had earlier announced his attention to stand as a candidate in the forthcoming presidential election. (WA 23/2)

(Cross-border attacks – see Sierra Leone.)

Mali

The Transition Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) cited the continued rebellion by **Tuaregs** in northern Mali as the reason for the postponement of the election process, which should have started on 1 December. CTSP officials said the constitutional referendum would be held on 12 January, and the election process would carry on until 26 March, which day marked the anniversary of the overthrow of former Pres Moussa Traoré. The CTSP also announced the postponement of a special conference on re-establishing peace, from 15 November to 16 December, in Mopti. At the Mopti conference the Tuaregs accepted the principles of a negotiated settlement and both sides agreed to stop attacks and release prisoners. The government and the Tuaregs met again, from 22 to 24 January in Algiers, where a 30-day truce and continued **negotiations** were agreed upon.

In the 12 January referendum, 99 per cent of the 43 per cent voters agreed to **multiparty politics**. The municipal elections of 19 January again saw a low voter turnout (35 per cent), and several complaints of electoral irregularities were made. The Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adema), the party that spearheaded Mali's popular uprising in 1991 won the most seats, 214 out of 751 seats. Despite the opposition's request for a postponement of the vote, the parliamentary elections were held on 23 February. The majority of opposition parties boycotted them, saying the conditions for "reliable and open" elections had not been implemented. Adema again gained the majority of the seats. (K 11-12/91, 1-2/92; SWB 11/11, 20/12, 21/1, 24/1; ARB 30/11, 31/1; AM 12/91, 1/92; JA 3/12, 5/2; WA 8/12, 12/1; AA 13/12; C 18/1; AC 21/2)

Mauritania

The first round of presidential elections was set for 24 January and the second for 27 February 1992 and parliamentary elections

were scheduled for 6 and 13 March. In the run-up to the presidential election, police broke up an illegal protest during which five people were killed. In the 24 January round, the incumbent Pres Taya won 62.75 per cent of the votes cast, giving him outright victory without needing a second round. The three other candidates appealed against the result, saying there had been gross **irregularities**, but the supreme court rejected the appeals. In reaction, opposition parties threatened to boycott the March elections. The African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (Flam) announced on 15 January that it was taking up the armed struggle again (suspended in July 1991) to bring democracy to Mauritania, because "dialogue was impossible" with Taya. (SWB 12/11; TS 12/11; AA 29/11; ARB 30/11, 31/1; K 1/92; S 28/1; WA 9/2; AED 10/2)

Niger

In response to a Tuareg attack on 1 January that left four people dead, Prime Minister Cheiffou on 5 January indicated a willingness to use **military force** to crush the rebellion in the north. He also rejected any partition of the country and called on the rebels to disarm and use dialogue to resolve their grievances, to which they replied in a communiqué on 7 January. The Tuareg preconditions for negotiations included a return of the army to barracks and an independent inquiry into the issue, as in Mali. Meanwhile, Niger closed its border with Algeria in an effort to prevent further Tuareg attacks, following an incident on 22 January in which a group of European tourists was attacked and robbed. The tourists were subsequently attacked by soldiers mistaking them for Tuaregs.

Mutinous troops twice seized the **state radio** station at the end of February in a dispute over two months' back pay. After being assured of prompt attention, the soldiers withdrew, saying they had no political aspirations. (K 1/92; SWB 11/1, 2/3; WA 19/1, 9/2, 16/2; SN 29/2; C 3/3)

Nigeria

The first population **census** since 1973 took place in the last week of November. Both the 1963 and 1973 censuses have long been rejected as inaccurate, the last census regarded as reasonably reliable was that of 1952. (ARB 30/11)

Another phase in the transition to democratic civilian rule was completed when the voters went to the polls on 14 December to elect the **governors and assemblies** of the country's 30 states. In 16 gubernatorial elections the candidates of the National Republican Convention (NRC) were successful while the Social Democratic Party (SDP) had 14 governors elected. However, the SDP achieved majorities in 16 assemblies while in Enugu and Taraba states equal numbers of SDP and NRC candidates were elected. In Lagos, Katsina, Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers the voters elected NRC governors but gave the SDP majorities in the assemblies. The reverse happened in Anambra, which has a SDP governor and a

NRC-dominated assembly. Observers guessed that the percentage poll was higher than the estimated 20 per cent in the local government elections a year before. (EIU-CR 1/92)

The ban on politicians from previous dispensations was lifted on 19 December. The military government was apparently persuaded, as a result of the peaceful state elections, that the former politicians were no longer a threat to the political process and should therefore be allowed to participate in politics once again. (ARB 31/12)

On 12 December Pres Babangida moved his office and residence from Lagos to **Abuja**, the new capital. This city, with about 800 000 residents, had the best roads, telecommunications and hotels in Nigeria but was still developing. Most of the foreign missions had been slow in preparing to move from Lagos, which remained the economic hub of the country. The administrative status of the capital territory was to be that of a municipality, headed by a mayor. (ARB 31/12)

The government announced in February that the **elections** for the national legislature would take place on 7 November 1992 and that the presidential elections would be held on 5 December. (EIU-CR 1/92)

Senegal

A peace commission had been set up to bring an end to the renewed violence in **Casamance**, during which a member of the national assembly, Mamadou Cissé, and a companion were killed on 22 December. Reports from the Gambia indicated that at least 400 refugees fled from the region, some claiming to have been threatened by the Mouvement des Forces Démocratique de la Casamance (MFDC). (WA 12/1, 19/1; ARB 31/1; AB 2/92)

Pope John-Paul II arrived in Dakar on 19 February for his first visit to Senegal, whose population is 95 per cent Muslim. He also visited the Gambia and Guinea. (WA 8/3)

Sierra Leone

By the end of 1991 parts of the country bordering on Liberia had become seriously destabilized by **rebel incursions** from Liberia and because of revolts against the government among the local people. Many of them support the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) a local rebel group. The cost of the war – approximately one billion Leone monthly – was putting the government under serious pressure at a time when the International Monetary Fund was insisting that Sierra Leone should reduce expenditure in order to revive its ailing economy. (ARB 31/1; FOA 1-3/92)

On 4 January representatives of the Sierra Leonean government and the Liberian interim government, including Charles Taylor's NPFL, met for the first time in the Liberian capital. The meeting, arranged by Ecomog and chaired by an Ecomog commander, ended in deadlock with the Sierra Leoneans and the NPFL accusing each other of being aggressors. In February the Momoh government offered **amnesty** to Sierra Leoneans fighting alongside the Liberian rebels. (ARB 31/1; WA 16/2)

Togo

A **third attempt** by the army to oust Prime Minister Koffigoh (see previous Monitor) took place on 28 November. Troops seized the radio and TV stations, in reaction to the decision of the transitional government, the High Council of the Republic, to dissolve Eyadema's former ruling party. Their demands were that the High Council be dissolved, that all decisions of the national conference be declared null and void, and that a new all-party government be formed with a new prime minister. Koffigoh refused, and instead asked Pres Mitterrand of France for troops. On 29 November 300 French troops arrived in Benin, although Paris insisted they were there to protect French nationals in Togo. At least 26 people were killed in the unrest.

On 3 December troops **seized** Koffigoh at his official residence, after clashes in which a further eighteen people were said to have been killed. He was taken to the presidential palace for talks with Eyadema, and the next day appeared on television, announcing the formation of a **government of national unity**, claiming he had no other option. France refused to intervene this time. On 15 December the army again briefly took over the national radio station to broadcast their demands for the removal of Koffigoh, while a strike scheduled for the next day was called off after Koffigoh assured unions that the national conference decisions would be respected. Finally, on 29 December, following its first meeting since the coup attempts, the High Council approved the cabinet in which several members of the transitional government retained their posts, while a former Eyadema supporter was appointed.

On 29 January the government announced a new **electoral timetable**. Municipal elections would be held in the first two weeks of April, legislative elections in the second two weeks of May and presidential elections at the end of June. (S 28/11, 29/11, 3/12; ARB 30/11; K11/91, 12/91; AM 1/91; C 4/12; SWB 5/12, 31/12; AC 6/12; E 7/12; ACon 9/12; WA 15/12, 16/2; AN 23/12; AB 1/92; AE 1/92)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

Instead of calling a national conference as demanded by the opposition, Pres Biya announced that parliamentary elections would be held on 16 February 1992. In the meantime, talks with Prime Minister Hayatou (see previous Monitor) broke down on the issue of constitutional affairs, which Hayatou refused to discuss. However, the talks continued after a few days, and on 13 November the government, opposition and civilian organizations reached an agreement on the formation of a constitutional committee. The opposition also agreed to halt "Operation Dead Towns". On 9 December the national assembly approved a new **electoral law**, which reduced the voting age to 20 years, established a single round of voting, and forbade coalitions from participating in the elections. The last aspect drew wide

criticism, as it strengthened the chances of the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (RDPC) in the elections considerably. After calls from the opposition for a postponement of the elections to May to give them more time for preparations, they were postponed to 1 March. In reaction to the government's handling of the situation, a new opposition coalition was formed, the Alliance for the Redress of Cameroon, which decided to **boycott** the election. Biya responded by offering parties that contested the election, CFA500 mn each. (AED 4/11; BD 6/11; SWB 6/11, 18/11, 20/12, 13/1; ARB 30/11; AB 12/91; K 12/91; WA 19/1, 23/2)

Central African Republic

The opposition staged a demonstration in protest at the government's postponement of the national conference from September to February 1992. On 6 January, at a preparatory meeting for the conference, the opposition walked out in protest of the appointment of Prime Minister Edouard Frank to chair of the conference and the distribution of the seats, which favoured the government. Eventually the **national conference** was postponed again, but a national conference preparatory commission was created, chaired by the minister of finance, and received the support of the opposition. (SWB 28/11, 9/1, 27/2; K 1/92; WA 19/1)

Congo

On 22 December the parliament adopted a new constitution, replacing the Marxist single-party regime with a **multiparty system**. The parliament also adopted a draft electoral bill which prevented anyone denounced during the national conference for involvement in economic and financial scandals, from taking part in the presidential elections scheduled for mid-1992. Thus Pres Sassou-Nguesso was effectively barred from standing for another term. A referendum on the new constitution scheduled for 16 February was postponed indefinitely after claims by opposition parties that errors and irregularities had occurred in the national census.

Five civilians were killed in a **coup attempt** by army troops, after transitional Prime Minister André Milongo appointed Col Michel Gangou as secretary of state for defence on 14 January. Gangou had been detained in 1990 for an attempted coup against Sassou-Nguesso. Troops loyal to the president occupied the national radio and television stations and sealed off the airport, demanding the resignation of Milongo. Calm returned after Milongo backed down, dismissed Gangou and reappointed Gen Raymond Danase N'gollo. After the turbulence, Milongo thanked his countrymen for their support, but severely criticized France for its "stingily measured" support. The attack on France appeared in an open letter in the French daily *Le Figaro*. (SWB 20/11, 16/1, 22/1, 24/1, 15/2; ARB 30/11, 31/1; K 12/91, 1/92; AC 6/12; S 17/1; BD 21/1; AA 24/1; AED 27/1; JA 5/2; WA 9/2)

Equatorial Guinea

The new Equato-Guinean constitution establishing **multipartism**, which was submitted to referendum on 17 November, was adopted with 98.36 per cent of the votes according to official sources. According to these results, the participation rate was 94.26 per cent. The new fundamental law provides for the separation of powers between the president and the prime minister. Article 9 recognizes the existence of opposition political parties. (ARB 11/91)

On 23 January Pres Teodoro Mbasogo appointed a **transitional government** as a prelude to the introduction of a multiparty system. He appointed former justice minister Silvestre Siale Bileka as prime minister to lead the government during the transitional phase. The appointment provoked strong criticism from the opposition. (K 1/92, C 22/1, SWB 30/1)

Gabon

A wave of strikes swept through Port-Gentil after the Co-ordination of the Democratic Opposition (COD) called for a general **strike** on 24 February to be followed by a "dead city" day. A ban on public meetings and marches was imposed after violence erupted, but order was restored after a few days. (SWB 25/2; WA 15/3)

Zaire

At the end of October, France announced that all **aid** to Zaire had been cut. Thus Zaire lost its last aid donor, Belgium having cut off its aid in mid-1990 and the US having suspended economic assistance in September.

On 8 November Prime Minister Bernardin Diaka announced the resumption of the **national conference** for 15 November. The opposition responded with calls that the chairman of the conference, Rev Mutambaye, be replaced, claiming that he was discredited by his loyalty to Mobutu. They wanted Rev Pasinya, president of the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference to replace him. When the conference actually started, it was immediately adjourned, following Mutambaye's resignation as chairman. It convened again on 20 November, only to be adjourned again by acting chairman Diaka.

On 11 November a **bomb** destroyed a bar frequented by opposition supporters, killing seventeen people. Witnesses blamed Mobutu's soldiers, who also went on another looting spree, adding to the general chaos in Kinshasa.

In mid-November the Senegalese minister of state, Abdoulayé Wade, tried to mediate a settlement and announced on 18 November that an **agreement** between the government and the opposition was ready. Pres Diouf visited Zaire for the signing of the agreement on 22 November. One of the decisions was that the prime minister should be chosen from the opposition. Breaking an opposition agreement that Etienne Tshisekedi should remain its sole candidate for that post, Jean Nguza Karl I Bond, leader of the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (Uferi), offered himself as prime minister. On 25 November Mobutu appointed Nguza as his sixth prime

minister for 1991, demoting Diaka to the rank of Minister of State. The Sacred Union expelled Uferi.

Mobutu's seven-year mandate came to an end on 4 December, but he announced his intention to stay in office, saying circumstances beyond his control made elections impossible at that time. The Sacred Union organized a **strike** for the 5th to mark the theoretical end of the presidential mandate.

The national conference resumed on 11 December and Pasinya was elected chairman. On 9 January the government delegation claimed that Tshisekedi had packed the conference with his own supporters, and **withdrew**, cutting off financial support and live coverage of the proceedings on radio and television. However, the conference continued, but was suspended on 19 January by Nguza, who said it "was getting out of hand" and contributing to violence in the country.

On 23 January, 29 soldiers tried to **overthrow** Mobutu, seizing the radio station. They were flushed out less than three hours later by the Israeli-trained Special Presidential Division, with the loss of two lives. Joyous crowds surged into the streets at news of the coup, only to return home in silence. Belgium denied accusations that it had a hand in the attempted coup.

On 16 February a **march** to protest against the suspension of the national conference, organized by radical Roman Catholic priests, had a bloody end when troops opened fire, killing 30 and wounding more than 100. The government had banned the march the day before. The killings were stongly condemned by Belgium, France and the USA. By the end of the month, Nguza announced that the national conference was becoming too expensive and the number of delegates would have to be reduced substantially. (K 11/91, 12/91, 2/92; AED 4/11, 2/12; SWB 7/11, 13/11, 22/11, 10/1, 21/1, 24/1, 17/2; S 12/11, 17/2; BD 20/11, 5/12, 24/1; E 30/11; ARB 30/11; C 4/12, 20/1; WA 8/12, 1/3; DT 9/12; ANews 6/1)

(Border talks – see Burundi.)

EAST AFRICA

Burundi

A spate of **violent attacks** in Bujumbura and other regions claimed the lives of as many as 300 people in late November. A government statement broadcast by Radio Bujumbura said the aim of the attacks was the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group by "rebels of the Burundi Palipe-Hutu opposition group", operating from Tanzania and Rwanda. Both Zaire and Rwanda reported an influx of Burundian refugees. The attacks coincided with an official visit to France by Pres Buyoya. On 3 January the government stated that the number of deaths had risen to 551. Human rights organizations claimed that at least 3 000 people had been killed in reprisals by the army after the rebellion. The government denied the allegations.

On 4 January the presidents of Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi met in western Zaire to discuss **border security** and launched a joint

security commission to monitor their common borders.

On 10 January Buyoya said Burundians would vote on a new multiparty constitution in a referendum on 9 March, and that general elections would be held in early 1993. (ARB 30/11, 31/1; K 12/91; SWB 2/12; JA 10/12; DT 8/1, 10/1; AC 10/1; NA 2/92)

Comoros

Following a meeting at Fomboni on the island of Mohéli on 15 November, the Mouvement Revendicatif Mohélien (MRM) called for a **national conference** to discuss the problems of Mohéli. Earlier, threats were made that the island could break away from the archipelago if the central government continued not to take its interests into account. (BD 6/11; ION 23/11)

On 31 December a national reconciliation pact was signed by 22 of the 24 political parties, in which they recognized the legitimacy of Pres Djohar's government. Pres Djohar appointed a transitional government of national unity on 6 January 1992, still dominated by the his supporters. Mohamed Taki Abdoulkar, who had stood against Djohar in the 1990 elections, was named head of government, with the official title of "co-ordinator". On 24 January a national conference was convened to draft a new constitution and a national pact on democracy. (ARB 30/11, 31/1; S 8/1; SWB 14/1; K 30/1; ION 23/11, 21/12, 1/2)

The World Bank postponed its **structural adjustment loan** for one year until December 1992: its experts observed that the Comoran authorities had not fulfilled their commitments to contain the imbalance in public finances. State spending has continued to grow, while revenues have declined during the third quarter of 1991. (ARB 15/11; ION 7/12, 22/2)

Djibouti

On 19 December Pres Hassan Gouled Aptidon declared that **reform** in accordance with "democracy, pluralism or multiparty politics" was possible. He said that the reforms would have to be approved by the Djiboutian people in a referendum to be held once law and order had been restored. On 30 December the Foreign Minister, Moumin Farah announced that legislative elections would be held in May 1992. (K 12/91)

Paul Dijoud, Director of African Affairs at the French Foreign Affairs Ministry ordered the deployment of French peacekeeping troops on 25 February after talks with Aptidon. A total of 250 troops from France's 4 200-strong local garrison took up position around the town of Dikhil, the scene of recent fighting between the government and the FRUD rebels. On 29 February the government responded by agreeing to start **peace negotiations** with the rebels. (K 2/92)

Ethiopia

On 10 November some 100 000 Ethiopians demonstrated in Addis Ababa demanding that former Pres Mengistu Haile Mariam, who fled

to Zimbabwe shortly before the forces of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took the capital in May 1991, be returned to face **trial**. (SWB 11/11, ARB 11/92)

Details of a proposed division of Ethiopia into 14 autonomous regions were presented to the Council of Representatives on 18 November. The proposed regions, each of which would have an elected regional council, were based on the pre-1987 provinces and on the 1984 language survey. The five largest regions would confer formal autonomy on the Tigrayan, Afar, Amhara, Oromo and Somali ethnic groups. (K 11/91, ARB 11/91, AC 8/11)

Kenya

On 19 November Pres Moi dismissed his closest political ally, Nicholas Biwott, the Industry Minister, following revelations into the **February 1990 murder** of former Foreign Minister, Robert Ouko. Biwott was named as a prime suspect by a British detective, John Troon, investigating the murder. Troon said that Ouko's attempt to expose governmental corruption, including evidence against Biwott and Vice-President George Saitoti, had been the reason for the killing. (K 11/91; SWB 5/11, 8/11, 9/11; C 6/11; S 13/11; ION 23/11; BD 27/11; NA 1/92, 2/92)

Opposition leaders and dozens of their supporters were arrested on 16 November in a government crackdown aimed at halting a banned **pro-democracy rally** in Nairobi. Those picked up included 80-year-old Oginga Odinga, leader of the National Democratic Party (NDP) and co-founder of Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford), formed in August to put pressure on the government to adopt political reforms. The World Bank said in Paris on 26 November that international donors had deferred a decision on 1992 aid to Kenya for six months pending progress on moves to implement political and economic reforms. (C 16/11; SWB 16/11; S 16/11, 27/11; WM 29/11; E 30/11)

In an unexpected turnaround on 3 December, Pres Moi chaired a special Kenyan African National Union (Kanu) conference which passed a resolution recommending a **multi-party** political system for Kenya. Moi said that no tribal-based party would be allowed to register but there would be no limit on the number of parties permitted. The President gave no indication of a general election date, which is expected to be in 1992. Kenya has been officially a one-party state since 1982. By 20 December at least 16 political parties had been launched, and on 18 January more than 100 000 people attended Kenya's first legal (and peaceful) anti-government rally in 22 years. By the end of February five cabinet ministers had left the government in a spate of resignations, while MPs and other Kanu leaders quit the party and joined opposition parties. (ARB 11/91; K 12/91; C 4/12; S 4/12; SWB 5/12; AC 6/12; ION 7/12, 21/12, 22/2; AB 1/92; WR 21/2)

Madagascar

A new 18-month transitional administration, called a government of "national consensus"

was finally named on 19 December, after two previous attempts on 13 November and 14 December failed to enlist the support of the Comité de Forces Vives. This followed an agreement signed on 31 October by Pres Didier Ratsiraka and Prime Minister Guy Razanamasy, representatives of the opposition forces, religious groups and the armed forces. (C 2/11; ION 2/11, 8/11, 16/11, 21/12; A News 4/11, 2/12; SWB 15/11, 16/11, 19/12, 20/12; K 30/11, 31/12; S 20/12; AB 31/12; SS 11/1; AM 31/1; A Demos 2/2)

The accord of 31 October came shortly after the military hinted that it might take matters into its own hands unless the five-month political stalemate, described by Defence Minister Philippe Ramakavelo as "collective suicide", was broken. International aid donors and creditors, who wanted to see Madagascar back on what they judged a largely successful **economic reform programme** had also expressed their dismay over the island state's political crisis at the annual World Bank and IMF meetings in Bangkok. That pressure provided further incentive for Ratsiraka to move to break the political impasse. (ION 2/11, 8/11, 14/12; A News 4/11; ARB 30/11; SS 11/1)

Under the terms of the 31 October agreement, Pres Ratsiraka remains in office, stripped of all executive powers but retaining the power to appoint ambassadors and sign international agreements. He also stays on as supreme commander of the armed forces, albeit only nominally. The Supreme Revolutionary Council was dissolved, its duties being assumed by a High State Authority (HAE) of 31 members headed by Albert Zafy. Similarly, the National Assembly was replaced by a 131-member National Committee for Economic and Social Recovery (CRES) Besides serving as a think-tank for the government on socio-economic policies, this will also be a consultative body in the drafting of the state budget. (C 2/11; SWB 1/11, 2/11, 4/11, 7/11, 9/11; ION 2/11, 8/11, 30/11, 14/12, 27/2; TS 5/11; K 30/11; A News 2/12; ARB 30/11, 31/1; S 20/12; SS 11/1; A Demos 2/2)

The opposition did not enjoy the solidarity that once was its major strength and was now fractured into two feuding camps, the Force Vive Rasalama and the Force Vive Madagascar. A **national forum** of some 1400 delegates, representing every region in the country, would meet from 22 to 29 March to draw up a new constitution and an electoral code. This would be followed by a referendum on the future constitution in June, local and national elections in August, and presidential elections in October. Deadlines, however, would be difficult to meet as the country will need some time to recover from the paralysis of the past months – estimated to have cost Madagascar some US\$195 mn in multilateral and bilateral credits. (AA 15/11; C 2/12; SWB 19/12, 21/12, 19/2; ION 7/12, 11/1, 18/1, 15/2, 27/2; SS 11/1; NA 31/1; ARB 30/11, 31/1; AM 31/1)

Mauritius

The Mauritian government alliance of the Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien (MSM) and the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM)

won 125 of the 126 seats at stake in the **municipal elections** on 27 October. While the opposition coalition of the Parti Travailliste Mauricien (PTM) and the Parti Mauricien Social-Démocrate (PMSD) boycotted the poll, a Greens/FTS candidate won the Beau-Bassin/Rose Hill seat. The turnout for these elections was disappointing, however, with a 78 per cent abstention rate, the highest since the country gained independence in 1968. (ION 2/11; ARB 30/11)

South African Pres F W de Klerk's talks with Mauritian Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth on 16 November, and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha's discussions with Mauritian counterpart Paul Bérenger on 17 November, mainly concerned **trade**. (SWB 18/11; BD 18/11)

Following an announcement by Prime Minister Jugnauth on 22 October that Mauritius would break ties with the British Crown, the Legislative Assembly on 10 December passed the Constitutional Amendment Bill, under which the island – a constitutional monarchy since its independence in 1968 – would become a **republic** on 12 March. With its constitution modelled on the Indian presidential system – a president without executive powers – Mauritius would remain within the Commonwealth and will retain rights of legal appeal to the Queen's Privy Council. The current governor-general, Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, will assume the functions of president for a transitional period. The seven opposition members of the Assembly abstained from the vote, claiming that the new status strengthened the powers of the executive to the detriment of, notably, the judiciary. They also declared that the president of the republic should have been elected by universal suffrage and that the republican issue should have been put to a referendum. (ARB 30/11; ION 7/12, 14/12; SWB 11/12; C 11/12; S 11/12; K 31/12; AM 30/1; AB 29/2)

Réunion

The creation of an **export processing zone** on Réunion island, competing with that of Mauritius (in operation) and that of Madagascar (in progress), could eventually help to overcome the island's endemic unemployment problem (estimated at more than 37 per cent). Some development projects currently being implemented would likely benefit the island in the long term, however. Notable amongst these was the modernization of the port of La Pointe des Galets at Saint-Denis. The upgrading of the port, which handles 2 mn tonnes annually, had become indispensable if it were to compete with the other major ports of the area, such as Port Louis in Mauritius and Tamatave in Madagascar. (ION 16/11; ARB 15/2)

Rwanda

Despite the government's attempts to move towards democracy, fighting between government soldiers and rebels continued. In the meantime, Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana announced the formation of a transitional

government on 30 December. Some 50 000 supporters of the four main opposition parties joined in a demonstration to protest against the transitional government, in which 16 ministers of the 17 came from the former ruling party MRND. (ARB 30/11, 31/1; K 12/91; AN 2/12; SWB 1/1, 10/1; DT 28/1; S 28/1)

(*Border talks – see Burundi; Border attack – see Uganda.*)

Seychelles

An extraordinary congress of the ruling Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) voted on 3 December to legalize opposition parties within a **multiparty system**. Pres René had previously resisted pressure to end one-party rule on the grounds that the country could not afford a pluralist system. (ARB 30/11; ION 7/12; K 12/91)

To put the programme towards democratization in motion, the necessary amendments to the constitution were unanimously approved by the National Assembly on 27 December. The registration of political parties started on 27 January. Elections for a constituent commission, on the basis of proportional representation, was scheduled for July. The commission would draft a new constitution to be put to a referendum and, if approved, multiparty presidential and legislative elections would be held before the end of 1992. Pres René also said that Seychelles would call on international organizations to assist in a smooth transition towards democracy, "including the supervision of **elections and the referendum**". (ARB 30/11, 31/1; SWB 7/12, 12/2; K 31/12; ION 7/12, 14/12, 11/1, 25/1, 1/2, 15/2)

Somalia

Fierce **fighting** between opposing factions of the United Somali Congress (USC) again flared up in Mogadishu on 16 November. As in early September, when hundreds died, the clashes were between forces loyal to interim Pres Ali Mahdi Mohammed and supporters of USC chairman Gen Mohammed Farah Aydid, who appeared to be in control of most of Mogadishu. By the end of 1991 as many as 4 000 people had been killed and some 20 000 wounded in the battles in and around the capital. On 23 January the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing an arms embargo on Somalia. On 14 February delegations from the two USC factions met at a UN-sponsored venue in New York and agreed to stop fighting. However, by the end of the month, neither side had honoured its undertaking to stem the conflict and the violence raged on. (K 11/91, 12/91, 1/92; ION 2/11, 23/11, 22/2; E 16/11, 1/2, 22/2; SWB 19/11, 18/2; S 22/11, 18/2, 26/2; ARB 30/11; C 5/12, 28/2)

Tanzania

In mid-November former president and founding father of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, urged the government to permit a peaceful switch to **multiparty democracy**. Two months later, the country's supreme policy-making body, the

national executive committee (NEC) of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), met between 17-21 January and unanimously accepted a proposal to end 27 years of one-party rule. The NEC recommended that the constitution be amended to allow for the registration of political parties. The recommendations were ratified on 19 February by a special general congress of the CCM. (SS 15/12; K 1/92; SWB 3/1, 20/1, 22/1, 30/1, 21/1, 24/2; AA 10/1; ION 11/1, 25/1, 1/2; C 20/1, 22/1, 20/2; E 25/1; NA 3/92)

Uganda

Reports during November suggested that an estimated 50 000 Ugandans fled their homes along the Rwandan border following artillery shelling by **Rwandan troops**. A Ugandan army spokesman said that troops in the region had been reinforced following the shelling of the border town of Kisoro. The attack was an apparent retaliation for the expulsion of an estimated 300 Rwandan soldiers and civilians who had entered Uganda in search of food. Rwanda had been fighting rebels of the Rwandese Patriotic Front along its border with Uganda since October 1990. On 19 January Pres Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda's Pres Juvenal Habyarimana met in the northern Tanzania town of Arusha in an effort to promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (C 23/11; ARB 30/11; SWB 28/12; DT 23/1)

According to an Amnesty International report released in London on 4 December, the army in Uganda was detaining, torturing and executing citizens, and the government was evading its responsibility to prevent such **human rights violations**. Abuses appear to have been especially widespread in the north, where the army had for the preceding four years been waging a war against rebel groups threatening to overthrow Pres Museveni's government. The report argued that unless the administration acted quickly such outrages would once again become the norm in Uganda. On 25 January Pres Museveni responded to Amnesty International by claiming that "human rights must be seen in the context of insurgency in the country". (S 5/12; C 27/1; AED 10/2; SWB 14/2)

On 26 November Pres Museveni said that the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) would allow the opposition to take part in the 1995 general **elections**. His remarks came at a time when the opposition was increasing pressure on his NRM to permit other parties to take part in politics. Although Museveni had appointed a commission to report on a new constitution by mid-1992, he had never ceased speaking out against a multi-party system and still maintained a total ban on the former political parties. On 26 January the NRM marked its sixth anniversary in office. (SWB 2/12; TWR 11/12, 5/2; Acon 17/2)

On 9 January Uganda and Kenya agreed to establish a permanent **joint commission** of co-operation aimed at strengthening mutual ties between the two states. (SWB 13/1)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

On 10 November Pres Jose Eduardo dos Santos announced that a general **election** would take place on a date provisionally set for the second half of September 1992. He also rejected the idea of a national conference, proposed by some opposition movements. On 1 February the government and Unita reached consensus to the effect that the September elections would be conducted on the basis of proportional representation and that the post-election regime would be semi-presidential, with the president serving a five-year mandate, renewable for three terms. The parliament would have a four-year life. (K 11/91, 2/92; SWB 12/11)

In a decree issued on 22 November Pres dos Santos delegated some of his duties to the **Prime Minister**. In terms of the decree Prime Minister Fernando Franca van Dunem will now chair the sessions of the Council of Ministers and co-ordinate government activity. (SWB 25/11, K 11/91)

On 23 January Angola and South Africa agreed to establish formal **diplomatic ties** after a 17-year diplomatic freeze. Initially, the two countries would open interest offices in each others' capital cities. (ARB 1/92)

Botswana

On 30 December an agreement with South Africa to establish reciprocal representative missions, was made public. (S 31/12)

In December the news media reported on the building of a massive **air base** near Molepolele and smaller bases near Chobe and near the Okavango delta by a French firm Spie Batignolles, with the South African firm LTA as main contractor. The total cost, including new infrastructure, was stated to be around one billion pula. In view of the region's progressive demilitarization the project was raising many questions, and there was speculation that the country may also buy French aircraft and equipment. (BD 5/12; AED 16/12; NA 2/92)

On 14 January a contingent of 250 troops from the USA 325th Infantry Brigade arrived from Italy for a two-week training exercise with the 4 500-strong Botswana Defence Force, codenamed Operation Silver Eagle. (C 12/2; ST 19/1; K 1/92)

Lesotho

Lesotho would hold elections later this year, but although the military leader, Gen Rameama, announced that he did not intend to contest the elections, not all the political parties had confidence in him. The BNP (Basotho National Party), formerly led by the late Leabua Jonathan, had been accusing the military junta of **electoral irregularities**. It is not known which of the 15 political parties would be contesting the elections, but the main protagonists would undoubtedly be the BNP and the BCP (Basutoland Congress Party)

Meanwhile, the question surrounding the return of ex-King **Moshoeshe II** had not yet been resolved. Having deposed the exiled king and replaced him with his son, King Letsie III, Maj Gen Ramaema would allow him to return as a chief but not as incumbent of the throne. The issue would be debated during an emergency meeting of the constituent assembly, convened for the first week of May. (S 28/4; WM 30/4)

Malawi

Pres Kamuzu Banda of Malawi said he regarded the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in Harare, Zimbabwe from 16 to 22 October 1991 as the best he had ever attended. His account, however, totally **ignored** the main subject of the summit – the furtherance of democracy and human rights, and the need for an independent judiciary. The Malawian media also failed to report the signs of growing age and incapacity Banda demonstrated during the summit and on an earlier state visit to Tanzania from 3 to 7 October. In Harare, Banda fell heavily at one function and was able to regain his feet only with the help of fellow Commonwealth leaders. In Tanzania, the official media reported him as "stammering through" his speech at an official banquet. His health has **declined** rapidly since he reportedly suffered a stroke in 1990. In May and June 1991 he spent five weeks in Britain on a "private visit", during which he underwent medical treatment. (SWB 24/10; K 31/10; AC 20/12; AS 29/2; NA 31/3)

Opening Parliament in Zomba on 4 December, Pres Banda stated that the prosperity Malawi is experiencing has been possible because of the prevailing "peace and calm, law and order". He said there is stability in the country because "the people are united and are happy with the one-party system of government". He stressed that the Malawi government under the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) "has delivered the goods"; there was, therefore, "no need to change the present system of government". (At its September 1991 congress in Mzuzu, the MCP voted on and unanimously adopted a resolution to maintain the present **one-party system** in Malawi.) Again on 14 February, commenting on the multiparty system, Banda reiterated that the one-party state in Malawi had not been imposed by him but had naturally evolved through the ballot box after the first pre-independence general elections in 1961 and after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963. (SWB 5/12, 17/2; SAE 29/2-31/3; NA 31/3)

The Secretary to the President and Cabinet, Justin Malawezi, had been **fired** for "dishonesty, disloyalty and failing to set a good example as head of the civil service", SAPA-Reuter reported on 5 December. His crime, however, was clearly political. His two predecessors, John Ngwiri (1985) and Sam Kakhobwe (1989), were both sacked on similar grounds. (In the past, people have been dismissed or detained purely because they had uncovered evidence of corruption.) In Malawi, where ministers lack political power and do not stay

long in one post, senior civil servants wield substantial executive power under the President's watchful eye. The Secretary to the President and Cabinet is privy to the government's innermost workings and helps to control the access of politicians to Banda. Along with Cecilia Kadzamira (Banda's nurse when he still practised medicine in the 1950s and his "Official Hostess" since he came to power in Malawi in the early 1960s) and John Tembo (Treasurer-General and longest-serving member of the National Executive Committee of the MCP, and uncle of the Kadzamira's - Mary Kadzamira, Cecilia's sister, being Banda's private secretary), Malawezi would have been one of Banda's closest advisers. Malawezi's successor is Macdonald Banda, previously Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, and ex-ambassador to Germany and Zaire. (C 5/12; AC 20/12; AS 29/2)

Kanyama Chiume, national chairman of the Congress for the Second Republic (CSR), who briefly served as Malawi's first minister of foreign affairs before fleeing into exile in 1964, has said in an undated December interview with SAPA in Lusaka that "Malawi cannot afford to remain an island in a sea of democracy". The one-party model was no longer tenable in Africa because it had been abused by most post-independence rulers "who had created dynasties, persecuted the dissenters and propped up their sycophants". The government of Malawi "should abdicate its authority and give way to a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution" that could declare Malawi "a multiparty state that respects basic human rights". The ruling Malawi Congress Party should relinquish its political monopoly and allow exiled Malawians to go back home and participate in the political transformation. (C 30/12)

Pres Banda **dissolved** his cabinet on 31 December and said that he would deal with all matters requiring cabinet decisions until such time as a new cabinet had been formed. On 7 January, Banda appointed a new government in which the most notable change was the entry of John Tembo as Minister of State in the President's Office - a position which elevates him to *de facto* prime minister. Tembo, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi, is widely regarded as the President's heir-apparent. In another significant move, Maxwell Pashane, Minister without Portfolio and Administrative Secretary of the Malawi Congress Party, was dropped from the government. (SWB 1/1, 9/1; S 2/1; DT 8/1; K 31/1; ARB 31/1)

The leader of the Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), Dr George Mkali, said in an interview with *The Weekly Mail* in the week of 12 January that his party would be joining forces with the Canadian-based Malawi Party in March. The MDP was launched in South Africa in August 1991 and has an office in Johannesburg, from where it has been seeking support from the 150 000 South African-based Malawians. The MDP proposes a multiparty system and a constitution "beyond the reach of on-going party-political manipulation". Older exiled opposition movements are the Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo), the Socialist

League of Malawi (Lesoma) and the Congress for the Second Republic (CSR). Pres Banda on 27 February warned the country's dissidents abroad in a speech at Mchinji that they would be "**meat for the crocodiles**" if they dared to return to Malawi. (S Scan 17/1; WM 17/1; SWB 29/2; AA 6/3)

The exiled Malawi opposition umbrella organization, the United Front for Multiparty Democracy (UFMD), has appealed to Britain and the United States to **stop all aid** to Malawi until a multiparty democracy was in place. UFMD interim chairman George Kanyama said in an interview in Lusaka on 29 February that his organization was ready to hold talks with the Malawi government at a neutral venue to discuss transition arrangements. The UFMD wanted the government to repeal the one-party constitution; release all political prisoners including Orton and Vera Chirwa; unban all political organizations; grant a general amnesty to all political exiles; and repeal the public security and censorship laws, and other laws restricting individual freedom. The UFMD comprises Lesoma, Mafremo, the CSR, the Malawi Democratic Union (MDU), and the London-based Malawi People's Party - MPP. (SWB 3/3; AED 9/3; NA 31/3)

Mozambique

On 13 November the Mozambican government and Renamo signed a second **protocol agreement** on Criteria and Modalities for Forming and Recognizing Political Parties. Included in the agreement was a provision that immediately following the signing of a general peace agreement, Renamo would begin to operate as a political party. (NR 21/11)

On 21 December the government and Renamo ended a **ninth** round of peace talks in Rome without agreement on a truce. (ARB 12/91)

On 10 January, Pres Banda of Malawi and Pres Mugabe of Zimbabwe, in an effort to accelerate the peace process, met with Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama in Blantyre. (ARB 1/92)

On 21 January a **tenth** round of peace talks began in Rome between Frelimo and Renamo to discuss the principles that should guide the Mozambican electoral process. (NR 30/1)

Namibia

In late November the central committee of the DTA accepted a **new constitution** and transformed the alliance into a single political party to be known as DTA of Namibia. Dirk Mudge and Mishake Muyongo were re-elected as chairman and president respectively. (ARB 30/11; C 2/12; SWB 3/12)

From 7 to 11 December Swapo, the ruling party, held its first **congress** since its founding in 1960, with more than 1 000 delegates attending. Swapo transformed itself from a liberation movement into a political party. Sam Nujoma and the Rev Hendrik Witbooi were re-elected as president and vice-president respectively while Moses Garoeb won the post of secretary-general from Andimba Toivo ya Toivo with 668 votes to 63. Also elected were

58 members of the central committee while nine were still to be nominated. According to observers, open and frank speaking prevailed. (SS 7/12; SWB 9/12; Rep 11/12; C 12/12)

Provisional figures for the October 1991 population **census** indicated a population of 1 401 711 as compared with 1 033 196 for 1981 and 861 010 for 1970. (SWB 30/1)

Rössing Uranium Limited has **donated** the mining town of Arandis, built in the mid-1970s and valued at about R100 mn, to the government. Only a few mine employees remained there after falling demand for uranium compelled the company to lay off 770 workers, about one-third of its workforce, in 1991. Arandis was given export processing zone (EPZ) status and incentives to stimulate economic activity. (C 10/1; BD 28/2)

South Africa

At least 80 per cent of the workforce supported a two-day nationwide **strike** on 5 and 6 November to protest against the imposition of value added tax (VAT) on basic foodstuffs, health care and essential services.

Violence at a Welkom mine in the Orange Free State led to 84 deaths by 11 November. New allegations of a "**third force**" were made and the Anglo-American Corporation decided to temporarily lay off almost 5 000 workers in an effort to defuse tensions at the mine. On 8 November Law and Order Minister Henus Kriel announced the formation of a special police unit, called Internal Stability, consisting of 17 500 men to combat political unrest. At a news conference on 10 January, Mbongeni Khumalo, a former central committee member of the Inkatha Freedom Party, provided new evidence of South African Defence Force (SADF) complicity in attacks on the ANC. On 7 February the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry into the Prevention of Violence and Intimidation published a report on an investigation into the killing of 19 people by Inkatha supporters near Durban, in December 1991. The report accused several members of the police of illegal actions and of bias in favour of Inkatha. It also started hearing evidence regarding state involvement in the violence.

Preparatory talks for substantive negotiations were held on 29 to 30 November, where it was decided that a "Convention for a Democratic South Africa" (**Codesa**) would start on 20 December. The Pan-Africanist Congress, PAC, withdrew, accusing the government and the African National Congress (ANC) of secret collaboration and calling Codesa a government "instrument of manipulation". All delegates signed a "declaration of intent" on 20 December, which specified that decisions at Codesa should be taken by sufficient consensus and that Codesa had the power to draft legislation, although the parliament had a veto. This sentiment was drawn through to January when both Pres de Klerk and Foreign Minister Botha assured their white constituency that if whites did not approve of any constitutional changes: "...it's back to the drawing board".

The five Codesa working groups started their activities on 20 January, indicating that the next full Codesa meeting would be held in April.

The European Community lifted its remaining **sanctions** against South Africa on 22 January, and Japan re-established full diplomatic relations on 13 January, while the Netherlands Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, cancelled a trip to South Africa after severe criticism by the ANC.

On 2 February ANC President Mandela said the ANC was changing its economic policy from large-scale nationalization to a **mixed economy** with a public sector "perhaps no different from such countries as Germany, France and Italy".

The day after the National Party's defeat by the Conservative Party in the Potchefstroom by-election on 19 February, Pres de Klerk announced a "whites-only" **referendum**. It was eventually arranged for 17 March, and would be held to renew De Klerk's mandate for negotiations. The State President promised to resign if a "no" vote should win. (K 11/12/91, 1-2/92; NA 11/91; BD 10/11; S 20/11, 2/12, 20/1; AC 22/11; E 23/11; AR 12/91; Ma 12/91; SWB 2/12; AA 13/12; SS 21/12; VWB 31/1; ARB 31/1)

TBVC states

Ciskei – The conflict between the ANC and the government of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo led to the Ciskeian military leader announcing a **state of emergency** in November, following alleged acts of violence by ANC supporters bent on toppling his government. ANC-linked community associations, installed in accordance with ANC suggestions to replace the traditional system of local headmen, were disbanded and the headmanship reinstated.

A subsequent meeting between ANC leader Nelson Mandela and the Ciskeian head of state resulted in an uneasy peace. Brig Gqozo agreed to lift the state of emergency, and a conflict resolution body, the Border Peace Committee, was set up as part of the National Peace Accord. Plans leaked to the Gqozo administration appeared to reveal ANC intentions to use large-scale **mass action** as a means of ousting the government in what Gqozo has called a bid for destabilizing the Ciskei. (S 6/11, 18/11; SWB 7/11, 17/2; C 20/12; BD 11/3; M 10/4)

Venda – The creation of a **Reincorporation Forum**, suggested by Venda head of state, Brig M G Ramushwana at a press conference in October, 1991, was rejected by the ANC, the PAC and Azapo in a joint statement which indicated that they would not be associated with any movement sourced in apartheid-related structures such as the Venda homeland. The Venda government had nevertheless supported the ANC's call for a speedy transfer of power to an interim government in South Africa, provided, however, that its stand on regional autonomy for Venda is respected. (To 18/10; C 18/2; SS 20/3)

Swaziland

In the face of continued demands by Swayoco (Swaziland Youth Congress) and Pudemo (People's United Democratic Movement), on

26 February King Mswati III announced the introduction of a new committee to review the possibility of **constitutional reform**. Pudemo publicly rejected the new constitutional committee, Vusela II, a twelve-member committee led by the Secretary of the Land Speculation Board in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy, Prince Mahlallengeni. The committee would look into the possibility of direct elections to the Swazi parliament. During his speech to the nation, King Mswati also mentioned the possibility of outside assistance to monitor the election process as a guarantee that it reflected the will of the people. (TS 26/2, 27/2; C 27/2)

Zambia

In early November it was announced that **Frederick Chiluba** had received 972 753 votes, 75.8 per cent of the votes cast in the presidential election, against former president Kenneth Kaunda's 310 761 votes (24.2 per cent). Only 1 325 038 out of 2.9 mn registered voters went to the ballot box. (DB 7/11; SWB 8/11)

On 5 November the new government launched a major reorganization of the civil service and parastatals. Several senior executives were dismissed and others were questioned by the police about **corruption**. (K 11/91)

On 7 November Chiluba announced his **government** and pledged to rebuild the economy. Important appointments in a cabinet larger than the previous one were: Levy Mwanawasa – vice-president and leader of the National Assembly; Emmanuel G Kasonde – finance; Vernon Johnston Mwaanga – foreign affairs; Benjamin Yoram Mwila – defence; Newstead L Zimba – home affairs. (K 11/91)

On 8 November the **state of emergency** that had been in force since independence in 1964, was allowed to expire at midnight. The police were instructed to cease searching homes and vehicles without warrant and to remove all roadblocks immediately. (K 11/91)

On 31 January Finance Minister Emmanuel Kasonde presented his first **budget**. Individual tax was reduced from 50 to 35 per cent, corporate tax from 45 to 40 per cent. Millions were set aside for rehabilitation of the social infrastructure. During 1991 employment had fallen by 3.3 per cent. Since 1970 only 100 000 jobs had been created while the population grew by 4 mn. Foreign debt approached \$1 000 per capita. The Kwacha was devalued from K 94 per US\$1 to K 125 per US\$1. (SoS 7/2)

On 26 February Chiluba declared Zambia a "disaster-affected" country as a result of **drought**. Only 4.5 mn bags of maize were expected to be harvested in 1992 instead of the expected 12 mn. With consumption in the region of 10.8 mn bags a year, about 8 mn bags were to be imported at an estimated \$300 000. (SWB 28/2; S 28/2)

Zimbabwe

On 25 January the former Zanu leader, 71-year Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, returned after seven years of self-imposed **exile** in the USA. (ARB 31/1)

On 27 January 60-year-old **Sally Mugabe**, Pres Mugabe's Ghanaian wife, died of kidney disease and was buried at Harare's Heroes' Acre on 31 January. She had been Mugabe's closest political adviser. (WA 16/2)

In February the IMF agreed to lend US\$484 mn in support of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1992-94, while the World Bank and the African Development Bank provided \$175 mn and \$178.75 mn respectively. Italy also agreed to give \$175 mn in 1990-94. (ION 8/2; ARB 15/2; C 23/1)

At a World Bank-supported donors' meeting in Paris on 18 and 19 February, **development aid** of nearly \$1 bn was pledged as well as \$400 mn for food purchases from abroad because of drought. (SoS 21/2; AED 24/2)

Food and water shortages as a result of **drought** had assumed catastrophic dimensions. It was estimated that 1.1 mn tons of maize and 1 mn tons of other foodstuffs would have to be imported, and that 500 000 cattle might die. Bulawayo had only 18 weeks' water supplies left. (E 4/1; S 22/2; ION 22/2; DT 24/2)

Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA)

The 10th meeting of the PTA Authority in Lusaka on 30 and 31 January resolved to merge with the SADCC with the objective of forming a **common market** by 2000. Rule 2(1a) of the Protocol on Rules of Origin, discouraging foreign participation in investment and management, was scrapped. Zambian Pres Chiluba took over the chairmanship from King Mswati III of Swaziland. (SN 22/2; DT 25/2; AS 3/92)

PTA faced a serious **liquidity crisis** because only 47 per cent of annual contributions had been paid (only seven out of 18 members were paid up). Staff could not be paid on time and the secretariat was \$2 mn in debt. In December Secretary General Bingu wa Mutharika had warned of collapse because of a fall-off in aid and the failure of intraregional trade to consolidate. (S 30/1; SoS 31/1; SMR 3/92)

Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)

A recently published World Bank report found that all SADCC **airlines** were losing money and would collapse unless corrective measures were taken and the limited resources pooled. The Bank favoured the formation of one airline for the region. (SMR 12/91)

On 27 January the **Joint Planning Committee (JPC)**, established at the meeting of heads of state and government in Arusha in August 1991, had its first meeting in Maputo. JPC members are Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and, from South Africa, the ANC and PAC. It discussed aspects of South African membership of SADCC, especially trade, investment, finance, defence and security. (DT 31/1)

The annual Consultative Conference, held in Maputo from 29 to 31 January, adopted an important policy document: **SADCC Towards Economic Integration**, aimed at promoting economic integration and strengthening existing co-operation. Donors' representatives praised the plan and promised their support but warned that success was possible only

given political will, an active private sector role and market-friendly policies. A formal treaty to transform the SADCC in accordance with the plan is to be signed at the annual summit in Windhoek in August 1992. The organization favours co-operation with the PTA rather than a merger as proposed by the latter. According to spokesman, the SADCC had, by mid-1991, received foreign funding of around \$3,5 bn towards total costs estimated at \$8,5 bn in respect of 559 projects, mostly in transport and communications, followed by energy. (C 23/1, 30/1; BD 30/1, 31/1; DT 31/1; AIM 1/2; AED 10/2; SMR 3/91)

References

A – Afrika; AA – Africa Analysis; AB – African Business; AC – Africa Confidential;

A Con – Africa Concord; AED – Africa Economic Digest; AE&M – Africa Energy & Mining; AIB – Africa Institute Bulletin; AN – Africa Newsfile; ANews – Africa News; AP – African Preview; AR – Africa Report; ARB – Africa Research Bulletin; AS – Africa South; B – Beeld; BD – Business Day; BDN – Botswana Daily News; C – Citizen; CI – Crescent International; Cr – Crescent; D – Drum; DB – Die Burger; DN – Daily News; DT – Daily Times; E – The Economist; EIU-CR – Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report; FF – Frontfile; FG – Financial Gazette; FM – Financial Mail; FOA – Focus on Africa; F&T – Finansies & Tegniek; G – The Guardian; H – The Herald; I – The Independent; IMF S – IMF Survey; InfA – Informafrika; ION – Indian Ocean Newsletter; JA – Jeune Afrique; K – Keesing's Record of World Events; KT – Kenya Times; KN –

Kwacha News; LT – Lesotho Today; M – The Mail; Ma – Mayibuye; MF – Mozambiquefile; MIO – Mozambique Information Office; MNR – Mozambique News Review; MSE – Market South East; N – Namibian; NA – New African; NM – Natal Mercury; NN – New Nation; R – Rapport; Rep – Republikein; S – Star; SAB – SA Barometer; SAD – South African Digest; SAE – Southern African Economist; SAN – South African Newsletter; SAT – Southern Africa Today; So – South; SoS – South Scan; SMR – SADCC Monthly Report; SN – Swazi News; SS – Sunday Star; ST – Sunday Times; SWB – BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; T – Transvaler; To – Thohoyandou; TS – Times of Swaziland; TWR – Third World Reports; U – Uniform; VWB – Vrye Weekblad; WA – West Africa; WBN – World Bank News; WM – Weekly Mail; WR – Weekly Review; ZN – Zimbabwe News.

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
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