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
The Brain Drain

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The migration of skills and labour

The migration of skills and labour – human capital – is one of the key features of the globalisation trend. Not surprisingly, the management of this process presents an enormous challenge to the economies of the affected countries. In light of this, the South African government's White Paper on international migration indicates a clear preference and indeed inducements for the attraction and retention of skilled personnel. Government policy on migration spells out a regime of detect, detain and deport for those whose skills are found to be redundant in the South African economic context, writes **Winston Meso.**

A glance at the South African White Paper on migration shows a healthy dose of creative thinking in articulating the interests of skilled personnel by eschewing "rigid classifications" and employing what is termed a "monetary coefficient to simplify administrative procedures".

The current hue and cry about a "brain drain" haemorrhaging the Southern African economy obscures the fact that this is still a highly sought-after destination for skilled people for a number of reasons. Indeed, even the term "skilled" means different things in different contexts.

The articles in this issue use the term "skilled" in a holistic fashion, broadly defining the word to include even those people without post-graduate degrees. The studies, carried out by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), attempt to "get under the skin" of the push and pull factors for migration. Indeed, as the authors point out, thinking about migrating and actually doing it are totally different issues.

The debate on migration, as is often the case, ignores the reality that skilled people, whether citizens or foreigners, are on the whole content with their jobs and the communities they live in. One need only read beyond the sensational claims that litter our media to see that, for a variety of reasons, skilled personnel from the Southern African region and beyond base their decisions on more than horrid crime statistics.

Empirical studies, such as those collected here, show that high on the dissatisfaction list, for instance, are attitudes to taxation and services. This line of reasoning spells out the possibility of high taxation acting as a spur for the brain drain, given that countries that usually attract skilled South Africans in particular have comparatively low tax regimes.

In the United States, for example, "tax

The debate on migration ignores the reality that skilled people ... are on the whole content with their jobs and the communities they live in.

cuts" have become a potent political platform. However, we do not foresee the South African government slashing its revenue base in a bid to stem the so-called "brain drain".

The White Paper on international migration very clearly recognises the importance of a skilled pool and has put in place mechanisms to harness this scarce resource whilst also dampening the fires of xenophobia.

The SAMP studies, among others, illustrate the regional dimension of the skills/migration issue. The recently adopted SADC Free Trade Area Protocol specifically mentions the necessity for a regional framework on the movement of skilled people within the region.

It will therefore be interesting to see what sort of policies the Free Trade Area Protocol outlines with respect to skilled personnel. Some analysts argue that colonial constructs die hard, and therefore governments in the region will move according to their narrow nationalistic impulses and continue to make work permits impossible to obtain.

Yet an often overlooked aspect of the migration debate is that of those classified as "labour". Even the White Paper on international migration alludes to the labour component as being unwelcome, given the oversupply of unskilled labour, which almost invariably turns out to be black African. Nevertheless, the challenge remains for strategic thinking and planning with regard to the issue of regional migration. The SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of People must be rekindled and implemented in tandem with the Free Trade Area Protocol.

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
Understanding Skilled Migration in Southern Africa

The movement of skilled people from one country to another is one of the most hotly contested public policy questions today. Debates amongst politicians, academics and bureaucrats about the scale and character of skilled migration, and the policies required to address these movements, are taking place in countries throughout the world.[1] As the opportunities for skilled personnel to move increase with globalisation and the shift to a service economy, as the costs of international travel decrease, and as the ability to communicate with other parts of the world becomes easier, it is likely that skilled migration will increase over the next few decades —magnifying its importance as a public policy issue.[2] **David A McDonald and Jonathan Crush**[3] report.

Compared to the volume of unskilled and forced migration, the international movement of skilled people is still relatively small, but its social and economic relevance outweighs its numerical significance for a number of reasons.[4] The loss of a country's "best and brightest" is not only a loss of human resources but also a general indicator of whether a country is a desirable place to live. Nothing conjures up the image of a country gone wrong like the belief that skilled people are leaving in droves. A skilled exodus heralds tougher times to come, as social and financial capital moves with skilled nationals.

Given the far-reaching social and economic implications of the so-called "brain drain" it is not surprising that there has been much public and academic hyperbole on the matter. Political leaders declare emigrants unpatriotic and selfish, while the media make wild and unsubstantiated statements about the extent of emigration and its motivations.

Southern Africa is no different in this respect. Skilled migration is a topic of hot debate in the region – particularly in South Africa where the emigration of skilled nationals has generated considerable public attention. In the early 1990s, for example, the brain drain became a card in the hands of those arguing for the entrenchment of white political privilege.[5] The issue re-emerged with unexpected force after 1994. Front-page headlines declaring "74% of Skilled SAs Ready to Quit the Country"[6] or "Exodus as Rainbow Nation's iridescence fades"[7] have contributed to a panic over the state of the country's social and economic stability, while vituperative responses from government officials attempting to defend their post-apartheid record have served to polarise the debate. The *Sunday Times* headline, for example, fueled a national controversy on the subject, starting with a speech at a SADC conference by then-President Nelson Mandela in which he suggested that "whites were running away from their country" and that "the real South Africans were being sorted out in the process".

In other SADC countries, the long-standing "brain drain" debate is a great deal more sophisticated.[8] At independence in the 1960s and 1970s, most countries inherited a woefully underdeveloped local skills base. Much advanced training had, perforce, to take place outside the country or region. Governments sending students overseas confronted the challenge of drawing them back again later. Local training became a much more attractive and cost-effective alternative and there was dramatic expansion of higher education in most SADC states. Independence also saw a major expansion in the numbers of highly-skilled expatriates arriving in these countries, primarily from Europe, North America and the rest of Africa. Organisations such as the IOM also set up programmes to encourage skilled nationals to return home.[9]

Governments played a delicate game – offering skilled expatriates sufficient inducement to pass on their skills and experience while dissuading them from staying permanently. In the 1980s and 1990s, various new developments refocused the brain drain debate as many countries faced, for the first time, a potential drain of local skills to other countries within the SADC. The first movement of significance was the so-called "white flight" to South Africa from countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique.[10] Politically their departure was unlamented but their exodus left sudden holes in the private and public skills base. Deteriorating economic conditions in some states led to further uncertainty and departures, this time of skilled blacks. From the late 1970s, a "silent" drift of skills began from SADC and other African countries (particularly Ghana and Uganda) to the "independent" South African homelands of Transkei and Bophuthatswana. Prah's study of what he called "the great trek of talent" to the homelands involved an estimated 7 000 highly skilled Africans by the late 1980s.[11]

In the early 1990s, the end of apartheid produced fears within SADC of a "peace dividend" in the form of renewed brain drain to South Africa from the rest of the region.[12] Initially, these fears seemed justified. Skills migration to South Africa from all other SADC states jumped significantly in the run-up to the 1994 election. Some 200 medical doctors left Zimbabwe for Botswana and South Africa in 1992 alone.[13] Experts projected further losses and a significant impact on struggling local economies. The region's loss would be South Africa's gain, further exacerbating chronic regional inequalities. These fears have actually been muted by post-1994 South African immigration policy which placed a very low premium on skills import from anywhere.[14] The other SADC states have been the unwitting beneficiaries of South Africa's anti-immigrationism. Work permits have been hard to come by and the anticipated movement of skilled Africans into South Africa has not yet reached expected levels.

Finding the Right Numbers

The need for reliable data on the extent and impact of skilled migration cannot be overstated, as the recent South African furore amply demonstrates. Unfortunately, the debate has been based more on misinformation and conjecture than methodologically-sound research, with the *Sunday Times* article mentioned above being a good case in point. Although an impressive 11 000 people responded to a questionnaire in the "appointments" section of the newspaper, there is no way of knowing if the sample was representative of the skilled population in the country as a whole. Moreover, the largely financial and managerial nature of the jobs advertised constitutes a very narrow definition of "skills", and the people reading the "appointments" section are more likely to be out of work, about to change their jobs, or dissatisfied with their current job at any rate – not a normal cross-section of skilled personnel. The readership of the newspaper is also largely white and English-speaking.

Another problem with the *Sunday Times* survey was that responses came only from those who were sufficiently motivated to fill out the questionnaire and return it by post. Surveys that require people to post back responses, or phone-in their opinions, are likely to be biased since those who have strong opinions are more likely to take the time to fill the questionnaire out and return it. In this case, the odds are strong that the sample is over-represented by people who want to make a statement about their disillusionment with the current state of affairs. In other words, the 11 000 responses that led to the front-page banner headline and kicked off a national debate came from a group of people who read a traditionally white, English-language Sunday newspaper, and who are more likely to be dissatisfied with their present lot in life than a true cross-section of skilled South Africans.

There have been few serious efforts hitherto to take the brain drain debate beyond the level of anecdote and urban legend. While Prah made a serious effort at a representative survey of skills migration to the South African bantustans, the topic was of limited scope and the sample size small.[15] Considerably more bizarre was a survey of 89 emigrating

South Africans on board a cruise ship destined for Australia; research that was subsequently published as a serious academic contribution.[16] Policy making on a topic as important as the "brain drain" must be based on far more sound and rigorous methodological research than this and conducted in a transparent manner.

In 1998, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) therefore instituted a series of representative national surveys in the SADC region on the attitudes of skilled people towards migration. Nationally-representative surveys were conducted in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho to provide detailed information on the scale and character of skilled migration (plans to include Zimbabwe were cancelled due to the unexpected closure of the university at the time of the research). Future research on this issue is planned for Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique.

The research was broken into three components. The first component was interviews with "skilled nationals", i.e. skilled people who are citizens and residents of the country surveyed. A total of 1 257 people were interviewed from a range of occupations and training: 725 in South Africa, 306 in Lesotho, and 226 in Botswana. The samples were based on the best demographic information available for skilled nationals in each of the countries and were conducted using rig-

September 1998 interrupted interviews in that country and data collection was halted after only 67 interviews with skilled foreigners.

The third component of the research was interviews with employers of skilled personnel. This work was conducted in South Africa, and consisted of 200 public and private sector organisations from a wide range of industrial, commercial and service areas. Once again, these interviews are broadly representative of skilled employers in the country and sampling and interviewing techniques followed standard academic practices.

A final piece of research which was not part of the original SAMP research activities was conducted by the South African National Skills Abroad (SANSA) network. The SANSA article examines the pool of skilled South African nationals living in other parts of the world and attempts to gauge both the quantitative and qualitative character of this diaspora.

In total, over 2 000 people were interviewed by SAMP in three different countries, with an additional 2 000 diasporic skilled South Africans covered in the SANSA database. This research represents the widest sampling of skilled personnel ever conducted in Southern Africa. It serves as a reliable baseline of empirical data as well as a methodological yardstick for future research on the topic.

This research is not, however, the final word on skilled migration in Southern

er samples of skilled people can provide this kind of ethnographic information. The work presented here should therefore be seen as "research in progress"; an iterative process of understanding skilled migration in Southern Africa based on a range of methodologically-sound research activities.

What is "Skilled"?

The idea of a "brain drain" implies a depletion of skilled people who are vital to the functional core of a national economy. While definitions of skilled persons vary, they all tend to focus on people who have received some sort of specialised training that results in superior technical competence. Without these people, the operation and development of the economy would be severely hindered. We opted in this research for a relatively broad definition of skilled – one that encompasses a broader range of skills than the popular imagination might imply. The functional core of an economy does not only consist of people with post-graduate degrees, in well-paying, high level corporate positions. It is also sustained by people who, despite having no advanced formal education, have worked their way up the corporate ladder, started their own businesses, or play a critical role in the public sector.

The samples are also contextualised, as what is deemed an important skill in one country may not be important in

There is no doubt that thousands of South Africans, Batswana and Basotho are leaving their countries to live and work in other countries in the region and other parts of the world, but the situation is far from desperate and there is no indication of a looming mass exodus in the near future.

orous selection methods and trained interviewers. Sample selection and questionnaires were consistent across the three countries.

The second component of the research was interviews with "skilled foreigners", i.e. skilled personnel living and working in the country where they were interviewed but not citizens of that country. These samples were also broadly representative of the pool of skilled people, and sample selection and questionnaire formats were again consistent for the countries surveyed. A total of 400 interviews were conducted in South Africa and 125 in Botswana. Unfortunately, unrest in Lesotho and the subsequent intervention of SADC forces in

Africa. There are still serious methodological challenges to be overcome (gaps in the demographic information on the skills profile in the region being the most significant), and there are a host of new questions that need to be answered as a result of the research. There are also limitations associated with the quantitative research methods employed for these surveys. Closed-option, Likert-style questionnaires of the sort used for this study are useful insofar as they allow for large sample sizes and comparative data analysis, but they are limited in their ability to "get under the skin" of what motivates people to migrate (or not) and what their likely plans are for the future. Only detailed qualitative interviews with small-

another. In Lesotho, for example, interviewees were drawn from a core list of professions but a decision was made to also include teachers and skilled artisans, since people from these areas are regularly seeking, and often finding, jobs in South Africa, and are in short supply in Lesotho.

Challenging Stereotypes

Perhaps the most significant finding from the SANSA research is confirmation that official figures, in South Africa at least, dramatically undercount the extent of emigration. On the other hand, the SAMP surveys show that the alarmist rhetoric of crisis that pervades discussion of the brain drain in the popular press is

misplaced. There is no doubt that thousands of South Africans, Batswana and Basotho are leaving their countries to live and work in other countries in the region and other parts of the world, but the situation is far from desperate and there is no indication of a looming mass exodus in the near future. Skilled nationals in all three countries are generally satisfied with their work and social lives and have no immediate plans to leave. Moreover, there is a pool of skilled foreigners who are equally satisfied with their lives in their host country and do not plan on leaving in the near future.

Finally, and perhaps most revealing of all, employers of skilled personnel in South Africa do not appear to be having major problems hiring skilled nationals (with the notable, and globally relevant, exception of information technology personnel) and are generally able to hire skilled foreigners when required.

This is not to say that skilled people have not thought about leaving their home country or that South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana have an excess of skilled people ready to fill any vacant post. In South Africa, an extremely high 69% of skilled nationals said that they have given the idea of emigration "some thought". Many have also made contacts with potential employers overseas and many more have friends, colleagues or family members who have already emigrated, serving as examples and reference points for their own possible emigration.

But thinking about leaving, and actually doing so, are very different things. Only 20% of the skilled South Africans interviewed for this research said that it was "very likely" that they would leave the country for a period of more than two years and only 3% thought they might leave within the next six months. A composite statistical index was used to construct each person's "emigration potential", with the result that only 2% of the sample falls into the "very high" category. Hardly grounds for panic.[17]

Skilled nationals in Botswana and Lesotho have a similar profile, although attitudes in Lesotho may have changed since the SADC intervention in 1998. In Zimbabwe, political developments appear to have influenced the attitudes of skilled personnel towards emigration. But the survey results described reveal remarkable stability and commitment amongst skilled professionals to the home country in at least three SADC states.

In terms of "skilled foreigners", the surveys found them to be, by and large, happy to be living and working in their adopted country. Most have strong links back home, send remittances to family and friends, visit home on a regular basis and are proud to call themselves a citizen of their home country. Many say that they want to return home at some point, but there is no sense of a large or immediate exodus from the host country. Skilled foreigners are generally satisfied with their jobs, and with their colleagues, and are involved in the communities where they live. They have settled down for the medium term, if not permanently.

In sum, skilled people in the region, both nationals and foreigners, know where their suitcases are and have given some thought to what it would take to pack up and leave the country, but the suitcases are still in the closet and there are no plans to pull them out in the immediate future. There is no sense from this research that skilled people in the region are going to make a rush on the banks, pack their things and leave tomorrow. Whether citizens or permit holders, skilled people in the three countries surveyed have significant material and emotional ties to the countries where they live and work: homes, friends, families, communities, jobs, and careers. There is a sense of patriotism and commitment to the home/host country that is largely ignored in the popular coverage of the "brain drain" issue. If skilled people in the region have an alternative destination in mind, it is by and large a destination unknown, with no set timetable.

Another important aspect of the research worth highlighting here is the challenge it offers to stereotypes about emigration – particularly in South Africa. Popular myth in South Africa has it that English-speaking white males are most likely to be the ones to want to leave the country, with women, Afrikaners and black South Africans more likely to stay due to a lack of skills, a lack of a second passport, and a deeper commitment to the country. Our survey of skilled nationals in South Africa, however, found that English-speaking whites are just as likely to want to stay in the country and that black South Africans, women and Afrikaners are just as likely to say they would leave.

Implications for Immigration Policy: The South African Case

The policy implications arising from the research are discussed in some detail

for each country. But given the importance of the South African labour market in the region (and, indeed, on the continent), as well as the impending reforms to that country's immigration policy, it is worth relating the findings of this research to the new proposals.[18] When and if adopted, these policy reforms will replace the Aliens Control Act, the last major piece of apartheid-era legislation left on the books in South Africa, with far-reaching implications for South African citizens, residents and visitors.

The first point to emphasise is that the first term of office of South Africa's post-apartheid government was characterised by a general suspicion and hostility towards virtually all forms of immigration.[19] Temporary and permanent immigration of skilled personnel has declined consistently since 1994. The government has come only reluctantly to the view that skills immigration is not necessarily disadvantageous to South Africans. Indeed, the new White Paper on International Migration explicitly asserts the government's stated interest in "attract[ing] qualified people in South Africa to offset the brain drain".[20]

The reasons for this softening of position are related to the public arguments and private lobbying efforts of big business. Some of these complaints are legitimate. The Department of Home Affairs is seriously under-resourced and, under the archaic Aliens Control Act, lacks the mechanisms to speed skills entry. Press reports suggest that it is still dealing with the skills needs of South African corporations in an ad hoc and unpredictable manner.[21] The lobbying of South African and international business involves the construction of a "skills crisis". This crisis is supposedly crippling South Africa's international competitiveness.

Interestingly, however, the magnitude and impact of the skills haemorrhage are simply assumed rather than demonstrated. The government's White Paper similarly makes no systematic effort to quantitatively demonstrate that there is actually a brain drain of crisis proportions.[22]

The White Paper's strategy for attracting skilled personnel to South Africa is twofold. First, it argues that the South African government needs to make it easier for skilled persons to obtain extended work permits and/or permanent residency for themselves and their families. Second, the White Paper proposes to let market forces determine where skills are most needed in the economy. The state, through the auspices of the proposed

In a world of global head-hunting for increasingly mobile skilled personnel, South African policy makers and immigration bureaucrats will need to be much more sophisticated, transparent and strategic in their efforts to attract the people they seem to want.

in Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries to determine where skills are most needed, the White Paper argues that "[i]t is difficult for Government to determine what type of skills are required within South Africa, and who the people are that can contribute to our economic growth … Only the industry can tell who the industry needs, why and for how long". The White Paper argues that "it would be simpler if the industry by itself could determine what it needs to grow and prosper and were able to satisfy these needs from the world labour market" and proposes that Home Affairs delegates power to corporations to issue visas and permits.[24]

The White Paper stops short of a complete hands-off approach, however, arguing that corporate activity would be closely monitored and controlled by the proposed Immigration Review Board.[25] The number and type of permits which could be issued by corporations "would be the result of negotiations with the IS [Immigration Services] under parameters prescribed by the Immigration Review Board" and there would be quotas determined on a sector-by-sector basis. There would also be a national training fund to promote the hiring of skilled nationals.[26] There are also repeated references to the need for "discretionary powers" on the part of the Minister of Home Affairs. How these powers would be used with respect to skilled immigrants is never clearly spelled out but underscores the point that Home Affairs does not want to completely relinquish control to market forces.

There is, therefore, a fundamental tension in the White Paper between a laissez-faire approach to letting the market determine who should be let into the country and the legacy of "control" that has been so much a part of immigration policy and culture in the Home Affairs department in the past. Statements like "the migration system should enable Government to retain control over who may enter the country and the conditions and length of his or her stay"[27] are in direct contrast to the strident neoliberalism that also guides the document.

The proposal to require employers of foreign migrants to pay a proportion of their salary into a national training fund to provide training to South Africans is also highly controversial. With this fund the cost of hiring a foreigner would effectively be made higher than that of hiring an equivalently-quali-

Immigration Services, would continue to monitor the skilled labour market, and would establish a "national training fund" that employers who hire skilled foreigners would need to pay into to train South Africans for future jobs, but the bulk of the decision making would be delegated to employers.

The proposal to make it easier for qualified persons to obtain visas, work permits and temporary resident status for themselves and their families is a welcome corrective to the opaque and ad hoc history of immigrant decision-making of the past in South Africa. Simplification of administration and greater consistency in policy should go a long way towards attracting skilled people to the country.

There are, however, a number of problematic assumptions in the White Paper's proposals. The first problem is that skilled emigration (the "brain drain") is not necessarily the problem is it made out to be in the White Paper and by various pro-business think-tanks.[23] In uncritically accepting popular wisdom on the issue without questioning the validity of the "facts" which led to this conclusion, the White Paper unwittingly sets itself up for a series of policy reforms which may not address the demographic and attitudinal realities of skilled migration. At the very least, the SAMP research outlined here suggests that popular assumptions about the migration plans of skilled South African nationals and skilled foreigners cannot be taken for granted and that much more (academically sound) research is needed on this important topic.

A second problem with the White Paper is the proposed mechanisms for selecting skilled immigrants. As noted, the fundamental response of the White Paper is to let market forces decide what kinds of skilled people are needed in the country. In its rejection of a centralised, state-run "points system" such as is used

fied South African. Thus, employers would only hire foreign workers in preference to South Africans when they really needed to do so. That this would happen even without this disincentive seems lost on the bureaucratic mind. More persuasively, the funds would add value to programmes aimed at expanding the skills base of South Africans. Nevertheless, the practicalities of such a system remain open to doubt and it would be almost impossible to enforce in a consistent and fair manner. And because skilled foreign migrants are also already likely to be more expensive to hire, this will be seen as an additional penalty for hiring workers that are actually needed. Such a policy could act as a disincentive to immigration and settlement by skilled non-citizens, who are

its desire to attract skilled personnel by contributing to a general mood of distrust about non-citizens. Reports of harassment on the part of highly skilled professionals from other African countries are common and no doubt related to the high rates of xenophobia in the country as a whole.[31] Xenophobia must be addressed in toto as an issue of basic human rights and not as something that suits the narrow sectoral economic interests of a country one way or the other.[32]

A final tension relates to the question of where skilled immigrants are expected to come from. The White Paper lays out a hierarchy of immigration which seeks to "serve our people first; the people of the region and member states of the Southern African

silent on what would be required to stem the flow of skilled personnel out of South Africa. Part of the reason for this is the Constitutional right of South African citizens to move where they want (a right which millions of South Africans did not have until recently) and the reluctance of the South African government to institute policies to keep people in the country, but it nevertheless begs the question as to what policy mechanisms might reduce the so-called "push" factors and convince people to stay. The SAMP research examines the likes and dislikes of skilled South African nationals with respect to their home country and how they compare South Africa to their "most likely destination".

Not surprisingly, crime and safety come up as one of the main "push" fac-

A Zimbabwean doctor practising for ten years in South Africa may seem like a major loss to Zimbabwe at the time, but if this doctor returns to Zimbabwe with new skills and exposure to different systems it could create a "brain gain" for the country and the region as a whole.

seen in the White Paper as being expendable as soon as a qualified South African is available to fill their position. This is only partially resolved by the proposed five-year residence requirement for citizenship.

A third concern is the manner in which the new approach to skilled migration creates a sense of good versus bad immigrants. From the very beginning, the White Paper makes it clear that it is seeking to "let people who add value to our society in and to keep those that do not, out".[28] The people who add value are "those who invest, are entrepreneurs and promote trade, those who bring new knowledge and experience to our society and those who have the skills and expertise required to do the things we cannot properly do at this stage". Undesirables, by default, are those who do not have these skills or resources – in other words, poor, generally "illegal", and unskilled migrants who "compete for scarce resources" and "insufficient job opportunities", become "involved in criminal activities", and otherwise "weaken the state and its institutions".[29]

This kind of inflammatory language directly contradicts the White Paper's own proclamations about the need to address xenophobia by "making communities understand the tragedy of illegal immigration",[30] and undermines

Development Community (SADC) second; the people of Africa third; and the rest of the world last",[33] but fails to explain how this order of preference will be attained, whether this hierarchy is constitutionally sound, or whether the skills needs of South Africa coincide with the geographic supply of the skilled immigrants it is hoping for. The Immigration Bill is no more enlightening. In fact, this proposed hierarchy seems to be little more than a rhetorical tip-of-the-hat to the broader affirmative action goals of the South African government. If new legislation is to assist with this broader policy objective it would need to spell out in detail how it plans to achieve these objectives, whether it is constitutionally appropriate to have geographically-preferential immigration policies, whether it is practically feasible to implement, and what its implications might be for other SADC countries still concerned about a possible brain drain to South Africa.

In a world of global head-hunting for increasingly mobile skilled personnel, South African policy makers and immigration bureaucrats will need to be much more sophisticated, transparent and strategic in their efforts to attract the people they seem to want, and will need to break down the false distinction between skilled and unskilled migrants if they are to deal with xenophobia as a whole.

Finally the White Paper is remarkably

tors from South Africa. But even higher on the dissatisfaction list of skilled South Africans are their attitudes to taxation. Given the high profile that tax (and fiscal reform in general) has received in South Africa, it is not inconceivable that levels of taxation could start to play an even bigger role in the emigration decision-making process. This potential is made all the more likely with the downward pressures on personal taxes for high income earners in immigrant-receiving countries like the United States, and has sparked a furious debate in some countries (e.g. Canada) as to whether the personal tax differential is a source of their own "brain drain".[34]

Nevertheless, as fiscal conservatism continues to gain momentum in South Africa it will no doubt become a more explicit tool for keeping skilled personnel. But is this actually a line worth pursuing? Would South Africa, in its efforts to retain skilled personnel, simply be engaging in a "race to the bottom" of tax reforms; a race that it can barely expect to win on an international scale given its relatively limited scope for further fiscal cuts and growing pressures from an increasing pool of poor and unemployed South Africans for more progressive redistributive tax measures.

Would South Africa not be better off addressing concerns about crime and social upheaval with a fiscal framework

that addresses the material roots of crime and unrest though poverty alleviation? Tax issues cannot be ignored, of course, but to focus on these narrow economic reasons for emigration risks the potential of running in a tax reform race that cannot be won and losing out on an opportunity to construct a more sound and attractive public sphere that may ultimately go further in retaining the skills that South Africa needs.

Skilled Migration in a Regional Context

If regional integration in Southern Africa is going to take place in any meaningful way, the exchange of highly skilled personnel must be an integral part of it. At one level, this integration is already taking place, albeit at a slower pace than once anticipated. In the sample of 400 skilled foreigners in South Africa, for example, a total of 41% were from Africa with 18% from SADC countries. In Botswana, 77% of the sample of skilled foreigners were from African countries, with the majority from SADC countries. In other words, there is a significant regional exchange of skills taking place and SADC countries need to acknowledge, support and celebrate this interaction.

Thinking regionally also brings into question the notion of a "brain drain". If skilled South Africans are working in Lesotho, or if skilled Zambians are working in Botswana, does this represent a loss of skills to the country of origin or does it represent a building of the skills base for the region as a whole? This is particularly true if these people are in regular contact with colleagues back home and/or if they return home to practise their trade. A Zimbabwean doctor practising for ten years in South Africa may seem like a major loss to Zimbabwe at the time, but if this doctor returns to Zimbabwe with new skills and exposure to different systems it could create a "brain gain" for the country and the region as a whole.

In the end, of course, national bound-aries remain a very tangible feature of the Southern African landscape – both physically and psychologically.[35] Colonial constructs die hard, and as the rather fitful and marginalised attempts to create a SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of People illustrate, it will be some time yet before governments in SADC are able and willing to think strategically about the skills pool in the region as a whole.

Nevertheless, we can be optimistic about the potential for southern African countries to attract and retain skilled personnel. The challenge for the policy makers will be to develop strategies based on sound empirical research in ways which benefit the region rather than playing blindly into the lowest common denominators of globalisation. ◉

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The Brain Drain
What do skilled South Africans think?

In an interdependent and increasingly global economy, maintaining and enlarging a skilled labour force is vital to South Africa's national interest. Yet South Africa appears to be in a tight squeeze.[1] It is a developing new democracy committed to eradicating the massive social, economic and political disparities of its apartheid past. Part of this project is the empowerment and expansion of the pool of racially disadvantaged workers. But this cannot be achieved overnight, say **Robert Mattes and Wayne Richmond**.

While statistics differ widely, significant numbers of educated professionals and entrepreneurs have been leaving South Africa to find work elsewhere, taking with them skills crucial to the success of the country's development. And it appears that this flight has been exacerbated not only by the turmoil accompanying democratisation, but also the societal changes brought on by the post-apartheid transformation. Thus, attempts to train new skilled workers may strain to keep pace with the skills lost through emigration, producing a net loss of skilled workers, or what is known in South Africa as the "Brain Drain".

Yet estimates of the size and impact of this brain drain vary widely and analyses of its causes remain speculative. Needless to say, the present and potential size of this skills exodus, as well as its actual and potential economic, social and political impacts are a major concern to policy-makers.[2]

Official data from the period of South Africa's transition towards democracy (1991-1993) and democratisation period (1994 to the present) enable us to isolate economically active persons arriving in and leaving South Africa, defined by Statistics South Africa as employed persons (Figure 1). The data from this period reveal a rapid decline from a net gain of economically active persons to a net loss. In 1996 South Africa experienced its worst loss for at least eleven years.[3] Yet it is also apparent that the official figures drastically underestimate the extent of skills out-migration.

What is the actual extent of the brain drain, both in terms of its present and potential size? Official statistics are not gathered in a way that enables us to estimate this with any accuracy. Indeed, a recent study claims that official statistics are far too low, by as much as two-thirds.[4] Furthermore, it is very difficult to draw firm conclusions about the type of people who are leaving since the data may not be collected in this way, or may be collected in different ways at different points in time.[5] Neither is it very easy to determine how long these emigrants are leaving for or whether they intend to return at some point in the future. Migrants often leave with the intention of returning but change their minds once they have left. The few surveys which have been done are highly misleading.[6]

FIGURE 1: SOUTH AFRICAN SKILLED IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION

□ Immigration   ■ Emigration   □ Net migration

Source: Central Statistical Service. Data unavailable for 1993.

asked of those who have actually emigrated. But it is quite likely that crime, the economy and services would rate very highly as key grievances of all skilled South Africans. If so, then we must ask what distinguishes those who leave from those who stay behind.

To assess the present and potential extent of South Africa's brain drain, as well as more accurately understand its causes, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) undertook a study of the issue in mid-1998, in an attempt to:

- provide nationally representative and methodologically rigorous empirical data on the emigration plans of skilled South Africans;
- examine and assess the range of factors that contribute to skilled South Africans' desire to leave the country.

Defining the Brain Drain

The idea of a "Brain Drain" implies a depletion of skilled people who are vital to the functional core of the economy. In business, the functional core is a sub-group of key personnel in an organisation critical to its normal conduct of business. While actual definitions of skilled persons vary, they all tend to focus on people who have received some sort of specialised training that results in superior technical competence, talent, or abilities that are applied in professional occupations. Without these people, the operation and development of the economy would be severely hindered.

Thus, for a survey of skilled South Africans, the definition of skills requires that we approach a broader range of people than the typical popular image might imply. The functional core of an economy does not only consist of people with post-graduate degrees, in well-paying, high level corporate positions. Skilled people typically possess some specialised, formal training (e.g. a Technikon or University qualification). But the functional core of the economy is also sustained by people who, despite having no advanced formal education, have worked their way up the corporate ladder or have started their own businesses.

Skilled South Africans also include people at various levels of the corporate ladder. National economic performance will begin to break down not only when businesses lose a certain number of senior managers, but also when they cross a specific threshold of losses of middle-level people who fill vital administrative and support functions. Middle-level people also comprise the potential

Skilled South Africans also include middle-level people who fill vital administrative and support functions. It is these people who comprise the potential pool from which to fill senior positions in the future.

Common wisdom tends to attribute the loss of skills to the main characteristics of the transition and democratisation period: political instability and uncertainty, heightened racial conflict, poor economic performance, a heavy fall in the currency, and increasing crime and violence. Yet most debate and analysis about the causes of this problem is based on hearsay and anecdote.

Some systematic attempts have been made by various analysts, as well as Statistics South Africa, to document the factors that emigrants cite for leaving. Most often cited are the lack of safety and security, poor economic conditions, and poor social services.[7] Yet it is by no means certain that these are the key factors that actually pushed people out of the country. The questions have only been

pool from which to fill senior positions in the future.

A survey of skilled South Africans should also include individual entrepreneurs. The self-employed create jobs, add innovation and contribute to the overall growth of the economy. Finally, such a survey should also include not only people from the business or manufacturing sector but also from science, technology, education and arts and culture. These people also add value to the functional core of the economy by training skilled workers, contributing technological and scientific innovation or sustaining entertainment and tourist industries.

We therefore defined a "skilled" South African for the purposes of this survey, as conforming to the following criteria:
- a South African citizen,
- 20 years of age or older,
- matriculated and possessing a Technikon diploma or University degree from a recognised institution (or in their final year of studying for a diploma or degree),
- currently economically active (employed or looking for employment).

The only exceptions were people who either had not matriculated from High School and/or graduated from a tertiary institution, but who nonetheless owned a business or held a senior management position in their occupation: i.e. a manager, supervisor, professional worker, commercial farmer, or commissioned officer in the SANDF Permanent Force.

This definition enabled us to use the All Media and Products (AMPS) Survey to estimate the actual size of this "skilled" population group in South Africa. The AMPS Survey is conducted annually in 30 000 households nationwide. Given the historical problems associated with census data in South Africa, it is often used as the basis for demographic research. Based on 1998 AMPS data, the economically active population in South Africa is approximately 17 million. When we apply the criteria of education and senior occupational status to the AMPS data, we estimate the size of South Africa's skilled sector at 1.6 million (or 9% of the economically active population).

In June-July 1998, we surveyed a random probability sample, stratified by province, representative of this South African skilled population. Household phone numbers were randomly selected

TABLE 1: RACIAL BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE

Population group	%
White (Afrikaans)	45
White (English)	27
Black	18
Coloured	5
Indian	3

N = 725

Note: Figures in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value greater than zero but less than 0.5%.

TABLE 2: GENDER BREAKDOWN (%)

Gender	Total	Whites	Blacks
Male	61	66	36
Female	39	34	64

TABLE 3: AGE BREAKDOWN (%)

Gender	Total	Whites	Blacks
18 to 24	6	5	8
25 to 34	29	28	36
35 to 49	45	45	43
Over 50	17	19	9
Won't say	2	2	4.

TABLE 4: PROVINCE OF RESIDENCE (%)

Province	Total	Whites	Blacks
Gauteng	37	39	36
W Cape	20	18	19
KZ Natal	13	12	17
E Cape	7	7	7
Free State	6	6	6
North West	4	5	4
N Province	4	4	4
Mpumalanga	6	6	5
N Cape	3	4	3

from provincial phone directories. Within each household contacted, all people who met the criteria were enumerated, and one was then randomly selected. If no individual in the household met the requirements (or if the selected person could not be interviewed after three callbacks), another household was contacted. In the end, we made 4 250 phone calls to obtain 725 interviews.

Finally, to ensure the adequate inclusion of three small, but important types of skills (engineers, accountants and medical doctors), we built quotas into our sampling strategy to ensure that we interviewed at least 30 of each category. In

the end, we interviewed 54 engineers, 65 accountants and 36 medical doctors. The final sample was thus representative of the South African skilled population defined by our criteria.[8]

South Africa's Skilled Population: A Profile

What does South Africa's "skilled" population of 1.6 million look like? Given the role of apartheid in reserving important positions in the economy for whites, it is no surprise that the sample was predominantly white (72%). But it is significant that 26% of the skilled sample were not: 18% were African, 8% coloured and 3% Indian (Table 1). While we do not have comparable data from earlier points, we suspect we have caught a snapshot of a rapidly growing black skilled sector.[9]

In the survey, we discovered many differences in the views of skilled white and skilled black respondents – as well as some surprising areas of similarity or consensus. However, because of the small number of cases on which the results would be based, we do not report results of Coloured or Indian respondents as a sub-group. Further research with these populations is recommended.

Another possible surprise lies within the white sub-sample. Common wisdom holds that Afrikaners virtually monopolised the political sphere during apartheid, while English speakers retained extensive control over business and industry. Yet, as Table 1 shows, almost half of the sample was composed of white Afrikaners.[10]

The skilled population of South Africa also appears to have more women and younger people than expected. The black sub-sample is younger than the white sub-sample, and is predominately female (Tables 2 and 3). The skilled population is concentrated primarily in Gauteng province, followed by Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal (Table 4).

Over 20% of the sample are in households with a joint monthly income of less than R6 000 per month. However, there are substantial racial differences. Almost three-quarters of skilled black respondents (71%) have a joint, pre-tax, household income of R8 000 or less – the comparable white figure is 19% (Table 5).

Only 6% of the sample had less than a High School Certificate or Matric pass (4% of white and 14% of black respondents). These people are in the sample because they hold a managerial position in their occupation. A further 21%, who

TABLE 5: HOUSEHOLD INCOME (%)

Gross Monthly Household Income	Total	Whites	Blacks
Less than R2 000	3	1	10
R2 001 to R6 000	19	9	52
R6 001 to R8 000	9	9	9
R8 001 to R10 000	11	12	8
R10 001 to 14 000	14	16	7
R14 001 to R20 000	15	19	1
R20 001 to R26 000	8	10	1
R26 001 to R32 000	3	4	0
R32 001 to R38 000	1	1	0
More than R38 000	4	4	0
Refused to answer	13	12	4

TABLE 6: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS (%)

Qualification	Total	Whites	Blacks
Less than High School Certificate (HSC)	6	4	14
HSC only, or equivalent	21	19	26
HSC plus diploma or Bachelor's degree	58	60	56
Honours degree	9	10	6
Master's degree	5	6	3
Doctorate	1	2	1

TABLE 7: EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Employment Status (%)	Total	Whites	Blacks
Employed full time	57	58	58
Entrepreneur: Formal Sector full time	27	31	8
Entrepreneur: Informal Sector full time	4	3	7
Entrepreneur: Formal Sector part time	3	3	0
Employed: Part time	3	2	8
Final Year Student	3	2	8
Unemployed: seeking work	3	1	11
Entrepreneur: Informal Sector part time	1	0	1

TABLE 8: EMPLOYMENT SECTORS

Sectors	Sample	Total (%)	Whites (%)	Blacks (%)
Education/Research	**142**	**19**	**11**	**45**
Secondary education	50	7	3	21
Primary education	47	6	3	17
Tertiary education	36	5	4	5
Research	9	1	1	2
Heavy Industry	**111**	**15**	**14**	**7**
Manufacturing	40	6	6	2
Textile	13	2	1	2
Construction	32	4	4	2
Mining	8	1	1	1
Automotive	10	1	1	0
Steel and Iron	8	1	1	0
Service Industry	**110**	**14**	**12**	**12**
Retail	54	7	6	8
Real estate	10	1	1	0
Energy	15	2	2	2
Food	13	2	2	0
Transport	14	2	1	2
Private Security	4	<0.5	0	0
Professional Practice	**89**	**12**	**22**	**13**
Medical	42	6	10	11
Engineering	31	4	10	2
Law firm	16	2	2	0
Finance/Banking	**101**	**13**	**20**	**6**
Accounting	39	5	12	3
Finance	32	4	4	3
Banking	20	3	3	0
Insurance	10	1	1	0
Government/Military	**44**	**5**	**5**	**6**
Government	34	4	4	5
Military	10	1	1	1
Agriculture	**38**	**5**	**6**	**1**

had only a Matric pass or its equivalent, were included either because they were in the final year of a Technikon diploma or University Bachelors degree programme, or held a senior management position in their occupation. As for the rest, three-quarters of the sample has a high school certificate plus either a Technikon diploma or University Bachelor's degree (Table 6).

Just under one-third of the sample are self-employed, full-time entrepreneurs, either in the informal or formal sectors. A small percentage are unemployed but looking for work or do not yet have a diploma or degree but are in the final year of tertiary studies (Table 7).

Finally, skilled South Africans are spread widely across a broad range of economic sectors (Table 8). There are distinctive patterns of sectoral participation by race.

Predicting Emigration: An Imprecise Science

Predicting exactly how many skilled people will emigrate from South Africa in the future is difficult. Even if people say they want to leave, there is no certainty that they actually will. In referring to who or how many skilled people intend to emigrate, we therefore refer to an individual's potential for emigration, which is not the same as a firm prediction of future emigration patterns and trends.

Emigration potential is a complex issue and consists of several different elements:
- First, to what extent has a skilled person considered the idea?
- Second, to what extent do they actually want to emigrate?

- Third, even if they want to leave South Africa, to what extent do factors outside the person's control (such as financial costs) affect the likelihood of leaving?
- Fourth, exactly when do they plan to leave? There is a vast difference between those who have gone as far as setting a deadline for their move and those that have not. The longer one takes to make the move, the more likely that other factors might come into play to change the decision.
- Lastly, a distinction must be drawn between temporary and permanent movement (or emigration). It makes little sense to speak of a brain drain if skilled people intend to return to South Africa after a short period of time. This is especially the case where people may be leaving to study in other countries. In many ways, this can actually constitute an investment for the future of South Africa's economic well-being rather than a loss of skills. Permanent movement on the other hand is clearly indicative of a brain drain.

Only when all of these questions are considered can we give a more accurate estimate of the skilled emigration potential from South Africa in the near future. The failure to adequately recognise these complexities can result in some extremely misleading conclusions and misinformation.

First, the survey asked about the degree of thought given to leaving South Africa. It is safe to assume that those who have not thought about the matter, at least at present, have no potential to move. Thus, this question helps define the outermost limit of the pool of South Africans who might conceivably leave. The pool is a large one. Over two-thirds say they have given the idea of emigration some thought, and 38% say they have given it a "great deal" of thought (Table 9).

The popular perception of the brain drain is that it is a "white phenomenon" only. But when the responses of skilled whites and blacks are compared, there is a surprising level of similarity in attitudes, with 69% of whites and 68% of blacks having given it at least some thought. Some 33% of whites and 23% of blacks have given it a great deal of thought, suggesting that the emigration potential is higher amongst whites but far

TABLE 9: CONSIDERING EMIGRATION

Thought of moving to another country to live and work (%)

	Total	Whites	Blacks
A great deal	31	33	23
Some	38	36	45
None at all	31	31	3
Don't know	1	0	2

TABLE 10: DESIRE TO LEAVE S AFRICA

Desire to move temporarily to another country to live and work: less than 2 yrs (%)

	Total	Whites	Blacks
Great	18	18	17
Some	27	24	40
Total	45	42	57

Desire to move permanently to another country to live and work: longer than two years (%)

Great	28	34	16
Some	28	28	38
Total	56	62	54

TABLE 11: LIKELIHOOD OF LEAVING SOUTH AFRICA

Likelihood of ever moving temporarily to another country: less than 2 years (%)

	Total	Whites	Blacks
Very Likely	11	10	15
Likely	21	16	39
Total	32	26	54

Likelihood of ever moving permanently to another country: longer than 2 years (%)

Very Likely	20	22	14
Likely	29	29	27
Total	49	51	41

TABLE 12: COMMITMENT TO EMIGRATE

Likelihood of leaving South Africa ... in the next 6 months (%)

Very likely	3	3	2
Likely	4	2	10
Total	7	5	12

... in the next 2 years (%)

Very likely	5	5	3
Likely	20	20	22
Total	25	25	25

... in the next 5 years (%)

Very likely	13	15	8
Likely	29	27	33
Total	42	42	41

from insignificant amongst blacks.

These results were fairly similar to those obtained by a *Sunday Times* readership questionnaire. In that survey, 74% said they "would consider emigrating." Yet those who bought the *Sunday Times* on 13 September 1998 were assailed with provocative banner front-page headlines proclaiming "74% of Skilled SAs Ready to Quit the Country?". These headlines fuelled a heated and unedifying debate. They were also highly misleading. This is because thinking about leaving is far from synonymous with actually doing so. Regardless of whether people have thought about leaving, to what extent do they actually wish to move? And, if they say they want to leave, have they thought seriously enough about it to actually place some time frame on their exit?

The sample was therefore asked whether they would want to leave South Africa on either a temporary or permanent basis (Table 10). Following criteria laid out by the United Nations, we define a period of more than two years as a permanent move (emigration). That said, some skilled people might still wish to return to South Africa after living and working in another country for, say, a period of five years. Thus, what would be considered by international standards as permanent movement, and thus emigration, might not be totally equivalent to a permanent Brain Drain from South Africa – although it is certainly true that the longer one resides in a new country the lower the probability of returning home.

It is clear that far fewer skilled people actually want to leave the country than was implied by the *Sunday Times* headlines. While 69% had given some thought to leaving, only 28% expressed a strong desire to leave for a period of two years or more. While skilled black respondents are less likely to say they want to leave for a period of more than two years, it is still important to note that 16% do. On the other hand, skilled blacks are actually more likely to leave South Africa on a temporary basis than whites.

How likely is the wish to become reality? Thinking about leaving, and wanting to do it, is one thing. Actually doing it is quite another. Emigration is a fairly complicated and difficult process where people must look at a much broader range of physical and psychological factors than sheer desire; factors such as costs, leaving family behind, and the prospects that such a move will result in success. On the other hand, it is plausible that the desire to emigrate is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for emigration.

FIGURE 2: EMIGRATION POTENTIAL OF SOUTH AFRICANS

amounts of mental and physical commitments are required from the respondent, emigration potential declines sharply.

To test if the responses can be combined into a single valid index that reliably summarises a person's potential to emigrate, we used a statistical procedure known as Factor Analysis. Factor Analysis examines the similarity or dissimilarity in patterns of responses to a range of questions to determine whether respondents were reacting to them in common ways. If they are, we can infer that the various questions capture different elements of a common underlying dimension, and can thus aggregate the responses to these questions into a single index.

Factor Analysis confirmed that responses to four questions (desire to move for two years or more, the likelihood of moving for two years or more, likelihood of moving within two years, and likelihood of moving within five years) formed a valid and reliable index that measures a skilled person's emigration potential. Questions about whether people had considered moving, and whether they would move in the next six months, did not fit into this index because the pattern of responses to these questions were not consistent.

We then calculated index scores for each respondent by looking at their average score across the four key questions. Since each of the items has a four point score, the range of the average index scores also runs from 1 to 4. Those who score 4 (i.e. said "very willing" or "very likely" to all four items) were classified as having a "very high" probability of leaving. Those who scored between 3.75 and 3.25 (or who gave some combination of very intense and intense replies) were classified as having a "high" probability and so on.

Once an index score is calculated for each skilled respondent, the following conclusions emerge:
• 2% of the sample fall into the "very high" category of emigration potential (of leaving South Africa for a period of two years or more, within the next two to five years).
• 10% have a "high" emigration potential
• 25% have a "moderate" emigration potential
• 28% have a "low" emigration potential
• 16% have a "very low" emigration potential

For a range of reasons, such as perceptions of declining security or economic fortunes, people might feel they have no choice and conclude that despite not wanting to leave it is the most sensible decision for themselves and immediate family members.

Because emigration is a formal and often lengthy process that involves obtaining official documentation, preparing applications and organising employment opportunities, together with the sheer logistics of the move, people who have mentally set a specific date, or at least time frame, for leaving are far more likely to act upon their desires than those who leave it as an open-ended possibility. Table 12 illustrates the extent to which the sample has made a mental commitment to emigrate within a specified time frame. It is evident that specifying a time frame cuts the levels of potential emigration quite dramatically. Only 3% said that it was "quite likely" that they would leave within six months, 5% say they will leave in the next two years, and 13% say it is "very likely" that they will leave

within five years. The proportions of skilled blacks and whites who express a strong probability of leaving within six months or within two years are statistically the same (though whites are more likely to express a strong probability of leaving within a five year time period).

Possibly the firmest indicator of a person's emigration potential is whether they have actually begun the process of application for basic emigration documentation (a formal requirement for any move to take place). As of mid-1999, the proportions of skilled South Africans who had begun this process is far lower than any of the other indicators (Table 13). Only 6% say they have applied for work permits in another country, 5% have applied for permanent residence elsewhere, and 3% have applied for foreign citizenship. Again, there are no statistically significant differences between skilled white and black South Africans. Taken together with Table 12, this strongly suggests that, at the level of the very firmest indicators of emigration, the same proportion of skilled blacks are presently intending to leave the country as skilled whites. This is an aspect of the Brain Drain that has enjoyed no public or government awareness and profile.

How do these various components of the emigration decision fit together? Figure 2 reveals the consistent decline in indicators of likely emigration as we move from consideration, to desire, to likelihood, and to specified, increasingly shorter time periods. Thus, as greater

TABLE 13: APPLICATIONS FOR EMIGRATION DOCUMENTATION

Applied for (%)	Total	Whites	Blacks
Work permit in another country	6	6	5
Permanent residency in another country	5	5	4
Foreign citizenship	3	3	3

• 20% have "no" emigration potential at all

Thus, if only those skilled South Africans with a "very high" emigration potential left the country in the next five years, this would translate into a potential gross loss of around 32 000 skilled people in the next five years (2% of the skilled population). Taking into account the margin of error in surveys of this sample size, that number could be as low as 6 000 or as high as 58 000. If all of those with a high or very high potential left, the number would jump to a massive 192 000. Again, this could range from 155 000 to as high as 229 000 in the next five years.

To place these estimates in perspective, a recent SANSA report estimates that 43 000 "professionals" (which they admit excludes a number of other skilled categories, such as managers) have emigrated to the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the past nine years (based on immigration statistics in those countries). Overall, they claim that 233 000 have emigrated during that period, though they suggest that very high proportions of these would be skilled.[11]

These are estimates of gross skilled emigration or "gross loss". Any complete estimate of the brain drain, or "net loss" of skilled workers also needs to take into account the potential counter-balancing impact of skilled foreigners entering South Africa. SANSA estimates that "professional" immigration to South Africa in the past nine years amounts to no more than 10 000.[12]

The Emigration Potential index suggests that the popular assumption that skilled emigration is a "white" phenomenon is a grave misconception. There is absolutely no difference in the proportion of skilled whites and blacks who fall into the "very high" category (2% of either group). It is true that a higher proportion of skilled whites (11%) than skilled blacks (4%) fall into the "high" probability category. But adding the two together, the difference in proportions of skilled whites (13%) over skilled blacks (6%) with a high/very high probability of leaving the country within five years, is not nearly as great as might be expected.

The Nature of Skilled Emigration from South Africa

If skilled respondents with a "high" or "very high" emigration potential leave, where will they go? And will they completely sever all links with South Africa?

FIGURE 3: EMIGRATION POTENTIAL OF SKILLED SOUTH AFRICANS IN NEXT 5 YRS

Table 14 displays the top five most likely countries of destination. Overall, the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada rank as the five most often mentioned destinations. These preferences confirm the spatial patterns of previous skilled emigrant destinations reported by SANSA.[13]

While the popular image of the "Brain Drain" involves people cutting all ties with South Africa, this is not necessarily accurate. People may, for a range of reasons, intend to return at some stage in the future. Even where such a return is not expressly foreseen, uncertainty about what the future holds might also limit the extent to which ties are cut.

Table 15 reveals that the vast majority of those likely to leave in the next five years say they would want to stay away for more than five years. At the same time, only one-in-ten say they would never return home. Almost 70% would return at least once a year or more.

Emigration involves decisions about property, savings, investments, and ultimately, citizenship. The willingness to relinquish these things is a far better indicator of the nature of return intentions. A willingness to cut all these ties indicates a strong certainty of no return. Between 80% and 90% of likely skilled emigrants are willing to cut all economic ties with the country (e.g. sell their house, take out savings and investments).

A significant proportion (57%) is willing to give up South African citizenship (Table 16). Hence the permanence of the

potential move is strong.

Yet not all likely emigrants are sold on putting down deep roots in their likely country of destination. Some 36% say they do not want permanent residence, 40% do not want citizenship, and only half give indications of a life-time stay by saying they want to retire, or be buried there.

The Decision to Emigrate

While we now have a clearer picture of the potential extent of South Africa's brain drain, the other important question is what differentiates skilled people who express a high potential to emigrate from those who do not? The survey identified a range of key factors that play pivotal roles in encouraging skilled people to emigrate.

Declining Quality of Life

Dissatisfaction with overall "quality of life" is often cited as an important factor that "pushes" skilled South Africans out of the country. Indeed, the common wisdom is that the South African Brain Drain is heavily driven by white perceptions of a deteriorating quality of life since the demise of apartheid.

Skilled South Africans were therefore asked about their level of satisfaction with a wide variety of measures of "quality of life." Factor Analysis demonstrated that people did not simply respond to all these items in the same way, but rather had different patterns of reactions to different clusters of questions. There are

TABLE 14: INTENDED DESTINATION OF EMIGRANTS

Most likely country (%)

United States of America	24
Australia	22
United Kingdom	15
New Zealand	12
Canada	11

N = 87

TABLE 15: DURATION OF EMIGRATION

Length of stay at likely destination (%)

Less than 6 months	1
6 months to 1 year	2
1 to 2 years	8
2 to 5 years	14
More than 5 years	71
Don't know	4

Frequency of return (%)

Weekly	0
Monthly	4
Once every few months	7
Yearly	57
Once every few years	20
Never	12
Don't Know	2

N = 87

TABLE 16: LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Willing to sell house in S Africa (%)

Very willing	35
Willing	46

Willing to take savings out of SA (%)

Very willing	49
Willing	40

Willing to take investments out of SA (%)

Very willing	42
Willing	42

Willing to give up SA citizenship (%)

Very willing	23
Willing	34

N = 87

TABLE 17: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Dissatisfied or Very dissatisfied with (%)	Total	Whites	Blacks
Present level of taxation	74	75	74
Cost of living	71	72	64
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, beaches, toilets)	70	79	37
Family's safety	68	69	54
Personal safety	66	65	61
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	59	59	59
Customer service	56	65	27
Future of children in South Africa	55	61	29
Level of income	37	30	60
Prospects for professional advancement	30	32	35
Availability of affordable/quality products	28	29	31
Ability to find a good school for children	27	27	27
Security of job	26	20	44
Job	23	18	39
Ability to find the house wanted	21	17	37
Ability to find medical services for family	21	19	23

TABLE 18: RELATIVE DISSATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF LIFE

Overall personal economic conditions worse or much worse than (%)

Other South Africans	6	5	8
Other people in your race group	9	9	11
Other people who share your same language	7	6	8
Other people in your profession	8	8	8
Other people in your economic class	9	9	11

Overall conditions of in-group are worse or much worse than (%)

People of your race	22	22	19
People who share your same language	20	21	17
People in your profession	14	14	11
People in your economic class	15	15	12

TABLE 19: PERCEPTIONS OF FUTURE CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Do you expect the following to get worse or much worse in the next 5 years? (%)

Your present level of taxation	79	83	69
Cost of living	78	85	51
Your family's safety	76	82	53
Your personal safety	75	81	54
Your relative share of taxes in comparison to others	70	77	56
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, beaches, toilets)	70	83	23
Future of your children	60	71	22
Customer service	59	71	20
Ability to find a good school for children	52	61	21
Availability of affordable products	50	58	26
Ability to find medical services for family	43	60	20
Job	40	42	33
Your level of income	40	44	39
Job Security	38	39	35
Prospects for professional advancement	38	41	39
Ability to find a desirable house to live in	35	38	30

high levels of dissatisfaction with the cost of living, levels of taxation, safety and security, and the standard of public and commercial services in South Africa. In each of these cases (with the exception of standard of services), dissatisfaction extends across racial boundaries and is not a predominantly white pre-occupation (Table 17).

Interestingly, evaluations of their children's futures is statistically more closely related to how they rate specific public and commercial services, rather than to issues of safety, cost of living, schools or health care. We interpret the questions on public and commercial services as tapping what many refer to as the issue of "declining standards." Thus, skilled people seem to think about the future of their children in much the same way as they view the question of "standards."

In contrast, skilled South Africans are far less dissatisfied with personal economic conditions as well as with schools and available health care. The single exception is black dissatisfaction with current income levels, which is understandable given the relatively low income levels enjoyed by skilled black respondents.

More important than people's absolute assessment of conditions is the relative judgment they make when comparing their own conditions to those of others. For the most part, skilled South Africans do not exhibit high levels of dissatisfaction with their relative situation. They seem to understand that they, as skilled persons, are better off than the bulk of their fellow citizens, or others in their race or language group. Moreover, they do not see themselves as doing worse than other people of the same economic status, or others in their same profession (Table 18). Remarkably, only a minority of skilled blacks think that blacks as a group, or those who share their home language, are doing worse than other groups in the country. Nationally representative samples of ordinary black South Africans also find surprisingly low perceptions of relative deprivation.[14]

We see far higher levels of relative dissatisfaction among skilled whites when we ask them to compare their lives today versus five years ago. Some 65% of skilled whites say their lives have got worse in the previous five years. In stark contrast, 65% of skilled blacks say they have got better.

Regardless of where things are now, skilled South Africans do tend to feel that conditions will only get worse (Table 19).

They are particularly pessimistic about their future cost of living, levels of taxation and safety, and the standard of public services. Again, this pessimism extends across the racial divide. Pessimism about personal economic futures and the availability of quality medical services and good schools is less severe, though still significant. Along with their views on the standard of services and the future of their children, skilled blacks are, in fact, relatively optimistic about the future of their personal economic conditions and their future ability to find quality education and health care for their family.

The Political Situation

Internationally, a great deal of contemporary migration is related to aspects of the political arena; the most well known politically-motivated migration is the flight from oppression and persecution, or political turmoil and instability. However, the impact of political factors on skilled people may take different forms. Due to their higher mobility, skilled people may have a lower threshold of sensitivity and thus react not only to oppressive government, but also to unsatisfactory or disagreeable government and policies. A declining faith in the political system or a distrust of the government of the day may similarly precipitate emigration to countries with more attractive political environments.

The survey probed several different political issues, finding that skilled whites are highly dissatisfied with government performance, feel that it does not represent them and distrust government. Skilled blacks have far less pessimistic views across these indicators.

While skilled whites feel that government is largely uninterested in their opinions, and give government a very low approval rating (Table 20), most feel that the actions of government have been detrimental to them personally and to whites more generally. Skilled blacks in marked contrast give government a high approval rating. Interestingly, perceptions of the fairness of government are quite similar. There is not much comfort for government here: over 50% of skilled South Africans of both race groups find government unfair in its treatment of themselves and their race, class and language group.

Affirmative Action

A final political issue widely cited in public debate as a factor "pushing" skilled whites out of the country is the

government's affirmative action policy. The results confirm that skilled whites are widely opposed to this policy while only 20% of skilled blacks express similar views (Table 21). Given that they are the primary beneficiaries of the policy, the high level of support amongst black people is unsurprising. What is striking, though, is the pervasiveness and strength of white opposition to affirmative action. The general arguments for affirmative action (right of past wrongs) clearly have little resonance for whites.

Green Grass on the Other Side?

After establishing which country would be their most likely destination if they left South Africa, respondents were asked to compare the two. Substantial numbers of skilled South Africans clearly see greener pastures abroad (Table 22). In general, they are consistently more likely to think that conditions abroad are better. Especially attractive, when compared to South Africa, are the safety and security situation, standard of services, levels of taxation, schools, health care and children's future prospects.

Skilled blacks are much less likely to see conditions abroad as better than in South Africa, yet they are just as likely to feel that people who have left South Africa have led improved lives. Skilled blacks are also just as likely as skilled whites to feel that they personally would improve their lives by moving to other parts of the world.

Networks and Logistics

There is a whole other set of factors dealing with "networks" and "logistics" that can also affect a decision to go or stay. The degree to which people think conditions are better in another country, for example, may depend upon their knowledge of other countries, or their personal contact with people in those countries.

For example, the perceived physical and emotional ease of emigration may vary depending upon whether someone has close contacts in the country of destination who can help them manage their entry into their new world. This is probably even more important among skilled populations. Because of the growth in international communications, skilled people are more likely to have access to greater information about other places in the world.

There is also a host of logistical factors to consider. Regardless of how green the grass appears on the other side, a per-

TABLE 20: PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT BY SKILLED SOUTH AFRICANS

	Total	Whites	Blacks
Approval rating (%)			
Do you approve of the way the national government has performed its job over the last year? (% approved/strongly approved)	29	17	67
How much of the time can you trust government to do what is right (% all of the time)	18	7	62
How interested do you think the government is in hearing what people like you think? (% very interested/quite interested)	27	15	74
Responsiveness of government: Interest of government in the opinions of (% yes):			
People of my race group	23	22	82
People in my economic class	43	23	77
People who share my language	37	16	80
Impact of Government: Impact of the actions of the government over the last year (% positive or very positive)			
Personally	41	29	75
People of same race	27	14	73
People who share same language	29	18	71
People in same economic class	36	26	76
South Africa	32	10	76
Discrimination by Government: Extent to which the following are treated unfairly by government (% always or to a large extent)			
People of my race group	42	42	47
People who share my language	43	43	49
People in my economic class	36	34	46
Me personally	33	31	46

TABLE 21: ATTITUDES OF SKILLED S AFRICANS TOWARDS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Attitude (%)	Whites	Blacks
Strongly oppose	42	6
Oppose	41	14
Total	83	20

TABLE 22: COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND OVERSEAS DESTINATION

Better or much better overseas (%)	Total	Whites	Blacks
Personal safety	80	86	55
Family safety	80	86	53
Upkeep of public amenities	72	81	32
Customer service	67	76	36
Future of children	65	73	32
Availability of quality affordable products	62	69	34
Level of taxation	61	64	46
Level of income	60	61	52
Medical services	59	66	27
Cost of living	54	55	38
Ability to find a good school for children	53	56	38
Taxation	52	57	28
Job security	52	53	46
Prospects for professional advancement	49	49	46
Job	43	48	42
Ability to find desirable house	28	25	30

son will not emigrate if they cannot afford to get over the fence. Because of their greater material stake in their home countries, skilled people are more likely to weigh the costs of uprooting and moving.

Skilled South Africans in fact have relatively low levels of direct, regular contact with people or firms in foreign destinations. Very few people regularly travel outside the country (Table 23). Few whites and even fewer blacks have worked for foreign companies or clients overseas. While around one-quarter say they are in regular contact with professional associations abroad, only 15% have regular contact with fellow professionals abroad, and an even smaller proportion with foreign employment agencies.

However, significant proportions of skilled South Africans, especially whites, have been touched by emigration in very direct ways. One-fifth of skilled whites say a member of their immediate family has left to live and work abroad, and one-third say a member of the extended family has left. As many as 59% know a close friend who has left. In the professional environment, 40% say they have lost a co-worker, and 57% say someone they know in their profession has left (Table 24).

Prior exposure to emigration increases the probability of leaving (by reducing the unknown), but also means that there is the beginning of a personal network somewhere overseas. Between one-fifth to one-third of skilled South Africans say they "often" receive information about living conditions in other countries from a range of different sources (family, friends, newspapers, professional associations and professional journals). Between one-fifth and one-quarter say they "often" get information about job opportunities in other countries through these sources.

To assess the degree to which emigration is logistically feasible for skilled South Africans, we asked how easy it would be for them to work and live in another country, and whether they felt that moving and finding a new home would be affordable.

Significant proportions of skilled South Africans see few logistical obstacles to emigration. Over one third (37%) say it would be "easy" or "very easy" for them to leave, and 42% think they would be able to afford the costs of moving and finding a new home.

Conclusion: Stemming the Tide?

The study shows that 2% of skilled South Africans have a "very high" emigration potential, and another 10% have a "high" potential to leave in the next five years. A much higher proportion still have thought about emigrating. What do the findings of this survey imply for possible strategies to keep skilled South Africans in the country?

Whether the grass is actually greener abroad is an open yet answerable question. However, such research might be a useful way for government and civil society to create a better, more realistic understanding among skilled South Africans of what things are really like in other countries, especially the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. It is important to remember that skilled South Africans have very little experience with foreign employers and very little first hand experience of these countries (at least in the form of regular travel).

One other way of testing whether there is something that government can do, or at least

avoid doing, to keep as many potential leavers in the country as possible is to examine the responses of those 10% of skilled workers with a "high" emigration potential on two specific questions. First of all, they were asked what, if anything, would lead them to stay in South Africa. Only 12% of those with a "high" emigration potential said that there was "nothing" that could make them stay. One quarter (25%) said improvements in safety and security would make them stay (Table 25).

Finally, we asked the entire sample whether potential government steps to restrict emigration would make them more or less likely to leave. From the responses of those with a "high" emigration potential, we see that government policies to make emigration more difficult would be counter-productive and hasten the exit of almost half of this group. Other specific steps such as requiring a year's national service from students leaving professional schools, an end to dual passport holding, or increased fees for documents would also hasten the exit of between one-third to one-quarter of this group.❂

TABLE 23: EXPERIENCE OF REGULAR TRAVEL ABROAD (%)

Travel once a year or more to	Total	Whites	Blacks
Southern Africa	16	18	9
Elsewhere in Africa	3	3	5
Europe	7	9	3
North America	3	4	2
Australia/New Zealand	2	1	1
Asia	1	1	1

TABLE 24: KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER EMIGRANTS (%)

Knows at least one emigrant amongst	Total	Whites	Blacks
Members of immediate family	19	20	11
Members of extended family	36	40	14
Close friends	59	69	17
Co-workers	40	45	14
People in profession known personally	57	66	19

TABLE 25: FACTORS AFFECTING A DECISION TO LEAVE SOUTH ÂFRICA (%)

Most important factor causing person to stay	Total
Improvement in safety and security	25
Family roots	15
Nothing	12
Future of children in country	7
Climate/weather/nature	5
Better government	3
Patriotism	3
Good schools	3
Job security	3

Notes & references

1 J Crush and V Williams, 'Slamming the door on migration?', *SAMP Policy Brief*, Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project, 2000.
2 S Castles and M Miller, *The age of migration*, London: McMillan, 1993.
3 While 1986 saw a far greater net loss, it is not clear what proportion qualified as skilled.
4 See the article by Brown et al, in this issue. While Statistics South Africa data show 82 000 South Africans in total emigrating to the five major destination countries in the past nine years, they claim that the immigration records of those countries show 233 000 incoming South Africans. These are total emigrants,

not skilled.
5 Even while the SANSA study criticises the Statistics South Africa data, the authors speak about skilled emigration by at times counting "professionals" (whose definition is unclear), at times by occupation, and at times by tertiary education.
6 See for example '74% of South Africans Ready to Quit the Country', *Sunday Times*, (Johannesburg), 13 September 1998.
7 B Haldenwang, *Migration processes, systems and policies*, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch Press, 1998; Statistics SA, *Tourism and Migration: 1994- 1996*, Pretoria: Central Statistics Service Report No. 1000-03510-1425-8560, 1998.

8 Any result obtained from a randomly obtained sample is subject to a known degree of sampling error. Sampling theory calculates the margin of error at a 95% probability level. This means that any result based on a sample of this size will reflect the actual population parameter within a range of plus or minus 3.7 percentage points (for estimates between 45% to 55%) to plus or minus 1.6 points (for more extreme estimates such as 10% or 90%). However one out of every twenty samples may produce results that vary from the population parameter by even larger margins. Results based on smaller subsamples (e.g. blacks or whites) will obviously be subject to greater sampling

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
The Brain Gain

and legal immigration to post-apartheid South Africa

By Robert Mattes,
Jonathan Crush and
Wayne Richmond

Until recently, South Africa was an "immigrant-receiving" nation.[1] According to official statistics, the country consistently experienced net immigration gains from 1940 until 1994; temporarily interrupted by periods of political upheaval in 1960-1961 (Sharpeville), 1977-1979 (Soweto), and 1986-1988 (the States of Emergency). Under apartheid, legal immigration was limited to whites only, primarily from Western Europe. This policy was not officially removed from the statute books until 1991. However, in the 1980s the National Party government, seeking to bolster its bantustan policy, allowed homeland administrations to import skills from Africa and Asia.

Skilled immigrants and migrants make important contributions to any country's economic growth and development.[4] Immigrants can fill the gaps created by emigrating skills or the inadequacies of a country's education and training system. Even more importantly, skilled immigrants bring innovation to an economy through new ideas and skills.[5] This is seldom recognised in the anti-immigration discourse of post-apartheid South Africa.

To shift the debate so that skills immigration is not perceived as a universal evil by South Africans and its real potential is realistically debated and assessed, two things must happen. First, there needs to be far more precise documentation of the extent of the skills lost through brain drain. A recent study by the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) claims that official statistics on emigration are far too low, by as much as two-thirds.[6] Official statistics on emigration count self-declared émigrés, and do not capture those who might leave permanently under the pretext of, or subsequent to, a temporary visit.[7]

Secondly, there needs to be greater awareness of the profile and contribution of South Africa's current stock of skilled immigrants. Studies of skilled immigrants in other countries have shown that they rarely fit popular stereotypes. There is no reason why this should not be true for South Africa as well. This paper therefore aims to build a profile of South Africa's current skilled immigrant population. The analysis addresses the following questions: (a) who are these immigrants? (b) when did they come to South Africa? (c)

Officially, South Africa remained a net immigration country during the tumultuous transition years from 1990 to 1994. However, this picture is misleading since official figures seriously underestimate the extent of emigration. The official net immigration losses of the last five years similarly fail to reveal the full extent of the loss. One of the reasons is that immigration no longer keeps pace with emigration. Indeed, post-1994 skilled immigration policy has become increasingly restrictive.

Immigration is certainly not widely viewed as a public policy tool that could benefit South Africa and South Africans. Rather, immigrants (even the most highly skilled) are stereotyped as a threat to South African jobs. The reasons for this narrowing of national vision have been explored elsewhere.[2] They include the racially sullied immigration history of the country, the impact of nationalism and nation-building, a poor understanding of the relationship between skills and economic growth, and growing xenophobia.

The public debate around South Africa's "brain drain"

has focused almost obsessively on the emigration of skilled South Africans from the country.[3] But skilled emigration is only one side of the story. Before we reach firm conclusions about whether South Africa is experiencing a net loss of skilled labour, the volume of that loss, and its impact on the South African economy, need to be weighed against the numbers and types of skilled non-South Africans living in and immigrating to South Africa.

FIGURE 1: SOUTH AFRICAN MIGRATION: NET OFFICIAL GAINS & LOSSES, 1940-1998

Source: Central Statistical Services 1994, Tourism and Migration, 1993; Central Statistical Services 1995, Tourism and Migration 1995.

TABLE 1: IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA BY SOURCE REGION, 1926-1995

	Europe	Africa	Asia	Americas	Oceania
1926-30	30 871	791	742	746	511
1931-35	18 537	1 130	464	766	508
1936-40	30 896	1 596	845	1 369	841
1941-45	5 422	928	417	328	198
1946-50	91 573	4 027	3 438	1 865	1 189
1951-55	70 242	7 841	1 375	1 576	637
1956-60	48 857	14 187	1 423	1 386	654
1961-65	89 658	58 231	2 563	2 734	1 189
1966-70	157 087	44 418	2 918	3 218	2 511
1971-75	142 584	27 838	2 754	3 666	3 843
1976-80	76 381	50 343	2 189	2 441	2 428
1981-85	98 191	58 603	3 136	2 837	1 278
1986-90	28 189	13 946	4 730	2 422	554
1991-95	18 999	8 474	12 462	1 890	498

Source: S Peberdy, "Selecting Immigrants" (see note 1)

TABLE 3: IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA BY SOURCE REGION, 1990-1998

	Total	Europe	Africa	Asia	Other
1990	14 449	7 560	1 628	2 837	2 474
1991	12 379	5 767	2 065	3 650	897
1992	8 686	3 869	1 266	3 005	546
1993	9 824	4 541	1 701	3 165	417
1994	6 398	2 784	1 628	1 645	342
1995	5 064	2 272	1 343	1 063	386
1996	5 407	2 315	1 601	1 137	454
1997	4 352	1 630	1 281	1 148	473
1998	4 371	1 614	1 169	1 207	381

Source: DHA Annual Reports

TABLE 2: IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA BY MAJOR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, 1995-1997

	1995	1996	1997
Europe			
U.K.	1 046	1 052	623
Germany	249	253	162
Netherlands	113	118	56
Bulgaria	95	103	-
Yugoslavia	96	93	-
Asia			
Taiwan	247	244	182
India	303	342	367
Pakistan	79	79	96
Africa			
SADC	1 056	1 178	870
Non-SADC	287	423	480
Americas			
USA	145	171	136
Canada	93	36	37

Source: DHA Annual Reports

In 1991, the longstanding definition of an immigrant as someone "assimilable" by the white population was abandoned. The pattern of diversification continued in the 1990s despite declining overall numbers of immigrants (Table 2).

The new, post-apartheid restrictionist attitude towards immigration has affected flows in two main ways: first, the numbers of people being allowed to legally immigrate to South Africa has fallen consistently since 1994 (Table 3). The argument that this is because few people wish to emigrate to South Africa is almost certainly incorrect. With limited opportunity for legal immigration, South Africa's skills base has ironically been augmented by undocumented immigration and official corruption.[10] This is the regrettable downside of the absence of a proactive immigration policy. South Africa's economy is also relatively developed in comparison to the rest of the continent and much of the "Third World." Thus, South Africa has comparative advantages that make it a preferred destination for many skilled workers.

Second, the new restrictionism has affected temporary skills import. The official figures indicate that the numbers of work permits issued to foreign temporary residents increased during the 1990s but has fallen consistently since 1996 (Table 4). The 1998 figure was the lowest for many years. Employers have been frustrated and blocked at every turn as

are there significant differences between pre-1990 and post-1990 immigrants? (d) how do they perceive and experience the xenophobic smog which is said to blanket much of the country?

These questions are addressed using data from a 1999 SAMP survey of skilled non-citizens in South Africa. No one is sure exactly how many skilled non-citizens actually live in the country. There is also no precise knowledge of where they reside or work. This makes it impossible to draw scientific, representative samples. To obtain information which was as valid and reliable as possible in the circumstances, SAMP interviewed an area-controlled sample of 400 skilled foreign nationals in the country.[8] Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the Gauteng, Cape Town and Durban metropolitan areas. Many no doubt also reside in other metropolitan and rural areas, but due to the immense difficulty and cost in locating them, the survey was limited to the three metropolitan areas.[9]

From Dominance to Diversity

Official immigration figures show that until the 1980s, Western Europe (and Great Britain in particular), were the major sources of immigrants to South Africa. The peak decade for European immigration was 1965 to 1975, when 300 000 immigrants entered the country (Table 1). European immigration fell sharply after 1985. African immigration prior to the 1970s was primarily of whites from other countries to the north. The peak period coincides with white flight from independence in Africa.

In the 1980s, South Africa's immigration stream became somewhat more diverse. With the nominal "independence" of the homelands of Transkei, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, skills were imported from a more diverse range of sources, including Asia, SADC and the rest of Africa. In the 1980s significant numbers of Taiwanese immigrants were also welcomed by the apartheid government as part of the same strategy.

TABLE 4: TEMPORARY RESIDENCE PERMITS, 1990-1998

	New	Renewals	Total
1990	7 657	30 915	38 571
1991	4 117	32 763	36 880
1992	5 581	33 318	38 899
1993	5 741	30 810	36 551
1994	8 714	29 352	38 066
1995	11 053	32 838	43 891
1996	19 498	33 206	52 704
1997	11 361	17 129	28 490
1998	10 828	11 207	22 035

Source: DHA Annual Reports

TABLE 5: ORIGIN OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY REGION

Region of Origin	%
Western Europe	47
Rest of Africa	23
Southern Africa	18
North America	4
Asia/ Far East	3
Eastern Europe	3
Australasia	1
Other	3

For this and all subsequent tables, percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
N=400, unless otherwise specified

TABLE 6: CITIZENSHIP OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Country of Citizenship	N	%
Britain	123	31
Nigeria	32	8
Germany	22	6
Zimbabwe	15	4
DRC	21	5
Netherlands	16	4
Ireland	11	3
United States	9	2
Malawi	9	2
Zambia	9	2
Ghana	9	2
Portugal	8	2
Lesotho	8	2
Uganda	8	2
Botswana	8	2
Swaziland	6	2
Belgium	6	2
Canada	5	1
Austria	4	1
Cuba	4	1
Kenya	4	1

Only countries with at least 1% listed (N=400)

TABLE 7: ORIGINS OF IMMIGRANTS BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE

	Europe	Rest of Africa	Southern Africa	Other	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid 1991)	27.1	86.9	53.4	73.6	49.1
More than 8 years (before mid 1991)	72.9	13.1	46.5	36.8	51.2
N=	199	92	71	38	400

TABLE 8: RESIDENCY STATUS OF IMMIGRANTS

	Permanent Residence	Work Permit	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid 1991)	24.6	91.1	49.1
More than 8 years (before mid 1991)	75.5	9.2	51.2
N=	253	147	400

they seek to import high-level skills from outside the country. This discontent has swelled into a torrent of criticism over the last year as the policy has seriously interfered with the economic plans and operations of key enterprises. There are signs that the message is getting through and a loosening of restrictions has been promised. However, the new Draft Immigration Bill proposes a new system that is bureaucratically cumbersome and may simply exacerbate the situation further.[11]

The profile of the sample selected for this study of skilled immigrants should, if representative, reflect something of South Africa's diverse immigration history. In the sample, the major source region was clearly Europe (47%) and the most important source country, the United Kingdom (31%); a clear legacy of South Africa's racist past (Tables 5 and 6).

South Africa's more recent history of immigrant diversification is also clearly reflected in the sample. As many as 41% of the sample were from elsewhere in Africa (with 18% from the SADC region and 23% from other countries). The snowball sample method picked up respondents from ten African countries with Nigeria and the DRC prominent outside SADC, and Zimbabwe within. The fact that almost a quarter of the sample were from non-SADC African countries points to a newer, post-1990 trend in South Africa's immigration experience: the movement of skilled Africans (as immigrants and asylum seekers) to the country following the demise of apartheid. The relatively high proportion of African respondents, in comparison with overall immigration figures (Table 6), is a function of the fact that the survey identified many skilled African respondents who enjoy only temporary residence status in South Africa.

For purposes of comparison, the sample can be divided in various ways. First,

comparisons are possible between the older, primarily European, stream of immigrants and the newer breed of African (im)migrant. The former are associated with the population engineering of apartheid immigration policy. Nearly 73% of South Africa's skilled residents from Europe entered South Africa before 1991 (Table 7). The latter, increasingly global, movement is associated with the new opportunities and attractions of post-apartheid South Africa. As Table 7 also shows, 87% of non-SADC African respondents entered the country after 1991, highlighting the recency of South Africa's reconnection to the rest of the continent. SADC-country citizens are about evenly split between the two, indicating that the brain drain from neighbouring states began before the formal end of apartheid, and has continued since.

A second point of comparison therefore is between "old" and "new" immigrants. We use the year 1991 as the nominal divide between old (apartheid) and new (post-apartheid) immigrant movements. The former is predominantly European but includes some African and Asian immigrants who entered under the rubric of the country's late apartheid policies. The latter is predominantly African, but includes Europeans and other skilled personnel associated with the post-apartheid influx of foreign capital to the country.

The final point of comparison is between permanent residents ("immigrants") and temporary residents ("migrants"). As Table 8 clearly shows, three quarters of skilled non-citizens who have been in the country since before mid-1991 are permanent residents. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of skilled non-citizens who entered after 1991 are temporary residents on work permits. Nearly 80% of western skilled residents have permanent resi-

TABLE 9: PLACE OF RESIDENCE

	Greater JHB	Cape Town	Durban	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid 1991)	79	13	8	100
More than 8 years (before mid 1991)	43	30	27	100
Western (European/N American)	44	32	24	100
African	83	9	9	100

TABLE 10: GENDER OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS

Gender	Total	Western	African	Other
Male	68	61	79	64
Female	32	39	21	36

TABLE 11: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS

Educational Qualification	Total	Western	African	Other
Less than High School Certificate (HSC)	1	1	0	0
HSC only, or equivalent	7	11	1	4
HSC plus a diploma or Bachelors degree	68	61	74	84
Honours degree	10	10	10	0
Masters degree	12	12	14	4
Doctorate	3	4	1	8

TABLE 12: QUALIFICATIONS OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS

	High School or less	HS + Diploma	Bachelor's Degree	Post Graduate	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid 1991)	16.1	31.7	69.1	58.2	49.1
More than 8 years (before mid 1991)	83.9	68.4	31.1	41.8	51.2
N=	100	142	129	98	400

TABLE 13: INCOME OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS

Income	Total	Western	African	Other
R2001 to R6000	19	10	32	12
R6001 to R8 000	14	9	21	4
R8001 to R10 000	7	5	10	8
R10 001 to R14 000	16	17	15	20
R14 001 to R20 000	18	23	11	28
R20 001 to R26 000	11	13	6	12
R26 001 to R32 000	5	10	3	0
R32 001 to R38 000	2	2	1	4
More than R38 000	5	9	1	4
Refused to answer	2	2	0	8

therefore useful to know something about the new African immigrants already in South Africa.[12]

Comparing Old and New Migration

A systematic comparison of the different immigrant sub-groups reveals some distinctive differences. First, their residential geography is distinctively different (Table 9). Old immigrants cluster in Cape Town and Durban, while new immigrants are found in absolute and proportionally greater numbers in the economic heartland of the Gauteng area. Similarly, African skilled migrants are even more concentrated in Gauteng compared to the other centres.

Second, the sample reveals the distinctive gender characteristics of the immigrant sub-groups. Both the Western and African populations are predominantly male (Table 10). However, the western sample had proportionally more females. Much old immigration was of the family variety and the training and mobility of skilled Africans in their home countries remains male-dominated.

Third, in terms of formal educational qualifications, there is little obvious difference between African and western non-citizens (Table 11).

However, there is a much greater difference in the qualifications of old and new immigrants. There is a very strong trend for more recent, post-1991, arrivals to be better educated (Table 12). Almost 70% of skilled non-citizens with university degrees and 60% with post-graduate training arrived after 1991. This finding clearly contradicts the idea that the "quality" of immigrants to South Africa has been in decline. Under apartheid, a white skin was the usual passport to entry. Under the new dispensation, skills and value have become much more important determinants.

Fourth, despite the similar educational profile of western and African skilled residents and the superior profile of post-1991 entrants, the earning potential of the two groups varies considerably (Table 13). Western skilled residents tend to have higher incomes than their African counterparts. For example, some 63% of skilled Africans earn less than R10 000 a month (compared with only 24% of westerners). Again, a third of Africans, but only 10% of westerners, earn less than R6 000 a month. In part, this is a function of natural career progression (with long-time immigrants tending to earn more than newcomers in any context). But there are obvious racial legacies here.

dence status compared to only 44% of African non-citizens. The impact of a restrictionist immigration policy on the degree of commitment and permanence of non-citizens seems obvious, although it could be that the modern, skilled worker is less interested in permanent residence.

Comparisons are useful for a number of reasons. First, they provide valuable insights into the character, skills, attitudes and behaviours of old versus new immigrants. Second, we can test the pervasive

assumption in South Africa that the rest of the continent has little to offer; certainly its citizens are often stereotyped in the media and on the streets in predominantly negative terms. Third, the reality is that South Africa is currently a more attractive permanent immigration destination for Africans than it is for people from Europe. If South Africa were to adopt a more open policy towards skilled immigration, Africa would be a major source of potential immigrants (as happened fleetingly in the early 1990s). It is

Any white immigrant in the old South Africa immediately enjoyed job and promotion preference over a black counterpart.

Fifth, the survey provided useful insights into the shifting occupational distribution of skilled migrants since the demise of apartheid. New migrants are disproportionately represented in the medical, educational, financial and research and technical fields. They are severely under-represented in the commercial and manufacturing sectors. This may simply be a reflection of a lack of demand in industry, although this argument is difficult to sustain in the face of persistent complaints from business about the bureaucratic difficulties of accessing skilled non-South African labour.

Discouraging Permanence

One of the most striking features of post-1994 immigration policy has been the hostility to the import of skills from outside. There is a pervasive but highly misleading assumption that every job occupied by a non-citizen is one job less for a South African. This fallacy has produced a policy environment that favours limiting skills in-migration, and temporary over permanent settlement. This contrasts markedly with apartheid policy where (white) permanent immigration and assimilation were encouraged and promoted.

How transient are South Africa's skilled non-citizens? Another way to answer this question is to examine their longer-term migration aspirations. About half of the sample are interested in remaining in South Africa for longer than 5 years, with another 24% currently undecided (Table 14). The overall numbers wishing to acquire citizenship are much lower (at around 25%) but there is significant interest amongst African immigrants in doing so (Table 15).

Another way to answer the question is to examine their continuing economic commitments to their country of origin. Non-citizens who maintain tangible links to their home countries have a much greater potential ability and likelihood of returning. Half of the respondents still have a bank account in their home country, but the numbers are significantly lower on the other indicators. One-third still have a house and investments in their home country, while a fifth have a job to return to. Western respondents are much less likely to have retained a house back home, a reflection of their more permanent residence status. African respondents

TABLE 14: RESIDENCE INTENTIONS

How long do you want to stay in S Africa?	Total	Western	African	Other
Less than 6 months	2	2	1	0
6 months to 1 year	3	3	0	12
1 to 2 years	7	6	7	8
Up to 5 years	17	13	20	28
More than 5 years	49	48	55	20
Don't know	24	27	17	32

TABLE 15: ATTITUDES TO CITIZENSHIP

To what extent do you want to become a citizen of South Africa?	Total	Western	African	Other
Large extent	24	16	37	16
Some Extent	23	17	29	28

TABLE 16: CONNECTIONS WITH HOME COUNTRY

In your home country, do you still:	Total	Western	African	Other
Own a house (% yes)	35	18	53	52
Have a bank account (% yes)	50	53	44	60
Have investments (% yes)	34	34	34	32
Have a job to return to (% yes)	19	15	21	36

TABLE 17: FREQUENCY OF RETURN TO HOME COUNTRY

How often do you return to your home country?	Total	Western	African	Other
Often	16	18	10	32
Occasionally	27	31	22	20
A few times	13	17	9	4
Once or twice	32	26	40	32
Never	12	8	18	12

are slightly less likely to have a foreign bank account. Other than that, regional differences are minimal.

Another measure is how often they return to their home country. Very few appear to have cut all ties, with only 12% saying "never". On the other hand, only 16% return home often. Most do so on an irregular basis. Africans are far less likely to do so even though their destinations are much closer.

Another way of assessing the likelihood of staying in South Africa is by examining their developing ties to the country. As expected, old (white) immigrants are far more likely to have permanent residence in South Africa: nearly 80% of westerners versus only 56% of Africans interviewed. The latter, who are predominantly post-1991 arrivals, face considerable constraints on acquiring permanent residence. In fact, only 7% of the sample had work permits and had actually applied for permanent residence.

But how many temporary residents

would opt for permanence if the climate was more conducive? Of the work permit holders, almost half said that they would want "to a large extent" to become a permanent resident. Other indicators also suggest a considerable interest in a more permanent commitment to the country: 9% of the sample have already applied for South African citizenship while one quarter express a high level of desire to become a citizen. Similarly, one quarter express a strong desire to retire in South Africa.

However, not everyone wishes to make such a commitment. This is not surprising since the sample picked up two different "types" of post-apartheid skilled foreign resident: individuals who are temporary residents by design or preference (e.g. employees of foreign companies or in contract posts) and those who would prefer to immigrate to South Africa permanently, but cannot.

African skilled workers are much more likely to express a strong desire to

TABLE 18: PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA

	Total	Western	African	Other
Personal economic conditions	% satisfied/ very satisfied			
Job	79	83	72	84
Prospects for professional advancement	69	49	70	72
Job security	63	68	55	67
Income	51	50	52	56
Cost of living	47	36	59	56
Taxation				
Relative share of taxes compared to others	20	18	25	8
Present level of taxation	15	13	18	12
Education and Health Care				
Medical services	66	62	71	56
Education for children	45	39	55	40
Standard of Services				
The upkeep of public amenities	35	19	53	44
Customer service	35	18	55	44
Future of children in South Africa	18	11	27	16
Safety and Security				
Personal safety	15	13	18	12
Family's safety	13	9	17	12

TABLE 19: EXPECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN NEXT FIVE YEARS

	Total	Western	African	Other
Personal economic conditions	% satisfied/ very satisfied			
Level of income	45	29	66	40
Job	42	22	69	40
Job security	39	17	67	40
Prospects for professional advancement	29	10	53	28
Cost of Living	47	36	59	56
Taxation				
Present level of taxation	14	4	27	12
Relative share of taxes in comparison to others	11	1	22	12
Education and Health Care				
Ability to find medical services for family	32	7	64	24
Ability to find a good school for children	28	7	56	20
Standard of Services				
Customer service	32	12	58	36
Upkeep of public amenities	31	12	56	40
Future of your children	24	9	45	16
Safety and Security				
Personal safety	26	10	48	16
Family's safety	25	10	45	16

Eight in ten respondents agreed that they were proud to be called a citizen of their home country, with 66% agreeing that citizenship in their home country was an important part of their self-image. Half want their children to be citizens of their home country, while slightly less than that still feel that they have a duty to contribute to the development of their own country.

At the same time, it is important to note that these levels of assent are substantially lower than those given by a sample of ordinary South Africans about their South African patriotism.[13] Europeans and North Americans tended to be less enthusiastic about their identification with their home countries, probably because they have been in South Africa much longer. Continued identification with their home countries does not seem to preclude assimilation within South African society. While 87% agreed that their fellow citizens continue to see themselves as citizens of their country, some 80% also agreed that they also "tend to blend in with the people of South Africa and their culture."

Perceptions of South Africa

The survey results reveal that the skilled non-citizens are very satisfied with their personal economic conditions in South Africa, access to health care and quality schooling, and the cost of living. This extends across respondents from differing areas of origin (Table 18). The most important exception is the dissatisfaction of Europeans and North Americans with the cost of living (64% dissatisfied or very dissatisfied).

The respondents were much less satisfied with the standard of services available in South Africa. By a wide margin, they are also dissatisfied with their level and share of taxation. Finally, there is an overwhelming concern about the lack of personal and family safety.

Regardless of where people perceive themselves to be now, a more important question is where they think they will end up and why. Are skilled non-citizens optimistic about their personal futures in South Africa? Here there was a clear difference of opinion between western and African migrants, between old and new immigrants (Table 19). Most Africans feel that the various elements of their personal economic future in South Africa will continue to improve, in marked contrast to the pessimism of white non-citizens. These differences in attitude are remarkably similar to those between

become citizens. Even though more than 60% express some interest in obtaining citizenship, that does not always appear to translate into a desire to stay for the rest of their lives. Just over one-third are interested in retiring in South Africa, but only 20% would want to be buried there. Conversely, the older immigrants from the west are considerably more likely to express interest in retiring and being buried in South Africa. Almost half of the respondents said they wanted to stay in South Africa longer than five years.

Skilled non-South Africans still display a significant level of symbolic and patriotic ties with their home country.

white and black South Africans. Certainly, there is little reason why white non-citizens should not have imbibed many of the same gloomy attitudes as their white South African counterparts. The optimism of skilled Africans about the country and their place in it is a reminder to South African policy-makers that the South African experiment enjoys wide support amongst skilled black Africans in the country.

A range of evidence from the media to systematic opinion surveys reveal that South Africans are highly xenophobic and opposed to immigration, and that migrant workers and refugees often find themselves on the receiving end of discrimination, intolerance and violence.[14] The question, therefore, is whether skilled non-citizens are in any way immune to the stereotyping and hostility that is assumed to apply to all foreigners. The survey seems to show that the professional and higher income status of this group seems to shield them from much of the harsh treatment meted out to ordinary foreign workers, immigrants and refugees.

Skilled migrants are certainly not unaware of the general negative bias in the country. About a quarter said that South Africans hold very negative views – tellingly, 41% of skilled respondents from Africa feel this way. But only small minorities feel that their co-workers or others in their professions have a negative bias toward foreign residents. A smaller proportion felt that South Africans had a negative view of people specifically from their home country – and again, this proportion jumped to 36% among skilled Africans.

Perhaps more important, only 4% reported that they their personal relations with South Africans were negative. Indeed, not one respondent chose the option "very negative." Only very small numbers felt that people from their home country were discriminated against by ordinary South Africans or the South African government, or that they personally were discriminated against (Table 21).

In some sense these are remarkably tolerant and accepting responses, since the personal exposure to unpleasant incidents is not insignificant. Nearly 60% of skilled non-citizens have been robbed since they first arrived in South Africa, over a third have been harassed and one in five have been physically assaulted.

One plausible explanation is that they

TABLE 20: PERCEIVED ATTITUDES OF SOUTH AFRICANS

Perceived attitudes towards foreign residents of:	Total	Western	African	Other
	% negative/very negative			
People from South Africa	28	19	41	12
Co-workers	9	7	10	16
People in profession	6	5	6	16

TABLE 21: INTERACTION WITH SOUTH AFRICANS

	Total	Western	African	Other
Do you generally have negative or positive relations with people from South Africa? (% negative/very negative)	4	2	5	12
To what extent are you personally treated unfairly by the SA government? (% large extent)	7	10	3	8
To what extent are you personally treated unfairly by South Africans? (% large extent)	5	2	8	4
To what extent are people from your home country treated unfairly by the SA government? (% large extent)	12	12	12	4
To what extent are people from your home country treated unfairly by South Africans? (% large extent)	8	1	19	0

TABLE 22: PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA

	Total	Western	African	Other
% Harassed	35	29	45	16
% Assaulted	18	15	23	12
% Robbed	57	56	59	48

TABLE 23: COMPARING SOUTH AFRICA WITH HOME COUNTRY

Personal Economic Conditions	Total	Western	African	Other
Cost of living	58	47	75	32
Job	57	46	75	36
Level of income	46	27	71	36
Job security	33	19	50	36
Taxation				
Level of taxation	16	11	22	16
Relative share of taxation	14	8	23	16
Standard of Services				
Medical services	36	11	71	32
Upkeep of public amenities	34	8	67	36
Customer service	33	9	61	48
Education and Health Care				
Ability to find a good school	27	8	51	24
Future of your children	20	5	39	16
Safety and Security				
Personal safety	8	1	16	8
Family safety	7	1	16	4

TABLE 24: LIVING CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA VERSUS HOME COUNTRY

In general, is your life today better, about the same or worse than in your home country?	Total	Western	African	Other
Better / much better	65	62	70	52
About the same	25	25	22	36
Worse / much worse	9	8	8	12

compare their situation in South Africa favourably with conditions back home. Certainly this seems to be the case when it comes to personal economic conditions; most skilled non-citizens feel that they are better off in South Africa. Only with regard to job security and levels of taxation do significantly more people feel that they would be better off at home. This is hardly surprising given current government policy towards the employment of non-citizens. Nevertheless, skilled migrants from African countries are consistently more likely to think that things are better in South Africa.

The picture begins to change when we shift to comparing standards of services. Differences according to region of origin become particularly stark: with the majority of Europeans and North Americans saying these things would be better at home, and at least two-thirds of African respondents saying things are better in South Africa than in their home countries.

Favourable evaluations of South Africa are at their lowest ebb with regard to safety and security. Less than 10% feel that their family safety and personal safety are better in this country. This ought to be a sobering finding for South Africans. There is a widespread perception that the rest of Africa, in particular, is a chaotic and violent place. Yet, for skilled Africans, South Africa is a far more threatening and dangerous environment.

Perhaps the most important question a skilled worker asks him or herself when considering staying on in South Africa is whether life has improved as a result of the decision to come in the first place. The survey reveals quite clearly that coming to South Africa has been a positive career move for themselves and other fellow nationals. Fully 70% say that the lives of the fellow nationals they know who have come to South Africa have improved as a result of the move. More significantly, 65% say that their own lives have improved. Very small minorities feel their lives have worsened, with the balance saying that things have remained as they were.

The general thrust of the analysis is that skilled non-citizens in South Africa are generally far more interested in putting down roots in South Africa than is permitted by current policy. What would happen if the government were to adopt a more immigrant-friendly stance? Here the statistical method known as Multiple Regression Analysis is useful to answer the question: "what factor, or combination of factors, best explains the length of desired stay in South Africa?" Or, more generally, which of the factors included in the survey will ultimately determine how long South Africa will hold onto the skilled foreign population already inside the country?

Analysis indicates that a very limited set of factors account for variations in the likelihood of skilled respondents' staying in South Africa, as well as important differences between skilled westerners and skilled Africans. The most widely voiced explanations for a desire to stay in South Africa are the degree to which migrants believe their personal economic prospects will improve in the next five years and the degree to which they foresee improvements in the general state of services and the future of their children in this period. Thus, regardless of their satisfaction with present personal conditions or state of services, it was those people who felt that things would continue to improve who were significantly more likely to want to stay in South Africa indefinitely.

Five other factors were also significant determinants of the length of desired stay in South Africa: (a) the more people were dissatisfied with present levels of tax and the relative share they were paying, the more likely they were to want to exit the country in the next few years; (b) to the extent that people felt that they were discriminated against by the South African government, they were less likely to want to stay; (c) to the extent that people felt they were personally doing better than others in South Africa, they were more likely to want to stay; (d) the more they are involved in professional associations in South Africa, the longer they are likely to stay; and (e) to the extent that they felt that South Africans had positive views of foreigners, they were also more likely to stay.

In the case of skilled Africans, only one variable emerged as a significant predictor of desired length of stay in South Africa: they are significantly less likely to want to stay in the country to the extent that they have negative relations with South Africans or feel they are discriminated against by ordinary South Africans and the South African govern-

Perhaps the most important question a skilled worker asks when considering staying in South Africa is whether life has improved as a result of the decision to come in the first place.

ment. Because the impact of discrimination was so strong in differentiating between those skilled Africans who wanted to leave South Africa soon, and those who wanted to stay for an indefinite period, it is important to ask what would happen if levels of discrimination/ intolerance against Africans could be reduced to zero.

To answer the question, these variables were removed from the equation. The result was that satisfaction with present personal economic conditions became the sole predictor of skilled Africans desired length of stay. In other words, by simply removing the effect of discrimination, skilled Africans who are satisfied with the state of their personal economic conditions are significantly more likely to want to stay in South Africa.

Conclusion

While we need to be cautious about generalising from this sample of skilled foreign workers, the survey provides us with many rich insights and propositions that can be tested in the future with surveys of more systematically selected samples of foreign workers, or by other types of systematic research.

"Brain drain" pessimism has focused mainly on the exit of skills from South Africa with little focus on what South Africa can do to attract more skilled workers from abroad or to keep those who stay here. Lurking behind much of this one-sided focus is the misguided assumption that national development and skills migration are incompatible. In fact, the opposite is the case.

Skilled foreigners in South Africa (old and new migrants, Europeans and Africans) – by wide margins – feel that their lives have been made better by virtue of coming to the country. They are very satisfied with their personal economic conditions and their access to schooling and health care. They are also relatively optimistic about their personal prospects in South Africa over the next five years. However, they do show concern over the quality of other types of services, taxes, and especially in the area of personal and family safety. More

importantly, they worry about the future of their children, and the prospects of declining services and an even further deterioration to their security.

Continued economic prosperity and improvements in commercial and public services and standards, such that they feel assured of their children's future, seem to be the most important factors in keeping these skilled workers in the country. The recent economic recovery, as well as recent tax cuts, should have positive effects among this group. In contrast, a whole range of potential issues, such as movements towards an even more progressive taxation scheme, or a return of the deteriorating currency, high interest rates and high inflation that was experienced during the recession of 1998 could have the opposite effect.

There are clearly very important changes afoot in the composition of the skilled foreign workforce in South Africa. Compared to the situation just a decade ago when a similar survey would have been hard pressed to find significant numbers of black skilled workers from the rest of Africa, 41% of this sample were from Africa. This seems to suggest that South Africa is beginning to capitalise on its comparative developmental advantages as an attractive destination for skilled workers.

It is interesting to compare the survey results with a companion survey of skilled South Africans.[15] That survey reveals that, with a few exceptions, skilled white South Africans are consistently more pessimistic about South Africa (both in terms of present and future conditions in South Africa, as well as comparisons of South Africa with other countries) than skilled Europeans and North Americans – the very people with whom white South Africans would presumably identify.

At the same time, that survey demonstrated that few white South Africans have any regular direct experience with the very countries that they list as their most desired destinations. The skilled foreigner in South Africa at least has the advantage of having seen what the grass looks like on both sides of the fence in forming their evaluations – and by and large, they prefer South Africa.

At the moment, skilled African non-citizens are broadly satisfied with South Africa, and fairly optimistic about its future. What is required to keep them is, first and foremost, a change in their treatment at the hands of ordinary South Africans and their government.

In this regard, the problem of keeping skilled Africans appears to be the same problem confronting the formulation of a more rational immigration policy in general: xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination against foreigners, particularly those from the rest of Africa.

Finally, is there anything from this research to guide efforts by business and government to increase the entrance of foreign skills into the South African economy? While more systematic research would have to be done among skilled people in other countries to assess their images of South Africa, the views of those already there can provide an important start. In answering the question often posed by puzzled South Africans to skilled foreigners, "Who would want to move here?," the survey suggests at least one answer.

Even with all the uncertainties and changes that accompany periods of rapid political and economic transition, skilled people can make their lives better. South Africa is a dynamic society with a substantial economy still capable of producing the quality of lifestyles that highly qualified people desire (whether they be from the First or Third Worlds).

At the same time, the results also suggest that without sending clear signals that will increase certainty about the future, and without a sharp reduction in xenophobia and then communicating that reduction to skilled people outside the country (especially to those living in Africa), it will be increasingly hard to convince any skilled people that there is green grass in South Africa. ◉

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recognised institution (or in their final year of studying); be currently economically active (employed or looking for employment). The only exceptions were people who had not matriculated from High School and/or graduated from a tertiary institution, but who nonetheless occupied a senior management position in their occupation. Within each metropolitan area a 'snowball' sampling method was used. As a first step, interviewers contacted a range of firms to find potential respondents. Once initial contact was made and an interview completed, these respondents were then asked about other skilled foreigners they might know, and many of these people were subsequently interviewed when possible. Only one interview was conducted within each household.

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Dealing in Scarce Skills

Employer responses to the brain drain in South Africa

C M Rogerson and J M Rogerson

L ittle concrete information exists on the actual shortages experienced by different types of employers in the South African economy or how these different types of employers are addressing the question of specific skills shortages. Yet the answers to these questions have potentially important policy implications for the design of new immigration policies in South Africa. The policy importance of high level skills recruitment is underlined in the context of globalising labour markets and growing international competition for select groups of high skilled workers, such as medical personnel, chartered accountants and

computing specialists. In many South African newspapers there are regular advertisements by an increasing number of international companies, personnel consultancies or recruitment agencies seeking to attract South African human resources to Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The arrival and growth in South Africa of a new industry of immigration consultants and lawyers is further testament to the dangers posed to the country of globalising labour markets.

This article presents the findings of a detailed investigation into responses to the brain drain by employers of skilled personnel in South Africa. The survey sample of 200 enterprises was designed to be as representative as possible across the spectrum of the public and private sectors. Findings from this survey are supplemented by material from the business and technical press. The research was undertaken during March-September 1998, with the aim of identifying the scale and types of skills shortages which presently exist in South Africa, and assessing the hiring practices, attitudes and responses of enterprises dealing with skills shortages in key areas of the economy.

Research Methodology

In seeking to construct a profile of the skills pool and of skills shortages in the South African labour market, a questionnaire was administered to a representative sample of South African employers of skilled personnel. The interview was targeted at senior administrative personnel, normally the human resources or personnel manager, of major employers of skilled personnel. The interview schedule included a mixture of closed and open ended questions. Key themes included an analysis of an enterprise's skilled workforce, current skills shortages, recruitment and training practices for coping

with a loss of skilled personnel, and attitudes towards migration policies in South Africa.

The definition of "skilled personnel" is contested in the international literature with various definitions based on educational levels and occupational status. A typology of skilled international migrants has been constructed by Gould in which a useful distinction is drawn between circulatory movements (for example, managers within multinational companies) and permanent migration (resulting in brain drain).[1] Although the term "skilled personnel" is a slippery concept, it generally includes the following occupational categories: high-level and general managers; scientists, engineers and those with technical skills; education, health and welfare; administration; and literature, arts and sport.[2] In more recent analyses, the occupational category of computer and IT specialists is included as a separate category. In the developing world context, skilled personnel also includes other occupational groups, including certain blue-collar technical workers.[3]

The sample of 200 enterprises was designed to represent the key employers in the South African economy for whom the question of skilled labour supply is important. The starting point was the various sets of listings of major South African companies compiled annually in the *Financial Mail* Top Companies Survey. This provides a ranking of leading enterprises on the basis of their asset base or market capitalisation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). As these listings primarily focus on listed companies on the JSE, it was necessary to supplement them with additional company data.

Other sources used were the University of South Africa's Bureau of Market Research Industrial Register for manufacturing enterprises and a range of special sectoral surveys conducted by *Engineering News*. By drawing from these alternative sources we included groups of major foreign multinationals operating in South Africa and smaller (often niche) enterprises not always captured in listings such as the *Financial Mail* Top Companies Survey. The sample also included a group of public sector or parastatal employers operating in various sectors of the economy, in particular education, health, and finance.[4]

The activities undertaken by the enterprises span the key non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Table 1 shows the sectoral identification of the 200 enter-

prises. The largest category, 56% of the total, was manufacturing or industrial enterprise.

Table 2 indicates the different types of manufacturing enterprises included in the sample. The majority of industrial enterprises are high technology manufacturers, including producers of electrical, industrial and other machinery; radio, television and communications equipment; pharmaceuticals; scientific instruments; and office, computing and accounting machinery.[5]

The strong representation of industrial enterprises in the sample was the result of a decision to target high-technology enterprises as a category with special needs for highly skilled personnel. Outside the high technology sector, the survey sought to capture the skills situation and shortages of a cross-section of enterprises in several other areas of the South African economy, including mining, construction, tourism and entertain-

TABLE 1: SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF THE SAMPLE

Sector	No of companies
Mining	6
Computers & IT	14
Hi-tech industry	69
Other industry	47
Construction	7
Tourism and entertainment	13
Banking and finance	8
Business services	19
Education and health	17
Total	**200**

TABLE 2: BREAKDOWN OF INDUSTRIAL SECTOR COMPANIES

	No of companies
High-tech industrial sector	
Pharmaceuticals	13
Other hi-tech industry	56
Other industrial	
Food (7) and beverages (1)	8
Textiles and clothing (2); footwear (1)	3
Furniture	5
Paper, printing and publishing	6
Chemicals and rubber, and plastics	9
Pottery & glass	2
Metals, engineering and transport	14
Total	**116**

TABLE 3: LARGE ENTERPRISES WITH MORE THAN 300 EMPLOYEES

Sector	Number of companies	% of sector sample
Mining	5	83
Computers & IT	2	14
Hi-tech industry	19	28
Other industry	32	68
Construction	5	71
Tourism and entertainment	2	15
Banking and finance	8	100
Business services	5	26
Education and health	10	59
Total	88	100

TABLE 4: NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND LOCAL COMPANIES

Sector	Foreign	Local
Mining	1	5
Computers & IT	4	10
Hi-tech industry	29	40
Other industry	12	35
Construction	0	7
Tourism and entertainment	1	12
Banking and finance	0	8
Business services	8	11
Education and health	0	17
Total	55	145

ment, banking and finance, business services, computers and information technology, and education and health.

Table 3 shows the importance of large firms in the survey. Special concern was centred upon the needs and issues of large employers (with a minimum of 300 employees). Among the group of large enterprises were a number of giant organisations such as Standard Bank, First National Bank, Old Mutual, Sappi, Sasol, AECI, and the Premier Group. The major large enterprises were leading industrial companies such as Nestlé, 3M, Volkswagen, Hoechst, Bayer, Billiton and Dorbyl.

In total 44% of firms surveyed are classed as large enterprises. Manufacturing enterprises formed 58% of this group. In certain sectors, such as banking and finance, education and health, and mining, a high proportion of the interviewed enterprises could be classed as large. By contrast, in sectors such as business services, computing and information technology, tourism and

entertainment, the majority of enterprises are medium-sized (between 51-299 employees).

The sample also included a range of medium and specialist small-sized enterprises. Many of these were clustered outside the industrial sector in activities such as IT support and business services (accounting, law, advertising, brokering).

In terms of ownership structure, the sample included 16 public sector and 184 private sector enterprises. Public sector enterprises included a number of major universities, a provincial department of health, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and newer government organisations such as Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency.

The division between foreign and local ownership is shown in Table 4. The sample captured foreign companies operating across several sectors of the South African economy. In total, foreign enterprises represented 27.5% of the sample.

The majority of enterprises responded in a co-operative and positive fashion. But certain problems were experienced in the interview process and these should be noted. With several private large conglomerate or multi-divisional enterprises, it was difficult to locate an individual with the appropriate knowledge to speak on behalf of the enterprise as a whole. High profile examples of this problem included Anglo-American and South African Breweries. Often, therefore, the interview focused on particular divisions within the enterprise that were focal points for the employment of high skilled personnel.

Commonly, human resources or personnel managers were genuinely unable to provide detailed statistical information about different categories of skills within enterprises. Once again, large enterprises were a particular problem. Instead of quantitative information, qualitative responses were elicited in several elements of the interview schedule. A small but not insignificant problem with larger enterprises was the fact that certain managers did not have the experience to answer all questions.

Special problems arose in securing information from public sector employers, especially in the health sector. We had hoped to interview several provincial departments of health and education concerning the well-publicised and documented departure of their personnel. Regrettably, this was not possible as requests for interviews were constantly referred back to national departments in Pretoria, from which no meaningful response could be obtained.

Finally, there was no co-operation whatsoever from a small segment of the targeted individuals or enterprises. Despite assurances of confidentiality, refusal to participate was encountered from senior personnel in Coca Cola, Eskom and Simba. Most remarkable of all for a survey of this nature, was the complete lack of co-operation from South Africa's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a parastatal body responsible for issues relating to high-level manpower planning in South Africa. Although this was regrettable, it in no way reduces the validity of the results of this investigation.

The final sample of 200 enterprises is a representative cross-section of the spectrum of employers of skilled personnel in South Africa. In particular, the survey captures a cross-section of enterprises from a range of different sectors, of different sizes and with different ownership characteristics. It includes a set of enterprises, private and public sector, foreign and local, which are leaders in the market for high skilled personnel in South Africa.[6]

High Skills: Local or Foreign?

In total, the 200 enterprises employ an estimated 101 000 skilled personnel with the largest absolute numbers in banking and finance, education and health, and industry. The sectors with the lowest numbers of skilled personnel were entertainment, tourism and construction. In some respects, however, these figures are misleading as they fail to take into consideration the total number of employees in particular sectors of the economy.

A better indicator of the relative importance of skilled personnel in different sectors of the South African economy is a comparison of the numbers of skilled workers in relation to total workforce of individual enterprises. Table 5 shows the proportion of skilled workers in relation to total employment in the sample enterprises. Of the 193 enterprises for which information was available, 39% of enter-

prises have 50% or more of their employees classed as skilled personnel while 20% of enterprises have 75% skilled personnel.

It is evident that there are important sectoral variations in the employment and relative significance of skilled personnel in relation to the total workforce. Across the nine sectors in the survey it is possible to identify four sectors in which the ratio of skilled personnel to total employment is especially high: education and health (in which skilled personnel represents at least 50% of the total workforce for 94% of enterprises), business services (74%), banking and finance (71%) and computers and IT services (71%). For these four sectors the proportion of enterprises with over 75% skilled personnel is a significant indicator of major pockets of skilled workers in the South African economy.

The most high skills intensive sectors were found to be computers and IT services (57%), business services (47%), education and health (41%) and banking and finance (29%). In total, these four sectors accounted for 78 000 skilled employees, the major numerical segment of the survey. In several computer services and IT enterprises the proportion of the labour force that was classified as high skilled was as large as 90% or more.

Five sectors recorded shares of skilled workers below the sample average: mining, other industry, entertainment and tourism, high tech industry and construction. In total, these sectors accounted for approximately 23 000 skilled personnel in the surveyed enterprises.

The number of companies employing non-South African and South African high skilled personnel is shown in Table 6. The most striking finding is that over half employ a skilled workforce of citizens or permanent residents alone. Some variations by sector are again in evidence. The highest proportions of foreign workers are in banking and finance, computers and IT services, education and health, and business services. One surprise was the high proportion of construction enterprises that engage skilled non-South African personnel. Sectors of the economy with a low foreign skill component include mining, other industrial, industrial high-tech, and, least affected of all, entertainment and tourism.

Across the 200 surveyed enterprises, however, foreign skilled personnel number in total only between 2 000 and 3 000

TABLE 5: SKILLED WORKERS AS A PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL LABOUR FORCE

Sector	No. of Companies in Each Category			
	<25	25-50	51-75	>75
Mining	3	1	1	0
Computers & IT	1	3	2	8
Hi-Tech industry	29	18	10	8
Other industry	27	13	5	2
Construction	6	0	0	1
Tourism and entertainment	6	4	1	1
Banking and finance	1	1	3	2
Business services	1	2	7	9
Education and health	0	1	9	7
Total	**74**	**43**	**38**	**38**
Total Sample (%)	**38**	**22**	**20**	**20**

TABLE 6: COMPOSITION OF SKILLED EMPLOYEES BY CITIZENSHIP

Sector	Companies with skilled workforce 100% South African	Companies with skilled workforce partly foreign
Mining	3	3
Computers & IT	5	9
High-tech industry	46	22
Other industrial	27	20
Construction	2	5
Banking and finance	1	7
Business services	7	12
Entertainment and Tourism	9	4
Education and Health	6	10
Total	**106**	**92**
Sample (%)	**54**	**46**

Note: "South African" includes permanent residents of South Africa; "Foreign" refers to those on a work permit.

TABLE 7: PROPORTION OF SKILLED NON-SOUTH AFRICANS

Sector	Skilled workforce			
	0%	1-10%	11-50%	51-100%
Mining	4	1	1	0
Computers & IT	5	8	0	0
High-tech industry	45	21	1	0
Other industry	26	16	5	0
Construction	2	4	1	0
Banking and finance	1	4	1	2
Business services	7	10	2	0
Entertainment and tourism	9	4	0	0
Education and health	7	2	4	2
Total	**106**	**70**	**15**	**4**
Sample (%)	**54**	**36**	**8**	**3**

workers. The largest individual pockets are in education and health, and banking and finance. These small numbers, however, should not devalue the significance of this foreign skilled workforce component. In many instances, it represents the highest echelons of corporate management.

In certain multinational enterprises, foreign skilled personnel are not in South Africa on a long-term basis. Rather, they are part of intra-corporate movements involving a rotation of personnel or exchange programmes. The sources of foreign skilled personnel vary, with the most common countries of origin being the UK, Germany, the USA, Italy and Australia. Significant numbers were also from Portugal, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Russia. Overall, the numbers of skilled personnel recruited from other African countries was relatively small with the largest sources being Zimbabwe and Ghana. Indeed, because of its proximity and close ties with South African business, Zimbabwe was the most common African source for skilled personnel recruitment.

In sum, the study reveals the relatively small numbers of non-South African skilled personnel in relation to total employment in the country. Overall, non-South Africans represent more than 5% of the total labour force in only 8% of our sample enterprises.

The Effect of the Brain Drain

This survey also investigated the effects of the emigration of skilled personnel on the operations of enterprises in South Africa, asking interviewees to assess the flow and impact of emigration during two different periods: the period before the democratic transition and the four years (1994-1998) after.

The companies say that the impact of the emigration of skilled personnel has been much greater in the post-elections period. Moreover, the tempo of emigration of skilled personnel appears to have escalated, especially from 1996 onwards. Overall, one-third of enterprises rated as "significant" the outflow and impact of the emigration of skilled personnel in the post-apartheid period compared to a corresponding rating of 2% in the pre-elections period.

For policy makers this finding is alarming as it underscores an accelerating trend in the exodus of skilled personnel from South Africa.[7] More importantly, this out-migration is beginning to exert an influence on the workings of major South African enterprises. Unless measures are introduced to retain existing skilled personnel or to facilitate a counterflow of skilled personnel into the country, the ramifications of the brain drain on the functioning of the South African economy may become more widespread. Moreover, at the time of sur-

vey, the demand for skilled personnel has been dampened by a period of low economic growth. The chairperson of a sectoral manufacturers association noted: "Skills are in such short supply that I don't know what (South African) business will do if there is an economic upturn."

A second key result is more positive for policy makers. Against the very clear evidence of growing emigration from South Africa is the finding that this is of only minor importance compared to the total skills base of surveyed enterprises. In 41% of enterprises the issue of emigration of high skilled personnel was rated as of no importance whatsoever and in a further 26% of cases of only "negligible" significance.

What these results suggest is that whilst the brain drain continues, there are

few signs at present of a crippling of enterprises due to an inability to source necessary replacement skills. Once again, however, the situation during the post-elections period has become progressively worse. Some 98% of responding enterprises rated the impact of emigration as none or negligible before 1994. The corresponding figure for the post-1994 period falls to 67%.

A third finding is the sectoral variation in the impact of the emigration of high-skilled personnel. In the pre-1994 elections period, emigration flows were deemed significant for only a handful of the survey sample of enterprises (2% of the total). At the time of the survey, the numbers of enterprises reporting a significant impact had risen appreciably especially within five sectors: education and health (59%), business services (47%),

banking and finance (43%), computers and IT services (35%) and industrial high tech (35%). Sectors least affected by emigration were entertainment and tourism, and construction – both are areas of the economy in which the proportion of skilled personnel to total employment is relatively low.

Fourth, South African enterprises confront a different situation to multinational companies operating in South Africa. For South African-owned enterprises, the effects of an emigration of high level skills appear to be more problematic. Foreign companies can source skills from the enterprise's global network of employees, through short-term appointments, staff exchanges or recruitment within the existing international network. The financial resources and power of

these global enterprises reduces the potential impact of the emigration of high level skills.

The open-ended responses of interviewees to questions concerning the emigration of skilled personnel disclosed a number of important themes. First, the reasons for departure from South Africa confirm media concerns about crime and violence, the downturn in the economy, and perceptions of falling standards in the public education and health sectors.[8] Another core reason given for the drain of skilled personnel is the highly attractive salary packages offered by enterprises in North America, Europe and Australia. In the specific case of the health sector, Saudi Arabia was an important destination for skilled nurses because of the lucrative employment packages available.[9]

TABLE 8: IMPACT OF EMIGRATION OF SKILLED PERSONNEL ON COMPANIES

Sector	Pre-1994			Post-1994		
	None	Negligible	Significant	None	Negligible	Significant
Mining	3	1	0	1	3	2
Computers & IT	6	4	1	4	5	5
High-tech industry	55	11	0	33	12	24
Other industry	40	6	0	18	18	11
Construction	5	1	0	5	1	1
Banking and finance	3	3	1	1	3	3
Business services	13	3	0	5	5	9
Entertainment and tourism	10	2	0	11	1	1
Education and health	7	7	1	3	4	10
Total	**142**	**38**	**3**	**81**	**52**	**66**
Sample (%)	**78**	**21**	**2**	**41**	**26**	**33**

Second, a notable proportion of departing skilled personnel are individuals returning to their countries of birth after living and working in South Africa (as permanent residents) for lengthy periods. Not surprisingly, the most common destinations for this type of emigrant are the UK and Germany. This includes many personnel towards the end of their working careers.

Third, in the case of younger skilled personnel, the reasons for departure include seeking a broader international work experience. This particular group of skilled employees therefore may not necessarily represent a permanent loss to the South African economy. Nevertheless, some younger skilled emigration is undoubtedly permanent because of the attractive work packages offered by overseas enterprises.

Fourth, Gauteng-based enterprises experience the worst problems. A common theme in the corporate interviews was Gauteng personnel seeking internal transfers to the Western Cape because of its attractive residential environment and perceived lower levels of crime and violence. On a long-term basis, this trend might threaten and undermine Gauteng's position and long-term economic development as South Africa's "smart province."

The most severe emerging skills shortage clearly relates to computing and information technology personnel. A global labour market has emerged in this sphere, and South Africa is rapidly losing competitive ground to the aggressive recruitment strategies and lucrative employment packages of enterprises in the USA, Western Europe and Australasia.[10] As one specialist IT service enterprise stated: "South African IT personnel are highly marketable all over the world. As a company this is difficult to counter. We offer staff share options which mature after three years of service but for most this is not enough of a sweetener to make them stay."

The emerging shortage of specialist computing and IT service personnel is a pervasive problem in the South African economy. Several other cracks are emerging in the existing skills base of South Africa. One was exposed in an interview with a major multinational pharmaceutical and chemicals concern. Based on an internal audit and needs analysis, the recruitment of specialist local skills, such as pharmacists, veterinarians, chemical engineers or environmental specialists, is still not a major problem. But major diffi-

culty arises at the higher management and supervisory scale where composite skills and experience are necessary.

Another crack was evident in several interviews with industrial and high technology enterprises. Whilst technical skills, such as engineering skills, were possible to source, signally absent was a more sophisticated combination of technical and financial or sales/marketing experience required for high level managerial appointments. Indeed, the issue of the shortage of high level personnel in South Africa with both technical and financial or marketing skills was a consistent theme.

Certain specialist niches of skills are also showing signs of drying up in the South African labour pool. Many are of a highly technical and very specialised nature. They include logistics industrial engineers, armature winders, control engineers, polishers for high quality furniture manufacturers, instrumentation engineers, civil engineers with project management experience, telecommunications personnel with a combination of technical and sales expertise, and many others.

A factor that underpins some of the emerging shortages is the lack of take-up of certain apprenticeship programmes. As one interviewee argued: "No one is coming through the ranks... young people do not want to go through apprenticeships and consequently we will be suffering shortages in the near future." Another factor relates to South Africa's isolation from the international economy which has resulted in a shortage of experience and qualified personnel in several areas of international marketing.

Further insights into the impact of recent emigration of skilled personnel from South Africa are provided by the following selection of quotations:

We are losing marketing skills rapidly to overseas companies. The company has lost 20% of its workforce since the end of 1997 to Dubai, Australia and the USA. These skills have been built up locally as people have been trained and had a few overseas trips to further their training. Then they were poached or they up and go overseas. It is almost a waste of all the time and money spent on their training. One of the people who went to Australia was an IT specialist and marketing manager so a big loss to the company. A South African survey in which we took part revealed that IT remuneration

within South Africa was OK but internationally we were not competitive. (International IT company)

There is a lot of uncertainty among the younger staff members. Some of them left before the elections and they are still going. We try and counter this by using our international mother company contacts to send South African employees overseas. They pay back time overseas with time worked at the South African office. By doing this, more employees consider staying with the company in South Africa because there is something in it for them. However, as many as 50% do not come back. (South African office of blue-chip international financial services company)

One non-executive director left for Australia after he was car-jacked and a gun put to his five-year old child's head. In the last two years (1997 and 1998) a lot of people have spoken about leaving. It is the general topic of conversation. Crime is the number one problem. Everyone says that they don't want to go but will leave if something (crime-related) happens to them or their family. (Large industrial company)

The MD was going to leave (overseas) and take the company with him but he was shot dead one month before leaving. The company is expecting to lose quite a few skilled personnel in the near future. They are preparing to go overseas because of the crime and violence in the country and because they see little future for white males in South Africa. (High technology industrial enterprise)

Dealing in Scarce Resources

South African enterprises clearly regard high skilled personnel as a resource that is beginning to deplete and even exhibit signs of scarcity. Moreover, competition for such scarce resources is growing more intense both as a result of internationalised labour markets for several sectors (most importantly computer and IT service personnel) and as a result of democratic South Africa's late re-insertion into the international economy.

Approaches to Recruitment

The major potential source of recruitment for new high skill personnel is South Africa rather than overseas. The

survey disclosed that the majority of enterprises prefer to hire local South African personnel into high skill positions whenever possible. The advantages of local personnel are obvious.

First, foreigners often require a period of settling-in before becoming adapted to the local business environment. Second, the hiring of South African personnel is considerably cheaper, particularly in terms of relocation costs, home leave, housing and school fee allowances. Indeed, many companies stress that the recruitment of foreign personnel is a last resort as the costs of hiring from Europe or the USA are so onerous because the recruited employee is often paid a package comparable to that in their country of origin. Even the costs of recruitment of skilled personnel from other parts of Africa are extremely high. Overall, the survey disclosed no differentiation in the recruitment of skilled personnel from Europe, North America or Africa. The key issue in recruitment was the quality of the individual person rather than the country of origin.

Table 9 shows the different kinds of recruiting methods deployed by the surveyed enterprises. The majority use more than one method, usually for different types of skilled personnel. The most common technique is the engagement of specialist personnel agencies to track and hire new skilled personnel; nearly 60% of enterprises use the services of such agencies. In certain sectors, however, the use of such specialist agencies is avoided as it is felt that they do not understand the highly specialised needs for skilled technical personnel, for example in parts of the food sector.

Beyond the use of specialist personnel recruitment agencies, other methods include in-house advertising, newspaper personnel advertisements, word-of-mouth advertising, and use of general personnel

TABLE 9: RECRUITMENT METHODS FOR SKILLED PERSONNEL

Method	Companies (%)
In-house	31
Head hunters	14
Newspapers	30
Agencies	24
Specialist agency	58
Word of mouth	25
Other	5

The total exceeds 100% as many enterprises used several different methods of recruitment.

TABLE 10: TRAINING METHODS FOR SKILLED PERSONNEL

Sector	Number of companies in each category				
	In-house	Bring here	Send overseas	Use local institution	No training offered
Mining	1	1	1	1	3
Computers & IT	11	2	4	4	0
High-tech industrial	46	14	27	23	10
Other industrial	36	7	12	23	2
Construction	6	0	3	1	1
Banking and finance	3	3	6	1	0
Business services	10	1	8	7	3
Entertainment and tourism	5	5	4	1	2
Education and health	6	3	4	6	9
Total	**124**	**36**	**69**	**67**	**30**

Responses add up to more than 200 as many enterprises used more than one training method.

agencies. In word-of-mouth recruitment, bonuses are sometimes offered to existing staff if they are successful in sourcing new high skill personnel. Whilst the employment of headhunters is one of the least utilised recruitment methods, it is the preferred method for recruiting senior personnel (such as corporate managers) or specialised research and development (R&D) personnel. Headhunting is also a strategy for poaching personnel with necessary experience for top level managerial appointments. Finally, the category of "other recruitment methods" includes linkages to Universities or technikons through bursaries or graduate recruitment programmes, the use of internet advertising, and recruitment through industry training boards.

The Question of Training

A key issue in offsetting the brain drain is the training programmes offered to employees. Training programmes are a major means for expanding an enterprise's asset base of skilled personnel. As one industrial listed enterprise argued: "We know a lot of skills have left South Africa but it is important to train existing employees up. There is still a lot of untapped skills available."

A positive finding was that the vast majority of the surveyed enterprises – 85% of the total – are involved in some form of training and skills upgrading of their personnel. In many cases the budgets allocated to training and upgrading of personnel are substantial. For example, one leading industrial enterprise has an annual training budget in excess of R4 million. As a consequence, this particular company "had no gaps in expertise as

they bring people up through the company ranks." In this company the training programme necessitated the import of overseas personnel on 2-3 year contracts: "They share their skills and knowledge and by the end of the contract the South African personnel are able to competently take on the job."

The most common approach to skills training is through in-house or enterprise training programmes. Of the sample enterprises, 62% are engaged actively in the business of in-house training for skilled personnel. A second, less common, approach is to bring in skilled personnel from overseas to operate training programmes. This training strategy is particularly prevalent amongst overseas-based multinational enterprises in South Africa. A third, and more common, training approach is to send South African personnel overseas for a period to upgrade their skills. Nearly 35% of sample enterprises applied this approach, including many multinationals who choose to send South African personnel to their parent plant or head offices on technology exchange programmes. Another aspect of overseas training is the sponsoring of South African personnel to attend international short courses or conferences. Finally, the outsourcing of training to other South African institutions is a strategy for one-third of enterprises. Among these specialist local training institutions are South African business schools and technikons.

The training of South African personnel is a double-edged sword for many enterprises. On the one hand, training programmes improve the personnel skills and asset resources of enterprises. On the

other hand, the heightened skills of employees increases the danger of corporate poaching, including from overseas enterprises, as well as the general awareness and marketability of South African skilled employees to alternative job opportunities.

The quality of South African IT personnel, health professionals and engineers is recognised by international overseas recruitment agencies. In perhaps the most extreme case recorded in the survey, a Boston-based computer training company came to South Africa to train personnel employed in a high technology defence-related business. The Boston representative was so impressed by the calibre of the South African IT personnel that "within three months they had poached the entire department".

The Quality of New Recruits

In the context of accelerating opportunities for skilled personnel internationally and factors locally such as crime and violence, South African enterprises are necessarily having to treat their skilled labour resources very carefully. Moreover, as mentioned above, training is of crucial significance in maintaining the quality of an individual enterprise's labour force.

In the vast majority of cases the quality of new personnel is rated as either the same or better than that of the outgoing personnel. That so many enterprises are satisfied with the newly hired skilled personnel is perhaps an indicator that the dramatic popular press scenarios of impending economic collapse due to brain drain haemorrhage are massively exaggerated. In some cases, the departure of skilled personnel is seen as offering opportunities for new blood:

*Sanctions have gone and there are a lot more opportunities. New recruits have brought benefits to the company. Prior to 1994 a lot of people in industry sat in the same job for years. Now, however, there are new people with new ideas and this shift is good for the company. (**Industrial high technology company**)*

The high degree of satisfaction with new local recruits can be read as an indication that most training and educational institutions in South Africa continue to produce the quality of skills that are required for the economy to be globally competitive. That said, a number of areas of concern were noted by interviewees.

TABLE 11: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

Have you ever dealt with Home Affairs in recruiting skilled personnel from outside the country? (%)

Yes	42
No	58

How would rate your experience in dealing with Home Affairs? (%)

Very positive	1
Adequate	38
Negative	31
Very negative	29

In particular, several industrial companies drew attention to the fact that whilst university graduates remain of high quality, educational and training standards had fallen at the technikons. One multinational food and drinks company noted that "technical standards have dropped and we will now only consider university graduates".

Although there is general satisfaction with the quality of new local personnel, many enterprises drew attention to the increased difficulty and time spent in recruiting. Another common concern relates to the high remuneration packages demanded by skilled personnel in South Africa.

In a situation of growing shortages for high skill labour, the costs attached to recruiting such labour have risen markedly. A large South African owned industrial enterprise bemoaned the fact that "new recruits come with a premium. If you want quality, you have to pay more."

Another important issue is the loss of experience in personnel that emigrate. A large South African-owned industrial enterprise summed up the situation: "Expertise is lost, the base skill is the same but insight into the industry is lacking."

A high technology manufacturing enterprise concurred: "The generic skills in South Africa are still OK. However, when top people emigrate, it is a big loss as it takes 3-4 years for the new recruit to rise to that level."

Finally, a local listed manufacturing enterprise pointed out that: "We find that we don't get all the skills we require when we recruit. We have to live with it and hope that the new recruits pick up the necessary skills on the job."

Problems with Home Affairs

The recruiting of skilled personnel from outside South Africa is a final option (and often a last resort) for addressing shortages of skilled personnel in the South African labour pool. Table 11 presents findings concerning the dealings of the enterprises with the South African Department of Home Affairs.

The first point is that 58% of the interviewees had no direct experience of dealing with the Department of Home Affairs. Many enterprises deal with the Department at a distance, filtered through the use of an agency, lawyers or consultants. At least 12 enterprises actually employ consultants, lawyers or agents as intermediaries.

The broad findings are not complimentary to the Department as a whole. The majority of respondents (60%) rated as "negative" or "very negative" their experience of dealing with the Department in recruiting skilled personnel. Another 38% of interviewees rate their dealings with the Department of Home Affairs as only "adequate".

Only one interviewee in a sample of 200 responded enthusiastically. Multinational companies appear to experience fewer difficulties than South African enterprises in securing work permits for skilled staff from overseas. The procedures for intra-company transfers across international borders are somewhat more relaxed than for the direct recruitment of new personnel from overseas.

Positive or adequate responses were associated with the development of contacts and long-term relationships with very senior staff at the Department of Home Affairs or linkages with high ranking officials in other departments. Indeed, the level of understanding and assistance offered by senior personnel at Home Affairs was a factor appreciated by many enterprises. It appears that enterprises experience a learning curve in their dealings with the Department, beginning with negative experiences and shifting later to more positive assessments as they develop relationships with senior staff.

The troubling picture that emerges is that it is "who you know at Home Affairs" that is an important determinant of the kind of problems experienced in staff recruitment from overseas. Several commented that "If you know someone (at Home Affairs) it is easier" or that the "right people are very helpful". Strikingly, the most positive assessments of the Department of Home Affairs came

from two parastatal agencies. In one interview, Home Affairs was described as "brilliant" and in the other the enterprise only has to "speak to Trevor Manuel (the Minister of Finance) and the person they need is appointed very quickly".

The overall picture is that the Department of Home Affairs is a major obstacle to South African enterprises urgently seeking to recruit high level skilled personnel. Across the different sectors captured by the survey, similar descriptions were applied and the same themes repeated. A host of interviewees spoke in stark terms of their experience with Home Affairs as "shocking", "horrendous", "nightmarish" (the most common description), "crazy", "dreadful", "pathetic", "time-consuming" or "awful".

Several structural problems appear to exist which block or frustrate the entry of skilled personnel from overseas.

- Excessive time is required to deal with the bureaucratic processes. Interviewees spoke of waiting for 2-3 months, a delay that is costly. Many indicated that they were wholeheartedly in support of the principle of seeking to employ South African personnel as a first preference. However, once those options were exhausted the bureaucratic procedures are far too lengthy and urgently need to be streamlined.
- Overall, the view is widespread that Home Affairs processes for securing high skilled personnel are obstructive, time consuming and far too procedural. Other complaints are that service is shocking, queues outrageous and the waiting time for applications up to 5 months.
- The increasing cost to companies of using lawyers or consultants and the efficiency losses due to delays in recruitment of personnel from overseas. An associated set of issues is the costs imposed upon the affected individuals. The financial cost of applying to come and work in South Africa may be R8 000, an amount that is seen as too costly to risk, especially when individuals may go through the bureaucratic procedures and then be denied the necessary work permit. In addition, fees of R5 000 were quoted as baseline charges to hire lawyers "who know somebody at Home Affairs", a cost which amounts to thinly veiled bribery.
- Lack of transparency in the decision-making process within Home Affairs. Interviewees stressed that everyone

who goes through the bureaucratic process may be treated in a different way. Enterprises complain that no reasons are given for the rejection of particular applications whilst others admit that direct bribes have been paid in Pretoria to secure the entry into South Africa of desperately needed industrial personnel. Overall, a very common opinion is that the Department is "xenophobic" and that in recent years it has made the entry (as well as renewal of permits) of highly qualified personnel into South Africa more difficult.

- The lack of transparency in the internal operations, functioning and staffing at the Department of Home Affairs. Several companies spoke of telephone contacts as almost impossible with the Pretoria office. Moreover, the unprofessional conduct of Home Affairs personnel was commonly mentioned. If Home Affairs personnel could be reached they were "unobliging and a pain".
- The Department of Home Affairs dismally fails to understand the

needs of business for high qualified personnel. Several companies spoke of Home Affairs paying "lip service" to the needs of large business enterprise, of failing to consult with business as to its needs for highly qualified personnel, and lacking any appreciation of the value of high skilled personnel creating additional employment opportunities of unskilled workers or of the value of the embedded training and human resource skills that could potentially flow into South Africa. In one case, a high quality furniture producer requested a work permit for a highly skilled Russian furniture carver. The request was declined; subsequently the carver secured a Green Card for entry into the USA.

The conclusion is that the workings of the Department of Home Affairs have a negative impact upon enterprises and the economy as a whole. In the case of many private sector enterprises, new growth and job opportunities for the South African economy have been either postponed or, in many instances, lost forever

South African Network of Skills Abroad

The South African Network of Skills Abroad links skilled people living abroad who wish to make a contribution to South Africa's economic and social development and connects them with local experts and projects. The SANSA web-site contains a wealth of information about specialists living abroad.

SANSA has more than 2000 highly qualified South Africans now living in 67 countries around the country-all of whom are willing and able to provide help to South Africa. Members' details have been captured on the SANSA website – www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa - and South Africans are invited to contact them for advice, assistance and general discussion on key areas of development so that they can exchange information or develop joint programmes or projects.

SANSA aims to connect network members with the South African community. The system offers a facility whereby anyone can undertake a guided search at the database for a specific skill profile and get in contact with any network member whose skills profile is of interest to them. People searching the database can simply send an e-mail to any network member via the SANSA system.

SANSA is also setting up a discussion group and notice board at the web-site to increase communications between network members and people in South Africa. We encourage you to use the network to find other South Africans working in your medical field or other professions abroad.

The programme is based at the Science and Technology Policy Research Centre at the University of Cape Town, but is a country wide initiative aimed at tracking down skilled graduates who have emigrated and putting them in touch with South Africans, be they groups or individuals. It has the full backing of Ben Ngubane, the Minister of Arts, Culture and Science and Technology, and his department.

http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa

through what employers perceive to be the Department's inability, unwillingness or failure to expedite the entry into the country of a relatively small number of highly skilled personnel.

Conclusions

The national objectives of making South Africa a world class player and globally competitive within certain key economic sectors and markets cannot be realistically achieved without a substantial pool of high skilled personnel. The issue of high skilled personnel will therefore be of increased significance to South Africa in the next decade.

Our survey demonstrates that the present skills position within the South African economy is not yet at breaking point. Nevertheless, the emigration of skills to North America, Europe or Australasia is occurring at an accelerating rate. Behind this rising tempo of migration are unacceptable levels of crime and violence, economic stagnation, and perceptions of declining standards in the quality of public sector services, most notably education and health.

Despite the growing outflow of skills and highly publicised shortages of public sector health personnel, the skills base is being maintained in most areas of the economy. The survey, however, points to certain cracks in this skills base and the potential dangers if certain policy issues remain unaddressed. Of particular concern is the loss of personnel with high level experience which can only be made up over many years.

An important strategic challenge confronting enterprises is in "retaining and securing of skilled staff" to enable future growth. At the national level, and in the Department of Home Affairs, a greater degree of appreciation of the significance of retaining high skilled personnel is needed. Our findings suggest that the present attitudes and workings of the Department of Home Affairs are

extremely obstructive and that the Department's current policies concerning skilled personnel function as a negative drag on the performance of the economy.

Our recommendations to deal with the issue of highly skilled personnel in South Africa relate to retention of existing skilled personnel, and the attraction from overseas of additional personnel with valuable skills:

- Enterprises themselves must address the question of human resource upgrading through training and also be sensitive to the growing competition for staff particularly within internationalising labour markets. For national policy makers, the best policies to retain the skills base are those which grow the economy, address crime and maintain or improve existing standards in public education and health.
- Dealing with overseas personnel requires certain changes in the internal workings of the Department of Home Affairs, a streamlining of application and entry procedures and greater transparency in the application process. One step suggested by many interviewees, would be the introduction of a points system for immigrants or work permit applicants similar to that in use by many other countries. But this system has been explicitly repudiated in the recent White Paper on International Migration, despite its qualified endorsement in the earlier Green Paper on International Migration.
- Given the critical importance of highly qualified personnel and their relatively small numbers, it might be appropriate to set up a special unit within the Department of Home Affairs to deal with skilled personnel. There is a clear need to bridge the existing gap between private and

public perceptions of the need for skilled personnel in South Africa. A small special unit might be able to liaise more effectively with the major South African users of high skilled personnel to deal with procedures and applications for work and entry into the country of such personnel.
- The negative perception of the Department of Home Affairs is pervasive in the corporate sector. This perception of incompetence, favouritism, obstructionism and lack of transparency should be addressed. Criteria should be clear and consistent and facilitate economic growth. Policy reform in the area of high skills import is urgently needed. The bureaucratic and attitudinal problems experienced by companies can only be addressed by devoting adequate resources to training and upgrading skills within the department itself.
- The new corporate work permit system proposed in the White Paper could ease the problems experienced by many enterprises when importing high skills personnel. Most enterprises would probably qualify for such permits. The bizarre proposal to "penalise" companies financially who import foreign skills is likely to be counter-productive. As this study shows, enterprises already prefer South African employees, import only where necessary and bear considerable extra cost in doing so.

Notes & references

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3 E Thomas-Hope, 'Caribbean skilled international migration and the transnational household', *Geoforum*, vol 19, no 4, 1988.
4 The sample also included different locations. Although the majority of interviews were conducted with Gauteng-based enterprises, the spatial range of our interviews included enterprises from all major South African metropolitan areas as well

as a number of secondary centres.
5 These are recognised manufacturing activities in terms of the classification of the International Standard Industrial Classification system.
6 Besides those enterprises already named, the sample included: De Beers, Samancor, Microsoft, Q Data, Acer, Unisys, Log-Tek, TML Media, General Electric, Samsung, Sulzer, Panasonic, Bridgestone, Roche, Revlon, Reebok, Otis, Dorbyl, LTA, Stocks and Stocks, Rand Merchant Bank, Investec, Arthur Andersen, SBC Warburg, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Kessell

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The Brain Drain:
An outline of skilled emigration from South Africa

By Mercy Brown, David Kaplan and Jean-Baptiste Meyer

The brain drain issue has recently become a high-profile public policy issue in South Africa.[1] The media and policymakers are showing increasing concern over the drain of highly skilled professionals from the country. A major unresolved question is the actual scale and impact of the brain drain on South Africa. There has been growing suspicion that official Statistics South Africa (SSA) emigration data significantly underestimate the numbers of South Africans leaving the country to settle abroad. But we do not know with any certainty quite how inaccurate this data actually is.

TABLE 1: SOUTH AFRICAN EMIGRATION TO FIVE MAJOR RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 1987-1997[11]

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
NZ	632	246	209	202	223	422	2 054	2 638	2 046	2 648	2 689	14 009
NZ (SSA)	411	176	83	64	50	126	242	1 465	939	1 266	1 157	5 979
Aus	3 792	3 024	2 424	2 084	1 274	1 021	1 654	2 792	3 190	3 211	4 281	28 747
Aus (SSA)	3 484	2 588	1 275	1 292	928	694	1 309	1 298	1 507	1 767	1 508	17 650
UK	6 700	7 000	11 700	6 400	8 000	6 900	9 400	8 100	4 200	11 400	10 988*	90 788
UK (SSA)	3 817	2 295	1 420	1 804	1 800	1 987	3 716	2 880	2 045	2 243	2 162	26 169
Can	1 748*	1 672	1 558	1 083	1 014	1 141	1 822	2 910	1 753	1 526	1 898	18 125
Can (SSA)	755	722	454	349	266	285	566	947	679	774	557	6 354
USA	1 741	1 832	1 899	1 990	1 854	2 516	2 197	2 144	2 560	2 966	2 563*	46 724
USA (SSA)	543	325	174	278	307	314	566	752	882	963	832	5 936

* Estimates. NZ=New Zealand; Aus= Australia; UK=United Kingdom; Can=Canada; SSA=Statistics South Africa

Given the problems with official South African emigration data, a more reliable way of assessing the true extent of emigration would be to examine data from the recipient countries. But there are two problems with generating this data. First, South Africans emigrate to a wide variety of countries. And second, data from destination countries is not always available or accessible. To quantify the shortfall in South African statistics, this article compares the data from SSA with statistics from the five major recipient countries of South African emigrants – the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia.[2] The analysis clearly shows that there is significant official underestimation of the extent of South Africa's brain drain.

The brain drain, by definition, is not simply a question of absolute numbers. The skills profile of emigrants is also an important determinant of the impact on a country and economy.[3] Official South African statistics are not any more helpful on this particular issue. There is simply no way of knowing precisely which skills, and in what quantities, South Africa is losing. Here, destination country data is again of value. Most of the major destination countries collect data on the skills of immigrants by country of origin. This data can be used to generate a picture of the occupational categories most affected by emigration from South Africa.

Finally, there is an assumption in much of the debate, that the "brain drain" represents a permanent loss of skills to a country's economy and development.[4] This would require that emigrants retain no backward linkages, or that emigrants who have resettled elsewhere are still not interested in contributing to their countries of birth even if opportunities are made available. We have argued elsewhere that many emigrants do not cut ties with home and that they represent a strong latent pool of skills into which a country can tap.[5] Diaspora networks are increasingly recognised as a means of mobilising skills abroad and offsetting some of the negative impacts of skills loss and the brain drain.[6] The SANSA project at the University of Cape Town represents one such mechanism for providing South Africans abroad with concrete opportunities for contributing to their former country.[7] In this paper, we utilise the skills database generated by SANSA to pose the question of what professions and which sectors are most likely to benefit from a South African diaspora network.

Assessing the Real Extent of Emigration

Official SSA migration data is derived from forms voluntarily completed by those emigrating through one of the three main international airports. Emigrants who do not complete the forms or depart from any other location are not captured in the official data.[8] In addition, the statistics do not necessarily capture South Africans who leave for some other purpose (such as temporary work, travel or study) and subsequently settle overseas. Logically, therefore, the volume of emigration is an undercount, but by how much?

To answer this question, data was collected for the major five recipient countries of South African emigrants for the period 1987 to 1997. Recipient country data on South African immigration was obtained from Statistics New Zealand, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,

the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United Kingdom Immigration Research and Statistics Service and the Citizenship and Immigration Office of Canada.[9]

Immigration categories are reasonably comparable across countries. All of the datasets refer to immigrants entering a country, although some state the origin of the migrant by country of birth (e.g. the US) while others refer to the last country of residence before immigration (e.g. Canada). We can assume that this difference of recording method does not significantly affect the bulk of the South African data, since most of the people recorded by last country of residence would logically have been permanent residents in South Africa before departure. The datasets are mostly complete, except for the figures for the UK and the US for 1997 and Canada for 1987 – that is, only 3 missing observations out of 45.[10]

Comparison of data from all five recipient countries with South African figures shows consistent official under-reporting of emigration from the country (Table 1). The magnitude of the discrepancy increases over time, perhaps indicating not only that more people are leaving but that they are less willing to report it. In sum, an estimated 233 609 people left South Africa to settle abroad in these five countries between 1989 and 1997. The official figure for these countries, as reported by SSA, is only 82 811. There is thus significant under-reporting of emigration in official South African statistics: only 35% of the emigration stream was captured by official data-collection methods. These bald figures do not, however, provide any insights into the profile of emigrants. It is therefore necessary to ask what skills these emigrants possess.

TABLE 2: EMIGRATION OF PROFESSIONALS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, 1989-1997

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
AUS (SSA)	312	291	198	189	. 356	274	308	420	310	2 658
AUS	558*	479*	295	213	353	610	765	696	1 122	4 533
NZ(SSA)	25	24	12	49	93	349	209	297	286	1 344
NZ	60	59	63	104	551	656	462	628	631	3 214
CAN (SSA)	94	85	63	69	136	224	173	170	118	1 132
CAN	327*	227*	213*	243	407	677	421	315	421	3 251
USA (SSA)	56	68	89	81	153	216	235	254	258	1 410
USA	399*	418*	389*	528*	461*	450*	538*	618	538*	4 339
UK (SSA)	275	331	296	349	661	450	368	422	444	3 596
UK	2 574*	1 408*	1760*	1 518*	2 068*	1 782*	924*	2 508*	2 417*	16 959

* Estimates

TABLE 3: MIGRATION OF PROFESSIONAL SOUTH AFRICANS

|	1989-92	1994-97
Immigration (SSA)	6 714	3 295
Emigration (SSA)	3 721	7 534
Emigration (SANSA figures)	16 447	19 890

Quantifying the Skills Lost

A similar comparison between SSA and recipient country data can be undertaken for particular categories of immigrant, such as professionals.[12] This category of immigrant includes "professional, semi-professional and technical occupations", but excludes managerial, administrative and executive occupations.[13] Complete data on the emigration of professionals is only available for New Zealand. Australia and Canada have several missing years. US data was only available for one year and no breakdown at all was available for the UK.

Given these gaps, two methods were used to arrive at estimates.[14] The first method was the same as that used to assess total emigration. SSA statistics and recipient country data were used to extrapolate total figures for professional emigration. This method generated an estimate of 41 496 professional emigrants between 1989 and 1997. This is nearly four times larger than the official figure of 11 255.

The second method was based on only the countries and years for which data was available and complete. This data was then compared with SSA data for that country and year. There proved to be a very systematic pattern of discrepancies. On this basis missing data was extrapolated and summed with actual figures to derive totals for each period. The figures were slightly lower than those obtained by the first method, but were still significantly higher than the official SSA figures.

Immigration of professionals has dropped significantly during the 1990s.[15] This exacerbates the effects of emigration and the brain drain since there is little compensating in-flow of skills. However,

FIGURE 1: IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION OF PROFESSIONALS

this is not a new phenomenon. The loss of professionals began well before 1994. Indeed, a brain drain has been evident during and after each period of political crisis in South African history, dating back to the early 1960s.[16] Nevertheless, the volume of the brain drain has increased post-1994. In the period 1994-1997, we estimate that between 6 000 (Method 1) and 4 600 (Method 2) people in the professional category emigrated each year, compared with 3 800 per annum in the period 1989-92.

Skills Profile of Emigrants

Recipient country data on the occupational profiles of South African emigrants is also incomplete. The figures below summarise the available data. They confirm that emigration represents a considerable loss of skills, training and experience to South Africa and a major acquisition for the recipient countries.

A more detailed occupational breakdown is only available for two countries: Canada and New Zealand. These countries provide some idea of which occupational categories are most affected by emigration.

In the both countries, natural sciences/engineering and health are clearly sectors in which South Africans cluster in greatest number. Another significant category in the New Zealand data is education. The New Zealand data gives a particularly detailed picture within the main sub-categories. Figures 4 and 5 provide a breakdown of the sub-categories of natural sciences and engineering and health.

Health professionals and engineers account for the greatest share of emigration to New Zealand. However, the numbers decrease after the peak in 1993, compared to an increase in some of the other categories like computing and nursing.

FIGURE 2: CLASSIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS BY RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

Active emigrants to Canada (1989-1997)

Active emigrants to New Zealand (1989-1997)

Active emigrants to US (1996)


Active emigrants to Australia (1989-1997)

FIGURE 3: CLASSIFICATION OF IMMIGRANTS BY PROFESSIONAL SUB-CATEGORY

New Zealand

Canada

FIGURE 4: NATURAL SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERING IMMIGRANTS TO NEW ZEALAND

Compensating for the Brain Drain

The cumulative loss of skills through the brain drain is having a definite impact in South Africa. A restrictive immigration policy has exacerbated these effects. There is sometimes an assumption that once a South African emigrates, they are lost to their country and its development. This is not necessarily true, particularly if there are mechanisms in place for South Africa to tap into the skills of its diasporic population.

In this context, the aim of the SANSA project is to connect highly skilled South Africans abroad with their South African counterparts so they can engage in collaborative projects which will benefit the development process in South Africa. To mobilise this latent population and create the SANSA network, 25 000 questionnaires were sent out to highly skilled South Africans all over the world, inviting them to join the network.[17] To date, over 2 000 highly skilled South African expatriates have joined the SANSA network.

It is unfortunately not possible to establish the representivity of the SANSA database in relation to the whole skilled South African diaspora. However, the data is certainly likely to be more representative of that section of the emigrant population that is interested in continuing to be part of the country's development. It is therefore useful to provide a profile of this population to ascertain what kinds of emigrant skills are available to South Africa through a network such as SANSA.

The SANSA members are located in 69 countries with the majority in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Zimbabwe, Namibia and New Zealand. Most of them are between 20 and 60, which means that SANSA is a professional rather than student network. The network consists mainly of males, with females constituting only 25% of the membership.

The majority appear to have retained their South African citizenship. This, in itself, may be a sign that they still feel a strong connection to the country.

SANSA members left South Africa at progressively later stages in their lives over the decades. From the 1950s onwards, the average age of the emigrant population on emigration has become increasingly older.

The fact that the average age on emigration increases over time suggests that more and more South African emigrants have left as already trained and established professionals.

FIGURE 5: HEALTH PROFESSIONAL IMMIGRANTS TO NEW ZEALAND

FIGURE 6: LOCATION OF SANSA NETWORK MEMBERS

FIGURE 7: NATIONALITY OF SANSA NETWORK MEMBERS

Study abroad has often been proposed as a major motivating factor for emigration. For example, according to the National Science Foundation, two thirds of the foreign-born scientists and engineers working in the USA obtained their doctorates there.[18] Figure 8 shows the qualifications of SANSA members. They are certainly highly qualified with 28.8% holding a doctorate degree. Seventy-six percent hold at least a bachelors degree. Of these, 88% of them obtained their bachelors in South Africa, 89.2% obtained an Honours degree in South Africa and 57% obtained their Masters in South Africa.

The vast majority of SANSA members had already acquired at least a first and even a second degree in South Africa. However, a significant number only acquired post-graduate degrees, particularly doctorates and post-doctorate qualifications, once they had left South Africa.

FIGURE 8: QUALIFICATIONS OF SANSA NETWORK MEMBERS

FIGURE 9: PLACES WHERE SANSA MEMBERS OBTAINED THEIR DEGREES

TABLE 4: AGE AT EMIGRATION OF SANSA NETWORK MEMBERS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

Decade	Average Age
1930-1939	16
1940-1949	16.5
1950-1959	22.6
1960-1969	23.8
1970-1979	27.5
1980-1989	30.9
1990-1999	32.5

The diversity and richness of professional skills available through the SANSA network immediately becomes apparent from an examination of the data base. Members with a humanities and social science background are in a slight majority (29%). However, there are also considerable numbers with expertise in business and management administration (27.5%), natural sciences (23%), health (18%) and engineering (18%). In terms of current profession, interest is highest amongst people working in the private sector (38%), academia (37%), government (10%) and health (8%).

Conclusion

This paper highlights a number of important issues surrounding the brain drain. First, the South African brain drain is clearly much more significant than the official figures suggest. Clearly the country needs to revisit its methods of data

FIGURE 10: FIELD OF EXPERTISE OF SANSA NETWORK MEMBERS

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100, because some are active in more than one field.

FIGURE 11: PROFESSIONAL SECTORS OF SANSA NETWORK MEMBERS

■ Business   □ Academic   □ Government/Parastatal   □ Health   ▣ Cultural   ▣ Other

collection on emigration and, if possible, build in a systematic comparison with data that can easily be obtained from recipient countries.

Second, most emigrants are highly skilled and well-trained and many of them are located professionally in occupations which are in demand domestically. Third, a significant number leave South Africa as well-trained professionals. However, there is a tendency for professional emigrants to acquire further post-graduate training abroad. There is therefore a concern that many of South Africa's best-trained persons emigrate – although frequently their advanced training is undertaken only after emigrating. Fourth, the South African diaspora represents a well-trained, capable, uniquely highly skilled pool of individuals.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, emigration does not necessarily mean that all of these skills and expertise are lost to South Africa. Opportunities do exist for the country to make use of the skills of these expatriates even while they reside abroad. The SANSA network, which aims to connect highly skilled South Africans abroad with their South African counterparts, is a first step[1] towards mobilising South Africa's diaspora and countering the damaging effects of the brain drain. ⦿

Notes & references

1 J-B Meyer, D Kaplan and M Brown, Assessing the South African Brain Drain: a Statistical Comparison, Cape Town: DPRU Working Paper, Development Policy Research Unit, 2000.
2 According to official statistics these countries collectively account for 75% of South African emigration. There is no way of determining whether this is true for total emigration, but these are certainly the favoured destinations of the majority of potential emigrants (See the article by Mattes and Richmond, in this issue).
3 D Kaplan, 'Migration of the Professional, Semi-professional and Technical in South Africa: Past Patterns, Current Trends and Policy', in J Charum and J-B Meyer, International Scientific Migrations Today: New Perspectives, Paris: IRD, Colciencias, 2000.
4 J-B Meyer, M Brown and D Kaplan, The Brain Drain in Southern Africa: Old issue, new evidence, Bruxelles: Report to the European Commission, December 1999.
5 D Kaplan, "Reversing the Brain Drain: the case for Utilising South Africa's Unique Intellectual Diaspora", Science, Technology and Society, 2(2), 1997.
6 J-B Meyer and M Brown, 'Scientific diasporas: A new approach to the brain drain', UNESCO Management of Social

Transformation (MOST) discussion paper series, 1999.
7 See the SANSA website at http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa/
8 Reasons for completing or not completing these forms accurately may vary from one individual to another. It is understandable that somebody definitely leaving the country might not feel especially obliged to provide information to the government. Immigration data is likely to be more accurate since highly skilled immigrants tend to use legal channels. However, South Africa does have significant refugee and illegal migration movement from the rest of Africa. The evidence suggests that both streams contain numbers of skilled and highly-trained immigrants, even if they are not always specifically using their skills and previous training.
9 Statistics New Zealand, External Migration, Permanent and Long-Term Arrivals from South Africa by Period and Occupation, Ref: C2963TM, 1989-1997; Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs of Australia, Bureau of Immigration Research, South African-born Settler Arrivals for Financial Years 1987-1988 to 1997-1998; Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs of Australia, Bureau of Immigration

Research, Table B12, Settler Arrivals by Region/Country of Birth, By State of Intended Residence By Major ASCO Groups for Financial Years 1991-1992 to 1997-1998; United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 3, Immigrants Admitted By Region and Country of Birth, Fiscal Years 1986-1996; United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 21, Immigrants Admitted By Major Occupation Group and Region and Selected Country of Birth, Fiscal Year 1996; Immigration, Research and Statistics Service of the United Kingdom, International Migration, estimates from International Survey: Commonwealth Country of last or next residence, Table 2.3, Series MN no. 23, 1987-1996; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Permanent Residents, Table IM7, Country of Last Permanent Residence by Year of Landing, 1988-1994; CIC, Permanent Residents, Table IM7, Country of Last Permanent Residence by Year of Landing, 1989-1995; CIC, Permanent Residents, Table IM19, Country of Last Permanent Residence by Intended Occupations (Major Groups), 1992-1995; CIC, Permitted Residents Admitted From SA by Intended Occupation Based on the CCDO Codes, 1996-1998 (personal communication).

10 Missing figures were extrapolated from SSA data on a proportional basis; see Meyer et al (2000) for a description of the methodology used.
11 Official Data is from Statistics South Africa, Statistical Releases, Tourism and Migration, P0351, Jan 1989-Sept 1998; and Statistics South Africa, Statistical Reports, Tourism and Migration, 03-51-01, 1989-1997.
12 Kaplan 2000.
13 The latter category is much smaller and the relevant data discrepancy with official figures varies greatly from year to year and country to country. For this reason, inferences and extrapolations are subject to a much greater margin of error (Meyer et al 2000).
14 For detailed calculations, see Meyer et al 2000.
15 See the article by Mattes, Crush and Richmond, in this issue.
16 Kaplan 2000.
17 The names and addresses of potential members were obtained from the alumni lists of different universities and technikons in South Africa and from South African missions abroad.
18 Meyer and Brown 1999.

To stay or not to sta

Perspectives on the emigration potential of skilled Batswana

By Eugene K. Campbell

When Botswana attained independence in 1966 there were very few "highly skilled" nationals to fill technological, managerial and other positions deemed critical to development. The commencement of diamond mining in the 1970s, and the related economic growth and development activities that followed, necessitated considerable importation of foreign skilled labour to assist in the nation building process. At the same time, the government of Botswana also implemented a strategy of human resource development for Botswana citizens. Between 1979 and 1989, primary school enrolment increased by 66% while secondary school and University of Botswana (degree) enrolment increased by 247% and 335%, respectively. Between 1991 and 1997 about P379 million was spent on human resource development, increasing annually by 9%.[1]

These educational policies have managed to localise a wide range of positions previously held by expatriates. However, income and position/rank held by nationals do not appear to be commensurate with that of expatriate staff. Meanwhile, job opportunities in South Africa are often more appealing. Vacant positions in Botswana that require a Masters degree may only require a Bachelors degree in South Africa and salaries are often better. A further source of frustration amongst skilled Batswana is the perceived failure of many recent University of Botswana graduates to realise their dreams of accelerated promotion in Botswana.

These concerns are strictly anecdotal, however. Statistical data on permanent emigration does not exist in Botswana (Botswana citizens are not required to complete immigration forms when leaving or entering the country) and there has never been any

In sum, it would appear that Botswana is not facing an immediate "brain drain" crisis. Ongoing efforts to localise skilled positions in both the public and private sector, continued investments in higher education and a relatively strong economy and currency serve to encourage skilled Batswana to stay in the country and to attract back foreign-trained Batswana. Nevertheless, strong economies in South Africa and Namibia, as well as opportunities in Europe and North America, combined with frustrations about the lack of income parity with expatriates and limited upward mobility could create the conditions for increased emigration in the near future. The Government of Botswana would be advised to monitor this situation and to generate regular and useful information on emigration statistics and expectations.

Research Methodology

The aim of the survey was to interview a wide range of public and private sector professionals in areas deemed to be important to the development of Botswana. For logistical and budgetary reasons it was not possible to include every sector of the economy but the sample frame did include the private sector, the Ministries of Education, Health, Finance and Development Planning, the University of Botswana, the Botswana Institute of Accounting, the Botswana Institution of Engineers, and the Botswana Law Society. All these organisations were informed about the study and were requested to furnish a complete list of all their members and skilled personnel, nationwide. The information provided included names, rank, postal address and telephone numbers. The information from government ministries also included pay scales which helped distinguish between "skilled" and "unskilled" employees.

A smaller list of interviewees was then drawn up using random selection methods, with the exception of the University of Botswana where sample selection was done using the internal telephone directory. This initial sampling procedure gave a list of 900 possible interviewees, 80% of whom were sent a questionnaire by mail and 20% of whom received a hand-delivered questionnaire.

After a week of training, the research assistants – university students – did the actual selection of samples, stamped, addressed and posted or hand-delivered the questionnaire packages and made follow-up telephone calls and visits to retrieve completed questionnaires within Gaborone. Each questionnaire package included a stamped envelope for easy return of completed questionnaires to the researchers. With very few exceptions, respondents preferred to complete the questionnaires themselves. Thus the canvasser method of enumeration was not applied, as

systematic or representative empirical research on the more qualitative aspects of skilled emigration from the country.

This study is an attempt to redress this research gap by providing baseline data on what skilled Batswana are thinking about emigration, whether they have emigrated in the past, and what their plans are for the future. After a brief outline of the methodologies used, and a description of the interview sample, the article discusses the "emigration potential" of skilled Batswana: that is, how likely is it that skilled Batswana will leave the country, how often have they considered leaving, where would they go, and so on? In addition, does Botswana face an emigration exodus in the foreseeable future? The article also looks at the decision-making factors related to emigration: what is it that keeps people in Botswana and what is it that may motivate them to leave?

initially intended. Though attempts were made to retrieve completed questionnaires from respondents working outside Gaborone, almost all of them were returned by post. The survey was completed between 10 August and 30 October 1998.

A total of 226 people returned the completed questionnaires, representing a response rate of 25.1%, which is normal for mail-out surveys. The data were then entered into an SPSS database.

Profile of the Sample

As outlined in Table 1, the sample is drawn from a wide range of professions in the country. Education, health care and accounting make up the bulk of the interviewees, but there are also dentists, lawyers, graphic designers, radio producers and public relations officers included in the sample.

In terms of gender, 38% of the sample were men and 62% were women. This gender ratio is due in large part to the high number of (female) nurses that responded to the questionnaire, however, and is not necessarily representative of the gender profile of skilled Batswana in general.

The average age of the sample is 37.5 years and just over half (53%) of the sample are either married or co-habitating with a partner, suggesting a relatively established demographic profile for the sample as a whole. Respondents also have an average of 4.1 dependents and 3.2 partial dependents, implying a significant degree of domestic responsibility (financial and otherwise).

Income levels of the sample vary considerably, from less than P2 700 per month in joint household earnings to over P53 000 per month (before tax). One in five of the respondents interviewed reported household earnings of more than P16 700 per month – a considerable income by any Southern African standards, particularly when one takes into account the strength of the national currency (the Pula) relative to other currencies in the region. However, 43% of the sample is earning less than P4 300 per month in joint household income and 36% of the respondents said they only made it through the last 12 months by spending some of their savings and/or borrowing additional cash. It should also be noted that the modal point for joint monthly incomes is approximately P6 000 per month – P4 000 per month lower than that of skilled immigrants living in Botswana (see accompanying article in

TABLE 1: CURRENT OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS

Occupation	Number	%
Nursing	50	22
Accounting /auditing/finance	36	16
Other	28	12
Education (administration)	25	11
Lecturer/Professor	22	10
Teacher	16	7
Management	12	5
Statistician	12	5
Lawyer	11	5
Engineering	5	2
Dental/medical	5	2
Lab technician/analyst	4	2
Total	**226**	**99**

Note: Figures in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value greater than zero but less than 0.5%.

TABLE 2: DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE

Gender (%)	
Male	38
Female	62
Average age	**37.5 years**
Race (%)	
African	96
White	2
Coloured	2
Household monthly income (before tax) (%)	
Less than P 2 700	11
P 2 800 - P 5 400	32
P 5 500 - P 8 200	15
P8 300 - P11 000	12
P11 100 - P16 600	10
P16 700 - P 30 600	6
P31 700 - P41 800	5
More than P44 700	9
Highest educational qualification (%)	
Less than high school certificate	3
Diploma without high school certificate	7
High school certificate	8
Diploma with high school certificate	32
Bachelors degree	26
Honours degree	1
Post Graduate Diploma	1
Masters degree	21
Doctorate	1

Note: N = 226

this volume), giving credence to the oft heard complaint amongst skilled Batswana that they are paid less than skilled migrants in the country. However, the samples used in the two studies are not directly comparable in terms of occupations so it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion in this regard.

In terms of education, the largest portion of the sample (32%) hold a diploma from a college while a further 26% hold a bachelors degree, and 21% a Masters degree. Only 1% of the sample has a doctoral degree. The majority (64%) received their highest educational qualification in Botswana. Of those who obtained their certificates outside the country, the UK was the most popular location (16%), followed by the United States (10%). Although it costs less economically (and in terms of cultural and psychological stress) to study in neighbouring South Africa, only 2% of the sample completed their highest degree there.

It should be stressed, however, that the self-selecting sample is not entirely representative of the pool of skilled Batswana living in the country. Doctors, for example, are not well represented and women are disproportionately represented for the reasons described above. Nevertheless, the sample is the largest and most widely representative group of skilled Batswana interviewed to date and serves as a useful and methodologically sound indicator of the experiences and attitudes of this important group of people.

Emigration Potential

In order to try and determine the "emigration potential" of skilled Batswana, we asked a series of questions related to how much consideration people have given to the idea of emigrating, their desire to emigrate and the likelihood of emigrating. The extent to which people have considered emigration is outlined in Table 3, where it is evident that the majority (58%) of the sample have never given it any consideration. However,

TABLE 3: CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO MOVING TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (%)

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country to live and work	
Great deal	13
Some	28
None at all	58
Don't know	1

Note: N = 222

TABLE 4: DESIRE AND LIKELIHOOD OF EMIGRATION

	Desire to move to another country for less than 2 years (%)	Desire to move to another country for more than 2 years (%)		Likelihood of ever moving to another country for less than 2 years (%)	Likelihood of ever moving to another country for more than 2 years (%)
To a great extent	19	20	Very likely	4	8
To some extent	40	33	Likely	25	19
Hardly at all	12	13	Unlikely	35	25
Not at all	21	28	Very unlikely	28	37
Don't know	7	7	Don't know	7	12

TABLE 5: LIKELIHOOD OF EMIGRATING IN SIX MONTHS, TWO YEARS OR FIVE YEARS

	Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very unlikely	Don't know
In the next six months	1	2	21	70	6
In the next two years	2	10	26	55	45
In the next five years	7	13	18	45	17

13% of the sample have given it a "great deal" of consideration and fully 28% have given it "some" consideration.

We then asked respondents how much they "want" to emigrate and "how likely" it is that they would emigrate. In both cases people were given the option of migrating for "less than two years" and for "more than two years". The results, outlined in Table 4, show that respondents are more likely to say they would move for a short period of time than they would for a longer period of time. In other words, temporary migration as opposed to permanent emigration is the preference. Nevertheless, 20% of the sample said they want to move to another country for more than two years "to a great extent" and another 33% said they would want to do this "to some extent".

When it comes to the "likelihood" of moving, only 4% said it was "very likely" that they would leave the country for less than two years and only 8% said it was very likely that they would leave for more than two years. More importantly, only 1% of the respondents said that it was very likely that would leave the country in the next six months (Table 5). There was a slight increase in the number of people who said it was very likely that they would leave in the next two years or the next five years. However, these figures are still quite low, suggesting that there is very little likelihood of a mass exodus of skilled Batswana in the foreseeable future.

Interestingly, women were more likely than men to want to emigrate and slightly more likely than men to say that there was a good likelihood that they would emigrate. This could be due to the fact that most of the women interviewed were in professions (i.e. nursing and education) where there are many opportunities outside of Botswana but it could also be a reflection of the growing mobility of women in Southern Africa in general.[2] In terms of age, younger respondents were more likely to say that they want to migrate than older respondents. Similarly, unmarried respondents were more likely to want to emigrate than married respondents, as were those with few or no children/dependents. These findings fit with international trends on migration, where it is generally younger, single, and less attached people that are more likely to migrate.

There was also a slightly higher propensity amongst degree holders to emigrate than non-degree holders. Interestingly, respondents with higher incomes are slightly less likely to be interested in emigration – perhaps because they are satisfied with their income situation in Botswana. In terms of occupations, lawyers and accountants would appear to be most the most likely candidates for emigration.

When asked what would be the "most preferred" country to live and work in if they were ever to leave Botswana, the most popular responses were the USA (27%), South Africa (21%), UK (19%) and Namibia (8%). The rest of the responses were scattered amongst Australasian, European and African states. When asked the "most likely" destination if they were ever to leave Botswana, the same general set of countries emerge, but South Africa becomes the most common response (26%) and the UK drops to only 12%. Clearly,

South Africa looms large on the list of potential emigration destinations – unsurprisingly given the physical proximity of the country, the cultural and linguistic linkages between the two countries, and the wide range of opportunity in a relatively diverse South African economy.

When asked how long they would stay in their most likely destination if they "had to leave Botswana", just over half (52%) said they would want to stay for less than 2 years but a third said they would stay for 2-5 years and 15% said they would stay for more than 5 years.

Commitment to Botswana

A large majority of the respondents surveyed have a very strong attachment to Botswana and are indeed quite patriotic. Over 80% expressed strong feelings of pride in being citizens of Botswana and approximately 70% said they hope their children will have the same feelings towards the country. Another 80% said they have a "strong desire" to assist in building Botswana's economy and society. This last point is reinforced by the fact that 60% of respondents disagreed with the statement that "It really does not matter where one is a citizen as long as the person has a good quality of life" (although 34% of skilled nationals did agree with this statement).

The skilled Batswana interviewed are also overwhelmingly trustful of their national government, with more than 90% saying that they "trust the government to do what is right". Another 82% of respondents agreed with the statement that "it would be justified for the government to pass legislation requiring citizens of Botswana to work in the country for several years after completion of their

TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF CONDITIONS IN BOTSWANA AND MOST LIKELY DESTINATION (MLD)

Conditions (%)	Better in Botswana	About the same	Better in MLD	Don't know
Your personal safety	61	18	10	11
Your family's safety	60	20	9	11
The security of your job	52	17	15	16
The future of your children in Botswana	48	13	30	9
Overall living conditions	41	17	36	6
Cost of living	41	16	40	3
Your level of taxation	36	17	13	35
Ability to find the house you want to live in	33	16	23	18
Your job	31	13	49	7
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	29	17	14	40
Prospects for professional advancement	20	15	57	8
Your level of income	20	11	60	9
Ability to find medical services for your family and children	16	17	57	10
Ability to find a good school for your children	13	13	65	9
Availability of affordable quality products	11	10	70	9
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, beaches, toilets etc.)	9	13	66	12
Customer service	8	21	44	17

education". It should be noted here that a policy of national service (Tirelo Sechaba[3]) has been in effect in Botswana since the early 1980s, and has been generally well received, which may have influenced these results. Nevertheless, the highly positive responses are no doubt also a reflection of the generally high levels of satisfaction with government performance and the role that the state plays in development initiatives in the minds of the respondents.

This commitment to Botswana is further illustrated by the very low number of respondents (2%) who are interested in seeking citizenship in another country. As many as 96% said they are unwilling to give up their Botswana citizenship. Likewise, only a few would sell their house, take all their savings, or take all their investments out of Botswana if they were to leave the country (3%, 4% and 5%, respectively).

The only point where respondents qualified their commitment to Botswana was (revealingly) on issues of taxation. Less than 40% of skilled Batswana feel the government would be justified in requiring its citizens to pay a larger share of their income in taxes according to the ability to pay. Indeed, only 36% consider the tax level in Botswana to be better than that in South Africa, the USA, UK or Australia and less than 30% feel that their relative share of taxes paid to the government is better than what applies in these other countries. Finally, less than half of those surveyed feel the government of Botswana would be justified in requiring citizens to pay taxes on income earned outside Botswana.

In sum, the majority of respondents are not interested in long-term emigration but a significant number say they would leave the country if they had the opportunity (or were forced to leave for personal or economic reasons) and would stay out of the country for variable periods of time. These figures are not cause for alarm, particularly given the fact that very few respondents said they plan to leave in the near future and so many are clearly committed to Botswana. However, they should not be ignored, and suggest that the government of Botswana and employers of skilled personnel do need to take the question of skilled emigration seriously. If there were to be a dramatic downturn in the economy in Botswana, for example, it is possible that the number of potential migrants could increase significantly, leaving Botswana with a serious skills shortage.

Decision-Making Factors
Comparing Botswana to Other Countries

In an effort to try and understand the decision-making process on emigration, we asked a series of questions about how they compare Botswana to the country which they indicated as the "most likely destination" (MLD) if they were to leave Botswana. The results reveal three interesting trends. On the one hand, respondents clearly feel that Botswana offers them more security in terms of job tenure and the safety of oneself and one's family. On the other hand, respondents clearly feel that opportunities for job advancement and income are much better outside of Botswana along with social services like schools, medical services, public amenities, shopping, and customer service. Finally, there is a polarisation of responses on some of the indices, with respondents equally divided on which country has better overall living conditions, cost of living, quality of work, ability to find a good house, and the future of one's children.

It would appear, therefore, that it is only job security and safety where skilled Batswana feel that Botswana is clearly better than their MLD. These are important issues, of course, and could well be decisive in keeping skilled people in the country. If safety or job security were to become a concern it could very well tip the balance in favour of emigration. Alternatively, if social services were improved it could well convince those who are thinking about emigrating to stay in the country. Indeed, on almost every index, those who think conditions are better in their MLD are also more likely to have given a lot of consideration to emigrating. This association is particularly strong with respect to opportunities for professional advancement and income.

Possible Reasons for Leaving Botswana

We also asked which factors would be most likely to cause them to want to stay in Botswana and which would be most likely to cause them to leave. Not surprisingly, the primary factor influencing a decision to leave is prospects for professional advancement. This reason comprised 27% of valid reasons for all skilled Batswana and 29% for those who have considered emigrating.

Income is a close second for those who have considered migrating (27%) but is not quite as important for the sample as a whole. Cost of living, a factor directly related to income and taxation, is the third most important factor that may influence a skilled Motswana to emigrate.

Also not surprising is the fact that few respondents listed job security as a possible reason for wanting to emigrate. In fact, it has zero effect on those who have considered emigrating, once again underscoring the high levels of job assurance for skilled nationals in the country. Housing, personal safety and children's future in Botswana also have little effect on the consideration to emigrate, as do other social services like public amenities, shopping and medical services, suggesting that these may not be critical decision-making factors.

It is interesting to note, however, that the ability to find good schools for children in Botswana has much less effect (4%) on those who have considered emi-grating than those who have never considered emigrating (11%). This may be because those respondents who have considered emigrating tend to have higher incomes and are therefore not as likely to be able to send their children to expensive private schools of their choice in Botswana. The fact that the ability to find good medical services for one's family and children in Botswana is less a factor in the migration decision process among those who have considered migrating is probably due to the same reason. Gaborone Private Hospital and several private clinics in Gaborone and Francistown offer very good medical service.

Possible Reasons for Staying in Botswana

The reasons given for staying in Botswana are essentially a reverse of the reasons given for leaving, with personal/family safety and job security constituting the two most important factors. Cost of living is the third factor and illustrates the polarisation in attitudes on this subject referred to above. It is noteworthy that the survey was conducted at about the time that salaries of government staff and related organisations were increased by 25%. The initial expectations which followed this increase may explain at least some of the respondents' positive view towards cost of living in the country.

The second column in Table 8 gives the responses of those who have "never considered migrating". These responses are effectively the same as the total sample and suggest a high degree of consensus amongst skilled Batswana on the factors that would influence them to stay in the country.

The Role of Information in the Decision-making Process

Information plays a role in the migration decision-making process. As shown in Table 9, respondents who have given a "great deal of consideration" to emigrating are far more likely to have obtained information about living conditions and job opportunities in other countries on a regular basis. It is impossible to determine from the data whether or not the consideration to emigrate or the search for information came first. However, there is a clear and very strong relationship between the two, with newspapers and professional journals being a source of information for a large majority of those who have given a lot of consideration to emigration. Interestingly, a significant number of those who said they have

TABLE 7: POSSIBLE REASONS FOR EMIGRATING

Reason to Emigrate (%)	Proportion of sample citing as reason to emigrate	Proportion of those considering migrating who cited this as reason to emigrate
Prospects for Professional Advancement	27	29
Income	19	27
Cost of Living	19	18
Ability to find Good School for Child	11	4
Respondent's Job	6	12
Ability to find Good Medical Services	3	1
Personal/Family Safety	4	1
Availability of Quality Goods	2	4
Customer Services	2	2
Future of Children in Botswana	2	0
Ability to find Good Housing	1	0
Taxation	1	1
Job Security	1	0
Upkeep of Public Amenities	1	0
Other	2	1

TABLE 8: POSSIBLE REASONS FOR STAYING IN BOTSWANA

Reason for staying in Botswana (%)	Proportion who cited this as a possible reason for staying in Botswana	Proportion of those who have not considered migrating citing this as reason to stay
Personal/Family Safety	36	39
Job Security	26	25
Cost of Living	11	11
Respondent's Job	6	6
Taxation	6	4
Prospects for Professional Advancement	4	3
Income	5	4
Future of Children in Botswana	2	3
Ability to find Good Housing	2	3
Ability to find Good School for Child	1	-
Ability to find Good Medical Services	1	1
Being at Home	1	-

TABLE 9: THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN DECISION MAKING

Source of information for those who "often" get information about living conditions in other countries (%)	AMOUNT OF CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EMIGRATING		
	A great deal	Some	None at all
Professional journals/ newsletters	52	41	30
Newspapers	76	59	47
Friends	66	23	25
Family	45	24	13
Professional associations	45	31	27
Source of information for those who "often" get information about job opportunities in other countries (%)			
Professional journals/ newsletters	69	27	21
Newspapers	76	36	24
Friends	48	10	9
Family	38	11	6
Professional associations	45	15	12

TABLE 10: ABILITY TO LEAVE BOTSWANA

Ease of leaving Botswana to go and work in another country (%)	
Very Easy	11
Easy	28
Difficult	24
Very Difficult	19
Don't Know	18

Affordability of Costs of Traveling to Another Country and Finding a Good Home (%)	
Very Affordable	3
Affordable	23
Unaffordable	35
Very Unaffordable	17
Don't Know	22

TABLE 11: THE ROLE OF FAMILY IN DECISION MAKING

Would your family tend to encourage or discourage you from leaving Botswana?	
Strongly encourage	6
Encourage	9
Neither	14
Discourage	28
Strongly discourage	33
Don't know	10

not given any consideration to emigration still seek information on living conditions and job opportunities elsewhere, suggesting that there may be some latent potential here for them to also consider migration. In total, approximately one-third of the entire sample said they "often" use newspapers and journals for information on living conditions and jobs in other countries.

Ability to Leave the Country

The likelihood of migration is also a factor affecting one's ability to actually leave the country. We therefore asked respondents "how easy or difficult it would be for them to go and work in another country if they wanted to" and whether or not they would be able to afford moving to another country.

The results are presented in Table 10 and suggest that over a third (39%) of respondents would be able to leave the country if they wanted to and approximately one quarter (26%) would be able to afford it.

The flip-side of these responses is that 43% said they would find it difficult to leave the country and 52% said they would not be able to afford it – once again underlining the fact that although some emigration may occur, mass emi-

gration is highly unlikely in the near future.

The Role of Family in Decision Making

Decisions about international migration usually involve more than just the potential migrant. We therefore asked who would be the final decision maker on the question of emigration and what role family encouragement (or discouragement) plays in this process.

Table 11 presents the findings for the sample as a whole, from which it is apparent that most families would discourage emigration. No doubt this would have an influence on the decision-making process, despite the fact that over two-thirds (68%) said that they would be the final decision-makers.

Proof of this family influence is seen in the strong correlation between those who say they have given a "great deal" of consideration to emigration and those who say their families would encourage them to go.

Those who said they had not considered emigration were more likely to say their family would discourage it. Furthermore, those who have given a lot of consideration to emigrating are more likely to claim to be the final decision-makers on these issues.

Conclusions

Based on the interviews in this study it seems unlikely that Botswana faces a major exodus of skilled nationals in the foreseeable future. The economy is relatively buoyant, the currency is strong and the state continues to invest significant resources into training and localisation. More tellingly, the vast majority of those interviewed are generally happy with conditions in Botswana, proud to be a citizen of the country and trust the government. There are clearly areas where respondents would like to see conditions improve in Botswana (e.g. social services, room for professional advancement) but these do not appear to be fatal flaws – at least not yet.

These largely positive results are not

Notes & references

1 BIDPA, Study of poverty and poverty alleviation in Botswana, Gaborone: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1997; Republic of Botswana, National development plan 8, 1997/98-2002/03. Gaborone: Government Printer, 1997; Republic of Botswana, Annual economic report, 1998, Gaborone: Government Printer, 1998; Republic of Botswana, Annual economic report, 1999, Gaborone: Government Printer, 1999.

2 B Dodson, 'Women on the move: Gender and cross-border migration to South Africa', in D McDonald (ed), On Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa, Cape Town and New York: SAMP/St Martin's Press, 2000.

3 Tirelo Sechaba ("work for the nation") is designed to expose students who have completed Form 5 to pre-employment work experience in areas outside their places of usual residence while at the same time giving these young adults the opportunity to give community services to the nation. Increasingly, it has become an important part of the educated Motswana's life. For instance, it is a prerequisite for gaining government scholarships to study in tertiary institutions within and outside Botswana. It is anticipated that this policy will be terminated soon, however.

grounds for complacency, however. Rather, they should be seen as an indication of what Botswana is doing well and what it is doing less well in terms of retaining skilled Batswana. The results should be seen as a warning sign of what could happen if the economy were to stumble, if the government were seen to be corrupt or if personal safety were to become a problem.

The present study has succeeded in identifying the major concerns (good and bad) of skilled Batswana when it comes to emigrating and many of the key decision-making criteria.

Future studies should expand the number of professions interviewed and also interview policy makers and public and private sector executives with the aim of obtaining information on hiring practices/obstacles and attitudes towards policy reform.

What, for example, would policy makers and employers have to say about the perceived limits of professional advancement or the apparent differential between the salaries of skilled Batswana and skilled immigrants?

As Southern Africa heads towards a more unified and globalised future, skilled migration is only going to grow in importance and the government of Botswana would be well advised to monitor and address these issues in a proactive, rather than a reactive, manner.⊙

Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)

SAMP is an international partnership network linking organizations in Canada and Southern Africa committed to research, training, public education and policy development on migration issues. The project is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and managed by Queen's University. Copies of all publications are available from Idasa in South Africa (vincent@idasact.org.za) or from Queen's (samp@post.queensu.ca). Publications are also available for download at the SAMP website: http://www.queensu.ca/samp

Crossings

Copies of SAMP's quarterly public education broadsheet on migration policy issues, *Crossings,* are available on the SAMP website.

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List of SAMP Publications

Books

Jonathan Crush, ed., *Beyond Control: Immigration and Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa* (Cape Town, 1998). ISBN 1-874864-63-2

Jonathan Crush and Vincent Williams, eds., *The New South Africans? Immigration Amnesties and their Aftermath* (Cape Town, 1998). ISBN 1-874864-85-3

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No. 2: *Riding the Tiger: Lesotho Miners and Permanent Residence in South Africa* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-52-7

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No.13: *The Lives and Times of African Migrants and Immigrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8

No.14: *Still Waiting for the Barbarians: SA Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8

No.15: *Undermining Labour: Migrancy and Sub-Contracting in the Gold Mining Industry* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8

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No.18: *Losing Our Minds: Skills Migration and the South African Brain Drain* (2000)

No.19: *Botswana: Migration Perspectives and Prospects* (2000)

No. 20: *The Border Within: Studies on the Lesotho-South African Boundary* (in press)

Skilled Immigrants in Botswana

A stable but temporary workforce

Botswana became independent in 1966 with an economy that revolved around animal husbandry and little more. When diamond mining began in the 1970s, the country underwent rapid transformation and the country's economy began to grow. Today, Botswana has one of the most vibrant and fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as a result has also become a major destination for migrants from all over the world – particularly skilled migrants. **John O Oucho** reports.

This article assesses the attitudes of these skilled immigrants: why did they come to Botswana, what do they do in Botswana, how long do they intend to stay? It is hoped that this information will lead to a better understanding of the role that skilled foreigners play in the socio-economic make-up of Botswana and what their plans are for the future. Are skilled people from outside the country happy with Botswana? Is there anything that the government of Botswana can do, or should be doing, to attract or retain skilled immigrants in the country?

Currently, the Government of Botswana has an informal policy of "promotional entry" with which it tries to attract skilled personnel from other countries to fill critical areas of skills shortage (e.g. doctors, university professors). Moreover, the Directorate of Public Service Management has been sending recruitment missions all over the world to recruit skilled personnel.

It is critical, therefore, to have a better understanding of skilled migration into the country and what the future may hold.

This research is the first attempt to systematically evaluate the experiences and attitudes of skilled immigrants in Botswana and sheds light on a wide range of issues.

Botswana as a Migration Destination

Most sub-Saharan African countries have been in economic decline for the past two decades. Of the few African countries which have recorded economic growth, Botswana has exhibited an unusual economic resilience, largely attributable to its political stability and rich diamond deposits. In the three decades since independence, the country's GDP per capita has increased from P1,683 in 1966 to P7,863 in 1994/95,[1] growing at an average annual rate of 6.1%.[2]

With the exception of Seychelles and Mauritius, the country also had the most impressive Human Development Index of all the SADC member states (0.741 in 1993), although this dropped slightly to 0.678 in 1995.[3]

Incorporated in this impressive record is the development of infrastructure. The length of tarred roads increased nearly twenty times from 219 kilometres in 1975 to 4 177 kilometres in 1995, while ownership of motor vehicles went from 15 400 to 191 500 in the same period. Domestic electricity generation increased from 270 million kwh in 1975 to 1 040 kwh in 1995 and the number of telephone subscribers went from virtually nothing to 50 477 by 1995.[4] These are dramatic strides by any measure and demonstrate the relative prosperity that the country and its nationals have enjoyed in the first thirty years of independence while much of Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed decline. The National Development Plan[8] expects that this prosperity will continue, with real economic growth projected at 4.5% per annum over the period 1995/96 to 2020/21, a rate higher than the growth rate of the population.[5]

Source Countries of Legal In-Migration

The importance of Botswana as an immigration country is attested by Tables 1 and 2 which report African and non-African sources of immigration into the country before 1992. African immigrants were mainly from South Africa, followed by Zimbabwe, in the two census years 1981 and 1991. While the majority originated from SADC countries, the non-SADC countries of Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria play an appreciable role in the immigration equation. This country-of-origin mix is rare in a small population such as Botswana's and attests to the country's growing importance as an immigration country in Africa.

Non-African immigration involves a good spread of countries in Europe, Asia, America and Oceania (Table 2). More than half of immigration was from Europe with the United Kingdom

accounting for about 53% in 1981 and 64% in 1991 of all Europeans. Asia accounted for a mere 14% of total immigration in 1981 but almost 40% of all non-African immigration. India accounted for just above half of the Asian total, followed by China with approximately one-fifth. American immigration was predominantly from the United States. Oceania's immigration was insignificant.

Research Methodology

Data collection for the survey was based on a sample of employees selected from five principal employers in Botswana: staff of the University of Botswana; members of the Institution of Engineers; members of the Botswana Law Society drawn from the law firms registered with the society; members of the Association of Accountants; and three key Government Ministries (Health [where lists of doctors and nurses were available], Education, and Finance and Development Planning). Other professional institutions that had been approached to provide lists of their employees failed to provide the information in time and were unfortunately dropped from the survey. The sample is therefore not representative of all skilled sectors in the country but it does provide a representation of key skilled occupations both in the public and private sector.

From these lists of professions, a random, unstratified sample of non-Botswana citizens was generated and a total of 850 questionnaires were dispatched in August 1998 in two ways. First, research assistants hand-delivered questionnaires to the prospective respondents in the Gaborone area. On delivery of the questionnaires, the research assistants requested an appointment for face-to-face interviews.

Where this was not possible, respondents were asked to complete the questionnaires and return them by mail to the research coordinator, using pre-stamped and addressed envelopes. Second, the research assistants mailed questionnaires and followed them up after some time to determine whether the questionnaires, in pre-stamped envelopes, had been mailed back to the research office. By November 1998, 140 surveys had been completed (either in person or sent in by mail). Of these, 15 had to be discarded, leaving a total sample size of 125 individuals (or 14.7% of the initial list).

One possible explanation for this relatively low return rate is that some skilled

immigrants suspected that the research was meant to elicit information which was either too confidential or which could be prejudicial to their tenure as expatriate workers in Botswana. Nonetheless, the sample size is adequate for the purposes of providing insights into skilled foreigners in Botswana and for application of inferential statistical analysis where applicable. Most importantly, the sample represents a broad cross-section of important skills areas and provides invaluable insight into this hitherto under-researched group of non-citizens in Botswana.

A Profile of the Sample Population

The skilled immigrants in our sample originate mainly from African, European and Asian countries. Interestingly, despite the fact that we did not sample by country of origin, our sample is nevertheless similar to that of the universal sample of immigrants enumerated in the 1981 and 1991 censuses, suggesting a high degree of representivity and limited change in the 1990s. Approximately 60% of the sample come from Africa, with South Africa emerging as the most important country of origin, followed by Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya.

Of the European source countries, the UK emerges as the single most important country of origin, but a striking feature of the European immigration is the spread of origins in Western and Eastern Europe. Those of Asian origin are dominated by India (also not unexpectedly), followed by Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Finally, North America, the Caribbean and Oceania are insignificant origins, though the case of the United States is contradicted by census data and may represent a low response rate. In racial terms, 50% of the sample was African, 36% White, 12% Asian and 2% Coloured.

The official status of the sample is overwhelmingly "work permit holder" (85%). Only one person among the respondents had permanent residence, 3% had temporary residence and 11% hold exemption certificates. The reason for this pattern will become clear later.

As shown in Table 4, the occupational spread of the sample fits with the targeted categories of "skilled" professions, with the largest number of interviewees being in a medically-related field. It is also worth noting that 90% of the sample were employed full-time in their home countries before coming to Botswana, with an additional 8% and 1% self-employed in the formal and informal sector respectively.

While the average age of internal migration in Sub-Saharan African countries is 20-29 years, it is generally higher in international migration – a rule that is supported by this sample with a mean age of 42.[6] This result is also consistent with the stepwise migration hypothesis which suggests that most skilled foreigners must first have worked and gained experience in their own or other countries before migrating to Botswana.

Also unsurprising is the finding that the highest percentage of skilled foreigners in this random sample are males, accounting for 85% of the total. Men have traditionally dominated cross-border migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and gender inequalities in terms of access to higher education. Access to senior managerial

TABLE 1: AFRICAN POPULATION OF BOTSWANA BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Country of citizenship	1981 Census		1991 Census	
	Number	%	Number	%
South Africa	3807	44	6254	34
Zimbabwe	2375	27	5308	29
Zambia			2154	12
Malawi	234	3	771	4
Angola	403	5	596	3
Ghana	93	1	569	3
Lesotho	464	5	547	3
Tanzania			498	3
Uganda			319	2
Mauritius			316	2
Namibia	521	6	310	2
Kenya			132	1
Swaziland	125	1	117	1
Nigeria	99	1	117	1
Rest of Africa	612	7	331	2
Total	**8733**	**100**	**18538**	**100**

TABLE 2: RESIDENT POPULATION FROM EUROPE, ASIA, AMERICA, AND OCEANIA

Country of citizenship		1981 Census		1991 Census	
		Number	%	Number	%
Europe	Denmark			110	2
	Germany			359	6
	Ireland			200	4
	Italy			174	3
	Norway			125	2
	Netherlands			203	4
	Portugal			148	3
	Sweden	3650		140	3
	United Kingdom		73	3559	64
	Yugoslavia	1335		104	2
	Rest of Europe	4985	27	484	9
Total		**4985**	**100**	**5606**	**100**
Asia	China			946	23
	India			2128	51
	Pakistan			157	4
	Sri Lanka			431	10
	Rest of Asia	946		531	13
Total		**946**	**100**	**4193**	**100**
Americas	United States	122	81	653	74
	Canada	23	16	121	14
	Rest of Americas	776	3	107	12
Total		**776**	**100**	**881**	**100**
Oceania	Australia			130	84
	Rest of Australia	179		25	16
Total					

TABLE 3: SAMPLE BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Country and region	Country of passport		Home country	
	Number	%	Number	%
Africa	**74**	**60**	**77**	**63**
South Africa	12	10	15	12
Cameroon	1	1	1	1
Liberia	1	1	1	1
Sierra Leone	1	1	1	1
Ghana	7	5	7	6
Nigeria	2	2	2	2
Sudan	1	1	1	1
Eritrea	-	-	1	1
Ethiopia	2	2	1	1
Kenya	8	7	7	6
Tanzania	6	5	7	6
Uganda	5	4	5	4
Burundi	1	1	1	1
Zimbabwe	8	7	8	7
Zambia	14	11	14	11
Malawi	5	4	5	4
Asia	**19**	**15**	**17**	**14**
India	11	9	11	9
Sri Lanka	4	3	4	3
Bangladesh	3	2	1	1
Israel	1	1	1	1
Europe	**25**	**21**	**25**	**20**
Netherlands	1	1	1	1
Belgium	1	1	1	1
Yugoslavia	1	1	1	1
United Kingdom	15	12	13	11
Norway	1	1	1	1
Germany	1	1	1	1
Ireland	3	4	3	2
Russian Republics	2	2	1	1
Bulgaria	1	1	3	2
North America and Caribbean	**4**	**3**	**3**	**2**
United States	2	2	2	2
Canada	1	1	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	1	1	1	1
Oceania	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Australia	1	1	1	1
Total	**124**	**100**	**123**	**100**

> **It is equally evident that women are increasingly participating in cross-border movements in the region and it is likely that skilled women will come to feature more prominently in the area of skilled migration as well**

and professional positions has no doubt exacerbated these gender imbalances when it comes to skilled migration.

Nevertheless, it is equally evident that women are increasingly participating in cross-border movements in the region and it is likely that skilled women will come to feature more prominently in the area of skilled migration as well.[7] In fact, many of the spouses of the predominantly-male sample are already working in skilled or semi-skilled areas, suggesting a considerable skilled cohort of women is already in place in Botswana – if not by design then at least by default. There is also the possibility that skilled female immigrants selected themselves out of the survey by not returning the questionnaires. Unfortunately, the census data does not allow us to cross-reference these gender statistics.

Some 84% of the sample are married, once again underscoring the fact that skilled migrants tend to be older and more established than non-skilled migrants.

Of the 123 skilled foreigners indicating their academic qualifications, 85% hold a Bachelors degree or higher, with fully 23% of the sample holding Doctorate degrees (due in part to the large sub-sample of university lecturers).

The degrees themselves cover a wide range of disciplines, from chemistry to education to commerce, and represent a galaxy of reputable institutions in Africa, Europe, Asia and North America (e.g. Oxford, Yale, University of Cape Town, Chittigong Medical College).

The United Kingdom was the most common country of education, with 23% of the sample obtaining their highest qualifications in Britain. But African countries account for 46% of the educational institutions attended, with South Africa alone accounting for 14%. Interestingly, only 2% of the sample obtained their highest educational qualification in Botswana. All in all, the sample represents a very highly qualified group of people with an impressive list of qualifications from 28 countries on four continents – a truly cosmopolitan source of expertise.

The joint monthly income of the sample (before tax) is shown in Table 6. Some 24% of the households earn an income of between P5 500-P8 200, and the mean monthly income is P6 517. It is also important to note that 29% of skilled foreigners earn between P8 300-P13 800 a month, 23% earn P19 500 and above, and 8% earn P53 000 or more. These are extremely high income levels by any standards in the SADC region.

Botswana as Host Country

Are skilled immigrants happy living in Botswana? Do they feel they are well treated in the country by citizens and government? How do they perceive their personal situation in the country vis-à-vis other groups? And finally, do skilled immigrants feel they have an important role to play in the country?

For the overwhelming majority of respondents (70%), life is deemed to be better in Botswana than in their home country. Only 4% said things are "worse" in Botswana, suggesting high levels of overall satisfaction. An overwhelming majority of respondents (83%) also said that their relations with Batswana are good,

with only 3% saying they are "negative". Clearly the people interviewed in this survey are satisfied with their interactions with Batswana and their overall situation.

Surprisingly, therefore, almost half of the sample (46%) feel that foreigners are perceived negatively by Batswana. These opinions take a turn for the better when it comes to the perceptions of the attitudes of co-workers and others in the respondent's profession, but there would appear to be a widespread unease with how they are perceived by the public at large.

This concern is also evident in two questions about "unfair treatment" in Botswana. Over a third of respondents (36%) felt that foreigners as a whole are treated unfairly by Batswana at least "to some extent", and about a quarter (24%) felt that they personally have been treated unfairly by Batswana. These figures are only 18% and 13% for perception of how the government of Botswana treats foreigners or them personally unfairly, suggesting once again an institutional behaviour which is more accommodating to skilled foreigners than the general public's reception.

Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that a majority of respondents have hardly or never been treated unfairly by the citizens or government, underscoring the generally high levels of satisfaction with life in Botswana.

Respondents were also asked about their satisfaction with a range of socio-economic conditions. With the interesting exception of "customer service", a large majority were either satisfied or neutral on each of the points. Moreover, a large majority expect conditions in Botswana to remain the same or get better over the next five years, with only 24% saying they expect conditions to get worse.

These results also highlight the probable importance of non-economic factors in the retention of skilled immigrants in Botswana (e.g. housing, schooling for children, safety). As important as "Pula power" and high salaries may be, access to services like good health care and the safety of oneself and one's family undoubtedly play into the decision-making process. It seems evident from Table 11 that the majority do not have any major grievances on the social front.

When it came to comparisons with other groups in Botswana, the vast majority were again satisfied with their situation, saying that their personal conditions and those of foreigners as a whole are equal to, or better than, each of the groups we asked about. Interestingly,

TABLE 4: OCCUPATION OF INTERVIEWEES

Current Occupation	Number	%
Medical practitioner/doctor	21	19
Accountant	20	18
Professor/Lecturer	25	22
Finance Manager	9	8
Auditor	5	5
Radiographer	5	5
Director	3	3
Lawyer	3	3
Librarian	3	3
Specialist Surgeon	3	3
Financial controller	2	2
Manager/managerial office worker	2	2
Chief technical officer	1	1
Engineer (mining)	1	1
Graphic Designer	1	1
Speech Therapist	1	1
Physiotherapist	1	1
Vocational Training College Instructor	1	1
Technical advisor	1	1
Education Officer	1	1
Cosmetologist	1	1
Psychiatrist	1	1

these responses applied equally to comparisons between foreigners as well, suggesting a relative degree of socio-economic parity amongst the various nationalities represented in the sample.

Finally, the vast majority of the respondents feel that they have a role to play in the development of the country. Fully 44% of the sample feel that they personally have a "major" role to play while an additional 50% feel they have "some role" to play. Only 1 out of 125 respondents felt they had no role to play. No doubt this is a reflection of the satisfaction that respondents have with their social and work lives in the country and the generally good relations they have with Batswana and corporate/government institutions. If people are made to feel that they belong then they are more likely to feel like they can contribute. The fact that 55% of the sample are involved in some kind of community association and 52% are involved "to some extent" in community service indicates a considerable amount of extra-curricular activity as well.

TABLE 5: OCCUPATIONS OF SPOUSES OF INTERVIEWEES

Current Occupation	Number	%
Teacher/Lecturer	20	19
Nurse/Medical Technician	14	13
Professional Worker	10	9
Accountant	9	9
Managerial Office Worker	6	6
Employer/Manager of Establishment with less than 10 Employees	4	4
Lawyer	3	3
Medical Doctor/Practitioner	3	3
Engineer	2	2
Non-manual Office Worker	1	1
Services Worker	1	1
Supervisory Office Worker	1	1
Housewife/Househusband	30	29

TABLE 6: JOINT MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME BEFORE TAX

Income (Pula)	%
P2,800-P5,400	11
P5,500-P8,200	24
P8,300-P11,000	18
P11,100-P13,800	12
P13,900-P16,600	9
P16,700-P22,200	6
P22,300-P33,400	7
P33,500-PP53,00	8
Over P53,00	8

TABLE 7: COMPARISON OF LIFE IN BOTSWANA AND HOME COUNTRY

Quality of life in Botswana versus home country	%
Much better	10
Better	60
About the same	20
Worse	4
Don't know	6

TABLE 8: SKILLED FOREIGNERS' RELATIONS WITH BATSWANA

Relations with people from Botswana	%
Very positive	37
Positive	46
Neither positive or negative	14
Negative	2
Very negative	1

TABLE 9: HOW SKILLED FOREIGNERS THINK THEY ARE PERCEIVED

How skilled foreigners think they are perceived by (%)	Positive	Negative	Neither/ Don't know
Batswana	30	46	24
Co-workers	60	18	23
People in profession	64	12	26

TABLE 10: UNFAIR TREATMENT IN BOTSWANA

Unfair treatment of foreigners in general by ... (%)	Large Extent	Some Extent	Hardly at All	Never	Don't Know
Batswana	5	32	36	14	14
Government of Botswana	3	15	34	33	16
Unfair treatment personally by ... (%)					
Batswana	2	22	36	36	4
Government of Botswana	3	11	31	51	5

TABLE 11: PERCEIVED SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN BOTSWANA

Level of satisfaction with ... (%)	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Your personal safety	77	15	6	2
Your family's safety	73	14	7	6
Your job	70	18	11	1
Your level of taxation	67	12	10	1
Ability to find medical services for your family and children	63	15	19	2
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	61	22	12	5
Availability of affordable quality products	56	23	20	1
Your level of income	55	20	25	B
Cost of living	52	17	31	B
The security of your job	49	30	20	2
Ability to find the house you want to live in	45	22	31	3
Ability to find a good school for your children	42	19	27	13
Prospects for professional advancement	39	23	35	4
Upkeep of public amenities	37	14	43	6
Customer service	28	15	60	1
The future of your children in Botswana	25	33	25	18

TABLE 12: PERCEIVED CONDITIONS OF SKILLED FOREIGNERS VERSUS OTHER GROUPS IN BOTSWANA

Perceived conditions of skilled foreigners with ... (%)	Better	Same	Worse	Don't know
Other foreign residents living in Botswana	26	55	13	6
Other people from your home country living in Botswana	27	59	9	5
Citizens of Botswana	49	33	14	9
Other people in your profession	17	69	13	2
Other people in your economic class	9	76	13	2
Other people of your race	23	60	9	8

As important as "Pula power" and high salaries may be, access to services like good health care and the safety of oneself and one's family undoubtedly play into the decision-making process.

The only real concern with respect to the experience of the respondents living in Botswana is a concern with crime: 29% say they have been "harassed" and 29% say they have been "robbed". Only 4% claim to have been "assaulted" in Botswana, however, suggesting that the crime experienced by this group of foreigners is not particularly violent (and perhaps explaining why 77% of respondents said they were satisfied with their personal safety in Botswana. Nevertheless, the high rates of robbery and harassment are of concern. There was also one reported case of rape.

Contrasting Conditions in Botswana with Home Country

As noted earlier, the majority of the sample said that "life is better" in Botswana than their home country. This does not mean, however, that conditions in the home country are necessarily bad. In fact 44% of the sample said that conditions at home are "satisfactory". Moreover, close to half (45%) said they expect conditions in their home country to improve in the next five years.

Table 15 provides a more specific breakdown of how the home country compares with Botswana. It would appear that income-related issues are where Botswana is deemed better. Other important issues like schooling for children, job security, housing and prospects for professional advancement were actually deemed to be better in the home country by a majority of respondents, suggest that most skilled foreigners in Botswana have opportunities and satisfactory conditions to go home to.[8]

This last point is reinforced by the fact that 98% of the sample have visited their home country on at least one occasion since being in Botswana and 29% return home "often". Furthermore, 61% own a house in their home country, 85% have a bank account in their home country and 56% have investments there. Only 28% have a job to return to at home, but presumably they gave up their job to come to Botswana. It should also be noted that 79% of the sample have sent remittances to friends and/or family in their home country – with 22% sending at least a quarter of their income.

TABLE 14: SATISFACTION WITH OVERALL CONDITIONS IN HOME COUNTRY

How satisfied are you with overall conditions in your home country? (%)	
Very satisfied	10
Satisfied	34
Unsatisfied	35
Very unsatisfied	19
Don't know	3

TABLE 13: PERCEIVED ROLE OF SKILLED FOREIGNERS IN BOTSWANA

Perceived role of skilled foreigners in relation to ... (%)	Major role	Some role	Minor role	No role at all	Don't know
You personally	44	50	5	1	B
Foreign residents who live here	47	44	6	1	2
People from your home country who live here	33	57	7	1	2
People in your economic class	45	49	5	1	1
People who share your home language	45	49	5	1	1
People of your race	28	55	10	3	4

TABLE 15: COMPARISON OF CONDITIONS IN BOTSWANA AND IN HOME COUNTRY

Comparison of conditions between Botswana and home country (%)	Better in Botswana	About the same/ Don't know	Better in home country
Overall living conditions	60	33	7
Your level of taxation	66	21	13
Your level of income	64	21	16
Cost of living	55	16	29
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	49	38	14
Your personal safety	49	30	22
Your family's safety	48	32	20
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, beaches, toilets)	36	26	38
Your job	33	41	26
Availability of affordable quality products	32	26	40
The future of your children	27	27	46
Ability to find medical services for your children and family	25	29	46
Prospects for professional advancement	20	26	54
Customer service	20	20	60
Ability to find the house you want to live in	17	27	55
Ability to find a good school for your children	15	25	60
The security of your job	14	30	56

The close ties of non-citizens with their home country is further evidenced by the responses given to the questions in Table 16. The sense of pride, attachment and responsibility to the home country comes out very clearly in these responses, and although there is strong resistance to the notion of paying taxes to the home government this does not mean they would necessarily want to avoid paying taxes if living in situ.

Nevertheless, this sense of close ties with the home country is balanced by the fact that a majority of the sample also appear to be very happy with the overall living conditions in Botswana. As a result, there is no reason to suspect a mass exodus of skilled foreign workers from Botswana in the near future. Skilled immigrants in the country have options outside of Botswana that they would be happy to return to and a strong commitment to "home", but they also appear to be satisfied with their lives in Botswana.

Future Plans

We also asked a series of questions about plans for the future. The results show a stable, but clearly temporary, cohort of skilled migrants. When asked how long they plan to stay in Botswana, almost a third (31%) noted that they plan to stay for more than 5 years, while a further 22 % say they will stay for up to five years, with a mean length of stay of four years. Only 7% plan on leaving the country within one year.

Nevertheless, the majority of the sample see themselves as temporary sojourners in Botswana. As Table 18 attests, relatively few are interested in becoming permanent residents of the country and fewer yet want to become citizens, retire, or be buried in the country.

When asked where they would go if they were to leave Botswana, 52% said they would return to their home country and 39% said they would go to a third country (the remaining 9% did not

know). Of the third country possibilities, the United States and Australia were the "preferred" destination. As many as 42% of respondents said they would leave Botswana if it became difficult for them to renew their work permits. The fact that the overwhelming majority of respondents had no problem applying for their most recent permit would suggest that there is no danger of this happening in the near future, but it does highlight once again the potential "foot looseness" of this pool of skilled foreigners.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

The following policy-relevant questions and recommendations arise from the research:

- Given the importance of skilled immigrants to Botswana's economy,

the government should regularly collect and analyse data on skilled migration. This administrative data source would complement census data which are less detailed and generally static. That the vast majority of skilled foreigners expect to return to their home countries at the end of their work in Botswana underscores the need to have regular and dynamic information gathering. Since this survey, some significant changes have already taken place which may accelerate the return migration of skilled foreigners. One important change is the taxation of expatriates' gratuities from July 1999, which may deter expatriates from an already expensive country. Another is the withdrawal of fringe benefits such as fees subsidies for expatriate

TABLE 16: SKILLED FOREIGNERS' VIEWS ABOUT THEIR TIES TO THE HOME COUNTRY

	% Who Agree
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of your country	83
Being a citizens of your country is an important part of how you see yourself	72
You would want your children to think of themselves as citizens of your home country	67
It is your duty to contribute your talents or skills to the development of your home country	53

	% Who Feel This is Justified
Require citizens to work in the home country for several years after completion of their education	47
Require citizens who have received government bursaries for education to complete some form of national service	78
Require citizens to pay taxes on all income earned outside of the country	9
Require citizens to pay a large share of their income in taxes according to their ability to pay	32
Require citizens to serve in the armed forces in cases of national emergency	57
Limit the amount of money you may send out of the country	18

TABLE 18: DESIRE TO STAY IN BOTSWANA

Desire to ... (%)	To a large extent	To some extent	Hardly at all	Not at all	Don't know
Become a permanent resident of Botswana	21	29	11	33	7
Become a citizen of Botswana	12	21	15	42	10
Retire in Botswana	7	25	15	39	14
Be buried in Botswana	7	14	10	50	21

TABLE 17: INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY IN BOTSWANA

Planned length of stay (%)	
Less than six months	3
Six months to a year	4
One to two years	20
Up to five years	22
More than five years	31
Don't know	20

TABLE 19: PREFERRED THIRD COUNTRY DESTINATIONS

Country (%)	
USA	16
Australia	15
New Zealand	10
South Africa	10
Canada	8
Namibia	7
Britain	6
Malta	2
Mauritius	2
Uganda	2
Other	12

TABLE 20: EASE OF OBTAINING WORK PERMIT

Ease of Obtaining Most Recent Work Permit (%)	
Very easy	38
Easy	43
Difficult	6
Very difficult	2
Have never had one	6
Don't know	5

Response if Work Permit was Difficult to Get in the Future (%)	
Leave the country	42
Unsure	19
Reapply for another	25
I have permanent residence	2
Don't know	14

workers' children. These and other future developments could have important implications for what skilled immigrants think about Botswana and it is important to understand how social and economic policy may affect the conditions (real or perceived) of this group of people.

• Generally good relations between skilled immigrants and local Batswana bodes well for the future by creating an environment in which immigrants feel welcomed, thereby helping to attract and retain skilled people. But the government of Botswana cannot afford to be complacent on this point and should take heed of the concerns that many of the respondents expressed about negative treatment by Batswana citizens and the (latent) xenophobia that some perceive amongst the general public. Botswana is not immune from these kinds of attitudes, and should there be a significant downturn in the local economy there could be a parallel reduction in the amount of goodwill shown to immigrants occupying key skilled positions. The government of Botswana would be well advised to take a proactive approach to information generation and public education so as to avoid any serious xenophobic sentiments and activities in the future. This point applies to all types of migrants and refugees living in the country, of course, but may require a particular strategic focus for skilled immigrants.

• There is a need for the institutions from which the sample for the study was drawn, as well as other institutions that employ skilled people in Botswana, to quantify and qualify the roles of skilled immigrants vis-à-vis those of nationals as a means of undertaking strategic employment planning (for themselves and the government of Botswana).

• As skilled migrant workers are generally a transient population, they are inclined to keep moving wherever their personal and their families' conditions are likely to improve. Therefore, the government of Botswana in general, and employers in particular, should be sensitive to how their policies and policy changes on migration compare to those of other SADC states in particular. By not doing this, employers in

Botswana will lose out to their counterparts in Namibia and South Africa. The competition for skilled personnel in the SADC region is becoming increasingly intense as SADC member states try to improve their economies, and in lieu of a more harmonised and/or regionalised approach to immigration in the region, the government of Botswana

Counting the costs Grace Sunny has moved from India to Tanzania, Kenya and Botswana in the course of her career. Does she regret leaving India?

After obtaining an MA degree in Economics (with gold medal), I worked as a lecturer in the subject. After two years, I got married. My husband worked for the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia. Every year he came home for one month's leave. Meanwhile, time passed – six years. I completed a PhD in Economics and continued to work as a lecturer. We agreed to apply for jobs elsewhere as I was not going to get a job in Saudi Arabia.

Apart from my job as a lecturer, I was also selected as a planning officer in the State Planning Board. Meanwhile I was the only lady candidate among eight lecturers selected out of 3 000 applicants by the Government of Tanzania in July 1975. This news led my husband to resign his lucrative job in ARAMCO to accompany me to the African continent. Our only child was born a year later in Dar-es-Salaam. My husband had to wait several months before he got a job at the University. Being an expatriate employee, I was not eligible for any maternity leave. It began to dawn on us that we had moved to the wrong destination, but it was too late.

At this point, the University of Nairobi offered us a job, which was a great relief. As soon as we adapted to the new environment, we wanted to stay there, but the political instability in that country forced us to move again. In the nick of time, an offer came from University of Botswana and we moved to the new country. The salary was not up to what I was drawing at an international organisation in Nairobi. But we thought that money is not everything. My husband had to wait for a job offer. Our daughter wanted to return to Nairobi as soon as possible. Again, I thought that I had made a mistake.

From our wanderings, we learned different cultures and celebrated diversity. We enjoyed the hospitality of our friends and colleagues. It was great to have had the opportunity to teach the youth in Tanzania, Kenya and Botswana. I taught under-graduate and graduate courses in economics, conducted and supervised research, wrote books, articles, conference and seminar papers and presented papers at different fora in several countries.

But in terms of progress in career, assignments, consultancy allocation, application for international jobs, etc, we paid a great price. For example, when I applied for a Fulbright Scholarship through India, the reply was that I would need to stay in India for three years before applying. The money I sent home in 1990 is the same or even less in 2000 because of exchange rate volatility. Now is not the time to look back and regret that I ever moved from my own country. But had I stayed in my job, I would have become Head of the Department and retired on pension as full Professor. I could have gone on to a post-doctoral fellowship to the USA and developed my career further. Now as a contract employee, all my professional life has been spent in Eastern and Southern Africa. The experience was great, but when I return to India there will be no pension for me.

My advice to the youth is never resign a job you have in your own country to sojourn the globe, for at a young age you cannot comprehend what is in store for you.

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will need to be more cognisant of the policies and strategies of their neighbours when it comes to attracting and retaining skilled persons.
- While Botswana has provided a viable economic climate for skilled immigrants and immediate members of their families, it should complement this with a viable social climate (which migrants currently consider to be better in their home countries). If skilled immigrants were sure that they could own houses as easily as nationals, that their children and families would have better access to good schools and medical services and that socially they would mix easily with Batswana, they would have less reason to emigrate or relocate from Botswana soon.
- The general satisfaction with the economy of Botswana notwithstanding, the declining trend in "Pula power" is a source of anxiety. Should expatriates be paid in hard currencies such as the US dollar or UK sterling? Should expatriates' fringe benefits be improved and those already withdrawn restored? Should expatriates' gratuities be taxed? These are questions which must draw the attention of policy makers as changes take place in the economic arena, especially because of the growing need for human resources in fast developing countries like Botswana.

In conclusion, skilled immigrants appear to be satisfied with their situation in Botswana, and although most intend to return to their home country within a few years there is no reason to expect a mass exodus in the near future. As long as the country remains economically vibrant, politically stable and safe, it is very likely that skilled immigrants will continue to remain in, and be attracted to, Botswana.

But despite these generally positive findings it is clear that respondents in this survey show some concern with how they are perceived and treated by the general public in Botswana. There is also some displeasure expressed with respect to social amenities like housing and education. These latter points are too broad to make any specific policy recommendations, but they do underscore the need for more detailed and regular research to track the attitudes of skilled immigrants.

For policy makers in Botswana, this chapter will hopefully serve as a benchmark of information for reviewing the country's immigration policy and for addressing the fears and concerns of skilled foreigners.

For the research fraternity, the study is but the beginning of a process that should continue in international migration research in the region. ◙

Notes & references

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7 B Dodson, 'Women on the move: Gender and cross-border migration to South Africa', in DA McDonald (ed), *On Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa*, Cape Town and New York: SAMP/St. Martin's Press, 2000.
8 It is worth noting again the strong dissatisfaction with customer service in Botswana; a point which may have some bearing on the international tourism ambitions of the country.

The movement of people between Lesotho and South Africa has been a continuous process ever since the two nations were created in the mid-19th century. Even before that time there was an ebb and flow of individuals and clans within the southern African region, one result of which was the gradual separation of the Sesotho and Setswana-speaking peoples. These peoples were most likely unified prior to 1800, although there were differences among families and clan groups, writes **John Gay**.

Migration attitudes of skilled professionals in Lesotho

There have been five distinct phases in the migration process since Moshoeshoe I brought refugees together into a unified kingdom:

- refugees move from the highveld into what is now Lesotho;
- entrants into the money economy return to South Africa for unskilled work;
- adventurous families enter the mountains for grazing and then farming;
- job-seekers without land seek work in Lesotho's new urban areas;
- skilled workers in Lesotho's towns seek better jobs in South Africa.

The first major movement of people came as a result of the Great Trek of Afrikaans-speaking people into what became the Orange Free State. The Basotho sought a land where they could be free. They were joined by bands of refugees from south and east of the Drakensberg Mountains, who were fleeing the wars in what are now the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal. Lesotho's

who moved into Lesotho remained in their traditional lands, giving occasion for Moshoeshoe's people to visit and even stay with family members across the clearly artificial border.

Within Lesotho itself people moved from the lowlands to the foothills and then the mountains, as the population grew and the available land shrank due to erosion and the creation of villages and their related infrastructure. But this movement slowed down when it became clear in the mid-20th century that there was little virgin land left for newcomers. Lesotho stabilised as a primarily rural agricultural country, with the only urban areas being small towns which existed for the benefit of the colonial administration and the tiny, but growing, Basotho middle class.

At independence, the capital city Maseru and its peripheral villages had only 18 797 residents according to the 1966 census.[2] In contrast, the census reported 100 400 absentee workers, of whom about 55 000 were in the mines. It is most likely true that most of the

where traditional agriculture is possible for fewer families every year, are included in addition to the official urban centres, then in 1986 there were more than 300 000 town and city dwellers.

Why do so many people migrate to the towns and other urban areas? Since they can no longer make a living in agriculture, they must find some other source of livelihood. One alternative source has always been migration to South Africa, while still retaining a home in Lesotho. However, according to Mhlanga, the numbers in the mines have dropped steadily from a peak of 127 400 in 1990 to 73 500 in 1997.[5] The Labour Force Survey also estimates that another 39 700 persons were employed in other sectors in South Africa in 1997, for a grand total of 113 200.[6] This figure is only marginally higher than the 100 400 who claimed employment in South Africa according to the 1966 census, while the urban population in Lesotho has grown tremendously.

The contrast between the numbers actually employed in South Africa with the numbers of urbanised people clearly

TABLE 1: URBAN POPULATION AND GROWTH RATE 1966-2005

	1966	1976	1986	1990	1995	2000	2005
Urban population	29947	100394	312794	429050	574178	698069	839550
Percent of total population	3	8	20	24	30	34	39
Year growth rate (%)	NA	13	12	8	6	4	3

Source: TAMS Consultants, *Water resources management: policy and strategies*, Maseru: TAMS Consultants, 1996.

boundaries were finally fixed in the 1860s, and the country was taken as a protectorate by Britain in the 1870s.

At that point there began a movement back across the river into the lands where the Basotho had formerly lived. The reason was economic. Gold and diamonds were discovered, and labourers were needed. Basotho saw the opportunity to make a good living from mining, so that they could promote the already rapid economic growth of their country. Eldredge reports that, "In 1875 it was possible for a worker at the mines to earn enough money to buy a gun in just one or two months".[1]

For almost a century, most Basotho migration was external, once Lesotho and South Africa became politically different entities. From the point of view of many Basotho, however, the migration could also be considered internal, since the mining houses occupied land traditionally held by Basotho and Batswana. Moreover, many relatives of the Basotho

remaining 45 000 were also in South Africa, working on the farms and railways, in industries, as domestic servants, and as illegal brewers and hawkers, since there were almost no job opportunities for migrants in Lesotho's small towns. Influx controls had been imposed by South Africa during the 1950s, but there were still ways to beat the system, particularly because almost all citizens of Lesotho have relatives across the border.

Not until after independence in 1966 was there a significant shift in migration patterns, with educated, employed and employable people moving to the towns. Independence meant the rapid expansion of the civil service, as the ruling party paid its political debts to its supporters. It also meant the first beginnings of a small industrial base. As a result, the population of the towns grew dramatically. The 1976 census gives an urban population of 136 202, a population growth rate of 12.2% in a decade.[3] In 1986 the total grew to 186 120.[4] If other rapidly growing towns,

shows a serious need for jobs, whether in Lesotho or elsewhere. According to the Labour Force Survey, a total of 16.9% of the economically active population between 16 and 65 years of age either actively sought employment or wanted to find a job in late 1997.[7] The problem increases every year, when approximately 50 000 children reach 16 years, and thus potentially enter the job market. The fact that many remain in school for a few more years simply postpones the problem. That roughly 10 000 persons reach retirement age annually is a partial help, but by no means solves the problem.

In short, every year more Basotho need jobs, and every year there are fewer jobs for them in the mines in South Africa. The bulk of the new recruits to the labour force first make the effort to find work in Lesotho, since they now realise that the mines are taking almost no raw recruits. It is to Lesotho's credit that the economy has been able to maintain a 16.9% open unemployment rate, in

TABLE 2: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVIEWEES

Demographic characteristic (%)	Basotho	Foreigners
High school education or less	50	8
First degree	27	31
Higher degree	23	61
Aged 20-39	66	62
Aged 40 or above	34	38
Not married	36	27
Married	63	73
Head of household	53	65
Not head of household	47	29
No children	26	NA
1-2 children	45	NA
3 or more children	29	NA
0 dependents	6	28
1-4 dependents	31	56
5-8 dependents	41	12
9 or more dependents	22	4

Note: N = 306 Basotho, 67 Foreigners

a large measure due to the rapid growth of Lesotho's GNP per capita, at rates exceeding 10% in the mid and late 1990s. However, this rate of expansion of the economy is now dropping dramatically, following the completion of the Katse dam and infrastructure, and as a result of the political instability experienced in 1998, culminating in the riots and subsequent invasion of September 1998.

Thus those with skills are seeking work outside the country. A major opportunity for skilled Basotho has arisen following the Soweto riots of 1976, because large numbers of South African young people failed to complete their schooling. Many were politically motivated to make South Africa ungovernable, and chose rather to agitate for change rather than continue quietly to seek further education. As a result there are sectors in South Africa, such as medicine and other professional disciplines, where not enough black candidates have been trained to fill all the positions available. It has often been reported that many skilled Basotho have jumped in to fill the vacuum, thus leaving skilled jobs unfilled and seemingly unfillable in Lesotho.

In the case of the health sector, for example, there were only 1 839 nurses listed in the country's medical and dental register in mid-1998, leaving many established posts unfulfilled.[8] Even in 1989, many health workers were migrating to South Africa to fill empty posts there.[9] The reason why the nurses did not stay in Lesotho was said to be poor pay and poor working conditions.

This situation has led many people to speak about a "brain drain" from Lesotho to South Africa, or anywhere they can find better jobs. As a result, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) decided in mid-1997 to conduct a survey on attitudes toward the migration of skilled citizens and foreigners in Lesotho.

Research Methodology

The goal for the Lesotho survey was to include roughly 500 skilled nationals and 300 skilled immigrants (if possible). The professions to be included would be drawn from a core list of key disciplines, including engineers, medical practitioners, accountants, lawyers, planners, architects and senior business managers. It was also decided to include teachers and skilled artisans, since people from these professions are regularly seeking, and often finding, jobs in South Africa.

A series of delays meant that Lesotho was only able to start drawing up lists of professionals from professional associations and employers toward the middle of 1998, but prospects still looked good for a successful study. The plan was that people from these and other lists would be contacted either by telephone or in person. Where necessary the interviews would be completed by the field worker, but in most cases it was expected that the interviewees would complete the forms themselves. Initial contacts were made,

appointments were set up, and the goal of 500 nationals and 300 foreigners seemed within reach.

Quite independently a series of political events in Lesotho meant that the delay in starting would have disastrous consequences for the study. Almost simultaneously with the first meetings and interviews, the political situation in Lesotho took a very serious turn for the worse. The first letter to potential interviewees went out on 30 July. However, on 3 August the opposition political parties, which had suffered an overwhelming defeat in the May 1998 election, began a sustained protest, claiming fraud had cost them seats in the new Parliament. Many offices were closed, making it difficult to proceed with the work. The protests would culminate on 22 September with a military intervention by SADC and general riots and looting in Maseru and other major towns in Lesotho.

Needless to say the political unrest and ultimate chaos meant that the research would suffer. The research team did its very best to collect completed interviews, but many potential interviewees could simply not be reached. Initially, some sought to be invisible, because the protesters were threatening people who went to work in government and even private offices. Instead of showing up for appointments, many gave the very legitimate excuse that they were afraid.

Foreigners were especially wary of being too visible, since many of them have felt threatened over the years by latent xenophobia, leading to prejudice against Africans from north of the Limpopo. That their fears were legitimate was proved in the riots of 22 September when many foreign-owned businesses were looted and burned.

It is to the credit of the field workers that they were able to complete 306 interviews with skilled nationals and 67 with skilled foreigners. However, instead of working only with the lists they had been provided by the professional associations, they were forced to go out as "head hunters".

This meant that the interviewers sought out and interviewed any skilled person that they felt might possibly be attracted by and attractive to employment opportunities outside the country. As a result the mix of professions and skills in the final data set only marginally meets the criteria set at the November 1997 planning meeting. In particular, there

were far too many teachers, since at the time they were just about the only group of people regularly on the job, and not enough other senior professionals.

In the end, a few of the completed interviews were rejected as being too remotely linked to a possible brain drain. Perhaps some others should be rejected, but it is felt that these persons, despite the fact that their educational qualifications did not meet the initial standards, stood a chance of getting employment outside Lesotho.

Basotho of various occupations have always sought jobs in South Africa, not only because they have skills which South African industry needs, but also because they live close by and have friends and relatives who can advise when jobs are available. It has also been suggested that during the apartheid era Basotho were preferred to South African blacks, since they were less likely to cause political trouble.

Final sample

Table 2 gives the basic characteristics of the 306 Basotho and 67 foreigners who were entered into the database. 46% of the Basotho were males and 52% females, with 1% not stated. In contrast, over 80% of the foreigners were males.

Foreign professionals are generally better educated than the Basotho, and are more likely to be unmarried and have fewer dependents. This conclusion cannot be said to be statistically significant, because of the problems choosing the samples. But it very likely represents the reality of those who might choose or who have already chosen to move to a new country. Table 3 gives the monthly income and monthly income per dependent for both Basotho and foreigners.

The foreigners who were interviewed are clearly doing better financially than the Basotho. It must once again be remembered that the sample is very far from random. However, it is likely that foreigners in Lesotho in fact have a better living standard than Basotho, and that this standard is further enhanced by the smaller number of dependents. This finding is borne out by the results of Table 4, which shows the level of savings by Basotho and foreigners.

The level of savings for Basotho professionals is strongly correlated with the number of dependents and with the monthly income per dependent, but not at all with the actual monthly income. What seems to be important is not how much

the person receives but what he or she does with it to help those who depend on that income. The foreign professionals are living more comfortably than the Basotho professionals, and in their case the level of savings is correlated with the monthly income rather than the number of dependents.

The largest group consists of teachers in secondary and tertiary institutions, and the second largest of medical personnel. Of these the Basotho who were interviewed were mostly nurses, almost all female. The foreign medical professionals, on the other hand, were mainly doctors, the majority male. Those in manual work include electricians, mechanics and carpenters, whose skills also make them eligible and attractive for employment

across the border.

This pattern of occupations is clearly far different from that of the ordinary population. As mentioned previously, these were the persons most commonly still on duty during the troubled period. The median number of years that Basotho professionals have worked on their present job is seven. Nearly 12% have worked on their present job for less than a year, while about 20% have worked for a foreign company for around three years and 14% for a foreign client for just two and a half years.

The median number of years in Lesotho for foreign professionals is three and the mean is four. They were not asked the actual number of years they had spent in their present position.

TABLE 3: INCOME AND INCOME PER DEPENDENT DISTRIBUTION

Monthly income (%)	Basotho (Mean'M6639)	Foreigners (Mean'M8067)
<M2000	24	5
M2000-M6000	43	30
M6000--M14000	22	55
M14000 or above	11	10
Monthly income per dependent (%)	(Mean'M1314)	(Mean'M3713)
<M200	18	0
M200-M400	18	2
M400-M800	24	7
M800-M1600	18	28
M1600 or above	23	63

TABLE 4: LEVEL OF SAVINGS FOR BASOTHO AND FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS

Level of savings (%)	Basotho	Foreigners
Save money	18	38
Just get by	30	39
Spend some savings	17	11
Spend savings and borrow	35	12

TABLE 5: OCCUPATION CATEGORIES FOR BASOTHO AND FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS

Occupation (%)	Basotho	Foreigners
Manual work	4	0
Production or sales	4	0
Office work	2	0
Accounting	5	2
Professional	10	0
Science and research	5	5
Engineering or architecture	7	6
Medical	16	30
Public service	2	2
Teaching	38	52
Management	9	3

Attitudes of Basotho Professionals towards Leaving Lesotho

The questionnaire included several questions which measure attitudes towards leaving Lesotho and possibly finding work outside the country. Table 6 gives the degree to which interviewees said they would consider moving to another country to live and work.

Leaving Lesotho to find a job elsewhere is a real possibility for two-thirds of the sample. Only a third of the interviewees have never thought of moving, while another two thirds have given it at least some thought. It is very striking that there is hardly any difference between men and women in their responses to this and subsequent questions. In what fol-

lows, therefore, the tables will include only the totals for Basotho, rather than breaking the totals down by gender. Interviewees were then asked what is the most likely country to which they might move. Table 7.7 gives the most desired and most likely destinations.

That South Africa is the leading country, with Botswana not far behind, is not surprising. South Africa is the traditional source for employment outside Lesotho, and is considered by many to be the leader in economic expansion in the region. On the other hand, Botswana is growing rapidly, and has a currency which is substantially stronger than the South African Rand. Moreover, Setswana and Sesotho are almost the same lan-

guage, and as a result Basotho feel comfortable living and working in Botswana. It is interesting that so many persons believe they will finally move to a country outside of Africa. There is only a slight difference between the preferred and most likely destinations, suggesting a high degree of optimism on the part of those who were interviewed.

More direct are the questions whether the interviewees would want to move to the most likely destination, and if so how likely it is that they would do so. Table 7.8 lists the level of desire to move to the most likely destination with the next two years or after two years.

Almost two-thirds of both men and women want to move, and the urgency about wanting to move increases with time. It is also striking that so few are uncertain. There is apparently a hard core of one-fifth of the men and one-sixth of the women who have no desire to leave Lesotho. What ought to disturb Lesotho nationalists is that this number is so small. In a SAMP random sample of adults in Lesotho conducted in 1997, 58.4% of the 67 adults with at least a high school education wish to live in South Africa for at least a short period, although only 25% wish to live there permanently. Too few persons with the same occupations as those included in the present survey were interviewed in 1997 to make the figures meaningful. Table 9 lists the percentage of interviewees who feel that it is likely they would move within or after the next two years.

To say that one expects to leave is a stronger statement than only to say one would like to leave. Even on this more realistic and sober assessment, more than half those interviewed, both males and females, expect to leave Lesotho some time during the next two years. The women in this case are slightly more cautious than the men, preferring to postpone the move somewhat. Of the Basotho, both men and women, interviewed in the 1997 random sample, two thirds feel it is likely they will live in South Africa for a short period, but only a third feel it is likely they will live there permanently.

The question was asked once more, in a slightly different way, concerning the likelihood of moving from Lesotho within six months, two years or five years.

The data in Table 10 are somewhat more conservative than those in Table 9, which in turn represents more realism than Table 8. However, it is still clear that almost half of the interviewees expect to have left the country within five years.

TABLE 6: DEGREE OF CONSIDERING MOVING TO ANOTHER COUNTRY

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country to live and work? (%)	Males	Females	Total
A great deal	33	33	33
Some	37	33	35
None at all	30	35	33

TABLE 7: PREFERRED AND MOST LIKELY DESTINATIONS OF BASOTHO PROFESSIONALS

If you ever had to leave Lesotho, which country would you most likely end up living in? (%)	Most preferred	Most likely
South Africa	40	48
Botswana	33	32
Other African country	34	3
United Kingdom	6	3
Other European country	5	4
USA/Canada	9	6
Australia/New Zealand/Japan	34	4

TABLE 8: LEVEL OF DESIRE TO MOVE TO MOST LIKELY DESTINATION

To what extent would you want to move to your Most Likely Destination to live and work? (%)	A short period (less than 2 yrs)	A long period (longer than 2 yrs)
Great extent	21	35
Some extent	41	31
Uncertain	6	8
Hardly at all	11	11
Not at all	15	20

TABLE 9: LEVEL OF LIKELIHOOD OF MOVING TO MOST LIKELY DESTINATION

How likely/unlikely is it that you would ever move to your Most Likely Destination to live and work? (%)	A short period (less than 2 yrs)	A long period (longer than 2 yrs)
Very likely	15	25
Likely	29	28
Uncertain	12	12
Unlikely	27	19
Very unlikely	17	16

The difference between Tables 10 and 9 may lie in Table 10's cut-off point of five years. Some of those who say they will eventually leave may be thinking of the indefinite future, which could well be after five years.

Factors Supporting the Departure of Professional Basotho

The survey also explored reasons for the possible departure of interviewees from Lesotho. This section explores the relations between these possibly determinative variables and the interest in and willingness to depart. In this analysis, two questions will be used as the dependent variables. The first asks how much · consideration has been given to moving to another country to live and work, as shown in Table 6, and the second asks how likely is a move from Lesotho in the next six months, two years or five years, as shown in Table 10. The answers to the second question will be combined, to give a composite score which is the sum of the answers to the three parts.

As the previous tables show, there is essentially no difference between male and female skilled Basotho as to whether they want or expect to leave the country. However, age plays a very important role. There is a signficant correlation of -24 between age and interest in leaving the country, and an even higher correlation of -28 between age and likelihood of leaving. The older the person the less likely he or she is to leave. Children of the household head are much more likely to move than either the head or the spouse. There is a significant negative correlation between the number of children and the likelihood of leaving.

Those interviewees who were unemployed or self-employed had thought more often of emigrating than those with full-time employment. However, there was no significant difference between the two groups when considering the actual likelihood of moving. What is particularly striking is that the person's current occupation, current field of employment and highest qualification make almost no difference to the desire or the likelihood of moving. The only group which shows any deviation from the general pattern is accountants, or those in the financial and sales business, who are somewhat more likely to remain in Lesotho than those in other occupations. Income and the number of dependents also do not make a difference to the desire or the likelihood of moving.

TABLE 10: LIKELIHOOD OF MOVING WITHIN 6 MONTHS, 2 YEARS OR 5 YEARS

How likely or unlikely is it that you will move from Lesotho? (%)	In the next 6 months	In the next 2 years	In the next 5 years
Very likely	6	13	19
Likely	7	22	27
Uncertain	13	15	20
Unlikely	35	21	12
Very unlikely	42	29	22

TABLE 11: CORRELATIONS OF DEPARTURE VARIABLES WITH ATTITUDE VARIABLES FOR BASOTHO

Variable	Considering moving	Likelihood of moving	Mean
1. Identity with Lesotho	-.345 (287)	-.319 (287)	-0.3
2. Willingness to help Lesotho	-.243 (290)	-.201 (290)	-0.2
3. Impact of government on oneself and one's group	-.191 (286)	-.252 (288)	-0.2
4. Personal satisfaction with present state of affairs	-.279 (294)	-.156 (294)	-0.2
5. Condition of one's group compared with others	-.213 (242)	-.182 (243)	-0.2
6. Contacts with people and groups outside Lesotho	.152 (295)	.243 (295)	0.2
7. Knowledge of conditions abroad	.216 (265)	.215 (263)	0.22
8. Knowledge of available jobs abroad	.221 (264)	.226 (264)	0.22
9. Preference for likely destination versus Lesotho	.272 (295)	.203 (295)	0.24
10. Willingness to leave possessions in Lesotho	.241 (286)	.246 (291)	0.24
11. Applications made to most likely destination	.253 (288)	.265 (293)	0.26
12. Identity with most likely destination	.355 (263)	.276 (267)	0.32

Except for the expected factor of growing conservatism with age, it would appear that the issues which matter do not include the normal social and economic characteristics of the individual who might move. What then can be found to relate to the brain-drain process? The next set of possibilities lies in the attitudes of people toward their country and foreign lands.

Almost all of the correlations are significant at less than the .001 level. The first five correlations are negative, indicating that the lower the degree of interest in Lesotho, the higher the willingness to leave. The last seven are positive, showing that the greater the knowledge of and interest in foreign countries, the greater the correlation. In every case the correlations are in the expected direction, namely, that acceptance of Lesotho as home is negatively correlated with considering leaving Lesotho and the possibility of doing so. Likewise, disenchantment with Lesotho is strongly correlated with considering leaving Lesotho and the possibility of actually doing so in the near future. This is a question of attitude, not simply a question of money or family circumstances, although as Table 12 shows,

the overall evaluation of Lesotho grows out of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with material conditions.

The first variable measures the degree of identity with Lesotho. Persons who identify closely with Lesotho are those who feel proud to be called citizens, feel they have more in common with Basotho citizens than other professionals, want their children to be citizens, have a strong desire to help Lesotho, and want to use their talents for this purpose. Such persons are unlikely to consider leaving or actually to make the decision to move. Identity is a measure of emotional and material commitment to the country, and is the most important factor leading a person to leave or stay. More than half of those interviewed agreed with all aspects of the commitment to Lesotho. If all else about their life in Lesotho were good, they might well stay. But the remaining variables in the analysis tell a different story. Patriotism may be present, but the realities of life in Lesotho are such as to encourage many people to leave.

The second variable measures willingness to work in Lesotho after completing

school, to pay taxes, to serve in the army or to restrict the amount of money to be sent abroad. People who are willing to help Lesotho – a quarter of the sample –have some motivation to remain in the country. Those who feel no obligation to their home country are the ones who are most likely to seek employment elsewhere. This too is an important measure of patriotism and national feeling.

The third variable indicates that a positive impact by the government on the individual, as well as on the racial and economic group to which he or she belongs, provides a strong encouragement to remain in Lesotho. However, less than 15% of the interviewees felt that government had made a positive impact on them personally, while just over a third felt that the government had made a positive impact on the country. Most of these skilled professional Basotho are not happy with the performance of the government. They may be patriotic and willing to help their country, but the present government does not satisfy them.

Moreover, the person who is satisfied with the present state of affairs is less likely to leave than the person who finds conditions hard to bear – i.e. cost of living, job security and prospects, income, housing, schooling, medical services, taxation, safety, children's future, public amenities and shopping. While many people are satisfied with at least some aspect of life in Lesotho today, there was no one who was satisfied with everything. On the other hand, a third of those who answered the question are dissatisfied with every aspect of the state of affairs in Lesotho, and believe these would be better in a foreign country.

The condition of one's peers also has a strong bearing on both the consideration of moving and the actual intention to do so. In the case of Lesotho, there are people who feel that government and private employers favour persons from wealthy families as well as families with high social and political status. Such people are dissatisfied and are likely to try to find work elsewhere. Moreover, the feeling exists that some employers would prefer to hire white expatriates rather than Basotho. Over 40% of those interviewed feel that the conditions of blacks in Lesotho are worse than those of other races.

These five variables comprise the set of conditions which are likely to hold people at home and keep them from considering leaving. The next seven variables indicate which problems with life in Lesotho are likely to encourage the person to move abroad.

Actual knowledge of life outside Lesotho is an important motivating factor. Contacts with people abroad prepare the way for people to consider moving. Those who are in touch with their fellow professionals, either individually or through associations, are the ones who are likely to leave. Whether the desire to leave or the attempt to contact colleagues comes first is not clear. More than a fifth of professionals are in contact with their peers outside Lesotho at least once a month, 12% with professional associations, and 6% with employment agencies.

Information about living conditions abroad and knowledge of available jobs through journals, newspapers, friends, family and professional associations also strongly lead people to consider leaving Lesotho. In this case also the desire to leave because of dissatisfaction with conditions in Lesotho may be the catalyst which motivates people to explore possibilities abroad. It is striking that more than half of those who answered the question at least once in a while check sources of information about life in foreign countries, and a full 49% look into the possibilities of jobs abroad.

Another important factor lies in the comparison between Lesotho and the most likely destination, on indices of cost of living, job, professional advancement, income, housing, schooling, medical care, taxation, safety, children's future, public amenities and shopping. These factors are explored in Table 12, where the most important reasons for leaving and staying are outlined. It is striking that only one person of all those interviewed felt that Lesotho was better in every way than the most likely destination, as opposed to 16 interviewees who felt that the most likely destination was better in every way than Lesotho.

The willingness to leave permanent possessions behind in Lesotho is a strong measure of being prepared to pull up stakes and move. Those who would sell their house, take their savings and investments out of the country, and even give up citizenship are those most likely to go. Of the sample, 12% were willing to sell their home in Lesotho, and 19% were willing to give up citizenship.

The number of applications made for residence and citizenship in the most likely destination is also strongly correlated with the desire and likelihood of moving. If such applications have been made, then the decision has in effect already been made to depart. Nearly 9% of interviewees have applied for a work permit abroad,

TABLE 12: REASONS FOR BASOTHO PROFESSIONALS LEAVING AND STAYING

Do you feel the following are better in Lesotho or your Most Likely Destination (MLD)? (%)	Most important reason for wanting to leave	Most important reason for wanting to stay	Conditions are better or much better in the MLD
Cost of living	11	7	64 (300)
Having a job	11	3	80 (299)
Job security	3	12	44 (297)
Advancement	13	4	80 (299)
Income	37	6	88 (298)
Taxation	-	2	40 (294)
Good house	2	5	62 (301)
Good school	4	1	73 (301)
Health care	2	1	74 (301)
Personal safety	2	16	36 (301)
Family safety	5	26	35 (299)
Children future	7	7	60 (296)
Stability, peace	1	4	Not asked
Patriotism	-	4	Not asked
Government	2	-	Not asked
Amenities	0	-	76 (301)
Personal	-	3	Not asked

TABLE 16: CORRELATION LEVELS AMONG ATTITUDE VARIABLES FOR FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS

Variable	Identifies with home country	Basotho like foreigners	Satisfied with the present	Prefers Lesotho to home
1. Identity with home country	1	-.409 (63)	-.257 (64)	Not sig.
2. Hopes for good life at home	.354 (57)	-.357 (57)	-.321 (58).	Not sig.
3. Harassment/assault while in Lesotho	Not sig.	Not sig.	-.429 (62)	-.316 (53)
4. Basotho like foreigners	-.409 (63)	1	.498 (66)	.352 (57)
5. Satisfied with the present	-.257 (64)	.498 (66)	1	.541 (58)
6. Optimism for the future	Not sig.	.288 (65)	.527 (66)	.545 (57)
7. Commitment to Lesotho	-.273 (64)	.325 (66)	Not sig.	.287 (57)
8. Permanence in Lesotho	Not sig.	.279 (66)	Not sig.	.383 (57)
9. Prefers Lesotho to home country	Not sig.	.352 (57)	.541 (57)	1

nificantly correlated with any of the variables which measure attitudes toward staying or leaving. It seems that the important factors are attitudes, perceptions and beliefs, and not simply the facts of economic or family life. The only variable which is influenced by any of these factors is satisfaction with life at the moment, which is positively correlated with age, level of savings and education, but without direct influence on the choice to leave or stay.

On the other hand the person's continent of origin does influence attitudes and decisions. As mentioned before, Africans have a higher degree of commitment to staying in Lesotho than those from other continents, and tend to think more highly of Lesotho than those from elsewhere. Moreover, they have a higher level of affirmation of their own citizenship than those from other continents. It would appear that being an African has a strong meaning.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

Deriving a policy from the data presented above depends on a basic value judgement, namely, whether the process which we describe here is best called a "brain drain" or a "brain gain". The country from which a professional departs loses a skilled person, but the country to which he or she goes has an equal gain. To judge the departure of a teacher or a nurse or an accountant as a bad thing is to place more weight on the value of that person in the former job than the new job. Moreover, the idea of the African Renaissance, as discussed by both Thabo Mbeki and Kofi Annan, indicates a loss to one country can be a gain to another, with perhaps no net loss to the continent.

This article identifies, though, what the needs and requirements of someone considering leaving Lesotho may be. A good job with prospects for advancement, a secure and sufficient income, good conditions for the family, safety and security, and national stability help greatly to keep a person in their present job. But the findings also point to serious problems within Lesotho and also, by implication, within other African countries which have lost trained personnel. If Lesotho wishes to retain its skilled workers, then policy makers must realise that they have a strong base on which to begin: love for country and willingness to work to improve it.

Despite these factors, it is unfortunately true that people are presently leaving and will continue to leave, if nothing is done to build on the solid foundation of patriotism and national feeling. The government and other institutions in Lesotho must realise that the Basotho professionals who spoke to us in this survey believe that their country has failed to provide the conditions they need to remain and fulfil their duties in Lesotho.

What these professionals, both Basotho and foreign, are saying is this: create a society in which there are equal opportunities, in which the government serves the people, in which there are good schools and good medical facilities, in which there are decent salaries on which one can support one's family, in which public amenities are well constructed and well cared for. Then and only then can we as patriotic professionals afford to do what we know we should do. Until that happens, we are going to leave in order to find better opportunities elsewhere.

Basotho who think in this way will leave for other countries, if they are offered good jobs. Other Africans will come to Lesotho, often using Lesotho only as a way station to a better life elsewhere, because they too identify serious problems in Lesotho. The only reason they come here is that conditions in their countries are worse.

Other specific policy implications which would work for the betterment of society as a whole cannot be drawn from these data. Governments, institutions, companies, groups and organisations that do not want to lose their well-qualified employees should look carefully at Tables 12 and 14. In these tables, the reasons for going and staying are clearly listed. Any policies which block the free movement of professionally qualified and skilled people would, in our view, be counterproductive. Such a policy would lead to neglect of those features of life and work which now motivate people to leave or stay.

The result would in the end be weak teaching, poor quality nursing, inadequate accounting, and shoddy engineering. Rather than creating political barriers to movement, instead countries and institutions which are now losing skilled professionals to what the next country must see as a "brain gain" should look to their own political, social and economic institutions and working conditions. A well-run country and a well-run business will not lose its key employees. ◙

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Chris Landsberg asks some hard questions about South Africa's foreign policy, especially as it concerns the rest of the continent.

South Africa Inc.

Mbeki's External Initiative on Africa and the Global South

Foreign policy should be viewed as an extension of domestic policy. As the American scholar-diplomat Henry Kissinger once said, foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends. The two are inextricably intertwined. South Africa's foreign policy over the past year reinforces the theory that domestic and foreign policies are closely entwined.

Indeed, president Thabo Mbeki has made a direct linkage between his domestic and foreign policies. That has been part of a new set of geo-economic and geo-strategic considerations that are driving foreign policy under Mbeki. Both domestic and foreign policies have essentially been about what one could call "two worlds" and the closing of the gap between those worlds. On the home front Mbeki has depicted the society he governs as a divided country of "two nations".

Foreign policy has been articulated as an attempt to close this gap. In his seminal Statement at the opening of the debate on reconciliation and nation-building, in the National Assembly in Cape Town on 29 May 1998, aptly titled "South Africa: Two Nations", Mbeki said:

A major component part of the issue of reconciliation and nation-building is defined by and derives from the material conditions in our society which have divided our society into two nations, the one black and the other white.

He went on to lament that:

one of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. This enables it to argue that, except for the persistence of gender discrimination against all women, all members of this nation have the possibility to exercise their right to equal opportunity, the development opportunities to which the Constitution of 1993 committed our country.

If that is the one world, what is the other? Mbeki went on to note that:

The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under conditions of grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise in reality what amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity, with that right being equal with this black nation only to the

extent that it is equally incapable of realisation.

With the help of an external strategy, Mbeki has committed his government to closing this major lacuna between the two nations as a matter of urgency.

The new external strategy

Does the emerging Mbeki foreign policy have a strategic concept that is motivating its foreign policy globally? Official documentation that emerged from events such as the Euro/Africa Summit held in Cairo in April 2000; the 13th Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Conference in Cartagena; the South African-Nordic Summit in June 2000, the Berlin Conference on Progressive Governance and the South Summit of Heads of State and Government in Havana, both in April 2000; the Southern African Development Community-World Economic Forum meeting in Durban, in June 2000; and the Towards a Community of Democracies conference held at the end of June in Warsaw, Poland, articulates an approach to foreign policy that "supports domestic policies of security and economic development". The foreign policy focus is strongly on wealth creation, and the betterment of the human conditions of South Africa's populace.

Foreign policy further subscribes to the UN Agenda for Development and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's notion of "people-centred development". As such, it stresses a development strategy that will not only aim at material enrichment, but also "increase the capacity of people to lead full, productive, satisfying lives; have access to accumulated knowledge; have sufficient income to buy food, clothing and shelter".

Thus, Mbeki's foreign policy boasts a strong human development strategy. That strategy seeks to prioritise expenditure on human capital instead of physical capital; acquire knowledge, skills, experience and inventiveness; make human resource development a key to the development strategy; develop a long-term dynamic view of competitive advantage; and shift from labour intensive to human-capital intensive production.

Is there a more symbiotic link between domestic and foreign policies? Indeed, suggests the evidence! Just as domestic policy, backed up by an international human development strategy, seeks to close the gap between "two nations", so foreign policy more generally hopes to

close the gap between the two worlds of foreign affairs: that of the rich men, the first world, the white men if you like – the world of the highly industrialised Northern countries – and the poor men's world, the world of the black men, of Africa and of the South.

A cursory investigation of official speeches, private documentation from the Office of the President, the Department of Foreign Affairs, even the Departments of Finance and Trade and Industry suggests that Pretoria's new foreign policy has unequivocally come out in favour of developing "the agenda of the South". All these government departments appear to be singing from the same foreign affairs sheet. They typically search for opportunities to nurture "alliances with the South on development issues".

South Africa is explicitly attempting to play a double-bridge role: the Mbeki-administration sees itself as a North-South and a South-South bridge. It is seeking to cultivate "strategic partnerships and alliances" with countries like Brazil, USA, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, India and Germany. A typical architecture of co-operation with these powers is to establish Bi-national Commissions (BNC's) with the majority of them.

As pertains South-South teamwork, Mbeki and his ministers are punting the idea of a full-fledged G-8 of the South to act as a countervailing bloc for the mighty league of the G-8 industrialised powers, a point to which we would return later.

The Selebi project

The new directives in foreign policy are in a sense a culmination of the diplomacy overhauling processes started by the former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Jackie Selebi. The Selebi-initiative laid the foundation for the Mbeki foreign policy process. On 30 October 1998, Selebi initiated a "substantive review" of the Department's activities and processes with a view "to implementing the transformation goals set by government and preparing a strategic plan for the department". The transformation process was brainstormed at all diplomatic levels. During the course of 1999, overseas missions undertook several consultative processes.

The first phase of the strategic planning involved the identification of the key themes underpinning what Selebi had called "the core business" of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Selebi and his colleagues identified "wealth cre-

ation" and "security" as the two chief pillars of the Department's "core business" in the pursuit of the Republic's national interest. All these ideas were captured in a document entitled *Transformation Process: Strategic Planning and Identification of Core Business, December 1998*. Overseas missions were further encouraged and requested to identify key performance indicators which would "allow progress to be tracked".

From planning to execution?

While Selebi should be credited for laying the groundwork for the Mbeki foreign policy, it was up to the new president and his new team to implement that strategy. How did they play? South Africa's "new" post-Mandela foreign policy seeks to contain conditions of extreme deprivation, the marginalisation of the poor, the risk of greater financial instability, and persistent poverty and debt of the developing world. Another ambitious aspect of Mbeki's foreign policy is to try and ensure that the forces of globalisation are channelled "for the elimination of poverty and empowerment of human beings". Those foreign economic policy objectives seek to ensure inter alia that:

- globalisation is shared more widely;
- barriers to trade are dismantled for the greater mutual benefit of all;
- market access for exports of all countries is improved;
- the skills and manufacturing capacities of developing countries are built up;
- better market access in agricultural, industrial products and services is achieved;
- capital flows are promoted;
- international financial architecture is reformed to minimise financial instability;
- the voiceless are heard;
- discrimination and racism are eliminated;
- civil society becomes a partner.

Mbeki's foreign policy strategy also embodies a strong international trade and investment promotion strategy. That stratagem is committed to developing the world trading system; stressing both free and fair trade; promoting foreign direct investment; global manufacturing and materials management; and global marketing of South Africa. In brief, Mbeki is committed to instituting a South Africa incorporated strategy.

Such new priorities for a South Africa Inc. are even visible in South Africa's energetic sports diplomacy, through which the Republic has bid for a number of high-level sporting events such as hosting the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 Soccer World Cup finals. A key rationale behind such efforts is to show-case South Africa as a leading player of the South, even in the sports and entertainment industries. South Africa seems determined to portray itself as a leading and powerful "developed" developing nation. In fact, both bids were branded as African bids and the country acted as a spokesperson for Africa.

However, as the outcome of both bids shows, South Africa should not assume that countries from the developed North will act in its or Africa's interests when their own interests and bottom lines are at stake. They will protect their selfish interest when push comes to shove. Yet, northern industrialised powers will also render a sophisticated pro-Africa rhetoric that is not the same as the practices that they adopt in reality. Thus, Mbeki's global initiative on Africa and the South should take heed of the clash between shadow and substance emanating from the North.

Zuma's four-legged approach

Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is unquestionably one of president Thabo Mbeki's closest allies in government. Soon after her appointment as Minister, she said that she "hit the ground running when she joined the Department of Foreign Affairs". Evidence suggests that she will continue to run at a phenomenal pace in the months to come. She is irrepressible, indeed tough, as a Minister and this helps to account for some of her achievements over the past year. She always says she takes this country's global responsibilities "seriously".

On 14 March 2000 the Minister delivered her Foreign Affairs budget vote to National Assembly in Parliament. This was ground-breaking discourse; the speech contained important contours of the new Mbeki-administration's foreign policy. That speech helps to unpack and put into context some of South Africa's new departures in foreign policy as spelled out above. Indeed, the budget vote speech can serve as an important framework for analysis of the Republic's post-Mandela foreign policy.

Minister Dlamini-Zuma started by reaffirming that the central tenet of foreign policy was to lay the foundations for

"the African century" and the "African Renaissance". For the Minister, the African Renaissance embodies the challenge of "turning our backs to the ugly past of colonialism, apartheid, and oppression; to ignorance, hunger, disease and poverty; to war, violence and the absence of peace; to intolerance of rights and an absence of democracy; to socio-economic underdevelopment, economic dependence and poverty". Minister Dlamini-Zuma declared that:

the agenda of the African century for the African Renaissance will inform the programmes of the Ministry during my term of office.

Crucially the Minister expounded that South Africa's foreign policy and strategy "will rest on four broad pillars". These are "Development, Peace and Security, Governance and Transformation of the related institutions". This broad strategy could be dubbed a foreign policy in defence of "the democratic peace". Put another way, South Africa's foreign policy under the leadership of president Thabo Mbeki and Minister Dlamini-Zuma broadly subscribes to the thesis of promoting peace in Africa through democracy. This is of course the bedrock of the Kantian notion of the so-called liberal peace, the theory which suggests that democracies do not go to war with one another. In essence it argues that democracy and peace are inextricably intertwined. Without democracy there can be no peace, and vice versa.

Central to South Africa's foreign policy scheme is the belief that "it is wrong to think that conflicts should be solved through the barrel of the gun. Political solutions should be explored at all times." South Africa is therefore committed to peace missions; the military option is reserved as a last resort.

South Africa, said the Foreign Minister, is a keen supporter of the initiative on "the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA)". This initiative is spearheaded by Nigeria's president Olesegun Obasanjo, and dovetails closely with the idea of an African Renaissance. The CSSDCA promises to emerge as the centrepiece in dovetailing and consolidating various other initiatives like the African Economic Community (AEC) and the more recent pan-African parliament initiative launched by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Sirte, Libya. Pretoria has been a more

avid supporter of Obasanjo's Africa Helsinki-option than Muammar Qaddafi's ambitious idea of establishing a "United States of Africa". While South Africa's new foreign policy elite did not rule out the prospect of establishing such an African Union over the long haul, its policy was clear and unambiguous: that vision of the "brother leader" remained a long term project at best.

Pretoria has laid more eggs in the CSSDCA basket because it goes a long way towards consolidating an emerging concert of powers between Nigeria and South Africa. South Africa, after all, would be hard put to advance its interests in Africa without a strategic partner such as Nigeria which has comparable 'big power' status and clout to complement Pretoria's. Otherwise, South Africa would be exposed and isolated as the sole continental "big brother", a problem that has haunted its relations in Southern Africa.

Dlamini-Zuma also said that her government is committed to "entrenching" "the values of good governance and respect for human rights." South Africa, the Minister said, stands ready to promote free and fair elections and universal suffrage in Africa. South Africa is energetically going about trying to enlarge the world community of democracies.

The strategy of promoting good governance is closely linked to that of "institutional transformation" in Africa. For the Republic, institutions like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the OAU, and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) should be overhauled. This also harks back to the CSSDCA which, based on its draft final document, outlines a plan of action that addresses this need for transformation. Transforming the OAU-system is what originally inspired the initial launching of the CSSDCA initiative in Kampala, Uganda in 1991.

South Africa has in fact carried the "institutional transformation" position onto the broader plane of North-South relations. As such, the Minister said the Republic will "continue to advocate the reform and renewal of multilateral institutions particularly the United Nations, the World Bank and the IMF". Reform of the UN Security Council will be paramount. The South African government, according to Dlamini-Zuma, subscribes to the view that "the UN Security Council remains the paramount global instrument to safeguard peace and security".

Pretoria has also begun to show that there are limits to its regional co-opera-

tion. It has recently suggested that it is prepared to risk "going it alone" and attempt to become Africa's sole representative on the UN Security Council. Pretoria is even prepared to offset rival bids from countries like Nigeria and Egypt in the bid to secure that race, thereby opening up loopholes for new rivalries between these African powers.

South Africa is of the opinion that "capacity must be built, to be able to address new non-traditional threats to security such as ethnic conflict, mass refugee flows, illicit small arms trafficking, gross human rights abuse, failures of governance and the rule of law and abject human deprivation".

Pretoria's Foreign Economic Course of action

The foreign policy of the Mbeki administration goes beyond democratic peace theory, good governance and socio-political development. Over the past twelve months there has emerged a bold foreign economic guiding principle. During a press conference on 12 June 2000, at the Department of Foreign Affairs, the energetic Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, corroborated that a crucial objective behind most of President Mbeki's foreign visits was to push for a modification of the global economic system.

According to Pahad, South Africa will be working steadfastly to close the gap between the resource-rich North and the resource-poor South. The attention-grabbing point here is that, just as the Mbeki administration is committed to closing the gap between what the president has called South Africa's "two nations" on the home front, so its foreign policy is committed to closing the gap between the two worlds of global relations, with one being the rich, white men's world and the other the poor, black men's world. Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma also confirmed that the Republic is serious about a 'new' foreign economic policy; that 'new' policy is enunciated under the rubric of "economic development". The Foreign Minister stated in her budget vote speech that, "at the centre of our strategy must be the integration of not only our economy into the world system, but those of other countries in the African continent". Thus South Africa's foreign economic policy seeks to advance the welfare of the whole continent.

The Republic's role at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for instance, seeks to "enhance the development agenda of

the South". This trade strategy is an integral part of the country's North-South and South-South posture.

Another clear clue to the country's South-South posture was the Minister's statement that "establishing co-operation with various emerging economic blocs is one of the central features of South Africa's foreign policy". This position is clearly analogous to that articulated by Thabo Mbeki in 1998, when he called for a G8 of the South to serve as a counter balancing bloc to the all-powerful G7 industrialised bloc.

The role played by South Africa during the 1988-99 negotiations with the European Union (EU) for a successor to the Lomé Convention is further testimony to this commitment to the South-South posture. Indeed, the free trade pact entered into between South Africa and the EU is likely to be offset by a commitment on the part of South Africa for the beginnings of a trade agreement with Latin America's MERCOSUR. South Africa also intends to improve its relations with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).

These policy pronouncements by the Foreign Minister have been corroborated recently by president Thabo Mbeki. During his state visit to Denmark, the president opined that South Africa is in the process of establishing Free Trade Pacts with a number of countries and regional blocs.

In January 2000, the Republic ratified the SADC Trade Protocol; in highly optimistic fashion, Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Erwin, said that he believes that the building blocs for such a protocol would be in place by September 2000. With that move, the government sought to make known its commitment to establish a free trade area in the SADC region. This process, in fact, is the centrepiece from which all other linkages within Africa and in the wider South will evolve. Pretoria's SADC focus provides the point of departure for an Africa-centred informal grouping comprising Nigeria, Egypt, India and Brazil. The idea is that dealings with southern powers would also be geared towards beefing up relations with Africa.

This grouping is intended to give impetus to re-launching WTO talks and reforming the international trading system to better benefit the interests of

developing countries. The question is whether or not South Africa will parley this informal grouping into a more energetic commitment to interregional cooperation in the Indian Ocean via the IOR-ARC and the South Atlantic via MERCOSUR.

Put in the form of a question, how far will South Africa go in forging these links into a definitive southern hemi-

pacts with economically powerful countries in the West. Also on trade, he has vowed to pressure the World Trade Organisation to better concern itself with the poor economic conditions of Africa and the South.

The president has repeatedly called for debt relief and the cancellation of debt which now stands at some $270 billion. He also believes that efforts should be

ty, democracy and an end to corruption". But Mbeki has also criticised the move by many donors to cut back on their development assistance levels. He said the new paradigm should not simply be about trade.

Thus, Mbeki has called for a transfer of technology from Europe to Africa in an "organised manner". Another consistent theme, shared by Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin, as well as the Foreign Ministry, has been the push for "easier access of [African] products into the EU markets, covering both agricultural and industrial products". All this has as an objective "the reintegration of Africa into the global economy". This again is in line with Deputy-Minister Pahad's idea that the global economic playing fields should be levelled.

Just as Mbeki is committed to closing the gap between what he calls South Africa's "two nations" at home, so his foreign policy is committed to closing the gap between the two worlds of global relations: one being the rich, white men's world and the other the poor, black men's world.

spheric alliance? This, in turn, may depend on the extent of cooperation between DFA and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) whose minister, Alec Erwin, has been in the forefront of South Africa's informal networking. DTI, however, has not been an energetic player on the IOR-ARC. Brazil, on the other hand, is inviting South Africa to become an associate member of MERCOSUR. Will South Africa engage?

However this arena of inter-regionalism sorts out the government's foreign economic policy has been much elaborated upon by Mbeki during a number of summit and official state visit meetings. They include the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999, the NAM South summit in Havana, Cuba in April 2000, the EU-Africa summit in Cairo also in April 2000, and the South Africa/Nordic summit of June. During the Africa-EU summit, Mbeki called for the establishment of a "strategic partnership" between the two regional blocs. He cautioned the EU against a "fortress Europe". The EU, he said, should concern itself more with the development imperatives of Africa. Through fighting poverty and disease in Africa, the president noted, the EU will help to fight genocide, war and instability. The EU should cease to be indifferent to headlines in Africa, whether about war, disease or genocide.

The president also called for a "Marshall plan for Africa". He stated that the continent requires ample supplies of "capital to provide for infrastructure, industrialisation, and the overall modernisation of society". In Copenhagen in June, Mbeki stated that South Africa is in the process of establishing several trade

strengthened to push ahead with the highly indebted poor countries initiative (HIPC). Even when he was Deputy President of South Africa between 1994-98, Mbeki consistently pushed for accelerated debt relief for Africa by the world community. For example, during a tour of Asia in 1998, Mbeki argued that more generous debt relief would help Africa continue its journey from despair to hope. This, he claimed, would provide major economic opportunities for Asian businesses.

While South Africa will continue to make debt forgiveness to Africa and the developing world a priority, the country will also push ahead with its own debt forgiveness plan to neighbours such as Mozambique and Namibia.

During the recent G-8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan, Mbeki and his colleagues from Nigeria and Algeria were instrumental in getting the G-8 leaders to commit themselves again to help to reduce Africa's massive debt burden. The African leaders also got the all-powerful Northern leaders to commit themselves – at least rhetorically – to help close the global information divide between the rich North and the poor South. Under terms of the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, the leaders from the North made yet another pledge to establish the Digital Opportunity Task Force to develop IT policies and regulations, lower costs and teach IT skills in the developing world.

Mbeki has simultaneously been both consistent and emphatic in calling for the creation of "investment friendly climates in Africa". This means, inter alia, that African states must create "peace, stabili-

During his presidential inauguration speech on 16 June 1999, Mbeki spent considerable time dwelling on African Affairs. He lambasted 'African predators' that have plagued the continent over the past half a century. He said no longer will South Africa be a "European outpost in Africa"; instead, this is an African nation in the complex process simultaneously of formation and renewal. Again, during the president's opening address to parliament in February 2000, Mbeki continued to build on the African Renaissance theme. He called on those that are "a thousand times more wealthy and stronger" than African states to play their part in Africa's development.

In terms of regional industrial plans, Mbeki said South Africa would push ahead with Spatial Development Initiatives, industrial development zones, cross-border initiatives as well as an overall export drive. South Africa will also continue with plans to install a gas pipeline from the Mozambique gas fields to South Africa. Mbeki said South Africa wants to play a role in developing "productive economies of Southern Africa".

On South-South relations, Mbeki has pushed for the consolidation of G-77 with China. Leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, notably great powers from the South such as South Africa, India, Malaysia, Egypt, Argentina, and even Brazil which is not yet part of the NAM, should collaborate more closely, to serve as a countervailing force in world affairs. This goes back to the informal grouping Pretoria has forged with Egypt, Nigeria, India and Brazil, one that has the makings of a "G-8 of the South" that Mbeki has called for.

This grouping, besides pushing for trading system reforms within the WTO, would lobby for the urgent reform of the international financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. They would also push for urgent debt relief.

Moreover, Mbeki has managed to bring about a major shift in NAM's nuclear diplomacy. He has said NAM should not only push for nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-have powers. The nuclear have-nots should also commit themselves to nuclear non-proliferation.

Overhauling Foreign Policy Priorities

In contrast to the preceding four and a · half years of the Mandela-administration's foreign policy, Jackie Selebi, former director-general of Foreign Affairs, has stated that South Africa is eagerly preparing to play a role in peace keeping. But, said Selebi, the military option will remain the last option. Selebi said his department remains committed to making South Africa's foreign policy "predictable". To achieve this, "the country's domestic policy of creating wealth and a better life for all would guide the country's future relations with the region" and the world. Even though the country has bitten the peacekeeping bullet as it is actively engaged in the UN mission to the DRC, foreign policy still prioritises peace-making and preventive diplomacy. Restructuring of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the forging of key alliances with countries like Brazil in Latin America, India in South East Asia, Nigeria and Algeria in Africa, the United States in North America, and Germany in Europe are key new departures in foreign policy.

Under Selebi, DFA identified "wealth creation" and the security of nations as the core business of the department in pursuit of the "national interest". Selebi defined the national interest as "ensuring South Africa's sovereignty and enhancing its international capability to promote the well being of its citizens". Like successor Sipho Pityana, he continued the democratisation theme by saying one key challenge is to establish South Africa as a credible champion of human rights, democracy and good governance by promoting respect for humane values and practices.

South Africa will also lobby for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. It will identify like-minded countries of the South to this end. Selebi said the Republic would address its SADC responsibilities more vigorously. Another priority will be the attraction of foreign direct investment and the promotion of South Africa's trade and exports to make the Republic a first-class competitive manufacturing economy.

Assessing the "Democratisation as Conflict Resolution" strategy

A dominant theme of Mbeki's foreign policy has been the persistent call for an African Renaissance. Mbeki sees the African Renaissance as a cry for political, economic and social renewal in Africa. He has called for an end to one-party dictatorship, the extirpation of corruption and economic mismanagement, creating the conditions for attracting foreign direct investment, and the reintegration of Africa into the global economy.

Central to his foreign policy strategy, and to the building blocs of an African Renaissance, Mbeki has been the chief proponent of democratic peace. With the democratic peace thesis, Mbeki and all key foreign policy actors have promoted the enlargement of democracy in Africa. They have argued that without peace there can be no democracy, and without democracy there can be no peace. Thus, wars in Africa must be ended, and they must end through democratic systems of government. This is what Mbeki's government has tried to achieve in Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Zimbabwe, Angola, Burundi, and elsewhere.

Mbeki has thus made the "resolution of conflicts" a central pillar of foreign policy as he proclaimed during his opening address to parliament in 1999. Mbeki and his foreign policy chiefs have long said that the South African government is not willing to accept that "war, violent conflict and reprieve are a permanent condition of existence for us as Africans". His government will make the resolution of conflicts in Africa a major priority.

The president was a staunch backer of the creation of a council of African elders linked to the Botswana-based African Renaissance Institute (ARI), comprising outstanding African statesmen such as former presidents Julius Nyerere, Sir

Ketumile Masire and Nelson Mandela to help with the promotion of peace and democratisation. Before he died in 1999, Julius Nyerere served as facilitator in Burundi, and has now been replaced by Nelson Mandela, while Botswana's former president Masire serves as a mediator in the DRC peace efforts.

Minister Nkosazana-Zuma has similarly worked tirelessly to give meaning to the idea of an African Renaissance. For her, peace and democracy are sine qua nons for the African Renaissance. She stated in her budget speech that:

> we believe that those [African] wars cause human misery and pain. They reverse whatever little gains we make in socio-economic development, they divert limited and much needed resources to fulfil often unattainable military solutions.

Whenever she visits the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Goma, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Algeria, and other countries, that is a common message that the minister conveys.

However, this position can be problematic in pratice. With regard to Angola, for instance, South Africa has been hard pressed to defend its image as an independent, neutral African power after rejecting President José Eduardo dos Santos' request for military aid to crush Unita. South Africa said it firmly rejects getting involved militarily in the Angolan civil war. Dos Santos is of the view that Pretoria should render his country the necessary support as Angola gave support to the ANC during the struggle years.

As regards the DRC, Mbeki has become involved in efforts to rekindle peace efforts – a month before the June elections. Pretoria's new position on the DRC conflict identified Zimbabwe and Rwanda as the two key states in any peace effort. Mbeki has shown his seriousness in mediating in the DRC by interrupting his election campaign for a meeting with then Rwandan vice-president Kagame, and consulting the OAU's Salim Ahmed Salim on the matter.

Pahad, too, has spent time in the Comoros, Angola and DRC in efforts to bring peace to the region. South Africa has also adopted a new approach of consulting with SADC and individual states in the region. During his first day in office on 16 June 1999 signs of this new approach became clear, when Mbeki convened a meeting of Southern African leaders on the conflict in the DRC.

We cannot accept that war, violent conflict and reprieve are a permanent condition of existence for us as Africans

Further afield, in Africa, there are signs of a growing strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa. Both Pretoria and Abuja have recently stressed the need for co-operation, not competition, in Africa. The two countries are increasingly seeing themselves as pillars for a renaissance in Africa. In the words of Obasanjo, "a democratic South Africa and a democratic Nigeria can be the two good pillars on which Africa can rest". The two countries hope to be instruments and vanguards of hope for the management and resolution of conflict, for development and for the strengthening of democracy on the whole continent.

Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of Mbeki's approach to diplomacy is how it sought to deal with the "identity crisis" in South Africa's global role. The President has been at pains to stress that his country is "an African state" and a player and member of the global, developing South. He in fact used the occasion of his presidential inauguration to stress that "no longer should this country be seen as a European outpost in darkest Africa". Mbeki sought to send a powerful message to all constituencies of this deeply divided land that South Africa is an African power and that all citizens should strive to become Africans.

Conclusion

The new Mbeki-foreign policy is fast becoming a direct extension of the country's domestic policy. At home, much socio-political and economic policy is about closing the cleavages, polarisation and economic gaps between the various races in a deeply divided society; domestic policy typically warns that the country's democracy remains fundamentally fragile. Foreign policy is an extension of this domestic policy in that the Mbeki administration's external strategy is largely about spreading democratic peace in Africa, and closing the gaps between the two worlds of global affairs: the resource rich North and the developing and often impoverished South. Thus, the new foreign policy is essentially about closing the gap between the so-called "first" and "third' worlds. The foreign policy elite of his country essentially believes that they are well paced to occupy a centrist position in this highly divided globe, viewing South Africa as enjoying respect, and prestige – which derived from its transition from apartheid to democracy – by both sides of the global partition line.

But the question of Pretoria's meta-policies, that is the structures, processes, personnel, guiding principles and procedures, must now be raised. Put another way, does South Africa's foreign affairs establishment boast the capacity and wherewithal to fulfil the demands posed by its ambitious foreign policy agenda? Mbeki himself recently posed the question of capacity when he addressed parliament on his policy achievements during his first year in office. He asked whether South Africa is capable of rising to the occasion of heightened international expectations about its global role. Similarly, in an address to the South African Institute of International Affairs on 5 June 2000, Sipho Pityana noted that:

there can be no doubting the fact the challenges that we have to contend with as a continent will place an enormous burden on the South African government and the Department of Foreign Affairs in particular.

The Department of Foreign Affairs has been grappling with this question recently. As such, it has embarked on a process of "reviewing DFA's core business and priorities". In many of its transformation documents and strategies, the Department has committed itself to "entrench the new methodologies and priorities of the Public service". The new Director-General, Sipho Pityana, building on the foundations laid by Jackie Selebi, has said that his administration will focus on implementation. It is in the throes of finalising a five-year plan that is intended to boost capacity in the Department. Part of the tactic is to "provide leadership and co-ordination with other national departments". The plan is also to "develop a proactive communications and marketing strategy", something that is sorely lacking at present. Top-level members of the Department have pledged themselves to "develop a best practice model for implementation". These would include a review of foreign representation, a human resource plan, a training plan, and a Medium Term Expenditure framework.

Particularly with regard to Africa and the challenge of the African Renaissance, Pityana was spot on when he stated in his June address that:

We need capacity to facilitate mediation of conflicts long before they break out into war. The government should have a reliable resource in the Department of Foreign Affairs to facilitate the prevention of conflicts in a manner that complements those of regional bodies like the OAU. There is capacity for this kind of role that can be found in broader civil society, it must be nurtured and put to good use to complement that of our regional organizations.

Thus, the challenge is clearly before the Department of Foreign Affairs; it has been identified and well articulated. There has been a remarkable degree of consistency and congruity coming out of the top echelons of the presidency, the ministry, DTI and the Department of Finance. The question still remains: will the foreign policy establishment muster the will to put yet another sound idea into practice? The jury is still out.◙

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Uganda: no-party state or one-party state?

On 29 June 2000, Ugandans voted in a political referendum on the country's system of governance. The overwhelming support shown for President Yoweri Museveni's movement system of government raises important questions about the form of governance which operates within Uganda. For some, it is a unique and appropriate system suited to the particular circumstances and instability which have characterised Uganda's political history; others see it as no more than camouflage for a one-party state, write **Pal Ahluwalia and Abebe Zegeye.**[1]

President Museveni's position is both controversial and unique and warrants closer attention. The Museveni regime has been largely insulated from international pressure to reform its political system, unlike neighbouring Kenya which has been subjected to intense pressure to institute a multi-party democratic system. This is a reflection of the crisis of governance that has beleaguered Uganda and dominated much of its independent history as well as a recognition by the international community that Uganda is well on its way to recovery and that the Museveni government needs to be supported.

The NRA Government and the Ascendancy of President Museveni

The swearing-in of Museveni as President in 1986 marked a watershed in Uganda's political history. The National Resistance Army (NRA) was the first indigenous guerrilla movement to

groups. The NRA/M would be the custodian of Uganda's return to civil order. Its ten-point programme provided the basis for a national coalition of democratic, political and social forces that would overcome the cleavages of the past.

A New Ugandan Constitution

By the 1990s, the Museveni government had provided a degree of security that Ugandans had not enjoyed since independence. A system of local representation had been established and Uganda had held elections in 1989 and 1992. However, no elections, direct or indirect, were held for the National Resistance Council (NRC), which effectively operated as the Parliament of Uganda. Moreover, a decision was made by the NRC to prolong its own life as well as the presidency of Yoweri Museveni to 1995. This extension of tenure was justified as providing for a period of stability that would enable crucial constitutional questions to be addressed. A Constitutional Commission began work in February 1989 with the aim of providing a final report and submitting a draft constitution by 1991. It did not complete the task until the end of 1993. Part of the plan involved a review of the proposals by a Constituent Assembly. In 1994, Constituent Assembly elections were held to elect a body that would debate a draft constitution prepared by the Uganda Constitutional Commission.

At the core of the constitution was debate about the role of political parties in Uganda. A strong argument by those in favour of political parties was that civic peace could not be attained when significant groups in society were disaffected. To ensure a combination of civic peace and civic freedom, it was necessary to accommodate organisations such as political parties. The continuing debate about the role of political parties can be seen as a microcosm of the issues central to the operation of an effective civil society.

The issue of political parties remains a particularly poignant one in the case of Uganda, given its violent history that can be attributed in part to the manner in which the ruling party at independence, the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), utilised democratic institutions illegitimately to retain power. It is important to take stock of this to understand Museveni's consistent misgivings about party politics as they have operated within the Ugandan context. It is thus not surprising to see Museveni openly castigat-

ing the party system. A cursory glance at Uganda's political history suggests that the Westminster system has not been successful there. Museveni's antipathy towards political parties stems largely from the experience of the 1980 Uganda election, the post-colonial record of political parties as well as his involvement with the Southern African liberation movements and his avowedly Marxist orientation at that time.

The President's views about political parties are consistent with his ideological stance in which he describes party politics as "rubbish".[2] However, the prohibition on political parties' freedom of operation needs to be critically evaluated. On the one hand, it may be judged to be an abuse of fundamental rights. However, it may also be viewed from the perspective of a government that is circumspect about the ability of traditional political parties to effect good governance – within the context of the changes that have occurred on the continent as a whole and in Uganda in particular. If viewed from the former perspective, then the role of political parties has to be seen as central to any system of governance. However, if one takes account of the latter, it is important to examine the role of political parties in Uganda within an historical perspective. President Museveni and the NRA's position needs to be evaluated along these lines. It is important to note that Uganda has not been placed under the enormous strain faced by other African countries to attain "good governance".[3] This is largely due to the general agreement that this is perhaps the "best" government that the country has had since independence.

The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections highlight the interpenetration of the old and new in Uganda. Although the elections were fought under rules stipulated by the NRM whereby no party was permitted to campaign, individual candidates were allowed to identify themselves as supporters of either the multi-party system or the movement style of politics. The election results vindicated Museveni's faith in the movement system, which received a considerable boost from the electorate's overwhelming endorsement of movement candidates. The official election results for the CA gave the NRM 144 out of the 214 directly elected seats.[4] The composition of the 288-seat CA also included ten members appointed by the President and 56 representing special interest groups, including

wage a successful civil war to seize state power from the incumbent regime. According to Museveni, the coming to power of the NRA signalled a break with the past. The National Resistance Movement (NRM), of which the NRA was part, held office for four years during which time a new constitution was drawn up, elections were held and Uganda returned to civilian rule. Although political party activity was prohibited, parties themselves were not. Museveni confirmed his commitment to national unity and a broad-based government that would include representatives of all districts, religions and former opposition

women, the army, trade unions, the youth and the disabled. In addition, each of the political parties which contested the 1980 election – the UPC, Democratic Party (DP), Uganda Peoples Movement (UPM) and the Conservative Party (CP) – were given two seats to represent their particular interests. The debate between advocates of the multi-party system as opposed to the movement system occupied centre-stage in the CA proceedings. This was not surprising given the fact that the issue has dominated political debate within the country since the establishment of the Constitutional Commission. The Constitutional Commission, which engaged in a broad consultative process, recognised the diversity of views and ultimately retained both systems in the draft constitution. It recommended that a major task of the CA would be to determine the issue.

The widespread support for the movement system can be attributed not only to the successes of the Museveni government but also to a decline in support for traditional political parties. This can partly be attributed to the stringent rules governing their operations. However, the broad integrative role which the NRM has played in forging national unity was an important factor. The DP's participation in the NRM illustrates the NRM's

Western Uganda and Buganda respectively, were eroded. Not only were the South and West key sources of recruits and supplies during the struggle against Obote, but UPC's criticism of the NRM as a predominantly "Banyarwanda" organisation, that removed it from power with Rwandan help, further alienated support. In Buganda, it is the DP which suffered the most, where the decision to restore the Kabakaship (traditional King) further strengthened the NRM's position. At the same time, the NRM was successful in eroding the UPC's position in Northern Uganda.

Moreover, the political parties have been plagued by continuing leadership crises. In the case of the UPC, despite being in exile, former President Milton Obote has not relinquished his position as leader of the party. On the ground, this has meant that the UPC has been operating within a leadership vacuum. The DP continues to be led by Paul Ssemogerere, whose involvement in Museveni's government discredited him in the eyes of many DP supporters, and is in desperate need of rejuvenation. The CP leadership is also under attack from within the party for collaborating with the NRM by participating in the government of national

systems.[6] This walkout came in the wake of the resignation of Paul Ssemogerere, the leader of the DP and second Prime Minister, as well as Minister of Public Services in the NRM government. Ssemogerere occupied a symbolic position in the NRM and his resignation opened the way for a more confrontational style of politics. There was little doubt as to the outcome of the issue given the composition of the CA as a result of the March 1994 elections. Nevertheless, the walkout signalled that attempts by the NRM to inculcate a culture where the constitution has a great deal of credibility and legitimacy are not yet working. In the past, as history demonstrates, constitutions in Uganda have been used as mere instruments that can be manipulated to institutionalise the rule of existing governments.

The Ugandan Elections

In May 1996, Uganda held its "first" free and fair elections. Although Museveni was expected to retain power, given the favourable economic and political conditions in the country, the margin of his victory was surprising. He retained office with 74% of the vote and 32 out of 39 administrative districts in the country. In contrast, his principal opponent Ssemogerere who represented all the major opposition parties[7] (despite the disallowance of campaigning on party political lines) attained only 23% of the vote.[8] In August 1996, following the Presidential election, the country held Parliamentary elections in which the electorate overwhelmingly endorsed NRM candidates.

In the absence of political parties, it is difficult to be precise as to the number of movement and non-movement members. However, Museveni has the more than two-thirds support necessary in Parliament to effectively pass any legislation he wants. Some monitoring groups had reservations about the fairness of the elections on the grounds that party political activity was prohibited, giving the NRM an unfair advantage. Nevertheless, the elections were declared valid.

> **In the past, as history demonstrates, constitutions in Uganda have been used as mere instruments that can be manipulated to institutionalise the rule of existing governments.**

ability to incorporate a diversity of views within its broad-based government of national unity. The NRM's strategies, such as affirmative action policies for the disadvantaged and the marginalised, also contributed to the erosion of support for other political parties. These groups were not only accorded special status in the CA but were also an integral part of the NRC. In contrast, the traditional parties never attempted to accommodate political minorities. Consequently, these groups have endorsed the movement style of politics and have been strong advocates of President Museveni. For example, at the 1993 Women's Day celebrations, women's groups endorsed him as their candidate in the Presidential elections.[5]

The ethnic support bases of political parties were also undermined by the NRM. Some of the traditional support bases of both the UPC and the DP, in

unity. The traditional political parties' inability to draw new members into top positions is evidence of the continuing leadership struggles of these parties which have been dominated by the same figures since the period immediately following independence. Significantly, the lack of an internal democratic tradition within all of these political parties places serious question marks over their depiction of Museveni as greedily holding on to power.

The choice between the multi-party system or the movement system was finally resolved by the CA when it voted overwhelmingly to retain the latter: 199 CA delegates supported it as opposed to 68 delegates against the movement system. Following the crucial vote, the multi-party CA delegates walked out in protest and remained out of the CA for the duration of the debate on political

The results of the election were unsurprising for a number of reasons. First, the NRM and Museveni had the advantage of being incumbents. Second, the CA elections had only recently been held and the electorate had indicated its preference for NRM candidates. Third, favourable economic conditions and political stability provided

Museveni and the NRM with a great deal of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the opposition's poor showing was a clear blow given that they had sought to exploit the government's weaknesses in a number of areas. The opposition campaign focused

However, the low voter turnout needs to be seen as part of overall trends in Uganda which has seen a decline in voter participation since 1994. Since the 1994 CA elections, there have been Presidential and Parliamentary elections

thing of an incongruity. That little pressure is directed at Museveni and the NRM to free the political system is an indication that the particularities of the Ugandan political situation are understood internationally. In part, this is the result of Museveni's shrewd political manoeuvrings which have allowed him to gain a great deal of legitimacy while countries around him are faltering on both political and economic grounds.

Although the electorate has endorsed the movement system of politics, there is an growing recognition that such a system may be no more than camouflage for a one-party state

on the issues of allowing political parties to operate and the negative effects of the government's Structural Adjustment Policies. The opposition also hoped to make major inroads into its traditional support bases, Buganda for the DP and the North for the UPC. While they gained some support, it certainly did not return them to their earlier dominance. On the major issue which dominated both the CA elections and the 1996 elections – the role of political parties – Museveni and the NRM gained a clear mandate with the important proviso that a national referendum be held in 1999 to decide the issue of movement versus multi-party politics.

The Uganda Referendum

In the event, this referendum was not held until 29 June 2000. In the referendum, 90.7% of voters voted for the movement system, overwhelmingly endorsing the movement system of politics. This appears to have vindicated Museveni's claim that the Ugandan electorate does not want to return to the mayhem of competitive political parties. While the figures illustrate a resounding victory for Museveni's position, the opposition which ran a campaign urging voters to boycott the referendum also claimed victory. The boycott campaign appears to have had some effect as only 51.1% of eligible voters participated in the referendum. The referendum was also criticised by official observers for not being carried out on a level playing field with very few resources allocated to the multi-party campaign.

in 1996 as well as extensive local party elections in 1998. In each of these elections, the underlying issue has been the role of political parties. In each case, Museveni's position has been vindicated despite the fact that voter participation has declined. It may well be that Ugandan voters are simply exhausted by the continuous campaigning that they have endured in one form or another since 1994. In addition, when viewed from the perspective of most Western democracies where voting is not compulsory, a turnout in excess of 50% is an overwhelming endorsement.

Conclusion

The NRM is unquestionably Uganda's most stable government since 1964. Its accomplishments are even more laudable when juxtaposed to the Amin and Obote regimes. The government, while maintaining what is essentially a one-party system, runs what is, for Africa, a remarkably liberal state. The rule of law prevails, rights are generally respected and freedom of speech broadly prevails. At the same time, the Museveni government is very far from any notion of African socialism.

Rather, it promotes the free market economic order, advocating economic liberalisation, deregulation and the virtues of competition. It is regarded as exemplary by the World Bank and other key economic agencies. Museveni's stance with respect to parties in the democratic process is in fact some-

The stability and longevity of the Museveni years resides in a critical inter-penetration of the old and the new. Yet there are dangers as well as benefits here. The constitutional process, characterised by movement politics, aims to forge unity in the country. Yet it may well turn out to have the opposite effect. The accommodationist nature of movement politics has not managed to incorporate many supporters and leaders of the old political parties whose continuing agitation for power remains a source of instability and political tension.

Their critical stance places a grave responsibility on movement politics to continue to achieve its aims. The forces in favour of multi-party arrangements, as well as those favouring more regional political concessions within a federal structure, are still very powerful. While Museveni has clearly won another key political battle by winning the referendum, he is facing a more hostile donor community which was quick to point out that the referendum was not carried out on a level playing field.

It appears that the donor community is increasingly weary of the movement system of politics and concerned about Uganda's role in the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

This is a conflict that is placing increasing strain on a country that is still recovering from decades of economic ruin and political instability. Although the electorate has overwhelmingly endorsed the movement system of politics, there is an ever-growing recognition that such a system may be no more than camouflage for a one-party state. ◐

Notes & references

1 Ahluwalia is in the Politics Department, University of Adelaide, while Zegeye lectures in the Department of Sociology, University of South Africa.

2 For a detailed analysis of his ideological position, see YK Museveni, *What is Africa's Problem?*, Kampala: NRM Publications, 1992.

3 For an account of how Kenya has been placed under this pressure, see P Ahluwalia, *Post-Colonialism and the Politics of Kenya*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996.

4 *Africa Confidential*, vol 35, no 8, 15 April 1994, p 3.

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6 The walkout also has been an important trigger for several Western governments to force multi-party democracy to be put on the agenda.

7 This was an alliance of the two main political parties, the DP and the UPC, and was called the Inter-Political Forces Co-operation (IPFC).

8 The elections results were President Museveni: 4 428 119 votes (74.2%); Ssemogerere: 1 416 139 votes (23.7%) and Mohammed Mayanja 133 290 votes (2.2%). The voter turnout was 72.6% of all registered voters.

Weighing up Africa's Human Rights Record

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights forms the basis of the African regional human rights system, under the auspices of the OAU. Adopted in 1981, the African Charter has now been accepted as legally binding by all 53 OAU member states. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights was created in 1987 to supervise compliance with the Charter. The Commission consists of eleven independent members; the current chair is a Ghanaian, Victor Dankwa.

The members of the African Commission serve part-time, and meet bi-annually. The Commission is mandated to undertake a number of functions, both "promotional" and "protective". This duality in mandate corresponds with the division of meetings into "public" and "private" sessions.

At public sessions the Commission discusses and reports on its promotional mandate. The commissioners report on their activities and examine state reports (submitted under article 62 of the African Charter). In private sessions the Commission considers individual communications or complaints.

The 27th session of the Commission took place in Algiers, from 27 April to 11 May 2000. The President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, opened the meeting. A large number of states, national human rights institutions and NGOs were represented.

States have to report on the legislative and other measures they have taken to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the African Charter. Although states are supposed to do so every two years, very few have complied with this obligation. In fact, from 1988 when the first reports became due, only 27 states have submitted any reports. Five states (the Gambia, Libya, Rwanda, Tunisia and Zimbabwe) have reported more than once. South Africa's report was examined in 1999.

The reporting function plays a potentially important role. It requires different government departments in the reporting state to reflect on the extent to which their country conforms with the African Charter. The report is then evaluated by an independent body of experts. As with other international human rights instruments, the duty of submitting country reports is based on the notion that while states often ratify instruments, they are less likely to implement their provisions in their domestic legal systems. Reporting also creates a forum for supervision.

The most striking feature of the most recent public session was that five state reports were examined: Burundi, Libya, Rwanda, Swaziland and Uganda. This was the largest number of reports ever considered at one session of the Commission. It is especially encouraging that three countries – Burundi, Swaziland and Uganda – reported for the first time. As a consequence, the Commission is now entering into a dialogue with more states than ever before.

The quality of the reports was uneven. Some were relatively detailed (such as Burundi and Rwanda), some provided limited information (such as Swaziland), and some focused largely on legal provisions (such as Libya). In each instance, the country report was presented by a senior government delegate. A rapporteur, appointed by the Commission, then questioned the representative, followed by other commissioners. At the end, the delegate had an opportunity to respond. The aim of this procedure is to facilitate a "constructive dialogue" to improve implementation of the African Charter. The focus of the reporting procedure is on the general human rights situation in the country, and not on the plight of individuals.

The quality of the questioning was enhanced in respect of countries to which a member of the Commission paid a visit before the examination. For example, the vice-chair of the Commission, Commissioner Ondziel, undertook a promotional visit to Burundi earlier in the year, and her questioning revealed a good understanding of the problems there. In respect of Uganda's report, the chair again undertook a promotional visit, leading to incisive and topical questioning. Several representatives conceded difficulties in implementing the Charter.

But state reporting under the African Charter has so far not been very influential. One reason is that very few states have so far reported. But another cause lies at the door of the Commission, specifically in its failure to issue concluding observations, in which views on the human rights situation in a specific country could be expressed. This practice is followed by the treaty monitoring bodies of the United Nations human rights treaties. Without a concrete statement about deficiencies in implementing the African Charter, follow-up is almost impossible. Under these circumstances, the outcome of reporting remains uncertain.

The work of the Commission during its private session, focusing on individual complaints, will be revealed when the Commission presents its Annual Activity Report to the OAU Assembly.

In spite of problems, the 27th session demonstrated the stronger role that the African Commission is gradually starting to play. States are increasingly taking the Commission more seriously, as reflected in their attendance at Commission sessions and their submission of reports. This is a positive development, especially in light of the possible establishment of an African Court on Human Rights. This Court would supplement, rather than replace, the Commission. Strengthening the Commission now will lead to a stronger future Court. It should be added that fifteen ratifications are required before the Protocol will enter into force (and the Court becomes a reality). So far, only three states (Burkina Faso, Gabon and Senegal) have ratified the Protocol.

The next session of the Commission is scheduled for 23 October to 6 November 2000, in Cotonou, Bénin.

Prepared by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria.

COMPILED BY ELIZABETH LE ROUX

Bookshelf

The library of the Africa Institute of South Africa currently has over 65 000 books and periodicals on its shelves, covering every African country from 1960 to the present. The library is open to the public, and can be visited during office hours at the Africa Institute's offices in Pretoria. We look at some of the newest acquisitions.

North Africa in Transition: State, Society and Economic Transformation in the 1990s Edited by Yahia H. Zoubir

This volume of essays reflects North African states as grappling with issues that are familiar from other contexts. The essays tend to privilege explanations rooted in social, economic and political realities, in contrast to a body of scholarship that has emphasised North Africa's dual cultural heritage, French and Arabo-Islamic.

The volume is divided into three parts. In the first part, the contributors analyse why development in the Maghrebi countries – Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – has failed, linking this failure to economic liberalisation and the advent of civil societies.

The second part deals with specific, salient issues pertaining to the Maghrebi countries, including the West's obsessive interest in the question of Islamism, the youthfulness of the populations of these countries and the move toward market economies without concomitant political liberalisation.

The third part of the book is devoted to the Maghreb in world affairs, and it includes examinations of the Western Sahara conflict, and US and European Union policy towards the region. While the contributors acknowledge the problems that the Maghreb has witnessed in recent years, they also recognise the potentialities of the region.

Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa Edited by MA Mohamed Salih and John Markakis

The studies included in this volume provide ample evidence of the potency of ethnicity as the basis for political mobilisation. The authors focus on ethnicity's relationship to the state, a manifestly political matter, and try to account for the twists and turns that mark the history of this relationship in the post-colonial era.

They consider a variety of factors (economic, social, cultural, religious) that account for the politicisation of ethnicity and the volatility of its relationship with the state in Eastern Africa.

Women's Information Services and Networks: A Global Source Book Royal Tropical Institute, Oxfam and the International Information Centre and Archives for the Women's Movement

The third book in the Gender, Society and Development series, which is intended to be especially relevant to resource-poor areas, this collection provides a guide to the multitude of women's information centres and archives spring up world-wide.

The book considers the impact of information technology, including the potential of electronic networking, before analysing the situation of women's networking in Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. The core of the book is a directory, bibliography and list of web resources.

The chapter on Africa argues that 'the African women's movement has to move from the old status quo where our politics and identity were too closely tied to androcentric notions... It has to move to a new place, where we recognize that we are a political force, that sisterhood is no longer adequate as a construct to deal with the differences and the new challenges, and that this is the only movement which can give leadership to a new African political agenda for the future.'

Living on Mangetti, Thomas Widlok

The Hai‖om 'Bushmen' of northern Namibia are still a gathering people, living not only on mangetti nuts and other wild foods but also on the by-products of the cattle industry on the mangetti farms.

Namibian independence in 1990 has created dilemmas for the Hai‖om, who want to benefit from new options without giving up their autonomous modes of social organisation.

The personal quality of their social relations relies on a high degree of individual autonomy, cultural diversity, subsistence flexibility, social permeability, and of immediacy in religious affairs.

This book describes the main strategies that the Hai‖om have developed to deal with independence and dependency – their ways of accessing the new economic resources, their communication skills, their storytelling practices, their sophisticated ways of creating name and kin relations across spatial and social boundaries, and their way of co-operating in the medicine dance, their main religious ritual.

Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986-97 Heike Behrend

In August 1986, Alice Auma, a young women in northern Uganda, proclaiming herself under the orders of a Christian spirit named Lakwena, raised an army called the 'Holy Spirit Mobile Forces'.

With it she waged a war against perceived evil, not only an external enemy represented by the National Resistance Army of the government, but internal enemies in the form of 'impure' soldiers, witches and sorcerers. She came very close to her goal of overthrowing the government but was defeated and fled to Kenya. This book gives an internal view of Alice's movement, based on interviews with its members and numerous of their own writings, examining in particular their perceptions of the threat of internal evil.

It concludes with an account of the successor movements into which Alice's forces fragmented, including the 'Lord's Resistance Army', now actively involved in the civil wars of the Sudan and Uganda.

Oxford University Press have recently·released three new collections of the plays of the respected South African dramatist, Athol Fugard. Divided into Port Elizabeth Plays, Township Plays and Interior Plays, the volumes bring together the author's best work, with new introductions and prefaces by the author and critics of South African literature. The Port Elizabeth plays explore close and tense family situations against the background of wider suffering and tensions, while the township plays offer a unique insight into the role of theatre in a situation of oppression. The latter were produced in close collaboration with their original black amateur casts, drawing on their lives and everyday experiences in the townships. The final volume, Interior Plays, makes available some previously unpublished work which explores white anguish and alienation and the role of the artist during a period of liberal impotence and rising black power.

New Publications from the Africa Institute

Are We Losing Our Minds? Exploring the Nature and Scale of Skilled Migration in Southern Africa Edited by David McDonald and Jonathan Crush

The articles on skilled migration collected in this special issue will form the bulk of a new book to be published jointly by the Africa Institute of South Africa and the Southern African Migration Project. Based on national surveys undertaken by SAMP with skilled personnel and employers in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, as well as information on the skilled South African diaspora, Are We Losing Our Minds? represents the most comprehensive research on skilled migration ever undertaken in the region. The book provides invaluable insights into skilled people's perspectives on and experiences with emigration, and challenges many of the popularly held stereotypes about the "brain drain" in the region.

These research findings come at an important time in the development of new immigration legislation and dialogue in Southern Africa and will hopefully contribute to the policy transformation process as it relates to the movement of skilled people. The research will be of interest to policymakers, academics, employers and NGOs throughout the region.

Problematising the African Renaissance Edited by Eddy Maloka and Elizabeth le Roux

More than eight decades after the formal launch of Pan-Africanism, Olisanwuche Esedebe wrote, "Despite the flood of books and articles on Pan-Africanism in recent years the study of the phenomenon is still in its infancy... there is still no agreement on what it is all about". The same can be said of the "African Renaissance".

The notion of the "African Renaissance" is at present a very vague and unwieldy one, being used to mean many different things to different r Yet a revitalisation and revival of political, economic and social si has never been more necessary, · in light of the new challenges of sation. With this in mind, five sch. reflect on the meanings, weaknesses a challenges of the African Renaissance, offering new insights and fresh perspectives on a significant symbolic concept.

Whither Regional Peace and Security? The DRC After the War Edited by Denis Kadima and Claude Kabemba'

Much of the debate and coverage of the DRC crisis has concentrated on explaining the causes of the conflict and the merits and demerits of the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord, but has neglected the post-conflict reconstruction process. In Africa, the list of failed agreements is a long one. In most cases, these agreements failed because they were not accompanied by a clear programme to reconstruct the state.

The Africa Institute thought it imperative to initiate debate around the reconstruction of the DRC to avoid creating a vacuum between the time when peace is enforced and the actual rebuilding of the state. As initiatives are being pursued to end the war – an essential first step before accomplishing anything else in the DRC and the region in general – it would be a mistake not to pay attention to what will happen afterwards.

This collection of essays focuses on sustainable peace-building, the DRC's electoral system and system, demilitarisation, relations with neigbouring states, the role of women in peace building and in a future political dispensation, inter-Congolese dialogue and constitution-making, economic and social reconstruction after the war, and the state's capacity to provide adequate and equitable service to the population. Authors include researchers and civil society representatives.

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