

review

Volume 9 no. 2 June 2011

State of the force
THE VERDICT IS IN

Indigenous Knowledge
STEALING OUR IK IS NOT OK

World Cup
Did we score?

XENOPHOBIA
Stopping the hate



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THE CEO NOTES

Mustering scientific and policy communities for policy dialogue

This edition focuses on information generated from a particular group of seminars and workshops conducted between February and March 2011.

The science seminars were held at Mafikeng and East London in partnership with North West and Fort Hare universities respectively. The government cluster workshops were held at the Reserve Bank to share with government officials results from studies conducted by scientists from the HSRC and various universities. These workshops were the HSRC's contribution to the Human and Social Dynamic in Development Grand Challenge in the country's Ten Year Innovation Plan.

The seminars and workshops were sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology (DST) as part of an effort to create spaces, structures, processes and platforms that enable access to research evidence and improve evidence-informed policy making. The aim is to mobilise the scientific and policy communities to collaborate for more effective decision making and policy dialogue.

The process of organising the seminars and workshops entailed increased interaction between the HSRC and the various government departments and cluster secretariats whose focus is social policy analysis and research.

These interactions also served to sharpen the HSRC's awareness of the knowledge and evidence demands in policy development and implementation. They also increased the awareness among members of the government clusters of how the scientific community could be of practical value, thus strengthening the nexus between policy and research.

The seminars and workshops were a practical demonstration of knowledge brokering, that is the promotion of demand for and support of access to research-based information; and the facilitation of exchange and knowledge sharing among the spheres of research, policy and practice.[1]

They achieved several outcomes which are summarised below; the full report was submitted to the DST.

- They enhanced policy relevant interdisciplinary knowledge sharing;
- They showcased cutting edge research conducted at rural-based universities, thus stimulating ideas and consolidating research agendas and promoting collaboration. For example, one university used the information obtained from a seminar on migration to consolidate research on population and development, and begin a process to become a centre of excellence in demographic research on the continent;
- The active participation of master's and doctoral candidates in presentations and debate on their papers promotes their interests in research careers and will hopefully add to the pool of new researchers. The seminars revealed opportunities for research collaborations that will help forge closer, mutually beneficial relations between universities' science councils.

The topical focus of the policy seminars was determined by a joint sitting of the Social Protection and Community Development cluster and the Human Development cluster.

Key achievements of the policy seminars were:

- They created space for policy makers and researchers to have in-depth discussions and debates about both policy gaps and policy constraints, the theoretical underpinnings of various policy stances, and the practical ramifications of various assumptions;
- They provided opportunities to showcase the utility and relevance of research for policy making and programme development;
- They made researchers more aware of the imperatives and trade-offs confronting policy makers, and exposed researchers to the immediate policy and programme demands of policy makers.

These achievements were made possible by the calibre and diversity of the participants. On average, the seminars were attended by 45 participants and encompassed researchers from both universities and the HSRC, members of senior management in the public service, two parliamentarians, as well as PhD and MA students. The seminars were opened by Vice-Chancellors and the workshops by Directors-General.

[1] Knowledgebrokers.org

MUSIC ON A STRING Pops Mohamed, who made unique field recordings of the Khoisan people, played the traditional Khoi bow-and-arrow instrument and explained the cutural and historical context of the instrument at the launch of *Africa in Focus*.

AFRICA IN FOCUS LEADS TO LIVELY LAUNCH

One of the major issues raised by emerging African scholars is that their views on Africa's challenges are often dominated by academics and intellectuals outside of the continent who assert their diagnoses of and prescriptions for Africa's problems. Yet, given African scholars' strongly anchored understanding of the diversity of society and culture on the continent, they are well placed to reflect on and address Africa's challenges from first-hand experience.

With the launch of a new series on 25 May in Pretoria, *Africa in Focus, Governance in the 21st Century* (HSRC Press), the HSRC gives emerging African scholars a platform to make their voices heard in the academic and wider community. The series is the brainchild of HSRC CEO Dr Olive Shisana, whose financial support enabled the HSRC to assemble a group of scholars from all over Africa and the African Diaspora. Topics covered range from the normative dimensions of democratic governance in Africa; the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank; and issues and challenges experienced by people from various backgrounds across the continent.

A panel discussion, led by Dr Udesh Pillay of the HSRC, led to a lively debate. The panel consisted of three contributing authors, namely Dr Mike Muller (environment and natural resources), Professor Laetitia Rispel (public health and well-being), and Dr Tim Murithi (Africa's engagement with the world). The panelists raised themes of governance, international relations and the responsibility of civil society, the academic community and government in shaping Africa's future.

In the light of current events in North Africa, several of the strands touched on by the panel members in their presentations were taken up by the audience, both in comment and further questions to the panel. It became apparent that issues of water, health and foreign policy are key issues for the African Union agenda.

And, in the spirit of celebration, musician Pops Mohamed entertained the guests with his demonstration of traditional African musical instruments and, in addition, regaled guests with the cultural contexts of each instrument.

It is envisaged that future editions of the *Africa in Focus* series will be project managed by the HSRC in partnership with CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa) and under the umbrella of the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme.

With adequate funding and a dedicated managing editor, the aim would be to release a new edition every two or three years focusing on different aspects of democracy and governance across Africa.

AUTHOR PANEL From left to right, Dr Mike Muller, Dr Tim Murithi, Professor Laetitia Rispel and Dr Udesh Pillay.

NEWS ROUNDUP

HELPING HAND Constance Mamogobo (right), a MAFLI fellow, is managing director of the Makhudu-thamaga Umbrella, which assists emerging NGOs working in 150 villages in Limpopo. Through her HIV/AIDS prevention plan, Mamogobo uses existing family-oriented values in the rural South African context to promote HIV/AIDS prevention among women, girls and boys.

THE LIPSTICK CONNECTION

Gender equality is critical to effective HIV prevention and, for that matter, prevention of all sexually transmitted infections. In a new approach to tackle these complex issues, the MAC AIDS Fund, established by MAC Cosmetics in 1994, raised over US$ 135 million with a new product called 'Viva Glam' lipstick. All profits from the sale of the lipstick go into the Fund, which supports people affected by HIV and AIDS.

From this grew the MAC AIDS Fund Leadership Initiative (MAFLI) – a one-year fellowship designed to respond to the complex challenges of promoting gender equality in the context of HIV prevention in South Africa.

This unique and pioneering programme is underpinned by the vision to build the capacity of emergent leaders to support and sustain HIV prevention efforts throughout the country, and at the same time advancing gender equality.

Earlier this year, the HSRC hosted the Capstone Conference in Cape Town, which was the culmination of four years of the Leadership Initiative.

Since its launch in April 2007, 46 fellows in four groups have been trained and supported in the development and implementation of innovative, community based HIV prevention programmes. Fellows from across the country and from all four groups, along with programme staff and a number of trainers, converged in Cape Town for serious discussion about the future of leadership, gender equality and HIV prevention in South Africa.

The keynote speaker, former Constitutional Court Judge Yvonne Mokgoro, delivered a personal and moving address on her experiences of leadership in South Africa. During the leadership panel discussion, project leaders Dr Anke Ehrhardt (Colombia University) and Dr Thomas Coates (University of California, Los Angeles), lead a discussion on leadership in HIV that included their experiences thereof, as well as gender, and a focus on leadership in the field going forward.

NEW@THE HSRC

DR JULIA LOUW (PhD in Rehabilitation Counselling, Michigan State University, USA), has rejoined the HSRC as a research specialist, following her studies in the USA. She works in the programme on HIV/AIDS, TB and STIs. Previously she was a senior researcher in the office of the CEO. She has also worked as a course instructor at Michigan State University, teaching an undergraduate class in substance abuse and a Master's class in multi-cultural counselling.

DR KE YU (PhD in Educational Management and Policy Studies, University of Pretoria), rejoined the HSRC after completing her studies. She has been appointed as a post-doctoral research fellow in the Research Use and Impact Assessment programme.

DR LIEZILLE PRETORIUS (PhD in Research Psychology, Stellenbosch University) has been appointed as a post-doctoral research fellow in the Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (CeSTII). Before joining the HSRC she was a PhD research intern at the SA Medical Research Council. She has also worked in the area of Health Promotion.

DR NAZEEM MUSTAPHA (PhD in Applied Mathematics, UCT), has been appointed chief research specialist in the Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation programme. Before joining the HSRC in February 2001, he was a specialist in statistical methodology at Statistics South Africa. He has also worked in the areas of cosmology and indicator development in socioeconomic analysis.

MS SANUSHA NAIDU (MA in International Relations, University of Staffordshire, UK) has taken up a position as senior researcher in the Democracy Governance and Service Delivery programme. Before joining the HSRC in March 2011, she was research director of the China/Emerging Powers in Africa programme, based with Fahamu, a Pan African network for social justice NGOs. She has also worked as a research fellow at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch.

one GOAL one NATION

Did the World Cup 2010 help realise social and economic developmental goals by encouraging constructive social behaviour in individuals and promoting social cohesion and nation-building? This is one of the questions JARÉ STRUWIG, VANESSA BAROLSKY and BEN ROBERTS try to answer by analysing results from the South African Social Attitudes Surveys (SASAS), conducted annually from 2005 to 2008.

When, in May 2004, South Africa won the bid for the 2010 Soccer World Cup there was widespread euphoria in the country. The South African Football Association (SAFA) claimed that South Africa's 2010 World Cup would be 'African and South African', and would have the potential to bring both the nation and the continent closer together.

In order to understand attitudes and values around the hosting of the World Cup, a set of questions about this event was included in the South African Social Attitude Surveys (SASAS) from 2005 to 2008, and again in November 2010, following the event. Nationally representative samples of about 3 000 South African adults aged 16 years and older living in private households were interviewed in each instance.

An analysis of the survey results shows a remarkable shift in perceptions regarding the benefits that were anticipated from the country's hosting of the 2010 World Cup and the actual benefits that citizens felt the country experienced following the event. ►►



FIGURE 1: The impact of the 2010 World Cup – mean score (%)

► ► Most significant was an enormous upswing in the belief that the 2010 World Cup had a positive impact on social cohesion and nation-building after the event, from a small percentage of 2% to 4% prior to the event. On the other hand, expectations of economic benefits and job creation were significantly disappointed.

During the run-up to the event, the majority of South Africans stated that the main benefit of hosting the World Cup would be job creation, economic growth and, in particular, 'putting South Africa on the international map'.

While expectations that the World Cup would 'put South Africa on the map' increased from 22% in 2005 to 29% in 2008, during the same period expectations about job creation decreased from 33% in 2005 to 21% in 2008.

Perceptions about economic growth remained fairly stable between 28% and 26%. In contrast, a mere 2% to 4% of people thought that the main benefit of hosting the World Cup would be achieving national unity.

After the Word Cup, a set of questions designed to gauge people's perceptions about both the benefits and disadvantages of hosting the World Cup (see figure 1), was analysed by combining the information into four key themes, namely:

- social cohesion
- confidence in government
- economic opportunities
- economic disadvantages

The data collected after the hosting of the World Cup contrasts markedly with the data collected before the event.

After the World Cup, many noted that the 'intangible' impact (social cohesion and nation-building) was in fact a primary contribution to the country, rather than its 'tangible' or economic impact, as was the expectation prior to the event.

According to SASAS data there therefore appears to be an overwhelming concurrence among South Africans across provincial, racial, demographic, urban, rural, age and economic divides that the World Cup had an enormously positive impact on social cohesion and nation-building.

The results also show an increase in trusting the government to be able to deliver services but, in terms of job creation and economic opportunities, South Africans were less likely to agree that the World Cup succeeded in providing these benefits.

As illustrated in the Figure 2, the majority of respondents by far felt that FIFA had been the primary economic beneficiary of the World Cup.

Following the World Cup, a significant proportion of respondents felt there were economic disadvantages to hosting the event, such as wasteful expenditure on stadiums (46%) and delaying the provision of basic services to poor areas (59%).

Coloured and white respondents were most likely to agree that the hosting of the World Cup led to a waste of money, delayed the provision of necessary basic services to poor areas, and increased the prices of goods and services. Indian or Asian respondents and African respondents were least likely to state that there was economic spillage.

Looking at social cohesion, the results show that men were more likely than women to experience

the World Cup as a unifying event. Young people were also much more likely to feel that this event raised social cohesion, gave people the opportunity to socialise with other race groups and unified South Africa.

In terms of race, white citizens were by far the least likely to see the value of the World Cup in terms of unifying the nation, compared to other race groups, especially coloureds and Asians.

> The majority of respondents by far felt that FIFA had been the primary economic beneficiary of the World Cup

When asked whether South Africa should *not* host other major sports events like the Olympics, almost half (49%) disagreed with this statement, indicating that South Africa should host other major sports events. However, a sizeable third (34%) said that they did not want South Africa to host other major sporting events. The rest were undecided.

Ironically, it is those who appear to have benefited most economically from the World Cup (i.e. high LSM respondents) who were most opposed (40.2%) to South Africa hosting future sports mega-events.

Low LSM respondents and people in rural areas, despite being quite clear about the fact that they did not benefit economically from the World Cup, appear to be more in favour of hosting similar events in the future. ◂◂

Jaré Struwig and Ben Roberts are SASAS coordinators, and Vanessa Barolsky is a chief researcher in the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme, HSRC.

Acknowledgement: The research presented in this article was partly sponsored by the Department of Sports and Recreation

FIGURE 2: Main beneficiaries of the 2010 World Cup (%)



TABLE 1: Perceptions on social cohesion and nation-building during the 2010 World Cup	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Do not know	Mean (0-100)
Hosting the World Cup has helped to build a positive view of South Africa	77%	12%	9%	1%	79
The hosting of the World Cup has enhanced my national pride	76%	11%	12%	1%	78
It has assisted the government in achieving its aims in terms of nation-building	72%	12%	14%	2%	76
I feel a personal sense of pride through my participation in the World Cup	65%	15%	19%	1%	72
After the World Cup people of different racial groups trust or like each other more	54%	16%	25%	4%	68

FIGURE 3: Agreement with the statement that SA should *not* host another major sports event because it is too expensive (%)



A Vote of Confidence

Results from the IEC Election Satisfaction Survey 2011

The Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) commissioned the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in late 2010 to conduct two studies related to the 2011 Municipal Elections: firstly, a Voter Participation Survey (VPS), which was conducted in November and December 2010; and secondly, an Election Satisfaction Survey (ESS) conducted on the day of the elections – 18 May. In this article, JARÉ STRUWIG, BEN ROBERTS, UDESH PILLAY and ELMÉ VIVIER present general findings from the Election Satisfaction Survey.

The main aim of the Election Satisfaction Survey 2011 was to determine opinions and perceptions of both voters and election observers regarding the freeness and fairness of the electoral process.

A further aim of the study was to assess the operational efficiency of the IEC in managing the municipal elections.

The study was conducted among two groups of respondents, namely (i) South Africans who voted in the 2011 Municipal Elections, and (ii) local and international election observers.

The target population for the voter component of the study was individuals aged 18 years and older who are South African citizens, and who were registered as voters for the 2011 Municipal Elections.

The study also conducted interviews among local and international election observers visiting the selected voting stations on election day, though this article presents exclusively the findings from the interviews with voters.

Methodology

A complex sample design was used in drawing the sample of voting stations. The design included stratification and a multistage sampling procedure. The database of voting stations obtained from the IEC was merged with that of Population Census Enumeration Areas (EAs). The sampling of the voting station was done proportionally to the dominant race type, geo-type and the number of voting stations in a given province.

This was to ensure that a nationally representative sample of voting stations was selected and the results of the survey could be properly weighted to the population of registered voters in the country.

At the actual voting stations, fieldworkers used random sampling to select voters to ensure a fair representation in terms of gender, race, age, and disability status. A sample of 300 voting stations countrywide was selected.

The distribution of these voting stations and the resultant number of interviews at and in the vicinity of the voting stations was proportional to the IEC's distribution of registered voters.

At each voting station 50 voters were interviewed during the course of the day. These were divided into four time slots to ensure a fair spread of interviews over different times of the day, when different dynamics might have been in operation.

General voting experience

Two-thirds of voters (66%) took less than 15 minutes to reach their voting stations, with 20% taking between 16 to 30 minutes, 9% between 31 to 60 minutes and 5% longer than an hour.

On average, voters waited 23 minutes in the queue before voting. Ninety-seven percent were satisfied with the instructions and signs about where to go and what to do. Ninety-eight percent found the voting procedures *inside* the voting station easy to understand.

Consideration of voting procedure for people with special needs

The majority of voters stated that the voting procedures considered the needs of the elderly (90%), persons with disabilities (80%), the partially sighted (70%), the blind (66%), women (84%), and women with babies (78%). Overall, 85% of the voters found the voting stations easily accessible to persons with disabilities and the elderly, while 8% did not.

Timing of decision on political party of choice

Decisions about party choice were mostly made months prior to election day (75%), with only a small share deciding upon their voting preference on election day or shortly beforehand (11%).

Udesh Pillay presents the results of the Election Satisfaction Survey.

Perceived secrecy of vote

Ninety-seven percent expressed satisfaction with the secrecy of their vote.

Equally high proportions of satisfaction were found among the various race groups, age groups and for men and women.

Political coercion

Ninety-four percent reported that no one had tried to force them to vote for a certain political party. Of those who did mention some form of coercion, 21% said that this had actually changed their decision. The most commonly mentioned sources of coercion were political parties and family or friends.

Political party tolerance

Fifty-nine percent of voters expressed the view that political parties were *very* tolerant of one another during the 2011 election campaigns, with 22% reporting that parties were *somewhat* tolerant of each other and 13% perceived intolerance.

Electoral freeness and fairness

An overwhelming majority of sampled voters (95%) felt that the election procedures were free, with a further 2% saying they were free with only minor problems.

Similarly, 94% of the voters were of the opinion that the election procedures were fair, with 2% saying they were fair with only minor problems.

IEC performance

Ninety-seven percent voiced general satisfaction with the quality of services rendered by IEC officials to voters, with 2% expressing a neutral position and 1% dissatisfied. Voters were asked to rate 10 aspects of the conduct of IEC officials at their voting station. Overall, there was a very positive assessment of officials.

They rated officials as extremely friendly (88%), helpful (86%), patient (84%), co-operative (84%), professional (82%), interested in their jobs (82%), honest (81%), knowledgeable about elections (81%), considerate (80%) and impartial (75%).

Voter education

Sixty-eight percent of voters believed that the IEC's voter education was *very* effective, 22% *somewhat* effective, and 3% indicating that it was ineffective. Seven percent were uncertain or unsure of how to respond to the question on voter education effectiveness.

Voters were asked to indicate the extent to which they found various information sources to be useful in providing information about voting.

Radio and television (94% and 93% respectively) were the most useful information sources about voting.

Posters and billboards (91%), as well as political parties (87%), newspapers (86%), and pamphlets (80%) also received broadly positive evaluations.

Moderately lower levels of usefulness were reported in relation to voter awareness booklets (73%), civil society organisations (68%), the IEC communication campaign (67%), and workshops (57%).

Sources based on information technology such as the 'X for Democracy' website (39%) and the IEC website (37%) were found to be useful by the lowest proportion of voters, which is a reflection of the generally low levels of access to this media source.

Overall assessment

Based on an assessment of voter interviews from a representative sample of voting stations, the HSRC finds that the voting public was overwhelmingly confident that the 2011 Municipal Elections were both free and fair, and provided an exceptionally favourable evaluation of the management performance of the IEC and the conduct of officials at voting stations. ◂◂

Ben Roberts and Jaré Struwig are SASAS coordinators, Udesh Pillay is executive director, and Elmé Vivier is a Master's intern in the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme, HSRC.

The research presented in this article was commissioned and financed by the IEC. The authors are especially grateful to the IEC's Kealeboga Maphunye and Shameme Manjoo or their support.

SHOOTING BLANKS?

South Africa's confidence in police

The recent killing of Andries Tatane by police during protest action in Ficksburg, together with a high incidence of police deaths this year, has begun to raise questions about excessive force and the current policing approach and, by extension, the nature and extent of confidence in the police. Yet, at the same time, a large majority of South Africans believe that the police generally have the 'same sense of right and wrong' as them. In this article, BEN ROBERTS and JARÉ STRUWIG present initial findings from an ongoing collaborative project exploring perceptions about the police.

Data for this study draws from the 2010 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. The survey series consists of nationally representative probability samples of South African adults aged 16 years and over living in private households. The sample size for the 2010 survey round was 3 183 individual respondents, with interviewing conducted between mid-November and mid-December 2010. The module of questions on police confidence derives from a rotating module currently being fielded in 30 countries as part of the fifth round of the European Social Survey. It has been designed to assess national levels of trust in justice and the legitimacy of legal authorities, as well as to test conceptual models that link trust to legitimacy to compliance/cooperation with legal authorities. The survey data provide a range of indicators with which to better understand and monitor confidence in the police, but will also enable comparison of the views of the South African public on this salient topic against those in a host of other developed and developing nations.

Perceived police performance and effectiveness

Several questions were initially posed to respondents relating to their general analysis of the performance of the police and its effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate to citizens. Taking into account the things the police are expected to do, 43% report that the police are doing a good or very good job, 25% suggest that the police are doing a bad or very bad job, with 30% offering a more neutral evaluation.

> If a violent crime or house burglary were to occur near to where you live and the police were called, how slowly or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene?

Regarding measures of police effectiveness, the survey asked participants the following questions: 'Based on what you have heard, or your own experience, how successful do you think the police are at preventing crimes in South Africa where violence is used or threatened? And how successful do you think the police are at catching people who commit house burglaries in South Africa?'

Answers were captured on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely unsuccessful) to 10 (extremely successful). A third question stated: 'If a violent crime or house burglary were to occur near to where you live and the police were called, how slowly or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene?' Answers were measured on a scale of 0 (extremely slowly) to 10 (extremely quickly).

The SASAS 2010 results show that South Africans are generally polarised on matters of police effectiveness. Virtually equivalent shares of South Africans placed themselves on the bottom and top halves of the success scale for the crime prevention question (38% and 40% respectively), with 21% opting for the mid-point of the scale.

The same is found for the measure of the catching of perpetrators of house burglary, with 40% and 41% respectively rating the police in the top and bottom halves of the success scale, with 17% choosing the mid-point of the scale.

There is more scepticism in terms of the time police take to respond to incidents of violent crime or house burglary. Half of South Africans (50%) placed themselves on the bottom half of the responsiveness scale, 15% selected the mid-point of the scale, while a third (33%) expressed some measure of trust in rapid police response by choosing a point on the upper half of the scale.

Trust in police distributive and procedural fairness

A series of questions was included in the module in order to ascertain how confident South Africans are that the police treat victims of crime equally (distributive fairness), as well as how satisfied they are with how the police treat people and make decisions when dealing with crimes like house burglary and physical assault (procedural fairness). In making their evaluations, respondents were asked to think of their own experiences, or alternatively, what they have heard from other sources.

In terms of distributive fairness, 44% of South Africans expressed the opinion that the police treat poor people worse than rich people, 43% believe that all groups are treated equally, 2% feel the rich are treated worse than the poor, while 10% are uncertain. Although those with low living standards are more inclined to feel that the poor receive worse treatment (52%), this view is still firmly entrenched among those with high living standards (41%). In the reporting of crimes, 38% stated that the police treat black South Africans worse than other race groups; 43% believe that all race groups are treated equally; 8% feel that white, Indian and coloured South Africans are treated worse than black South Africans; with the remaining 10% uncertain.

Turning to procedural fairness, half the adult population (50%) feels that the police rarely treat people with respect, with 47% stating that they are often or very often respectful (Figure 1).

A similar critical assessment is evident with regard to the ability of police officers to make fair and impartial decisions, as well as their tendency to explain or not explain their decisions and actions when requested to do so.

Police legitimacy

There appears to be a fairly robust sense of moral identification with the police (Figure 2). More than two-thirds of adult South Africans (69%) agree or strongly agree that the police generally have the 'same sense of right of wrong' as them, compared to only 17% that disagree. Furthermore, 52% of respondents believe that the police 'stand for values that are important to people like me', with a quarter (25%) inclined to disagree with this perspective. However, in spite of this relatively positive message, there is more ambivalence among the public in terms of the manner in which police act. While 42% agree that they support the way the police usually act, 33% disagree with the remaining 25% neutral.

Concluding remarks

The results presented above offer a mere glimpse of the rich data that the HSRC has begun to collect on the public's confidence in the police through SASAS. Taken together, the evidence suggests that South Africans see the police as a legitimate authority that is aligned to their moral values. Nonetheless, for a significant share of the population there remain fundamental questions about the efficacy of the police, the extent to which they uphold distributive and procedural fairness; and the manner in which they generally act.

There also remains much scope for improving the overall assessment of police performance, with less than half the adult population indicating that this authority was doing a good job in late 2010.

These results serve as a useful baseline which, as additional rounds of survey data become available and further analysis undertaken, will enable us to understand the determinants of trust in the police, ascertain the effect that events such as the death of citizen Tatane have on attitudes toward the police, and benchmark our progress against other societies. ◂◂

Ben Roberts and Jaré Struwig are SASAS coordinators, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme, HSRC.

Figure 1: Trust in police procedural fairness in treatment and decision-making (%)



Figure 2: Public perceptions on the legitimacy of the police (%)



Figure 3: Perceptions of police performance (%)



Figure 4: Distributive fairness by living standard measure (%)



Figure 4: Distributive fairness by race (%)



SOCIAL NETWORKS

Connecting young fathers

Instead of interviewing young fathers as individuals in townships in South Africa, a research team used an innovative approach to interventions by interviewing groups of young men within their social networks, with positive results, relates JAMES HAMILTON HARDING.

The study of masculinity has in the past 15 years become an increasing focus of researchers, funders and development practitioners. Often controversial, the amount of resources spent on work with men and boys results from two main perceptions with regard to gender and human development: first, that attention to the experiences of women and girls in development has seen significant success in terms of poverty alleviation, health and economic growth; second, that issues such as unemployment, gender-based violence, crime and alcohol dependency would improve if similar attention were paid to the challenges of men's lives.

Research and intervention efforts based on these perceptions tend to address men or groups of men as individuals without taking into account their day-to-day lives and those who share it with them – in other words, their social networks.

Foregrounding social networks

In the book *Teenage Tata*,[1] the authors employed interviewing social networks as a means of studying young fathers within their communities. Research participants carried out interviews with members of their social networks – including parents, extended family, the family of the mother of the child or children, teachers, friends and religious leaders – based on questions developed collaboratively. Questions the young fathers included, 'What kind of father do I think I have been since my baby was born?' and 'What advice do you have for me about being a young father?'

These interviews provided rich qualitative data about the lives of young fathers – a frequently invisible group – but also the opportunity for these young fathers to engage with people who share their lives about their feelings and thoughts related to fatherhood.

Social network interviewing also provided an opportunity for discussions of the effects of culture, poverty and opportunity on behaviour, and created space for the young men to engage in self-evaluation in relation to those impacted by their choices and actions.

> Questions to the young fathers included, 'What kind of father do I think I have been since my baby was born?' and 'What advice do you have for me about being a young father?

Further, social network interviewing allowed for corrective messages to be relayed in a manner in which young men were more likely to be receptive than in standard educational sessions, workshops and media messages. For example, a friend interviewed by a young father candidly said: 'As your closest friend, uh, because I've been spending a lot of time with you – [I can see that] you don't take care of your baby. You're very – sometimes you become irresponsible – you're [with your new girlfriend] instead of doing what you must do to keep contact with your baby.'

The positive response from the participants highlights the transformational potential of social network interviewing in addressing stereotypes, encouraging behavioural change and supporting gender equality.

The support of social connections is an important and recurring issue in African gender scholarship. Researchers stress the importance of collectivity within family, peer groups and the wider community in describing gender values, roles and behaviour in African societies.

In the context of South Africa, the legacies of decades of racial subjugation, intentional impoverishment and forced migration experienced by the majority of the population have significantly damaged the collective social structures that form the foundations of communities.

As a result, post-apartheid South Africa contends with a complex social and economic situation marked by widespread poverty and welfare dependency, nearly 50% unemployment (broadly defined) and poor education.

Explaining behaviour, changing behaviour

The deterioration of family and social structures, as well as the lack of access to traditional masculine roles, such as providing for one's family, have further contributed to the rise of destructive



behaviour among men, for example, alcohol and substance abuse, crime and violence, sexual assault, child abuse and absentee fathers.

But, despite these obstacles, researchers and development practitioners have reported positive outcomes from working with men. Further, men have demonstrated their willingness to support gender equality based on their participation in projects and programmes.

As a case in point, the Teenage Tata participants were thankful for the opportunity to speak freely about their experiences for the first time and regretted that the project had to end.

Beyond programmes to build skills, provide employment and support victims of crime and abuse, the key to fostering positive change among men in the South African context of poverty and historical disadvantage is to mobilise and support existing social networks. Social network interviews help to explain behaviour by focusing attention on the relationships between individuals and society.

Rather than exclusively studying the particular context of an individual, such as demographic and socioeconomic traits, social network analysis highlights individuals' ties to religious organisations, educational institutions, recreational activities, and family and peer groups. For example, in one social network interview, a grandfather commented to his young-father grandson: 'The culture forced us to stand for you at the beginning when the family had to tell you that you make their child [pregnant]. So they could not talk with you because of your age. That's how the culture made you a good father. But it also made you a bad father because of excluding you in many things.'

This community elder speaks of how social networks shape behaviour, while the previous example of admonishment by a friend shows how social networks support positive changes in behaviour.

The power of community

Too often research and support programmes interact with men either as individuals with personal challenges, restraints and opportunities, or as groups of men with shared obstacles and experiences.

Through interventions such as educational programmes and workshops, focus groups and counselling, productive gains may be made at the level of individual men's lives, but a gap persists between these improvements and wider social change and benefits to the communities in which men live. Social network interviewing spreads the benefits men accrue from their interaction with these activities to the larger community.

The function of social network interviewing is well illustrated by one participant who said that the experience gave his community a chance to express their criticisms of his behaviour and allowed him to 'hear some of the other things [members of his community] have to say. Like also there's a chance for them to say what they could have done, and [what] they never did do to help'.

Community involvement is a priority of both research and intervention projects but is notoriously difficult to achieve. Social network interviewing represents an opportunity to make meaningful advances toward positive change at the community and wider societal level.

Although this article deals with social network interviewing as a method of research and intervention to support positive change in disadvantaged men's lives and conceptions of masculinities, it is a framework that can be extended to work with other marginalised groups around issues such as unemployment, HIV/AIDS and substance abuse – all of which HSRC researchers are currently pursuing.

Support of social networks enhances the ability of communities as cooperative entities to develop resilience in the context of poverty, gender inequality and xenophobia. It is a useful tool to add to existing research and interventions methods to enhance the transformational possibilities of work with marginalised, hard-to-reach and disadvantaged groups. In the difficult and disjointed social context of South Africa, rebuilding communities around positive action is essential to producing meaningful and lasting social change. ◂◂

[1] *Teenage Tata: Voices of Young Fathers in South Africa*, by Sharlene Swartz and Arvin Bhana (HSRC Press).

The state of South African cities

A decade ago, South Africa put into practice a bold vision for metropolitan government, recognising that cities are integral to solving some of our biggest challenges. Disparate local administrations were brought together to form large citywide authorities that correspond broadly to functional economic areas. IVAN TUROK reports on a study to assess the progress made in improving conditions for citizens in these big metropolitans.

The new citywide authorities had new responsibilities to promote social and economic development and to encourage community involvement in decision-making.

The aim was to integrate divided communities, to distribute municipal resources more fairly across the whole urban area, and to ensure viable and sustained service delivery. Metro government was given a leading role in driving national development as an equal and distinctive sphere with the right to govern on its own initiative.

In the Constitution, all three spheres were regarded as 'interdependent and interrelated', and the principle of 'cooperative government' required them to work together and support each other in mutual trust and good faith.

Ten years later, the South African Cities Network commissioned a study to assess the progress made in improving conditions for citizens in the nine largest urban municipalities from five perspectives: economic, spatial, environmental, governmental and financial. Broad proposals were also made for the new generation of civic leaders responsible for planning and managing cities after the May 2011 local elections.

Resilience a key factor

Resilience was the overarching theme of the analysis, defined as the capacity of a city to withstand and adapt successfully to challenging conditions, such as the decline of traditional industries, problems of food security, water scarcity or other looming environmental hazards. Resilience captures the reality of being connected to an increasingly open and uncertain world, while also recognising the intrinsic local characteristics of a place.

Resilience was the overarching theme of the analysis, defined as the capacity of a city to withstand and adapt successfully to challenging conditions

Resilience is particularly relevant to the transition taking place in South African cities, with questions raised about the durability of the changes underway, including the pressures of in-migration and population growth, and the extension of suburban sprawl and exclusionary neighbourhoods.

Political resilience is vital, meaning cities governed by institutions with the administrative capabilities and leadership to help local citizens and firms tackle problems and respond positively to change.

Economic growth reveals strengths and weaknesses

Over the last decade cities have enjoyed a period of more robust economic growth and job creation than in the previous two decades. They have functioned as the country's 'job machines' and performed more strongly than flagging rural economies, with GDP per person up to 70% higher than the national average.

Stronger urban economic performance has also funded the roll-out of public services and social grants to towns and rural areas. Their economic vitality has something to do with economies of scale enabling better labour market matching, shared services and learning between firms. It is also linked to the presence of expanding industries such as finance, business and consumer services, and high-level professional and technical occupations. Johannesburg, Tshwane and Cape Town have experienced more vigorous growth than other cities and towns.

Yet stronger economic growth has exposed bottlenecks in urban infrastructure and shortfalls in the supply of energy, water and advanced skill-sets that have undermined local productivity and restricted future growth potential.

Only towards the end of the decade, and after a period of fiscal austerity dating back to GEAR in the 1990s, did the government respond with increased capital investment in freeway improvements, airport extensions, public transport projects and municipal infrastructure.

It is too soon to say whether capacity constraints in urban infrastructure will hold back job creation in the decade ahead.

Improved economic opportunities over the last decade had the effect of attracting domestic and international migrant populations to the cities.



This added to the pressure on space and services in poorer townships. Metro councils have struggled to keep pace, partly through insufficient financial support and flexibility in national housing, land and social infrastructure policies. So the share of households living in informal housing without access to essential services has risen in the cities, against the trend everywhere else.

Counteracting negative attitudes

This helps explain why recent service delivery protests have been concentrated in and around the big cities.

Media coverage of the disputes has focused almost entirely on municipal mismanagement and political intrigue. The underlying problem that the demands on some municipalities are much higher than on others has been overlooked. It is probably not surprising that the metros have battled to cope with the rising level of social and physical need, given their constrained revenue streams and administrative capacity.

The task facing the new metros was under-estimated when they were established, with their enlarged boundaries and extra responsibilities to service extensive low-income communities.

National attitudes towards urbanisation are beginning to change, although there remains some ambiguity towards the process. There appears to be insufficient recognition that informal settlements function as low-cost entry points to urban labour markets. The instinctive reaction has been to contain or eradicate 'slums', especially those that are centrally located and visible from strategic routes into the cities.

Priorities for the future

A more sensitive approach would recognise these places as stepping stones or 'escalator areas' that enable migrants to gain a foothold in the job market, to accumulate skills, to increase their earnings, and in due course to move on to better housing elsewhere.

Cities that are dynamic and inclusive need such areas to accommodate growth and social mobility. We need to recognise that informal settlements are here to stay and that they need investment to improve living conditions and how they function.

One of the implications is that municipalities should be more responsive to the needs and livelihood strategies of the poor. This chimes with other evidence in the analysis that local government is perceived by citizens to be insufficiently open, transparent and consultative. In fact, its standing in society has deteriorated to the point where it is one of the least trusted public institutions in the country, after political parties.

A priority for new municipal leaders is to restore confidence in the integrity of metro government. Following recent negative publicity, civic leaders should acknowledge past problems and rebuild credibility by tightening up internal procedures. Oversight mechanisms such as ward committees should strengthen the voice of communities.

Such arrangements are necessary to strengthen local participation and accountability, and thereby counteract the danger of the large size of the metro jurisdictions undermining local democracy. In addition, the original vision of metro government should be revisited. Greater focus is needed on building productive and inclusive cities in which all citizens can lead useful and fulfilling lives. It means giving priority to economic development and job creation above all else.

Developing human capabilities and active citizenship is a better way forward than welfare or consumerism. This will require a renewed emphasis on the different spheres and sectors of government working together more closely to ensure that every city develops to its potential.

Looking further ahead, the government deserves praise for its recent efforts to devolve housing and transport functions to the metros. An integrated approach to transport, housing and land-use planning should help to manage urban growth more efficiently and equitably in the future. The metros will need to rise to the challenge, and will require sufficient resources and technical assistance to fulfil these functions effectively. ◂◂

Professor Ivan Turok is the deputy executive director of the HSRC's research programme on Economic Performance and Development, and the principal author of the 2011 State of the Cities report.

Indigenous knowledge



to preserve and protect

The African saying, 'When an old person dies, a library burns down' epitomises the nature of indigenous knowledge, handed down orally from generation to generation and preserved in 'human databases'. CATHERINE NDINDA and colleagues examine approaches that have been used elsewhere to protect, preserve and promote indigenous knowledge and look at the implications for policy in South Africa.

As the elderly, who are mainly the custodians of indigenous knowledge (IK) pass on, this knowledge is threatened with extinction. Yet this same knowledge has guided and preserved the existence of indigenous people for centuries and governs the lives of the majority of the population from the cradle to the grave.

For example, 80% of the South African population – and this is probably true for the rest of Africa – relies on traditional medicine for their well-being, even when they consult modern medicine.

Given the importance of IK in the lives of the African population, the South African Department of Science and Technology (DST), in collaboration with the HSRC, initiated a process to develop a national policy for the protection of the existing IK databases.

IK and the World Trade Organisation

In 2004 the World Trade Organisation (WTO), through the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), sought to establish the link between TRIPS and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), and the protection of indigenous knowledge and folklore.

The TRIPS agreement sets minimum standards for the intellectual property rights instruments (patents, trademarks, copyrights) for the protection of industrial-type intellectual property – the type that is most dominant in developed countries.

Ironically, about 95% of patents are held by developed countries and only 5% by developing countries, which hold most of the genetic material and IK required for the development of new inventions. Because IK is communally owned and handed down through the generations, it is difficult to protect it using the conventional intellectual property rights instruments as required by the TRIPS agreement.

Most knowledge in developed countries is legally protected, but in developing countries it is not, a situation which presents a serious imbalance and leaves much IK in developing countries open to biological piracy and other forms of misappropriation.

The exploitation of the genetic resources of Southern Africa is likely to be worsened by the signing of the TRIPS agreement, to the disadvantage of the poor countries that are the holders of much IK.

Policy options

Most developing countries support the protection of IK at an international level, since protecting it at a national level would have little or no effect beyond the borders of the state. Developing countries sought to amend the TRIPS agreement so as to protect their IK resources.

Most knowledge in developed countries is legally protected, but in developing countries it is not, a situation which presents a serious imbalance and leaves much IK in developing countries open to biological piracy and other forms of misappropriation.

To guard against 'bad patents' based on misappropriation of traditional knowledge, some developing countries have proposed that before patents are awarded to applications relating to biological materials, the applications must disclose the country of origin and IK used in the invention; provide proof of prior informed consent obtained through relevant authorities in the country of origin; and show evidence of fair and equitable benefit sharing.

These conditions are legally binding defensive measures but are inadequate to guard against the loss of biodiversity and its commercialisation without benefits accruing to the holders of IK.

India is an example of a country that has used the defensive approach to protect its indigenous knowledge through the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL).

Taking the defensive approach implies that South Africa would require patent applicants in any other part of the world to disclose the source and country of origin of the traditional knowledge used in their invention, provide proof of prior informed consent from recognised authorities, and proof of benefit sharing from the patent.

Taking the positive approach to the protection of IK entails the creation of a *sui generis* database (literally meaning 'of its own kind/genus or unique in its characteristics') and this implies that adding information to the database automatically 'constitutes establishing a legal claim' over it.

Another form of positive protection consists of declaring the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities and recognising their ownership of traditional knowledge. This approach has been used in Venezuela and Bolivia.

The recognition of customary law in national legislation is also a form of positive protection of indigenous knowledge. Taking a positive approach would entail South Africa availing its TK databases to the international community so that when there is a patent application in any part of the world the South African databases can be searched for the existence of the information on which the patent is based. A third option is to use a combination of the two approaches, and that, too, has consequences for the protection, preservation and promotion of IK in South Africa.

Whatever approach adopted, there is no doubt that there is urgent need to protect, preserve and promote IK in South Africa. ◂◂

Dr Catherine Ndinda, African research fellow, Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation; Dr Mbithi wa Kivilu, former director of the Education and Skills Development programme and recently appointed deputy CEO of the Kenyan Examination Board; Carol van Wyk, deputy director, Knowledge Management, Department of Science and Technology (DST); Tom Suchananda, director of the same unit, DST.

Improving mathematics performance at schools

The education system consists of two parts, namely the socioeconomic haves and the have-nots. VIJAY REDDY and DEAN JANSE van RENSBURG analyse the mathematical performance of the South African schooling population and come to the conclusion that differentiated targets need to be set for both these socioeconomic groups, since neither is performing at the requisite levels.

In a nutshell, the South African schooling system shows the following characteristics: the national mean mathematics scores are low and need to improve. There is a high differentiation of the educational performance of students from different socioeconomic conditions and we can say that we have two systems of education. This means that an estimated 30% of schools perform reasonably well, while 70% of schools are underperforming.

Another feature of our educational system is that the national average mathematics achievement score for different grade levels across the schooling system is similar and stable; around 30% to 40% at different grades.

This raises the question of whether improved schooling makes any difference in performance.

In discussing mathematics performance, I am not dismissing the other areas of a school curriculum, but mathematics is a proxy for analytical thinking.

As we evaluate the high skill capacity in the country and active participation in the knowledge economy, mathematical skills are very important.

The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) is an international assessment of the mathematics and science knowledge of fourth and eighth grade students around the world. South Africa participated in TIMSS in 1995, 1999 and 2003. South Africa is participating in the 2011 study.

High levels of attention paid to the early years of learning for children from environments of lower household and parental resources would contribute to breaking the cycle of poor academic performance.

Let us focus on mathematics performance in both the 'performing' and 'underperforming' parts of the educational system.

Underperforming schools

For the underperforming schools, mathematics performance continues to be low. Even with many interventions we seem unable to effect changes, using the indicator of matriculation mathematics performance.

Findings from a paper[1] where we used a panel-like data-set to examine the extent of association between grade 8 mathematics performance and grade 12 performance shows a strong correlation between grade 8 mathematics performance and matric mathematics achievement. The strong relationship between grade 8 and grade 12 mathematics scores corroborates the findings from the literature that earlier performance and strong foundational knowledge form the base for subsequent learning.

Analytic skills in mathematics need to be built up from early years. Mathematical knowledge is hierarchical in nature and therefore strong prior knowledge is critical for conceptual development. The acquisition of these capabilities is shaped in the early years by the nature and quality of interactions in the home and community and the quality of input from school.

The policy implication from this finding is that raising the mathematics scores at grade 12 level requires raising grade 8 mathematics scores. Extrapolating from this – and linking to the literature on cognitive development – we need to raise the mathematics scores from the foundation phase of schooling.

High levels of attention paid to the early years of learning (reception year and foundation phase) for children from environments of lower household and parental resources would contribute to breaking the cycle of poor academic performance. If we do not do this, both their backgrounds and schooling will let the children down and the reproduction of inequality will continue.

Students must know and understand earlier concepts and only when they do can they progress. Our findings show that it is too late to try to improve matric mathematics performance by the time students reach the secondary level. But this learning does involve a school and a teacher – a teacher that especially understands how learning occurs. Thus, one of the priorities is that foundation phase teachers must have appropriate qualifications and expertise to teach these classes.



This means government targets should not only be the assessment scores, but should also include the number of new foundation phase teachers. Interventions made at the secondary level do not raise exit level mathematical performances. It might raise general performance, which is fine, but we need to recognise what interventions at the secondary level will provide and what they will not. Therefore, as we talk about 'second chance' programmes, we need to recognise what the outcome will be, and it may not be raised mathematics scores at grade 12 level.

Performing schools

There are also challenges for students from what are described as well-performing schools. Scores on international tests show that we are not globally competitive.

The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) results show that students from South African top-performing schools are outperformed by other African countries – with lower GDPs.

In the 2002 TIMSS study, involving 50 countries, schools categorised as well resourced and better performing (i.e. from the House of Assembly and House of Delegates) schools performed at the international mean level.

The way forward

The country's mathematic performance must be located within the global trends. TIMSS surveyed a number of countries for grade 12 physics performance. It had undertaken these studies about 10 years ago. The results showed that globally (with the exception of Russia), performance levels in physics had decreased.

Internationally, there is a concern that students entering tertiary institutions are coming in with less maths and science knowledge.

Given the knowledge growth and the vastly technological and information-oriented world we live in and the strides that need to take place for the economy to grow and meet the social and environmental challenges, it would seem that we are not nurturing or growing the mathematics knowledge at the top end.

The hypothesis for the drop in science and maths competencies and capabilities is that we have focused on the Education for All agenda – and it was necessary to do so – and have neglected the agenda of maths for excellence and access to science, engineering and technology qualifications.

Given South Africa's agenda for economic competitiveness, this is an investment we need to make. The mistake we made is to assume that it would happen on its own. But results have shown that it does not and for this reason we should include achievement targets for better-resourced schools as well.

In conclusion, we need to set differentiated targets for the two parts of our educational system. Neither part is performing at the requisite levels, and specific strategies need to be designed for each part of the system. ◂◂

Dr Vijay Reddy is Executive Director of the research programme on Education and Skills Development, and Dean Janse van Rensburg is a research trainee. This article is based on a paper, 'Improving education quality and skills development', delivered at the Human Condition Seminar hosted by the National Planning Commission, 29 March 2011, at the Presidency.

[1] Reddy V, Van der Berg S, Janse van Rensburg D and Taylor S (2011) Educational Quality in an Unequal Society: Student pathways and performance in South African schools. Submitted to *South African Journal of Science*.

from South Africa with love

exporting corporate social investment

From 1994 to 2008, the trade of South Africa with the rest of Africa experienced a rapid and major growth, but little is known about the extent of the social responsibilities and investments of large South African companies in host African countries. DIANA SANCHEZ reports on some preliminary research on the social investment approach of five large South African companies operating in Swaziland and other countries in the region.

In Swaziland, as in other neighbouring countries, South Africa has exercised a long-standing economic footprint and is the leading investor, particularly through medium-sized investments.

The primary position of South African capital in this economy is especially visible in the far and wide presence of South African supermarkets, fast-food stores, banks and cellular service providers. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in some describing Swaziland as a periphery of the South African economy.

While South Africa is increasingly playing a vital role in many African economies, and South African companies subscribe to corporate social responsibility (CSR) codes, little is actually known about the extent of the social responsibilities and investments of large South African companies in host African countries.

As pressures arise worldwide for companies to behave in a socially responsible manner, new studies of such behavior are likely to be launched. These studies will usefully consider some variables in how companies are, for instance, designing and implementing CSR and CSI initiatives on the African continent.

In an effort to start filling this knowledge gap, the South Africa in Africa (SAiA) project, with the support of the RLF, conducted some preliminary research on the social investment approaches of five large South African companies operating in Swaziland and other countries in the region.

While assessing the real impact of the CSI initiatives of these companies was beyond the scope of this study, a central concern driving the research was to unveil whether companies that have highly structured CSI programmes in South Africa are applying a similar approach to their African operations.

To shed some light on this subject, the CSI and African expansion experiences of FNB, MTN, Pick n Pay, Sun International and Standard Bank were analysed. Data was primarily collected through interviews with managers of these companies in both countries.

Long-term vision needed

In post-apartheid South Africa, companies have been expected to assist with the social transformation of the country, behave in a socially responsible way and invest in the country's social development. Thus, CSI has become a distinct concept which is broadly used to describe the social spending and role of companies in communities. While most South African companies started some sort of CSI programmes to support community initiatives in the mid 1980s, the establishment of similar initiatives in their African operations has not been a straightforward process. On the whole, a comparative analysis of the CSI approaches of these companies in South Africa and Swaziland illustrates a number of things that are relevant to debates on the role of the private sector in African development.

Firstly, preliminary findings indicate that, in contrast to South Africa, in Swaziland and elsewhere in Africa, CSI seems to be limited to charity or loose social spending aimed at positioning the company within a market, but without a long-term vision. Indeed, while most companies in Swaziland embrace the South African CSI discourse, which is highly structured, interventions are mainly short-term and primarily aimed at improving companies' brands and relations with consumers, employees or communities.

Secondly, the experiences of these companies indicate that CSI is likely to be more structured in contexts where both regulation and market forces impel companies to behave in a socially responsible manner. Therefore, even if all of these companies have structured CSI policies and approaches to social investment within South Africa, this was not the case in their other African operations.

Within South Africa, with the pressures for a socially engaged private sector, companies have found in CSI a useful tool to be perceived as socially responsible while also benefitting from this.

By contrast, in Swaziland and the rest of the continent, where pressures through regulations or market forces are not explicit, companies limit themselves to a basic social spending approach.

The study also suggests that companies with highly centralised business structures seem to be better positioned to advance long-term CSI interventions, and that aligning CSI to the core business facilitates the promotion of social spending within companies.

The experience of Standard Bank, which follows a distinctive business approach to CSI, is illustrative of these findings. Indeed, the bank stands out from the other companies for its CSI business discourse, long-term CSI goals and for clearly integrating CSI as part of its business strategy in South Africa.

This approach has seemingly encouraged the ‘buy-in’ from managers and executive boards, who are ultimately the ones driving CSI.

Furthermore, as the bank was the only company that reported to be moving towards a global approach to CSI, it seems that the application of CSI principles and structures beyond South Africa is largely linked to this instrumental approach to social investing.

Standard Bank is already taking steps to apply the same CSI policy in Swaziland and the rest of the continent, and this seems to be driven by its interest in positioning the bank in emerging markets like Africa and using CSI as an important element of this process.

> In contrast to South Africa, in Swaziland and elsewhere in Africa CSI seems to be limited to charity or loose social spending aimed at positioning the company within a market, but without a long-term vision.

Companies must be more socially aware

Findings also suggest that even if there was an interest in exporting CSI to African operations, companies with a decentralised business model (like Pick n Pay and FNB) are in a weaker position to influence the CSI agenda of their subsidiaries or franchises on the continent.

In general, it seems that structured CSI approaches in the South African style are only likely to be exported to African operations when this makes business sense, when market expectations are pushing the CSI agenda, and when the business model and structures are conducive.

Therefore, expectations of South African companies to apply similar CSI approaches when expanding into Africa are not likely to be fulfilled in the forthcoming future.

However, the CSI experiences of these companies in Swaziland illustrate that the very existence of a CSI discourse (which is government- and consumer-driven) is helping to infuse some sort of social awareness in companies.

Therefore, in Swaziland, and perhaps on the continent at large, the arrival of this South African discourse has seemingly pushed CSI higher up on the corporate agenda as managers perceive the benefits of being active CSI players and are trying to align their local programmes to the South African style.

While the highly instrumental approach to CSI followed within South Africa needs to be revisited, and the actual impact of CSI programmes remains an unexplored area, placing CSI high on the African corporate agenda is creating some social awareness within companies and this is on its own a positive development.

On the whole, while this study sheds some light on this subject, it has underscored the need for further research on the broader elements influencing the potential developmental role of the private sector in societies, as well as the need to carefully look at the social and cultural impact of South African investments in African societies.

DR ANDREA HURST
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

DR JANET CHERRY
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University



DR IAN GOLDMAN
Programme to Support Pro-poor Policy Development (PSPPD) in the Presidency

DR GLENDA KRUSS
HSRC Research Director, Education and Skills Development programme

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Where policy implications meet social realities

Public servants and researchers in the social sciences have their comfort zones. Public servants may often ignore the uncomfortable questions coming from academics, while researchers are in a space where they often do not have to confront directly the policy implications of the unyielding social realities that they study.

Public servants and researchers tend not to interact as much as they should.

Understanding this, in 2010 and 2011 the Department of Science and Technology (DST), in cooperation with the HSRC, embarked on a programme of workshops on social issues. These workshops brought together academics and public servants to analyse research evidence and administrative experience, policy options and solutions.

There were four workshops. The two held at the Mafikeng campus of the North-West University and at the Eastern Cape's University of Fort Hare tapped the underutilised resources of the country's rural universities, focusing on migration and on the 'knowledge economy' and community renewal.

Dr Seán Morrow

Two linked sessions on the developmental state were held in Pretoria, the first dealing with transformative social policy, and the second with improving access to basic services. The Pretoria workshops were designed to address the roles of ministries grouped under the Social Protection and Community Development cluster and the Human Development cluster.

Guest author Seán Morrow reports on some of the presentations and the vigorous debates they stimulated.

These ranged from broad themes and concepts to specific reports on the latest research in a number of areas. Both categories – overlapping in many cases – are represented in the articles that follow.

The programmes of all four workshops are available on www.hsrc.ac.za.

science & technology

Department:
Science and Technology
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

PROFESSOR SHIREEN HASSIM
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Political Studies
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PROFESSOR BEN TUROK
ANC MP;
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Department
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THE Topics

With characteristic flair, Professor Ben Turok raised the provocative issue of the balance between social welfare and economic and educational investment in the developmental state, and of the state's capacity to implement a developmental agenda.

Professor Robert van Niekerk's historical study of the social democratic tradition in the African National Congress, stressing the movement's long-standing commitment to welfare, and implying that this is a tradition that should continue, was in many ways an implicit critique of aspects of Turok's presentation. How, though, does a society generate the sort of commitment to fellow citizens needed to support social policies benefitting the poor and underprivileged?

The discussion that followed Dr Andrea Hearst's paper on *ubuntu*, a community-oriented philosophy which, however, some argued, may sap individual enterprise and initiative, went some way to address this issue.

Questions of community solidarity and individual endeavour also permeated Dr Janet Cherry's presentation on the limits of conventional economic thinking in relation to impoverished urban communities. How, she asked, can such communities sustain themselves in satisfying and environmentally realising sustainable ways while bypassing the unrealisable dream of formal wage employment for all?

Focusing on specific research issues, the authors of a number of papers dealt in detail with aspects of migration, settlement, poverty and their social consequences. Ms Catherine Cross, in two linked papers drawing on research in Johannesburg and Tshwane, drew a vivid picture of the dynamics of urban and peri-urban housing for the poor, illuminating in particular the dilemmas of women, and showing how crucial transport is to patterns of settlement and the search for work.

Xenophobia is undoubtedly one of the byproducts of urban poverty and unemployment. Mr Jean Pierre Misago discussed why in some communities, in 2008 but also at other times, this resulted in extreme violence against immigrants, while in other apparently entirely similar places it did not and still does not.

Ms Geci Karuri-Sebina, from the dual perspective of implementation and research, looked at the experience of a specific government programme to regenerate townships, identifying the difficulties faced in moving towards beneficial long-term structural change.

Xenophobia is undoubtedly one of the byproducts of urban poverty and un-employment. Mr Jean Pierre Misago discussed why in some communities, in 2008 but also at other times, this resulted in extreme violence against immigrants, while in other apparently entirely similar places it did not and still does not.

Echoing issues raised by Turok and others, Professor Shireen Hassim discussed the South African social welfare system in relation to women. While, she argued, women are the beneficiaries of many social welfare grants, these grants are not designed to challenge the structural disadvantages that they experience, or to alter gender imbalances in domestic work.

Dr Glenda Kruss reported on her research into university community outreach programmes. Her preliminary findings indicate that criteria for success in this field are less rigorous than for the other university responsibilities of teaching and research. As a result it is often difficult to measure the impact of such programmes and their prestige tends to be low.

► The DST workshops were a bold experiment. As with all experiments, the results must be analysed and further development planned.

Future directions might be towards a more extensive and more widely accessible forum in which policy-relevant research would be reported and debated between researchers and officials.

There might be a series of 'think tanks', focused intensely on particular issues, bringing together the relevant public servants and researchers with specific expertise. Whatever structure is decided upon, a robust foundation has been laid. ◄◄

Guest author: DR SEÁN MORROW, from Ngomso Research, Writing and Editing Service, and a former chief research specialist at the HSRC,was the rapporteur at these workshops.

South Africa: developmental or charity state?

How can South Africa move forward, economically and socially? Should we spend our money on fish or fishing rods, or can we do both? Can our civil service do the jobs that need doing? Can we generate Argus Cycle Tour levels of commitment to development? PROFESSOR BEN TUROK, ANC MP and editor of *New Agenda*, speaking on 'Construction of a developmental state in South Africa', set the cat among the pigeons.

Who makes policy, asked Turok. Parliament? Cabinet? The public service? Well, all of them. But none of us should surrender the policy space to somebody 'up there' who makes it for us. Simply administering policy does not make a good public servant.

And who are the major economic decision-makers in South Africa? The President? The Cabinet? The ANC? Business? In a workshop straw poll, business came out tops. But the real decision-maker is the Cabinet, he said. Why had he asked the question? Because, if it is not clear who the major economic policy-makers are, there is no hope of achieving a developmental state.

This is Turok's developmental state checklist:

- Strong, coordinated central government
- Decisive economic policy
- Promotion of the real economy, not financial 'fizz'
- Creation of jobs in the formal sector and for the marginalised
- Overcoming apartheid dualism in the economy
- A Chinese-style, risk-taking private sector
- Civil society participation, ensuring a developmental, not an autocratic state.

He believes South Africa is still trapped in the colonial legacy of mass poverty and economic stagnation.

Politicians want to deal with this, but too often they take their eyes off the ball. The market, an imperfect and distorted instrument, will not do it all for us. The sausage-machine of 'delivery, delivery, delivery' is not enough: As former president Thabo Mbeki said in 2008, 'Know that the poor are knocking at the gate. If this gate does not open … the masses will break [it] down'.

South Africa is becoming a charity rather than a developmental state, said Turok. We have been thinking too much about consumption and not enough about investment.

Economic stability, at the heart of our economic policies, takes us only so far: development means investment, growth, and the ability to manage these processes. But coordination and innovation are lacking, and without these a developmental state is impossible, Turok argued.

Utilisation of resources

Hold on, said respondent Wiseman Magasela of the Department of Social Welfare. If we want to construct a developmental state it is not just a question of what the ANC or government thinks should happen, but of the public services' know-how. So we must peer inside government and see what it can do: an interventionist state depends on capacity.

Remember the administrative legacy of the ex-homelands and the former Republic. We rummage in the pre-1994 ragbag for materials to build the developmental state. We must break out of this – what can we learn from education in Zimbabwe and Lesotho, for instance? Come to that, what are the lessons from Scandinavia and elsewhere? We need content-specific expertise in the civil service. This is a precondition for building a developmental state, otherwise it will remain a dream, Magasela said.

The economy is the priority, we are told. But South Africa has a history of shocking neglect of welfare. What happens to ordinary people if the emphasis becomes overwhelmingly economic? Can one imagine a developmental state without a parallel emphasis on social policies? Welfare must accompany economic investment, otherwise we have a Thatcherite state, undermining welfare and privileging the rich.

Ben Turok and Wiseman Magasela both acknowledged that South Africa has limited resources – financial and intellectual. The question is, how should they be used?

Invest in productive industries in the ex-homelands, where the worst poverty is to be found, said one participant, using state resources to encourage private investment that will contribute to both economic growth and welfare.

Let us not be timid, said another: going cap in hand to private investors has its limits. Mobilise government's powers of enforcement and regulation, and do not be distracted by the

Know that the poor are knocking at the gate. If this gate does not open... the masses will break [it] down

Former president Thabo Mbeki, 2008

clamouring and sometimes contradictory voices of NGOs and others.

That's all well and good, but what about government's capacity to deliver? This participant reminded the workshop that the civil service has too few skilled specialists. How do we fix the machine while it is on? When will we admit we do not have the means to get to where we want to go?

Another participant asked whether the ruling party takes problems of implementation seriously enough. Indeed, specific expertise is only part of the problem: technical experts are promoted to managerial roles and are often inadequate and, worst of all, indecisive. Good managers must be developed in the public service.

It goes even further, said another. Does a developmental state require men and women with an ideology, a 'line of march', that goes beyond their personal professionalism?

If it does, how will this happen? South Africa has inherited a hotchpotch of administrators – can they be welded into the sort of civil service that is required?

Yes, Professor Turok replied, the developmental state needs an ideology of service. Why should the spirit of commitment that, for example, characterises the annual Argus Cycle Tour, a massive undertaking largely run on voluntary labour, not mobilise and invigorate the civil service? Questions of technical capacity are important, but without commitment little can be done.



The way forward

There have been errors. Teacher training, nursing and vocational colleges were closed or neglected. SETAs are only now beginning to operate effectively. Since 1994 other considerations have displaced developmental thinking in the ANC. So, yes, the old and infirm must have pensions, but the priority must be to generate work.

We cannot build without welfare, Turok said, but it is a question of balance. Do existing grants really improve investment? Can they not in many cases be reoriented towards small-scale investment and production rather than consumption?

This would require careful planning and research, made more difficult by the elimination of much research capacity in state enterprises now seen as profit-making entities. In rural areas we need to ask: who fixes roofs and cars? We should invest in such knots of potential development.

Why should there not be vocational training centres in all villages? Social grants, said Turok, should go only to the most desperate. We should instead invest in training and job creation. Certainly, civil society can be quarrelsome, even obstructive and, although the frustrations of building a developmental state can lead to demands for authoritarian solutions, they should be resisted. And politics is complex and resistant to simple solutions: the ANC initiates policy, but Cabinet is independent, with different forces at play.

Wiseman Magasela had the last word. The fundamental question, he said, is: what do social grants buy us? Able-bodied people do not get them, and grants that may seem to be oriented towards consumption in fact go, in part, towards development in the form of paying for education. In any case, the amounts are minuscule as compared to spending by the privileged classes of South Africa. The choice between social or economic development is a false one. They are a continuum. To put it starkly, the death of children in hospitals is, or ought to be, as important as economic growth.

TAKING HISTORY SERIOUSLY

Social democracy in the ANC

Contemporary South African political debate can oversimplify or even ignore the complicated and contested history of social and political thinking in the ANC. It is, however, important to consider this history, said PROFESSOR ROBERT VAN NIEKERK of Rhodes University's Institute for Social and Economic Research, and to see contemporary debates in the context of a past that powerfully determines what is possible today. Reflecting on the ANC's social democratic tradition, he concluded that the idea of a social democratic welfare state in the policies of the ANC is a robust and valuable tradition which it would do well to reconnect with.

What kind of social policy, Professor van Niekerk asked, can overcome the legacy of poverty and inequality from the colonial, segregationist, apartheid and post-apartheid eras?

President Zuma recently drew a distinction between welfare and developmental states, implying that it is the latter for which we should aim. But is there in fact a contradiction between the two?

Does South Africa not, with its universal primary education, statutory social insurance and moves towards national health insurance, already have many of the characteristics of a social democratic welfare state?

Social democracy or not, it is essential to be clear on the developmental route we want to take, said Van Niekerk. We need to look at South Africa's history and that of other countries and learn from these earlier experiences. If we do not, we may find ourselves locked for many years into policies with unpredictable and possibly disastrous consequences from which it may be difficult to escape.

Clearly, the ANC has long been and still is a crucial forum for discussing and formulating social policy. The key moments were in the 1940s, 1950s and 1990s. We may be in another such moment now.

A crucial document is the 1943 *African Claims*. Dr AB Xuma's ANC shifted from ethnic mobilisation to mass campaigning, and used the radical ideas prevalent during the anti-fascist struggle. These ideas involved equality of treatment for the whole population: a bill of social rights, state medical services and compulsory education, as well as extension of progressive labour legislation to all racial groups.



TRAILBLAZERS Albert Luthuli (above) and Dr AB Xuma

This was the first clear formulation of social democratic ideas in the ANC. Reiterating these themes, the 1955 *Freedom Charter* demanded income maintenance, universal education and medical care provided by the state, as well as rights to housing.

However, how might these aims have been achieved? The goals of *African Claims* and the *Freedom Charter* could not have been achieved without a democratic, interventionist state which could redistribute wealth and resources between the white minority and the black majority, much as Clement Attlee's Labour government carried out its redistributive programme in post-war Britain. At the time, this was a pipe-dream. Now, however, the ANC is in power. How might similar aims be achieved today? What political conditions need to be satisfied and policies applied to achieve the goals of re-distributive social policy?

In the 1990s conditions emerged in South Africa where social democracy might become a practical programme and not just an attractive theory. However, this was also the post-Cold War era, when fiscal conservatism was dominant all over the world and the World Bank was at the peak of its influence.

In South Africa this was reflected in the sidelining of the RDP and the implementation of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, later modified as the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). The radical social democratic programme implemented by the RDP shrank to a social safety net.

In 2008 the dramatic political events at Polokwane seemed to include an attempt to recover and emphasise the social democratic tradition.

But is there the potential for a South African social democracy? Could there be a political consensus between the middle and working classes that might make this possible? Was this 'contested re-emergence of a social democratic agenda' simply one of various fleeting alternatives that emerged at a moment of political uncertainty and change? Or can its champions assert it as the driving force in the creation of a humane, egalitarian and democratic South Africa?

Comment came from many angles. Some wondered about the terms used: is there really one thing called 'social democracy'? It seems a loose concept, the precise meaning of which is difficult to pin down.

Which version of social democracy should be pursued in South Africa?

Others questioned whether social democracy really had such a clear line of descent within the ANC as the paper implied, and wondered whether the ideas of Xuma and Luthuli, admirable in their day, might not become a straitjacket in the modern era.

Nonetheless, some were clear that the ANC stood and stands for a socialist, anti-capitalist society, and that increasing inequality since 1994 is the main challenge it faces.

Others felt that the issue of economic growth was more important than the paper implied. There is substantial consensus about social ends: however, inclusive growth is the problem.

Ultimately, structural change must come from production and ownership rather than from distribution.

The question of whether the South African state is 'weak' or 'strong' – or perhaps even 'effective' – was discussed extensively: is it robust, skilled and focused enough to take on a thoroughgoing programme of transformation?

As one participant put it, are we looking at desperate attempts to reach a goal without clarity about how to reach that goal? On the other hand, some thought that the question should be whether the government, rather than the abstract 'state', was weak or strong. Some focused on the internal dynamics of the civil service: the Treasury was accused of putting a brake on transformative policy: lack of coordination, and reports and campaigns that run into the sand, are major problems.

African Claims, 1943
The section of dealing with industry and labour:

WE DEMAND FOR THE AFRICANS:

► equal opportunity to engage in any occupation, trade or industry. In order that this objective might be realised to the fullest extent, facilities must be provided for technical and university education of Africans so as to enable them to enter skilled and semi-skilled occupations, professions, government service and other spheres of employment;

► equal pay for equal work, as well as equal opportunity for all work and, for the unskilled workers in both rural and urban areas, such minimum wage shall enable the workers to live in health, happiness, decency and comfort;

► the removal of the Colour Bar in industry and other occupations;

► the statutory recognition of the right of the African worker to collective bargaining under the Industrial Conciliation Act;

► that the African worker shall be insured against sickness, unemployment, accidents, old age, as well as for all other physical disabilities arising from the nature of their work: the contributions to such insurance should be borne entirely by the government and the employers;

► the extension of all industrial welfare legislation to Africans engaged in agriculture, domestic service and in public institutions or bodies.

http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1943/claims.htm#1

Stony ground?

Poverty and sustainable development in South Africa

Why do environmental questions seem to be primarily the concern of the better-off? Why do energy-saving towns seem more possible in Germany or the United Kingdom than in South Africa or Kenya? Why, when toxic waste is dumped on African coasts and when African seas are fished to near-extinction, does the world fix its attention elsewhere? Good food is not necessarily expensive: why then, worldwide, do the middle classes have the most balanced, healthy diet? In short, why does ecologically oriented thinking and action seem to be the territory of better-off countries and classes when the poor are so often on the receiving end of environmental crises? Such questions underpin 'Cutting edge social science, transition towns and sustainable human communities' by DR JANET CHERRY of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

Doctor Janet Cherry measured modern developmental discourse – productivity, the knowledge economy, social capital and the like – against the realities of a Port Elizabeth township. Be alert to the assumptions within this kind of discussion, she said, and question them when appropriate. How does the 'knowledge economy' actually impact on the poor? Does increased production help them in a measurable way? Do the poor really have to hang on the coat tails of an economy from which they will be shaken off whenever capitalism falters and stumbles?

Economics is not a physical science, it is a social construction. People are not the playthings of blind forces that they cannot influence. If they are to survive in a decent, dignified way, it is essential that they focus on what is important and possible, take their future into their own hands, and to a substantial degree cut themselves free from an economy in which they have no realistic chance of participating and from which they stand to gain little.

Implementing international best practice

South Africa has the intellectual and material space to explore alternatives and do things differently, Cherry said. In other parts of the world 'transition towns' have come into existence in response to climate change, with energy, transport, health and other issues looked at in new ways, though so far only in small towns in relatively wealthy societies. The challenge in South Africa is to take a similar approach to desperately poor communities. She recounted how two apparently 'unsustainable' communities – Tembisa and Kuyga, both in the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan municipality – are attempting their own renewal while not following the beguiling but, for the great majority, unrealistic aspiration of formal jobs at centres like the Coega Industrial Development Zone.

The crucial focus is livelihoods rather than formal jobs, with community members using their skills and enterprise in growing, making, trading and building within their own area. Numerous problems, of course, arise. The aim is not to isolate communities from the wider environment, or to reject the resources of modern technology and governance, though it is necessary to hold those with incompatible visions of social organisation at arm's length, even to the extent of declining possible funding from such sources.

Key ideas are localisation, diversification, resilience, recycling and satisfying real needs rather than consumption for its own sake. Indigenous and appropriate technologies (which are not necessarily 'low technologies') should be used. The central aim is a decent quality of life achievable within the possibilities and limits dictated by the resources and energies of particular communities. This should be supported but not dominated by governmental and other agencies that understand and sympathise with this approach.

Cherry argued that South Africa's advantage is that, in attempting such locally based development, the starting point is different from that of transition towns in advanced industrial economies with high mass consumption.

It is hard to change behaviour when infrastructural and economic systems are established and accompanying behaviour is already entrenched.

Can we avoid following the same path or are we bound to fall into the same traps? she asked. Is it not imperative to find sustainable and just social and economic solutions for not only the poor, but also for South African society as a whole? And, right now, can we not use our creativity, ingenuity and knowledge for innovative and interactive policy design and implementation in partnership with such poor communities? It may be, she thought, our last opportunity to do so.

Challenging the learned helplessness psyche

Participants questioned Cherry's concepts closely. We have to be careful, said one, about language. The World Bank also tells us to 'listen to the poor', and talks about 'livelihoods'. These terms have now become saturated with a crude idea of 'economic development'. If we want to challenge orthodoxy we will have to invent other, less compromised, terms. The creation and satisfaction of communities is the aim, and for clear thinking we require words to express this.

And are communities to 'delink' from wider society? Is this possible? How would this work and what are the policy implications? Would supermarkets be banned from these areas, for example? Is there not the potential for creating local ghettos? Come to that, what complexities and conflicts are concealed by the term 'community'?

The history of 'learned helplessness' is also crucial, said another. It is likely to be a long and difficult journey for those coming from years of oppression and marginality to learn how to 'adopt a position of agency'.

Some projects based on self-help have fallen flat, and small government grants may be more effective than initiatives motivated by an environmental consciousness that may not be understood as addressing the perceived needs of the intended beneficiaries. ◂◂

Ubuntu
Are we fooling ourselves?

How do economies and ideas interact? Is 'rugged individualism' typical of people in the US, and is it related to a supposed spirit of enterprise, self-reliance and hard work? Do the Japanese act according to a national spirit of formality and discipline? These are crude caricatures, yet *ubuntu*, the spirit of communal care and mutual reliance, said to be characteristic of African people, is often portrayed as a cornerstone of life in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent. DR ANDREA HURST of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University's paper on 'The knowledge economy in an ethical context: autonomy and *ubuntu*' led to a vigorous debate on *ubuntu* as it does, or does not, affect attitudes to work and enterprise.

We have been brought to the brink of disaster by current economic practices, Hearst argued. If the 'knowledge economy' is to mean anything, it must be more than just putting information technology to work in the interests of our economic system as it is now. It should be much wider, less purely technocratic, and part of an ethos that includes the social sciences, humanities and, centrally, ethics.

The premise of *ubuntu*

Ubuntu involves three core values, according to Hearst. People come first, which means that resources become things for humans to use. People should live within communities where they understand one another, and even when there are disagreements there is general assent to social rules. There should be social solidarity, with teamwork the ideal, and avoidance of opposition and conflict. An approach with these values could guide an ethical economy, according to some South African philosophers.

But is this possible? Has *ubuntu* the potential to support a more humane, collaborative society, while also enabling the economic development that seems necessary for the dignified, secure life that South Africans desire?

Hearst left the question open. *Ubuntu* promotes group solidarity, she said, but at the cost of suppressing individual difference and constraining the mavericks who are likely to do the unusual and unexpected. It thus encourages a static society suspicious of the innovators who may be the key to economic development. However, what some participants called 'disaster capitalism' is hardly an attractive alternative.

Can new ways be found of tolerating and even encouraging the difference and enterprise necessary in a complex modern society, while enabling the emergence of 'rich human beings'? Might such people emerge from new, more humanistic 'knowledge economies'? Might *ubuntu* be part of this process?

Get real, one participant said. *Ubuntu* perpetuates the myth of African collectivity, first proposed by romantic anthropologists looking for village Edens in Africa. If this vision ever had any basis in reality, it is long gone. Now, the idea links blackness, poverty and supposed collectivism under this neo-traditional slogan, which, if anything, tends to lock people further into poverty. It does not even reflect reality: far from being naturally collaborative, people are in some ways almost ungovernably quarrelsome and assertive, and this individualistic aspect of African life needs to be acknowledged and studied more seriously than it has been.

This is too sweeping, said another. *Ubuntu* is a useful term that describes relations between humans, and between humans and the environment, focusing usefully on inter-connectedness, interdependence and inter-relationships. A.C. Jordan's 1940 isiXhosa classic, *Ingqumbo Yeminyanya* (The Wrath of the Ancestors), is saturated with such a spirit.

Others debated the possibilities that *ubuntu* might present in modern South African society. Comparing collective solidarity to individualism is a false juxtaposition: these tendencies both exist and are used together or separately, according to circumstances. And are its limits not demonstrated when, no matter how long arguments continue, agreement cannot be reached? What answer does *ubuntu* have to this?

Is there anything specifically African about *ubuntu* apart from the name in any case? Is it not an Africanisation of a universal idea? In fact, elements of the idea may already exist in the most technologically advanced parts of modern societies, and are functional to them, another speaker said.

Although ideas similar to *ubuntu* can lend themselves to a rigid, static approach, they can and perhaps have been reconfigured and related to complexity. Modern sites of creativity tend in fact to operate on a model that incorporates both competition and collaboration. It is a distortion to imagine that cooperation and 'talking until we agree' is completely foreign to technologically advanced societies. Is *ubuntu* alive and well and living in Silicon Valley?◂◂

INSPIRATION OR DELUSION?

'*Ubuntu* is the capacity in African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building and maintaining community. *Ubuntu* calls on us to believe and feel that:

Your pain is my pain,
My wealth is your wealth,
Your salvation is my salvation.
In essence *ubuntu* … addresses our interconnectedness, our common humanity, and the responsibility to each other that flows from our connection.

Barbara Nussbaum, from *Ubuntu: Reflections of a South African on Our Common Humanity, Reflections,* 4, 4 (2003): 21.

Migration, work, housing, transport

simple words, complex problems

Though there is still a strong feeling that migration can be controlled or even prevented, this is probably unrealistic, Cross said. Cities everywhere struggle with what they consider a never-ending influx of poor people. Even when, worldwide, attempts are made to control the flow of immigrants, the poor flood back.

The countryside is unlikely to provide an acceptable standard of living to the rural unemployed, and movement to towns and cities continues. Cities can attempt to equip the poor with marketable skills, but this is expensive, takes a long time and tends to be overwhelmed by continuing rural to urban migration.

Analysing the data

This has important implications for transport. Who is moving and who is not? What are the likely results of different forms of migration? The project on which Cross and others are working involves breaking down the components of migration and profiling the types of service delivery demanded by various types of urban settlement. The results have important implications for government at local and other levels.

Above all, people come to cities in search of jobs, which are mostly to be found in city centres and nearby. It is therefore important to improve access to CBDs. The concentration of jobs in and around the Pretoria CBD in Tshwane is illustrated in figure 1. But there is a danger of saturating the centres with job-seekers, most of whom will be rural immigrants with low skill levels. The number of available jobs will not expand indefinitely. Most formal housing in CBDs is for rent. The main occupants of such accommodation are not the unemployed and mostly young inner-city poor, but rather employed women with children and above-average education. Such women are poor, but working poor. Young male work-seekers, on the other hand – without families and willing to tolerate tough conditions in the hope of getting jobs – may not easily commit to upgrading. This constituency is a difficult one for cities to come to terms with.

> Upgrading of all shacks may be unrealistic: they are part of the search for a job

Shifting perspectives

Shack-dwellers have a different profile. Shacks can be functional for some people at some times, and not every shack-dweller is necessarily unwilling to spend at least some time in these surroundings.

Upgrading all shacks may be unrealistic: they are part of the search for a job. Even when formal housing is 'free' it has costs: residents are subject to social expectations and, if they are not economically firmly established, are likely to find themselves moving out again, or hanging on with difficulty.

Shacks are cheap and reduce such pressures. House ownership and rental in the formal market tends to be for those who are relatively financially secure. The closer to CBDs they are, the more functional shacks are for job-seekers, who are mostly young and male, with some young women. They are making a sacrifice in order to get a job and most do not think they will be there for long.

Shacks on the periphery are sometimes of better quality, and conditions tend to be easier. Women without jobs or with badly-paying jobs are likely to cluster on the periphery, often in the safety of backyard communities as, at this level of existence, city centres tend to be turbulent and dangerous. For similar reasons, women are underrepresented in shack areas, which are predominantly male.

Cross focused on the shack settlement of Swedenville bordering the established Tshwane township of Mamelodi, east of Pretoria. It is cheap to live there but there are no services. Nonetheless, though stringent, it is not an intolerable environment. In a series of maps, she illustrated how dwellings, work, earnings and transport interact. These vivid maps speak for themselves. Two are reproduced here.

Policy needs to be worked out with constant attention to realities on the ground. For this, detailed case-by-case research is required. When new housing is planned, transport should be much more closely considered than has often been the case.

Transport subsidies, enabling more affordable access to jobs, may help – though it is mainly the working poor who would benefit. There is certainly no way that all the poor who might wish to do so could inhabit the centres of cities.

In two presentations, 'Access to the urban core for the rural poor: migration, housing, transport and types of poverty settlement' and 'Differentiated household demand for housing and the targeting of access to basic services', the HSRC's CATHERINE CROSS discussed key aspects of urban life in post-apartheid cities. Her detailed evidence from Johannesburg and Tshwane underscored the inadequacy of 'the poor' as a category: age, gender, skill and many other factors make overarching solutions to the many problems impracticable. Urban and peri-urban dwellers are often far ahead of government in their flexible responses to the challenges and opportunities of their environment.

These are difficult questions, going to the heart of contemporary South Africa's political economy, that require intensive and continuing consideration.

A respondent to one of Cross's papers, Mr Ahmed Vawda from the Presidency, focused on the markets, networks and hierarchies that mediate the demand for and supply of housing. The government is often caught flat-footed by markets – for instance, informal rental and ownership – which may develop without its knowledge or intervention.

Housing officials need to be retrained and reskilled to operate in this fluid environment for which their training, experience and administrative mind-set does not prepare them.

People are making varied choices about what they require in different places, and builders of informal settlements race far ahead of any official action or approval.

Cross's work, he said, begins to indicate how to understand this new and protean world and how it might be possible to learn from and about it and act in relation to it. To move from administering subsidies to finding flexible ways of responding to complex and changing environments is a huge task to ask of public servants. ◂◂

Maps supplied by Dr Christo Venter, University of Pretoria, and Mr Willem Badenhorst, MandalaGIS.
This work was done for the Integrated Planning Development and Modelling project.

Figure 1: TOTAL JOBS



TRAVEL COST: Taxi with local feeder (Rand per return trip)



TRAVEL COST: Taxi with no local feeder (Rand per return trip)



Xenophobia

Causes, responses, policies

In a country where liberation narratives have stressed solidarity between Africans, the outbreak of xenophobic violence that racked some communities in May 2008, and which has continued sporadically since then, deeply shocked many South Africans. It raised uncomfortable questions about townships, immigration, and responses by government and civil society. While xenophobia is a worldwide phenomenon, JEAN PIERRE MISAGO of the African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand, reflected on causal factors, responses and policy implications of xenophobic violence; why in South Africa it can take such violent forms; and lessons that may have been learned since 2008.

Xenophobic violence has not gone away. In the year up to March 2011 there were 20 deaths and 40 injuries, 200 foreign-run shops were looted and thousands displaced. Unknown numbers have been threatened. Rumours that there would be widespread attacks after the Soccer World Cup were taken sufficiently seriously for the security forces to deploy.

What triggers this violence or threat of violence? Research by the African Centre for Migration and Society attempts to identify specific factors, based on case studies in Gauteng, Western Cape and Eastern Cape.

Xenophobia is fuelled by suspicions and myths: migrants tend to be blamed for crime, corruption and other socioeconomic ills; they are seen as the source of illegitimate competition for jobs, trade, women and houses. Violence may grow from this soil – but it does not always do so. Why, for instance, did some areas of Alexandra township experience fierce violence in May 2008, but others with identical socioeconomic profiles did not?

What are the key triggers of violence? Competition for formal and informal local leadership positions and for business opportunities is important. Where this takes violent form it is generally because local governance structures are absent, weak or considered illegitimate by the population.

Where there is a leadership vacuum, 'un-touchable' and often violent leadership groups tend to emerge. Local leaders and would-be leaders mobilise residents to attack and evict foreigners so as to strengthen their personal power base in the local community, and local business owners instigate violence against what they perceive to be 'illegitimate' foreign competitors.

Thus, while lack of effective mechanisms for conflict resolution and of trust in local institutions leads to vigilantism and mob justice, effective leadership tends to prevent violence in potentially volatile areas.

> Violence is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics. Even where violence is clearly rooted in pre-existing conflict, it should not be treated as a natural, self-explanatory outgrowth of such conflict, something that occurs automatically when the conflict reaches certain intensity, a certain temperature.'
>
> – Brubaker and Laitin 1998. 'Ethnic and nationalist violence', *Annual Review of Sociology* 4: 423-452

What conclusions can be drawn about xenophobic violence? It seems to be most likely when accepted social controls or institutions are absent or weak, and when the reach of the state is feeble, allowing warlords and other non-official power centres to develop.

It tends to emerge at times of socioeconomic and political uncertainty. Does violence spread because of a copycat effect, or because the media give it publicity? Unlikely, since these theories do not explain why in 2008 some areas were racked by violence while others, very similar, were quiet. Similarly, allegations of a 'third force' were quickly withdrawn for lack of evidence.

The violence exposed serious tensions in communities but also weaknesses in the country's ability to protect its residents. Unelected persons dictated who has the right to live and work in South Africa's cities, revealing a growing territorial, nationalistic or ethnic understanding of rights and entitlements. The ominous lesson is that violence against groups out of favour was seen to make political and economic sense. If this is internalised, everyone is at risk.

State needs to step up

The state proved itself unable to protect its residents, responding slowly and indecisively to the outbreak of 2008. There seemed to be reluctance to intervene against the governing party's 'natural'

constituency. When intervention did come, it largely supported the intentions of the perpetrators. Papers were checked, followed by evacuation, deportation and repatriation of foreigners. Repatriation was 'voluntary', but camps were closed and people in them had to leave. Those 'reintegrated' were reinserted in communities where little had been done to alter the conditions that led to violence in the first place.

There have been some positive developments. There have been shifts in perception in some key departments, such as the police and disaster management. Some measures for proactive response have been implemented. There have been examples of quick and decisive responses to early signs of violence. Within civil society there have also been signs of an increased awareness of xenophobia as an urgent social problem, with some initiatives to promote tolerance and social cohesion.

But there are continued gaps. Reluctance to face realities by some prominent figures has negative consequences on responses and interventions. Social cohesion is a recognised political priority, but declarations at national level are rarely translated into concrete measures; community leadership and local governance issues are not addressed, and civil society organisations have failed to hold government accountable for protecting residents. Politicians do not want to face issues that could damage their power bases.

Where there is a leadership vacuum 'untouchable' and often violent leadership groups tend to emerge

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Crucially, security responses are often inadequate and there is apparent impunity for perpetrators: most of those arrested for xenophobic attacks have been released without charge due to pressure from communities and their leaders. There has not been a single conviction for murder or rape, and nobody lost their job on account of xenophobic attacks. Real or perceived impunity can only encourage the ill-intentioned.

Preventative solutions

What is the way forward? It should be recognised that the situation that led to violence still exists: if those who attack see no consequences, they will probably do so again. Others may be encouraged to embark on attacks. Preventing them requires fundamental institutional reforms, but the motives behind the violence must be systematically investigated. Tensions must be monitored and early intervention take place where necessary. Accountability must be enforced and impunity not countenanced.

Conflict resolution is vital: trusted community-based conflict mechanisms that respect constitutional principles of universal rights and due process must be developed. Unlawful compromises, like limiting the number of foreign shops, must be avoided when attempting to resolve tensions between migrants and locals. Civil society must find ways to hold government accountable.◂

For its level of development South Africa has a remarkably comprehensive system of social welfare grants, many of which benefit women. Nevertheless, women remain disadvantaged in many respects. PROFESSOR SHIREEN HASSIM of the University of the Witwatersrand spoke on 'Gender, social policy and the developmental state in South Africa'. She explored how social policy might contribute more fully to a democratic, developmental South Africa.

Schools and hospitals and other care-giving institutions are important, but they are intertwined with households. When public institutions do not work well, the households where women work become 'shock absorbers'. Services not delivered by the public sector, especially to the very young and very old, are picked up by families and communities, and this generally means women.

Contradicting worldwide neo-liberal downsizing of welfare, almost one in four citizens of South Africa benefit from a social grant, making it in these terms one of the world's most generous states.

But there are limitations: the rollout of basic services to households faces many challenges, and there is disquiet at the dependency implied by a 'welfare state'. Furthermore – this was Hassim's focus – the welfare system does not necessarily challenge embedded social inequalities. The vision of the socially responsible developmental state should oblige policy-makers to think about the minimum conditions necessary for making social rights a reality. However, this focus is often lost when ideas are translated into projects.

For example, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) provides livelihoods for poor women, young people and the disabled. But its impact is limited and temporary because it transfers insufficient skills to enable beneficiaries to operate effectively in the market.

Spending on social grants is not everything. We need to look at the burdens borne by different people and at the presuppositions of decision-makers. These are questions about norms and values. They are also often questions about gender. For example, how are the burdens stemming from unemployment and HIV distributed?

Who cares for children and the ill? What kinds of institution are being strengthened, and which weakened? What impact does this have on the goal of gender equality?

Schools and hospitals and other care-giving institutions are important, but they are intertwined with households. When public institutions do not work well, the households where women work

Social Grants

Liberating women or confining them to the home?

become 'shock absorbers'. Services not delivered by the public sector, especially to the very young and very old, are picked up by families and communities, and this generally means women. A superficial celebration of women as household managers obscures the need to question this uneven pattern of social responsibility.

Similarly, home-based care for the sick is only recognised officially in the context of projects run by community-based NGOs. There is no relief for individual women in households. The young are targeted, but many of the middle-aged women, who are providing the bulk of care and who most need support, are missed. In short, the rhetoric of expanding capabilities is used, but in implementation more traditional discourses that see care as women's work predominate. Class and gender are crowded out by long-established apartheid patterns. The role that hospices might fill, vital in the age of AIDS, is pushed onto women. Thus we do not have the kinds of outcomes we would wish to see in a country committed from the Constitution downwards to women's equality: women's labour continues to subsidise failures in the state system.

Social justice is not achieved by simply handing out grants

Hassim provoked lively discussion and interesting differences of emphasis. What is the purpose of social grants: are they to support vulnerable people in the situations in which they find themselves, or should they also aim to transform social relations?

Specifically, should women be supported in their often subordinate positions, or should state resources be used to contribute to transforming gender relations?

Specifically, should women be supported in their often subordinate positions, or should state resources be used to contribute to transforming gender relations?

The presentation put social justice firmly on the agenda, demonstrating that social policies are not gender-neutral, said respondent Professor Leila Patel. The question is, however, how to translate the complex idea of transforming social relations into practical policy. What would be the indicators of success or failure? Who is falling between the cracks?

Patel related the discussion to her research in Doornkop and Soweto on women and social grants. Women comprise 96% of beneficiaries in her sample. Her findings suggest that women largely control grants. They utilise these resources prudently and they contribute to food security, child survival, schooling, specialised health and prepaid services like electricity and water. However, the grants are small, and this in itself limits the potential of such programmes to transform societies.

Women continue to carry out functions that state institutions might be expected to undertake. Their situations are often worsened by the widespread non-payment of maintenance by fathers of their children. The Director General of the Department of Agriculture said that social grants protect the weak under capitalism, and anticipate another, liberatory, social logic. There is a tendency to fall into a pattern of delivery to passive recipients: this lack of empowerment is reflected in service delivery protests. A developmental state should help people to help themselves. The South African economy at the moment cannot support a basic income grant, desirable though that is.

Resources must be used with care, and social grants represent the best that can be afforded towards enabling people to live dignified lives. However, there is no question of paying people to look after their children. Work of this kind in the private sphere should be shared, but cannot be paid for by the state.

Hassim recognised the real progress that had been made. The sort of questions she was asking were: what would society look like if there were hospices for the terminally ill rather than relying on stressed and desperate women? If there were child-care centres where women would be employed rather than struggling in comparative isolation at home?

These are difficult questions, going to the heart of cultural understandings of care – she herself grew up in an environment where a family member in an old-age home would be indicative of shameful family dysfunction.

But instead of reinforcing ideas of women being the carers, should we not be building public welfare in a more sustainable way? What basic standard of living is required? How can we create jobs so that we do not have one in four citizens relying on these small amounts of money?

Let us have a national discussion on social spending, Hassim said, but not one limited to rands and cents: let us talk about how such spending affects social and especially gender relations, and how, perhaps, it could be deployed to bring about a more democratic, socially equal, South Africa.

Driving township regeneration

Lessons from a Treasury programme

Traffic in research information is not all one-way. Some important social research originates within government. GECI KARURI-SEBINA works with National Treasury. Her presentation on strategies for township and small town regeneration under the Neighbourhood Development Programme provided insights from the world of policy and implementation. She concluded with some challenging propositions.

Apartheid gave birth to South African townships. They were designed to isolate their inhabitants and exclude them from the full benefits of citizenship. Municipalities made little effort to plan for them. They were starved of skills and financial resources. Township residents were poor; there were high levels of unemployment, little economic activity and a property market hardly existed.

After 1994, municipalities found themselves ill-equipped to deal with such challenges. Basic needs such as water, electricity and drainage dominated spending on townships and small towns, and there was underinvestment in economic infrastructure and social amenities.

Most municipalities were unable to handle large-scale, long-term planning and investment, and were not even able to exploit the potential of existing assets.

The Treasury's Neighbourhood Development Programme provides a medium- to long-term funding commitment to municipalities for township and small town development.

This funding is conditional on systematic planning and careful packaging and testing of projects by municipalities, for which technical assistance is provided. This creates certainty and predictability which should enable municipalities to negotiate confidently with partners.

There are, as is to be expected, numerous difficulties. Townships were designed well for the purposes for which they were originally intended. Regeneration – addressing the symptoms of decline – may be possible, though even when life is improved, they may remain the ghettos that they were intended to be.

However, transformation – fundamentally altering for the better the development path of townships – is a major challenge.

A plan of an imagined but typical South African town illustrates the difficulties of changing apartheid spatial planning, and also changing contemporary developments that reproduce patterns of inequality, though divisions now tend to follow the lines of social class more than race.

These are the issues that the Neighbourhood Development Programme grant is intended to address. It is in two parts and one part cannot be utilised without the other.

The bulk of the funding enables municipalities to purchase what they need, and about 10% is devoted to technical assistance. These are the issues that the Neighbourhood Development Programme grant is intended to address.The difficulty has been to persuade the municipalities to focus on technical assistance instead of on the immediate benefits that come with the bulk of the funding. The uptake is poor: there is resentment at having to develop a long-term strategy when immediate problems are so overwhelming.

Local politicians and administrators see funding – tantalisingly within their reach – being denied in the interests of a long-term planning process which seems to them a distraction rather than a priority.

The challenges are obvious: history and geography make township transformation a most difficult enterprise. In this difficult context, what is required? What are the lessons of the Neighbourhood Development Programme?

> Townships may appear to be 'all the same', but they have different historical and geographical contexts. Not every township has the potential to be an economic powerhouse

There is a need for vision and long-range strategy if township transformation is the true objective. The objective of transformation must be expressed concretely in designs, strategies and plans. Without this there can be no convincing platform for transformative development of townships.

A concerted focus on developing South Africa's townships will be impossible without unequivocal support from relevant institutional champions that have the power, political will, capacity and resources to carry out the agenda.

Townships may appear to be 'all the same', but they have different historical and geographical contexts. They must be looked at realistically. Not every township has the potential to be an economic powerhouse. Local and external factors must be considered.

In practice, municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are often weak and unhelpful. This emphasises the importance of inter-departmental and inter-governmental involvement in township development.

Systematic accumulation, sharing and analysis of data and practice-based learning about township development plans and interventions would be an important step towards improving the chances and speed of development. Currently, the diffuse and sparse nature of information and knowledge is an obstacle to learning and informed, coordinated intervention.

The quality of surveys and reports by some consultants in particular, often leave much to be desired, though capable consultants are necessary to township development. In all these respects the Neighbourhood Development Programme may provide a concrete starting point for further progress.

Universities in South Africa

Ivory towers or social workshops?

Universities are in the knowledge business. Academics have skills and knowledge relating to many disciplines.

But they are now also expected to engage directly with communities in developmental roles of some kind. Is this what they should be doing, or should they rather be doing what they are meant to do best – researching and teaching? Are universities really the best organisations to carry out social outreach? Or should they leave it to those more qualified in this area? Is it all, in fact, a wasteful distraction?

Whatever doubts there may be about what community engagement really is, it is certainly prominent on the South African higher education agenda. Institutions such as the Council on Higher Education (CHE) declare it an essential part of the higher educational process. Universities are reacting to such pressures and it is being widely debated at these institutions throughout the country.

Kruss focused on two research universities with different institutional cultures. Her study led her to identify four critical issues:

► To what extent does community engagement have weight within the structures of institutional power in universities? Do senate and other university committees pay much attention to it? Are there senior posts dedicated to the area?

► Is there a coherent, generally accepted institutional policy framework for community engagement?

► Is there coordination and alignment between university structures that deal with research, teaching and innovation on the one hand and outreach on the other?

►Are there mechanisms for disseminating information about community engagement throughout the university? Are there incentives to award achievements in it amongst academics? Is such achievement a criterion for promotion?

It is an unfunded mandate, which wealthier universities may be able to carry, but which is a burden on the poorer universities

Is it publicised and reported? Are resources dedicated to it? There was lively debate on Kruss's paper. The role of higher education in social development is clearly an issue of great concern to government and social activists.

However, although universities are urged to become engaged with communities, there is little official clarity as to what this might involve.

The 1997 Higher Education White Paper introduced the concept of community engagement but gave no guidance as to how it might be implemented. Though there is a large body of literature on social responsibility and industry, the CHE, for example, has published little on the issue in relation to universities.

In addition, it is an unfunded mandate, which wealthier universities may be able to carry, but which is a burden on the poorer universities that are

Research, teaching and community engagement appear in nearly every South African university's mission statement. We feel we know what research and teaching are. But 'community engagement', 'social responsibility' or whatever it may be called, seems like a good thing. Should universities not be doing more of it and fulfilling this mandate? DR GLENDA KRUSS of the HSRC looked at what they are doing.

perhaps closest to community needs. Community engagement takes place in a conceptual muddle amidst financial stringency.

Academia needs to be implemented practically

The idea in any case implies that the work of universities is somehow not already engaged with communities. Clearly academic areas differ, and some are apparently remote from ordinary life, though an argument could be made that even the most seemingly obscure disciplines serve the community in a broad sense.

A 'cake sale' outreach model, as one participant termed it, can alienate academics and marginalise the concept by trivialising it

Is training people in the numerous skills and competencies upon which universities focus not central to community engagement?

Even more, is it not already obviously at the heart of education, social work, agriculture, engineering and many other areas? In this context, may not community engagement – seen as separate to the normal work of a university – be a distraction from the vital interactions with the wider society in which they are already involved?

Vagueness about the meaning of community engagement, accompanied by insistence that it takes place, opens the way for wasteful and inappropriate models to take hold.

Where there are so few accepted norms, there is much room for inflated claims representing very little, thereby debasing the currency.

If people want to involve themselves with charitable or philanthropic work, they are free to do so as private citizens. But should academics with valuable and often scarce skills be sidetracked in their professional lives into such areas? Also, a 'cake sale' outreach model, as one participant termed it, can alienate academics and marginalise the concept by trivialising it.

Though generally given verbal endorsement, there seems to be a lack of engagement at operational level between mainstream academics and those involved with community engagement.

Indeed, community engagement professionals are often low in the institutional pecking order. Minimal dedicated funding and lack of recognition in terms of promotion, pay and allocation of time suggest that much apparent focus on the area is superficial. As Kruss said, support and incentive mechanisms, integrated with institutional strategies and structures, are missing.

The growing tendency towards enforcing compliance in this area is problematic, some participants believed.

Because community engagement remains vague and its results difficult to measure, to insist that it be assessed as part of the criteria for allocation of funding and other forms of support is an invitation to tokenism and evasion. ◂◂

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

CAPITAL CITIES IN AFRICA: POWER AND THE POWERLESS

Simon Bekker
and
Göran Therborn (eds)

Soft cover, 264pp, ISBN 978-0-7969-2350-9, peer-reviewed book, September 2011, price on publication

Capital cities today remain central to both nations and states. They host centres of political power, not only national, but in some cases regional and global as well, thus offering major avenues to success, wealth and privilege. For these reasons capitals simultaneously become centres of 'counter-power', locations of high-stakes struggles between the government and the opposition.

This volume focuses on capital cities in nine sub-Saharan African countries, and traces how the power vested in them has evolved through different colonial backgrounds, radically different kinds of regimes after independence, waves of popular protest, explosive population growth and, in most cases, stunted economic development. Starting at the point of national political emancipation, each case study explores the complicated processes of nation-state building through its manifestation in the 'urban geology' of the city – its architecture, iconography, layout and political use of urban space. Although the evolution of each of these cities is different, they share a critical demographic feature: an extraordinarily rapid process of urbanisation that is more politically than economically driven. Overwhelmed by the inevitable challenges resulting from this urban sprawl, the governments seated in most of these capital cities are in effect both powerful – wielding power over their populace – and powerless – lacking power to implement their plans and to provide for their inhabitants.
In its concentration on urban forms of multi-layered power, symbolic as well as material, Capital Cities in Africa cuts a new path in the rich field of studies related to African cities and politics.

It will be of interest to scholars in a wide range of disciplines, from political history, to sociology, to geography, architecture and urban planning.

This book gets to grips with the complexities of policy change in South Africa, asking how evolving doctrines and policies shape the way water use rights are conceptualised and governed. It offers an historical overview of the evolution of water resources policy and legislation, before going on to explore in depth the process of formulating the Water Allocation Reform policy.

This is then contrasted with an 'on-the-ground' case study that brings into relief the dynamics occurring at the policy level.

The book offers a new perspective that emphasises the discursive construction of rights – how different principles are privileged in diverging discourses around scarcity, equity, efficiency and sustainability, and how such 'allocation discourses' are transformed at the local level by new processes of politics and power. The book sets these processes within the wider context of political and economic change in South Africa, and draws lessons for the broader experience of water policy and legislation in an international context.

The book is aimed at researchers, policymakers and practitioners, and a broader international readership interested in water policy and development.

Synne Movik

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