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

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Cover by William Steyn



Malawi: Deep shadows over the economy

Denis Venter, a senior researcher at the Africa Institute, has recently returned from a visit to Malawi. Here he provides some insights into the economic problems threatening the country.

In its 25th year as an independent nation, Malawi — once regarded as an oasis of economic and political stability in Southern Africa — is suffering from economic recession and the effects of the continuing civil war in neighbouring Mozambique. Falling world prices for its tea and sugar exports cut its impressive growth rates of up to 6 per cent of gross domestic project (GDP) a year in the 1970s to minus 0,3 per cent in 1986 and a modest 1,4 per cent in 1987. The inflation rate has now soared to a staggering 31,5 per cent from an already high 26 per cent last year and a manageable 15 per cent the previous year. Only favourable world prices for Malawi's main export, tobacco, kept the 1987 trade deficit down to MK38,7 million. This rose to an alarming MK274,7 million in 1988, with a projected deficit of nearly MK400 million for this year. Such an erosion underlines the vital need to ease Malawi's transport bottlenecks if they are not to choke the renewed growth that is now under way.

The principal objectives of a current three-year structural adjustment programme, supported by an enhanced structural adjustment facility provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are therefore: first, to achieve growth of GDP in 1988 (a morale boosting 3,6 per cent has, in fact, been realized), and maintain real growth rates of 3 to 3,8 per cent annually during 1989–91, rising to 4 to 5 per cent by 1992; second, to reduce the annual rate of inflation to about 5 per cent by 1991–92; and third, to move to a more viable balance of payments position by the end of the programme. These rather ambitious goals are underpinned by tentative aid commitments totalling US$555 million over two years pledged by a group of six donor nations and nine international organizations which have endorsed Malawi's medium-term adjustment strategy. This figure represents an increase of almost 60 per cent in annual support compared with the US$170 million provided in 1987 — with US$265 million having been allocated for 1988 and US$290 million for 1989. Much of this project finance is slated for the Northern Transport Corridor (NTC) project, with the bulk of the remainder earmarked for agriculture. The latter, with industry, is the key sector in the economic recovery plans outlined in the *Statement of Development Policies, 1987–1996* — policies aimed at maintaining modest real GDP growth until the foreign currency squeeze hopefully eases in 1991/92, and laying the foundations for a larger and sustained expansion of the economy thereafter.

But, although Malawi enjoyed an overall balance of payments surplus of MK247,2 million in 1988, compared with MK85,5 million in 1987, mainly as a result of higher aid inflows, warning lights are flashing because the deficit on the current account rose to MK269,9 million from a figure of MK131,4 million in 1987, and total foreign debt jumped to US$988 million. This state of affairs does little to create reassurance about the Malawian economy. It is undeniable that the present problems have been exacerbated by the huge influx of refugees from Mozambique over the last few years, but the major cause for concern is the failure of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programme to reduce the dependency of the economy on tobacco exports and especially on expensive trade routes. Being a model pupil has not really helped Malawi, because essentially it remains the innocent victim of a general condition of instability in the south-eastern corner of the subcontinent.

Pondering the transport options

One of the main burdens on foreign exchange (besides debt servicing, still running at more than 40 per cent of export earnings in 1988, even after reschedulings by the London and Paris Clubs), the high transport costs caused by the need to route most trade through South Africa, is expected to remain unchanged until 1991/92 when the multidonor Northern Transport Corridor through Tanzania becomes fully operational. This cumbersome re-routing of Malawi's foreign trade, originating from the country's landlocked position and the generally unstable conditions in neighbouring Mozambique, is currently consuming a massive 54 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, up from 43 per cent in 1988. For Malawi's economy, which is exclusively based on agriculture, the export of commodities such as tobacco, sugar and tea, and the importation of fuel, fertilizer and manufactured goods, such as parts for machinery and vehicles, are vitally important.

World Bank projections, reviewing Malawi's transport options, are based on two fundamental assumptions. The first is that the Beira and Nacala routes through Mozambican territory will remain closed until at least the early 1990s. The second is that thereafter, even if these routes could be upgraded under more favourable circumstances, Malawian traffic would probably only be able to flow at a rate equal to half the route capacity (it is anticipated that either possible continued rebel activity or poor operating conditions at Mozambican ports, or a combination of both factors, will prevent full utilization of the Beira and Nacala routes). Although not much is being done to rehabilitate Malawi's direct link with Beira because of rebel activity, it has the option of trucking goods through the Tete Corridor in Mozambique (which is guarded by Zimbabwean troop convoys, and is an essential link in the route to South Africa) to Zimbabwe and then to Beira via the Beira Corridor, which is also protected by Zimbabwean military contingents. Even more critical are developments along the Nacala Corridor. Over the last year or two, close to US$200 million has been invested in providing this port — one of the best natural, deepwater harbours in Africa — with new facilities. Theoretically the port could handle all of Malawi's trade. The main bottleneck is along the railway line, where work by a Portuguese-French consortium has been suspended pending better security arrangements.

But even if the Mozambican transport routes become fully operational before expected, the additional trade generated as a result of the structural adjustments currently being undertaken by Malawi will justify an extra or alternative transport outlet through Tanzania. Seven European countries together with Canada and the World Bank have provided aid of US$50 million to give Dar es Salaam harbour a major facelift, with the objective of raising the handling capacity of the port to 4 million tonnes a year from its present 2,5 million tonnes. Although Dar es Salaam is about twice the distance from Blantyre as either Nacala or Beira (roughly 700 km each from the southern commercial hub of Malawi), it is half the distance from the nearest South African port. Thus the Northern Transport Corridor — a US$113 million project funded by Western donors and coordinated by the World Bank, and now in the initial stages of implementation — seeks to provide a complex lake, road and rail link to Malawi's next most logical outlet on the Tanzanian seaboard. The project focuses on the development of a 1 400 km multi-modal link to the port of Dar es Salaam. This will involve a 750 km section of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (Tazara) line between Dar es Salaam and Mbeya railhead, near the northern border with Malawi; a 250 km road link from Mbeya over the Songwe River to the port of Chilumba at the northern end of Lake Malawi; and a 400 km journey down the lake to the southern port of Chipoka, to link up with the rail and road network in Malawi's industrial and commercial heartland around Blantyre. The major components of the project are the construction and/or upgrading of the main road from Chilumba over Karonga and Ibanda to Mbeya; the rehabilitation of the Salima/Chipoka to Balaka section of the main road to Blantyre; the provision of dry cargo, fuel storage, and transhipment facilities at Dar es Salaam and Mbeya; and the improvement of shipping and cargo handling facilities on Lake Malawi, including procurement of a container/fuel carrying vessel, rehabilitating and expanding dry cargo and fuel storage capacity at Chilumba and Chipoka ports, and expanding ship maintenance facilities at the Monkey Bay shipyard.

The aim is to have the NTC operational by early 1991, by which time it is expected to handle between 25 and 30 percent of Malawi's overall trade, increasing to nearly 40 percent (or 300 000 tonnes) by the mid-1990s. Malawi and its donors have come to regard the project as an essential insurance policy for that country, as long as there are still so many imponderables in the region. Apart from providing a more politically secure trade outlet, the Northern Transport Corridor should be cheaper than the existing rather circuitous routes to the South African ports (more so, as almost half the route runs through Malawian territory, thus greatly reducing the foreign currency costs of transport). In fact, this route is deemed viable even if it should in the end carry only traffic from the north and centre of the country.

Shouldering the refugee burden

Another consequence of instability in south-eastern Africa is the constant stream of Mozambican refugees into Malawi. Currently there are a conservatively-estimated 700 000 refugees in Malawi, although the official figure stands at 640 000 — about two-thirds of the total number of Mozambican refugees in all of southern Africa. While there are an average of 20 000 new arrivals every month, a similar avalanche to the May-June influx of 140 000 in 1988 is expected this year. In fact, in absolute numbers Malawi now shoulders the third most serious refugee crisis in Africa, after the Sudan and Somalia. Moreover, with a local population of 7 983 000 people (according to preliminary results of the 1987 Population and Housing Census), this tiny south-east African country now has one of the highest ratios of refugees to nationals in the world.

The largest concentrations of Mozambican refugees are at the Mankhokwe camp in the Nsanje district with 260 000, representing 60 per cent of the local population, followed by Ncheu district with 137 000 and the three districts of Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza with a combined total of 240 000. With prospects for peace in Mozambique continuing to be dim and over a third of its 14 million people facing starvation, ever-increasing numbers are still finding their way into Malawi from the three provinces of Tete, Zambezia, and Niassa which form a 1 540 km ring around the southern portion of Malawi. While these provinces are generally agriculturally rich, the fact that many peasant farmers have not been able to grow crops for the last four seasons is creating its own steady flow of asylum-seekers. Mozambican refugees have over the last few years crossed into all 11 districts in southern Malawi bordering on Mozambican territory, including — besides the ones already mentioned — Mwanza, Chikwawa, Thyolo, Mulanje, Machinga, and Mangochi. Because a rather artificial boundary between Malawi and Mozambique separates the Sena, Ngoni, and Lomwe peoples, some refugees went to stay with relatives.

Initially, as Malawi was not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Refugees, the Malawi Red Cross Society (MRCS), the Ministry of Health, and the Christian Services Committee (CSC) of Malawi's churches shouldered all relief work. But as the numbers spiralled, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was invited to assist and hasty negotiations took place, leading to Malawi signing the Convention in November 1987 and to the UNHCR opening an office in Malawi in February 1988. The UN agency now serves as chief coordinator of the relief effort and — according to Joël Boutroue, UNHCR Programme Coordinator in Blantyre, in a recent interview — will probably spend US$60 million in 1989 (having spent US$50 million in 1988) of which roughly half will again be for food supplies alone. This is augmented by approximately US$10 million provided by non-governmental organizations, such as the MRCS (which now coordinates all forms of aid given by Malawian private sector bodies, amounting to about 9 000 tonnes of food and other items, such as blankets and clothing, every month), the *Médecins sans Frontiéres* of France, and the International Rescue Committee in the United States. Significantly, an International Red Cross official describes the relief operation in Malawi as one of the best in Africa.

Because of the closure of Malawi's rail links with both Nacala and Beira, food supplies have to be trucked to Malawi largely from the South African port of Durban, nearly 3 840 km away. Some 60 per cent of all relief supplies are trucked through Zimbabwe and the Tete Corridor in Mozambique, while the rest goes via a much longer route through Zambia. Donor representatives in Malawi believe that as long as donor support is maintained, the presence of refugees will not adversely affect the country. In practice, however, the matter may not be quite that simple. Although most experts attribute the fact that Malawi itself had to import maize for the first time in two decades during 1987 to bad weather and poor pricing policies, many Malawians feel it was not a coincidence that 1987 also witnessed the largest influx of refugees. The fact that maize had to be purchased on the international market, added to the severe constraints on foreign exchange — already stretched because of Malawi's high transport costs.

Some of the economic costs of having large numbers of refugees are less obvious, but pose a burden nonetheless. The large influx has exacerbated fiscal pressures, diverted scarce government managerial resources, and strained Malawi's limited social infrastructure. These include a heavier administrative burden (all refugee arrivals must be registered with the respective local authorities), the need to expand law-enforcement agencies, the drilling of boreholes for clean drinking water, the provision of proper sanitation, and strains on road links, health care and medical services, and educational facilities. Because of land pressure in Malawi, no Mozambicans have been allowed to farm, work, or sell handicrafts, as they may flood the local market. Joël Boutroue says that the UNHCR and the Malawi government have been hammering out an integrated rural development programme to provide employment for the refugees, without prejudicing Malawi and raising the standards of the local population at the same time. Among the proposals being implemented are large capital investment projects such as land reclamation and irrigation to squeeze as much as possible out of existing resources; rapid reforestation in view of the alarming rate at which trees are being felled in the refugee camp areas; road-building in order to improve distribution networks; and agricultural development to further enhance local self-sufficiency in food production, now under increasing strain. But, although an international aid programme is in place to assist the refugees, the funds and food coming in do not prevent them from becoming a serious drain on the economy.

Conclusion

Both the refugee and transport problems have served to almost cripple an already vulnerable economy. Moreover, the Paris and London Club debt reschedulings and IMF standby facilities may stave off total disaster and show continuing foreign confidence, but they do nothing to improve living standards, effectively restructure the export-dependent economy or feed Malawians, let alone a Mozambican refugee population expected to total 840 000 by the end of the year. And overhanging the atmosphere of economic despondency are the ever-darkening clouds of political uncertainty as jockeying for the succession continues. Imaginative economic planning or entrepreneurial initiative cannot exist in an uncertain or unfavourable political environment. Until the succession issue is finally and satisfactorily resolved, Malawi therefore seems set to drift from crisis to crisis.

Notes

Statistics on the general economy were gleaned from reports in:

Africa Economic Digest, vol 9, no 25, July, 1988
Africa Research Bulletin — Economic Series, vol 25, no 6, July, 1988
Africa Research Bulletin — Economic Series, vol 26, no 3, April, 1989
EASA — Trade and Investment in Eastern and Southern Africa, vol 2, no 11, August, 1988
EASA — Trade and Investment in Eastern and Southern Africa, vol 3, no 6, April, 1989
IMF Survey, vol 17, no 15, July, 1988
World Bank News, vol VII, no 26, June, 1988

Statistics on the refugee situation were obtained mainly in an interview on 27 April 1989 with Joël Boutroue, Programme Coordinator for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Blantyre.

Focus on the cities — Towards a new national agenda

*Ann Bernstein, Executive Director, Urbanization at the Urban Foundation, looks at the multifaceted nature of the urbanization process in South Africa, and analyses the vital political choices that have to be confronted if the urbanization challenge is to be met successfully.**

Introduction

The process of urbanization — the transformation of a society from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban culture — is of great significance for any society. In South Africa the rapid urbanization of black people will, we believe, have a profound influence on every aspect of our lives. The political, social, economic and cultural implications of the large and growing urban population concentrating in and around South Africa's largest cities will in time transform this society.

Over the past ten years or so, the reality of burgeoning black urbanization has become more visible throughout the country, and the inability of present policy, structures and attitudes to deal with this situation, increasingly apparent.

In the 1930s South Africa accommodated the large-scale rural-urban migration of white South Africans. Now, in the late 1980s, South Africa once again faces the challenge of an expanding population concentrating in urban areas, massive rural-urban migration and the consequent assimilation of newcomers into a changing urban environment. Today the process is complicated by four constraints: a history of racially discriminatory legislation; a backlog of deliberate decline in urban conditions; the relatively large numbers of people involved in the process; and — most important of all, especially when compared with white urbanization — the people who are urbanizing now do not have the franchise.

This article is based on a lecture delivered at the University of Cape Town Summer School in January 1989.

Why urbanization is important to South Africa

For most of this century, South African society has been structured to prevent large-scale black urbanization. In essence it was officially believed that the cities were for white people and that black South Africans were only "temporary sojourners" in these urban areas and should live in the predominantly rural reserves.

However, apartheid ideology has come increasingly into conflict with the reality of modern South Africa: a single interdependent economy; a growing and irreversible rate of urbanization; and the concomitant interdependence of black and white South Africans on each other. This conflict has led to a change in official rhetoric and in some aspects of policy, such as the recognition of the permanence of black people in the South African urban economy and the tentative exploration of the legal, practical, social and political ramifications of that recognition.

The implications of further changing policy in South Africa — of really accepting black citizenship — are immense. What is involved is a fundamental reassessment of the way in which policy is formulated, power is allocated and development is managed. A new urbanization strategy for the country *must* be based on freedom of movement and full citizenship for all.

It is vital that South Africa be changed into a country where race does not determine opportunity; where development — urban and rural — is for all the country's citizens and not racially based; and where cities are managed in order to facilitate access and opportunity rather than exclusion, denial and restriction.

A new, non-racial and positive urbanization strategy will necessarily involve the restructuring of some of the major political, legal, social and economic institutions in this society. Managing the process of urbanization effectively and productively will entail *fundamental* structural change in the traditional way we do things. For example, we will need to ask (and answer) such questions as: who owns what land, who lives in what part of town, who has access to resources, who governs, who implements, who has homes, who gets services and who is employed?

In short, developing a new urbanization strategy is an important, large and ambitious endeavour. It is possibly the most significant way of taking up the challenge of transforming this society from "where we are" to "where we would like to be".

Developing a new urbanization strategy

The development of a new urbanization strategy for South Africa has to be viewed as a process and not a single event. The reality of South African politics makes it inevitable that the myriad issues involved in managing the urbanization process can only be tackled sequentially, despite the fact that this will delay results and frustrate the millions of people directly involved. However, this would appear to be unavoidable — as in other areas of South African life, there is no "quick fix".

One can identify at least three overlapping but separable areas of concern in which appropriate policy will form the substance of a new urbanization strategy. Some of the issues involved have already been debated, many others are not yet on the establishment's national agenda. Observation of South African policy-making and politics suggests that the composition of a new urbanization strategy will be handled in three core phases.

The first phase was initiated after 1976 when the entire debate on *the irreversibility of black urbanization* was opened up within the establishment. This phase could be said to have culminated in the legislation of June 1986 abolishing influx control and partially restoring the South African citizenship of certain groups of black people.

The second phase, the substance of which was always inherent in the debates on the abolition of influx control but is now more clearly focussed, is characterized by a multi-faceted debate concerning *where and how black urbanization should occur*. It is only when this question has been satisfactorily resolved that a number of current disputes (forced removals, shack demolitions, Group Areas Act, and so on) will fall away.

The third phase, again implicit in the debates that will have to occur on the location and method of urbanization, concerns decision-making: *who formulates policy on urbanization*, who implements such policy, and what priority is this allocated in national expenditure?

Of course, there is nothing inevitable about movement from one phase to the next in this complicated process of developing a new and effective urbanization strategy. In fact, any assumption of such a smooth linear progression towards the desired end will lead to a misinterpretation of precisely what progress has indeed been made and what battles still remain to be fought before the quality of people's lives will really be improved on a mass scale. Progress in removing the many discriminatory obstacles to an effective approach will depend on two factors: the inevitable realities of the urbanization process; and strategic coordinated intervention in policy-making by a number of key actors.

Phase One: Towards freedom of movement for all South Africans

Since the mid-1970s, and particularly after the events of Soweto and elsewhere in 1976, the rigid Verwoerdian approach to the presence, conditions and future of black people living in urban areas began to disintegrate. In its place emerged a hesitant acceptance of the permanence of black people in the "white" urban areas of South Africa. This reversal of the previous ideology and approach culminated in the *President's Council's Report on Urbanization*, the *White Paper on Urbanization* and finally the Abolition of Influx Control Act in 1986. *The White Paper on Urbanization* is an important document. While its importance should not be overstated, neither should its significance be underestimated. After a decade of tentative and often backward movement — the repeated attempts to "improve" influx control, for instance — it represents the critical and decisive first step in unleashing the larger debate about a new approach to urbanization in South Africa.

The major achievement of the *White Paper* is that it paved the way for the abolition of the laws and regulations that comprise the influx control system. In addition, it rejected the President's Council's notion of "approved accommodation"; recognized that informal settlement is an inevitable part of urban growth and formally stated government acceptance of the inevitability and irreversibility of black urbanization. The remainder of the document consists of a restatement of existing government policy (with all its contradictions) in relevant areas — the Group Areas Act, decentralization, deconcentration of metropolitan areas, housing policy and so on. Within this restatement of existing apartheid policy, there are hints of possible new and positive directions for future policy — for example, recognition of the critical role in economic and urban growth of the metropolitan areas and the need for large-scale provision of land, and the necessity to reduce the present travelling time between workplace and residence for black people.

The Abolition of Influx Control Act gave legislative effect to the intentions, and perhaps the contradictions, of the *White Paper*. The heart of the Act repealed the formidable array of laws and regulations that curtailed the movement of black South Africans in urban and rural South Africa. It is important to note that there was nothing inevitable about this step. Another possibility discussed at the time was the extension of influx control to all citizens, albeit on a theoretically non-discriminatory basis. Instead, influx control for South African citizens was unambiguously abolished and the Riekert notion, supported in part by the President's Council's recommendation of "approved accommodation" or a plot of land as a requirement for movement into the city, was rejected. The abolition of influx control means that black South Africans are no longer divided by the law into urban "insiders" and rural "outsiders"; it is now possible, in principle at least, for families and dependents to join the family breadwinner in the city. South African migrant workers and commuters, until now excluded from full participation in a free labour market, now have access with all other workers to economic opportunities. In short, the Act repealed the complex legislative structure governing the entry of black South Africans into urban areas, their presence and employment therein and their removal therefrom.

The Abolition of Influx Control Act also amended the Slums Act (to make its provisions applicable in black areas) and the Illegal Squatting Act. The amendments to the latter legislation provide for increased penalties and for the designation of land by the relevant minister for "controlled squatting". The Illegal Squatting Act has always exhibited a negative attitude to the phenomenon of informal settlement. Its general thrust was based on the assumption that such settlement is undesirable and should therefore be prevented. However, the new section allowing the minister to designate areas for controlled informal settlements could be seen either as a mechanism of forced removals or as a positive measure to allow informal settlement.

Citizenship

There is one major caveat to the abolition of influx control. The government has linked freedom of movement to South African citizenship, but when the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei took "independence", some nine million black South Africans lost their South African citizenship. The 1986 Restoration of South African Citizenship Act enabled some of these people to reclaim their South African citizenship, but only if they could prove "permanent residence" in South Africa. The authorities estimate that some 1,75 million people will qualify for the restoration of their citizenship. This means that government intends to restore citizenship to less than a fifth of the people who lost it.

The position of TBVC people who are not able to regain South African citizenship is uncertain and the actions of the authorities have not clarified the situation. Ministerial corrections have followed formal departmental press conferences, and official letters outlining the new obligations of employees and employers have contained legal inconsistencies. Our best assessment of the situation, and this comes after some eight months of intensive research by legal experts and others, is that TBVC citizens do not require any permission to be in the Republic. This is only because of an exemption which has been made in terms of Section 7 (bis) of the Aliens Act. However, there are still uncertainties as to whether TBVC citizens are legally obliged to obtain work permits to work in the Republic. Initially the Department of Home Affairs said that they were, now it is equivocal on the subject — stating that they are not obliged to obtain work permits but are obliged to go through a series of migrant-like requirements prescribed in the interstate agreements between South Africa and each of the homelands. According to legal experts, there is some doubt as to whether TBVC citizens can lawfully be required either to obtain work permits or to go through the migrant labour system while the exemption to Section 7 (bis) remains in force.

What we have here is a typical South African conundrum, which is, however, a tragedy for the people involved. Theoretically all that is required to resolve the matter is the automatic restoration of South African citizenship to all TBVC citizens. Their citizenship was automatically taken away from them and it can be automatically restored. The South African government rejects such a step on the grounds that it would belittle the sovereignty of the four independent homelands. It has chosen instead to negotiate the grant of dual citizenship to TBVC citizens permanently resident within those countries. However, it refuses in this case to treat each homeland as a separate entity and instead insists on dealing with all four homelands jointly — a rather strange position if these are indeed independent states. In addition there are certain homeland governments that claim that they will not allow dual citizenship for their citizens "because of the race discrimination existing in South Africa".

This is a serious matter for millions of people. In summary, while some 14 million black South African citizens have indeed acquired a new freedom of movement through the abolition of influx control, some 6–9 million TBVC citizens who cannot prove rights to permanent residence in the RSA are currently in a position of considerable uncertainty and perhaps greater disadvantage than before as regards access to the South African job market.

Phase Two: Where and how should black urbanization occur?

Whereas prior to the *White Paper on Urbanization* one had first to persuade decision-makers that the process of black urbanization was inevitable, irreversible and desirable for economic growth and an improved quality of life, the debate now shifts to a new terrain. Where and how should black urbanization take place? This seemingly technical question is, in fact, inherently political and presently the subject of real dispute.

The traditional policy of separate development encompasses a wide range of sub-policies. These include:

- homeland development and urban growth supported by the industrial decentralization policy;
- controls over the movement of TBVC citizens coupled with remaining restrictions on the development of housing in the "white" urban areas;
- constraints on the economic growth and spatial expansion of the large metropolitan areas linking into both the decentralization and urban deconcentration policy, which are geared towards points chosen to buttress the homeland policy rather than regional development;
- the Group Areas Act and other legislation which confine black settlement, economic development and use of facilities to restricted, isolated parts of the large and small urban areas;
- and the forced removals policy, the Land Acts and homeland consolidation, all of which combine to exclude black ownership an occupation from the bulk of the South African land area.

All these policies influence where urbanization is taking place today.

In "white" South Africa black urban growth is found in segregated formal urban townships in the metropolitan areas and small towns; in backyard shacks in these townships; in informal settlements in and around the formal townships; in free-standing informal settlements on vacant urban and peri-urban land; and in illegal residence in the white suburbs of the large metropolitan areas. In the "homelands" urban growth occurs in formal township developments; large, generally informal, settlements on the borders of white urban areas (for example Winterveld, KwaNdebele, Inanda, Botshabelo); and in closer settlement areas far removed from formal economic and urban centres, but where people live in very dense conditions and do not derive the bulk of their income from agriculture. The effect of the overlapping, intertwined structure of apartheid has not been to prevent urbanization, but to distort its form, influence its location and disguise its magnitude. If one defines "urban" more appropriately than in the 1980 census, some 51 per cent of the black population throughout the country is urbanized.

Since the publication of the *White Paper on Urbanization* and the abolition of influx control there have been a number of events whose interpretation can be related back not only to the wider political situation, but also to the question of where black urbanization should occur and to government attempts to influence this. These events include:

- The demolition (or the threatened demolition) of settlements — predominantly informal — in cities throughout the country: for example, Crossroads and KTC in the Cape; Kabah in Uitenhage; Red Location in Port Elizabeth; Wielers Farm in the PWV; Oukasie near Brits.
- The recurrence of the forced removals policy, whereby black communities are forcibly removed from land they have owned or occupied in South Africa for decades and re-located into (or on the border of) a homeland.
- Inhibiting the freedom of movement of TBVC citizens, thus confining millions of people to an urbanization pattern of single migrancy and insecurity in the cities or to informal settlements on the borders of white South Africa.
- The implementation of the Guide Planning process, where totally inadequate amounts of land are allocated for black settlement in the heart of the country's largest metropolitan areas. The thrust of the planning document confirms the policy of restricting the economic growth of the cities and encouraging future urban and economic growth to places on the periphery of existing urban areas.
- The re-emergence of the "city state" concept as the solution to black political and constitutional demands.

Although there is no longer unanimity and certainty concerning the approach, the government's attitude to urbanization is still influenced by apartheid principles. These can be identified as follows:

- The existing metropolitan areas are too big and further black urban settlements should be restricted and redirected wherever possible.
- Urban development must continue to be racially segregated.
- Economic growth is to be induced in uneconomic locations on the peripheries of the cities and in the rural areas.
- The location and pace of black urbanization is to be controlled through restricted access to land and serviced sites in selected areas, through a generally negative response to informal urban settlement, and through the provision of subsidized rental housing in decentralization and deconcentration points.
- A very large part of the black population will continue to be confined to some 13 per cent of the land area — the homelands.
- The white rural areas will have little role to play in the development needs of the black community.
- Homeland development will take precedence over comprehensive national urban and economic development.

The government's traditional policy encourages urbanization away from the metropolitan areas to the homeland border or fringe settlements and the decentralization or industrial growth points, including homeland capitals and other towns. If one looks at the urban areas, it becomes apparent that the Group Areas Act, the Black Communities Development Act and the decentralization and deconcentration policies restrict black settlement and growth to segregated, confined townships and then push additional black settlement away from the heart of the city to the periphery of the metropolitan area. Urbanization can occur, but not in the metropolitan heart of the country. This approach to urbanization strategy and urban policy has five consequences:

- It avoids the facts concerning where the vast bulk of black urbanization is actually occurring, irrespective of the wishes of the ideological policy-makers.
- It denies the reality of the nature of South African economic growth and the inevitable spatial consequences of that form of growth.
- It creates an urbanization process and pattern that has all the bad features of rapid urbanization and none of the positive. Unless urbanization occurs organically in the large urban centres, the society will fail to capitalize on the benefits of increased urban agglomeration and the urbanizing individual will be denied access to the opportunities and benefits of urban life.
- It ensures that the impact of rapid urban growth falls most heavily on those public authorities (homeland governments, black local authorities) least able to deal with the necessary economic, technological and management demands required to create, maintain and improve complex urban environments.
- It diverts public money in an inefficient allocation of resources through the expensive industrial decentralization policy and homeland development policy.

This then is the content and scope of the government's broad and traditional policy approach. However, as I noted at the outset of this article, present policy is failing to cope with the realities of modern South Africa. Thus we find ourselves in an era of transition where some policies are being reassessed and adapted. It is important to note three areas of some change.

Group Areas

One of the changes was embodied in the controversial Free Settlement Areas Act, which provides for a bureaucratic process whereby selected areas can become legally "open" to non-racial residential settlement. This is a mechanism designed to cope with the growing number of inner-city "grey" areas, but is seen by government as a means of dealing with the exceptions to the desired norm of segregated living areas, rather than as the forerunner of a "normalized" society.

Informal settlement

Although considerable controversy has surrounded the proposed Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill, nevertheless there have been indications of positive changes in attitude among officials and politicians concerning informal settlement. From the early 1970s to the late 1980s, we have seen a change in the nature of the debate. As a generalization, officials are no longer arguing that "we must demolish the shacks and send these people back to where they came from". Today the debate concerns how informal settlement should be managed *in* South Africa's cities. That shift — however much delayed — is a change of fundamental importance.

Land

Finally, there does appear to be some momentum developing within selected metropolitan areas concerning the identification of land for black settlement.

The Urban Foundation's position on the location of urbanization is straightforward. On the basis of a great deal of international and South African research we would argue as follows.

Since the early 1980s there has been a significant shift in how the international community views large cities. It is now recognized that policies to divert growth away from the large cities have almost universally failed and that the cities of the Third World have coped considerably better than was initially anticipated.

Deflecting urbanization away from the metropolitan areas has tremendous costs of its own.

South African cities are small by international standards and should be allowed to expand. Attention should focus on how best to manage these urban centres rather than on curbing their expansion.

Informal settlement must be recognized as an efficient, affordable and prolific form of housing. The thrust of public policy must be towards the preservation and upgrading of all forms of shelter and not their demolition. The key question for rapidly urbanizing societies concerns how to respond to millions of people's needs *on scale*.

South African cities face the challenge of generating an increasing capacity to absorb a large and growing population and promote their productivity by creating the employment opportunities, the infrastructure and the services necessary for this purpose. In addition, the cities must overcome the negative consequences of the apartheid legacy and its effect on urban structural form and quality of life. In the context of this immense challenge, South Africa must move away from determining its urban policy in racial terms. Urban policy should be guided by three overriding concerns:

- providing access on a mass scale for a very large urban population to employment, shelter and other urban services;
- ensuring that poorer sections of the community are increasingly incorporated into the urban system;
- and ensuring that the management of the cities is politically legitimate — and effective in maintaining the cities as the centres of economic growth, innovation and vitality in the society generally.

None of this will occur if South Africa continues to think about urban management in racial terms. This means we must move away from the racial zoning of land and housing and from a racially constituted form of local government.

Phase Three: Who decides on urbanization policy?

It is not desirable or even necessary that this question should be handled last. Logically, and preferably, it should have been resolved at the outset, but political reality is likely to dictate that the question of who decides on urbanization policy and priorities will only be fully discussed at some later date. This is not to suggest that the question has not yet been asked — it has, and in a number of different ways. What I am suggesting is that it is unlikely to be tackled in full — let alone resolved — at this time.

This question of the locus of decision-making needs to be attacked at a number of levels. At the individual level people are already challenging the dictates of the authorities. This can be seen in the defiance of the pass laws before their repeal; in the creation of shelter in unauthorized locations; in the creation of jobs without official permission; and in the growing evidence of black occupation of so-called "white" housing.

At the community level we are witnessing a desire for, and on issues of dispute a demand for, community participation in the decisions taken concerning their future. Examples range from community resistance to forced removals and subsequent initiatives in formulating proposals for *in situ* upgrading as an alternative; communal occupation of unauthorized land; and the creation of community-wide informal services and representation.

The next level is that of local government — the key institutional agent necessary to manage urban growth effectively. In this arena the last four years have witnessed the rejection by popular community groups throughout much of the country of the local government system imposed on them.

At a national level, the demand by all nation-wide black organizations for the franchise implicitly raises the question of who decides on the content of South African's new urbanization strategy and its place in the nation's priorities.

To summarize then, the development of a new urbanization strategy in South Africa is a complex process. I have argued that this process will be sequential, marked by at least three phases covering themes that overlap and interconnect. The satisfactory resolution of all the issues in each of these themes will be necessary before South Africa will have an effective, new and positive urbanization strategy. This new strategy can only be built on:

- Freedom of movement and full citizenship for all South Africans including people from the TBVC areas.
- Increased urban concentration throughout the country as a whole and within the towns and cities themselves. This means the reversal of race discrimination in the ownership and occupation of all urban and rural land in South Africa; the reversal of the ideological approach to industrial decentralization and urban deconcentration; and ultimately the reversal of the independent homeland policy. It is only when these policy changes are made that the urban and rural sectors will be able to play their full part in the development of all the country's citizens and that the shortage of land for settlement in existing urban areas will start to be tackled seriously on scale.
- Full, meaningful and equal participation of all South Africans at all levels of decision-making.

Conclusion

South Africa today faces three major challenges. The first is the economic challenge to increase our rate of growth and development in such a way as to provide millions of new jobs for a large and growing population. The second challenge concerns urbanization. Our society must make maximum use of the dynamics of the black urbanization process so as to make the phenomenon "an instrument of national development and personal betterment". The third challenge is a political one. It is the task of building an inclusive non-racial democracy, thus creating the institutions able to make the continuous choices necessary to meet the economic development challenge and provide the mechanisms to manage urban growth.

All three of these demands are highlighted in the challenges facing South Africa's urban areas. The three national demands — increased economic growth and massive job creation, rapid urbanization, and the challenge of building an inclusive democracy — all come together at the fulcrum of the nation, in the cities.

The attention of the national decision-makers should be turned to these cities, their place in the social structure, how they should be managed and governed, and the inter-relationship of sound urban growth with healthy rural and regional development.

The cities

The first requirement for a new urban policy is a *major conceptual breakthrough*. In the early 1980s the conceptual challenge was to change the way in which the state thought about urbanization. There had to be movement away from a government position which saw urbanization — particularly black urbanization — as an evil to be prevented at all costs, to the position almost universally held today by those to the left of the Conservative Party, that urbanization is inevitable, irreversible and (more grudgingly) is "also desirable". The conceptual breakthrough now required is in our attitude to the cities.

South Africa's cities are leading the country towards the future. It is in the urban areas that the challenge of urbanization is increasingly obvious and that the failure of racial policies and approaches is so evident; it is here that the consequences of that failure manifest themselves so harshly, visibly and violently; and it is here that a new society encompassing 35 million South Africans is being forged.

As South Africa moves towards the year 2000, the cities are playing their historic role as *vehicles for modernity*. This role must be recognized, it must be encouraged and it must be managed in such a way as to respond positively to the challenge of urbanization. South Africans brought up to believe in the inherent advantages of a rural past must begin to face the future. That future is an urban one and it is spearheaded by South Africa's largest and most productive cities. The cities are our key mechanism for coping effectively with urbanization, for they provide the core environment in which economic growth must occur, expand and provide jobs and in which the benefits of urban agglomeration — such as all-night chemists, modern sewerage systems, big department stores and opera houses — must become available to an expanding population. South African cities are today at the crossroads. They face two serious obstacles: the negative consequences of apartheid and racial segregation for the structure and functioning of our cities and the impact these have had on race relations and the urban economy; and the belated recognition of black urbanization and of the millions of South Africans who must now be fully integrated into our urban society, economy, service networks and all the other benefits of urban living.

The question now is whether our cities are going to be overwhelmed by the growing, but as yet mainly unmet, needs of an expanding urban population, or are we going to harness the inevitable process of growth and urbanization so as to manage it productively and to the benefit of all South Africans.

The international experience is mixed. It shows that some Third World cities have failed to respond to the reality of urbanization and are increasingly unable to function efficiently or equitably. The costs of this failure are borne most heavily by the urban poor, but also by the country as a whole, since cities that do not function efficiently will hinder national economic recovery and growth. And yet other cities in the developing world have coped remarkably well with an expanding population and have indeed been able to improve the quality of life for millions of urban dwellers.

Are we as a nation willing to change our attitude to the cities and radically adapt our policies so that our urban areas can change from cities of exclusion, restriction, control and, in some instances, economic decline to cities of opportunity, expansion and economic growth for all?

How do we do this: how do we make ours cities of opportunity and growth? We will need to deal with a number of interrelated issues. Let me mention a selection of ten key issues we will need to think about.

Is it possible to meet the challenge of urbanization if we persist with racial thinking on urban issues? Rapid urbanization places any society under pressure. The need for jobs, services, shelter and access to facilities grows more quickly than existing institutions have been designed to accommodate. All urbanizing societies are in a race against time, for every day that passes, more people are being born in or moving to the city. Responding to this major transformation is difficult in the best of circumstances.

To spend time debating whether a black South African may live next to a white South African is precious time wasted on the wrong problems altogether. This is not the key issue confronting our city managers today, for they face the enormous task of managing cities that will more than double in population in the period between 1980 and the year 2000. They must concentrate on the provision of jobs, services, facilities and the creation of institutions capable of meeting the large-scale challenge of urbanization and its implications.

The second issue we will have to resolve can be encapsulated in the question: Whose city is this, who governs and in whose interests do they rule? All South African areas have boundaries which are politically and not functionally derived. Our cities are racially divided and government and administrative structures flow from that division rather than from functional criteria. This has serious implications for each and every urban area, and the consequences — economic, political, financial, administrative, and so on — are far-ranging.

Who is planning for the city as a whole, and who do they represent? How do we plan effectively for cross-cutting, interlinking, large and expanding urban regions which are racially separated and administratively divided? How do we ensure effective representation of community viewpoints? How do we test the planners' understanding of what is best for people, as against people's knowledge of what is best for them? How does one plan the effective provision of facilities if officials must ignore the illegal black residents of "white" suburbs? Who is planning for a future that includes all the city's inhabitants?

What is our guiding image for the city? Is it the old conception of a colonial town combining neat First World suburbs with far removed migrant accommodation? Or is it a future-orientated image of the city — a city which works as a thriving urban entity, combining its skilled and unskilled components, its formal and informal settlements in a creative and growing synergy?

Do we manage our urban areas as environments for economic growth? Cities are competing with each other —

nationally and internationally — for the attraction of investment resources. The cities need to be managed so as to emphasize their comparative advantage as an efficient and desirable environment for economic growth, for this is the necessary base to provide opportunities for an expanding population.

Are we geared to respond to the scale of urban population growth? Do we have policies and urban institutions capable of responding to the future? A future characterized by new issues (such as informal housing and basic service delivery), new methods (such as incorporating community involvement in building and community decision-making in planning) and unprecedented numbers (our cities will at least double in population between the years 1980 and 2000).

Are our cities and their managements sufficiently expansion-orientated? Are we thinking big enough and far enough ahead to meet the growing challenge of rapid urbanization?

Do we understand the difference between executing some development projects and the process of managing urban growth? We need to move away from a few good projects that create "islands of privilege" in a "sea of poverty", to understanding the process of urbanization so that we can pinpoint the essential areas of intervention, to ensure that the city performs better. Projects must be conceived and situated within city-wide policy frameworks and programmes that tackle the development problems of the city as a whole.

Is there an increasing disjuncture between the "legal" city (formal planning rules, regulations, zoning, and the like) and the "real" city (informal jobs, informal settlements, "grey areas", and so on)? What does this mean for the city — its structure, economic development and accessibility for all its citizens? The new suburbs of Cape Town are in Khayelitsha and the shacks of the Cape Flats are not problems to be demolished, for they provide prolific and affordable shelter that must be preserved and upgraded. The squatters are in fact South Africa's new city-builders, and we need to think through the implications of this reality. The wrong response is to ignore this phenomenon and thus condemn people to whatever they can provide for themselves in the most insecure circumstances imaginable.

Do we consider sufficiently how policies will impact upon the poor? The development experience is clear. Unless one focusses specifically on the incorporation of poor people, and on opening access for such people, they will continue to be excluded and denied opportunities. As the city grows, the competition for resources of all kinds will increase. We need to look closely at each sector in the urban economy and service provision network to ensure that the poor — by definition those who have least access to everything — are gaining increased access to the opportunities of urban agglomeration.

Is there sufficient leadership on urban issues? The challenges facing the cities are essentially political challenges. National and local leadership must seek to develop popularly accepted and effective processes and ultimately institutions that will develop, and then communicate a shared vision of the future. This vision must be inclusive of all citizens; be built on democratic decision-making and participatory processes; be realistic about the scale of the challenge we face; and must focus on economic growth and on opening opportunities for the poor.

These are only some of the questions we will have to answer and implement if we are to create a new national agenda for the cities and thus have an effective urban policy in South Africa.

Informal settlements in African cities

Frik de Beer, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Development Administration and Politics at the University of South Africa, discusses the positive role that could be played by informal settlements, performance standards and incremental construction in seeking a solution to Africa's urban housing problem.

Introduction

The term "self-help housing" is currently very much in vogue in South Africa. Government professes it as though it were the new found gospel. Utility companies as well as private sector concerns see it as a way to assist the poor in helping themselves, or as a means of getting a slice of the housing cake. Regardless of the merits or disadvantages of the term, or whether everyone agrees on its definition, self-help housing is promoted vigorously. In the face of a growing demand for urban housing and the obvious inability of government to meet this need, the present emphasis on self-help housing could probably have been predicted.

It is not a new concept, however — not even in South African terms. What is new in South Africa is the government's viewpoint that this approach offers the opportunity to contribute significantly to meeting the demand for urban housing. The experience of African countries with self-help housing and squatter upgrading may hold some lessons for South Africa. We would be well advised to take heed of those lessons before pinning all our hopes on the "self-help solution".

**This article is based on an earlier unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on Population Development in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, October 1988.*

In contemplating the African situation a few factors need to be taken into account: rural deprivation, the consequent rapid urbanization and concomitant growth of informal settlements in African cities; the relative lack of employment opportunities as well as the overwhelming incidence of poverty; and the financial inability of governments to meet the demand for urban housing. These factors led African governments (often prompted by inducements from aid agencies) to replace their former "bulldozer" strategies with more humane and economically sounder policies. South Africa experiences many of the same circumstances referred to above and may find some lessons from the African experience in addressing the housing question.

Urbanization and informal settlements

It is often stated in academic papers that Africa is the least urbanized yet the fastest urbanizing continent in the world. This feat is shared with some South Asian nations which are expected to experience large increases in their urban populations during the following 20 to 30 years.[1] Latin America is now experiencing a decline in its rate of urbanization, since almost 70 per cent of its population is already living in urban areas. While about 30 per cent of Asia's population is now urbanized, in some East Asian nations, such as Japan, this figure exceeds 75 per cent.

In global terms, it is the countries of East, Central and West Africa that are experiencing the most rapid growth in their urban populations at present. More than half of the people of North and Southern Africa already live in urban areas.

PERCENTAGE OF AFRICA'S POPULATION URBANIZED, BY REGION[2]

	1970	1990	2005
East Africa	10,3%	21,5%	32,0%
Central Africa	24,8%	39,7%	51,4%
West Africa	17,6%	27,9%	38,6%
North Africa	36,5%	44,6%	53,8%
Southern Africa	44,1%	55,3%	63,6%

One of the consequences of rapid urbanization in Africa has been the enormous growth of informal or spontaneous settlements. At present, these settlements accommodate up to two-thirds of the urban population of African cities.[3] Insufficient housing, inadequate social services and a high incidence of unemployment are some of the characteristics of informal settlements.

"Man and beast beget, but land does not beget." Degradation of land in rural areas forces people to seek "greener pastures" in the cities

Juppenlatz describes these areas as ". . . a fungus growing out of the carapace of the city",[4] and a shocked Lévi-Strauss says that informal settlements are ". . . the urban phenomenon, reduced to its ultimate expression . . . filth, chaos, promiscuity, congestion: ruins, huts, mud, dirt: dung, urine . . .".[5] The typical Western reaction, reflected in the above quotations, could be expected. The fact is, however, that most people who live in informal settlements have very little, if any, choice in doing so. Few would share the above perception, because they are struggling to survive and are doing their best in a hostile environment.

Conditions in rural areas very often leave people no choice but to migrate to urban areas. The Xhosa phrase "men and beast beget, but land does not beget" perhaps best epitomizes the problem faced by Africa's rural population. While population density in Africa is low (18 per km^2)[6] the carrying capacity of the land is also low and, owing to various factors, is decreasing at an alarming rate. Food production has deteriorated to the extent that grain products have to be imported in an attempt to combat the malnutrition that affects 60 per cent of the African population south of the Sahara.[7] Fuel wood is becoming scarcer, resulting in women having to spend much more time in gathering wood.

The rural areas are experiencing two things simultaneously: the means for subsistence are being depleted, making the struggle for survival much more difficult; at the same time, population growth is constantly accelerating. Men beget but land does not increase. While the necessity for rural development may feature prominently in the rhetoric of politicians, the fact is that an urban bias still predominates in the spending of development aid. Thus, while more the more schools, clinics and other services are being provided in urban areas, the sparsely (yet often overpopulated and underserviced) rural areas are left neglected. In this situation many rural dwellers perceive cities as places of opportunity: places to find employment, better schools and more readily available medical care.

Those arriving in the city seldom find the land of milk and honey they may have expected. African cities developed primarily as colonial centres of administration and trade. While colonial administrators and businessmen were the generators and holders of power and wealth, little attention was paid to the development of an indigenous process of urbanization. On the contrary, various attempts were made to implement influx control. Africans who succeeded in finding jobs in the civil service or in commerce were generally housed in compounds or in heavily subsidized government houses. As a result of colonial domination, African cities were developed to a large degree along the lines of modern European "garden cities". After independence, the newly-created ruling class opted for a continuation of the former colonial policy on urbanization. Among the measures that this entailed were the eviction of people and the demolition of shacks and the imposition of high and often inappropriate building standards.

Nevertheless, informal settlements expanded rapidly, despite the efforts of African governments to curb their growth. Informal housing constituted one-third of Lusaka's housing in 1974,

Backyard squatting in Katlehong, Germiston. Up to four shacks may be erected in the backyard, providing the "landlord" with an additional income

Self-help housing. Living in a shack while the house is being built

while two-thirds of the new houses were being built as unauthorized housing.[8] In Nairobi, Kenya, 38 per cent of the population live in informal settlements, yet it is reported that 50 per cent of Nairobi's population cannot afford minimum standard housing — a house of 42 m^2 with reticulated water and sewage disposal, in a street with street-lighting.[9] The same tendency can be observed in South Africa. In 1983 more than 44 per cent of the black population in the Durban area was living in informal settlements,[10] while large squatter areas like Mshenguville (30 000 average population) spring up in places like Soweto.

In the early 1970s some African governments began to move away from their former "bulldozer" strategy. The emphasis was placed increasingly on self-help housing projects and on the upgrading of squatter (or informal) settlements. There were various reasons for this change of attitude.

Self-help housing: Pursuing a chimera?

Since time immemorial, people have assumed responsibility for finding shelter for themselves. In nineteenth century Europe people provided their own dwellings;[11] in rural Africa it is even today the practice for people to build their own houses.

The present upsurge in the interest in self-help housing in the Third World can be attributed to the pioneering work of men like Charles Abrams, Otto Koenigsberger and John Turner. Between 1952 and 1963 Abrams and Koenigsberger produced a series of reports on housing in various Third World countries — including Pakistan, Singapore and the Gold Coast (Ghana). In his seminal work on housing, which first appeared in 1963, Abrams laid the foundation for a school of thought that came to dominate the debate. On the subject of self-help housing Abrams declared:

> . . . it is preferable for the government to lay out and provide plots and utilities and *let each owner decide whether to use his own skills or hire others for all, most, or part of the work* (emphasis added).[12]

Already in the early 1960s, Abrams warned against the notion that self-help housing is a cure-all for the Third World's housing problem.[13] This warning is as relevant today as it was three decades ago. To imagine that all the poor in the cities have the time and ability to build their own homes is simply to expect too much from "self-help" housing; it is also to limit the meaning of the concept.

After researching the informal settlements of Latin America, John Turner declared that the inhabitants of those settlements succeeded in providing for their housing needs because they possessed autonomy of action:

> Autonomy in building environments means self-help — that is, self-determination at the local level where a person still retains his or her identity.[14]

Simply put, this means that the people were allowed a wide variety of choices to be able to create a living environment that is existentially meaningful to them. They were allowed relative freedom to choose where they wanted to stay; to build houses according to standards affordable as well as applicable to their situation; to build their houses (or have them built) incrementally — that is to say, to build and improve their dwellings as the means became available and the need arose. The role of government was to facilitate the initiative of people by designing an open system of housing provision. An open system, in short, means that government provides land, ownership of land, basic infrastructure

An "informal house". Self-planned, built and financed. The present three-roomed house will be extended and another bedroom and bathroom added once the owner can afford it and financial assistance and then allows people to build their own homes according to minimum standards.[15]

By allowing people "dweller autonomy" a situation of dependency can be overcome. According to some critics, self-help housing projects of the past tended to perpetuate dependency:

> In the housing situation, an undesirable dependency means that those who supply shelter are also the ones who decide how much shelter there should be, where it should be, and how it should function in the lives of essentially passive users.[16]

This is the main criticism levelled in the literature against self-help housing projects: they still leave the poor in Third World cities in a position of relative dependency. People are allowed some choices, standards are somewhat adapted and housing is provided more cheaply than in the open market, but the housing needs of the vast majority of Third World city-dwellers are still unattended to. As the discussion of case studies below will point out, these charges do hold water. The rhetoric of politicians and officials indicate a willingness to promote self-help in the sense of "dweller autonomy", yet in practice there is still a reluctance to implement fully the housing policies being proclaimed. In the words of Kalabamu, a "city beautiful" complex still predominates in the development of housing in Third World cities.[17]

"Informal housing". When they are allowed to, people can provide their own shelter, satisfying their needs and giving expression to their individuality

Self-help housing operationalized

Apart from the reality of inadequate housing in African cities, two external factors contributed towards the popularity and eventual acceptance of self-help housing as a partial solution to the "housing problem". Firstly, the World Bank, because of its substantial development aid programme, contributed in a real sense towards the acceptance of the approach by Third World governments. This acceptance was also facilitated by the 1976 Declaration of Principles, signed by 124 member countries and issued by the Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements.

This declaration includes the statements that basic needs have to be addressed in order to improve the quality of life; that the needs of the poorest should be addressed first; and that freedom of movement needs to be facilitated by a comprehensive land use plan. The declaration outlines the following guidelines for action: orderly urbanization should be promoted by integrated development; and qualitative standards should be applied in order to meet felt needs of people. One of the most important guidelines is that housing and services ought to be considered as:

> . . . a basic human right which places an obligation on Government to ensure their attainment by all people, beginning with direct assistance to the least advantaged through guided programmes of self-help and community action.[18]

However, it was the World Bank, through its financial support to African governments, that made the greatest contribution towards the acceptance of self-help housing as a definite policy option. Since the early 1970s the World Bank had begun to recognize urban development problems as an important issue to be addressed.[19] Subsequently much attention has been paid to urban — and especially self-help housing — projects.

For the World Bank, the idea of self-help housing is concerned principally with the utilization of scarce resources in the most economic way. The urban poor's contribution of initiative, capital and labour is regarded by the World Bank as a resource that, through proper planning, can be utilized to combat the housing problem in Third World cities. In this way, housing can be provided meaningfully and at the same time a contribution can be made towards economic development. Thus, the cost of providing houses is shared by the public, private and popular sectors, and the pressure exerted on the state for the provision of houses can be reduced.

Although the World Bank does not reject conventional solutions to the housing problem, it assumes that conventional solutions do not work in the present circumstances.[20] In reaction to its market analysis, the World Bank gives preference to site-and-service schemes and the upgrading of informal settlements, but if market conditions should change ". . . a recourse to conventional solutions would be fully acceptable to the World Bank".[21] Since there seems little prospect of this happening in the foreseeable future in African cities, one may expect the "self-help solution" to dominate the housing scene for quite some time.

Self-help housing: Some African case studies

The largest of the self-help housing projects undertaken by the World Bank in Africa were the "Lusaka upgrading and site and service project" in Zambia, the "National site and service project" better known as the "surveyed plots project" in Tanzania and the "Kariobangi Site and Service Scheme" in Nairobi, Kenya.[22]



Given the opportunity and the time, squatters can build houses that comply with high standards

These projects reflect an attempt by the authorities to come to grips with the reality of rapid urbanization as well as the inability of the state to supply the housing needs of an urbanized population. They also signify attempts to acknowledge the positive attributes of informal settlements. The fact that people can create dwellings at a fraction of the cost of "standard" housing, and that they are willing to accept lower (yet more applicable) standards are factors that African governments have to face. Governments can no longer deny or ignore the informal settlers' demands for (urban) services and rights of ownership.[23] Apart from their demands it should be acknowledged that, to a large extent, informal settlers provide their own livelihood as well as shelter. Therefore one has to agree with Yeh when he says:

> . . . a sound housing policy must accept that much slum and squatter housing represents a positive response by the poor to the lack of low-income housing.[24]

Zambia's *Second National Development Programme (SNDP) (1972–1976)* pertinently acknowledges the potentially positive role of informal settlements:

> . . . although squatter areas are unplanned, they nevertheless represent assets both in social and financial terms. The areas require planning and services and the wholesale demolition of good and bad houses alike is not a practical solution.[25]

In 1974 the SNDP was followed by the Housing (Statutory and Improvement) Act — legislation which made provision for the upgrading of informal settlements. Legislation passed in 1975, together with statements made by the Zambian President, however, made it clear that illegal settlements on unoccupied land would not be tolerated by the authorities[26] and in August 1982 the Zambian Prime Minister stated that:

> . . . the government is seeking ways to curb the mushrooming of shanty compounds around cities and towns . . . (and wants) to build better houses and flats for workers.[27]

Resentment against what appears to many to be inferior housing still runs high. After an upgrading project sponsored by the World Bank had been initiated in his town, the mayor of Eldoret, in Kenya, said that he was not in favour of such projects: "The houses that are built make it look as if the country were going backwards".[28] In Kenya's central and local government circles the fear also exists that upgrading and site-and-service schemes will lead to the spread and extension of this type of settlement.[29]

In Asia, too, the existence of informal settlements as a point of departure for the formulation of a housing policy is more often encountered in official rhetoric than in official planning documents. Prior to 1978 informal settlements were demolished on a large scale in Karachi, Pakistan. Since 1978, mainly because of political pressure from the inhabitants, these settlements have been legalized. Nevertheless Yap found that:

> Contrary to what critics of the self-help school assume, the government does not seem to be all that eager to execute the policy it has adopted, probably because it runs counter to the interests of other powerful groups in society.[30]

Although the views of the World Bank on the situation of the urban poor are reflected in policy documents of Third World countries, these sentiments are often contradicted in practice. Some officials and politicians still ignore the existence of informal settlements, refusing to recognize their potential for contributing to the development of urban societies. In 1979 a general election was held in Kenya. The electorate in the constituency in which the informal settlement of Mathare was situated, had a choice of two candidates. One was the ex-mayor of Nairobi, who, with a telling lack of political insight, advocated the selective demolition and redevelopment of the area. The other candidate, Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in favour of gradually upgrading the settlement. The latter won the election.[31]

In spite of the many statements made at national and international conferences, and of policy documents subscribing to the view that existing informal settlements should be the starting-point for a national housing policy, as well as numerous pilot projects for upgrading informal settlements and instituting site-and-service schemes on an experimental basis — and all the evidence of this being a positive approach — we cannot conclude that the contribution made by informal settlements towards the solution of the housing problem is reflected in housing policy or practice. Admittedly the era of indiscriminate demolition of settlements seems to be passing, as this strategy is no longer subscribed to internationally.

In fact, recognition is given in rhetoric to the positive role that informal settlements could play in the provision of housing.

However, it is often merely on an *ad hoc* basis that informal settlements are accepted and recognized by law. Only when a situation can no longer be kept under control by conventional methods and strategies does an informal settlement gain legal acceptance and recognition, often at the insistence of aid agencies. This gives rise to the ambivalent approach exhibited by countries such as Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya. In these countries existing informal settlements have been legalized and upgraded to a large extent, whereas some official statements and policy documents clearly reflect irritation with the situation.

Chemist/Nyanga. Even a tin shack can serve as a shop

Standards and incremental construction: Another lesson from informal settlements

The success achieved by informal settlements in providing accommodation for the poor is due to the fact that these settlements enable people to acquire, at an affordable price, the type of accommodation that will meet their basic needs. The use of appropriate standards and an incremental approach to home improvement in informal settlements forms the basis for this success.

These standards should make provision for housing that meets social and cultural needs and is suited to the local way of life, customs and climate.[32] All the low-cost housing projects undertaken in Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya seem to have recognized the principle of appropriate standards. The Fourth National Development Plan (1981–1985) of Nigeria follows suit, and makes provision for realistic designs and the use of local building materials.[33]

The recognition of the necessity of establishing standards different from those prevailing in a former era is closely linked to realizing the positive elements of informal settlements. It is also connected with the international aid agencies' acceptance of lower standards as a means of providing affordable housing. In its "Housing sector policy paper", for example, the World Bank states:

> . . . if standards are set too high for existing income levels, . . . their primary effect will be to push down the living standards of the poor by reducing the amount of housing available at prices they can afford.[34]

Trading in Winterveld. Self-generated employment provides many people with an income

Incremental construction is linked to appropriate standards. The majority of houses in the informal settlements of the Third World are built piecemeal, to meet increasing needs as money becomes available.[35] It is evident from Laquian's evaluation of housing projects in Senegal, Zambia, El Salvador and the Philippines that incremental construction is considered to be an integral part of the projects in these areas.[36] The housing policy makes provision for it and attempts are made to implement appropriate standards and incremental construction. Unfortunately, however, the recognition given to appropriate standards and incremental construction also remains largely rhetorical.

In spite of official intention, rhetoric and attempts to implement low-cost housing in practice, claims are nevertheless made that low-cost housing is still beyond the means of the poor. In a report in *People*, Mwanza, writing about the "National Housing Authority" of Zambia, claims that its "so-called low-cost houses have remained beyond the reach of an average worker".[37] Statements by politicians and officials and substantial research results all support this view. For example, declarations of policy and official intent indicating that appropriate standards will be recognized are contradicted in other statements and in the practical implementation of housing policy.

The lack of basic services in informal settlements constitutes a health hazard

At a meeting of the town council of Morogoro, Tanzania, for example, a cautionary note was sounded:

> Houses to be built in the surveyed plot areas should comply with the prevailing standards of the area, dictated by the building regulations.[38]

Tanzania's building regulations are based on those of the 1930s.[39] At the end of 1981 the Tanzanian government for the first time published a comprehensive policy on housing, which became known as the "New National Housing Policy". Kalabamu is critical of the emphasis placed in this policy on the granting of medium and long-term rights of ownership. According to him these forms of ownership cause housing developers to be subjected to stringent regulations and standards. This reinforces the elitist preference for beautiful cities.[40]

The emphasis on the house construction process advocated in the new policy is a further indication of this attitude in spite of the rhetoric on squatter upgrading and site-and-service programmes launched more than a dozen years ago.[41] According to Kabagambe and Moughtin the skills of a qualified builder are required in order to be able to meet the standards demanded for the housing projects in Kenya, as these are too high for the do-it-yourself builder.[42] The low standards suggested in Kenya for the Dandora project failed to secure the approval of the Nairobi Town Council, and after some negotiation a compromise was reached. As a result the first part of the Dandora project (1 000 stands) was completed in accordance with the lower standards. However, for the second part of the project and for subsequent projects the standard was raised.[43]

The approach followed in the Lusaka project seems to have given more recognition to appropriate standards and incremental construction. According to Martin standards were purposely kept low.[44] For example, participants in the project were allowed to plan the lay-out of the settlement, and to use sun-dried clay bricks for building and wooden slats instead of glazed frame windows. In most cases it was found that participants in the project voluntarily accepted and applied higher standards.

Rakodi's findings, however, contradict the rosy picture painted by Martin. She found that the standards which were applied in the housing project ". . . mean that this option is suitable for the middle rather than the lowest income ranges".[45]

From the above discussion we can conclude that although appropriate standards and incremental construction are recognized in rhetoric and sometimes even reflected in policy approaches, their implementation in practice has met with only partial success. Opposition from the authorities is still being encountered, and it appears that policies are not implemented wholeheartedly in practice. An analysis of this situation shows, however, that the main objection seems to be that where lower standards have in fact been applied, they have nevertheless remained inappropriate and have merely served to place housing beyond the reach of those in need of cheap and safe housing.

The ambivalence about the recognition of the potentially positive role informal settlements can play in informing housing policy is also apparent, therefore, in respect of standards and incremental construction. In the rhetoric and even in documents on policy and planning, the acceptance of appropriate standards and the practice of incremental construction is professed, but in comparing public speeches with the implementation of the declared policy certain discrepancies become evident.

Mulenga's statement encapsulates the challenge facing Third World governments:

> The solution to the urban housing problem can only be formulated by accepting

Water — at 2 cents a litre, a valuable load to be transported over long distances

> the reality of a rapidly urbanizing population and accepting the tremendous resource constraints we have in tackling the problem.[46]

Officials and politicians still seem to be disinclined to accept the challenge. The current cost of legitimate housing in urban Kenya that complies with the minimum standards determined ". . . places the acquisition of such housing beyond the financial means of large — perhaps majority — sections of the urban population".[47] In spite of pronouncements in favour of appropriate standards, and of existing policy documents and various pilot projects, appropriate standards and the promotion of incremental construction are not afforded the maximum recognition in the housing policy of Third World countries. The "city beautiful" complex identified by Kalabamu is probably still one of the main stumbling blocks in the way of implementing a policy with regard to appropriate standards and incremental construction. This policy has at least been given lip-service and in some instances has been embodied in policy documents. An increase in the demand for housing and the consequent political pressure on governments could eventually contribute to more considered attempts to implement a policy which requires appropriate standards.

Being a landlord and a businessman in an informal settlement has its advantages

The South African case

The situation in South Africa is remarkably similar to that in other African countries. Officials and government spokespersons acknowledge the need to use informal settlements to overcome the housing shortage. Likewise they emphasize the need for appropriate standards. In practice, however, it is the lower-middle and middle class black population that benefits from the very real shift in government policy on urbanization and housing.

After 1976, the government began to realize the fallacy of homeland development and the vanity of their attempts to keep "white" South Africa clear of blacks. A protracted drought during the 1980s as well as a general lack of real economic development in the homelands, led to an ever-increasing flow of migrants to urban centres. Among the important policy changes that resulted were: acceptance of the fact that the authorities could not supply the total demand for urban housing; and the partial abolition of influx control and the concomitant introduction of a policy of "orderly urbanization".

The various forces at work have created a situation where South African cities are increasingly assuming the appearance of other African cities: a wealthy core surrounded by haphazardly built and often illegal squatter or informal settlements. According to De Vos 56,4 per cent of the black population cannot afford, without being subsidized, a "standard" house (of 55 m^2, land and services included) costing on average R20 000.[48] In view of these facts the change in official policy on housing, introduced since 1983, is significant. The new policy accepts in principle that self-help housing systems are the favoured form of housing delivery, and encourages the participation of the private sector in the provision of housing.

Unfortunately only about 16,5 per cent of the black population can afford economic "standard" housing. It is mainly towards this group that the private sector is addressing itself. A further 27 per cent of the black population can afford "standard" housing with the aid of subsidies of varying amounts. The housing needs of this group are mainly addressed by government subsidized self-help schemes (core and shell housing) and by various schemes administered by utility companies such as Family Housing Association Homes.

In the meantime the odd 56 per cent excluded from the above groups house themselves in informal settlements, amongst other places. It is in analysing the plight of this group that the similarity between South African housing policy and those of its northern neighbours becomes apparent. The *White Paper on Urbanization* specifically mentions "informal housing structures on approved plots" as an acceptable form of housing.[49] Furthermore, it reiterates the need for community development and for appropriate housing standards. The *White Paper* states that the government role should be that of facilitator: creating the circumstances under which private sector, employers and individuals can all contribute towards the housing process. On the face of it this comprehensive policy document leaves the impression of a concerned government which wants to harness urbanization as a tool for positive socio-economic development. However, the opportunities created by this policy have as yet not been applied in a comprehensive and practical manner.

Instead, many of the pre-*White Paper* problems still manifest themselves in South African society. Only to a small extent (notably in Khayalitsha, Cape Town) are poor people allowed to build and improve their homes according to appropriate standards. In government sponsored self-help projects in Soshanguve (Pretoria), some private developers benefit more than those for whom the project was initiated. During the early stages of the project individuals who wanted to buy a plot and erect their own homes were allowed to do so, but the latter part of the project was left to private developers from whom individuals could buy a house — costing about R9 000.

Resettlement and the demolition of squatter housing still continues. Upgrading plans for the Weilers Farm settlement (near Vereeniging) were shelved in favour of resettling its inhabitants in an area recently demarcated for low-income housing. In spite of assurances to the contrary by government spokespersons, the people from Oukasie near Brits will have to resettle.[50] In some places the abolition of influx control has created a new "industry". In a forlorn part of Free State province, the town council of Kutlwanong charges a R300 "entrance fee" for prospective squatters — no plot or services provided.[51]

Perhaps the problem lies in the absence of the political will to implement a reasonably sound policy which is, at least in principle, condoned by government. If not, then many influential people in South Africa still live in a fool's paradise, believing that the problem of housing the poor will go away if you concentrate on ignoring it.

Conclusion

The "city beautiful" complex noted by Kalabamu is certainly just as alive and well in South Africa as in other parts of the continent. The difference, however, is that some determined attempts have been made in many African countries — through large scale projects — to address the issue of housing the urban poor. Once the intentions and principles embodied in the *White Paper on Urbanization* are operationalized, South Africa should be in a position not only to learn from African countries but also to contribute towards finding solutions for the African urban housing question.

Recognition of the role of informal settlements and the potential contribution of performance standards and incremental construction towards alleviating the demand for housing, would by no means imply a government's capitulation to the housing problem. On the contrary it would mean that, taking into account the reality of the situation, a better future can be planned in which the evolutionary development of cities could be brought about. This applies equally to South Africa. Failing to plan for improvable informal settlements will compound the problem, rather than make it disappear.

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The provision of urban housing in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: Policy and strategy since independence

André Wilsenach, previously a researcher at the Africa Institute and now a senior development researcher at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, examines the efforts of the BLS countries to provide affordable housing for their rapidly growing urban populations.

Introduction

Cities in developing countries are growing at an extremely fast rate: from two to ten per cent per year. This means that by the year 2000 more than two billion people will be living in cities and towns in developing countries — three times more than in 1970. The United Nations has projected that by the turn of the century, 20 of the world's 25 largest cities would be in developing countries. Moreover, the inhabitants of these cities would be extremely poor.[1] In 1980 it was estimated that more than 200 million city dwellers in developing countries were living in absolute poverty; this figure is expected to double by the year 2000.[2]

Coping with rapid urban growth and widespread poverty would strain the resources and imagination of even the most efficient government. Yet a government itself often reduces its ability to deal with such problems because it misunderstands the way in which the urban economy functions, with the result that it fails to implement the correct policies and strategies. This is particularly true in the case of urban housing. Even the most superficial research will confirm that housing policies in many developing countries are ineffective and inequitable.

Because the policies and strategies applied in developing countries often also underlie the most important constraints in the provision of adequate housing, this article attempts to determine the most common errors in the implementation of housing policies and strategies, and their implications for the provision of housing in three developing countries — Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries). Special attention will be paid to the development of housing policies since independence — the structures that have been established as well as the strategies that have been implemented. The differences and similarities in the implementation of housing policies in the BLS countries will also be highlighted.

Housing shortages

By the time the BLS countries were granted independence in the late 1960s, they faced extensive housing shortages. Hardie, for example, points out that there was a shortage of 3 500 units in Gaborone, Botswana.[3] This is a staggering figure in view of the fact that Gaborone's population at the time was only 17 700 (4 000 families). In 1969 Swaziland's *Post Independence Development Plan* stated that there was already a great shortage of urban housing in the country,[4] while Lesotho's *First Five-Year Development Plan*, published in 1970, recognized that urban growth had already given rise to poor housing conditions.[5] Significantly, these initial shortages of urban housing were not limited to a single income group but — in contrast to the situation in subsequent years — affected all income groups.

Conventional housing policy

Botswana was the first of the BLS countries to offer a possible solution to the housing problem: a policy was adopted in 1970 in terms of which the government would become responsible for the provision of all housing for all income groups. Lesotho followed suit in 1971 and shortly afterwards, in 1972, Swaziland adopted the same policy. Public sector institutions were established in the early 1970s to implement the policy: the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) was established in 1970, the Lesotho Housing Corporation (LHC) in 1971 and the Industrial Housing Company (IHC) in Swaziland in 1972.

Because of the poor quality of the existing housing stock in these countries, it was decided that housing supplied by the new institutions should be conventional, conforming to certain prescribed standards. In effect this meant that urban housing would not be provided for all income groups (even though this was the goal of the policy) since the nominally conventional housing was too expensive for the low- and even the middle-income groups.

According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Housing, the least expensive model offered by the Botswana Housing Corporation had a base area of 39 m^2 and cost R4 100 — for a basic house without electricity — and this could be afforded by only 30 per cent of the total urban population.[6]

A similar problem arose in Lesotho. In his report on that country's housing policy, written in 1978, Devas pointed out that the cheapest unit provided by the Lesotho Housing Corporation had a base area of 40 m^2 and cost approximately R8 000.[7] In order to qualify for such a unit, the prospective buyer had to be able to repay this amount over 15 years, at an interest rate of 12 per cent, without his monthly payment exceeding 25 per cent of his total income. In effect, this meant that the monthly instalment would be R106, which would imply an annual income of R5 000. Since only five per cent of the total urban population of Lesotho had an annual income of more than R5 000 in 1978, very few families were able to afford even the lowest standard of housing provided by the LHC.[8]

The situation was little different in Swaziland. In 1978 the USAID Office of Housing expressed the opinion that approximately 53 per cent of the total urban population in the country consisted of low-income families — families with an income of R160 or less per month, who were therefore unable to qualify for IHC housing.[9]

Since housing projects in the three countries made no provision for the needs of the low- and middle-income groups in their implementation, the initial problem was aggravated, rather than solved. Although their institutions provided a relatively large number of housing units, they were unable to effectively meet the demand for housing for the low- and middle-income groups because of the high costs involved. This resulted in a growing imbalance between demand and supply in respect of housing.

In 1979 the USAID Office of Housing pointed out that there had been a total demand for 11 700 urban housing units in Botswana in 1978, but that the BHC could assist only 3 500 families.[10] The remaining 6 225 low-income and 1 048 middle-income families could not afford this type of housing. As the Botswana Presidential Commission investigating housing policy reported: "The BHC concentrates its efforts on easy housing solutions, usually higher income housing,

Temporary and traditional structures in the Old Naledi squatter area are replaced by permanent buildings, using self-help methods

Old Naledi, Gaborone. Signs of upgrading are clearly visible

A core house with basic services, as provided by the SHHA in Lobatse

and avoids the harder to solve lower-income housing problems".[11]

In Swaziland the imbalance between demand and supply in respect of urban housing, and the increase in this imbalance since the establishment of the IHC, is strongly evident. For example, the demand for urban housing increased from approximately 500 units in 1975 to 11 000 in 1981. However, the IHC was unable to supply housing for more than 300 families per year between 1975 and 1981.[12] Although this imbalance was partly due to delays in construction, the main reason was the high cost of the housing provided.

The shortages in urban housing for middle- and, especially, low-income groups in the BLS countries, became obvious with the rapid growth of squatter settlements around the larger urban areas. Families in these income groups had no choice but to settle in new or existing squatter camps. In Botswana this phenomenon gave rise to the Old Naledi squatter camp close to Gaborone. In 1973, Swaziland's *Second National Development Plan, 1973–1977* estimated that about 40 per cent of the urban population were then living in slum conditions and expected the figure to rise to 50 per cent by the end of the Second Plan period in 1977. The plan also recognized that the "increase in informal, low-income settlements of shelters built of mud, stones and poles is therefore representative of the backlog of need not met by the formal sector in these countries".[13]

Although Lesotho has so far not seen the development of actual squatter areas, a considerable amount of unsatisfactory housing exists in and beyond town boundaries. In contrast with Botswana and Swaziland, where shortages of water and sanitary facilities are restricted to the squatter areas, these shortages are much more widespread in the towns of Lesotho. As far as water for domestic consumption is concerned, a survey by Metcalf in Maseru in 1981 showed that although enough water was available to serve the whole of Maseru's population, it was not adequately accessible. In 1980 only 1 152 (12 per cent) of Maseru's total population had running water in their homes and 3 360 (36 per cent) had water on site.[14] The remaining 52 per cent had to walk various distances to public water points. Of these, 17 per cent had to walk a distance of 100 m or more, while as many as 1 534 (16 per cent) had to walk a distance of 300 m or more. Low water pressure, a common feature at these public water points, resulted in endless queues. With regard to sanitary facilities, only 15 per cent of Maseru's population had modern facilities in 1980, while as many as 13 per cent had no facilities at all. Of the 72 per cent who had access to some sort of facility, 50 per cent had to make use of public facilities.[15]

Subsidized housing

In order to find a solution to the high cost of urban housing and to curtail the establishment or expansion of large squatter areas, two strategies were implemented in the BLS countries. Addressing the problem of unaffordable housing, the Botswana government decided in 1974 to control the price of housing by subsidizing the costs related to construction and the provision of essential services, such as water and electricity. According to the USAID Office of Housing, subsidizing urban housing alone cost R3,3 million in 1978.[16] Unfortunately the system only benefited those who already had homes — the high-income group and, with a few exceptions, the middle-income group. The Agency also pointed out that R2,4 million of the R3,3 million earmarked for subsidizing housing was in fact used for high-cost housing, while only R980 000 (28 per cent) of the total amount was spent on medium- and low-cost housing. This was confirmed by the Botswana Presidential Commission, which showed that as much as 70 per cent of all subsidies was allocated to families with a higher than middle income.[17]

Lesotho and Swaziland implemented similar strategies. In this regard Devas warned: "It is necessary to examine ways in which these costs can be reduced, but the usual way, subsidies, carries with it some severe dangers". He pointed out that the system of subsidized housing in Lesotho favoured those who were fortunate to get a house, and the bigger the house, the bigger the subsidy. Although construction costs and the provision of essential services were not subsidized as such in Swaziland, the government heavily subsidized the interest rate on housing loans in an effort to encourage home-ownership.[18]

Demolition of squatter camps

In their attempts to counter the problem of growing squatter areas, two of the

BLS countries — the exception being Lesotho, where there are widespread informal settlements rather than actual squatter areas — declared squatting illegal in the early 1970s. The implementation of this policy frequently resulted in the demolition of squatter camps. Yet, because the housing agencies were supplying mainly conventional housing, squatter families were not being provided with better housing. The Old Naledi squatter camp close to Gaborone is a case in point. In 1971, when approximately one-third of the city's population was living in Old Naledi, it was decided that the whole area should be bulldozed and the inhabitants resettled in nearby New Naledi. Soon afterwards Swaziland made various efforts to evacuate the Msundusa and Sidwashini squatter camps bordering Mbabane.[19]

However, it soon became clear that all efforts to evacuate existing squatter areas and resettle their inhabitants were futile. Families kept returning to the original squatter camps because no alternative accommodation was available. Hardie's comment on the resettlement of families at Old Naledi comes as no surprise: ". . . as there was little possibility of accommodating these people, and given that few could afford to pay the subsidized rents, this scheme also failed."[20]

Housing project, Lesotho

Informal housing policy

Recognizing their inability to effectively meet the demand for urban housing for all income groups, in the mid-1970s the BLS governments adapted their policies and strategies. As a result, affordable housing for the low and middle-income groups was given more attention, although the public sector was still directly responsible for its provision. The 1977 *Botswana Development Plan* recognized the need for "inexpensive housing with services comparable to those provided in the rural areas".[21] Lesotho's *Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76–1979/80* pointed out that in the past housing policies had been directed solely towards the provision of housing for high-income civil servants, and proposed the formulation of a comprehensive housing policy which would accommodate all income groups and would progress towards economic rents.[22] Swaziland's *Second National Development Plan* stated that the highest priority would "be given to the improvement of housing conditions for low-income groups".[23]

In order to implement the policy, alternative institutions for the provision of housing were established in the public sector. The Self-Help Housing Agency (SHHA) was established in Botswana in 1978, and the Lower Income Housing Company (LEHCO-OP) in Lesotho and the Housing Unit (HU) in Swaziland in 1975. These institutions were aimed exclusively at providing housing for low-income groups, mainly through site-and-service schemes, where families could provide their own housing by means of self-help construction methods.

Another aspect of the shift in emphasis in housing policy was the decision of the governments of Botswana and Swaziland, in view of the extremely limited success achieved by the evacuation of the squatter areas, to legalize these areas and upgrade them by means of self-help programmes and site-and-service schemes.

A significant measure of success was achieved with the upgrading of the Old Naledi squatter area near Gaborone. Instead of bulldozing the camp and resettling its 5 000 residents as had been planned initially, in 1975 the President of Botswana took the first step in the upgrading process by announcing that Old Naledi would no longer be an illegal settlement, but would be treated as a *bona fide* residential area. As a second step, a few families were moved to the nearby area of New Naledi, where sites and essential services had been provided and where families could erect their own homes with the assistance of the SHHA. These families were vacated from specific areas required for the establishment of essential services and infrastructure at Old Naledi. As a third step, land tenure was granted to the remaining inhabitants of Old Naledi.

The upgrading programme's success stemmed mainly from the fact that the settlers were convinced by the government that their stay at Old Naledi would be permanent. As a result, approximately 50 per cent of the settlers replaced their temporary structures with permanent ones within the first year. Besides causing the existing supply of housing to be maintained and improved, the policy resulted in the growth of an informal construction sector at Old Naledi. An equal measure of success was achieved in Swaziland with the upgrading of the Msundusa and Sidwashini squatter areas. Today these areas are regarded as fully fledged suburbs of the two countries' capitals, Gaborone and Mbabane.

Middle-income dilemma

Despite the success achieved after these shifts in emphasis — especially in the provision of low-cost housing — the shortages were not eradicated completely. On the one hand, the policy catered for the high-income group, which resulted in the establishment of institutions like the BHC, LHC and IHC to provide high-cost housing. On the other, provision was made for the low-income groups through the establishment of institutions like the SHHA, LEHCO-OP and HU. However, no provision was made for middle-income families. The Botswana Presidential Commission recognized that urban families with incomes in the R1 000 to R3 000 range had been overlooked. The Commission claimed that these middle-income families could, and wanted to, afford something better than what was being offered by the site-and-service scheme, but that they simply could not afford fully serviced housing such as that provided by the BHC.[24]

In the case of Lesotho, there was a perceived gap in Maseru's housing delivery system, where middle-income households did not have the same degree of access to serviced land and credit facilities for residential purposes as did their compatriots in the low- and high-income groups.[25]

In Swaziland the shortage of medium-cost housing reached such proportions that families in the middle-income group began to utilize the self-help site-and-service schemes provided for low-income groups by the HU, instead of renting houses as was done in Botswana and Lesotho. This trend resulted in a situation where families in the low-income group found themselves increasingly facing the dilemma previously faced by the middle-income group. Since middle-income families could qualify more easily for housing loans than low-income families, sites intended for low-income families were taken up by middle-income families.[26] The implications in Swaziland became apparent in a study undertaken by Rossman as early as 1980. He pointed out that approximately 50 per cent of families in squatter areas near Mbabane and Manzini qualified for housing provided by the HU, but that they were unable to obtain it because of occupation by the middle-income group who enjoyed preference.[27]

Problems and solutions

The similarities between the housing policies and strategies applied in the BLS countries are evident from the discussion above. In part this reflects the fact that the BLS countries are typically Third World and that they experience similar problems and conditions. They also have almost identical historical backgrounds — they all became independent in the late 1960s, and the formulation and development of the majority of their post-independence policies and strategies were strongly influenced by Britain. It is not surprising, therefore, that they shared four similar but distinct problems in the provision of housing. Unfortunately, the policies and strategies they implemented in an effort to solve specific problems consistently led to other problems.

The first problem related to a severe shortage of housing. In a common attempt to reach a solution it was decided that the various governments would in future assume full responsibility for the construction of houses. This approach is often incorrect. A housing shortage usually results from a rapid growth in demand for, and/or impediments in the supply of, housing. Governments do not, in general, respond to demand faster or more efficiently than the private sector. This does not imply that governments in developing countries have no role to play in the provision of housing, but there should be a shift of emphasis in their activities. Governments can, for example, do much to mitigate or remove market imperfections. In the system for the provision of housing (which has three components, namely the input markets, the production process and the output market), most bottlenecks occur in the input markets, for example a shortage of available land for residential expansion, infrastructure, finance and labour. If governments addressed these aspects instead of involving themselves in the production process, most of the problems in the housing market could be solved. (These very problems often prevent private sector involvement in the production process.) In the BLS countries the governments not only became involved in the production process, but they also tried to influence the costs of the production process through large-scale subsidies. These activities disturbed signals on house prices were carried over into the output market, resulting in an aggravation of the initial problem, that of unaffordable housing.

The second problem concerned the poor quality of housing available in the BLS countries since independence. The common approach to this problem was to raise standards through stricter building codes and the more effective enforcement of these codes. This, too, is often the wrong approach. The enforced standards often have little to do with basic structural soundness or hygiene. Even standards related to safety and hygiene are relevant only if they can be attained by the majority of the population. Standards and codes should rather focus on basic safety and health requirements. Further improvements would come about with development and rising incomes, provided that regulations do not prevent upgrading.

The third problem faced by the BLS countries was large-scale squatting. The common solution was to clear squatter areas, but this can also be the wrong approach for a variety of reasons. When people are moved off land, they either move somewhere else or eventually return to the same place. Squatter housing represents a large part of the capital stock of the underprivileged, and its destruction is not conducive to development. Instead, other policies may be adopted — policies to improve conditions more cheaply for more people than the clearance programme did. (This was subsequently done in the BLS countries.)[28]

The fourth problem — surely the most important one faced by the BLS countries — was the high cost of housing in relation to family income. This problem stems from the tendency of policy-makers in developing countries to see housing in terms of "housing needs", defined as the minimum acceptable physical standards of housing and infrastructure. "Needs assessment" based on such standards are normally used to establish the basic requirements of a country's housing strategy, with regard to numbers, quality, location and cost. In practice such assessments are often inadequate guidelines for policy because they neither include a realistic assessment of the available resources, nor consider people's ability and willingness to pay for housing. An alternative to planning based on housing needs is to consider the effective demand for housing, which is essentially a needs assessment backed by an analysis of people's willingness and ability to pay. This definition is, therefore, positively based on the behaviour of individuals, borne out by surveys of how much they actually spend on housing as well as other goods and services. These are related to measurable influences on spending, such as income and family size, the price of housing compared with other goods and services, and the state of the housing market — including, for example, the general level of economic development, inflationary expectations and the existence of government policies, such as rent control, which might influence spending on housing. Policies formulated in this way have an inherently greater chance of success than do those based on rather arbitrary normative standards.

Controlling rent, the price of land, building materials and services in order to solve this problem is usually also a faulty approach. When house prices rise faster than prices of goods and services, it is a signal to the market to produce relatively more houses. Such price increases are usually transitory unless the market is prevented from adjusting itself because of a shortage of inputs, excessive government regulations and similar restrictions.

General guidelines for the provision of housing

In conclusion, the following guidelines seem appropriate to developing countries where rapid urban growth and a severe shortage of housing — such as in the BLS countries — prevail:

- the provision of urban housing should in all respects be in relation to the income and needs of the various income groups;
- more value should be attached to the amount of money the various income groups are prepared to spend on housing;
- the provision of urban housing should be co-ordinated in such a way that no income group is neglected;
- housing subsidies should be granted with circumspection and limited to those whose need is greatest; and
- a government's role should be toned down to consist of guidance, assistance and supervision, while the private sector should be encouraged to become actively involved in the provision of housing.

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SADCC security issues

In this article, Dr Simon Baynham, a senior researcher at the Africa Institute, looks at international security assistance to the SADCC organization rather than at external military aid to its nine member states. However, because of the crucial importance of Mozambique to SADCC's transport routes, much of this article is concerned with security aid to that state. Future contributions in this journal will be devoted to the individual defence forces of the Conference countries.

Introduction

The economic and military imbalance between the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and its independent neighbours pervades all Southern Africa's political relations. The extent of this strategic asymmetry is well known and requires little elaboration here. At the same time, this lopsidedness provided the driving force for the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in April 1980.

SADCC was established by the six Frontline States (FLS) — Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland — with a view to progressively reducing their inherited economic dependence on (and mounting military vulnerability to) their powerful neighbour, South Africa.[1] As its name implies, SADCC is concerned with the coordination of economic development in the region; its principal method of action has been to identify specific projects which benefit more than one country. Thus (with the possible exception of Malawi, the only African state to have full diplomatic relations with South Africa) the countries' motivations were rooted in both economic and political imperatives, the political one being their mutual antipathy to the Pretoria administration. Because of its transport routes, Mozambique is the geographical centre of gravity for SADCC; and because of its economic and military strengths, Zimbabwe is the political pivot.[2] The South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo) has made it clear that Namibia would join the Conference on Independence, now expected to take place in 1990.

Given the fact that SADCC was created at a time when P W Botha was promoting an alternative alliance, the Constellation of Southern African States (Consas),[3] which proved unattractive to the FLS, it is possible to see how the counter-constellation label has sometimes been applied to SADCC, thereby lending credence to allegations within some South African quarters that the regional organization is implicitly a hostile alliance. Indeed, SADCC has sometimes been presented as both a political and an economic threat to Pretoria: a political one because it has attracted considerable international support; an economic one because if it is successful in its objectives, it might have a detrimental impact (at least in some respects) on the Republic's economy. In addition it would enable its members to impose their often-threatened economic boycott of South Africa with less likelihood of crippling retaliation. The Conference has also been depicted as a security threat since SADCC successes in attaining its aims might encourage some of its members to provide a more hospitable roof for the African National Congress (ANC) with less fear of South African recrimination. Because of this cocktail of perceived threats, some conservative South Africans have asked why they should be providing vital transit services to SADCC now, only to be repudiated and isolated in the future.[4] By contrast, other South African observers are urging that SADCC should be encouraged; indeed Department of Foreign Affairs officials are openly looking forward to being admitted to the Conference.

What then are SADCC's objectives? According to the Lusaka Declaration at the founding meeting on 1 April 1980, the goal of SADCC is "to liberate our economies from their dependence on the RSA, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation, and to coordinate our efforts towards regional and national economic development."

Each SADCC project was to be coordinated by one of the member states, a decision that led one sceptic to remark that it required a special sense of humour to assign responsibility for development finance to Zambia and industrialization to Tanzania.[5] However, to be fair, SADCC has always operated on a "step by step" basis in which emphasis is placed on modest achievements rather than on grand regional strategies.

SADCC sector commisions are as follows:

Transport and communications	Mozambique
Energy	Angola
Agricultural research	Botswana
Tourism and conservation	Lesotho
Fisheries, wildlife and forestry	Malawi
Manpower	Swaziland
Industry	Tanzania
Mining and development finance	Zambia
Food security	Zimbabwe

The Lusaka Declaration continued that "the key to its strategy is transport and communications." Thus the first priority was to rehabilitate and upgrade existing transport links, particularly ports and railways in Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola.

This "Web of Steel" — which aptly describes the way in which the countries to the north have been enmeshed in South Africa's transport network — is centred on five railway lines:

- the Benguela line, running from Lobito on the Atlantic coast through Zaire to Zambia;
- the Tazara line, stretching from Lusaka in Zambia to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania;
- the Nacala railway, linking the Indian Ocean deepwater port of Nacala with Malawi via Nampula and Cuamba;
- the Beira corridor, running from Mutare on the mountainous frontier in Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port of Beira;
- the Maputo or Limpopo line, stretching from Maputo to Chicualacuala and thence via Sango into Zimbabwe.

Particular emphasis is being directed at refurbishing Mozambique's railways and ports as alternative transport routes. These corridors have become vital for the SADCC states, representing their best opportunity for breaking free from the South African embrace. However, SADCC has no military structure — yet the successful realization of its economic objectives and rehabilitation of the transport network are critically linked to the application of security measures. It is to this dimension — especially to the question of external security assistance — that this article is directed.

Eastern bloc aid

Because of the importance of communist military intervention in Southern Africa — in terms of both equipment and troops — a few comments regarding the Eastern bloc will be made before moving on to Western and other sources of security aid. Considerations of space do not permit a detailed inventory of communist military assistance/arms transfers here,[6] instead some wider observations will be summarized concerning current trends.

Firstly, the USSR has no vital strategic interests in the region. On the one hand, the alleged strategic importance of the Cape sea route is a myth in the nuclear age; and on the other, the well-endowed Soviets have no reason to covet the region's mineral wealth.[7] One might take these points further and argue that since the USA's strategic and economic interests in the region are also a low priority for them in global terms, there is an enhanced likelihood that the superpowers' mutual disinterest may lead them to further increase their consultations and cooperation on Southern African issues — especially in the wake of the Angola/Namibia peace settlement.

In the second place, the Soviets are now beginning to accept that the prospects for socialism in Africa are vanishing. For all the rhetoric to date, the USSR seems increasingly resigned to the fact that it cannot afford the resources to buy influence in Africa. At the same time, Moscow has discovered that arms supplies do not necessarily buy influence. As a consequence, Soviet arms transfers have become more a matter of trade than aid. There are of course exceptions. One of these is Ethiopia; the other is Angola. In both cases, the USSR is committed to keeping the existing regimes in power — not so much for their own sake, but rather to preserve Soviet credibility as a superpower.[8]

The third observation concerns recent developments in Angola and Namibia. There can be no doubt that the armed escalation in Angola tilted the military balance on the sub-continent. The South African Defence Force's (SADF's) military edge was eroded during 1987–88 as Cuban reinforcements moved south, protected against Mirage warplanes by a combination of Soviet-supplied static and mobile radar, surface to air missiles (SAMs) and *MiG*-23 Flogger fighters.[9] South Africa has clearly lost some of its military advantage in the past two years. And the fact that the RSA no longer has unquestioned superiority in the region is obviously a difficult new reality to which Pretoria has to adjust.

The fourth and final point concerns communist military assistance to Mozambique. The USSR has had an ally in Mozambique since the *Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique* (Frelimo) came to power in 1975. In 1977 Samora Machel signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the USSR from whom he purchased almost $1 billion worth of arms. At present, there are also some 1 500 Soviet, Cuban and North Korean military advisers, together with several hundred East German security specialists, in the country. Yet for all the above, the Soviet Union appears to be losing its monopoly on supplying weapons and other materiel to the Maputo regime.

Indeed, the evidence suggests that over the past two to three years Mozambique has been moving decisively to reduce Eastern bloc influence in the country. Not only has there been a string of visits by Mozambican security chiefs to Western capitals since February 1988 — about which more below — but a revised Maputo politico/military orientation can also be detected in last year's renewed refusal to accept Cuban troops on its soil. The matter was raised by Cuba during President Chissano's visit to Havana in April 1988. Chissano was apparently irritated by the fact that his hosts sought to discuss an issue not even on the agenda.

It is not the first time that Cuba has tried to persuade Mozambique to accept Cuban combat troops. But Maputo — suitably wary of counter-action by South Africa — has repeatedly declined to take up the offer. However, it should not be assumed that the Mozambican leadership is united on the issue. Pro-Soviet purist elements within the Frelimo hierarchy are reported to be opposed to any diminution of Eastern bloc links. At the same time the military elite — epitomized by armed forces chief of staff General Antonio Hama Thai, army commander General Tobias Dai, air force chief Colonel Joao Honwana and head of military intelligence Brigadier Aleixo — seem keen to diversify and upgrade sources of military assistance.


SOUTHERN AFRICA
ZAIRE
TANZANIA
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
MALAWI
ZIMBABWE
MOZAMBIQUE
SWA/NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
RSA
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
BOPHUTHATSWANA
VENDA
TRANSKEI
CISKEI
Shaba Province
river transport
Voie Nationale
Benguela line
Tazara line
Mwanza
Arusha
Mombasa
Kindu
Kigoma
Tabora
Dodoma
Kalemie
DAR ES SALAAM
Kiberege
Mbeya
Tunduma
KINSHASA
Ilebo
Matadi
Kananga
Kamina
Tenke
LUANDA
Malange
Luau
Luena
Bie
Lobito
Huambo
Lubumbashi
Kasama
Mpika
Kitwe
Ndola
Lichinga
Kapiri Mposhi
LILONGWE
Kabwe
LUSAKA
Nacala
Cuamba
Nampula
Namibe
Menongue
Cassinga
Kafue
Blantyre
Tete
Zawi
Kalomo
Mocuba
Livingstone
HARARE
Mutare
Gweru
Tsumeb
Grootfontein
Outjo
Otjiwarongo
Bulawayo
Francistown
Rutenga
Beit Bridge
Messina
Chicualacuala
Gobabis
WINDHOEK
Rehoboth
Pietersburg
Phalaborwa
GABORONE
Guija
Marienta
Mafikeng
Komatipoort
JOHANNESBURG
MBABANE
Keetmanshoop
Sishen
Kimberley
MASERU
Bitterfontein
De Aar
Calvinia
UMTATA
Beaufort West
CAPE TOWN
East London

For a number of reasons, Moscow may not be discouraging this process. Heavily committed to both Angola and Ethiopia and suitably aware that, unlike Angola, Mozambique lacks the resources to pay for Soviet assistance, the USSR may be trying to get Maputo off its back. Thus, despite the *Resistência Naçional Moçambicana* (Renamo) threat to Frelimo and despite the presence of General Yevgeny Ivanovsky (chief of staff of the Soviet ground forces and a deputy defence minister) at Machel's funeral, Moscow has been either unable or unwilling to make the same sort of large-scale military commitment to Maputo that it has made to Luanda. In order to fill the gap and to defend itself, therefore, the Frelimo government has chosen to turn more and more to the West.

Western security assistance

The European Community, together with Norway, Sweden and Canada, have committed themselves to assisting the SADCC states to reduce their dependence on South Africa. But they are beginning to conclude that if this objective is to become a reality, the defence of their technical assistance and investments must be matched by appropriate security measures. In short, military assistance is seen as a *sine qua non*, without which the entire scheme would be seriously jeopardized. However, while Mozambique's calls for Western nations to provide armoured vehicles and the like to defend food relief convoys and so forth has won little response to date, an increasing number of donor countries have agreed to earmark a portion of their aid monies to beef up security around development projects they sponsor. Six countries — Portugal, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom — figure prominently in this respect.

Not suprisingly, Portuguese/Mozambican relations took some time to unfreeze and a real improvement has only been noticeable in the past seven years. In April 1982, the two countries signed a set of agreements whereby Portuguese military instructors would provide training in counterinsurgency warfare to *Forças Populares de Libertaçao do Moçambique* (FPLM) officers. Mozambican officers also train at the Portuguese Military Academy. More recently, in March last year, General Thai (Mozambique's armed forces chief of staff) and Brigadier Aleixo (the military intelligence chief) visited Lisbon. Mozambique proposed that the two countries should exchange military intelligence reports. Interestingly — and as an aside — immediately after his visit to Portugal, General Thai met an Israeli military mission in Maputo. The past eighteen months has also seen an agreement signed by Portugal to put the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam back on stream — a key example of increased Portuguese involvement where the security need will be paramount. There are, of course, at least half a million Portuguese in South Africa, and Lisbon enjoys good formal relations with Pretoria. It is a key pillar of Portuguese foreign policy to look after its emigrant communities' interests. For all these reasons, Lisbon treads a delicate path in the sub-continent.

France also hosted a senior Mozambican officer in March 1988 when Colonel Honwana (the air force chief) visited Paris to negotiate a deal for the purchase of French-made Gazelle attack and Puma transport helicopters. During the past four years Maputo has also been replacing its East bloc military radio equipment with more advanced French and British designs. Mozambican officers also train in France. Finally, in September 1988 France offered to help Mozambican government troops protect the Nacala railway. Rehabilitation work for Phase 1 of the railway from Nacala to Nampula was completed by a consortium of French and Portuguese companies in 1987, but the deteriorating security situation led the consortium to suspend Phase 2 of the operations in April 1988. The French offer — in which two officers will set up a training centre and non-lethal equipment will be supplied — is based on the findings of a French military mission that visited the line in 1988 following President Chissano's request for aid during his September 1987 visit to Paris. The mission recommended that 3 000 troops would need to be trained to protect the line and restart work. If this was achieved, Phase 2 could be completed by 1991. Despite France's reputation as the "Policeman of Africa", French military assistance to the black states of Southern Africa has been virtually nonexistent in the past. It would seem, therefore, that Paris is venturing into new and uncharted territories.

Spain is also involved in Mozambique. The Spanish paramilitary civil guard (the *Guardia Civil*) is currently training Mozambican soldiers to protect its aid projects. Madrid has also agreed to train Mozambican police officers to help them combat guerrilla activity in rural areas. The idea is to establish special police units to clear the countryside of rebel activity. Some of this training programme is to be conducted in Spain, at least in its initial stages. The two countries have also had secret discussions on the possible purchase of Spanish aircraft.

With regard to Italy, there were reports earlier last year that Maputo has approached Rome with a view to buying *Aermacchi* aircraft for anti-Renamo operations. Italian companies also provide food and clothing to the Mozambican soldiers guarding their dam projects in southern Mozambique.

Given Sweden's neutral status, more surprising perhaps is the growing commitment to security by Stockholm. At an international donors conference in April 1988 held under the auspices of Mozambique and the United Nations (UN) in Maputo, the Swedish Foreign Ministry announced it would break from its previous policy and take "specific measures" to strengthen the security situation around projects where Swedish development assistance is involved. Sweden provides more aid to Mozambique than to any other country in the world.

Some donors to SADCC states, such as West Germany and Denmark, are currently opposed to all forms of security aid, but most Western countries have now accepted it as inevitable. Thus Norway and Canada, for instance, are currently contemplating contributions towards the protection of their projects.

To conclude this section then: whether they see it in these terms or not, one of the more remarkable results of the Mozambican crisis is the manner in which Western countries are being drawn gradually into the military conflict — and none more so than the United Kingdom.

British military assistance[10]

Because of Mrs Thatcher's steadfast opposition to comprehensive economic sanctions, the British government has gained a reputation for appeasing South Africa. This is partly the reason why London has attempted to buy *de facto* acquiescence from black Africa by taking the lead on economic and military aid to the SADCC countries.

As the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mrs Chalker, said in 1988:

> Britain has long been involved in working to strengthen the economies of SADCC states, to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa and, through the SADCC organisation, to restore the natural pattern of transport in the region by rehabilitation of regional routes through Mozambique. From 1980 to 1986 Britain gave £819 million in bilateral aid to SADCC states.[11]

And at another venue earlier last year she added that:

> . . . because of the grave security situation in Mozambique the effort to rehabilitate the transport routes requires parallel measures of military assistance . . .. We are therefore making a considerable effort to provide targetted military training, and we are now supplementing this with a related package of non-lethal defence equipment for those countries directly involved in protecting the transport routes [12]

Thus Britain has two strands, or a twin-track, to its Southern Africa policy.

Britain is currently providing professional military expertise for eight of the nine SADCC states.

In Zimbabwe, a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) has been in the country since Independence in 1980. The 43-strong team under a brigadier is helping to run the Staff College and train Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) units at the Nyanga Battle School. Most of these troops are then deployed in Mozambique. The cost of £3,6 million (1988/89) is born by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

The British success in Zimbabwe — where they have superseded North Korean and Chinese training teams — convinced Samora Machel of using British military personnel to train Mozambican troops. Since 1986, therefore, Mozambican officers have been trained at a separate wing of the Nyanga Battle School. Although the agreement between Britain and both Zimbabwe and Mozambique forbids British personnel from being involved in operational duties, Britain has provided both countries with millions of pounds worth of non-lethal military aid. It is interesting to note that Mozambique is the only non-Commonwealth country in Africa receiving British military training assistance. Mozambican officers also train at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, an arrangement now into its fourth year.

Three factors lie behind the level of military support given to Mozambique — a country whose army was recently trained solely by the Soviet Union, East Germany and Cuba. The first reason is that Britain owes Mozambique a debt of gratitude for helping to bring about the Zimbabwe settlement. Secondly, aid to Mozambique is seen as a more practical option than sanctions for helping the SADCC states, seven of which are members of the Commonwealth. Thirdly, London hopes that the Frelimo government will be incrementally weaned from its socialist orientation and dependence on the Eastern bloc.

There are also small British military teams in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. As with the teams in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the costs are borne not by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) but by the FCO. Botswana's Okavango swamps have also provided training facilities for the British Army — including (it is alleged) the elite Special Air Service (SAS).[13]

Finally, personnel from all the above states, as well as from Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia, regularly attend training courses in Britain. Late in 1988 Malawi also received almost £1 million worth of military assistance, most of which is being spent on communications equipment for Malawian army units guarding the Nacala railway. Another option presently under consideration is the offer of a small British unit to advise on protecting the Nacala line.

To summarize: British military aid in Southern Africa has confirmed the UK's position as the top Western supporter of Frelimo's war against Renamo. But, for all this, the British military contribution is, for the moment, a relatively modest one. However, government-to-government assistance is not the only mode of military aid. There is also the question of private security activity.

Private armies

At the moment, private sector security involvement is apparent only in Mozambique. To encourage mining, agricultural and other non-urban enterprises, the Mozambican government is giving companies a free hand to set up what amount to semi-private militias. The government supplies troops and guns; the investor feeds the troops, buys uniforms and may provide officers to train them. Thus Maputo is actively aiming to associate foreign aid donors with the protection of the projects which they fund. In short, economic incentives are insufficient — hence the Mozambican government's flexibility on the security side. This link between projects and the need to provide direct of indirect military assistance in protecting them is increasingly accepted by Western donors. As one Western diplomat recently put it: "It makes no sense to help build a bridge or a factory only to have it destroyed by Renamo."

The current leader in this field is the British company, Lonrho, which has engaged a British security company, Defence Systems Ltd, to defend its assets and to help train Mozambican soldiers. Lonrho owns the Beira Corridor oil pipeline, and Defence Systems Ltd has a good deal of experience in Africa, including security work for De Beers and training helicopter pilots in Uganda.

Another security company, Hall & Watts, has been given a contract by the Mozambican government to create an elite battalion of 600 men to guard the Nacala railway. This and other deals appear to involve four separate parties: Hall & Watts, Defence Systems Ltd, Lonrho (which has helped to fund a contract with a £3,8 million loan in return for a number of "concessions" from the Mozambican government including permission to run a 100 000 acre cotton estate — also protected by a private security force) and fourthly the British government, which has paid £2 million through SADCC for the repair of the railway. However, both Whitehall and the commercial interests involved deny that the security companies are being used as a front for a discreet British government operation. Government sources in London also stress that none of the military advisors are serving British military personnel.

The activities of private armies have aroused fears in many quarters that Mozambique may be turned into a patchwork of heavily-defended aid enclaves. This has led to suggestions that such bodies are chipping away at Mozambique's sovereignty. In short, it has been argued that the cultivation of private militias might promote the very thing it was intended to avoid — the fragmentation or Balkanization of Mozambique.

For the time being, however, private armies account for only a small proportion of the security mosaic: for direct help, Mozambique's hard-pressed army will continue to rely heavily on its black neighbours. And it is to this issue — the question of intra-SADCC security assistance — that we now turn.

Intra-SADCC assistance

Because of the grave security situation inside Mozambique and the importance of Maputo's transport routes to SADCC, the Conference countries have concentrated their military efforts in Mozambique. Soldiers at brigade, battalion and semi-battalion strength have been deployed in Mozambique by Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi respectively. Zimbabwe is by far the most deeply committed.

On a number of occasions Robert Mugabe has announced that "The survival of Mozambique is our survival. The fall of Mozambique will certainly also be our fall." Apart from self-interest, however, Mugabe is also repaying Mozambique a debt, for support during Zimbabwe's independence war. For these reasons, Zimbabwe has committed up to a quarter of its 47 000-strong forces since it first deployed at battalion level in October 1982. At first these troops were concentrated along the Beira corridor; by 1987, however, the ZNA's involvement had escalated to include oeprations in central and northern Mozambique. The ZNA is well-equipped and well-disciplined — in striking contrast to the under-equipped and demoralized Frelimo soldiers, who are held in low regard by the ZNA and who are notorious for their ill-discipline and incompetent logistics. The cost of the Zimbabwe operation is extremely burdensome, but withdrawal is not an option for Mugabe: were the Beira corridor to close, Zimbabwe would be forced to depend on South Africa for virtually all its imports and exports.

However, Zimbabwe's military involvement has led to other tensions: Renamo claims that Zimbabwe's occupation of the Beira corridor strip is tantamount to creating a neo-colonial enclave, largely for the benefit of Zimbabwe. Indeed, there have been suggestions in the Zimbabwe Parliament that the two countries should merge in a federation. Ironically, therefore, Mugabe the Marxist is being seen in some quarters as an imperialist.

Tanzania and Malawi's involvement has been much more limited, yet the deployment of their troops since 1986 and 1987 respectively demonstrates an increased commitment on the part of SADCC countries to the military dimension of that body's economic plans and aspirations. The Tanzanian operation is not of course unprecedented. Apart from extensive military involvement elsewhere in Africa, Tanzania sent two infantry battalions to Mozambique between 1975 and 1980 to help bolster the newly established Frelimo government against Ian Smith's Rhodesia.[14] However, largely because of the financial burden (although Tanzania claimed that its soldiers had withdrawn "because they had achieved their military objectives"), Tanzania withdrew its units in November 1988.

Malawi's decision to dispatch troops at several companies strength was not, of course, entirely voluntary. Its assistance mainly takes the form of armed guards to protect workers repairing the Nacala railway line, which has been the target of sabotage by Renamo rebels. Although Malawi has only 400 or so troops in Mozambique, they are already suffering casualties. Such incidents are likely to contribute to a deterioration in relations between Lilongwe and Pretoria.

International defence forces

In view of the fact that military assistance to the SADCC states is still relatively meagre, some observers have canvassed the idea of an international defence force to defend the transport routes. Four possibilities have been under consideration for some time, the fourth of which — a UN force — seems the least likely, not least because President Chissano clearly feels that the prospect of UN military help is currently unrealistic as well as undesirable. Another possible source of security assistance is from the Non-Aligned Movement, which established an Africa Fund (in India) in 1987 aimed at helping the FLS to bear the cost of economic sanctions against South Africa. The Fund also envisages supplying security personnel to defend communication links in Angola and Mozambique. The two key ideas, however, have centred on a Pan-African body and a Commonwealth Force.

Robert Mugabe has already called for the mobilization of a Pan-African defence force "to fight the mammoth army of South Africa" and to help defend the SADCC countries; and Nigeria has indicated its willingness to send troops.

On paper, of course, black Africa could amass an enormous army. But although it may have the advantage cumulatively in manpower and weapons, none of these countries — singly or in concert — is capable of significant external action. The reasons for this are legion but they include:

- The fact that their armies are trained in a variety of traditions (British, French, Portuguese, Soviet, Cuban, North Korean, etc) and trained with different weapons.
- They also speak different languages, embracing conflicting ideologies and cultures.
- In addition, many of their troops are tied down in local civil wars (Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, etc) and in combatting dissident guerrillas (Uganda, Somalia, Cameroon, etc).
- Also border tensions (Morocco/Western Sahara, Kenya/Sudan, Ghana/Togo, Mauritania/Senegal etc) mean that many of them would be unwilling to weaken themselves by releasing contingents of their best troops to a Pan-African Force.
- Participation could also be domestically unpopular — as Ghana and Nigeria found to their cost in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s.
- Finally, the logistical problems are quite beyond the capabilities of most African armies — as their officers are privately quite ready to admit.

As the African Intervention Force (Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire) raised to undertake peacekeeping duties in Chad demonstrated in 1981, the story of African military cooperation is a dismal one.

The last option, a Commonwealth Defence Force, has been enthusiastically sponsored by elements within the Commonwealth Secretariat, not least by Nigeria. It could be argued that the basic framework for a Commonwealth Force exists already, since three African Commonwealth countries have committed troops to Mozambique and Britain trains both Zimbabwean and Mozambican soldiers for operations in Mozambique. However, the Commonwealth option is unlikely to get off the ground, quite simply because the older white Commonwealth countries are opposed to it. On the other hand, at its Vancouver summit in October 1987, the Commonwealth agreed to set up an enhanced programme of coordinated assistance to help Mozambique to improve its railways and ports and to ensure their physical protection.

To summarize this penultimate part of the article then, of all the options, there is a real possibility of a limited increase in Commonwealth security assistance. This reflects the fact that seven of SADCC's nine members are members of that organization, and Mozambique sees itself "as the current cousin of the Commonwealth" — as Maputo's Ambassador to London, General Panguene, put it to the author in November last year.[15]

Yet the Frelimo regime is not interested in a situation where military aid pours in from all and sundry. In fact quite the opposite holds true: the Mozambican government appears determined to limit the use of foreign combat troops to African ones and, if this writer's discussions with General Panguene are anything to go by, would like to limit it to the SADCC states directly involved. Indeed, Panguene was even opposed to Nigerian troops, viewing any sort of international or out-of-area force as too problematical — politically, militarily and logistically.[16]

Conclusions

This article ends with a number of assertions and propositions which attempt to highlight the key themes outlined above, whilst drawing some conclusions regarding SADCC prospects and problems in the security sphere.

Firstly, the Conference is an alliance of independent states, each of which has different perceptions about its interests and the means of pursuing those interests. It will not be an easy task to accommodate these diversities — especially in the military arena, where there are different and sometimes conflicting concerns. And here it is crucial to repeat the point that SADCC has no real military structure — yet the success or otherwise of its endeavours will, nevertheless, rely to a significant extent on the application of military and security measures. In this respect, there is ample scope for serious recriminations within the Conference. Having said that, security cooperation is likely to grow amongst the SADCC countries themselves, although there are no signs at present of a significant increase in either regional or non-regional forces in the sub-continent.

Meanwhile — and this is the second point — Eastern bloc assistance is likely to decline. Soviet involvement has not been a great success in Mozambique, but Moscow's commitment to Angola will remain — not only for the reasons expressed earlier but also because Angolan oil is able to foot the security bill. Although the south-western Africa peace settlement is back on track, an early and permanent ceasefire between Angola's warring factions is not yet in sight.

By contrast the inputs from the West are growing. The link between aid projects to SADCC and the requirement to provide direct or indirect military assistance in protecting them, is increasingly accepted by Western donors who are beginning to view SADCC as a vehicle for detaching themselves from support for South Africa. Although Western security aid to the region will continue to grow at a modest rate, there is little likelihood that it will go beyond military training and supply of what is termed "non-lethal" equipment.

This brings us to the fourth point, namely the whole question of non-lethal equipment. What exactly is non-lethal equipment? The fact is, of course, that the distinction between lethal and so-called non-lethal equipment is a very blurred one. For instance, Land Rovers, fuel tanks, helicopter pads and radios — all of which are currently supplied to Mozambican soldiers guarding British-financed repairs on the Limpopo line — enable troops to deploy and communicate better and to hit targets more accurately. Also, the provision of non-lethal aid releases funds for the purchase of more deadly materiel — a point made in another context with regard to the supply of humanitarian aid to the ANC and Swapo. It is more than likely, however, that military assistance will become less and less non-lethal.

Finally, no discussion on military aid to SADCC can ignore the other side of the equation, the question of South African attitudes and responses to SADCC. As Pretoria's regional survival strategy under the Nationalist administration to some extent depends on keeping neighbouring states dependent on it for port and rail facilities, most analysts believe it unlikely that the RSA would want the SADCC rail corridors to function fully. Potentially, the railways are South Africa's most effective economic lever in the sub-continent. To this end, the transport weapon should be viewed as the key mechanism in confronting both the guerrilla and the sanctions threats. However, Pretoria is aware that the constant use of military overkill against its neighbours could threaten South African hegemony by activating a host of unpredictable responses from the international community.[17] On the other hand, by permitting the SADCC countries to lessen their dependence on South Africa to a limited extent — indeed, by actively assisting such a process and by accepting the imperative of the sub-continent's interdependence — it may be possible for Pretoria to offset perceived losses by a number of gains: not least of these gains would be a reduction in regional tensions which would be of benefit to all the states and peoples of Southern Africa.

Notes and references

1 D Anglin, "SADCC after Nkomati", *African Affairs*, vol 84, no 335, April 1985, p 163.

2 For further elaboration on Zimbabwe's importance to the regional grouping, see J Hanlon, *Beggar your neighbours*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986, p 17.

3 The idea of Consas was embraced by P W Botha as a way of establishing an economic and political alliance, dominated by South

Africa, to counter socialist countries in the region such as Angola and Mozambique. Consas was to include Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Muzorewa's "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia", Malawi, Namibia and South Africa and its homelands. SADCC proved more attractive to all South Africa's independent neighbours, however, and Consas never materialized.

4 R Weisfelder, "The Southern African Development Coordination Conference: A new factor in the liberation process', in T Callaghy (ed) *South Africa in Southern Africa: The intensifying vortex of violence*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p 259.

5 *Ibid*, p 255.

6 For a recent analysis of East European arms transfers to the region, see C Coker, "Pact, pox or proxy: Eastern Europe's security relationship with Southern Africa", *Soviet Studies*, vol XL, no 4, October 1988, pp 573–584.

7 R Martin, *Southern Africa: The price of apartheid*, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988, chapter 6; *Front File, Southern Africa Brief*, no 3, July 1987, p 4.

8 For more on the special case of Angola, see E Leistner, "South Africa and the Soviet Union", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, vol 28, no 4, 1988, p 2.

9 The argument is expanded and elaborated in S Baynham and G Mills, "Angola's land battle: A post mortem", *Front File, Southern Africa Brief*, no 9, December 1987, pp 1–3.

10 This section is distilled from a comprehensive paper currently being prepared by the author on British security assistance to the SADCC states, especially to Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

11 *Hansard*, 3 February 1988, col 640.

12 Speech given to the Southern African Association, London, 1 March 1988, London Press Service, Central Office of Information, London, 1 March 1988.

13 *The Times*, 9 May 1987.

14 Details of Tanzanian troop deployments across the African continent may be found in A Hughes and R May, "Toward an explanation of transnational intervention among black African states: 1960–85", in S Baynham (ed) *Military power and politics in black Africa*, London and New York: Croom Helm/St Martin's Press, 1986.

15 Interview, London, 2 November 1988.

16 *Ibid*.

17 R Martin, *op cit*, p 113.

The plight of rural widows in Ciskeian agriculture

Dr G J Steyn, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development at the University of Fort Hare, examines the situation of widowed heads of households in the rural areas of the Ciskei.

In less-developed countries the number of female-headed households has increased considerably, both as a result of widowhood and concurrently with the growth in population. This increase has been accompanied by a multiplicity of social changes. Of particular importance is the breakdown in extended family structures and traditional social patterns — such as inheritance of widows, arranged marriages — wrought by rapid socio-economic change, increased inequality and impoverishment.[1]

Although data on widowhood are readily available from almost all censuses, very little attention has been paid to the position of widows in traditional societies in developing countries.[2] Sociologically, widows are also of interest since they invariably, in more than one sense, constitute so-called "minority groups" in almost all societies.

In a farming systems study of two rural areas in Ciskei, to be described further on, it was found that widows had become an increasingly important component of rural communities. In 1984/85, 23 per cent of households in these areas had been headed by widows; by 1985/86 this figure had risen to 32 per cent. According to Maqashalala, the changed circumstances brought about by a decrease in the proportion of male-headed households have had deleterious consequences because of "social loss", implying that not only has there been a decrease in physical manpower, but also certain social role adaptations have occurred within the rural society.[3] This situation has a serious effect on social and rural development programmes being undertaken in Southern Africa.

According to the study, certain personal, socio-economic and cultural factors relating to workers affect agricultural production in one way or another. These factors are discussed in this article.

Methodology

The investigation was confined to two typical subsistence or below-subsistence communities in the Peddie District, chosen because of their apparent infrastructural, organizational and socio-economic varieties.

The field research was planned over a three year period which commenced in September 1983 and was completed in October 1986. In the study the frequent interview survey method was adopted. Because of the cost and long-term nature of the research project it was accepted that one local enumerator per study area would be adequate.

According to information derived from local government officials, who included health workers, extension staff and local teachers, the study areas appeared to be fairly similar in terms of ecological conditions and culture, and were representative of rural areas in Ciskei. It was decided that because of the small populations in these two areas — 280 households at Nyaniso location and 274 at Lujiko location — a random sample of 14 per cent of these populations would be adequate.

A step-wise multiple regression analysis was used to explore the possible existence of multivariate predictive models for certain key criteria. All statistical calculations were performed with the SPSS statistical package on a Prime 750 computer.[4]

Characteristics of widows

Data from the study indicated that the majority of widows (74 per cent) were aged 61 years and older, and that of these, half were 70 years and older. It is unlikely that the majority in this category had the necessary physical capabilities to carry out crop production activities, such as planting and weed control.

Furthermore women of this mature age group usually find it difficult to find employment in any other sector of the local economy. This is supported by Maqashalala's findings that the retirement age of women in Ciskei is 60 years.[5]

The majority of widows (79 per cent) had received less than four years of schooling and could therefore be regarded as illiterate. They were consequently disadvantaged in participating in any adult educational programmes aimed at improving crop production and living standards.

There was a general lack of able-bodied males in households headed by widows. This led to dependence on female labour for agricultural tasks, as well as general household chores. It was concluded, therefore, that certain farming tasks were inevitably either not undertaken or were neglected. This also suggested that a large proportion of widows depended on neighbours, friends or male members of their extended families for assistance in agricultural activities, since it was most unlikely that they could afford to make use of hired labour.



Crop production

Contrary to expectations only eight per cent of widows had no land rights. This reflected a more satisfactory situation than that existing in other parts of Ciskei. Oram found that a third of the women without husbands in Burns Hill did not have land rights.[6] Sixty-two per cent of the widows had lands of one hectare, while 25 per cent had lands of 1 to 2 hectares. Only one had 4 hectares. On the assumption that approximately 4 hectares of arable land is required for dryland subsistence-level farming in medium to high potential agro-ecological areas[7] it was concluded that, except for one widow (3,4 per cent), in common with most Ciskei rural households none had viable farming units and were therefore not in a position to support their families adequately from agricultural activities.

An evaluation of their crop production methods showed that widows did not follow an acceptable timetable for planting, sowed maize by broadcasting, did not use manure, fertilizer or improved seed, nor did they take any precautions against cutworm and stalkborer pests.

Weed control was reasonably adequate during the early stages of the crop, but was inadequate at the later, critical, stage. It was also found that although no crop rotation system was practised, the majority interplanted maize with crops such as pumpkins, beans and melons.

Since only 29 per cent of the widows owned cattle and only 14 per cent owned oxen, they were dependent to a large extent on tractors for ploughing. This lack of draught animals not only had a long-term cost in lower production owing to lack of timeliness but it also demanded an immediate cost in the form of cash outlay for ploughing.

Scarcity of labour proved to be one of the major stumbling-blocks, especially at peak periods such as planting, weeding and harvesting. Apart from their own labour input, widows were to some extent assisted by their relatives (in 56 per cent of cases), friends (27 per cent) and family members (daughters 17 per cent).

Assuming that a family of six persons require 1 000 kg of maize grain per annum[8] it was found that only about 25 per cent of the widows were self-sufficient in maize. This suggests that a large number (75 per cent) were compelled to purchase a large proportion of their own maize requirements.

These findings showed that widows were in a disadvantaged position as regards crop production. In general, crop husbandry methods applied by widows were of a primitive nature, and recommended practices with regard to time of planting, use of manure, fertilizer and improved seed were largely ignored.

Likewise, inadequate insect control, weed control and a complete lack of crop rotation practices all contributed to low maize yields. The general lack of knowledge relating to crop management, together with the findings that widows generally did not perceive poor management (70 per cent) and/or lack of knowledge as a cause of poor yields, posed a serious challenge for extension staff.

Livestock production

Introduction

From the early days, livestock has played an important part in the lives and economy of all African rural peoples. Only 55 per cent of the widows in the sample actually held grazing rights for livestock, suggesting that a large proportion (45 per cent) were deprived of the benefits which could be derived from livestock in terms of milk, meat and wool. The average numbers of livestock owned by male heads of households and widows in the area studied are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Average numbers of livestock owned by male heads of households and widows in the study, 1985/86.[9]

Average	Males (n=57)	Widows (n=24)
Cattle	4,7	1,0
Sheep	24,7	13,1
Goats	18,9	13,7
Pigs	2,25	0,6
Laying hens	5,4	4,8

Cattle

In the context of what is known and practised in the commercial livestock farming sector, the livestock husbandry methods practised by widows could only be described as primitive. It was found, furthermore, that cattle were of very little economic significance in the lives of widows, since only 29 per cent of the latter owned cows. Compared with the average cattle ownership for male heads of households (Table 1), widows owned significantly fewer animals.

According to Bembridge, eight livestock units are considered the minimum number to satisfy primary needs of survival and subsistence, as well as social needs, before any secondary needs can be catered for.[10] Only one widow had a herd large enough to meet such basic needs.

The shortage of draught animals was also illustrated by the fact that only one widow had four oxen. In general the reproduction rate of the herd was very low, and calf and herd mortality rates exceptionally high, reflecting low levels of management.

Widows were more involved with the management of their livestock than were the wives of farmers. On average, over the period of the study, 48 per cent of the widows were responsible for herding their cattle, compared with 39 per cent of herding performed by their sons and 13 percent by their daughters.

In one area widows and their daughters were also responsible for milking the cows. Of the seven widows who owned cows only three derived some benefit from the milk. Therefore, on the assumption that milk requirements are 0,5 litres per day per person, production did not meet the demands of most of the widows' families.

Similarly very little financial gain was derived from the cattle herd. Only five head were sold over the three-year period, for a total cash income of R1 580, and one ox was slaughtered for ceremonial purposes, at an estimated value of R500.

Sheep

Sheep farming, the price of wool being very favourable at present, offers a good opportunity for widow-headed households to generate a reasonable income. It was found, however, that very few widows owned sheep. On average, as indicated in Table 1, widows owned fewer sheep than did male-headed households.

Several factors inhibited the progress of economic sheep farming. Lambing percentages were generally very low, while lamb mortality rates were exceptionally high. It was concluded, therefore, that the level of sheep management again left much to be desired.

Herding of sheep was mainly undertaken by the widows (in 87 per cent of cases), assisted by sons and daughters, but sheep were generally allowed to graze with the rest of the local flocks, and normally returned to their kraals in the afternoon on their own.

In 1985/86, of the total benefit derived from their flocks, the sale of stock accounted for 32 per cent, the sale of wool for 46 per cent, and the balance, 22 per cent, went in own consumption.

In the last two years of the study period, income from the sale of wool showed a favourable increase, which might become an incentive not only for the widows, but for all sheep-owners, to improve the general management of their sheep as this could make a valuable contribution towards the overall economic situation in rural areas such as Ciskei.

From discussions with widows it became clear that an efficient extension service was desperately needed to train and motivate this disadvantaged group to improve their management skills and thereby build up an economically stable sheep farming industry.

Goats

With its high fertility rate, the goat offers a very favourable opportunity for the less-privileged widow group to improve their general socio-economic situation. Compared with cattle, goats are not very difficult to manage nor are they so adversely affected by deteriorating veld conditions especially during droughts.

Over the three years during which this study took place, it was found that, on average, 50 percent of widows possessed goats, the mean herd size being 13. These findings compare very favourably with those found by Bembridge in three locations in Ciskei,[11] but are less than the average number owned by male respondents.

As with sheep farming, goats were herded mainly by the widows assisted by their sons and, to a lesser extent, daughters. No instances were reported where widows dosed sheep or goats for internal parasites and 35 per cent of them relied on the stock inspector and neighbours for castrating redundant male animals.

In 1983/84 three widows sold three goats for an average amount of R61,33 giving a total of R184. No goats were slaughtered during this year. In 1984/85, however, three widows slaughtered two goats valued at R85 each for ceremonial purposes. Three widows sold four goats at R87,50 each in 1985/86, and seven goats valued at R80 were slaughtered for ceremonial purposes and two widows slaughtered one goat each for cash valued at R80 per goat.

TABLE 2: Off-take and income derived from goat herds in areas studied 1983/84–1985/86. (N=11)[12]

	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
Herd off-take (per cent)	1,4	1,8	3,8
Gross value (Rand)	184,00	440,00	1 808,00
Value per goat (Rand)	0,84	1,57	3,14
Gross value/household (Rand)	18,40	44,00	98,18

From Table 2 it is clear that widows did not derive much from their herds in terms of income or nutrition.

In this case, too, the generally poor level of livestock management among widows in the areas studied revealed an urgent need for the provision of extension services to promote the adoption of sound practices.

Pigs

With good management, pig farming can undoubtedly contribute significantly to the income of widows. In the case of both pigs and poultry, where grain forms a large part of the animals' diet, the keeping of such livestock should be well integrated with crop production, especially grain production.

The old system, whereby pigs were allowed to range freely and scavenge is no longer permissible, and heavy fines are imposed on the owners of pigs that are found roaming about.

In 1983/84 only two widows from Lujiko location owned one pig each, and they derived no financial benefit from their animals in that year. The situation changed to some extent in 1984/85, when it was found that 11 of the widows owned pigs. Six widows had one pig each while five owned two pigs each. One piglet was purchased for R5 in that year but no sales or slaughters were recorded.

In 1985/86 nine widows owned pigs; three owned one; four owned two pigs and one owned three pigs. Once again no sale transactions or actual slaughters were recorded for that year. On average widows owned one pig in 1985/86 compared to two pigs owned by male heads of households for the same period.

From the above it is obvious that pig farming did not play a significant role in the household economy of widows. Apart from the fact that pigs were no longer allowed to scavenge and roam about freely, theft was mentioned as being a serious problem. The fact that widows invariably did not have adult males in the household made them very vulnerable targets. This problem of theft also applied to poultry, small stock and vegetable crops in their gardens.

Poultry

Poultry farming, both for eggs and meat, has been common on the domestic scene in these rural areas for many years. Were it not for theft problems and the security measures involved to combat this, raising birds commercially in these two locations could be a paying proposition. It would also be within the means of widows, who could make use of locally available resources such as crop by-products. In normal crop production years, maize grain becomes freely available since households only utilize between 45–50 per cent of the maize produced as green mealies, with the rest being available for stock feed.

Poultry farming made a valuable contribution to the widowed households, not in terms of sales, but in terms of egg production for domestic consumption. Actual sales of eggs and broilers were minimal.

In 1983/84 the gross value of production was very low at R31, but increased substantially to R98 in 1984/85, only to decrease again to R50 in 1985/86. It was established that an unusual number of traditional ceremonies were held by respondents in 1984/85 especially in the one area, which accounted for the high gross value of poultry slaughtered during that period.

Pensions

According to African tradition, it is customary to request help when in need. Such requests are not interpreted as begging, however. The exchange of gifts and help is reciprocal and mutual obligations among kin, friends and neighbours are common occurrences among African peoples.

Fifty-eight per cent of the widow-headed households in 1985/86 had at least one member drawing an old-age pension, which therefore constituted an important source of income.

Ciskei pensions are paid out on a bi-monthly basis and there was general agreement that pensioners, especially widows, invariably experienced great difficulties in meeting their financial commitments towards the middle of the second month. This was particularly the case with those families who depended entirely upon pensions as their source of income.

Even with increased pension benefits, the high inflation rate means that benefits fail to keep pace with the rising cost of living. From general discussions with respondents it became clear that even those who were paid an old-age pension were unable to meet their needs with these limited resources. These findings also support those of the study in Tyume Valley by Maqashalala, who found that widows were living below the minimum subsistence level.[13]

Twelve of the 14 respondents who received pensions, received R140 (R70 per month) and two received R90 (R45 per month). It was also found that applications for old-age pensions took a very long time to be effected. In 1985/86 it was determined that 29 per cent of the widows in our sample received no income from any source — pensions, remittances, social welfare, and so on. Maqashalala found that 80 percent of the widows in his study did not receive any income.[14]

Monthly remittances

In 1985/86, 34 per cent of widows received monthly remittances ranging from R35 to R130. Eighty per cent of these remittances were made by their sons and the rest by their daughters.

This tallied with Maqashalala's findings, that widows were more dependent upon their sons for financial support than upon their daughters.[15] According to Ware, a widow is dependent upon a son's kindness for her support and can be relegated to the status of a servant in his home.[16]

Employment

Because of advanced age and the generally low level of education, it was not surprising to find that only a very small number (16 per cent) of this group were employed. One was employed in a drought relief scheme, which could be considered as temporary employment, but two were employed in town and were earning R210 and R150 respectively per month.

In all, 29 per cent of the widows had more than one source of income (pension and remittance), while in 42 per cent of the households, only one member of the family received some form of income through either pensions, remittance or wage employment.

According to Potgieter a family of 5,5 members in the Peddie rural area required about R290 per month for subsistence.[17] From these figures it was concluded that more than 90 per cent of widows in our studies were living below subsistence level. The necessity for rendering formal support to widows in these areas is obvious. It is quite clear that the average annual cash income for widows is well below the required Household Subsistence Level. This group is poor in absolute terms and does not have adequate savings or cash resources to adopt improved agricultural practices. This results in a heavy reliance on subsistence based agriculture.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, unless the husband was living away from home, and was not part of everyday life, including the social and emotional life of the wife, we can expect her to experience great changes after his death. Not only must the widow undertake the complex process of "grief work" by which she breaks ties with the deceased and established herself as an independent, but she must also reorganize her life on many levels. Some form of training or informal learning or new skills must be obtained, old roles must be modified and new ones acquired and adjustments made within the greater role cluster. On being widowed, for example, a woman loses much of her "ascribed" status and must now assume a new or greatly altered role and status.

It is clear from the findings of this study that widows head a fairly large percentage of households. Although further research should be undertaken to provide more detail about the nature of their recurrent needs, it is already very evident that the present systems of support, both formal and informal, are inadequate. It therefore appears urgent that more assistance, including financial support, be made available by the Ciskei government.

The findings further suggest that in future male extension workers be supported by well-trained female extension workers, health and home economics workers who can give individual attention to primary health care and improving the homes and quality of life of widows.

Because of the general labour and draught animal problems it is advisable that emphasis be placed on vegetable production, small stock, pig and poultry farming.

Because of the advanced age and illiteracy of most widows it is doubtful if they will benefit much from literacy and numeracy training. Training should rather be designed to suit seasonal agriculture and work cycles.

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B·O·O·K·S·H·E·L·F

Book review

Hans Jenny, *Afrika — Woher? Wohin? Reisen, Begegnungen, Gedanken.* (*Africa — Whence? Whither? Travels, meetings, reflections*), Bern: Kümmerly & Frey, 1988, 272 pp, maps, photos.

Hans Jenny is a leading German-language interpreter of present day Africa. Since 1952 this remarkable Swiss businessman and author has travelled extensively on the continent, visiting 35 countries from the Maghreb to the Cape of Good Hope. Like the six earlier books resulting from these travels, the present one reflects the author's wide range of personal acquaintances and other contacts, his extensive knowledge of Africa's recent as well as earlier history, and his grasp of its economic, ecological, political and social problems. The book bears testimony to his intense concern for the well-being of the people of Africa — a concern which is warm-hearted yet sober.

As Peter Sulzer, the well-known Swiss authority on African literature, writes in his foreword, "Hans Jenny loves the traditions of Africa but keeps his Swiss soberness; romantic *Weltschmerz* brought about by contemplation of the ravages of time is foreign to him. He castigates the abuses of civilization and the consequences of ill-conceived technical developments but refuses to be impressed by those who squeal about neo-colonialism and imperialism whilst unawares of their own racist arrogance." Sulzer rightly stresses the author's deeply religious attitude which underlies everything he writes but which never forces itself upon the reader.

The subtitle of the book, "Whence? Whither?", suggests that Jenny aims to probe into Africa's historical, cultural and spiritual heritage in order to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges facing the people of Africa as they endeavour to raise their living standards, gain meaningful independence, and become part of the modern world. Rather than treating these topics in heavy academic fashion, Jenny enlivens the accounts of his travels with vivid historical sketches and anecdotes, insight-giving conversations, and pertinent factual data. In this way he manages to maintain the reader's interest and to present a multi-dimensional, colourful picture of African reality. A more abstract and speculative discussion is to be found in the concluding chapter, entitled "Retrospect and prospect. Africa a continent without a future?"

When dealing with complex scientific issues, Jenny quotes from his personal discussions with noted authorities such as Raymond Dart, L S B Leakey, Oswin Köhler, and Henri Lhote. History is brought to life through the reminiscences of his interlocutors, who include not only internationally known figures like Houphouët-Boigny, Roy Welensky, Julius Nyerere, Tom Mboya, Albert Luthuli, Alan Paton, Dr Vedder and Jonas Savimbi, but also guides, businessmen, officials, foreign diplomats and other expatriates. While a short review obviously cannot do justice to this book, a few less well known or otherwise interesting points may serve to illustrate the kaleidoscopic diversity which it portrays.

Writing about a visit to Cameroon, Jenny relates how Sultan Njoya of the Bamum early in the present century designed an alphabet with more than 500 letters, subsequently reduced to 72, for the Bamum language, and established his own schools and a printing shop (p 137).

The impressive academic qualifications of President Marien Ngouabi of Congo (Brazzaville), who was assassinated in 1977, and his cabinet are not generally known. Ngouabi himself worked on a doctoral dissertation on the utilization of solar energy; the prime minister had studied mathematics, while his predecessor had held a chair of history in France; the foreign minister was the author of four books on anthropology; the minister of agriculture was an agricultural engineer; the minister of justice was writing a dissertation on juvenile delinquency; and so forth (p 147).

Dealing with the Senufo in Côte d'Ivoire, who are famous for their woodcarvings and brass castings, Jenny tells how a cultural revolution in the late 1940s was responsible for a vast outflow of precious Senufi artefacts to Western countries when the Senufo people were led to believe by a medium that they could expect paradise on earth if they were to remove their cult figures from the sacred groves and adopt a new cult instead (p 126). The mysterious cults and black magic that have prevailed in Benin (Dahomey) to this day, are touched upon in Jenny's accounts of a visit to a temple where there were sacred pythons, and of the young girl who had guided the visitors through a museum and who refused to talk about the scars on her upper arms which looked as if they had been caused by a leopard or a jackal (pp 130–131).

Several instances of "development ruins" are mentioned. The University of the North Gaston Berger, 10 km from Saint-Louis in Senegal, was built to relieve pressure on the University of Dakar but is standing empty and decaying because students as well as teachers refuse to go there (p 112). In Burundi the author saw a dairy built at a cost of 1,2 million Swiss francs by an overseas welfare organization with the aim of improving the protein intake of poor children, and which produces only 7 kg of cheese a day which is so expensive that only the upper class and expatriates can afford it (p 162). Algeria tries hard to attract its native people into technical and managerial jobs in the petroleum industry, but despite serious unemployment and notwithstanding generous scholarships and incentives, the young people prefer the sweet life in the cities to the harsh but highly remunerative employment conditions on the oil fields (p 103/4).

There is also the touching meeting with 76-year old Mr Götz who had lived in Ethiopia for 53 years, married a local girl, built up a flourishing farm and lost it when Haile Selassie fled before the Italians. A mine of information on the country's history, he had to admit that half a century was not enough to fathom the mysterious ways of the Ethiopians, and that "on the long ladder to such knowledge he had perhaps reached the first or second rung" (pp 83–87). Jenny also tells amusing stories in connection with Haile Selassie's visit to Switzerland in 1954 (pp 71–73); gives an account of ceremonial and a parade at the imperial court (p 82); relates what he learned about Ethiopia in conversation with the famous orientalist Professor Enno Littmann (pp 80–81); and describes unusual punishments for murderers and robbers in that country (pp 74-75).

Jenny is particularly familiar with South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia, and in his view South Africa's "prospects for successful evolution are better today than 20 to 30 years ago", notably because "performance rather than skin colour increasingly determines success or failure in a business career" (p 259). At the same time he observes that South African stop-go politics is reminiscent of a traditional religious hop-skip procession with three steps forward, two steps back (p 255). With the benefit of hindsight, it is interesting to learn that in 1982 Minister Chris Heunis in conversation with Jenny confidently predicted that Buthelezi would be compelled by his people to opt for full independence for KwaZulu (p 253). Thanks to Jenny's attention to detail, which is reflected throughout the book, one also learns of the toy steam engine — "like those we give to boys at Christmas" — on the desk of President Lennox Sebe who is quoted as saying, "I am rather a big fish in a small pond than a small fish in a lake" (p 233).

The concluding observations on the nature and causes of Africa's present malaise, while sound and balanced, tread familiar ground. The same applies, by and large, to the section headed, "What could be done?", but it is to be regretted that the author does not elaborate on some of the issues raised. Starting with population policy, Jenny outlines four fundamental changes needed if a further slide into "chaos and hopelessness" is to be prevented. The others are a transition to private property and free markets; agricultural and rural development; and regional autonomy. Every single one of these points raises numerous questions. There is, for instance the statement that political leaders ought to combat promiscuity as a foremost cause of Africa's population explosion ". . . which is considerably easier than with us because Africa is mostly governed autocratically" (p 270). As it stands, this statement implies a degree of farsightedness and moral fibre on the part of African leaders which is not apparent anywhere on the continent.

Or take the issue of regional autonomy within a given state. Highly desirable though greater self-determination for the various tribes and other ethnic entities may be, it is clear that in the majority of African states, the cohesiveness and legitimacy of central government is so weak that even without regionalization the danger of disintegration is very real. However, Jenny is not dogmatic, and emphasizes the need for each country to evolve its own appropriate model of government.

He acknowledges that his vision for a new Africa might be considered utopian, but rightly points out that the continent's seemingly instractable problems are but one facet of the enormous difficulties confronting mankind as a whole; mankind as such faces a huge task of re-learning and can expect far worse disasters than the two world wars if it fails to meet the challenge in time. Jenny is deeply convinced that religion alone, and "for us Europeans and a large number of Africans: Christianity", can provide the new orientation that is needed. He ends on a note of hope because in Africa, unlike the many ossified structures of Western and East Bloc countries, things are in a flux, and also because Africans are still consciously rooted in the metaphysical and, furthermore, are capable of spontaneous and dynamic thinking (p 272).

The book contains many excellent colour photographs, and also sketch maps showing most of the geographical places and areas referred to in the text, but has no index. This multifaceted book, which so graphically presents the fruit of almost 40 years of first-hand observation as well as of extensive reflection by a cultured and sympathetic observer, is rewarding reading for both novice and specialist.

Erich Leistner

(*Dr Jenny's book is obtainable in South Africa from Kontakt-Vertrieb, P O Box 7174, Pretoria, 0001.*)

The Atlantic ports of the Zaire river basin

Denis Fair, senior research fellow at the Africa Institute, continues his series on the ports and harbours of Africa.

The basin of the Zaire river embraces the countries of Zaire, Congo, most of the Central African Republic (CAR) and a small portion of north-eastern Angola. It covers an area of over 3,3 million km^2, or a little less than half the area of the United States of America. This vast basin straddles the equator, lying between latitude 9° north and 12° south. Its climate is tropical and equatorial, its rainfall ranges from 1 000 mm to over 2 000 mm (40 to more than 80 inches) per year, and its predominant vegetation is lowland rain forest. The population numbers 40 million, Zaire accounting for 34 million. Its main resources are coffee, cotton and timber, copper, cobalt and diamonds and, off the Atlantic coast, crude oil.

The basin is served by two main transportation systems. The first is internal to Zaire, Congo and the CAR, utilizing some 20 000 km of navigable waterways, 6 000 km of railways, and some 175 000 km of roads of poor quality, of which not more than 3 700 km are asphalted. Through these channels both domestic and international traffic are funnelled to four major ports. Two are the river ports of Kinshasa and Brazzaville and two the seaports of Matadi and Pointe Noire in Zaire and Congo respectively.

The second transportation system is external and connects eastern and south-eastern Zaire by road and rail to the Indian Ocean ports of Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, Beira, Maputo, Durban and East London, and to the Atlantic Ocean port of Lobito via the Benguela railway. The capital cities of Kinshasa (Zaire) and Brazzaville (Congo) have populations of 2,6 million and 600 000, respectively.

Zaire

The *voie nationale*

Zaire's south-eastern province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) is the country's main producer of copper and cobalt, accounting for 55 per cent of Zaire's export earnings in 1985. Before 1975 these minerals were exported mainly via the 2 100 km Bengula railway, completed in 1931 between Lubumbashi in Shaba and the port of Lobito. Zambia's copper was also exported via this route.

The remainder of Shaba's copper, 300 000 tonnes in 1973 out of a total of 800 000 tonnes, was exported via Matadi, a longer route of 2 700 km known as the *voie nationale* or national way. It involves a rail connection completed in 1928, from Lubumbashi to Ilebo (1 600 km), then transport by barge on the Kasai river to Kinshasa (700 km) and rail again to Matadi (370 km). The two transhipments required make this route very much slower than the Lobito link, while delays can also be caused by low river levels and shifting sandbanks. Nevertheless, it was official policy to use this domestic route as much as possible in order to save foreign exchange and to use the country's own infrastructure.

Today there are two major national parastatal organizations responsible for transport affairs in Zaire. They are the *Société Nationale des Chemin de Fer Zairois* (SNCZ), the authority responsible for all railways except the Kinshasa-Matadi line, and the *Office National des Transports* (Onatra), responsible for river transport, port management and the Kinshasa-Matadi railway. In addition, a number of other parastatals are responsible for certain specialist transport functions, such as the *Régie des Voies Maritime* (RVM) and the *Régie des Voies Fluviales* (RVF), responsible for maintaining the infrastructure connected with water transport. There is also the *Office des Routes* (OR) concerned with major roads, while other bodies are involved in air transport and shipping.

The role of the private sector is growing, especially in road transport which in recent years, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, is steadily superseding rail transport. In Zaire about 75 per cent of the volume of all traffic handled, both short and long distance, now goes by road, although mineral traffic moves primarily by rail and river.

In 1975, during Angola's war of liberation against the Portuguese, the Benguela railway was put out of action. With the ensuing civil war between the Unita movement, which controls most of south-eastern Angola, and the MPLA government the line has remained closed. Ideally, the *voie nationale* should have taken the extra load shed by the

Benguela closure. However, this was impossible because of the deterioration in its operational efficiency since 1960 when Zaire gained its independence from Belgium.

By 1985 the national route was coping with 48 per cent of the mineral traffic from Shaba — 274 000 tonnes out of a total of 565 000 tonnes. The remainder had to be routed via Dar es Salaam (12 per cent) and, because of serious congestion at that port, via the much longer and more expensive 3 500 km rail link to South African ports (40 per cent). In 1986 the tonnage of minerals carried on the national route rose to a more encouraging 310 000 tonnes, thus raising its proportion of the mineral export traffic handled to 55 per cent, the highest recorded since 1974.

Kinshasa

Zaire has four main river ports: Kinshasa, Mbandaka and Kisangani on the Zaire river and Ilebo on the Kasai. Kinshasa is the transhipment point from river to rail for all commodities leaving Zaire via the port of Matadi and from rail to river for those entering the country. The reason is that upstream of the Malebo pool at Kinshasa lie the vast navigable reaches of the Zaire river and its tributaries, while downstream from the pool to Matadi the river descends 270 m in falls and rapids over a distance of 350 km. The hydroelectric potential of this stretch of river is enormous and the Inga project, commenced in 1972, taps some of this power potential. But for transportation the river here poses a major hurdle, necessitating a tortuous rail connection of 366 km through the Crystal mountains between Kinshasa and Matadi.

Kinshasa is a busy port through which passes almost 600 000 tons of cargo per year. In 1987 considerable improvements were made to its handling facilities. It has over 1 000 m of quays for handling minerals, petroleum products, palm oil, timber, general cargo and containers. The city is connected by ferry across the river to Brazzaville, the capital of Congo. In 1986 discussions were held on the possibility of building a road and rail bridge between the two cities. If this project ever eventuated it would allow some of Zaire's export and import traffic to go via Congo's railway to and from its port of Pointe Noire.

Matadi

Zaire has 9 000 km of land frontier with neighbouring countries, but only 40 km of coastline. Matadi is located on the Zaire river in this narrow wedge 133 km from the river's mouth. It has a population of 150 000 and can be regarded as the outport of Kinshasa, to which it is connected by the railway built in 1897, by road and by two oil pipelines. Ocean-going vessels first reached Matadi only in 1933. The port and town are built on a narrow strip of land on the southern bank of the river, backed by steeply rising valley sides. The site leaves little room for expansion and the residential areas of the town have spread upwards to higher ground.

Ships plying to Matadi meet with unstable sandbanks, sharp bends and swift river currents, including the swirling "devil's cauldron". The port handles both general and container traffic and can take vessels of up to 10 000 dwt, or up to 15 000 dwt if they are not heavily laden, but navigation is confined to daylight hours. About 500 ships per year call at the port. Ango Ango, immediately downstream, handles petroleum products and inflammable materials. Over half of Zaire's mineral exports and 90 per cent of its non-mineral exports, excluding crude oil, pass through Matadi. In 1987 a substantial renovation of the port was completed involving improvements to quays, the provision of new cranes and the relaying of new rail track.

Immediately downstream of Matadi the southern bank of the river forms the boundary with Angola, so that it is only on the northern side of the river that Zaire has access by land to the Atlantic Ocean. Two small ports are located in this corridor. Boma is 74 km from the mouth of the river and is the terminus for a short 140 km railway line serving a limited hinterland. Some cargoes are off-loaded at Boma so that ships can reduce draught and proceed more easily upstream to Matadi. From Boma the cargoes go on to Matadi by road. Banana is a fishing port at the mouth of the river and immediately north of it lies the Moanda oil terminal. Of the three ports, Matadi accounted for 92 percent (1 464 124 tonnes) of the total import and export cargo handled (1 584 940 tonnes) in 1985, excluding crude oil.

The annual increase in cargo handled was rather sluggish in the five years from 1978 to 1983, rising from 1 127 803 tonnes to only 1 323 719 tonnes or by 3,2 per cent a year. The increase had improved to 9,4 per cent per year by 1985 and was over 10 per cent in 1986, thanks largely to the rise in copper exports and an increase in food imports.

Moanda oil terminal

Crude oil accounts for 17,6 per cent by value of Zaire's exports (1986). It was first exploited in 1975 in areas off the Atlantic coast and in the estuary of the Zaire river. Production is comparatively small and seems to have reached a level of about 1,5 million tonnes per year, far less than the 14 million and 6 million tonnes produced, respectively, in neighbouring Angola and Congo in 1986. An offshore loading terminal taking tankers of up to 100 000 dwt is located at Moanda. There is also a refinery here but the plant is unsuitable for the refining of Zaire's heavy crude oil, most of which is exported. Instead, the refinery treats imported light crude to meet part of its domestic requirements.

Proposed deepwater harbour

Owing to Matadi's location and limited space for expansion, an old idea was revived in the early 1970s, to bridge the river at Matadi and continue the railway from Kinshasa to a new deepwater port at Banana. In addition, with the completion in 1977 of the large Inga hydroelectric power station on the lower Zaire, with a generating capacity of 1 750 MW, new sources for the consumption of this power had to be found. One proposal was the Inga free zone authority (Zofi) the aim of which was to establish at Banana a free trading and industrial zone to which it was hoped to attract new industries, including a large aluminium smelter.

Estimates of the cost of the Zofi and Banana projects proved to be excessively expensive and were subsequently shelved. The bridge at Matadi, however, was built, and was financed by the Japanese, being completed in 1983. It is a suspension bridge of 722 m and the cost was $136 million. It was planned as a combined road and rail bridge, the longest of its kind in the world. The railway, however, was never installed as the volume of traffic has not justified this added investment. As it is, even road traffic using the bridge is hardly enough



to pay for the cost of maintaining the structure and servicing the loan. The existing ferry across the river is regarded as adequate for current traffic volumes, although waiting and crossing times are longer than by way of the bridge.

Transport rehabilitation plan

While the government of Zaire is anxious to give preference to the use of its own port of Matadi and its internal rail, river and road system, the fact remains that this system has been operating far from efficiently or satisfactorily. The high proportion of copper being exported via the longer and more expensive southern route to Indian Ocean ports is sufficient testimony of this. Rehabilitation of the country's transport system has been long overdue. Until recently it has been neglected and starved of funds and has been described by Huybrechts and Taylor as in a "critical condition". Because of run-down facilities the rail and river journey of Shaba's copper to Matadi took on average more than 50 days in the 1980s compared with only 20 in the early 1970s, but some improvement in efficiency recently has seen the time now fall to 45 days. To South African ports the time is 36 days and to Lobito, before closure of the Benguela railway, it was only 10 days.

The causes of the problem lie not only in the deterioration of the transport infrastructure but also in that of the management and operational performance of the various transport parastatal bodies. The result is seen in the high cost of transport for all commodities, not only copper. Agriculture is also suffering. Farmers, for example, receive no more than 20–40 per cent of the retail value of their products after the costs of transport to the country's markets have been paid. In fact, plantation companies in the north-western province of Kivu ship out their coffee and tea by plane. Zaire's poor transport infrastructure lies at the base of much of the problem facing its current uninspiring economic performance.

Consequently, emphasis in a new development plan is being placed heavily on the rehabilitation of the road, rail, river and air transport infrastructure and primarily on the *voie nationale*. The work involves all the transport parastatals and will cost well over \$300 million, \$265 million of which will be directed at the SNCZ and Onatra. Rehabilitation began in 1987 and should be completed about 1994. Financial assistance is coming from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Community, France, West Germany and Belgium. When the project is complete the transit time from Lubumbashi in Shaba province to Matadi should be reduced to 20–25 days from the present 45. Savings in costs will also be achieved by increasing the route's carrying capacity.

On the first section, SNCZ's railway from Lubumbashi to Ilebo, 300 km of railway track will be rebuilt, new electric locomotives, shunting engines and rolling stock added, rails and sleepers replaced and telecommunications and signalling improved. The packaging of commodities, including copper, will be made more efficient by resorting to containerization.

On Onatra's river section from Ilebo to Kinshasa hazards in the form of shifting sandbanks and channels will be reduced by dredging, and marker buoys and navigation lights will be installed for night-time transportation. New river craft including barges, tugs, pushers, and pilot and inspection boats will serve the Zaire, Kasai and other river routes. At Kinshasa the port's capacity is being increased, the shipyard and navigation aids are being modernized and a new wharf and port equipment added.

The capacity of the Kinshasa-Matadi railway line is to be raised to meet, by the mid-1990s and later, steadily increasing tonnages over the 1,1 million tons per year that are now carried. Track is to be relaid, more diesel locomotives, passenger and goods coaches and wagons are to be purchased, including equipment for their maintenance and repair, and telecommunications and signalling systems are to be refurbished. However, reliance for the cartage of import and export goods between Matadi and Kinshasa does not rest solely on the railway. At present nearly 60 per cent of these goods, mostly imports, is carried by road transport, while petroleum products go by pipeline. Rehabilitation at the port of Matadi, already commenced, also aims at meeting expected increases in tonnage handled over the next ten years, largely by reducing the turnaround time for ships. Moreover, access to the port is to be improved and made safer by dredging, not only to reduce the hazards of shifting channels but also to increase channel depth to take vessels of up to 8,5 m draught for ten months of the year.

After some years of discussion attention is also being given to improving one of two eastern outlets from Zaire to Dar es Salaam. One is the all-rail route via Zambia and the Tazara railway. The other route is by rail from the Shaba mining region to the port of Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika, then by lake steamer to Kigoma on the eastern side of the lake and on to Dar es Salaam by rail. Complementary to this project is the substantial programme now being undertaken by the Tanzanian Railway Corporation to upgrade the railway line between Kigoma and the coast and by the Tanzanian Harbours Authority to expand the port of Dar es Salaam.

Essential to the successful implementation of the whole transport rehabilitation plan is the overall improvement in the management and operational methods and skills of all the Zairean transport parastatals. This is necessary so that the myriad administrative, organizational and integrating functions involved can be brought to bear on the programme's successful completion. The funds earmarked for this aspect of the plan are substantial and are regarded as a vital element in the rehabilitation process as a whole.

A proposed new railway

An issue which has been the subject of some speculation for many years is the desirability of eliminating the Ilebo-Kinshasa river section of the *voie nationale* by building a railway link of 800 km. The matter arose again recently when a Soviet delegation to Zaire put forward the idea in 1987. The cost would be very high, at least $1 billion, and the time to completion ten years. It would involve expanding handling facilities at Matadi and even building the new port at Banana. Most observers believe that it would be cheaper and more expedient to wait for the re-opening of the Benguela railway to Lobito when peace returns to Angola. That railway, however, requires enormous rehabilitation. A programme to undertake this has already been agreed upon by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as the sponsoring organization and by the owners of the line, *Société Générale de Belgique*, and the Angolan government. The cost is estimated at $280 million. An emergency phase of 1–1½ years will at least allow traffic to start flowing again on the line, although full restoration will take much longer.

The issue of domestic versus external routes is not new. For pre-independent Zaire, Hance and van Dongen wrote in 1958 that "the question must soon be faced whether it is worthwhile to expand Matadi further despite the great difficulties of the site or whether some of the extra-national routes should not be willingly accepted as natural gateways of the Congo" (now Zaire).

Congo and CAR

River traffic

Across the river from Kinshasa the port of Brazzaville serves all of the Congo Republic, most of the Central African Republic (CAR) and small parts of south-eastern Cameroon and southern Chad. This area, upstream of Malebo pool, has no railways, roads are poor and not more than 1 000 km are asphalted. Thus the area is heavily dependent on the Zaire river and its right bank tributaries, notably the Sangha and the Likouaoa and especially the Oubangi, together giving over 7 000 km of navigable waterways in Congo and CAR.

In 1984 the Congolese state authority responsible for river transport and for the port of Brazzaville and the seaport of Pointe Noire indicated that 40 500 passengers and 300 000 tonnes of goods were transported by river. Of the latter, 140 000 tonnes was timber. A considerable proportion of the river traffic through Brazzaville is from or is bound for the CAR. Traffic on CAR rivers, managed by the *Sodetraf* company, totalled nearly 240 000 tonnes in 1984. Moving downstream from Bangui, the capital, were 146 000 tonnes of exports, of which 130 000 tonnes were logs and sawn timber and 13 000 tonnes were cotton. Imports totalled 91 000 tonnes, much of it fuel and other petroleum products.

In all some 500 000–600 000 tonnes of cargo passes through Brazzaville each year. This is more than twice the volume handled by Bangui. With the increase in general cargo through Brazzaville funds have been obtained from the European

Investment Bank to build a new quay and to expand the port's container handling capacity from 45 000 tonnes per year to 180 000 tonnes by 1995.

Bangui is 1 200 km from Brazzaville by river and another 500 km by rail to Pointe Noire. These distances indicate the considerable problems that this landlocked country has in participating in international trade and in procuring essential commodities such as fuel. CAR traffic on the Oubangui river has declined slightly in recent years, but a rehabilitation programme now in progress will rectify problems of both a management and an operational nature.

However, while the CAR relies primarily on river transport for its external links, it also uses its surface connections with its western neighbour Cameroon. By road from Bangui to Belabo, on the Transcameroon railway, and from there to the port of Douala is about the same distance as by river to Brazzaville. The road from Bangui to Cameroon is being improved and forms part of the larger Trans-African highway planned to join Mombasa on the Indian Ocean with Lagos in Nigeria. This 6 400 km road, partly asphalted, partly gravel and partly earth, will be 90 per cent complete by 1993 and will certainly strengthen the CAR's ties to Douala as an alternative Atlantic port to Pointe Noire. Discussions have also taken place over many years to extend the Transcameroon railway from Belabo to Berberati and then to Bangui. France, among other possible donor countries, considers the railway uneconomic and refuses to back it financially. This view is also a reflection of the fact that in many parts of Africa today road transport is superseding that by rail. Emphasis is therefore upon building new roads rather than new railways.

The Congo-Ocean railway

Brazzaville is the meeting point for river and rail transport. Between that city and Pointe Noire import and export goods travel via the Congo-Ocean railway. This line was commenced in 1921 and completed in 1934. Like the Kinshasa-Matadi railway it traversed difficult country to the coast, passing through twelve tunnels, negotiating many sharp curves and steep gradients and spanning nearly 100 bridges. In 1976 a new 91 km realignment over the most tortuous section of the track was commenced and completed only in 1985. With new locomotives and rolling-stock the time between Brazzaville and Pointe Noire has been considerably reduced and the carrying capacity of the line increased by 40 per cent. In 1986 the railway carried 3 860 000 tonnes, of which timber comprised 14 per cent and manganese 64 per cent. The manganese is mined in neighbouring Gabon. It is transported first by aerial cableway from the Moanda mine near Franceville across the border to M'binda and then by a branch of the Congo-Ocean railway to Pointe Noire.

Pointe Noire

This port has a population of nearly 300 000. Its modern deepwater harbour was opened in 1939 and is regarded as one of the best equipped in Africa. It has over 2 000 m of quays and can handle ships of up to 40 000 dwt. The port has seven general cargo berths, two timber export berths, a bulk loading terminal for manganese and a fishing harbour. There is ample covered and open storage space, along with refrigeration facilities and carrier cranes for handling containers.

Oil production

Congo is a substantial producer of crude oil, and the loading terminal is at Djeno, 15 km south of Pointe Noire. Oil was first produced in 1960 but declined until 1972, after which a number of new offshore fields were brought into production by the french *Elf* and Italian *Agip* companies. The Congolese government has a 20–35 per cent share in the ownership of the oil fields. As a result of the new finds output trebled from 2,1 million tonnes in 1973 to 6,3 million in 1987. Nearly all the oil is exported. Production should stabilize between 6 million and 7 million tonnes over the next ten years. Due to falling world prices earnings have dropped substantially, the value of output in 1987 being about half that in 1985. Nevertheless, in 1987 oil and petroleum products accounted for 75 per cent of the value of exports, having been 90 per cent in 1985. Congo's oil refinery is located at Pointe Noire. It was established in 1974 but technical problems forced its closure and limited production was resumed only in 1982. It utilizes domestic supplies of crude oil and exports about half its production.

Port traffic

In 1986 total traffic through Pointe Noire and Djeno amounted to 9,4 million tonnes, of which 93 per cent were exports. Of the exports (8,8 million tonnes), 62 per cent was crude oil, 28 per cent manganese and 5,4 per cent timber. Transit traffic from neighbouring countries represents no less than 70 per cent of non-oil traffic through Pointe Noire. This is accounted for mainly by manganese from Gabon, but some of this lucrative source of transport revenue will soon be lost to Congo. In 1986 Gabon completed its own Transgabon railway between Franceville and its port of Owendo, where a minerals loading terminal was completed in 1988. It is reported that agreement has been reached to share equally, between Pointe Noire and Owendo, the 2,5 million tonnes of manganese shipped annually. In the longer term the proportion may well shift in favour of Owendo, the loading facilities of which have a planned capacity of 6 million tonnes per year.

Conclusion

Congo, Zaire and CAR are all export economies vulnerable to world price changes in the primary commodities upon which they are dependent. The first relies almost wholly on a single commodity, crude oil, while Zaire's and CAR's economies are more diversified, each being based on four mineral, agricultural and forestal products. This dependency is well reflected in the export traffic passing through the ports of Matadi and Pointe Noire and the Moanda and Djeno oil terminals. This traffic totalled 11,3 million tonnes in 1985, of which 86 per cent was attributable to oil (64 per cent) and minerals, including Gabon's manganese (22 per cent). Thus only 1,6 million tonnes (14 per cent) was attributable to other commodities, a third of which was timber. In the case of Zaire and CAR diamonds accounted for 12 to 24 per cent of exports by value, respectively, and these were probably exported by air or overland.

Clearly, the efficient transport and handling of bulk commodities which form the basis of the economies of these countries is a sine qua non in maintaining their economic health. Fortunately, the production and export of oil is located at the coast and is in the hands of international companies long experienced in these activities. It is the overland transportation and handling facilities at the ports that obviously, in the case of Zaire rather than Congo, have been allowed to deteriorate and so have threatened the viability of the national economy. The current plans to upgrade Zaire's transportation system, virtually in its entirety, have come none too soon.

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AFRICA MONITOR

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Jenny Macgregor

NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

In a country-wide **referendum** held on 23 February the Algerian people approved reforms which effectively end the country's total commitment to socialism and the monopoly of power enjoyed by the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) since independence in 1962. The reforms, promised after last October's riots, open the way to a **multi-party system** and guarantee the right to strike to all workers. Both the number of "yes" votes and the turnout were lower than in previous referendums — 73,4 per cent of voters approved the new political system, on a 79 per cent turnout — indicating a measure of opposition to the new constitution from Islamic fundamentalists who object that the reference to Islam as the state religion does not go far enough, and from FLN traditionalists. In the month following the referendum 19 new political parties were formed, while public sector objections to FLN favoritism have come out into the open (TS 7/2; AED 6/3; ARB 15/3; AA 31/3).

The government is to spend more than $150 mn this year on a crash programme to ease **unemployment**, which helped to touch off the October protests against economic hardship. An estimated 110 000 new job-seekers now come on to the market each year (ARB 31/3).

In mid-January France signed a $1,1 bn aid agreement with Algeria, paving the way for a resolution of the 2½ year pricing dispute between *Gaz de France* and Algeria's state hydrocarbons concern *Sonatrach*. Pres **Mitterand** visited Algeria on 9–10 March, setting the seal on the recent aid and gas supply agreements, and opening a new era of political cooperation (ARB 31/1; AED 20/3). (*President's visit to Morocco — see Morocco; Maghreb Summit — see Morocco.*)

Chad

Libya and Chad are continuing efforts to proceed with the normalization of relations; on 21 March the second meeting of the joint cooperation commission was held (AED 3/4).

The appointment of Acheikh Ibn Oumar to the post of external relations minister in the Chad government reshuffle announced on 3 March is thought to mark the final stage of the reintegration of former members of the **Transitional Government of National Union** (GUNT) into Chadian public life. More than 800 rebels belonging to Oumar's Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR) have been officially integrated into the Chadian National Army (AED 13/3; ARB 15/3; WA 20/3).

Egypt

The **Arab Cooperation Council** (ACC) was formally established by the heads of state of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen on 16 February. The ACC is committed to the charter of the Arab League, its agencies and the Arab Common Defence Treaty. It will seek the creation of an Arab common market as a prelude to Arab economic unity. It is seen partly as a way of preparing for the EEC's creation of a single European market after **1992** (AED 27/2).

On 9 March, after years of delay and uncertainty, Egypt signed a loan agreement worth R217 mn with Britain for the redevelopment of the Maghara coal mine in the Sinai desert. Production is eventually expected to total 600 000 tonnes a year. Idle since the 1973 war, the mine has reserves of 27 million tonnes (C 13/3; AED 27/3; ARB 31/3).

Talks on the sharply deteriorating **debt** position dominated Pres Mubarak's talks with EEC officials and Belgian, Dutch and West German leaders during his 9–15 March tour of Europe. Repayments on foreign debts estimated at $46 bn are absorbing 40 per cent of export revenues, making rescheduling vital. The USA is giving backing for the IMF recommendation of a six-point reform package by suspending, for the second year running, disbursement of the $115 mn cash element of the $815 mn annual aid programme, until the government agrees to the IMF terms (AED 20/3).

A nephew of the late Egyptian president Abdel **Nasser** made a dramatic return to Cairo in January to defend himself in the trial of 20 members of the organization **"Egypt's Revolution"** accused of killing Israelis in Egypt. Among those accused is Khaled Abdel Nasser, the eldest son of the late president. He is expected to remain in Yugoslavia until sentence is passed. Defence lawyers have sought to put Egypt's current foreign policy on trial, particularly its adherence to the 1979 peace treaty with Israel; the authorities are equally determined to show that they will abide by the Camp David Agreement. Egypt is the only Arab country to have formal ties with the Jewish state (DT 5/1; ARB 15/2).

The Soviet Union's Middle East peace initiative aimed at gathering support for a United Nations-sponsored international peace conference, broke new ground in February following the meeting of Pres Mubarak in Cairo with both the Soviet and Israeli foreign ministers, enhancing Egypt's role in the peace process (ARB 15/3).

Israel has handed back the Red Sea beach resort of **Taba** to Egypt, completing its withdrawal from Egyptian territory captured in the 1967 Middle East War (C 16/3; TS 3/4).

Libya

US Navy fighters shot down two Libyan fighters over the Mediterranean on 4 January in an incident which added to the rising tensions between the two countries. What was deemed by the USA to be "provocative action" by two Libyan fighter pilots precipitated the incident (ARB 15/2).

The seizure by West German customs police of 255 tonnes of a chemical bound for Libya appears to confirm recent reports that Libya is producing **chemical weapons** at a factory near Rabta, while US authorities have alleged that about 100 West German, US and European companies have been unwittingly involved in the Libyan plant (S 26/1; C 4/2, 7/2; AED 13/3).

Col Gaddafi has reported that all traditional state institutions will be scrapped this year in favour of "rule by the people". In his 16 January speech, Gaddafi was particularly critical of the security agency and the official news agency, *Jana*. All state import and export organizations will be abolished and replaced by the private sector or groups of individuals (ARB 15/2; SWB 4/3).
(*Maghreb Summit — see Morocco.*)

Morocco

Syria and Morocco announced on 9 January that they had restored diplomatic relations broken off by Syria in July 1986 in protest at the visit by the Israeli prime minister. The decision followed an initiative from Saudi Arabia which aimed to eliminate obstacles hindering Arab activities, so that "the threats facing the Arab nation can be confronted" (ARB 15/2).

A major breakthrough in the drive for peace was made on 4 January when King Hassan of Morocco met with top level delegates of the **Polisario Front**, which is fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara. No statement was made after the meeting, at which implementation of the UN peace plan was discussed. Although Polisario subsequently declared a unilateral **truce** throughout February on all battle fronts, it threatened to resume fighting unless dialogue with Morocco was resumed. The Polisario Front hopes that continued negotiations with Morocco would ensure it a place at the Maghreb summit were dashed by Morocco's rejection of a resumption of dialogue. On 1 March Polisario abandoned the ceasefire (H 5/1; SWB 30/1, 20/2; ARB 15/2; NA 2/89; AED 13/3, 20/3).

At the end of January, Morocco's finance minister announced plans to dismantle exchange controls and create **"people's capitalism"** as part of the next stage of the drive toward an open, competitive economy. An outspoken advocate of a World Bank-sponsored adjustment programme, he pointed to economic growth of 8 per cent in 1988, an inflation rate of only 2,5 per cent, one of the lowest rates in the Third World, and a current account surplus (the first for 13 years) of $12 mn, as evidence that the country has "turned the corner" since the 1983 debt crisis (ARB 28/2).

A brief working visit (his first) to Morocco by Algerian Pres Bendjedid in early February, ended with the signing of an agreement to create a joint company with equal shares to build and manage the gas pipeline which will link **Algeria** to Europe, via Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar. The project is seen as giving added impetus to the new spirit of cooperation between the two countries (ARB 31/3).

At the **Maghreb summit** which ended on 17 February, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia proclaimed the Maghreb Union, and signed a **treaty** to establish a new economic block. The new accord groups together 62 mn people (AE 3/89).

Sudan

On 28 December 1988 the **Democratic Unionist Party** (DUP) resigned from the coalition government headed by prime minister Sadiq el-Mahdi, following the cabinet's refusal to ratify the peace accords reached on 16 November between representatives of the DUP and the rebel **Sudanese People's Liberation Movement** (SPLM). The next three days were marked by strikes and violent street demonstrations in Khartoum as the trades union movement reacted to price and tax increases decreed by Sadiq. The government was subsequently forced to back down on the issue of price increases, though wage increases were backdated. Ominously, the army refused to assist the police in curbing the violence, and rumours of **coup plots** were rife.

By the end of January, having failed to entice the DUP back into the government, and against the background of a series of military reverses inflicted by the rebels in southern Sudan, Sadiq once again showed signs of a willingness to negotiate with the SPLM, securing parliament's agreement in principle to the holding of a **constitutional conference**. Nevertheless, government procrastination continued, while the rebels went from strength to strength, the economy all but collapsed and the plight of the population in the south became ever more desperate.

On 21 February Gen Khalil, the defence minister, resigned his post, citing the deteriorating military, economic, political and security situation as reason for this step. The following day the prime minister received an **ultimatum** from the armed forces high command, demanding that he form a new government which should attempt to make peace with the SPLM. This demand was accompanied by a warning that should he fail to act within the week, the army would take steps to assure national unity.

Sadiq, denying that these demands constituted an ultimatum, reminded the army oi its duty to the state, threatened to resign, and continued to delay until 4 March, when he secured the agreement of a broad number of political and other groupings to the formation of a **new government**. The fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF), presumably upset by Sadiq's tacit undertaking to suspend the issue of Shari'a law until a new constitution had been agreed, refused to participate in the new arrangement.

Contacts were now resumed with the SPLM, in order to secure the passage of relief supplies to the south. Finally, on 22 March, Sadiq announced the structure of his new coalition government, and his acceptance of the accord agreed with the rebels in November (ION 7/1, 14/1, 4/2, 18/2, 25/2, 4/3, 11/3, 18/3, 1/4; AA 20/1; AC 20/1; SWB 30/1, 23/2, 25/2, 1/3, 2/3, 6/3, 10/3, 24/3, 29/3; TWR 8/2, 1/3, 8/3; ARB 15/2; E 4/3; AED 10/4).
(*Diplomatic row with Kenya — see Kenya.*)

Tunisia

Tunisia is being forced into undertaking a programme of vast **economic reforms** and structural adjustments because of the serious difficulties caused by the gradual decline of **oil** reserves, and consequent imbalance in the economy. If no new deposits are found before the end of the 7th Plan (1987–1991), Tunisia will become totally dependent on oil imports over the next four years (AE&M 26/1; WBN 23/2).

Foreign exchange receipts from **tourism** increased in 1988 by 100 per cent and were worth $1,3 bn against $600 mn in 1987, making the sector the country's main source of foreign exchange after oil and textiles (ARB 31/3).

On 18 March Pres Ben Ali ordered the release of more than 1 500 prisoners to mark the 33rd anniversary of independence. At the same time proceedings were dropped against 35 of the 90 Islamic fundamentalists charged in November 1987 with planning terrorist actions against the regime of former president Bourguiba (AED 3/4).
(*Maghreb Summit — see Morocco.*)

WEST AFRICA

Benin

France's approval of what it terms the government's "courageous measures" and progress in negotiations with the IMF and World Bank have resulted in the provision of $45 mn in fresh funding during 1989 in support of an **economic recovery programme** (AED 6/1).

Pres Kerekou has secured the backing of his government and the ruling party for an IMF-World Bank supported structural adjustment programme. Negotiations with the two bodies have been under way since 1982 (AED 20/3; ARB 31/3). Faced with an unsustainable economic situation, Pres Kerekou has been urgently seeking an agreement with the IMF, but austerity measures recommended to meet the chronic budget deficit — Benin has a $420 mn financing gap — have threatened the stability of the government. In January, public salary arrears and non-payment of student grants led to civil service **strikes** and student **riots**. How the government managed to find the cash to pay the salary arrears remains a mystery. Public enterprises currently owe an estimated $253 mn in arrears (AED 30/1; ARB 15/2, 28/2, 15/3; AA 3/3, 31/3; NA 4/89).

Burkina Faso

The approval by the IMF and the World Bank on 14 February of a joint policy framework, the essential prerequisite of loan approval, has led to negotiations on a credit package (AED 6/3).

Côte d'Ivoire

The **cocoa surplus** has been eased by the purchase of 400 000 tonnes of cocoa by a French broker, which has been questioned as contravening EC rules governing trade between member states because of the implicit French government funding for the purchase. The sale — the country's biggest ever export deal — has left other cocoa traders and shippers uncertain about their future role. Output in 1988/89 is expected to match last season's record 653 000 tonnes, but the sharp drop in prices over the last three years has resulted in lost revenue amounting to $2 bn to the government (AED 13/1; AA 3/2; AC 10/2).

The latest estimates by the Department of Economy and Finance point to a real per capita GDP decline of 3,7 per cent in 1988, following a 6,6 per cent drop in 1987. The overall balance of payments is estimated to have been in deficit to the tune of CFA F78 000 mn at the end 1988 (AED 3/4).

Gambia

An **amnesty** for 50 prisoners has been granted by Pres Jawara, as part of ceremonies marking the 24th independence anniversary. Many were involved in the attempted coup of July 1981 (AED 6/3).

Ghana

The government has expressed satisfaction at the 60 per cent turnout for the country-wide district-level **elections** which ended in February. They were the first elections of any sort in the country for a decade (WA 27/3; NA 4/89).

Confidence in the **economic recovery programme** has been further boosted by a donors' conference on 1 March, at which more than $900 mn in new finance was pledged for 1989. More than $500 mn is coming from bilateral donors, the balance from multilateral donors, including the World Bank. About one-third is pledged for quick disbursement. Exceptional economic progress is the reason that Ghana has become one of the world's most favoured aid recipients — a growth rate of 6,2 per cent was recorded in 1988, a rate unmatched by any other West African country, while for the first time foreign exchange earnings and inflows exceeded the outflow, by almost $180 mn. The country has now current paid off accumulated arrears on its foreign debt. New exchange rate, trade and tax measures, further increases in producer prices for cocoa and a comprehensive reform of the financial sector, form part of the next phase of the reform programme (AED 6/3; AC 10/3; ARB 31/3).

The government has disbanded the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, the country's largest state-owned industrial conglomerate, and sacked its top management because executives took bonuses while workers went unpaid (S 16/3).

Guinea-Bissau

A six-member commission of lawyers has been set up by the ruling party to revise the **constitution** to bring it into line with the structural adjustment policy introduced in May 1987. One of the features of the new economic policy is the abolition of state monopolies in all sectors. In January Pres Vieira announced plans to dissolve the biggest loss makers in the public sector, and to **privatize** the more viable ones (AED 6/2, 27/2; ARB 15/3).

Liberia

The US agency for International Development (USAID) has threatened to suspend its programmes and cut off aid, unless it receives **arrears** of $7 mn by 10 May. A country of two million people founded by freed American slaves in 1847, Liberia is the largest per capita recipient of US aid in Africa. Corruption in Pres Doe's government — an issue raised by the US Congress and Liberian dissident groups abroad — have contributed to foreign reluctance to provide loans (C 13/3; AED 27/3, 3/4).

Mali

A record **cotton** crop of 236 000 tonnes, up 24 per cent on the previous season, is forecast for this year, thanks to regular and abundant rainfall in 1988 (AED 20/1; ARB 31/3).

Production of 70 000 ounces of **gold** a year from the Syama mine will start in mid-1990 following several years' exploration. Situated in a remote part of the south, it will cost around $30 mn to develop. Proven reserves are more than 2 mn tonnes of oxide ore extractable by surface mining, and an additional 5–7 mn tonnes of higher-grade sulphide ore extractable by both surface and underground mining (AE&M 9/3; AED 13/3; ARB 31/3).

Mauritania

There was a high turnout for the municipal **elections** in 163 rural councils which ended without incident in mid-January. This ballot was the third and final phase of the municipal elections which began in 1986 with the "democratic" installation of municipal councils in the regional capitals and main towns (ARB 15/3).

(*Maghreb Summit — see Morocco.*)

Niger

Niger negotiated a major **rescheduling** of its public debt with its public creditors in the Paris Club in December, giving the country an important boost in its efforts to stabilize the financial position. An estimated $40 mn in principal and interest payments due in 1989 is covered. The rescheduling follows approval by the IMF of an agreement for loans over three years amounting to $69 mn. Bilateral official obligations represent almost half of Niger's total outstanding disbursed debt which stood at $1 259 mn in December 1987. Total debt service for 1989 is estimated at $139 mn (ARB 31/1).

The government has launched an information campaign on the draft **constitution** recently approved by the council of ministers (SWB 11/2; AED 20/3).

The Niger Movement of Revolutionary Committees announced in March that it was resuming its struggle against the Saibou government, following a period of silence intended to let the new government prove itself. The stated objective of the party is to establish a civilian democracy along the lines of Libya or Burkina Faso under the late Thomas Sankara (SWB 29/3).

Nigeria

Legislators of the Second Republic who served in the defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN) have been banned from taking part in the elections for the Third Republic. The ban affects the NPN's former lawmakers at both the national and state levels. Their disqualification was based on the fact that the NPN's constitution contained a provision which made every legislator elected on its platform a member of the party's executive council. It is assumed that other political parties of the Second Republic were not necessarily affected by the ban since the provision was not present in their constitution (WA 16/1).

The **Armed Forces Ruling Council** (AFRC) dissolved on 6 February, was **reconstituted** with reduced membership a few days later. In what is seen as a bold move, Pres Babangida reduced the council from 28 to 19, and subsequently carried out a minor reshuffle. Fifteen of the members are military personnel (the most senior military officers, including all chiefs of staff and the inspector-general of police). The small number of changes made were seen to reflect Babangida's confidence in many ministers and his desire to push ahead with the economic recovery programme. Coinciding with the changes was the sacking of Prof Eme Awa, chairman of the 19-month-old National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the secretary, Alhaji Umara Sanda. Prof Humphrey Nwosu has been appointed as chairman (SWB 11/2, 4/3; AA 17/2; WA 6/3; AC 17/3; A Con 10/3; AED 13/3; ARB 15/3; Cr 15/3).

In an effort to attract investment and encourage the private sector, the government has raised the 40 per cent **restriction on foreign investment** in broad areas of Nigerian business to 100 per cent. The 40 per cent limit is to remain in the banking, insurance, petroleum prospecting and mining industries (ARB 28/2).

On 3 March the Paris Club reached agreement with the government on terms for the **rescheduling** of $6 bn owed to Western governments, representing about one-fifth of the country's total foreign debt. The agreement represents a critical step in the governments efforts to sustain the structural adjustment programme (AED 13/3; ARB 31/3).

Senegal

Senegal, which has already had its debts rescheduled six times by the Paris Club, has agreed with the Club to another **debt relief** package. Creditor governments have agreed to reschedule more than $100 mn of public and publicly guaranteed debt under terms which are only applied to the very poorest nations. With gross national product per capita estimated at around $510, Senegal has been hard hit by plunging prices for groundnut oil, one of its main exports. Its total external debt is estimated at around $1,44 bn (AED 30/1; AC 2/2; ARB 28/2).

Trade between **Mauritania** and Senegal has returned to normal, following an agreement reached between the two heads of state. They emphasized their desire for the resumption of normal relations during the dispute, which led to a reciprocal ban on some categories of imports (AED 30/1, 20/2).

Primary and secondary **school** students returned to their classes at the beginning of the year after a year-long strike — the most serious educational crisis in the country's history — following sweeping concessions by the government which included the improvement of student food and accommodation, the promise of additional teachers, classrooms and scholarships, and a pledge to drop disciplinary action against students and to expunge the 1987–88 academic year from their records. The boycott, which began in October 1987, quickly spread to schools throughout the country including the university in Dakar. However, within a month academic staff and students again went on strike, calling for higher staff wages (AR 1/89; WA 27/3; AC 31/3).

On 10 December Abdoul Azizi Ndaw was elected the new president of the National Assembly, replacing Daouda Sow, an outspoken opponent of greater **democracy** within the party, who resigned from the post the previous day following a no-confidence petition from the deputies of the Socialist Party. The event reflected the internal crisis that the party is experiencing, the reason behind the calling of the **extraordinary party congress** held on 3–4 March. At the congress of the party, which has been in power for over 30 years, Pres Abdou Diouf was re-elected to the post of Secretary-General and given full powers to 'renew' and 'open up the party in order to expand its base'. Because the party felt it was not ready to carry forward the necessary changes proposed by him, it suspended activities by the PS politburo and central committee until the next congress is held in early 1990. In the interim the party will be run by a new 12-member executive committee thereby allowing Diouf to "groom" his own men (ARB 15/1; SWB 8/3; WA 6/3, 13/3; AED 20/3; AC 31/3).

Following talks with the Minister of State Jean Collin on the formation of a coalition government, PDS leader **Abdoulaye Wade** returned to Senegal on 7 March from Paris, where he has been living in self-imposed exile for the past seven months. Greeted exuberantly by several thousand supporters, Wade's homecoming overshadowed Pres Diouf's success a few days earlier of gaining a mandate for political reform. At a political rally attended by an estimated 15 000 people, Wade called for the formation of a transitional national unity government and the dissolution of the national assembly. In response Pres Diouf said **new elections** cannot be held before **1993** and accused the opposition of trying to destabilize the country (AC 3/2; SWB 17/3; AED 20/3; WA 20/3; AC 31/3).

Sierra Leone

The government has embarked on a fresh series of **economic reforms** aimed at breaking the current deadlock with the IMF and opening the way to renewed financial inflows, including a $25–$30 mn structural adjustment loan from the World Bank. Arrears to the IMF — currently $91,4 mn — are an impediment to further borrowing from the fund. The new economic reforms include a series of measures to increase revenue, further controls on expenditure, special provision for debt service payment and loans to privatize loss-making parastatals. A massive shake-up of loss-making state enterprises is planned for later this year with twelve companies being put up for privatization. State enterprises (a total of 38), contribute 12 per cent of GDP and provide employment for nearly 14 000. Further sales depend on the success of this first phase (AED 13/2, 20/2; ARB 31/3).

Pres Momoh was re-elected unopposed as Secretary-General of the ruling All People's Congress on 29 January. The convention, the first since Momoh came to power in 1985, also adopted a code of conduct for party members aimed at stamping out corruption and approved the abolition of the post of party chairman, on the grounds that it was seen as a potential source of friction between the party chief and the head of state (SWB 31/1; AC 10/2; AE 3/89; ARB 15/3; WA 27/3).

Togo

One of the president's closest colleagues, Justice Minister Kpotivi, has been dismissed from his post. The surprise move preceded charges being laid for attempted fraud in connection with a racket to defraud West African gamblers on the British football pools (AED 20/3; AC 31/3).

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

Cameroon will increase livestock production and raise traditional producers' incomes through a project that will improve the availability of veterinary drugs and health and extension services, promote land conservation, and build up agricultural agencies. Existing meat production is insufficient to meet local demand, and livestock losses from disease are costing around $100 mn a year. Costing $55 mn, the project will be partly financed with a World Bank loan of $34,6 mn. The livestock sector already accounts for about 16 per cent of agricultural output, by value, and provides income for around one-third of rural households (WBN 12/1; AED 20/1).

Central African Republic

The Central African Republic's major sponsors have agreed to finance a general **energy plan** in order to satisfy its requirements, both immediate and until the year 2005, for electric power. The $75,7 mn project will be supported by an $18 mn loan from the International Development Association (IDA). The programme's largest component is a $50 mn project to build a dam and power station on the Mbali river (WBN 12/1; AED 6/2; AE&M 9/2).

Two former opponents of Pres Kolingba have been brought into his government in a New Year reshuffle. Hugues Dobozendi, the internal leader of a dissident movement led by Ange Patassé, former prime minister under self-styled Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, is now in the cabinet. A representative from another potentially dissident faction, Jean Bengue who was in the David Dacko government ousted by Kolingba in 1981, was also brought into the cabinet. Edward Franck who presided over the tribunal that tried Bokassa in 1987, was the third new cabinet member. The **reshuffle** is seen to have reinforced the IMF-backed structural adjustment programme (SWB 7/1; AED 13/1; AA 3/2).

Congo

A major project to diversify the economy through **palm oil** production will start this year, under a $73 mn donor-funded investment programme. The project will enable Congo to subsitute refined oils imports with locally produced vegetable oil (AED 20/1).

Equatorial Guinea

Spain has cancelled one-third of the country's estimated $45 mn official bilateral **debt** following Pres Obiang's visit to the country in January. The remainder of the debt is to be rescheduled over 14 years, with eight years' grace. The country's total external obligations are estimated at $200 mn — eight times larger than annual export earnings. In 1988 debt service totalled $17,9 mn; this year it is forecast to decline slightly to $14,7 mn before peaking at $22,9 mn in 1991 (AED 30/1; ARB 28/2).

Gabon

On 6 March Pres Bongo officially inaugurated the "Rabi Kounga" **oil** field installations which are situated in the middle of tropical forest 160 km south-east of Port-Gentil. The field's production rate is set to increase from 15 000 barrels a day (b/d) in January 1989 to 80 000 b/d by the end of the year, and 120 000 b/d in 1990.

Reserves are estimated at 58 mn tonnes, excluding satellite deposits which are in the process of being appraised; this should allow the exploitation of the oil field for 20 years. *Elf-Gabon* has said that the discovery of the Rabi Kounga deposit is the most important in the oil history of Gabon and constitutes but one small step in a huge area as yet unexplored. Total investment of $600 mn was necessary to develop the deposit (ARB 31/12, 31/1, 28/2; AED 6/1, 20/1, 30/1; AE&M 12/1, 26/1, 9/3).

Sao Tomé and Principe

A 16,6 per cent **devaluation** of the dobra was announced 14 February, setting the rate at $1 = STD120. The devaluation forms part of a series of measures introduced under the structural adjustment programme being implemented with the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF (AED 20/1; ARB 31/3).

Zaire

In December Pres Mobutu appointed Gen Singa Boyende Mosambay as Minister of State for National Defence and Territorial Security, a portfolio which he himself had held since he came to power in November 1965 (ARB 15/1).

Responding to reports that **South Africa** is negotiating with Zaire over the importation of **electricity** from dams on the Congo river, Angola, Zimbabwe and Zambia have said they will refuse to allow Zairean electricity destined for South Africa to pass through their territory. The proposal is seen as a politically motivated desire to promote interdependence and "better understanding between African states" as South Africa has no immediate need of electricity imports from neighbouring states, itself producing 60 per cent of all electricity generated on the continent, and exporting to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (AE&M 12/1; C 14/1; BD 16/1; S 26/1).

Further talks on the proposed **economic recovery programme** for 1989 were held with the IMF in early February. An indication of the willingness of the government to adopt the required economic measures is the 1 February announcement of a sharp increase in petrol prices, which were among the lowest in Africa. The rise, the second in five months, is one element of the package of fiscal reforms urged by the IMF and reflects pressure from donor agencies and oil companies (AED 13/2).

Angola has threatened to ask the Frontline states to impose **sanctions** against Zaire if it does not stop supporting Unita. The two countries have agreed to hold talks to discuss the presence of the **Unita** movement in Zaire (S 13/3, 20/3, 29/3; SWB 1/4).

Relations between **Belgium** and its former colony have steadily deteriorated since late 1988 when Pres Mobutu took offence at Belgian parliamentary and media criticism of his rule. The dispute has been aggravated by a number of events: in mid-December a Belgian judge issued a court order seizing all the president's Belgian assets, which are worth about £3 mn; in January Pres Mobutu abrogated two cooperation treaties that have shaped relations since independence and halted repayments on its £670 mn debt — in response Belgium halted new aid funding; the situation became critical at the beginning of February when the Zairean government threatened to either suspend or break off relations with Belgium. Despite a meeting on 6 February in Paris with the Belgian prime minister, there have been no further signs of a rapprochement. Pres Mobutu has indicated that he may call on the International Court of Justice to arbitrate in the row (ARB 31/1, 15/2, 28/2, 15/3; SWB 17/1, 28/1; AED 20/1, 20/2; C 14/1; AC 6/1, 20/1, 2/2; WA 6/2, 8/2; JA 8/2; E 11/2; NAP 3/89).

On 14 March Pres Mobutu authorized the reopening of Kinshasa University and four other colleges in the capital that were closed in February. The unrest ended when the government agreed to release students' grants and provide help with their transport costs. A near doubling in fuel prices and lack of means of transport were a main causes of the unrest. The death toll in clashes between **students** and troops in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi is given by independent witnesses as seven (AED 20/3; SWB 17/2, 20/2, 25/2, 21/3).

Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), is among several opposition figures who are reported to have been arrested in Kinshasa during February and March. He was accused of taking part in the recent student unrest in the country. Tshisekedi was under house arrest for most of last year (SWB 10/3).

Exiled Ugandan dictator **Idi Amin** was expelled from Zaire, for the second time in a week, on 18 January, following his mysterious arrival there on 3 January. He was returned to Saudi Arabia where he has lived since his overthrow in 1979. Uganda called for his extradition, but there is no extradition treaty between the two countries (C 16/1, 17/1, 19/1, 23/1; ARB 15/2).

EAST AFRICA

Burundi

Col Jean-Baptiste **Bagaza**, the former president of Burundi, is now living in **Libya**, having left Uganda where he has been living in exile since September 1987. Bagaza has expressed the wish to return to political life in Burundi (SWB 18/1; AED 18/1).

The World Bank's IDA is to provide a $21 mn credit to Burundi to help finance the development of **"secondary towns"** in rural areas by establishing an institutional and financial environment which will encourage economic development in five towns, as well as in the capital, Bujumbura. The programme is expected to speed up urbanization, which is estimated at just 5 per cent. It is hoped that the project will help Burundi to resolve its ethnic tensions and build national unity (EASA 21/12; AED 6/1).

Comores

A **strike** movement which began on 10 February has paralysed post-primary and secondary **schools** in Grand Comoro. The teachers are protesting against the fact that the state — perhaps in an attempt to look good in the eyes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — paid them for December but not for October or November. The economy has been under strain since 1987, when sales of vanilla, which bring in 70 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, collapsed in the face of strong competition from Indonesia. On 7 January the government announced the cutting of staff from the civil service in order to open the way for a structural adjustment programme (SAP), the first for the Comores. Although the government has accepted the urgent need for adjustment, it has little room to manoeuvre, other than through civil service reforms. If successfully negotiated the SAP will also clear the way for rescheduling foreign debt, of which the bulk is owed to Arab aid funds (AED 20/1; ION 18/2).

Djibouti

The government has announced that it is to create a financial body to control public administration and state company accounts. The new institution, if it is allowed to operate freely, is expected to introduce greater rigour into the running of **state finances** at a time when foreign aid is becoming rarer and France, which is Djibouti's main donor country, is pushing for healthier government. The misappropriation of public funds which seems to have taken place with some regularity over the past few years had rarely been met with disciplinary measures. Djibouti has been facing growing financial problems since 1984 as a result of an accumulation of budgetary deficits, decreasing liquidity and increases in government spending, despite stagnating revenue and a drop in aid flow. The total external debt estimated at $300 mn represents 73 per cent of GNP. In February France granted FF37,5 mn in current budgetary aid to Djibouti for 1989 (ION 18/2, 4/3; ARB 31/3).

In what was seen as the most serious incidence of civil unrest since independence, at least four people were killed, a hundred others wounded and about 200 arrested on 3 January in serious clashes between the security forces and inhabitants of a shanty-town who were fighting against being evicted and having their homes destroyed (ION 7/1, 21/1; ARB 15/2).

Ethiopia

The government has formally endorsed a proposal to split its northern province of **Eritrea**, where rebels are fighting for independence, into two autonomous regions, one for the mainly Christian highlands, and the other for the Muslim lowlands. The split was proposed by former rebels of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) who said they represented some 750 000 lowlanders in exile. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the only secessionist group still fighting in Eritrea, has rejected the proposal on the grounds that it exploits religious and ethnic differences among the Eritreans. Parliament may ratify the agreement in June (DT 12/1; ION 14/1; ARB 15/2; Cr 15/2).

The renewal of diplomatic relations between Iraq and Ethiopia on 11 February, broken off during Haile Selassie's reign, is seen as another sign of détente between Ethiopia and the Arab states, given added impetus by the government's plans to create two autonomous regions in Eritrea (ION 18/2).

The government has approved a five-year development plan that provides further incentives for **private investors**. The plan, which is expected to be implemented later this year, will be "free of all Marxist rigidity and will stress the prominent role private capital would play in the economic life of the country" according to the official Ethiopia News Agency. Among the measures envisaged is the opening up to private investment of sectors including industry, farming and hotels, as well as wholesale and retail trade. After the military government seized power in 1974, it nationalized most enterprises and limited the private sector to small-scale and cottage industries with maximum capital of $240 000. The plan is not seen by the government as a deviation from its socialist policy (AED 27/2; AC 4/3).

More than 1 mn tonnes of food and the equivalent of $191 mn in other forms of **international assistance** flowed into the country last year. Most was in response to the urgent appeals made by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission since August 1987, in an effort to avert the potentially catastrophic results of a new famine. Following the 1984/85 famine, international assistance totalled around $120 mn (AED 20/2).

Aid workers have reported that an outbreak of **meningitis** may have killed up to 10 000 people in southern Ethiopia in the past six months. The World Health Organization has sent drugs and vaccines to the area and a task group has been set up to coordinate medical assistance from UN and private groups. About 27 mn people, more than half the population, are at risk. A general spread of killer diseases such as meningitis, the fall in living standards, damage to the environment and a systematic break-up of ethnic cultures have been some of the developments directly ascribed by critics to the **Villagization Programme** started by the Ethiopian government in 1985 (AC 10/3; SWB 15/3; ARB 15/3; AN 10/4).

For the first time since the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 the **Tigrean Peoples' Liberation Front** (TPLF) is in control of the whole of the Tigre province — both the main towns and the countryside, including Ethiopia's strategic road to the main port of Massawa, on the Red Sea. This severe military setback follows the capture of the capital, Makelle on 19 February in a joint EPLF-TPLF operation, their first large-scale attack since their agreement to coordinate campaigns and give each other mutual support in offensives. A major result of the capture of Makelle is that the government's overland access to Eritrea has been cut off. Increasingly uneasy over the continuing disastrous defeats being suffered in Tigre and Eritrea, the Soviet Union is urging the government to negotiate with the liberation fronts. An increase in joint military operations by the various organizations active in the north is expected (ION 25/2; SWB 28/2; AC 3/3; TWR 3/3; AED 6/3; ARB 15/3, 15/4; C 21/3; NA 4/89).

Kenya

After more than two decades of consistent government opposition, former vice-president Jaramogi **Oginga Odinga** — Pres Moi's most feared and popular critic — has suddenly come out in support of the government. Announcing his decision on 13 January, he expressed his loyalty to Pres Moi, the ruling party and its policies. The unofficial Luo leader is thought to be hoping for an eventual political comeback, for which he will need to be allowed back into the Kanu party. Odinga's about-face is expected to have broad political ramifications (SWB 16/1; ION 21/1). The death on 7 February of Moses Mudavadi, the powerful local government minister and Pres Moi's staunchest ally, has opened up further the race for the **presidential succession** (ION 11/2).

The discovery of a map which apportions a large part of Kenya to **Sudan** has provoked a **diplomatic row** between the two countries, with rival claims to sovereignty. The **Elemi Triangle**, an area of 14 000 km^2, is thought to be rich in gold and hydrocarbons. Kenya has refused to hold talks on the dispute (SWB 30/1; AE 3/89; ARB 15/3).

With earnings for 1988 in excess of $330 mn, **tourism** clearly remains Kenya's major foreign exchange earner, ahead of both coffee and tea. More than 700 000 tourists visited the country in 1988 (AA 6/1).

The World Bank is to finance Kenya's fourth **urban development** project estimated to cost $560 mn, of which the government will contribute 25 per cent (EASA 13/1).

West Germany has **cancelled** total bilateral **debt** of $435 mn, linking the decision to an **environmental protection** programme. The cancellation coincided with Pres Moi's arrival in Germany on the first leg of a three country tour that also took him to France and Italy. His European tour was aimed at seeking relief from Kenya's pressing debt burdens and to drum up support for the new investment code. Mounting concern has been expressed by manufacturers and foreign investors over the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act, which became law on 1 February. It focuses, *inter alia*, on unwarranted concentrations of economic power and is aimed at manufacturers who own their own distribution networks. About 30 of the 140 US firms based in Kenya have either left the country or moved their regional headquarters elsewhere; in the recent past there have been no major US investments. The country's high debt burden — at $3 bn it absorbed 30 per cent of exports in 1988 — has contributed to concern over the economic future (AED 30/1, 27/2; EASA 24/2; TWR 1/3; AC 10/3; ARB 31/3).

Kenya, **Uganda** and **Tanzania** have signed an agreement to resume **legal co-operation** within the region to strengthen existing legal machinery and cement ties. Some days before the agreement, Kenya and Uganda reached a bilateral agreement to "wipe out elements bent on destabilizing their countries from across the border" (AC 4/3).

(Tensions with Uganda — see Uganda.)

Madagascar

France has shown its growing support for Madagascar and its desire to consolidate French influence in that part of the Indian Ocean by providing major financial support in the form of three loans (worth a total of FF137 mn) to support the economic adjustment programme (ION 7/1).

A World Bank and IMF delegation visited Madagascar in early February to evaluate the results of **adjustment measures** applied by the government during the second half of 1988 and to prepare a new structural adjustment plan. However, economic hopes are fading for the country which has been a "star pupil" of the IMF, as eight years after Madagascar began to structurally adjust its economy there are scant signs of improvement. Per capita incomes have fallen 25 per cent since 1980 and are now among the lowest in the world; export earnings have slumped by a third in real terms as world prices for Madagascar's main exports of coffee, vanilla and cloves have declined steadily; and government spending cuts have created massive unemployment with most factories operating at 20 to 50 per cent of their capacity. The foreign debt is $3,14 bn, $2 bn of which is bilateral debt. Servicing the debt over the coming year will require $271,4 mn, or about 64,6 per cent of the country's export earnings. The social impact of the IMF-sponsored austerity has probably been worse than in any other country — infant mortality has doubled and malaria has killed an estimated 150 000 people in the highlands in an epidemic which was directly due to lack of medicines. International aid of $37 mn was granted in January for a World Bank emergency aid programme which will focus mainly on disadvantaged people who are in danger of becoming victims of the structural adjustment measures (AA 20/1; ION 18/2; AC 18/2; ARB 28/2).

A Canadian company *QIT-Fer et Titane* has formed a joint venture with the Malagasy state mining firm *Omnis* to exploit vast deposits of ilmenite sands. The $260 mn project will be run by *QIT-Madagascar Mineral*, which will be owned 51 per cent by *Omnis* and 49 per cent by *QIT-Fer*. Ilmenite production is due to begin in 1992/93 and the mine is scheduled to reach 75 per cent of its capacity by 1994. Exports from the proposed mine would be worth about $50 mn per year, making ilmenite ore Madagascar's second largest export after coffee (ARB 28/2).

Pres Ratsiraka was re-elected in the 12 March **presidential elections** with a smaller majority, receiving only 62 per cent of the votes as against 80 per cent in the 1980 elections when he campaigned against one opponent. This time he faced a vigorous campaign from three opposition candidates — Razanabahiny, leader of the centrist *Vonjay Iray Tay Mivaky* party, Joana, traditional opposition spokesman and chief of the *Monima ka Mioviombio* party, and the leading opposition candidate, Rakotonirina, leader of the left wing *Mouvement Pour le Pouvoir le Proletarian*. The campaign was dominated by a row between Ratsiraka and Rakotonirina over whose policies are closest to those of the IMF and World Bank. Of a total 5,7 million voters registered, 19 per cent abstained, mainly in the urban centres where the opposition were most active. After his re-election, Ratsiraka announced the **abolition** of **press censorship**, which has been in force in the country for the past 14 years (ION 7/1, 14/1, 21/1, 18/2, 25/2, 4/3; AED 30/1, 27/2; ARB 15/2, 15/3; AC 17/2; C 13/3; SWB 18/3; AE 4/89).

Mauritius

The head of the Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM), Harish Boodhoo, imprisoned for three weeks on charges of trafficking in Mauritian passports, was released on 3 February without paying bail, but he will be charged with broadcasting false information (ION 21/1, 4/2; ARB 15/2, 15/3).

Mauritius and the **Seychelles** have denied strongly that they are being used as re-export bases for **South African** goods in violation of international **sanctions** (S 15/3; BD 22/3).

Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth escaped a second **assassination attempt** in four months on 3 March, amid a clamour from opposition politicians for his resignation over the arrest in London on charges linked to drug trafficking of the former high commissioner to Britain, for whom Jugnauth had earlier expressed his support (SWB 6/3; AED 13/3).

A record 245 000 **tourists** visited the country in 1988, up 15 per cent on the previous year. A further 10 per cent increase is expected for 1989. The majority of tourists come from Reunion, France and South Africa (ION 18/2; ARB 31/3).

Seychelles

Foreign exchange receipts for 1988 were a record $165,6 mn, up nearly 30 per cent, thanks to a 16 per cent increase in revenue from tourism and a massive 250 per cent increase in merchandise exports due to the opening of a **tuna canning** factory. Opened in mid-1987, production in 1988 represents only a third of production capacity. Tuna accounted for 73 per cent of exports. The current account surplus increased by 38 per cent to $17 mn because of the record foreign exchange earnings, but higher debt payments sent the balance of payments into a $3,6 mn deficit (ION 18/3; AED 27/3).

Pres **René** has confirmed that he **intends to stand down** at the end of his third term of office in June 1994. His decision is contrary to rumours that although the constitution gives the president three successive terms of office of five years each, he would try to maintain his position beyond the limit (SWB 17/3; ION 18/3).

Somalia

The finance minister announced on 2 January that the IMF has accorded a credit of $120 mn to help control inflation, stabilize circulation and repay foreign debt (ION 7/1). A few days later the government announced far-reaching economic and political reforms which are seen as part of a wider campaign by the government to win support for its efforts to end the civil war in the north and counter allegations of human rights infringements. Economic reforms involve plans to **liberalize** state-controlled sectors of the economy to speed economic development. Other moves include a tour by Pres Barre in January to Egypt, Iraq and Kuwait to explain the political and economic reforms, an **amnesty** for all political prisoners taken last year during the civil war and an amnesty to all Somali citizens living abroad, new plans to resettle refugees and a streamlining of the armed forces. Several aid agencies have confirmed reports of widespread economic and social turmoil, and some have withdrawn in protest at the government's poor human rights record. Plans have also been announced for the reconstruction and restoration of the war-torn **northern region**. In February Pres Barre reshuffled senior army officers and appointed a civilian defence minister for the first time in 20 years. He replaces Gen Gabiyu, who was suspected by Pres Barre of having formed an alliance with the president's half-brother, Abdurahmane Jamma Barre, currently finance minister and one of the main contenders to succeed the president. The new minister, former attorney-general Hussein

Abdirahman, will not be as powerful as his new deputy, Brig-Gen "Morgan" Said, who is Pres Barre's son-in-law. Pres Barre's eldest son, Gen Maslah Mohammed Siad, has been given command of the infantry (AED 20/1, 6/2; ACon 20/1, 17/2; AC 18/2; ARB 31/1, 4/2, 15/2, 15/3; SWB 14/1, 11/2, 15/3; NA 3/89; ION 7/1, 21/1, 28/1, 11/2, 18/2, 18/3).

Tanzania

The World Bank's $900 mn **road rehabilitation** scheme, the largest programme ever in Africa, was optimistically received by donors at its February conference. Of the 20-plus donor agencies represented, 15 showed interest in financing the programme for which the World Bank has already earmarked $100 mn. The scheme aims to repair major trunk and feeder roads linking the 11 agricultural regions, as well as routes between the principal urban centres (EASA 24/2; AED 20/3, 27/3).

The success of Tanzania's three-year **Economic Recovery Programme** (ERP), launched in 1986, is reflected in the growth of GDP from 3,6 per cent in that year to 4,5 per cent in 1988; a 12 per cent growth in exports over the same period and the stabilization of inflation around 28 per cent. Pres Mwinyi has warned of the closure of loss-making parastatal organizations (ARB 31/1).

Troop reinforcements were sent to **Zanzibar** during the run-up to the 12 January celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the island's independence, following rumours of a **coup plot** against Abdul Wakil's government. A number of people, including Soud Yusuf Mgeni — a senior government minister until last year — were briefly detained just before the celebrations, which were marked by the conspicuous absence of ex-president Julius Nyerere. Despite the atmosphere of tension in Zanzibar and calls for unity, there was no apparent violence. Political tension has been rising since Pres Wakil fired Chief Minister Shariff Hamad in January 1988 (AED 6/1; AA 20/1; AC 20/1; ION 21/1; TS 6/2).

Pres Mwinyi announced a small ministerial reshuffle on 6 March, and the creation of a Planning Commission, which will be chaired by Kighoma Malima, who is known for his desire for close co-operation with the IMF and with Western countries. The reshuffle fell significantly short of public expectations which forecast a major Cabinet shake-up that would have put ex-President Nyerere's close colleagues out of office. It is seen to illustrate Mwinyi's cautious approach in his effort to reduce his predecessor's imprint on his Cabinet (SWB 16/3; ION 18/3; AN 27/3).

(Legal co-operation with Kenya and Uganda — See Kenya.)

Uganda

Libya has signed three agreements, including a $130 mn soft loan to alleviate the **Coffee** Marketing Board's cash squeeze and speed up long overdue payments to farmers. The loans represent the largest aid commitment by an Arab country since Museveni came to power three years ago. Libya is also to increase its supply of petroleum products to Uganda by 50 per cent to a total value of $12 mn. In 1988 Uganda received $8,8 mn worth of Libyan petroleum products in exchange for 4 000 tonnes of coffee. Under the new agreement Uganda will also supply other agricultural products. The selling of crops in advance through **barter** deals puts great pressure on the government to increase production (EASA 13/1; AA 20/1; AED 13/2; ARB 31/3). Although barter has been a feature of Uganda's trade since the early 1980s, a notable momentum set in during 1988 raising the annual value of such transactions to around R50–70 mn. Due to shortage of foreign exchange, the pronounced emphasis on barter underlies a conscious policy to activate the development cycle in the country. Uganda has signed nine barter trade contract with foreign countries and companies in which railway equipment, trucks and other manufactured goods will be paid for with coffee exports. Economists have queried the value of the barter policy on the grounds that Uganda may end up paying too much for goods imported through barter as against conventional trade (TS 23/1; AE 2/89).

In January the Paris Club agreed to a **rescheduling** of a substantial portion of the country's overseas debt amounting to $25–30 mn, but only on agreements entered into before 1982. The seven countries represented at the meeting — France, Israel, Italy, Japan, the UK, US and West Germany — agreed to apply the range of options agreed to under the UN 1988 Toronto debt relief initiative. Uganda is the seventh African country to benefit from the package, following donor approval of the government's IMF-supported structural adjustment programme (ION 4/2; AED 13/2; ARB 28/2).

The price of petrol and kerosene are expected to increase following the **devaluation** of the Uganda shilling from $1 = USh165 to $1 = USh200 on 7 March. This was the third major devaluation of the currency under Pres Museveni (EASA 17/3).

An electoral legislation amendment has opened the way for the army, through the **National Resistance Army Council** (NRAC) to be able to have a say in the designation or dismissal of the president. In effect the NRAC and the **National Resistance Council** (NRC) will jointly exercise **presidential powers** over army involvement in military operations, the declaration of a state of emergency or the declaration of war. The army thus strengthens its power in the highest corridors of the state, in the face of a relatively democratic parliament (ION 4/2). The amendment was made just 10 days before the 25 February countrywide **elections** at the local level and as well as legislative elections to the expanded NRC. Pres Museveni appointed 20 of the NRC members, in addition to the ten members from the NRA. The elections, the first since Pres Museveni came to power, have given him a chance to boost his nationwide system of "resistance committees" and have strengthened the NRC who are due to debate a new constitution (AC 2/2; ARB 15/2; WM 10/2; SWB 15/3; AC 23/3). Pres Museveni has appointed a 17-member constitution commission responsible for the drafting of the new Uganda **constitution** (SWB 17/2).

The former leader of the rebel Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), Lt-Col **Okello**, aged 32 has died after a long illness (ARB 15/2).

Tension between Uganda and Kenya were fuelled by an incident in which in March in which Kenyan killed 72 armed cattle raiders who crossed from Uganda, and an air attack on a Kenyan border village which left five people dead. Diplomats have queried whether the attack was not the work of a Libyan pilot who thought he was bombing a nearby Sudanese village (C 13/3; AC 23/2; SWB 16/3, 24/3).

(Legal cooperation with Kenya and Tanzania — see Kenya; Idi Amin expelled from Zaire — see Zaire.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference has launched a $343,9 mn project, largely aimed at rehabilitating Angola's two other **transport systems** feeding the ports of Luanda and Namibe (EASA 24/2).

A large US company, Lazare Kaplan International, has signed a multi-million dollar agreement to import no less than $20 mn a year worth of high-quality, uncut gem **diamonds**, equal to about 10 per cent of Angola's current output. The agreement is the first major international business deal announced with the government since the signing of the peace accords late last year (I 2/2; AA 17/3; EASA 17/3; BD 20/3).

In March Angola announced a decision to devalue its currency by 200 per cent, with an initial **devaluation** of 100 per cent (C 6/3; TS 7/3).

The first contingent of 450 **Cuban** troops left Angola on 10 January. Under the 22 December peace agreement the Cubans are to withdraw 3 000 of their 50 000 troops from Angola by 1 April. By 1 November, all remaining Cubans are to be pulled back to a point north of the 13th parallel, in time for elections in SWA (S 10/1, 16/1; DT 10/1; C 11/1).

The US has expressed concern about allegations of US-backed **Unita** rebels torturing and murdering political rivals. Amnesty International has also provided evidence of human rights abuses (BD 13/3; C 14/3).

An acknowledgment in early February by the deputy defence minister, Gen Antonio dos Santo Franca "Ndalu", that there have been contacts between his government and Unita, was denied by Pres dos Santos, who reaffirmed his government's refusal to negotiate a political settlement with the rebel opposition group (C 27/1, 30/1; BD 30/1; AC 3/2).

In the second **major governmental change** this year, Pres dos Santos has dismissed the Minister of Interior, Manuel Rodrigues. In January, Van-Dunem "Loy" replaced Van-Dunem "Mbinda" as Foreign Minister. Both men who were replaced were considered members of the "old guard". In February the industry and health ministers were dismissed in a partial reshuffle of the government. The changes have been linked to efforts to bring in important economic reforms and improve the government's image abroad (AED 30/1; ARB 15/2, 20/2, 15/3; C 29/3).

The government has reported the surrender of at least 2 000 Unita rebels in response to its **amnesty** offer. Nine Unita prisoners were freed on 1 February, the first day of the 12-month amnesty offer (C 6/2; S 31/3).

A meeting of the five-nation joint monitoring commission was held at the end of February to monitor the **peace accords**. Angola and South Africa "agreed to differ" on the issue of allegations by Angola of a South African attack on an Angolan force, denied by South Africa (S 13/2, 27/2; C 15/2, 27/2; SWB 27/2).

Three Cubans and 20 Angolans were exchanged on 31 March for Johan Papenfus, the South African prisoner of war held in Cuba for 11 months (S 22/3, 25/3; C 29/3, 1/4).

Botswana

Falling surpluses have ensured a policy of fiscal conservatism in the **1988/89 budget**. Revenue remains almost unchanged from the previous year at BP2 237 mn. Total expenditure is budgeted at BP1 955 mn. The economy continued to surge during 1988 with strong export performance and marked growth in international reserves. The sale of diamonds, which comprise 80 per cent of exports, rose 15 per cent, while foreign reserves have risen to $2,26 bn, surpassing those of South Africa. Real GDP growth of 8,7 per cent is forecast for 1988/89. Exchange controls will be further liberalized and work permits for investors will now be valid for five instead of two years (AR 1/89; DN 17/2; S 22/2; AED 27/2; BD 14/3).

The University of Botswana, closed indefinitely on 23 January after its 2 000 students boycotted classes in demand for higher grants and better conditions, was reopened after six weeks (ARB 15/2; C 4/3).

Lesotho

Ntsu Mokhehle, the 72 year-old leader of the opposition Basotho Congress Party **(BCP)**, has returned to Lesotho after 15 years in exile. His return, and that of an estimated 275 BCP members, follows a government amnesty (SWB 28/1, 9/2; LT 9/2; S 10/2, 20/2; D 4/89).

Malawi

Floods caused by a week of heavy rain swept away villages in southern Malawi, leaving 6 dead and about 37 000 people homeless (C 13/3, 14/3).

An act of rail **sabotage** in which 20 km of track was totally destroyed on the line running eastwards from Malawi to the deepwater port of Nacala, has set back hopes of bringing the Nacala line back into operation before the end of 1989. The Malawian economy will have to bear the costs of now continuing to export cash crops over the long and costly southern route (AA 3/3).

Mozambique

Despite an emergency appeal launched in April 1988, Mozambique still faces an extreme **food crisis**. To date, only 451 000 tonnes of food has been pledged by donors, instead of the 710 000 tonnes requested. To make matters worse, the delivery of emergency food relief, upon which almost a third of the population depends is being hampered by a lack of transport. Much of the logistical aid promised in the form of trucks, boats and airlift has not been forthcoming. Food deliveries at district level have averaged slightly less than 6 000 tonnes a month — only 35 per cent of the estimated need. The government has recently issued a world-wide appeal for $382 mn to feed an estimated 4,6 mn people in need of aid. Of these 1,7 mn have fled their homes and 2,9 mn are unable to feed themselves. For the year 1989/90, Mozambique is going to need 936 800 tonnes of food products, of which it can only provide 150 000 tonnes itself (ARB 31/12; ION 14/1; S 26/1, 17/2). The severity of the problem has been borne out by the tragedy of starvation in the Memba district in the northern province of Nampula. In the first two months of this year, nearly 5 000 people starved to death, yet only 70 km to the south in Nacala, 5 000 tonnes of food was found to be stored. Mismanagement by provincial authorities, drought and increasing rebel activity in the area are to blame. **Renamo** rebels have attacked Memba, looting shops and warehouses (S 16/3, 28/3; MF 3/89).

The metical was **devalued** by 4 per cent on 2 January to $1 = MM645, by a further 2,8 per cent on 8 February to $1 = MM663, and again for the third time in 1989 by 2,9 per cent on 4 March to $1 = MM682 (AED 20/2, 13/3; ARB 28/2, 31/3).

Zimbabwe has deployed almost 700 men in Mozambique to help government troops fight off a new Renamo offensive in the centre of the country. The deployment came only weeks after the repatriation of the Tanzanian contingent (ION 4/2).

According to a Unicef document prepared with the collaboration of the Mozambique government, the war with the Renamo rebels has so far resulted in the deaths of 600 000 people. Of these 494 000 are thought to be children who have died from the combined onslaught of malnutrition and the war. The infant mortality rate has risen to 325–375 per 1 000, among the highest in the world alongside Afghanistan and Angola. The number of orphaned and abandoned children has been estimated at 200 000. Between 1982 and 1987, Renamo destroyed 822 health centres of which only 567 have been reconstructed (ION 18/3).

Relations between Mozambique and **Portugal** have deteriorated following the expulsion of diplomats by both countries. The problem was initiated by the expulsion from Portugal of a Mozambican diplomat, Rafael Marques. He was wanted for questioning on his alleged involvement in the killing of Renamo leader, Evo Fernandes, last year, but Mozambique refused to lift his diplomatic immunity (ION 4/3, 25/3; C 8/3; S 20/3; TS 21/3; SWB 23/3; AED 27/3).

South Africa

The **African National Congress** announced on 8 January that it will move its guerilla camps out of Angola in support of the regional peace plan. Until now the location of its main military training bases, Angola has been the home of an estimated seven camps in the northern and western sectors of Angola with about 2 000 cadres. **Tanzania, Ethiopia** and **Libya** are believed to be the most likely countries to allow the establishment of new camps (SS 1/1; C 5/1, 9/1, 10/1; S 9/1; BD 9/1; SWB 11/1).

Dr Abu-Bakar Asvat, health secretary for the banned Azanian People's Organization (Azapo) was shot dead on 27 January in what appeared to be a political assassination (SWB 30/1; WM 3/2; ION 4/2; S 17/2; B 23/2).

Allegations about the involvement of **Winnie Mandela**, wife of jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and the Mandela Soccer Club, in the death of a 14-year-old activist, "Stompie" Moeketsi, led to the arrest of four members of the club. The possibility of the events leading up to his death being linked to the death of Dr Asvat, who treated the badly beaten Stompie after he had apparently been assaulted by members of the soccer club, were denied by Mandela. The "mass democratic movement" represented by the trades union federation, Cosatu, and the restricted United Democratic Front (UDF), "distanced" themselves from Winnie Mandela and the actions of her bodyguards. Representatives of the movement met with ANC officials in Zambia on 26 February to discuss the controversial events (SS 12/2, 19/2, 26/2; S 22/2, 28/2, 1/3; C 13/2, 17/2, 18/2, 20/2, 24/2, 27/2; BD 17/2, 24/2; SWB 17/2, 24/2; ST 19/2; WM 23/2, 9/3; DN 3/3).

A South African security policewoman, **Olivia Forsythe**, has claimed that she succeeded in infiltrating the ANC and obtained vital information about its operations. In response to the claims, the ANC contended that her attempts to infiltrate were foiled even before they got off the ground. The disclosure was an embarrassment to Britain, as Forsythe was given sanctuary at the British Embassy in Luanda for six months after she escaped from the ANC, which detained her for 22 months (S 3/2, 5/2, 7/2, 17/2; C 6/2, 8/2; WM 16/2; ARB 15/3).

The state president, **P W Botha** suffered a mild stroke on 18 January. He subsequently **resigned** his post as leader of the National Party. In a caucus election the leader of the Transvaal National Party, F W de Klerk, was elected national leader of the party. The move resulted in a temporary **leadership crisis** over who was to decide government policy, aggravated by speculation and advice that Botha call an early election and retire. However, Botha resumed his role as president in mid-March, having reasserted his authority over the party. His brief absence was marked by what political analysts described as a new spirit of re-invigorated reform (C 2/2, 3/3, 9/3, 10/3; S 22/2, ST 26/2; SS 26/2, 5/3; SWB 4/3; BD 6/3, 13/3; FM 10/3; E 18/3).

Amichand Rajbansi, leader of the National People's Party in the House of Delegates, resigned from the party which he had led for the past five years on 21 February. This decision followed publication of the findings of the James Commission which held him unfit to hold any office of integrity. He was subsequently suspended from the House of Delegates (C 22/2, 24/2; S 24/2, 27/2).

(*Eskom's negotiations with Zaire — see Zaire.*)

TBVC States

Bophuthatswana — Charges against 22 of the 195 people accused of attempting to overthrow the government in 1988 have been withdrawn. Only one of the remaining defendants, Matilo Phiri, has pleaded guilty to **treason** (WM 10/2, 17/2, 23/2; S 23/2).

Transkei — The former Transkei Prime Minister, **George Matanzima**, and a former Transkei cabinet minister, Sidney Qaba, were sentenced to a total of 13 years in jail on charges of bribery, by a Transkeian court on 22 March (SAB 3/89).

South West Africa/Namibia

On 27 January **South Africa** announced the start of the **withdrawal** of its troops from Namibia. By 1 April, the target date for the beginning the implementation of the UN independence plan, only an estimated 15 000 troops will remain (AED 6/2). The timing of the announcement was seen by UN diplomats as an attempt to counter hostility to the reduction in the size of the **UN peacekeeping force** from 7 500 to 4 650, which was announced a few days earlier. The move provoked strong opposition from the nonaligned countries and the South West African People's Organization (Swapo). The deployment of the troops, who began arriving in the country in mid-March, will cost an estimated $416 mn (C 27/1, 13/3; AED 30/1; SWB 11/3).

The dusk-to-dawn curfew in force in Ovamboland since 1976 was lifted on 20 February. Ovamboland's 500 000 inhabitants, who comprise half the country's population, have borne the brunt of the conflict (AED 6/2; S 21/2).

The Transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) handed over the central authority to South Africa's administrator-general **Louis Pienaar** on 1 March. He will rule the territory in consultation with the UN Special Representative for Namibia, Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari, until an independent government is installed. Politicians have begun preparing themselves for an **election** and internal parties have had talks on points of contact and possible alliances. A number of new parties have been declared, while Swapo has consolidated its leadership into a single operational command structure in a move which brought in several internal-wing members on to the central committee as well as the secretariat. One of the members chosen was Anton Lubowski, a Windhoek advocate, the first white public Swapo member. There are more than 40 registered political parties in the country, though only six of them are major groupings (S 14/2; SWB 15/2, 17/2; ACon 17/2; NN 2/89; AED 6/3; C 2/3, 9/3).

Swaziland

Proposals designed to encourage new investment, introduce tax reforms and set up a stock exchange are the highlights of the **1989/90 budget** announced on 20 February. The proposed stock exchange is intended to recycle the large volumes of savings that now go to South Africa, for the benefit of the local economy (TS 3/2, 15/2, 21/2; FM 24/2; AED 27/2; ARB 31/3).

Zambia

Pres Kaunda has demoted prime minister **Kebby Musokotwane**, in a cabinet reshuffle that places loyal supporters in key posts and strengthens his own position. The prime minister, who has served since 1985, becomes education, youth and sports minister. He is replaced by home affairs minister, **Gen Malimba Masheke**. Defence minister Lawu Malimba was replaced by Frederick Hapunda. The shake-up is the most significant since Kaunda's re-election for a sixth successive term last October (C 16/3; SWB 17/3; AA 17/3; SS 18/3).

The three-fold raise in **maize meal prices**, announced on 31 December, which came into force on 7 January, sparked off sporadic riots in Luanshya. 61 demonstrators were arrested. The introduction of food coupons, which serve both to assist the very poor and to prevent the government subsidizing the **smuggling** of mealie meal (estimated to absorb 30 per cent of production), caused considerable confusion. The gradual removal of the subsidies was undertaken to help prepare the ground for the government's anticipated detente with the IMF (C 10/1; H 10/1; AED 13/1; SWB 19/1; EASA 3/2; SAE 2/89; AA 31/3). On 15 January Zambia announced its acceptance of an offer by the **IMF** to resume an **economic restructuring programme**, though there is no likelihood of a new reform package in the near future. The IMF will assist with domestic economic reforms adopted by the government since it severed ties with the fund in May 1987. Zambia owes the IMF $957 mn in outstanding debts, making it the most heavily indebted country in sub-Saharan Africa. In early January, Britain offered to write off its development loans to Zambia if the IMF accepts the country's go-it-alone economic recovery programme. The offer included the resumption of balance of payment support (S 3/1; H 5/1; TS 24/1, 20/2; AED 7/2; ARB 28/2).

Zimbabwe

The **"Willowgate"** (Willowvale) car scam, which was disclosed in late 1988 has resulted in the resignation of the finance minister, **Enos Nkala**, senior political minister, **Maurice Nyagumbo**, and industry minister **Callistus Ndlovu**. The three were all found by the Sandura Commission to be implicated in the purchase of cars for which they jumped a long waiting list and then immediately resold on the black market for up to three times the purchase price. They all also admitted lying to the court. The man responsible for the disclosure, **Geoffrey Nyarota**, editor of the Daily Bulawayo Chronicle, was subsequently "promoted" to a public relations post at Zimbabwe newspapers' head office. He was accused by Pres Mugabe of being "overzealous" in his revelations. **Edgar Tekere**, Mugabe's greatest critic and a foremost anti-corruption crusader, has described the Willowgate Scandal as the tip of the iceberg. He has undertaken to set up a new political grouping to challenge the "corrupt" leadership (AR 1/89; H 27/1, 28/1, 4/2, 7/2; S 9/2, 17/2, 3/3, 10/3; C 23/2, 11/3, 16/3; SAE 2/89; NA 3/89; ARB 15/3; FM 17/3; AA 17/3; E 18/3; ACon 23/3; AED 20/3, 27/3).

The government has renewed its 23-year-old **state of emergency**. Since independence it has renewed the emergency every six months, citing the security threats that remained after the war, the anti-government violence from dissident rebels in Matabeleland from 1982 until and 1988, and now the threat posed by Mozambican **Renomo** rebels. The government has recently moved an estimated 1 800 families from a south-eastern border area frequently raided by Renamo. Twenty people, including five children, from the north-eastern Mount Darwin area were killed in January alone (C 16/1, 25/1; S 20/1; SWB 28/1; ARB 15/2).

On her Southern African three-country tour at the end of March, British Prime Minister **Thatcher**, spoke out strongly against the value of the imposition of sanctions on South Africa and advocated negotiations (BD 29/3; S 14/3, 29/3; C 29/3, 31/3).

An ambitious R2 000 mn programme of **dam building** stretching into the next century has been unveiled. Envisaged are 36 large dams and about 100 medium-sized ones which when completed will cushion the country against the effects of drought for years and will stimulate irrigation farming among the peasants. The programme will focus primarily on rural areas. An annual investment of R96 mn over the next 25 years will be required. Assistance for the programme will come from Britain and Japan (S 15/3).

The GDP growth of 6 per cent in the first half of 1988, following less than 1 per cent growth in 1987, has been largely attributed to the good agricultural season in 1987/88. Tobacco dominates the agricultural component which contributes about 15 per cent to GDP. A four per cent growth rate in the economy and a 10 per cent inflation rate were predicted by the finance minister, Bernard Chidzero, on 1 March (AA 17/3).

Sources

A — *Afrika*; AA — *Africa Analysis*; AB — *African Business*; AC — *Africa Confidential*; ACon — *Africa Concord*; AED — *Africa Economic Digest*; AE&M — *Africa Energy & Mining*; AIB — *Africa Institute Bulletin*; AN — *Africa Newsfile*; BD — *Business Day*; BDN — *Botswana Daily News*; C — *Citizen*; Cr — *Crescent*; D — *Drum*; DN — *Daily News*; E — *Economist*; FM — *Financial Mail*; F&T — *Finansies & Tegniek*; H — *The Herald*; IMFS — *IMF Survey*; LT — *Lesotho Today*; *I — The Independent*; ION — *Indian Ocean Newsletter*; JA — *Jeune Afrique*; MF — *Mozambiquefile*; MIO — *Mozambique Information Office*; MNR — *Mozambique News Review*; NA — *New African*; NN — *New Nation*; S — *Star*; SAB — *SA Barometer*; SAE — *Southern African Economist*; SAD — *South African Digest*; SAT — *Southern Africa Today*; So — *South*; SN — *Swazi News*; ST — *Sunday Times*; SWB — *Summary of World Broadcasts*; TS — *Times of Swaziland*; TWR — *Third World Reports*; WA — *West Africa*; WM — *Weekly Mail*; ZN — *Zimbabwe News*.

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