

Review

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Human Sciences
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THIS

ISSUE

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Cover: *The State of South Africa's Fathers 2021* report found that many men who are not fathers nonetheless reside with children and take on parenting responsibilities.

Photo: [@childrennaturenetwork](#), Nappy

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EDITOR'S NOTE

By Antoinette Oosthuizen, Editor

South Africa, like many other developing countries, can ill afford the global instability brought on by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, we've been struggling to alleviate poverty, reduce inequality and expand decent work opportunities for all.

The HSRC's research agenda is strategically aligned with national development priorities, with our centres and divisions committed to inclusive economic growth, supporting health and well-being, developing people's skills and capabilities, and building a trustworthy and capable state and safe communities.

We have just launched the fieldwork for the 6th South African HIV Behavioural, Sero-status and Media survey (SABSSM), which has been tracking HIV in the country for two decades. In this issue, Qinisile Dlamini, a senior research data curator at the HSRC, spoke to the *HSRC Review* about the importance of sharing datasets from such longitudinal studies in support of open science. Sharing data becomes crucial in times of crisis when resources should be preserved and prioritised for the greatest good.

Dr Ben Roberts, coordinator of the HSRC's South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), spoke to the *HSRC Review* about the meaning of the latest SASAS trends for the state of South Africa. The survey has been capturing the views of South Africans since 2003, covering topics such as democracy and governance, national identity, intergroup relations, immigrant-related attitudes, education, moral issues, fatherhood, personal well-being, poverty, crime, voting, and household income.

Several articles in this edition focus directly or indirectly on the plight of the most vulnerable in society, especially children. Just over a third of children in South Africa live with their biological father. However, the State of South Africa's Fathers 2021 report, a first-of-its-kind survey on fatherhood, paints a much more nuanced picture than simply a nation of absent fathers, writes Andrea Teagle. She also spoke to Prof Charles Hongoro about a recent study investigating health inequalities in India and South Africa. The researchers found that in India, children in rural areas were more likely to be food insecure, while the opposite was true in South Africa.

Sustainable agriculture, which lies at the heart of food security in Africa, also receive attention. We cover an HSRC policy forum where the findings of the HSRC's first survey on innovation in agriculture catalysed rich debate among actors from universities, farming councils and government departments.

Late last year, the HSRC also hosted a series of debates on the prospect of a universal basic income guarantee (UBIG). We feature two articles covering the affordability of such an instrument and whom it could target, written by Asanda Ntunta and Dr Peter Jacobs.

In another article, Dr Vuyo Mjimba talks to Andrea Teagle about the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, which aims to eliminate import tariffs on 97% of the goods and services traded between African countries. The question remains whether this will support industrialisation on the continent.

To remain competitive and innovative, South Africa must increase funding for research and experimental development (R&D), but this requires a collaborative approach between the government, private enterprises and other stakeholders, writes Dr Mario Clayford. He looked at the findings of the HSRC's annual survey on R&D indicators, which collects inputs on expenditure invested in R&D activities, including personnel, qualifications, research fields, foreign investment, collaboration, and special-priority research areas.

Finally, Dr Adam Cooper reports on a special edition of the *Journal of Education*, which looked at how the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises have influenced education systems and choices in the context of existing inequalities in the Global South.

Please see the contact details of the authors and researchers below the articles. We look forward to hearing your views.

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What makes a father, according to South Africans?

Just over a third (36%) of children in South Africa live with their biological father, a figure that has remained fairly consistent over several years. However, the State of South Africa's Fathers 2021 report, a first-of-its-kind survey on fatherhood, paints a much more nuanced picture than simply a nation of absent fathers. Produced by the HSRC, Sonke Gender Justice, the Men Care campaign and Stellenbosch University, this report discusses the survey alongside data from the General Household Survey, the Social Attitudes Survey and the National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey.
By **Andrea Teagle**

A first-of-its-kind survey on fathers and fatherhood in South Africa found a broad consensus on the importance of fathers' involvement in children's lives, with 9 in 10 (89%) participants agreeing that all children need fathers to grow up well.

The survey involved 1 003 respondents across the country who were either biological fathers or identified as social fathers. The findings were released in the [State of South Africa's Fathers 2021 \(SOSAF\) report](#), the latest in a series that aims to produce academic evidence and insights to inform law and social reform, and to provide credible arguments to influence national narratives around fathers and fatherhood in South Africa.

Over half (55%) of the participants said that it was the act of care that made a man a father, compared with 32% who said it was making a woman pregnant that made you a father. However, some apparently contradictory views of fatherhood and caregiving emerged from the report, as acceptance of men in nurturing roles came up against more traditional, ingrained views of men as mainly material providers.

For example, while 77% of participants indicated that men were as good caregivers as women, in a separate question, more than half of participants (55%) agreed that women were naturally better parents than men, with only 23% disagreeing with this statement. The apparent inconsistency might be explained by participants viewing financial assistance as part of caregiving in their answers to the first question.

At the launch of the report, Prof Kopano Ratele of Stellenbosch University spoke about the findings of another country-wide survey on parents' attitudes towards gender equality (see p134–135, chapter 6 of the report).

The survey found that while most participants – men and women – said that they agreed with gender equality, when asked about specific roles in the household, a different picture emerged. For instance, 56% of men and 66% of women agreed that girls should do more of the housework than boys.

Encouragingly, in the SOSAF survey, only 27% of participants agreed that it was inappropriate for men to be kindergarten teachers, suggesting that most men believe that care work is not solely reserved for women. The report highlights that a policy approach that increases the number of men in paid caregiver roles is important for normalising men's caregiving practices. Additionally, Ratele and his co-authors write in chapter 6 there is a need for 'targeted efforts to making gender equality more practical ... for example by encouraging egalitarian views and practices between partners, gender-neutral toys and play, and by advocating for fathers and sons to do more housework'.

Father involvement


Father involvement in South Africa is often gauged by statistics on how many children live with their father, and how many men live with their children. The latest household survey found that 36% of men lived with their children. However, statistics on co-residence are a limited proxy for father involvement, according to the HSRC's Dr Tawanda Makusha.

Statistics on co-residence do not capture fathers who live elsewhere but who are involved practically, emotionally and financially in their children's lives. According to the report, 45% reported interacting with their youngest child at least twice a week (with 10% reporting once a day or more), and a further 17% reported interacting once a month. Co-residence statistics also do not account for the fact that some fathers who reside with their children are violent or completely uninvolved in their lives.

"The fact that there is a father in the house doesn't mean much more than the fact that there is a father in the house," pointed out Wessel van den Berg of Sonke Gender Justice, speaking at the report launch. "What means much more to children's outcomes is the involvement of the father."

One of the report's major findings was the number of men who were not biological parents but who lived with children and identified as social fathers. General household survey statistics that capture instances where 'the child is living with the mother only' do not ask about other adults in the household, Van den Berg said.

The number of men living with children increased from 48% in 2019 to 61% in 2020.



“While these statistics might mean an increased vulnerability of men who lost their jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic and might have returned home, previous research has indicated that most of these men take up social fatherhood duties and responsibilities, such as providing psychosocial and practical support,” Makusha said.

Interpreting statistics on co-residence also requires historical and socioeconomic context, such as the migrant labour system and ongoing inequalities. For example, Van den Berg said, findings that white fathers are more likely to reside with their children tend to receive media attention. However, racial differentials reflect an underlying correlation between co-residency and income: wealthier, employed fathers of all population groups are more likely to live with their children. In the lowest income quintile, just 38% of biological fathers live with their children; in the highest quintile, this figure jumps to 69%.

Given these socioeconomic barriers to active parenting, more needs to be done to promote father-child co-residency, said Makusha. For example, the government could introduce social protection that can be accessed by poor and unemployed fathers.

Parental leave

In January 2020, South Africa’s Labour Laws Amendment Act came into effect, granting new fathers 10 consecutive days of paid leave – a significant step towards greater gender equality in the home. The South African Social Attitude Survey found that South Africans support the provision of paternity leave [up to a point](#). However, 50% of women and 49% of men agreed that men would use parental leave for purposes other than parenting.

Still, the SOSAF survey provides evidence that men did in fact use it for caregiving. Of the 400 participants who answered the question about parental leave time used for childcare, 74% reported using all of it or most of it for childcare. Only 7% reported using none of it for this purpose. These findings are encouraging, although it is possible that men who had used the leave for caregiving were more likely to answer the question.

The authors hope to gather information from mothers and children as well as fathers about the involvement of fathers in the 2024 SOSAF report, added Van den Berg. The report will also aim to provide a clearer understanding of the role of social fathers in South Africa.

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Over half (55%) of participants in the State of South Africa’s Fathers 2021 survey said that the act of care makes a man a father.
Photo: @Nappystock, Nappy



Photo: Image by Dorothee Quennesson from Pixabay

Leave no child behind:

Urban living's reverse effects on child health in South Africa and India

In South Africa and India, wide health inequalities exist among children under five years of age. Children with inadequate food, nutrition and immunisation are at greater risk of death and enduring health problems. A recent study investigating health inequalities in the two countries found that in India, children in rural areas are more likely to be food insecure, while the opposite is true in South Africa. The study authors, including the HSRC's Charles Hongoro, explore this and other reasons for socioeconomic disparities in health – and how to close the gaps.

By **Andrea Teagle**

In India and South Africa – both developing countries with heightened poverty and inequality – child mortality and poor health remain unacceptably high. One-third (34.7%) of [children under five](#) in India, and one in five children in South Africa were stunted in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Evidence suggests that the health of children in South Africa has deteriorated [over time](#), despite an increase in social spending, with inequalities further widening during the COVID-19 pandemic.

But what exactly drives the health discrepancies between rich and poor households? Having a clearer idea of what these factors are – aside from, for example, simply household income – can help policymakers close this gap.

A team of researchers, led by Dr Olufunke Alaba from the University of Cape Town, set out to better understand the problem in India and South Africa. First, they plotted the cumulative share of immunisation coverage, food insecurity and malnutrition against the cumulative share of children ranked poorest to richest in each country. They then looked at individual drivers of these socioeconomic distributions. These included parents' individual education levels, mother's age, socioeconomic status, and whether the child lives in an urban or rural area.

As might be expected, in both countries food insecurity and malnutrition were concentrated among poorer children, and in both countries the poorest three quintiles of children were most likely to be vaccinated. However, in South Africa, there was a cumulative pro-poor effect, while in India, immunisation coverage slightly favoured children from richer households.

Urban-rural divide

The study was based on South Africa's 2016 and India's 2015 nationally representative demographic and health surveys. A child was considered to be fully immunised if they had been vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, measles, and tuberculosis: the six

childhood diseases that account for the biggest proportion of deaths among children younger than 12 months. Food insecurity was defined as consuming less than 4 out of 14 food groups (including grains, vegetables, and meat among others), in accordance with the World Health Organization's recommendations. Malnourishment was determined from [weight for age](#).

To plot the inequalities, the researchers used the Erreygers normalised concentration index (ENCI). ENCI values range from -1 to 1, and the larger the absolute value of the ENCI, the more severe the health inequalities. A negative ENCI means that the indicator is concentrated among poorer children. (Note that in the case of immunisation coverage, a negative ENCI means a pro-poor distribution – in other words, this is a positive finding, as immunisation helps to combat health inequalities.) For food insecurity, a negative ENCI means that poorer children are more likely to be food insecure.

In India, two-thirds (66.1%) of children were fully immunised, with an ENCI of 0.16 indicating that overall, richer children account for a slightly higher proportion of immunisations. In South Africa, the ENCI index was -0.2, indicating that immunisation was slightly more concentrated among lower-income children. While this is an encouraging finding, South Africa's total immunisation coverage remains low at 33.4%.

Food insecurity was exceptionally high in both countries, with 8 out of 10 (79.8%) children in India and just over 8 out of 10 children (85%) in South Africa experiencing food insecurity. Malnutrition in children was markedly higher in India, at 39.3%, compared with 7.9% in South Africa.

According to the HSRC's Prof Charles Hongoro, one of the study authors, "South Africa had a lower rate of malnutrition probably because of the effect of social grants and other social protection interventions that are meant to assist the poor and vulnerable populations."

The study also found a differing geographic distribution of food insecurity and malnourishment between the two countries. Three-quarters (74.8%) of children facing food insecurity in India (and 78.4% of malnourished children) lived in rural areas. By contrast, a majority (65.3%) of the food-insecure children (and 53.8% of malnourished children) in South Africa lived in urban areas.

“In South Africa, this is linked to urban migration that’s leading to the proliferation of informal settlements and urban poor. Most of these people are unemployed and therefore have limited access to food, and if they have, food diversity is very poor,” says Hongoro, adding that most of these children come from households that are reliant on social grants.

Complex effect of mothers’ education

In South Africa, children with mothers with a higher education level were more likely to be food secure. However, a mother’s education did not have a positive influence on malnourishment, suggesting that while education increases the availability of food for children, partly through indirect impact on employment opportunities, etc, it does not necessarily ensure the availability of nutritious food. Similarly, female-headed households narrowed the inequality gap in food security in South Africa; however, malnourishment was more likely to be higher in these households. (In South Africa, obesity and malnourishment often occur concurrently.) Part of this effect likely reflects the [higher rate of poverty](#) in female-headed households.

In India, children in female-headed households were more likely to be both food secure and adequately nourished. But a mother’s education increased inequalities in food security, a non-intuitive finding that the authors attribute to “complex social and cultural beliefs in many developing countries”.

Recommendations

In South Africa, efforts need to be made to increase the availability and affordability of nutritious food in urban areas. To better understand barriers to accessing nutritious food, the HSRC is currently undertaking the National Food and Nutrition Security Survey – South Africa’s first in-depth food insecurity survey.

The positive effect of mothers’ education on food security in the child nutrition survey reflects the findings of international literature. However, the fact that in South Africa, this positive effect does not extend to reducing inequalities in nutrition suggests a need for nutrition educational programmes. Household wealth, or the lack thereof, accounted for the biggest share of health inequalities in food security in both countries. Noting the strong interdependence between nutrition security and social protection, the authors recommend enhancing social protection for vulnerable households.

South Africa’s pro-poor immunisation infrastructure can be leveraged to reduce some of the nutrition inequalities. ‘Immunisation is the only healthcare intervention that brings most households into contact with the health system, five or more times during the first year of a child’s life,’ Alaba and her team write. ‘It is essential to make nutrition services part of the standard package of available healthcare services and universally available to vulnerable populations with higher levels of undernutrition, morbidity, and mortality rates,’ they contend.

Socioeconomic inequalities with regard to malnourishment can also be targeted through community health programmes, particularly in urban areas in South Africa. The authors note that in Mali, an [expansion of community health workers’ package of interventions](#) to include diagnosis of malnutrition as well as treatment significantly reduced instances of malnutrition among children. In the absence of such interventions in South Africa, India, and other developing countries, the authors warn that the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goal of ‘leaving no one behind’ will not be met.

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
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Photo: Freepik

HSRC fieldwork starts for largest HIV survey to date



SABSSM VI fieldworkers visiting communities in Mpumalanga
Photo: HSRC

The HSRC has launched fieldwork for its 6th South African HIV household survey, the largest to date. Researchers plan to interview 93 000 people and to collect 65 000 blood specimens in all 9 provinces. For two decades, this survey has helped to track the HIV epidemic in South Africa and has informed healthcare and prevention programmes. This time, it will also shed light on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has disproportionately affected vulnerable communities during the past two years, including those living with HIV and Aids.

By **Antoinette Oosthuizen**

Twenty years ago, at the height of HIV and Aids denialism in South Africa, former President Nelson Mandela, through the Nelson Mandela Foundation, helped launch the first HSRC study to estimate HIV prevalence in the country. Those years were marked by controversy, but the [HSRC's researchers were steadfast](#), urging South Africa to follow the science.

Since then, the country has made significant strides in its fight against this epidemic and is home to world-class expertise on infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Continuing its work to track the HIV epidemic, the HSRC launched the fieldwork for the 6th South African HIV Behavioural, Sero-status and Media survey (SABSSM VI) on 8 February. The survey is the largest to date and has been expanded to collect data on SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.

SABSSM has been a major source of information for measuring progress in the implementation of South Africa's national strategic plan to curb HIV, sexually transmitted infections and tuberculosis, said the HSRC's Prof Khangelani Zuma, the overall principal investigator of the study. Over the years, the researchers have increased the number of biomarkers measured, expanded participation to entire households, and have introduced electronic data collection systems, which allow them to access data immediately.

The 2002 survey: Speaking truth to power in the era of HIV dissidents

Twenty years ago, at the height of HIV and Aids denialism in South Africa, the 2002 Nelson Mandela/HSRC Study of HIV/Aids found that 11,4% of the participants were HIV positive. Among those who did not believe that HIV caused Aids, the prevalence was higher than among those who did, and HSRC scientists urged the government to act. **Read more** about the complicated early history of this survey and the HSRC scientists who rooted for science and spoke truth to power in this interview with former HSRC CEO, Dr Olive Shisana.

"The main objective is to estimate HIV prevalence among adults and children at national and provincial levels, but also in a selection of priority districts where interventions are most needed due to high burdens of HIV," said Zuma. The researchers will visit 25 000 randomly selected households and all members of these households will be invited to participate. All responses are anonymous. Guardians will respond to special questionnaires for children under 12 years. Teenagers between 12 and 14 will respond to a different questionnaire that also includes questions on sexual behaviour. Those 15 years and older will respond to a detailed questionnaire designed to gather demographic data and information about their orphan status, education, media communication, and substance use.



Wearing marked uniforms during household visits, the SABSSM VI data collectors and nurses will be clearly identifiable in the field.
Photo: HSRC

It will also collect information on tuberculosis, mental health, sexually transmitted infections, sexual behaviour, intimate partner violence, contraception, male circumcision, and HIV disclosure.

This type of information helps us understand what drives HIV infections and informs policies and strategies to curb the epidemic, said Zuma.

Dried blood spot specimens will be collected by finger prick from participants who consent. These samples will produce data on HIV incidence (the number of new infections per year) and prevalence (the total number of individuals living with HIV). Researchers will also measure viral load suppression (reducing HIV's ability to multiply in the body), exposure to antiretroviral treatment, and drug resistance.

A sub-sample of participants will be randomly selected to provide specimens to test for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies.

This will allow researchers to analyse co-infections of SARS-CoV-2 and HIV, said Zuma. The samples will be collected for research, but the participants will receive their results, pre- and post-test counselling, and be referred to healthcare services if needed.

Mluleki Zazini, a representative of people living with HIV, welcomed the survey, adding that communities still face several treatment challenges.



Photo: HSRC



Bobby August, an HIV testing services counsellor in the Western Cape, wears a bib that identifies him as part of the HSRC research team.
Photo: HSRC

“For example, we need to make sure people are virally suppressed, but many do not receive their viral-load results, nor do they really understand what viral suppression is.”

Buti Manamela, Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Science and Innovation, said the survey will allow scientists and the government to critically reflect on the effectiveness of the HIV policy and research interventions. Testing for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies will help experts to estimate the proportion of coronavirus infections at national and provincial levels.

“In the post-1994 era, South Africa’s high levels of HIV infections became the ultimate test of our country’s pandemic readiness. It will, therefore, also be interesting to see how the policy and research investments we’ve made over the past 20 years are helping us today in our fight against the COVID-19 pandemic,” said Manamela.



Study team leaders and funder representatives at the launch of fieldwork for the 6th South African HIV Behavioural, Sero-status and Media survey (SABSSM VI).
Photo: Adziliwi Nemantandani

“South Africa is fortunate to have superb scientists and excellent data on HIV from many different sources,” said Dr John Blandford, country director for the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in South Africa. “But none of these can replace what we learn by going door to door across the country, speaking to South Africans about HIV.”

“From a public health perspective, the timing of SABSSM VI could not be more important. COVID-19 has impacted the health of all South Africans, including those living with HIV, and has at times interrupted access to critical HIV services. Now, more than ever, we need to understand who does and who does not have access to these essential HIV services and what barriers people face on the ground.”

SABSSM VI is funded by the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief through the CDC. The HSRC’s partners include the South African Medical Research Council, the University of Cape Town, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases, the National Department of Health, the South African National Aids Council, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the US Agency for International Development, and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and Aids.



The HSRC’s Prof Khangelani Zuma, the overall principal investigator, speaks at the launch of fieldwork for the 6th South African HIV Behavioural, Sero-status and Media survey (SABSSM VI).
Photo: Adziliwi Nemantandani

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Photo: HSRC

Africa's historic free-trade agreement:

'Short-term pain
for long-term gain'



Dar es Salaam, the largest city and financial hub of Tanzania, at dawn
Photo: Rohan Reddy on Unsplash

On 1 January 2021, at around the same time as Brexit, the African Union launched the historic trade agreement that created the African Continental Free Trade Area. All African countries, except Eritrea, are signatories to the agreement, which aims to eliminate import tariffs on 97% of the goods and services traded between African countries. Will this prove to be what Africa needs to industrialise? **Andrea Teagle** spoke to the HSRC's Vuyo Mjimba.

The signatories of the [African Continental Free Trade Area](#) (AfCFTA) hope that the agreement will galvanise trade in manufactured goods and services, creating jobs and accelerating industrialisation on the continent. If successfully implemented, the AfCFTA will create the biggest trade bloc in the world, with additional free movement of [investment and protection of intellectual property rights](#).

“Industrialisation is synonymous with development,” says Dr Vuyo Mjimba, a chief research specialist at the HSRC’s Africa Institute of South Africa, which has hosted online workshops to facilitate stakeholder dialogue around the agreement. “Presently, all of what we call the developed countries are marked by high levels of industrialisation, to the point that primary production becomes moot, compared to manufacturing and services,” he says.

Conversely, over three-quarters of Africa’s exports to the rest of the world comprise agriculture and primary products (including minerals, oil and timber), according to a [2019 report](#) by Baker McKenzie and Oxford Economics.

In addition, half (51%) of Africa’s imports from other continents are manufactured goods. This snapshot is part of a longer-term trend in a declining or stagnating industry. Manufacturing as a share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total gross domestic product (GDP) dropped from 16.5% in 1981 to 9.3% in 2010. Since then, it has increased slightly, but remained low at 11.2% in 2020, according to the [World Bank](#).

Some experts [argue](#) that one reason for a general failure to industrialise is an over-emphasis on the part of African policymakers on GDP and foreign investment, and a fear of pursuing [development policies](#) in the face of external opposition. Is the AfCFTA agreement the kind of bold move that will set African countries on a new course?

Mjimba believes that the agreement will be a game-changer for development if countries can accept that the first few years will be difficult. “It’s short-term pain for long-term gain,” he emphasises.

Unequal gains?

By removing or minimising import tariffs, the agreement makes it easier for manufacturers and service providers to enter the African market, encouraging innovation and development and leading to much-needed regional upgrading, Mjimba says.

However, some have questioned whether the agreement will contribute to social equality in a continent characterised by large discrepancies in the size and composition of economies. South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt between them account for about 50% of Africa’s GDP. These developed economies are far better placed to take advantage of the envisaged ‘new market’. Will import competition [exacerbate intra-continental inequalities](#) and lead to unequal development?

“The argument that [some will be better off and some will be losers](#) assumes a very static regional economy,” Mjimba says. Initially, he concedes, some countries will lose money from the loss of import tariffs. But, in the medium to long term, it’s a win-win outcome because intra-continental trade in goods and services means that money circulates in Africa, rather than ending up in the pockets of multinationals.

The benefits of regional value chains will encourage regional development and knowledge transfer between countries, says Mjimba. For example, if a car manufacturer in South Africa uses components from Mozambique and Tanzania, it can export its vehicles to those countries without paying excise duty. All three countries benefit. Smaller companies also have the opportunity to innovate and integrate more deeply into regional value chains. For instance, a car-assembling company in Mozambique might come to see how a particular part could be improved and begin to produce that product.

Others have argued that the agreement needs to go further to [protect smaller economies](#). Teniola Tayo, a consultant for the Institute for Security Studies, [argues](#) that the AfCFTA should have a hand in creating regional value chains that include smaller states. 'Collaboration with the African Development Bank to identify and finance critical infrastructure will help improve the production competitiveness of less advantaged economies and their attractiveness for investment,' she adds.

Sustainable growth?

What does industrialisation look like in the era of the climate crisis? Africa is in the unenviable position of having contributed a fraction to cumulative anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions while being disproportionately vulnerable to climate change. The urgency of the climate crisis means that development programmes, while tackling poverty and inequality, also need to find innovative ways of minimising adverse environmental impact. Although the AfCFTA – unlike other recent trade agreements – [does not currently feature a protocol on the environment and sustainable development](#), sustainability is a core component of Africa's [Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want](#).

Greener development involves two strategies. The first is developing resource-efficient technology and infrastructure, a strategy that Mjimba emphasises as essential in the African context. The second is investing in renewable technologies like solar, wind and geothermal energy and hydropower.

The agreement could be leveraged to facilitate the development and diffusion of green innovation throughout the continent, and to tighten controls on environmentally damaging imports from elsewhere. As the world shifts to greener industries, clean technologies produced in African countries can be integrated into global value chains.

The AfCFTA could also act as an umbrella for African countries to coordinate external trade policy that supports local green industry, as Dr Henok Asmelash of the University of Birmingham writes in [WhyAfrica](#). Whether clearer links to green industrialisation will be built into the next phases of the agreement [remains to be seen](#).

Political will

Although it came into effect in January 2021, the implementation of the agreement has been slow. Some leaders are still taking a wait-and-see approach, Mjimba says, despite having signed the agreement. He says that part of the problem is that the longer-term gains do not align with short-term election cycles.

"Those who want to be elected take short-term decisions that are popular, but which in 25 years are useless. We need politicians who are authentic and can tell us that for the first five years we suffer, but after that, we'll gain." He points to Rwanda as an example of a country that had built back its economy after the 1994 genocide by accepting short-term pain for long-term gain.

"For me, there is no agreement that is equal," Mjimba says. "Come 2063, those who are in the programme will be much better off than those who are not."

Researcher: Dr Vuyo Mjimba is a chief research specialist at the HSRC's Africa Institute of South Africa. [Watch him interviewed on the SABC News Morning Live show.](#)
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A bustling street in Nairobi, Kenya
Photo: Nina Stock from Pixabay



HSRC shares its research datasets in support of 'open science'

Decades ago, this photo was taken of the HSRC library in Pretoria. While still home to many who work in the organisation's eResearch Knowledge Centre, most research information is stored on a digital repository these days. The HSRC's data curators are committed to making datasets available to researchers and the public.
Photo: HSRC

The HSRC is known for its large-scale research surveys that help us understand South Africa's most pressing societal challenges. Providing a social-science perspective, the survey data inform the development of policies, strategies and programmes to improve the lives of South Africans. The organisation's research agenda is, therefore, also closely aligned with the country's national development priorities.

After having been deposited, the HSRC's research datasets are curated, stored and shared from a digital repository facility.

"Our data come from survey questionnaires, hours of face-to-face interviews, focus-group discussions and researchers' observations in the field. Our researchers have also embraced digital research methods using cellphones (WhatsApp), online platforms (Google Forms and social media data) and video diaries. We must share this data with other researchers to optimise its value," says Qinisile Dlamini, a senior research data curator at the HSRC.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organisation that works to stimulate economic progress and world trade, encourages publicly funded research data to be as open as possible. 'Open science initiatives facilitate open access to publications, data, algorithms, software and workflows, [and] play an essential role in accelerating needed scientific research and the innovation process itself,' writes Dr Alan Paic, a senior policy analyst at the OECD, in a digital toolkit that discusses the 'open science' movement, its challenges and how it could be embraced.

Every year, social scientists collect large volumes of data, often through in-person or digital surveys, interviews or observation. They interpret this data to understand various societal issues, such as people's voting behaviour or adherence to COVID-19 protocols. Other surveys track the HIV epidemic and monitor the country's investments in research and development, for example. After having published their findings in academic journals, researchers store these datasets in repositories. Qinisile Dlamini, a senior research data curator at the HSRC, speaks to **Antoinette Oosthuizen** about the importance of sharing these datasets.



Qinisile Dlamini is a senior research data curator in the HSRC's eResearch Knowledge Centre. She holds a Master of Commerce degree in economics from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and is currently studying towards a Master of Philosophy degree specialising in digital curation at the University of Cape Town. **Photo:** HSRC




Food adequacy according to the latest SASAS

Since 2007, one particular question that has been included asks respondents the following: 'To what extent was the amount of food your household had over the past month less than adequate, just adequate or more than adequate for your household's needs?' This question forms part of a broader set of items addressing the adequacy of specific types of consumption in households as the basis for determining poverty levels based on subjective evaluations rather than expert opinion. This is seen as a more democratic approach to examining phenomena such as poverty and deprivation. The 2018 round indicates the following:

People reporting having less than adequate food, per province

16.1%	Western Cape
21.1%	Mpumalanga
21.3%	North West
22.1%	Gauteng
23.4%	Free State
24.5%	Limpopo
26.6%	Northern Cape
28.2%	KwaZulu-Natal
34.1%	Eastern Cape



Food inadequacy statistics of the population:	24.1% Food less than adequate
33.6% R99 – R2 000 Income group	40.2% Urban informal settlement

- From the total number of respondents, 24.1 % of adults reported that food had been insufficient in the previous month. The Eastern Cape had the highest percentage (34.1%), followed by KZN and the Northern Cape, which had 28.2% and 26.6%, respectively.
- Households in the urban informal settlement areas had the highest rate, of food inadequacy, at 40.2%, and individuals in the R99 – R2 000 income category reported the highest rate of 33.6%.

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Download the data and explore more!

Human Sciences Research Council. South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2018: Questionnaire 1 – All provinces. [Dataset] - SASAS 2018 Q1. Version 1.0. Pretoria South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council [producer] 2018, Human Sciences Research Council [distributor] 2021. [http:// dx.doi.org/doi:10.14749/1629884021](http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.14749/1629884021).



Access our datasets and learn more about food adequacy according to the latest South African Social Attitudes Survey (2018)
Source: HSRC

In an OECD blog, Paic further [writes](#), 'Access to data has had far-reaching effects on the reproducibility of scientific results, diffusion of knowledge across society, cross-disciplinary co-operation, resource efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness.'

The importance of data preservation and sharing

"Globally, many funders have made it mandatory for researchers to manage their research data properly," says Dlamini. Increasingly, she adds, researchers must publish the data upon which their findings are based to get their articles accepted by journals. "This highlights the importance of scientific integrity and research transparency. Sharing enables others to replicate, validate, or correct your findings, thereby improving the scientific record. Future scholars can then build on your work."

As technology changes, researchers should also plan for hardware and software obsolescence and consider the longevity of their file format choices to ensure long-term readability and access. Preserving data in a repository eliminates data and metadata loss, says Dlamini. "Submitting data for sharing usually implies that it will also be preserved for the future. This also allows principal investigators and research teams to retrieve their own data years later, even after they have lost familiarity with it."

With research funding being under pressure globally, it is crucial to allocate scarce resources where most needed. [According to the OECD](#), open science increases collaboration and productivity in an era of tight budgets and reduces duplication in collecting, creating, transferring, and reusing scientific material.

HSRC datasets

"The HSRC's quality datasets are free of charge for research or educational purposes. However, users need to register so that the HSRC can keep track of how many people requested the data and how many downloaded it," says Dlamini. "We use that information to compile statistics that help us monitor the success of our data-sharing efforts."

The datasets are available according to different access levels, applicable to the metadata and all electronic files.

- Open-access information is immediately available without the need to register, provide additional information or obtain approval.
- For registered access to information, users log in and provide a reason for wanting access. No approval is necessary.
- Restricted access also requires users to log in and provide a reason. However, access is subject to approval from the owners, funders or depositors of the data. An email notification will be sent to confirm that access has been granted.

Most of these datasets are from longitudinal, repeated, cross-sectional studies, allowing for trend analysis, such as the following:

Tracking societal values in changing times

The annual South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) is a nationally representative, cross-sectional survey that has been conducted since 2003. It provides a unique, long-term account of the speed and direction of change in the underlying public perceptions, values and social fabric of modern South Africa. As such, it is a notable tool for monitoring evolving social, economic and political values among South Africans, but also demonstrates promising utility as an anticipatory or predictive mechanism that can inform decision- and policymaking processes.

The **2018 SASAS survey** is the 16th wave in the series. Topics covered in the questionnaire include democracy and governance, national identity and pride, intergroup relations, immigrant-related attitudes and behaviour, education, moral issues, fatherhood, a personal well-being index, poverty, taxation, crime and safety, *bathopele*, voting, respondent characteristics, household characteristics, as well as personal and household income.

Access the data [here](#).

Tracking HIV in South African households

The South African National HIV Prevalence, HIV Incidence, Behaviour and Communication Survey (SABSSM) has been implemented since 2002. It is a nationally representative household survey designed to assess the levels of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and related health indicators in the population. The survey provides information on HIV prevalence (total number of cases), incidence (new cases per year), antiretroviral treatment exposure, viral-load suppression, HIV drug resistance, risk behaviours, and key HIV care and treatment services. This data is crucial for the government, policymakers and other stakeholders to manage the HIV epidemic in the country and reach global targets. Fieldwork for the 6th SABSSM was launched in February 2022.

Datasets are available for the 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2017 surveys.

Access the data [here](#).

Monitoring South Africa's R&D investments

The South African National Survey on Research and Experimental Development is undertaken annually to monitor the country's investments in research and experimental development (R&D). The HSRC's Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators performs these surveys on behalf of the South African Department of Science and Innovation. The surveys provide the latest available data on R&D expenditure and performance across five sectors: higher education, science councils, government, business, and not-for-profit organisations. These statistics are used in the development of science policy to set government R&D priorities and funding levels, as well as for monitoring and benchmarking purposes.

The HSRC has released aggregated datasets for download and also accommodates ad hoc requests for access to academic papers, reports and other outputs.

Access the data [here](#).



Read more at <http://datacuration.hsrc.ac.za/> or contact us at datahelp@hsrc.ac.za.

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Further reading:

South Africans' social views: 'the real state-of-the-nation indicators' – Andrea Teagle interviews Dr Ben Roberts about SASAS and what the shifts in South Africans' political, social and sociocultural views mean for the state of South Africa (Page 22).

Photo: HSRC





South Africans' social views: 'the real state-of-the-nation indicators'

*Since 2003, the political, social and sociocultural views of people living in South Africa have undergone significant shifts. The biggest change has been a negative shift in political attitudes, while progress in relation to interpersonal attitudes is mixed. Indicators on LGBTQI views, for example, have become more progressive, but the same is not true for attitudes towards foreign nationals, suggesting different underlying factors. Ben Roberts spoke to **Andrea Teagle** about the HSRC's South African Social Attitudes Survey series, and what these trends mean for the state of the country.*


President Cyril Ramaphosa at the statue of former President Nelson Mandela, observing the National Guard of Honour, the fly-pass of the SANDF's Hawk Mk 120 jets and the 21 Gun Salute as part of ceremonial proceedings for the 2022 State of the Nation Address in February
Photo: GCS, Flickr

Two decades ago, a group of HSRC researchers sat down with international advisors to conceptualise what would become one of South Africa's broadest national surveys. The annual South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) is designed to monitor and understand value change among the public. Questions capture changing views on democracy and governance, identity, and interpersonal relations, among other topics.

"I like to think of the findings as our real state-of-the-nation indicators," said the HSRC's Dr Ben Roberts, research director and coordinator of the survey. The results from the past decade paint a sobering picture.

The survey has revealed a profound negative shift in political attitudes since the mid-2000s. Satisfaction in democracy is erratic and shows a clear downward trend, collapsing from 54% in 2005 to 26% in late 2021 (Figure 1). Trust in government saw an even greater decline, from 64% to 26%. And, as of 2021, 70% of participants indicated that the country is going in the wrong direction, up from 49% in 2010.

Figure 1: Satisfaction with democracy, 2003–2021



Source: SASAS, HSRC




Photo: GCIS, Flickr

A degree of disillusionment is expected as a democracy matures and the initial optimism of the early years of democratic experience begins to decline. However, the disconcerting outlook captured in the SASAS results also speak to the inertia and downturn that followed the relative economic growth of the first democratic decade, Roberts says, together with mounting frustrations over unemployment, crime and corruption, service delivery, and the recent impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. "I interpret these trends as a resolute appeal for greater accountability and responsiveness for the social needs of the public."

Shifts in opinion of this magnitude illustrate why it is important to monitor social attitudes over time, and to use evidence of underlying value change in society to inform policy discussion, he adds.

Figure 2: Percentage (%) saying that two adults of the same sex having sexual relations is 'always wrong' (2003–2020)




Source: SASAS, HSRC

Interpersonal relations

Another set of core indicators tracked by the social attitudes survey looks at interpersonal relations, including race relations, attitudes towards foreign nationals, and beliefs around LGBTQI. With regard to attitudes towards homosexuality, South Africans have shown a small but significant shift towards greater tolerance, albeit from a low base (Figure 2). "We initially thought that this value change was primarily a reflection of generational change on social values, driven especially by the born-free generation," Roberts recalls.

Figure 3: Percentage (%) supporting the death penalty for those convicted of murder, 2003–2020 (%)



Source: SASAS, HSRC.



Photo: GCIS, Flickr

“When we actually looked at the trends in more detail, it emerged that there appears to have been what we call a ‘period effect’. This implies that, across all generations, there are signs of progressive change in attitude towards LGBTQI.” The influence of South Africa’s progressive policy agenda may [partly explain](#) this softening of negative attitudes.

In 2015, Roberts and the rest of the SASAS team undertook a study for the Other Foundation to explore contextual nuances in attitudes towards homosexuality and gender nonconformity.

The [nationally representative survey](#) found that even though 72% of the SASAS respondents thought that homosexuality was morally wrong, just over half (51%) thought that gay people should have the same human rights as all South Africans. Additionally, 56% indicated that they would accept a gay family member.

Other cultural-social indicators show signs of change, too. For example, support for the death penalty has started to dip in recent years. In 2010, 15 years after it had been


abolished, almost three-quarters (74%) of people in South Africa were still in favour of the death penalty for murder – even though evidence shows that it [does not act as a deterrent](#) for crime. In 2015, this figure was 63%, and by late 2020 it had dropped further to 56% (Figure 3). This decline again likely reflects increasing numbers of born-frees in the sample as well as a change in normative values, Roberts says.

Conversely, attitudes towards foreign nationals have proved much ‘stickier’, remaining predominantly negative over the past past 20 years (Figure 4).

“You would think that with increasingly progressive views on attitudes towards the death penalty and on LGBTQI, our views towards our neighbours might show some sign of moving in a similarly progressive direction,” says Roberts. “This proves not to be the case, which raises the question ‘Why?’”

HSRC research led by Dr Steven Gordon suggests that these negative attitudes are driven to some degree by [false beliefs about the economic impact of immigration](#).

Figure 4: Percentage (%) that would welcome all, some or no immigrants (2003–2020)



Source: SASAS, HSRC

Untapped data

Although the political indicators reflect growing frustration among the public, the positive aspect is that South Africans are attuned to the state of affairs.

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s appeal to the public to form a social compact reflects a response to the widespread and growing democratic discontent, Roberts says. However, greater accountability – even in the best-case scenario – will take time, and the July 2021 unrest suggests that South Africans are running out of patience. Similarly, addressing xenophobia will require addressing the long-term lack of economic opportunity in addition to combating false beliefs about economic threats. Meanwhile, the narrowing of the gap between constitutional values and views on homosexuality might present more opportunities for promoting productive dialogue in this area.

While the SASAS data has been instrumental for capturing the views of South Africans, no amount of research can do justice to the almost 20 years of collected data, Roberts says, appealing to the academic community and media houses to download the data and communicate the information it contains.

The database also routinely includes a rotating component that includes themes and items that change more slowly, but that need to be monitored from time to time, as well as new or experimental topics, such as attitudes towards decolonisation, collective memory and the public relationship with science.

Importantly, because it was designed with international collaboration in mind, the SASAS series allows for international comparison. The International Social Survey Programme module, which is fielded annually in over 40 countries worldwide, allows us to understand our society through the lens of other societies, Roberts says. Topics are designed to be of global relevance and include attitudes to inequality, views on the role of government, issues around religion and, most recently, health. The SASAS also supports dedicated commissioned surveys, such as the Electoral Commission of South Africa’s Voter Participation Surveys that capture the changing electoral views of the voting age public.

“By collecting these voices, there’s a real obligation and responsibility to make sure those voices are conveyed to the policymakers,” says Roberts.



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Shacks built against an old railway line in Siyahlala informal settlement in Langa, Cape Town (1 October 2020).
Photo: [Tariro Washinyira](#), GroundUp (CC BY-ND 4.0)



For years, even before the additional hardship brought on by COVID-19, civil society organisations and social grant recipients have been pleading for social grant amounts to be increased. This picket was held outside the gates of Parliament in May 2017 where protesters also demanded an end to illegal deductions and outsourcing and an increase to the amount of grant money paid out amongst other things.

Photo: Ashraf Hendricks, GroundUp (CC BY-ND 4.0)

A universal basic income for all:

*South Africa needs a mix of instruments to defeat poverty, inequality and unemployment. One of the most hotly debated instruments in this mix is a universal basic income guarantee (UBIG), an unconditional-cash transfer policy, whereby those aged 18–59 years are guaranteed a basic monthly income. **Asanda Ntunta** and **Peter Jacobs** report back on the [first](#) of the UBIG seminar series, hosted by the HSRC, the Institute for Economic Justice and the Pay the Grants Movement.*

Can South Africa afford this pro-poor instrument?

The COVID-19 pandemic has threatened the health and livelihoods of millions of people. In South Africa's existing context of poverty, inequality and unemployment, it was an added burden, leading to vibrant debates on how to support the most vulnerable members of society. One of these debates focuses on the resurgence of local and international demands for a universal basic income guarantee (UBIG).

Towards the end of 2021, the HSRC, the Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) and the Pay the Grants movement hosted four UBIG webinars. This overview is based on the [first webinar](#), which focused on affordability.

Social security not achieved

Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that 'everyone has the right of access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance'.

Launching the webinar series, Brenda Sibeko, deputy director-general of the Department of Social Development, said despite this, and the fact that social grants and social assistance for the most vulnerable members of society constitute more than 95% of the department's budget, access to social security has not been achieved for most unemployed working-age South Africans. Therefore, the department has to think about how to implement a basic income grant and deal with the issues of affordability, Sibeko said.

Given the above, some experts argue that South Africa cannot afford to forgo the introduction of a UBIG. Other experts, meanwhile, argue that that it is not economically viable. It is important to understand that discussions about UBIG take place in the context of austerity budgeting. The National Treasury has introduced austerity measures in fiscal policy over the past few decades, despite abundant international evidence that shows how austerity leads to rising unemployment, falling incomes and increased inequality.

The multiplier effect

These dire outcomes result from austerity budgets grounded in the principles of cutting public expenditure and progressive taxes at the expense of state assistance to vulnerable populations. Duma Gqubule, an independent developmental economist who spoke at the webinar, emphasised that UBIG is not affordable within the context of the current austerity budget principles implemented by National Treasury during the national budget process. Key to affording UBIG is implementing the grant outside of austerity budgeting, said Gqubule. Therefore, UBIG serves as an alternative agenda for reversing what would be extremely harmful austerity measures.

Defending his case for the affordability of UBIG, Gqubule asserted that "social protection should be viewed as an investment in people, their communities and the wider economy. UBIG should be considered as part of a policy package that will have a positive economic impact. South Africa needs a new economic development path that considers the multiplier effect of UBIG in stimulating the economy".

Three scenarios

When considering whom a basic income guarantee should include, [three possible scenarios exist](#), the IEJ speaker, Dr Gilad Isaacs, suggested in his webinar presentation. The first scenario is a universal grant available to all working-age citizens, regardless of employment status, income levels, receipt of other social grants, or other criteria. The second is an unemployment grant available to those of working age who are unemployed, and the third is a targeted grant available to those who earn less than a specified income threshold. For the grant to be effective in reducing and ultimately eliminating income poverty, the amount should be based initially on the lower-bound poverty line, and then gradually increase until it reaches the upper-bound poverty line.

The annual cost of each scenario depends on which poverty line its monthly transfer value is set at. The financing cost of the scenarios ranges between R150 billion and R240 billion. Various financing source options came up in the discussion, with the modelling results of these options recently published by the IEJ. The [financing options](#), according to Isaacs, include a mix of taxing higher-income individuals, for example through wealth taxes on individuals and businesses, and closing corporate tax loopholes.

The suggested tax measures ensure that the grant is recouped from those employed and those at the higher- and middle-income levels to make sure that it is benefitting those in need, thereby enhancing equity.

Is debt a deal-breaker?

Using International Monetary Fund statistics, Gqubule examined public debt as an option to finance UBIG. He calculated that the world average debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 15 percentage points to 98.6% of GDP in December 2020, up from 83.6% in 2019. Advanced economies had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 122.7% and emerging markets had a debt to GDP ratio of 64.3%. South Africa's debt ratio is not high when compared to other upper-middle-income countries such as Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and India. Therefore, there is no tipping point at which a rising debt ratio results in economic collapse. South Africa has a GDP growth problem, Gqubule emphasised, not a debt problem. If it increases GDP growth – the bottom part of the debt ratio – the debt will take care of itself. The South African debt-to-GDP ratio should not be considered as a limitation for the implementation of UBIG.

In his presentation, Léo Czajka, a research fellow at the World Inequality Lab, illustrated that UBIG in South Africa is affordable if one starts from the historical incidences of the country's tax and transfer system, which has remained skewed in favour of the rich. Tax and transfer systems are key determinants of the affordability of basic-income-grant-type redistributive measures. In the period 1993–2019, pre-tax and transfer income of the bottom 85% of the distribution declined, which means a worsening situation for the poor, said Czajka.

He concluded that “a tax on the richest 1% of net wealth, with a rate ranging from 3–7% marginal tax rates, would help raise R134 billion. Moreover, even after the tax, the wealthiest 1% would remain the wealthiest 1%”. This illustrates the redistributive potential of a wealth tax, which is an essential instrument for the affordability of UBIG.

South Africa's UBIG affordability debates can be enriched through learning from experiences elsewhere, argued another webinar speaker, Evelyn Astor, who is an economic and social policy advisor at the International Trade Union Council. Social spending is affordable in eight low- and middle-income countries (excluding South Africa), Astor's presentation illustrated, because ‘increases in income security boost demand and consumption, which can in turn increase growth, a process with a virtuous circle effect’. This positive effect falls outside mainstream neoclassical economic logic and models, she said. Social protection is more than just consumption spending, as its [cumulative socioeconomic benefits](#) exceed its costs. Astor found that factoring in the investment impacts of social protection almost doubles the economic returns when compared to the initial spending, thus addressing UBIG affordability questions.

Authors: Asanda Ntunta, researcher, and Dr Peter Jacobs, Strategic Lead: Changing Economics, in the HSRC's Inclusive Economic Development division

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WHO PROFITS FROM
POLICE
CIAL
ANIRATES

NET 1 BEE PARTNER
INVESTMENT
HOLDINGS is run by
BRIAN MOSEHLA

Photo: Ashraf Hendricks, GroundUp (CC BY-ND 4.0)



sassa

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SECURITY AGENCY
EERSTE RIVER LOCAL OFFICE

RESERVED PARKING
SOCIALS ONLY
GERESERVEERDE PARSING
FAMILIE

People queue for social grants outside the South African Social Security Agency's office in Eerste River, Cape Town, in October 2018. Just more than a year later, the COVID-19 pandemic pushed many more vulnerable South Africans into poverty. Can a basic income guarantee work in this country and who should qualify to receive it?

Photo: Ashraf Hendricks, GroundUp (CC BY-ND 4.0)

How to design a basic income grant for South Africa

*Long-term livelihood crises have made a universal basic income guarantee (UBIG) an attractive route towards human well-being security for all in South Africa. Despite its attractiveness, questions remain about how to design a basic income grant for the country. Who should be the targeted recipients of this basic income assistance? How can authorities ensure that those in need of basic income support are its actual recipients in practice? How to design a UBIG was the focus of the second of four UBIG webinars hosted by the HSRC, the Institute for Economic Justice and the Pay the Grants movement. **Asanda Ntunta** and **Peter Jacobs** share their thoughts.*

When it comes to the design of a basic income grant, authorities must decide, first and foremost, whether it should be universal or targeted. A universal basic income guarantee (UBIG) is a relatively simple instrument through which everyone in the population receives a grant of the same value. International evidence shows that universal grant programmes are effective in reaching the poor and the middle-income population, as it eliminates the exclusion errors associated with targeted or means-tested programmes. It might be more expensive but, if its design is right, it will produce much better results in terms of reducing poverty and inequality in the short term, and is also more favourable for the economy as well as social cohesion.

On the other hand, categorical or conditional grants have a defined purpose. The would-be recipients undergo a means test to target people in dire socioeconomic circumstances. This type of grant design can either be an age-related benefit, like the elderly grant or child support grants, or a health-condition-related grant, such as a disability grant. Sometimes, targeted grant programmes concentrate support on fewer recipients.

Designing targeted social protection schemes in middle-income countries is fraught with conceptual and empirical errors. Theoretically, targeting splits those who meet the qualifying criteria for social protection from those who do not qualify. This allows for distinguishing the eligible from the non-eligible based on rules such as age and income profiles (poverty status), usually codified in 'means testing'. These eligibility thresholds (means tests), however, come with inclusion and exclusion errors that impose (unintended) costs on society, invariably subverting the intent of basic income assistance schemes. An inclusion error happens when individuals who are not eligible access the grant. Exclusion errors create the opposite problem: eligible beneficiaries are not accessing the social protection programme. These errors may have many causes, including tough decisions on how the government prioritises its spending. In the final analysis, political contests over public finances determine these budget priorities.

Evidence of exclusion errors

Dr Stephen Kidd, a senior policy analyst at Development Pathways, recently labelled social protection targets a "fictional construct". This was during his presentation on grant targeting at the second of four UBIG seminars, which were hosted by the HSRC, the Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) and the Pay the Grants movement.

Kidd's argument flows from a comparison of [global evidence of exclusion errors](#) from developing countries that invest a lot of funds in administrative capacity for social protection. "Guatemala is an example of a country that still had relatively strong administrative capacity, but actually the targeting is incredibly bad, with 96% of the intended recipients of the programme being excluded," said Kidd. He also highlighted the case of a conditional-cash-transfer programme in Indonesia, which targets the poorest 8% of its population, but generated an exclusion error of 82%.

To shed more light on the negative outcomes of targeting, Kidd zoomed in on a child support programme to combat stunting in the Philippines. Kidd explained: "Stunting among the children who were selected by the programme was reduced. However, stunting increased by 11 percentage points among non-recipient children, because it distorted the prices of high-protein goods in the communities. Those who were excluded, who were just as poor as the recipients, were no longer able to afford the high-protein foods and ended up having to depend more on rice, which increased stunting."

In South Africa, a growing proportion of the population is effectively excluded from labour and social protection programmes due to a shrinking core of stable employment at a living wage and the informalisation of work. Unemployment insurance, as a category of social protection, is an income source for a very small fraction of those who end up jobless. This is so because large and growing sections of the labour force are in precarious jobs without social protection (also known as working poverty), whereas those in structural and chronic unemployment struggle to find work with income security.

Debating design options

Debates on design options for a basic income grant in South Africa are happening against this backdrop and fluctuate between two broad proposals: a UBIG that benefits those between the ages of 18–59 years, and a targeted basic income grant with various targeting and means testing (food poverty line or income tax threshold) options.

The South African government favours a variant of a targeted basic income grant. Brenton van Vrede, the chief director of social assistance at the Department of Social Development (DSD), explained the pros and cons of suites of targeting configurations, premised on unemployment status or various poverty lines.

Using the tax system might be more streamlined, Van Vrede showed, and will include the largest number of potential recipients, but at a relatively high cost to the fiscus. In this instance, “your tax threshold in essence becomes your means test threshold, which in South Africa is quite high. That would probably mean you would then include around 75% of your population – you’re looking at about 27 million people – which then makes it quite expensive”, cautioned Van Vrede.

If targeting rests on the food poverty line, then it could reach 13 million people, compared to an unemployment-based target that should include 7–11 million people, depending on whether the narrow or broad definition of unemployment is used. In addition, Van Vrede also considered the complexities of using a means test threshold: “The child support grant is a very simple threshold of R4 600 a month, but that does create what we call a ‘cliff’: If you are earning R4 610, you are not going to get the grant, versus someone earning R4 550. Arguably there is no real difference between those two individuals in terms of poverty.”

A way forward for South Africa?

Neil Coleman, a senior policy specialist at the IEJ, reported new insights from their research on [UBIG designs](#). With this evidence, Coleman exposed and countered the flaws in design assumptions of UBIG opponents, but he also mapped pathways to transition to a UBIG tailored for South Africa. He weighed up if the design features of the Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant – assistance introduced in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic – would be a model for a UBIG. Assessments of the SRD to date, Coleman reported, found that the grant “is currently excluding 3–4 million beneficiaries who should be getting the grant”. A large proportion who are excluded would actually benefit from being recipients. DSD reported more than 9.5 million recipients of the SRD grant, but design and administration flaws have aggravated its exclusion errors. Coleman emphasised that if the SRD is to be a model for the future, even as a transitional individual or household grant leading to a UBIG, the flaws that bedevil it must be removed.

Note: Towards the end of 2021, the HSRC’s Inclusive Economic Development (IED) division, the IEJ and the Pay the Grants movement co-hosted four poverty and inequality webinars on the UBIG debate. This overview is based on the [second webinar](#) under the title [#BigQuestionsForUBIG: Why Does Design Matter?](#)

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Photo: Ashraf Hendricks, GroundUp (CC BY-ND 4.0)

Data drives strategic dialogue around innovation in agriculture

Photo: Freepik

South Africa's first survey on innovation in agriculture found diverse patterns of innovation activity across the sector. At a recent HSRC policy forum, the findings catalysed rich debate among actors from universities, farming councils and government departments about how to foster and direct innovation. Speakers identified the need for better data, a more coordinated policy approach regarding innovation, and incentives for technologies that promote sustainability and benefit small scale farmers.

By **Andrea Teagle**

The agriculture and manufacturing sectors are cornerstones of a more inclusive, equitable and resilient future South Africa. Yet, instead of growing over time and absorbing unemployment, both sectors are contracting. In 2021, agriculture contributed just 3% of GDP, down from 7.7% [fifty years ago](#).

Innovation is critical for the sector to develop and to be able to withstand external shocks like COVID-19. "Some people talk about technological innovation, social innovation, etc. I put everything under one umbrella, as a complex process of continuous learning," said Judith-Ann Francis, an independent policy advisor on innovation in agriculture and the keynote speaker at a recent HSRC policy forum on the topic.

How can the agricultural sector and public and private stakeholders foster effective innovation? First, we need data on the kinds of innovation that are currently taking place in the sector. Then, stakeholders need to agree on what problems we want agriculture to prioritise, so that we can devise targeted funding instruments for innovation activities that are most likely to solve them.

The [White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation](#) aims to achieve inclusive development and food security, said Dr Glenda Kruss, who heads the HSRC's Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (CeSTII). She asked if current innovation activities in the agricultural sector contributed towards these goals and, if not, where the obstacles lay.

Base of innovation

CeSTII researchers, including Kruss, recently conducted the first survey to understand innovation in the agricultural sector in South Africa, on behalf of the Department of Science and Innovation. [The South African Agricultural Business Innovation Survey, 2016–2018](#), looked at innovation patterns in forestry, fisheries and farming with livestock and crops. The indicators were based on standard international methods – to enable comparison with other countries – but were adapted for the local context. In total, almost two-thirds (62%) of agribusinesses undertook some form of innovation activity between 2016 and 2018, according to the survey; however, the type and amount differed within and between sub-sectors. For example, Kruss said, 76% of crop farmers are innovating, but among livestock farmers, who constitute a smaller percentage of agricultural farmers, this figure is just 47%. Fisheries reported the highest levels of both technological and non-technological innovation, while the survey revealed little innovation activity in forestry. (See this [Review feature article](#) for a breakdown of the findings.)

Although the report suggests a degree of innovation, it also found that the sector faced several stumbling blocks. According to the agricultural stakeholders who spoke at the conference, many issues are related to a lack of coordination in policy implementation among different government departments, which leads to conflicting policy goals.

"One of the big issues we have is that sometimes there are not proper synergies between the [agricultural] trade mandate and what is good for producers," said Marinda Visser of Grain SA, adding that what is good for the farmer is not always aligned with what is important for trade and for the country.

Inclusive innovation?

What counts as innovation? It might be an innovative technology, or it might be an innovative process. If we are interested in product innovation, Kruss said, we might look at the novelty of our innovation. How far is it from the technology frontier? Of the 42% of agribusinesses that reported engaging in product innovation, 90% reported innovating to significantly improve existing goods, while a much lower 54% innovated to create entirely new goods.

In the future, Kruss and her team are also interested in assessing whether innovation activities are fostering inclusive development. They propose that one way of doing this might be to break the concept of inclusivity down into three components: social inclusiveness referring to inclusion of marginalised communities; territorial inclusivity considering whether innovation extends to marginalised areas, isolated rural areas, etc; and industrial inclusiveness referring to whether we are modernising sectors and including SMEs.

Although small-scale farmers are often celebrated as critical to sustainability and food security, the benefits of most technologies were enjoyed by large-scale commercial farmers. For instance, many farmers in the fruit and wine sectors believed that the fourth industrial revolution posed a threat to the competitiveness of smaller players, said Dr Albert Strever, an agri-informatics expert. However, technologies like blockchain could help with issues such as traceability – making the supply chain transparent – which could [benefit small-scale farmers](#).

“We have to find mechanisms of bringing in new entrants and ... developing farmers into the main value chains,” said Dr John Purchase, CEO of the Agricultural Business Chamber. The speakers highlighted the need for data on innovation activities among small-scale farmers. (While small-scale commercial farmers were included in the current survey, it did not capture inputs by subsistence and emerging small-scale farmers.)

Policy coherence and holistic solutions

Innovation could be enabled by aligning the innovation agendas of different stakeholders, including government departments, academic institutions and industry associations. “I think there is a need for a much more coordinated approach from the government in respect of innovation in agriculture,” said intellectual property and innovation expert Dr McLean Sibanda.

In addition to funding, the government should coordinate non-financial support, such as negotiating licensing and navigating intellectual property rights, Sibanda said. Visser said that the grain industry had agreed upon a common agenda with policymakers. This included climate resilience, biosecurity, digital agriculture, and investments in building local capacity. Growing local capacity requires partnerships between stakeholders and across disciplines.

Speakers also emphasised the importance of scaling up local innovations to reach other African countries and to make room for African innovations to find their way here via the [African Continental Free Trade Area](#) agreement.

Sustainability

What about sustainability in the sector? “There is a commitment to a circular economy, which has zero waste,” Kruss said. “It leads to resource efficiency but, importantly, means that we might have to have major changes to our methods of production and consumption. So, our indicators need to be assessing that in some way.”

Agriculture also has an opportunity to lead societal shifts towards greener, more sustainable living. For example, energy is a major obstacle in agriculture, but it also presents an opportunity for growth. In addition to aiming to become carbon neutral, agribusinesses could position themselves as future energy producers for urban sectors, Strever said. “I think agri-photovoltaics [the simultaneous use of land for food production and for solar power generation] ... has not reached the potential it could in Africa, but specifically also not in South Africa.”

Finally, Strever noted the importance of innovations that improve efficiency in agricultural businesses. “So many producers tell me that they will integrate blockchain and all kinds of synergistic technologies if it improves the baseline and helps them survive.”

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
Photo: [Tim Mossholder](#), Pexels



Foreign funding of R&D in South Africa: A growing potential

Research and experimental development (R&D) provide researchers and scientists with new knowledge, techniques and technologies that lead to improvements in productivity and solutions to the country's challenges. Achieving this requires continuous monetary investment in R&D activity and support by the government and foreign entities of public and private institutions.

Photo: [Artem Podrez](#) from Pexels



*As part of its National Development Plan, South Africa has set a target of spending 1.5% of its gross domestic product on scientific and technological research and experimental development (R&D). Achieving this goal requires a significant increase in R&D investment, which currently stands at 0.62% for 2019/20. This comes as the economy is recovering from a recession, affected by the crippling COVID-19 pandemic and the measures to contain it, as well as the social unrest and protests of July 2021. Funding for R&D in South Africa must be increased urgently, writes **Mario Clayford**.*

I ncreasing investment in research and experimental development (R&D) in South Africa requires a collaborative approach between the government, private enterprises and other stakeholders. The HSRC's Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (CeSTII) conducts an annual survey on R&D indicators, which forms part of the country's national statistics system. This survey collects inputs on expenditure invested in R&D activities, including personnel, qualifications, research fields, foreign investment into R&D, R&D collaboration, and special priority research areas.


In the recently published results of the [2019/20 R&D Survey](#), national expenditure on R&D decreased from R38.725 billion in 2018/19 to R36.784 billion in 2019/20. Government funding, which includes support to science councils and universities, accounted for 56.3% of all R&D funding in South Africa, followed by funding from the business sector (27.1%). Businesses fund 91.3% of their own R&D, while most of the government R&D funding goes to the higher education and science council sectors.

R&D investment by the business sector decreased by R5.175 billion or 12.4% from 2018/19, representing a significant decline. The decrease in R&D investment by the business sector since 2017 points to a concerning trend. The COVID-19 pandemic has negatively affected businesses and many did not recover from the containment measures implemented to contain the virus. As the business sector recovers, the government needs to look at more viable ways of increasing R&D investment. One such way is attracting more foreign funding.

Foreign funding of R&D in South Africa


In 2019/20, foreign investment in R&D in South Africa reached R4.662 billion, an increase of R664 million over the previous financial year. A decade ago, the business sector was the largest recipient of foreign R&D funding, but currently, the higher education sector receives the bulk of funding, at 42.5% (see Figure 1). In 2019/20, the share of foreign funding for the business sector increased significantly (by 15.1%) to R1.169 billion. If this upward pattern continues, it could show a trend in foreign investment in business enterprises.

Figure 1: Proportion of foreign funding by sector, 2010/11–2019/20



The largest proportion of foreign funding by country (Figure 2) originates from the USA/Canada (78.5%), followed by Europe (18.6%) and Africa (1.4%). Funding from the USA/Canada is directed largely towards the government (41.8%), foundations (20.3%) and private non-profit organisations (9.5%). Funding from Europe is directed more evenly across the different economic sectors, whereas the business sector received the most funds from Africa.

Figure 2: Proportion of foreign funding by country, 2019/20



Increasing foreign investment in R&D

One way to attract more foreign investment is by streamlining practical mechanisms to encourage opportunities for foreign venture capital and private equity companies. One of these is the tax incentive for investors who fund small-to-medium-sized enterprises and junior mining companies. As explained in Thomson Reuters's [Practical Law: Venture capital investment in South Africa guide](#), the goal of this incentive is to attract financing, which allows persons who invest in shares through a venture capital company to claim an upfront tax deduction.

A drawback of this incentive is the exchange control regime in South Africa that applies to the transfer of intellectual property and cross-border licensing. This regime has a negative and limiting effect on South African technology companies and their capability to raise investment internationally and to commercialise their property.

A recent proposal by the Minister of Finance was set to replace the exchange control system with a new capital flow management system. The major benefit of this new system is expected to permit transactions instead of relying on a burdensome and unnecessary system of approvals and dispensations within an overall prohibition. Further benefits of this system are a more transparent, modern and risk-managed approvals framework, and strengthened capabilities to deter illegitimate financial cross-border flows and tax evasion.



Photo: [Artem Podrez](#) from [Pexels](#)

Another option is to promote foreign direct investment in research and development that can facilitate knowledge and technology transfer. Such investment can boost South Africa's economy through the sharing of specialised skills and enabling an increase in exports to accelerate trade in the global market.

Requirements for foreign direct investment are balanced against the costs to the South African economy such as the need to protect jobs, retain competitiveness, and promote the localisation of small businesses or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons. The procedure of the proposal application process is an additional concern. Investment regulations can sometimes be cumbersome due to red tape and can affect business collaboration between local and international entrepreneurs.

Offering additional support to government agencies and role players that promote foreign investment could also boost such funding. The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition established its [Trade Investment South Africa division](#) (TISA) to promote investments in South Africa and promote exports of South African products into global markets.

TISA is also mandated to change the perceptions of foreign investors regarding South Africa's investment climate. This can be an arduous task. Laws, political environments, tax policies, political and economic stability, and governance issues such as corruption influence investment climates. These can all negatively affect foreign investment.

Conclusion

Promoting the growth of foreign funding is a viable option for South Africa to increase its R&D investment to bolster government policy efforts and fiscal changes to promote and support internal investment in R&D. The government should increase its efforts to market South Africa as a destination with attractive R&D investment opportunities.

The upcoming results of the 2020/21 R&D survey will provide further insight into foreign investment and how the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting national lockdown have affected R&D activity in the country, particularly in the corporate sector.

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Interlocking inequalities, conflicts, and crises: **COVID-19 and education**

A special edition of the *Journal of Education* looked at how the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises have influenced education systems and choices in a context of existing inequalities in the Global South. **Adam Cooper**, a co-editor, reports.

More weeks into the COVID-19 pandemic, HSRC experts [warned](#) of the negative effect it could have on South Africa's education system, an effect felt in other countries too, particularly those in the Global South. Recently, a [special issue](#) of the *Journal of Education* used the COVID-19 pandemic as a starting point to interrogate and reflect critically on how crises and pandemics intersect with existing educational challenges.

Along with my co-editors, Prof Yusuf Sayed from the University of Sussex and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, and Prof Vaughn John from the University of KwaZulu-Natal's School of Education, we sought contributions that evaluated how the pandemic affected education choices, how educational decisions were taken, and how these worsened or disrupted existing inequalities.

The articles show how interlocking inequalities affect groups of people, and education sub-sectors. Early childhood development (ECD), for example, despite repeatedly being acknowledged as most important for learning outcomes, was neglected during the pandemic in comparison with basic education and the university sector. Coping with 'learning loss' in schools and universities drowned out the needs of younger children in ECD, according to an [article](#) by Hasina Ebrahim, Colwyn Martin and Lorayne Excell. An online survey and semi-structured interviews illuminated how COVID-19 disruptions entrenched inequities in service provision and early learning opportunities. A million children were excluded from ECD programmes because of the pandemic and 68% of ECD staff working in disadvantaged centres reported not receiving an income, while 99% of poor parents sending their children to ECDs were compelled, by circumstances, to stop paying fees.

Schools in the ECD sector had different outcomes based on their locations and parental incomes, illustrating how COVID-19 interacted with existing divisions. Centres in poor communities received minimal government support, while the shock created by the pandemic was more easily absorbed by centres in more affluent communities. Following the reopening of centres after the initial hard lockdown, centres in poor communities struggled to adjust their learning programmes to accommodate altered modes of delivery, wrote Ebrahim, Martin and Excell. Despite these immense struggles, the needs of people working in and attending the ECD sector were largely ignored, as the basic education and university sectors garnered the bulk of attention. The ECD case study shows how a set of inequalities, related to education sectors, race, class and location, intersected in the context of the pandemic to compound effects on marginalised people.

The technical and vocational education and training (TVET) sector had also been overlooked in the national discourse and it was again negated during the pandemic. The marginalised TVET sector was placed under further duress as unprepared lecturers and colleges were thrust into online learning, writes Joy Papier in another [article](#). Before COVID-19, TVET staff and colleges were aware of changing demands related to technology, which was already re-shaping teaching, learning, and skills development. Colleges had been attempting to make progress towards blended and remote learning. However, the sudden onset of the pandemic meant that face-to-face learning was substituted, wholesale, with remote teaching and learning, something for which the struggling sector was not prepared, wrote Papier.

The research illuminated a sector where lecturers are deeply concerned with students' well-being, but are overwhelmed by conditions that create anxiety and confusion.

While basic education was certainly not left out of the national education focus during the pandemic, research showed that teachers were largely excluded from decisions and policymaking. This created a schism between policy formation and its implementation, with a range of outcomes from affluent to more impoverished schools, according to an [article](#) by Ronicka and Vimolan Mudaly. Training staff to implement social distancing, mask-wearing and sanitising, had radically different implications at former model C, township and rural schools, yet teachers were largely sidelined in the process of contributing insights to the production of policy. Research in this sector illustrates how the government needs to be more cognisant of the diverse and unequal schooling contexts in which teachers work when making policy for and on behalf of teachers. An [article](#) by Marcina Singh and colleagues describes how research in eight African countries, including South Africa, revealed an absence of teacher involvement in policymaking, as well as a neglect of their professional development and psychosocial needs during the pandemic.

Research in the university sector was preoccupied with the issue of 'to go' or 'not to go' online, according to an [article](#) by Aslam Fataar and Najwa Norodien-Fataar. This 'either/or' mentality reveals a problematic aspect of the logic underpinning crises in general: the term 'crisis' originated in the medical field, referring to a moment when a patient either recovers to full health or dies. The 'either/or' logic of crisis therefore presents a set of binary outcomes – 'online' versus 'face-to-face' or 'death' versus 'recovery' – hiding that a range of options and outcomes may be possible in times of crisis.

Research on universities during COVID-19 showed that the dominance of the 'online' versus 'face-to-face' debate drowned out challenges that occur, regardless of whether the country is faced by a health emergency, and which exist regardless of pedagogical modalities. The debate ignores how effective e-learning, like all forms of learning, requires students to actively participate in learning processes, the authors write.

A lack of learner agency in the university sector was illustrated in an article by Nompumelelo Thabethe and Sarasvathie Reddy. They explored how the knowledges, languages and insights that poor students hold and bring to educational spaces were again occluded from university spaces that merged online and face-to-face teaching. The production of culturally relevant knowledge that might emerge in the connections between and among the university, community, and curriculum rarely takes place because students continue to be perceived as empty vessels into which knowledge should be poured, they write. The dominance of the 'online' versus 'face-to-face' teaching debate also meant that other ways in which inequalities interlocked through the intersections of race, class, and gender were largely overlooked. For example, some female university students returned home and were reinserted into a different set of familial roles and responsibilities that they generally avoid as students in urban university settings, according to an [article](#) by Ansurie Pillay and colleagues.

The special issue moved across educational sub-sectors, highlighting how crises interlock with and exacerbate existing inequalities. Parts of the education landscape that are most critical to learning and that have the most debilitating effects on marginalised students, like ECD and TVET, were given support. This trend is indicative of educational politics more broadly. Research articles also showed how gender, rural-urban divides, and socioeconomic factors intersected during COVID-19, compounding the challenges of marginalised people and education sub-sectors. Importantly for teaching and learning, while much debate has taken place about the advantages and challenges of online teaching and learning, research showed ongoing educational problems are prevalent regardless of teaching mode. Ensuring that students engage in learning as active participants and that their culturally relevant knowledges are incorporated into educational processes rarely happens, whether classes are held online, face to face or in hybrid form.



*Access the journal [here](#).


Editors: Dr Adam Cooper (senior research specialist in the HSRC's Inclusive Economic Development division); Prof Yusuf Sayed (School of Education and Social Work, University of Sussex, and Centre for International Teacher Education, Cape Peninsula University of Technology); and Prof Vaughn John (School of Education, University of KwaZulu-Natal)

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A school learner walks through Sigalo informal settlement in Cape Town in June 2021.
Photo: [Ashraf Hendricks/GroundUp](#) (CC BY-ND 4.0)

Granting Justice

Cash, care, and the child support grant



Price **R250**

Author:	Tessa Hochfeld (1972 - 2019)
Editors:	Leila Patel and Shireen Hassim
Publication date:	March 2022
ISBN (soft cover):	978-0-7969-2620-3
Format:	240 x 168 mm
Extent:	256 pp

ABOUT THE BOOK

Granting Justice takes issue with the characterisation of the South African state as 'developmental'. The crucial aspect of care is missing from the practice for this to be the case. Thus, while the grants address the immediate survival needs of many South Africans, social justice requires quite a different approach: an approach of care that would grant agency and dignity to recipients.

Tessa Hochfeld adopts a highly personal narrative style that reflects the ethical standpoint she took during her research. Telling a story is what makes her writing so strong and distinguishes it in the development literature. The book addresses issues in the fields of development studies, as well as social welfare and social development.

Endorsement


'By diving deep into poor women's lives while keeping a steady eye on feminist theories, Tessa Hochfeld guides us in the debate on the implications of child support grants for female recipients in South Africa. Inspired by the American philosopher Nancy Fraser, Hochfeld wonders whether cash transfers contribute to these mothers' capacities to live the lives that they value and make the world more just. The study is a path-breaking example of understanding the meaning of institutional failure for individual lives, in this case, the lives of six women living in Johannesburg. Hochfeld concludes that the South African state, while offering cash grants for its poor children (most South African children), fails to invest systematically in poor children's future, thereby not only limiting the impact of the grant but also continuing injustice by privatising caring responsibility onto families, in particular mothers. The book must be read by all activists, policymakers, students, academics, and politicians in and outside South Africa.'

– *Trudie Knijn, Emeritus Professor of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, Netherlands.*

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The Political Economy of Contract Farming in Zimbabwe



Price **R380**

Author:	Freedom Mazwi
Publication date:	March 2022
ISBN (soft cover):	978-0-7969-2622-7
Format:	240 x 168 mm
Extent:	300 pp

ABOUT THE BOOK

This book examines the emerging patterns of agricultural finance in Zimbabwe since the advent of the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme, which was implemented from 2000. It draws from the Nairobi debates of the 1980s on contract farming and the peasantry in Africa. With a specific reference to contract farming in tobacco and sugarcane, the book explores the scale and extent of power relations and how these affect land use and the well-being of farmers who benefitted under the land reform programme. It also offers an insight into how contract farming influences social contradictions in rural Zimbabwe, while assessing the emerging institutional financing mechanisms that have emerged as a response to the radical land reforms and the country's international political and economic isolation since 2000. The book also offers lessons on how agrarian finance can be structured to be inclusive for the benefit of small-scale farmers.

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