

Paradise Lost

Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies

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Paradise Lost

*Race and Racism in Post-Apartheid
South Africa*

Edited by

Gregory Houston, Modimowabarwa Kanyane
and Yul Derek Davids



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Struggling with the Weight of ‘Race’ and Racism

Crain Soudien

A general and relatively widely-held assessment of the state of well-being of the people of the planet is that they sit in the depths of an apparent aporia – an irresolvable contradiction. They are much better off than they were fifty years ago. People are living longer. Materially poverty levels are significantly lower. And yet, and this is the aporia, inequality is as intense as it has ever been and rising. With respect to the first element of the aporia, the drafters of *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* say that “significant progress has been made in meeting many development challenges. Within the past generation, hundreds of millions of people have emerged from extreme poverty” (United Nations 2015: para: 15). With respect to the second, the United Kingdom based advocacy group Oxfam (2016: 1) explains that “the global inequality crisis is reaching new extremes. The richest 1% now have more wealth than the rest of the world combined.”

This aporia has a certain poignancy for South Africa. While the quality of life for most of its people improved after 1994 when apartheid fell, its citizens, the sociologist Goran Therborn (2019: 31) tells us, “are among themselves about as unequal as the inhabitants of our planet. And the *burghers* or *citadines* of Johannesburg are more unequal not only among other citizens of South Africa but (possibly) among humankind as a whole.”

In this short Foreword I seek to work in an exploratory way with this South African expression of our aporia. How might we understand what has happened here? Why is South Africa, as Therborn suggests, not only reflective of the globe but, in some ways, a poster child for the worst that it has to generate?

It is at this point, as the why question is posed, that we all who claim understanding of this extraordinary place – South Africa – stiffen our backs and assume postures of puzzlement at the question. Isn’t the answer obvious? Not without some anxiety, I would beg to differ and say, as some might anticipate, that the answer is complex. It is both *more* and *less* than the explanations that riff off the standard logics that circulate amongst us. To help us Therborn himself is useful. Why South Africa’s inequality is so intense, he argues (Therborn 2019: 33), has to do with many factors. Deeply influential, even determinative, amongst these, is the weight of the country’s history. In Therborn’s explanation this history is what he calls *settler colonialism*: “the conquest and occupation of a territory by people coming from somewhere else.” He argues that settler colonialism

is not, by definition, racist, but “(if) the occupied territory is at all populated, it tends to generate racist arrogance and contempt vis-à-vis the natives” (Therborn 2019: 33). The racism that has come out of this experience does not explain all South Africa’s inequality. Inequality within the black South African community has increased and racism is partly responsible for the high levels that are evident in the country. But the way racism works, as Therborn (2019: 33) explains, is, I would argue, a major distinguishing factor. It cannot account for all of South Africa’s inequality but, I suggest, catalyses it and provides it with a dynamic that is present in only a few other global contexts – contemporary United States and Brazil, and, historically, over centuries, caste-encased India. In these countries, racism and caste-ism operate as ubiquitous viruses. They are never total. People are able to resist them. But they infect everything. Everything, all social relations, are, to a degree, touched by them. It is this single factor, in the midst of everything else that is problematic about South Africa, and indeed the United States, Brazil and India, that requires better and more substantial explanation.

The problem that confronts us in this discussion is that the effects of racism are largely read through and interpreted through proxy indicators, i.e., what happens to people, the operation of racial discrimination in people’s everyday lives. It is clear, to be seen, in the major indicators of material inequality in South Africa – incomes, levels of education, the provision of housing, access to amenities such as education, health, welfare provision, the availability of social amenities. People who have been classified black are worse off than, particularly, those classified white. But, as the critical work of Seekings and Natrass (2005) shows, in operation in many of the outcome indicators for determining discrimination are often a multiplicity of factors. ‘Race’ may be one of them, but it is not, looking at things causally, unambiguously the sole and only responsible factor.

One is in a bit of difficulty here. Intuitively, one wants to say that the work of scholars such as Seekings and Natrass (2007) cannot be correct. They are not accounting for the weight of racism on South Africans’ lives. This criticism may have something to which we need to hold on. Following Therborn (2019), I want to argue for a better understanding of the psychological effects that surround the experience of racism. Towards understanding racism better, we need to understand how it affects people directly. We need to understand what it does to their heads, their ways of thinking, and particularly their self-understandings. These self-understandings are never, it needs to be said, either straightforward or predictable. Racism certainly incapacitates some. It produces within them that thing, that hard-to-talk-about thing called an inferiority complex. It also produces a superiority complex in some. But this is not what automatically plays out in the victims’ heads, or, indeed, the heads of perpetra-

tors. Racism, strangely, strengthens some. It puts them in the mind of wanting to show that they will not be beaten down. Others, we must acknowledge, are. They are psychologically stricken. They produce amongst many South Africans who are not white anxieties of inferiority, and amongst those who are thought of as white, and who regard themselves as white, conceits of superiority. Generalised uncertainty amongst black people. The opposite for white people. At the social level these states of mind are reproduced amongst communities and racialised groups. Habituated feelings and attitudes along these lines are produced and reproduced.

But, unfortunately, aside from anecdotal evidence for what I am saying above, it is very difficult to demonstrate the claims that are made there empirically. We do not, as yet, have a full and documented analysis or a deconstructive psychosocial/economic framework with which to work which says categorically that this is how racism works in the lives of people. We can do so through the proxy factors I spoke of above. But direct evidence of the effects of racism is very difficult to adduce. This is clear from the work of Williams et al. (2008 and 2012) which provides us with the strongest empirical record of what effects racism precipitates in people's heads and minds.

This work, *Paradise Lost*, is an important contribution to understanding how this process works amongst us. It is an attempt to understand better what is going on in our lives. It arises out of political disappointment but is fuelled by the urgency of wanting to understand better so that the work of remaking the world in truly non-racial ways may proceed on a better and more informed basis. It is an important contribution to the South African discussion but has implications for the global struggle against racism.

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Abbreviations

AA	Affirmative action
AAP	Anglo-American Platinum
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
B-BBEE	Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CBD	Central Business District
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
CEE	Commission for Employment Equity
CELS	Contemporary English Language Studies
CeSTII	Centre for Science, Technology Innovation and Innovation Indicators
CSA	Cricket South Africa
CSI	Corporate Social Investment
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DA	Democratic Alliance
DCES	Developmental, Capable and Ethical State
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EAP	Economically active population
EBITDA	Earnings before income tax, depreciation and amortisation
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPD	Economic Performance and Development
EU	European Union
FoEPRDS	Frequency of Experiencing Personal Racial Discrimination Scale
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
LiEP	Language-in-Education Policy
LPHE	Language Policy for Higher Education
LSM	Living Standard Measurement
MUST	Multilingual Studies

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEF	National Empowerment Fund
NFSAS	National Financial Students Assistance Scheme
NHC	National Heritage Council
NMMU	Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
NP	Nationalist Party
NWU	North West University
ODI	One Day International
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RMF	Rhodes must fall
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADET	South African Democracy Education Trust
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAIRR	South African Institute for Race Relations
SALS	Small area layers
SASAS	South African Social Attitudes Survey
SJN	Social Justice and Nation-Building Hearings
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
STU	Solidarity Trade Union
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCT	University of Cape Town
UFH	University of Fort Hare
UKZN	University of Kwazulu-Natal
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNISA	University of South Africa

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Introduction: *From a Minority Racial to a Non-racial Paradise*

Gregory Houston, Modimowabarwa Kanyane and Yul Derek Davids

At the dawn of South Africa's democracy, the sense of hope of a new nation where citizens would stand equally in what once was a discriminatory and racist country was palpable. All South Africans would stand, walk and live equally and free in a country that would no longer discriminate on the basis of race. Yet, as South Africa moves towards the third decade of democracy, the hope of a non-racial paradise seems lost. We see an increasing number of racist incidents coupled with intensified racialised politicking which brings to the fore deep-seated feelings of inter-racial dislike and mistrust. These are expressed privately and publicly in the form of harmful stereotypes that often perpetuate inter-racial hostility in a country that once held so much promise of building a reconciled and united nation rooted in its diversity. The promise of a non-racial paradise that so many struggled for remains elusive after more than a quarter century of democracy.

The South African National Planning Commission (NPC) noted in its Diagnostic Report in 2010 that: "Without a high degree of social cohesion, without unity of purpose, it is difficult to envisage South Africa overcoming the significant obstacles that stand in the way of prosperity and equity". The Commission recognised that one of the obstacles to the achievement of social cohesion was the fact that in the democratic era "South Africa is a deeply divided society where opportunity continues to be defined by race, gender, geographic location, class and linguistic background". Race remains one of the most salient lines of division, largely because of the country's history of white minority rule. The increasing number of racist incidents in the past few years is indicative of the challenges the country still faces.

The chapters in this volume draw from theoretical debates on race, the history of apartheid, qualitative and quantitative accounts of experiences of racism, and quantitative studies of attitudes towards race to describe and explain the persistence of racial privilege and racism in the post-apartheid era. In particular, several of the chapters deal with the ways in which race and racism are manifested in the economy, the education system, sport, the heritage landscape, etc. *in ways in which an attempt is made to write about race while*

simultaneously putting it under erasure. While most of the themes covered in the volume – theoretical debates on race, the evolution of white privilege, and racism in the economy, education, sport, etc. – have been covered by many publications, it is this objective which sets the volume apart from the previous studies of race and racism published during the post-apartheid era: *dealing with race in order to render it irrelevant and ultimately bring about its erasure.* The central questions investigated are: *what factors account for the continued salience of race in South Africa; and how can race be made irrelevant and ultimately erased?*

Race as an indicator of privilege and exclusion will continue to persist in South Africa for as long as racial privilege and inequalities persist. The book deals with race as an important concept to use to achieve social justice, but also to demonstrate its irrelevance and therefore promote its erasure. It is important to note from the outset that it is impossible to discuss race and racism without using the racial terms associated with apartheid, and which still apply in the post-apartheid South Africa.

1 Race and Racism

There are several premises on race and racism that are held in common by all the authors of the chapters in this volume. The first is that ‘race’ has no basis in biology, and that it has been scientifically proven that the genetic differences that exist between people “are too small to justify grouping humans into distinct categories such as ‘races’” (Bardien-Kruger & Müller-Nedebock 2020: 33). Research into the human genome, the complete set of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences for, or genetic blueprint of humans, has made this possible. In particular, this research has demonstrated that: human beings share 99.9% of their DNA; that around 85% of human genetic variation does not occur between what are commonly labelled as racial groups but within them; and that the 0.01% difference is a consequence of the impact of the different environments that humans live in (Morning 2008). In consequence, since race has no biological basis, it is therefore a social construct.

In contrast, race science, or science that aims at proving that certain groups of people are biologically, culturally and intellectually superior to other groups, has consistently failed to achieve this objective. The scientific study of ‘racial’ differences from the eighteenth century on used a variety of methods such as differences in skin colour and place of origin (Linnaeus 1735), differences in skin colour and the size of skulls (Blumenbach 1790), differences in the angle of the jaw (Camper 1794) and differences in brain size (Tiedemann 1836;

Morton 1839) to categorise people into ‘race’ groups. These studies formed the basis for subsequent studies that sought to distinguish innate qualities such as intelligence between groups they defined as races. The latter include studies in South Africa conducted by M. Lawrence Fick (1929 and 1939) and Jansen van Rensburg (1938), who both concluded that there were differences in the intelligence of black and white South Africans. However, studies that attempt to link intelligence to race have consistently been found to be scientifically inadequate (Sternberg, Grigorenko & Kidd 2005: 57), with, for example, Fick’s study failing to take account of differing social conditions and opportunities between black and white South Africans (Wober 1971: 18). Other limitations in such studies include “misrepresentation of data, neglect of the role of culture, language, socio-economic status (SES), and differences in school funding, unjustified speculation, and consistent minimization of the history of racial oppression” (Jackson & Winston 2021: 4). In consequence, there is no scientific basis for race and inherent capabilities.

Nevertheless, the biological validity of race has been refuted only recently, as was the adoption of the notion that race is a social construct among academics. There is also no evidence that these have become common knowledge outside of academia (Tawa 2016: 245). But the potential exists for beliefs on race to be changed and the associated racism that flows from these beliefs to be erased.

The second premise is the common recognition among the authors that while race is a social construct that is “poorly descriptive of the phenomenon it seeks to describe” (Thompson 2006), the reality is that many people believe that people can be divided into distinct race groups based on observable properties such as skin colour, hair type and eye shape, and that these properties are good predictors of inherited biological, cultural and intellectual differences (Andreason 2000: S663). These beliefs are often accompanied by the belief in racial stereotypes, and account for the racism that flows from the practices of many people. These beliefs are learned, and are not held by all humans.

The reality for most people in South Africa is that race is a lived experience, largely in consequence of a lengthy process during which “the core function of institutions ... was to produce identities of superiority and inferiority” (Soudien & Botsis 2011: 90) based on race. A plethora of laws was promulgated from the late 1940s in this country to institutionalise race, including the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. The result is that, according to Hino, Leibbrandt, Machema, Shifa and Soudien (2018: 7): “South Africans growing up in this period grew up believing, unless they were taught otherwise by their parents, teachers or religious and educational institutions, which did happen, that their imposed

racial classifications were real". The potential thus exists for South Africans to be taught that racial classifications are not real.

2 Where we Come From

Our immediate past is apartheid South Africa. The most important thing to understand about race in this society is that it was used to dominate, and to justify the disproportionate enjoyment by some people of the society's political, social and economic benefits. In apartheid South Africa, race was used to justify the exclusion of some people from political and economic power and the creation of a racial hierarchy. This racial hierarchy was entrenched in legislation and government programmes that denied access to land to some; restricted higher-paying professions to others; and ensured that some were paid more than others for the same work. It provided more funding per capita for education, health, housing, and social assistance for some people than others; and ensured that some were marginalised from certain opportunities and confined to lives of poverty. Access to opportunities was based on race, giving rise to racial privilege, where an individual's position in the hierarchy determined what privileges he or she enjoyed or was denied. These processes culminated in the apartheid 'paradise', in which white privilege was evident in virtually all aspects of society. Apartheid emerged as a model for multi-cultural societies from which racists around the world could draw upon to establish a privileged paradise based on race.

The starting point for a study of where we come from is the apartheid ideology. Some of the literature on the ideology draws attention to its genesis in the British colonial segregationist era. David Welsh (1971), for instance, identifies the ideology of segregation in its application in Natal during the colonial era, in particular the formation of native reserves and indirect rule through traditional leaders, as the basis of the idea of racial separation in South Africa (see also Dubow 1989; Rich 1990; Worden 1994; Magubane 1996; Maylam 2001a). Shula Marks (1986) later argued that the segregationist ideas applied in colonial Natal reflected the racial ideas of British colonialists. Other studies that focus on the genesis of the ideology draw attention to how ideas of racial separation took root in the Afrikaner community (see, for instance, Moodie 1974; O'Meara 1983; Scholtz 1984; Dubow 1995; Maylam 2001a; Giliomee 2004). A second broad area in the historiography of the ideology focuses on its content, which includes studies that draw attention to notions of white supremacy found in the ideology (Johnstone 1970; Moodie 1974; Price & Rosberg 1980; Frederickson 1981; Cell 1982; Corder 1988; Wolpe 1990; Dubow 2014); to

aspects related to territorial segregation found in it (Davenport & Hunt 1974; Dubow 1989; Beinart & Dubow 1995); to the ideology's emphasis on economic and social segregation to avoid miscegenation (Cronje, Nicol & Groenewald 1947; De Kiewiet 1957; Dubow 1989; Lemon 1991; Adhikari 2009; Dubow 2014); and to those aspects of the ideology that relate to control over black labour (Wolpe 1972, 1990; Wilson 1972; Jeeves 1985; Lipton 1986; Swilling, Humphries & Shubane 1991; James 1992; Moodie 1994; Crankshaw 1997).

A second point of departure for a study of where we come from is the evolution of the legislation that underpinned the apartheid policies. Several studies trace the evolution of racial legislation such as the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, and various other apartheid legislation. While the *Annual Surveys of Race Relations* of the South African Institute of Race Relations published during the apartheid era provide analyses of legislation introduced in each year during that era, Landis (1961) provides a review of all significant legislation up to 1961 and Dugard's 1977 study relates apartheid legislation to human rights (see also Glucksmann n.d.; Beinart & Dubow 1995; Sisk 1995; Boddy-Evans 2005; Clark & Worger 2011). Several chapters in the book edited by Hugh Corder (1982) focus on various laws and their consequences for black people during the segregation and apartheid era.

A third point of departure of relevance here is the link between apartheid and racism. The studies by Van den Berghe (1967) and Adam and Giliomee (1979), for instance, isolate racism as a key feature of the apartheid era. Van den Berghe (1967: 11) notes that racism is "any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races". He then proceeds to distinguish between paternalistic racism, which is found in societies where white domination and superiority is not challenged, and competitive racism where the legitimacy of white domination and superiority is challenged and conflict arises between groups, as was the case in South Africa. Van den Berghe concludes that intergroup conflict has been a major determinant of racist attitudes in South Africa (see Duckitt 1992: 22, 160). Several other studies draw attention to racism during the apartheid era (Maylam 2017; Variava 1989; Dubow 1995), while others examine the link between apartheid and the development of racial stereotypes (Crijns 1959; Duckitt 1992; Adhikari 2006a).

A final point of departure of relevance is the evolution of white privilege and black deprivation. Merle Lipton's (1985) seminal study on the relationship between capitalism and apartheid provides an understanding of the increasing

racial inequalities associated with apartheid. This study illustrates the development of the racial hierarchy in the country, in which white South Africans enjoyed significantly more economic benefits than their black counterparts. Sampie Terreblanch's (2002) tome on the history of inequality in South Africa examines the progressive development of inequality in the country from 1652 until 2002. Most importantly, this Afrikaner scholar acknowledges, while demonstrating it, that white South Africans have "benefited from colonialism, segregation and apartheid" (Terreblanch 2002: 4). Jeremy Seekings and Nicola Nattrass (2008) trace racial income inequality and the racial dimension of unemployment from the apartheid era through to the post-apartheid era. Their central argument "is that the distributional regime in South Africa has long served to privilege one section of the population while excluding others". Vusi Gumede (2015) traces the roots of current economic inequalities from the apartheid era. These studies provide a wealth of data on the extent of white privilege and black deprivation during particular historical periods that is relevant. One chapter in this edited volume illustrates the evolution of white privilege during the apartheid era, while several others draw attention to specific aspects of white privilege and black deprivation during apartheid.

3 Where We Are

The relevant literature on the post-apartheid era with regard to where we are focuses on the persistence of racial inequality and the racial power structure, the variety of ways in which racism is manifested and the salience of racial identities in South Africa after the democratic transition in 1994. For instance, Terreblanch (2002), Seekings and Nattrass (2008), and Gumede (2015) all provide evidence of racial inequalities in the post-apartheid era that are roughly similar to those that existed during the apartheid era. Several chapters in the book edited by Vishwas Satgar (2019) draw attention to the perpetuation of racial inequalities in post-apartheid South Africa, the link between race and class, various perspectives on non-racialism, and xenophobia. Neville Alexander (2002) illustrates that racial capitalism has resulted in a perpetuation of white ownership and control of the economy (see also Seekings & Nattrass 2008; Southall 2016; Gumede 2017; McKinley 2017; Lee 2021), while there are several studies of racism in post-apartheid South Africa's higher education institutions, including a book written by Hugo Canham (2019), who uses ethnography to capture accounts of experiences of black academics at tertiary institutions that illustrate white domination of certain higher education institutions (see also Tabensky & Matthews 2015; Van der Merwe & Van Reenen

2016; Khunou, Phaswana, Khoza-Shangase & Canham 2019). Alexander (2013) demonstrates how language policies at higher education institutions in the post-apartheid era reinforce the racial class and power structure created by centuries of white minority rule (see also Foley 2004; Hibbert & Van der Walt 2014; Van der Merwe & Van Reenen 2016).

Among the studies that draw attention to experiences of racial discrimination in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as the various ways in which racism is manifested, is Swartz et al.'s (2018) study of the experiences of black university students in post-apartheid South Africa. The authors trace the experience of students at eight universities over several years and, using qualitative research methods, discern certain experiences of racial discrimination (see also Walker 2005; Van der Merwe & Van Reenen 2016; Maré 2019). Seekings (2008) draws attention to the persistence of racial labelling and discrimination in the post-apartheid era (see also Walker 2005a, 2005b; Adhikari 2006b; MacDonald 2006; Mtose 2011; Durrheim, Mtose & Brown 2011; Puttick 2012; Nyar 2016; Satgar 2019). Several studies exist of racism in the media (for instance, several chapters in Mano 2015; and Bothma 2020), the churches (Coetzee & Conradie 2010; Elpich 2012; McEwen & Steyn 2016; Pali 2017; Baloyi 2018), schools (De Wet 2001; Nkomo, McKinney & Chisholm 2004; Pather 2005; Ndimande 2009; Soudien 2012; Hunter 2019; Spaul & Jansen 2019), and the military (Mashike 2007; Seloane 2011), among others, in post-apartheid South Africa.

The chapters in Ashwin Desai's edited book on sport (Desai 2010) illustrates that, despite efforts at transformation, inequality endures during the post-apartheid era in most sporting codes, with the main divide being between elite (mostly white) and grassroots (mostly black) sport. Andre Odendaal's historical treatment of cricket (Odendaal 2018) traces the manner in which race impacted on the development of the sport in the country in general, and in black communities in particular. Peter Alegi and Chris Bolsmann's (2010) edited collection on soccer contains chapters which explore racism in the sport historically (for other studies of racism in sport see also Booth 1998; Chappell 2005; O'Leary & Khoo 2013; Sikes, Rider & Llewelyn 2019).

Du Rand, Vorster and Vorster's (2017) edited volume includes several chapters that link racism directly to xenophobia, for instance, those written by Vorster and du Rand that link race and nationalism and ethnocentrism on the one hand, and the construction of social myths to justify exploitation and oppression on the other. They link these consequent forms of racism to xenophobia in South Africa (see also Crush 2008; Hassim, Kupe & Worby 2008; Neocosmos 2010; Solomon & Kosaka 2013; Adjai & Lazaridis 2013; Klotz 2016; Tafira 2017). The perpetuation of a racialised heritage landscape has been highlighted in the studies of Marschall (2008 and 2019), Meskell (2011) and Breakfast, Bradshaw

and Haines (2018), among others, while the relationship between heritage and identity in post-apartheid South Africa has been demonstrated in studies by Van der Waal and Robins (2011) and Marschall (2012).

Johan Maré (2014) explains how and why race classifications have been kept alive 27 years after the Population Registration Act was repealed. According to Maré, in the post-apartheid South Africa, race has “been thoroughly naturalised, it is so ‘obvious’ ... that it seems to invite no questions.” It is argued that individuals are forced to decide on their race when they fill in forms that require a racial characterisation, or are ‘classified’ by some bureaucrat. Laws such as the Employment Equity Act and the Black Economic Empowerment Act use the racial categories of apartheid, while the demand to classify people racially extends to other areas of life in South Africa (see also Posel 2001; Distiller & Steyn 2004; Alexander 2006; Tewolde 2020). Mohamed Adhikari’s (2009) edited collection on coloured identities examines the factors that accounted for the persistence of coloured identities in various parts of Southern Africa. In part, it is argued, coloured identity is a product of European racist ideology, and in part a product of the agency of coloured people in making their own identity. Xolela Mangcu’s (2015) edited volume addresses the tension between the promise of a post-racial society and the persistence of racialised identities in South Africa, which is close to one of the central objectives of this volume (see also Dolby 2001; Franchi & Swart 2003; Whitehead 2012).

Almost all the chapters in this volume illustrate the salience of race and persistence of racism in post-apartheid South Africa. For instance, several chapters illustrate the persistence of white privilege and a racial power structure in key sectors of society, in particular the economy and educational institutions. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment and employment equity, as well as racism at universities that is directed against leading figures in these institutions and the language policy of universities entrench this power structure by providing more benefits to some, while disadvantaging others. In addition, several other chapters illustrate the persistence of racial discrimination, including individuals’ own experiences of racism and their perceptions of racism against their race group, the persistence of racial stereotypes in people’s perceptions of the causes of poverty and merit for selection for national sports teams, and the way interracial conflict gives rise to xenophobia. Finally, race remains a key determinant of identity in post-apartheid South Africa, including the use of race for self-identification and to identify others, the way in which young people view their own opportunities and challenges in terms of the opportunities and challenges of their race group, and the racial political identities that are linked to heritage.

4 Where We Want to Be

For many, the anti-apartheid struggle was premised on the notion that the goal was a non-racist society. From the outset, non-racism was defined in different ways: by some as equality of opportunity for all, and by others as the elimination of race from every aspect of society. In particular, the different strands in the liberation movement had various perspectives about race and a non-racial society. The African National Congress (ANC), for instance, held onto the notion of race as a reality in South Africa for most of its history (Ndebele 2002), and recognised differences between the various groups identified as races in apartheid legislation. For instance, a leading ideologist in the ANC, Z.K. Matthews, wrote in 1953 that: “Not only do [South Africa’s] racial groups differ in number and in racial stocks, but they differ in cultural background, in the languages they speak, and in the level of their cultural development in terms of modern Western Civilization” (Matthews 1953. Cited in Soske 2015: 13). Throughout the 1950s, the ANC remained committed to the idea of racial organisations and restricted its membership to black Africans. However, in its alliance with other racially-based organisations – the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), South African Coloured People’s Congress (SACPC) and Congress of Democrats (COD) – the ANC claimed that it “championed equal rights ‘without distinction of colour, race, sex, or belief’”. It thus envisioned the future non-racial society as “a diverse, African country in which the law would be applied without regards to race, gender, or belief” (Soske 2015: 27. See also Frederickse 1990; Everatt 2009).

The ANC’s Freedom Charter envisaged a non-racial democratic South Africa that belonged “to all who live in it”, on the one hand, and gave recognition to various “national groups” on the other. The latter was challenged from within the alliance in the early 1960s when leaders of allied organisations such as Barney Desai of the SACPC applied for membership of the ANC, and, in so doing, “was arguing as a self-defined ‘African’, for a broader attitude in a movement that he thought was more accommodating of non-racial practices” (Ndebele 2002: 138). It was only in 1969 that the ANC opened up membership to people of all “national groups”, which Ndebele characterised as “an attempt to balance non-racial principles and the *de facto* race consciousness inherent in the organisation” (Ndebele 2002: 140). In 1985, the first non-black African members were elected to its leading structure, the National Executive Committee, and all non-black Africans given full membership of the organisation (Ndebele 2002: 139ff).

The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), on the other hand, criticised the ANC’s notion of South Africa as a multi-racial society and posited instead “a nonracialism which challenged the notion of ‘race’ and insisted on a definition of national identity stressing common interests rather than differences among

all South Africans” (Soudien 2000: 35). Despite this, as Adhikari (2005) argues, the NEUM acknowledged “the salience of racial distinctions within South African society” for a long time. Indeed, the use of the term ‘Non-European’ implied recognition of the differences between those identified by the white administrations as such and those identified as ‘European’, and “of racial and ethnic differences within the black population” as well (Adhikari 2005: 407). From the outset, then, its recognition of racial differences found expression in a federal structure as “the only way of accommodating racial and other differences within a broadly based popular movement while allowing its activities to be coordinated nationally” (Adhikari 2005: 409). Up until the late 1950s, the NEUM aimed at Non-European unity as the path towards universal citizenship after the demise of apartheid (Soske 2015: 23).

By the early 1960s, however, some factions within the NEUM began to clarify its concept of non-racialism, some aspects of which had been earlier articulated by ideologues in the late 1950s. Included here was the proposition “that the concept of race had no scientific validity and that racial thinking was morally indefensible because of the essential unity of humankind” (Adhikari 2005: 413. See also Alexander 1979; Nasson 1990; Erasmus 2017). For instance, NEUM leader I.B. Tabata stated in 1962 that non-racialism meant that “it wasn’t the colour of a man’s skin that you judged him by, but his actions. Some whites had assisted them in their struggle; and there were blacks who had betrayed them” (Tabata 1969: 113. Cited in Erasmus 2017: 2010). Another leading NEUM ideologue, Kies, stated the following about race: “mutations in skin-colour, hair texture, shape of nose or skull . . . owing to geographical dispersal, isolation and diet, have made not the slightest difference to the biological unity of man as a single species, and provide no scientific basis for a division into what are popularly mis-called ‘races’” (Kies 1989: 7. Cited in Erasmus 2017: 216). Nevertheless, he defined the term “non-European” politically in relation to Europe as people “of any skin-colour, height, hair texture, skull or nose shape who live outside the Continent of Europe . . . including those exposed to European invasion and conquest” (Kies 1989: 4. Cited in Erasmus 2017: 216).

The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), by contrast, “rejected the concept of race on scientific and ethical grounds” from the outset (Soske 2015: 26). Its first president, Robert Sobukwe, stated in his inaugural address in 1959 that:

The Africanists take the view that there is only one race to which all belong, and that is the human race. In our vocabulary, therefore, the word ‘race’ as applied to man, has no plural form. We do, however, admit the existence of observable physical differences between various groups of people, but these are the result of a number of factors, chief among which has been geographical isolation. SOBUKWE 1977

The PAC held to the notion that South Africa consisted of three national groups – Africans (including so-called coloureds), Indians and whites – defined by their distinct geographical origin and historical experience, and that revolutionary unity lay in all who supported African nationalism (Soske 2015: 26). It held the view that “everybody who owes his only loyalty to Afrika and who is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority” was an African. The PAC aimed “at the full development of the human personality and a ruthless uprooting and outlawing of all forms or manifestations of the racial myth” (Sobukwe 1977). This was only possible after the dismantling of white political and economic control, at which point all citizens (including whites) “could participate in a continental project to develop a genuinely African culture”. However, the focus was on mobilising black African, Indian and coloured people into a force against apartheid, and denying white participation in this movement because their “material interests” would lead them to “seek guarantees that undermined African nationalism” (Soske 2015: 26. See also Kies 1943; Tabata 1974; Alexander 1979; Drew 1997).

The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), which rose to prominence in the 1970s, adopted a position very similar to that of the PAC. Thus, while it focused on racial mobilisation and black (defined as black Africans, Indians and coloureds) unity in order bring an end to apartheid, it envisaged a post-apartheid society in which race or colour would not have the same kind of significance they had during apartheid. Race was defined not on the basis of biological notions of race, but in terms of black people’s common experience of oppression (Maylam 2001b: 173). It was therefore not seen as a given, but as a social construct in that its effects in apartheid South Africa were a reality: white domination and black subjugation. Moreover, as Steve Biko, the founder of the BCM, noted, “being black is not a matter of pigmentation – being black is a reflection of mental attitude” (Biko 2004: 52. Cited in Thompson 2012: 24), that is, the willingness to participate in the liberation struggle. For the BCM, the goal was to bring about unity among, and psychological liberation of, black people as a step towards the liberation of South Africa and the construction of a “non-racial society unhindered by the limitations of white superiority and black inferiority” (Thompson 2012: 1). In such a context, race has no meaning because it only has meaning in a context in which one group dominates another (Thompson 2012: 22. See also Gerhart 1978; Fatton 1986; Pityana, Ramphela, Mpulwana & Wilson 1991; Howarth 1997; Mngxitama, Alexander & Gibson 2008; Lamola 2016).

However, it was the ANC that won political power in the first democratic elections in 1994, and it is the ANC’s approach to race and non-racism that has impacted current South African society. On assumption of power, the

ANC-led government immediately embarked on a process of repealing legislation that discriminated against black people in general to ensure equality before the law with the intention of bringing about equal enjoyment of the political, economic and social benefits of the society (Worden 2011; Clarke & Wonger 2016), while enacting a selection of new race-based laws aimed at creating equal opportunities for all regardless of “race, gender, or belief” (Deane 2005; Habib & Bentley 2008; Worden 2011; Alexander 2013; Clarke & Wonger 2016). The former was devised to ensure equal access to political and administrative office, to employment, to land and other economic opportunities, to movement, and to various forms of social assistance. The latter were devised to bring about racial redress and reduce the inequalities between the different groups. Included in the latter are the Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998) to ensure equal opportunities in employment and the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act (No. 53 of 2003) to bring about equal opportunities in ownership and management of the means of production in the private sector. Measures introduced to deal with racism include hate crime legislation (see Breen & Nel 2011; Dixon & Gadd 2012; Breen, Lynch, Nel & Matthews 2016) and a National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Finally, nation-building and social cohesion have been fundamental goals of the ANC-led government since inception in its effort to forge national unity in response to the racist past (see Palmberg 1999; Barolsky 2013; Johnston 2014; Jenkins & Du Plessis 2014; Abrahams 2016).

All the chapters in this volume are predicated on the notion that the ultimate objective is a non-racial society where the political, economic and social benefits of the society accrue to all irrespective of race (as well as gender, geographical location, class and linguistic background), racial discrimination and xenophobia do not exist, racial labelling for official purposes is not necessary, and racial superiority and inferiority complexes and racism are eliminated. This is a society in which the race consciousness that was characteristic of apartheid and persists in the post-apartheid era is replaced by a consciousness that race is a social construct and in which there is recognition of the humanity of all its citizens.

5 How We Get to Where We Want to Be

The South African liberation struggle was fought with the objective of eradicating race and racism and the establishment of a non-racial society. Failure to achieve this after more than two-and-a-half decades of democracy requires

specific strategies to deal with the multiple ways in which race and racism are manifested. There are several studies that provide suggestions on how to deal with racial inequality and the racial power structure, racism in the various ways it is manifested, and persisting racial identities, as well as how to bring about a non-racial society in South Africa.

Suggestions have been made on how to deal with black economic empowerment to increase black ownership and control of the economy (Cargill 2010; Ndedi & Kok 2017), including measures to ensure compliance with black economic empowerment legislation by white-owned companies (Kilambo 2016: 281–2). Suggested changes to employment equity to bring equity in employment in senior and top categories of employment include the creation of opportunities for black people through voluntary resignations by white people in senior categories of employment (see Selby & Sutherland 2006). These changes aim at redistributive social justice – and thereby transformation of the existing power structure in key sectors. Canham (2019) suggests ways to transform higher education institutions and proposes decolonisation as a way of reducing racial discrimination experienced by black academics at these institutions, while several chapters in the book edited by Chaunda Scott and Eunice Ivala (2019) provide examples of successful transformation at universities in the country (see also Mabokela & King 2001). Liesel Hubbert and Christa van der Walt's (2014) edited volume highlights efforts made to introduce African languages at universities in South Africa, including the use of African languages as Languages of Learning and Instruction at the University of South Africa and the use of multilingual course content materials to decrease inequality of opportunity between English-speaking and other students.

The chapters in Mangcu's (2015) edited volume highlight the need for a race-transcendent vision that moves beyond 'the festival of negatives' embodied in concepts such as non-racialism, non-sexism, anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid. It is argued that this vision can be found in Steve Biko's notion of a 'joint culture', in which the constituent elements of South Africa's 'EuroAfricanAsian' heritage is acknowledged. Decolonisation emerges as a theme to deal with racial inequalities and racism in several studies, including Jansen's (2001) edited collection on decolonisation in universities, Susan Booysen's (2016) study of the Fees Must Fall movement, and Laurence Piper's (2018) study of the impact of decolonisation on research and teaching at universities.

Suggestions are made in the chapters in this volume to make race irrelevant, and therefore bring about its erasure, including the need to develop economic strategies that are targeted towards redistributive justice for the wellbeing of

all those previously disenfranchised. There is need to consider ways in which African languages could be used as the medium of instruction at universities; hate crime legislation could be used to reduce or end racial discrimination; and to create greater awareness of the racist nature of xenophobia. South African students and other youth need to listen to one another's views on their experiences as the 'born free' beneficiaries of the dream of a better life. Also, the social exclusion of the millennial generation in post-apartheid South Africa encourages deeper concern with racial identities than previous generations, and policies are needed to remedy this, including unlocking cages of ascribed racial identities and freeing people to define themselves. This should include the elimination of all processes that require people to classify themselves by race, for example, in surveys or official and unofficial documents. There is also a need for a new way of presenting and narrating the country's history that considers the historical imbalances and racialised configuration of the heritage landscape of post-apartheid South Africa. Finally, there is a need to promote decoloniality – with its emphasis on African ideas and systems – as a solution to the continued salience of race and persistence of racism in post-apartheid South Africa.

Figure 1.1 below sets out the core themes of the book and the ultimate objective.

The central concept that draws the chapters together is that patterns of racial privilege and stratification that shaped apartheid continue to play out in a post-apartheid context. It is virtually impossible for a single volume to capture the multiple ways in which race continues to shape post-apartheid South Africa. This volume is intended to add to our understanding of the politics of exclusion and inequality based on race by exploring theoretical debates about race in racially divided societies, historical analyses of racial privilege, discourses on experiences of race, and social attitudes towards race, poverty, inequality and other challenges.

Several chapters in the volume suggest different ways in which race can be made irrelevant, leading ultimately to its erasure, taking cognizance of the multiple ways in which race operates in the South African situation – therefore requiring multiple ways in which race needs to be made irrelevant. Above all else, the chapters in the book lead to the conclusion that race remains relevant as long as social injustice based on race persists and notions of racial superiority and inferiority prevail, which is at the core of the current situation in South Africa as illustrated in the chapters, and becomes irrelevant once strategies have been implemented that make race irrelevant in multiple areas, and provide the basis for its ultimate erasure.




FIGURE 1.1 Race and racism in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa¹

The authors of the various chapters in the volume deal with theories of race and racism in varying ways, with often divergent views on them. This is indicative of just how vast the literature on these theories is, making it impossible to do a literature review in the limited space allowed. One of the most important recent theoretical treatments of race written by a South African is Crain Soudien's *Realising the Dream: Unlearning the logic of race in the South African School* (Soudien 2012). Soudien puts forward an argument about the dire importance of realising the dream of being human, in which he raises questions about social constructivism, issues about identities, debates about 'race', the impact of the Enlightenment on modernity and modern selves, questions about difference, multiplicity and movements of people through space and time and how these shape their lives and who they are and become. In dealing with race, Soudien argues that while 'race' is a social construction and is scientifically false, the social experiences of racism are real. It is in the latter context that several chapters in this volume draw attention to the lived experience of racism in South Africa. Soudien contributes a Foreword to this volume drawing on this excellent study of race.

¹ Adapted from Stokke 2017: 26.

6 White Privilege and the Racialised Power Structure in South Africa

The five chapters in Part 1 of the book demonstrate how political power during the apartheid era was used to give the white minority disproportionate enjoyment of the economic and social benefits of the society and to create a racial hierarchy that privileged some race groups more than others, and some of the key processes through which, despite the advent of democracy, significant aspects of a racialised power structure are maintained and protected during the post-apartheid era. In terms of the former, the white privilege and relative privilege Indians and coloureds enjoyed during apartheid is a legacy of apartheid that still has a major impact on the post-apartheid era, and one of the key factors behind the persistent salience of race and pervasiveness of racism in the country. In terms of the latter, various responses to racial redress to bring about social justice for the black majority and the repeal of discriminatory legislation during the post-apartheid era have resulted in the persistence of a racialised power structure in important sectors of the society, in particular in the economy and higher educational institutions that are together responsible for determining who constitutes the political, economic and social elite in the country, and indicate some of the areas where racism remains persistent and where race can be made irrelevant, and thereby promote its erasure.

Chapter 2, written by Gregory Houston, tracks the evolution of white privilege and the creation of a racial hierarchy. Houston argues that white dominance in South Africa has a long history, and the history of South Africa is characterised by processes in which white dominance over the other race groups living in the country left a legacy of white privilege and a racial hierarchy in which some race groups have better enjoyment of the society's benefits than others. This chapter then provides an important background to begin to answer one of the primary questions that this book seeks to answer. The persisting salience of race and racism in post-apartheid South Africa, for instance, can be partially explained by the need to implement racial redress and track progress in its implementation on the one hand (which is impossible without racial categories), and by the processes through which members of some race groups defend and maintain the privileges they enjoyed during apartheid on the other. These become clear only with an understanding of how some groups were deprived during apartheid and others privileged.

One of the ways in which an attempt was made to change the racial power structure in the post-apartheid era was to introduce legislation and policies aimed at racial redress as well as racial discrimination. In Chapter 3, Alexis Habiyaemye locates one of these policies, Black Economic Empowerment

(BEE), at the centre of the process in which race is used to incorporate a black elite into the 'monopoly capitalist class', largely dominated by whites. Drawing on the concept of racial capitalism, he critically analyses the persistence of white privilege in post-apartheid South Africa, despite efforts to de-racialise the economy. Taking an analysis of BEE as a point of departure, the author analyses the interlocking system of racism, capitalism and marginalisation in post-apartheid South Africa to demonstrate how the power structure in the economy has remained largely unchanged. Habiyaemye concludes that there is a need for economic strategies that aim at redistributive justice for the previously disenfranchised majority until a point is reached where racial inequalities are eradicated, consequently making race irrelevant.

Catherine Ndinda and Tidings Ndhlovu also focus on policies to transform the economy in Chapter 4, in this case, affirmative action in employment. They premise their chapter on the notion that racism persists alongside sexism and results in unequal outcomes for women in South Africa, with consequent cosmetic changes to the racialised power structure in key sectors in society, particularly the economy and at higher education institutions. Ndinda and Ndhlovu draw on data from employment equity reports to illustrate the extent of gender and racial transformation in the South African workplace, and conclude that certain categories of women have benefitted from the transformation, while others have not. They argue that there is need for greater targeting of employment equity programmes for certain categories of women to ensure their inclusion and representation in senior positions in the workplace, as well as mechanisms to bring about changes in attitudes, that collectively give rise to social justice. Social justice in this area would go a long way to making race irrelevant, and thereby promote its erasure.

Two chapters in the volume focus on racism in the higher education sector that see a role that discrimination plays in perpetuating the racial power structure. In Chapter 5, Neo Lekgotla *laga* Ramoupi examines racial exclusion from academic positions at universities as a consequence of government policies in the apartheid era and racial discrimination in the post-apartheid era, while in Chapter 6, Konosoang Sobane, Pinky Makoe and Chanel van der Merwe explore the medium of instruction at universities – English and Afrikaans – as mechanisms for the exclusion of black African students, and the consequences of such exclusion for racial equality. In both chapters, suggestions are made about mechanisms to overcome exclusions that would make race irrelevant in several areas where it continues to be relevant.

Ramoupi's chapter describes the experience and perceptions of racial superiority and loss of privilege that interact to reinforce racism in post-apartheid

South Africa. The thread that runs throughout this chapter is one that strings together evidence of the continuing presence of racism and racial privileges and exclusions in the higher education sector. Case studies are provided of significant incidents at South African universities where black academics have been individually targeted to prevent the challenge to white privilege in these institutions that they pose. The chapter includes recommendations to eradicate racial privilege and racism in the higher education sector in South Africa as mechanisms to make race irrelevant and thereby promote its erasure.

Sobane, Makoe and Van der Merwe argue that the South African education system continues to maintain features of a racialised past characterised by the institutionalisation of English and Afrikaans as languages of learning and teaching (LoLT) in higher education, to the exclusion of the other nine official languages. This results in the perpetuation of inequalities, since speakers of English and Afrikaans are systemically placed in an advantageous position where they have more potential to succeed academically and to have more chances to participate in the labour market at a later stage, compared to their counterparts. In this chapter, the authors draw on the experiences of students at universities to identify several impacts on them of university language policies. They conclude that adequate groundwork has been done for the promotion of multilingualism in South African universities that lays a good foundation for the implementation of multilingual practices to create equal opportunities for all South Africans in the higher education sector. This would go a long way towards making race irrelevant in such institutions, and thereby promote its erasure.

7 The Manifestation of Racism in Post-apartheid South Africa

Racism is manifest in multiple ways in post-apartheid South Africa, as most of the chapters in this volume demonstrate. The four chapters in Part 2 of the volume deal with individual and groups experiences of racial discrimination, the persistence of racial stereotypes, and racism in sport and towards foreigners. What draws these four chapters together is their focus on attitudes, and the impact of these on racial discrimination. An understanding of these is necessary to arrive at ways in which racial discrimination can be reduced, thereby promoting the erasure of race.

The starting point, however, is to determine how prevalent racism is in South Africa. In Chapter 7, Thobeka Zondi, Samela Mtyingizane, Ngqapheli Mchunu, Steven Gordon, Benjamin Roberts and Jarè Struwig use data from the national South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) to look at patterns

of reported discrimination by race (population) group and how these patterns have changed over the period 2003–2018. The authors investigate both personal and collective experiences of racial discrimination, providing important insights into the practice of modern racism. They conclude the chapter by reflecting on mechanisms that will likely reduce overt discrimination as well as contribute to a change in attitudes towards people of different race groups.

Attitudes towards people of different race groups in post-apartheid South Africa is the subject of Chapter 8. In this chapter, data from the 2011 to 2017 SASAS survey is used by Yul Davids, Benjamin Roberts, Gregory Houston and Nazeem Mustapha to examine whether there are different perceptions of the causes of poverty among the various race groups, and to assess whether there are class differences with regards to perceptions of the causes of poverty. Their study reveals the persistence of racial stereotypes in the understanding of the causes of deprivation. They conclude that a change of attitude will only be brought about by a process of increasingly educating South Africans about the structural factors behind poverty and its racial distribution, and by social justice that brings about similar levels of wealth, income and poverty for all race groups in the country.

Racism in sport and towards foreigners during the post-apartheid era are merely two of the many areas of the society in which racism is manifested, and include racism in the media, churches, schools, social movements and political parties, among others. However, examining every facet in which racism is manifested in the country would be a huge task, and the two remaining chapters in Part 2 are used to illustrate the effects of attitudes on racism in practice.

Chapter 9, written by Ashwin Desai, seeks to uncover individual forms of racism in South African cricket as much as how Cricket South Africa has approached issues of racial representation. Drawing from the recent report of an independent inquiry into the causes, nature and extent of racism in cricket, he illustrates how certain perceptions of ascribed racial capabilities in sport and of certain sporting codes as white spaces, as well as political pressure to transform sport in post-apartheid South Africa, make racial discrimination a key feature in several ways in national sports. Included here are perceptions of the ability of black sports people as well as the evolving class nature of sporting opportunities in the country. Desai proposes that a start has to be made to unlock ‘cages of ascribed identities and free people to define themselves’ so that race becomes irrelevant in sport, and that the link between race and class in South African society be brought into sharp focus as a way of progressively bringing about social justice.

In Chapter 10, Steven Gordon considers how cues from trusted elites inform popular attitudes on immigration. Gordon dismisses the argument that these cues, as well as economic factors, are the main causes of xenophobia, and places race and racism in a racialised society at the centre of the issue. He argues that interracial conflict appears to have a significant impact on South Africans' attitudes towards foreigners and goes a long way towards explaining why some groups are less welcome than others. For Gordon, the solution partially lies in increased efforts to promote social cohesion.

8 Race and Identity in South Africa

The final theme explored in Part 3 of the volume is the significance given to racial identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Since race identity is probably one of the most significant factors behind the persistence of race and racism in post-apartheid South Africa, an understanding of how this identity is reinforced is necessary to arrive at ways in which race can be made irrelevant, thereby promoting its erasure.

In Chapter 11, Natasha van der Pol, Zaynab Essack, Melissa Viljoen and Heidi van Rooyen examine the challenges faced by mixed Indian/white youths of having to negotiate the issue of what race they belong to in what is supposed to be a non-racial South Africa. Use is made of interviews conducted with students of mixed Indian/white ancestry to demonstrate that first-generation mixed-race people find it difficult to navigate the seemingly simple question about which race they belong to posed by the *unofficial racial census-takers* they encounter. This chapter illustrates another reason for the salience of race in post-apartheid South Africa, i.e., the need for people to constantly identify others, while showing that some biracial people find their existence representing a step toward ending racialised thinking.

Chapter 12, written by Joleen Steyn Kotze, complements this qualitative study of the lived experience of young South Africans by drawing from an empirical survey conducted among students at six South African universities to assess values and perceptions on whether their quality of life had improved since the first democratic elections in 1994. She finds that racial identity is becoming stronger among young South Africans, and there is an increasing identification of individual opportunities and constraints with that of the race group to which individuals belong. Thus, while illustrating other reasons for the salience of race, i.e., perceptions held by people of the impact of democracy on the group to which they belong, Steyn Kotze posits that both black and white students should begin to listen to one another's views which show

that they face similar concerns and challenges. This recognition of common concerns and challenges should negate the trend towards increasing racial identity, and thereby contribute to making race irrelevant.

In Chapter 13, Luvuyo Dondolo explores the impact of colonial and apartheid monuments such as the Paul Kruger Statue in the Church Square heritage precinct in Pretoria on racial identity in South Africa. He argues that the Paul Kruger Statue symbolises the sociocultural, political and economic identities which paved the way for the formation of the Boer Republics, the apartheid ideology and the consolidation of racial segregation in South Africa. The defacing of colonial and apartheid statues in 2015 illustrate the complexities of negotiating the past, race politics, reconciliation, nation building, and social cohesion. Dondolo concludes that the statue must be removed from the Church Square heritage precinct, and a process begun to construct a non-racial heritage landscape in the country that would contribute to the erasure of race.

In the final chapter in Part 3, Modimowabarwa Kanyane explores several developments since 1994 that are linked to racism in the post-apartheid era from the perspective of decoloniality, i.e., the view that freedom in the twenty-first century for countries emerging from colonialism is only possible through de-westernisation. For Kanyane, there is a need for South Africans to pursue a decoloniality project that aims to achieve the total emancipation of all black people, including the eradication of race and racism. The author concludes by arguing that the only way to bring about the erasure of race is to de-colonise the mind to robustly deal with complex issues such as transformative justice, as well as to promote national reconciliation and unity.

The concluding chapter, written by Houston, Kanyane and Davids, draws together the various ways in which the preceding chapters in the book illustrate the salience of race and persistence of racism in post-apartheid South Africa, the reasons for this, and the ways in which race can be made irrelevant, thereby promoting its erasure.

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PART 1

*White Privilege and the Racialised Power Structure
in South Africa*



Racial Privilege in Apartheid South Africa

Gregory Houston

1 Introduction

White dominance in South Africa has a long history, and its roots are found in the process of colonisation that began with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck and a small group of Dutch settlers at the Cape in 1652. From that early period of settlement up to the first democratic elections in April 1994, the history of South Africa is characterised by, among other things, processes in which whites have established their dominance over the other race groups living in the country. These processes culminated in the apartheid 'paradise', in which white privilege was evident in virtually all aspects of society.

The basic premise from which this chapter proceeds is that the apartheid system was based on one group exercising dominance in all spheres – political, economic and social – over the other race groups. In essence, apartheid was a model for the establishment of a paradise for one race group in a society with several race groups. The whole system was geared at protecting the white minority's privilege, where a small proportion of the country's population had disproportionate (and in some instances, exclusive) enjoyment of the country's political, economic and social benefits. The cornerstone on which this system was built is the notion of racial supremacy, or the view that one race had superiority in knowledge, capabilities, moral values, culture, etc. and should therefore take leadership in all spheres.

The apartheid system also led to the development of a racial hierarchy, in which the different race groups were allocated a social status and political and economic benefits in accordance with their race. Thus, while apartheid was not a paradise for coloured and Indian South Africans, they enjoyed more political, economic and social benefits than black Africans during the apartheid era. The consequence is that some members of those race groups that enjoyed more privileges than others perceived themselves as superior to those lower in the hierarchy.

It is necessary to examine the evolution of racial privilege for some groups in the apartheid era to contextualise racial privilege and racism in the post-apartheid era. This chapter provides a background to the conditions that provide for the perpetuation of a racialised power structure and give rise to various

manifestations of racism as well as issues around race and identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Without knowing what apartheid left behind, we lose sight of how the current situation with regard to race and racism developed. The analysis below focuses on various aspects of white – as well as coloured and Indian relative – privilege in apartheid South Africa. Linked to the enactment of legislation that entrenched white privilege, the emphasis is on the disproportionate enjoyment of the country's political, economic and social benefits by white South Africans, as well as on the entrenchment of the racial hierarchy.

The chapter is divided into three sections, each focusing on distinct historical periods from 1948 to 1994. The period between the electoral victory of the Nationalist Party (NP) in 1948 to the establishment of a Republic in 1961 focuses on the entrenchment of a system which was aimed at providing quality services for racially defined, privileged whites and systematically excluding the majority of South Africans from owning land in the urban and other areas of 'white' South Africa, certain types of employment, and access to quality education, health and other basic services, while simultaneously establishing a racial hierarchy based on unequal enjoyment of political, economic and social benefits. The period from 1961 to 1976 marked the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth, suppression of resistance to apartheid, increasing international pressure on South Africa because of its racial policies, and a deepening of the application of race legislation and policies. The period from 1976 ushered in an era in which certain aspects of apartheid legislation were relaxed and efforts were made to provide more services to the black population in general in the context of heightened international pressure against South Africa, an unprecedented level of resistance to apartheid, and economic crisis. A brief description is given at the beginning of the sections of some studies in the historiography of apartheid during each phase to illustrate some of the key ideas and issues raised in the literature about the evolution and characteristics of this system in South Africa.

2 From the Nationalist Party Electoral Victory to the Declaration of a Republic, 1948–1961

This phase in the development of white privilege was underpinned by a series of writings, largely of Afrikaner academics, that justified apartheid and white privilege. Among these were some earlier studies, such as a chapter in Gustav Preller's (1938) book *Andries Pretorius*, in which he asserts that modern science has proved that there are inherent and unalterable differences of quality,

intellect and moral stamina between the races that justify notions of white superiority; a book written by Van Biljon (1947) in which it is argued that black and white have their destiny in distinct territories; another written by Cronje (1945) in which he proposed that psychological and biological racial differences are inherent, and that it is the will of God that the races should be kept apart in their distinct territories with whites living in a state ruled by Afrikaners and guided by Afrikaner principles; and a paper written by Du Toit (1944) in which he argued that the separation of the races is based on the will of God (see Thompson 1962: 133–5).

Several publications by Afrikaner academics towards the end of the phase described the evolution of apartheid policies and practices during the period, including the book written by Rhoodie and Venter (1960). These authors trace the evolution of the Afrikaner 'nation' from the time of the free burghers in the Cape to the introduction of the apartheid policy to separate the races (see Thompson 1962: 135–7). They conclude that race, "by a process of psychological association", was "the outward manifestation of more deeply seated cultural and social differences" and "became the criterion with which the standard of cultural and social development of an individual was judged". This arose, in their view, because black Africans were "an inferior racial group" insofar "as civilisation and general development are concerned" (Rhoodie & Venter 1960: 180). This served as justification of their separation and rule under Afrikaners until they could reach a point where they could rule themselves in separate territories, as well as for the unequal enjoyment of the society's political, economic and social benefits.

Immediately on winning the all-white election in 1948, the NP moved rapidly to introduce legislation to bring effect to its election policy of apartheid. This involved a dual process of providing whites privileged access to political, economic and social benefits while entrenching a racial hierarchy, with whites at the top, Indians below whites, coloureds below Indians, and black Africans at the bottom. The apartheid project was designed to elevate all whites, including 'poor whites', to a position, economically and socially, above all people who were not white (Seekings 2010: 3). Among the first acts to be passed was the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No. 55 of 1949), which prohibited marriage between white and black people. Sexual relations between white and black people were made illegal through the Immorality Amendment Act (No. 21 of 1950).

The Population Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950) provided for the classification of South African citizens as white, Native or coloured, with Indians classified as coloured at the time. Appearance, social acceptance and descent were the criteria used to determine the qualification into each of these racial

categories. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (No. 49 of 1953) was introduced by the apartheid government to prevent the use of amenities such as cinemas, toilets, parks and beaches designated for use by members of a specific racial group by members of the other racial groups. The Act specifically forbade whites from travelling in the same train coaches and buses as black people, and set aside specific spaces where people of different race groups had to wait for, board and alight from public transport (Pirie nd: 5).

The Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950) was the cornerstone of spatial segregation during the apartheid era, which was a culmination of the pre-1948 restrictions on the black African, Indian and coloured race groups to their own residential and trading areas. Blacks in general were only allowed to acquire or occupy land or houses in areas specified for them under the Act. Large numbers of black African, Indian and coloured families were removed from areas declared white and placed in racially-defined residential areas. Very few economic opportunities existed in the black African townships, while the authorities clamped on the limited opportunities that did exist. The Group Areas Act was used to declare many areas white, which further extended the amount of land accessible to or owned by whites in the urban areas of the country. Table 2.1 below illustrates the anticipated impact of a proclamation in 1958 to declare certain parts of Durban areas for white occupation.

At the time, 131,430 whites living in the Durban area already owned 16,419 acres valued at £113,879,100; 145,744 Indians owned 10,323 acres valued at £24,541,061; and 148,945 coloureds and black Africans owned 105 acres valued at £90,000. The remaining 12,885 acres of land in Durban valued at £40,113,620 was owned by the all-white government and local authorities (Bhana & Pachai 1984).

The homeland policy, introduced in 1951 with the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951), also entrenched racial segregation. The legislation aimed at restricting the entry of black African people into the 'white' urban areas, while separating South Africans on a racial and ethnic basis. The apartheid regime established eight ethnic homelands, and, after the passage of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, these were to move progressively towards independence under the leadership of traditional leaders. Black Africans would then lose their citizenship and political rights in 'white' South Africa by becoming citizens of the 'independent' homelands. This led to the exclusion of a significant number of South Africans from many economic and social benefits that were given to other black Africans, whites, Indians and coloureds in 'white' South Africa.

In the trade union sector, the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1956 brought to an end the recognition of trade unions that had mixed white,

TABLE 2.1 Impact of the Group Areas Act in Durban, 1958

Area	Race group	No. of people to be removed	No. of dwellings lost	Land lost	Value of land lost
Berea	Indian		705	127 acres	£1,134,450
Beach area	Indian	120			
	Coloured	120			
	Black African	2,700			
Woodlands/ Montclair	Indian	175			
	Black African	1,600			
Merebank	Indian	2,000		241 acres	£82,140
	Coloured/Black African	1,100			
Bluff	Indian	1,800	175	552 acres	£195,000
	Coloured	181			
	Black African	3,359			
Rossburgh, Sea View, Bellair and Hillary	Indian	6,000	400	755 acres	£266,520
	Coloured	493			
	Black African	3,306			
Briardene, Riverside and Prospect Hall Rd	Indian	6,000	400	480 acres	£403,240
	Black African	5,000			
Cato Manor	Indian	25,798	2,444	2,891 acres	£1,685,350
	Coloured	2,107	133 ^a	70 acres ^a	£25,940 ^a
	Black African	28,298			

SOURCE: DEVELOPED FROM *NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS AGENDA BOOK, DURBAN CONFERENCE, 21-23 NOVEMBER 1958*, S. S. SINGH COLLECTION. REPRODUCED IN S BHANA & B PACHAI 1984.

a Combined coloured and black African.

coloured and Indian membership, and empowered the Minister of Labour to make job reservation determinations over and above any job reservation decisions reached during industrial council negotiations. Mixed membership trade unions were required to cater exclusively for one racial group or split up into exclusive racial sections. The Extension of University Education Act (No. 45 of 1959) provided for the establishment of separate higher education institutions for the different race groups. In particular, blacks were not allowed

to attend white universities unless they obtained special permission from the government.

Job reservation was further entrenched during the apartheid era. Thus, as indicated in Table 2.2 below (appendices), in 1960, whites, who constituted 19% of the total population, made up 67% of professional/technical workers, 87% of managerial/administrative workers, 88% of clerical workers, 61% of sales workers, 7% of service workers, 7% of agricultural workers, and 19% of production workers/labourers. By contrast, black Africans, who constituted 68% of the total population, made up 23% of professional/technical workers, 9% of managerial/administrative workers, 6% of clerical workers, 18% of sales workers, 78% of service workers, 85% of agricultural workers, and 68% of production workers/labourers. Coloureds, who constituted 9% of the total population, made up 7% of professional/technical workers, 1% of managerial/administrative workers, 3% of clerical workers, 6% of sales workers, 13% of service workers, 7% of agricultural workers, and 11% of production workers/labourers. Indians, who constituted 3% of the total population, made up 2% of professional/technical workers, 3% of managerial/administrative workers, 3% of clerical workers, 14% of sales workers, 2% of service workers, 1% of agricultural workers, and 2% of production workers/labourers (Lipton 1985: 400 and 406).

Unemployment was also disproportionately high among the black population in general, and black Africans in particular throughout the apartheid era. Thus, in 1960, while 28,000 whites were either unclassified workers or unemployed, 286,000 black Africans, 59,000 coloureds, and 17,000 Indians were unclassified workers or unemployed (Lipton 1985: 404). However, Lipton notes that statistical figures of black African unemployment for the period are unreliable, and that the figure might have been much higher. Nevertheless, as illustrated in table 2.2 below, black Africans constituted 73% of all unclassified or unemployed workers, coloureds 15%, and Indians 5%, all above their proportionate share of the total population in 1960, while whites, who constituted 19.3% of the population made up only 7% of unclassified/unemployed workers.

In addition to enjoying preferential access to better-paying employment because of job reservation, whites were also paid higher salaries for doing the same work than their black counterparts virtually throughout the apartheid era. Per capita income of the different race groups is set out in Table 2.3 below. In 1952, white per capita income was 8 times the per capita income of black Africans, 5.8 times the per capita income of coloureds and 3.8 times the per capita income of Indians. By 1960, white per capita income was 11.8 times the per capita income of black Africans, 6.4 times the per capita income of coloureds and 5.7 times the per capita income of Indians.

Another measure of racial inequality and the racial hierarchy is the share of national income of the different race groups. Table 2.4 below illustrates the share of income and the percentage of the population of the different race groups as a proportion of the total population of South Africa at various times. In 1960, whites had 71.2% of the total national personal income, black Africans 21.4%, coloureds 5.5% and Indians 1.9%.

Government funding of education was based on race during the apartheid era. Thus, as illustrated in Table 2.5 below, in 1951, white per capita funding on education was 5.8 times per capita funding of black African education, and 2.3 times per capita funding of coloured and Indian education. The NP government introduced the Bantu Education system in 1953 to deliberately and explicitly ensure that black Africans remained a source of unskilled labour for the economy. Black African school students were to be exposed to an education system that was of far inferior quality to their white (and Indian and coloured) counterparts throughout the apartheid era. Racial expenditure on education ensured that whites were provided with the most, and black Africans the least, leading to a situation where black African schools were characteristically lacking in libraries, laboratories, running water, and functional toilets, and having high teacher-pupil ratios, no textbooks and under and/or unqualified teachers. The situation was worse in the homelands. The school curriculum for the various racial education departments was also designed to prepare school students for their particular station in the apartheid hierarchy (Mhlauli, Salani & Mokotedi 2015).

The consequences of the racial hierarchy were unequal opportunities for members of the different race groups. For instance, as indicated in Table 2.6 below, while 85.8% of white children between the ages of 5 and 19 were at school in 1950, 67.9% of coloured children, 49.1% of Indian children, and just 32.9% of black African children in this age group were at school in that year. In 1960, 94.9% of white, 82.6% of Indian, 69.2% of coloured, and 45% of black African children between the ages of 5 and 19 were at school. More importantly, in 1960, while 31.7% of white children in the age-group 5–19 were enrolled in secondary schools, the figures for Indian, coloured and black African children in this age group were 12.9%, 9.3% and 2.5%, respectively. Thus, 79.6% of white children in the age group 15–19 were in secondary school in 1960, compared to 28.5%, 19.9% and 3.6% of Indian, coloured and black African children in this age group, respectively. This is indicative of high drop-out rates for black school students at the secondary school level (Pillay 1984: 6).

According to the figures in Table 2.7 below, while 6,217 white school students obtained a matriculation exemption (94.7% of the total number of matriculants) in 1951, only 176 black African school students (2.7% of the total), 103

Indian school students (1.6% of the total), and 67 coloured school students (1% of the total) obtained this qualification. By 1956, whites constituted 92% of matriculants, black Africans 3.2%, Indians 3% and coloureds 1.7%.

Furthermore, as indicated in Table 2.8 below, 18,519 white students (94.5% of the total number of students enrolled at universities), 499 black African students (2.5% of the total), 374 Indian students (1.9% of the total), and 214 coloured students (1.1% of the total) were enrolled at universities in South Africa in 1952. Whites constituted 89.4% of all students enrolled at universities in South Africa in 1958, while black Africans constituted 5%, Indians 3.7% and coloureds 2%. Per capita government expenditure on black African university students was R0,07 in 1960, while per capita expenditure on Indian students was R0.10 and white students was R3,09, as indicated in Table 2.9 below.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the housing shortage for black Africans was in the region of 250,000 units, while there were about 200,000 black Africans squatting in the urban areas. In the early 1950s, the Native Services Levy Act was passed obliging employers to contribute to the funding of housing for black Africans in the urban areas on a monthly basis. During the decade the government embarked on a substantial housing programme, giving rise to new townships such as Soweto, Daveyton, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Zwide, Umlazi and Kwa Mashu (Soni 1992: 42). Between 1948 and 1956, 12 black African townships were built in the urban areas of South Africa, with several others under construction. During this period, the authorities approached the black African housing problem by introducing the 'site and service' scheme, in which serviced sites were provided to black Africans where they could construct their own dwellings (Malinga 1997: 28). In addition, between 1948 and 1962 an average of 11,386 houses were built every year in black African housing schemes compared to 1,573 between 1920 and 1948 (Malinga 1997: 34). However, the housing shortage for urban black Africans was still chronic at the end of this phase.

By 1948, two-thirds of whites and Indians were living in the country's urban areas, and half of the coloured population. Several suburbs had already been established in towns such as Durban and Johannesburg to house the large poor-white population. For instance, from the early 1930s the Johannesburg Municipal Council had embarked on a subsidised housing scheme for poor whites for the building of sub-economic housing. Following the introduction of group areas, Indian and coloured suburbs were established in the mid-1950s. This was extended country-wide soon thereafter (Parnell 1992a). Very few coloureds, Indians and black Africans benefitted from council housing schemes at the time. By contrast, from 1944, new schemes were introduced which made it easier for whites to acquire loans for housing (Parnell 1989). The 1957 Housing Act made housing for low-income whites, coloureds and Indians the

responsibility of the central government as well as local authorities. Funding of housing for these groups was also made the responsibility of the Department of Community Development. Before 1960, most whites lived in rented, older, smaller spaces following the introduction of a subsidy for poor whites in the 1930s (Mabin 2005: 48).

Access to basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity also privileged whites throughout the apartheid era. The Group Areas Act in particular ensured that black Africans had very little, if any, access to these services from the very beginning of the apartheid era. In the urban areas, the newly-constructed townships had very limited services and infrastructure because the local authorities felt that the residents would be too poor to pay for services. This meant that service delivery of potable water, sewerage and waste removal hardly existed in black African townships. A similar situation prevailed in many coloured areas in the late 1950s.

The Bantu Services Levy Fund was established to make money available for essential services such as water and sanitation in the black African townships. By 1955, the funds were used for site-and-service schemes, and as many as 49,773 (residential) plots had been provided with services (Tempelhoff 2017: 205). This did not extend to the many informal settlements that had been mushrooming in the urban areas of the country from the beginning of the century. These areas have historically been characterised by poor housing, overcrowding, inadequate water supplies, bad sanitation and poverty.

The Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act and Bantu Authorities Act led to the entrenchment of a fragmented health system in South Africa during the apartheid era and racial differentiation in access to healthcare. The health system in South Africa between 1948 and 1994 has been characterised as follows:

- 1) rigid segregation of health facilities; 2) disproportionate spending on the health of Whites as compared to Blacks – resulting in world-class medical care for Whites while Blacks were usually referred to congested and dirty facilities; 3) public health policies that disregarded diseases primarily affecting Black people; and 4) the denial of basic sanitation, supply of clean water and other components of public health to rural areas and townships. BRAUNS 2016: 47–8

The consequence of this is evident in certain health statistics. For instance, in the 1950s the level of infant mortality amongst whites was low (less than 15 deaths per 1,000 live births) while life expectancies were high (about 65 for men and 72 for women). By contrast, for black Africans, 30–50% of live births

in the rural areas died before they turned five. During the 1950s, the life expectancy of a black African male was 36 and a female 37. By the late 1960s, life expectancy was 51 for black African men and 59 for black African women. In 1960, the infant mortality rate for whites was 29.6 deaths per 1,000 live births, for Indians, 59.5 deaths, for coloureds, 128.6 deaths, and for black Africans, 95 deaths (Horwitz 2009: 1).

In 1944, old age pensions were extended to black Africans, four years before the beginning of the apartheid era in 1948 (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard 2007: 31–2). However, the pensions for black African were less than one-third of the maximum payable to white pensioners. In 1958, black Africans, who comprised 60% of the 347,000 social old-age pensioners, received only 19% of the amount spent by the state on old-age pensions. By this time, as well, most white pensioners were receiving pensions on retirement from their employment.

Whites enjoyed a disproportionate share of social spending between 1949 and 1959, as illustrated in Table 2.12 below, with social spending on the white population in 1949 being 59.5% of total social spending and black Africans 26.4%, coloureds 11.2% and Indians 2.9%. The black African share of social spending rose slightly to 27.3% in 1959, coloureds to 11.6%, and Indians to 3.3%, while that for whites dropped to 57.8%.

During this phase, the apartheid government enacted a series of laws to contain opposition to apartheid, and therefore defend white privilege. Included here were the Suppression of Communism Act (No. 44 of 1950); the Public Safety Act of 1953; the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 8 of 1953); the Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Amendment Act (No. 15 of 1954); the Riotous Assemblies Act (No. 17 of 1956); and the Unlawful Organisations Act (No. 34 of 1960), which led to the subsequent banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 1960. The General Law Amendment Act (No. 39 of 1961) led to the introduction of twelve-day detention. The Separate Representation of Voters Act (No. 46 of 1951) was passed to extend the denial of political rights to black people. This Act stripped coloureds of their voting rights and removed them from the common voters' roll while providing for a separate voters' roll on which coloureds would be able to elect white representatives to parliament.

The apartheid regime also used other legislation to restrict the civil rights of the black population. The Natives Laws Amendment Act of 1952 further restricted the movement of black Africans into the urban areas by narrowing the definition of the category of black Africans who had the right to permanent residence in towns. The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act (No. 67 of 1952) curbed black African influx into the urban

areas by introducing reference books bearing photographs, details of place of origin, employment record, tax payments, fingerprints and encounters with the police. Black Africans who wanted to leave a rural area for an urban area had to obtain a permit from the local authorities. This gave rise to severe hardships for black Africans.

The racial hierarchy, together with the restriction of black Africans and other black people to the lower categories of employment, limited education and training opportunities for blacks in general, and black Africans in particular. High levels of poverty and unemployment among black Africans in particular, and notions of racial superiority prevalent among sectors of the white, Indian and coloured communities, gave rise to racial stereotypes and high levels of racism against black Africans. Racial stereotypes of all race groups developed during the apartheid era, but black Africans were the major victims of racism.

3 From the Declaration of a Republic to the Soweto Uprising, 1961–1976

In the late 1960s, Afrikaner scholars of apartheid, such as van den Berghe (1967), identified race as “the most significant criterion of status in South Africa” (Van den Berghe 1967: 267). Van den Berghe argued that race determines the socio-economic differences between race groups, and asserted that: “The only principle which pervades the whole society is that of ‘race’”. From this arises racism, which he sees as:

...any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races.

VAN DEN BERGHE 1967: 11

In this view, then, racism accounted for the racial inequality that evolved during apartheid.

On the other hand, liberal scholars such as Horwitz (1967) began to question the significance of racism and the benefits of apartheid for capitalism in their writings. Horwitz saw the evolution of Afrikanerdom as a process that leads to the acquisition of political power in order to control the economy. For Horwitz, the Afrikaner’s aim was to use political power and control of the economy to preserve the superior political and social status of whites. In essence, then,

the basis of apartheid lay not in racism or economic interests, but in the protection of white supremacy and privilege, which were much more important for Afrikaners than economic prosperity. Horwitz concludes that: "The polity has always sought its ideal and ideology – the White man's supremacy. The network of economic development had to follow accordingly" (Horwitz 1967: 10–11).

These publications were followed soon after by a classical Marxist study of apartheid written by Jack and Ray (Alexander) Simons (1969). In exploring the relationship between class and colour in South Africa, these authors describe, among other things, the interaction between class interests and racial interests. In their view, the race politics that evolved in the country and finally found expression in apartheid was compatible with capitalism, and racial discrimination intensified as the economy grew (see Saunders 1988). Simons and Simons illustrate apartheid's compatibility with capitalism by describing several instances in which the (often conflicting) economic interests of the different sectors of the white elite – English and Afrikaner, and industrialist, mine-owner and farmer – (as well as the white worker) were accommodated through some form of racial discrimination from which they stood to gain; that "(p)olitical power opened the door to economic privilege".

Horwitz and Simons and Simons set the basis for the examination of how the various characteristic features of apartheid – minority rule, job reservation and influx control – and their economic consequences – restriction of black Africans in particular to unskilled labour positions, migrant labour, and low wages – affected capital accumulation. These studies differ fundamentally in their views on the benefits of apartheid for capitalist development. What they have in common, however, is the view that apartheid accounted for unequal enjoyment of the society's political, economic and social benefits.

A series of other publications that analysed apartheid from a Marxist perspective appeared in the early 1970s. The leading writers in the revisionist tradition were Martin Legassick (1974), Harold Wolpe (1972) and Frederick Johnstone (1970), who sought to link politics directly to economics by linking the evolution of racial segregation to the evolution of capitalism. Apartheid was viewed as a peculiar system in which one class exploited another instead of in terms of its racial character. The system was seen as beneficial to capitalists, allowing for the super-exploitation in particular of the black African working class. According to Legassick, for example, the "specific structures of labour control which have been developed by post-war South Africa are increasingly functional to capital" (Legassick 1974: 269). "Capital" was exclusively white and those subject to "labour controls" were exclusively black in apartheid South Africa at the time.

In May 1961, South Africa became a Republic following its withdrawal from the British Commonwealth. White monopoly of political power was extended through legislation such as the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act (No. 50 of 1968), which removed the four white members of the House of Assembly elected by coloured voters in the Cape and abolished the nominated seat in the Senate representing coloureds while establishing the Coloured Persons Representative Council; the South African Indian Council Act (No. 31 of 1968), which established the Council consisting of twenty-five members that the Minister of Indian Affairs appointed; the Prohibition of Political Interference Act (No. 51 of 1968), which prohibited non-racial political parties; the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970), which made all black Africans citizens of a self-governing territorial authority; the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No. 21 of 1971), which provided for increased powers for homeland governments; and the Black Laws Amendment Act (No. 7 of 1973), which was designed to speed up the planning for partial consolidation of the homelands (Horrell 1978: 205).

The NP government enacted legislation to further erode the civil liberties of the black population, and those whites that supported their struggle, during this phase. The General Law Amendment Act (Sabotage Act) (No. 76 of 1962) increased the power given to the State President to declare organisations unlawful and introduced new restrictions for banning orders (Horrell 1978: 443). The Terrorism Act (No. 83 of 1962) introduced indefinite detention without trial. The General Law Amendment Act (No. 37 of 1963) authorised the detention – without a warrant – of any person suspected of a political crime and to hold them for ninety days without access to a lawyer (Horrell 1978: 469). The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (No. 96 of 1965) extended detention to 180-days and provided for re-detention thereafter (Horrell 1978: 279). Meanwhile, throughout this phase there was stricter enforcement of influx control than ever before.

The apartheid government embarked on a programme, which ended in the early 1970s, of strengthening the apartheid legislative edifice while strictly enforcing high apartheid. This was the period of heightened white privilege. In the 1960s, for example, the government increased the pace of forced removals, and hundreds of thousands of people were forcibly removed from ‘white’ areas during this phase. Apartheid on the trains and at the railway stations also reached extreme levels in the 1960s and 1970s, although legislation had been introduced to enforce it much earlier (Pirie 1990: 2). The first-class coaches on trains were restricted for white use only, while train stations had separate lounges and other facilities for the ‘Europeans’ and ‘Non-Europeans’, where they existed. Blacks were restricted to second- and third-class coaches. Similarly, in the 1960s and 1970s there was strict enforcement of bus apartheid, with

certain buses restricted for 'Europeans' and others for 'Non-Europeans'. The latter were, of course, of inferior quality and service.

By the early 1970s, apartheid on the beaches had become entrenched. For instance, 90% of the coastline of the then Natal Province, from the Tugela River mouth to Port Edward, was restricted for white use. In Durban in the mid-1970s, black Africans were restricted to 650 metres of beach, despite being 46% of the population of the city. By contrast, whites, who made up 22% of the population, were allocated 2,100 metres. Indians, who made up 28% of the population, were allocated 550 metres, while 300 metres were allocated to the coloureds, who comprised 4% of the population. In addition, white beaches had better amenities and were more accessible because they were located closer to the city, whereas beaches for blacks outside municipal control were either not suitable for recreational use or dangerous (Goodenough 2001).

Meanwhile, as indicated in Table 2.2 below, the black African share of technical/professional positions had grown from 23% in 1960 to 25% in 1971, while the coloured share had stayed at 7%, the Indian share had grown from 2% in 1960 to 3%, and the white share had dropped from 67% to 65%. However, the black African share of managerial/administrative positions had dropped from 9% in 1960 to 0.6% in 1971, the coloured share from 1% to 0.4%, the Indian share from 3% to 2%, while the white share had grown from 87% in 1960 to 97% in 1971. Whites as a proportion of clerical workers dropped from 88% in 1960 to 79% in 1971, while the black African proportion increased from 6% to 10%, the coloured proportion from 3% to 5%, and the Indian proportion from 3% in 1960 to 6% in 1971. The African share of unclassified/unemployed workers grew from 73% in 1960 to 75% in 1970, while the white share grew from 7% to 9% in the same period.

The figures in Table 2.3 indicate that white per capita income grew from 11.8 times the per capita income of black Africans in 1960 to 15 times in 1970, dropped from 6.4 times the per capita income of coloureds in 1960 to 6 times in 1970, and dropped from 5.7 times the per capita income of Indians in 1960 to 5.1 times in 1970. In 1975 white per capita income was 10 times the per capita income of black Africans, 5.1 times the per capita income of coloureds, and 3.9 times the per capita income of Indians. The black African share of national income had dropped from 21.4% in 1960 to 19.3% in 1970, while that of whites had grown from 71.2% to 71.9%, coloureds from 5.5% to 6.5%, and Indians from 1.9% to 2.3% during the same period, as illustrated in Table 2.4.

Per capita funding of white education was about R140 and per capita spending on black African education R12.50 in 1963, with expenditure on each white school student rising from 5.8 times that on each black African school student in 1951 to 11.1 times in 1963, as illustrated in Table 2.5 below. By 1971–2, per capita

funding of white education was 18.2 times that of black African education, 5 times that of coloured education, and 3.7 times that of Indian education.

In addition, while 95.7% of white children between the ages of 5 and 19 were at school in 1970, 84% of Indian children, 74.6% of coloured children, and 54.2% of black African children in this age group were at school in that year, as illustrated in Table 2.6. More importantly, while 36.4% of white children in the age-group 5–19 were enrolled in secondary schools in 1970, the figures for Indian, coloured and black African children in this age group were 24.5%, 11.5% and 9.4%, respectively. Thus, 90.9% of white children in the age group 15–19 were in secondary school in 1970, compared to 54.1%, 27.1% and 16.4% of Indian, coloured and black African children in this age group, respectively (Pillay 1984: 6). It appears that there continued to be a high drop-out rate for Indian, coloured and black African school students at the secondary school level, and, in some cases, of school students from these race groups dropping out of school to supplement the family income.

While 59.9% of white school students who entered Standard 1 in 1967 reached Standard 10 in 1976, only 21.5% of Indian school students, 5.9% of coloured school students, and 3.2% of black African school students who entered standard 1 in 1967 reached standard 10 in 1976 (Pillay 1984: 9). In the same year, whites constituted 91% of all South Africans who had a matric as their highest qualification, and black Africans 4.5%, Indians 2.4% and coloureds 2.1%. Whites also constituted 95.5% of all South Africans who had a university degree as their highest qualification, and black Africans 1.3%, Indians 2.2% and coloureds 1% (Pillay 1984: 27).

In 1970, as indicated in Table 2.7, 13,616 white school students (86% of the total number of matriculants in that year), 985 black African school students (6.2% of the total), 842 Indian school students (5.3% of the total), and 394 coloured school students (2.5% of the total) obtained a matriculation exemption. The figures in Table 2.8 indicate that, in the same year, whites constituted 90.9% of all students enrolled at universities in South Africa, while black Africans constituted 5.7%, Indians 2.3% and coloureds 1.2%. Per capita government expenditure on black African university students was R0.22, on coloured students R0.44, on Indian students R2.64, and on white students R11.55 in 1970, as illustrated in Table 2.9. In addition, from the early 1960s, following the establishment of universities for black students, black African students in particular had very few opportunities to study in certain fields such as engineering, veterinary science, dentistry, architecture, fine arts, music and military science because they were refused permission to study at the 'white universities' where these courses were offered (Beale 1998: 366). At the same time, there was a rejection of the race-based and ethnic universities.

By 1970, most whites lived in owner-occupied, newer, larger housing units in suburbs characterised by low residential densities, and infrastructure in the way of properly made roads, storm-water drainage, piped water, waterborne sewage, street lighting and so on that had spread unevenly both within and outside the urban areas for more than the first half of the twentieth century. In the inner cities, which were reserved almost exclusively for whites, high-rise apartment complexes were developed in large cities like Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. From the beginning of the apartheid era up to the 1970s, a process occurred in which whites moved from rental to home ownership. Many in the rapidly growing white population moved from older rental residential areas to newer suburbs in new Group Areas after obtaining various forms of subsidy for home ownership (Mabin 2005: 48). These suburbs had been established after blacks had been removed from certain areas and placed far from the suburbs. Large suburbs such as Chatsworth in Durban and Mitchells Plain in Cape Town were constructed during the 1960s and early 1970s to house Indian and coloured communities displaced through the Group Areas Act.

Local authorities continued to build houses for black Africans for much of the 1960s. After 1968, however, the apartheid government confined the construction of black African family housing to the bantustans, and over the next 10 years spending on black African housing in 'white South Africa' was cut by a factor of seven (Parnell 1992b: 60). In addition, leasehold tenure was suspended in 1968, and black Africans could only rent houses in 'white South Africa' and were encouraged to build their own homes in the homelands (Soni 1992: 44). The housing needs of urban whites, coloureds and Indians were administered by white-elected City Councils, which were advised, where applicable, by coloured and Indian Local Affairs Committees. Decision-making power was in the hands of whites, leading to the allocation of most productive public goods to white group areas, and most noxious facilities either near to, or within, coloured, Indian or black African areas. Although Urban Bantu Councils had been established from 1961 on, black Africans had no representation on City Councils and the Bantu Councils had little control over planning, services or rental levels within the townships, which were the prerogative of white administrators (McCarthy 1992: 27).

Between 1972 and 1976, the Department of Community Development spent R256,646,000 (42% of total expenditure) on housing for whites, R250,110,000 (40.9%) on housing for coloureds, R69,615,000 (11.4%) on housing for Indians, and R34,629,000 (5.7%) on housing for black Africans. During the same period, the private sector erected 161,178 and the Department of Community Development 26,185 houses for whites (56.7% of houses built by the private sector and the state), while the private sector erected 5,015 and the Department of

Community Development 40,862 houses for black Africans (13.9% of houses built by the private sector and the state). The private sector erected 15,894 and the Department of Community Development 61,591 houses for Indians (23.4% of houses built by the private sector and the state), and the private sector erected 7,251 and the Department of Community Development 12,551 houses for coloureds (6% of houses built by the private sector and the state) (Manzi 1994: 8–9).

In 1965, per capita government expenditure on health was R462 for whites, R249 for Indians, R245 for coloureds and R115 for black Africans, as illustrated in Table 2.11. Government expenditure on health for whites was 4 times that spent on black Africans. In 1970, there were 109 black Africans for each hospital bed in the urban areas, and 191 black Africans for each hospital bed in rural areas (Delobelle 2013: 177).

The system of social assistance changed little in terms of its basic structure in the previous phase up to the 1970s. The system continued to be based on means-tested, non-contributory old age pensions and disability pensions and vast differences in terms of access to the grants and the levels of benefits for the different race groups.

However, after 1970 racial discrimination was removed from these two programmes, resulting in increased access and real benefit levels for black Africans and reduced benefits for white pensioners. This equalisation did not extend to the state maintenance grant, and very few black African children were in receipt of this grant during this phase (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard 2007: 33).

Whites continued to enjoy a disproportionate share of social spending during this phase, as indicated in Table 2.12, with their share dropping slightly from 58% in 1959 to 57% in 1969, and then to 55% in 1975. The black African share of total social spending dropped from 27% in 1959 to 26% in 1969, and then grew to 28% in 1975. Per capita black African social spending was, nevertheless, 12% of per capita white social spending in 1975. In 1975, the coloured share of social spending was 12.4%, while that of Indians was 4.2%.

4 From the Soweto Uprising to the First Democratic Elections, 1976–1994

Not long after the onset of this phase, Afrikaner historian Herman Giliomee collaborated with Heribert Adam on two publications released in 1979 titled *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power* and *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* In the latter, they dismiss ideological racism and prejudiced

Calvinism as the basis for the rise of Afrikanerdom and emergence of apartheid. Instead, they posited that ethnicity was used to mobilise Afrikaners, first against British imperialism, and then against the black majority, with the intention of entrenching Afrikaner power and white privilege, while drawing attention to the “Afrikaner politics of privilege maintenance” (Adam & Giliomee 1979a: 13). Giliomee notes in a chapter in the book that the NP success in the 1948 elections allowed for increased white privilege as well as ethnic patronage through the Afrikanerisation of the apartheid bureaucracy and increasing number of state-owned enterprises (Yale University Press, nd). The theme of ethnic mobilisation was taken up later by a Marxist scholar, Dan O’Meara (1983), who describes how Afrikaner nationalism was used to unite often conflicting classes to achieve political hegemony. This hegemony allowed for certain sectors of the ethnic group to prosper economically, with the ideology of apartheid serving well the class interests of the Afrikaner elite (see Walshe 1984: 339) while ensuring privilege for all whites.

One of the most influential books on apartheid written by a black South African scholar at the time is Bernard Magubane’s (1979) *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*, which is a study of the history of racial segregation and the development of capitalism from a black perspective. The author adopted a Marxist analysis to reach the conclusions that race “was initiated by the needs of capitalist development”, “that these needs remain the dominant factor in racist societies” and that the study of the “development of capitalism is thus the best way to study race inequality” (Magubane 1979: 3). Racial inequality is seen as inherent to the development of imperialism and capitalism in South Africa. According to Magubane, the evolution of capitalism resulted in a situation in which, by 1979, “whites, who constitute less than 20 percent of the nation’s population, consume more than 60 percent of its income, have legal occupancy rights to 87 percent of its land, and fill most of its skilled and semi-skilled occupations” (Magubane 1979: 1–2). Racial inequality is seen as “the creation of people who systematically and deliberately fashioned conditions to separate blacks from whites in order to exploit the former” (Magubane 1979: 12). The historical evolution of race and capitalism is seen through black eyes, for instance, in the ways in which the European invaders stole land, destroyed livestock, and killed Africans in their pursuit of personal and corporate profit.

Merle Lipton’s seminal study on apartheid appeared in 1985. Adopting a liberal perspective, she differed most significantly from the revisionist Marxists by arguing that apartheid benefitted only agricultural and mining capitalists, and not manufacturing and merchant capitalists, and that white workers benefitted from apartheid. In time, however, the benefits of apartheid for all

capitalist sectors began to diminish, leading to the state ‘reforms’ of the late 1970s and early 1980s – i.e., extended trade union rights, the right to permanent residence in urban centres in ‘white’ South Africa, and a degree of autonomy for local government for black Africans living in the urban areas – that were strongly opposed by white labour. For Lipton, nevertheless, apartheid was a unique system in the world because it had a “privileged elite with a disproportionate share of economic and social privileges and political power” that belonged to one race group, while “its essence was the hierarchical racial structure, the fact that all whites were above all blacks, and that blacks could never be equal, let alone superior, to whites” (Lipton 1985: 15–16).

In June 1976, black African school students in Soweto took to the streets in opposition to the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction at their schools. The state’s violent response to the student action led to the spread of the uprising to the rest of the country, and what followed was a marked change in the apartheid government’s policies relating to the other race groups. This included the introduction of community councils for black Africans living in the urban areas, the recognition of trade unions for black Africans, and the easing of influx control legislation for urban black Africans, among others. The Transkei was the first homeland to acquire ‘independent’ status in 1976, and then Bophuthatswana in 1977. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 established a tri-cameral Parliament with separate houses representing whites, coloureds and Indians. Black Africans remained unrepresented, while the whites retained overall authority.

As indicated in Table 2.2 below, between 1980 and 1991, the proportion of whites that were employed as professional/technical workers dropped from 57% in 1980 to 49% in 1991; and as managerial/administrative workers from 91% in 1980 to 88% in 1991. By contrast, the proportion of black Africans that were employed as professional/technical workers grew from 31% in 1980 to 36% in 1991, while black Africans as a proportion of managerial/administrative workers remained unchanged between 1980 and 1991 at 4%. Nevertheless, the black African share of production/labourer positions grew from 69% in 1980 to 75% in 1991, while the white share dropped from 16% to 5% in the same period. In addition, black Africans constituted 86% and 81% of workers considered unclassified or unemployed in 1980 and 1991 respectively, while whites constituted 3% and 6% of such workers in 1980 and 1991, respectively. Unemployment was still disproportionately high among black Africans.

Table 2.3 below provides figures which illustrate that the per capita income of whites was almost 10 times the per capita income of black Africans in 1975. However, there was a progressive increase in the per capita income of black Africans between 1975 and 1990. By 1990 the per capita income of whites was

8.7 times the per capita income of black Africans, 4.6 times the per capita income of coloureds and 3 times the per capita income of Indians. Racial per capita income also illustrates the persistence of the racial hierarchy. Between 1952 and 1990, the per capita income of whites was higher than the per capita income of Indians, which was higher than the per capita income of coloureds, which was still higher than the per capita income of black Africans.

In 1980, black Africans constituted 72.4% of the total population of South Africa, but their share of the national income was only 24.9%, according to the figures in Table 2.4. On the other hand, in the same year whites constituted 15.5% of the total population and held 65% of the national income. The black African share of the national income grew to 29.9% in 1991, while that of whites dropped to 59.5% between 1980 and 1991. There is also evidence of the racial hierarchy. Indians, constituting 2.3% of the total population in 1980, held 3% of national income, while coloureds, who were 9.3% of the total population had 7.2% of national income in that year. Similarly, while Indians who constituted 2.6% of the population held 4.8% of national income in 1991, coloureds who constituted 8.7% of the population had 6.8% of the national income. Nevertheless, the data in the table indicates that whites had a disproportionate share of the national income a few years before the first democratic elections in 1994.

Per capita education expenditure on the different race groups changed dramatically during this period, as indicated in Table 2.5. For instance, per capita expenditure per annum on black African school students increased from 7.4% (R48.5) of per capita expenditure on white school students (R654.00) in 1976/7 to 37.9% (R1,659) of per capita expenditure on white school students (R4,372) in 1992-3. In 1976/7, per capita expenditure on white education was 13.5 times per capita expenditure on black African education, 4.2 times per capita expenditure on coloured education, and 3 times per capita expenditure on Indian education. By 1992/3, per capita expenditure on white education was 2.6 times per capita expenditure on black African education, 2.1 times per capita expenditure on coloured education, and 1.2 times per capita expenditure on Indian education. However, differences in per capita expenditure on the education of the children of the different race groups had several consequences, including the differences in the percentage of children of school-going age of the different race groups that were enrolled in schools.

For instance, as indicated in Table 2.6, while 96.3% of white children between the ages of 5 and 19 were at school in 1980, 94.8% of Indian children, 93% of coloured children, and 83.1% of black African children in this age group were at school in that year. However, in 1980, while 37.7% of white children in the age-group 5-19 were enrolled in secondary schools, the figures for Indian, coloured and black African children were 31.7%, 18.9% and 15.9%, respectively.

Thus, 89.2% of white children in the age group 15–19 were in secondary school in 1980, compared to 80.2%, 44.4% and 35% of Indian, coloured and black African children in this age group, respectively (Pillay 1984: 6). There were still high drop-out rates for some groups. In addition, while 69% of white school students who entered standard 1 in 1969 reached standard 10 in 1978, only 34.4% of Indian school students, 10.5% of coloured school students, and 3.9% of black African school students who entered standard 1 in 1969 reached standard 10 in 1978 (Pillay 1984: 9).

According to the figures in Table 2.7, there was a sharp increase in the black African share of matriculants during this phase, rising from 14% in 1979 to 46% in 1992. By contrast, the white share in the number of matriculants dropped from 71% in 1979 to 37% in 1992. In addition, as the figures in Table 2.8 indicate, there was a sharp increase in the number of black university students during this phase. In 1980, 114,119 white students (75.4% of the total student population), 17,989 black African students (11.9% of the total), 11,496 Indian students (7.6% of the total), and 7,660 coloured students (5.1% of the total) were enrolled at South African universities. In the same year, whites constituted 79.9% of all South Africans who had a matric as their highest qualification, and black Africans 12%, Indians 4.7% and coloureds 3.8%. Whites also constituted 90.7% of all South Africans who had a university degree as their highest qualification, and black Africans 3.7%, Indians 3.8% and coloureds 1.8% (Pillay 1984: 27). By 1994, whites made up 41.4% of all university student enrolments, black Africans 46.7%, Indians 6.9% and coloureds 5.1%. Thus, while black South Africans constituted about 89% of the population of the country in 1994, black students made up 58.6% of students enrolled at universities. In 1994, 11 of South Africa's 21 universities were designated 'white', 1 'coloured', 1 'Indian', 4 'black African', and 4 'homeland' (Bunting 2004: 39).

In the mid-1980s, about 75% of the white population were housed in individually owned houses. On the other hand, most urban housing for black Africans, as well as coloureds and Indians, was state rental stock. Funding for black African township development began to increase only after the 1977 advent of Administration Boards, following a freeze of housebuilding for black Africans outside the bantustans since 1968. In addition, the Urban Foundation was established in 1976 as a mechanism through which the business sector could fund housing for black Africans (Soni 1992: 45). This was followed by the introduction of legislation in 1978 that extended leasehold rights to black Africans to 99 years in the urban areas. However, in 1987, the official shortage of housing in the urban areas of South Africa for black Africans reached about 850,000 housing units, for coloureds about 100,000 housing units, and Indians about 20,000 units, while there was a surplus of about 100,000 housing units

for whites (Parnell 1992b: 56). In 1983, tenants of 500,000 public housing units were given the option of purchasing their government-owned homes at greatly reduced prices. However, by September 1989, only 39% of coloured, 77% of Indian, 37% of white and 34% of urban black African occupied government-owned houses had been transferred to individual ownership.

Figures are provided in Table 2.10 below of per capita expenditure by the government on housing for the different race groups. There was a dramatic increase in government spending on housing for coloureds and Indians in the 1980s, while government spending on housing for black Africans also increased. In particular, the formation of Housing Departments for coloureds and Indians after the introduction of the tri-cameral parliament in 1984 led to a dramatic increase in spending on housing for these groups. However, by the 1980s most coloured suburbs were “characterised by standardised state-built houses and large, uniform complexes of flats connected to the city by rail and road”, and “insufficient amenities such as health care and cultural services, poor public transport and a shortage of shops, schools and day-care centres” (Lupton 1992: 71).

The government allocated about R80-million for white housing in 1987, while just under R500-million was allocated for black African housing. However, the per capita expenditure on black African housing remained very low, while whites were less reliant on state assistance for housing than in earlier decades (Parnell 1992b: 57). In the 1980s, the typical black African township is exemplified by the following description of Khayelitsha:

Occasional small paved and landscaped corners fail to relieve the monotonous sprawl of uniformly low quality 27.8-square-metre houses set behind vibracrete fences against which sand is driven by fierce southeasters. Large prefabricated schools (mostly junior) have some grassed areas but they are behind high fences and strong gates. Tall floodlights provide street lighting and although schools, crèches, clinics and community centres have electricity few houses are connected to the service.
COOK 1992: 128

Houses in the newly-formed township lacked plastered walls and ceilings, baths or showers, and electricity. The situation in the homelands was dire.

There were a number of ways in which whites benefitted disproportionately from state assistance for housing during this period. For instance, whites were the main beneficiaries of state home ownership assistance offered to first-time buyers, with whites receiving a larger subsidy amount than blacks in general. In addition, more whites were able to make use of the subsidy than blacks

because of red tape. Whites also benefitted disproportionately from indirect government assistance to housing in the form of mortgages, primarily through their employment benefits as state employees given that they dominated the civil service and that 70% of all mortgages were being funded by the state at the time (Parnell 1992b: 61–63).

By 1987 there were 14 separate departments of health in South Africa: ten in the homelands, one each for whites, Indians and coloureds, and one Department of Health for 'general affairs'. Two key features of this health system were evident in the late 1980s: overcrowded, understaffed black hospitals and under-used, overstaffed white hospitals; and the increasing privatisation of health care that was mainly accessible to whites and a minority of blacks who could afford private medical care (Chetty 1992: 219–20). In 1987, per capita government expenditure on health for whites was R597, for black Africans R137, for coloureds R340 and for Indians R356, as indicated in Table 2.11. Racial disparities in access to healthcare is indicated by the fact that the number of white dentists for each person in the white population was 1: 2,000, and for black African people it was 1: 2,000,000 in 1987 (Hassim, Heywood & Berger 2007: 12–13).

In 1985, the infant mortality rate was 9.3 deaths for every 1,000 white infants born, while it was 61 deaths for every 1,000 black African children born, 40.7 deaths for every 1,000 coloured children born, and 16.1 deaths for every 1,000 Indian children born. Life expectancy for whites was on average 71 years, while it was 61 years for black Africans, 62 years for coloureds, and 67 for Indians. The number of beds per 1,000 persons according to race group was as follows: whites, 150 (urban 130 and rural 260), and black Africans, coloureds and Indians 260 (urban 150, rural 460, and homelands 302) (Benatar 1991: 31, 33). The life expectancy for whites was 69 for males and 77 for females between 1985 and 1990; the values for black Africans were 61 and 67, respectively. By 1992, the infant mortality rate of whites was 7 deaths for every 1,000 white children born, for Indians 10 deaths for every 1,000 Indian children born, for coloureds 36 deaths for every 1,000 coloured children born, and 54 deaths for every 1,000 black African children born (McIntyre et al. 1995: 12–13).

According to Fatima Meer (1985), in the early 1980s there was one doctor for every 330 whites, 730 Indians, 12,000 coloureds and 91,000 black Africans; and there was one nurse for every 14 whites, 549 coloureds, 707 black Africans and 745 Indians. Only 5% of the doctors were practising in the rural areas, where the incidence of diseases was ten times higher than in the urban areas. A total of 27,205 hospital beds in the urban areas were for whites only (18% of the population at the time), as opposed to 43,935 for black Africans, coloureds and Indians. The average bed occupancy rate for whites was 59%, while for black

Africans it came close to 100%. An informal settlement in the Orange Free State had six doctors, 38 country health workers, one dentist, and three health centres for between 200,000 and 300,000 people. By the early 1980s, as well, white children had:

all the sporting amenities they could possibly desire, black children have token facilities. In 1984, 49,000 African pupils in Port Elizabeth had only seven rugby fields and one cricket ground; 26,020 white pupils had 84 rugby fields, 35 hockey fields and 176 tennis courts. The government expenditure on sport for white children is 240 times higher than that for black. MEER 1985

Racial disparities persisted in spending on social assistance, with state pensions for whites being R275.70, for coloureds and Indians R224.70, and for black Africans R174.70 in 1988–9 (Cooper, Schindler, McCaul, Hamilton, Beale, Clemans, Kruger, Delvare & Moonsamy 1990). Discrimination in the provision of old age pensions was brought to an end after the passage of the 1992 Social Assistance Act. Previously, there was discrimination in social assistance between the different race groups in terms of access to the grants and the levels of benefits (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard 2007: 32). Most importantly, very few black African children and their caregivers qualified for the state maintenance grant. In 1990, only 0.2% of black African children were in receipt of maintenance grants, while 1.5% of white children, 4.0% of Indian children and 4.8% of coloured children received the grant (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard 2007: 33).

One illustration of reform during this phase was the dramatic increase in the black African share of total social spending between 1975 and 1993, as illustrated in Table 2.12. The black African share rose from 28% in 1975 to 43% in 1986, 51% in 1990, and 67% in 1993. By contrast, the white share of social spending dropped from 55% in 1975 to 38% in 1986, 33% in 1990, and 17% in 1993. In addition, per capita black African social spending grew from 12% of per capita white social spending in 1975 to 69% of per capita white social spending in 1993. Black African per capita spending rose by 40% while spending on whites, Indians and coloured people dropped by 17%, 21% and 10% respectively (Gelb 2004: 12). In 1978, black Africans made up 70% of the 770,000 pensioners while receiving 43% of pensions. By 1990 this latter proportion had increased to 67% (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard 2007: 32).

Access to basic services remained highly unequal right up to the first democratic elections. In 1993, while 39% of all South African households had access to piped water inside their dwellings, a little under 100% of white households

compared to 18% of black African households had piped water in their dwellings. Similarly, while close to 100% of white households had flush toilets, this was the case for only 34% of black African households. Almost all white households had access to electricity in 1993, and only 37% of black African households had access to electricity (Budlender 2003: 176).

Another measure of the reform process during this period was the decrease in racial inequality in several areas. The Gini Coefficient can be used to measure inequality, with 0 indicating complete equality and 1 indicating total inequality. Table 2.13 below sets out South Africa's Gini Coefficient by race group between 1975 and 1991. South Africa's Gini Coefficient during the apartheid era was among the highest in the world, with only a slight drop from 0.68 in 1975 to 0.67 in 1991. When inequality is measured within race groups, however, the Gini coefficient increased dramatically for black Africans between 1975 and 1991, and to some extent for whites. Thus, the most remarkable increase in inequality occurred between members of the black African race group, indicating increasing benefits for some members of this race group. Inequality within the coloured and Indian race groups increased slightly in the same period. Nevertheless, overall inequality in both periods was greater than inequality within race groups.

5 Conclusion

This chapter does not attempt to cover all the economic and social benefits enjoyed by whites during the apartheid era. However, white control of political power was used to ensure that whites had exclusive enjoyment of certain high occupations, quality serviced and safe residential areas, well-resourced and adequately staffed health facilities, well-equipped schools, and high quality train stations, buses, parks, beaches, cinemas, restaurants, hotels, and sports facilities, among others, and were paid higher salaries than their black counterparts in the same occupations and had preferential access to power, land and the best universities in the country. Apartheid South Africa was a virtual paradise for whites, with white living standards comparable to the highest standards of living in the world, but particularly so when compared with black South Africans' access to the country's economic and social benefits.

The latter were denied employment in high occupations, lived in inadequately serviced and dangerous residential areas, had limited access to under-resourced and inadequately staffed health facilities, under-equipped schools, and low quality train stations, buses, parks, beaches, cinemas, restaurants, hotels, and sports facilities, among others, and were paid lower salaries than

their white counterparts in the same occupations and had limited access to power, land and the best universities in the country. Apartheid South Africa denied black South Africans opportunities that their fellow citizens had, but the racial hierarchy ensured that privilege was determined on the basis of race even within the black group. These unequal opportunities for whites and blacks, in general, and black Africans in particular, had several consequences. One of the most damaging was the development of notions of whiteness (intellectual superiority, competence, moral superiority) and blackness (stupidity, incompetence, corruption), and of racial stereotypes arising from these that found their expression in acts of racism.

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Appendix: Tables

TABLE 2.2 Racial Share of Occupational Structure (Percentages), 1960–1991

	Year	Black African	Coloured	Indian	White
Share of population	1960	68.3%	9.4%	3%	19.3%
	1971	70.2%	9.4%	2.9%	17.5%
	1980	72.4%	9.3%	2.8%	15.5%
	1991	75.2%	8.7%	2.6%	13.5%
Professional/technical	1960	23%	7%	2%	67%
	1971	25%	7%	3%	65%
	1980	31%	8%	4%	57%
	1991	36%	11%	4%	49%
Managerial/administrative	1960	9%	1%	3%	87%
	1971	0.6%	0.4%	2%	97%
	1980	4%	2%	3%	91%
	1991	4%	4%	4%	88%
Clerical	1960	6%	3%	3%	88%
	1971	10%	5%	6%	79%
	1980	25%	8%	6%	60%
	1991	19% ^a	13% ^a	7% ^a	61% ^a
Sales	1960	18%	6%	14%	61%
	1971	17%	6%	10%	67%
	1980	40%	8%	8%	44%
	1991				
Service	1960	78%	13%	2%	7%
	1970	81%			8%
	1980	78%	10%	1%	11%
	1991	66%	13%	3%	18%
Agricultural	1960	85%	7%	1%	7%
	1970	91%			9%
	1980	87%	8%	?	5%
	1991	87%	9%		7%
Production/labourer	1960	68%	11%	2%	19%
	1970	69%			16%
	1980	69%	13%	2%	16%
	1991	75%	16%	4%	5%

TABLE 2.2 Racial Share of Occupational Structure (Percentages), 1960–1991 (*cont.*)

	Year	Black African	Coloured	Indian	White
Unclassified/unemployed	1960	73%	15%	5%	7%
	1970	75%			9%
	1980	86%	9%	2%	3%
	1991	81%			6%

SOURCE: LIPTON 1985: 408; KRAAK 1995: 666; LABOUR MARKET SURVEY, APRIL 1971; MANPOWER SURVEY, 1991.

a Figures for clerical and sales.

TABLE 2.3 Per Capita Income by Race, 1952–1995

	1952 ^a	1960 ^b	1970 ^b	1975 ^c	1980 ^c	1985 ^c	1990 ^c	1995 ^c
Black Africans	R315	R1,153	R1,301	R 4,479	R 5,107	R 5,423	R 6,008	R 6,704
Coloureds	R430	R2,147	R3,252	R 8,630	R 8,822	R 9,855	R 11,404	R 12,722
Indians	R660	R2,380	R3,828	R 11,244	R 13,296	R 15,113	R 17,637	R 20,592
Whites	R2,500	R13,632	R19,558	R 44,242	R 46,670	R 48,370	R 51,951	R 58,840
TOTAL	R976	R4,828	R6,985	R 11,626	R 12,125	R 12,385	R 12,903	R 13,436

a Seekings & Natrass 2005: 67.

b Crankshaw 1997: 107.

c Van der Berg 2010: 9.

TABLE 2.4 National Income and Population Shares, 1960–1991

	Share of total national income				Share of total population			
	1960	1970	1980	1991	1960	1970	1980	1991
Black African	21.4%	19.3%	24.9%	29.9%	68.3%	70.2%	72.4%	75.2%
Coloured	5.5%	6.5%	7.2%	6.8%	9.4%	9.4%	9.3%	8.7%
Indian	1.9%	2.3%	3.0%	4.8%	3%	2.9%	2.8%	2.6%
White	71.2%	71.9%	65.0%	59.5%	19.3%	17.5%	15.5%	13.5%
South Africa	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SOURCES: LIPTON 1985: 408; LEIBBRANDT, WOOLARD & WOOLARD 2007: 6.

TABLE 2.5 Per Capita Expenditure on Education by Race, 1951–1993

	1951	1963	1971–2	1976–7	1979–80	1987–88 ^a	1992–3 ^a
Black African	£7.58	R12.50	R25.31	R48.50	R91.29	R595.39	R1,659
Coloured	£18.84		R94.41	R157.59	R234.00	R1,507.55	R2,092
Indian	£18.84		R124.40	R219.96	R389.66	R2,014.88	R3,702
White	£43.88	R140.00	R461.00	R654.00	R1,169	R2,722.00	R4,372

SOURCES: PHATLANE 2006; PILLAY 1984: 2; VARIOUS ANNUAL SURVEYS OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

a Excluding the homelands

TABLE 2.6 Enrolment at Schools by Race (Percentage of 5-19 age group), 1950-1990

	1950		1960		1970		1980		1990 ^a	
	Total	Secondary school	Total	Secondary school	Total	Secondary school	Total	Secondary school	Total	Secondary school
Black African	32%	45%	45%	2.5%	54.2%	9.4%	83.1%	15.9%	51.9%	13.6%
Coloured	67.9%	69.2%	69.2%	9.3%	74.6%	11.5%	93%	18.9%	56%	15.2%
Indian	49.1%	82.6%	82.6%	12.9%	84%	24.5%	94.8%	31.7%	57%	22.5%
White	85.8%	94.9%	94.9%	31.7%	95.7%	36.4%	96.3%	37.7%	57%	23.9%

SOURCE: PILLAY 1984: 4, 6.

a 0-19 age group.

TABLE 2.7 Matriculation Exemptions by Race (Including Percentage of Total Matriculation Exemptions), 1951-1992

	1951		1956		1969-70		1979 ^a		1992 ^a	
	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number
Black African	2.7%	176	3.2%	289	6.2%	985	14%	3,806	46%	34,230
Coloured	1%	67	1.7%	156	2.5%	394	9%	2,456	7%	5,130
Indian	1.6%	103	3%	275	5.3%	842	6%	1,595	10%	7,098
White	94.7%	6,217	92%	8,445	86%	13,616	71%	19,086	37%	27,779

SOURCES: BEALE 1998: 53; ANNUAL SURVEYS OF RACE RELATIONS, 1980, 1993-4.

a Excluding the homelands

TABLE 2.8 Per Capita Expenditure on University Students by Race,^a 1960–1978

	1960	1970	1978
Black African	R0.07	R0.22	R3,143.66
Coloured	Not applicable	R0.44	R1,968.00
Indian	R0.10	R2.46	R1,325.00
White	R3.09	R11.55	R2,657.40

SOURCES: BEALE 1998: 342; ANNUAL SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1979.

a Based on per capita expenditure on the universities designated for the different race groups.

TABLE 2.9 Enrolment at universities by race, 1952-1994

	1952		1958		1970		1983		1994	
	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number
Black African	2.5%	499	5%	1,797	5.7%	4,578	18.1%	33,345	46.7%	360,250
Coloured	1.1%	214	2%	704	1.2%	947	5.3%	9,701	5.1%	18,225
Indian	1.9%	374	3.7%	1,318	2.3%	1,818	7.7%	14,216	6.9%	24,683
White	94.5%	18,519	89.4%	32,137	90.9%	73,204	68.9%	126,610	41.4%	148,970
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SOURCES: BEALE 1998: 53; *THE RATCATCHER*, 17 JANUARY 2012; VARIOUS ANNUAL SURVEYS OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

TABLE 2.10 Per capita budgeted expenditure on housing, 1988/89 and 1990/91

	1988/89 ^a	1990/91
Black African	R15.36	R74.44
Coloured	R40.07	R30.27
Indian	R89.23	R64.01
White	R26.67	R16.18

SOURCES: ANNUAL SURVEYS OF RACE RELATIONS.

a Excluding the homelands

TABLE 2.11 Per capita expenditure on health, 1965 and 1987

	1965	1987
Black African	R115.00	R137.00
Coloured	R245.00	R340.00
Indian	R249.00	R356.00
White	R462.00	R597.00

SOURCES: HORWITZ 2009: 1.

TABLE 2.12 Racial share of social spending, 1949–1993

	1949	1959	1969	1975	1986	1988/9	1993
Black African	26.4%	27.3%	26%	28%	43%	51%	67%
Coloured	11.2%	11.6%	17% ^a	12.4%	19% ^a	16% ^a	16% ^a
Indian	2.9%	3.3%		4.2%			
White	59.5%	57.8%	57%	55%	38%	33%	17%
South Africa	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SOURCES: GELB 2004: 12; VAN DER BERG & BURGER: 2002: 9.

a Combined coloured and Indian.

TABLE 2.13 South Africa's Gini Coefficient by race, 1975 and 1991

	1975	1991
Black African	0.47	0.62
Coloured	0.45	0.49
Indian	0.51	0.52
White	0.36	0.46
South Africa	0.68	0.67

SOURCE: MCGRATH & WHITEFORD 1994: 16-17.

The Impasse of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa: *A Glance through the Lenses of Postcolonial Epistemic Violence and Racial Capitalism*

By Alexis Habiyaemye

1 Introduction

Close to three decades after the formal end of apartheid, South Africa remains one of the most economically unequal societies in the world with a Gini coefficient of 0.95 for wealth and 0.68 for income (Statistics South Africa 2017). This inequality is still largely running along the racial divide because white South Africans clearly dominate the top 10% of wealth distribution, which owns at least 90–95% of all private assets of the country, according to Orthofer (2016). Their share of national wealth is constantly strengthened because white households are also still earning 5 times more than their black counterparts, according to the 2015 data released by Statistics South Africa in 2017 (Mdulwa 2017).

Whites also occupy 68% of all top and senior managerial positions in the economy, according to data from the Department of Labour and the Helen Suzman Foundation. Data from the 2017 Land Audit Report show that whites still own 72% of the total of 37,031,283 ha farmland and agricultural holdings by individual landowners, even after 25 years of land redistribution efforts aimed to redress the crippling injustices created by more than 300 years of land dispossession. Despite forming 80% of the nation's population, black Africans possess only 4% of the country's agricultural land in individual holdings.

This wealth and income concentration in the hands of a racial minority is highly problematic as its accumulation has resulted in abject and still deteriorating living conditions for the majority of South Africans, and black Africans in particular.¹ Racialised poverty living side by side with racialised wealth accumulation is rooted in the colonial policies of racial discrimination, land dispossession

1 Poverty headcount statistics show that 30 million people were living in poverty in 2015 (up from 27 million in 2011), with almost 14 million of them living in extreme poverty (i.e., on less than R513 per month). Black Africans remain the majority of those living in poverty with

and exploitation of blacks as a source of cheap labour for extracting the abundant mineral wealth the country is endowed with.

Racial segregation under apartheid disenfranchised blacks and excluded them from any meaningful economic opportunity, whereas colonial epistemic violence (Spivak 1983) and subsequent neo-liberal capitalism have, in the name of “economic efficiency”, sanctified the logic of wealth concentration in the hands of a group of people (of European descent) who deem themselves a “superior race” and enabled the economic subjugation of the oppressed majority to persist in the post-apartheid economic arrangement.

Attempts to redress the racial and economic injustices created by centuries of colonial exploitation of black labour and the racial segregation of the apartheid era were initiated soon after the democratic government was formed through the black economic empowerment (BEE) policy. This policy was understood to be an integral part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and was expected to not only redress economic imbalances by uplifting the previously marginalised black majority, but also to form an engine of a shared prosperity as economic inclusion was projected to lead to efficiency gains. However, instead of forming an engine of shared growth for the majority of South Africans, BEE resulted in an alliance between (what is commonly referred to as) “the white monopoly capitalist elite” and the “black state elite”, which gave rise to a new Janus-headed ruling class with convergent interests (Williams & Taylor 2000; Van der Walt 2015; Terreblanche 2018).² Examples of deals that sealed this alliance between the ANC elites and the white dominated corporations of the apartheid era include the R5,5-billion share transfer transaction to a consortium led by current ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa and Saki Macozoma, which was funded by Standard Bank and the Liberty Group, the ABSA deal with ANC coryphaeus Tokyo Sexwale, as well as the R2.2 billion deal between apartheid-era life insurance company Sanlam and Patrice Motsepe,

46.6% affected, followed by coloureds at 32.2%, with less than 5 percent of Indians living in poverty. For whites, the figure is below one percent.

2 The political bargain agreed upon in South Africa in 1993 to legally end the apartheid system was reached through a negotiated process between the white elite of the Nationalist Party (NP) and the emerging black leadership elite dominated by members of the African National Congress (ANC). According to Terreblanche (2018), this alliance was reached through a series of meetings in 1990–1994 involving white politicians and white capitalists, a leadership core of the ANC, and American and British pressure groups. As a result, the country retained an economic edifice biased toward white monopoly capital, and left undisturbed the lopsided wealth distribution resulting from centuries of land dispossession and labour exploitation of the black majority.

brother in law of current South African president, Ramaphosa (Bridge and Moses 2004).³

This alliance enabled the white corporate leaders to take the leading role in the voluntary and often marginal transfer of company shares to politically connected blacks, which resulted in a narrow-based BEE unable to redress the economic imbalances between the impoverished black majority and the affluent white minority (Acemoglu et al. 2007).⁴ As suggested by Leong (2013), this affiliation with ‘non-white’ individuals thus became merely a useful means for white-dominated corporations to acquire desirable social and economic benefits while deflecting potential charges of racism and avoiding more difficult questions of racial equality. Acemoglu et al. (2007) also note that it may not be seen as a mere coincidence that the first BEE deal was proposed and concluded by Sanlam, an Afrikaner-controlled company that had been closely connected to the apartheid regime.

Subsequent efforts to extend the reach of BEE through legislation to turn it into a broad-based policy instrument (B-BBEE) have hardly changed its elitist delimitations, whereas the economic inequality of the country has been constantly worsening. By articulating its strategy within the neoliberal doctrine as defined by the same colonial epistemic system that created the very injustices it purports to redress, BEE policy has based its theoretical foundation on an epistemic paradox: the irony of using capitalist market orthodoxy, an inherently inegalitarian doctrine, to achieve the benefits of restorative social justice and redistribution (two notions that by their essence lie at the antipodes of profit maximisation). By enabling the capitalist elites who had dominated the colonial and apartheid economy to lead its implementation through the co-optation of the black state elite into their economic structure, the current BEE policy has charted its way into a racial capitalism impasse (Leong 2013; Acemoglu et al. 2007) from which it cannot be rescued without a decolonisation of the mind (James 2014; Modiri 2015).

The persistence of the colonial economic structure in post-apartheid South Africa suggests that the democratic society has failed to shed an economic

3 Acquisition of shares in these “transactions” had to be funded through future dividends on the transferred shares.

4 Through its wielding of state power and controlling government financial assets, the ruling party is rightly perceived as having become the new champion of protecting the privileged capitalist wealth of a few (Williams & Taylor 2000). On top of this racialised capitalist alliance, globalisation and financialisation have come to exacerbate the already glaring disparities by both shifting ownership of local assets to foreign capital investors and increasing the movement of white South African financial assets to larger overseas interests.

system built on epistemic repression and internalised racism, by which the colonised end up emulating their white oppressors, as pointed out by Frantz Fanon (1952). Because of the still latent inferiority complex inculcated by colonialism (coupled with the partial destruction of their epistemic and value system), the new black elites aspired to become like their colonisers and to enjoy the privileges previously denied to them simply because of their non-whiteness (Fanon 1961). Drawing on the concepts of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983; Leong 2013; James 2014) and epistemic violence (Fanon 1952; Spivak 1983; Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1986), this chapter illustrates the persistence of white privilege in post-apartheid South Africa in the way that the BEE policy has led to cosmetic and minimal change through co-optation of a new black elite into business, without fundamentally altering the racialised accumulation regime (Acemoglu et al. 2014). It is argued that the failure of B-BBEE to achieve true transformative change in South Africa's economic structure is best understood through the lenses of racial capitalism underlying the co-optation of a black elite into corporate ownership and management of white-owned businesses (Leong 2013) and the concept of epistemic violence (Spivak 1983; Fanon 1952; Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986) that renders this postcolonial black elite incapable of developing an autonomous epistemic system that can uplift the formerly economically excluded black majority and afford them a fair share in the country's economic opportunities.

The chapter is structured as follows: The next section reviews the features of epistemic violence and racial capitalism that form the dual analytical lenses through which the failure of B-BBEE implementation should be viewed. Section 3 revisits the economic context in which BEE was introduced and presents its implementation strategy as well as the limitations of its conceptual reach. Section 4 provides some considerations on the relation between B-BBEE implementation and the consequences of latent epistemic violence and racial capitalism in the alliance between the white business elite and the black state elite. It is followed by a brief discussion on the decolonisation of minds in section 5, which explores possible path towards responding to the damage caused by epistemic violence and bring about a meaningful transformative change. Section 6 concludes with some observations on the impasse created by the persistence of white privilege and the inability of policies embedded in a Eurocentric epistemic domain to change the status quo that they were designed to preserve.

2 Epistemic Violence and Racial Capitalism as a dual Framework for Understanding the BEE Impasse

By any reasonable standard of success, the BEE policy has failed to deliver on its intended promise to dismantle the painful socio-economic injustices

created by the apartheid regime and bring about new growth dynamics for a shared prosperity for all South Africans. In order to understand the impasse into which the policy has led the effort to redress the injustices of the past, it is useful to examine the dynamics that shaped its strategy and implementation through the lens of epistemic violence (Spivak 1983; Fanon 1961; Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986) and racial capitalism (Leong 2013).

2.1 *Epistemic Violence*

Epistemic violence, brought to prominence by Spivak (1983), is closely related to the concept of symbolic power introduced by Bourdieu (1979) and characterises the modes of cultural and social domination occurring within everyday social habits and maintained over conscious subjects. For Bourdieu, this domination grows to become 'world-making power', giving those holding the power the ability to impose their vision of the social world, and its divisions, as legitimate (Swartz 1997). By using symbolic power, British and French imperial domination of the world has imposed their views, norms and knowledge systems as being the universal standard against which others ought to be measured and validated (Spivak 1983). For Spivak, to commit 'epistemic violence' is to actively obstruct and undermine non-Western methods or approaches to knowledge. This imperialist subjugation of non-Western understanding has been masterfully used by colonialists to define the colonial subject solely as an objectified 'Other'. This form of epistemic violence is deleterious in nature as it strives to erase the cultural, epistemological and value system of the population group to be "othered". Spivak (1983) characterises the colonial imposition of the dominant Western narrative as 'palimpsestic', i.e., an attempt to erase or alter the historical and social native consciousness and to delete all traces of the original self-perception and consciousness in order to overwrite it with its own Eurocentric paradigm that is considered more appropriate.

Spivak's characterisation of violence is understood to be derived from Michel Foucault's representation of the intertwined relationship between power and knowledge, a concept Foucault (1976) termed "power-knowledge" (*savoir-pouvoir*). In that understanding of how power is exercised in relation to its subjects, power is based on knowledge, and makes use of it, while at the same time shaping it in accordance with the ruling elite's own intentions. Bourdieu (1979) understood this world-making power to be synonymous to ideology, wielding the ability to impose the means for analysing and comprehending the world and adapting to the social order by representing economic and political power in ideologically disguised forms that are easily taken for granted (Swartz 1997).

Stemming from the concept of symbolic power is epistemic violence, which focuses on the discourse involved in the practice of othering. Othering, in this

sense, is defined as the marginalisation of those who are perceived as distinguishably different from the perceived power-wielding group ('us'), which uses differences in beliefs and customs to define the others as the "out-group" (Rawls & David 2003).

To better describe different discursive manifestations of such epistemic violence, Bunch (2015) looked at its various facets and classified them into three categories: *discriminatory*, *testimonial* and *distributive* epistemic violence. Each of these manifestations possesses its distinct ways in which it is exercised by the dominant group in the process of "othering" the group subjected to this violence.

The *discriminatory* epistemic violence is primarily conveyed through the dehumanisation of the targeted group to be reified for subjugation and exploitation. It is the discursive and attitudinal construction of the "other", in the same sense in which "Orient" is conceived in the minds of the Occident (Said 1979), or the negro is conceptualised by the white man (Fanon 1952), and treatment of the non-Western population groups by Western colonial conquerors. Non-Western epistemology is dismissed as inadequate, 'insufficiently elaborated' and naïve. By disparaging the moral and epistemological system of the others and by denigrating their very essence, the system of Western domination imposes its own power-knowledge to exclude others from being human, to refuse reciprocity and to disparage their "intelligibility" (Rawls and David 2003). Discriminatory epistemic violence is often the first to be exercised as it creates the base – the other – and is frequently used by those in power as a stepping stone to garner majority support for policies of separation from the "other".

For example, the segregation laws formalised by the apartheid system in South Africa are a manifestation of this discriminatory epistemic violence, whose repercussions continue to linger in the collective memory of the power-wielding group even long after the system on which they were based has been formally discredited and repudiated.

Testimonial epistemic violence comes in two forms: reduced credibility of the "out-group" and its silencing. Reduced credibility implies that prejudice of the listeners makes them prone to discrediting the information brought forth by "the other", despite any competence (s)he may have (Fricker 2006).⁵ Silencing is extensively discussed by Spivak (1983), and is defined as the damage to

5 Testimonial epistemic violence is closely related to the discriminatory epistemic violence because it is often rooted in the presumption that the Western way of knowing is the only validation benchmark based on rationality and the heritage of the enlightenment.

a group's ability to speak for itself and to be heard.⁶ *Distributive* epistemic violence refers to the denial of access to resources by the dominant group to the "out-group."

What becomes an important consequence of epistemic violence is the internalisation, or rather as Fanon calls it, *epidermisation*, by individuals that belong to the dominated group of the sense of inferiority preached by the dominant group. The entire purpose of the behaviour of these individuals becomes the emulation of members of the power-wielding group. In the South African case, epidermisation is measuring oneself by reference to whites; to become like them, and thus hope to be accepted as men.

2.2 *Racial Capitalism*

Whereas theories of white racial superiority nourished by Social Darwinism flourished in the 19th century and fuelled colonial conquest, modern scientific progress has now completely repudiated them.⁷ More so, advances in genetics have now come to prove that all humankind originates from common African ancestors. Racism dies hard, but it's no longer politically correct to practice it unashamedly in the open. Increasingly, the necessity to recognise our common humanity has been finding its way even among those who still wish to hold on to the bygone glory of their supposed superiority. Therefore, even in countries like the United States where racism is still widely manifest in public life, the official discourse has embraced the positive image conveyed by diversity and attached a desirable social value to it. As a result, non-whiteness has become a valued commodity in a society preoccupied with diversity (Leong 2013; James 2014). And where that society is founded on capitalism, the commodity of non-whiteness is exploited for its market value. Because of the benefits that mainly white people and institutions derive from being associated with blacks (or being so perceived), the 'diversity rationale', rather than the need for redress of past injustices, is used as the only permissible defence of affirmative

6 An example of silencing in the South African context is the so-called "empty-land myth" propagated throughout the 19th century, by which both Afrikaner and British colonisers claimed that Europeans and the Bantu tribes had entered South Africa at roughly the same time. It was used to justify the unjustifiable impetus of land dispossession and reduce to silence the claims of forcibly dispossessed black Africans.

7 To justify colonialism, Darwin's theory of human evolution was applied to create a hierarchy among human societies and used to defend the idea that colonialism required a racial hierarchy that "naturally" privileged the population of European descent. As a result, colonial powers in the United States and Europe came to regard racism as a "natural order" for positive political evolution.

action policies based on a compelling interest in diversity.⁸ As such, this diversity rationale is primarily used to benefit white institutions and individuals so that they can be successfully promoted as diverse, thus enhancing their institutional reputation, as well as their social and cultural capital (Leong 2013).

This has given rise to the flourishing of a new form of racial capitalism, which consists in the inclination of white people and white institutions to capitalise on the value attached to diversity and try to derive benefits from their thick or thin association with blacks (Leong 2013).⁹ Racial capitalism in the context of this chapter refers thus to the processes of deriving social or economic value from the racial identity of another person (Leong 2013; James 2014). This pertains to the various forms in which blackness, in its post-apartheid South African figurations, is utilised by white individuals, entities or institutions to obtain legitimacy, in particular by associating with blacks for the purpose of seeking diversity to comply with the B-BBEE requirements. Many white-owned South African companies that had flourished under apartheid used this tactic by hiring politically-connected blacks, whose role served to shed past image of racism and exclusion under the guise of supporting BEE policy (Randall 1996; Southall 2004).

The fact that white individuals or predominantly white institutions can exploit relationships or affiliations with black individuals to accumulate for themselves the capital associated with blackness can be viewed as an indication that the corresponding society is still defined by the latent epistemic violence that favours whiteness and reifies the blacks. Because of the pervasiveness of the hysteresis effects of past epistemic violence, a mere increase in the raw number of black people present at a white company or a predominantly white institution may not *per se* signify actual progress toward racial equality (Acemoglu et al. 2007; Leong 2013; James 2014). Ostensibly increasing diversity in a context still dominated by the testimonial and distributive epistemic violence may just serve to hide the discriminatory epistemic violence without removing it. This is where the diversity objective and the remedial objective diverge: the former assumes that benefits will result from the mere presence

8 James (2014) argues that labelling racial justice measures as “unfair” implies white innocence and constitutes a rhetorical leap often employed to challenge affirmative actions by presenting whites as victims of racial redress policies. By suggesting that whites have not received any unearned benefits, it reaffirms belief in the myth of meritocracy and blindness to white privilege.

9 The concept of ‘racial capitalism’ has a longer history in South Africa, which originates in the writings of liberals such as Merle Lipton, who drew a connection between segregation and apartheid policies and capitalist economic development in South Africa. They argued that the racial basis of segregation and apartheid were important for the development of capitalism in South Africa.

of black people (removal of visible discrimination), while the latter requires tangible progress toward racial equality (James 2014; Leong 2013).

3 The Broad-based BEE Strategy and Its Implementation

The black economic empowerment strategy was viewed as a necessary government intervention intended to redress the past systematic exclusion of most South Africans from full participation in the economic life of the country. Paradoxically, the socio-political and moral imperative to redress racial discrimination was primarily justified through its potential to contribute to growth. The imperative dictated by the need for sustainable growth was put forward; namely, that inclusive participation is necessary to exploit the full potential of the country's productive forces, because an economy based on excluding most of its labour from the required productive skills is vulnerable in the long run (Department of Trade and Industry 2007).

As outlined in article 2 of the 2003 B-BBEE Act (Act 53 of 2003), South Africa had introduced the black economic empowerment concept during the transition period in 1993 following the repudiation of the apartheid doctrine as a formal government policy with the view to achieving the following set of specific objectives considered pertinent to address the imbalances left by the past exclusion of blacks from the apartheid economy:

- a. promoting economic transformation to enable participation of black people in the economy;
- b. achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises;
- c. increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;
- d. increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;
- e. promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to achieve sustainable development and general prosperity;
- f. empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills; and
- g. promoting access to finance for black economic empowerment.

In this context, blacks are defined as a generic term that includes those who had been designated as black Africans, coloureds and Indians under apartheid policies and who had therefore been marginalised by segregationist legislation. In terms of the B-BBEE Act, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment means “the viable economic empowerment of *all black people*, including in particular women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas” (Amended B-BBEE Act 2013).

The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has issued a code of good practices with a generic scorecard against which to measure compliance with the B-BBEE policy. The code is applicable to all organs of the State and public entities, as well as all measured entities that undertake any economic activity with organs of the state. Even though there are no punitive measures for non-compliance, the government can leverage its powerful preferential procurement mechanism to stimulate compliance, since the legislation obliges any entity wishing to undertake any economic activity with organs of the state to be B-BBEE compliant.

The current B-BBEE scoring system for a generic enterprise currently consists of five separate elements as represented in Table 3.1: ownership, management control, skills development, enterprise and supplier development, and socio-economic development (DTI 2013). This has been narrowed from the previous system which had seven elements, with employment equity and preferential procurement being absorbed into the other five elements to reduce the overall number. The priority areas most recently identified by the DTI are indicated in Table 3.1 below:

TABLE 3.1 Generic B-BBEE Scorecard

Core BEE component	Indicators	Weight	Code
Equity Ownership	% share of economic benefits	25 pts	100
Management control	% of black persons in executive management and /or executive boards	15pts	200
Skills development	Skills development expenditures as % of total payroll	20 pts	300
Enterprise and supplier development	Investment in black owned and empowered enterprise as % of total assets	40 pts	400
Socio-economic development	Extent to which entities carry out initiatives contributing to socio-economic development	5pts	500
Total		105	

At the inception of the programme, it was envisioned that this policy intervention would significantly increase the number of black people who managed, owned and controlled the economy. It was also anticipated that this process would lead to a significant reduction in social and economic inequalities in the country. At that time, there was a significant focus on the creation of a black middle class, building on and strengthening the already existing levels between 1994 and the early 2000s.

The DTI, in collaboration with the President and the B-BBEE Advisory Council, leads the government policy related to BEE and oversees its implementation. From the number of points that each measured entity gathers across the black empowerment components as outlined in Table 3.1, it is categorised in the corresponding recognition level, which determines its compliance position and the preference level that it can get in procurement with state and public organs. The correspondence between the scores and the recognition levels are reported in Table 3.2.

TABLE 3.2 BEE recognition levels

B-BBEE status	Qualification	BEE recognition level
Level one contributor	≥100 pts on the scorecard	135%
Level two contributor	95 ≤ pts on the scorecard <100pts	125%
Level three contributor	90 ≤ pts on the scorecard <95pts	110%
Level four contributor	80 ≤ pts on the scorecard <90pts	100%
Level five contributor	75 ≤ pts on the scorecard <80pts	80%
Level six contributor	70 ≤ pts on the scorecard <75pts	60%
Level seven contributor	55 ≤ pts on the scorecard <70pts	50%
Level eight contributor	40 ≤ pts on the scorecard <55pts	10%
Non-compliant	<40 pts on the scorecard	0%

BEE policies are used by government whenever:

- It grants a licence to engage in a specific regulated economic activity, for example, gambling or mining,
- It grants a concession to a private enterprise to operate an asset or enterprise on behalf of the state,
- It sells an asset or a state-owned enterprise,
- It enters into a public-private partnership,
- It engages in any economic activity, and
- Preferential procurement.

The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the National Empowerment Fund (NEF) are currently the two main actors in the government policy toolbox for funding the B-BBEE strategy. The government's wish is to associate the private sector with the implementation of the B-BBEE programmes because it recognises that its BEE strategy will not be effective if government acts alone without the support of the private sector. The government's repeated appeal to the private sector for the implementation of a policy with a redistributive mission calls into question the wisdom of allowing market forces to drive this process. If B-BBEE is about dismantling injustices that were created by the distortion of the market in the first place, how can the same market forces be appealed to for redress?

The role of the IDC in B-B BEE implementation is to manage and disburse funds from the European Investment Bank for funding of empowerment projects. The IDC has for the past 21 years put supporting black economic empowerment at the centre of its mandate. During that period, the Corporation provided R28-billion to black-owned businesses, and more than R53-billion for broad-based black economic empowerment (B-BBEE) generally. In 2017, the minister noted, the Corporation (IDC) approved R1.6-billion in funding for black industrialists.

By 2022, (since establishment in 1998) the NEF has approved 716 black empowered business deals worth over R12.35 billion. Over 2017, the NEF approved 94 deals worth R895 million against a target of 96 deals worth R718 million. This pales in comparison to the earnings before income tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) of R12 billion reported by just one mining company, Anglo-American Platinum (AAP), over the same period. The operating profit of the Shoprite group alone over the same period is R7.725 billion for a net profit of R5.435 billion. The market capitalisation of the 25 biggest companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is above R10 trillion! With those benchmarks in mind, it is relatively easy to see that the scale of this broad-based black economic empowerment programme pales in comparison to what private firms are doing for their operations in a capitalist market from which blacks have been excluded for more than 350 years.

Another consideration to be raised when examining the success rate of a policy meant to be redistributionist is the choice of implementation vehicles: enterprises, shares, company ownership, procurement, business development, etc. all evoke intersection between black economic empowerment and capitalist entrepreneurship. As a result of its contract-based orientation towards the so-called black industrialists, broad-based BEE has done little to assist the majority of black South Africans since the tendering systems seems to benefit the few minority organisations that have enough human and financial

resources to exploit big contracts (Shava 2016). In South Africa, millions of people who were victims of the apartheid brutality do need redress, but do not necessarily need to be entrepreneurs, hold a seat on the board of a big corporation or own options in a JSE-listed company.

4 Case Studies of BEE Deals

It is instructive that the first BEE deals in the country were initiated by South Africa's leading established white-owned businesses, namely the insurance giant Sanlam and the corporate conglomerate Anglo-American, and were "specifically designed to cater to a new class of black businessmen and women" (Freund 2007: 665). These were the leading forces of 'Afrikaner' and 'English' capital in South Africa, respectively, for much of the preceding 50 years or more. It is also instructive that the main beneficiaries of the BEE deals were politicians in leading positions in the ruling ANC, namely Cyril Ramaphosa, Saki Macozoma and Tokyo Sexwale, or politically connected individuals, namely Patrice Motsepe, among others.

Sanlam took the first step in the direction of empowering black businesspeople when it sold 10% of its stake in Metropolitan Life (Metlife) to a BEE company in March 1993, a year before the transition to democracy in April 1994. Sanlam had taken a decision in 1991 to initiate the Metropolitan Life BEE deal, and the sale of the 10% stake was made to a new company, Metlife Investment Holding company (Method), that had obtained R135 million financing from the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to buy the Metlife shares. Method shares were then sold to the public, bringing in investment from a range of black businessmen and political activists such as Dr Nthato Motlana, Sam Motsuenyane, Franklin Sonn, Enos Mabuza, Archie Nkonyeni, Paul Gama, Zwelakhe Sisulu and Godfrey Pitje. When the public announcement of the deal was made in July 1994, Method changed its name to New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL) and listed on the JSE with Motlana as executive chairman of the board and Dikgang Moseneke as deputy executive chairman (Verhoef 2003: 39–44).

Anglo-American used BEE deals between 1994 and 1996 to unbundle several of its companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and to sell assets to black investors. Included here are its sale of a stake in African Life to a consortium headed by Don Ncube, a black director in Anglo-American, in February 1994; a R4 billion stake in industrial group Johnnic to Ramaphosa's National Empowerment Consortium in July 1996; and the mining company Johannesburg Consolidated Investment (JCI) to Mzi Khumalo's African Mining

in November 1996. Anglo-American's deal with African mining was "hailed as a post-apartheid model for black economic empowerment" (Tangri & Southall 2008: 704), while the Johnnic deal was described at the time as the "largest black economic empowerment deal ever in South Africa" (see Thackwray 1998: 11). Anglo became involved in black empowerment following an announcement in February 1995 that one of its subsidiaries, JCI, was to be restructured. It was stipulated in a circular sent to shareholders of JCI on 24 February 1995 that: "Black South Africans should be given every encouragement to participate meaningfully in mining and industrial finance groups" (cited in Thackwray 1998: 11). Anglo-American saw several benefits in its BEE deals:

First, it should enable Johnnic and JCI Limited to align themselves more easily with the new social and political structures in South Africa and to adapt more readily to the changes that are occurring in the new society. Second, the potential credibility that black participation brings and new cultural values should accelerate growth and provide new opportunities for the companies in South Africa and Africa. Third, a broad base of black shareholders, many of whom may be represented through investments by black trade unions, savings societies and business organisations, should bring with them the opportunities for closer and more sympathetic business relationships. Finally, it should attract new investors who are eager to support the companies and contribute to their success. CITED IN THACKWRAY 1998: 40

Ramaphosa was one of the four key beneficiaries of BEE mentioned above that participated in this wave of BEE deals. Ramaphosa, a former trade unionist and Secretary General of the ANC, began to play a leading role in the business world after he failed to be appointed to a top position in the new Government of National Unity (GNU) established after the 1994 elections. The appointment of Thabo Mbeki as one of the deputy presidents of the country in the new dispensation temporarily held up his political career. Ramaphosa was a chief negotiator on the part of the consortium made up of 50 black investment groups, including NAIL, bidding during Anglo-American's Johnnic deal. After its successful conclusion in August 1996, he announced that he was leaving politics to take up the position of chairman of Johnnic (Barnett 1999: 654). Ramaphosa soon came to signify what was termed "the successful embourgeoisement of a liberation movement" (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert & Moodley 1997: 167).

In May 1998, Ramaphosa was appointed to head a Black Economic Empowerment Commission set up by the Black Business Council, an umbrella group of eleven prominent black business organisations. The Commission's objective

was to consolidate what exactly was meant by BEE and determine future directions it should take to empower black South Africans to participate more fully in the economy (Ponte, Roberts & van Sittert 2006: 21). In 2001, Ramaphosa created Millennium Consolidated Investments (MCI) as an investment vehicle to take advantage of BEE opportunities. He was thus well-placed when the second wave of BEE deals began after the passage of the Mining Charter in 2002, which provided that 15% of each mine's value should be owned by black empowerment groups within five years, reaching 26% in ten years, to be funded partially by R100 billion raised by the mining industry. This was followed by a Financial Services Charter in 2004, which set a target of 25% black ownership in this sector by 2010 (Chabane, Goldstein & Roberts 2006: 565).

The most significant BEE deal Ramaphosa was part of at the beginning of this phase was the Standard Bank BEE deal. In July 2004, Standard Bank, South Africa's biggest banking group, and its subsidiary Liberty Group, South Africa's third largest insurer, announced that they would each sell 10% of their businesses for a combined total of R5.6 billion. Ramaphosa, together with Saki Macozoma, secured 40% of the shares put up for sale in the deal without putting down any cash upfront. The two netted about R200 million each from a deal in which the shares they obtained were virtually given to them (Tangri and Southall 2008: 709–710).

Saki Macozoma was a leading member of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC who rose to prominence in the business world after Safika became a key beneficiary of the Standard Bank BEE deal. His initial involvement in business began in 1996 when he resigned as an ANC Member of Parliament, where he had served as chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Committees, to become the first black managing director of Transnet, the state-owned company that runs South Africa's ports, railways and South African Airways. Two years later he was appointed to the Board of Standard Bank. After resigning from Transnet in March 2001, he bought a 10% stake in Safika Holdings, a company co-founded by Moss Ngoasheng, where he took up the position of Deputy Chair. Safika joined with Ramaphosa's MCI for the Standard Bank and Liberty Group deal. It had earlier partnered with two other black investment companies, Nduna Trust and Simeka, to purchase 51% of Standard Bank's stake in its security and management division to Andisa Capital in another BEE deal in 2003 (Bridge, Clow-Wilson, Mackay, Serrao & Wu 2007: 87–89).

Tokyo Sexwale, the former Premier of the Gauteng Province, began his business career in the Thebe Investment Corporation, founded in the early 1990s to provide a funding source for the newly legal ANC (Southall 2005: 317). However, he was deployed to serve as the first Premier of the newly-created

Gauteng Province after the first democratic elections in 1994. Three years later, in December 1997, he resigned from this position before the end of his term of office. He returned to business in the next year when he established Mvelaphanda with about R5,000. Mvelaphanda soon acquired a 35% stake in a small diamond firm, Gem Diamonds, followed by a 38% stake in Trans Hex, a much larger alluvial diamond company. In 2000, the company purchased 22.3% of Northam Platinum, acquired East Daggafontein through a reverse takeover in 2002, and in 2003 acquired a 10% stake in Gold Fields, one of the world's largest gold producers. Sexwale also led a consortium that purchased 10% of ABSA Bank in 2003, and in 2007 was part of a consortium of black companies that acquired control over about R35 billion, at a 30 percent discount to market value in mining assets, from Anglo Platinum, the world's largest platinum producer (Bridge et al. 2007: 72; Chabane, Goldstein & Roberts 2006: 566, 671; Heduru 2008: 353).

In 1994, Motsepe, whose sister is married to Ramaphosa, created a small mining company called Future Mining with a loan secured from Anglo-American. The company, among other things, cleaned gold dust from inside mine shafts for the Vaal Reefs Gold mine, a subsidiary of one of South Africa's largest mining companies, AngloGold. He subsequently created African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) in 1997 when an opportunity arose to purchase a mine shaft that had been put up for sale by AngloGold to be paid for from future profits. He diversified into platinum mining in 1999 when ARM partnered with Anglo Platinum (a subsidiary of Anglo-American) to establish a new platinum mine in Maandagshoek in the Northern Province worth R1.35 billion. ARM, which had joined with Harmony Gold to purchase four gold mining operations from AngloGold in 2001, merged with Harmony to give it a significant stake in a much larger company (Barnard 2015: 53–55; Chabane, Goldstein & Roberts 2006: 566). Motsepe had a R2.9 billion stake in ARM by 2005.

Motsepe also seized the opportunity when the Mining and Financial Services Charters were promulgated, and has been a participant in several significant BEE deals during the second wave. Included here is the 2004 Sanlam deal with the Ubuntu Botho empowerment consortium, to which he contributed R200 millions of his own funds, in the year that he had been appointed non-executive director of both Barclays Africa Group Limited and ABSA Bank Limited. In this BEE deal, 8% of Sanlam shares were sold to the consortium and a further 1.8% in 2006. Motsepe had a 55% stake in Ubuntu-Botho Financial Services, which was at the centre of the Sanlam deal. In the aftermath of the deal, he was appointed as the deputy chair in 2004 and as a non-executive director in Sanlam Life Insurance Limited in 2006. Motsepe was part of another 'mega' BEE deal in 2006 when Xstrata signed a R2.3 billion deal with BEE company

Armcoal that gave ARM 26% control of Xstrata Plc for \$360 million (Barnard 2015: 56–57; Heduru 2008: 356).

The beneficiaries of BBE described here would come to serve as a significant part of a:

buffer group among the black political class that would become an ally of big business in South Africa. This buffer group would use its newfound power as controllers of the government to protect the assets of big business. The buffer group would also protect the *modus operandi* of big business and thereby maintain the status quo in which South African business operates. MBEKI 2009

5 Broad-based BEE under epistemic violence and racial capitalism lenses

There is a wide consensus among observers that the B-BBEE policy has been a failure in terms of its objective to empower a broad base of formerly excluded blacks. Kovacevic (2007), for example, already pointed out that the programme has achieved little success on any of its targets of eradicating poverty, increasing employment or fostering economic growth. As for Moeletsi Mbeki, brother of the former South African president Thabo Mbeki, he sees BEE as an obstacle to the emergence of a dynamic black entrepreneurship because all it does is create a small class of wealthy, yet unproductive black crony capitalists allied with the economic oligarchs (Mbeki 2009). Hamann, Khagram and Rohan (2008) have also expressed their disappointment that after ten years of implementation many of the challenges that the policy was designed to address were still hurting the population or had in some instances even become more acute.

The failure of B-BBEE to redress the effects of decades of economic oppression under apartheid is therefore patent, and the situation is unlikely to improve any time soon. That calls for elucidating explanations to help grapple with the incapacity of the governing party to enact redistributive policies that are still inscribed in the Freedom Charter, despite having a majority in the national parliament since 1994. To analyse this paralysis, it is useful to take the two analytical lenses that were reviewed above: post-colonial epistemic violence and racial capitalism.

Epistemic violence forms the socio-cognitive context within which attempts at economic reforms and redistributive measure would be undertaken, whereas racial capitalism is one of the multiple mechanisms that the still dominant white capitalist group (wielding more than 90% of the country's wealth) can

resort to in order to display cosmetic diversity while firmly blocking any meaningful economic redress for the victims of the system that favoured whiteness. The co-optation of the ANC black state elite into the wealthy ruling class by white corporate businesses is a typical manifestation of racial capitalism: a white individual or a white-dominated entity decides to associate with blacks to shore up his/her/its diversity credentials and derive economic value from that. As underscored by Leong (2013), however, such alliances serve primarily to cosmetically mask the inertia in race relations and often turn out to be an impediment to genuine remedial reform that would improve race relations.

Epistemic violence is a particularly salient problem in South Africa as it pervades our daily lives in the form of a hysteresis effect of the long history of violent colonial repression and silencing of its black people, both by British colonists and by Afrikaners. By co-opting the ANC ruling class in secret negotiations and subsequently constantly shaming them for corruption through the white dominated media (while at the same time covering up all forms of corruption and fraud committed in the corporate sector), the white elite is perpetuating a culture of othering blacks in general as inferior.¹⁰ When white-dominated companies threaten to lose share value by hiring black managers, the stock market is sending an epistemic violent signal about the competence and capacity of not just the manager in question, but all black people in the collective representation by whites.

The geopolitical context within which BEE implementation was initiated contained already the seeds of its future impasse as it started with both epistemic violence and attempts at racial capitalism. Before using the concept of post-colonial epistemic violence to analyse the dynamics of resistance to economic restructuring, it is worth noting that South Africa was never decolonised. Instead, at the end of the negotiations that followed the release of Mandela, an odd compromise was reached by which the colonial minority could keep its control of economic power by only allowing democratisation and political participation for the majority. According to Williams and Taylor (2000) and Terreblanche (2018), however, the elite compromise negotiated at that time emphatically excluded the possibility of a comprehensive redistribution policy, which was regarded as unaffordable after preference was given to addressing the interests of the old white corporate elite and the emerging black elite, and after the conditionalities prescribed by American-led neoliberal pressure groups were accepted.

¹⁰ The ubiquitous use of euphemisms by corporate media regarding the Steinhoff scandal (biggest fraud in South African History) when contrasted with the daily denunciation of Zuma and the Guptas, are quite revealing of that culture (see e.g. Lungisa, 2017).

Whereas apartheid has been declared a crime against humanity, the unfair and unjust distribution of wealth that it created through violence and repression have been legitimised and elevated to the status of sacred property rights by market fundamentalism. During the transition from apartheid to democracy, in which BEE was initiated, even though political power was orderly transferred from the exclusive white apartheid government to the new (national unity) government without major obstacles, the economy and the corporate media remained firmly dominated by the white minority. The domination of the media enables the white corporate sector to dominate and shape public opinion and maintain its preferred narrative as the representation of public opinion. This means that facts, knowledge and values that do not conform to that narrative are simply either invalidated or silenced (testimonial epistemic violence).

6 Breaking out of Epistemic Violence

By subordinating the need for redress to the working of private businesses, the post-apartheid government has confirmed the unfair advantages conferred by practices now deemed crimes against humanity, and subtly converted them into meritocratic entitlements. In such a context, the failure of the BEE policy to bring about the needed change, rather than being an aberration, seems to have been designed to achieve exactly what it is achieving: a cosmetic change that serves as a fig leaf for the failure to deliver real change, and a lot of racial capital to the partners in the said Janus-headed alliance. Such is the epistemic violence that dominates the discussions about economic and social redress for the victims of colonialism in South Africa, and racial capitalism is used to put black faces on narratives supporting cosmetic changes without altering the *status quo* favourable to the heirs of the colonial spoils. The deployment of racial capitalism has often contributed to situations that relegate the involved black individuals to the status of “trophy” or “passive emblems”, and by so doing degrade their blackness by commodifying it.

To understand the failure of BEE to deliver redistributive justice is also to recognise that the privileges of whiteness as a valuable property in South Africa persists, and is here to stay. Jean Paul Sartre (1961) explains why the combination of racial capitalism and epistemic violence has intentionally been designed to function perfectly in support of the neo-colonialist agenda:

The European elite undertook to manufacture a native elite. They picked out promising adolescents; they branded them, as with a red-hot iron,

with the principles of Western culture; they stuffed their mouths full with high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck to the teeth. After a short stay in the mother country they were sent home, white-washed. These walking lies had nothing left to say to their brothers; they only echoed. From Paris, from London, from Amsterdam we would utter the words “Parthenon! Brotherhood!” and somewhere in Africa or Asia lips would open “...thenon! ...therhood!

The aim of the strategy is unfailingly the same: maintain the white domination for the control of natural resources, as pointed out by De Witte (2017):

Thus, the coloniser may have passed from life to death, neo-colonialism is well alive and kicking. In fact, one can say of Congolese wealth what Henry Kissinger once said about the Middle East oil: “Oil is too important to leave it in the hands of the Arabs”. In a world dominated by vultures it is a true curse to have such quantities of natural resources. Congo is simply too rich for the West to let go of it.

Whiteness continues to confer privilege on those who are endowed with it by allowing exclusion, as the predominantly white-oriented media continue to populate the media landscape and shape public opinion by creating the racial categories to which others are relegated. Likewise, the existing distribution of social goods that was originally determined by whiteness continues to define the normative baseline for benchmarking such distribution. And to make the circle full, the legal system that determines entitlements to those social goods continues to enforce that normative baseline.

The failure of the black economic empowerment policy to deliver the desired social inclusion for the realisation of the country’s full growth potential stems partly from the still ongoing epistemic violence imposed by colonialism. It is also the result of the racial capitalism apparent in the alliance between the black ruling party (ANC) and the white business elite (Williams and Taylor 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2007; Van der Walt 2015). As posited by Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986), mental colonisation for the control of people’s wealth has been the most important area of domination, because it imposed upon the colonised how they should perceive themselves in their relation to the world. The postponement of the promised redistributive justice suggests that racial capitalism will continue to define social justice policies and suffocate resistance to its subliminal epistemic violence. To overcome its stifling effects on the dynamics of social transformation, it will be necessary to support the development of meaningful mechanisms for improving racial relations (Leong 2013).

Such mechanisms include a fair and rapid resolution of the land question because land is key to redistributive justice in South Africa. Without an equitable resolution of the land and agrarian question, there can be no lasting inter-racial peace.

To reach the goals of equitable liberation in a social landscape dominated by epistemic oppression, Asante (2003) proposes Afrocentricity, which puts African ontology at the centre of the self-perception and worldview of Africans as subjects, not objects. For the decolonisation of minds to be effective, it is necessary to initiate a complete overhaul of the Eurocentric epistemic system from whose perspective social and economic policy is still being shaped in this country. The necessary shift must come from the realisation that the mindset and the economic arrangements that created the conditions for the current inequality and widespread poverty is the alliance between capitalism and racial subjugation aimed to control the supply of cheap labour for the maximisation of profits.

7 Conclusion

While the formerly oppressed and marginalised South Africans may now proudly celebrate the achievement of a wide array of political freedoms and rights, the reluctance of the white minority to participate in an economic and social transformation has remained the elephant in the room that the government has always cautiously avoided addressing. As Joe Slovo once put it, it is not difficult in South Africa for an ordinary person to see the link between capitalism and racial exploitation. The biting inequality in South Africa is not the result of market forces within a fairly functioning economic system: the South African economy has been built on cheap labour and continues to rely on it to sustain the opulence of a few and the deprivation of many. A long history of land dispossession and colonial epistemic violence have resulted in a deeply polarised South African society in which the transfer of political power to the majority has failed to redress the legacy of injustice. By subscribing to the logic of radical market capitalism, the very system that was used to impoverish the black majority by reducing them to a mere source of cheap labour, the ANC government has put itself in an impasse from which it will remain unable to deliver on the promise of a prosperous society where the previously excluded have their fair share. The problem of redressing economic injustices in South Africa is compounded by the fact that, since the time of the development of the mining industry, the country's economy has been entangled with massive foreign capitalist investments; and this intermeshing has continued into the

post-apartheid economic structure. The convergence of interest between powerful foreign and domestic investors in the domestic economy keeps open the possibility of capital outflow in case of policy that does not favour their capitalist profits over the social welfare of workers.

The paradox of racial capitalism practiced in a context where testimonial and distributional epistemic violence is still pervasive is that it also forecloses structural transformation on a practical level, both by inflicting identity harms on black individuals and by displacing substantive anti-discrimination reform. South Africa's black poor, who since the end of the apartheid have been expecting their government to redress the injustices of apartheid, do not feel validated. By massively investing in racial capitalism through the co-optation of the ANC elite into a lucrative alliance, the South African oligarchs have secured the protection of the property rights created for them by the apartheid regime at the expense of coerced cheap labour.

In a landmark court decision in early November 2020, certain regulations under the Public Procurement Framework Act which set out the qualification criteria related to black ownership of companies that tendered for government contract were set aside for a period of 12 months. In particular, the Supreme Court of Appeal gave the government a year to rectify the regulations that gave state-owned entities discretion to set the level of ownership of companies that could qualify for tendered contracts. The court deemed these regulations unlawful, invalid and unconstitutional, enjoining "organs of the state to contract goods or services in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective" in terms of section 217(1) of the Constitution and thereby opening space for public procurement to be based on factors other than race. This has the potential to open the door to eroding other aspects of black economic empowerment. Most importantly, however, this has the potential to affect new BEE entrants in the short-term, but not to alter the already-entrenched alliance between the black state elite and white monopoly capital.

Only by developing economic strategies that are targeted towards redistributive justice for the well-being of formerly disenfranchised South African can the democratic government change the dynamics that created the BEE impasse and effect a meaningful improvement in the living conditions of most of its citizens. But before redistributive justice can be accepted as a permissible means to address the injustices of the past in a significant manner, it will be necessary for white South Africans, and indeed for white people everywhere, to honestly recognise the effects of their conditioning as being central to the world and begin the work of deconstruction and rejection of this now repudiated binary thinking.

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The Intersectionality of Gender, Race and Class in the Transformation of the Workplace in Post-apartheid South Africa

Catherine Ndinda and Tidings P. Ndhlovu

1 Introduction

After centuries of oppression of the African people under colonialism and apartheid, South Africa's Constitution (1996) appeared to have ushered in a new dawn of equity based on race and gender equality. The end of apartheid in 1994 brought change in *formal* or legalistic equality (i.e., meritocracy or equal treatment in the eyes of the law), but less progress has occurred in *substantive* equality (i.e., the extent to which equality of outcomes is addressed) (Ndhlovu 2016, 2019; Ndinda & Uzodike 2012; Ndinda & Ndhlovu 2018). In fact, hierarchical institutional and cultural racism, along with patriarchal practices, have become more entrenched in both the private and public spheres in post-apartheid South Africa (Ndinda & Uzodike 2012).

This chapter is premised on the notion that class and power relations not only anchor our understanding of inequalities, but their interaction with gender and race also explain the persistence of racism and sexism in post-apartheid South Africa. This results in unequal outcomes for different groups of women. Gender, race and class interact to shape different women's experiences of either privilege or disadvantage. It is widely acknowledged that, while all black men and women (black African, coloured and Indian) struggled under the yoke of apartheid, black African women in particular bore the brunt of the oppression during the apartheid era. While white women might not have actively participated in the empowerment of white men, they shared in the privileges accorded to them and benefitted from the privileges bestowed upon their race by the men that designed and entrenched the racist policies that oppressed black Africans in their own land (Ndinda & Uzodike 2012; Ndhlovu 2016). This is what Crenshaw (2011, 2020) describes as the privileging of whiteness (White Privilege), with white women being the "norm" while black women become the "other" (also see Adib & Guerrier 2003; Bhopal 2019; Cho et al. 2013; Collins 2015; Cordoso 2016; Hirsh 2018; Lutz et al. 2011; Ndinda & Ndhlovu 2016, 2018). For their part, migrant Africans, particularly "foreign" (black) women, were and

still are more vulnerable in their experiences of “Afrophobia” or “otherness” in the workplace and elsewhere. They suffer worse discrimination and marginalisation than all other women in the hierarchy of oppression of Africans because of their identification as “outsiders”.

The intersection of different forms of oppression are critical in exploring and explicating the complex ways in which gender, “race” (often used to refer to black people rather than all of humankind), class and “ethnicity” are experienced in post-apartheid South Africa (refer to Bhopal 2019; Ndinda & Uzodike 2012; Cleeve & Ndhlovu 2015). The purpose of this chapter is therefore to deconstruct racism and sexism in employment in South Africa. Use is made of data from the Department of Labour’s (DOL) Employment Equity (Commission for Employment Equity – CEE) reports for 2013 and 2018 to analyse patterns of employment in the public, private and educational sectors in South Africa. The analysis draws out what these portend for gender, race and class transformation in South Africa.

To contextualise our analysis, we first examine the intersection of gender, race and class in South Africa, followed by race classifications and policies designed to tackle structural racism, before examining employment trends in post-apartheid South Africa.

2 Racism and Gender Inequality

Structural or institutional racism refers to those processes that are ingrained in legal, economic, social and political practices and institutions, resulting in the oppression, disempowerment and “othering” of certain racial groups by those that are deemed to be superior (Williams et al. 2019: 107; also see Andrews 2013; 2018; Ndhlovu & Khalema 2015; Ndinda & Ndhlovu 2018; Saini 2019). This is reinforced and perpetuated by cultural racism, that is:

...the installation of the ideology of inferiority in the values, language, imagery, symbols, and unstated assumptions of the... [so-called superior group] ... [This also manifests itself in hidden or] implicit biases... [while] stereotypes, values, images, and ideologies are presented to society [via the media, the schooling system and other means] and are consciously or subconsciously adopted and normalised. WILLIAMS ET AL. 2019: 110

Manifestly, the world of work in post-apartheid South Africa is situated in and structured by institutional racism, racialised power and gender relations that are mirrored by cultural or subtle racism. With regard to the latter, ingrained

biases are projected through “hidden forms of differential treatment” (Sian 2019; also see Magasela 2000). Historically, systematic discriminatory practices in South Africa have been deeply embedded within the capitalist system, and expressed through social control. Despite some progress in formal equality (“equality of opportunity” or meritocracy) in post-apartheid South Africa, terms such as “decency and fair play” and examination of racism as “an abstraction ... [that is, as] an isolated and particularised case of prejudice” (Younge 2019) conceal the true nature of structural racism. It is in this light that Akala (2019) warns against attributing any breakthrough by black people (personal exceptionalism) to the triumph of meritocracy; instead, this must be seen as no more than proof of injustices and inequalities, that is, systemic institutional racism reflected in privilege, class and gender oppression (Bhopal 2019; Hirsch 2018). Indeed, while the depiction of “race”, cultures and “ethnicities” is often seen through colonial eyes, underrepresentation of Africans in the higher echelons of work and society-at-large is a manifestation of unequal outcomes (*vis a vis* substantive equality) (Frank 2018; Kubota 2019; Ndinda & Uzodike 2012).

Terminology can overlay or obscure institutional racism, while the collective experiences of the oppressed and racial harassment can then be dismissed as over-sensitivity (Magasela 2000). Racial, class and gender objectification conceal the uncomfortable truths about the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid. The failure to highlight the underlying power relations as inextricably linked to racial, class and gender struggles has often led to the de-linking of systematic discrimination (such as gender pay gaps and racial discriminatory employment outcomes and educational attainment) from the intersectional struggles.

Given the dominant neo-liberal ideology in South Africa, contemporary debates have tended to view racism as isolated individual acts that are an aberration from the norm. Individualism dominates the discourse, and inequality is seen as a natural occurrence that, in the language of classical economists of colonial times, reflects people's inadequacies (laziness, incompetence, etc.) (Akala 2019; Goodfellow 2019; Hirsh 2018; Lewis 2019; Ndhlovu 2016, 2019; Saini 2019; Worger 1983). Unequal distribution of wealth and income are rationalised by special talents that allegedly contribute relatively more to production (Ndhlovu 2019; Ndhlovu & Spring 2009; Ray 2019). This is reflective of the absurdities of race science (Saini 2019).

This chapter critiques the neo-liberal conception of individualism, re-focusing the debate about inequality and difference towards unequal power relations and collective/intersectional struggles. It attempts to deconstruct, as Gathara (2019) succinctly puts it, “the frameworks that have been used to define the African's place for him [or her]”. Legislation and an array of

interventions to ensure gender and race transformation in South Africa have largely been ineffective because powerful social structures remain intact and institutional racism is a systemic rather than individual problem. Unequal outcomes are increasingly reinforced by continuing unequal power. To the extent that gender is a social and cultural construct, barriers are often erected by the dominant class to exclude the “othered” from certain spaces and positions and undermine their cohesiveness. Notwithstanding this, collective, intersectional struggles can eventually contribute to social transformation and the abolishing of oppressive and dehumanising capitalist relations of production (Ndhlovu 2019; Ndhlovu & Spring 2009).

Although policies introduced by the democratic government have succeeded in drawing African people, including African women, into spaces from which they were previously excluded, historical structural racism and sexism persist and intersect most visibly in the patterns of employment in post-apartheid South Africa.

3 The Place of Race, Class, Identity and Terminology in South Africa’s Racialised Society

Although apartheid officially ended in 1994, racism is deeply embedded in South African society, while competence is still associated with whiteness and incompetence, laziness and corruption continue to be linked with black Africans who are often subjected to “public ideological lynching” by the white-dominated media. Younge (2019) posits that racism in its many guises is not:

...a state of mind – a deficiency of the soul, heart, intellect, emotion or spirit. Racism is a systemic form of discrimination, with a centuries-old legacy, that shapes lived experience today. As such,... [racism] is already ... [an ideological] weapon. As well as denying people employment, housing, education, equality, human rights, safety and opportunity, it can literally kill. YOUNGE 2019

Younge adds that racism “can ... be deployed ... [to] galvanise, distract, deflect, distort, scapegoat and marginalise. It is an incredibly effective tool for dividing people and giving a sense of superiority to those whom you have nothing material to offer” (Younge 2019; also see Goodfellow 2019; Magasela 2000). Clearly, institutional and cultural racism, combined with the associated categorisation of people into distinct groups, also obscures the underlying historical power relations.

In South Africa, not only was colonialism founded on systemic racism and segregation against indigenous Africans, but structural racism also intersects with class and gender biases that represent a complex mosaic of power, white privilege and women's oppression. Skin colour was used to privilege those who were classified as white to the disadvantage of all others. In the hierarchy of race, Indians and coloureds were relatively superior to black Africans, but all inferior to whites. Access to resources and opportunities were predicated on this racial hierarchy designed by colonialism and perfected by the apartheid regime. Whiteness was equated to superiority and relative privilege, but the hierarchy of race created degrees of inferiority among the blacks who, nevertheless, were considered to be all inferior to whites.

Accordingly, opportunities and resources were opened or closed depending on this hierarchy of privilege. Black Africans were the most oppressed and most deprived. To ensure the total control of the country, the white colonial and apartheid governments divided the oppressed by denying black Africans the privileges that were accorded to coloureds and Indians. Black Africans were designated as labour migrants and denied free entry to the urban areas. Land expropriation and racist laws blocked access to cities, and an inferior (Bantu) educational system was designed to keep black Africans subservient. Meanwhile, coloureds and Indians, through the Job Reservation Act and other forms of preferential treatment, had some jobs reserved for them and could be resident in urban areas without requiring permits.

Given that all blacks were deemed to be inferior to whites, Indians and coloureds were given to believe that they were superior to black Africans. The legacy of colonialism and apartheid is a hierarchical racial structure and cultural racism; whites, Indians and coloureds often regarded and continue to regard themselves as superior to black Africans, while some South African black Africans, in turn, occasionally show hostility towards African immigrants as illustrated by the persistent waves of "Afrophobic" attacks (Ndinda & Ndhlovu 2016).

In this chapter, the racial classifications are only used to illustrate the extent to which racism has resulted in privileging certain groups and marginalising others in South Africa. The categorisations are not a given; these are social constructs that we seek to challenge. Apart from class, whiteness does provide a certain group of women with privileged access to the labour market, and ensures them better opportunities for advancement and promotion. Similarly, entrenched myths have resulted in and continue to influence African and coloured women's access to the labour market, their promotion and advancement in the workplace. Women are not a homogenous group; there are differences among them. The intersection of race and class that characterised the

apartheid project in South Africa continues to be interlinked with, and impact on, gender relations to reveal different forms of oppression.

4 Racial Classification

For 342 years (1652–1994), racism in South Africa was codified through the classification of the population along racial lines – in more recent times, black African, coloured, Indian and white. The most privileged were and continue to be whites, while black Africans were and remain the most disadvantaged. Racial privilege for whites and the disadvantage of indigenous black Africans persists in post-apartheid South Africa. An analysis of the classification of black Africans throughout colonialism and apartheid requires a study of its own. Suffice it to say, it is a key element in understanding race, class and gender, and provides the linguistic context under which power relations are concealed in South Africa in general and the workplace in particular.

Arguably, another way in which social control has been exercised was through the ability of certain groups to define and redefine other groups. Africans and coloureds in particular have historically been subjected to imposed identities. For example, the socially constructed race category of coloured not only conferred relatively minor privileges over Africans but, more importantly, it became part of a wider apartheid project of entrenching hierarchical levels of oppression, undermining any collective struggles against the system, and ensuring total control. These racial categories or foisted identities have remained after 1994, arguably to keep track of racial transformation in the country. It remains to be seen to what extent black Africans and coloureds can articulate their own identities as part of addressing substantive inequality, particularly since these labels have been used to perpetuate structural racism. How far will self-identification contribute to the intersectional collective struggles (race, gender, class) for unshackling power structures that underlie endemic institutional racism and substantive inequality? Indeed, the challenge is how far alternative narratives of Ubuntu and/or “decoloniality” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019a; 2019b) can assert themselves in the discourse.

Without delving into identity politics, we argue that the terms that are imposed on indigenous Africans remain critical to deconstructing race and the power relations in post-apartheid South Africa (Ndhlovu 2016; 2019; Ndinda & Ndhlovu, 2016, 2018). Although the racial category coloured is fraught with difficulties and requires a thorough historical excavation and eventual replacement, it is used here for the purposes of evaluation only, while the terms Indian and white are also used as they are in government policies.

The speech that was delivered by the deputy principal of Jeppe High School for Boys in Johannesburg, Kevin Leatham, and co-written with his wife Tammy Bechus, summed up white privilege in South Africa:

If you can look out of your car window and still genuinely believe that white people and black people start from the same base and enjoy the same economic and social opportunities, then you are like someone walking into a blood-spattered room and not seeing anything amiss. You are unable to see that a crime has been committed, and you are likely to dismiss appeals for justice because you don't think an injustice has been done. No matter how kind and generous you might consider yourself, if you deny that a crime has occurred then you are subtly working to defeat the ends of justice. LEATHAM & BECHUS 2018: 4

Redressing the effects of more than 300 years of racial discrimination requires more than policies and programmes. Close to 30 years into post-apartheid South Africa, there remains a need to urgently tackle the impact of racial discrimination in contemporary society and to address the multi-layered disadvantages of race, class and gender.

5 Policies and Programmes to Address Race and Gender Differences in Employment

Since the transition to democracy in 1994, a range of policies have been put in place to facilitate race, class and gender transformation in South Africa. The post-apartheid Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, indicates that the core values upon which the country is founded are “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms” and “non-racialism and non-sexism” (Republic of South Africa 1996: chapter 1a &b). While the Constitution represents broadly the ideals upon which post-apartheid South Africa was founded, the sectoral policies and programmes provide the measures that need to be taken to tackle racial and gender inequalities in the country.

The most significant post-apartheid law that addresses gender and racial inequality is the Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998). The Act seeks to ensure formal equality through the elimination of unfair discrimination with a view of ensuring equal opportunities in employment. The Act promotes “affirmative action to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational

categories and levels in the workplace” (Government Gazette 1998: section 2a). The Employment Equity Act explicitly prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race and gender, amongst others. The Act operationalises affirmative action as taking “measures intended to ensure that suitably qualified employees from designated groups have equal employment opportunity and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce” (Government Gazette 1998: section 15a; also see Langston 1997; Mkhondo 2014; Motileng 2004; Nel 2011; Ngalwana 2015; Padilla 1997; Twala 2005). The designated groups include black Africans, coloureds, Indians and women.

The formulation of relevant legislation has at least contributed to diversity in organisations, particularly in the public sector, but much less in the private sector. However, the policies and programmes have not deterred top executives in both the public and private sectors from over-stretching their discretion and making appointments that are contrary to the ideals of racial and gender equity and justice in the workplace. This is by no means surprising since, by its very nature, capitalism is based on inequalities. The trends that have emerged from the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) illustrate how employment equity policies are being implemented in both the public and private sectors (Department of Labour 2019).

6 Labour Market Participation by Race and Gender

Based on the CEE reports for 2013–2014 and 2018–2019, this section illustrates the extent to which gender and racial transformation in the South African workplace has occurred. The levels of employment in the senior occupational levels in national government, the private sector, and educational institutions are analysed. Our purpose is to understand which racial and gender groups dominate top management, senior management and the professionally qualified positions in these sectors.

According to the CEE report (2018–2019), most economically active South Africans are black African, who made up 78.8% of the economically active population (EAP) in 2018. This is not surprising, given that black Africans constitute about 80% of the total population in South Africa (Table 4.1) (appendices). The table also provides a break-down of the economically active population by race and gender in employment in national government at various levels: top management, senior management and professionally qualified.

Table 4.1 compares the percentages of the EAP by race and gender in the different levels of leadership in national government in 2013 and 2018. In

2013, black African females were 34.9% of the total EAP compared to white females (4.6%), Indian females (1.2%) and coloured females (5.0%). The proportion of the total economically active population that were black African female increased to 36.0% in 2018 and the proportion that were white females declined to 3.9%, Indian females decreased to 1.0% and coloured females decreased slightly to 4.4%.

Black African males constituted 40.3% of the total EAP in 2013, compared to white males who constituted 6.2%; Indian males who constituted 1.9% and coloured males who made up 5.6% of the country's total EAP. By 2018, the black African males' share of the total EAP had increased to 42.3%, while that of white males had declined to 5.1%, Indian males decreased to 1.7% and coloured males decreased to 5.2%. In terms of race and gender, the only increases between 2013 and 2018 in the share of the total EAP were among black African males and females.

6.1 *Employment Trends in National Government*

In 2013, black African females represented 34.9% of the EAP but only 25.8% of those employed in top management in the national government. White women, who represented 4.6% of the EAP, were under-represented at top management level where they comprised 3.9% of top managers in national government. Indian women, who were 1.2% of the EAP, comprised 1.9% of top managers in national government. In other words, the proportion of Indian women in top management positions in national government comprised close to two times their proportion of the total EAP in 2013. Coloured women were significantly under-represented in top management positions in 2013. While they were 5.0% of the economically active population in that year, they occupied 1.6% of these positions in national government.

In 2018, black African females represented 36.0% of the EAP but only 27.3% of those employed in top management in the national government. White women, who represented 3.9% of the total EAP, were also under-represented at top management level where they comprised 3.4% of top managers in national government. Indian women, who were 1.0% of the EAP, in 2018 comprised 2.7% of top managers in national government, increasing their proportion in these positions to close to three times their proportion of the total EAP. Coloured women were under-represented in top management positions in 2018 because, while they were 4.4% of the economically active population in that year, they occupied 2% of these positions in national government. Nevertheless, black African, Indian and women increased their proportionate share of top management positions between 2013 and 2018, while the share of white women in these positions declined between 2013 and 2018.

In both 2013 and 2018, black African and coloured women were under-represented in both the senior management and professionally qualified positions in national government, while both white and Indian women were over-represented in these positions. In 2013, black African women constituted 24.0% and coloured women 2.6% of senior management positions in national government, while white comprised 10.5% and Indian women 4.1% of those employed in these positions. Five years later, black African women made up 29.6%, coloured women 2.5%, white women 6.5% and Indian women 3.4% of people who occupied these positions. However, while the proportionate share of white, Indian and coloured women employed as senior managers in national government declined between 2013 and 2018, the share for black African women employed in these positions increased in this period.

In 2018, black African women represented 31.9% of the professionally qualified in national government. By comparison, in 2018, white women comprised 8.2%; Indian women, 2.0% and coloured women 3.6% of the professionally qualified employees in national government. While the level of employment of both black African and coloured women in these positions was below their share of the total EAP in both 2013 and 2018, their share of these positions increased during this period, while the share of these positions occupied by white and Indian women declined.

Contrasting women at the professionally qualified level with those in top and senior management positions shows some inconsistencies. Both black African and coloured women increased their share of these positions between 2013 and 2018, while white and Indian women employed in these positions declined as a proportion of the total number of employees in these positions in this period. In addition, the percentage of indigenous African women in the professionally qualified category is almost equal to their proportion of the total EAP in that year. The fact that African women constitute the largest percentage of professionally qualified women in national government (31.9%) in South Africa in 2018 and yet are underrepresented in leadership relative to their share of the EAP suggests that their qualifications, skills and competence count for nothing as far as securing jobs or promotion to senior management positions in national government are concerned. This suggests that other factors, particularly ingrained structural sexism, are at play in blocking their advancement – the “glass ceiling” (Ndinda & Uzodike 2012). Nevertheless, there has been a consistent increase in the share of all these positions that black African women occupy between 2013 and 2018, illustrating some progress in national government.

Both black African and coloured women are better-represented in professionally qualified positions in national government, but this has not translated

into equitable representation at either senior or top management positions in government. The barriers to the advancement of indigenous African and coloured women are not explicable from questions of human capital or individual characteristics of the women but, rather, power structures that are built on institutional racism. This explains why, despite their undoubted competence and percentage increases in their share of the economically active population through affirmative action, indigenous African women and coloured women are still underrepresented in top and senior management positions in government (Ndinda & Uzodike 2012). Their continued lack of tangible advancement stems from the systemic structural organisation of an unequal society that advances the interests of white and Indian women, while simultaneously blocking the progress of African and coloured women.

The black African share of top management positions in national government increased only slightly from 66.2% in 2013 to 66.6% in 2018, below their share of the total EAP of 75.2% and 78.3% in 2013 and 2018, respectively. Black Africans occupying senior management increased from 58.3% in 2013 to 68.8% in 2018, and decreased slightly in professionally qualified positions from 66.8% in 2013 to 66.4% in 2018.

6.2 *Employment Trends in the Private Sector*

The racial hierarchy of structural racism and gender bias is most evident in the private sector. Regardless of the requirement for affirmative action, the private sector is dominated by white males and females followed by black African and Indian males. The private sector remains dominated by white males, with white women holding leadership positions in significant numbers as well. There is minimal racial transformation, and gender transformation through employment equity seems to have been utilised to ensure the promotion of white women to the exclusion of black women. Regardless of their low levels of representation among the EAP, white women are more visible than black men and women in top and senior management positions in the private sector. It is also notable that Indian females in top management (2.4%) in the private sector were more than twice their share of the EAP in 2018 (1.0%) (Table 4.2). Hierarchical institutional racism is reflected much more in the private sector. The low rates of participation of black African and coloured women in, and indeed virtual absence from, top and senior management positions in the private sector suggests that there is even greater reluctance here to implement reformist affirmative action or formal equality in line with racial shares of the EAP.

As indicated in Table 4.2 below, the share of black African women in top management positions in the private sector grew by 0.1% between 2013 and 2018, from 3.8% to 3.9%, which was significantly below their share of the EAP

in both years (34.9% and 36.0%, respectively). The share of coloured women in this position increased by 0.4%, while they remained significantly under-represented in these positions in both 2013 and 2018. By contrast, white women as a proportion of those employed in top management positions in the private sector increased by 2.2% between 2013 and 2018, while for Indian women the increase was 1.1%. Both white and Indian women were over-represented in these positions in both years.

Black African and coloured women were significantly under-represented in senior management in the private sector in both 2013 and 2018, while white and Indian women were over-represented in these positions. The proportion of these positions occupied by white women in the private sector (19.1%) was close to five times their share of the economically active population in 2018 (3.9%), while for Indian women it was over three times their share of the EAP. By contrast, while black Africans constituted 36.0% of the EAP in 2018, they made up only 5.9% of those employed in senior management positions in the private sector. For coloured women, who constituted 4.4% of the EAP in 2018, their share was only 3.2%.

Black African women experienced the most dramatic increase in their share of the professionally qualified positions in the private sector, increasing their share by 2.2% from 9.8% in 2013 to 12.0% in 2018. Only white women experienced a decline in their share of these position during this period. However, while both black African and coloured women were significantly under-represented, white women in particular were over-represented, occupying 17.9% of these positions in 2018 while constituting only 3.9% of the economically active population in that year.

When looking at employment trends in the private sector by race, whereas whites occupied 69.6% of top management positions in the private sector in 2013, the share of these positions occupied by whites did not change between 2013 and 2018, with the only change being an increase in the share of white women who occupy these positions and a decrease in the share of white men. Whites also dominated senior management and professionally qualified positions in the private sector, constituting 64.4% and 60.1% of senior management in 2013 and 2018, respectively, and 50.8% and 45.9% of professionally qualified positions in the private sector in 2013 and 2018, respectively. The dramatic increase in the white female share of senior management positions was responsible as well for white predominance in these positions.

6.3 *Employment Trends at Higher Educational Institutions*

At higher educational institutions, the percentage of black African women in top management was 14.7% in 2013, but this dropped to 8.4% in 2018 (Table 4.3).

Representation of black African females in senior management fell from 13.8% in 2013 to 9.5% in 2018. While in 2013 black African females comprised 30.6% of the professionally qualified, by 2018 this had fallen by 0.2% to 30.4%. The decline in the representation of black African females was thus evident at all levels of leadership at educational institutions. There were similar falls for all race groups except among white females whose representation increased across all levels of leadership.

In 2013, white females comprised 14.5% of top management employees in educational institutions, but their representation in top management almost doubled to 28.6% in 2018. Whereas in 2013 the representation of white women in senior management was 22.1%, by 2018 their numbers had risen to 32.2%. Although the percentage rise of white women in the professionally qualified category in educational institutions was not as dramatic as in the other categories, it still rose from 16.7% in 2013 to 20.2% in 2018. While Indian women's representation in educational institutions declined from 2013 to 2018, their representation was more than double their proportion of the EAP in 2018. Despite black African females dominating amongst the professionally qualified at educational institutions by 2018, their representation in senior and top management actually declined, suggesting that skill or human capital endowment played little or no part in employment or promotion.

While whites occupied 40.8% of top management positions in educational institutions in 2013, the share of these positions occupied by whites rose to 64.1% in 2018. This contrasts sharply with the proportion of these positions held by black Africans, which decreased from 43.7% in 2013 to 21.3% in 2018, i.e., by more than half. The Indian share of these positions decreased from 7.7% in 2013 to 5.5% in 2018, while the coloured share decreased from 7.5% in 2013 to 4.8%. Whites also dominated senior management and professionally qualified positions in educational institutions, constituting 43.9% and 55.6% of senior management in 2013 and 2018, respectively, and 31.1% and 31.2% of professionally qualified positions in educational institutions in 2013 and 2018, respectively. Black Africans, Indians and coloureds experienced a decline in these positions during this period.

6.4 *Discussion*

These statistics suggest that, while government policies are meant to address both gender and race disparities, the implementation of these policies continue to result in a tilted distribution in favour particularly of white females, and also in favour of whites. Black African and coloured women remain the most disadvantaged in the racial pyramid of oppression. This shows that reformist affirmative action policies may tinker at the edges but, ironically, gender transformation through these policies has strengthened existing racial

hierarchies and the relative dominance of white minority women in leadership positions in the private sector and at educational institutions.

Paradoxically, affirmative action regarding gender has resulted in overrepresentation of Indian women in top and senior management positions in national government. However, the same policy has not had the same effect upon black African and coloured women who remain underrepresented in top and senior management positions despite their increased representation among the EAP and in the professionally qualified category. In terms of race, affirmative action policies have succeeded in accelerating the rise of Indian men to the top and senior management positions in government, but have not had the same impact for black African and coloured men.

The dominance of whites in senior positions in the private sector and educational institutions does not bode well for the establishment of a non-racial democracy, particularly in a society where racism is so deeply entrenched. In other words, the continuing dominance of whites of sectors of society that are so critical for development points to the persistence of gender and racial hierarchies in South Africa. A situation in which 9% of the economically active population occupied almost 70% of top management positions in the private sector and 64% of these positions in educational institutions in 2018 cannot be allowed to continue.

These patterns and trends suggest that the implementation of affirmative action policies have not only had unintended consequences, but also reinforced the structural racial and gender hierarchies embedded in South African society. Hierarchical structural and cultural racism, particularly gender bias against women of colour, continue to be anchored by unequal power relations, thus resulting in the underrepresentation of indigenous African and coloured women in top and senior management positions in government, the private sector and educational institutions.

Entrenched racial hierarchies in the pyramid of privilege have ensured that whites are at the top with black Africans at the bottom of the pyramid regardless of their geographical location. Indeed, by virtue of their social capital endowment and their belonging to the dominant racial group, that is, their belonging to the same social networks with white males, white women have retained and even strengthened their privileged positions.

7 **Theoretical and Practical Implications for Formal Equality and Substantive Equality: What is to Be Done?**

In South Africa, affirmative action is premised upon the inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups (black Africans, coloureds and Indians) in the

economic, social and political spheres. Whether we refer to affirmative action or diversity, evidence shows that the intended beneficiaries, particularly black African and coloured women, were worse off in 2018 than in 2013. This is despite their higher economic participation rates and the democratic state facilitating their dominance in formal qualifications, that is, formal competence. Thus, the claim in some quarters in South Africa that affirmative action has resulted in reverse racism or discrimination against whites is not borne out by reality. Instead, our findings show that especially female whites have strengthened and consolidated their already exalted positions of power and influence.

In the circumstances, the assertion of reverse racism is a political, legal and ideological device for challenging remedial policies that are designed to “[correct] injustices of historical inequality and expanding capabilities” (Evans & Heller 2013: 16), and address “legally imposed White supremacy and oppression” (Moore 2018: 56) of, particularly black Africans and coloureds in the pyramid of structural and cultural racism. Moreover, attacks on affirmative action can be seen as rhetorical tools for garnering support against formal equality, while detracting “attention from patterns of White domination” (Moore 2018: 59). Rather than inequality resulting from relative contribution to production and/or individual endeavour (“hard work”), our analysis has shown that unequal power structures reproduce, sustain and perpetuate a capitalist system of privilege and hierarchical institutional racism (also see Ndhlovu 2019; Warikoo 2016).

South Africa remains structured along racial, class and gender lines, and it is imperative that support through affirmative action is used to overcome historically inherent institutional racism (against black Africans and coloureds in particular), as well as other economic and social hurdles (Gaertner & Hart 2015; Moore 2018). While the democratic state should perform its technocratic functions of redistribution, it must also ensure that more stringent penalties are levied for non-compliance with affirmative action policies. Affirmative action can facilitate formal or legalistic equity, but it is intersectional collective struggles that are likely to bring about substantive equity.

To the extent that intersectional struggles are played out at different levels, including the level of the state, the private sector in particular in South Africa has resisted and circumvented measures for implementing affirmative action by using informal networks (patronage, nepotism) and “fronting” (Ndhlovu & Spring 2009). In addition, the resistance to even reformist affirmative action policies by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) party only highlights the determination of those who previously benefitted from the apartheid racial hierarchies, and their intent to preserve and perpetuate unequal power

relations. Their primary focus is on *formal* equality (equality of opportunity) rather than *substantive* equality (equality of outcome).

Structural changes can only arise by going beyond affirmative action to the root of the problem, that is, entrenched power relations that have been reproduced over centuries. In addition: “There must also be a willingness to look beyond law and create change through other means, political and social” (Smith 2016: 101–102). Without fundamental changes in the underlying power structures and systemic structural racism, the ANC (African National Congress) government is unlikely to see tangible changes for black African and coloured women in particular from affirmative action (AA) policies (formal equality), let alone substantive equality.

Using intersectionality analysis gives insight into “multiple social inequalities and identities” (Konstantoni & Emejulu 2017: 6; Smooth 2016; Welch & Yates 2018: 15). Indeed, it makes possible the unravelling of the social processes of change, from remedial “creeping incremental shifts [formal equality]” (Welch & Yates 2018: 14) to fundamental “social, economic and political conflicts, upheavals and interventions [substantive equality]” (Welch & Yates 2018: 14). Understanding the “interlocking systems of oppression” or “matrix of domination” (Collins 2015) that comprise race, gender and class requires a keen historical awareness of the “dynamic and shifting” (Smooth 2016: 516) institutional and power structures, as well as the central role played by social movements for change (also see Konstantoni & Emejulu 2017: 6; 9–12; 15–17).

Given that “purposive collective action” (Welch & Yates 2018: 14) is accompanied by “dispersed collective activity” (Welch & Yates 2018: 14), struggles for inclusion and against systemic racism and unequal power relations must be rooted in people’s lived experiences (Welch & Yates 2018: 9–15). These collective struggles must also be anchored on intersectional prefiguration whose foundation is “radical democratic politics” and social organisation for transformative change (Ishkanian & Saavedra 2019: 985–990; 993–998).

However, there are challenges to creating such supporting networks and operationalising collective action. In South Africa, hierarchical structural racism ensured that some members of the oppressed collective groups were led to believe that they were relatively superior to their peers. Thus, they have a contradictory “privileged yet marginalised” (Smooth 2016: 518) status that can result in their being “silent oppressors” of the collective (Smooth 2016: 517–520). In other words, their conflictual positions in the hierarchical capitalist system of oppression often leads them to become “partners” in their own oppression and that of others (Gathara 2019).

Conscientisation regarding the nature and form of endemic racism is essential, but navigating the underlying power structures is also crucial for

the success of the collective movement for change. While there may be few examples of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) success stories, personal exceptionalism (as Akala 2019 describes it) only serves as a painful reminder of the unequal and unjust capitalist system that has been in place in South Africa for more than 300 years. The focus on the “multiple identities” of relatively “privileged but marginalised” members of the oppressed groups shine a light on underrepresentation that “results in a concentration of power and influence in the hands of a few” (Smooth 2016: 519).

Advancement of black Africans and coloureds in general, and black African and coloured women in particular, requires collective action to address both the subtle and obvious ways in which they are excluded from advancing into leadership positions in both the public and private sectors. Therefore, appointment and promotion boards should not only have “intersectional disadvantaged” representatives that are exposed to and deeply appreciative of social and political realities but, as Smooth (2016: 520–526) suggests, the whole process must also be geared towards maximising support for “intersectional opportunities” (Smooth 2016: 521). In the final analysis, “political solidarity”, participation “in national organisation” (Smooth 2016: 522) and supporting networks of the oppressed collective are key to effecting institutional change. In other words, activism is central to fundamental social change.

8 Conclusion

This chapter sought to explore and explain the extent to which race and gender affect people’s positions in the South African labour market. Existing statistics were analysed, and intersectionality analysis used to unravel the different and interrelated layers of oppression and discrimination against black people and, in particular, black African and coloured women. As a theoretical construct, intersectionality not only reveals unequal power relations in practice, but also deep-rooted structural racism that erects barriers for especially black African and coloured women in the labour market. Despite employment equity policies and programmes such as affirmative action, the imbalance in power relations and historical privileging of whiteness have enabled employers to circumvent legislation that seeks *formal* equality. Affirmative action has largely failed to reverse structural and cultural racism in employment, let alone address the more fundamental questions of advancing race, class and gender transformation, that is, *substantive* equality, because it does not address power structures.

Despite policies designed to target women to ensure inclusion and representation, that is, employment equity, centuries of gender and race discrimination and marginalisation of black African and coloured women remain rooted in post-apartheid South Africa. As argued throughout this chapter, power structures, social capital, systemic hierarchical structural racism and gender biases are major explanatory variables for the skewed distribution of employment of women of the different race groups, particularly in top and senior management positions in the private sector and at higher education institutions. Nothing short of radical transformation in the configuration of power is likely to change this reality. This is where intersectionality analysis helps us to understand the complex relationship of gender, race and systemic racism. While South Africa has all the policies to bring some changes to race and gender discrimination (*formal equality*), the major changes required to eliminate the concentration of power and associated hierarchical structural racism (*substantive inequality*) have yet to be effected. While affirmative action may bring some relief in the labour market, it is this elephant in the room (*substantive inequality*) that needs to be tackled. It is only through the intersectional collective struggles of those who suffer discrimination that the racial hierarchy in employment, particularly in the private sector and at institutions of higher education, can be eliminated by giving rise to the necessary political will to enforce existing policies that aim at racial redress.

Appendix

TABLE 4.1 Economically active population, and percentage employment by race and gender in the national government, 2013 and 2018

		Female						Male						Total					
		African		White		Indian		Coloured		African		White		Indian		Coloured		Female	Male
		2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018	2013	2018		
Economically Active Population		34.9%	36.0%	4.6%	3.9%	1.2%	1.0%	5.0%	4.4%	40.3%	42.3%	6.2%	5.1%	1.9%	1.7%	5.6%	5.2%		
Top Management		25.8%	27.3%	3.9%	3.4%	1.9%	2.7%	1.6%	2.0%	40.4%	39.35	11.7%	10.5%	6.3%	6.2%	5.6%	6.6%	0.2%	0.2%
Senior Management		24.0%	29.6%	10.5%	6.5%	4.1%	3.4%	2.6%	2.5%	34.3%	39.2%	13.8%	8.8%	4.8%	4.5%	4.6%	4.4%	0.5%	0.6%
Professionally qualified		30.1%	31.9%	9.9%	8.2%	2.6%	2.0%	3.0%	3.6%	36.7%	34.5%	11.4%	11.4%	2.2%	2.6%	3.5%	4.6%	0.2%	0.4%
																		0.4%	0.8%

SOURCES: ADAPTED FROM COMMISSION OF EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 2014; 2019.

TABLE 4.2 Economically active population, and percentage employment by race and gender in the private sector, 2013 and 2018

		Female					Male					Foreign		Total
		African	White	Indian	Coloured	African	White	Indian	Coloured	Female	Male			
Economically Active Population	2013	34.9%	4.6%	1.2%	5.0%	40.3%	6.2%	1.9%	5.6%					100%
	2018	36.0%	3.9%	1.0%	4.4%	42.3%	5.1%	1.7%	5.2%					100%
Top Management	2013	3.8%	11.0%	1.8%	1.5%	8.8%	58.6%	6.6%	3.2%	0.6%	4.2%			100%
	2018	3.9%	13.2%	2.9%	1.9%	7.9%	56.4%	7.1%	3.2%	0.5%	3.0%			100%
Senior Management	2013	4.8%	16.9%	3.2%	2.4%	10.2%	47.5%	7.4%	4.3%	0.6%	2.8%			100%
	2018	5.9%	19.1%	4.1%	3.2%	10.8%	41.0%	7.7%	4.7%	0.8%	2.7%			100%
Professionally qualified	2013	9.8%	18.0%	4.6%	4.5%	15.3%	32.8%	6.9%	5.7%	0.6%	1.8%			100%
	2018	12.0%	17.9%	4.8%	4.9%	17.0%	28.0%	6.5%	5.9%	0.8%	2.3%			100%

SOURCES: ADAPTED FROM COMMISSION OF EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 2014; 2019.

TABLE 4.3 Economically active population, and percentage employment by race and gender in educational institutions, 2013 and 2018

		Female						Male						Total						
		African		White		Indian		Coloured		African		White		Indian		Coloured		Female	Male	
Economically Active Population	2013	34.9%	4.6%	1.2%	5.0%	40.3%	6.2%	1.9%	5.6%											
	2018	36.0%	3.9%	1.0%	4.4%	42.3%	5.1%	1.7%	5.2%											
Top Management	2013	14.7%	14.5%	2.2%	2.2%	29.0%	26.3%	5.5%	5.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	2018	8.4%	28.6%	2.1%	2.4%	12.9%	35.5%	3.4%	2.4%	1.5%	1.5%	3.1%	3.1%	1.5%	3.1%	1.5%	3.1%	1.5%	3.1%	1.5%
Senior Management	2013	13.8%	22.1%	3.7%	3.1%	23.0%	21.8%	5.4%	4.5%	2.1%	1.8%	4.2%	4.2%	1.8%	4.2%	1.8%	4.2%	1.8%	4.2%	1.8%
	2018	9.5%	32.2%	3.5%	2.7%	16.3%	23.4%	3.2%	2.1%	3.2%	3.8%	3.4%	3.4%	3.8%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%
Professionally qualified	2013	30.6%	16.7%	3.8%	2.8%	19.8	14.4%	3.8%	3.4%	2.0%	1.3%	2.0%	2.0%	1.3%	2.0%	1.3%	2.0%	1.3%	2.0%	1.3%
	2018	30.4%	20.2%	3.5%	2.5%	21.2%	11.0%	3.0%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%

SOURCES: ADAPTED FROM COMMISSION OF EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 2014; 2019.

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Racism in Higher Education: *Privileges and Exclusions at Universities in South Africa*

Neo Lekgotla laga Ramoupi

The *racism* experienced was indirect and subliminal, i.e., direct manifestations of racism were by and large a thing of the past: *Racism* has become subtle. The victims can smell it a mile away. The problem is how to articulate it so that the pain can be expressed. (UJ meeting with Council). *Racism* is ubiquitous, (but) it can't be seen and then you feel you must be 'mad'. (NMMU meeting with staff). You feel it but can't pinpoint it. Talking to (white) colleagues and you feel a wall coming up. It exists, but how can we deal with it? (VUT meeting with staff). SOUDIEN ET AL. 2008

The *racism* I have experienced from my white colleagues at the University of Cape Town has driven me to despair, whether it is being mistaken for a delivery boy or being told to go to the students' bathroom or being policed by colleagues who have absolutely no authority over me. These things are known to our universities but nobody does anything about them, let alone pick up the phone to find out. The experiences are either explained away or covered up. MANGCU 2017

1 Introduction

The quotations above are extracts from the report of the 'Ministerial Committee on Transformation and Social Cohesion and the Elimination of Discrimination in Public Higher Education Institutions' released in 2008, and a 'Letter to the Editor' written by Xolela Mangcu, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Cape Town (UCT) at the time, which was published in the *Mail & Guardian* in June 2017. They illustrate that the 'rainbow nation' of a post-apartheid 'paradise' that was expected to emerge in South Africa after the first democratic elections on the 27 April 1994 has not materialised after more than 27 years of democratic rule. The experiences described by Mangcu, one of post-apartheid South Africa's eminent black African professors, is very recent—and is

the common experience of many like him at the universities and other workplaces in South Africa. Almost a decade earlier, in 2008, fourteen years after the first democratic elections, when it had become clear that racism in the higher education system was so ingrained that it was here to stay, the then Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor, decided to establish the Ministerial Committee. The Committee was chaired by Professor Crain Soudien, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor for Transformation at UCT at the time.

Mangcu's letter was written not long after the eruption of student activism at universities and the growth of the "Fallist Movements", whose birth can be traced to the #Rhodes Must Fall Movement (#RMF) at UCT that took place from March 2015. Later in the same year, in October, the #Fees Must Fall Movement (#FMF) emerged at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg.¹ On Friday 23 October 2015, the Fallist student movements shut down the entire Higher Education system when they marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria to demand a meeting with the President, J.G. Zuma. Both #RMF and #FMF are the culmination of the students' rage; publicly expressed because of the lack of concrete transformation and decolonisation at South African universities more than two decades into democratic rule. The concerns and grievances of these student movements were not only directed against colonial and apartheid statues and the rise in students' fees, but students' experiences of race and racism as well, which were at the core of the Fallist Movements.

A year earlier, in 2014, before the formation of #RMF, the black postgraduate students in Wits University's Department of Political Sciences presented a "Transformation Memorandum – 2014" to their faculty and to the university's Vice-Chancellor, Professor Adam Habib. The memorandum states:

The university fails to create the type of environment in which *black academics* feel welcome. Furthermore, as black students, when we don't see anyone who looks like us teaching, there is very little reason or inspiration for us to believe that we can be academics and lecturers ourselves one day. This notion of 'the exceptional black' who meets faculty criteria to become a lecturer serves to disincentivise rather than incentivise black

1 There is an ongoing debate about the genesis of the #Fees Must Fall Movement. Some argue that it was not students at Wits University that initiated it, but the students at the Tshwane University of Technology (TUT). The TUT student activists argue that because the TUT student body is black, their protests against fee increases were not taken seriously by the government, whilst the protests arising from the same grievances by students at a predominantly white university were perceived by both government and the public as a national crisis.

students to continue with their studies and become eligible candidates to teach. The need for positive role models and mentors for all students cannot be overemphasised.... What we as students know is that there is no acceptable reason that in 2014 the university fails to recognise the existence of highly qualified black scholars as well as the contribution of black African scholars to existing political thought and the emergence of new areas of study. POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES 2014: 5–6

These postgraduate students were raising concerns about race and racism at the institution because, as the Brazilian philosopher, Paulo Freire, states: “Education never was and never will be neutral” (Freire 1972: 93). “Education is a political act”, because conceptualisations of courses and disciplines are influenced by the dominant political paradigm, whether it be colonial, apartheid or post-apartheid in the South African context.

The focus of this chapter is to demonstrate how the experiences and perceptions of racial superiority and loss of privilege interact to reinforce racism in education institutions in post-apartheid South Africa. It does so by drawing attention to historical and recent experiences of racial discrimination and racism at some of the country’s leading universities. The focus is on the experience of black academic staff at these institutions. Prior to doing so, however, it is necessary to examine key features of the apartheid education laws, the Bantu Education Act of 1953 and Extension of University Education Act of 1959, that underpin the racial discrimination and racism at universities.

2 The Bantu Education Act of 1953

After the Nationalist Party (NP) government came to power in 1948 with its policy of apartheid it set up a Commission on Native Education under the chairmanship of Dr W.W.M. Eiselen in January 1949. The Nationalist government believed that schooling was an essential means to achieve success in bringing about apartheid, and the Commission’s terms of reference included the formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives (black Africans) in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitudes, and their needs under ever-changing social conditions were taken into consideration (Christie & Collins 1982: 59). The Eiselen Commission reflects the significance the new apartheid government ascribed to transforming the education system of the ‘natives’ for the success of its apartheid project.

The 1951 Report of the Eiselen Commission gave rise to the Bantu Education Act (No. 47 of 1953), which gave wide powers to the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, to bring into effect the major recommendations of the Commission. Bantu education was to be directed to the “Bantu”, which, according to the Act’s definition, “shall be synonymous with native” (Bantu Education Act No. 47 of 1953). It was to be centrally controlled and financed under the Minister of Native Affairs, and syllabi were to be adapted to the “native” way of life, and “native” languages introduced into all “native” schools. Most importantly, however, the control of “native” schools was to be slowly taken over from the Mission churches and bodies who were running most black African schools at that time and to be placed under the apartheid government’s Native Affairs Department.

According to Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, who was responsible for implementing the Bantu Education Act, the education previously given, and even more the atmosphere in which it was given, had led to the production of frustrated black Africans because they had been made to feel that they were above their community and wanted to become integrated with the life of the European [white] community by obtaining posts in a European [white] setting and through the elimination of Europeans [whites]. When this had not happened, they became rebellious and encouraged rebellion in their community because of their misdirected and alien ambition (Shepherd 1955: 138). These statements make obscure the real intention behind the new education system:

Education is the key to the creation of the proper relationship between European [*white*] and non-European [*native*] in South Africa ... Put native education on a sound basis and half the racial questions are solved.....
CHRISTIE & COLLINS 1982: 69

The Eiselen Commission report was very explicit on how this should be done:

We should not give the natives an academic education, as some people are too prone to do. If we do this we shall later be burdened with a number of academically trained Europeans and non-Europeans, and who is going to do the manual labour in the country? ... I am in thorough agreement with the view that we should so conduct our schools that the native who attends those schools will know that to a great extent he must be the labourer in the country. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1953

One aspect of the education system that emerged from the Bantu Education Act deserves special attention here. The Bantu Education system that was

implemented from the mid-1950s made familiarity with one of the two official languages, Afrikaans and English – deemed to be the languages of the employers – an important part of the curriculum. Although the purpose of language instruction was undoubtedly to facilitate communication in the language of the employer, it was unlikely that a rudimentary exposure to these languages as set out in practice would have resulted in mastery of them, and this in itself would perpetuate the ideology of inferiority and the social relations of domination and subordination. Most importantly, the object was to ensure that a few years of schooling would achieve the function of preparing black Africans to participate in capitalist social relations at the level deemed to be their place by the white authorities. This elementary level of literacy would, for example, enable blacks to participate in bureaucratic practices such as filling in basic forms, reading basic instructions, and so on, as well as to entrench their position in the hierarchy of social relations (Christie & Collins 1982: 72).

The Bantu Education system that later emerged was designed to restrict black Africans to manual labour and was assisted in this regard by the way the apartheid authorities dealt with tertiary education for blacks (black Africans, Indians and coloureds) in general.

3 The Extension of University Education Act

The Extension of University Education Act (No. 45 of 1959) was passed in 1959 and empowered the government to establish university colleges for black people; that is, for black Africans, coloureds and Indians. At about the same time, the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act empowered the Government to transfer control of the College from its Governing Council to the Minister of Bantu Education, who was also given control of two new colleges for black Africans. Later it was decided that a newly-established coloured College would fall under the Department of Coloured Affairs and a newly-established Indian College under the Department of Indian Affairs. In 1969, the five university colleges established under the 1959 Acts were granted university status by appropriate Acts of Parliament (Moulder 1975).

The Extension of University Education Act also empowered the government to state that from the beginning of 1960 no black person who was not already registered as a student might register at, or attend, any university for whites without the consent of the responsible Minister. In December 1960, a proclamation was issued which stated that no black students would be allowed to register at an open university for degrees which could be obtained from a university college created for their group. In general, therefore, Xhosa people had

to attend what is now the University of Fort Hare (UFH); Zulu and Swazi people the University of Zululand (UniZul); and Sotho, Tswana, Venda, Tsonga and Ndebele people the University of the North (UN) since 1959. The University of the Western Cape (UWC) served the coloured people; and Indians attended the University of Durban-Westville (UDW).

Before the enactment of the Extension of University Education Act, Fort Hare was a multi-racial institution: in 1959 the staff consisted of 28 whites, 10 black Africans and one coloured. The university Council was composed of 19 whites and 3 black Africans, and the Senate of 21 whites and 4 black Africans. Of the 498 students at the time, 37% were Xhosa-speaking black Africans, 33% came from other black African groups, 15% were Indian and 15% were coloured. Such an arrangement was not acceptable to the Government (Nagan 1965: 101).

Prior to the introduction of the Extension of University Education Act, the Universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand (the open universities) enrolled black students and followed a practice of "academic non-segregation". The University of Natal (UN) also enrolled black students; but it had segregated classes. Rhodes University (RU) occasionally admitted a black student who wished to take a post-graduate course that was not available at the University College of Fort Hare. On the other hand, the Afrikaans-language Universities of the Orange Free State (UOFS), Potchefstroom (UPotch), Pretoria (UP) and Stellenbosch (SU) were closed to black students.

Although all four English-language universities objected to the provisions of the Extension of University Education Act which empowered the Government to prohibit black students from enrolling with them, the two open universities were more emphatic that this was an infringement of their academic freedom. For example, in April 1959 the University of the Witwatersrand pledged itself to the following affirmation of academic freedom:

We affirm in the name of the University of the Witwatersrand that it is our duty to uphold the principle that a university is a place where men and women, without regard to race and colour, are welcome to join in the acquisition and advancement of knowledge; and to continue faithfully to defend the ideal against all who have sought by legislative enactment to curtail the autonomy of the University. Now, therefore, we dedicate ourselves to the maintenance of this ideal and to the restoration of the autonomy of our University. MOULDER 1975: 65

Despite this, the successes of the 1959 Act that privileged white academics by excluding both black students and academics from these institutions was

observable in a variety of ways. All black people suffered because of this legislation and the apartheid government's arrangement to build universities for different ethnic groups; it denied them the same quality education provided to whites at the 'white universities'. The quality of education was different. The Act also enabled the allocation of resources unequally to the different racial institutions, as is shown elsewhere in this volume. Better qualified lecturers, more sophisticated equipment, better-stocked libraries, and better academic resources of all kinds than those found at the black universities ensured that whites had a better chance of success in their university studies. Black students were allowed limited access to this quality education, and were required to obtain the special permission of a Minister to do so. These universities were white spaces, and the democratic transition opened them up to all in a way that threatened this privilege. But they have now become sites of racial discrimination as never before.

4 A Case Study of Black Academic Staffs' Experiences of Racial Discrimination and Racism at Universities

In a new publication titled *Black Academic Voices: The South African Experience* (Khunou et al, 2019), twelve black (black African, Indian and coloured) academics – ten of whom are black African women – describe their experiences at the former white English-speaking universities in biographical format. These accounts draw attention to the privileges and exclusions based on race at the historically white universities (HWUS); but the most pronounced is that of Katijah Khoza-Shangase, an associate professor and former Head of Department in Speech Pathology and Audiology at Wits University. She is the first, and to date, the only black African to be awarded a PhD in her field. Her impressive academic achievements did not protect her from the racial exclusions she experienced in a field where she is the only black academic (Khoza-Shangase 2019: 46). She writes: "I have diagnosed myself as suffering from intellectual and emotional toxicity induced by racism, harassment, discrimination and white privilege within the academy" (Khoza-Shangase 2019: 42). These are the words used by Khoza-Shangase to begin a biographical chapter about her experiences as a black academic.

Khoza-Shangase stepped down as head of the department after she had been told that a harassment case she had initiated against a white professor in the university had been dismissed. The communication she received informing her about this decision took her by surprise and left her baffled. At a subsequent meeting where she requested to discuss the decision, she was told that

she had three choices: accept the decision and live with it, take the university to court, or resign. This took place at the time Khoza-Shangase had “applied for personal promotion to full professor, a time when my application was under review” (Khoza-Shangase 2019: 48).

It is clear that privileges of race were afforded “a very senior member of staff” who was “a white professor in the university” (Khoza-Shangase 2019: 48). Khoza-Shangase concludes that: “...with continuing evidence, my university reifies, celebrates and protects white-as-normal epistemological and sociological values” (Khoza-Shangase 2019: 49). She added that: “...the university can’t afford to discipline a white, rated, full professor – whose rating contributes to what university rankings are all about – in favour of a black female associate professor with no rating” (Khoza-Shangase 2019: 49).

There is a long history of such experiences, and the next section focuses on the experiences of black African academics at universities during the apartheid era.

5 Racial Discrimination Against Black Academics during the Apartheid era

According to Murray, writing about Wits University, from the onset of apartheid “the status of lecturer was closed to blacks; the black members of the academic staff engaged by the University were all in African languages and, to the chagrin of at least one of them, Robert Sobukwe, the founder of the Pan-Africanist Congress in 1959, were described as ‘language assistants’ (Murray 1990: 651).

Robert Sobukwe’s appointment at Wits University in June 1954 to the position of “Language Assistant” in the Department of Bantu Languages was in contravention of the university’s policy of “academic non-segregation”, but in accordance with apartheid policy which stipulated that a black member of the academic staff would not be given the title of a lecturer; but the title of “Language Assistant” which was appropriate to denote his “lesser status” (Pogrud 1990: 55). The “title of lecturer” was reserved “for white academics”. In a letter, dated 5 May 1969, written by the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of the Witwatersrand at the time, G.R. Bozzoli, to the Minister of Justice, Petrus Cornelius Pelser, it is clear that the university authorities were aware that they had supported the apartheid regime to achieve its racist goal.

We are glad that you have now felt able to announce the release of Richard [sic] Sobukwe and as this University was his previous employer I feel

that we might be thought to have some moral responsibility to assist him in his rehabilitation on his release from prison. I would like you to know that if it would be helpful to the government, the University would be prepared to try to fit him into the teaching establishment as a Language Assistant. This would necessitate our creating a new post and we would naturally have to satisfy ourselves that Mr Sobukwe could and would fill the post completely and adequately. As these steps take time to complete, it would be helpful to the University to know confidentially, as soon as it suits your convenience, whether the restrictions which might be placed upon him would be such that he would be unable to accept employment of this type, but our willingness to assist in his rehabilitation might be of assistance to yourself in determining the conditions of his release. I need hardly add that the whole matter would be handled, on our part, with the minimum of publicity, and we would ensure that Mr Sobukwe understood this and would appreciate that we could not retain him on the staff if he courted publicity or became active in politics. We realise full well that we might land ourselves in difficulties but we are prepared to face this if it would help your Department and the position generally. CITED IN NDLOVU 2009: 64

These were the conditions under which a black academic such as Sobukwe would be accepted in the university. He was to be appointed to a position he had first been appointed to in 1954, fourteen years later.

At about the same time, another incident was taking place at the University of Cape Town. In May 1968, Archie Mafeje was appointed as a senior lecturer in the Department of Social Anthropology. Mafeje had completed an MA at the university and was studying for a PhD through Cambridge University. He was thus eminently qualified for the post. However, there were restrictions on the appointment of black academics, with black African lecturers at the white universities only employed to teach African languages. The government objected to Mafeje's appointment, and demanded that the post be filled by a suitably qualified white person. The University Council withdrew the appointment of Mafeje, particularly after threats of a funding-cut and the introduction of laws that allowed for the employment of black Africans as lecturers in African languages (Plaut 2010: 200).

The Mafeje incident is particularly significant and symbolic in that it took place at UCT, the oldest university in the country. By supporting apartheid legislation as it related to Mafeje's proposed appointment in 1968, and not challenging the Minister of Education, Jan de Klerk, the university entrenched and strengthened apartheid and racism in higher education at white universities

in general. UCT had the opportunity to confront apartheid and the racism that underpins it by appointing Mafeje, and thereby set the trend for other white universities to challenge apartheid policy on the appointment of black academics. This would have justified the name it was given in recognition of its apparent opposition to apartheid: “Moscow on the Hill” (Ramoupi 2014: 271). However, in 1968, UCT opted to protect white privilege and exclude blacks from the university.

Mafeje went abroad where he distinguished himself as an academic, first by obtaining a PhD in Anthropology and Rural Sociology from Cambridge University. In 1973, at the age of 34, he was appointed Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Development at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague by an Act of Parliament, and with the approval of all the Dutch universities, becoming the first African scholar to be so distinguished in the Netherlands. That appointment bestowed on him the honour of being a Queen Juliana Professor and one of her Lords. His name appears in the prestigious blue pages of the Dutch National Directorate. He was guest professor at universities and research institutions in Africa, Europe, and North America, and he authored many books, monographs, and journal articles. His critique of the concept of tribalism and his works on anthropology are widely cited as key reference materials. He also did path-breaking work on the land and agrarian question in Africa (Ramoupi 2014: 272).

6 Racial Discrimination Against Black Academics during the Post-apartheid era

The appointment of Mahmood Mamdani as AC Jordan Professor of African Studies and as director of the Centre of African Studies (CAS) at UCT in 1997–98 is significant here, firstly, because it relates to what happened to Mafeje in the 1990s. In 1993, Mafeje applied for this position, and was seen as the most eligible candidate (Ntsebeza 2014: 281). In a letter to UCT, Mafeje described what qualified him for the position:

I believe that I am eminently qualified for the post. Not only did I have the privilege of working with the late A.C. Jordan as a research student at the University of Cape Town and abroad but also I can claim that among African scholars specialised in African Studies I probably have the widest experience and recognition throughout the continent, including Arab-speaking Africa. NTSEBEZA 2014: 281

UCT rejected Mafeje, who was not even invited for an interview, in favour of Mamdani. A black South African had been rejected in favour of a foreign African. Why did UCT reject Mafeje and accept Mamdani? The preferential appointments of South African black academics became policy at several universities only in the wake of the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall and other #Fallist movements. Prior to this, it appears that some universities preferred the appointments of non-South African blacks because they were less of a threat to the status quo than black South African academics. As Sipho Seepe later noted, universities at the time “tried to bring as many African scholars as possible from outside the country” (Seepe 2021). However, Mamdani, despite being a non-South African, eventually challenged the status quo at UCT, and, by extension, at other white universities in South Africa (Ramoupi 2014). This incident draws attention to another issue of relevance here.

By appointing Mamdani, it appeared that UCT was willing to shed its antagonistic attitude towards African knowledge production, scholarship, and research. This was not the case. It was not long before the university came out strongly against the syllabus Mamdani developed for a compulsory introductory course on Africa that was to be taught as part of a Foundation Semester in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities. Pedagogy and content were the causes of disagreement, and the main question was about “how to teach Africa in a post-apartheid academy”. The opinion of most of the members of a Working Group established to review the syllabus before it was implemented was that most of the material – which included the history of Africa prior to colonialism and the history of slavery – was irrelevant. The central issue for Mamdani was that UCT was using mostly white scholars to teach courses on Africa through a Eurocentric lens. Mamdani questioned this abnormal pedagogy; and this questioning was met with dismay by his fellow white academics. Maart (2014) provides an explanation for their dismay:

...what needs to be noted, given the ways in which apartheid operated, is that White professors were taught by White professors for the most part.... White South African scholars currently employed at universities in South Africa, as has regularly been verified despite the discomfort upon asking the question, have not been taught by Black professors and they treat the matter as ‘normal’ without even the slightest concern for what it says about the ways in which Africans and African scholarship is kept out of university institutions in South Africa. MAART 2014: 59–60

In his own words, Mamdani states:

Race is not absent from this issue. . . . Broadly, it is a question about *curriculum transformation*, and about who should be making these decisions. Narrowly, *it is a question about how Africa is to be taught in a post-apartheid academy*. MAMDANI 1998

The curriculum transformation, re-teaching of Africa in a post-apartheid university, and appointments of African and black professors are, and must be at the heart of institutions of higher learning in South Africa today. It is more urgent now after we have celebrated close to three decades of freedom.

Mamdani was suspended from participation in the course for the following year on the day he had completed designing it, but before he was able to present the syllabus to the rest of the academic staff of the faculty. Mamdani protested, but nothing was done, forcing him to go on what he termed a “one-person strike” by suspending “all institutional involvement” until the matter was addressed. He was also concerned that the syllabus that substituted his for the year was “substandard”, and its content “a poisonous introduction for students entering a post-apartheid university” and “wrestling with the legacy of racism”. He requested that his suspension be lifted and that he be given leadership of the course because he was the Professor of African Studies at the University. His suspension was lifted, but his leadership of the course was not confirmed. He was then invited to be a member of a group tasked with drafting the course, which he rejected (Mamdani 1998). Mamdani eventually resigned from UCT to take up a post at Columbia University (see also Shoro 2014).

Professor William Makgoba’s treatment at Wits after his appointment as the university’s first black Deputy Vice-Chancellor and most senior black African academic in the 1990s is another example of racism in the higher institutions of learning in post-apartheid South Africa, and the protection of white privilege. Makgoba wrote about his experiences in *Mokoko: The Makgoba Affair: A Reflection on Transformation* (1997), where he captures the essence of the challenge he posed to white privilege at the university as follows:

Wits must realise that the cultural ethos which apparently served the institution so well in the past must change to accommodate other cultural values. The *curricula* have to change fundamentally, as the University comes to terms with the reality that *it is educating all South Africans in Africa. Africans in particular do not come to university to escape or erase the Africanness, but to confirm and articulate their roots*. MAKGOBA 1997:

Like Mamdani, Makgoba was challenging the institutional culture of the institution and in particular its curricula. This incident took place prior to the events Mamdani experienced at UCT, and he drew from Makgoba's book to write about the treatment of the latter just a year before he underwent a similar experience. According to Mamdani, towards the end of 1995 a "cabal of 13 deans and dons" compiled "a dossier of some 400 pages, purporting to detail the lapses in Makgoba's CV, claiming that this man is actually intellectually dishonest, nothing less than an intellectual hoax" (Mamdani 1997: 3). They also accused him of administrative incompetence and making statements harmful to the university. Makgoba responded by publicly revealing details of the CVs of the 13 deans, "giving the 13 a taste of their own medicine" (Mamdani 1997: 3). He accused the 13 of tax evasion and of employing illegal means to obtain the information used against him, while denying the charges made by them. This volatile dispute between a senior black academic and 13 senior academics (12 white liberals and one African American) "filled the front pages and letters to the editor section of South Africa's newspapers, eventually engaging the State President, Minister of Education, and a 'who's who' of South Africa's political and intellectual elite in its rancorous dialogue" (Statman & Ansell 2000: 279). However, eventually an agreement was reached with 9 of the 13 accusers, and Makgoba was removed from the position of Deputy Vice-Chancellor and appointed research professor in the Faculty of Health Sciences (Statman & Ansell 2000: 282). He later went on to become the Vice-Chancellor of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

The Vice-Chancellor of the university, Professor RW Charlton, noted at the time of the incident that:

The Makgoba affair has raised extremes of emotion and anguish ... [and] seems to have acted as a lightning conductor for some of the tensions of a society in transition. 'Transformation' of the university has been perceived by many as the real issue rather than the allegation concerning Prof. Makgoba's managerial performance, his public statements, the accuracy of various versions of his CV, and his conduct in relation to the personal files of the members of the staff who lodged complaints against him. Charlton 1996. CITED IN STATMAN & ANSELL 2000: 279-280

While Charlton saw the affair as a mirror of the broader 'tensions of a society in transition', for Mamdani, one of the central questions the incident raised is: "To what extent is the regime of excellence in South Africa's most affluent universities masking a regime of white privilege?" (Mamdani 1997: 3). Both were right,

in the sense that the issue of white privilege was one that confronted the new democracy in virtually every sector of the 'society in transition'.

Another academic who was at the university during the time the events occurred, Professor Sipho Seepe, saw the roots of the Makgoba incident as an effort on the part of the university "to move into a direction that gives the pretense that it is committed to change". In doing so, according to Seepe, it sought "what they thought were pliable black people" who had studied at universities outside South Africa. Makgoba, who had an international reputation and had studied and worked for years abroad, "was seen to be such a person". In addition, Makgoba "had to be far superior than any other person within Wits in terms of his qualifications [and] his experience". The mistake Wits made, according to Seepe, is that "they thought the Africanness in him would have been removed from him, diluted his own cultural identity" (Seepe 2021). Makgoba recently made the same point when he stated that Wits saw in him at the time of his appointment as Deputy Vice-Chancellor: "Their notion of an educated African ... who has relinquished his culture" (Makgoba 2021). The situation was compounded by the presence of a liberal group of academics at the university, who, Seepe states, "saw themselves as 'tutors of black people'" but who "excluded the notion of an African identity and the issue of black people". Makgoba then made a statement that antagonized both conservative and liberal academics at the institution when he said: "*The time for white people to think that they will determine the future of black people is over*" (Seepe 2021).

Black academics at the university such as Seepe and other blacks in the governing structure of the university such as Dr Ntatho Motlana, a member of the Council who walked out during the course of the incident, were confounded by the two cvs that emerged. According to Seepe, Makgoba explained that the cvs were different because they were designed in response to the requirements of particular posts advertised. But these were presented as being fraudulent. By contrast, Makgoba had come across the cvs of many white academics who had attacked him and found that, according to Seepe, there were many people at the university "who were given professorship who had no PhDs. That would not happen if you are black!" For Seepe, the very people who "talk about standards did not have" doctorates. In his view, "the notion of standards was shattered by Makgoba" (Seepe 2021), which Makgoba himself saw as criteria designed to "exclude other people" (Makgoba 2021). Seepe adds:

...that most of us who graduated from Wits, even guys who ultimately got their PhDs, they left; because it is hard to get in and once you are

in, it is hard to stay in. But once you can get out, you run as quickly as possible. But the white students, they remain, become junior lecturers and all that because the place is socially and culturally welcoming for them; *it is not socially and culturally welcoming to black students!* That is a reality. SEEPE 2021

The Makgoba incident and similar ones at other institutions were designed, according to Seepe, to “whip” black academics “into line”. He also cautions against the celebration of every appointment of black academics to executive positions in the historically white universities because many are appointed because they do not threaten the status quo (Seepe 2021). Makgoba sums up his own experience as the first black Vice-Chancellor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in the following terms:

Vice-Chancellors are often alienated because they are surrounded by nine people other than themselves. They are like a drop in a sea of other people; and they have to function there. They are not functioning among their own people; but are functioning outside their own culture. MAKGOBA 2021

The prevalence of racism in higher education institutions was again demonstrated by the racist reaction to the application for the position of Vice-Chancellor of UCT by Professor Mamokgethi Phakeng in 2018. The racism became evident towards the end of November 2017 when two UCT alumni responded to an article titled “Institutional Racism at our Universities” by writing degrading and disrespectful emails to over 40 other academics in which they questioned her qualifications (Sokaba 2017). Only one of the people in the email distribution list challenged the duo to provide an explanation of what they were claiming. The tactics applied against Professor Phakeng mirrored that which had been done years before to Professor Makgoba. When Phakeng joined UCT as the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research and Internationalisation), she was subjected to the vile and undue questioning of her qualifications in internal and external e-mail messages. With a PhD, an NRF B-rating, an international profile, several cited publications and major national and international awards, she still faced the condescending scorn of UCT’s institutional racism. She responded by taking to social media, where she drew attention to similar treatment like that meted out to Makgoba (*Mail & Guardian*, 11 October 2017).

In the week that the advert for the position of Vice-Chancellor at UCT was published, Phakeng was made aware of the unjustified concerns about her qualifications that were being raised by some of her colleagues at the

university. “So I interpreted it as a message that I shouldn’t even try applying”, she said (*Destiny* magazine, July 2018). She did not apply for the position until a senior professor and a top research fellow who reminded her of “the bigger picture” changed her mind (*Destiny* magazine, July 2018). Nevertheless, Phakeng became the second black South African woman to be the Vice-Chancellor of UCT, after Ramphela Mamphela. The attempt to block her application for the post was done to exclude another black person from such a position of leadership. It failed!

However, at about the same time UCT was rocked with conflict over the appointment of a Deputy Vice Chancellor (Teaching and Learning) when it ignored its own Employment Equity Plan. In 2017, Professor Elelwani Ramugondo, an A-rated scholar who was fully qualified for the position and had the relevant experience, was told that she was “unappointable”. The other candidate, and incumbent in the position, was an adjunct professor without the relevant academic track record. She was appointed. The University’s Black Academic Caucus, an organisation of black academics at UCT, pointed out several inconsistencies in the selection process that led to the appointment of Adjunct Professor Lis Lange. In a public statement, the BAC noted that

- Senate did not reach the necessary two-thirds majority to approve the appointment of Adjunct Professor Lis Lange;
- there was no customary livestreaming of the candidate presentations, which allows constituencies to give feedback to the selection committee;
- re-composition of the selection committee that replaced four black members with four white members; and
- the same constituencies represented in the selection committee, ratified the process as part of the Institutional Forum.

In addition, Professor Ramugondo was said to be unappointable at the time because she was an associate professor. However, the selection committee went on to appoint an adjunct professor. For the Black Academic Caucus, this was evidence:

...that no matter how hard one works, how much one achieves, how much one sacrifices, none of those exceptional efforts will be recognised, acknowledged, nurtured or respected by the university. BLACK ACADEMIC CAUCUS 2018

In 2016, twenty-two years into post-apartheid South Africa, UCT, the oldest university in South Africa, did not have any black professors or lecturing staff members in its Department of Philosophy. All members of the department were white South Africans or white foreigners, and the Department did not

have a single course on African Philosophy because, according to the Head of the Department, Professor David Benatar, Africa does not have any philosophy (Interview with Xolela Mangcu; Benatar 2015). Thus, students of all races who graduated with a degree in Philosophy at UCT for many years did so without ever been taught by a black lecturer or professor in a country that is on the African continent—and not in Europe. The Department responded to the pressure arising from the *#RhodesMustFall* movement at UCT for the institution to decolonise the curriculum by introducing one course, the “Philosophy of Race”, which is taught at second year level (Interview with Ramabina Mahapa).

More recently, the selection of a retired white male over a black woman professor for the post of Deputy Vice Chancellor for Transformation at UCT in April 2021 illustrates persisting racism at the institution. This followed the announcement that Professor Loretta Feris, the deputy vice-chancellor responsible for transformation, was going on sabbatical leave until January 2022. The black president of UCT Convocation, Dr Eddy Maloka, an internationally renowned scholar and head of the African Peer Review Mechanism, resigned in protest at the appointment of Professor Martin Hall as Acting DVC. In his to letter of resignation to Ms Babalwa Ngonyama, Chairperson of the university Council, Maloka stated:

I have a lot of respect for Professor Martin Hall whom I was fortunate to know during my days at UCT. He is a renowned anthropologist and an accomplished leader in the higher education sector. I do not doubt or question his integrity, ability, and commitment. At the same time, I regard the portfolio of DVC Transformation to be very critical to our University that is still engulfed in the flames of “Fees Must Fall”. The choice of the person who occupies it is as important as the terms of reference that brought it into existence. MALOKA 2021

Maloka was concerned that the black head of transformation had left her post unceremoniously, adding that: “When her replacement is being sought, we opted for a retired white male when the university has so much talent for this portfolio in its midst.” The appointment of Hall was also particularly offensive because he had been central to the race row that erupted around the axing of Mahmood Mamdani (Naidu 2021).

Finally, the death of one senior academic and university administrator in 2014 illustrates the effect that those who defend white privilege can have on those who challenge it. Some people argue that racism played a prominent role in the death of Professor Russel Botman. It was exactly 20 years into the

South African democracy when the Stellenbosch Vice-chancellor died in his sleep on 27 June 2014, at the age of 61. According to Jonathan Jansen, the then Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Free State, the “gossip, rumour, insult, intimidation, side-lining and sheer slander” that “right-wing” elements directed at Botman during the past few years were responsible for the death of “this gentle theologian” (Steward n.d.). Jansen wrote that:

Botman incurred the wrath of the right-wingers by ‘pushing for more black students to enter the university’; by ‘introducing a more flexible language policy so black Africans can enrol in greater numbers’; ‘by asking that building names honouring white supremacists, like the first apartheid prime minister DF Malan, be changed to reflect the new country and the transformation vision that appears largely on paper’; by ‘desiring a Centre for Inclusiveness that could challenge the deeply racist, sexist and homophobic foundations on which this institution, and others, was built’. STEWARD N.D.

Botman, according to Jansen, was subjected to “merciless vilification” by “right-wing alumni, aided and abetted by the Afrikaans press, in blogger postings, in alumni associations, and in formal gatherings of the institution”. Jansen draws attention to “the Dark clouds of evil” that “were Gathering around Prof Botman’s Head before his death” (Steward n.d.). Jansen wrote these remarks in a leading newspaper, *The Times of South Africa*, under the provocative title, “Who Killed Russel Botman?”

One of Botman’s friends, Ronald A Wells, Emeritus Professor of History at Calvin College in the United States, notes that he:

...had considerable success in his first five-year term in turning Stellenbosch away from what he called a culture of exclusion, in which white and male leadership and perspectives were seen to be normative. But in his second term he intended to move the university toward a culture of inclusion. He likened his task “to redesigning and rebuilding a huge passenger plane – while flying it.” His goal, he said, was to have Stellenbosch be a place “where the daughter of a farm worker would feel equal to the son of a farmer”. WELLS 2014

According to Wells, Botman sought to do this by establishing a Centre for Inclusivity to “monitor and promote inclusion on campus”. However, some members of the university Council “bitterly opposed the Centre and what it stood for”. This small group saw the Centre as “an affront to their heritage and

all they thought the university had valued for over a century". Their response was to engage in a campaign "to frustrate, discredit, and undermine" Botman by planting rumours "and innuendo in local media, especially in the Afrikaans-language radio stations and newspapers". The agenda of Council meetings were leaked beforehand allowing for critics to debate issues before they were discussed in the Council. It was in this manner that an article in the local newspaper the day before Botman's last Council meeting before his death noted that there would be a motion of no confidence in him. Although no such motion was made, "it was part of a campaign to rattle him and wear him down". A few days after this meeting, on 27 June 2014, Botman felt unwell and went home early. He died later that night. Wells concludes: "We know who killed Russel Botman and why they did so. They will not be brought to justice" (Wells 2014).

A white academic at the university at the time, Professor Ian Liebenberg, recalls several features of Botman's experience at Stellenbosch University that speak to attempts to preserve white 'privileges' on the part of "many of the old guard, steeped in old Stellenbosch thinking" who "resisted his community-directed initiatives, his vision ... for a future all-inclusive Stellenbosch and the Hope Project", on the one hand; and on the other hand, the 'exclusions' of a black Professor, Rector and Vice-Chancellor from the University that they feel should not be led by a black academic:

As later Rector and Vice-Chancellor of Stellenbosch University, we all felt a genuine new era had arrived [with the appointment of Botman]. Russel's vision for a future all-inclusive Stellenbosch and the Hope Project testifies to this. As Rector and Vice-Chancellor many of the old guard, steeped in old Stellenbosch thinking resisted his community-directed initiatives and his vision. Among others, the pro-Afrikaans lobby ("die Taalbulle"), but others also, gave him a hard time, which may have been an extremely tense and taxing time for Russel. Maybe such turmoil and tensions played a contributing role when he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. LIEBENBERG 2020

7 Conclusion

It is clear that racism is a persistent feature in the higher education system in South Africa twenty-seven years into the democratic dispensation. The case studies presented here illustrate an alarming effort to maintain white spaces, and exclude blacks from senior positions in the most affluent universities of

the country. A strategy to undermine this is vital, and this must include a radical alteration of the Transformation Policies of the former white universities, in particular, to include measures to be taken when cases of racism are made. In particular, however, some of the demands documented in the “Rhodes Must Fall Mission Statement, March 2015” at UCT could be the basis of radical transformation at these institutions. The statement includes long-term goals such as:

- providing financial and research support to black academics and staff;
- radically changing the representation of black lecturers across the faculties;
- revising the limitation on access to senior positions for black academics, including interrogating the notion of “academic excellence” which is used to limit black academics’ progression within the university; and
- increasing the representation of black academics on the currently predominantly white, male decision-making bodies which perpetuate *institutional racism* (University of Cape Town 2015: 3–4).

It is this institutional racism that is perpetuated through direct attacks on individual academics, making it uncomfortable for any black academic to seek ‘progression’ in these institutions. The objective is to create fear, so that others become reluctant to apply for leadership positions and thereby challenge white leadership of, and the racial power structure in these institutions. The spaces denied to black Africans as envisaged by the Bantu Education Act and to other blacks by the Extension of University Education Act are now open to all, irrespective of race. But an effort needs to be made to transform these spaces taking into account the steps suggested by UCT students. It is likely that race will become irrelevant once the historically white universities become transformed spaces in which the racial dominance that currently exists is eliminated.

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The Reproduction of Racial Inequalities through Language of Learning and Teaching at Universities in South Africa

Konosoang Sobane, Pinky Makoe and Chanel Van Der Merwe

1 Introduction

More than two decades after the dawn of apartheid, deeply entrenched inequalities and injustices continue to characterise the South African education system. Despite post-apartheid constitutional and legislative reforms recognising language rights and giving official status to 11 languages at the national level, the implementation of multilingualism in South African universities is still to be realised. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa declares that ‘everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable’ (The Republic of South Africa 1996: Section 29 [2]). Yet the reality is that the current language situation in higher education (HE), in particular the languages of learning and teaching (LoLT), tends to resonate with a racialised past wherein only English and Afrikaans were legally endorsed and legitimised/institutionalised for the purpose of teaching and learning at South African universities, at the expense of indigenous African languages.

Since the introduction of the democratic dispensation in South Africa in 1994, there has been an accelerated increase in linguistic and cultural diversity in terms of student demographics, consequently changing HE environments. However, English and Afrikaans still dominate as the only media of instruction, to the exclusion of the other nine official languages in the country. This hegemony, especially in the era of constitutional democracy, undermines the realisation of multilingual education as a right in HE and continues to disadvantage South African students who speak languages other than English and/or Afrikaans. Often these students must assimilate into dominant institutional cultures and practices rather than participate as equals owing to marginalisation of their knowledge and experiences in the curriculum. As Breidlid (2013: 65–66) points out, ‘when the thinking and acting of the majority of the people in a country, that is, their cultural expression, is more or less excluded from the curriculum...it does something profoundly damaging to self-confidence and

self-esteem of those people, aside from the obvious learning challenges it creates in school'.

The hegemony of Afrikaans and English occurs despite global acknowledgement of the value of mother tongue education in the knowledge economy where production and application of new knowledge are essential (Van Der Waldt et al. 2016). African languages in the South African education system play a peripheral role and are restricted to being merely learnt as subjects (L1 or L2), not as official languages of instruction and assessment, as noted by Ramani and Joseph (2002). In essence, African languages are not considered as capital and having currency in their own right (in Bourdieu's terms, 1997). This resonates with Prah's (1993: 39) contention that 'it is in these languages, spoken by at least 90 per cent of us, that our histories, cultures, and indigenous knowledge rest'. Yet the South African education system tends to associate notions of superiority with particular kinds of knowledge and culture. This results in the perpetuation of inequalities since speakers of English and Afrikaans are systematically placed at an advantageous position where they have more potential to succeed academically and to have more chances to participate in the labour market at a later stage, compared to their counterparts.

Referring to the role of language in social and education transformation, Alexander (2003) argued that 'unless the educational systems on the continent are based on the mother tongues of the people of Africa instead of on foreign languages as most of them are at present, all attempts at establishing a platform for improving the quality of education will in the final analysis benefit only the elite and its progeny' (Alexander 2003: 3). A large body of scholars (e.g., Madiba 2013; Makalela & McCabe 2013; Mkhize & Bafour 2017) support multilingual education in higher education and conceptualise diversity or heterogeneity – linguistic, cultural, knowledges, experiences – as a norm rather than an exception, and problematise students' own languages and knowledge systems as resources that can be meaningfully integrated in curricula for the purpose of teaching, learning and research. Other scholars suggest ways in which university language policies can be designed to accommodate a multilingual approach and the diversity of the student body (Stroud & Kerfoot 2013; Scott 2009).

Although there have been several research initiatives on languages of instruction in South African higher education institutions (see, for example, Madiba 2010, 2013; Makalela & McCabe 2013; Mkhize & Bafour 2017; Mortensen 2014; Uys et al. 2007), such studies have neglected an exploration of the experiences of students who must grapple with grasping content in a foreign language, and how such experiences are perceived to have shaped future prospects for such students. Drawing on data collected through focus

groups and interviews with students from diverse backgrounds, this chapter explores students' construction and experiences of racialisation through language choice in selected South African universities, and how contemporary institutionalisation of English and Afrikaans continue to reproduce and reinforce apartheid ideologies rooted in colonisation. Using raciolinguistics and decolonial thinking as theoretical lenses, we set aside normative education practices enabled by discrimination through language and view multilingualism as a resource for mediation and production of knowledge. In an education system where particular languages and literacy practices remain engrained in colonial, apartheid and Western epistemological traditions largely privileging Eurocentric ways of being, ways of knowing and knowledge production, we advocate the reframing of the Higher Education system to make indigenous language resources visible and to open the system to different knowledge and knowledge-making traditions. Thus, it is proposed that universities establish inclusive language policies and practices as well as pedagogies that foster 'non-racial orientations to knowledge production' (Soudien 2011: 25) to 'delink' from hegemonic language ideologies that manifest in the 'colonial wound' (Mignolo 2007).

2 Language in the South African Socio-political Space

Language has played a significant role in the various political conquests in South Africa. In the three significant social shifts that took place – 'Dutchification' (1652–1795), 'Anglicisation' (1795–1803, 1806–1948) and 'Afrikanerisation' (1948–1994) – Dutch, English and Afrikaans were, respectively, mobilised as the languages through which one receives access to resources, including education (Kamwangamalu 2003). The most recent social shift, Afrikanerisation borne from the apartheid era, represented many significant shifts for language. English and Afrikaans were the only languages identified as the official languages of the country. The forced imposition of Afrikaans on black African students as well as the introduction of extended mother tongue education (which was strongly viewed as a strategy by the apartheid government to prevent black African students from entering higher education) led to the 1976 Soweto uprising (Kamwangamalu 2003). This significant event had a deep impact on the discourses on language in South Africa and aided in creating associations and connotations about languages (Mesthrie et al. 2000). These discourses included a deep suspicion of the viability and relevance of African languages in education, and associations in which Afrikaans is viewed as the language of the oppressor and English as the language of liberation. Afrikaans and English

continued to be legitimised as languages of higher education to the exclusion of other African languages during the post-apartheid era.

The continued visibility of Afrikaans and English in higher education implied that in the long term they would acquire a historic background as languages of instruction in the education sphere, while African languages were prevented from acquiring histories as academic languages in higher education (Mkhize & Balfour 2017). It is this historicity discourse that continues to be used as an excuse for the exclusion of African languages as LoLT more than two decades after the end of apartheid. African languages are said to have “not developed” sufficiently to include the terminology for some scientific concepts, and there are not enough learning and teaching materials in African languages. This leaves questions on the extent to which there has been demonstrable political will, and investment, to actively promote these languages and to promote development of materials and resources in them.

The period since 1994 has been characterised by a strong focus on the transformation of Higher Education. This was clearly stated in the Education White Paper 3, which was named “a programme for the transformation of higher education”. The White Paper on Higher Education sought to establish ways to “redress past inequalities and to transform the higher education system to serve a new social order, to meet pressing national needs, and to respond to new realities and opportunities” (Council on Higher Education 1997: 3). Thus, the goal of transformation was to address the inequalities experienced by black students in Higher Education in terms of access, funding and quality of education (Odhav 2009: 38).

Given that language was a significant part of the segregated university system regulated by the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 (Antia 2015) during the apartheid era, it has become central to the transformation agenda in the post-apartheid era. The Higher Education Act (No. 101 of 1997) requires, at Section 27(2), that universities develop and publish their language policy documents. In 2002, the Language Policy for Higher Education (LPHE) was developed. The LPHE states:

[L]anguage has been and continues to be a barrier to access and success in higher education; both in the sense that African and other languages have not been developed as academic/scientific languages and in so far as the majority of students entering higher education are not fully proficient in English and Afrikaans. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 2002: 4-5

Thus, the Language Policy for Higher Education (2002) acknowledges the role that language has played in advantaging only a few, while excluding many

students based on their proficiency in English and Afrikaans. This document also acknowledges that these “barriers” exist because African languages do not function as “academic” and “scientific” languages. The policy, therefore, supported the mandate for all universities to develop language policies that promote multilingualism.

3 Languages in the South African Higher Education system

South Africa is a multilingual country with 11 official languages (Afrikaans, English, sePedi, Setswana, Sesotho, isiZulu, isiXhosa, isiNdebele, siSwati, Xitsonga, and TshiVenda) as well as numerous unofficial languages. However, the languages are not equally distributed throughout the country owing to its social and political history. Except for English and Afrikaans, the other official languages tend to be distributed according to colonial and apartheid geo-spatial arrangement wherein distribution of speakers was based on ethnicity, including racial categories. Of interest here is how this socio-political history still penetrates the distribution of languages in post-apartheid South Africa. English is more widely used throughout the country, and Afrikaans to a lesser extent. In addition, these languages continue to dominate high-function domains such as politics, business and education. English is used as the primary medium of instruction in nearly all South African universities and Afrikaans in traditionally Afrikaans universities. This is the case despite the Constitution of South Africa and the 1996 post-apartheid language policy which explicitly recognised the pervasiveness of multilingualism in the country and made a special commitment to the promotion of previously marginalised indigenous languages. The LPHE, adopted in 2002, requires universities to implement multilingualism in their curricula, teaching and learning programmes to ensure equity of access and success for all students.

This said, multilingual education and its implementation in HE remains a controversial matter and no university in South Africa uses an indigenous African language as the primary or official LoLT. This means that a large proportion of students continue to be disadvantaged because they receive their education in a foreign language. Even though the present LPHE provides an enabling environment for introducing African languages as LoLT and developing curricula in these languages to facilitate conceptual learning and understanding, the reality is that little has been done.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of English and/or Afrikaans in HE perpetuates the differential educational experience, equal access to higher

education, academic participation, and academic success in higher education. Hurst's (2016) investigation of students' language histories or biographies at the University of Cape Town (UCT) revealed the extent to which students whose first language is an African language that had registered for one course in the Faculty of Humanities were affected and impacted negatively by the use of English as LoLT. The students described feelings of alienation in classroom interactions because their languages were seen as inferior, lack of confidence and fear to speak or respond in a language that is not their home language, and self-doubt in terms of their intelligence as their sociocultural backgrounds played an insignificant role in the teaching and learning process. Similarly, Cakata & Segalo (2017) posit that the failure to implement post-apartheid language policies successfully lies in the fact that:

...certain sectors in the government have been accused of merely being accommodative to indigenous languages through slightly opening doors to previously properly colonial spaces. This opening of doors of previously white-only spaces to black South Africans has not been enough as the integration only meant a welcoming of black bodies into white spaces, and ignored that which they bring (Their knowledges, their experiences and their world).

There is global acknowledgement of the educational efficacy of mother tongue education in the current knowledge economy and that educating students in a language that they do not understand, or which is not their home language, limits their chances of success in HE (see, for example, Fouche 2009; Hurst & Mona 2017). Likewise, Gyagenda and Rajab-Gyagenda (2014) underline the importance of a home tongue in education, not only as a right, but as a tool that can serve to empower students as opposed to disempowering them by using a language foreign to them. Referring to African countries that have opted to choose English or French as LoLT, they argue that these countries have failed to actualise "a viable and appropriate language of instruction policy that engenders a sense of self, identity, and empowerment. Education must liberate and empower and not subjugate nor disempower". The sustained dominance of English in South African education, and especially in HE, as a language that would provide access to socioeconomic empowerment, middle-class status and access into the global environment inevitably reproduces and perpetuates the idea that indigenous knowledge and languages are inferior and Western or European scripts are universal and superior. In this regard, Alexander states that:

...unless African languages are given market value, that is, unless their instrumentality for processes of production, exchange and distribution is enhanced, no amount of policy change...can guarantee their use in high functions and, thus, eventual escape from dominance and hegemony of English.... [The] current language-medium practices cause cognitive impoverishment and, consequently, necessitate investment in compensatory on-the-job training.... This wastefulness would have been avoidable if there had been a national development plan in which reform of education and economic development planning were integrated.

ALEXANDER 2013: 108

We therefore argue that, despite the stated legislative frameworks, there is still a lot of work that is needed to create an equitable education space, which provides equal access and opportunities to all its citizens, and eradicates the inequalities brought by a racial past.

4 **Theoretical Framing: Raciolinguistics and Decolonisation of Higher Education**

This chapter uses raciolinguistics and decoloniality as theoretical lenses that help in understanding the experiences of language practices in South Africa's HE institutions. Raciolinguistics is a theory that describes the interplay of race and language. According to Alim et al. (2016), this theory provides tools to examine the ways in which language is used to construct race and how ideas of race influence language and language use practices. This theory has been widely used to explore the inextricable interrelationships between language and race and to examine the complex role that language ideologies play in the production of racial difference (Flores & Rosa 2015). Flora and Rosa (2015) show that raciolinguistic ideologies construct the language practices of racialised and minoritised communities as inherently deficient, based on the amount of the dominant language that they have adopted and are able to use in different domains of life. These ideologies then model racial inequalities as a result of the linguistic deficiencies of racialised communities and views a solution to these racial inequalities as language policies and practices that can modify the said deficient language practices (Rosa & Flores 2017).

In the education setting, raciolinguistic perspectives practically shift attention from understanding the linguistic practices of the student to the perceiving practices of the listener/reader. Thus, one is positioned as successfully engaged

in academic language if one is able to master the use of the dominant language for academic purposes. Institutional frameworks are then set up to address the perceived linguistic deficiencies and legitimise further minoritisation of the speakers who are perceived as having to be corrected to engage in the majority language (Rosa & Flores 2017). By using the theory of raciolinguistics as a lens, attention is placed on the ways in which the continued use of English and Afrikaans as academic languages in South African higher education institutions amount to the racialisation of speakers of other languages. It also lays a foundation for explaining the ways in which such language use practices discourage multilingual education practices and thus compromise the achievements of those that would have benefitted from multilingual education (Alim et al. 2016; Flores & Rosa 2015; Rosa & Flores 2017).

Considering the history of segregationist apartheid, it is important to situate our discussion within the problematic concepts of race and coloniality because the 'conception of race and the politics of race...shaped the higher education policy' (Bunting 2004: 35). In consequence, the education system 'remains a colonial outpost' that continues to produce and reproduce 'hegemonic identities instead of eliminating hegemony' (McKaiser 2016 in Heleta 2016: 2). Reddy's (2004) report for the Council on Higher Education unequivocally underscores the point that higher education during the post-apartheid era is still 'reproduc[ing] itself along racial and ethnic lines' and mired in 'the history of unequal relations of power perpetuated during colonial and Apartheid rule' in that 'the emergence, roles, and cultures of universities in contemporary South Africa relate quite directly to the history of white political, economic and cultural domination' (Reddy 2004: 9). The fact that education is facilitated 'in a foreign language or through a language in which a student is not sufficiently proficient effectively removes the most valuable resource that s/he brings to the classroom: their linguistic repertoire' and university curricula remain steeped in Eurocentric and are 'designed to meet the needs of colonialism and apartheid' Mbembe (2016: 32).

In his book, *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature*, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1994: 100) reminds us that:

Africa as a continent has been a victim of forces of colonial exploitation, oppression and human degradation. In the field of culture she was taught to look on Europe as her teacher and the centre of man's civilization, and herself as the pupil. In this even Western culture became the centre of Africa's process of learning, and Africa was relegated to the background.

It is our contention that drawing on raciolinguistics and decoloniality provides opportunities to disrupt the hegemony of European languages and reimagine students' linguistic repertoires that are often located on the margins of official institutional practices. Decoloniality involves 'the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonial world' (Maldonado-Torres 2011: 1). We propose the kind of action that interrogates monoglossic myths that construct European languages as superior and African language as inferior, what counts and does not count as knowledge as well as who decides what knowledge is legitimate. In a similar vein, Mignolo (2007: 459) stresses the need to delink from the colonial matrix of power 'toward a vision of human life that is not dependent upon or structured by the forced imposition of one ideal of society over those that differ...the struggle is for changing the terms in addition to the content of the conversation'. Such a process not only opens possibilities for alternative ways of thinking, knowing and doing, but also aims to lay foundation for equal education and epistemic justice for all.

'Race' is inevitable here because it is still at the core of the country's social fabric and a significant aspect of the institutional culture of some of the country's university, and an indicator of historical inequalities and injustices. According to Suransky and van der Merwe (2014: 578):

...today, the reality is still far removed from the post-apartheid vision of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist higher education system. South African universities struggle to address their own particular apartheid legacy and become public universities for all citizens in a democratic society.

We acknowledge that race is a social construct, setting aside the essentialist view of 'race' as neutral and/or biologically defensible. Thus, we align our understanding with May's (2001: 51) conceptualisation that the "process of equating group differences on 'racial' grounds is now considered to be scientifically invalid", and Omi and Winant's notion of race (1993: 5) as "a fundamental principle of social organisation and identity formation." While 'race' is not symptomatic of any biological makeup, we are aware that it is an "endemic facet of life in our society" (Pizzarro 1998: 62) and a reality for many. We draw on this notion of race to uncover and to make visible the racial assumptions that are embedded in students' responses, reflections and discourses on tertiary education experiences.

Alongside the concept of “race” is our understanding of racism as comprising of three elements, namely:

1. A set of ideas [ideology] in which humanity is divisible into distinct ‘races’, each with specific natural characteristics derived from culture, physical appearance or both;
2. A historical power relationship in which, over time, groups are racialised, that is, treated as if specific characteristics were natural and innate to each member of a race group; and
3. Forms of discrimination flowing from this [practices] ranging on spectrums from denial of access to material resources at one end to genocide at the other (Garner & Selod 2014: 3).

It is this notion of racism that also provides a lens through which we see contemporary language policies at South African universities, and the extent to which they continue to take a racial stance and deny equitable access to education for speakers of languages other than Afrikaans and English.

The performance of racism is understood as racialisation, a concept whose use can be traced back to the 19th Century (Garner & Selod 2014). Our understanding of racialisation draws from the work of Vidal-Ortiz (2004) and Garner and Selod (2015), who view racialisation as a process through which lines are drawn among various groups of people, thereby instigating ‘group-ness’ or belonging to a particular group and not the other. In this process, characteristics are assigned to particular groups of people because of their shared ideologies, race or how the group organises itself socially and culturally. These ascriptions then become a benchmark through which resources are distributed and power relations are attributed.

We argue that the current higher education language practices in South Africa are a process of racialisation. Higher education is attributed to speakers of English and Afrikaans, and it becomes their legitimate space, while everyone else get ‘accommodated’ into that space. As an accommodated racialised body, the latter must strive to fit into this space by finding a way to navigate both academia and the language sphere, while their counterparts are faced with the struggle to navigate academia only. This then creates an unequitable ground which needs institutional commitment and targeted actions to address.

5 Post-apartheid Language Policy Reforms in South African Higher Education Institutions

There is ample evidence that there has been active re-thinking of university language policies. This is found in policy activity at universities flowing from

the development of the LPHE in 2002. The policy committed to “the development, in the medium to long term, of South African languages as mediums of instruction in higher education, alongside English and Afrikaans” (Ministry of Education 2002: 15). Furthermore, the policy makes the following provisions:

- The Ministry requires all Higher Education institutions to develop language policies and will monitor the impact of language policy in Higher Education.
- The Ministry is committed... to ensuring that language should not act as a barrier to equity of access and success (Ministry of Education 2002: 10).

In response to the policy, most institutions’ language policies were reviewed to make provisions for African languages in the area of learning and teaching, while in some cases where they were not there, they were developed anew. While some university language policies were developed or reviewed as an imperative to respond to the legislative framework, others were done as a response to some immediate emergent crisis in the form of students’ mass action. The peak of these protests was experienced in March 2015 with the advent of the #Rhodes must fall (RMF) movement which had started as a student protest against white superiority in universities (Du Plessis 2017) at UCT. It later escalated into a national campaign which gave rise to other movements such as #Open Stellenbosch, a movement that had been started by predominantly black students at Stellenbosch University to challenge the hegemony of the predominant white Afrikaans culture and the exclusion of black students and staff at the university. At the heart of this movement at Stellenbosch University was an attempt to challenge the then pace of transformation at the university, and to voice out students’ concerns about lectures being conducted only in Afrikaans for some degree courses (Du Plessis 2017; Holmes & Loehwing 2016). These and other mass actions led to language policy reviews and the development of implementation plans that were meant to make learning and teaching linguistically inclusive of other languages, and not just English and Afrikaans.

Another incidental language policy review was seen at the North West University (NWU) in response to the recommendation of the Minister of Higher Education and Training after a report submitted to the Minister by an independent investigative task team. The team had been commissioned to investigate an incident in which first year students at the university reportedly made a Hitler-like salute at the Potchefstroom campus of NWU in 2014 (Cilliers 2014). One of the recommendations of the team was for NWU “to ensure the promotion of linguistic diversity and to ensure that the promotion of Afrikaans is not used as a tool for exclusion in any form” (Department of Higher Education and Training 2014: 6).

Many studies have analysed the successes in the implementation of these policies in Higher Education spaces. Madiba (2013: 385) has stated that the majority of universities in South Africa have developed multilingual language policies, but adds that: "However, some of these language policies are still very symbolic and their implementation in teaching and learning remains a challenge". Similarly, Kaschula (2013: 11; 2014: 11), in a study of the language policy of Rhodes University, commented on the lack of implementation of the policy because of the lack of "political will to drive the process". At Stellenbosch University, Van der Walt (2008: 217) notes that "[t]he University also undertakes to develop the third official language of the Western Cape, isiXhosa, as an academic language, but such efforts are currently restricted to corpus planning". Commenting on the University of the Western Cape's language policy, Antia (2015) observes that the Afrikaans and isiXhosa provisions in the institution's language policy serve symbolic interests whilst the provisions on English serve purposes related to real communication and institutional identity promotion.

These case studies illuminate one major discourse in university language policies, and that is the lack of political will for implementation. However, implementation can have different meanings, and universities can have a central stake in what Madiba terms "symbolic" implementation in the domains that have a significant impact like teaching and learning. As such, implementation can be justified by the inclusion of African languages in signage, or the establishment of a Language Unit to create terminology (as is the case for Stellenbosch University). However, it is questionable to what extent these initiatives are aligned with the goals set forth in documents such as the Language Policy for Higher Education (2002) and the Education White Paper: A programme for the Transformation of Higher Education (1997), which seek to redress past inequalities and create an equitable Higher Education space. What is also debatable is the extent to which these policies benefit African-language speaking students and promote the success of their higher education learning in preparation for active and meaningful participation in the economy.

Very good strides have been made at the national and institutional levels to develop multilingual language policies and entrench multilingualism and language diversity in higher education. There is also evidence of efforts by some universities to actualise these policies and pave a space for African languages in teaching, learning and research. Such efforts include the pioneering of a degree in which an African language serves as a medium of instruction by the University of Limpopo in 2003 (Ramani, Kekana, Modiba & Joseph 2007). The University implemented a dual-medium undergraduate degree called the *BA in Contemporary English Language Studies (CELS) and Multilingual Studies (MUST)*. The degree affords learners an opportunity to acquire academic

English and academic Sepedi through two distinct programmes, namely CELS and MUST. While MUST is taught and assessed entirely in Sepedi, CELS is entirely in English, thereby creating an opportunity for Sepedi to be used as a medium of instruction and not only as a taught subject.

The University of Kwazulu-Natal (UKZN) made strategic attempts to provide teaching and learning in isiZulu in courses for professional degrees such as nursing, education, law, psychology and commerce (Ndimande-Hlongwa, Balfour, Mkhize & Engelbrecht 2010: 347). This was planned for implementation through an annual implementation plan (2008 – 2018) that would adopt the Complementary Language Use Approach that allows for African languages to act as an auxiliary language of instruction to English (Ndimande-Hlongwa et al. 2010: 348–349). It was hoped that instruction in isiZulu would enhance student learning and help to improve throughput (Ndimande-Hlongwa et al. 2010: 355).

It should be noted, however, that while there are policy and practical initiatives to promote multilingual education at HE institutions, there are some sentiments which note that while this is ideal, the state of readiness for these initiatives has not yet been attained. Some public narratives have noted that African languages are not developed enough to function adequately as mediums of communication in teaching, learning and research (see, for example, Foley 2004). However, Makalela and McCabe (2013: 410) show that this can be counteracted if implementation of multilingual language practice in higher education is done through a comprehensive process that involves:

- status planning, which will imply official pronouncement of African languages as official languages of the university;
- corpus planning, which entails the development of materials, lexical equivalents and translations of materials and resources; and
- acquisition planning, which involves the active use of these languages through either institutional, integrated or individual multilingualism.

At the University of Cape Town, multilingual concept-literacy glossaries have been used and developed to fast-track students' concept learning and vocabulary development in the different content areas. Madiba (2013: 390) notes that the glossaries are in English and all other ten official languages of South Africa, and therefore cater for the linguistic needs of most South African students.

At the University of the Western Cape, initiatives have been introduced to produce lecture materials in the three official languages of the institution, namely, English, Afrikaans and isiXhosa, for a third-year module in the Department of Linguistics (Antia & Dyers 2016). The resources are not only textual, but audio as well (podcasts); and they are not only in the standard varieties of Afrikaans and isiXhosa, but also in the informal varieties which a large number

of students are familiar with. Antia & Dyers (2016) noted a range of positive effects of this initiative on the learning outcomes.

These initiatives demonstrate that if there is a will to implement, there are ways of getting around the issue of “inadequately developed” vocabulary and the lack of materials in African languages, two challenges often cited as barriers in these contexts.

Despite these initiatives, to a large extent current language practices in higher education continue to perpetuate the dominance of English and Afrikaans as languages of higher learning and research, thus perpetuating inequalities between African language speakers on the one hand, and Afrikaans and English speakers on the other hand. English and Afrikaans still carry with them the hegemony of prestige and continue to be dominant as languages of learning and research. This undermines the tenets of additive multilingualism embedded in the legislative frameworks such as the Language-in-Education Policy (LiEP) (Department of Education 1997), Language Policy for Higher Education (Department of Education 2002) and other legislative frameworks.

6 The impact of language practices in higher education institutions on students

The continued institutional choices and research and learning practices that reinforces the dominance of English and Afrikaans as language of learning and of research have negative effects on the students and the outlook they have on future opportunities. In-depth understanding of the impact can best be achieved by having insight into the first-hand experiences and feelings of students who have gone through the South African higher education system.

6.1 *Methods*

The study is aimed at developing an understanding of the lived language-use experiences of students at South African universities and their reflections of the impact of those practices on future prospects. The study adopted a qualitative design to get in-depth descriptions and to get deeper insights into these experiences and reflections. Data for the study was collected from a sample of 52 participants who have graduated from South African universities in the past five years, and are either doing further studies, working, or doing both. These graduates were selected through multi-stage purposive sampling and subsequent snowballing, where the sampling initially targeted participants who fit into the criteria, and later add others identified by their peers because they fit into the criteria for participation. The criteria for participation were as follows:

- Have graduated from a South African university in the last five years;
- Is willing to share experiences and perceptions in a one-on-one interview or group setting.

The data generated from this study was drawn from three focus group discussions with five participants each; in-depth interviews with a structured questionnaire; and semi-structured interviews. The focus groups were comprised of mixed genders and language profiles that aimed at acquiring a diversity of perceptions and experiences; while the individuals selected for one-on-one interviews were of a similar nature.

This triangulation of methods allowed the collection of robust descriptions of lived experiences and perceptions on the extent to which the current language practices and policies in South African HE institutions legitimise the racialisation of minority language speakers. It also allowed participants to give critical reflections of the effects of these practices on performance and participation in academia and the economy. While the interviews and FGDs were done face-to-face, the in-depth interviews were done over zoom. The in-depth interviews were guided by a set of five questions and the conversations allowed participants to relate their experienced and the meanings they make of those experiences (Mears, 2012).

The data analysis involved the use of a thematic content analytic procedure. To achieve this, the data were imported into Atlasi-ti 8 software which facilitated data coding and development of links and networks between and among different data components. An inductive data-driven approach in which the themes are allowed to be derived from the data was used (Elo & Kyngäs 2008). This inductive approach facilitated an objective approach in which the use of preconceived categories is avoided, and categories emerge from the data (Braun & Clarke 2006). The analysis considered both dominant explicit themes and latent themes that are not dominant but significant as parts of the experiences of participants.

6.2 *The Linguistic Profiles of Selected Graduates and Recalled Language Landscapes at University*

The sample of participants for the study was 48% male and 52% female. Most of them are working in different sectors, while two of them are now lecturers at South African universities. They have multilingual language profiles that can be divided into four types, based on how they identified themselves. The table below shows these language profiles and the distribution of participants in each profile.

These profiles provided a useful context for understanding participants' experiences and perceptions, and provided insights into the context that

TABLE 6.1 Participants' linguistic profiles

Multilingual profile	No of participants	LOLT in higher education	No of participants
1. South African language as first language, English as a second language	26	English	18
		Afrikaans	8
2. Afrikaans as first language, English as second language	13	English	3
		Afrikaans	10
3. English as first language, Afrikaans as second language	8	English	6
		Afrikaans	2
4. Other African language as first language, English as second language	5	English	3
		Afrikaans	2
Total	52		52

shapes their reflections. In presenting the data, participants are given ascribed names and profiles.

The data shows that the HE education experience was challenging for all students because it signified a life transition into a new life whose different facets were unfamiliar to the students. It also introduced new responsibilities that were never there before and new academic language practices that compounded the already complex transition. In the section below we discuss these experiences and their perceived implications.

6.3 *Anxiety about the Transition into a New Social, Academic and Language Space*

The transition from high school to university is described by the participants as an overwhelming experience because it involves several social transitions such as moving from parents' houses to living alone for most students, having to be responsible for their own financial management, and adjusting to new social relationships. For many, the situation became more complex because they were required to learn in English completely for the first time in their lives. For the African language speakers, high school teachers switched between an African language and English when they explained complex concepts. So, for many, university was the first time that no teaching at all took place in their home language. For some, the situation was made even more complex by the introduction of a new language (Afrikaans) in lectures provided for some

courses. The following excerpts show examples from the interviews illustrate this complexity:

There was all sorts of *information that gets thrown at you*, and you were expected to understand. It didn't even seem like anyone is aware that some of us are not proficient in English. DEBORAH

A further complexity was that I am from Johannesburg which is more multilingual and multicultural. Now here *nobody speaks my language at all*, even the people in the offices that look like me speak IsiXhosa and I *don't know to communicate with them*. I really felt lost all the time. MIKE

I woke up in the morning and I felt like I was a little black dot in the sea of white bodies. *Everyone in the corridor was busy talking to each other in Afrikaans and I felt like I was invisible*. The few black students I saw were also talking in what seemed like French. So already that set me in panic mode. SOPHIA

As it can be seen in these excerpts, the language barrier begins complicating the situation in contexts that begin prior to the learning experience. For most of the participants there is a sense of suddenly feeling overwhelmed, which has implications on the extent to which they feel being part of this new academic world. The context creates for them a sense of exclusion and renders them unable to communicate. This sentiment of complexity was very common among participants whose first language is a South African language and English a second language.

Beyond the context, the idea of having to conduct all their academic activities in a foreign language was problematic because in some cases many had not mastered the language (English) adequately to comprehend all the learning activities, while in other cases the language (Afrikaans) was completely new. They thus had the dual pressure of having to learn independently and to navigate this process without assistance given in their own language. As some of the participants put it:

There was too much big English that they bombard us with, things like referencing, orientation, plagiarism ... that are supposed to be part of your life, plus some difficult academic English. ANDREW

Let's face it, there is English and there is academic English. Although I am good at English, the so-called academic English sounded foreign to me.

The terminology, the way you put information, it was a new language for me. LEYLA

I didn't do Afrikaans at all in high school. So, I went to a university that is 90% Afrikaans; all my subjects are in Afrikaans... announcements are in Afrikaans, etc. In a classroom we put on headsets and there is an English translator and that was difficult because even the English was a problem for me. MICHAEL

The data shows that the language problem was not only experienced by those whose first language is not English, but also first language speakers of English. They allude to the fact that the use of “academic language” presented a new challenge for them too.

These experiences are consistent with the already existing evidence that for African-language speaking students in general, the dominance of English and Afrikaans across the different levels of education creates a problematic situation (Mkhize & Balfour 2017; Moloi & Chetty 2011). This is largely a consequence of the lack of proficiency in English of most of these students and their lack of bi/multilingualism, which Widdowson (2001) describes as the ability to express oneself or understand complex meanings in more than one language.

Because of the under-representation of African languages and the hegemony of English as LoLT, these students are unable to capitalise on the strengths of translanguaging. Makalela (2015) describes translanguaging as the communicative function of language that allows fluidity between the languages to accommodate the multiplicity of learners in super-diverse classrooms, instead of separating the different languages in the continuum of a repertoire. Makalela (2015) agrees with Canagarajah (2011), who holds the view that in contemporary multilingual settings the languages that a person speaks are not discrete and separate entities but are part of a repertoire that is accessible for multiple communicative purposes. A large body of work (for example, Makalela 2013, 2015; Garcia 2011; Wei 2011) has shown the value of translanguaging in promoting epistemic access and comprehension and its potential for improving throughput rates for learners. If adopted in higher learning settings, the anxiety that is felt by first year students will be minimised.

6.4 *Being Identified as a Potential Failure Even before Starting: The Plight of academic Literacy*

The African-language speaking participants felt that from the beginning of their university studies they were identified as potential failures. This is because they were required to register for academic literacy courses whose content

was, in their opinion, English language lessons. Achievement in these courses was regarded by students as an indicator of potential success in the rest of the academic sphere. Those students that did not perform well in these courses felt that they were already identified as potential failures. For example, one of the participants points out that: “...*putting us into academic literacy class felt like the system was saying I am already not good enough* (David). For some, this created a feeling of helplessness and despair, while for others it created the zest to work harder to prove themselves.

Studies of academic performance at universities in South Africa put language as an important factor in influencing the performance of students (Van Rooy & Coetzee-Van Rooy 2015). As a result, academic literacy courses are compulsory for first year students in most South African universities. According to Sebolai (2016), enrolment in these courses is often preceded by various language tests to measure the levels of these students’ literacy in English, since this is the medium of instruction at most universities.

For those participants who performed badly in these tests, the tests became an indicator that academia is an English space, and those who failed to become proficient in English would not be successful. It therefore marked them as “those getting into a space to which they do not really belong”, as one of them explained. This has negative implications on their attitudes to studying and learning.

6.5 *Navigating new Learner Roles in a Foreign Language: A recipe for Low Self-confidence*

In addition to the many communicative problems that students face at university, particularly in their first year, there is also the need to navigate their new learning activities in a language that is not their first language. According to the participants whose LOLT was not their first language, they often became overwhelmed because lecturers always emphasise the importance of being independent learners, yet there was little or no support for them. The sentiments below are illustrative of similar sentiment expressed by many of the participants in the study:

The lecturers always told us the importance of being independent at university and to learn by ourselves, but the course materials were in language I could not fully understand; so how do I become independent? I needed some assistance. RACHEL

My friends and I could not ask for help from student support centres, nor from lecturers, because we did not have enough confidence to articulate our challenges or to seek assistance. ANTHONY

These participants mentioned that they relied on peer support, while English-speaking students had access to student support services and lecturers during consultation periods. The realisation of the difficulties faced by other students is indicated by the following statement made by Ernest, one of the English first language speakers:

I didn't struggle as much as the others to be honest. I already used English in most domains of my life, so it was not a problem. I even assisted some students who were struggling when I had spare time. ERNEST

Another new role that students felt the language issue barred them from navigating appropriately is active participation in the classroom. Lecturers often inform students that they are just facilitators in the classroom, and that students need to actively participate in class to enhance their understanding and subsequently their performance. Active participation was described as voicing opinions or making queries on the subject matter, listening to other's opinions, and arguing one's point of view. This was explained as a route to increased understanding of the subject matter. However, participants revealed that they lacked confidence, and felt discouraged and demotivated from participating in class because they felt they did not have a good command of the "academic" language (English). Deborah noted that:

Back in high school I was able to participate in class, raise my hand and ask questions because we all spoke Setswana, but here I first had to think how will I put it in English? So, I would just stay with my questions. DEBORAH

This sentiment is shared by another participant who was in a university where the LOLT is Afrikaans. He notes that:

You are already struggling with translations in two languages that are not your mother tongue in class. Now you have to ask a question. The one language you can't use at all, another one you are not that fluent in it, [and] your mother tongue is not an option.... How do you even ask a question? STANLEY

This implies that the language barrier technically excluded them from full participation in class. As a result of this, most participants whose first language was not their university LOLT showed that their first year was difficult, as seen in the excerpts from interviews below.

I felt that the workload was too much and the expectations for me to suddenly be able to do everything in English also were too much. *So, I struggled a lot to cope.* VINCENT

First year was *a struggle* for me because there were so many new things I had to navigate with no assistance at all, in a language I am not good at. ZAYNE

It is noteworthy that these are challenges faced by both students whose first language is an African language and Afrikaans-speaking students subjected to learning in English. Afrikaans speaking graduates who had studied where there was an opportunity to choose Afrikaans modules were the only ones who expressed none of these challenges.

6.6 *Linguistics Strategies, Practices and Resources for Assisting Students*

The complexities that participants show necessitates initiatives to assist them to cope. In some universities, participants in the study found that there were tutors and units designated for assisting students. These services and resources, however, were accessible in either English or Afrikaans, and thus still inaccessible for African language speakers. Some of the participants describe their experiences of language assistance as follows:

...there were tutors, but when I had to ask questions I always thought I will have to talk in English. So, I would just decide *to pretend it's ok*. I will understand later. ROBERT

... for class materials it was hard. But for notices and short announcements I would walk around with *my phone and use google translate*. SUSAN

...there were *translators*. But they made the whole situation (simultaneous translation) clumsy and it was hard to hear.... The *headphones* caused ear infections for some of us because they were used by different students. CELIA

Students whose first language is not the LOLT engage in additional work that is not required of other students. In addition, the support in place is either not useful as in the case of translators, or not accessible as in the case of tutors. Interviews with participants who are now lecturers revealed that these

experiences influenced the way they presently assist their students. These are some of the strategies they use:

I use part of my research funds to translate the study materials into Zulu, which is a dominant language here. Since I did that, I have seen much participation and higher marks with some of the students. ISAAC

I make it clear that they can ask questions in their own language. Since most of them are Sepedi speakers we understand each other... I see that they understand better if I do that. LYDIA

I always tell the tutors to allow students to speak in their own language in seeking assistance. ISAAC

In these cases, the lecturer makes an extra effort to help and, as indicated, these have yielded positive results in students' participation in class and performance

6.7 *The Impact of Monolingual Practices on academic Performance and Labour Market Prospects*

Many of the participants felt that learning in a language that they are not fully competent in compromised their academic performance. Most of them feel that they would have performed better if they were given an opportunity to learn in their language. The data has three types of impact articulated by participants as seen below:

I realised I will not finish this degree if I do not move. So, me and a few others quit and moved to another university. ISABEL

My performance was very bad. I used to get very low marks. So, I failed and repeated, but in another university. SUSAN

This implies that the university language practices took away the freedom of choice from these participants. They had to change their university in some cases, while in others they changed their courses. This has implications for the choices they would later have in the job market.

6.8 *Universities as Sites of Unfair Competition: A Need to Level the Field*

Many of the university graduates described their previous universities as sites where they were subjected to unfair competition in academic performance.

Their impression is that in English-instruction classes there seemed to be no attempt to accommodate students who did not have a good command of English. Classes in such universities seemed to be a space institutionally designed for students who had come from private schools and those whose first language is English, or those who came from families where they have had access to English at home. While such students seemed to exist in a familiar language space, black African participants felt that they were disadvantaged by the system and set up for failure.

African language speaking students who studied in universities that have Afrikaans as a second language of instruction felt even more unable to compete than students from other universities. They reported several instances where the subject matter was delivered in Afrikaans in class, and they could read the English course material later. They also recalled several cases where they were treated as invisible in class while a discussion was carried out in English.

The dual language modules at some universities also presented another level of discrimination and unequal opportunities. Graduates revealed that they were aware of cases where guidance for a test was given in general terms for English class students, while the Afrikaans class was given specific direction about what to study. One of the participants put the situation as follows:

During test times my friends who are in the Afrikaans stream would tell me that they have been given a specific scope, while our English class wasn't. The English class would be given the scope of the test to be chapters 1–5 of a textbook, while the Afrikaans class would be given specific details of what to read in each of the chapters. BETTY

In that way, the Afrikaans class was placed at a more advantageous position in the test than their counterparts.

7 **The Way Forward: Creating an Equitable University Space**

It becomes apparent from both the literature on language of instruction and the experiences of graduates that although there is a strong legislative framework to promote multilingual higher education, the apartheid era language practices still prevail. Just as was the case during the apartheid era, African languages continue to be excluded in decision-making about languages of instruction at universities. There is ample empirical evidence that shows the disadvantages of monolingual pedagogical practices in multi-lingual societies and that offer practical ways in which multilingual repertoires can be

appropriated to enhance students' performance. However, there are very few notable attempts to implement multilingual pedagogical practices. The continuing hegemony of English, as well as Afrikaans in some universities, reproduces the inequalities of the past.

Higher education is a vehicle towards participation in the labour market and in the economy. If good academic performance is not equitably facilitated, and the education system advantages one group over another, this also has negative consequences for opportunities for some in the job market. At a later stage, this builds on class inequalities, and thus reproduces the vicious cycle of poverty for students who come from rural schools and who do not have a good command of English.

We argue that there is adequate groundwork that has been done for the promotion of multilingualism in South African universities. This groundwork lays a good foundation for the implementation of multilingual practices to create equal opportunities for all South Africans. The vicious socio-economic inequalities that threaten our society can best be addressed by having an equitable higher education system. South Africa cannot afford to be grappling with apartheid era mechanisms that fail to extend the benefits of democratisation to many in the higher education system. It is imperative that efforts be made to deracialise not just the university physical spaces but also the pedagogies.

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PART 2

*The Manifestation of Racism in Post-apartheid
South Africa*



Discrimination Followed Us into Paradise: *A Quantitative Analysis of Self-reported Racial Discrimination*

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1 Introduction

With the electoral victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, a series of laws and policies were introduced and implemented to end centuries of racial discrimination. In his inaugural address as the first black President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela stated that:

Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world. Let freedom reign. The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement! God bless Africa!. CITED IN BUTHELEZI 2006: 500

The repeal of apartheid legislation dates to the 1980s with the abolition of oppressive laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts in 1985, and the pass laws in 1986. Numerous discriminatory laws were subsequently abolished in the early 1990s, such as the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act in 1990, and both the Population Registration Act and the Land and Group Areas Act in 1991. The first task of the post-apartheid transition was the repeal of all remaining racially discriminatory legislation. The mission to end racial discrimination was enshrined in the Interim South African Constitution (No. 200 of 1993), whose anti-discrimination principles were themselves inspired by the Freedom Charter (1955). The aim was to forge comprehensive transformation from an oppressive culture which deprived a majority of South Africans of a human rights-based culture in which human dignity is celebrated and respected.

Since 1994, more than 1,200 laws and amendments have been passed by the government to eradicate all forms of discrimination and to provide for the redress of apartheid-created inequalities. The Equality Act (2000) prohibits

unfair discrimination, hate speech¹ and harassment. The Equality Courts can refer a civil case involving hate speech for criminal prosecution, and in this manner ensure that civil remedies are available against hate speech and unfair discrimination based on race. However, they have not been well-utilised and available remedies have not been tested sufficiently (Bohler-Muller, Pienaar, Houston, Barolsky & Majozi 2017). In 1995, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) was established, in part, to protect the human rights of ordinary South Africans against discrimination (Majola 2017). The SAHRC received 505 racial complaints in the 2015/16 financial year – a significant increase in contrast to the previous year. Since 2015/16, this high level of racial complaints has remained relatively stable (SAHRC 2020). The Commission stated that the increase in racial discrimination complaints did not necessarily reflect an increase in racial incidents. The argument was that South Africans have become more eager to voice out racism and inequality and are also aware of their rights.

Despite the multiple laws and policies passed, the SAHRC remains concerned about the poor state of transformation taking place in South African society. To adequately address a problem, it is first necessary to understand it. Currently, not much is known about how frequently ordinary people in South Africa experience personal racial discrimination. To bridge this knowledge gap, self-reported experiences are examined in this chapter using contemporary public opinion data. Data from the nationally representative South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) is used to look at patterns of reported discrimination by population group and how these patterns have changed over the period 2003–2018. Both personal and collective experiences of racial discrimination are investigated, providing important insights into the practice of modern racism. Looking at the claims of the country's four major population groups, the chapter reflects on feelings of racial marginalisation and the expectations of the post-apartheid period.

2 Racial Prejudice, Discrimination, Whiteness and Blackness

Regardless of the multiple transformative policies and other measures that have been adopted in South Africa, there has been evidence of racist rhetoric

1 The Act defines hate speech as the publication, propagation or communication of words where there is a clear intention to be hurtful, harmful or to incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. In 2017, the South African parliament introduced a draft Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill to supplement existing laws governing discrimination, hate speech, crimen injuria and defamation under which acts of racism can be prosecuted (Bohler-Muller, Pienaar, Houston, Barolsky & Majozi 2017). At the time of writing, the bill has not been signed into law by the National President.

in both traditional and social media (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2012). A multitude of race scandals have arisen that have left the nation shocked, outraged and doubtful about the state of race relations (e.g. Sibiyi 2016). In addition, several pro-white groups have become hostile to government efforts to reduce racism and claim that contemporary policies in the country negatively affect the white minority. According to the Solidarity Trade Union's (STU) Centre for Fair Labour Practices report (2015), for example, the government pursues policies that are 'overtly race-based'. The report notes that AfriForum (a civil rights organisation allied to the STU) repeatedly seeks platforms (such as the United Nations' Human Rights Council) to communicate issues regarding the rights of white South Africans, incitement of hate, and hate speech against whites in the country.² In short, the report argues that state policies are not "non-racial" but "neo-liberal", and deliberately "racialist" at worst. Moreover, several pro-white groups have claimed that the government does not do enough to protect the white minority from discrimination directed at the group by people of colour (Afriforum 2017).

With the above in mind, let us consider how racial prejudice can be defined in a modern context. According to Reicher (2007), racial prejudice can be viewed as having negative stereotypes usually against previously oppressed groups such as black people and minorities. The basis of such stereotyping is the supposed superiority of one race group over another. The superiority of some races over others has been dismissed by the scientific community (Fanon 1986). Indeed, there are no biological constructs explaining different racial behaviour, and 'race' should be understood as a social (rather than a scientific) construct (O'Donnell 1991). Racial prejudice can be institutionalised and executed through the discriminatory implementation of policies in areas of life as diverse as the right to vote, sexual relations, and access to employment, land, education, and housing. However, racial prejudice can also manifest in less overt ways and can take the form of micro-aggressions. This form of aggression often constitutes unintentional, subtle and persistent insults founded on race, which in the long term has an accumulating effect (Pierce 1995; Boswell 2014). Micro-aggressions are often "little comments" regarding, for instance, how one race group is incompetent, corrupt or lazy. These (often covert) aggressions serve to perpetuate racial power hierarchies (Carolissen, Van Wyk & Pick-Cornelius 2012; Conger, Dygdon & Rollock 2012).

In modern Sub-Saharan African spaces, racial discrimination is informed by notions of 'whiteness'. The work of Frantz Fanon (1986) shows that whiteness

² On numerous instances the AfriForum has condemned the government for denying the minority their rights. Nonetheless, the organisation has been accused of overplaying the state of affairs concerning minority rights in the country and that the campaigns of the organisation are founded on victimhood (*News24*, 26 September 2011).

is shaped by the histories of colonialism, which is a world inherited and prepared for white bodies. He argues that 'whiteness' through habit can penetrate black consciousness, although the mind may disremember. 'Whiteness' seemingly becomes a 'natural' proxy for quality, merit, and advantage (also see Fine et al. 1997 and Alexander 2004). It gets itself surrounded by "protective pillows" of resources and benefits. In this context, racial discrimination becomes normalised as people of colour internalise these notions of 'whiteness'. The accumulative effect of racial discrimination is the adoption of habits of oppression.

According to the Fanonian phenomenology of racial discrimination, discrimination is a social experience of restriction, uncertainty, losing access to privileges and rights or the inability to move throughout the world without losing one's way. For Fanon (1986), the consciousness of a black person is of "third person consciousness", and the feeling is one of negation. Gordon (1999), in his criticism of racial inequality, suggests that "White people are universal and Black people are not". This leads to the notion that to be human is to be white, and not to be human is to occupy the negative; this is by way of unfolding the realities of racism. Fanon's phenomenology acknowledges the pressures of being a person of colour that forces black people into becoming incapable of acting or extending themselves and becoming disconnected, and hence losing identity and capability. Fanon captures the reflective alienation of people of colour that had been instigated by the process of colonialism that essentially disadvantages the former colonised subjects.

Fanon (1986) associates habits to what is unconscious or has become second nature, and stipulates that habit can be thought of as a form of inheritance or entitlements to certain honours. These inheritances are understood as "reachable objects" which are made available or, better yet, given. 'Whiteness' is not identified as the "reachable object", but as a position that expects certain merits to be within reach. Ahmed (2004) reveals that whiteness is undetectable only to those that inhabit it or learn to disregard it. Nonetheless, it makes people of colour uncomfortable, unprotected and different. Whiteness is a term denoting societal privilege that solely benefit the white-skinned. Whiteness encompasses the noticeable as well as the less noticeable passive benefits that the white person may not be aware they have; this then differentiates it from explicit racial prejudice.

One of the most influential philosophers on Black Consciousness on the African continent was Steve Biko. While advocating for Black Consciousness, Biko spoke of "Blackness", which is assumed to be a political category. This meant Blackness does not refer to a racial affiliation or biologically transmitted physical characteristics, but strictly political considerations. In short, blackness in an anti-black world is used as a unifying tool to combat oppression for

all those who are persons of colour (More 2017). Biko's understanding was that to be black certainly locates one in an inferior oppressive socio-political position. The South Africa Student Organisation's 1973 Policy Manifesto defined black people as "those who are by law or tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in South Africa and identifying themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of their aspiration". Blackness for those who advocated for black consciousness was understood to be oppression-centred and associated with vulnerability to apartheid racism (More 2017).

Biko identified the fundamental problem of black people to be the anti-black racism of apartheid. Biko stated that: "There is nothing the matter with Blacks. The problem is with white racism and it rests squarely on the laps of white society" (Biko 1996: 23). This is an indication that, for Biko, the foremost problem was race distinctions (blackness and whiteness) in South Africa. Given the negative connotations attached to 'black' through apartheid, Black Consciousness was a response to the divide that painted the world in black and white, as evil and good, barbaric and civilised, other and self (More 2017). Biko therefore argued that change could be accomplished by a programme planned by black people to defeat the foremost political elements working against them. This meant dismantling a deliberate apartheid-cultivated psychological inferiority complex devised to ensure white domination (Ahluwalia & Zegeye 2010). He characterised the black person as "dehumanised" and caught up in a white rhetorical vision that led blacks to feel more animal-like than humans. His belief was that blacks must firstly consider themselves to be real human beings and not subordinates or slaves; only then can they pursue political, economic and/or social change.

3 Data

This study uses data from SASAS, a survey series that has been administered by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) since 2003. SASAS is an annually repeated cross-national opinion survey that is designed to be representative of the population aged 16 years and older living in private homes. In each year of surveying, a set of 500 small area layers (SALs) were drawn spreading across the country's nine provinces. In each SAL, seven households were randomly selected. In each household, a respondent was selected at random using the Kish grid method. The realised sample size for each survey round consisted of about three thousand interviews. A special attempt is made to achieve a racially representative sample with certain minorities (such as whites and

Indians) oversampled. The data is then weighted to be nationally representative – all data represented in this chapter is weighted unless otherwise indicated. This study looks at data from sixteen rounds of SASAS (2003–2018).

Each SASAS round conducted over the last sixteen years has included the following question as a core indicator: “How often do you personally feel racially discriminated against?” with responses captured using a four-point frequency scale: (i) always; (ii) often; (iii) sometimes; and (iv) not at all. It is important to take into consideration the sensitivity of asking about an emotive issue like discrimination. All SASAS interviews are administered face-to-face, and respondents may be disinclined to report feelings of racial discrimination to a fieldworker who does not belong to the respondents’ racial group. This reality should sensitise us to the fact that survey interviews are a social interaction in which social norms affect face-to-face conversations (for further discussion of “response bias”, see Krumpal 2013). To resolve this problem, the SASAS administrators deploys its fieldworkers to ensure that respondents are interviewed (as far as possible) by co-racial interviewers.

4 Results

Self-reported levels of personal racial discrimination for the period 2003–2018 are presented in Table 7.1. As can be observed, 28% of South African adults reported that they had personally experienced racial discrimination “sometimes” in 2003. Around a seventh (14%) said that they had experienced discrimination of this type “often or always.” Only 53% of the general population reported not facing prejudice of this sort in 2003. Levels of self-reported personal racial discrimination fluctuated over the period under consideration. Between 2007 and 2009, we can observe a period of low self-reported discrimination at a national level. In 2009, 19% of the general population said that they felt personally racially discriminated against sometimes and 9% admitted to feeling this way often or always. Following this period, reported levels of discrimination grew, and in 2018, 30% of the adult population stated that they were personally discriminated against occasionally and 15% that they experienced this type of discrimination frequently or continuously.

Examining trends in self-reported discrimination, it is evident that the level of discrimination experienced by the general population is not declining. Rather we observe a degree of stability despite fluctuations in certain survey waves. This speaks to the intractability of the problem as well as the failure of existing policy interventions designed to address this problem. To provide a greater level of insight into the observed trends in Table 7.1, we

TABLE 7.1 Self-Reported Personal Racial Discrimination, 2003–2018

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	5	5	6	3	2	3	3	4
Often	8	6	6	7	6	5	5	5	8	8	6	8	6	6	9	12	7
Sometimes	28	22	21	26	19	18	19	28	29	27	21	25	24	22	26	30	24
Not at all	53	66	67	61	71	72	71	63	58	58	65	60	65	68	61	54	64
(Do not know)	5	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2

now turn our attention to population group differences in self-reported personal racial discrimination. In Table 7.2 we can observe how different population groups reported racial bias over the period under review. It is evident from the table that certain groups report facing bigotry more frequently than others.

Adult members of the black African majority reported, on average, personal racial discrimination less frequently than other race groups. Regardless of which year we look at, only about a tenth of this population group said that they experienced racial discrimination either often or always. In terms of confronting racial bias, the black African majority was not found to be too dissimilar from other people of colour in South Africa. The frequency with which adult members of the Indian and coloured minorities reported levels of racial discrimination was, overall, only somewhat higher than that of their black African counterparts. Levels of self-reported discrimination amongst the coloured population were rather stable for the period 2003–2010. Between 2012 and 2018, we can see an incline in experiences of bigotry amongst this group. At the start of the period, about two-thirds (64%) of the adult coloured minority reported no discrimination while only 42% did so at the end.

It is worth looking more closely at the black African majority and their experiences of racial prejudice. Table 7.3 presents self-reported personal racial discrimination by educational attainment amongst black Africans for the 2003–2018 period. Looking at those who completed their secondary education or less, we can observe similar levels of reported discrimination over this period. However, those with some form of post-matric education are distinct and tend to report facing this type of bigotry more frequently than less educated adults. Three-fifths of black African adults with a post-matric qualification said that they felt personally racially discriminated against in 2018. This can be compared to 45% of those with a matric, 39% with an incomplete secondary education and 46% of those without any secondary schooling.

In order to examine experiences of racial bigotry over a range of socio-demographic groupings, we constructed a 0–3 Frequency of Experiencing Personal Racial Discrimination Scale (FoEPRDS). The higher value on this scale indicates the higher frequency with which an individual experienced racial bias. The mean scores on the FoEPRDS are presented in Table 7.4 by select subgroups for the period 2003–2016. The results show that, on average, those born in the democratic era (1990 and after) have lower FoEPRDS mean scores than their peers. It appears that those born between 1980 and 1990 are likely to report a regular personal experience of racial discrimination. Regardless

TABLE 7.2 Self-Reported Personal Racial Discrimination by Population Groups, 2003–2018

BLACK AFRICAN																		
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	6	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	5	5	5	4	2	3	3	4
Often	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	5	7	7	5	8	6	6	9	11	6
Sometimes	27	21	19	26	18	16	18	18	27	28	27	20	24	23	20	25	29	22
Not at a	55	68	70	62	72	74	74	72	64	60	59	69	62	66	71	61	56	66
(Do not know)	5	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1

COLOURED																		
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	4	4	3	5	4	3	3	3	3	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	2	4
Often	10	5	5	9	4	5	4	4	5	9	10	5	9	7	8	10	17	7
Sometimes	23	27	25	24	20	21	23	23	25	32	22	27	34	26	32	37	38	26
Not at a	54	60	63	60	71	71	70	70	65	52	64	58	51	63	54	48	42	61
(Do not know)	9	4	3	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	6	0	0	2	1	1	2

TABLE 7.2 Self-Reported Personal Racial Discrimination by Population Groups, 2003–2018 (cont.)

INDIAN																	
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	9	5	3	4	7	2	4	3	3	3	11	4	5	3	3	3	5
Often	7	6	6	5	8	5	5	6	10	6	9	6	5	4	5	9	6
Sometimes	28	22	19	30	23	18	30	44	28	26	24	27	23	20	38	28	26
Not at a	51	60	71	57	63	73	60	47	58	65	55	62	67	69	51	56	61
(Do not know)	5	6	2	4	0	3	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	4	3	3	2

WHITE																	
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	6	6	4	3	2	3	4	4	8	10	9	10	1	2	3	3	5
Often	13	8	10	13	7	9	5	10	19	14	15	12	12	9	11	15	11
Sometimes	37	28	30	24	25	29	21	31	29	35	28	26	31	30	15	34	29
Not at a	40	56	49	57	63	53	69	53	42	41	46	50	55	57	71	47	52
(Do not know)	4	2	7	3	3	5	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2

SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 2003–2018.

TABLE 7.3 Self-Reported Personal Racial Discrimination by Educational Attainment amongst Black Africans, 2003–2018

Junior Primary and Below																	
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	5	3	3	2	6	4	7	3	4	5	5	8	4	1	2	4	5
Often	7	5	3	7	6	4	5	5	8	8	7	8	5	5	9	10	6
Sometimes	21	17	19	21	15	11	14	26	27	24	16	23	20	18	24	29	19
Not at a	61	73	73	66	72	80	72	67	57	62	71	62	70	75	64	54	69
(Do not know)	6	1	2	3	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	2	2	2
Senior Primary																	
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	6	2	4	2	5	3	7	3	4	5	6	5	3	1	2	2	4
Often	8	5	3	8	7	4	5	7	9	7	6	9	5	4	7	10	6
Sometimes	18	16	20	17	17	15	16	27	27	21	17	26	21	18	26	26	20
Not at a	65	77	71	69	70	77	70	63	57	65	69	60	71	75	63	61	69
(Do not know)	3	1	2	3	1	1	2	0	3	2	1	0	0	2	2	1	2

Post-Matric

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Always	23	5	7	14	3	4	3	4	1	4	8	7	3	5	2	0	6
Often	7	12	13	6	8	7	7	11	13	11	6	8	12	10	9	19	10
Sometimes	30	28	30	35	24	22	31	32	27	39	28	33	30	24	30	40	30
Not at a	37	54	49	44	64	66	59	54	58	43	56	50	54	60	57	40	54
(Do not know)	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	2	1	0	2	2	1

SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 2003-2018.

TABLE 7.4 Mean Scores of Frequency of Experiencing Personal Racial Discrimination Scale (0–3) for Select Subgroups, 2003–2018

	2003		2008		2014		2018		2003–2018	
Total	0.65	(0.88)	0.40	(0.76)	0.59	(0.86)	0.63	(0.80)	0.51	(0.80)
Gender										
Male	0.71	(0.91)	0.41	(0.74)	0.62	(0.87)	0.68	(0.82)	0.55	(0.82)
Female	0.59	(0.86)	0.39	(0.77)	0.56	(0.86)	0.59	(0.78)	0.48	(0.78)
	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F
	11	0.001	0	0.501	4	0.045	8	0.004	109	0.000
Birth Cohort										
1990 and after			0.26	(0.60)	0.46	(0.76)	0.51	(0.70)	0.46	(0.74)
1980–1989	0.51	(0.74)	0.43	(0.76)	0.62	(0.88)	0.69	(0.85)	0.51	(0.78)
1970–1979	0.67	(0.96)	0.41	(0.75)	0.69	(0.93)	0.78	(0.87)	0.56	(0.83)
1950–1969	0.76	(0.89)	0.45	(0.80)	0.67	(0.90)	0.68	(0.80)	0.55	(0.83)
1949 and before	0.62	(0.92)	0.32	(0.72)	0.49	(0.83)	0.60	(0.92)	0.46	(0.79)
	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F
	7	0.000	5	0.000	9	0.000	11	0.000	27	0.000
Provincial Residence										
Western Cape	0.56	(0.81)	0.60	(0.81)	0.79	(0.79)	0.84	(0.89)	0.56	(0.79)
Eastern Cape	0.57	(0.81)	0.41	(0.81)	0.68	(0.93)	0.50	(0.74)	0.46	(0.78)
Northern Cape	0.80	(1.01)	0.59	(0.79)	0.96	(1.09)	0.53	(0.79)	0.68	(0.93)
Free State	0.83	(0.96)	0.10	(0.39)	0.51	(0.83)	0.59	(0.76)	0.59	(0.84)
KwaZulu-Natal	0.65	(0.84)	0.28	(0.60)	0.42	(0.66)	0.76	(0.80)	0.51	(0.75)
North West	0.62	(0.95)	0.50	(0.89)	0.54	(0.81)	0.79	(0.84)	0.48	(0.78)
Gauteng	0.71	(0.93)	0.42	(0.79)	0.69	(1.00)	0.58	(0.78)	0.55	(0.84)
Mpumalanga	0.81	(1.04)	0.30	(0.60)	0.42	(0.78)	0.70	(0.82)	0.44	(0.79)
Limpopo	0.48	(0.75)	0.53	(0.89)	0.45	(0.76)	0.29	(0.61)	0.44	(0.77)
	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F
	4	0.000	12	0.000	11	0.000	14	0.000	25	0.000

SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 2003–2018.

Notes 1: A high value indicates a higher frequency of experiencing racial discrimination than a low value; 2: Figures shaded in grey indicate a mean score above the national average in that given year; 3. Standard deviations shown in parenthesis; and 4. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests of statistical significance are shown.

of the survey round under review, those born before 1950 also tended to have FoEPRDS mean scores below the national average. Standard tests confirm that the FoEPRDS means of the birth cohorts were significantly different from each other.

If we turn to how FoEPRDS levels differ by geography, then some noteworthy trends emerge. Residents of certain provinces tended to report higher than average FoEPRDS mean scores than residents of others. Except for 2003, people living in the Western Cape had higher FoEPRDS mean scores than the national average. Higher than average levels of prejudice were also frequently reported in the Northern Cape. Throughout the period under review, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, with some exceptions, tended to report low levels of racial discrimination. This could be linked to how people in rural traditional authority areas (the former Bantu homelands) experience this type of bigotry. Self-reported racial discrimination was quite low in these areas when compared to urban areas.

Could the differences observed above be explained by well-known differences between different population groups in South Africa? To answer this question, we used multivariate regression analysis to help discern which factors are associated with a self-reported frequency of experiencing racial bigotry. To comprehend how certain socio-demographic factors are correlated with self-reported personal racial discrimination, we used an ordered logistic regression analysis. As our dependent variable, we used the FoEPRDS. Five regression models were computed, one for each of the four main race groups in South Africa and a fifth for the population as a whole.

Table 7.5 presents the results from the coefficients from the five models predicting the association between the dependent variable and individual characteristics. One of the most interesting findings to emerge from the table concerned the fifth and final model. In this model we noted that, using the black African majority as the reference group, belonging to the coloured ($r = 0.192$; $SE = 0.047$) and white ($r = 0.328$; $SE = 0.051$) race groups increased the chances an individual would report feeling racially discriminated against. This finding held even when we controlled for a range of other socio-demographic variables, such as age, gender and geographic location.

We found that formal educational attainment was a statistically significant predictor in four out of the five models in the table. For people of colour, gaining formal education increased their likelihood of experiencing personal racial bias while the same was not found to be true of the white minority. We can observe that the size of the effect of educational attainment on the dependent characteristics was greater for members of the black African population. Using no secondary education as the reference group, having a post-matric

TABLE 7.5 Ordered Logistic Regression on Frequency of Experiencing Personal Racial Discrimination Scale

	Black African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Female	-0.190 (0.038) ***	-0.117 (0.068)	-0.125 (0.098)	-0.225 (0.078) **	-0.181 (0.031) ***
Birth Year	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.002) *	0.000 (0.001)
Work Status (ref. employed)					
Unemployed	-0.058 (0.101)	0.157 (0.192)	-0.316 (0.324)	0.278 (0.346)	-0.032 (0.084)
Labour Market					
Inactive	-0.162 (0.109)	-0.177 (0.187)	-0.119 (0.268)	-0.546 (0.194) **	-0.227 (0.086) **
Education (ref. no secondary)					
Incomplete					
secondary	0.018 (0.051)	0.232 (0.092) *	0.189 (0.184)	0.263 (0.297)	0.046 (0.045)
Completed					
secondary	0.146 (0.056) **	0.333 (0.108) **	0.417 (0.195) *	0.352 (0.292) *	0.171 (0.048) ***
Tertiary	0.602 (0.078) ***	0.353 (0.142) *	0.432 (0.208) *	0.347 (0.293)	0.438 (0.062) ***
Population Group (ref. Black African)					
Coloured					0.192 (0.047) ***
Indian					0.015 (0.060)
White					0.328 (0.051) ***

Provincial Residence (ref. Western Cape)					
Eastern Cape	-0.399 (0.084) ***	-0.083 (0.100)	0.863 (0.511)	-0.152 (0.145)	-0.122 (0.059) *
Northern Cape	-0.317 (0.117) **	0.462 (0.093) ***	1.954 (0.899) *	1.167 (0.138) ***	0.289 (0.066) ***
Free State	-0.163 (0.089)	0.638 (0.192) **	0.631 (1.226)	0.547 (0.143) ***	0.166 (0.066) **
KwaZulu-Natal	-0.208 (0.081) *	0.386 (0.161) *	1.222 (0.379) **	-0.321 (0.139) *	0.062 (0.058)
North West	-0.422 (0.092) ***	-0.057 (0.242)	1.625 (0.713) *	0.420 (0.153) **	-0.095 (0.070)
Gauteng	-0.363 (0.086) ***	0.306 (0.121) *	0.725 (0.388) ***	0.428 (0.119) ***	-0.015 (0.059) ***
Mpumalanga	-0.535 (0.089) ***	0.285 (0.354)	1.064 (0.581) *	-0.156 (0.164)	-0.246 (0.069) ***
Limpopo	-0.507 (0.084) ***	0.352 (0.647)	1.246 (0.515) *	0.249 (0.227)	-0.202 (0.066) **
Obs.	27,795	7,585	4,872	5,737	45,989
/cut1	-3.992 (1.952)	6.088 (4.315)	6.088 (4.315)	9.347 (4.303)	-0.839 (1.868)
/cut2	-2.486 (1.952)	7.751 (4.315)	7.751 (4.315)	10.879 (4.310)	0.677 (1.869)
/cut3	-1.406 (1.952)	8.959 (4.326)	8.959 (4.326)	12.251 (4.311)	1.802 (1.869)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 2003–2018.

Notes: 1. Positive coefficients indicate an increased frequency of experiencing personal racial discrimination; 2. Standard errors in parenthesis and 3. The regressions control for survey wave.

education increased the log odds ($r = 0.602$; $SE = 0.078$) of experiencing racial bigotry for black Africans. Finally, it was interesting to observe that, when compared to men, women were less likely to report feeling personally racially discriminated against. We should note that the influence of gender on the frequency with which an individual experiences racial prejudice was greater for members of the white ($r = -0.225$; $SE = 0.078$) and black African ($r = -0.190$; $SE = 0.038$) populations than it was for other population groups.

The results confirm that gender and geography did play a role in determining how an individual would score on the FoEPRDS. We also found that, even when holding other variables constant, formal educational attainment did increase an individual's chances of experiencing racial bias. Finally, we observed that much of the provincial differences noted in Table 7.4 can be explained by factors other than provincial residence.

5 Discussion

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that a significant minority of South African adults report frequent personal experiences of racial discrimination. This finding has been corroborated by other public opinion studies. According to Afrobarometer (2016), for instance, a large proportion of the black African majority group in South Africa feels that courts, employers, and landlords commonly discriminate against people based on their race. Interestingly, most South Africans do not believe the government discriminates against their ethnic groups. However, the perception of group discrimination by the government has increased particularly amongst the minority racial groups. The rise of such racism is worrying and a reminder that it is the one issue we cannot wish away.

Educated people of colour in South Africa are more likely to experience racism than their less educated peers. This may be because educated people of colour tend to work as professionals in proximity with white people. Racial pecking orders are still alive and well in many workplaces, and numerous examples inform this problem. Consider, for instance, one case heard before the Constitutional Court. Mr. Jacobus Kruger, an employee at South African Revenue Service, had a disagreement with Mr. Abel Mboweni who was his superior; Mr. Kruger referred to Mr. Mboweni using the k-word. As a result of this, the Constitutional Court held that by using the offensive term, he not only undermined the capacity and capabilities of Mr. Mboweni but rather of all his fellow black African employees (Sibiya 2016).

In our study we found that many adult white South Africans felt that they were the victims of racial bias. From a statistical perspective, this does not square with evidence from the South African Stress and Health Study. Williams et al. (2008) indicated that all groups categorised as black in South Africa (black African, coloured and Indian/Asian) are two to four times more likely than white minorities to report acute and chronic experiences and perceived racial discrimination. However, white people in South Africa tend to be pessimistic about race relations in the country. A 2004 SABC poll, for instance, discovered that 65% of black African respondents, 60% of coloured people and 56% of Indians thought race relations in South Africa have been improving since democracy, while 37% of white people felt the same way.

Indeed, when taking socio-demographic factors into account, our findings demonstrate that members of the white minority were more likely to say that they suffered discrimination than people of colour. Since the inception of democracy, steps have been taken by government to redress past racial imbalances. The implementation of these policies has resulted in criticism that it unfairly punishes white people. Indeed, previous research by Roberts (2014) and Nyamnjoh et al. (2020) found that white people were deeply opposed to government programmes of racial redress. This prior research seems to suggest the self-reported discrimination showcased here may reflect white opposition to racial transformation. However, at the time of writing, it is not possible to identify the reason for white feelings of discrimination and further research on this intriguing outcome is required.

Ernst Roets, in his speech on anti-white racism, provides a different illustration of perceived racial discrimination against whites in South Africa (Afriforum 2017). He stated that the racial hatred directed against this minority is virulent, dangerous, and ignored. According to Roets, there are alarming double standards in the way South African society at large deals with racism directed at the white minority. He put forth how double standards manifest by referring to the contrast in the treatment of Penny Sparrow who equated black people at a Durban beachfront to “monkeys”, and Velaphi Khumalo, an employee of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Sport, Culture and Recreation, who wrote that he wanted to purify the nation of white people and that whites should be treated as Hitler had treated Jews. In another post, Khumalo stated that South African whites deserved to be slaughtered similar to the way Jews had been killed. Sparrow insulted black Africans and Khumalo advocated for genocide of white people. Nonetheless, Sparrow was fined R150,000 and Khumalo subjected to an internal investigation.

The revival of racial discrimination, as illustrated by Roets, is one amongst the many inexplicable relations between blacks and whites which undermine the legacy of South Africa's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, who risked outrage from his own people in his pursuit of racial tolerance.

In our research we also found that a significant number of Indian South Africans felt that they were victims of racially-motivated discrimination. While racism dominates discussions in South Africa, the racial discrimination experienced by Indians is a matter that has been at the forefront on numerous instances in the democratic era.³ While some Indian people enjoyed relatively privileged treatment meted out by the apartheid system, a sizeable proportion participated in the struggle for liberation led by the current governing party (*Daily Maverick*, 13 October 2017). On the other hand, many young people of Indian descent, particularly those living in urban areas, feel that they are unfairly victimised by contemporary racial transformation legislation (*Mail & Guardian*, 13 May 2013; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2012).

Throughout 2016, several detrimental racial remarks received recurrent coverage by the media, adding emphasis to the idea that South Africa could again revert to racial conflict. In response to this surge in coverage on racism, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) fielded an opinion survey with the intent of establishing how South Africans interpret race relations within the country. Upon identifying serious problems that had not been resolved since the commencement of democracy in 1994, South Africans cited joblessness, service delivery, crime and education respectively as the most pressing issues facing the country. Racism was least mentioned as the most pressing issue, with a mere 3% of respondents seeing it as the most pressing issue, while only 2% of black Africans saw this as the most pressing issue facing the country. More than half the respondents in this survey

3 Consider that in early 2002 globally celebrated singer and composer Mbongeni Ngema released a provocative anti-Indian song translated from isiZulu as "Oh brothers, oh my fellow brothers. We need strong and brave men to confront Indians. This situation is very difficult, Indians do not want to change, whites were far better than Indians. Even Mandela has failed to convince them to change." However, former President Nelson Mandela requested that he apologise (*Daily Maverick*, 15 November 2015). In other incidences, politicians have spread anti-Indian sentiment. Julius Malema, for instance, referenced *amakula* (a derogatory term for Indians) in a 2017 speech and Jimmy Manyi suggested that KwaZulu-Natal is congested by Indians and majorities of this group corrupt as they buy their way to the top.

felt race relations had improved since 1994 (South African Institute of Race Relations 2016).

6 Measures to Reduce Racial Discrimination

There are several existing mechanisms and plans to reduce racial discrimination in South Africa. Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa prohibits unfair discrimination on several grounds, including race, while Section 10 protects the right to dignity for all. It is a crime under South African common law to impair someone's dignity through speech (an offence called *crimen injuria*). Under common law, defamation is the unlawful and intentional publication of matter that impairs another person's reputation. South African common law does not provide for the treatment of speech and publications that impair the dignity of groups or individuals on the basis of their race. In 2017, the South African parliament introduced a draft Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill to supplement existing laws governing discrimination, hate speech, *crimen injuria* and defamation under which acts of racism can be prosecuted (Bohler-Muller, Pienaar, Houston, Barolsky & Majozi 2017). The Bill was passed in 2018, and provides for the prosecution of people who commit hate crimes. Stricter sanctions against racial discrimination are likely to contribute to the reduction of overt racial discrimination, and future survey research will reveal if this is indeed the case.

However, we also need to challenge the menace of racism at a grassroots level by organising societal sectors into a joint front against racism and racial discrimination. People ought to be called upon to learn, speak and act against racial discrimination. A National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was recently adopted by the cabinet of the fifth administration under President Cyril Ramaphosa. The Action Plan was the result of years of consultation with all sectors of society, and commits all "to the promotion and protection of human rights, and to raising awareness of anti-racism, equality and anti-discrimination issues". It also calls "for a partnership between government departments and Chapter Nine institutions in implementing anti-racist and anti-discrimination education". One of the key steps in the implementation of the plan is the collection of data regarding racism and discrimination. Another key step includes the identification of legislation that needs to be amended or adopted with a view to improving the protection of victims, the building of a more equal society,

and strengthening of the rule of law and democracy. The plan envisages specific roles from all sectors of society, from the government, non-governmental organisations, trade unions, the private sector to the media and academic institutions (Republic of South Africa 2019). The roll-out of this plan will also likely contribute to a change in attitudes, thereby contributing to a reduction in racial discrimination.

7 Conclusion

South Africans of various ages, race, geographic locations and educational levels have reported experiences of racial discrimination. After 27 years of democracy, the country should be making more progress towards becoming a non-racist society devoid of racial identity politics. However, the disturbing reality is that the experience of racial discrimination still exists.

What about claims that people of colour have become racist? The SASAS data confirms, that for more than a decade, the white community have been more likely to experience feelings of being discriminated against than people of colour. Steve Biko, in his book *"I Write What I Like"*, has an uncomplicated interpretation of this. He begins by stating that the white man's skin colour has been his passport to privilege that places him far ahead of others. According to Biko, apartheid has been associated with white supremacy, exploitation and deliberate oppression, making racial discrimination in this country a far more complex problem. However, he argued that blacks cannot be racist because to be racist one must have the power to subjugate. Biko claimed that the report of racial discrimination by the white community is simply frustration at the challenge blacks are posing to the privilege and the power of whites.

Fanon requests that racial groups "turn their backs on the inhuman voices ... of their respective ancestors in order that authentic inter-racial communication is possible" (Fanon 1986: 180–181). He turns away from the past in his book *Black Face White Masks*, and strives for the realisation of a community that compliments racial variance and plurality while all together upholding human equality. According to Fanon, building a non-racial society is ultimate and is the core of his work; he insists on universal humanitarianism rather than identity politics. Former struggle hero Ahmed Kathrada said that "the fight for non-racialism, equity and equality is not short-term work, but generational work. It requires united effort and a lifetime of commitment...". A lot is yet to be done in building an equal and non-racial society where there is still a steady revolution of race consciousness.

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Race and Class Perceptions of Poverty in South Africa

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Poverty and inequality that entrench racial disparities constitute fault lines which South Africa will have to grapple with if it is to overcome the apartheid legacy. People experience not only poverty and inequality which are structural and systemic in nature, but also, in many instances, discrimination on a variety of grounds. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (2019: 21)

1 Introduction

This chapter is about how people perceive poverty; not about how one defines and measures poverty. Nevertheless, how poverty is defined and measured influences people's perceptions of poverty. Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, and researchers employ various definitions to define poverty along these dimensions. The result is that different measurements based on these many definitions often identify different groups of people or different people as poor or non-poor.

The South African Human Rights Commission (2018) emphasised that poverty in South Africa has increased, while income and wealth inequality remain the highest in the world. These high levels of poverty and inequality often severely prejudice vulnerable individuals and groups based on their race, geographic location, and gender and disability status. The Human Rights Commission therefore strongly highlighted the need for radical socio-economic transformation and redistributive fiscal policy choices to address unfair discrimination against vulnerable groups and at the same time ensure the right to equality, the right to further education, the right of equitable access to land, housing, health care, food, water and social assistance (South African Human Rights Commission 2018).

This chapter focuses on the race dimension, which has largely corresponded with class throughout the apartheid era and into the post-apartheid

era. Previous studies showed that the poor and non-poor, people from different race groups, and people from different classes (low, middle and high) perceive poverty differently (Clarke and Sison 2003). It is against this background that we examine poverty in South Africa, followed by a section on inequality and another on the link between race and class and perceptions of poverty. Our discussion of existing literature is complemented by an analysis of data from the Human Science Research Council's (HSRC) South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). Firstly, we examine South Africans' perceptions of the causes of poverty. Next, we examine whether there are different perceptions of the causes of poverty among the various race groups (black African, coloured, white and Indian). Finally, we assess whether there are class (low, middle and high LSM) differences regarding perceptions of the causes of poverty. We assess whether black Africans are more likely to perceive the cause of poverty in structural, individualistic or fatalistic terms, and if this differs from how whites, coloureds and Indians perceive the causes of poverty.

The results indicate the need for a more tolerant and inclusive society where those who are well resourced are more sensitive and supportive of those who are vulnerable and poor. It is necessary to begin, however, with a definition of poverty and ways of measuring this phenomenon.

2 Measuring Poverty

Some researchers use absolute poverty measures to define poverty, while others use relative measures. Absolute poverty is the condition of failure to meet the essentials of physical existence (Lok-Dessalien 2002: 2; Ravallion, Datt & van de Walle 1991: 346; Cutler 1984: 1119). In contrast, relative poverty takes into account societal norms so that the definition of the minimum socially acceptable level of consumption tends to rise with the country's overall standard of living (Hanmer, Pyatt & White 1999: 799; Kanbur 1987: 61; Hagenaaars & Praag 1985: 139).

Poverty can also be viewed from both an objective and subjective perspective. The objective approach to the measurement of poverty has traditionally been favoured over the subjective approach. Lok-Dessalien (2002: 3) described the objective perspective as the conventional approach followed by economists to measure what constitutes poverty and what is required to move people out of their impoverished state. Normally this involves some normative or value judgement. On the one hand, since individuals are not always the best judge of what is best for them, economists reason that poverty assessments are best made by experts. De Vos *et al.* (1991: 268), on the other hand, indicated

that proponents of the subjective perspective strongly believe that the opinions of people concerning their own situations should be the decisive factor when defining poverty.

The distinction between absolute and relative as well as objective and subjective poverty measures is crucial in the context of identifying and quantifying who are poor. Unfortunately, once labelled as poor an individual often becomes the target of negative criticism. Previous research on perceptions of poverty showed that poor people are often labelled as lazy or that they lack the ability to manage money (Wright 1993; Clarke & Sison 2003; Underlid 2005). These negative stereotypes are likely to have significant implications for poor people themselves, especially in terms of their involvement in poverty eradication initiatives and projects. There is a wealth of research that examines the implications of how researchers define and measure poverty (Woolard & Leibbrandt 1999 and 2006; Noble, Ratcliffe & Wright, 2004). Moving beyond purely money metric measures of poverty, a growing number of researchers started to broaden the concept of poverty by using methods that were much more people-centered and participatory in nature (Room 1999; Clert *et al.* 2001; Noble *et al.* 2006). Today, a more holistic multidimensional approach to defining and measuring poverty has emerged that includes many aspects of well-being and inequality. It is against this background that the United Nations General Assembly, through the sustainable development goals (SDGs), revised its goal on tackling poverty from money metric-orientated measures to dealing with poverty in all its forms. The South African government also adopted a multi-dimensional approach that includes measures of education, health, living standards, economic activity and financial commitments (Office of the President 2008).

3 Poverty in South Africa

In a discussion document (African National Congress 2012), the ruling African National Congress (ANC) political party drew attention to enduring poverty, which is overwhelmingly located in black communities, black Africans, women-headed households and rural communities. The document was an acknowledgement of the fact that policies to reduce poverty had not succeeded.

In South Africa, a cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) approach is used to determine poverty lines. In 2012, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) published a suite of three national poverty lines that were used to measure poverty. These are the food poverty line (FPL), the lower bound poverty line (LBPL), and the upper bound poverty line (UBPL). The FPL is the amount of money that individuals

need to afford the minimum required daily energy intake. This is also known as the 'extreme' poverty line. The LBPL and UBPL lines include non-food consumption items. The LBPL is the amount needed for minimum daily energy intake (the PFL) plus an equal amount for non-food items of households. The UBPL is the addition to the latter of both adequate food and non-food items. Statistics South Africa uses the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to update the three poverty lines periodically (Stats SA 2018: 1; World Bank 2018: 8).

In 2011, approximately 23 million South Africans were living below the UBPL. When one looks at extreme poverty, defined as those living below the FPL, the number increased from 12.6 million in 2006 to 15.8 million in 2009, and then dropped to 10.2 million people in 2011. This historical spike was largely due to the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Despite this adverse effect of the financial crisis, poverty levels did improve noticeably. This was the result of a growing social safety net to deal with the crisis, income growth, significant wage increases, decelerating inflationary pressure and increased credit (Statistics SA 2014). In short, the poverty rate decreased from 45% in 1993 to 38% in 2013, with social grants for people living below the LBPL playing a significant role in this drop (The Presidency 2014: 43).

However, according to the World Bank, poverty rates rose from 36.4% to 40.0% at the national LBPL between 2011 and 2015. This meant that over 3.1 million more South Africans slipped into poverty in absolute terms between 2011 and 2015 (World Bank 2018: 10–11). This was despite a positive overall trend in poverty reduction between 2006 and 2015. Nevertheless, just under half the population were chronically poor at the national UBPL of R992 per person per month in 2015 (World Bank 2018: 6).

There is also a close connection between race and poverty, as well as gender and poverty and geographic location and poverty. In 2015, 47% of the households headed by black Africans were living below the LBPL, compared to 23% of households headed by coloureds, a little more than 1% of households headed by an Indian, and less than 1% for households headed by white South Africans. The poverty rate among black Africans increased by 3.7 percentage points, and for coloureds by 2.5 percentage points between 2011 and 2015 (World Bank 2018: 13). In 2006, while about 41.5% of households with male heads were poor, 63.4% of female-headed households were poor. In 2015, 51.2% female-headed households were poor compared to 31.4% among male-headed households (World Bank 2018: 13). In the rural areas, 65.4% of people lived below the LBPL in 2015, down from 74.9% in 2006. In the urban areas, 25.2% of the population were poor in 2015, a huge decrease from 34.3% in 2006. The rural-urban poverty gap did not change significantly between 2006 and 2015. It was about 41% in 2006 and 40% in 2015 (World Bank 2018: 10). Approximately 34% of South

Africans lived in the rural areas in 2016, with black Africans making up 98.7% of the rural population, white 0.7% and coloureds and Indians, 0.6% (Arndt, Davies & Thurlow 2018: 8). The overwhelming bulk of poverty in the rural areas is thus located in black African communities, particularly in those provinces that include the former homelands such as the Eastern Cape and Limpopo.

Close to half the South African population is considered chronically poor at the UBPL of R992 per person per month (2015 prices), and is characterised by high poverty persistence. Another part of the population has a strong chance of falling into poverty (the transient poor). A third segment of the population, the non-poor but vulnerable, can meet their basic needs but face a strong risk of slipping into poverty. These latter two groups made up 27% of the population. Thus, about 76% of the population face poverty as a constant threat in their daily lives. Most importantly, black Africans made up 91% of the vulnerable, 84% of the transient poor, and 95% of the chronic poor. Coloureds constituted about 8% of the vulnerable, 14% of the transient poor, and 5% of the chronic poor. Indians and whites made up close to 0.1% of the vulnerable, 0.2% of the transient poor and virtually none of the chronic poor in 2014 (World Bank 2018: 39).

The above World Bank and Statistics South Africa data confirmed that poverty in South Africa has a clear divide along race, gender, and geographic location. We see that poverty is worst among black African and coloured South Africans, and those who are female and living in rural areas. These differences are characteristic of apartheid South Africa. More concerning is that the pattern has not changed over the last 27 years of democratic rule. A major question that this chapter therefore explores is: "How do these differences in poverty influence how people perceive the causes of poverty?"

4 Inequality in South Africa

There is also a clear connection between race and inequality. South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world. According to the World Bank, the high level of inequality was inherited from the time of apartheid, and it has increased since. In 2015, the Gini coefficient was 0.63 (per capita expenditure), one of the highest in the world and a dramatic increase during the post-apartheid era since 1994 (World Bank 2018: 43). The top 10% wealthiest households held 71% of net household wealth in 2015, while the bottom 60% held 7%. By comparison, the top 10% wealthiest households in the OECD countries own 50% of total wealth, while the bottom 60% own 13%, on average (World Bank 2018: 51). In South Africa, only 8% of household incomes, 5% of total household

asset values, and 4% of household net wealth accrue to the bottom 50% of households. In contrast, 55% of incomes, about 69% of asset values, and 71% of net wealth go to the top 10% wealthiest households (World Bank 2018: 52).

The middle class made up about 20% of the South African population between 2008 and 2015, and 4% of the population could be considered elite (World Bank 2018: xviii). Black Africans made up just above 50% of the middle class and only 24% of the elite in 2014, while making up about 80% of the total population. In contrast, whites constituted about 28% of the middle class and about 57% of the elite while making up a mere 10% of the South African population. Coloureds constituted 14% of the middle class and 7% of the elite, while Indians constituted about 7% of the middle class and 11% of the elite in 2014.

In 2011, 92.2% of income held by the bottom 40% of households (7.5% of total income) was held by households headed by black Africans, 6.8% by coloured-headed households, and 0.5% by both white- and Indian-headed households. In 2015, this share increased to 8.3%, of which 92.3% was held by households headed by black Africans, 6.5% by coloured households, 0.7% by Indian households, and 0.5% by white households (Stats SA 2017: 24). In addition, black Africans who constituted part of the bottom 40% households in South Africa in 2015 held 7.7% of total income, while non-Africans who made the rest of the bottom 40% of households held 0.6% (Stats SA 2017: 24). This is another indication that black Africans make up the largest share of households in the lowest quintiles.

South Africa is characterised by extreme wage inequality according to the World Bank. On the one hand, a small part of the population enjoys wages roughly equivalent to those living in developed economies. On the other hand, lower-end wages are comparable to those in the poorest countries in the world. In 2015, a little over 10% of the working population was white. At the time the average wages of white South Africans (R12,241) was nearly three times the average wages of black Africans (R4,413), who constituted nearly three-quarters of the entire labour force. The average wages of coloureds (R4,834) was slightly above that of black Africans, while the average wages of Indians (R11,900) was slightly below that of whites (World Bank 2018: 49–50). Income inequality was much higher than expenditure inequality, with the per capita income Gini coefficient being 0.68 and the per capita expenditure Gini coefficient being 0.62 in 2015 (Stats SA 2017 21).

Finally, South Africa has an alarmingly high Gini coefficient for wealth inequality at approximately 0.95, largely a consequence of apartheid-era structural injustices (see Chapter 2 in this volume). In consequence, the average black African household had about 4% of the wealth that the average white household had in 2017, while an average coloured household held about 6%

of the wealth held by an average white household. Furthermore, it seems that wealth inequality is increasing much faster than income inequality (South African Human Rights Commission 2018: 28). It is quite clear that, as the South African Human Rights Commission asserts: 'Poverty and economic inequality manifest in patterns that severely prejudice vulnerable individuals and groups based on their race, geographic location, [and] gender', among other things (South African Human Rights Commission 2018: 4).¹

5 The Link between Race and Class and Perceptions of Poverty

Reviewing the half-century of academic literature that exists on perceptions of the causes of poverty reveals that three perspectives dominate public representations of poverty. These accounts owe much to the formative empirical and theoretical contributions of Joe R. Feagin (1972, 1975) on beliefs about poverty attributions in the United States. This research suggested that people generally perceive poverty along individualistic, structural and fatalistic dimensions (see Davids & Gouws 2011; Hunt 2004: 829; Shek 2004: 273; Shek 2002: 790; Sun 2001: 164). This section outlines these three theoretical explanations. In doing so, it is recognised that people's perceptions of poverty are likely to be multi-dimensional in nature, and interact with socio-demographic attributes and context. The first theoretical perspective is that individuals are themselves to blame for their own poverty. Secondly, poverty is regarded to be a consequence of external economic, political or cultural factors. Thirdly, poverty is viewed to be a result of some unforeseen circumstances, such as illness or bad luck (Shek 2004; Smith & Stone 1989).

The *individualistic perspective* of the causes of poverty presents poverty as a kind of pathology, in which the poor are blamed for their own circumstances (Appelbaum, Lennon & Aber 2006: 390). Material deprivation is considered a consequence of individual shortcomings, such as a lack of ability, effort or even morals (Wilson 1996: 413). There are two separate underlying explanations in this category: the culture of poverty, and the underclass. The culture of poverty theory reasons that many poor people get accustomed to their deprived situation and then develop a way of life that keeps them poor and consequently exhibit feelings of marginality, helplessness, dependency and

1 As the analysis indicates in the chapter, a black African or coloured person is more likely to be poor, lower down the class structure and in a single-parent family headed by a female than a white or Indian person. A black African person is more likely to live in a white rural or impoverished former homeland area than a white, Indian or coloured person.

inferiority (Lewis 1959, 1966; Hunt 1996: 295). The underclass is seen as a small group of people living in poverty with a distinct set of values and behaviours, and a strong propensity for crime and other anti-social behaviour (Hunt 1996: 295; Wilson 1987: 13; Murray 1984, 1990). The individualistic explanation has often been used to legitimise expressions of racism, sexism and individualism. It is particularly evident in the United States, where it is argued that wealth is attributed to individualistic traits such as hard work or motivation (Hunt 2004: 829). These negative views about the causes of poverty have been deconstructed by more comprehensive explanations of the causes of poverty, which include influences such as social structure and lack of opportunities. Besides adopting a negative individualistic perspective for the causes of poverty, other scholars have focused on a more positive approach.

Wilson (1987: 4) categorises these positive and negative descriptions of the causes of poverty into two distinct groups. In his analysis of the inner-city underclass, he refers to those scholars who advocate a more positive approach as “liberals”; and those that believe that the poor (“ghetto family”) have a history of welfare dependency and that their children will lack ambition and a sense of self-reliance as “conservatives”. These approaches (liberal and conservative approaches) may represent two typical groups into which one can group the theories explaining perceptions of the causes of poverty. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail the theories informing people's perceptions of the causes of poverty. Nevertheless, according to Auletta's (1982: 18) review of the underclass within these two categories (conservative and liberal), the distinction between the conservatives and liberals are founded on different assumptions about human nature, where the liberals believe you must change the systems and the conservatives argue you have to change the individual. However, the authors of this chapter are proponents of the liberal approach because we believe that race is a social construct and that individuals are not inherently inept to perform tasks such as managing money or to be wasteful merely because they are part of a specific cultural group.

Structural perceptions of poverty ascribe the cause of poverty to unequal conditions within society, rather than the intellectual and cultural deficits of the poor. In this instance, the poor are not to blame for their own circumstances, as external factors have placed them unfavourably in social structures in a position often characterised by a lack of access to opportunities (Shek 2004: 273). In most of these situations, the individual is unable to manipulate these factors; as a result, it has a direct bearing on his or her poverty status. For instance, Bullock *et al.* (2003: 695) showed that poor immigrant Mexican women in the United States were unable to access good quality education because of a lack of money and transport. Within the structural framework, there is also

a distinction between social injustice (lack of social opportunities) and economic injustice (exploitation as consequences of capitalism, for example, the rich exploit poor people) (Hunt 1996: 295). Ascribed deprivation is the lack of access to opportunities, mostly for poor people living in under-resourced and impoverished circumstances (Shek 2004: 273).

The third perspective recognises that poverty is often attributed to ill-health or social or economic consequences (Bullock & Waugh 2005: 1133). Some scholars refer to these causes as accidental causes, while others refer to it as fatalistic factors such as bad luck or misfortune (Shek 2004: 273). The *fatalistic perspective* describes poverty as emanating from some unforeseen circumstances normally beyond the individual's control (Bullock *et al.* 2005: 1133). Some scholars argue that the fatalistic classification holds that one is poor because of wild, unanticipated variables that one could not maintain a strategic distance from, for example, disease, not having good fortunes or having awful luck (Kainu & Niemelia 2010 and Samuel & Ernest 2012). Bernard (2011) indicated that there is considerable controversy regarding what fatalism is and that it is a difficult concept to study. Nevertheless, fatalism can be described as a system of beliefs which holds that everything has an appointed outcome that cannot be altered by effort or foreknowledge. In other words, fatalism in this sense implies that people are destined to be poor irrespective of what action they undertake. Those who ascribe to the fatalistic perception of the causes of poverty therefore explain the poor in terms of 1) they lack luck, 2) they have bad fate, 3) they have encountered misfortunes, and 4) they are born inferior.

Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen (2009) completed a critical review of empirical research focusing on popular perceptions of poverty and concluded that there is no consensus with regards to the typologies (dimensions) of perceptions of poverty. Their detailed review indicates that Feagin's three-way explanation (individualistic, structural, and fatalistic) of the causes of poverty is inadequate for several reasons. They argue that the indicators listed by Feagin are not enough for all the potential types of poverty attributions or explanations. Furthermore, some of the indicators also overlap or cover two dimensions (for example, both structural and fatalistic). In addition to the three dimensions, they argue that some sub-types or composite explanations could be distinguished. Previous research showed that the structural perceptions of the causes of poverty can be classified according to more abstract or macro-level explanations (socio-economic system and income distribution), preferred by the non-poor, and other individualistic structural perceptions that are more related to tangible or concrete explanations (unemployment and lack of education), favoured by poorer respondents (Lepianka, Van Oorschot & Gelissen 2009).

Kluegel (1990) explains individualistic poverty perceptions of black Americans held by white Americans in terms of traditional and motivational beliefs. The traditional individual beliefs focus on the generic inferiority of blacks and is considered a component of the common definitions of racial prejudice. The motivational individual perceptions attribute poverty to lack of will or effort on the part of blacks without an association of generic inferiority (Kluegel 1990). Kluegel's (1990) individualistic distinction is consistent with the conclusions reached by Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen (2009) in which poverty is attributed, on the one hand, to individual causation (arising from laziness and lack of entrepreneurial spirit) and, on the other hand, cultural conditions such as the behaviour of the poor (e.g. that they have many children).

Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen (2009) also showed that fatalistic perceptions of poverty could be separated into at least two sub-types. For instance, in some studies the fatalistic individual factor items are loaded together with societal explanations, such as failure of the society to provide good schools or prejudice and discrimination against the poor. At the same time, these fatalistic explanations also correlated with familial attributions such as too many children in the household or single-headed households. This mix-fatalistic perception of the causes of poverty indicate that people are perceived to be poor because they are unlucky not only in individualistic terms, but also resulting from fatalistic societal factors (Lepianka, Van Oorschot & Gelissen 2009). In simple terms, fatalistic explanations of poverty have both an individualistic and a structural sub-type.

Besides the overlapping and sub-type nature of the poverty explanations, the review by Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen (2009) also questioned whether the factor-analysis approach is useful in establishing the actual three underlying dimensions or poverty explanations. They felt that the number of factors that emerged and the subsequent interpretation may be a result of the actual items used in the survey as well as the way the question items were formulated. Despite these shortcomings, there appear to be no available research to offer better alternatives or to address these limitations (Lepianka, Van Oorschot & Gelissen 2009; Costa & Dias 2014). This is also one of the reasons why Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen (2009) examined an alternative approach that builds upon a Eurobarometer survey carried out in the mid-1970s where respondents were asked the following set of questions: "Why do you think there are people who live in need?"; "Here are four opinions: which is the closest to yours: 1) Because they have been unlucky; 2) Because of laziness and lack of willpower"; 3) Because there is a lot of injustice in our society; 4) It is an inevitable part of the way the modern world is going"; and "(None of these)" as well as "(Don't know)". The brackets indicate that it was not mentioned to the

respondent. This same set of questions were asked in the present study, and the results of our survey are reported in the next section.

It is worth noting the review of Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen (2009) with regards to use of the poverty perception questions in the Eurobarometer survey before presenting our findings. This set of questions was also used in the European Values Study (EVS) and the British Social Attitude (BSA) survey, but the interpretation of these questions continues to be challenging in terms of the specific poverty typologies. Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen's (2009) review also demonstrated that there is also a great deal of overlap among the four set of questions. For example, the question items "because they have been unlucky" and "because of laziness and lack of willpower" are seen to be operating at the individual level, while the question items "because there is a lot of injustice in our society" and "it is an inevitable part of the way the modern world is going" are operating at the level of the society. Further analysis reveals that the individual level items can be separated into "fatalistic" explanations of poverty (because they have been unlucky) and "individualistic" explanations of poverty. The external / societal level items can be categorised as structural explanations (because of injustice in society) and "it is an inevitable part of the way the modern world is going" can also be considered structural but some sub-type of societal-fate.

It is against this background that the present study acknowledged the limitations of the perceptions of the causes of poverty survey question items and that the items are open to inconsistency and ambivalence, and also depend on the way the public view the poor. It is important to emphasise that people may attribute the causes of poverty for those segments identified as poor (for example, the homeless, single mothers, the working poor) very differently. That is why we have opted to examine, in addition to the three explanations of poverty, their interaction with other socio-economic variables. In other words, in describing the three broad perspectives on perceptions of the causes of poverty, this chapter emphasises that poverty is a multidimensional problem and that one dimension, or even a combination of the individualistic, structural or fatalistic dimensions, is inadequate to explain it. From this viewpoint, we must understand poverty within a social context. Moreover, both external and internal factors, as well as both conscious and unconscious processes, influence people's perceptions of the causes of poverty. Hence, a more advanced analysis is required from several perspectives, including demographic variables such as race, class, education, geographic location and employment status. Several previous studies have also emphasised the inclusion of socio-demographic variables to understand the multidimensionality of poverty. Niemela (2018),

for example, highlighted that poverty studies must consider whether poverty attributions vary between different disadvantaged populations, such as single men, the young, the aged, single parents, and immigrants.

A review of the literature showed that demographic variables such as race correlate with perceptions of the causes of poverty. For example, a study conducted by Nasser, Abouchedid and Khashan (2002: 111) found that South African students in general are more likely to blame poverty on structural explanations, and that white and coloured respondents showed a high fatalistic inclination. Another study conducted in the United States by Hunt (2004: 843) showed that African Americans and Latinos are more likely than whites to see both structural and individualistic explanations of poverty as important. Then again, Cozzarelli, Wilkinson and Tagler (2001: 223) found that white American college students were more likely to explain poverty in terms of internal attributes while non-white students indicated external factors as responsible for poverty situations. A review of several popular perceptions of poverty studies in South Africa also show that race has an overwhelming influence on explanations of poverty (Hamel *et al.* 2005: 352; Aliber 2002: 2).

Education is another variable that influences people's perceptions of the causes of poverty (Hunt 1996: 300). Previous studies in this regard have hypothesised that people with high levels of education are more likely to view poverty in terms of individualistic rather than structural factors. These assumptions are located within the Cognitive and Learning Theories, which generally assume that education influences the way we perceive, interpret and interact with our world. Serumaga and Naude (2002: 570) also reported that "higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of poverty".

Furthermore, the inclusion of socio-economic and demographic variables such as geographical location is based on the assumption that people's values, preferences and behaviours are the result of their material or life circumstances (Mattes & Bratton 2003: 7; Zhang & Thomas 1994: 885). A sociological approach therefore emphasises that demographic variables such as geographical location may play a key role in determining how people explain poverty (Salmond, Crampton, King & Waldegrave 2006: 1475; Mukherjee & Benson 2003: 349; Seekings 2000: 833).

Employment status is another variable that has influenced how people perceive the causes of poverty. Hunt (1996: 310), for example, demonstrated that employed minorities such as Latinos often ascribe their success to internal or individualistic factors such as hard work. On the other hand, the same employed Latinos also attribute poverty to structural factors when they compare themselves with middle-class whites.

6 South Africans' Perceptions of Poverty

In this section, we review differences in perceptions of the causes of poverty held by members of the various racial and class groups. According to Gibson (2004) race is a social construct, and not a biological one. He recommends that we provide a basic description of the differences among the racial groups, but that at the same time one must explain why these differences exist. We follow a similar approach: these differences arise because of the difference in poverty and inequality among the various race groups.

The data used to examine South Africans' perceptions of poverty comes from the SASAS survey, a repeat cross-sectional survey series conducted by the HSRC on an annual basis since 2003. The series was designed to be nationally representative of the adult population aged 16 years or older living in private residences. The sample for each round of surveying consisted of 500 Population Census Small Area Layers (SALS) as primary sampling units, stratified by province, geographical sub-type and majority population group. In each of the sampled localities, seven visiting points were randomly selected for interviewing, followed by the random selection of a single, age-eligible member in each household using a Kish grid. Questionnaires were administered using face-to-face interviewing in the respondent's language of choice. The realised sample size (Base N) for each survey round ranged between 2,500 and 3,300. Data for this study is available for the period 2010–2017.

The specific question asked in the survey was: "Why, in your opinion, are there people who live in poverty? The respondents needed to select one of four options: 1) "because they have been unlucky", 2) "because of laziness and lack of willpower", 3) "because there is much injustice in our society", and 4) "it's an inevitable part of modern progress". A review of the data from 2010 to 2017 reveal that large proportions of South Africans (33%) ascribe poverty to "injustices in our society" (Table 8.1). About one in five (22%) of South Africans believe poverty is a result of bad luck, while a worrisome fifth (19%) perceive the causes of poverty as a consequence of "laziness and lack of willpower". A smaller proportion of the survey respondents (13%) perceived the causes of poverty "as an inevitable part of modern progress". The biggest variance (9 percentage points) in the causes of poverty can be attributed to injustices in our society with 29% recorded for 2013 and 38% in 2017. The variance that poverty is "an inevitable part of modern progress" ranged from 11% in 2011 to 17% in 2017 (Table 8.1).

6.1 *Perceptions of the Causes of Poverty among the Different Race Groups*

Next, we disaggregate the findings by race group (Figure 8.1). While 71% of black African and 67% of coloured respondents viewed poverty to be caused

TABLE 8.1 Attribution for Poverty, 2010–2017, (%)

	Unlucky	Laziness	Injustice	Inevitable	(None of the above)	(Do not know)	Total	Base N
2010	21	18	33	14	9	6	100	3 151
2011	20	18	31	11	14	6	100	2 990
2012	19	17	37	12	11	5	100	2 462
2013	24	22	29	12	7	6	100	2 843
2014	22	18	33	13	9	5	100	3 069
2015	24	20	34	13	5	5	100	3 078
2016	22	20	32	17	5	4	100	3 034
2017	21	17	38	14	7	3	100	3 104
All years	22	19	33	13	8	5	100	23 731
Range	5	5	9	6	9	3		

SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017




FIGURE 8.1 Attribution for poverty, average over 2010–2017 period (%) by population group
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress), 57% of Indian and 57% of white respondents viewed poverty to be a consequence of such factors. Indians (33%), whites (30%) and coloureds (23%) in particular felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness, in contrast to only 16% of black Africans.

6.2 Perceptions of the Causes of Poverty among the Different Class Groups

The disaggregated results by Living Standard Measure (class) reveal that 72% of respondents in the low living standard group and 70% of respondents in the medium living standard group viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress), while 60% of respondents in the high living standard group viewed poverty to be a consequence of such factors (Figure 8.2). Respondents in the high living standard category (23%) in particular felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness, in contrast to only 17% of respondents in the medium living standard group and 12% of respondents in the low living standard group.

6.3 Perceptions of the Causes of Poverty among the Poor and Non-poor Groups

The previous results showed that Indians, whites and coloureds in particular felt that poverty is a consequence of individuals' laziness, in contrast to black Africans. We also found that those respondents in the high living standard category ascribed poverty to an individual's laziness. Consequently, we wanted to establish if those respondents who categorised themselves as non-poor have similar views as those who are white and have a high living standard.




FIGURE 8.2 Attribution for poverty, average over 2010–2017 period (%) by living standard level

SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017




FIGURE 8.3 Attribution for poverty, average over 2010–2017 period (%) by subjective poverty status
 SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

Figure 8.3 reveals that 76% of respondents who considered themselves to be poor and 69% of respondents who considered themselves to be just getting by viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress), while 61% of respondents who considered themselves to be non-poor viewed poverty to be a consequence of such factors. Respondents who considered themselves to be non-poor in particular felt that poverty was caused by individuals’ laziness (26%), in contrast to only 19% of respondents who considered themselves to be just getting by and 10% of respondents who considered themselves to be poor who held this view.

6.4 Racial and Class Differences in the Perceptions the Causes Of Poverty

The results presented thus far reveal a clear pattern where those respondents categorised as white and Indian, with a high LSM, and non-poor ascribing the causes of poverty mostly as a consequence of laziness and lack of willpower, while black Africans and those respondents who are poor consider poverty to be caused by injustice in our society. It against this background that we reviewed perceptions of the causes of poverty in terms of class differences within race groups.

Only a few of the white and Indian respondents could be categorised as poor in terms of their living standards, while several of the black Africans and coloureds fell into this category (Figure 8.4). While 64% of black Africans, 60% of




FIGURE 8.4 Class differences among population groups
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

coloureds, and 58% of whites in the high living standard category viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress), only 54% of Indians in this category felt this way. However, 23% of black Africans, 29% of coloureds, and 31% of whites in this category felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness, while 36% of Indians in this category felt that way.

While 71% of black Africans, 69% of coloureds, and 66% of Indians in the medium living standard category viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors, 60% of whites in this category felt this way. However, 16% of black Africans and 21% of coloureds in this category felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness, while 25% of Indians and 26% of whites in this category felt that way.

On the other hand, 73% of black Africans and 75% of coloureds in the low living standard category viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors. Only, 12% of black Africans and 12% of coloureds in this category felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness (Figure 8.4).

6.5 Generational Differences in Perceptions of the Causes Of Poverty

There does not appear to be a significant difference in the way in which different age groups viewed the causes of poverty (Figure 8.5). Sixty-nine percent of




FIGURE 8.5 Attribution for poverty, average over 2010–2017 period (%) by birth cohort
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

born free, struggle generation and grand apartheid respondents, and 66% of early and pre-apartheid respondents viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). Between 18% and 21% of respondents from all categories felt that poverty was caused by individuals’ laziness.

There also does not appear to be a significant difference in the way in which different age groups of black African respondents viewed the causes of poverty (Figure 8.6). Sixty-nine percent of black Africans born after 1990, 70% born in the 1980s, 71% born between 1960 and 1979, and 72% born before 1960 viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). There was a progressive increase in the proportion of black African respondents who ascribed poverty to external factors as the age of the group increased. The longer the respondents lived under apartheid, the more likely they were to ascribe poverty to such factors. In contrast, those born free (or born after 1990) were slightly less likely to ascribe the causes of poverty to “injustices in our society” when compared to those born before 1960. Nevertheless, between 15% and 17% of black African respondents from all age categories felt that poverty was caused by individuals’ laziness.

There also does not appear to be a significant difference in the way in which different age groups of coloured respondents viewed the causes of poverty (Figure 8.7). Sixty-five percent of coloureds born after 1990, 66% born in the




FIGURE 8.6 Generational differences among Black African adults
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017




FIGURE 8.7 Generational differences among coloured adults
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

1980s, 67% born between 1960 and 1979, and 70% born before 1960 viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). Nevertheless, there was a progressive increase in the proportion of coloured respondents who ascribed poverty to external factors as the age of the group increased. The longer the respondents lived under apartheid, the more likely they were to ascribe poverty to such factors. Twenty-three percent of coloured respondents from all age categories felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness.

There were also no marked differences in the way in which different age groups of Indian respondents viewed the causes of poverty (Figure 8.8). Fifty-nine percent of Indians born after 1990, 56% born in the 1980s, 52% born between 1960 and 1979, and 60% Indians born before 1960 viewed poverty to




FIGURE 8.8 Generational differences among Indian adults
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). However, between 30% and 37% of Indian respondents from all age categories felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness.

There were marked differences in the way in which different age groups of white respondents viewed the causes of poverty (Figure 8.9). Sixty-five percent of whites born after 1990, 58% born in the 1980s, 52% born between 1960 and 1979, and 54% born before 1960 viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). The older generations of white respondents were least likely to view external factors as a cause of poverty than the younger generations. White respondents born before 1960 in particular (34%) felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness, while 28% of those




FIGURE 8.9 Generational differences among white adults
SOURCE: SASAS 2010 TO 2017

born between 1960 and 1979, 26% of those born in the 1980s and 26% of whites born after 1990 felt this way. The longer a white person lived under apartheid, the more likely that person was to attribute poverty to laziness. Conversely, younger respondents (those who were born after 1980) were more likely to attribute the causes of poverty to injustices of the past when compared with their older counterparts (those born before 1996). Nevertheless, between 26% and 34% of white respondents from all age categories felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness.

7 Discussion

South Africans continue to suffer from poverty, inequality and unemployment despite major advances. Furthermore, the levels of poverty and inequality have a major impact on vulnerable individuals and groups based on their race, geographic location, age, gender and class status. The South African government will therefore have to increase efforts on all fronts to improve the living conditions and quality of life of its citizens. This will need to take place within a context of declining economic growth, high levels of corruption and a host of other socioeconomic challenges. This chapter therefore appealed for urgent and more effective transformation efforts to address poverty and inequality because it severely prejudices vulnerable people such as the poor. Consequently, if one understands individuals' perceptions of the causes of poverty, it will greatly assist to break down the negative stereotypes that confront vulnerable groups and individuals.

It is against this background that poverty, inequality and the link between perceptions of poverty, class and race was examined. A literature review on perceptions of the causes of poverty showed that poverty is categorised according to structural, individualistic and fatalistic perceptions. Furthermore, these three broad perspectives on perceptions of the causes of poverty interact with a range of demographic and socioeconomic variables. It was necessary, then to conduct a multidimensional analysis that included demographic variables such as race, class, age and Living Standard Measure.

In general, it was found that the largest proportion of South Africans attribute the causes of poverty to injustices in South African society. This is not surprising since many South Africans still believe that apartheid continues to impact on the poor. On the other hand, a large proportion (22%) of South Africans indicated that poverty is a result of fatalistic explanations such as bad luck. More concerning, though, is the 19% of South Africans that perceived

poverty to be a consequence of “laziness and lack of willpower” over the period 2010 to 2017.

The results were disaggregated by race, Living Standard Measure and age group. It was established that most black Africans and coloured respondents viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). Conversely, Indians and whites in particular felt that poverty was caused by individuals’ laziness and being wasteful. A breakdown by LSM showed that larger proportions of respondents in the low LSM group and the medium LSM group viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors when compared to those respondents with a high LSM. In contrast, respondents in the high LSM category felt that poverty was caused by an individual’s laziness and being wasteful. It was also necessary to establish if those respondents who categorised themselves as non-poor have similar views as those who are white and have a high living standard. It was determined that those who considered themselves to be “poor” and “just getting by” mostly attributed poverty to external economic, political or cultural factors, while the non-poor (mostly white and older respondents) ascribed poverty to be a result of individuals’ laziness.

When perceptions of the causes of poverty in terms of class categories within race groups was reviewed it showed that almost a quarter (23%) of black Africans, and almost a third of coloureds (29%) and whites (31%) in the high LSM category ascribed poverty to individuals’ laziness, while 36% of Indians in this category felt that way. It is therefore clear that a large proportion of high LSM South Africans across all the race groups consider poverty to be caused by laziness. On the other hand, larger proportions of black Africans and coloureds in the low living standard category viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors. In other words, black Africans and coloureds in the low LSM category, when compared to their high LSM counterparts, were more likely to ascribe poverty to injustices from the past than laziness. There are no major generational differences in terms of how the respondents perceived the causes of poverty, except among whites. Thirty-four percent of white respondents born before 1960 felt that poverty was caused by individuals’ laziness, while 26% born after 1990 felt this way.

However, the survey results showed that among coloured and black African respondents the longer they lived under apartheid the more likely they were to ascribe poverty to injustices from the past. We also established that the older white generations were least likely to view external factors as a cause of poverty than the younger generations. In other words, the older white respondents

were more likely to perceive poverty as a consequence of laziness than injustices from the past. The results of this study are consistent with studies conducted in the United States, which showed that African Americans in general perceive poverty in structural terms while whites ascribed it to individualistic causes. A study by Campbell, Carr, and MacLachlan (2001) showed that there is a clear distinction between the perceptions of the causes of poverty of those people living in a developed country compared to those living in a developing country. For example, the people in a developed country such as Australia were more likely to attribute the causes of poverty to individualistic characteristics of the poor, while those in a developing country like Malawi perceived the causes of poverty in structural terms.

The perception that poverty can be ascribed to laziness has a major impact on policies such as social welfare. A study by Federico (2004), for instance, found that opposition to welfare is linked to American whites' perceptions of African Americans, even though the American welfare programme is not race oriented. A study by Wright (1993) demonstrated that the victim-blaming concept, namely that the poor is responsible for their situation, is just another way of portraying anti-African American or anti-Hispanic feelings.

In the South African context of whiteness and blackness, where laziness and incompetence are considered part of the racial stereotypes for some groups, perceptions about poverty can reveal deep-seated notions of the other and the self. There are some significant differences in perception that need attention here. The first is that while the majority of black Africans and coloured respondents viewed poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors, Indians and whites in particular felt that poverty was caused by individuals' laziness and being wasteful. The second significant difference in perceptions is black Africans, including those in the high LSM group, are less likely to ascribe deprivation to laziness and wastefulness than coloureds, who in turn are less likely to feel this way than whites and Indians. A larger percentage of the older generation of whites ascribe poverty to laziness than the generation born after 1990, which indicates a possible deeper understanding of the structural causes of poverty among young whites.

These negative perceptions, particularly among older white South Africans, not only create or sustain a hostile racial climate but may also influence this group's attitudes and behaviour towards affirmative action policies, support for residential and educational integration and generally support for equal opportunity and multiculturalism (Sigelman & Tuck 1997). The study of perceptions of the causes of poverty is therefore extremely crucial in the context of South Africa because it has implications on social interaction with the poor as well as support measures to address poverty. For instance, those who

explain poverty as a consequence of individualistic causes are less likely to support social protection policies (da Costa & Dias 2013). A detailed country-specific analysis will provide policymakers with a deeper understanding of the dynamics of poverty perceptions and how to disentangle the negative stereotypes that continue to persist in democratic South Africa despite major social and political transformation.

While there is a sizeable proportion of South Africans who consider laziness as a major cause of poverty, it must be emphasized that this view of the cause of poverty held by whites has decreased slightly, while over time more whites began to view the injustices in South African society as reasons for poverty. This is a positive sign for reconciliation and an indication of a decline in negative stereotypes. Nevertheless, the injustices of the past or structural reasons as causes of poverty must be tackled, and the Covid-19 pandemic made it clear that large-scale interventions are needed to address the plight of the poor, who are mostly black. A step in this direction was taken in April 2020 with the introduction of a range of social relief support measures to assist the poorest South Africans during the Covid-19 national lockdown. The relief measures included an increase in the child support grant to R300 per month for May 2020 and R500 per month from June to October 2020. The package included expanded unemployment insurance payments and short-term assistance in the form of the Social Relief Distress grant, which has been extended in several ways. Government's emergency R500 billion financial relief packages have included the broader availability of the Social Relief of Distress grant to anyone who has no other form of income, including discouraged work-seekers and the long-term unemployed who do not benefit from government's ordinary social protection policy (Pienaar et al. 2020).

8 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that poverty and inequality are major challenges in post-apartheid South Africa. Other chapters have demonstrated how certain racial groups have been deprived of the economic and social benefits of the society over centuries, and most particularly during the apartheid era. It has also been demonstrated elsewhere in the volume that a racial power structure exists in the society in which certain key sectors are dominated by whites. The economy and educational institutions are critical for any effort to eradicate poverty, facilitate social mobility, and for social transformation in general. The way that whites in particular and those in the upper-class categories from all race groups view the causes of poverty has significant consequences for

social transformation. It has also been demonstrated in this chapter that black Africans, and to a lesser extent coloureds, have a disproportionate share of poverty, while there are comparatively fewer poor Indians and whites. Poverty is thus linked to race, as is class in South Africa.

In this study, it has been shown that race correlates closely with perceptions of poverty. Making use of the results of an attitudes survey, it has been demonstrated that there appears to be quite a high level of lack of understanding of just how centuries of colonialism, segregation and apartheid have impacted on blacks in general, and black Africans in particular (which gives rise to a structural view of the causes of poverty). While whites and Indians in particular do not view poverty to be caused by these factors, a significant proportion of coloureds, whites and Indians in the higher LSM also discount external factors and adopt an individualist view of the causes of poverty. This does not bode well for social transformation because these groups are largely in control of the economy and the educational institutions, which are key sectors requiring transformation. However, the fact that the younger generation of whites ascribe more weight to external factors in determining poverty bodes well for the future of social transformation. The study has shown that the shorter the period a white person lived under apartheid the more likely that person is to see injustices in our society as a cause of poverty and the less likely that person is to see laziness as a cause.

However, given the differences in perceptions between black Africans on the one hand, and whites and Indians in general and whites, Indians and coloureds in the higher LSM group on the other on laziness as a cause of poverty, there is a potential racial perception of the poor. In addition, there are sharp differences between those black Africans and whites who were born before 1960 who perceive laziness to be the main cause of poverty. This is the generation that has lived through the apartheid era, and stereotypical views of black people may account for this perception among this group of whites.

There is no doubt that laziness and the way people manage money will be reasons why some people are poor; but it is the structural factors arising from the country's apartheid past as well as the failure of racial redress during the post-apartheid era to adequately alter the effects of these structural factors that are largely responsible for the racial distribution of poverty in South Africa. Increasing understanding of the structural factors behind poverty and its racial distribution is absolutely essential if attitudes are to change. Education in this regard is essential, in particular through the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance recently adopted by the South African government. Moreover, racial attitudes in this regard can be changed through social justice that brings about similar

levels of wealth, income and poverty for all race groups in the country. This will be achieved when the average black African, coloured, Indian and white household have similar incomes, asset values and net wealth.

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The Boundaries of Race and the Wicket-ness of Class in the Gentleman's Game

Ashwin Desai

1 Bearing Witness

'Much, much more than cricket is at stake'. JAMES 1963: 192

The South African report into allegations of racism in cricket, held under the banner of the Social Justice and Nation-Building Hearings (SJV) in 2021, revealed the depth of racism that runs through the gentleman's game.

One of those who spoke about the pain and labelling he endured was Ashwell Prince, the normally quietly spoken Proteas' batsman. Prince exposed the reception he received when he entered the Proteas dressing room:

There was no welcome from the coach. There was no (sense of) let's make this guy comfortable. It was a lonely place. A person knows when they are welcome, and you know when you are unwelcome. You can get a sense of whether people want you here or don't want you here. It would have been nice for people to back you. You saw it happening to other guys your age, your peers. You saw it happening to a new player if he was white but it wasn't happening if the player wasn't white. *ESPN-CRICKINFO*, 2 AUGUST 2021

The SJV hearings probed the 2015 allegation that Khaya Zondo was deliberately de-selected from the final One Day International (ODI) against India. The evidence that was led at the hearings showed the determination of the captain, A.B. de Villiers, in ensuring that Khaya Zondo was excluded. On the tour, it was widely recognised that the incumbent middle-order batsman David Miller was out of form and the experienced J.P. Duminy was injured. Zondo, after having performed admirably in the South African A tour of India, was next in line to be selected. To this end, it was not unexpected that the day before the ODI, Zondo was informed by the travelling convenor of selectors that he would be playing. But much to his surprise and disappointment, on the morning of

the game, he was told by A.B. de Villiers that he would not play. Instead, Dean Elgar, who had just been flown in as 16th member of the squad, was immediately drafted into the team.

In their summing up of the evidence presented, the hearing was incisive:

It is noteworthy that Mr Elgar, a white player, who was flown in because, in Mr de Villiers opinion, an experienced player was preferred over Mr Zondo, had no ODI experience. Given Mr Elgar's lack of experience, it was irrational to select him instead of Mr Zondo as part of the starting 11. Similar to Mr Zondo, Mr Elgar was also starting out his ODI career... Furthermore, Mr Elgar was placed in a batting position which he doesn't specialise in. SJN 2021: 159

The hearing concluded:

...that Mr de Villiers went to extreme lengths to ensure that a white player is secured participation in what he regarded as a critical game for the Proteas...racial discrimination continues to plague our society under the guise of merit justifications. Black people are denied opportunities because of unscrutinised misconceptions regarding their competence as compared to their white counterparts. Mr de Villiers, conduct evidences this erroneous and baseless misconception of Mr Zondo as a black player. One may go as far as to state that he feared to place a person whom he viewed as incompetent, by virtue of that person being a black player, in what he regarded as a prize match. SJN 2021: 161

In many ways, this finding vindicated a letter written to Cricket South Africa (CSA) in November 2015 by black African players, highlighting what they saw as discriminatory practices:

The purpose of this letter is to address a fundamental problem in the national team. The quality of opportunity afforded to Black African players...historically, and more recently, the call-up has acted to erode the Black cricketers' human dignity and self-esteem. They have been pushed to the margins to become "hewers of wood and drawers of water". There is a mistrust of Black African players' ability to perform and assume responsibility and be charged with leadership roles...At the national level, Black African players have become political pawns and official drinks carriers....
CITY PRESS, 16 NOVEMBER 2015

In the aftermath, at a general level, a CSA task team in 2015 found:

...evidences that generic Black players, and Black African players have consistently undertaken National Tours without being given an opportunity to play. The most recent example was that of Aaron Phangiso when he was not selected to play one match at the ODI World Cup held in New Zealand and Australia in 2015. Although it appears from the statistics that this is indeed the case, it is difficult to determine whether the exclusion of Black African players in particular was on grounds other than cricket grounds. There does, however, appear to be a mind-set which indicates a mistrust of Black African players particularly when it comes to the Proteas playing in high-profile matches or in so-called “series’ deciders”, like the Fifth ODI match in Mumbai on 25 October 2015. CSA 2015

Zondo was to reveal that his humiliation and angst did not end in Mumbai. On his return to South Africa, in a game representing the provincial Dolphins against the Lions, while at the crease, he recalled:

There were two white players close to me. One was bowling to me. I hit the ball for four and he said, ‘Why didn’t you do this for South Africa A?’ Then he bowled another ball which beat my bat and he said, ‘If you weren’t so focused on writing letters, you might be a better player.’ The other white player proceeded to call me a ‘postman’, Zondo said. I remember walking up to the guy who was bowling and I lost it. I was pointing my bat in his face. I had just been through the hardest thing any player can go through and they had no understanding of what it was like to be in that position and were making fun of it. Instead of these guys not having something to say, they saw fit to comment and belittle and ridicule. They saw it as a joke. *ESPNCRICINFO*, 2 AUGUST 2021

The issue of the non-selection or rather de-selection of Zondo was not an isolated occurrence, however. In 2008, it was announced that the fabulously talented “coloured” pace bowler Charl Langeveldt would replace the white Andre Nel for the tour against India. Coach Mickey Arthur was livid and spoke to Langeveldt:

Langers knew that he had jumped the queue, and was immediately uncomfortable.... A short while later, Charl came to my room and said that he was not prepared to go to India...At that moment I felt a strong mixture of deep respect and deep sadness for Charl: respect for

his honesty and decency as a person, but sadness because he had been made to feel like a pawn. He wasn't one. Or shouldn't have been. He was always good enough to play for South Africa, and his record is testament to that. For him to be made to feel that the colour of his skin was suddenly more important than his ability was a slap in the face—a disgrace, in fact. ARTHUR 2010: 114–5

In this instance, Langeveldt was confronted with the high possibility of snide remarks from teammates, on-field “isolation” and thrown the ball late in an innings. The decision of Langeveldt to withdraw also had to be seen in the fact that he had already faced a pushback earlier in 2008, in the lead-up to the tour of Bangladesh. In the announcement of the squad to Bangladesh, there had been some hostility between CSA president Norman Arendse and Mickey Arthur, with Arendse pushing for Gibbs and Langeveldt to be part of the squad. The casualties would be Neil McKenzie and Andre Nel (two white players). While this was justified in the context that Bangladesh was a good opportunity to give players knocking on the door, such as Langeveldt, game time, Arthur felt that it was important ‘to build the team towards the England and Australia tours’ (Arthur 2010: 104). In this confrontation, Mickey Arthur prevailed, with the support of Graeme Smith, Jacques Kallis and Mark Boucher, who ‘said they would not board the plane for Bangladesh without me (Arthur), and would persuade the other players to do likewise’ (Arthur 2010: 109).

One of the most revealing testimonies was that of Paul Adams, who told the SJN hearings that he was called a ‘brown shit’ by teammates and named the present Proteas coach Mark Boucher as one of the participants (SJN 2021: 79). This racial naming and shaming of Adams was admitted by Boucher. Boucher offered an apology, but as the SJN concludes, this apology was ‘buttressed by an excuse that the comments were made in a team setting as if racism can be excused in a team setting’ (SJN 2021: 80).

Arguably the most haunting example of marginalisation was Makhaya Ntini’s recollection of his days in the team, when he recounted how he would run between the hotel and training ground to avoid being on the team bus:

I would go to the driver of the bus early in the morning, and I would give him my bag. I would say to him, ‘I will meet you at the ground?’ I would put on my running shoes and run to the cricket ground. On my way back, I would give the bus driver my dirty clothes and say, ‘I’ll see you at the hotel’. I would run all the way back to the hotel. I was running away from that loneliness of driving back to the hotel. If I’m sitting at the back, the

rest of them are at the front. I was forever lonely. Being lonely is not having someone come knocking on your door and say 'let's go for dinner'. You'll watch friends calling each other, making plans right in front of you, and then you'll be skipped. They will have dinner, lunch and breakfast at the same time. If I was the first one in the breakfast room, the next guy will never come sit next to me. EPHRAIM 2020

The revelations of Proteas players points to what Martinot (2010) calls the 'machinery of whiteness', that pushes you to the edges or insists that you "fit in". In this, whiteness is unquestioned, normalised, while blackness is constantly under scrutiny (Steyn 2005: 121). Whiteness allows for a seeming commitment to non-racialism (or more appropriately colour-blindness) that occludes the historical and contemporary privilege of being white.

Running through all this is the sense that you were under extra scrutiny if you were black. A few years earlier, Prince had taken on the fabulously talented former Springbok batsman Graeme Pollock in 2017. Pollock bemoaned the state of South African cricket after the Proteas experienced a humiliating defeat against England in a Test match at Lords. This was the first of a four-match series, which the Proteas eventually lost by three matches to one. Pollock argued that the team was, and will continue to be mediocre because of the commitment to selecting teams for racial rather than cricketing reasons:

The major thing is the problem with the politics and interference with the selection of players.... It's affecting the performance of the side – they don't put the 11 best players on the field.... It's never going to change. As South Africans, we've got to accept that South Africa are going to be middle of the road in their future Test cricket. *SPORT24*, 14 JULY 2017

Ashwell Prince succinctly showed how Pollock had both a selective memory about his own time at the crease and the performances of black players in the national team:

Mr Pollock talks about merit selection or non-political selection. I would like to take him back to his era and remind him of the name D'Oliveira. It would be very, very naïve to think that apart from the legendary Basil D'Oliveira, there would not have been any (Hashim) Amlas, (Vernon) Philanders, (Herschelle) Gibbses, (Makhaya) Ntinis or (Kagiso) Rabadas in those days. I mention these names because they all have one thing in common; the fact that at some stage of their careers, they all occupied the No 1 ranking in the world. Not in the country, in the world.

Transformation has been a topic from as long as I can remember. From the day I made my first-class debut in 1995, up to the day I retired in 2015, I had heard every kind of abuse you can think of under the sun. The message is all very much the same, just varying in expletives, but basically trying to tell me that I'm not good enough and that I will never be good enough, and that I'm only there because of the colour of my skin. The difficulty we face in South Africa is that the influential people, i.e. captains, coaches and selectors, until recently have predominantly been white. The fact that those people are/were predominantly white shouldn't necessarily be a negative for a non-white player, providing those people have transformed hearts and minds. Unfortunately, in my experience as a player, that did not seem to be the case. White coaches and captains seemed to prefer to stick to "what they know"; in other words, their own kind, because that is what they feel they can trust.

WEEKEND ARGUS, 22 JULY 2017

In picking up on Prince's reply, the most astonishing aspect of the black player "quota" system is the number of times assumed beneficiaries turn out to be world-class players. Take the case of Herschelle Gibbs. In 1998/9, a huge public outcry began for at least one black player to be in the team for the upcoming West Indies tour. Gibbs was promoted into the team for the second test in Port Elizabeth ahead of the incumbent Adam Bacher. Gibbs was a batsman of fabulous talent. Yet, his inclusion was seen as an "outside" intervention. Rodney Hartman, Ali Bacher's official biographer saw it as Adam Bacher becoming a 'victim... the truth was that Gibbs had to play in order to provide a "player of colour"' (Hartman 2004: 325).

Ironically, Gibbs was in line for the earlier England tour, but lost out to the "white" Gerhardus Liebenberg. Liebenberg was to prove an unmitigated disaster. A close scrutiny of Liebenberg's record prior to the England tour would have rung the alarm bells, but despite this, he was selected. So pivotal was what the English referred to as a "walking wicket" failure that Colin Bryden argues that 'Gibbs or Ackerman could have made all the difference' (Desai 2016: 148).

Despite this assertion, Bryden goes on to qualify that the selection of Gibbs for the West Indies tour of South Africa 'was an act of expediency', while coach Bob Woolmer demurred: 'I think it was actually my suggestion that he open the batting, if only because we couldn't do any worse' (Desai 2016: 148).

This assessment of the ability of Gibbs is belied by the stats. Gibbs played 90 test matches with an average of 41.95 and a strike rate of 50.26, 248 ODIs with an average of 36.13 and a strike rate of 83.25. Adam Bacher, 19 test matches with

an average of 26.03, a strike rate of 40.48 and 13 ODI s with an average of 20.76 and a strike rate of 57.57. Gerhardus Liebenberg, 5 test matches ending with an average of 13 and 4 ODI s with an average of 23.5 (Desai 2020).

This raises the possibility that, far from giving preferential treatment to black players not quite up to standard yet, quotas were necessary to force selectors to divest themselves of prejudicial thinking and to make the objectively correct cricketing decision. In this way, quotas functioned to enhance the performance of a team hamstrung by selectors not quite up to their job. If Temba Bavuma's inclusion in the team was indeed forced on selectors for political reasons, then the question arises as to why his natural talent was not spotted apolitically. It bears some reflection. Kevin Pietersen, who went on to have an incredible career with England, argued that he left South Africa as he feared the quota system would rob him of a fair chance at making the team, despite his talent. Ironically, if Kevin Pietersen were black, given the experiences of so many players in the era post 1991, without the operation of quotas, he may still have been denied a fair opportunity to show his abilities.

In this context, the Proteas batsman Temba Bavuma's comments on racial identity and cricket are prescient:

We honestly don't see each other as Black, white or Indian, but rather as human beings with the talent to play cricket for South Africa.... However, in a more general sense, it's true that Black players face different challenges to their white counterparts within South African cricket. I feel there is extra pressure for Black players to deliver big performances each time they take to the field. *GQ SOUTH AFRICA*, SEPTEMBER 2016

It also lends substance to Gemmell's point that underlying the cricketing narrative post-apartheid is the way in which whiteness has been naturalised: 'By describing a player as non-white we are assuming "white" as the pre-existing norm. We read and hear of the "coloured" Herschelle Gibbs, the "Black" or "African" Makhaya Ntini, yet "the all-rounder" Shaun Pollock – never the "white" Pollock' (Gemmell 2013: xvi).

In this context, Gunaratnam's assertion that 'whiteness is naturalised and left to stand as a de-racialized (and also often a de-ethnicised) norm, with "race" being the defining property and experience of "Other" groups' (Gunaratnam 2003: 29) is apposite. This allows 'those categorised as white to ignore, deny, avoid or forget their racialised subjective and social positionings.' This has led to challenges in bringing to the fore 'the ways in which whiteness is produced through its silences and invisibility' (Gunaratnam 2003: 112).

In South African cricket, while whiteness is rendered invisible, blackness becomes hyper-visible. Meanwhile, less visible, but increasingly powerful, are the workings of class inequality.

2 The Schools of Class Apartheid?

By Africanising elites, the ANC plays to racialism, broadens the racial coalition that benefits from collusive business organisation, and depoliticises economic inequality. The new African bourgeoisie, because it shares racial identities with the bulk of the poor and class interests with white economic elites, is in a position to mediate the gap between rich and poor and black and white by creating cross-cutting cleavages. Cutting in the African bourgeoisie without providing for the African poor changes the racial character of economic inequality, but it does not narrow it much... It changes the beneficiaries and justifications for the political economy, but not its logic. MACDONALD 2004: 651

The SJN hearings heard evidence of the perilous state of schools' cricket in township schools. Rajan Moodley from Eastern Province gave the following testimony:

During June of last year the Minister of Sport was presented with a report of persons known as the Eminent Persons Group and in that report it highlighted the fact that *less than 10% of the 25000 schools that we have participate in sport* [own emphasis] ...If you look at - and again, these are horrible terms, but let's use them - Black African cricket in your Proteas setup at the moment, which schools do they come from? And I am not blaming these kids. I take my hat off to them because they've achieved what is due to them, but where do they come from? St Stithians, Hilton College, SACS Cape Town, Marist Brothers, Joburg... You need to ask yourself: *When are we going to get people coming from Langa, Gugulethu* (own emphasis) ...I conducted a study of township schools in Eastern Province Cricket from 2009 to 2019...for that entire period, the average representation of township schools in all those age-group teams is also less than 10%. *So while we are meeting the quotas that are required, because it says 50% of those teams must be players of colour, the question is where are they coming from? They are coming from affluent or elite schools, but they're not coming from township schools* (own emphasis). SJN 2021: 101-102

Beyond the school system, the dire position of cricket in black townships was brought to the fore by Geoffrey Toyana, a highly successful black coach and former Proteas fast bowler Mfuneko Ngam. They expressed their frustration to journalist Ongama Gcwabe in 2020. According to Toyana:

The main challenge that we have in every township in South Africa is something that breaks me. I come from Soweto. It's quite sad as we speak that the Soweto Cricket Oval has not improved since I last played. I mean, I was involved in Soweto Cricket in late 90s and early 2000s. For me to see that there's no change and there's no improvement in that facility and other facilities as well all over South Africa. I know CSA has Hubs at the moment to try to close gaps but I don't think that's how you need to close gaps. It will be a shock for me to see a black African kid coming from the township, without any private education, go play franchise cricket.... Do all coaches understand this? Are they taught about this? Or are they just given a piece of paper telling them they need to put in three black Africans per game without any explanation? GCWABE 2020

Ngam, touted as one of the best fast bowlers in the world, but who succumbed to a series of injuries, revealed the perilous state of facilities in an area that has a long history of cricket:

If you go to Dan Qeqe [Stadium], in Port Elizabeth, those fields have not improved. That's a huge challenge that we always talk about but there's no action. Has cricket become inclusive? I'm from Motherwell and I can assure you that apart from the new nets the Motherwell Cricket Club was sponsored with, there's no improvement whatsoever. The stands are in bad shape, the club still struggles to this day. GCWABE 2020

As one sharply realises, the class divides in South Africa deepen as much as the national teams of cricket and rugby de-racialise. This happens by the coming of a new African elite that can afford the fees demanded at top private schools. It is also reinforced by CSA's policy of placing talented cricketers in formerly white schools. Occasionally, there is also the workings of chance. The brilliant Proteas fast bowler, Lungi Ngidi, only got the chance to attend Hilton College, with its incredible sports facilities and which has produced a host of national cricketers, because his parents worked at Kloof Junior Primary School on the school's housekeeping and maintenance staff teams, and he received a scholarship to attend the school. His powerful performances then earned him a chance to go to Hilton College. Ngidi's example reinforces the

sense that without going to a select number of ex-white schools, especially the highly priced private schools, the chance of making the national team are close to zero.

Toyana provides a vivid example of how race and class in cricket are entwined:

I still remember as a young coach when I was still playing for Gauteng, where I was coaching at a school – there was this kid who was always late. And he was very talented, he was my best player but was always late. I was asking myself – “why is this kid always late?” Then one day I decided to follow this kid after school. He didn’t see me obviously. So I kept following him up until I got to his place to see his house only to realise that before he comes to training he basically has to cook for his mom first and his mom was HIV-positive. So, he has to do all those things before he comes to training. We don’t understand our own people. Some white coach won’t understand that for a black kid to go to the Wanderers for example, he has to take three taxis to get there. Some white coaches would go – “this kid has an attitude, he’s always late.” Until we address those issues, that’s when we’re going to head in the right direction. But we’ve been talking about this for the last 20 plus years and it seems like there are no answers. GCWABE 2020

There is often a dividing line running between race and class. The Marxist approach tends to emphasise class. Gerhard Maré puts it this way: ‘Class conflict will take centre stage, as the vocabulary used to classify groups whose lives are so materially different from one another, and used to explain these differences, shifts from race to class categories’ (2014: 35). In this framework, race is seen as a biological fiction and so the experiences of black players as witnessed at the SJN hearings are given little purchase.

At the same time, there is a counter-narrative that does not problematise race and racial targets and quotas. So, for example, Tim Fish Hodgson eloquently exposes how, despite the strides made by black players:

Kyle Abbott, a white player who has chosen to quit playing for South Africa, has dominated the columns of cricket analysts, the comments of former players and discussions of cricket enthusiasts on social media and platforms. In most of these discussions, the future of South African cricket is depicted as being on the point of imminent implosion... The disproportionate importance given by the South African public to Abbott’s decision can only be understood in its full context. In our cricket team,

white South Africans still take up far more space than we deserve in the country. This is true with regard to ownership of land, university degrees achieved, ownership of companies on the JSE, the list of South African billionaires and positions as top-paid executives. *MAIL & GUARDIAN*, 13 JANUARY 2017

Hodgson goes on to tabulate CSA's 'strides towards transformation';

Just a few weeks and 2017 has already begun quite a year for transformation in cricket. When the Proteas completed an emphatic series win against Sri Lanka in Cape Town last week, all 20 wickets were taken by black players.... The CSA took another bold step in fostering black cricketing excellence by announcing nine players of colour in a 13-player T20 squad to play Sri Lanka.... The future of South African cricket is both bright and black. *MAIL & GUARDIAN*, 13 JANUARY 2017

There is absolutely nothing in Hodgson's article about how the very Minister of Sport of the time that he lauds, Fikile Mbalula, has presided over a Ministry that has largely neglected township school sport. Similarly, on issues of land, it is the ANC government that has spectacularly failed to meet its own targets. In this context, CSA really becomes an easy political stump for failing to meet its targets. Importantly, Hodgson fails to consider how racial targets occlude class and privilege (*Mail & Guardian*, 13 January 2017). As Rajan Moodley so eloquently pointed out at the SJN hearings, in schools' cricket, the black quota is met but this comes disproportionately from Model "C" and private schools. While allowing administrators to meet targets and earn plaudits for transformation, it at the same time reinforces if not exacerbates class divides.

Thirty years after the unification of cricket, we need to raise the issue of how we can move beyond race labels, despite the seeming barriers to that happening, and instead place class inequalities in the firing line.

In this context, it is useful to think through Rattansi's idea of racialisation, which argues

...that racism is never simply racism, but always exists in complex imbrication with nation, ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality, and therefore a dismantling of racism also requires, simultaneously as well as in the long run, a strategy to reduce relevant class inequalities, forms of masculinity, nationalisms, and other social features whereby racisms are reproduced in particular sites. RATTANSI 2005: 296

The idea of racialisation allows us to be sensitive to the continuing power of “whiteness” and how this, as shown in the case of Zondo, plays a role both in cricket selection decisions, but also in creating a hostile environment for black players. It also opens up how quotas based exclusively on race fail to account for class divides.

The value of the idea of racialisation, as Rattansi argues, lies ‘precisely in pointing not just to race and racism, but beyond them in their manifold imbrications’ (2005: 273). This ‘involves’ what Reeves calls ‘the recognition of race’ so as to achieve ‘non-racial moral ends’ (Reeves 1983: 175). In order to escape the rigid imposition of apartheid’s race categories while ignoring deepening class divides, we need to once more consider conjuring up the idea of *militant* non-racialism.

One of the first casualties in this regard might well be quotas, given that the chairperson of selectors is black, the Board is predominantly black, and this demographic shift goes all the way down to the provinces and franchises. It is the contention of this chapter that the positives are now outweighed by the unintended negative consequences. At the same time, the ANC government’s economic policy of relying on the “market” to level the playing fields has proven to be a monumental failure. There has to be a more concerted, interventionist role in ensuring that township sport, especially in schools, is addressed. As a beginning, the onus needs to be placed on the Departments of Education and Sport. Right now, the latter is intent on meeting racial targets rather than meeting targets for the provision of basic facilities.

Nearly three decades after the ANC government first came to power, the deepening class divisions that fracture race and also reinforce it, allows us to think about transformation that goes beyond racial bean-counting. One thinks of W.E.B. Du Bois’ proposal that: ‘perhaps it is wrong to speak of [race] at all as a concept rather than as a group of contradictory forces, facts and tendencies’ (in Murji 2017: 18). Those contradictions are increasingly manifest and present an opportunity in contemporary South Africa for thinking about racialisation and ‘its imbrication...with class’ (Rattansi 2005: 296).

Cricket, as this chapter has shown, brings into sharp focus how whiteness becomes naturalised and race thinking “instinctive”. However, it proposes, rather than simply taking racial categories as given and forever, we urgently need to start moving beyond apartheid’s racial labels so that we can think more seriously about inequality and challenge the transition both within cricket and in broader society from race to class apartheid.¹

1 As the title suggests, this chapter deals with men’s cricket. For an analysis of women’s cricket, see the SJN report that refers to ‘toxic patriarchy’ bedeviling the ability of women’s cricket to garner resources and other support (SJN 2021: 50).

3 A New Innings?

'Prevented from changing, [racial] identities become frozen'. MAMDANI 2001: 47

The sJN hearings have shown how whiteness becomes naturalised, and as Boucher's response to Adams exposed, race thinking has become normalised. The hearings, as well as a host of other studies, also illustrates that cricketing performance is still primarily founded on the attendance of particular schools. In this sense, the continued focus on black African, coloured, Indian and white in the counting of transformation targets has functioned to reinforce rather than expunge what was intended: privilege unearned by anything other than potential to perform on the field. The challenge is to start 'unlocking cages of ascribed identities and freeing people to define themselves' (MacDonald 2006: 186).

A way in which to think about this is to remember the struggle against apartheid sport that placed the call for "same opportunity" as a central plank of its vision. Whatever one thinks of the romanticism of "same opportunity" one can see how at the acme of apartheid, these sentiments captured the imagination of sportspersons and inspired a global movement. Thirty years after unification of cricket, the challenge is to bring into sharper focus both racism and class privilege. This means moving beyond the boundary of the game to the idea of structural change that places redistribution and inequality at the centre of macro-economic policy.

As I put the finishing touches to this chapter, Temba Bavuma is batting in an ODI against India on 19 January 2021. The setting of Boland Park cricket ground, nestling in the crook of the mountains, is spectacular. I watch in Alice-like wonder as Bavuma pushes into the 90s and then, with a nonchalant flick of the wrist, reaches a century. My mind wanders back to his Test debut at Kingsmead against England in 2015. I was in the stands capturing the moment and followed the next Test at Newlands on television. At Kingsmead, Bavuma fails. South Africa loses. Questions are asked about Bavuma's ability to be a Test batsman. But then in the next Test at Newlands, in the shadow of his township of Langa, Bavuma scores a century, with an innings marked by a series of stunning drives. Bavuma's beautiful, unbeaten innings of 102 dashed the curses of many a white supremacist and reinforced the ideological zealotry of many an African chauvinist. For those in favour of quotas, it revealed the necessity of forcing quality black players into a side where they would thrive, if given half a chance. For those opposed, it revealed the inevitability of the entry of quality black players through patiently nurtured merit. But, for one particular

moment, we all suspended histories and social relations beyond the boundary and simply basked in an innings of pure class.

Class and race. It for these times at Newlands and Paarl that cricket lovers who witnessed the battering of apartheid cricket live for: while acknowledging that the top batting order of cricket has de-racialised, the promised trickle-down to the historic tailenders has not materialised. The struggle against racism and class privilege is not a razzle-dazzle twenty over game. The exploits of Bavuma encourage us to dig in for a longer innings, drawing on the histories of those white-flannelled dreamers, inspired by the slogan 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' while playing on apartheid's broken wickets.

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Are Foreigners Welcome in South Africa? *An Attitudinal Analysis of Anti-immigrant Sentiment in South Africa during the 2003–2018 Period*

Steven Gordon

1 Introduction

Protections from discrimination based on nationality or country of origin were included in the current South African Constitution (No. 108 of 1996). Legislation, especially the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (No. 4 of 2000), criminalise this type of prejudice. In terms of both the Constitution and the law, discrimination against an individual because of their nationality is considered no different from other forms of discrimination, including racism. Despite these protections, many international migrants living in South Africa face abuse, discrimination and hate speech based on nothing more than their ‘foreignness’. There is a strong undercurrent of anti-immigrant sentiment in the country that motivates prejudice against this population group. The existence of such sentiments leads to the following question: what are the underlying causes of these negative attitudes? If we can understand the causes of such anti-immigrant sentiments, we can perhaps better understand how to combat them.

When considering the problem of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa, a good place to start is the 50th Conference of the African National Congress (ANC). Held at Mafikeng in December 1997, the conference delegates discussed a multitude of problems facing the ANC, the country and the world. One of these was animosity towards international migrants living in South Africa. In the conference’s resolutions on peace and stability, a diagnosis of this problem was presented (African National Congress 1997). The cause of the problem – which the final document labelled as ‘xenophobic hostility’¹

1 The word ‘xenophobia’ is often used by commentators and scholars in a vague manner. In their meditative essay on xenophobia in Europe, Kim and Sundstrom (2014) stated the need for greater attention to how xenophobia is defined in academia. Given that the label ‘xenophobia’ has occupied an interesting point of division in South Africa, it is important to delineate the word ‘xenophobia’. In order to do so, it would be useful to understand the origins of

– was ‘competition for scarce resources’ caused by an influx of undocumented migrants into the country. Based on this diagnosis, the document recommended tightening border security and greater police action against undocumented migrants. This is one of the first times the ruling party debated this problem in the post-apartheid period, and it would form the basis for how the party would respond to the problem in subsequent years. Indeed, it could be argued that the ANC – and the post-apartheid government in general – has not departed from this position since 1997.

The stance taken at the ANC’s 50th Conference on xenophobia provides a thesis on why negative attitudes towards international migrants form. The intention of this chapter is to evaluate this thesis and contribute to how we can understand the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. This will be done using public opinion data from the period 2003–2018. This data allows us to look closely at the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes in the country. The chapter is structured in four parts. First, the study will be placed into its proper context by an overview of the relevant literature which the reader can use to understand the data presented in this chapter. Second the data source is outlined, and the results presented. Third, the findings are appraised and their implications for combatting xenophobia in South Africa are discussed. The chapter then concludes by outlining the prospects for the future and what needs to be done to reduce xenophobia in the country.

2 The Context of Immigration in South Africa

South Africa is home to a substantial number of international migrants. To more adequately understand this population, it would be beneficial to reflect on immigration inflows into the country during the 20th century. For most of the past century, migration flows into South Africa followed two distinct

the word. It was first used in a novel (*Monsieur Bergeret*) by Anatole France in 1901 (Villard 1984) although the word might have been used by French journalists the year before. The novel described the Dreyfus Affair in which Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a young French military officer of Alsatian and Jewish descent, was unjustly convicted of treason in December 1884. The word denoted prejudice towards a group of people defined (by the state and the public at large) as ‘foreign’. One of the first academic discussions of ‘xenophobia’ as a word was by Bergman (1943), who argued that ‘xenophobia’ was a different category of prejudice from anti-Semitism. Bergman’s arguments succeeded, and since the mid-20th century xenophobia has been used to denote antipathy or antagonism towards a group labelled ‘foreign’ or different on the basis of country of origin.

tracks. The first accorded migrants basic residence protections and, eventually, the rights of full citizenship. This track was reserved (almost exclusively) for a particular kind of white Protestant from Western Europe (for a review of immigration policy during this period, see Peberdy 2009; Klotz 2013). In the latter half of the century, the white minority government extended considerable resources to attract this type of migrant from Western Europe. Following the end of white minority rule in Mozambique (1975) and Zimbabwe (1980), several waves of white immigrants entered the country from elsewhere in Southern Africa. The country's immigration legislation was amended to (ostensibly) open this track to people of all races in 1986. Between 1950 and 1994, approximately a million documented migrants entered South Africa as permanent residents (Figure 10.1).

The second track of migration into South Africa was designed to bring workers into the country to service certain industries, particularly the mining sector. These migrants were contract workers and did not qualify for citizenship rights, and were subject to draconian movement controls. This track of migration was reserved for people of colour and recruiters were particularly active in Southern Africa. For the apartheid period, the best source of information on this foreign-born population is South African census data (albeit such data is not always reliable). In 1970 there were more than 500,000 foreign-born Africans living in the country. Three-quarters of these were from the so-called frontline states in Southern Africa. Beginning in the late 1970s, growing restrictions were placed on this migration track (for a discussion of this type of migration, see Crush, Jeeves & Yudelman 1991). According to census data, this foreign-born population declined by 38% between 1970 and 1985.

In the 1990s, the post-apartheid government was keen to restrict migration into the country. Employers were encouraged to reduce their formal foreign workforce recruitment and restrictions were placed on the number of work permits that could be issued to foreigners. In addition, severe limitations were placed on the number of international migrants that could be legally admitted. The stock of international migrants in South Africa declined between 1990 and 2000 according to the United Nations (UN) (Table 10.1). Between 2000 and 2019, the observed decline in South Africa's international migrant stock was reversed. As a growing number of international migrants sought to subvert restrictive migration controls in the 1990s, undocumented immigration into the country became a priority for the new democratic regime. Immigration officials and police were granted wide-ranging powers to detain individuals suspected of being undocumented and significant economic capital was outlaid for border control. The systematic deportation policy of the new regime was used to deport about 2.9 million people between 1994 and 2010 (Figure 10.2).



FIGURE 10.1 Documented Immigrants into South Africa, 1950-1994
 SOURCE: DATA WAS DRAWN FROM STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (2005)

According to the UN, the annual rate of change in international immigrant stock was robust for the period 2000–2019. During this nineteen-year time-frame, the number of international migrants increased by more than three million. Reforms in the administration of border control also led to a decline in the number of deportations. According to data from the Department of Home Affairs, reported deportations reached their peak in the late 2000s and then fell considerably in the next nine years. In 2018, the department reported only 24,326 deportations, down from 300,000 in 2007. As can be observed from the table below, the last two decades has been one of significant and profound change in terms of international migration in South Africa. Only Botswana has seen similar levels of net migration growth, although even that country cannot match the kind of change observed in South Africa in terms of absolute numbers.

TABLE 10.1 International Migration Information for South Africa and Her Neighbours, 1990–2019

	Migrant stock						Average annual rate of change	
	Count (000)			% of total population			1990–2000	2000–2013
	1990	2000	2019	1990	2000	2019		
South Africa	1 164	1 002	4 224	3.2%	2.2%	6.7%	-3.3%	6.7%
United Republic of Tanzania	574	928	509	2.3%	2.7%	0.9%	4.8%	-8.4%
Angola	34	46	670	0.3%	0.3%	2.1%	3.2%	4.9%
Malawi	1 128	233	248	12.0%	2.1%	1.3%	-14.2%	-2.3%
Mozambique	122	196	335	0.9%	1.1%	1.1%	4.7%	0.9%
Zambia	279	321	170	3.4%	3.0%	1.0%	1.4%	-0.9%
Zimbabwe	627	410	411	6.0%	3.3%	2.8%	-4.3%	-1.0%
Eswatini	72	23	32	8.4%	2.1%	2.8%	-8.0%	-2.1%
Namibia	121	134	108	8.5%	7.1%	4.3%	-4.5%	-3.3%
Lesotho	8	6	7	0.5%	0.3%	0.3%	-2.9%	-5.3%
Botswana	28	57	111	2.0%	3.3%	4.8%	7.1%	7.4%

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIVISION




FIGURE 10.2 Deportations of undocumented migrants by the South African Department of Home Affairs, 1994–2018

SOURCE: DATA WAS COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR FROM THE ANNUAL REPORTS BY SOUTH AFRICA’S DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS. DATA FROM 2011 AND 2012 DATA IS FROM 2013 PARLIAMENTARY PORTFOLIO COMMISSION ON HOME AFFAIRS.

Let us consider how the economy fared during the period (1990–2019) under discussion. During the period 1990–2000, the government struggled to grow the economy. Data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth rates for the period 1970–2000 (Figure 10.3) show a lack of long-term economic growth. Following the difficulties of the early post-apartheid period, the country’s economy grew significantly between 2001 and 2006 – growing at an average rate of 4.2% in real terms over this five-year period. In 2008 and 2009, the national economy suffered a significant downturn and has struggled to return to the growth levels of the mid-2000s. Levels of real GDP growth in




FIGURE 10.3 GDP per capita growth (annual %) in South Africa, 1970–2019

SOURCE: WORLD BANK NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA, AND OECD NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA.

the 2014–2019 period were especially poor. The commodity prices slump of that period has been one of the main reasons for the slow recovery. Another important contributor for persistent low growth rates has been government mismanagement of the sovereign debt as well as state-owned enterprises (especially the public electricity utility) during this period.

3 Understanding and Measuring ‘Xenophobic Hostility’

As the previous section of the chapter has shown, in the last decade and a half, the number of international migrants in South Africa has increased substantially. According to the Mafikeng Conference’s thesis on xenophobia, this level of growth should have heightened resource competition and we should have seen a significant upswing in public hostility towards international migrants. To test whether this upswing did in fact occur, and to evaluate factors most associated with public attitudes towards foreigners, use is made of public opinion data. Such research instruments are designed to give scholars the ability to generalise their findings to situations outside that of an experimental context (Zaller 1992). Psychological theories of attitudinal formation can then be applied to the data gathered to understand the determinants of certain attitudes (such as, in this case, anti-immigrant sentiment). This research approach contributes to our knowledge of what is driving attitude formation on a specific issue, providing us with unique insights into why people think the way that they do.

It is important to be aware that some scholars have critiqued the use of public opinion data to understand societal change. Indeed, the idea that ‘attitudes’ could be measured using surveys has been criticised as a naïve bid to imitate physical scientists, and at worst crass, culturally inauthentic and reductive (for a review of the main anti-positivist arguments, see Turner 1993; Heidtman, Wysienska & Szmataka 2000). Much of the academic research on xenophobia in South Africa has focused on philosophical arguments and suppositions. Funding for researchers studying xenophobia in South Africa has tended to flow through independent research organisations, like the African Centre for Migration and Society and the Society Work and Development Institute, which favour case study research methodologies (see, for instance, Hassim et al. 2009; von Holdt et al. 2011; Adam & Moodley 2014). These academic investigations tend to be dominated by efforts to understand collective violence against international migrants. Consequently, these academic investigations tend to focus on the structural driver behind collective violence, and *not* on attitudinal change.

The lack of public opinion studies on anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa may be due to a lack of appreciation for the academic importance of the study of 'attitudes'. For early social psychologists like Thurstone (1929), attitudes were particularly important because they could be used to predict and motivate social behaviour. In fact, Triandis (1991: 4) went so far as to define attitudes in terms of behavioural predispositions, saying attitudes were "a state of a person that predisposes a favourable or unfavourable response to an object, person, or idea" (also see Fishbein & Ajzen 1975). Indeed, it could be argued that public opinion research allows the scholar to identify the values, beliefs and understandings that influence individual actions. Some researchers in South Africa have realised the importance of this method of investigation (see, for example, Crush, Ramachandran & Pendleton 2013; Gordon & Maharaj 2015; Gordon 2017; Gordon 2018). There have been a few cross-sectional studies of public attitudes towards international migration in the country during the last decade. However, this is a scholarly tradition that is still in the minority in South African academia.

In comparison to South Africa, the use of attitudinal data to understand anti-immigrant sentiment is more common in the Global North (see Ceobanu & Escandell 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014; Berg 2015 for reviews of the relevant studies). In academic circles in that region, a quantitative examination of public opinion data is one of the best ways to understand how individuals respond to changes in macro-conditions (such as the size of a country's international migrant population). So why is there so little quantitative analysis of attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa? This is due to three developments in South African academia. First is the scarcity of public opinion data available for such studies which would require multiple survey waves to discern clear and consistent patterns over time. Second, there is a bias against the utilisation of such an approach amongst the country's political and social scientists (Mattes 2013). Finally, there appears to be a belief amongst some scholars that South Africa is exceptional and cannot learn from scholarly traditions in other countries.

The rationale for 'xenophobic hostility' put forward by the ANC's 1997 Mafikeng Conference has been critiqued by several prominent non-empirical scholars in South Africa. The work of Nyamnjoh (2006), Neocosmos (2010) and Matsinhe (2011), in particular, has been sceptical of the 'competition thesis', and these scholars put forward a number of alternatives to this thesis. These alternatives all involve social identity and argue that identification with various types of 'we-images' in South Africa is driving xenophobia. There have been, however, few quantitative analyses of how *social identity* influences attitudes towards international migrants in the country – a lacuna that needs to be

addressed. This chapter will address this knowledge gap by using quantitative data to explore how certain types of social identities affect attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa.

4 Data

Data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) was used for this study. SASAS is a repeated cross-sectional survey series that has been conducted annually since 2003. The sampling frame used is based on Statistics South Africa's 2011 Population Census, which was used to construct a set of small area layers (SALS). There are 500 SALS in each survey round spread out among the country's nine provinces. Estimates of the population numbers for various categories of the census variables are obtained per SAL. In the first sampling stage, SALS are drawn with probability proportional to size, using the estimated number of dwelling units in a SAL as a measure of size.² The sample is restricted to adults aged 16 years and older, and is usually gathered in October and November each year. The number of respondents in each survey round ranges from 2,500 to 3,500, and the instrument is representative of the country's adult population. Each SASAS round was weighted to be nationally representative, and all the data presented in this chapter was weighted unless indicated otherwise.

Since its inception, SASAS has employed the following question designed to capture individuals' perceptions of foreigners: "Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa... (i) All immigrants; (ii) Some immigrants; (iii) No immigrants; and (iv) Don't know". The question asks the respondent to indicate their association with an extreme anti-immigrant position versus two more conciliatory options. Consequently, this question can be seen as an effective measure of anti-immigrant sentiment. Before these questions were asked, fieldworkers informed respondents that they were going to be asked: "some questions about people from *other countries* coming to live in South Africa". This was done to avoid confusion over the word "foreigner" which could be applied to all groups the respondents believe are alien or unusual.

2 In the second sampling stage, a predetermined number of individual dwelling units (or visiting points) are drawn with equal probability in each of the SALS. These units have been defined as separate (non-vacant) residential stands, addresses, structures, flats, homesteads, etc. A respondent is then drawn from all persons 16 years and older in this unit.

In the following section, quantitative attitudinal research techniques are used to discern patterns in public views on welcoming international migrants over the period 2003–2018. First, a review is conducted of how attitudes have changed over the period with a particular focus on whether events over this period resulted in attitudinal change. Then an examination is made of the effect of socio-economic status on anti-immigrant attitudes between 2008 and 2018. Finally, attention is drawn to which specific groups of foreigners attract the greatest level of acrimony in South Africa. Finally, the relationship between racialism and anti-immigrant sentiment is examined to provide valuable insight into the role played by social identity in shaping attitudes here.

5 Trends in Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Attitudes towards international migrants are presented for the period 2003–2018 in Figure 10.4. In 2018, about a quarter (25%) of the South African adult population said that they would welcome all immigrants, while the remainder indicated that they would accept either none (26%) or some immigrants (47%). Over the 2003–2018 period, the share of the adult populace that would be ready to welcome foreigners fluctuated within a narrow range. Anti-immigrant sentiment reached a peak in 2007 when two-fifths of the general public reported that they rejected all immigrants. But it was clear from the figure that there was a notable incline in pro-immigrant attitudes in the country in 2008. In that year, more than two-fifths (43%) of the adult population told fieldworkers that they would welcome all foreigners. Following the observed




FIGURE 10.4 Attitudes towards International Migrants in South Africa, 2003–2018
 SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 2003; 2004; 2006–2018.

dip in anti-immigrant sentiment in late 2008, there was a downward trend in pro-immigrant views over the next ten years. In 2018 only 25% of the general public reported that they would accept all international migrants.

The above suggests that attitudes towards international migrants changed significantly over the period between 2008 and 2018. This may indicate that events over this period resulted in this change. To test this hypothesis, a multivariate regression was conducted – this technique made it possible to account for the effects of individual characteristics (e.g., demographic, geographic and socio-economic) on attitudes towards immigrants. To explore the relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and survey wave, a multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression approach was used. This approach was thought apposite given that our goal was to identify which characteristics were most associated with a selected nominal outcome variable. The dependent variable here was whether an individual would welcome no, some or all immigrants. When compared to other models (such as ordered logistical), multinomial regression is also less restrictive. Several background variables were created for the regression analysis. Census classifications of respondents' area of residence were used to construct province dummy variables as well as a South African specific urbanisation variable (urban formal, urban informal, commercial farms and rural areas under traditional authority) to control for geographic location. Finally, standardised dummy variables were used to control for structural demographic characteristics like gender, race and age. Years of completed formal educational attainment level was used to capture socio-economic status.

The results of the regression are displayed in Table 10.2 and the base outcome was "Welcome None". First, the coefficients for the survey wave and the dependent in Model I are presented, and then the background controls in Model II are introduced. The reference group for the SASAS survey wave variable is 2003. The patterning of results was not altered substantially by including background variables. The sizes of the coefficients between the dependent and the survey wave dummies observed here are large and suggest that events over the period had a significant effect on attitudes. It was possible to detect a somewhat *linear* relationship between the survey wave and attitudes. People become less willing to say 'welcome all' during the 2012–2018 period. The largest difference was between 2003 and the 2016–2018 period. Interestingly, if an individual was interviewed in late 2008 the odds of responding that they 'welcome some' (rather than all) immigrants are significantly lower than if they were questioned in 2003. If interviewed in 2008, the log odds of 'welcoming no immigrants' (versus welcoming all) were also observed to decrease.

TABLE 10.2 The Role of Survey Wave in Estimating Attitudes towards International Immigrants in South Africa, 2003–2018 Using Multinomial Logistic Regression

	Some immigrants versus All immigrants	No immigrants versus All immigrants	Some immigrants versus All immigrants	No immigrants versus All immigrants
ROUND (ref. 2003)				
2004–2007	-0.046	0.052	-0.082	0.065
2008–2011	-0.007	-0.036	-0.064	-0.021
2012–2015	0.381 ***	0.136	0.330 **	0.154
2016–2018	0.583 ***	0.174	0.619 ***	0.257 *
Background Controls	No		Yes	
Number of obs.	43,996		40,162	
Wald chi ²	217 (8)		855 (52)	
Pseudo R ²	0.006		0.021	

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Using this method, significant differences were revealed in individuals' opinions on international immigrants in different periods between 2003 and 2018. From this kind of testing, it can be observed that the differences noted between 2008 and other survey waves were statistically significant. This finding holds even when a range of individual-level characteristics are considered.

In South Africa, economic status is one of the most important units of analysis in any study of intergroup relations. It is important to establish how different socio-economic groups changed their views on international migrants during the period 2008–2018. It is often said that the poor are the most likely to be economically threatened by migrants. A comparison is made of the attitudes of different Living Standard Measurement³ (LSM) cohorts towards international migrants over the period 2008–2018 in Figure 10.5. The general pattern of results do not seem to show a clear linear relationship between

3 Designed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation, this index consisted of more than thirty questions about a respondent's asset ownership and access to services. The LSM divides the population into 10 groups, ranging from the least affluent at 1 to the most at 10. As a measure of economic status, LSM is considered superior to income. Income does not take into account access to basic services or ownership of household assets.




FIGURE 10.5 Attitudes towards International Migrants in South Africa across LSM Cohorts, 2008–2018
 Note: The colours in the figures denotes dark grey 'all immigrants', light grey 'some immigrants' and dotted 'no immigrants' and black signifies 'don't know'.
 SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY; 2008–2018.

socio-economic status and attitudes. Consider, for example, that out of all the LSM cohorts in the 2018 round it was the poorest cohort (i.e., LSM 1–3) that showed the lowest level of antagonism towards foreigners. It was interesting to note that the poor were found to be the most likely to vary their opinion of international migrants year-to-year.

The lack of a clear link between socio-economic status and anti-immigrant sentiment evident in Figure 10.5 is not surprising. Data from public opinion surveys by the Southern African Migration Project found that anti-immigrant sentiment cut across economic class (Crush, Ramachandran & Pendleton 2013). Recent research has tested the relationship between objective economic status and attitudes towards foreigners using quantitative public opinion data (see, for instance, Gordon & Maharaj 2015; Gordon 2017; Gordon 2018). This work has largely confirmed the results of this study and shown that socio-economic position was not a robust driver of anti-immigrant sentiment.⁴ In addition, based on an overview of the results, observed changes in South Africa's

4 In this way South Africa is not different from Europe and North America where public opinion research has tended to find that socio-economic status plays, at best, a limited role in predicting attitudes towards international migrants and international immigration (for a review, see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Berg 2015).

stock of international migrants do not seem to have had an effect on public attitudes towards international migrants (also see Gordon 2016).

At this stage it is possible to speculate about the causes for the observed changes detected in the analysis of the results in Figure 10.5 and Figure 10.4. The statistically significant uptick in pro-immigrant sentiment observed, in particular, in the 2008 survey wave is interesting. The observed change in attitudes may, ironically, be related to the largescale anti-immigrant riots that broke out in that year. The violence provoked an outcry from journalists, politicians, media personalities as well as the general public. This chorus of voices may have prompted a significant segment of the general public to adopt more favourable views of international migrants. When SASAS fieldworkers went to gather data in October and November 2008 these views were still active. As the sense of emergency inspired by the 2008 riots receded, this positive messaging ceased, and more anti-immigrant voices were allowed to take hold. Anti-immigrant attitudes did not, however, return to 2007 levels which suggests, perhaps, some positive long-term effects of this messaging.

There is a need to better understand which types of international migrants draw the most hostility in South Africa. Since 2008, SASAS respondents were asked the following *open-ended* question: “Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?” Survey participants were not influenced by predetermined options in the questionnaire and the question did not even refer to an explicit type of foreigner. Respondents could choose any group that they could think of. Data on which groups were named by the general population over the period 2008–2018 are depicted in Figure 10.6. As can be observed from the figure, the groups identified most frequently as least welcome were from African countries. At the end of the period under review, around three-fifths of the adult public chose groups from Africa. It would be instructive to look at which groups from Africa the adult population did not want to come live in the country.

The most mentioned foreign group was ‘Nigerians’ regardless of the survey wave under consideration. In 2018, for instance, 25% of the general population identified ‘Nigerians’ as the kind of foreigner that they would least like to come live in South Africa. The next most frequently cited group was ‘Zimbabweans’, with 11% of the adult public identifying this group in 2018. It was interesting to note the rise in the share of the general adult population that mentioned groups from Asia as their foremost unwanted category of immigrant. The segment of the public who stated an Asian group as their least desired type of immigrant grew from 3% in 2008 to 6% in 2018. Only a small minority of the population mentioned a group from the Global North as their primary undesirable type of immigrant.




FIGURE 10.6 The Most Undesirable International Migrant Groups, 2008–2018
 SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 2008–2018

6 Racial Animosity in South Africa

South Africa has struggled to build and maintain cohesive race relations during centuries of division and colonialism. The moral axioms of one group of South Africans are not the axioms of another, and cultural diversity seems to have produced extreme discontinuities in the development of a common value system. As scholars like Durrheim et al. (2011) have noted, this has resulted in tension between race groups in South Africa (also see Gibson & Gouws 2005). The role that anti-immigrant sentiment may play in creating this tension is frequently discussed (see, for instance, Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010; Matsinhe 2011; Adam & Moodley 2014), but rarely tested using quantitative public opinion data. Given the emphasis on overcoming interracial divisions in South Africa and addressing the country’s history of legislated discrimination, it would be highly relevant to investigate whether interracial attitudes were influencing the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Use was made of the Interracial Threat Index as a proxy for racial resentment in the country. A multivariate regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between a sense of interracial threat and attitudes towards immigrants. Beginning in 2010, SASAS respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: (i) People of other race groups in South Africa are trying to get ahead economically at the expense of my group; (ii) People of other race groups in South Africa tend to exclude members of my group from positions of power and responsibility; (iii) The traditions and values that are important to people of my race are under threat because of the

influence of other races in this country; and (iv) Other race groups in South Africa will never understand what members of my group are like. Respondents answered on five-point Likert scales with the higher value indicating disagreement with the statement. Responses to these four items were reversed and combined to create a 0–10 index labelled the Interracial Threat Index. The construct has a respectable level of reliability, with a Cronbach coefficient of 0.769 and the item-rest correlations showing that all three items fit satisfactorily on to a single scale.

Once again, use was made of a multinomial logistic regression to examine the relationship between attitudes towards international migrants and the Interracial Threat Index. This relationship for each of the four major population groups in South Africa was examined. For each group, two models were calculated – the first included just the coefficients for the index and the dependent and the second introduces the background controls as well as survey wave. The control variables are identical to those described earlier for the logistic regression approach used to explore the relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and survey wave. The outputs of these eight regression models are portrayed in Table 10.3; the base outcome was “Welcome None”. The results show a clear positive correlation for each group regardless of whether the model controlled for a range of socio-demographic variables. The size of this correlation appears to be smallest for the adult black African population and largest amongst the Indian population.

The results show that a sense of interracial threat has a significant impact on anti-immigrant attitudes for *all* four major population groups. In other words, even controlling for a range of other socio-demographic characteristics (such as educational attainment, labour market status, age and gender), interracial attitudes had a robust effect on welcoming attitudes towards foreign nationals. The fear generated by racism is indirectly undermining trust between foreign nationals and the native-born in the country. Interracial animosity in South Africa is, in other words, harming the relations between the two groups.

One of the most troubling aspects of the SASAS results is that levels of interracial threat were quite high in South Africa. The post-apartheid government has struggled to build and maintain interracial cohesion. Several policy documents (such as the National Social Cohesion Strategy⁵ as well as the National

5 The strategy was design to provide a framework that will contribute to social cohesion in South Africa. The overall goal is to create countrywide conscious sense of being proudly South African. The document was drafted by the he Department of Arts and Culture.

TABLE 10.3 The Role of Interracial Threat Index in Estimating Attitudes towards International Immigrants in South Africa, 2003–2018 Using Multinomial (polytomous) Logistic Regression

		Model I				Model II			
		Some immigrants vs. All		Some immigrants vs. All		Some immigrants vs. All		Some immigrants vs. All	
		Immigrants		Immigrants		Immigrants		Immigrants	
		Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.	Coef.	Sig.
Black African	Interracial Threat	0.087	***	0.166	***	0.081	***	0.155	***
	Background Controls	No				Yes			
	Number of obs.	15,427				13,275			
	Wald chi ²	124	(2)			493	(54)		
	Pseudo R ²	0.008				0.029			
Coloured	Interracial Threat	0.092	**	0.246	***	0.092	**	0.229	***
	Background Controls	No				Yes			
	Number of obs.	4,287				3,727			
	Wald chi ²	64	(2)			241	(54)		
	Pseudo R ²	0.015				0.055			
Indian	Interracial Threat	0.092	*	0.255	***	0.091	*	0.252	***
	Background Controls	No				Yes			
	Number of obs.	2,827				2130			
	Wald chi ²	21	(2)			4039	(54)		
	Pseudo R ²	0.019				0.064			
White	Interracial Threat	0.170	***	0.217	***	0.166	***	0.207	***
	Background Controls	No				Yes			
	Number of obs.	3,389				2,920			
	Wald chi ²	45	(2)			300	(54)		
	Pseudo R ²	0.014				0.100			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance⁶), exist on how to build social cohesion in the country. However, these policies seem to have little impact on perceptions of racial threat amongst the general adult population. Of course, this should not surprise anyone familiar with the growing social psychology literature on race relations in South Africa.⁷ But, considering decades of government-sponsored efforts to build interracial cohesion, the results of this study are disquieting. Not enough is being done to confront problems of racism and xenophobia in South African society.

The observed correlation between a sense of interracial threat and anti-immigrant sentiment shows the exclusive way 'blackness' and 'African-ness' is understood in the South African context. Certainly, it helps explain why, as we saw in the last section, certain foreign groups are singled out for hostility more frequently than others. In the previous section, 'Nigerians' were listed as the most undesired type of international migrant in every survey wave under review. This suggests a relatively consistent hierarchy of preferences between immigrant groups for the ordinary South African. Matsinhe (2011) argues that hostility towards African foreigners is grounded in an anti-black social identification that is imprinted on South Africa's 'we-image' (also see Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010). These distorted we-images are themselves a direct outcome of colonial established insider–outsider relations.

If anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa is 'racialised' to a certain extent, then this would be consistent with similar racialised hierarchies of immigration preference in other countries (like the United Kingdom, see Erel, Murji & Nahaboo 2016). The racialised nature of xenophobia in the country points to a link between constructions of identity and attitudes. This appears to strengthen the arguments of those scholars who contend that social identity, rather than economic conditions, is a prime predictive mechanism through which to understand xenophobia in South Africa. Indeed, it could be argued that the label 'Nigerian' in the country has come to represent a host of colonial stereotypes about backward and corrupt 'African-ness'. This could be linked

6 The plan was produced to provide the foundation to develop a comprehensive public policy against racial discrimination and related intolerance. The document was written by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.

7 It is important to recognise that there has been a modest improvement in race relations in the country over the last two decades. This has been shown by a substantive body of social psychological research (Bormman 2011 provides a review of this body of work). Recent research discussed by Durheim et al. (2011), however, has shown that the racial stereotypes in South Africa have exhibited a remarkable level of inertia, even in the face of rather dramatic historical change. Many in the country still feel threatened by other race groups (for a longer historical analysis, see Gibson and Gouws 2005).

to Neocosmos's (2010) stated binary on South African nationalism between rural (i.e., backwardness) and urban (i.e. modernity). Within Matsinhe's (2011) argument, such stereotypes are framed within the country's history of white supremacy, and this is why Matsinhe focuses on those stereotypes related to the 'indigenous' body (such as dark skin, smell and hair). But more academic research is needed to adequately draw a clearer link between social identity and anti-immigrant attitudes.

7 Conclusion

Civil society organisations have tried to advocate for action against anti-immigrant prejudice. Although some juridical victories have been achieved for refugee and migrant rights,⁸ the findings of this chapter show that a considerable share of the country's adult population does not welcome foreigners. The results suggest that the current programmes to fight anti-immigrant attitudes have been less than successful and more urgent action is needed. But the situation is not hopeless. The findings noted a significant number of South Africans who are more progressive in their views towards international migrants. The goal of civil society and policymakers should be to expand their number.

The question confronting those concerned about xenophobic hostility is what can be done to reduce such enmity? The chapter has looked at the thesis put forward by the ANC at their 1997 Mafikeng Conference to explain 'xenophobic hostility'. By adopting this perspective, this chapter has sought to open a new lens into how we may understand attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa. Socio-economic status was not a good predictor of attitudes, which is in keeping with a growing academic consensus on this question. Observed trends in anti-immigrant sentiment over the period 2003–2018 do not seem to be linked to changes in macro-economic conditions or to the recent growth of the foreign-born population. To understand the causes of xenophobia

8 Consider how advocacy groups have helped prevent the closure of refugee reception centres in different parts of the country. In one example, the Lawyers for Human Rights' Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme compelled the Eastern Cape High Court to re-open the Port Elizabeth Refugee Reception Office in 2013. In another example, the Cape Town-based Scalabrini Centre challenged the closure of Cape Town's refugee office in court in 2012 and again in 2014. The Supreme Court of Appeal eventually ordered the Department of Home Affairs to reopen the office in late 2017 (although there has been some departmental resistance to this ruling).

in South Africa, policy-makers need to look outside the ‘competition for scarce resources’ thesis for answers to the problem of xenophobic hostility.

The primacy that we give to materialism when trying to explain xenophobia is instructive for what it reveals about how we understand human nature. In its most simplistic terms, it reflects an economistic interpretation of humanity – i.e., antipathy as a rational response to economic competition. Assumptions about the economic rationality of individual attitude formation have deep roots in Western academia. Such assumptions build on the philosophical work of several Western scholars (such as Thomas Hobbes as well as the neo-classical economists; for a full review see Mansbridge 1990). In those societies and nations where the ideologies of individualism have distinct political support and funding, the assumption that self-interest is a prime motivator tends to have wide currency.

In this study, interracial animosity is a better determinant of attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa than socio-economic status. Investigating whether anti-immigrant sentiment had a relationship with intergroup threat allowed this study to engage with the complexity of race relations and the formation of interracial attitudes in the post-apartheid period. The results showed a strong correlation between interracial threat and anti-immigrant sentiment. This finding is consistent with other work on intergroup attitudes (see, for instance, Gordon & Maharaj 2015; Gordon 2017; Gordon 2018) and suggests the importance of understanding ‘xenophobic hostility’ as part of the greater problem of racism and racialisation in the country.

It must be acknowledged that there are limitations in quantitative public opinion research for the exploration of pathways of attitude formation. Despite these limitations, however, the results of this chapter serve as broad evidence of the racism-xenophobia nexus that future research should explore. The findings of this study raise fundamental questions about the nature of prejudice, the social fabric and community in South Africa. Social fractures in the country may encourage attitudinal predispositions which promote fragmentation rather than cohesion. More needs to be done to ensure freedom from racism and prejudice. In addition, we need more research on anti-xenophobia intervention and how these interventions could link with efforts to reduce interracial prejudice. Building effective forms of social cohesion in South Africa will not be easy, but it is essential that more is done.

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PART 3

Race and Identity in Post-apartheid South Africa



Strategies Employed by Biracial People When Encountering *Unofficial Racial Census-Takers* In Post-apartheid South Africa

Natasha Van der Pol, Zaynab Essack, Melissa Viljoen and Heidi van Rooyen

1 Introduction

In post-apartheid South Africa, remnants of apartheid segregation linger, resulting in uneasy relations between the country's four major so-called race groups: black African, coloured, Indian and white (Potgieter 2017). Protecting racial 'purity' and maintaining white supremacy were primary goals of the apartheid system. A key element underpinning this was the effort to eliminate interracial mixing by prohibiting sexual relations and marriage between black and white South Africans through legislation. For biracial people born during and after apartheid, constructing an identity that is neither white nor black is particularly challenging in a racialised society. This chapter explores the lived experiences of 15 biracial South Africans, aged 21 to 59. Most participants had white/Indian parents (n=11), two had white/black African parents and two had white/coloured parents. Participants were eligible to participate if they had one white parent and one parent who was identified as belonging to another race. These participants were therefore able to describe their lived experiences in terms of both their majority (white) and minority (black African, coloured and Indian) in-group racial classification. In this way, participants could describe if, and how, they straddle the privilege and oppression associated with their proximity to both whiteness and blackness given the residual effects of apartheid.

Through in-depth interviews, the 15 participants shared their experiences and perceptions on how their mixed-race heritage influences their identity, sense of belonging, social interactions and the strategies they use when encountering *unofficial racial census-takers* in post-apartheid South Africa (refer to the sample in the appendix of this chapter). Unofficial racial census-takers is a term coined by the authors to refer to individuals who are in the habit of categorising others according to race based on arbitrary information much like the official racial census-takers of the apartheid era. The data arising

from the interviews was analysed using a thematic analysis with themes identified from the transcripts of the interviews with the participants. This chapter begins with a brief history of interracial mixing in South Africa, followed by a discussion of the participants' lived experience of being biracial, and ends with the role that biracial people play in creating a non-racial South Africa.

2 A brief History of Interracial Mixing in South Africa

As early as 1865, colonial settlers in the Cape of Good Hope began to take a taxonomic approach to census-taking, marking the beginning of differentiation between the indigenous populations (Christopher 2002). This lay the foundation for the racial hierarchy underpinning apartheid South Africa which separated the South African population into four so-called race groups: white, Indian, coloured and black African.

Apartheid's principal vision was a society in which every so-called race knew and observed its proper place – economically, politically and socially (Posel 2001). Underpinning this logic was the widely accepted fictional idea that each race shared essential characteristics that united them into discrete racial groups because those in power at the time required each race group to be separate in a hierarchical and oppressive racial system (Baxley 2008). Based on this logic, a series of apartheid laws were introduced.

The legislative cornerstone of racial categorisation under apartheid was the enactment of the Population Registration Act of 1950. This law required that every South African was to be racially classified and captured in a national population register that indicated their race. In 1951, the first attempt at mass racial classification was included in the national census, and official census-takers were given the responsibility of racial classification which was considered largely a matter of “common sense” (Posel 2001: 64). In 1953, the Director of Census delegated his power of racial classification to all officials of the Department of Native Affairs and to all public servants in 1969 (Posel 2001). Race was to be based on “appearance” and “general acceptance” (Posel 2001). The infamous pencil test,¹ for example, was used by some officials to distinguish white from black according to hair texture. According to Posel:

1 The pencil test was a method used to determine racial identity by pushing a pencil through an individual's hair. Two variations of the pencil test were used to determine racial identity in apartheid South Africa. For a white person's racial identity based on hair texture, the pencil had to fall to the floor. If the pencil stuck, then the individual was classified as coloured. For a coloured racial identity, an individual was asked to shake their head. If the pencil fell out of

In the case of the boundary between white and coloured, judgements were not subjected to any bureaucratic scrutiny or surveillance, other than when contested in appeals to the Race Classification Appeal Board, which were remarkably few and far between. POSEL 2001

However, those classified as white were assured a lifetime of privilege whereas those classified as “coloured” or “native” were reduced to fewer opportunities, benefits and power with little or no prospect of social or racial mobility (Posel 2001).

The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, one of the first pieces of legislation introduced by the Nationalist Party (NP) after coming to power in 1948, prohibited marriages between “Europeans” and “non-Europeans”, and was later amended in 1968 to invalidate interracial marriages involving a South African citizen that were contracted in other countries. In 1950, the apartheid parliament amended the Immorality Act of 1927 to prohibit sex between whites and all black people (the 1927 Act only prohibited sexual relations between white and black African people). Both laws carried strict penalties for contravention, with the Immorality Act providing for a sentence of imprisonment of up to six years, which was in practice imposed mainly on the black partner in the relationship.

Although these laws were repealed in 1985, the systematic propaganda against the dangers of racial mixing has resulted in an enduring societal discomfort with biracialism and racial ambiguity in post-apartheid South Africa. While the category coloured was originally created as a catchall racial classification to capture all individuals of mixed-race origin, “coloured” has developed into a race group unto its own, through generations of intermarriage among mixed-race people over a long period, with a culture and traditions that separate coloured people from biracial people. Biracial is a term used to refer to individuals who have parents from two socially defined racial groups (Francis 2006). Research on biracial people is limited, and even more so in the South African context. This study therefore adds to the extant literature in South Africa (e.g., Francis 2006; 2008; 2012; Maré 2012).

2.1 *What are you?*

“What are you?” is a common question that biracial people in South Africa encounter when meeting new people (Francis 2006). In post-apartheid South Africa, people, particularly white people, are conscious of not appearing racist

the hair, the individual could be classified as coloured. If not, the individual was classified as black African (Bowker & Star 1999).

(Steyn 2001; Verwey & Quayle 2012). Bluntly enquiring about race is a sure-fire indicator to others that you use race as a method of categorisation (Potgieter 2017). To avoid blatantly asking about race and risking accusations of racism, *unofficial racial-census takers* often opt for one of two approaches to boxing a racially ambiguous person. The least conspicuous method comes via thinly veiled interest in a person's heritage through questions such as "what country are you from?" or through guesses such as "are you [Portuguese; Italian; Greek; Spanish; Mediterranean; Brazilian; Latin; Mexican; Egyptian...]?" A less sophisticated approach is to exclude the term *race* when asking "what [race] are you?" in an attempt to be less offensive. Framed this way this contentious question appears to be somehow more offensive to biracial people than simply asking about race as illustrated by Rachel (21, female, white father/coloured mother):

...that specific question, 'what are you?' is always hard to interpret... It irritates me because what I am is *human*... It's kind of like they are trying to degrade me. If they asked 'what *race* are you?' I think I would be more open.

Some commentators suggest that when individuals appear racially ambiguous, it results in such incidents where biracial individuals "are blatantly asked dehumanising questions like 'what are you?'" (Gaither 2015: 115).

South Africans understand that the racial hierarchy ingrained by apartheid continues to taint interracial relations. The habit of categorising people into distinct race groups means that most present-day South Africans are guilty of acting as unofficial racial census-takers. People of colour have developed a certain level of tolerance toward those who occasionally make racial blunders because of their implicit racial prejudices. For instance, some biracial people interviewed, like Kieran, have come to expect being questioned about their race and dismiss the poor choice of words when enquirers ask "what are you?":

I don't take offence to it. I guess I'm fine with it. I expect it now for people to ask me 'what are you?'...I get it so commonly now that it's impossible to take offence to it. I realise that it's obviously something that people wonder, and it's something that people aren't quite accustomed to yet in South Africa. So it's okay. I don't get offended.

However, in post-apartheid South Africa, continuously being asked to classify yourself racially to others means that a biracial person perpetuates the practice of placing themselves in a racial category and taking on the social status

and stereotypes associated with whichever category they select. In addition, biracial people who racially identify with a race that does not match them phenotypically risk experiencing racial identity invalidation, in which their racial identity is rejected by others (Franco & Franco 2015). Racial identity invalidation can be particularly damaging to a biracial person when it is perpetrated by a member of the racial in-group that the biracial person has identified with (Franco & Franco 2015).

There is a sense among biracial people that often others ask about their race to “put them in a box” which dictates their social status and how they ought to be interacted with and treated by the enquirer. When encountering unofficial racial census-takers, five strategies emerged among participants, including (1) stating that they are biracial; (2) passing for white; (3) pretending to be foreign; (4) labelling themselves as coloured; or (5) refusing to racially classify themselves.

Simply stating that you are biracial and perhaps supporting that by stating the races of your parents was the most common response shared by participants, as illustrated by Alex (21, male, white father/Indian mother) and Kieran (29, male, white father/Indian mother):

My usual response is [that] I’m mixed-race. My father is white and my mother is Indian, and I’m from South Africa. ALEX

I’ll tell them I’m mixed.... When they hear that it makes sense [to them].
KIERAN

This strategy seems to be the quickest and easiest way to move past enquiries about racial heritage. There are also inherent psychological benefits that accompany this strategy. Research on biracial identity formation indicates that biracial adolescents who identified with multiple racial categories tended to report higher levels of self-esteem and social engagement compared to their counterparts who identified predominantly with only one racial category (Binning, Unzueta, Huo & Molina 2009). Three other benefits were also noted. Firstly, the biracial person does not have to choose between either of their parents’ races; secondly, the enquirer’s question is answered truthfully; and thirdly, the biracial person is no longer burdened by how their racial ambiguity affects the way the enquirer chooses to interact with them.

However, revealing that you are biracial in post-apartheid South Africa is still risky because of the racial prejudices that remain salient. Natalie (29, female, white father/Indian mother) described how she decides whether to reveal that she is biracial or employ another strategy, which is to pass as white:

It depends who it is. If it someone who I know is asking me because they want to put me in a box and decide how they want to treat me [and] just generally be a racist, I tell them I'm white. And then they seem to accept that. But if they have access to my family then I guess I feel like I have to tell them I'm mixed. My mom is Indian and my dad is white.

There is extensive literature exploring the phenomenon of black, multicultural and biracial people choosing to pass for white (Aldorondo 2001; Allen, Garriot, Reys, & Hsieh 2013; Bonovitz 2009; Collins 2000; Crothers & K'Meyer 2007). The ability to pass for white provides access to the social privileges that whiteness offers. Despite the relatively smaller population size of the colonial settlers, white supremacy was established and further entrenched by apartheid. While there have been efforts to redress historical disadvantages and erase racial hierarchies in post-apartheid South Africa, apartheid's racial hierarchy has come to be viewed as a natural order (Benedictsson 2017). Given the unjust privileging of whiteness, biracial people's proximity to whiteness means that many of them benefit from social and economic advantages available to white people; but *only if they can pass as white* (Allen et al. 2013). Research on biracial individuals' racial identity choices indicates that there is fluidity in the way that biracial people choose to identify their race within different situational contexts (Allen et al. 2013). Often their assumptions of how others perceive their appearance influence how they identify themselves racially (Allen et al. 2013).

For biracial people, the ability to pass for white means that they are viewed as more intelligent, capable, trustworthy and safe (Benedictsson 2017; Durant & LeBlanc Gillum 2018). However, passing for white gives rise to significant psychological conflict, even when biracial people self-identify as white due to their cultural upbringing and immersion in white society (Young 2009); instances where biracial people are *othered* because they are reminded that they are not actually white can be emotionally scaring and a reminder that their racial identity is a contested site (Young 2009). Passing for white also elicits a sense of guilt toward their black parent (Baxley 2008). Essentially a biracial person who chooses to identify as white rejects their black parent's race, ethnicity and culture as part of themselves and privileges their white parent. The pressure of having to choose one racial identity over another is a source of tension for biracial individuals (Allen et al. 2013; Gaither, 2015). The desire to pass for white may also be underpinned by internalised racism which increases the psychological conflict associated with passing for white (Durrant et al. 2018). Passing for white perpetuates the cycle of what is constructed as white privilege in post-apartheid South Africa.

Interestingly, white/Indian biracial participants in another South African study did not identify as white or coloured (Francis 2006), although some did reclassify as white to access better education – resonating with our participants' stories of passing as white to access privilege. However, variance in reported racial identities may relate to participants in the present study responding to external enquiries about their race, while participants in Francis's study were describing their own perceptions of their racial identities. Like some participants in this study, it was noted that in contemporary South Africa it might be more beneficial to identify as black to access benefits associated with redress policies (e.g., employment equity and black economic empowerment). Access to better opportunities linked to minority status, including scholarships, was also reported as a benefit of a biracial as opposed to white identity by participants in research outside South Africa (Soliz, Cronan, Bergquist, Nuru & Rittenour 2017).

In many instances it is other people who assume that a biracial person is white rather than the biracial person actively trying to pass as white, as illustrated by Annabelle (32, female, white father/Indian mother):

At first people assume I'm white. Um, but then you know the more time you spend with people the more they start noticing specific identity markers that I guess they somehow come to the conclusion that maybe I'm not white. And they automatically will guess something like 'Oh you're Greek?'

When a biracial person's whiteness is called into question, passing for white can be difficult and requires a different strategy to maintain the privileges associated with whiteness such as pretending to be foreign instead of a biracial South African. There is an allure in pretending to be foreign as opposed to biracial. In post-apartheid South Africa, revealing that you do not have two white parents often results in a loss of the social privileges that whiteness offers. In society there appears to be dominant social norms regarding hypo-descent (e.g., the one drop rule of racial classification) in which biracial people are classified according to their minority status because that is how the dominant society perceives them (Bracey, Barnaca & Umana-Talor 2004). Privileges remain intact, and may even increase as a result of the enquirer believing that the biracial person is foreign. As stated earlier in the chapter, unofficial racial census-takers likely enquire about race due to a tendency to use race as a method of categorisation. Thus, some foreigners such as Europeans and North Americans are given a higher status than black South Africans as there is a tendency among South Africans to devalue their nationality, particularly white

South Africans following democracy (Dube 2018). In contrast, other foreigners such as Africans and Asians may be subjected to misanthropic attitudes among South Africans in general (Durrheim, Mtose & Brown 2011). The following excerpt from Natalie's interview captures these sentiments:

Sometimes after I've told them I'm white they'll be a bit suspicious of that. They'll ask if I'm Portuguese or Greek or Italian or something like that. And depending on how I'm feeling, sometimes I'll say 'something like that'. Or I'll give them some other exotic country.... [Sometimes I tell people I'm foreign because] when I've told people that I'm half white and half Indian...a weird thing happens. They're like, 'oh, so you're an Indian'. So, immediately it doesn't matter that I'm biracial to them. All they can see is Indian...even though I don't look Indian at all.

However, there are consequences to pretending that you are foreign as opposed to revealing that you are biracial. Often the enquirer asks follow-up questions that a person who is pretending to be foreign finds difficult to answer. A prolonged *racial interrogation* tends to cause embarrassment or discomfort for the biracial person, and requires the ability to think quickly and lie convincingly. Rachel and Alex shared similar experiences when pretending to be foreign:

Once at a festival I said I was from Portugal and people really believed me.... But then they asked me questions like 'can you speak the language'. And I felt like *aww damn*. RACHEL

Once or twice...I've said I'm from Portugal or Italy, or something. But I don't do it often because I can't do accents. And they start asking questions [that I can't answer]. ALEX

Pretending to be foreign creates psychological conflicts that are similar to, and arguably more challenging than passing for white. Assuming a foreign identity means a rejection of both parents' racial, ethnic and cultural identities and the adoption of an unfamiliar identity. This results in the biracial person feeling *even more* like a fraud when confronted with instances that remind them that they have no claim to that identity, as in Rachel and Alex's experiences. Thus, it is not difficult to see why many participants chose to employ this strategy very rarely and often only with strangers who they did not anticipate seeing again.

For some biracial people the act of explaining your racial heritage repeatedly becomes exhausting as enquirers view your openness as an opportunity to pry further into your heritage. A fourth strategy that biracial people tend to

employ is to simply say that they are coloured. Given that this racial classification was specifically created as a catchall for people of mixed-race, adopting this racial identity is somewhat easy. However, as stated earlier, in the South African context coloured has come to be a discrete racial category which embodies a cultural history and a set of traditions that biracial people may not necessarily have access to. Biracial people who choose to identify as coloured do so with an uneasy reluctance. For instance, Kerry (38, female, white father/black African mother) shared that she felt “the same on the outside with the skin colour but on the inside...totally different to coloured people”.

This sentiment was shared by many of the people who were interviewed. When asked what it is about being coloured that is different from being biracial, they found it difficult to articulate, often citing technical differences such as “when you’re coloured you’re born into a family where your parents are coloured.... When you’re biracial you’re born into a family where one parent is one race and your other parent is another race” (Annabelle). They also mentioned cultural caricatures of what it means to be coloured for instance “eating malva pudding at Christmas” (Chloe, 22, female, white father/Indian mother), and negative stereotypes like “gangsterism in the Cape flats” (Alex) or “thinking it’s okay to have children before you’re married” (Kerry). Identifying as coloured was also used strategically among participants who perceived that a coloured identity as opposed to a biracial identity in post-apartheid South Africa held more privilege due to efforts to redress previous disadvantage.

Identifying what being coloured really means appeared to be beyond the ability of those who were interviewed and thus outside the scope of this chapter. Clearly biracial people cannot necessarily be considered truly coloured because so many of them felt that they had no real claim to colouredness. Pinpointing the subtle cultural characteristics that allow a person to claim a coloured racial identity was difficult, although many felt that *coloured* was the closest racial classification that exists in South Africa to describe themselves. Kieran felt that he could “relate very well to coloured people. But....if you put coloured people in a group and they become *all coloured* and then all of a sudden you feel like you stick out like a sore thumb because you’re not actually coloured”. Many interviewees who spoke about their experiences of dating coloured people shared similar sentiments about not quite being fully able to connect and attributed this to the cultural differences that separate biracial people from coloured people. Kieran recalled implicit reactions from a former girlfriend in response to him identifying himself as being coloured:

[It was] little niggles here and there. I don’t think the [race] topic was ever discussed.... It was just sort of undertones like...she would laugh

when I called myself *coloured*. She would sort of snigger like ‘*you wish you were coloured*’. It didn’t make me feel great, but more from the sake that I was hoping to relate to her rather than being included in the coloured community or something. I felt like ‘*if I’m not coloured, what am I? Give me this*’.

The quotations above demonstrate the struggle that biracial people experience when using this strategy to respond to queries about their racial identity. On the one hand, adopting a coloured racial identity in post-apartheid South Africa provides relative privilege in terms of quotas for economic reform because of coloured proximity to blackness and the relatively small coloured population across South Africa. In addition, by identifying as coloured instead of either parent’s race, biracial people reduce the psychological conflict associated with privileging one parent over the other. By assuming a racial identity that is different to both parents, biracial people acknowledge that their racialised social interactions and experiences are different to those of their monoracial parents (McKenzie 2018). On the other hand, the enduring racial hierarchy socially disadvantages biracial people when assuming a coloured identity. Biracial people who identify as coloured lose their proximity to whiteness and the associated privileges. Instead, they are subjected to the (negative) stereotypes of colouredness (Adhikari 2006). Moreover, the constant underlying perception that you are not *actually* coloured exists, and reminders of this creep up during social interactions. Adopting a coloured racial identity in post-apartheid South Africa might be somewhat convenient when completing forced choice racial classifications on official documents; however, it does not remove the sense of *otherness* that biracial people feel in a society that continues to emphasise racial difference.

The least popular strategy used by biracial people was to refuse to classify themselves racially for other people. Opting to not answer when asked was uncommon. A possible reason for the limited use of this strategy could be attributed to the social awkwardness that arises as a result. For instance, Rachel recalled how she usually responds by saying “take your pick”, which effectively frees her from assigning the burden of racial prejudices associated with racial stereotypes. As a result, this burden becomes solely the enquirer’s. When biracial people offer racial classifications to unofficial racial census-takers it is possible to move swiftly past the enquiry. In contrast, this strategy denies the enquirer the opportunity to assign a societal station to a racially ambiguous person and move on with little regard to the important consequences that arise in response to that seemingly innocuous interaction. Rather, should the enquirer attempt to probe further they risk placing undue importance on

finding out the race of the respondent and exposing their underlying racial prejudice.

This uncommon strategy presents a useful opportunity to deal with the habit that South Africans have of categorising each other racially and employing the racial hierarchy that apartheid entrenched. The discomfort caused by refusing to adopt a racialised identity could be the catalyst needed to force people to examine their implicit racial prejudices. It could foster an introspection exploring the unknown underlying factors that arise from the need to know another person's race, and why being denied that information creates such discomfort. Perhaps then we can move on from using race as a distinctive characteristic that shapes who we are as humans and how we perceive and treat other humans (O'Hare 2014).

3 Toward a Non-racial Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa

I didn't know who I was or where I belonged. I couldn't fit in with the black people. I couldn't fit in with the coloured people. And I don't fit in with white people up to this day with the whole racial thing. KERRY

Kerry captures the sense of not belonging that many biracial people feel. New-born babies do not have a racial or cultural identity; these are things that unfold as children make their way into adulthood as social beings (Litcher & Qian 2018). South Africans entered post-apartheid South Africa trusting the lie that race no longer matters or affects the way we perceive and treat each other in our rainbow nation. Following the introduction of democracy, racism did not disappear; although the social unacceptability of explicit racism meant that racism had to take on a more implicit form (Durrheim et al. 2011). After 27 years of democracy, many South Africans want to forget about race and accuse people of *harping on about race* whenever the topic surfaces. Our inability to talk about race without feeling accused, guilty or angry means that we may never fully destroy the power that race has over our society.

Creating a non-racial identity is not the same as having the well-intended *colour-blind* outlook that stems from the notion that all people are created equal, and that racial differences should not be seen or acknowledged because to see colour is to be caught seeing prejudice (Frankenberg 1993; Simpson 2008). Colour-blindness is inadequate because, rather than removing racial prejudice, it sustains white privilege because it allows white people to dismiss the lived experience of the enduring racial hierarchy that exists in racialised societies (Baxley 2008). Colour-blindness dismisses alternative ways of being,

knowing and doing social interactions because talking about race propagates anxiety (O'Hare 2004; Simpson 2008).

Biracial people often feel that it is their duty to end racism because they are the bridge between races. As hybrid beings, they have insights into cultural worldviews that monoracial people do not have access to. Hall (1996) describes hybridity as a blending of cultures and representation of a coexistence of difference in which new structures and perspectives emerge, as if this in-between status was something to negotiate. This responsibility is a heavy burden because, by virtue of being in-between races, biracial people are acutely more aware of racial and cultural differences. Annabelle describes this as making [them] feel like an "insider-outsider.... You're not white enough to feel comfortable in white communities and not brown enough to be insider [in black communities]". Many participants found the prospect of their existence representing a step toward ending racialised thinking difficult because their own identities were greatly affected by a sense of *otherness* that they attributed to being biracial. Participants often identified more with Bakhtin's description of hybridity than Hall's:

...[within] the hybrid...[there are] two individual consciousnesses, two voices, two accents... two socio-linguistic consciousnesses, two epochs... that...are not here unconsciously mixed . . . but that come together and consciously fight...it is the collision between differing points of views on the world... [but] they are pregnant with potential for new world views.
BAKHTIN 1981: 306

Participants described being biracial as *difficult* or *confusing*, particularly when trying to craft an identity. Biracial people tend to exist in a "liminal space that is neither here nor there, they are betwixt and between" (Turner 1974: 85). Racial ambiguity allows biracial people access to different social circles; but this sense of being different makes them feel *othered*. The constant struggle of having to negotiate the boundaries between inside and outside meant that many participants longed for a simpler monoracial existence, as illustrated by Alex and Natalie:

There are a multitude of terrible things that stem from racial segregation. But having a race to identify with in social situations that you could almost retreat to provides social norms that show you how to act or who you're supposed to be and be with. Biracial people are genetically half [one race] and half [another race]. But socially they are neither. ALEX

Life would be easier if I was just one race. Monoracial people have a sense of belonging, family culture and they just know who they are. NATALIE

However, many biracial participants described being biracial as somewhat empowering because it forced them to develop their identities much earlier than their peers (Bracey et al. 2004; Brown 1990). Yet, many still experience difficulties communicating with their parents regarding race and culture, which meant that participants had to come to terms with their biracial identity on their own. However, participants felt that this made them more competent, well-rounded individuals that did not need to rely on others, as stated by Alex:

My parents are not the discussion type. Even if I wanted to speak to somebody, neither of my parents could ever understand what I was going through or the difficulty I face as a mixed-race person because they grew up as one race... In high-school I realised I was never going to fit into a group and have a secure group identity. So I decided I was going to improve myself. I started exercising. I started martial arts. I started reading self-help books. You know, trying to build up my individual identity rather than try copy what other people are doing in a group. And I believe that served me very well.

These participants lived experience of being biracial draws attention to the comprehensive ways that our identities are dependent upon others. Constructing a hybrid identity is a fluid process where biracial people continually construct, reconstruct, collaborate and contest their identity (Young 2009). Although these participants may at times experience a deep sense of not belonging anywhere, they had mixed feelings about belonging to their own biracial race group. To a certain extent the idea of having a group to belong to was attractive, but most participants felt that their identities had been shaped to a large extent by their feeling unique, different and outside the norm. Their sense of uniqueness and in-betweenness freed them from the stereotypes associated with particular races, and in this way, could be considered an asset (Tizard & Phoenix 1993). In fact, research has found that because biracial individuals represent multiple racial groups, "they are more likely to reject the conception that race biologically predicts one's abilities, which may buffer them from the negative effects of prejudice" (Gaither 2015: 115). In the following quotation from an interview, Nicky (22, female, white father/Indian mother) described her need for diversity when entering social situations: "I am very conscious when I walk into a room.... I don't want to be in a place that's only one race because I feel out".

A growing biracial community is more conducive to promoting racial integration because: (1) biracial people feel more comfortable socialising in diverse groups; and (2) monoracial people may feel more comfortable interacting with other races when there are biracial people present to act as *social bridges*.

However, for Kieran, the concept of a biracial community emerging in post-apartheid South Africa is an impossibility: "A biracial community will never exist because being [biracial] is essentially single races mixing and crossing borders. And over time, when mixed-race people are with mixed-race people that simply becomes coloured".

4 Conclusion

Biracial people were an issue for apartheid because they go against the structure of racialised order and the preservation of white privilege that underpinned the apartheid system. In post-apartheid South Africa, interracial relationships are becoming more and more common. However, the participants interviewed suggested that their interactions with monoracial people indicated that biraciality remains uncommon and people react to the idea of interracial mixing with varying degrees of acceptance. Biracial people occupy a space in post-apartheid South Africa that is somewhat unique; they have first-hand experience of the privilege and disadvantage that majority and minority status affords people. Often this space is described as uncomfortable because biracial people belong to both the majority and minority race groups, and simultaneously do not fully belong to either. In terms of bridging the gap between race groups and constructing a non-racial society, the strategies that biracial people choose to employ when encountering unofficial racial census-takers is particularly important.

Self-identifying as biracial has been deemed as psychologically healthy by researchers (Brunsma 2006). However, it perpetuates the cycle of classifying ourselves using race. Self-identifying as only one race or adopting a foreign ethnic identity to hold onto the privilege this offers means that biracial people not only contribute to the enduring racial hierarchy that apartheid indoctrinated, but they may also experience an increase in the psychological conflicts that arise from possible racial identity invalidation (Allen et al. 2013). Identifying as coloured was touted as somewhat of a convenient option because (1) this provides relative advantage in the post-apartheid context given the efforts to redress historical disadvantage, and (2) provides a simple racial classification that is widely understood and accepted. However, many participants who used this racial identity reported that they did not feel fully comfortable identifying as coloured because they perceived being biracial as different to being coloured. Still, a few brave others refused to classify themselves racially, bearing the uncomfortable awkwardness that followed their silence, in an attempt to cease South Africans' incessant need to classify each other using

race. The underlying theme that is uncovered by these participants lived experience is that race is still an issue in post-apartheid South Africa; and it needs to be talked about. Over time, the boundaries between race groups may blur as the biracial population grows and discrete racial groups shrink. However, at the moment we cannot ignore the issue of race and hope that regime changes and time will make the problems of race disappear.

Appendix

TABLE 11.1 Sample Summary

Gender	Age	Father	Mother
Female	38	White	Black African
Female	59	White	Black African
Female	21	White	Coloured
Female	32	White	Indian
Female	29	White	Indian
Female	22	White	Indian
Female	22	Indian	White
Female	32	Indian	White
Female	22	Indian	White
Male	35	White	Coloured
Male	21	White	Indian
Male	29	White	Indian
Male	34	Indian	White
Male	34	Indian	White
Male	23	Indian	White

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‘Collectively Oppressed and Unequal’: *University Students’ Perceptions of Quality of Life*

Joleen Steyn Kotze

1 Introduction

In 2015, a clarion call for radical social transformation sounded at South African universities. Rooted in a narrative of an urgent need to decolonise universities through radical and revolutionary change, students highlighted a sense that the status quo within South African universities perpetuates racialised patterns of exclusion and inequality. For them, this repression undermines the social and economic inclusion of black students in contemporary South African society. They argue that life for them had not necessarily improved under democratic and dominant rule by the African National Congress (ANC). Their narrative emphasised the exclusionary structure of universities, symbolised in colonial statutes like that of Cecil John Rhodes (#RhodesMustFall) and driven ideologically by “apartheid culture” (#OpenStellenbosch) that does not advance an African philosophical and intellectual project, rendering African identity and lived experiences of oppression and continued economic and social marginalisation to the periphery of society. At the core of this protest movement is the lived experiences of social and economic inequality and marginalisation that perpetuate apartheid patterns of race-based exclusion in a post-apartheid context. Or, rather, a persistent inequality of opportunity that characterises social, economic, and political life in post-apartheid South Africa.

Context matters, and one cannot ignore the contemporary socio-political and socio-economic South African context in which the narrative of #Fees-MustFall is located. South Africa remains a highly unequal country where racialised patterns of poverty and inequality persist, despite 28 years of democracy and ANC rule. With political liberation and its associated euphoria, many expected the material benefits of democracy to follow, through the promise of a *better life for all*¹ where one would see poverty decline and where societal transformation would reflect racial inclusivity in the new post-apartheid order.

1 The ANC created the catch phrase “A better life for all” for its 2004, 2009 and 2014 electoral campaigns.

Yet, of 52 million South Africans, approximately 17 million rely on government social grants, meaning that around 30% of the population is dependent on social welfare (Sesant 2016). The majority of the grant recipients are South Africa's poor and black African economically marginalised citizens, who lack adequate education and, by default, opportunities for social mobility.

While we have seen the delivery of housing and basic services on the one hand, we have also seen failures in education² and primary health care³ provision on the other. There has been an increase in corruption⁴ and a lack of accountability.⁵ The most notable expression of inequality in South Africa is found in inequality of opportunity. Inequality of opportunity is referred to as '...a lottery of birth...' where 'characteristics like gender, economic circumstances, geography, and ethnicity can trap large groups of people in poverty, and specifically affect access to basic services among children' (Kohkhar 2014). States play an essential role to facilitate a more balanced equality of opportunity through the provision of basic services such as health care, education, and essential infrastructure to facilitate clean water, sanitation, and travel (World Bank 2018: 45). When looking at patterns of poverty and inequality in South Africa, the World Bank (2018: 22) found that there is a positive correlation between access to basic services and income level. Poor South Africans tended to have limited access to proper water and sanitation, were generally food insecure, lived in overcrowded homes, and have lower rates of completing primary school (World Bank 2018: 22 – 27). Similarly, access to health care and educational outcomes remained unequal across income group with, and given the

2 Only 28.9% of South Africans completed high school and 11.8% hold a tertiary qualification (StatsSA 2011).

3 Known as the Esidimeni Tragedy, more than 94 patients requiring special care for mental disorders died due to dehydration, starvation, uncontrolled fits and pneumonia when they were removed from specialised state facilities into unregistered and ill-equipped NGOs (<http://citypress.news24.com/News/timeline-life-esidimeni-tragedy-20170207>). See also <http://www.hst.org.za/news/hospitals-crisis>.

4 There have been various corruption scandals in South Africa's democratic history. On one of these government spending in excess of R200 million on upgrades to former President Zuma's Nkandla homestead which included a swimming pool and an amphitheatre.

5 Many municipalities and departments are unable to achieve a clean audit status. The Auditor-General regularly finds evidence of maladministration, irregular spending, and wasteful expenditure. It has also become common practice for government tenders to be awarded to companies in which government officials have a direct stake and as such are able to unduly benefit. This has now become known as "tenderpreneurship". Key issues highlighted by the Auditor-General include corruption, poor leadership, and unqualified and incompetent officials who occupy key leadership position. Terence Nombembe, 'The AG's comments on the provinces', *Politicsweb*, 23 July 2012. <<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=314323&sn=Detail&pid=71654>> (27 June 2014).

racialised nature of poverty in South Africa, black African and coloured households suffering higher levels of inequality of opportunity when compared to demographic groups given the relationship between race and poverty in the country (World Bank 2018: 38).

In this context, the #FeesMustFall movement highlighted that university spaces recreate the patterns of apartheid's racialised poverty, inequality and exclusion through the exorbitant costs of higher education, and by marginalising black voices and experiences in post-apartheid South Africa. In other words, South African universities perpetuate *inequality of opportunity*; this even though universities play a central role in facilitating *equality of opportunity* for social mobility through diversifying and increasing a middle-class structure. Democratic consolidation is dependent on creating *equality in opportunity* where everyone is afforded the same chance to advance socially and economically, regardless of the *lottery of birth*. In the South African context, universities are mandated to play an active role in levelling the race-based inequality playing field by dismantling the political, ideological, social, and economic legacies of the apartheid system (Reddy 2006: 122).

The narratives of #FeesMustFall stress a form of anaemic freedom found in continued inequality of opportunity that undermines meaningful societal transformation. It is in this context that the chapter assesses perceptions of students' belief in whether their *lives are indeed better* in a post-apartheid context. I first present an overview of the relationship between social mobility and deepening democracy as central to facilitate equality of opportunity. This is followed by an overview of an *illusion of freedom* as narrated by #FeesMustFall to demonstrate how continued inequality of opportunity finds expression in student views. I then provide an overview of the sample and research methodology to discuss the key findings on whether students' believe there is indeed *a better life for all* in post-apartheid South Africa.

2 Equalising Society: Social mobility, Political Efficacy and Deepening Democracy

Conventional wisdom in democratisation studies constructs democratic regime performance as an essential element in developing legitimation for the new democracy (Ethier 1990; Diamond 1999; Schneider & Schmitter 2004; Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri & Tessler 2008; Diamond 1996: 33–34). This democratic legitimation can only be built on the basis of effective state capacity to deliver on the hopes and aspirations of citizens for a better life and a transformed social structure. This implies that through delivering on the promise of a better

life and improving the material conditions of citizens (most notably those excluded under authoritarian rule) the state will facilitate intrinsic democratic support, as people evaluate the democratic regime in a positive light as life improves under democratic rule (Ethier 1990: 15–16).

Universities are generally regarded as a key catalyst of social change (Brennan, King & Lebeau 2015: 17; Reddy 2006). From a democratisation perspective, universities need to facilitate upward social mobility, especially for those excluded under the authoritarian regime, not just to increase, but also to diversify the middle-class strata in society. Central to social mobility is equality of opportunity where, regardless of class, ethnicity, or gender, a person is afforded an equal chance to access higher education. This implies that the quality of education is the same, that people have equal and sufficient access to basic services, and that all have equal access to quality health care.

Reddy (2006: 122) also notes that in a post-apartheid context, South African universities have a transformative mandate for economic emancipation. Universities must ensure that student populations would be diverse to ensure that those previously excluded would be afforded the opportunity to access and successfully complete higher education. This, in turn, would work towards reducing racialised patterns of socio-economic inequality that entrenches inequality of opportunity.

The importance of the need for universities to produce a highly skilled labour force cannot be understated in terms of democratic sustainability. For democracies to endure, one requires “economic development, producing increased income, greater economic security and widespread higher education”. This, in turn, “largely determines the ‘class struggle’ by permitting those in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist view of politics” while “increased wealth affects the political role of the middle class by changing the shape of stratification from an elongated pyramid, with a lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class” (Lipset cited in Özbud 2005: 98). Therefore, in unpacking the role of universities in transforming societies, questions of who gets into university, what is taught, and whether this has impact on employment and status, are key points of reflection (Brennan, King & Lebeau 2004: 17).

Higher education is a gateway to a better life characterised by status; yet access to education in South Africa is not equal as ‘some social groups are more likely to participate in higher education than others’ (Brennan, King & Lebeau 2005: 17). In other words, inequality of opportunity entrenches what Brennan, King and Lebeau (2005: 17) refer to as the ‘disadvantage gap’, where those who were traditionally excluded from higher education remain at the periphery of being able to access a tertiary qualification. Furthermore, Brennan, King and

Lebeau stipulate that universities may express some resistance to a transformative agenda through non-engagement with the process, and thereby preserve a student profile that still mirrors historic inequalities and structures (Brennan, King & Lebeau 2005: 17).

Inclusiveness is a key element for deepening democracy and for societal transformation, although it is often limited to political, economic, cultural and social life. However, one also must pay attention to the inclusiveness in university spaces, and specifically whose knowledge is included in university curricula. This would include what is being taught in the classroom. Here Brennan, King and Lebeau (2005: 17–18) draw attention to questions of *what gets taught* when looking at universities as facilitators of social transformation:

The role of universities in labelling particular aspects of knowledge as valuable enough to be investigated, passed on to others, and preserved for future generations may be at the heart of the questions about the impact of universities. Certainly, it has profound implications for the contribution of universities to change ... we do know ... that different academic subjects and forms of curriculum organisation produce different kinds of people ... If academic disciplines are essentially 'ways of life' involving indistinguishable world views and values, then curriculum questions become essential questions of the kinds of people educational institutions produce, and, it could be argued, need to produce in order to meet a variety of cultural, economic, political and social needs.

Curriculum therefore matters, as it emphasises whose knowledge is important in a multicultural democratising context. This becomes an important consideration when one considers who goes to university and what is being taught at university. Democratising and transformative spaces need new democratic values of inclusiveness, tolerance, and equality (note: not equity) to germinate. Societal equity can be generated as larger numbers of the previously excluded access university education and, consequently, the professional job market. But equality would require that the knowledge and skills they obtain also recognise diverse forms of knowledge for advancing inclusiveness under democratic rule.

3 **The Illusion of Freedom: The #FeesMustFall narrative**

The apartheid state was built on a discriminatory and racist ideology that completely disempowered black South Africans politically, economically,

culturally, and socially. It acted as a vanguard for white interests that effectively created a society of white privilege and advancement at the cost of empowering black South Africans. Through the Bantu Education Act of 1953, for example, the apartheid state laid the foundation for inferior and separate education for black African people, based on the racist notion that black Africans could only be educated in accordance with the opportunities afforded to them in this system of race-based exclusion (Steyn Kotze 2015). The effect of Bantu Education, a gross human rights violation according to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was the destruction of missionary schools through cutting much needed funding and under-skilling generations of black African children, effectively excluding them from skilled labour (Steyn Kotze 2015). The liberation struggle was fought to secure political liberties, human dignity, and socio-economic advancement for ALL South Africans.

As South Africa's historic negotiations that ushered in democracy ended, the ANC (1993) presented its vision for South Africa in the *Ready to Govern* document. The post-apartheid political project was (1) to advance the rights of all South Africans, regardless of race and gender; (2) to engage in progressive and principled policies to dismantle inequality and injustice created by colonialism and the apartheid state; (3) to develop a sustainable economy and state infrastructure that will improve the quality of life of all South Africans; and (4) create a sense that South Africa belongs to all and to promote a sense of common loyalty and pride underpinned by a universal sense of freedom and security (African National Congress 1993). Thus, a new South Africa would be founded on the principles of equality of opportunity for all and the state had a moral duty to dismantle the structures of inequality of opportunity to create a socially just society.

The ANC linked economic empowerment and transformation in order to achieve the complete liberation and meaningful social transformation of post-apartheid South Africa (African National Congress 1993). The underlying sense, it seems, was that by virtue of generating economic equality through economic development with strong state capacity and political efficacy, South Africans would find a renewed sense of nationhood in the context of reducing racialised inequality and poverty, as a new multi-racial class structure was engineered. The National Democratic Revolution became the political project of the new post-apartheid social contract to advance democracy and meaningful social transformation. This revolution would work to advance a political project of creating a "united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society" which would entail the "liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general from political and economic bondage" (African National Congress 2000). For the

ANC, this meant uplifting those in poverty and improving the quality of life of all (African National Congress 2000).

By 2015, however, students under the banner of various hashtag movements like #RhodesMustFall, #TransformWits, #OpenStellenbosch, and later on #FeesMustFall, presented a macro-narrative of inequality, exclusion and repression that characterises post-apartheid society. They brought forth political narratives contesting inclusion, belonging, marginalisation, and exclusion. Students involved in these movements had started a conversation on the nature and experiences of post-apartheid citizenship, and more importantly, how a lack of meaningful economic and social transformation continues to subject black students to apartheid economic oppression. This is evident in the imagery and slogans of the hashtag movements, such as “the Rainbow Nation is a White Lie built on Black Pain”,⁶ which entails black assimilation of “white culture and knowledge” at the cost of true freedom and the complete humanity of black people (The Free Black 2016; Chikane 2015).

At the core of the Fallist narrative is a sense that, while the post-apartheid era was meant to usher in a new future of inclusion through social and economic transformation, the political project of transformation continues to violently repress those who were excluded during apartheid in the first place. For them, the notion of a “rainbow nation” as a political project serves to mask this assault on black identity and psyche: “land dispossession, poverty, the disempowering public education system, rampant unemployment, and unequal wealth distribution” characterise the lived experience of those who had suffered the most under the brutal hand of apartheid; those who were supposed to benefit from a new political era as the beneficiaries of societal transformation for inclusive citizenship (Dlakavu cited in Pillay n.d.). For some, like Msimang (2016), these movements may have shattered the illusion of the rainbow nation, thus bringing about the symbolic *end of the rainbow*, where we find *equality on paper*. But this freedom only works for those who have means:

This democracy of ours facilitates a pre-paid freedom. It is a pay as you go system of democracy and the majority of people in this country simply cannot afford to pay. If you can pay, you can afford a good education. If you can pay, the law will work for you. If you can pay, you can live in a safe and clean neighbourhood. If you can pay, you can eat healthy food. If you can pay, you can get quality health care. The list goes on. KUNENE 2017

6 See <http://kaganof.com/kagablog/category/categories/politics/page/2/>.

The narratives that underpin #FeesMustFall, #RhodesMustFall, and #OpenStellenbosch point to a call for substantive transformation or deeper social change as *nothing much has changed under democratic rule*. Their narratives call for one to rethink the university space and its broader role in societal transformation, as well as the broader societal mandate which is undermined by issues of access and the cost of getting into university, and by default (through university education) escaping a life of poverty. This sense of *we remain oppressed* is palpable on university campuses, not only in terms of what is being taught, but also who can access higher education and, more importantly, who eventually drops out and cannot finish their degree.

For Davids and Waghid (2016), the core issue that underpins the narratives of #FeesMustFall is the *inequality grip* where universities have not sufficiently worked to engage in deeper societal transformation. On the one hand, there is a demand for free quality higher education, and on the other hand, the expectation of complete decolonisation of the university curriculum to create an African public university. These two demands essentially contest the nature of the post-apartheid nation-building project and point to a failure to generate a “new” civic nationalism as envisaged at the dawn of South Africa’s democracy. Racialised patterns of poverty and inequality relegate the black population to the economic periphery. This, coupled with a sense that universities value “white knowledge and superiority”, culminated in the creation of a narrative of divided citizenship, where black identity, values, culture, and knowledge remain marginalised. Consider, for example, the following view held by Thato Magono, a Fees Must Fall leader interviewed by Bauer (2016):

Those most marginally affected by the oppressive system of capitalism must come together to fight. It cannot happen in individual pockets ... otherwise we will never get the victories ... The students have been fighting against fees every year since our democracy has come into effect twenty-one years ago. It is only now that we understand the fact that those oppressed and marginalised by the system can work together to have some protected and meaningful systemic change. This year we are coming back to say that there should not be any students excluded from university because they cannot afford to pay the fees ... We are continuing to allow education to be accessible only to the elite ... As a movement we are committed to the notion of the African public university. This university is built on four pillars: the understanding of intersectionality, the understanding of an African epistemological curriculum, the understanding of black academia-led institutions, and the understanding that the university space itself needs to reflect the continent that it does its

business in. This notion of intersectionality means that we come to these spaces with different identities; however, our blackness is a unifying factor. So none of us should ever be discounted in our liberation of these spaces. The second one, the African epistemological curriculum, means that it's not good enough anymore that twenty-one years later we still continuously have a curriculum that centres European and American schools of thought. There is enough post-colonial, pre-colonial, and even colonial scholarship that speaks to a different way of entering schools of thought than what is the norm. This supremacist idea of whiteness and western modernity is something that needs to come to an end and something we need to push as a movement. From the academic perspective it is disheartening that in a country where 88% of the population is black, only 3% of Ph.D. holders are black. Institutions of higher learning need to do more to develop and retain black academic talent and produce these scholars. That has not happened over the past 21 years because we have always believed that transformation would take care of itself, but I think what we realise is that the condition of blackness is so precarious that a black student cannot afford the 10 years that it takes to complete an undergraduate degree to a Ph.D. degree.

Issues of access and facilitating access for South Africa's poor, who are primarily black, is essential in facilitating a deeper sense of social change and transformation. But, it is not just facilitating access to higher education for South Africa's black poor, but also ensuring that universities are decolonised and inclusive of African knowledge, ideas, and *ways of knowing* (Shay 2015). For the #FeesMustFall movement, education must become a tool for liberation; not just economically, but socially, psychologically and culturally (Disemelo 2016). It entails interrogating the *spatiality of transformation* that extends beyond just societal change in terms of recreating a middle-class structure by numbers only. Transformation and societal change require a deeper commitment to reimagining new societal values, a new knowledge, and a new citizenship for an inclusive post-apartheid social reality. Merely increasing the numbers of black students, as #FeesMustFall argue, will not effectively deal with the sense of deep-rooted marginalisation, exclusion and oppression perpetuated in what they see as systemic exclusion and oppression based on race.

4 Research Method and Sample

South Africa's first democratic generation is colloquially referred to as the "Born Frees", and the irony is not lost if we consider the narrative of #FeesMustFall.

The use of the term “Born Free” is not without controversy. For example, Friedman (2013) highlights that the biggest problem with the construction of the Born Free factor is that commentators assume that they are truly free, as they never experienced apartheid realities expressed through the perpetual nature of racialised poverty and inequality. Mattes (2011) constructs the Born Free generation as those who became politically mature (at the age of 16) from 1997 onwards. For Mattes, the Born Free generation is thus inclusive of those who lived through and can remember the transition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the birth of the new Constitution in 1996. For the purposes of this research project we delimited the “Born Free” generation as people who had grown up exclusively under the democratic order and in the context of ANC electoral dominance. In the context of this chapter, therefore, the Born Frees are constructed as youth who had reached adulthood and matured politically under democratic rule and ANC dominance, but also experience the lived apartheid legacies of poverty and inequality in a democratic context. They were thus born between 1990 and 1994, being between the ages of 18 and 26 years old.

Between 2013 and 2016 we collected 1,910 completed questionnaires at six South African universities. These are the University of Fort Hare, the University of the Free State, the University of Stellenbosch, Rhodes University, the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. These institutions were all affected by #FeesMustFall protests in 2015 and 2016 and witnessed much violence and destruction in the latter part of 2016 (Pather 2016a) when #FeesMustFall shut down university campuses following the Ministry of Higher Education and Training’s announcement of fee increases for the 2017 academic year (Pather 2016b). The 2016 students’ protests precluded further data collection at three additional universities, namely the University of the Western Cape, University of Pretoria, and the University of Limpopo that were identified to form part of the sample. The study used a convenience sampling method. Using research assistants at the different universities, lecturers from all the faculties were asked to allow the research assistants a portion of their lecture time for the students across all year levels at predominantly undergraduate level to complete the questionnaire in order to generate a representative sample. Various faculties made a few of their classes available to allow students to complete the survey. This included the faculties of arts, sciences, economics, health sciences, and humanities and social sciences. The sample is thus inclusive of future lawyers, journalists, civil servants, architects, accountants, artists and designers, and scientists. As universities are mandated to play a central role in upward mobility and transformation in South Africa, it is worthy to note that it is very likely that a significant number of the students sampled would have come from the lower and working class strata on the government initiated National Financial Students Assistance Scheme (NFSAS).




FIGURE 12.1 Number of respondents per participating university

The participating institutions are representative of the traditional map of South African universities in terms of being classified as English, Afrikaans, and black institutions. The sample includes two traditionally English institutions (Rhodes University and the University of KwaZulu-Natal), three traditionally Afrikaans institutions (University of the Free State, NMMU [formerly the University of Port Elizabeth], and Stellenbosch University), and two traditionally black universities (University of Fort Hare and NMMU Missionvale [formerly Vista University, Port Elizabeth Campus]).

The racial breakdown of the sample is reflected in figure 12.2. There is variance in the number of total enrolments between 2013 and 2016, the period of data collection. In 2013 the total headcount of enrolments at South African universities was 983,698. In 2014 this number declined to 969,154 and by 2015 increased to 982,212 (StatsSA 2016). It is thus difficult to ascertain what the exact racial profile of university students was during the period of data collection, as the available data from the Council of Higher Education in South Africa only presents data up to the year 2013. The sample, however, was representative of the racial demography at participating institutions.

The age and gender distribution of the sample are presented in Figure 12.3 and Figure 12.4. The majority of the participants were between 19 and 20 years of age. Figure 12.4 shows that most of the participants were female (approximately 60%) while male participants constituted approximately 34% of the sample. While the sample may appear to be skewed toward females, StatsSA (2016) found that post-secondary attendance is higher among females and that “females also tend to enter into post-secondary education at a much earlier age than males”. In addition to this, in 2013 the number of females accessing higher




FIGURE 12.2 Racial composition of the sample




FIGURE 12.3 Age profile of the sample

education was 58% compared to 42% of males (Council of Higher Education South Africa 2013). While this is a positive development in terms of gender equity in accessing higher education, the Council of Higher Education (2013) stressed that female participation in higher education is higher at undergraduate and honours level, but at Masters and PhD level there are more men than women.

The methodology employed in this study was essentially quantitative in nature. The survey data, comprising of both closed- and open-ended questions,




FIGURE 12.4 Gender distribution of the sample

were analysed with the aid of data analysis software. The closed-ended questions, largely drawn from the HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (2004), were analysed using SPSS software to generate descriptive statistics.

5 Has the ANC Delivered a Better Life?

The question of whether the ANC has delivered a better life for all remains a contentious one in South Africa (Steyn Kotze 2016). The answer to this question depends on who you talk to. For some, the ANC has indeed delivered on its promise of freedom and a better life, as evidenced in the number of people who now have access to basic services, and the growth of a multiracial middle class (Biko 2013: 1). For others, however, life under ANC rule has not delivered a better life, but merely reproduced patterns of dependency where a few may have plucked the economic fruits of freedom, but the large majority still live in squalor, and are dependent on government grants and social welfare (Biko 2013: viii–xi). The broader political narratives of whether the ANC has indeed produced a better life and the much coveted promise of freedom from 1994 is framed in two different schemata: one of liberation and one of continued oppression. Noting the macro-themes of #FeesMustFall, the student movement presented a narrative of continued oppression, as freedom remains incomplete and elusive. The lived reality of racialised poverty and inequality had not necessarily disappeared like the proverbial mist when democracy dawned in South Africa.

Given this contested narrative, we were interested in assessing whether students, who are the beneficiaries of this dream of freedom, feel that the ANC had done enough to deal with poverty and equality in South Africa. Students were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement that *the ANC has done enough to deal with the major challenges in South Africa* (see figure 12.5). These challenges are generally constructed as the curse of the triple challenges of racialised poverty, inequality, and unemployment (Marais 2011). The question specifically asks whether the ANC – as opposed to the government – has done enough. This is because the ANC has been the ruling party since the inception of democracy and has pursued its policy agenda over the previous 22 years of democracy in South Africa. Voters may not necessarily draw a distinction between government and the ANC, and also construct their support for the ANC on the notion of liberation (Steyn Kotze & Prevost 2015).

Figure 12.5 demonstrates that the large majority of the sample does not feel that the ANC has done enough to deal with the major challenges in South Africa. Only 23% of students sampled indicated that they agree that the ANC has indeed done enough to deal with South Africa's challenges, while 60% felt that the ANC had not done enough. Table 12.1 presents the breakdown of responses to this question based on race.

Table 12.1 demonstrates that most participants across all racial groups felt that the ANC had not done enough to deal with major challenges in South




FIGURE 12.5 Perceptions: The ANC has done enough to deal with major challenges in South Africa

TABLE 12.1 Cross tabulation Race: The ANC has done enough to deal with major challenges in South Africa⁷

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Strongly Agree	9%	2%	3%	2%
Agree	23%	17%	3%	5%
Neither/Nor	19%	17%	10%	7%
Disagree	28%	28%	43%	43%
Strongly Disagree	19%	38%	40%	51%
Did not Answer/ Missing	2%	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 12.2 Descriptive Statistics: The ANC has done enough to deal with the major challenges in South Africa⁸

Race group	N	Mean	Std. deviation	95% confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Black African	1122	3.26	1.336	3.18	3.34
Coloured	188	3.81	1.154	3.64	3.97
White	482	4.28	0.951	4.19	4.37

Africa. A higher proportion of black African participants (32%) agreed that the ANC had done enough to deal with South Africa's major challenges, compared to 19% of coloured participants and 6% of white and Indian/Asian participants.

Table 12.2 presents the descriptive statistics for participants on the perception of whether the ANC has done enough to deal with the major challenges in South Africa. Even though most of the participants disagreed with the statement that the ANC had done enough to deal with South Africa's challenges, there are statistically significant variances between the views held by black African and white and coloured and white South African students.

⁷ Figures were rounded up.

⁸ Response options to this question used a 5-point Likert scale as follows: 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither/Nor, 4 = Disagree, and 5 = Strongly Disagree

Table 12.3, which provides the T-Test for Equality of means, demonstrates that white participants hold more negative views on the question of whether the ANC has done enough to deal with the major challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, while there are statistically significant differences among the respondents based on race, one may observe variances that indicate higher degrees of negativity among white and coloured participants. The variance in views among different race groups may be rooted in the narrative of social welfare and basic service delivery, especially in South Africa's township

TABLE 12.3 T-Test for Equality of Means: The ANC has done enough to deal with the major challenges in South Africa⁹

Black African and coloured participants	95% confidence interval of the difference			
	Equal variances not assumed	Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	-5.886	-0.548	-0.732	-0.365
df.	278.012			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0.000			
Black African and White participants	Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound	
t	-17.320	-1.020	-1.135	-0.904
df.	1254.750			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0.000			
Coloured and White participants	Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound	
t	-4.981	-0.472	-0.658	-0.285
df.	291.254			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0.000			

⁹ The Indian/Asian population is excluded from this analysis as the sample size is too small. Levene's test for equality of variance was significant in all cases.

communities. For example, in narrating why respondents supported the ANC, some participants noted that:

I vote for the ANC as it is because of the ANC that I am at university today.

Because ANC has been making an effort in terms of granting the elderly and orphaned children grants to survive on and the progress of the building of RDP houses in poor townships.

ANC leaders improve a lot in my society in terms of infrastructure and food parcels.

Provision and expansion of social welfare, representing the interests of the previously disadvantaged, and the continued political project of transformation formed the foundation on why participants supported the ANC (Steyn Kotze & Prevost 2015: 156–164) and could inform the view that the ANC has done enough to deal with South Africa's major challenges. Comparatively, white participants express a sense of exclusion in that they do not get the "benefits" of citizenship (Steyn Kotze & Prevost 2017) in a post-apartheid South Africa:

Because if you are not black it is harder for the rest of us to get jobs, enter a university or get student loans.

...the ANC does so much to empower black people that white people are unfairly disadvantaged.

This sense of exclusion could inform the view that the ANC had not done enough to deal with South Africa's major challenges given that there is a sense of exclusion among white participants. This negativity also finds expression in views on whether race relations had improved or not in post-apartheid South Africa (Steyn Kotze & Prevost 2017).

Regarding the view that the post-apartheid order provides merely an empty shell of political freedom given persistent patterns of racialised inequality and poverty, we wanted to know whether participants believed that the quality of their lives and that of their families had improved since the dawn of democracy in 1994. This is an important question, as it speaks to perceptions of inclusiveness and the extent to which democracy delivered on the expectation of a *better life for all*, especially if we consider the potential benefit of higher education in facilitating social mobility for students enrolled at higher education institutions.




FIGURE 12.6 Perceptions: The Quality of my life and that of my family has improved since 1994

TABLE 12.4 Cross tabulation Race: The quality of my and my family’s life has improved since 1994

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Strongly Agree	17%	11%	7%	6%
Agree	42%	48%	50%	26%
Neither/Nor	19%	26%	30%	34%
Disagree	11%	12%	7%	19%
Strongly Disagree	7%	2%	7%	13%
Did not Answer/ Missing	4%	1%	0%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 12.6 demonstrates that most participants (53%) felt that their quality of life and that of their families had improved since 1994, while 21% disagreed that their quality of life and that of their families had improved. Table 12.4 presents the cross tabulation of responses based on race.

Table 12.4 demonstrates that the majority of black African (59%) and coloured (59%) respondents agreed that their lives and that of their families had indeed improved since 1994. 32% of white participants had indicated that their lives and that of their families had not improved since 1994, while 32% agreed with the statement and 34% indicated a neither/nor response.

TABLE 12.5 Descriptive statistics: My quality of life and that of my family has improved since 1994¹⁰

Race group	N	Mean	Std. deviation	95% confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Black African	1122	2.53	1.280	2.46	2.61
Coloured	188	2.46	0.961	2.32	2.60
White	482	3.11	1.154	3.00	3.21

Table 12.5 presents the descriptive statistics for participants on the perception of whether their lives had improved since 1994.

One notes that the mean scores for black African and coloured participants are closer to one another than that of white participants. Black African and coloured participants seem to be closer to the “agree” option that their lives and that of their families had indeed improved since 1994. White participants are within the “neither/nor” range, but closer to the “agree” option as opposed to the “disagree” option.

Table 12.6 presents the results of a t-test for Equality of Means. One notes variances which are statistically significant in the views of university students on whether their quality of life and that of their families had improved based on race; with the greatest variance being between black African and white and between white and coloured participants.

Do students believe that compared to their parents at the same age their quality of life is better? This is also an important question given the view that the onset of democracy had brought political freedom, but substantive social transformation has not necessarily materialised for the new citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa.

Figure 12.7 demonstrates that most participants (72%) agreed that their quality of life is better when compared to their parents at the same age. 15% felt that they are worse off than their parents at the same age, while 13% indicated that there is no difference. Table 12.7 presents the cross tabulation of the responses based on race group.

Table 12.7 demonstrates that an overwhelming proportion of black African participants feel that their quality of life is better when compared to that of

¹⁰ Response options to this question used a 5-point Lickert scale as follows: 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither/Nor, 4 = Disagree, and 5 = Strongly Disagree

TABLE 12.6 Independent T-Test: The quality of my life and that of my family has improved since 1994¹¹

Black African and coloured participants		95% confidence interval of the difference		
	Equal variances not assumed	Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	0,846	0,068	-0,090	0,225
df.	310,012			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0.398			
Black African and White participants		Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	-8.890	0.578	-0.705	-0.450
df.	1003.335			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0.000			
Coloured and White participants		Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	-7.363	-0,645	-0,817	-0,473
df.	406.412			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0.000			

their parents at the same age. Approximately 80% of black African and coloured participants agreed that their quality of life is better than their parents at the same age, while 63% of Indian/Asian and 47% of white participants agreed with the statement. Comparatively, white and Indian/Asian participants seem to be more negative regarding their quality of life compared to their parents at the same age, with 32% and 13% respectively disagreeing with the statement. 7% of black African participants disagreed with the statement while 8% of coloured participants also felt that this is not true for them.

¹¹ The Indian/Asian population is excluded from this analysis as the sample size is too small. Levene's test for equality of variance was significant in all cases.




FIGURE 12.7 Compared to my parents at the same age, my quality of life is better than theirs

TABLE 12.7 Cross tabulation Race: Compared to my parents at the same age, my quality of life is better

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Strongly Agree	42%	40%	40%	14%
Agree	37%	40%	23%	33%
Neither/Nor	9%	12%	23%	20%
Disagree	4%	4%	0%	20%
Strongly Disagree	4%	2%	13%	12%
Did not Answer/Missing	4%	1%	0%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 12.8 presents the mean scores of participants based on race. One notes that the mean scores for black African and coloured participants are closer to the agree option, while the mean score for white participants, although in the range of “agree”, is also closer to the “neither/nor” view. Table 12.9 presents the results for a t-test of the Equality of Means based on race group.

Table 12.9 demonstrates that the variance in the views between black African and coloured students is not statistically significant. The variance between the views of white and coloured, and white and black African students are however statistically significant, indicating that white students may hold more negative views on the quality of their lives compared to their parents at the same age.

TABLE 12.8 Descriptive Statistics: Compared to my parents at the same age, my quality of life is better¹²

Race group	N	Mean	Std. deviation	95% confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Black African	1122	1.96	1.247	1.81	2.03
Coloured	188	1.88	0.990	1.74	2.03
White	482	2.87	1.281	2.75	2.98

This finding is not surprising given that white students have expressed a view that they are victims of “reverse discrimination” and “economic exclusion” due to Affirmative Action policies that prioritises the appointment of black South Africans in various employment opportunities. For example, some participants noted that:

Instead of now whites monopolising race territory, it has only been flipped. Blacks has[sic] the monopoly and all other races are a by-product, being enslaved by the idea that they do not matter, only black lives.

The apartheid excuse is always being used by the black people and some are far too young to understand what happened back then. Stop them from using it as an excuse for those that only breed more hate... State that apartheid is history and remove this stupid BEE or BBBEE, because this is causing so much hate. And, stop the killing of white farmers.

[It's] reverse apartheid now.

Apartheid have improved for most black people because one sees black people holding high positions in their work place, because of the BEE act. But, with this in mind, apartheid is alive which are affecting white people.

I think we've made progress from apartheid. But our country still has enormous racial tensions. Current government policy is based on racial

¹² Response options to this question used a 5-point Lickert scale as follows: 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither/Nor, 4 = Disagree, and 5 = Strongly Disagree

TABLE 12.9 T-Test: Compared to my parents at the same age, my quality of life is better¹³

Black African and coloured participants		95% confidence interval of the difference		
	Equal variances not assumed	Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	0,881	0,072	-0,088	0,231
df.	296,024			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0,379			
Black African and White participants		Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	-13,362	-0,915	-1,051	-0,779
df.	889,268			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0,000			
Coloured and White participants		Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound
t	-10,624	-0,986	-1,169	-0,804
df.	437,985			
Sig. (2-Tailed)	0,000			

bias. Racial quotas infiltrate policies for job opportunities. Study opportunities and much of civilian life is infiltrated by racism... Racial quotas should be done away with.

Concomitantly, black participants stated that white supremacy finds expression in the ownership of wealth and white privilege. Here they stated that:

As must as there is no laws which entrench discrimination and segregation in our country, there is still a large gap between the poor and the rich. This amounts to social and economic discrimination/segregation. The rich remain mostly the white minority with privileged backgrounds. They are the minority, but still have power and wealth.

¹³ The Indian/Asian population is excluded from this analysis as the sample size is too small.

Racial divides are still prevalent in our society, although it's not as pronounced as in the apartheid era. Black people are still marginalised regarding the economy. There is still superiority and inferiority complex attributed to white and black people respectively.

Because blacks, coloured, and Indians are still seen as inferior and, especially at workplaces whereby blacks, coloureds, and Indians are oppressed by whites. Also, us blacks are still not at that point of forgetting the past and moving on. That is why we are always against change introduced to us by whites, because we still have that mindset that they are trying to oppress us.

Because still the "blacks" are disadvantaged in many ways. White and other races still dominating [them]. Even when you go up to the suburbs, you will find that only those so-called rich blacks are there, but the rest is white people, while black people suffer the most.

Even though I was born after apartheid, I still feel less important because I'm black and resources are limited when compared to white people.

...In all honestly, us blacks are still worst off, and the white people have kept the power (money). To truly be liberated we need to be financially strong and blacks are still poor.

Whites and coloureds still look down at blacks. They strongly believe that we don't have a potential to do great things.

In unpacking the political discourse of race, one must acknowledge that because political realities are very often constructed, one has to firstly identify the type of political knowledge a group holds. This knowledge is very often constructed based on the particular experience of individuals and groups, which in turn structures the emotional affect which influences group thinking around particular political issues and decisions (Dolan & Holbrook 2001: 27). Models that structure social perceptions and actions based on mental representations of particular events or actions determine the political cognition of reality (Van Dijk 1994: 110–111). In this sense, effect may dominate political thinking and lead to *wishful thinking* where people tend to mould their perceptions of political reality into a frame that fits those perceptions (Dolan & Holbrook 2001: 27).

In this sense, we find that both black and white respondents mould their assessment of quality of life and narratives on inequality within the racial prism. A Durkheimian collective consciousness of race facilitates narratives of freedom/oppression, inclusion/exclusion, and superiority/inferiority based on the experience of socio-political reality. This creates a sense of “we-ness ... stressing similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo 1997: 386).

By virtue of being united in whiteness, for example, sharing the experience of exclusion based on Affirmative Action policies and their construction as the “oppressor”, the collective consciousness of white participants may be one that reflects a narrative of exclusion as opposed to privilege. Similarly, the we-ness of a collective consciousness of blackness and the experience of continued racialised poverty and inequality facilitates the narratives that life has not improved because of white privilege, but more importantly, white economic ownership, an assertion that Mbeki (2016) challenges. Due to perhaps high levels of intergroup distrust, we find that black participants present a view that white students continue to be the oppressor because of a desire to oppress them, both psychologically (through white privilege) and economically (by not *sharing the wealth to which they are not entitled to in the first place*).

The collective consciousness of the first post-apartheid generation university students mirrors the divisions, fears, exclusions, and societal constructions associated with an apartheid society (Steyn Kotze & Prevost 2017). This does not bode well for the broader role of the university in facilitating societal transformation and social cohesion, as well as for the deepening of democracy. It also demonstrates that although the opportunity for social mobility exists, racialised inequality undermines the ability of black students to fully take advantage of these opportunities due to a lack of finance or a lack of academic support. Participants across all race groups stressed the necessity of equal quality education for all, and not just in former white schools (known as Model C schools), for equality of outcome in order to create equality of opportunity.

6 Conclusion

Has the ANC done enough to facilitate societal transformation and deal with South Africa’s challenges for meaningful social change? At a glance, it would seem the answer is not really. Participants generally disagreed that the ANC had done enough to deal with South Africa’s challenges of poverty, inequality,

and unemployment. However, questions on quality of life highlight that there is a view that life had indeed improved, most notably for black participants. This may be attributed to a sense of possessing full political rights and inclusion as citizens of South Africa, something that was denied to black South Africans during the apartheid era. This may also explain why an overwhelming majority of black participants felt that their quality of life is indeed better than their parents' at the same age.

However, the narratives evident in the interview questions also point to feelings of continued oppression and exclusion based on a sense of economic exclusion and racialised poverty and inequality, issues that #FeesMustFall and other hashtag movements like #RhodesMustFall and #OpenStellenbosch have brought to the fore in the public debate. This sense of exclusion may facilitate a view of continued oppression, and the construction of white economic wealth and superiority as the core issues around the lack of societal transformation. However, one also needs to consider the roles that a lack of political efficacy and high levels of corruption within the realm of the South African state play in undermining societal transformation. Racialised patterns of poverty and inequality are thus seen as a violent assault on black identity in that there is a lack of equality of opportunity and equality of outcome when accessing public goods like education. It is this violent assault that may create the feeling that black oppression remains a post-apartheid reality. White participants held more negative views on questions of whether their lives had improved since 1994. This may be rooted in a sense of marginalisation and economic exclusion based on affirmative action policies.

It would seem that both groups face similar concerns and challenges in terms of the fear of economic exclusion, a sense of marginalisation, and the belief that they are being oppressed. As the beneficiaries of the Promise of Freedom of 1994, their political realities do not reflect the aspirations implicit in the idea of a *Rainbow Nation*. It is, rather, an *empty promise of freedom*. One cannot negate the importance of higher education in facilitating societal transformation through who accesses higher education and what is being taught. It may perhaps be time for South African students to listen to one another's views on their experiences as the "born free" beneficiaries of the dream of a *better life*. This would include their collective struggles on finance, accessing higher education, and curricula. Deeper social change can only be facilitated if the future generations are able to find a common ground from which to push for change for meaningful societal transformation. And hold governments who cannot deliver on their vision of what a transformed and free society would entail accountable.

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Racialised Heritage in Post-apartheid South Africa: *The Paul Kruger Statue in Pretoria*

Luvuyo Dondolo

1 Introduction

In South Africa, space, period and context have over different historical eras been the frames of racism. The entry point for racism in this country was the historical process of European colonialism that ended when all the indigenous peoples of the territory had been brought under white rule. This process began with the establishment of a trading station in the present-day Western Cape Province by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, and was followed by the increasing subjugation of indigenous people in the province in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Dutch settlers, the British conquest of African societies in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces during the eighteenth century, and the subjugation of African communities in the north of the country and the formation of the Boer Republics in the nineteenth century. The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 brought all these colonised territories into one Union under colonial rule. Thereafter followed a period of self-government, under white rule, that entrenched segregation between the various race groups, and, from 1948, the period of apartheid under Afrikaner rule which saw race as the primary determinant of citizenship.

Central to race politics is the politics of difference and power as underpinned by the text of whiteness that has defined the soul of the “other”. Racism as an ideology, attitude and human experience finds expression in multiple ways, including the heritage landscape. The colonial legacy of racism is still evident today in South Africa’s racialised heritage, which demonstrates the race-based engagement with the past.

The focus in this chapter is on the place of colonial and apartheid monuments such as the Paul Kruger Statue in Pretoria in the post-apartheid heritage landscape. The investigation is located within the social justice and transformation milieus that came sharply into national focus during the #RhodesMustFall campaign at the University of Cape Town and spread to other university campuses in 2015. The defacing of colonial and apartheid statues in 2015 illustrates the complexities of negotiating the past, race politics, reconciliation, nation

building, and social cohesion. By focusing on this racialised heritage, and the politics and poetics of representation, the image and significance of Paul Kruger's statue is examined in the context of the transformative text, reconciliation and nation building enterprise, social justice, and rewriting of history in the democratic era. The Paul Kruger Statue, like the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria, is a symbol of Afrikaner nationalism. It symbolises the sociocultural, political and economic identities which paved the way for the formation of the Boer Republics, the apartheid ideology and the consolidation of racial segregation in South Africa. It is representative of the racialised heritage that continues to exist in post-apartheid South Africa, which can be observed in museums, cultural institutions, and public cultural spaces such as the Church Square heritage precinct in Pretoria.

2 General characteristics of the heritage landscape in apartheid South Africa

Race (or racism) is not just a religious and colonial project, but also a process of formation of political identity. Political identities are also associated with the process of state formation, as can be observed in South Africa during different historical periods. The rise and consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism and the creation of the Boer Republics and the apartheid state are prime examples. The colonial and apartheid projects in South Africa produced and reproduced both race and ethnicity as political identities. This was further entrenched in discourses in texts of race, whiteness and white supremacy. In this context, race as political identity was "imposed through the force of colonial law... imported from European law, called civil law" (Mamdani 2004: 3–5).

The material cultural expression of racism in the form of heritage resources such as memorials is linked to the broader colonial and Afrikaner concepts of nationhood. This meant that the colonial and apartheid heritage resources were privileged at the expense of black African heritage resources, and, consequently, the two cultural geographies become more visible in post-apartheid South Africa. Bombardella and Goodrich depict the inherited heritage landscape as follows:

South Africa's skewed heritage landscape is the result of two practical features of heritage. The first, is the inherited British privileging of material objects of artistic, archaeological or architectural significance. The second is what Depelchin has termed the 'syndrome of discovery'. The term describes the dominant trend in the production of African history

by outsiders. In this mode, truths are discovered according to rules of evidence deriving from broader relations of domination in disciplines that 'deal with social reality from the perspective of the dominant group'.

BOMBARDELLA & GOODRICH 2016: 2

The concept of coloniality helps to bring understanding and provides context for the inherited British and Afrikaner heritage and the phenomenon of 'discovery' in South Africa. The inscription of the colonial and apartheid memory on South African heritage landscapes include geographical places – towns, cities and streets – naming of buildings, national holidays and erection of statues such as the Paul Kruger Statue and monuments such as the Voortrekker Monument, amongst others. The memorialisation of individuals who played a prominent role in the colonisation of South Africa and during the apartheid era also takes several forms, most importantly in the names of cities, towns, streets, buildings and parks, which is evident in the post-apartheid South African landscape.

Both British and Afrikaner heritage dominate place nomenclature, public statuary, monumental buildings and the visual arts. They form, nevertheless, separate heritages with little connection between them, serving different and historically opposed communities. Afrikaner heritage was strongly focused upon delimiting and strengthening the solidarity and separateness of the Afrikaner Volk. It depended heavily upon the mythologies associated with the "Great Trek" of the 1830s and 1840s, the commemoration of which was greatly intensified during and after centenaries of its associated events. For instance, the Voortrekker Monument outside Pretoria (now Tshwane), was dedicated on 16 December 1938, the "Day of the Vow", an annual holiday on 16 December during the apartheid era celebrating the covenant between God and the chosen people. The Paarl language monument celebrates the Afrikaans language, which remains closely identified with Afrikaner cultural identity and supremacy, and ultimately with apartheid.

British heritage is less focused upon specific historical events and more upon imperial and monarchical connections, and British economic ascendancy in most of South Africa's mining and commerce. It is mostly evident in urban heritage resources, notably government buildings, Victorian architecture, and in industrial heritage. Except for the addition of some representations of the apartheid leaders, this monumentalisation has essentially survived the democratic transition. The principal common features are the war memorials and battle sites of the Anglo-Boer war of 1881 and 1899–1902 (now known as the South African War), which were, and are jointly interpreted and managed but with significantly different meanings.

The black population was not included in a single pillar as such, but segmented into several groups. Ashworth reasoned:

Their heritage expressions were rigorously excluded from urban identity and were tourist-commodified (under the rubric of a world in one country) in ethnographic museum presentations, or displays of dancing or crafts in the “homelands” and in some townships. The coloured group never possessed a heritage identity clearly distinguished from either “white” or “black”. In Cape Town, it is expressed positively in the inner-city Bo-Kaap. The Indian identity was chiefly marked by mosques and temples, again now tourist-commodified in Durban. This identity, like that of other “non-whites”, was largely excluded from the city centres.

ASHWORTH ET AL. 2007: 171

The Paul Kruger Statue epitomises this cultural dominance. The bronze sculpture of the Boer political and military leader, the founder of the Kruger National Park¹ and the President of the South African Republic from 1883 to 1900, was sculpted in 1896. It was first installed at Prince’s Park, Pretoria West, and then moved to the Pretoria Railway Station. In 1954, it was mounted at Church Square in the Pretoria Central Business District (CBD). Along with Paul Kruger, the sculpture has four unnamed Boer soldiers at the corners below the main plinth. Figure 13.1 is a visual depiction of the statue.

It is no coincidence that this statue was installed in Church Square, and has been there since 1954. The connection to the site is not merely about Afrikaner identity, but also has political connotations. The history and significance of Church Square is multi-layered. Established in 1855, it was originally known as the ‘Market Square’ since it was a marketplace where people from different parts of the city shopped. It was also a home to a church which was engulfed by fire in 1882. On 6 May 1889, Paul Kruger, as the sitting president of the Zuid

1 Towards the turn of the twentieth century, South Africa witnessed the creation of parks. This movement resulted in the forcible removal of many indigenous communities from the areas that were later declared as national parks/reserves. This act was undertaken with race undertones, disrespect of the local’s use of the area, their secret sites, graves and other forms of cultural and historical sites. The local people were pushed out of their ancestral lands. In 1926, after the National Parks Bill was passed, the Kruger National Park was officially opened. The Paul Kruger Statue that sits outside the ‘Paul Kruger gate’ was unveiled in 1976 to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the park. The statue does not just acknowledge the role played by Paul Kruger in the establishment of the Park, but also illustrates the land dispossession and marginalisation of Africans.



FIGURE 13.1 Paul Kruger Statue at Church Square, Pretoria, surrounded by a fence to protect it from vandalism. PHOTOGRAPHER ADZI NEMATANDANI, HSRC

Afrikaanse Republiek (South African Republic), laid the foundation stone of the Raadsaal (Council Chamber) at the south western corner of the historic Church Square. Since then, it has been:

...a home for street performers, a testing ground for artists, a venue for impromptu sermons and a starting point for protests. It also turned into a popular meeting spot.... The square's most prominent feature is the statue of the late Boer leader and president of the South African Republic, Paul Kruger, which sits at its centre and is surrounded by statues of four anonymous Boer soldiers. The Old Capitol Theatre, Tudor Chambers, Ou Raadsaal (Old Council Chamber) and the Palace for Justice where the famous Rivonia trial took place are just some of the historical buildings situated around the square. *IOL NEWS 2017*

The Paul Kruger Statue was installed in Church Square during a process in which the ruling Nationalist Party (NP) was consolidating the power of the Afrikaners after its 1948 election victory, and was engaging in a process of constructing and entrenching an Afrikaner identity linked to a certain conception of the nation ('volk') that found expression in certain public spaces. The statue

was unveiled on 11 October 1954 by Dr D.F. Malan, who led the NP into power in 1948. The unveiling of the statue of the first president of an Afrikaner Republic at a significant public space in the administrative capital of the country by an Afrikaner nationalist president of the white-ruled African country at the time of his retirement has particular significance. It was a symbolic act to celebrate the victory of the Afrikaner and a demonstration of their rule of the whole country and all who lived in it. The statue was unveiled two years after the 1952 Jan van Riebeeck festival, the tri-centennial celebration of the arrival of the 'father' of the Afrikaner nation at the Cape in 1652. This was also a period, as is demonstrated elsewhere in this volume, during which the apartheid government introduced several laws to entrench the separation of the races, intensify economic exploitation of black African people, consolidate white political power, and suppress black opposition.

3 The #Rhodes Must Fall Movement

The #Rhodes Must Fall campaign, which originated at the University of Cape Town, brought into national and international focus the issue of colonial and apartheid statues such as the Rhodes and Paul Kruger statues, amongst others. This movement also exposed the limitations of the government's social cohesion and nation building project that failed to deal with the inherited racialised heritage and understanding of the past.

In 2015, South Africa witnessed the defacing of public statues associated with colonial and apartheid histories. This movement, which was started by the students who demanded the removal of Cecil John Rhodes' statue from the university, spread to other parts of the country and included the defacing of the Gandhi Statue in Johannesburg, the Queen Elizabeth Statue in Port Elizabeth, the Paul Kruger Statue in Pretoria, the Rhodes Statue in Kimberley, and King Edward's Statue in KwaZulu-Natal, to mention a few. The movement also spread to other countries, and included the campaign against Rhodes' grave in Bulawayo and the removal of Gandhi's statute from the University of Ghana.

The #Rhodes Must Fall movement did not merely raise questions about national symbols, nation-building and social cohesion, but, most importantly, it elevated questions about social transformation, South African-ness, and inadequate management of the situation by the South African Heritage Resources Agency, National Heritage Council and Department of Arts and Culture as legitimate custodians of heritage management in the country.

The 'statue must fall' movement has also become part of '#revolution'. The '#revolution' engulfed university campuses throughout the country as it

related to students' financial issues, transformation, racism, and the medium of instruction at universities, particularly Afrikaans. The movement against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in universities such as the University of Pretoria, University of the Free State and Stellenbosch University coincided with the 40th anniversary of the Soweto Uprising against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. This also reflects how far transformation has occurred in the country, or lack thereof.

The movement against colonial and apartheid symbols of memorialisation draws attention to the serious lack of a radical social transformative conceptual framework in post-apartheid South Africa. This points to several factors relating to social transformation and an uncompleted socio-political transition. This phenomenon has been the result of the politics of transition and search for identity and struggle for recognition in post-apartheid South Africa. The movement draws attention to issues of social justice, the democratisation of heritage landscapes, and the complexities of nation building, social cohesion and the fragile and artificial reconciliation project. The racialised heritage landscapes are windows into the past as well as the present state of the nation. The nation needs permanent, sustainable and long-term solutions with a clear social transformation conceptual framework.

4 The contestation over memorials in the United States

South Africa is not unique in terms of contestation over memorials that represent a divided past. The removal of the Durham Statue in the United States in 2017 drew attention to the commemoration of the past, (dis)remembering of the past in the present, the telling and re-telling of the past with its meanings and significance which are a product of racial superiority, texts of whiteness and nationalism, and racialised democracy where whiteness is a ticket to freedom and justice. According to Michael Eric Dyson of the *New York Times*:

The late, great Gore Vidal said that we live in "The United States of Amnesia." Our fatal forgetfulness flares when white bigots come out of their closets.... Such an ungainly assembly of white supremacists rides herd on political memory. Their resentment of the removal of public symbols of the Confederate past ... is fuelled by revisionist history. They fancy themselves the victims of the so-called politically correct assault on American democracy.... Top of form they cling to a faded Southern aristocracy whose benefits — of alleged white superiority, and moral

and intellectual supremacy — trickled down to ordinary whites. If they couldn't drink from the cup of economic advantage that white elites tasted, at least they could sip what was left of a hateful ideology: at least they weren't black. The renowned scholar W.E.B. Du Bois called this alleged sense of superiority the psychic wages of whiteness. DYSON 2017

The removal of the Durham Statue was followed by other similar actions: for example, the removal of the Roger B. Taney Statue in Annapolis and the removal of four monuments to the era of the Confederacy in Baltimore (Bidgoog et al. 2017). Just as the Paul Kruger Statue was installed during the consolidation of apartheid, most Confederate memorials “rose to prominence at the same time that blacks were being re-enslaved and mercilessly subjugated by Jim Crow segregation laws and sharecropping economic systems” (Vieira 2017).

Just as the erection of the Paul Kruger Statue during the 1950s was a way of telling and retelling the mythical stories underlying Afrikaner nationalism, white supremacy and justification of apartheid in South Africa, similar processes were occurring in the United States at roughly the same time. In the American South, they were erecting statues and memorialising southern history at the same time Afrikaners were producing the Boer heritage complexes in an unprecedented way, which included the relocation and unveiling of the Paul Kruger Statue in the city centre. Brian Vieira argues:

Southern whites began to tell – or rather – retell their cultural myths: the [civil] war was portrayed as a noble cause against a tyrannical government. And the construction of symbols became proud testimonials to southern resistance against the “war of northern aggression.” But none of this changes the fact that the South’s “cause” and its leaders were morally repugnant and reprehensible to most Americans then and now. But because of southern revisionism, the construction of memorials to men who had been considered traitors – something that would have been galling, shameful, and unthinkable to most Americans in the war’s aftermath – had in the 20th century become a normal part of the nation’s landscape. VIEIRA 2017

In response to President Trump’s statements that the removal of the Confederate statues was an attempt to rewrite history, Vieira specified:

No Mr. Trump: it was the building of the monuments that was an attempt to re-write history. The removal of these symbols is an attempt to ‘re-right’ history so that physical legacies to slavery and rebellion cannot be re-cast as symbols to southern ‘pride’. VIEIRA 2017

5 Theoretical Foundation of a Cultural and Heritage Transformative Agenda

The theoretical framework for a transformative agenda for the heritage and cultural landscape is developed from the scholarship of prominent Africans on the effects of colonialism, the meaning of African liberation, and the nature of cultural emancipation.

The starting point is the concept of Pan Africanism, which has been an important vehicle to disassemble colonial consciousness at the root of its manifestation. The epoch-making 1945 Pan African Congress – led by its co-secretaries Kwame Nkrumah, who became the first president of Ghana, and Jomo Kenyatta, who became the first president of Kenya – was the second launch of the Pan African Movement. Inspired by the movement, Nkrumah later developed the concept of the ‘African Personality’, which is about the rich history, heritage and civilisations of the African people that were disturbed by colonialism, slavery and other forms of oppression against Africans on the continent. According to Nkrumah:

An important aspect of Pan Africanism is the revival and development of the ‘African Personality’, temporarily submerged during the colonial period. It finds expression in a re-awakening consciousness among Africans and people of African descent of the bonds which unite us – our historical past, our culture, our common experience, and our aspirations.

NKRUMAH 1972: 205

Nkrumah, through his philosophy of the ‘African Personality’ and conceptualisation of the African revolutionary path and Pan Africanism, saw the main purpose being the total emancipation of the African continent and its people, as well as the transformation of the heritage and cultural landscapes to reflect Africa’s histories, heritages and civilisations. The proliferation of memorialisation and the growing interest in African knowledge and significant institutions such as Timbuktu (in Mali), Mapungubwe (in South Africa) and Great Zimbabwe (in Zimbabwe), amongst others, in post-colonial African states resonate well with Nkrumah’s broader concept of the African Personality.

In the same spirit of anti-colonialism and anti-racism, and the notion of whites as the ‘guardians’ and ‘trustees’ of the Africans, Frantz Fanon’s comprehension of the de-colonialisation of Africa and a vision of a free Africa is also linked to a cultural struggle against white supremacy and superiority, as well as the black African inferiority complex. Fanon, in *‘The Wretched of the Earth’*, reasoned that:

Adherence to African-Negro culture and to the cultural unity of Africa is arrived at in the first place by upholding unconditionally the peoples' struggle for freedom.... Colonial domination manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by the negation of national reality, by new legal relations introduced by the occupying power, by the banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying districts by colonial society, by expropriation, and by the systematic enslaving of the men and women.... Every effort is made to bring the colonised to admit the inferiority of his culture which has been transformed into instinctive patterns of behavior, to recognise the unreality of 'nation', and in the last extreme, the confusion and imperfect character of his own biological structure. FANON 2001: 189–190

The culture of the colonised has been stigmatised as 'backward', 'less human', 'uncivilised', and 'unsophisticated' by the settlers with a text of racist science, biological curiosity, the white public's taste for human zoos, racialised gazes and juxtaposition of the two worlds – African and Western.

Fanon argues that African culture and heritage had been dismissed as insignificant by colonial authorities. He does this in two ways: firstly, by reflecting how African cultures and heritages were disrupted by colonialism and have been treated under it; and, secondly, by suggesting what should be done to change the situation, which for him is "by upholding unconditionally the peoples' struggle for freedom". In consequence, the attainment of freedom paves the way for redressing of past imbalances. The transformative agenda then becomes central in changing and undoing the past – the projected and experienced colonial heritage and culture under colonial rule.

Fanon advocates the removal of heritage that celebrates white supremacy, nationalism and privileges. This process would make the previously colonised and oppressed become 'beings for themselves' (Freire 1993) in contrast to the complexes of racial inferiority that present them through the eyes of the colonial power, authority and hegemony. The white heritage landscape dehumanises the colonised, and Fanon sought the transformation of the cultural landscape in ways that humanises the previously dehumanised. The heritage transformative agenda in post-colonial Africa is not just a necessity, but also a cultural struggle (Fanon 1965/2001), one that resonates with the quest for identity, full citizenry, humanisation and (re)Africanisation of the previously colonised indigenous people.

Anton Muziwakhe Lembede promoted black African race consciousness and evoked the importance of African history as a way of rejecting colonial heritage

and white superiority. According to Edgar and Msumza (2015), Lembede, in his promotion of self-knowing, national consciousness, self-respect, African nationalism and challenge to the internalised inferiority complex and self-hatred experienced by Africans, used rich African history to highlight the importance of the ancient African civilisation/s and the significance of African kingdoms. The emphasis in his writings was on national pride and race realisation, and, most importantly, underscored the value of the decolonised 'being' – decoloniality of culture, of heritage, of knowledge, and of being.

The anti-thesis of the white colonial heritage landscape, which is what Fanon and Lembede were advocating for, is the redefinition, re-discovery and re-imagining of the self and the humanisation of the previously dehumanised 'other'. "African people must articulate the reconstruction and development of their societies and institutions within the context of African culture, ontological constructs and historical experiences" (Bunting 1993).

It is in this context that Kwame Nkrumah's concept of the decolonisation of education, including African history and civilisation, was an anti-thesis of the colonial framing of indigenous knowledge. Because of inferiority and superiority complexes, the colonisers presented Africa as having no history, as 'uncivilised' and as a place that did not contribute to broader human development. Thus, its cultural expressions and heritage were viewed as inferior by the white colonisers. This colonial perspective was trapped in the juxtaposed discourse of the 'civilised' and modern white community against the 'primitive' and 'backward' black African people. This accorded well with the politics of 'otherness' and superiority and inferiority complexes that dominated the African socio-political and economic landscapes for decades.

The founding President of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Robert Sobukwe, shared the link of the origins of modern racism to colonialism in his inaugural speech as the founding president of the organisation:

The Europeans are a foreign minority group which has exclusive control of political, economic, social and military power. It is the dominant group. It is the exploiting group, responsible for the pernicious doctrine of white supremacy which has resulted in the humiliation and degradation of the indigenous African people. It is this group which has dispossessed the African people of their land and with arrogant conceit has set itself up as the "guardians", the "trustees" of the Africans. PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS 1993: 29–30

Sobukwe added: "Now it is our contention that true democracy can be established in South Africa and on the continent as a whole, only when white

supremacy has been destroyed... White supremacy in whatever disguise manifest must be destroyed" (Pan Africanist Congress 1993: 29).

In the context of a transformative heritage agenda, to fully comprehend this emphatic reflective view, it is important to consider the milieu. As argued in this chapter, although many monuments such as the Paul Kruger Statue are manifestations of white supremacy, considering the socio-cultural, historical and education contexts, it should not be physically destroyed. Rather, it should be removed from public view and be placed elsewhere. It is the undertones, philosophy and attitude associated with it that must be destroyed in all its manifestations in the process of transformative heritage production, humanisation of the previously oppressed Africans, and (re)Africanisation by evoking the philosophy of the African Personality.

Steve Biko viewed the struggle to build Black Consciousness as having two stages: 'Psychological liberation' and 'Physical liberation'. The struggle to free our minds, mental emancipation, is the first step toward physical liberation. Liberation of the mind, which leads to total emancipation, is an important step towards affirmation of the previously colonised darker people and their quest for a transformed heritage landscape in the post-colonial era. The essence of the decolonisation of minds found in Nkrumah's concept of the African Personality, Sobukwe's concept of 'mental revolution', Fanon's two stages of revolution, and the Black Consciousness Movement's philosophy of psychological liberation, amongst others, give rise to the necessity for a transformed heritage landscape in post-apartheid South Africa.

Chabani Manganyi's (1973) concept of 'being-black-in-the-world' has a particular relevance here because it is linked to coloniality, the discourse of "us" and "them", and the racialised juxtaposition of the "civilised" and "modern" white settler community against "backward" and "uncivilised" black people. Manganyi reasoned that: "The psychological impact of the white dominant culture on the relation between blacks and objects may be formulated in the following way: the white culture has over a number of centuries proclaimed the superiority of its cultural heritage" (Manganyi 1973: 27–28). Manganyi's 'being-black-in-the-world' theory supplements Fanon's theory of psychological liberation, cultural struggle, and inferiority and superiority complexes. It is argued here that the experiences of being black-in-the-world and negotiating the past and race politics provide sufficient basis for the transformation of the heritage landscape in South Africa.

The institutional patterns and social practices that express racism, racialised heritage and lack of meaningful transformation of the heritage sector in post-apartheid South Africa still demonstrate the relevance of the 'being-black-in-the-world' theory because the offensive colonial and apartheid memorials still

exist in prominent public spaces. This racialised heritage, or lenses of looking into the past, is inspired by South Africa's race-bound historical past. This discourse has been carried over to the present in the way people engage with the past, the legacy of colonial geography and apartheid memorials, and the post-apartheid memorial complexes.

Race consciousness and black African scholarship have led to the interrogation of the links between racism, power, and authority in knowledge production, public culture, and commemoration of the past. In the African context, the notions of statues and monuments are western concepts and colonial products that have found their expressions in modern and post-modern South African memorial complexes. These forms of public culture have become dominant, and to some extent, the only perceived way of commemorating the past in the country. Given the country's racialised past, this trajectory has race undertones, and reflect cultural domination and the falsification of history where Africa (and Africans) has been presented as having no history and as being culturally 'backward'. The current South African heritage landscape emphasises the power and authority of its colonial and apartheid past, and continues to exert control over the remembering of this past. This discourse must be reviewed as part of the necessary process of (re)writing history and interpreting the past in the present.

The post-colonial or post-apartheid nation-state must, through the transformative agenda outlined here, promote the development of a post-apartheid identity that considers the inclusion of the culture and heritage of the previously colonised and oppressed indigenous people. Through the impact of the transformative enterprise, the immense socio-political, cultural and historical significance of this process can give rise to a situation in which the "subaltern" (Spivak 1988) can speak.

6 Nation-building and the Transformation of the Heritage Landscape in Post-apartheid South Africa

The relationship between national unity and a transformed heritage landscape in the context of the 'new' South Africa was first promoted by the country's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela. The latter viewed nation building and the creation of a "new" nation and national reconciliation as the basis for progress, development and forging the vision for a shared future with no fixed identities based on race. Hence, he appealed to, and was respected and loved by different people across colour lines.

The nation building project is a struggle to (re)build, create, and (re)define a particular country as a "nation" in a "new" political, cultural, economic and

sometimes geographical context as a way of resolving preceding conflict. The concept of a “new” nation is in itself a creation of history and strives to bring together the previously polarised societies through various activities of social cohesion. According to Gecau:

History and cultural processes of signification are themselves inextricably linked. The concept of ‘the nation’ is in fact made evident through the circulation of symbolic forms and holding of national events which assume more or less ritualistic aspects. The day that the people achieve their nationhood, with the symbols that come with it, is celebrated in elaborate annual commemorative ceremonies and in song and dance. These popular festivals and occasions help in the construction of a national identity and a sense of community and are strengthened when the media turns them into media events of national significance. GECAU 1999: 20

Processes of signification are themselves linked as festivals, history, culture, arts (including performing arts) and sport symbolise reality and their use in the construction of identity and a ‘new’ nation.

Generally, (national, regional and local) memorial landscapes in their “material-symbolic complexity serve three basic ideological functions in making up a national identity: (1) they give unity to people and place; (2) provide people and place with a common ‘origin’; and (3) naturalise the unity and the ‘origin’” (Larsen 1999: 64). Memorial complexes by their nature have historical specificity and are used to achieve a social and political agenda – social cohesion, nation building, reconciliation and the production of a national identity. The use of memorial complexes and other aspects of public culture for nation building and the notion of a rainbow nation in South Africa is arguably a kind of “cultural homogenisation order from above which has been the rule in many countries all over the world” (Palmberg 1999: 8).

The production of heritage landscapes within an historical framework is emotional and contested in South Africa. This is the case because it is linked to a particular nation or group of people’s socio-cultural, historical and political identities. This can be better understood in the context of heritage as a social construct rather than inheritance.

6.1 *State-led Transformation of the Heritage Landscape*

Various post-apartheid administrations have engaged in several exercises to transform the heritage landscape. In post-apartheid South Africa, the history of the resistance against colonialism and the struggle against apartheid have become a focal point of reference in building the nation. It provides symbols

and responsiveness of how the collective – the new nation – has through its efforts moved from one phase of its historical evolution into another. It details the transition from the majority of people being oppressed, segregated and subjugated to their becoming citizens with democratic rights.

6.1.1 Monuments, Memorial Sites and Museums

Prior to 1994, almost all heritage sites and museums in South Africa reflected the interests and identities of the white minority. In 1997, Nelson Mandela noted that there was a conspicuous absence of heritage sites that reflected black history and that there was a glorification of white colonial history in the heritage landscape at the time (Rantao 1999). For instance, in 1991 only just over 2% of all national monuments were explicitly dedicated to black culture and history. In consequence, the democratic government launched a Legacy Project, which has given rise to a series of heritage developments such as Freedom Park in Pretoria, Constitution Hill in Johannesburg, the Blood River (Ncome) Commemoration in KwaZulu Natal, and the Nelson Mandela Museum in Mthatha and Qunu which reflect the black experience. The Legacy Projects were devised, among other things, to affirm cultural diversity, redress past imbalances in the heritage landscape, acknowledge the needs of disadvantaged communities, and promote public ownership of heritage projects (Dlamini 2001: 126).

As way of illustration, mention needs to be made of some of the key features of these Legacy Project heritage sites.

- The Robben Island Museum, which memorialises the experiences of imprisonment of South African political prisoners, is situated in Table Bay about twelve kilometres from Cape Town.
- The Hector Pieterse Museum in Orlando West, Soweto, is two blocks away from where Hector Pieterse was shot and killed on 16 June 1976 at the outbreak of the Soweto uprising, and commemorates the 566 people who died during the student uprisings.
- Freedom Park, on the outskirts of Pretoria, commemorates South Africa's transition to democracy and consists of a series of different areas and structures, each with a symbolic link that express freedom, a spiritual resting place, and the story of the important conflicts during the struggle for freedom.
- The Apartheid Museum is located just off the highway that links Johannesburg to Soweto, and consists of a series of exhibition spaces that sets the historical context for apartheid, the narrative of the subjugation of the indigenous population during the apartheid era, and the struggle of the majority to overthrow this tyranny.

- The Nelson Mandela Capture Site, located on the R103 just north of the small town of Howick in KwaZulu-Natal, which commemorates Nelson Mandela's capture on 5 August 1962 while on his way back to Johannesburg after meeting with Chief Albert Luthuli in KwaDukuza (Stanger), features a sculpture which captures Mandela's face on fifty jagged spikes, arranged like pillars or tree trunks.
- The Ncome Museum memorialises the battle which took place between the Voortrekkers (ancestors of the Afrikaners) led by Andries Pretorius, and the Zulu army of King Dingane on the banks of the Ncome River on 16 December 1838 in which a Zulu army of about 12,000 to 16,000 men were defeated by a much smaller contingent of Voortrekkers.
- Constitution Hill, located on the site of the Old Fort (popularly known as Number Four), a prison where several members and leaders of the liberation movements were incarcerated at different times during the course of the liberation struggle, features the Old Fort, which housed white male prisoners, the Women's Gaol, which was segregated for black and white female prisoners, and Number Four, for black male prisoners.

In 2011, another process specifically related to liberation struggle heritage was introduced by the National Heritage Council (NHC), an agency of the South African Department of Arts and Culture charged with the preservation of the country's heritage (National Heritage Council nd: 1). The NHC initiated the National Liberation Heritage Route project in consequence of the adoption of Resolution 33C/29 by the Commission for Culture (Commission IV) of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in October 2005. This resolution recognised liberation struggle heritage as being of universal value and significance.

The Liberation Heritage Route is intended to consist of a series of sites that express the key aspects of the South African liberation experience. These sites are linked together by a common historical narrative of the liberation struggle and experience, and consist of historical evidence of events and activities associated with the history of the struggle. Included among the sites of the LHR are the Wesleyan Church where the African National Congress (ANC) was formed in 1912, the Sharpeville Memorial, Lilliesleaf Farm, the Langeberg Rebellion, the Bisho Massacre, and Victor Verster Prison. The objective is to get the Liberation Heritage Route listed as a World Heritage Site as part of the African Liberation Heritage Route.

The public memorials and other heritage sites produced in post-apartheid South Africa echo the grief and the atmosphere of heartache of the struggle. History and heritage are intertwined, as some aspects of heritage resources are products of history. The past and heritage are ingredients for forging identity

that underscores the notion of republic and citizenship, as it is a product of social processes. Erasing heritage and its historicity, and the past, has individual and societal negative results which affect the notion of a nation and republic. The dialectic of comprehension to forget, remembrance and dis-remembering is central to how national identity, heritage and history are constructed, and national consciousness produced through the inscription of public memories on memorial landscapes. The construction of shared identity, heritage and national consciousness is not a technical issue, but rather a social process of nationalising history, curating the nation, social transformation and developing social cohesion and national unity. Identity is inextricably linked to memories, as people remember what they know or deem relevant at a particular time and context which then underpins who they are. Nation is built through shared human experiences and memories which then constitute their history, which gives them a sense of identity and national consciousness.

6.1.2 Heritage Excluded from State-led Initiatives

State-led initiatives to transform the heritage landscape are not fully representative of both political formation in South Africa and the previously oppressed communities. In the first place, post-apartheid heritage is the product of those who control what history has become dominant, and which heroes and historical events are to be memorialised. Thus, the post-apartheid memorial complexes present a monolithic and hegemonic historical narrative, and suppress unwelcome alternative historical narratives. This disjointed national discourse and mythological national consciousness have their own matrix of affirmation which feed into the monolithic and hegemonic historical master narrative on the one hand, and suppresses conflicting histories and their resulting memorialisation, exclusion, marginalisation and underrepresentation on the other.

In countries where there were more than one liberation movement, the post-liberation memorial landscapes become problematic and contested when they are not inclusive. The construction and configuration of heritage in general is intertwined with identity and place; and the politics and complexities of inclusion and exclusion manifest in more than one way. In defining such ideas of inclusion and exclusion, Ashworth (2007: 5) reasons that “people call upon an affinity with places or, at least, with representations of places which, in turn, are used to legitimise their claim [in history] to territory. By definition, these are representations of imaginary places, but they still constitute a powerful part of the individual and social practices that people consciously use to transform the material world into cultural and economic realms, meaning and living experience”.

The constructed post-apartheid memorial complexes have symbolic value because of the intangible significance – social, historical and cultural – associated with commemorated events or individuals. Some aspects of the memorial landscapes have complex meanings and layers of history which need to be reflected. At the moment, that is not the case. This is so because the present memorialisation is based on the monolithic and hegemonic historical narrative of the ruling ANC government and expressed through its heritage agencies. In consequence, the transformation of the heritage landscape has resulted in the marginalisation of different historical narratives, and of memorialisation of heroes and heroines and significant historical events of the other liberation movements and anti-apartheid organisations. As Marschall has noted, “the under-representation of the PAC story, both in the ‘writing of history’ and especially in its public representation through the heritage sector, is partly a reflection of unequal power relations...” (Marschall 2008: 111).

The PAC boycotted the unveiling of a memorial to the victims of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in 2002 after it became clear that the ANC was appropriating “this international icon of the anti-apartheid struggle” because the memorial was funded by an ANC-led local government and the main dignitaries invited were ANC leaders. Instead, it unveiled its own memorial at a local cemetery (Marschall 2008: 119–120). Again, a heroes’ acre erected by the government in New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, to honour six ANC affiliated guerrillas killed by the apartheid regime was opposed by members of the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) “whose role in the liberation struggle the new memorial implicitly erases” (Marschall 2008: 121). The politics of identity, or political allegiance, very often surface in the process of production of memorials. The production of post-apartheid memorial complexes is no exception.

In the second place, the production of post-apartheid memorial complexes in South Africa is trapped in the politics of masculinity, iconhood, and the “Great Man” approach. This gendered phenomenon gives a misleading impression at two levels. Firstly, that it was only males who were involved in the liberation struggle, and, secondly, that the authors of this history are and have been men. Gibb (2019) illustrates how the role of women in the liberation struggle has been erased from memorialisation in post-apartheid South Africa. She argues that “the dearth of women’s memorials, after democracy, compared to that of men, indicates ... an erasure that reflects systemic patriarchal attitudes and structures in South Africa’s government and public culture” (Gibb 2019: 12–13).

In addition, in the few instances where women are memorialised, as Samuelson (2007) illustrates, they are presented “as domestic – usually maternal – figures”. According to Samuelson, Krotoa-Eva, Nongqawuse and Sarah Bartmann have been used in the nation building, reconciliation and rainbow

nation projects in such a way that their legacies “have been mediated through the mists of time to take their symbolic place as mythic figures in our present” (Samuelson 2007: 3). She writes: “Re-presented as maternal figures, these women reflect back to the nation its wholeness and unity. Forgotten in such accounts are women’s experiences of motherhood, and their relationship to their reproductive bodies. Motherhood is, instead, presented as patriarchal institution and national emblem” (Samuelson 2007: 3).

Through the gendered approach of remembering the nation, the inscription of public memories on the memorial landscape does not recover the voices of women. The approach does not move beyond the domesticity narrative of women, and it compromises history and knowledge production. The unsung heroines, therefore, ought to be included in the public culture and history discourse of the post-apartheid era. This ingredient will play a pivotal role in demystifying the masculinisation of post-apartheid heritage and provide a space for memorialisation of alternative aspects of the country’s history.

The omissions in state-led initiatives have given rise to several notable local initiatives to transform the heritage landscape.

6.2 *Local Initiatives to Transform the Heritage Landscape*

Memorialisation cannot solely be confined to initiatives of the state, and some forms of memorialisation have been initiated by local communities, and others jointly with the state. These initiatives broaden the scope of memorialisation and political culture in the new political dispensation. An example of such an initiative is Sobukwe Square in Langa Township in Cape Town.

The Sobukwe Square in Langa Township, a site where people were shot at and killed by the apartheid police during the 1960 anti-pass campaign, was given the name by supporters of the PAC and community members of Langa Township in Cape Town. The area where the shooting took place during the PAC’s anti-pass campaign in March 1960 includes an area where there is a circle, the Langa Taxi Rank, nearby shops and a residential area. The naming of the site as Sobukwe Square without official recognition was justified because it has meaning and memories attached to it by a large number of people based on their political allegiance, age group and, to some extent, gender.

Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, after whom the site is named, was the founder and first president of the PAC in 1959. He is one of the heroes who significantly contributed to the liberation struggle and sacrificed his life for freedom, justice and a democratic South Africa. After organising the 1960 march, he was arrested, sentenced to imprisonment in Pretoria Central Prison for his first three-year term and later at Robben Island. On the Island, he was incarcerated in a house that became known as Sobukwe House. He was completely cut off

from the other political prisoners. Sobukwe was kept in prison after the ending of his term of imprisonment under the “Sobukwe Clause”, which empowered the Minister of Justice to prolong the detention of any political prisoner indefinitely. He was the only political prisoner treated in this way in South African history. The residents of Langa participated in the anti-pass campaign in 1960, and, in the process, some were killed, and others injured by the apartheid police and soldiers. Although this site has national significance, no official memorial has been erected; people just gathered there to commemorate the events of 1960.

Dagama Mngqibisa, a veteran of the liberation struggle and one of the people who participated in the 1960 anti-pass campaign, asserted the following about the naming of the site:

PAC supporters and community members named the site. The naming of the site has to do with the memory of the event of 1960. In the mid-1990s, the leadership of the PAC said we should meet the councillors and erect a memorial on the site so that we can point that this is where we were shot and killed by the apartheid forces. We also wanted the whole area nearby the circle to be named Sobukwe Square because of memories and attachment to the site. But the councillors did not give us a direction because of party politics. INTERVIEW WITH MNGQIBISA

Zibi, another veteran of the liberation struggle and a resident of Langa Township, pointed out that: “The erection of a memorial at the site would make present and future generations know about the history associated with that site” (Interview with Zibi).

During the apartheid era, people used to gather at the site to commemorate the shootings. From 1986 they introduced an annual procession to the graves of the victims of the 1960 shootings. Mngqibisa described the procession as follows:

The procession starts by a prayer in front of the Flats. After a religious leader one of the veterans who was present on the day of the event would share the experience of the day with the audience. They then move to the site and indicate that this is the site where people were shot and killed. From the site we move to the graves of the victims and on our way we sing freedom songs until we arrive there. When we arrive we put flowers on the graves. We show that this day is essential in our history. It means a lot to us and we will not forget it. People must remember that there are people who sacrificed their lives for the freedom we are enjoying today. INTERVIEW WITH MNGQIBISA

Memorial sites such as those associated with the procession:

...are places where people tell the constitutive narratives, and their 'shared' stories of the past. They become communities precisely by having shared (if only vicariously) the experiences of their neighbours. At the same time, it may even be the activity of remembering together that becomes the shared memory, once ritualised, remembering together becomes an event in itself that is to be shared and remembered. YOUNG 1993: 7

7 The Paul Kruger Statue in Post-apartheid South Africa

The Paul Kruger Statue represents the 'lost cause' of Afrikaners, which has been re-cast in post-apartheid South Africa in the name of protecting the rights of minorities and cultural and linguistic rights. In the process, however, colonial and apartheid memorials are also used for socio-political mobilisation by the Afrikaner community. It is this mobilisation and repackaged use that makes this statue a source of conflict between its proponents and the opposing communities. This mobilisation and repackaging are also an attempt to re-tell a particular story of the past.

In South Africa, there is a long history of erecting memorials honouring certain cultures or individuals believed by their 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) as holding their values and aspirations. The same can be said about their removal too. According to Bombardella and Goodrich:

In South Africa the practice of toppling statues is as old as the practice of erecting them. The opening act of this now highly public symbolic battle took place when indigenous South Africans toppled the first monument erected on South African soil – the stone cross erected by Vasco da Gama in 1497. Da Gama responded with cannon fire, and the rest, as they say, is history. In this history the cannons prevailed so that by the end of the 20th century there were around 3,500 declared heritage sites in South Africa. BOMBARDELLA & GOODRICH 2016: 2

They add that: "The bulk of these were examples of colonial British and Cape Dutch architecture and sites associated with the Afrikaner struggle for self-determination. By 1992, 97% of declared national monuments related to the values and experiences of the white minority" (Bombardella & Goodrich 2016: 3).

The recent call to remove colonial and apartheid memorials is not different from the earlier attempts as it is part of the long struggle for identity and

recognition. These tensions always relate to privilege, authority, the politics of transition and nation-state formation or consolidation. In 2014:

...Tokolos Stencils, a Cape Town-based group of graffiti activists responded to this preservation of privilege by spraying the words 'Disown this heritage' in red across the base of Cape Town's Paul Kruger Statue. The point that they were trying to make was that while statues of Kruger and other colonial figures might represent white South Africans' heritage, South African racial inequality is rooted in the order these figures represent. BOMBARDELLA & GOODRICH 2016: 4

In 2015, during the defacing and vandalism of colonial and apartheid memorials that were initiated by students at the University of Cape Town as the '#Rhodes Must Fall' Movement, the Paul Kruger Statue in Pretoria was also targeted and covered with green paint. Soon thereafter, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which initially claimed responsibility for defacing the statue but later retracted when the Tshwane Municipality declared its intention to open a criminal case of malicious damage against the perpetrators, pledged to destroy the statue. The white community reacted, with one woman chaining herself to the statue to prevent further damage while a group of Afrikaners in military uniforms began to guard the statue. A rally also took place at Church Square where speaker after speaker requested that the statue be left alone as it was part of South Africa's cultural history. A 1.5m high wire fence was then constructed around the statue to protect it from the public (Khubeka 2015).

Calls for the removal of colonial and apartheid memorials have been made since 1994. Such calls become strident during national events such as the annual Heritage Day public holiday on 24 September. As is the case with this issue, there are different opinion about the Paul Kruger Statue, with some pushing for its removal and others objecting to its removal. These contrasting views are race-based, with those objecting to its removal largely being Afrikaners who cling to apartheid symbols such as the old South African flag and the apartheid national anthem, 'Die Stem van Suid Afrika'. This was evident at one rally held by a group of Afrikaners in defence of the statue at Church Square when controversial Afrikaans singer, Steve Hofmeyr, closed the rally by singing the apartheid anthem. These opposing views draw into sharp focus the country's apartheid past and its future as a deracialised society that has addressed past imbalances.

In an online *City Press* newspaper article titled "*Protesters to chain themselves to Paul Kruger statue to defend it*" it is reported that:

The Front National Party is getting behind Afrikaans singer Sunette Bridges to defend the statue of Paul Kruger in Church Square, Pretoria, this morning. The controversial Bridges plans to chain herself to the statue this morning after the ANC Youth League called for its removal. 'This act of defiance is a call for unity of all like-minded individuals and groups to resist any further acts of vandalism or intention of removal of national heritage sites and symbols,' Front National said today. Meanwhile, Red October – which says it is a 'movement dedicated to raising awareness about the inhumane slaughter and oppression of the white ethnic minority in South Africa' – has started a petition to protect heritage sites and symbols. *CITY PRESS*, 7 MARCH 2015

The clash over the removal of the Paul Kruger Statue illustrates the long road that the country still has to travel to transform the heritage landscape and construct a national and inclusive heritage. The lack of transformation of the heritage landscape by failing to decisively deal with colonial and apartheid memorials can be considered an insult to the black majority. The lack of a coherent approach from the government arises from the negotiated political settlement during the transition period and the obsession with national reconciliation, the concept of the 'rainbow nation' and nation building during the Mandela administration, which was still evident in 2015.

For instance, the then Minister of Arts and Culture, Nathi Mthethwa, stated the following in a press statement released on 15 April 2015:

...heritage sites and national monuments have cultural significance and value because of their importance to a community in revealing a pattern of South Africa's history. They demonstrate a particular aspect or time of South Africa's natural or cultural places or objects. Also, they may hold strong or special association with a particular community or cultural group for social, cultural or spiritual reasons. This may entail a strong or special association with the life or work of a person, group or organisation of importance in the history of South Africa. Thus, as a Government that promotes a transformative national agenda, we also accept that the past cannot and should not be completely wiped off. This is to avoid repeating the same mistakes out of ignorance of what has happened before. It is for this reason that as part of transformation, the diverse voices of all citizens of this country must be allowed to express themselves but guided by the law in our efforts to alter the national heritage landscape. The government's attitude and policy to all heritage sites, including statues of former colonial heroes like Cecil John Rhodes and Paul Kruger, among others, is

based on a national policy of reconciliation, nation building and social cohesion. Thus, we neither support nor encourage the defamation or violent removal of any statue because we do not encourage people to take the law into their own hands. DEPARTMENT OF ARTS AND CULTURE 2015

By contrast, some members of the previously oppressed groups, as well as a small number of whites, view this justification for retaining such landmarks in their current positions as an attempt to appease certain sectors of the white community and a failure to redress historical imbalances and to deal with the complexity of reconciliation, nation building and social cohesion. They believe that there shall be no reconciliation without socio-economic justice, equality, and the redressing of past imbalances. In addition, they argue, colonial and apartheid memorials represent white and Afrikaner supremacy and nationalism that promote hatred, separate development and discrimination.

In more recent times, the Democratic Alliance (DA)-led administration of the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality implemented plans to revamp the Church Square heritage precinct. During his budget speech in May 2017, then Mayor Solly Msimanga announced plans for this heritage precinct. The Metro proposed to keep the Paul Kruger Statue on Church Square, while transforming it into an open-air entertainment venue and 'monument for freedom of speech' through the addition of the Lalela Freedom of Expression Monument (*IOL News* 2017). The new plans have neither historical context, nor do they contribute to the rewriting of the history of that public space as it does not, in any form whatsoever, bring into consideration the layers of historical significance of that locality. Instead, it de-historicises the space, thereby avoiding the contentious and contested question of what to do with the Paul Kruger Statue. The proposals further demonstrated the cosmetic transformation of a heritage landscape by the municipality that was designed to avoid conflict with Afrikaners.

The political leadership of the municipality under the DA mayor missed the opportunity to remove the Paul Kruger Statue from Church Square and to place it elsewhere where it can be given a new meaning and context, as well as to re-contextualise the Church Square precinct to reflect the layers of history associated with it. These include its key features, including, amongst others, the Raadsaal (the Council Chamber), street performances, 'the starting point for protests' in the 1950s, and the 'Palace of Justice' where the well documented Rivonia trail took place.

Adding aspects of the democratic state's values in the form of the Lalela Freedom of Expression Monument, which has no historical and political

context associated with the precinct in terms of black people's history, to the already existing white people's images and expressions as a way of giving expression to previously silenced and excluded histories is inadequate. It fails to dismantle representations of the master's narrative and historiography that is associated with white supremacy and nationalism. The Metro's transformation initiative hampers the democratisation of this cultural space and undermines and devalues programmes aimed at redressing certain historical imbalances.

It is vital to consider what form and shape the democratisation of these spaces should take. Transformation of our society calls for its re-orientation from the past values and practices defined by racism, sexism, inequality and the lack of respect for human rights (Dondolo 2015: 33). The colonial and apartheid statues are visible signs of white hegemony and hierarchies of discrimination. The meaningful way to deal with them should not be solely aimed at reconciliation and nation building that compromises the indigenous people's quest for the restoration of dignity and rectifying of past imbalances.

Some believe that colonial and apartheid memorials should be removed from public spaces and placed in a special museum or park for historical reference. During the #Rhodes Must Fall Movement in 2015, the then Minister of Higher Education, Dr Blade Nzimande, echoed this view. This view, which seems to be gaining support, however, is also trapped in post-apartheid reconciliation politics.

The Paul Kruger Statue has much to do with the past, colonialism, and the construction of the Afrikaner nation which later instituted and systematised racism, subjugation and unjust laws for the majority under apartheid. It promotes Afrikaner nationalism on the one hand, and exclusion, subjugation, stigmatisation of the colonised indigenous people and the racialised configuration of modern South Africa on the other. The latter negatively affected generation after generation of black Africans; and its physical, psychological and socioeconomic scars are still evident among members of this group. The context of its erection gives full weight to the view that the statue was part of the apartheid agenda epitomised by white supremacy, race politics, segregation and marginalisation of Africans. Paul Kruger's public posture, ideology and political identity unquestionably demonstrate this assertion.

It is argued here that this statue must be removed and placed off-sight where it will be re-conceptualised with a new subtext and provenance. The removal of the Paul Kruger Statue from Church Square must be viewed in the context of the transformative text, the search for social justice and the rewriting of history. This statue and similar memorials should be removed from public view because they have greater value in their use to promote the very values that

are inconsistent with the values of a democratic South Africa – colonialism, racism, subjugation, unjust laws, hierarchies of discrimination, and superiority and inferiority complexes. Most importantly, the maintenance of these colonial and apartheid geographies should not be promoted and funded by the state. While it is true that keeping them as they are might be important for social cohesion, it is equally important to avoid promoting histories and heritages that are offensive to others, and that resonate with the past dehumanisation, objectification and oppression of the majority, as this statue does. It is one thing to accept history, and document it; and another to honour racists, racism, white supremacy, and oppressors. Such despicable historical processes and actors do not deserve any memorialisation.

The Church Square heritage precinct also needs to be re-contextualised to take into account its layers of history and uses at different times in South African history. These histories can be used to redefine the space with a new connotation, sense, and values. This will humanise the previously dehumanised, ‘not only as an ontological possibility but as historical reality’ (Freire 2017: 17). This type of engagement with the statue and the precinct will restore the sense of humanity of the previously dispossessed.

South Africa must move towards the production of a balanced heritage landscape that meaningfully assists in the process of bringing about social justice. This is important because, as Bombardella and Goodrich argue:

...building a new political order requires inculcating in a population a new historical narrative that legitimizes present distributions of power. As such, transformed political circumstances, particularly in the wake of totalitarian regimes, affect the lives statues lead. The official symbolic landscape onto which the values of the ousted political order have been projected and given stability must be removed when the time comes to imagine community differently. And there are numerous international examples of this. BOMBARDELLA & GOODRICH 2016: 3

There is also a need for a national discourse on heritage that aims at making post-apartheid memorialisation more inclusive.

8 Towards a Non-racial Heritage Landscape

On the one hand, it has been illustrated that the post-apartheid heritage landscape is not inclusive, and important aspects of the country’s history that the

ANC-led government has marginalised is the contribution of the other liberation movements and women to the liberation struggle. This is reflective of the prevalence of political/ideological and gender biases. The solution here is very simple: it requires a commitment of the government to embark on a programme to construct new heritage resources that memorialise the contribution of the other liberation movements and women.

On the other hand, it has been demonstrated how some colonial and apartheid heritage resources are offensive to the black majority, and how some sectors of the white community – a very small minority – cling on to some of these heritage resources as nostalgic reminders of a glorious past. Here, the issue of race is related to who were the perpetrators, defenders and beneficiaries of colonialism and apartheid (mostly whites), and those who opposed and suffered the most under these systems (mostly black people). This is reflective of the racial division in the country. Another factor that could contribute to racial division is the nature of the new heritage resources constructed during the post-apartheid era – they are largely linked to the liberation struggle. The memorialisation of the liberation struggle is a reminder to whites of their complicity during apartheid and, in many instances (e.g., the Sharpeville Massacre memorial, Constitution Hill, and Robben Island Museum), of the gross violations of human rights committed to defend their privilege. Moreover, it is a celebration of triumph over a system they supported and benefitted from. This contrasts sharply with the pre-1994 heritage landscape, which celebrates colonialism and apartheid. These are conflicting forms of heritage that are inextricably linked to race.

How, then, is it possible to construct a non-racial heritage landscape in which heritage resources do not promote racial division? There are several processes that need to be undertaken that can make non-racial heritage a possibility in South Africa.

The first is to conduct an audit of existing heritage resources and identify those that might be offensive to the black majority, in particular public statutory such as the Paul Kruger Statue. Once general agreement has been reached on these resources through a national discourse on heritage, agreement must be reached on how they should be treated, including treating them in the same manner as has been suggested for the Paul Kruger Statue – removing them from their current sites of prominence and placing them elsewhere where they would not offend. Unlike the approach taken in many East European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to the dismantling and destruction of statues of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, two options could be put forth in the proposed national discourse: to place the offensive statues in existing

museums in different parts of the country; or to select a museum where these could all be housed, as the Angolans did by placing similarly offensive colonial heritage resources in the Museum of the Armed Forces in Luanda.

Such an audit could also lead to the identification of colonial and apartheid era heritage resources that might not be offensive to the black majority, e.g., the Voortrekker Monument. Offensive heritage resources, in particular public statuary, are most likely to be those associated with the processes of subjugation, oppression and exploitation of the black majority. The national discourse should lead to agreement on resources that are not offensive as well, and on how they should be treated, including giving them equal status – e.g., as national heritage sites – to that of the most prominent resources that memorialise the liberation struggle where this is not already the case. The audit and national discourse would also provide for a similarly equal acknowledgment of heritage resources that are considered important by other groups in the country, such as the Grey Street Mosque in Durban, and the Old Slave Church (Paarl) and Bo-Kaap (Cape Town) in the Western Cape where this is not already the case.

The third process that needs to be undertaken must draw from aspects of the liberation struggle that have not been given sufficient attention in heritage development, in particular its non-racial and international nature. The national discourse suggested here could lead to the identification of key figures in the liberation struggle of all race groups, significant events that signify the non-racial nature of the struggle, and the forms of memorialisation that arise from these. Similarly, the national discourse could identify those forms of international solidarity with the South African liberation struggle that are indicative of its non-racial nature – including school children in India raising funds for the liberation movement, Swedish compatriots providing skills training to black exiles, Russians and North Koreans providing military training to guerrillas, East German workers making uniforms for guerrillas, black and white Cuban Internationalists in the war in Angola, and black and white demonstrators against visiting South African sports teams in Australia and outside the South African High Commission in London and the South African Embassy in Washington – and ways of memorialising these.

The final process would be to include in the proposed national discourse a discussion of the achievements during the democratic era which all South Africans can relate to that can be memorialised, e.g., South Africa winning the rugby World Cup in 1995, 2007 and 2019 (although incomplete transformation and race politics still manifest themselves in rugby and cricket), South Africa winning soccer's African Cup of Nations in 1996, and hosting the 2010 football World Cup, amongst other national achievements. These processes would go a long way towards the creation of a non-racial heritage; one that is a concrete reflection of the national motto, 'unity in diversity'.

9 Conclusion

South Africa has a long history and culture of racism. It is manifest in a structured and systematic manner in so many ways, including heritage. The heritage landscape inherited in 1994 had much to do with the text of whiteness, white supremacy and white nationalism. In the South African context, race is not just a social and historical construct legislated by colonial and apartheid laws. It is also associated with the development of political identities. Racialised political identities emphasise otherness, and the presence of the Paul Kruger Statue at Church Square, and other similar memorials elsewhere in the country, reinforces both the political and cultural identities of the Afrikaner and of their subjugation of others. Keeping the Paul Kruger Statue in the Church Square Heritage Precinct gives significance to what it represents. The alteration of the heritage precinct where it is located is about the rewriting of history and a new way of presenting and narrating the country's past that considers the past historical imbalances and racialised configuration of modern South Africa. This is one among a number of processes that need to be undertaken to make progress towards the development of a non-racial heritage landscape. It is also urgent that the additional steps suggested in this chapter to develop such a heritage landscape be given national priority in order to make the issue of race irrelevant in our heritage, and thereby contribute to its erasure.

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Apartheid, Democracy and (De)coloniality at the Crossroad

Modimowabarwa Kanyane

Unless the promises and expectations of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid are realised, and ordinary South Africans are emancipated, we will have failed the democratic project. MAKOPO 2021: XXI

1 Introduction

This chapter explores various developments since 1994 that are linked to race and racism in the post-apartheid era from the prism of decolonisation, the process through which colonisation is reversed. Arguably, the African countries that emerged from Western influence and colonialism can undo their colonial past through de-westernisation and decolonisation. The same process can take place in South Africa where the legacies of the apartheid system, which is linked to colonialism and racism, could be decolonised through decolonisation and de-racialisation of the education system, land, labour markets and other critical spaces, among others, universities and sports fields.

According to Gibson (2011: 55), decolonisation in South Africa is incomplete because it has not been tackled at all levels – political, socioeconomic, geographical, and psychological – in short, at the objective and subjective levels. It is argued here that all efforts to transform the society from its apartheid past since 1994 are immaterial if they do not address substantively the gross racial inequalities in the country, as well as the decolonisation of the minds of both black and white. However, the South African democracy oscillates between the apartheid past on the one hand, and a particular vision of a non-racial future on the other. There is, in most circles, a failure to critically engage what is obviously an encounter of two worlds and to mediate between what might seem to be intractable opposites. There is the temptation to be opportunistic in relation to both worlds (Eze 2015: 416). In consequence, apartheid, democracy and (de-)coloniality are at the crossroad in post-apartheid South Africa. This crossroad, simply put, means that the South African democracy either remains in a

situation in which critical features of apartheid remain intact, or moves in the direction of a non-racial society.

On the one hand, the ongoing and prevailing manifestation of coloniality – a lack of ownership over key industries such as banks, insurance companies, and even the liberty to fully overhaul the education system – is an affirmation of deep-rooted and ongoing racism (Thesnaar 2017: 2). On the other hand, the demands of full liberty requires a national project to decolonise, leading to a search for indigenous wisdoms to deal with the challenges of a modern democracy emerging from white rule. Given this crossroad, can we remain on the path of a continued emphasis on race identity and persistent racism on the one hand, or the total emancipation that flows from decolonisation on the other? This chapter provides ways in which the challenges of race and racism the country currently faces can be resolved through decolonisation. A model of deconiality is thus seen as a necessary response to issues of race and racism that characterised apartheid and continue to exist in post-apartheid South Africa.

The chapter has several sections. In the first an analysis is made of the impact of colonisation on African countries as a first step towards developing an understanding of decoloniality. This is followed by a review of developments in South Africa since 1994 to illustrate the lost opportunity to deal with the effects of apartheid. The third section examines the meaning of decoloniality, while the fourth sets out various requirements, including ubuntu and national reconciliation, among others, for a decoloniality project in post-apartheid South Africa. It is argued that critical mechanisms to decolonise South Africa include policies aimed at reversing the effects of centuries of colonialism, including land expropriation without compensation and stricter application of programmes to bring about racial equity, among others, as well as the broad adoption of the values in the African humanist philosophy of ubuntu by South Africans to promote the reconciliation and unity that is necessary for the creation of a non-racial South Africa.

2 The Impact of Colonisation on African Countries

According to Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243), coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation. Coloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged because of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and

knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality is the consequence of colonialism. In other words, coloniality survives colonialism or colonisation. To fully understand what decoloniality means, and what it aims to achieve, one needs to grapple first with the impact of colonisation on African countries.

Colonisation, according to Fanon (1967: 15), is the political process in which one nation imposes political rule and forcefully governs a people against their will. Fanon sees it as a process in which power structures in the political, economic and religious spheres of colonial states collaborated to entrench a colonial system of rule to control the resources of the colonised. This process came at a huge price for the indigenous populations of colonised regions, who lost their land and resources, language, economy, spirituality, culture and their identity. Fanon captures the pain of colonised Africans in graphic detail as follows:

You are making us into monstrosities; your humanism claims we are at one with the rest of humanity but your racist methods set us apart... Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm's length; it seeks to de-humanize them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture without giving them ours. Sheer physical fatigue will stupefy them. Starved and ill, if they have any spirit left, fear will finish the job; guns are levelled at the peasant; civilians come to take over his land and force him by dint of flogging to till the land for them. If he shows fight, the soldiers fire and he's a dead man; if he gives in, he degrades himself and he is no longer a man at all; shame and fear will split up his character and make his inmost self fall to pieces. FANON 1967: 15

The racial subjugation of black African people, and, by implication, their dehumanisation, has triggered questions of identity that are related to questions of ontology. The nexus between ontology and identity is captured impeccably by the assertion that the consequences of a questioned and denied humanness, of being treated as sub-human, a sub-person, or an animal, invariably leads to the profound experience of existential dread and anguish which in turn generates the problem of identity (Matabeni & Kanyane 2017: 32). It is for this reason that black African people are stigmatised and labelled as being lazy, corrupt, violent, rapists, illiterate and half-human. What the stereotype does is to intentionally undermine the black Africans by destroying their self-worth and confidence.¹

¹ The Penny Sparrow racial rant illustrates this type of dehumanisation in South Africa. In her Facebook post on 1 April 2016, Sparrow referred to black African people as monkeys (Mashau 2018: 3).

In the minds of the white colonisers, the black African was a savage and had to be civilised. Yet the behaviour of the coloniser and settler portrayed the black African as the worse kind of savage (Elkins 2014), first, in their failure to recognise the indigenous people as human beings and, secondly, in their introduction to Africa of an oppressive system that worked towards 'whitewashing' Africans and making them into what is colloquially termed 'coconuts' – black on the outside and white on the inside. Regarding the latter, the colonisation project specifically worked to uproot the essence of black African culture and lifestyle and transform it into a European identity in areas where the colonisers declared themselves as rulers of a land that belonged to others.

In time, some of the colonised began to mimic their masters in terms of identities, cultural practices and lifestyles. This mimicry of the conduct of colonial masters, which saw enclaves of extreme wealth in the midst of unemployment, poverty and inequalities, was reproduced in the immediate post-colonial era. For instance, it was evident in Egypt during the rule of King Farouk, one of the richest men in the world at the time, who was famous for his spending sprees, gargantuan appetite and endless processions of mistresses. His fortune included the largest landholding in Egypt, four palaces, two yachts, thirteen private aircrafts, two hundred cars and a huge collection of pornographic artefacts. At the age of thirty-two, he had become an inveterate playboy, obese, balding and addicted to pleasure-seeking (Meredith 2013).

The colonisers also deliberately attempted to wipe away the glorious history of Africa so that they could emerge as the champions of civilisation. The great pyramids of Giza, the libraries of Alexandria, and the city of Timbuktu stand out as monumental evidence of civilisation and African ingenuity without western influence. The great Benin City of the 17th century reminds us of the glories of 'Old Africa' that are no longer in existence. A Dutch traveller who came to Africa described it as follows:

It is certainly as large as the town of Haarlem, entirely surrounded by a special wall. It is divided into many significant palaces, houses and apartments of the courtiers and comprises beautiful and long square galleries, about as large as the exchange in Amsterdam but one larger than another resting of wooden pillars, from top to bottom covered with cast of copper on which are engraved the pictures of war. This was the glorious artefact until the British colonialist demolished it. DE VILLERS AND HIRTLE 2007

This example of the destruction of African achievements demonstrates how European colonialism damaged the Africans' sense of self-esteem and moral worth. Linked to this was the European notion that Africa had no history or

institutions of any worth. The education they introduced for the indigenous populations would only include African history insofar as it related to the history of the coloniser. The distortion of the black African people's identity was further advanced by the rejection of African names and imposition of white first names on them, while imposing the hegemony of the languages of the colonisers in all significant areas of society. The most significant consequence of colonisation has been the colonisation of African minds, "making it very difficult for Africans to exercise extra-structural agency" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014: 36). In consequence, the colonised come to "perceive themselves as powerless, that is, as victims even when they were actively engaged in myriad acts of self-assertion" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014: 8).

Hence, the narrative of decolonisation represents the depth of the rejection and reaction against the power of racist imperial colonisers, who for centuries were responsible for the dehumanisation of black Africans on the continent. Their oppressive and exploitative relationship with the continent designated its denizens to be inherently inferior as a race. When African countries gained their independence during the second half of the previous century, it was assumed that this would bring with it an end to colonialism. However, the contrary is true, because the majority of African countries are to a large extent still dependent on the countries that colonised them because of the latter's greater economic and political power (Thesnaar 2017: 2).

Africa stands exposed to the harsh realities of western political and economic abuse in that it remains the richest producer of minerals on earth yet cannot afford to buy the finished products of these minerals that are produced outside the continent. In addition, weak leadership and the lack of viable economic policies made Africa more vulnerable to the former colonisers. Another issue, however, is the strength of the seduction of the narrative of victimhood. Few can resist its allurements because of its presumed power to exonerate leaders' complicity in their societies' dysfunction. The consequences of colonialism and apartheid, i.e. neo-colonialism and persistent racism, must be reversed, which is possible through a process of decolonisation.

3 Post-apartheid South Africa: A lost Opportunity

The new democracy in South Africa has given rise to political freedom without economic freedom, which is an empty political shell. It gives the black African majority access to land, but limits black ownership of land and control of its resources because of the legacy of white ownership of the overwhelming bulk of the land and the economy of the country. The consequences are evident

in the deepening of inequalities and poverty experienced largely by the black African majority during the post-apartheid era. Despite the promises of economic freedom found in the ruling African National Congress's (ANC) political document, the *Freedom Charter*, South Africa's transition from apartheid has not seen a radical transfer of wealth to the black African majority (Gibson 2011: 53). This situation needs to be challenged! The ruling party is aware of this, as became evident at its 2017 national conference when it passed resolutions on radical economic transformation and expropriation of land without compensation.

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has seen remarkable social and economic stability and has acquired significant influence on the African continent and globally. Despite its success, however, South Africa is still characterised by what former president Thabo Mbeki referred to as 'two economies': a vibrant first-world economy which is globally integrated into the world of production, exchange and consumption; and a second, and disconnected, economy characterised by severe underdevelopment, high levels of unemployment and abject poverty (Kanyane 2018: 212). These stubborn realities of unemployment, poverty and inequalities are the consequences of failing to deal decisively with the consequences of white supremacy and privileges that persist in the democratic era.

Mbeki drew his idea of the dual economy in South Africa from Mhone's (1997) concept of economic dualism and enclavism in Southern Africa, and how they reproduce poverty and inequality. Mhone nuances economic dualism and enclavism as a minority engaged in dynamic activities propelled by the capitalist imperative for material accumulation of wealth and a majority trapped in low-productivity, non-capitalist forms of production that are static from the standpoint of accumulation – an enclave of capitalist white supremacy and sub-imperialism in the sea of black poverty. Put cogently, the capitalist sector exists as an enclave in a sea of underemployment, poverty and inequality in the southern African region. Even after four decades of autonomous rule, the region is still plagued by pervasive open and hidden unemployment born out of economic dualism and enclavism (Kanyane 2018: 212).

The current dual nature of the South African economy has resulted in a highly unequal society. In consequence, freedom cannot be reduced to sharing toilets with whites, doing the same jobs whites do, and voting for representation in the same parliament that whites do. The battle for total emancipation must be rooted on radical economic transformation and decolonisation. This requires a radical shift to create an economy that ensures participation of all with a deliberate bias towards the increased participation of the underprivileged and marginalised. Moreover, South Africa can only redeem itself from

the shackles of apartheid and white supremacy if all South Africans accept that the practice of racism is evil and intolerable.

In South Africa, the historical legacy of colonialism, as well as the structural legacy of apartheid, continue to reinforce old patterns of racism, dehumanisation, white supremacy and prejudice as enclaves despite existential political democracy. These patterns are still evident in the injustices found in this society, such as economic, education and land injustices, to name just a few. These injustices have recently been drawn attention to by the #FeesMustFall University protests of 2015/6, especially on issues of de-colonisation and curriculum transformation, as well as racism and reconciliation (Thesnaar 2017: 7). The #FeesMustFall protests is evidence that South Africans have become impatient and can no longer tolerate a democratic regime that has ruled a hollow democracy for so many years. However, the #FeesMustFall, and other Fallist movements, subsided after capturing the country's imagination for several months in 2015; but it has drawn attention to the need for momentum to shift the boundaries of transformation and decolonisation further. The movement, together with other movements such as the #RhodesMustFall movement, placed emphasis on decolonisation as a necessary process to address the issue of race and racism, as well as to deal with the historical injustices inherited from apartheid that are proving to be so intractable.

The process of radical economic transformation and other mechanisms to decolonise South Africa require leadership. However, the country's politicians are largely seen to be corrupt because of their view that 'it is our turn to eat', as noted by Michela Wrong (2009). There is a strong sense among them of entitlement to power, resulting in the abuse of this power. In addition, the appetite for western privileges and lifestyles of affluence and opulence amid poverty has defined the conduct of many of these politicians, sadly so, in a way that mimics the conduct of the former colonial masters. This is an unwelcome repeat of the past! Most importantly, however, is that this situation has made it difficult for nation building and social cohesion to thrive. South Africa was expected to avoid the historical lessons found in past African politicians who amassed the wealth of their own countries to advance their selfish interest. The failure of South African politicians to heed this lesson has been made patently clear in revelations made at the State Capture Commission,² and they

2 The Zondo Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture was established after the previous Public Protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela, made recommendations which were binding. This occurred after the release of a report on an investigation into complaints of alleged improper and unethical conduct by the president and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and the involvement of the Gupta family in the removal

have lost the opportunity to maintain the moral leadership that is so necessary for a decoloniality project to succeed. It appears that South Africa has a long way to go to achieve economic freedom and racial equity.

When South Africa gained its freedom in 1994, it focused on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to provide housing, electricity and water infrastructure, to mention a few, to the black African majority. It failed to deal with several pertinent issues, including the decolonisation of minds to overcome racial superiority and inferiority complexes. The consequence of this is that the country is still battling with racism, economic subjugation and the land question after 27 years of democracy. It is the narrative of 'whiteness', 'white power', 'white supremacy' and 'white monopoly capital', issues which should have been tackled from the outset, that must be firmly placed back on the political, economic and socio-cultural agenda so that they can be tackled with a sense of urgency. The outbreak of looting and violence in the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces in July 2021 are a testament of an unequal society in South Africa.

There is need for a frank and robust discussion about decolonisation that would empower today's black African people suffering from the isomorphic mimicry of the whites because of a broad inferiority complex and desire to attain the goods and privileges that the former white colonial masters had. The people who fought for the liberation of the majority from white oppression are now in power; but after 27 years of rule they have failed to bring about racial equity and economic freedom for this majority who largely live in the black townships, informal settlements and impoverished rural areas. It is clear, in particular, that the ruling party has failed to make progress in achieving an objective that is stated in the country's Constitution, a non-racial South Africa. Above all else, there is a need to restore the dignity and respect of black African people from the injustices of the past through decoloniality, a project which must be informed by indigenous knowledge systems.

4 (De-)coloniality

It is important to understand what decoloniality and decolonisation mean. In this chapter, decoloniality is seen as an outcome, while decolonisation is a process to achieve decoloniality (Walton 2018: 34). The opposite of decoloniality, coloniality, outlasts colonialism and perpetuates patterns of power in social,

and appointment of ministers and directors of State-Owned Entities (SOEs). It was alleged that the Guptas benefitted with these relationships by obtaining lucrative state contracts and other benefits.

economic, cultural, and educational relations that were established as a result of colonialism. Decoloniality is a new term that appears easy to define because it is the opposite of coloniality; but in practice it means different things to different people. Although there is no common understanding of it, it is more than merely gaining independence from colonisers. Many understand it as the outcome of a process of unmasking and stripping the African world of all that is colonial; about undoing imperial domination in all its manifestations. One of the critical stances of a decoloniality project is to reverse the many ways in which Western imperial powers have dominated and shaped the colonised world and to reject or resist those forms of domination. Through this process of reversal and rejection, the objective is to never again be colonised nor to have any form of domination within the decolonised country, where universal dignity is at the epicentre of racial equity and universalism (Eze 2015: 409).

According to Eze (2015: 408), however, the initial decolonisation process in Africa failed to translate into socio-economic equality, and respect for civil and human rights, democratic principles and other individual freedoms. Fanon (1967: 127) notes that the post-colonial bourgeoisie failed to expand a vision of humanity and thus replicated the evils of their racist colonial masters.

In consequence, the efforts at decolonising power and decolonising the mind must be interwoven. This is based on the recognition that, in order to create new public policies that entrench post-colonial democracy, the prevailing colonial mind-set must also change (Suárez-Krabbe 2013: 333). According to Kaunda (2016: 54), if Africans want to minimise the impact of global colonisation, decolonising the mind lies at the core of the struggle for an alternative future. He adds that the de-colonisation of the mind should be understood in holistic terms (Kaunda 2016: 65), and constitutes the first step towards economic and political development, social cohesion, and nation building.

Hwami (2016: 23–4), in his analysis of Fanon's writings, argues that decoloniality by implication means the reversal of colonial conditions and the restoration of pride among black Africans to eliminate the effects of decades of racialisation and dehumanisation. It is for this reason that a decoloniality project should be understood as a way to erase racism and the dehumanisation of the former colonised. Liberation is not only about the transfer of political power to the colonised; but also addressing the economic and cultural aspects of life so that they do not become isomorphic mimicry of the west and the white race. In Fanon's theoretical construct, the national culture 'alerts the colonised to colonialism's agenda of ensnaring them to Western culture', and it helps 'retrieve those cultural practices that the apartheid and colonial regime had thought to erase or reject' (Hwami 2016: 23).

Fanon's work cogently exposes the complexity of nation building after the attainment of political independence that goes beyond the racial divide (Hwami 2016: 24, 33). As such, the black African must refuse to be shackled to the past. It is this Fanonism that can be used to challenge the modern post-colonial African educators' efforts to deconstruct the current Western-oriented education system. A new education system must recognise the shared colonial experience and the best way to approach the future beyond the divisions of white and black race groups. There is a need to create a decolonising learning space; a process of having those being educated develop a sense of ownership and responsibility for their own knowledge creation. It is about bringing to the fore liberated epistemologies, histories, and experiences. In other words, knowledge must not only be consumed in Africa, but it must also be produced there by the black Africans. As such, Nativist education for decolonisation must go beyond black against white, Europe against Africa, but must interrogate all forms of power and hegemonic tendencies from the locus of enunciation to level the playfield. The colonial matrix of power, as (Mignolo, 2009:39) puts it, as the untouched structure of power and knowledge since its formation in the sixteenth century, must be rebutted.

For a decoloniality project to succeed, it will require a discursive radical shift to correct cognitive dissonance and make the African assertive and strong enough to determine their own future. Without this intervention, which Fanon refers to as revolutionary violence, justice will not prevail. Fanon wages war against colonialism and capitalism in the same way as race and racism must be shunned in the post-independent era (Hwami 2016: 22). Furthermore, according to Maldonado-Torres (2007: 244), colonisation is structured around the idea of race. He argues that Fanon's message is clear: decolonisation should aspire at the very minimum to restore or create a reality where racialized subjects could give and receive freely in societies founded on the principle of receptive generosity. Receptive generosity involves a break away from racial dynamics as well as from conceptions of gender and sexuality that inhibit generous interaction among subjects (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 260). As the fiction, i.e. the hegemonic narrative that designated a vast portion of the planet's population to be inferior, is disclosed, the process of liberation can ensue (Mignolo 2009: 40, 44).

According to Mignolo (2009: 42,45), decoloniality is everywhere and is a connector of many organised responses delinking from Western civilisation – imposed dichotomies articulated in the West – and relinking with the legacies that people want to associate with and preserve in view of the affirming modes of existence they want to live. In a nutshell, decoloniality is a response from people who are not happy to be told what to do and who they are – a race question.

Patel (2020: 1464) confirms the relationship between race and decolonisation. Meghji (2020: 1, 3) is also of the view that critical race theory reduces racism to a legacy of the past which obfuscates how people still benefit from racism in the present day and consequently maintains an interest in reproducing the present racial structure. Understandably, critical race theory and decolonial thought are about the analysis of the deep-rooted racialised social system. Meghji (2020: 13) goes on to say that this is another reason why decolonial thought, which links the past to the present by focusing on the enduring logic of coloniality, can capture dimensions of our current political projects and predicaments that critical race theory struggles to reach with its presentist focus, i.e., the present racial structure. The next section therefore demonstrates how the South African people can break from their historical past to live and shape their own present and future lives.

5 Requirements for Decoloniality in South Africa

The 2015/6 Fallist movements taught us that decoloniality is not 'elitist', but rather a grassroots movement that has seen the mobilisation and solidarity of South Africans across racial divides in response to a clarion call for a decolonised and non-racial society (Mashau 2018: 2). Mbembe (2016: 3, cited in Thesnaar 2017: 2) argues that coloniality and racism urgently need to be disrupted and brought to an end by any means possible. This includes dealing with the control white people have over the economy and higher education; the privileges that white people still enjoy at the expense of the marginalised; and superiority and inferiority complexes.

In the South African context, therefore, a decoloniality project is meant also to (de)construct the frontiers of the human mind so that the black African majority can be healed from the ills of the apartheid past. In the narrow and more specific sense, it is about rebutting race and racism in all its forms and manifestations. Decoloniality must help to reclaim the lost dignity caused by the legacy of apartheid, and implies the urgent need to thoroughly confront the racial complexes, white privileges, and other legacies of colonialism and apartheid so that the last can be the first (Hwami 2016: 28). Unless there is radical transformation in post-apartheid South Africa, the anger, angst and pangs of the "native" will not be restrained. To delay radical transformation is to invite explosive retaliation that has the potential to become violent. This retaliation could take the form of race conflict because of the lack of remorse on the part of the perpetrators of oppression during the apartheid era and persistent marginalisation of the black African majority during the post-apartheid

era (Fanon 1967: 16). This revolt of the marginalised and excluded is possible if racism, white privileges and black deprivations persist in the democratic South Africa. What is required is a decoloniality project, which should have three important requirements:

Substantive Equality and Social Justice

Several chapters in this book draw attention to areas in which the democratic state has failed to achieve substantive equality and bring about social justice. They also suggest ways in which radical measures can be implemented to bring about social justice. However, several other areas have not been dealt with. Two deserve mention here. The first is the land issue, and the requirement of a decoloniality project in South Africa in this regard means returning the land to its original owners. To decolonise the land, it must be expropriated without compensation because land dispossession in the country occurred largely without compensation. Decolonisation, as Almeida and Kumalo (2018: 8) write, cannot happen without the recognition among whites that they remain beneficiaries of a colonial system that disposed the indigenous people of their land. If this is not achieved and land expropriation without compensation is resisted, it must be met with violent protests in the manner that the #Fees-Must-Fall and other Fallist protests in 2015/16 disrupted and negated the structures that maintain and support racism and white power. This conforms with Fanon's view of the relevance of revolutionary violence as the last resort when all else has failed.

Another important area is the decolonisation of the curricula in the institutions of learning, which have for long been carriers of western epistemologies. Fomunyan & Teferra (2017:197–8 & 203) write that decolonising the curriculum in the South African context would be one way of making it responsive to local challenges and by extension developing measures to address these challenges. Decolonisation of the curricula in institutions of higher learning should be seen as the inclusion of local or indigenous knowledge and lived experiences in curricula content, thereby eradicating Eurocentric experiences and white power which have dominated curriculum content for decades.

Decolonisation of the Mind through the Pan African Philosophy of Ubuntu

Gibson (2011: 54) argues that there is no colonisation of the land without the colonisation of the minds of the people. A very important requirement for decoloniality is about reviving African humanism, which in this case is *ubuntu*. It is necessary to revive *ubuntu* to take South Africans out of the historical experience of colonialism, discrimination and racism. The values found in *ubuntu*

should be revived because the post-colonial national culture is also based on the values that inspired the struggle for freedom, i.e., the values that gave rise to a new humanism that is beyond white and black distinctions. Ubuntu does not know race, colour or creed. It recognises people as human beings and not as black and white, inferior and superior, but equals. In this sense, ubuntu has parallels with the view that race has no biological basis and is basically a social and political construct. In this sense, ubuntu can replace beliefs in the biological basis of race found in properties such as skin colour, hair type and eye shape, and that these biological differences give rise to inherent cultural, intellectual and physiological differences.

Simply put, ubuntu means humanness, a moral value of common good. It is the humanistic experience of treating all people with respect, granting them their human dignity. Being human encompasses values like universal brotherhood for Africans, sharing, treating and respecting other people as human beings. It places great premium on dignity, respect, reconciliation and social justice in the midst of conflict and hardship. In sum, ubuntu is the “collective consciousness” of the people of African descent – it is the true soul of an African sensitive to the needs of others. The concept of ubuntu is understood as a collective solidarity whereby the self is perceived primarily in relation to the perception of others; that is, persons are perceived less as independent of one another, and more as interdependent of one another (Kamwangamalu 1999: 26). It is a humanistic orientation towards fellow humans (Letseka 2012: 48).

From this perspective, the philosophy could be metaphorically portrayed as the ultimate calibrator of relations among Africans in general, or more philosophically, ‘the potential of being human’. Its assertion of a humanistic attitude towards other human beings creates the potential for the former oppressors and the oppressed, the former coloniser and the colonised, to live equally as humans with no superiority or inferiority complexes about each other. This is recognised in Section 9(1) of the South African Constitution, which emphasises human dignity and social justice by acknowledging the equality of all before the law and their right to equal protection and benefit of the law. Nelson Mandela described ubuntu as follows: “In the old days when we were young, a traveller through a country would stop at a village, and he didn’t have to ask for food or water; once he stops, the people give him food, entertain him. That is one aspect of ubuntu, but it will have various aspects” (Grootboom, 2016: 131). This is a recognition of our common humanity.

Exclusion on any grounds is inherently disrespectful of individual humanness. This exclusion has been a characteristic of apartheid, and is an impediment to the achievement of racial equity and a non-racial society. For this

reason, humanness is important for building strong communities, and South African communities characterised by racial divides should embrace the humanness found in the African philosophy of ubuntu as their core value. Humanness is therefore critical for the eradication of superiority and inferiority complexes.

According to Mashau (2018: 7), to advance true reconciliation and unity in a highly polarised society like South Africa there is a need to treat one another as equals because humanity, irrespective of race, is created in the image of God. From a biblical or theological standpoint, true reconciliation is essential to any approach to humanness and human relationships. A decoloniality project in South Africa thus requires a focus on the re-imagining of self-worth among blacks and, more importantly, to inculcate the values of *ubuntu* among South Africans in general to deal with superiority and inferiority complexes.

There is therefore a need for white South Africans to acquire awareness of the historical roots of their privilege and of the deprivation of blacks in general and black Africans in particular during the apartheid era. This includes a realisation that these benefits and deprivations persist in post-apartheid South Africa, and that they are not a consequence of inherent characteristics and rights of particular racial groups. Ubuntu is the mechanism that can lead to this realisation to the extent that it recognises that every human being has self-worth, with none having more rights and privileges than others. Whites can reach an understanding that they are not superior to black South Africans and black South Africans that they are not inferior to whites if, as Naude (2017:30) writes, they confirm and affirm each other by recognising the humanity of each other. This is one of the requirements on the the road leading to a non-racial society. In this context, the former oppressor must publicly accept that black African people are endowed with the power to think and do, and are not simply reflectors of white people's thoughts. Black Africans must be equally recognised and treated with the respect and the dignity they deserve (Matabeni & Kanyane 2017: 34).

Post-apartheid South Africa has adopted ubuntu as the foundation for the transformation of all aspects of life. There has been a drive towards the revival of values that were lost or demeaned during colonialism and apartheid since 1994, as well as a renewed interest and appreciation of African culture, identity and values. As a result of this quest, the affirmation of ubuntu as an African ethic is important in the quest for identity and human dignity after years of colonial and apartheid rule for black people in general and black Africans in particular. Ubuntu allows for the reimagining of an authentic African identity and sense of belonging which was systematically suppressed during the colonial and apartheid past (Maris, 2020: 308).

Reconciliation and National Unity

The concept of social cohesion has become an increasingly significant part of South African policy discourse. On the one hand, it reflects the imperative of building a democratic post-apartheid nation-state and, on the other hand, increasing anxieties regarding current fragmentation along lines of race, class, gender and ethnicity. Social cohesion is critical to the objectives of the developmental state, which, arguably, requires a “social compact” to rally all sectors of society around a common national vision of transformation (Kanyane 2021: 56).

In 2015, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) published a study which indicated that the creation of a united, reconciled nation remains a noble cause to pursue in South Africa. The study concluded that South Africa has made progress with national reconciliation and that it should continue to pursue reconciliation as a national objective. Although this is certainly a positive development, the IJR study recognises that reconciliation and unity will continue to be under pressure because the black majority is still impoverished and economically excluded. Therefore, it is understandable that most black Africans will not tolerate any form of reconciliation and unity without eliminating all forms of injustice (Thesnaar 2017: 3).

It has become evident that reconciliation and unity is not possible without addressing issues of race and racism, white privileges and all forms of injustices that dehumanise the black Africans. These injustices include superiority and inferiority complexes, as well as the deprivations faced by black Africans in particular, and blacks in general. There is thus a need to search for renewed perspectives to resolve these pertinent issues. Decoloniality is one possible alternative if given a chance. Arguably, the only way to end colonialism and racism is to decolonise the mind in the manner suggested. In addition, complex issues such as land restitution and transformative justice must be tackled uncompromisingly.

Mashau (2018: 2) writes that if the vision of a non-racial South Africa, especially the erasure of race and racism, is to be realised, there is need for an open and genuine conversation between the descendants of the coloniser and the colonised. This is something which is missing, because it is difficult to talk frankly about race issues without evoking the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divisions and sparking racial tension.

According to Thesnaar (2017: 6), safe spaces must be created within our communities where human beings from all sides can be afforded an opportunity to engage with one another, listen to each other, voice their fears and anxieties, journey together and be open to each other’s humanity, fragility and challenges. One such space that can be created is a reconstituted Truth and

Reconciliation project that focuses on race and racism and issues such as restorative justice and unity (Thesnaar 2017: 3). Such a project would draw attention to the nature and consequences of race and racism, while exploring ways in which restorative justice and unity can be achieved. A refocused Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) could be recognised as an independent Chapter 9 Institution³ similar to the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). Such a TRC should focus on certain biological, historical and restorative justice truths, including:

- The scientific evidence that ‘race’ has no biological basis and that no individual has inherent characteristics and capabilities because of ‘race’;
- The historical evidence that centuries of colonialism, segregation and apartheid in South Africa privileged a section of the society and disadvantaged others; and
- The existing evidence of gross inequalities based on race during the post-apartheid period arising from three centuries of white rule in the country which can only be resolved through racial redress.

These truths can form the foundation for a process of reconciliation that is only possible once there is broad understanding and consensus on these three truths.

If it is not possible to reconstitute the TRC in this form, the mandate of the SAHRC could be amended to include issues such as restorative justice to advance reconciliation and national unity that is a prerequisite for a society free from race and racism. The TRC envisaged here, or alternatively a SAHRC with a revised mandate, and the philosophy of ubuntu that should underpin it, should be embedded in the National Action Plan (NAP) to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance adopted in March 2019 by the cabinet. The NAP (2019: 4) “is based on the collective conviction of South Africans that, given that the ills of unfair discrimination and inequality are human-made; there are means to completely eradicate these ills from our country. The plan calls for commitment by all South Africans to values and behaviour that will break with our hurtful and damaging past and that will keep our moral compass trained on our path of renewal and growth.” The NAP

3 Chapter 9 institutions are state institutions supporting constitutional democracy found in Chapter 9 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution, 1996. These are: (a) The Public Protector, (b) The South African Human Rights Commission, (c) The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, (d) The Commission for Gender Equality, (e) The Auditor-General and (f) The Electoral Commission. They are oversight institutions which must be independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.

in its current form must be revised to include ubuntu as the underlying value and a TRC as an implementing instrument of the Plan.

In summary, the *achievement of substantive equality and social justice, decolonisation of the minds* and *national reconciliation and unity* are key requirements of a decoloniality project in South Africa. All three requirements aim at transforming South African society to take it beyond its traumatic past. In this way, greater social cohesion of significant value could be attained such that people will respect each other's humanity, dignity and desire to reclaim their identities, self-worth and social humanness.

6 Conclusion

Apartheid and all its manifestations are still stubbornly persistent in the post-apartheid South Africa. The issues of race and racism, along with the related issues of white supremacy, white privilege, superiority and inferiority complexes, and deprivations, will continue to occupy South Africans if they remain unresolved. South Africa is not making much progress in aggressively dealing with the consequences of apartheid insofar as race and racism are concerned, and it has missed an opportunity to move decisively towards a non-racial society. The persistent manifestations of various aspects of the apartheid system in the democratic South Africa leaves the new democracy at the crossroad between apartheid and decoloniality. However, there is a possible way out of this impasse. The solution is a national decoloniality project that has three key requirements: (a) the achievement of substantive equality and social justice; (b) the decolonisation of the minds through ubuntu as a pan African philosophy; and (c) the achievement of reconciliation and national unity. These would go a long way to making race irrelevant in South Africa, and thereby contribute to its erasure.

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Conclusion: *Towards a Non-racial Society*

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Race and racism remain salient features of post-apartheid South Africa, more than twenty-seven years into democratic rule. The chapters in this book demonstrate their manifestation in many significant areas of the society, but deal with only some of the ways in which race and racism are manifested. However, to come to a full understanding of the challenges of race and racism in post-apartheid South Africa, it is necessary to discuss the situation the new democratic state inherited after the first democratic elections in April 1994.

Centuries of colonial, segregation and apartheid rule resulted in a society in which a minority, which enjoyed almost exclusive political control during this entire period, enjoyed a disproportionate share of the economic and social benefits, while a majority, which was prevented from exercising any significant political control, were denied opportunities equal to that of the minority. Processes underlying political conquest, colonial genocide, land dispossession, the denial of political rights, racial segregation, and unequal access to land, education, jobs, economic opportunities, health, housing and other social benefits created a grossly unequal society in which poverty and wealth were disproportionately allocated to certain race groups. South Africa at the time of the first democratic elections mirrored colonial society in which enclaves of extreme wealth co-existed with large tracts of unemployment and poverty. The country was a paradise for the white minority. Legalised racial discrimination and racism made this possible!

These extreme disparities were justified and made possible because of the ideologies of racial difference and superiority and inferiority, which led to the inculcation of notions of inherent capabilities and rights for each 'race' group by generations of both black and white. Most importantly, the dehumanisation of the black African majority during the colonial period and the entrenchment of a racial hierarchy during the apartheid era in particular promoted superiority complexes among members of the other 'race' groups, and inferiority complexes among members of both the black African and other black 'race' groups. While whites considered themselves and were considered by many black people to be superior, many coloureds and Indians, by virtue of the privileges accorded by the white regime, considered black Africans inferior to them. There were several other significant consequences. Among others,

the history, knowledge systems and culture of black Africans in particular, and blacks in general, were deemed inferior and of no relevance for the society. White history, knowledge systems and culture predominated until the end of apartheid.

The first democratic elections ushered in a period of hope and expectation that a non-racial paradise would be established in the country in which race would become irrelevant and racism eradicated. The chapters in this book illustrate that this did not happen. Above all else, it has been demonstrated that: white privilege and a racialised power structure continue to exist; racism is manifest in the society in many ways; and race remains significantly linked to identity in post-apartheid South Africa.

Systemic racism and racial capitalism in the post-apartheid era are the key factors behind the perpetuation of a power structure in which, while political power has been transferred to the majority, economic power remains in the hands of a racial minority. A mechanism introduced to transform the latter power structure, Black Economic Empowerment, failed to do so because race is being used to benefit a small black elite and lead to a convergence of interest with white capital that leaves the racial control of the economy largely unchanged. The control of the economy that whites enjoyed during apartheid that was left intact when political power was transferred to the black majority enabled white corporate leaders to play a leading role in the process of black economic empowerment such that it led to benefits accruing only to a small number of black people. In addition, white capital used the mechanism for redress of past imbalances to acquire additional social and economic benefits while deflecting more difficult questions of racial equality by allowing a few black people to enter their ranks. Race and racism lie at the centre of a process in which the racial identities of black people are used to give social and economic benefits to white capitalists, while systemic racism accounts for the denial of access to black people in general to the economic resources that black economic empowerment was intended to achieve. The apartheid economic power structure remains intact.

The persistence of structural racism, as well as cultural biases that were evident during the apartheid era, continue to impose barriers on the advancement of black African women in particular in the workplace in post-apartheid South Africa. The introduction of legislation to address past historical imbalances in employment in government, the private sector and in other sectors of society has failed to bring about a radical change in employment patterns in certain sectors and has had several other unintended consequences. The most significant of the latter is that white women have been the main beneficiaries of employment equity legislation, particularly in terms of their increasing

occupation of the senior categories of employment in the private sector and educational institutions. This, in turn, has meant that white control of the private sector and educational institutions has remained largely the same as it was during the apartheid era. Evidence of a dramatic increase in employment of black people in general in senior positions in all three spheres of government, and the continuing dominance of whites of similar positions in the private sector and educational institutions, illustrate just how significant a role race plays in determining advancement (and control) of certain sectors. Employment equity has accounted for the advancement of white women in such a manner that the power structure in the economy and the educational institutions of the country remains, essentially, white-dominated.

Racism accounts for the domination of certain spaces in South African society by white South Africans, including the country's higher education institutions. The racial discrimination directed against black academics at universities during the apartheid era continues to play out in several of these institutions in the post-apartheid era. Case studies of direct attacks on individual black academics at certain institutions indicate a trend in which white privilege is protected in such a manner that makes it uncomfortable for any black academic to seek 'progression' in these institutions. There is also the charge that selection processes are manipulated to favour white candidates. This racism accounts for the continued domination by whites of senior positions in educational institutions, and a perpetuation of the racial power structure.

This process of exclusion of academics at specific institutions based on race is exacerbated by the structural racism that is found in the language policies of various universities, which lead to advantages for mainly white students and disadvantages for black African students in particular. The use of English and Afrikaans as languages of learning and teaching at universities provides English- and Afrikaans-speaking students a better chance of succeeding at university (and therefore professionally in all sectors later in life), while black African students, whose first languages are not used for learning and teaching purposes nor for academic resources such as books, are more likely to fail because they have the additional burden of having to assimilate into dominant institutional cultures and practices that favour white and other black students. This reinforces a racial power structure, in which better qualified white, Indian and coloured students are in a more favourable position than black African students to advance towards higher positions in both the private sector and educational institutions.

Racial discrimination and prejudice flourish in the new democracy, and is evident in the high level of self-reported experiences of racial discrimination

among all race groups, as well as the pervasiveness of racist attacks by members of one race group against members of another. Although the level of self-reported discrimination differs from one race group to the other, South Africans of all race groups experience racial discrimination in post-apartheid South Africa. In some respects, some individuals feel discriminated as a group because of their race, and experience discrimination in terms of how they perceive their group to be marginalised in the new democracy. For others, it is the experience of discrimination directed against them by members of other race groups that accounts for their self-reported racial discrimination. Nevertheless, the evidence of self-reported racial discrimination indicates not only that racism continues to be pervasive, but that it includes perceptions of racial discrimination directed against whites as well as against members of some black groups by other black people.

Poverty is linked to race in South Africa, with black Africans constituting a disproportionate share of the poor in the country. Thus, the ways in which members of the different race groups perceive the underlying causes of poverty is another demonstration of the persistence of racism during the post-apartheid era. In a society in which whiteness is associated with intellectual superiority, competence and success, and blackness with stupidity, incompetence and laziness, such prejudices contribute to people's understanding of the causes of poverty. On the one hand, significant numbers of black Africans and coloureds view poverty to be caused by external economic, political or cultural factors (bad luck, injustices in South African society, and an inevitable part of modern progress). On the other hand, a smaller number of Indians and whites view it to be a consequence of such factors. Most importantly, however, is that while 33% of Indians, 30% of whites and 23% of coloureds feel that poverty is caused by individuals' laziness, only 16% of black Africans feel this way. This reflects the racial differences in understanding the causes of deprivation, and of negative views of the poor held by members of some race groups.

Racial discrimination is experienced by South African sports people as well. Racial privilege, prejudice and stereotypes lie behind the racism found in certain South Africans' views on the selection of blacks for the country's national sports teams, as well as how selections are made. Here, white privilege provides an advantage for white sports people by providing them better sports facilities and opportunities early in life than black people, creating networks that ensure selection for national sports teams, and making it easier for them to fit into an institutional culture found in national sports teams such as cricket that is predominantly white. This is reinforced by a view that whites are inherently better at certain sports than black sports people. Thus, when black people are selected, it is often perceived to be because of a political objective

to include black people in national sports teams and not on merit. Racism is thus one of the most significant obstacles to transformation in sport in post-apartheid South Africa.

Racial discrimination also contributes to xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. The country has seen increasing discrimination and xenophobic attacks against foreign migrants, as well as high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment among the country's citizens. Interracial animosity appears to be a better determinant of attitudes towards foreigners from Africa than socio-economic status because there is a strong correlation between interracial threat and anti-immigrant sentiment. 'Xenophobic hostility' is thus part of the greater problem of racism and racialisation in the country. It would appear that the fear generated by racism is indirectly undermining trust between the native-born and foreign nationals in the country. Hostility towards African foreigners is grounded in anti-black social identification and colonial-established insider–outsider relations. The correlation between a sense of interracial threat and anti-immigrant sentiment shows the manner in which 'blackness' and 'African-ness' is understood in the South African context, and helps explain why certain foreign groups are singled out for hostility more frequently than others. This is evident in certain stereotypes about foreign migrants from Africa, including the use of the label 'Nigerian' in the country to represent a host of colonial stereotypes about backward and corrupt 'African-ness'.

Race is central to identity – in terms of both self-identification and how others identify individuals – and there is a continuing emphasis on racial difference in post-apartheid South Africa. The requirement to often define 'who you are' to others is an issue that young biracial people face, and is indicative of the emphasis placed on racial classification as identity. This is an issue that is not peculiar to biracial South Africans, but affects dark-complexioned whites who might appear to be coloured, dark-complexioned coloured and Indian South Africans who might appear to be black African, fair-complexioned black Africans and Indians who might appear to be coloured, fair-complexioned coloureds and Indians who might appear to be white, and dark-complexioned black Africans, Indians and coloureds who might appear to be migrant foreigners from other parts of Africa. The strategies employed by biracial people to deal with questions about their racial identity illustrate just how complex the issue of race is for many South Africans. Above all else, the need to classify oneself to others is linked to awareness of the perceived benefits associated with whiteness and blackness (such as affirmative action), as well as the negative effects of identifying as a member of either of these groups in post-apartheid South Africa.

The link between race and identity in South Africa is also illustrated by the way that both black and white South African students view the government's performance in bringing about social transformation and resolving the country's challenges through a racial prism and collective consciousness. Both white and black students identify their opportunities and challenges, and those of other race groups, in post-apartheid South Africa from the perspective of the opportunities and challenges faced by their race groups as a whole. While black students base their perceptions on the collective consciousness of blackness and the experience of continued racialised poverty and inequality, white students base theirs on the collective experience of exclusion based on affirmative action policies and their construction as the "oppressor". The collective consciousness of the race group, rather than individual experiences and prospects, tend to predominate, indicating the impact of racial identity on perceptions. This is evidence of an increasing race consciousness.

The democratic government inherited a racialised heritage landscape in 1994, and several challenges to transform this landscape arise from this. The dominant feature of the racialised heritage is the celebration and memorialisation of colonial conquest over the indigenous populations, and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and its triumph over all other South Africans. This heritage is closely linked to state formation during particular periods, which is in turn linked to the formation of political identities – which were largely race-based. The colonial and apartheid manifestations of race dominance are repugnant to the majority of South Africans, and student movements have been instrumental in popularising opposition to these commemorative symbols that memorialise the triumph of one race group over others. By contrast, the new heritage resources developed since 1994 celebrate the triumph of the struggle against apartheid, and memorialise South Africans of all race groups. Nevertheless, these symbols memorialise the triumph of one group over another. Heritage remains linked closely to racial identity. In addition, race remains at the centre of the debate about the transformation of the heritage landscape, with those who defend the status quo that provides a prominent place for colonial and Afrikaner heritage resources being mainly white, and those calling for the radical transformation of this landscape by removing all colonial and apartheid heritage resources being largely black.

Centuries of colonialism, segregation and apartheid rule have resulted in the dehumanisation of the indigenous population, and a distortion of the black African identity in particular. African histories, achievements, cultures and identities have been deemed insignificant. The period of democratic rule has not brought about substantive equality and social justice, and the democratic state is at a crossroad: to continue in the manner that keeps certain vestiges of

apartheid intact; or to move in the direction of a non-racial society through a decoloniality project. Such a decoloniality project requires the achievement of substantive equality, the decolonisation of the minds of both black and white South Africans, and national reconciliation and unity.

There are several reasons why race is still salient and racism pervasive. The first is the significant advantage that a small sector of the society enjoyed after 300 years of colonial, segregation and apartheid rule at the time democracy was introduced in 1994. Apartheid accounted for the development of a racial 'paradise', in which whites came to enjoy a standard of living comparable to those of people living in the industrialised countries of the west largely through the application of race legislation. In order to achieve this, legislation was applied to deny black people access to political power, as well as to suppress their efforts to acquire such power; to deny black people economic power by limiting their access to jobs, education, land and other economic resources that resulted in whites enjoying a disproportionate share of the national wealth; and to deny black people an equal share of social spending to further restrict them to lives of penury. This was possible through legislation that defined people's 'race' and protected the 'purity' of the white 'race'; and thereby made it possible to assign to each 'race' group certain benefits.

The cornerstone on which this system was built is the notion of racial supremacy, or the view that one race has superiority in knowledge, capabilities, culture, etc. and should therefore take leadership in all spheres. Several of the chapters in the book demonstrate how colonialism, segregation and apartheid rule have given rise to superiority and inferiority complexes. The dehumanisation of the African people by categorising them as savages, 'othering' and the subordination of their knowledge systems, achievements, languages and culture have all conspired to make some feel that they are inherently more knowledgeable, capable, endowed with moral behaviour and entitled to certain benefits than others, and for some to see that they inherently possess less of these human characteristics and entitlements than others. At worst, it has given rise to the notions of "whiteness" (intellectual superiority, competence, moral superiority) and "blackness" (stupidity, incompetence, corruption), and to racial stereotypes arising from these notions that find their expression in acts of racism. The consequence of centuries of race rule is the strong belief in these notions and stereotypes held by significant numbers of both black and white South Africans at the beginning of, and throughout the democratic era.

Secondly, race remains relevant in post-apartheid South Africa because of the necessity for racially discriminatory affirmative action legislation and racial labels to undo the effects of centuries of racial discrimination, oppression and

exploitation. The first democratic government took over political power after centuries of white domination and control of every significant sector of society, and was unlikely to change this situation by relying on whites to willingly relinquish this domination and control in all areas. In addition, this is a process that cannot be left to the 'market', as some would argue, precisely because black and white do not enter that market on an equal basis due to centuries of white privilege. Thus, the achievement of substantive equality, like the substantive inequality that was achieved during the apartheid era, requires legislation that discriminates positively in favour of some groups. In consequence, the labels applied to these groups acquire significance because they are necessary for the implementation of redress measures as well as the measurement of success or failure in reaching targets. Thus, race legislation and labels remain relevant as long as substantive inequality continues to exist.

Thirdly, race remains relevant because of the unintended consequences of affirmative action legislation, as well as the failure to achieve substantive equality despite this legislation. As has been demonstrated in some chapters, race legislation such as the Black Economic Empowerment and Employment Equity Acts have both had the unintended consequence of giving an advantage only to select groups in South African society. In the case of the former, an elite group of black business-people have been the main beneficiaries of efforts to achieve equality in the economy through race legislation, thereby leaving white control of this sector virtually unchanged. In the case of the latter, employment equity has largely benefited white women in certain key sectors, thereby reinforcing white control of the economy and educational institutions. Most importantly, it has been demonstrated that affirmative action has failed to bring any significant change to the racial power structure in South Africa, with the only significant change being the transfer of political power to all South Africans, and black Africans in particular. By contrast, whites continue to dominate the top categories of employment in the private sector and educational institutions, giving them power in these sectors that is not commensurate with their small share of the population.

Fourthly, there are significant areas of racial discrimination that have not been given adequate attention for most of the post-apartheid era, including the skewed racial ownership of land, the treatment of African languages at universities, racial discrimination against black lecturing staff at universities, sports development in the townships, discrimination against foreigners, to mention just the few that are discussed in this book.

Finally, racism is still pervasive in post-apartheid South Africa because of the loss of privileges by some that democracy brought with it and the persistence of superiority and inferiority complexes.

Race legislation has had the unintended consequence of adding fuel to inter-racial resentment and feelings of marginalisation and discrimination among members of some race groups. Some of the chapters in the book draw attention to a feeling among whites that affirmative action discriminates against them and leaves them marginalised in the democratic South Africa. In large part this has more to do with perception than with reality. On the one hand, while political power lies in the hands of the black majority, it is here that the apparent commitment to creating substantive equality lies and where a major power shift has occurred. Whites perceive that black Africans are using their political power to discriminate against them and to favour black Africans in particular, while the reality is that whites continue to dominate top management positions in the private sector and educational institutions. On the other hand, while whites continue to control the levers of the economy and educational institutions, substantive equality remains an illusion and a goal still to be achieved in these sectors. This raises a range of perceptions of racial discrimination in the private sector and higher education institutions among members of other race groups, including the way employment equity and black economic empowerment are implemented in these sectors, the hegemony of English and Afrikaans as languages of instruction at universities, and the treatment of senior black academics at these institutions. Together, these fuel racism.

Notions of racial superiority and inferiority encourage the belief that certain spaces 'ought' to be restricted to members of certain race groups because they possess inherent qualities and entitlements. The ability to wield political power, to command the heights of the economy and the academy, to succeed in higher education, to excel in certain sports, among others, is believed to be ascribed to some and not to others. It is no wonder that biracial youth are confronted with challenges of fitting into one or the other racial group because, among other things, the selection of one confers certain privileges and entitlements, and the selection of others involves a loss of privilege and entitlement. Whiteness thus confers on some South Africans the inherent right to certain spaces that other South Africans are seen as incapable of occupying. When the latter do occupy these spaces – from beaches, universities, and national sports teams to the commanding heights of the economy and certain academic institutions that were reserved for whites during apartheid – it evokes all kinds of racist reactions.

Because of the multiple ways in which race and racism are manifested in post-apartheid South Africa, and because of the various reasons why race continues to be relevant and racism so pervasive, race and racism have to be tackled in multiple ways. Several suggestions are provided in this volume, although the list is not exhaustive.

One of the most significant of these is to achieve racial redress in significant sectors of society that culminates in genuine transformation of the power structure that currently perpetuates structural racism and gender biases in the country. This requires radical action to transform the existing power structures in the economy and educational institutions in particular. Racial discrimination cannot be tackled by government programmes that promote social cohesion, laws that outlaw and criminalise hate speech, and institutions that monitor and mete out punishment against racists alone, but require a fundamental change in attitudes that are the consequences of centuries of colonisation, segregation and apartheid. The goal of establishing a society “that compliments racial variance and plurality while all together upholding human equality” is a difficult objective. The starting point is to increasingly work against all that places race at the centre of identity.

Included here is the need for white South Africans to come to the realisation that whiteness and blackness are realities in post-apartheid South Africa, where they continue to enjoy a disproportionate share of some of the benefits of the society while others suffer a disproportionate share of its disadvantages; and that these are not a consequence of inherent racial attributes, but of centuries of racial privilege and deprivation. White South Africans need to reach an understanding that “white privilege”, or “whiteness”, and in particular the way the colonial and apartheid systems provided such significant opportunities for them while denying the same opportunities to black people in general, and black Africans in particular, has created a form of structural racism that persists in post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, despite perceptions of exclusion and feelings of being discriminated against, the reality is that whites as a ‘race’ group are among the main beneficiary of the democratic dividend. This structural racism is characterised, and indeed perpetuated, by a racialised power structure that gives them control over significant sectors of South African society.

Race labels only have relevance in a society that is characterised by stark racial inequalities and of high levels of racial discrimination and racism, as post-apartheid South Africa currently is. If there is no substantive equality in all areas of South African society, and as long as both black and white people have not undergone a decolonisation of the minds that destroys all inferiority and superiority complexes, race will remain a salient feature of South African society, and racism pervasive. The two are vital factors behind the persisting salience of race and the pervasiveness of racism. The chapters in this book have drawn attention to multiple manifestations of race and racism, and that each manifestation requires a particular action (e.g. radical economic empowerment and employment equity strategies, introducing African languages as

languages of instruction equal to English and Afrikaans at universities, radically transforming the heritage landscape, etc.) in order to achieve substantive equality, as well as the need to embark on a project that eliminates inferiority and superiority complexes. It is only through these two processes that race and racism can be erased and national reconciliation and unity become possible.

On the one hand, there will always be a need for policies and programmes that place race at the centre if substantive equality is not achieved. Thus, racial labels and discriminatory legislation remain necessary while equality remains elusive. This, in turn, encourages perceptions of racial discrimination among some, and consequent alienation between race groups. Both black and white South Africans must realise that it is necessary to achieve substantive equality in order to deal with the challenges of race and racism. Creating racial equity will go a long way towards eradicating race and racial labels.

On the other hand, even in a situation of substantive equality, racism and racial discrimination will flourish if perceptions of racial superiority and inferiority persist, and one group of people feel that they are superior to another. Both black and white South Africans need to come to the realisation that race is a social construct, and that racial superiority and inferiority have no scientific or any other basis. The fallacious ideologies of race and white supremacy lie behind the justification for colonialism in Africa and racial segregation in South Africa, and all their consequences. The increasing recognition that these are false ideas will go a long way to making race irrelevant.

Democracy has meant that the racial 'paradise' and some of the privileges it brought to some people have been lost, while the non-racial paradise it promised and that many have sacrificed their lives for has not yet been realised. Post-apartheid South Africa retains some of the privileges of apartheid for a few, as well as some elements of the non-racial paradise for all. It is only by dealing with the former decisively and totally that the latter can be attained, and race and racism ultimately erased. This is only possible if a decoloniality project is embarked upon in earnest.

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