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# Call For Papers

**Special Issue: Tourism in Africa**
**Submission Deadline: 31 May 2002**

*Africa Insight* reflects thinking about theoretical and practical developments in African studies, and about contemporary affairs and issues on the continent. The Journal's purpose is to provide insight into the process of change in Africa.

With this goal in mind, the Africa Institute of South Africa is planning a special issue of *Africa Insight* to focus on tourism in Africa, especially as it relates to development and the African renaissance.

Submissions are invited from researchers from a variety of disciplinary and cross-disciplinary backgrounds, using a variety of approaches. Contributors are encouraged to write about a wide range of African countries, and for this reason preference will be given to papers focusing on countries other than South Africa. Comparative studies will also be encouraged.

**Notes for Contributors to this Special Issue:**
In order to allow for a variety of contributions, manuscripts should be kept to a 4000-6000 word limit (including notes and references). Selected manuscripts will be sent for peer review. The usual style guidelines and notes for contributors apply. Please send an abstract of 100-150 words, one hard copy manuscript and an electronic copy (by email or on disk), along with full contact details, by 31 May, 2002.

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# The Challenges of Development

BY ELIZABETH LE ROUX

Has the world changed since September 11? Journalists, world leaders and commentators emphasise the fact that the war against terrorism is a global war, and that all parts of the world have been, and will be, affected. This includes the African continent, whether it likes it or not.

One of the immediate consequences is an increased focus on security, and especially internal security. This is leading governments the world over to introduce 'anti-terror' legislation, and to suppress human rights such as freedom of the press if need be.

In a hard-hitting opinion piece in this issue, Rotimi Sankore looks at the potentially dangerous consequences of such legislation, and the effects it may have on the still fragile democracies in African countries. It is a bleak but timely warning.

Apart from this, there are concerns that the preoccupation with fighting terrorism and increasing security will knock Africa off the agenda of the international community. Urgent meetings and conferences are already being held to ensure that Africa's development remains a priority, especially in the era of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

This successor to the New Africa Initiative declares its own global war, on poverty and underdevelopment:

> This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.

Sustainable growth and development are seen as the key challenges of this century. The essential elements of sustainable development are longevity (health), knowledge (education) and acceptable living standards (income). These indicators form the basis of the UNDP's Human Development Index. In this issue, the contributors look at a variety of these elements, including HIV/AIDS, higher education, employment creation, and sustainable rural industrialisation. They ask how African people can improve their access to health care, education and jobs, and what policy measures are needed to introduce real change.

Equally important are regional responses to the perennial problems of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, the free movement of peoples, and human rights on the continent.

Amara Essy, the Secretary-General of the OAU and overseer of the transition to the African Union, argues that integration – and especially economic integration – cannot take place in an atmosphere of conflict, instability and a lack of democracy.

What this reminds us of is that, even in a new world order, the challenges of development remain the same. ○

Photo Guy Stubbs

The SADC HIV/AIDS Framework:

# A regional response to

# HIV/AIDS

BY SIPHAMANDLA ZONDI

Regional integration recognises similar challenges and the interdependence between countries of a region. The Southern African region has remarkable similarities in historical background and socio-cultural outlook, while countries are also interconnected infrastructurally, economically and ecologically. Most importantly, the *raison d'être* for closer co-operation among countries of the region is a

Siphamandla Zondi is a programme co-ordinator at the Africa Institute of SA

human one, that the peoples of the region have been put in touch by centuries of migration.[1]

Such human contact, whether for goods, security or pleasure, has not only had positive effects, but has also caused a few problems for the region, among them the escalating incidence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The urgency of joint action to mitigate the impact of the epidemic in the region has never been more apparent.

Southern Africa has leapfrogged from an era of loose co-operation, as the 10-member Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) to tne Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprising 14 comparatively young and democratic states. In its nine years of existence, SADC has managed to foster greater integration with states having signed eleven protocols on areas ranging from trade, transport and communications, and law enforcement to education and health. These sectors were moved from member states to an enlarged secretariat with sectoral directorates overseeing national committees to foster greater co-ordination and compensate for the differing capacities of member states.

Mechanisms have been put in place to increase the role played by non-governmental stakeholders through forums, associations and commissions. The greatest challenge for the region remains employing this reformed regional machinery for tackling the issues of HIV/AIDS, poverty and the colossal debt burden. The crosscutting problem of HIV/AIDS, which respects no borders or sovereignty, s by far the most letna, threat to SADC development at present.

Indeed, the need for an integrated approach dawned upon the region's health ministers in a historic meeting in Pretoria in 1999 where not only a health protocol highlighting the need for a multilateral response to HIV/AIDS was drawn up, but more crucially an institutional mechanism to thrash out the modalities for implementation of a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary regional strategy against the pandemic was set up. As a guiding vision ministers adopted the 'SADC Society with Reduced HIV/AIDS' document. A regional task force was established to turn the vision into an operational programme, and in June 2000 the team produced a Southern African Development Community (SADC) HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework docu-

ment, a strategic plan with concrete p ans for each sector represented.[2]

Whether the framework and the work done so far signifies remarkable progress in terms of coming up with an effective, comprehensive, cohesive, but realistic SADC response to the HIV/AIDS scourge is what this article attempts to evaluate. Success ir this regard will be measured on three fronts: (1) whether the Health Protocol and the work of the Task Force reinforces the integration agenda by encouraging harmonisation of policies and in tiatives versus HIV/AIDS; (2) whether it encourages the optimum use of countries' relative strengths and unequally distributed resources across the region; and (3) wnether it gives due attention to surmounting the problem of institutiona incapacity to deliver on decisions made at a higher level. But such capacity-building initiatives must take into account that with the AIDS question it is particularly the popular responses and individual choices that will influence necessary changes in sexual oenaviour and, hence, will determine the success of institutional strategies.

## HIV/AIDS in the SADC Countries
### Population Structure

The HIV/AIDS menace in Southern Africa, if available figures are to be relied upon, is nothing less than a calamity in progress. Today an estimated six million SADC citizens are HIV positive and may develop fully blown AIDS complications and die in the next few years.[3] The pandemic is thus sure to change the population structure in the region. Since the first cases of HIV/AIDS were reported in the late 1980s, close to four million deaths from AIDS-related illnesses have been estimated. The projections for adult mortality show a hike to well over ten million deaths by 2010, while infant and child mortality figures at an average 119.6 per 1 000 in 2000 reflect nothing short of a demographic disaster. If one in five children dies

> The problem of HIV/AIDS, which respects no borders or sovereignty, is the most lethal threat to SADC development at present

before they reach the age of five, it is hard to imagine how society will function in the coming decades. Young adults being the worst affected, population pyramids will in the long run be transformed into demographic 'chimneys'. Most countries in the region have lost more than 10 years in life expectancy over the decade, signif cantly reversing the enormous gains made in the previous two decades. The situation is sometimes so dire that countries ike Botswana are approximately 31 years down in life expectancy figures.[4]

In addition, some three million children have been orphaned, creating a heavy burden on institutional care systems and household ingenuity.

### Economic costs

The prevalence rate among able-bodied adults is currently around 12%, translating to an impending loss of ten mil on economica y active adults in just a few years. This translates to a real loss of the human capital that is central to sustairao e development. In Zimbabwe, for instance, 35 out of 1 000 workers in the private sector have been lost due to AIDS in 1999 alone. South African companies have been reported to be losing almost 3% of the r workforce for the same reason.[5] Sickness and mortality on such a scale necessarily pushes household expenditure beyond capacity, whic exacerbates poverty and in turn puts more pressure on welfare coffers and programmes for fighting poverty.

In economic terms, the epidemic will encourage the disposition of income in consumption rather than social and economic investment, with negative effects on production patterns and social development. Everyone expects an increase in budgetary allocations in education, health and social welfare which could put immense pressure on interest rates, inflation and expenditure levels and in turn slow down economic growth. The point is countries crippled by the global economic downturn have very little to spend. Decades of Structural Adjustment Programmes and donor dependency have already meant significant cuts in spending on social services and infrastructural development creating conditions of underdevelopment that are conducive for the deepening of the AIDS impact. The region's

## SADC HIV/AIDS



**Percentage of adults (age 15 - 49) living with HIV/AIDS, 1999**
- More than 15% (rounded)
- 5 – 15% (rounded)
- Less than 5% (rounded)
- [ ? ] No data

Map: Elize van As/AISA

GNP per capita is an average US $1 096. In South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius it is well over US $3 000, but countries like Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania have figures of less than US $200. What scale of these meagre resources will be allocated to HIV/AIDS programmes where, according to a World Bank Development Report, an average 93% of the GNP in the region is sourced from external debt, is a grave cause for concern.[6] Worse, average GNP is expected to fall.

### Political Implications

Even in countries like Mozambique where the HIV prevalence is reportedly low, the impact of the pandemic on its ailing economy, complex political stability and mammoth social developmental needs is huge. All national disasters present serious challenges to the political life of a country and HIV/AIDS is one such threat.

Politically, the epidemic threatens to paralyse good governance and the entrenchment of democracy in the region even though disasters of this nature tend to revitalise the social

intervention movement as the case of NGO and CBO activities around AIDS demonstrate. The disease's toll on skilled public and private sector workers responsible for carrying out government programmes will erode the capacity of governments and their partners to deliver sustainable development to the citizens of the region. The erosion of the popular base for government and other vital political institutions in society poses a serious challenge to the processes of democratisation currently taking place in the region.

The aggregate effect of the pandemic will be the creation of a sense of crisis and insecurity, as well as public disillusionment, catalysts for public disorder and attendant political problems. In this sense, AIDS is a matter of regional security in the region. Not only in the form of political instability and the erosion of capacity to deliver sustainable development, but also in the potentially devastating effect on the security instruments in the region with HIV incidence in the region's armies reported to be increasing at alarming rates.[7]

Clearly HIV/AIDS is also a matter of security. Conflict and violence at both the personal and group level are factors in the intensity of HIV prevalence in Africa. Wars and social disorders tend to exacerbate the forced movement of people and internal dislocation, resulting in a loss of families, household subsistence, social capital, collapse of health, education and welfare services, while providing a conducive environment for prostitution and sexual abuse.

AIDS is a mobile epidemic, so as people open new routes of movement the disease follows. The deployment of military personnel in conflict zones adds another element to the situation. Whether deployed as belligerents or peacekeepers, troops are fast becoming significant carriers of the virus to areas previously unaffected by the syndrome.

Worse, conflict tends to bring two high-risk groups together: young, sexually-active soldiers and sex workers. Both have a significant behavioural feature in common: a sense of risk-taking that extends to their sexual behaviour.

## The SADC Health Protocol

The past two years have seen drastic steps by SADC to rid itself of the perception of inefficiency. The process began with the transformation of the secretariat, which had been criticised for its incompetence and failure to act on decisions made at ministerial level. The public face of this intricate process was the replacement of the Namibian national, Dr Kaire Mbuende, as Executive Secretary by a Mauritian, Prega Ramsamy. SADC's August 1999 Summit devoted its time to reinforcing further transformation of its structures "to put a strong emphasis on efficiency, cost effectiveness and improved coordination".[8]

Naturally, transformation is a long, multi-stage process. Apart from rationalising the secretariat, its main executing agency, SADC followed with a broader institutional review recently described by Sonto Kudjoe, Chief Director for Africa Multilateral at South Africa's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an attempt to speed up delivery on SADC decisions and programmes in the interest of regional integration and observable socio-economic development for SADC citizens.[9]

In the health protocol not only did the ministers declare HIV/AIDS a regional priority – a threat to the region's social, political and economic infrastructure – but they urged each member state to treat the problem as a national priority. More importantly, SADC ministers realised the shortcomings in the implementation of decisions taken at a high level and recognised that the Health Sector Co-ordinating Unit alone was not sufficient to bring about a holistic strategy against the epidemic. So they resolved to set up a SADC HIV/AIDS Task Force comprising experts from various sectors. At the SADC Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique in August 1999 Heads of States committed their governments to a number of specific strategies to realise the goal expressed in the Health Protocol:

- To harmonise their policies with regard to disease prevention and control, including identification of and co-operation regarding mechanisms to reduce transmission of STDs and HIV infection;
- To develop approaches for preventing and managing HIV/AIDS and STDs to be implemented in a coherent, comparable, harmonised, standardised manner;
- To develop regional policies and plans in a manner that emphasises the significance of the multi-sectoral approach to this disease;
- To co-operate with regard to standardisation of HIV/AIDS and STD surveillance mechanisms for the purposes of data collation, sharing of information and experiences, and regional advocacy efforts to increase commitment to an expanded response to HIV/AIDS and STDs

This was a culmination of a widespread concern among intellectuals that SADC's successes in strengthening regional integration were being undercut by the erosion of many its strengths in human development due to the incidence of HIV/AIDS. The criticism was that there was a lack of co-ordination and collective action on the part of SADC vis-à-vis reversing the tide of HIV/AIDS. In that context the emphasis given to the incidence of cross-border epidemics and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) by SADC ministers was a breakthrough.

Yet questions over the reliability and even, in the case of some countries, inadequacy of data on HIV prevalence remain unresolved. So worried were health ministers about the urgent need for accurate statistics on HIV and AIDS for health planning and policy-making that they raised, as part of the solution, the controversial tactic of notification of HIV/AIDS. Critics wasted no time in pointing out the problems of confidentiality and protection of sufferers' dignity inherent in the idea of notification.

> Is it sufficient ... to open doors to profit-crazed drug companies to cash in on a large pool of sufferers in a relatively well-to-do economy?

The Namibian minister defended the notion, arguing that "the special confidentiality accorded afflicted people encourages them to infect others at random without being detected". Opponents also warned that technically speaking, notification was not a reliable means of collecting data relating to diseases clouded in stigma and morality like STDs and HIV/AIDS; that it might drive infected individuals into hiding and further lead to their demonisation. Questions have been raised for instance about the extent and clarity of the raw data from which statisticians draw estimates and how such calculations are arrived at. Statisticians using the same statistical models from the Actuarial Society of South Africa, for example, have painted different pictures from those in government's hands.[10]

Statistics on AIDS deaths have also raised more questions than answers in terms of accuracy of methods of data collection, interpretation and the resulting impression being created. Mortality information is indispensable for policymakers and planners in the health and social development sectors, especially in addressing the consequences of deaths for households. The need for base-line information on infection, morbidity and mortality data has been heightened by debates over the merits of existing mortality statistics. Questions of methodology in the collection of data have been raised time and again.

Statistics on HIV infection now come mainly from sero-prevalence surveys at antenatal clinics, and they have been sharply criticised as open to gross misinterpretation and for assuming that prevalence rates among pregnant women are representative of the entire female population. The mortality data is even more pidgin. The recent controversy generated by the release of the South African Medical Research Council's report on mortality which pronounced HIV/AIDS as the leading cause of death in South Africa has only heightened this long-existing debate on the reliability of such data when the system of recording deaths is so flawed

Over and above the reservations from statisticians, notably Statistics South Africa, the MRC report is also questionable for fostering the tendency to reduce the impact of disease to

undigested cold statistics. This, as social scientists have long been arguing, tends to hide the complex nature of ill-health and causes of natural death and, therefore, limits debate on the best preventive and curative means to medical measures in exclusion of social and economic factors. One question which has lingered in many people's minds is the following: leading cause of death or not, what are we supposed to glean from this?

Is it sufficient for the South African government to open doors to profit-crazed drug companies to cash in on a large pool of sufferers in a relatively well-to-do economy?

The SADC document leaves the question of accuracy of the infection and mortality data littering the document untouched. Although it does urge SADC member states to harmonise their disease surveillance and monitoring efforts, it does not problematise these surveillance methods nor does it link these exercises to substantive research. The problem with the unquestioning acceptance of estimates as they prevail is that Africa and the sub-region misses the opportunity to engage with the international agencies that produce this data about the accuracy of the picture being painted of Africa, an impression resembling the age-old stereotypes of an ailing, diseased and dangerous Dark Continent.

Whether SADC is justified to base its plans and strategies on estimates from the West without question is highly debatable. How were the data for estimates collected, collated and interpreted? As with the MRC report, what of the almost entirely absent information on living conditions and life-circumstances predisposing people to suffering from AIDS?

## From Plans to Action

The main strategy of the Task Force was the planning, co-ordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the response to HIV/AIDS at country and regional level across all sectors in a manner that was consistent with their mandates and comparative competencies.

# PARTNERSH AGAINST AIDS



Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, South African Minister for Health, at a press conference in Pretoria giving the report back on the X111th international AIDS conference The conference - held in Durban from 9-14 July 2000 - was the first to be held in a developing country.
Photo: Eddie Mtsweni/PictureNET Africa

By so doing, the intervention would become more multi-pronged in character, would take on a more regional flavour and would be more realistic.

The Task Force transformed itself from a health unit into a multi-sectoral team representing all sectors of the SADC structure directly affected by the epidemic. Seven sectors formed the following three clusters:

- Health and Human Resource Development, Culture, Information and Sports;
- Mining, Tourism and Transport;
- Employment and Labour.

The Health Protocol required each sector within SADC to use its comparative strength to address the needs of those sectors and communities they serve. Hence, the Task Force went about assisting each sector to build its capacity to develop, implement and monitor effective HIV/AIDS programmes with the support of the Health Co-ordinating Unit.

Another strategy set in place was the promotion of interaction amongst sectors through the cross-dissemination of information and sharing of experiences at all stages of the development of sector-specific strategies. All sectors had committed themselves to the broad principles adopted by the Task Force. This allowed for a greater co-ordination and synergising of activities amongst sectors: a necessary ingredient of an integrated regional response to the epidemic.

These processes culminated in the document, *SADC HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework for the period 2000-2004*. It is a laudable business plan with clear objectives deduced from broad principles in the Health Protocol, but refined to clear targets consistent with a set of anticipated outcomes. It is a roadmap to a SADC with a reduced AIDS incidence. The main objective is "to reduce and prevent the incidence of HIV infection among the most vulnerable groups in SADC". Secondly, the team hoped to "mitigate the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS", another achievable aim and a recognition of the fact that HIV/AIDS is as much a health threat as it is a problem of social development. The third objective is "to review, develop and harmonise policies and legislation aimed at prevention and control of HIV/AIDS transmission." Harmonisation of practices is made unavoidable by the cross-border nature of the epidemic and is central to successfully integrate regional strategies. Finally, the Framework urges SADC to mobilise and co-ordinate additional resources for the multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS without precisely spelling out the sources of such aid. However, SADC is expected to make optimal use of available resources, however scarce and

unequally distributed amongst member states, to face its most serious regional challenge.

While concerns have been expressed in some quarters that such an ideal would benefit not only the under-resourced and weak countries, but also their unscrupulous neighbours, the region stands to be the winner in such a syndicated strategy.

On the anticipated outcome of a reduced HIV/AIDS infection, we will have to wait a bit longer to judge. But in the medium term we can expect results to begin to emerge from the implementation of multi-sectoral strategies that integrate socio-economic factors in the responses against HIV/AIDS within and between countries and sectors. The Framework contains micro plans drawn up by each sector detailing their targets, actions and anticipated outcomes within specified time periods. To date, the sectors are already developing actual programmes. Programmes geared at improving expertise and capacity in the surveillance of the pandemic and its attending effects are in place.

On the ideal of harmonised disease control policies with reference to HIV/AIDS, success will depend on the speed with which the multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach takes hold in individual countries and on any successes achieved in capacity-building exercises. Positive signs exist for optimism in this area, in particular because there is overwhelming political will.

The incipient stage of denial and conspiracy theories among political and economic actors is passing. The regional leaders are agreed not only on the serious nature of the problem, but also on the irrevocable need for well co-ordinated and harmonised policies and strategies from all fronts of society. In time, the bureaucracies under the guidance of the SADC Health Co-ordinating Unit (HCU) should produce this harmony of strategies and operationalise them. For some time now, a project on HIV/AIDS policy analysis has been running alongside another on communication to prepare for policy harmonisation. What is problematic, however, is that progress will be determined by the pace of the slowest member state.

Country-based, sector-specific projects under the guidance of a properly staffed and resourced HCU in Pretoria can only augur well for the concept of an integrated approach. Indeed, reports that the Unit has been augmenting its support and expert staff complement to enhance co-ordination and monitoring of progress in sectoral and national programmes are encouraging.

The Task Team has also realised the vital role to be played by other sectors previously excluded from the process. Perhaps most notable is the Food and Agriculture sector, in a region whose economies rely heavily on agricultural production. Poor performance in agriculture in SADC countries can put millions of people at risk of falling into life-threatening poverty and food insecurity. Poverty eradication is vital to creating conditions for a reduced AIDS infection.[11]

The past two years have also seen some success in building partnerships between the SADC HIV/AIDS initiative and some donor organisations providing vital financial support for anti-HIV programmes. The protocol was clear on the need for SADC structures, individual governments, and sectors to strike up smart partnerships with the private sector to maximise existing resources. Crucially, the European Union has stepped in with funding for regional HIV/AIDS programmes as soon as they come into place.

The Health Protocol allows for periodic reviews of the process of developing a regional response to the pandemic. Indeed, the Council of Ministers met again in August 2000 in Windhoek, Namibia. The outcome was a major workshop in November 2000 on the implementation of the Protocol.

## The Caveats

While there are causes for optimism, there are also some caveats which need to be borne in mind. Perhaps most seriously, it has been found that

> The HIV/AIDS dilemma presents challenges to state and human security in the form of deepening food insecurity, weakening household economy and eliminating social capital

only three countries have ratified the Protocol – by the middle of 2001 – meaning that eleven member states were not bound by the developments arising out of the groundbreaking work done in 1999-2000. Even more damning is an indication that the positive outcomes of the process have been unevenly spread among countries and SADC sectors. It is surprising, for instance, that while all sectors worked on the component parts of the Framework, the co-ordinator of the human resource development sector, Jabulani Kunene, reportedly acknowledged the lack of co-ordination among SADC units working on various anti-AIDS strategies and, worse, that many member states were simply incapable of implementing such regional initiatives.[12] This poses many problems for the laudable Strategic Framework, particularly as to whether it will foster the necessary multi-sector co-operation and compensate for uneven institutional capacity among member states to deliver the necessary measures to realise the goals and targets set in the Framework.

Clearly there is political will at the heads of state summits to tackle the whole AIDS problem head-on. But whether this will is widely shared within national governments is not clear. An important indication of such a tendency would be the place of HIV/AIDS in the list of national priorities. AIDS is of serious concern to all SADC governments, but understandably it has to share the slender social expenditure with many other pressing needs such as poverty eradication, education, and the general health of the population.

The difference in the intensity of attention to AIDS as a developmental as well as health problem suggests serious disparities in the conceptualisation of the problem. Naturally, it is usually only when the problem is perceived to be a threat to national and

regional security that states' action will be sharpened. The HIV/AIDS dilemma presents all sorts of challenges to state and human security in the form of deepening food insecurity, weakening household economy and eliminating social capital, thus providing a breeding ground for social protest.

Maybe the strategic framework is not the right platform for articulation of this reality, but somehow it is incumbent on SADC to securitise the incidence of lethal disease epidemics like HIV/AIDS.

Closely related to this point is that while the SADC position is commendable for taking cognisance of the recent innovations as far as viewing HIV/AIDS as a developmental problem is concerned, a significant blind-spot in the document is a failure to see the HIV/AIDS question in terms of security. This begins with a conceptualisation of the problem as a security matter, not only in terms of human security as outlined above, but also a political threat, as suggested in the situational analysis section above, and military security.

Clearly, HIV/AIDS' impact might generate conditions for conflict, violence, and spawn sexual abuse as well, but of greater concern is that it might adversely affect the state's capacity to secure its borders and citizens as AIDS takes its toll on military personnel. It is interesting to note that the security sector was apparently not involved in the conceptualisation of the SADC position, in spite of evidence of an exponential rise in infection rates among national armies in the region and their potential to worsen the spread of infection in the general population

Generally, the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and elimination of violence in society alongside programmes preserving human security ought to be key elements of the overall strategy attacking the roots of the AIDS problem.

Moreover, while the Framework is a brilliant document as far as the long term plans and visions are concerned, the short-term reality is that the region's rates of infection are rising too quickly to wait for such plans to take effect. At current levels, the scourge will have a devastating effect on ailing health systems, families and welfare institutions. Surely, as with any

calamity of a similar scale, the authorities need a disaster management approach, according to which long-term schemes are foregrounded by contingency plans. The SADC team could facilitate a set of strategies – ready to be implemented in the short-term – to respond to specific hotspots and particular problems like the supply of protective material to cross-country truck drivers and prostitutes, care strategies for AIDS orphans and the supply of anti-retroviral drugs to pregnant women.

The Framework has other shortcomings, too: it is silent on both the continental and international contexts of the spread and prevention of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, not least where SADC initiatives fit in the global trends in the fight against AIDS.

Nowhere in the entire document, for instance, does the drugs question feature in spite of the intense interest and publicity that issues of affordability, patent rights, and the behaviour of drug manufacturers have generated. The withdrawal of a daring court interdict instigated by 39 pharmaceutical companies to block the South African government from legislating to allow the production of cheaper medicines for its people is an example. The withdrawal followed intense campaigns by civil society and the South African government to put pressure on drug multinationals to allow measures to make the best medications accessible to those who would not ordinarily afford them. This set a significant precedent, as major western drug companies followed suit by cutting the prices of drugs destined for poor countries by 80-90%, and drug producers from developing countries, notably India and Brazil, offered generic drugs at discounted prices.

Botswana, a SADC member, was the first African country to declare its intention to acquire and use these discounted AIDS therapies for 100 000 infected citizens. Most countries preferred a more cautious stance, pointing out that slashing drug prices to an

average of $350 a person a year is still well beyond the means of millions of sufferers living on well below $1 a day. Just how effective these therapies will be where there will not be proper supervision, skilled support, and where the health system is crumbling and under-resourced has occupied the minds of many within SADC.

Clearly, cheaper drugs need to be part of a fuller package negotiated between the North and South, including revision of the WTO agreement on intellectual property concluded at the 1994 Uruguay Round to make it possible for developing countries to order generic drugs in the parallel market. Secondly, the argument that rather than 'scraps from the master's table' what poor African countries need urgently is help in their bid to reconstruct their health system and eliminate the socio-economic conditions that make AIDS thrive in the region, has gained currency.[13]

The billion-dollar war chest instigated by the UN's Koffi Annan to create such institutional capacity is a significant step in the right direction. Just what SADC makes of these matters is hard to say as the topic is completely shunned in the strategic framework.

Partly because of the institutional focus of the work, there is a conspicuous lack of appreciation of the reality of a long-established medical plurality in which a disease control policy must become mainstream if it is to have an effect on all sections of the population. In fact, the SADC health sector has not fully identified itself with the far-sighted World Health Organisation's undertaking to ensure 'Health For All' in the 21st century through, among other key strategies, creating synergies between western and indigenous health systems.

Hence, moves to unearth the health potential of centuries of indigenous knowledge are being undertaken largely outside the ambit of SADC health structures.[14] On this subject, the Framework limits its focus to encouraging long-standing cultural

> At current levels, the HIV/AIDS scourge will have a devastating effect on ailing health systems, families and welfare institutions

links amongst the people of the region and to using cultural knowledge to manage social responses (such as stigma and denial) to public health matters. In countries like Zambia, for instance, with a population of 10 million, there are only 900 western-educated doctors as compared to over 400 000 traditional healers on register.[15]

Add to this reports of western-style public health systems crumbling throughout the region.[16] In South Africa, where close to 80% of the population and 90% of HIV/AIDS suffers consult the 300 000 indigenous healers, indigenous healers are already part of the process of health policy-making and indigenous pharmacopeia are being studied closely for possible cures and preventives.[17]

Note also that HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily a sexually transmitted disease, making it a problem clothed in cultural and moral sensitivities as epitomised by a recent statement by regional Catholic Church leaders against condom use as part of an acceptable campaign against HIV/AIDS. The impact of religion on sexual behaviour, strengthening social capital and in building institutional support for the care of the affected is self-evident.

Not only is there a need for taking into account relevant religious pre-cepts, but religious healing as a significant resort for thousands of SADC residents when unwell needs to be mainstreamed into the official regional response to the scourge. A partnership between western orthodox medical systems, indigenous health regimes and spiritual healing would maximise the reach of whatever measures are undertaken to implement the regional initiative.

In addition, it is critical for any sustainable response to the mobile AIDS epidemic to make on-going research even of an operational nature a key component of the overall plan. The need to streamline research in a co-ordinated manner into the regional response to the crisis is pressing, given the disjointed and duplicative nature of work in this area. Slowly the large body of social science research into the epidemic and its impact and inputs on how to mobilise social, cultural and political resources to mitigate such an impact is making inroads into policy planning. SADC's social development ministers have, at least once, raised concerns about the nature of research into the epidemic's impact on social policy imperatives to support their initiatives. How this Framework will maximise regional research collaboration and foster synergies among research initiatives in the region is unclear.

> A partnership between western medicine, indigenous health regimes and spiritual healing would maximize the reach of (anti-AIDS) measures

## Conclusion

On the whole, the Southern African regional initiative in response to HIV/AIDS, although belated, is a positive, bold and progressive move. It certainly goes some way towards addressing the old SADC problems of an incapacity to carry out or monitor programmes by including these processes in the very HIV/AIDS strategy itself.

The multi-disciplinary agenda pushed so emphatically in this strategy is beginning to bear fruits in the development of plans and programmes at sectoral level as tributaries to the main strategy against HIV/AIDS. In many ways it furthers the regional agenda, not least in espousing the idea of using the comparative strengths and resources of member states to reduce HIV/AIDS infection in the region as a whole.

As mentioned above, perhaps where the Framework fails is in its exclusive focus on an institutional response, thus trivialising the human potential to deal with a scourge whose arrest depends on changes in human behaviour. Even at that, it baffles one's mind as to why authorities at SADC and country level continue to shape their response around western-style institutions like the public health system, regardless of the limited nature of their reach and in exclusion of vital role players such as religious and cultural institutions.

The result is that one wonders how the majority of the population, whose main resort in times of disease is traditional and spiritual therapeutic systems, would be affected by the regional strategy. ⊙

# Notes **& references**

1 However, as South Africa's President Mbeki recently reflected, regional integration as a people-driven process remains a serious unaccomplished challenge to the region despite the fact that peoples share not only a cultural outlook, but also common languages and experiences. See *Sowetan* (Johannesburg), 20 August 2001, pp 12-3

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5 These figures were cited by Health Economists at the WEF Southern African Summit in Durban in July 1999. See *The Star* (Johannesburg), 5 July 1999, p 3.

6 World Bank, *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000*, Washington, Oxford University Press, 2000

7 See statement of concern from the SANDF, for instance, in *M&G AIDS Barometer* for June 2001.

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10 For controversy over differences in HIV prevalence estimates, see, for example, *Mail & Guardian*, 23 to 29 March 2001, p 6.

11 SADC, *Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review*, Gaborone: Southern African Marketing Company, 2001

12 *MRB*, February 2001, p 12

13 *Financial Mail*, 27 April 2001, p 30; *African Agenda*, vol 3, no 3, p 3; *African Recovery*, June 2001, pp 28-29

14 There are projects to "unearth", preserve and protect the so-called ethnomedical knowledge in Zambia by the Traditional Health Practitioners Association of Zambia. Other similar

donor-funded initiatives exist in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola, for instance. See *IK Notes* in www.worldbank.org/aftdr/ik/default. htm.

15 See M Naur, 'Indigenous Knowledge and HIV/AIDS: Ghana and Zambia', *IK Notes*, No 30, March 2001.

16 This applies to most of the developing world. See, for instance, G Arthur et al, 'The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Hospital Services in Developing Countries: Will Service Breakdown Ensue?', *AIDS Analysis Africa*, vol 10, no 6, April/May 2000, pp 15-16.

17 See *Sunday Times*, 29 April 2001, p 5

# Globalisation and the crisis of higher education in the South

## Case studies of South Africa and Nigeria[1]

BY 'KUNLE AMUWO

Guy Stubbs

There is little doubt that in the same way that the postcolonial African university system was caught between the old and the emerging externally-driven social and economic system at independence in the early 1960s, the contemporary African university is hedged between the logic of globalisation and the market, and the rationality of localisation and of the state. In other words, the same capitalist economic ethic, in the guise of a seemingly value-neutral globalisation thesis, that insists that what is good for international capitalism is necessarily good for developing economies of Africa, is at work in relation to the marketisation or privatisation of the continent's university space. Again, in the same way that globalisation has virtually voided the African state of its capacity for autocentric development,

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empowering it only militarily, not economically, its privatisation agenda on higher education seeks to dis-articulate the university-driven knowledge industry in Africa and to deepen the crisis of the African professor and professional as a global citizen.

Whereas since the mid-1980s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have been relentlessly canvassing the idea of the non-profitability of higher education in Africa (counselling Africa to rather concentrate on primary, secondary and technical education!), in the European Union, higher education has been described as "one of the most important mechanisms for economic growth and social development", the general objective being to "maximise the economic and societal value of higher education".[2]

One observes a similar trend in the United States where the proliferation of universities is considered a welcome development. Indeed, this phenomenon is perceived as a "striking testimony of the value to society of the culture of learning and inquiry that universities nurture".[3]

The argument in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa as well as in militarist and post-military Nigeria is lack of funds. As Jane Hofmeyr and James Moulder have argued in respect of South Africa ,"... it seems to be 'a rule of the game' that the government does not have the resources to equalize educational expenditure at the level of the white norm... given the many competing claims on the budget; huge backlogs in housing and social services; a recessionary economy and the resistance of whites to the redistribution of revenue".[4]

Using an implicit radical political economy theoretic model of analysis, I argue that contemporary scenarios in the higher education sector of many an African state are a function of externally-driven economic reform programmes that do not take into account the peculiar situations and critical needs of the countries in ques-

tion. Africa continues to be treated as if it were a single country, not a continent of diverse states, with recipes for higher education reforms that, in significant respects, should be *sui generis*. In the higher education sector, international financial institutions attempt to empower Africa financially – in terms of millions of US dollars to finance primary and secondary education – only to disempower the continent's otherwise important knowledge industry. Yet, what the continent needs at this time is the resurrection of the idea of the university.[5] I submit that a public-oriented university system funded multi-dimensionally is a *sine qua non* for national growth and development – a position the World Bank seems, albeit belatedly, to have recently embraced, arguing that investments in education and health promote lasting growth and advance the prospects of the poor.[6]

> ... a public-oriented university system funded multi-dimensionally is a *sine qua non* for national growth and development ...

## Between the Logic of globalisation/market and the Rationality of localisation/state

It is interesting, to begin with, to interrogate the meaning and essence of globalisation in both its positive and negative senses. Globalisation does not mean – and ought not to be equated to – universalisation. In other words, it is well-nigh possible for different states to skillfully domesticate or localise globalisation and render it more useful to the resolution of the domestic issues of the day.

The argument is that it is by so doing that globalisation can become more universal – and probably less western – as well as "more specific, more relevant and better adapted to today's world".[7] This intellectual trajectory is located in Zaki Liadi's definition of globalisation as "a global space where the walls are being rebuilt", ostensibly since the formal end of the Cold War. But this is with scant regard to societies within that global space that are still in search of the initial building blocks to build – not rebuild – walls both of defence and of prosperity.

Such societies have had an uphill task not only from the deepening phenomenon of universalisation of the values of globalisation, with its territorialisation of wealth, but also from the fact that an orthodox acceptance of this model has become a socio-economic *desideratum* for poor and weak states in search of investments to capitalise their economies.

Whilst the promise of free choice is ever present, it offers no relief since the dictatorship of globalisation ensures that a redefinition of the universal is more theoretical than practical.

A movement already in process in the West, from a market economy to a market society, is also invoked as an example worthy of emulation by developing states. "This society is only a market," writes an analyst, "social bonding within it takes part only through the exchange of goods, services and products or is determined by a contractual relationship which is exclusively individual".

He adds that that society "develops... without social mediation and, first and foremost, without state mediation".[8]

The other side of the picture is that from the point of view of the Western state, citizens are not altogether atomised individuals left to their own devices and bereft of any form of institutional and corporate succour. On the contrary, the state does care and is also certainly interventionist to assure the greatest happiness and good of the greatest number of citizens.

Shed of all embellishments, globalisation is nothing but western imperialism couched in a more acceptable political language. Since the end of the Cold War, African states have been forced to succumb to the dictates of globalisation, as if it is a value-free and disinterested economic and allied process.

The renewed rat-race to 'catch up' with the West, even though barely stated, seems to be perceived as a process of embracing a strong market but without a strong state, a macro-policy stance that has hardly led to the development of any country in modern history, let alone in the West.

Within this context, one would have expected the recipe for economic recovery proposed to developing

nations to reflect this janus-faced approach in the West. That has, however, not been the case. Rather, globalisation expects Africa to run open, liberalised and non-protectionist economies, even as developed economies are becoming increasingly protectionist in relation to developing countries. Nor is there any room for ostrich-like behaviour: "countries in [Africa] have been forced to realign their policy framework with those of the triad (US, EU and Japan) as a precondition for participation in the trans-national corporation-mediated global economic system".

And that framework takes it as "an article of faith that all interventions must be bad and all governments corrupt and inefficient".[9] In this macro-economic panoply, the importance of government is overlooked and the state becomes little more than a footnote in the development matrix. Elsewhere, though, the state is always very much present. Thus Joseph Stiglitz recognises that the state has to deliver social services for societies to perform and that to do so, they require resources, financial and otherwise.[10]

Semou Pathe Gueye elaborates on this point: "the history of mankind does not give a single example of a country which succeeded in attaining genuine development, without a state, or even without a strong one" Apropos of Africa, the snag is that "the imported state, which colonialism

Higher education in Nigeria was weaned from colonialism. Both Yaba Higher College and University College, Ibadan were created with the main aim of training an educated middle class that would be a hand-maiden to the colonial administration by defending its values and support-ing its policies.

Africa has, to all appearances, been confronted with a no-win situation. Whatever the level of improvement in its macro-economic policies, the Bank is often unim-pressed, arguing that "most African countries still lack policies that are sound by international standards".[12] Thus, Barbara Stallings makes the point that whilst Africa's experience of globalisation has, generally, been one of "few new opportunities and many new problems", one of these being "an incapacity to produce internation-ally competitive goods", East Asia, for instance, has exploited the phenome-non for developmental purposes.[13]

What separates Africa from East Asia is that whilst the grammar of pol-itics used by the international financial institutions has remained somewhat similar, there were differences in meaning and interpretation. Thus, for Stallings, "having an open economy in Asia means being export-oriented, not necessarily open to imports. In Latin America and Africa, it has primarily meant the latter."[14]

Similarly, whilst "market-oriented economies in Asia were not stripped of state capacity to provide infrastruc-ture, training and other incentives", in both Africa and Latin America, "mar-ket orientations (plus the debt crisis)

brought in its bag and mechanically applied in Africa, has obviously failed to be the vector and organ-iser of the devel-opment of (African) coun-tries".[11]

meant that states were so weakened that they often could not perform basic functions".

Stallings concludes that whilst Asia was being modelled after the Japanese model of capitalism, Africa and Latin America were being moulded in the image of the less successful Anglo-American variant.

More specifically, whilst gov-ernments intervened decisively in the Asian states to promote development, the other two continents were encouraged to rely on the private sector for basic services and the market to regulate distribution. Unbridled neo-liberal policies were such that nei-ther institution-building nor the idea of shared growth is considered a pri-mary responsibility of government.[15]

A major consequence of a failed localisation of globalisation in Africa is the drastic reduction in investment and social spending. These sectors are often looted when governments expe-rience balance of payments and bud-getary deficits. When public sector deficits are cut, they generally trans-late into more spending on the securi-ty, safety and intelligence sectors. Investments in education, research and development often suffer miser-ably.[16] Michael Chege contends that fiscal cutbacks in health spending mandated by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) aggravate this social profile: "the diminution of human capability resulting from the degradation in health, education and skills amounts to the single most enduring handicap to the continent's long-term economic recovery".[17]

### Nigeria and South Africa: The road not taken?

It appears that in developing countries an open, deregulated economy can only be operated within the context of a tightly regulated political system. As Labour and other civil society organi-sations contest macro-economic choic-es, the state tends to resort to political arm-twisting, thus rendering the policy process a contested terrain. Dependency is also reinforced by the "open approach to foreign capital, and by the emphasis on free trade policies that leave national industrial sectors largely unprotected from the cyclical swings of the global econo-

my".[18] The drive towards getting new foreign investments, new loans and better aid tends to divert governments away from the people, their primary constituency. In this respect, whatever the merit of the argument that the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy has made South Africa one of the few developing nations able to stand up to the Bank and IMF, its strength being a strict adherence to fiscal discipline "against a cacophony of noise that was saying we should just spend and spend to alleviate the legacy of apartheid", a lot of money still has to be spent judiciously, domestically, so that a multi-racial and multinational democracy can begin to find a positive resonance in the lives of ordinary people.[19] The problem, to be sure, is that key operators of open economies that are not competitive often have a mind-set that, save for foreign investments, their economies will not experience growth. It matters little that the wait for these investments is often long and in vain.

Stallings and Streeck have argued that "Sub-Saharan Africa has been marginalised almost completely from private capital flows and has to rely on shrinking amounts of foreign aid".[20] And when foreign capital eventually trickles in, growth-related economic activities – in line with the IMF's prescription of growth first, redistribution later – are more of a priority than the provision of the people's basic needs. "What ails Africa," writes Michaels, "is that its governments, reformed and under reform alike, remain bankrupt facades, relating more to donor largesse than the poverty of their own populations".[21]

In South Africa, for instance, foreign business interests seem to have more hold on the Mbeki government than domestic interest groups – a direct consequence of the drive for foreign investments. Thus, "as long as the government continues to believe that foreign investment is a greater priority than the local variety, foreign business is likely to enjoy influence beyond that of most South African interests".

Moreover, as long as the drive towards a "crude free market ideology" remains unabated, foreigners, not citizens, will have pre-eminence. Worse, citizens will be encouraged to see business people as "zealous defenders of democracy, good government and enlightened social values".[22]

By 1994, on the eve of the multiracial, constitutional democracy, three major challenges to the Mandela government were identified. These were unsustainable public debt; poverty and moribund economic growth. Seven years later, it is agreed that whilst "macro-economic balance has been restored... poverty is deepening and growth is barely positive". Yet, for GEAR to begin to fulfill its promise – to lay the foundation for a competitive economy – it has to ensure a growth rate of 6% as well create some 400 000 jobs per annum. The annual growth rate has been a mere 3.5%, thus the incidence of rising unemployment and increased poverty.[23]

The point is that not being a labour-intensive, export-oriented macro-economic strategy, it was short on delivery. Having been led to believe the end of the Cold War and globalisation have narrowed "the range of economic policy choice for developing countries", African governments often make it clear to their domestic 'development partners' that there is no alternative to the economic structural adjustment programmes of the IMF.[24] Yet the South African government knows what to do so that multiracial democracy may have a popular resonance. That government is not oblivious of the truism that "foreign capital inflows are not unambiguous blessings and are not costless".[25] What is not clear has been the mix of public and private sector funding.

As Chege puts it, "how much of (the rehabilitation) the new government can take without upsetting stable fiscal and monetary policies to which it is pledged remains a big question".

So, where is the salvation? Whilst acknowledging that "South Africa is in a strong position to supply consumer goods to new markets outside its traditional catchment area in Southern Africa", Chege reminds us that "it has to reckon with competitive substitutes – like textiles and electronics from East and South-East Asia – in a new era of liberalised trade".[26] Moreover the Mbeki government has the UNDP Poverty Report 2000 which urges that poverty be placed at the top of the development agenda: "while 40% of the total population is income-poor, the percentage for black South Africans is 60%. Almost 3/4ths of the population live in woefully underdeveloped rural areas. Many people lack adequate housing and access to basic social services".[27]

The logic of globalisation is such that neither South Africa nor Nigeria can take the road that leads to national prosperity with minimum costs to national sovereignty and dignity. Indeed, the costs of globalisation have been very severe in South Africa.

That country emerged out of the dark alleys of apartheid at a specific historical juncture where the name of the game was globalisation. Having been an international pariah state for a long time, South Africa was willing to play along with the West and its multinational capitalism. Moreover – and this is also true of post-military Nigeria – it does seem that the price to pay for the West's support during periods of political transition is the adoption of market reforms.[29]

Reinforcing a statist macro-economic policy is a seemingly off-hand and snobbish governance system that is gradually turning South Africa into a *de facto* one-party state. Increasingly the tendency is towards a shrinking political arena where political conformism and opportunism are more rewarding than the time-tested political principles of critical reflection, and constructive and patriotic criticism. In the process, the democratic culture of open and robust debate of crucial public matters is being broken down.[29]

Yet, for the success of policy choices, whether it is the seemingly far-reaching higher education reforms or

> Neither South Africa nor Nigeria can take the road that leads to national prosperity with minimum costs to national sovereignty and dignity

the economic African Renaissance, what is needed is "an environment that encourages a flourishing and flowering of ideas...an environment that promotes robust and vibrant intellectual engagements".[30]

Similarly, the contemporary Nigerian experience can hardly be intelligible without a study of the Babangida regime. An IMF-led SAP commenced in Nigeria in June 1986, with the goal of economic efficiency through a combination of fiscal, monetary and structural reforms. Its elements included currency devaluation, subsidy withdrawal, and trade liberalisation. Certain sectoral implications followed: formal stoppage of import licensing; shrinking of the public sector; scrapping of marketing boards; privatisation and commercialisation of several public enterprises and deregulation of the financial system.[31] This reform was fine on paper, but the rigour, discipline and investments necessary to drive reforms were in very short supply. Not only was there a relationship of vacillation between control and *laissez-passer*, worse,

there was a breakdown of discipline on the part of the government.

By the same token, "fiscal policies and control over public expenditure were the most difficult area to implement". The result was an increasing fiscal deficit. Yet, it was in the area of short-term and medium-term balance of payments deficits that the regime claimed that it was most successful.

Through a combination of direct control of the oil industry and an expedient implementation of the SAP, Babangida was able, not unlike the generals before and after him, to foster "economic windfalls for an array of private sector beneficiaries".[32] The latter benefited from diverse opportunities in the non-productive sectors of the economy, which did little to help the SAP achieve its objectives.

The Bank and IMF contributed to the failure of their proposed reforms

In South Africa, the mission statement of the Department of Education is one in which all South Africans "have equal access to lifelong education and training opportunities, which will contribute towards improving their quality of life and building a peaceful, prosperous and democratic society".

Photo. Guy Stubbs

by unbundling the responsibility of the state, particularly in the provision of basic services, onto a fictitious people-friendly private sector.

Patricia Adams has made the point that "the World Bank's single most destructive accomplishment has perhaps been to free Third World governments from the need to deal with their own people, thereby undermining the growth of democratic institutions and legitimate tax regimes throughout the Third World".[33]

Without any advertised review of the previous market reforms, the Obasanjo government, inaugurated in May 1999, embarked on another round of SAPs. In a short space of time, the two main oversight institutions, namely, the private sector think-tank, the Nigerian Economic Summit Group and the National Council on Privatisation headed by the Vice-

President slated no fewer than 74 state-owned companies for sale of equity to be facilitated, it seems, by a promised $1 billion standby agreement as well as a $40 million loan from the World Bank.

Obasanjo, a virulent critic of SAPs outside government – he had notably attacked the Babangida variant for lacking a "human face" – seems convinced that Nigeria's nascent constitutional democracy needs large doses of foreign investments and debt relief to thrive. But he has been as disappointed as his counterpart in Pretoria. This is because "neither… are likely to be forthcoming in significant quantities until the government has begun to implement all the reforms it continues to promise".[34]

To be sure, the Obasanjo government inherited a political economy that was neither viable nor enviable. And if the economy has shown very few signs of recovery, it is because salient negative factors that had, over the years, become structural impediments are yet to be seriously addressed. The government has, however, not confronted this crisis with the urgency and political courage it deserves. The linchpin of Nigeria's economy is oil. Yet, the Nigerian state has shown little will to domesticate and communalise that sector. On the contrary, it allies with multinational capitalism to use that sector for rent purposes for state elites and, consequently, for the pauperisation of the citizens.

As a peripheral player in the oil industry, the Nigerian state is "unable to accumulate enough surplus capital to invest in expanding and modernising the agricultural sector as the engine of growth".[35] Clearly, the Nigerian government plays politics with the strategic oil sector. With all the money at its disposal, ordinary folks, no less than informed citizens, are often confounded that government complains incessantly of lack of funds for basic social services and for better and adequate funding of higher education.

## Driving Higher Education Reforms: Beyond rhetoric and palliatives

It is interesting that, whilst arguments are made in favour of a deregulated market economy, deregulated higher education is frowned upon. Whilst many universities and technixons (or polytechnics) may have embarked on large-scale long-distance learning programmes, there is no denying the fact that they are serving an important social need and filling a big educational gap.

This development raises the larger issue of a university system that is open and flexible enough to ensure easier and greater access to its services from all sections of society. Whatever the differences between Pretoria and Abuja in this context, they share a similarity in matters educational in that "with the conquest of Africa by Europe, Africa was denied the status of a civilisation compared, say, to Chinese or Indian or Western civilisation".[36]

In South Africa, the mission statement of the Department of Education is one in which all South Africans "have equal access to lifelong education and training opportunities, which will contribute towards improving their quality of life and building a peaceful, prosperous and democratic society".

But the legacy of apartheid, structural as it is, has created a dual nation, not just of rich and poor, but also of educated and non-educated, the one reinforcing the other. Avril Joffe et al make the point that "the legacy… of apartheid policies in education will clearly live to haunt a post-apartheid economic policy, just as it undermines the current operations of many industrial enterprises".[37]

In the last seven years or so, some significant changes in the higher education sector have been made with a view to altering the education landscape for good. Key participants, observers and analysts point to the South African Schools Act of 1996 and the Higher Education Act of 1997 that, respectively, brought school children and students in higher institutions together for the first time, and to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), articulated by the country's Qualifications Authority (SAQA) that, again for the first time, integrated education and training at all levels, making the system "the most comprehensive in the world" (according to a former Minister of Education). A national policy and regulatory framework for transforming the higher educational system – *A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education* – was issued in 1997.[38]

Furthermore, there has been progress in improving the quality of education, including the provision of infrastructure. Investment in research and development, with special attention to the information superhighway, has been one of the focal points.[39]

Yet, these improvements have merely scratched the surface of what is, essentially, a systemic and structural crisis. Thus, an important pre-1994 study concludes that "we… observe a relatively uneducated population, a problematic school system, underinvestment in relevant training at the tertiary level and a falling level of commitment to vocational training within the productive sector".[40]

By 1999, notwithstanding significant changes in the system, the outgoing Minister of Education concluded frankly that "striking changes have not yet added up to the transformation of learning opportunities for the poorest South Africans, or to a decisive improvement in the quality of learning attainment for the majority. Inequality is still writ large in the education system, and too many families are on the receiving end of an unacceptably low standard of educational delivery".

Amongst other reasons for this lacuna, the Minister cited the multidimensional nature of the reform programme as well as the extent of damage to the system in the past, requiring a painstaking commitment to reforms that could not be realised overnight.[41] The Ugandan scholar,

> 'The white universities were islands of privilege, in which intellectuals functioned like potted plants in greenhouses. They had intellectual freedom but lacked social accountability...'

Mahmood Mamdani, articulates this phenomenon robustly:

> The white universities were islands of privilege, in which intellectuals functioned like potted plants in greenhouses. They had intellectual freedom but lacked social accountability... In contrast, black universities coming out of apartheid were the intellectual counterparts of Bantustans. They were designed to function more as detention centres for black intellectuals than as centres that would nourish intellectual thought. As such, they had little tradition of intellectual freedom or institutional autonomy. They were driven by the heavy hand of bureaucracy[42]

To understand why virtually all Historically Black Universities (HBUs) are in distress today, Thandabantu Nhlapo contends that we have to revisit the apartheid context "and the cynical origins of the concept of 'bush colleges'". The HBUs were "not really meant to be centres of scholarly excellence or to encourage original thought or critical analysis", especially since this was also a context of "so-called homelands with their own home-grown leadership of generalists with degrees".[43]

As already remarked, there is little doubt that the black majority government is conscious of the intellectual and institutional gap between HBUs and Historically White Universities (HWUs).

What is not apparent is whether it has the requisite political will to undertake systemic reforms as well as mobilise the required funds to, for instance, give free tuition, for a specified period, to all students from all historically disadvantaged national groups who qualify for admission into tertiary institutions.

This is what Nigeria has been doing for close to three decades with good results. Whilst this is a long-term socio-political programme, the first steps have to be taken. To begin with, there is evidence that there is hardly any coherent national policy of higher education training. Witness: at the University of the North, whereas there is reference, in general, to a draft affirmative action policy formulation, it does not appear that its implementa-

tion is a priority for the relevant authority.[44]

Similarly, the formulae for obtaining state subsidies are heavily skewed in favour of HWUs – in terms of facilities on campus; number of students enrolled; annual number of successful students; and capacity to do research and get published.

It may well be that neither the Mbeki presidency nor the ruling party has given enough thought to this phenomenon: market forces may end up determining the higher institutions that will survive. Few former guerilla fighters and ex-anti-apartheid activists now in power seem to ask how fair, just and equitable is a contest whose platform is steeped in legendary inequality and inequities.

In consequence, HBUs are justified in harbouring a "growing sense of disappointment" over the 'failure of the government to acknowledge the role played by [these institutions] in the liberation struggle and their present plight". They are also right to feel slighted that they are being required to compete with HWUs "on an equal footing without any visible help to achieve that footing".[45]

Little wonder that, insofar as government has problems abandoning an exclusivist paradigm of running its tertiary education sector, HBUs continue to lose students and, therefore, are less and less qualified to receive adequate state subsidies.

What is required is a philosophy of change specifically targeted at turning the fortunes of the institutions in question around for good. In this context, whilst *The National Plan for Higher Education* certainly has redeeming features, it is not time yet for *uhuru*.

I find particularly germane to our discourse three elements in the plan: (1) the establishment of student equity targets with black and women students as the target group; (2) redress for HBUs linked to "developmental strategies to build capacity"; (3) tying

research funding to production of research or higher degree students and research publications.

Beyond these potentially rewarding proposals, the plan fails to tackle the structural crises in South Africa's higher educational landscape. The plan thus does not break with an unhappy past. It speaks little to the systemic disadvantages of both black institutions and black students.

Rather, we are treated to a cocktail of macro-economic analyses of efficiency, cost-effectiveness and accountability. Whilst these considerations are certainly not out of place, they acquire meaning and are intelligible only within a political context and a social matrix with level-playing fields for all races, languages and tongues. Secondly, to the extent that four principal issues – economic disadvantage and access; academic disadvantage and access; programme and course offerings; and geographic disadvantage – have not been tackled, any talk about a "new consensus" will be unintelligible.

Worse, "black students... will continue to be on the outside looking in and the creation of a critical mass of black intellectuals and researchers will continue to elude us".[46]

Furthermore, the decision to increase the number of African students and academics from SADC member-states in particular and from the entire continent, in general, is a progressive one. It may also have been a subtle reply to some African politicians and scholars alike that have been criticising Pretoria for doing little, concretely, for the sake of the continent's development. Part of the official *leitmotif* for this policy stance is to change the "overwhelmingly white staff profiles". But this policy may generate an unintended backlash. Again, the decision to grant foreign African postgraduate students subsidies will have to be accompanied by an aggressive pursuit of not only expanding spaces for South African students, but, more significantly, giv-

> Wherever necessary and appropriate, government will have to sacrifice today's non-strategic foreign and domestic interests for tomorrow's future citizenry

ing the greatest majority worthwhile subsidies. Within this context, government has to articulate the transformation of higher education as a key element in the overall macro-economic transformation of South Africa. Wherever necessary and appropriate, government will have to sacrifice today's non-strategic foreign and domestic interests for tomorrow's future citizenry.

Whilst, at face value, there may not be too much similarity between the South African university space and its Nigerian counterpart, in reality the Nigerian university system seems like a chip off the same old block with which South Africans are familiar. Higher education in Nigeria was weaned from colonialism. Both Yaba Higher College and University College, Ibadan were created with the main aim of training an educated middle class that would be a handmaiden to the colonial administration by defending its values and supporting its policies.

As it turned out, colonialism was consumed by its own creation: the educated strata of the society would form the nucleus of the nationalist groups that fought for independence. By the time of that independence in 1960, a university system was beginning to be put in place, with Ibadan, and later Nsukka, Zaria, Ife and Lagos leading the pack.

There was also an intellectual environment, a commitment to truth and "an openness to diverse values, interpretations and frames of reference".[47] Though Nigeria's universities were modelled after some of the best European and American universities, where the dominant ideology is conservative, radical political thought, mainly Marxist, started to gain roots in most of the universities.

Students benefited from the universal and intellectual culture through a series of lively symposia, public and faculty-driven lectures. This intellectual tradition still continues, even though it has lost some of its vigour as a result of drastic changes, principally occa-

sioned by market economic reforms and rampant corruption in the socio-economic and political environment of the universities.

Thus, Nigeria has had a fairly long and robust history of academic freedom. Nwala dates this history to 1919 when the idea of the university as a free and autonomous centre of thought and learning was first articulated and canvassed. It was felt that such centres of learning would introduce cohesion into the body politic, and would help the "native society" regain its lost balance.

Nwala further argues that, on account of their relative freedom, the independence universities did not betray "the hopes which inspired the vision of the early nationalists and their founders". He adds that it was in fact "in the process of being truly themselves that conflict has arisen with the powers that be".[48] But the decline would begin with militarism and military rule, even though part of the golden age of the system was also spent under the military.[49] About 15 years after independence, the universities had been hijacked by "military, political and bureaucratic cliques".[50] As the years wore on, not only academic freedom but also salary and non-salary conditions of service as well as adequate funding were gradually eroded.

Successive Nigerian governments were in a dilemma on what to do with the university system in a period of economic crisis. The option to reduce the number of universities, through mergers or simply shutting some down, was for long on the state's agenda.

Yet, in the face of rapid technological, scientific, economic and political changes in the world, and the continuous need for knowledge, the role and importance of universities would continue to be emphasised. Inadequate funding by government and poor remuneration were used to good effect. Since 1975 when, driven by huge oil revenue, the federal government took over existing universities

and created seven new ones, funding has been used in a stick and carrot diplomacy to regulate the affairs of the universities. The Babangida government cut subventions to the university system; there was also a reduction in the number of scholarships and bursaries awarded to students. Yet, that government promised not to starve the universities of funds.

Subsequent governments have not fared much better, not for lack of funds but on account of withdrawal of subsidies coupled with the sneer incompetence and venality of political authorities. Professor Tunde Adeniran, Obasanjo's first Minister of Education, acknowledged, in May 2000, that about $500 million was missing from the Education Tax Fund, set up by the state to promote education in the country.

On account of poor funding, the quality of university education has degenerated in the past decade. A recent World Bank study claims that "university graduates are poorly trained and unproductive on the job" and that "graduate skills have steadily deteriorated over the past decade". Most astonishing in this report is the claim that the number of graduates in Nigeria outstrips the absorptive capacity of the economy.[51]

To the extent that no jobs are created, about 60 universities and polytechnics that barely admit up to 20% of qualified candidates annually are adjudged as having "over-produced" graduates. We are thus led, indirectly, to interrogate the idea of the university. According to a commentator, "decades of atrophy of the university system has had the result of killing the very idea of the university. The greatest challenge of autonomy would be the resurrection of the very idea of the university; the rebuilding of what used to be known as a university culture with the pursuit of learning strictly at its core".[52]

Nigeria and South Africa find a common agenda for the immediate future: the one, to revamp and revitalise a decaying university culture; the other to fashion, particularly in the HBUs, a viable university culture.

## Conclusion

The notion of globalisation as a market society in which atomised individuals are bound together only by a pat-

> Nigeria and South Africa find a common agenda for the immediate future ... to revamp and revitalise a decaying university culture

tern of exchange of goods and services, and in which the state is more of a 'night-watch man' than interventionist on behalf of the poorest and the most vulnerable, is a false one.

At best, it is a partial picture of the socio-economic system in the most 'open' economies in the world.

For Africa to subscribe to this macro-economic framework with little consultation with critical domestic stake-holders is tantamount to promising people the right to life without giving them the means to live. On the social terrain, it is not enough to empower a people politically; it is more rewarding to empower them intellectually so that they may put political empowerment to socially beneficial ends.

We argue that a conservative, market-driven higher education reform programmes is not in the best interest of South Africa or Nigeria. The drive towards commercial and business studies is a direct consequence of a tame and lame response to the dynamics of globalisation.

If this trend is left unchecked, we will be confronted, in the very near future, with a generation of higher education graduates with little or no liberal education.[53]

For the sake of the long-term interests of the continent, it seems appropriate to reiterate the point that only developing countries that are prepared to confront latter-day colonialism – in the form of multinational capitalism – through a robust and nationalistic response to globalisation, both in their macro-economic strategy and in sectoral reforms such as in higher education, will have a future they can properly call their own. ◐

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# Illegal immigration into South Africa: what policy options?



## BY HUSSEIN SOLOMON

What strategic responses have been and could be adopted by South Africa to deal with illegal population flows? The choice of the term 'strategic' is deliberate, suggesting a comprehensive and long-term vision as opposed to the ad hoc responses which have characterised Pretoria's responses to illegal immigrants thus far. Only with such a strategic perspective can a sustainable solution be found to illegal population displacements.

Drafting such a strategic response, however, is not as easy as it may first appear. After all, illegal immigration into South Africa is as a result of various sources of insecurity within and between Southern African states. This suggests that any strategic response to the question of illegal population flows into South Africa needs to be regional in orientation and multifaceted in approach, tackling such diverse emigration pressures as poverty, environmental degradation and lack of political pluralism and human rights.

What is also clear is that a bridge needs to be found to reconcile the concerns of the illegal immigrant, on the one hand, with those of the state, on the other. In other words, a compromise needs to be found which would satisfy the human security considerations of the illegal alien as well as South Africa's national security considerations.

## Current South African immigration policy

Since 1994, South African immigration policy can best be described as ambiguous. Various factors account for this. In the first instance, it could be argued that the ambiguity relates to the fact that the Department of Home Affairs is one of the few government departments that still does not have a White Paper on Migration Policy. This lack of clear policy guidelines results in ad hoc, reactive and unco-ordinated responses to illegal immigration and confusion amongst civil servants who require clear signals

from policy-makers. Ambiguity also arises from the nature of the Government of National Unity, where one finds that the Minister of Home Affairs, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, whose portfolio includes the issue of illegal aliens, is the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which is known for its hardline anti-immigrant stance.[1] This contrasts markedly with the dominant African National Congress (ANC) that – at least in its policy documents – advocates a softer approach to the issue.

This ambiguity is seen in the government's vacillation between measures of accommodation and control. Measures of accommodation were demonstrated in 1996 when the Department of Home Affairs offered permanent residency to Southern African Development Community (SADC) citizens who met at least some of the following criteria:

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- they can
  demonstrate or
  provide evi-
  dence of con-
  tinuous resi-
  dence in South
  Africa from 1
  July 1991;
- they are
  engaged in productive economic
  activity;
- they are in a relationship with a
  South African partner or spouse
  (customary marriages included);
- they have dependent children
  born or residing lawfully in South
  Africa;
- they have not committed a crimi-
  nal offence as listed in the Aliens
  Control Act (Act 96 of 1991).[2]

According to the Department of
Home Affairs, an estimated one mil-
lion SADC citizens qualified for perma-
nent residency under this amnesty.[3] By
1 October 1996, however, after the
closing date for applications, only 84
815 applications had been received.[4]
Several reasons could be given to
explain the low level of applications

Illegal immigrants cross the border
between SA and Mozambique.
These borders are patrolled and
many of these illegal aliens don't
make it through the mine fields or
the wild animals of Kruger Park.

Photo: HennerFrankenfeld /PictureNET Africa

The first and most
obvious relates to
the fact that the
illegal aliens who
met the conditions
listed above were
far fewer than
estimated by the
Department of
Home Affairs. The second reason
relates to a possible fear on the part
of illegal immigrants that this is a gov-
ernment ploy to identify them for
deportation and subsequent repatria-
tion. In Europe, this fear has partly
accounted for the failure of such
amnesty measures.[5] A third possible
reason for the failure of the amnesty
could relate to the fact that illegal
aliens were not aware of it, despite a
radio and newspaper blitz, as this was
conducted only in English. This would,
for instance, exclude, Portuguese-
speaking Mozambicans who make up
the bulk of illegal immigrants. This sit-
uation is further compounded by the
fact that very few illegal aliens are lit-
erate.

As a result of this failure, the
Department of Home Affairs extended

the deadline for applications indefi-
nitely.[6] In so doing, the Department
has set a dangerous precedent:
research elsewhere in the world has
indicated that such amnesties are
counterproductive in halting illegal
immigration and may even contribute
to greater illegal immigration flows
since prospective migrants are encour-
aged by these periodic amnesties.[7]
After all, one cannot have laws stipu-
lating who may enter one's state and
in what numbers whilst at the same
time rewarding those individuals who
have flouted the same laws by grant-
ing them amnesty and permanent res-
idence. It is also difficult to see how
such accommodation measures
enhance the security of the state and
solve the problems caused by this
form of immigration.

At the same time that Pretoria
embarked on such 'soft' measures, it
also sought to tighten measures of
control. These include greater repatria-
tion and deportation of illegal aliens.
Thus government figures reveal that
90 692 illegal immigrants were
deported to 39 countries in 1994. This
constitutes more than a 100%
increase from 1988 when 44 225 ille-
gal aliens were repatriated. By 1995,
this figure rose to 157 084, including
131 689 Mozambicans and 17 549
Zimbabweans.[8] By 1998, the total of
those repatriated reached a staggering
181 286.[9] In 1999, the figures
climbed to 183 861 but in 2000 they
dropped to 170 317.[10]

Two arguments have since been
directed against such control mea-
sures. The first challenges the inherent
'immorality' of enforced deportations.
This argument posits that given the
years of apartheid destabilisation of
the region, South Africa owes a moral
debt to its neighbouring countries.
This debt prevents South Africa from
employing coercive measures to solve
its illegal alien problem. Rather, the
argument goes, South Africa needs to
accommodate the region's people
within its borders in some form or
another.[11] This argument, however, is
as dangerous as it is fallacious.

It is dangerous because, as any
realist knows, if a relatively safe and
prosperous country – as South Africa
is within the African context – opens
its borders, it risks being overwhelmed
by a massive influx of immigrants from
poor or violent countries:

Any country, rich or poor, that opened its borders might soon find other states taking advantage of its beneficent policy, a neighbouring country whose elite wanted a more homogeneous society could readily expel its minorities; a government that wanted a more egalitarian society could dump its unemployed and poor; an authoritarian regime could rid itself of its opponents; a country could empty its jails, mental institutions, and homes for the aged. In an extreme case, an overcrowded populous country could take over a hypothetically generous country simply by transferring a large part of its population, and an aggressive country would no longer need tanks and missiles for an invasion.[12]

But the logic of the moral argument is also fallacious, and several criticisms can be levelled against such a view. For instance, can the current South African government be held accountable for the actions of the previous, illegitimate, apartheid one? Obviously, the answer is an emphatic no!

Moreover, regional destabilisation was far more complicated than some commentators would have us believe. Certain of South Africa's neighbours benefited a great deal from co-operation with the apartheid state. Malawi, under President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was one of the few African states to enjoy full diplomatic relations with South Africa. For this and for co-operating in other spheres, it received various material benefits from the apartheid pariah. Swaziland, too, benefited from co-operating with the apartheid state. One of the alleged undertakings between South Africa and Swaziland in the 1980s was a secret security agreement. In return, Swaziland was to receive some South African territory – in the form of Ingwavuma – although this did not materialise due to strong opposition from Inkatha.[13]

But, extending the moral argument to Malawi and Swaziland, does this mean that we should close our borders to migrants from these states for co-operating with apartheid Pretoria, while according preferential access to

those states that suffered under destabilisation, such as Mozambique or Angola? If one accepts the moral argument, one must accept its internal consistency.

There is, however, another side to South Africa's relationship with its neighbours during the apartheid era, relating to the relationship between its liberation movements and the Frontline States. Guerrillas of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, fought alongside Zimbabwean African Peoples' Union fighters during that country's independence struggle. This means neither that Zimbabwe owes South Africans a moral debt for assistance in their independence struggle, not that this 'debt' cancels out the 'debt' caused by apartheid's regional destabilisation.

Another criticism of the moral debt argument is that while we should be concerned with the welfare of human beings everywhere, the South African state may owe a greater moral debt to its own citizens, many of whom are homeless, jobless and destitute.

While personally appealing, then, the moral argument is an inadequate basis on which to build policy.

Some of those who embrace the moral argument point out that there are international norms which prevent the state from undertaking coercive measures such as enforced repatriation to deal with illegal immigrants. Once more, there are problems with this argument, stemming largely from the fact that international law is rather ambiguous on the question of trans-border migration. Various global norms have evolved to deal with issues of human rights. The foremost of these is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country". Balancing these rights of individuals, however, are agreements emphasising the rights of states to regulate their borders. For example, the 1985

> ... while we should be concerned with the welfare of human beings everywhere, the South African state may owe a greater moral debt to its own citizens ...

'Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live' states:

Nothing in this declaration shall be interpreted as legitimising any alien's illegal entry and presence in a State, nor shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay...

Hence, the various international legal provisions regarding migration do not take away the power of the state to regulate its borders; states are free to decide who should enter and in what numbers.

A different, and more serious criticism, relates to the efficacy of control measures. Maxine Reitzes notes that despite strenuous control measures, it is estimated that one illegal immigrant enters South Africa every ten minutes, while the Department of Home Affairs has admitted to netting less than 10% of all illegal aliens who enter the country.[14] On the basis of this admission, it is often argued that control measures are obsolete especially in the context of South Africa's long borders. South Africa's coastline is 2 881 km long, and its land boundaries total 4 973 km, including borders with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.[15] This means that government departments such as Home Affairs, Customs and Excise, the Police (SAPS) and the Defence Force (SANDF), all of which are suffering severe manpower constraints, are further stretched by the number of points of entry. There are 65 land points of entry and nine harbour points of entry into the Republic. In addition, there are 35 airports with international point of entry status. By comparison, the UK has only six international airport points of entry. In addition, according to Minaar and Hough, "there are an estimated 400 secondary airports which theoretically

can offer an entry point facility for those wanting to enter the country illegally (either an illegal on a legal flight or a completely illegal flight)".[16]

However, such an argument is also problematic. South Africa's failure to apply control measures should not be seen as a failure of control measures generally. After all, other countries have made extensive use of control measures with a great deal of success. For instance, US Border Patrols along the Rio Grande have managed to reduce the flow of illegal Mexicans into the USA by 60%.[17]

Likewise, despite the length of South Africa's borders, measures can be undertaken to utilise South Africa's limited human and material resources more effectively. First, the number of land, sea and air international entry points needs to be reduced so as not to spread personnel too thinly on the ground. Second, there is a tremendous need for greater inter-departmental collaboration between Home Affairs, the Police, the SANDF, Justice, Correctional Services, Foreign Affairs, Customs and Excise, and the intelligence services to avoid costly duplication and also to work on joint strategies to combat the threat illegal immigration poses to the country. Third, there is a need to concentrate personnel in those areas where the movement of illegal immigrants into the country is greatest. Already some of these routes have been identified.[18]

Finally, control measures should not be seen as mutually exclusive. In addition to measures of enforced repatriation and deportation, there is a desperate need to beef up internal control measures. In my view, this would include tamper-proof identity cards, measures to halt the spiralling levels of corruption inside the Department of Home Affairs, and a comprehensive national registration system (as exists in Sweden) with built-in punitive measures against employers who do not check the national registry before employing anyone.

## The Interventionist Approach
The question that needs to be posed, however, is what alternatives there are to the control measures listed above. One alternative that has been mooted is what I term the 'interventionist' approach.[19] This implies a long-term vision and attempts to address the

root causes that give rise to population movements. The objective of the interventionist approach is to provide incentives for prospective emigrants to stay within the borders of their own country. Essentially, this aims to redress the political and economic causes which give rise to mass migrations.[20]

One line of the strategy argues broadly that political pluralism should be encouraged in the Third World.[21] This is generally seen in terms of liberal democracy, and free, fair and frequent elections. These, the argument runs, would stem political conflict and civil war, and reduce refugee flows. While not disputing the importance of pluralism, it is important to recognise that transitions from a single-party state to political pluralism are delicate. As the resumption of fighting after the elections in Angola in 1992 suggests, it could have the opposite results to those desired. This point holds special relevance to Southern Africa, where "the difficulties which transitions pose are exacerbated by the overall weakness of the polities within which change is taking place".[22]

Recognising that poverty, or rather the lack of economic opportunities, is often at the root of population movements, the interventionist approach stresses the need for economic development within those states from which these population displacements arise. This is often done through special trade agreements, investment programmes and educational schemes.[23] A programme of this kind has been proposed by Italy and Spain, in the hope that these policies will result in job-creation and economic stability and that they will reduce population movements from North Africa into Southern Europe.[24]

One criticism which can be levelled against this approach, however, is that South Africa is a Third World state whose own development needs are such that it cannot become a donor country in the foreseeable future. Moreover, should South Africa have the necessary resources and share this with its neighbours; this is necessarily a long-term project that has contradictory results in the short to medium term:

> The development process itself tends to stimulate migration in the short to medium term by raising expectations and enhanc-

ing people's ability to migrate. Thus the development solution to the problem of unauthorised migration is measured in decades – or even generations... Any co-operative effort to reduce migratory pressures must stay the course in the face of shorter term contradictory results.[25]

A more sophisticated strategy is to encourage regional integration. Proponents of such a strategy see regional integration as the key to stem migration and point to the European Union as a successful example. For instance, Gomel points out that, in the 1970s, countries of southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) ceased to export their "surplus labour" to the more affluent countries in northern Europe as a direct result of EU regional integration.[26] This effectively decreased wage differentials and increased economic and social homogeneity within the EU.

On the surface, such a strategy seems feasible. However, on closer inspection various cracks are revealed. For example, the decrease in population flows from southern to northern Europe was not only the result of economic factors – demographics also played a role. A drop in birth rates decreased the pressure on social and economic infrastructure, thereby increasing the overall living standards of the population.[27]

## Free movement within the region
Another strategy, closely allied to that of regional integration, is the free movement of people. This strategy has been explored extensively within SADC. In June 1995, the Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in SADC was announced with much fanfare. In the course of the following two years, however, it became the object of considerable criticism, and January 1997 witnessed the Protocol being overturned and replaced by the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC.

### The 1995 Draft Protocol
The preamble to the 1995 Protocol notes that the objective of the free movement of people is intimately related to the promotion of interde-

pendence and integration of the SADC region. The free movement of people was also to result in the fostering of a "community spirit" among SADC citizens. But the 1995 Protocol was more ambitious than simply trying to foster regional integration in Southern Africa. It saw such regional initiatives as the first step towards building an African Economic Community, resulting in the free movement of people throughout the continent. Thus, the free movement of people and regional integration as its concomitant were seen as the first steps in realising Kwame Nkrumah's vision of a "United States of Africa", by the drafters of this Protocol.

According to Article 3 of the Protocol, the ultimate objective was to achieve the progressive elimination of all controls on SADC citizens so that there would be free movement of people in the region. Article 2, more specifically, mentions the following rights to be accorded to citizens of member states:

- The right to enter the territory of another member state freely and without a visa for a short visit;
- The right to reside in the territory of another member state;
- The right to establish oneself and work in the territory of another member state.

To realise the objectives of the Protocol, four phases were identified. Phase 1 was to see the visa-free entry of SADC nationals into member states for short visits not exceeding six months. Phase 2 was to see the rights of residence extended to all SADC nationals, while phase 3 was to result in the right to establish yourself, including the right to work. Phase 4 aimed at the elimination of all internal national borders between SADC member states.

There are certain positive features of the Protocol. Firstly, the abolition of visa requirements coupled with the harmonisation, standardisation and easing of the entry procedures for all SADC nationals could have practical spin-offs for all member states.[28] These benefits largely relate to the promotion of intra-regional trade with the facilitation of travel of business people.

A second positive feature relates to asylum-seekers and refugees.



A refugee shows a police officer his documents after he was stopped for speaking French rather than a southern African language. Any persons not looking like South Africans or speaking a southern African tongue are likely to be stopped and checked.

Photo: Shaun Harris/PictureNET Africa

According to Chapter 12 of the Protocol, member states reaffirm their support for the international refugee regime as represented by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; the OAU's 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; as well as other aspects of international humanitarian law. This would mean that states are compelled to house and protect refugees, while there could be no enforced repatriation of refugees. But this is not all. Member states also committed themselves to find regional solutions to the refugee problem that seek to address the root causes of forced migration. In this, the Protocol was clearly far-sighted. Implicit in this

new approach was an understanding that longer-term solutions were needed to complement short-term measures seeking to manage mass migrations.

However, these positive features were overshadowed by the weaknesses inherent in the Protocol. The first problem relates to the fact that, contrary to international experience, the Protocol assumes that the free movement of people would result in the "interdependence and integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the Region".[29] In fact, the free movement of people results from the harmonious integration of national economies of the same relative size. For this reason, Turkey's application for

membership of the European Union was repeatedly turned down for fear that the wage differential might lead to substantial emigration from Turkey to Western Europe.[30] In this context, it is important to note that South Africa's GNP contributes approximately 70% to Southern Africa's regional GNP. To put it another way, the average South African earns 36 times more than the average Mozambican.[31] Such wide wage disparities and economic imbalances have traditionally served as an impediment to regional integration, as the European case illustrates. The collapse of the East African Community in 1977 and the demise of the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1980 also bear testimony to this point. [32]

One of the problems dogging regional integration efforts in the Third World is that labour and capital gravitate to the most developed country in the region. The reasons are obvious – better economic infrastructure, as well as the fact that there is a large supply of workers used to the rigours of industrial labour in the regional hegemon.[33] In Southern Africa, South Africa is such a regional hegemon. Thus, far from resulting in a more equitable regional development, the free movement of people and integration as envisaged in the 1995 Protocol could result in wider disparities within the region. That this is already occurring is seen in the fact that in 1991, nearly 200 recently qualified Zimbabwean medical doctors settled in South Africa and Botswana.[34]

One may conclude from the above that the free movement of people in the region will not be to the benefit of either the more developed or the least developed states of Southern Africa. From the perspective of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, the free movement of people will place an additional burden on their socio-economic infrastructure which would, in turn, spill over into the political sphere, as seen in the rising tide of xenophobia against illegal aliens. From the perspective of Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique, the free movement of people will intensify their brain drain, thus consolidating their underdeveloped status within the region. At the heart of the criticism, therefore, is the fact that the 1995 Protocol did not pay sufficient attention to the

importance of the wide discrepancies among the various national economies. Such economic differences could serve to scuttle the entire process of regional integration.

It is also precisely for this reason that, where regional integration efforts have proceeded among economies of different sizes, no provision is made for the free movement of people. Consider two such regional integration efforts. In the case of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), there is no free movement of people between the USA and Mexico. In fact, the signing of NAFTA has seen the USA strengthening its border controls, as well as the promulgation of new anti-illegal immigration legislation. In the case of the MERCOSUR agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, no specific provisions related to the free movement of persons are included.[35]

It is incredible to think that, despite this wealth of international experience, the drafters of the 1995 Protocol were unaware of the specific dynamics relating to causality between regional integration and the free movement of people.

This, however, is not the only problem inherent in the 1995 Protocol. As noted above, phase 4 was to result in the abolition of all internal borders between Southern African states, but with the external borders being strengthened. In practice, this means that once a national of a 'third' country enters, (s)he can then proceed to any other member state, without any further legal hindrance. But the fundamental issue is that South Africa's own security depends on other countries' abilities to police their borders effectively. Both Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are in a state of civil war and are known not to be in control of large sections of their borders. Moreover, the border police and Customs and Excise officials of several neighbouring states are known to be inefficient and corrupt.[36] In addition, there is no centralised computerised pool that would enable all member states to keep track of movements of third country nationals. Thus, there is a contradiction between the theoretical objective of policy and the practical reality of logistics.

In their attempt to eliminate all internal controls and beef up external

controls, SADC seeks to imitate the Schengen experience in Europe. In June 1985, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain signed the Schengen agreements, although full implementation was only to occur on 1 July 1995.[37]

Like SADC, Schengen member states sought to remove internal controls while strengthening external controls. The weak link in 'Schengenland', however, was the southern European states. They soon became the conduits through which third country nationals moved to the richer northern states, resulting in an increase in illegal immigrants and the smuggling of contraband. The situation became a source of tension between northern and southern Schengen states. As a result, France, citing internal security reasons, decided to continue with passport controls at all its borders.[38]

The lesson is clear: where certain states abrogate their responsibility to effectively police their borders, due to a lack of financial or human resources, the security of all states in such a union becomes compromised. This, in turn, results in tensions between states that could be counter-productive to the integration process.

But it is not only with regard to third country citizens that the removal of internal controls is problematic. There are an estimated 400 organised crime syndicates operating in the SADC region.[39] The scrapping of all internal controls would only serve to boost their illicit activities.

Placing these concerns in a nutshell, Dumiso Dabengwa, Zimbabwe's Home Affairs minister, declared: "We are not ready to sign the protocol on the free movement of people. Doing it at this moment would be like opening the floodgates to criminals."[40]

Given these weaknesses inherent in the Protocol, it came as no surprise when it was retracted and replaced in January 1997.

## The 1997 Draft Protocol

Unlike its predecessor, the 1997 Protocol is more modest in its aims. This is evinced by its very title: the "facilitation of movement of persons", as opposed to the "free movement of persons". The objectives of the Protocol are as follows.

• to facilitate the movement of citi-

zens of member states within the region by gradually eliminating obstacles which impede such movements;

• to expand the network of bilateral agreements among member states in this regard as a step towards a multilateral regional agreement;

• to co-operate in preventing the illegal movement of citizens of member states and the illegal movement of nationals of third states within and into the region;

• to co-operate in improving control over external borders of the SADC community;

• to promote common policies with regard to immigration matters where necessary and feasible.

While the 1997 Protocol also sought to result in the free movement of people within the region, it was clearly cognisant of the difficulties. Note, in this regard, its concern with illegal immigration and the fact that it did not specify a time-frame to achieve the objective of the free movement of persons. This is of crucial importance. Consider the time-frame in the European integration process from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to Maastricht and the emergence of a single currency in 1999.[41] Understanding that regional integration and the free movement of people are fraught with obstacles, it is clear that SADC has, with the 1997 Protocol, adopted a gradual, incrementalist approach as opposed to the 'Big Bang' approach characterising the 1995 Protocol.

Underlining this new approach was an understanding that uneven economic development and the inability of some member states to effectively police their borders could prove to an Achilles Heel for the integration process:

The progressive implementation of the objectives of the Protocol shall particularly be guided by economic and other developments in the region and the particular circumstances of each Member State, the degree to which control over external borders can effectively be established, as well as the requirement for migrant labour within the region;

It is recognised that disparities in the levels of development in the region have led to imbalances and large-scale population movements within SADC, which, if not addressed, will be to the disadvantage of certain Member States.[42]

It is clear that the drafters of this Protocol have understood that the free movement of people in the region has to be preceded by the integration of economies at similar levels of development. The emphasis on bilateral as opposed to multilateral relations is also a welcome break from the past, recognising that, while the rhetoric of a common regional identity is frequently used, it is really at the bilateral level that tangible results of co-operation are often realised, such as the agreements between South Africa's Minister of Home Affairs and his Zimbabwean and Mozambican counterparts.[43]

The 1997 Protocol keeps a practical and realistic tone pertaining to the free movement of people throughout. A case in point is the visa-free entry of SADC nationals into member states for short visits. Recognising that thousands of such people overstay their welcome, the Protocol redefines a "short visit" to mean a period not exceeding 30 days, as opposed to the 1995 Protocol's six months. In addition, a person must meet the requirements for entry into that member state.

This would include proof of financial support during the period, while "the establishment of such an arrangement or not will inter alia be determined by the number of citizens of each Member State who overstay or fail to comply with the conditions attached to their temporary permits in the territory of another Member State, as well as the number of illegal aliens present in a particular Member State".

If there is any criticism to be levelled at the 1997 Protocol, it is that, while member states reaffirm their obligations under the international refugee regime, no provision is made to address the root causes of refugee movements, unlike the 1995 Protocol. While this is an obvious failure, it is also true that the 1997 Protocol as a whole constitutes a marked improvement on its predecessor. But it still has

not come into force since member states were reluctant to sign it at the SADC Summit in Mauritius in June 1998. This reluctance largely related to fears that certain states have lost control over large sections of their territory to insurgent forces, and that other states do not police their borders effectively, resulting in "porous borders".

In other words, the free movement of labour cannot be implemented in SADC in the short to medium term on account of states' uneven economic development and the lack of capacity to effectively police all borders. This does not mean that the idea of the freedom of movement be necessarily abandoned in the region; rather it should be recognised that there are several preconditions before the notion of the free movement of SADC nationals can occur. This would necessarily mean a longer-term project.

## Gazing into the Crystal Ball: SADC and Population Movements in 2025

Any future free movement protocol would, in my view, need to include collective co-operation between Southern African states to prevent mass disorderly movements. A variety of sources of insecurity exist which act as puissant emigration pressures, and which are overwhelmingly transnational in nature: drought, war and disease have no respect for national borders. This necessitates collective, multilateral and regional solutions to effectively deal with illegal immigration in Southern Africa. Hence the need for a collective SADC response to prevent the occurrence of mass disorderly movements. This, in turn, would have policy implications at various levels.

### Compatible border control and entry policies

It is imperative that the SADC member-states harmonise their border control and entry policies since, as the European experience indicates, pressure will always be exerted on the weakest link of the chain. Such pressures could result in inter-state tensions which negatively affect the regional integration project. The following measures can be undertaken to create more compatible border control and entry policies in the Southern African region:

- The criminalisation of smuggling of illegal aliens.
- Assistance in criminal matters for the prosecution of smuggling illegal migrants. This has already started with the establishment of the Interpol office and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs' Co-operation Organisation in Harare, Zimbabwe.
- The establishment of special units and services to combat the activities of illegal migration networks. Within South Africa, the SAPS have established an Aliens Investigation Unit to attempt to curb illegal immigration. In my estimation, such a specialised unit could also be established within the public policing sector of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. This would also be logical since one of the ISDSC's aims is to curb illegal population movements.
- The exchange of information on illegal migration. This is of grave importance since currently SADC states do not possess a common computerised database from which they could track third-country nationals who move into and within the region.
- Procedures and standards for the improvement of control at the border. Border posts are often understaffed, with inadequately trained officials. In addition, several SADC states have ineffective oversight mechanisms.
- Securing of external borders outside authorised border crossing points. Illegal immigrants skirt around official border posts and choose poorly patrolled areas between border posts. Hence it is these areas where border security needs to be beefed up. However, with limited resources, states do not have the capacity to unilaterally secure their own borders. Here there is a need for collective action to secure common borders, especially those where the risk of infiltration is greatest.
- Obligation of transport operators to prevent illegal migration. Financial penalties can be levied on aircraft carriers, ships and the like that allow passengers on board without valid visas for the destination country. This strategy has borne fruit in the North American and West European contexts.

## Harmonisation of asylum and refugee policies

It is essential that all SADC states sign and ratify the international refugee regime, including the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 New York Protocol, as well as the 1969 OAU Convention Relating to Refugees.

Such harmonisation would serve two main purposes: it would ensure that asylum and protection is provided on the same basis all over the region to persons who are really in need of protection, and it would mean that illegal immigrants cannot exploit discrepancies in the application of refugee and asylum laws between SADC states to enter the region.

## Efficient re-admission and return policies

Efficient re-admission and return policies are necessary because of the rapidity and scale of migratory movements in Southern Africa. If there is not greater co-ordination between SADC states, the effects of massive population displacements could adversely impact on the future of the region's fragile polities.

For instance, in 1994, after years of civil war, Mozambique underwent a peaceful transition that led to multiparty democracy. This resulted in a large proportion of its 1,7 million citizens who fled during the civil war returning home. The sheer magnitude of the population flow into

**In states such as Lesotho and Mozambique, villagers sing of the streets of Johannesburg being paved in gold**

Mozambique placed a tremendous burden on the fiscus and resulted in severe social tensions which negatively impacted on both political and economic stability.[44]

Similarly, the Zimbabwean government has recently asked the South African government to slow down the number of deportations and repatriations of illegal Zimbabweans from South Africa to their country, fearing that this will worsen an already bad economic situation that has seen two million Zimbabweans unemployed.[45] Thus, inefficient re-admission and return policies could have the unattended consequence of exacerbating emigration pressures, thus fuelling illegal population flows.

## Information as a means to deter irregular flows

Measures focusing on entry control, readmission and return, while important, are insufficient in themselves and need to be supplemented by preventive medium and long-term measures. One such measure is the spreading of objective information to prospective immigrants in the countries of origin regarding objective conditions in the countries they intend to go to. Such an information campaign was successfully conducted in Albania, for instance, providing information both on regular migration procedures and on conditions abroad, in particular regarding the lack of work opportunities and the mandatory repatriation of illegals.[46]

In states such as Lesotho and Mozambique, villagers sing of the streets of Johannesburg being paved in gold. Such misconceptions regarding the wealth of South Africa could be addressed through a similar information campaign. This could translate into reduced migratory flows.

## Labour agreements as a migration alternative

There is a functional relationship between the closing of formal channels of migration and the growing numbers of illegal immigrants attempting to enter South Africa. Thus, it may be an important facet to maintain and even expand the number of migrant labourers on farms and mines in South Africa.

Coupled with this, however, there must be a stipulation that they receive

the greater part of their salary back home. This would have two spin-offs: it would encourage the labour migrant to return home and not to stay on in South Africa as an illegal immigrant, while these migrants' remittances could assist in alleviating some of the economic pressures operating in the countries of origin which also act as powerful 'push' factors.

### Comprehensive preventive action

Addressing the root causes of population displacements is a prerequisite if other measures are ultimately to be effective.[47]

In this regard, issues like political instability, economic insecurity and environmental catastrophe, all long-term measures, need to be addressed effectively as the prime reasons for population displacements in Southern Africa.

### Human Rights and Population Movements

All the measures listed above relate to state security and how to protect and enhance it in the face of large illegal population flows. The question that now needs to be posed, however, is how we can protect the human rights of the illegal immigrants which are also being systematically abused.

By addressing the root causes of why people are compelled to move, their own individual security and thus the human condition is also enhanced. In this way the concerns of both the illegal immigrant and the state are addressed.

This, however, is not enough. It is imperative that South Africa, together with its neighbours, signs, ratifies and enforces the various international legal instruments protecting the rights of illegal immigrants. For instance, the 1990 Convention on the Protection of

the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families not only acknowledges the presence of illegal immigrants in many countries, but also seeks to extend human rights protection to this sector.

Under this 1990 Convention, illegal migrants have the following rights:

- Freedom to leave any state
- The right to return to the country of origin
- Protection against slavery and servitude
- Protection against arbitrary arrest and interference
- Protection against arbitrary deprivation of property.[48]

In pursuing such a policy approach, SADC states' migration policy would be seen not only to secure the national security considerations of individual states, but would also be humane. ○

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# Sustainable rural industrialisation in Lesotho

## Prospects and constraints

BY IV MASHININI AND G DU T DE VILLIERS



Guy Stubbs

Conventional debates on sustainable rural development in developing countries highlight the importance of sustainable rural industrialisation as one of the key strategies to promote poverty alleviation.[1] Rural industrialisation can be defined using either the locational or the linkages approaches.[2] The former regards an industry as rural on the basis of its location, whilst in the context of the linkages approach a rural industry is one that has both forward and back-ward linkages in the rural areas.[3] Sustainable rural industrialisation is measured using indicators such as the extent of its contribution to income generation, employment generation, conservation of the environment, impact on productivity through the generation of forward and backward linkages within the rural space economy, and the lasting impact and survival of the industries to promote rural development.[4]

Within the developing world, the sustainability of rural industrialisation continues to be hampered by a lack of good governance in the management of micro

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and macro economic variables and a political environment which has resulted in government policies that favour urban industries in terms of investor incentives, provision of development infrastructure services and subsidies to minimise the cost of production.

Rural industries have invariably remained poorly resourced, which forces them to incur relatively higher costs of production and a poor profit margin, thus increasing their chances of poor sustainability. Furthermore, the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) by developing countries has resulted in increased taxation, reduction of government incentives and subsidies, trade liberalisation, privatisation and retrenchment, all of which have, in different ways, aggravated the poor sustainability of rural industries.[5] In southern Africa, the poor sustainability of rural industries in peripheral countries such as Lesotho, has been accentuated by their geo-political and dependent position on South Africa as the regional economic giant, and the negative externalities that emanate from their membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Southern and Eastern African Countries (COMESA).[6]

The objective of this article is to investigate the sustainability of rural industries in Lesotho since independence. The data used in the study was collected through a literature review of books, journals and government documents, as well as unstructured interviews administered to eight rural industries.

## Lesotho's Rural Industrialisation Policies: An Overview

Lesotho's economy is primarily based on subsistence farming. According to the Lesotho Human Development Report of 1998, agriculture contributed an estimated 13% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the secondary sector 44% and services 43% in 1996.[7] The agriculture sector also employed some 72% of the population in a situation of under-employment, who relied on supplementary income from migrant workers in either South Africa or urban areas in Lesotho. Over the years, the contribution of agriculture relied heavily on livestock exports, especially wool and mohair. Although dairy production is

practised, especially in the outskirts of Maseru city, it is insignificant on a national scale. Productivity levels of major crops are low and fluctuate annually. However, in general, productivity levels of maize are 100kg per hectare, sorghum levels are 2 000kg per hectare, wheat levels are 500kg per hectare and beans are 500kg per hectare. These low productivity levels accounted for the low overall production of 136 000 tons in 1995/96.

Lack of food security, sustainable employment and income generation are the biggest human development problems in the rural areas of Lesotho. The relatively high levels of contribution to GDP by both the secondary and services sector were associated with the boom years as a result of transitory spin-offs from the construction phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Projects in the mid-1990s.

When Lesotho attained independence in 1966, there were virtually no industries in the country.[8] The country was totally dependent on South Africa for the import of manufactured goods and services. The dominance of apartheid governance in South Africa coupled with Lesotho's desire to attain full economic independence as well as self-reliance impelled the small country to formulate and implement national industrialisation policies as a matter of priority soon after independence.[9]

The government of Lesotho identified import substitution industrialisation as its key policy. In 1967, the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) was launched as a statutory body "to promote commercial, industrial, mining and tourist activities in the country". The LNDC was also to be "the primary source of medium, long-term and equity financing of the industrial sector".[10]

The LNDC promoted import substitution industrialisation by encouraging private investment especially from foreign investors and public investment through state-owned public enterprises to produce and market some products which were formerly imported from South Africa. Three strategies were used by the LNDC in order to attract foreign private investment. Firstly, special areas were identified as industrial areas – the Maseru Industrial Area, Thetsane Industrial Area, Maputsoe Industrial Area and Ha Nyenye Industrial Area – and these

were developed through zoning, plot division and the provision of basic infrastructure like roads, electricity, water and buildings and, in some cases, basic machinery, and then leased to foreign investors.[11]

The second strategy used by the LNDC to attract foreign investors to Lesotho was to create a conducive production environment for private industrial developers through a combination of government-induced incentives such as a six year tax holiday and preferential access to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Countries (COMESA), as well as access to the European Union through the Lomé Convention for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

Moreover, the government promoted cost-effective labour through enforcing deliberately low wage rates for domestic industrial labour. The foreign private investors were also offered unconditional banking and repatriation of profits.[12] The use of the motto "the sky is the limit" to lure foreign industrial investors into Lesotho, signifies the mood of the LNDC industrial investment policy throughout the years.

The third strategy used to attract foreign investors was the improvement of communication and information flows.[13]

All the five year development plans for Lesotho show that since independence, the main objectives of industrialisation were to generate employment, improve household and national income, create a market for, and value added on local raw materials, and to reduce dependence on imports of industrial products.[14]

In the context of rural industrialisation, implementation of import substitution industrialisation was promoted through the development of Maputsoe as a growth pole to attract propulsive industries to the northern region, and lessen the dependence of the northern region on imports from neighbouring border towns such as Ficksburg in South Africa.[15] The clothing and electric bulb making factories attracted to Maputsoe in the 1970s had no backward linkages in the rural economy of the northern region. The cloth and electric bulb parts used were imported from South Africa whilst the finished products were mainly con-

# LESOTHO

A map of Lesotho showing major towns, rivers, mountain ranges and roads, bordered by South Africa. Latitude lines at 29°S and 30°S; longitude lines at 27°E, 28°E and 29°E. Features include Maseru, Butha-Buthe, Hlotse (Leribe), Teyateyaneng, Mokhotlong, Mohale's Hoek, Moyeni (Quthing), Qacha's Nek, the Drakensberg and Maluti ranges, the Central Range, Thaba Putsoa, and Thabana Ntlenyana 3482m.

sumed in urban areas elsewhere in Lesotho.[16] In the same manner, the many textile industries at the Ha Nyenye industrial area had no backward and forward linkages in the rural regional economy.

The cloth inputs used by these Lee factories are imported from outside the country and their final garment products are also exported to the rest of the world. Their location in the rural areas of Maputsoe and Ha Nyenye has been decided mainly to exploit the cheap Basotho labour in the region. Informal interviews with some of the employees at Ha Nyenye

industries show that the minimum wage of M200 per month which is paid to their labourers falls far short of the national declared minimum wage of M300 per month.

The government of Lesotho has also promoted export-led industrialisation in those products in which it has a comparative advantage like handicrafts. The Village Development Organisation (VIDO) was established in the late 1960s to promote and co-ordinate the production of handicrafts in the country. VIDO was subsumed by Lesotho Co-operative Handicrafts (LCH) in the early 1970s.[17] The

Thabana-li-Mele handicraft centre was established to train Basotho people, especially women, in the production of handicrafts, knitting, sewing, candle making, soap making and pottery. However, this centre closed down frequently due to a shortage of donor funding and a poor commitment of funds by the government of Lesotho.[18]

At the time of research, the Thabana-li-Mele centre had been turned into a multi-purpose school offering training to students on agriculture, brick making and laying, home economics, carpentry and fitting and turning.

In the 1970s, CARE funded the development of a number of handicraft centres throughout the villages in the country to produce grass mats, hats, pottery and other hand-made small items for sale to tourists.[19] These CARE supported handicraft centres generated employment and income for rural households and also used local raw materials as inputs for their products. However, they too failed to become sustainable and closed down because of a lack of a viable domestic market and a poor competitive advantage in the international markets.[20]

The domestic market of the products was targeted at tourists. However, the tourist market in Lesotho collapsed in the early 1980s because it was not eco-tourism oriented but rather based on the multi-racial sex, pornography and gambling available in Lesotho before the Sun International Group introduced them in the former Bantustans in South Africa.[21]

Since the 1980s the government also promoted export-led industrialisation through textile industries initiated by direct foreign investment from the Far East. As a result, manufacturing accounted for 76% of all exports in 1993 and contributed about a 15% share to the Gross Domestic Product between 1992 and 1996.[22]

## Methodology

This paper is based on the results of a survey conducted on the sustainability of eight major rural industries established by the government of Lesotho through donor finance. The survey was motivated by the fact that some of these rural industries have been characterised by frequent closure and nearly all of them are due for privatisation for want of sustainability.

The criteria used in the selection of the eight rural industries was that they were the biggest parastatal rural industries declared as public enterprises by the Government of Lesotho in its attempt to improve rural development and reduce Lesotho's dependence on goods and services imported from South Africa. A checklist was used to conduct interviews with the top management of the eight rural industries in the survey.

## Survey results and discussion

The rural industries in the survey can be grouped and discussed under the headings agro-industries, pharmaceutical industries and shelter provision industries.

Five agro-industries were investigated in the survey. The first, Masianokeng Canners (Pty) Ltd, was launched in 1980 under European Union and LNDC funding to help farmers to produce asparagus to be canned and exported to the European Union. During the off-season of asparagus, the firm did the canning of green beans, peas, baked beans and fruits bought from Basotho farmers. The latter products were subsequently sold in Lesotho. The firm employed about 500 women as casual labourers when in full operation. While the market for asparagus in the European Union was good, the firm failed to operate sustainably and closed down intermittently over the last five years due to the poor top management, lack of funding from the government due to structural adjustment policies and the poor financial management of the firm's own proceeds and funds. At the time of research, many farmers were stuck with unsold asparagus crops for some years because the firm had closed down. The Masianokeng cannery has now been earmarked for privatisation by the government.

In the case of the National Abattoir, the objective was to improve the availability and quality of meat produced for national consumption and reduce dependence on meat supplies imported from South Africa. The abattoir had the capacity to slaughter 120 cattle and 200 sheep per day from individual farmers and the national feedlot. However, the low domestic supplies of livestock for slaughter impelled the abattoir to import some livestock for slaughter from South Africa and sell the meat to individuals, butcheries and institutions in Lesotho.

The abattoir failed to operate in a sustainable manner because of the poor top management seconded from the civil service in the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, the abattoir was heavily dependent on government funding, and the reduction in funding in the 1990s due to structural adjustment policies negatively affected its operations. Furthermore, there was no government protection against meat imports from South Africa due to SACU and SADC trade agreements and the abattoir lost the market to South African meat suppliers for want of a competitive advantage. As a result of its lack of sustainability, the abattoir is up for privatisation as well.

The Maluti Dairy was established in 1973 by the Government of Lesotho and was then financed by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It later received funding from Canada between 1987 and 1992. The objective of the Maluti Dairy is to process milk from the farmers in the lowlands and foothills of Lesotho and market it to consumers in order to reduce their dependence on milk imports from South Africa.

It has milk silos to store milk purchased from farmers in Butha-Buthe for the northern region, Maseru and Matsieng for the central region, and Mohale's Hoek for the southern region. A fleet of milk vans collects the milk from these regional silos three times a week. The processed milk is distributed to consumers throughout the country, especially through shops and public institutions.

The Maluti Dairy operated well when it started. However its sustainability is threatened by poor top management seconded from the Ministry of Agriculture, who lack aggressive business acumen. The products of the Maluti Dairy are also out-competed in the market by South African milk companies such as Clover Milk and long-life milk products. No tariffs exist to protect the milk from Maluti Dairy against these imported milk products due to the Southern African Customs Union agreement, which allow for a free flow of goods and services among member countries. The company's high dependence on finance from donors also impacts negatively on its sustainability, in that there has been a downscaling of operations,

> ... rural industries have been characterised by frequent closure and nearly all of them are due for privatisation ...

especially of milk delivery vans, since 1992 when donor finance from Canada stopped. The company is now earmarked for privatisation.

The National Feedlot Complex started in 1978 with funding from the Government of Denmark. The objective of the National Feedlot Complex was to improve livestock marketing, and to encourage farmers to cull their stock. The livestock purchased from the farmers was fed for 90 days to improve its value before it was sold to the national abattoir and the public. It was also anticipated that Lesotho would export some of the livestock to other countries in southern Africa and the European Union to earn foreign exchange. The aim was thus to reduce Lesotho's dependence on meat imports from South Africa. After some years of closure, the National Feedlot Complex was resuscitated under funding from the European Union up to 1996; then it was funded by the World Bank and Australia until 1998.

The National Feedlot Complex failed to become sustainable because the poor quality and low sales of livestock received from reluctant farmers failed to meet the international standards demanded by the European Union. Its operations also had a high dependence on foreign donor assistance without which it continually failed to become self-reliant. In addition, the poor top management by the civil servants seconded from the Ministry of Agriculture failed to accord the National Feedlot Complex the autonomy needed for aggressive business oriented management. Moreover, rather than reduce Lesotho's dependence on livestock imports from South Africa, the National Feedlot actually ended up importing livestock from South Africa to stock and sell to both the abattoir and the public, thus increasing the country's dependency syndrome. The National Feedlot Complex is in a state of advanced dilapidation and is earmarked for privatisation by the government.

The survey also investigated the sustainability of the Lesotho Pharmaceutical Corporation based in Mafeteng. This industry was launched in 1977 as the Lesotho Dispensary Association (LDA). It was meant to produce medical drugs for use in Lesotho and other parts of southern Africa. The main aim of the government was to reduce Lesotho's dependence on medical drugs from the then apartheid-ruled Republic of South Africa. Therefore, the industry was aimed at import substitution. However, the industry was also export-oriented because some drugs were exported to countries like Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland.

The study found that the industry was sustainable. However, the demand for the domestic medical drugs outweighed the supply. Moreover, democratisation in South Africa led to greater and freer access to South African drugs by countries like Mozambique, and as a result Lesotho lost the export market to South Africa. Within Lesotho itself, the locally produced drugs competed unfavourably with South African drugs for the domestic market. Furthermore, unlike before when the European Community supplied Lesotho with subsidised inputs used by the pharmaceutical industry, since democratisation in South Africa, this has stopped, and the Lesotho Pharmaceutical Company now directly imports the inputs at commercial prices from South Africa. This has raised the costs of production of drugs in the industry and narrowed its profit margin and financial sustainability.

Sustainable human development is dependent, among other things, on sustainable shelter provision. Lesotho sought to promote sustainable shelter provision through the improvement of construction, building and housing. To this end Kolonyama Pottery and Candles (Pty) Ltd, Loti Brick (Pty) Ltd and Highland Ceramics (Pty) Ltd were established as rural enterprises that would produce different utilities in the different facets of sustainable shelter provision.[23]

Kolonyama Pottery and Candles (Pty) Ltd started shortly after independence. It was meant to produce Kwena candles to substitute candle imports from South Africa and reduce Lesotho's dependence. The pottery component of the firm was meant to produce utensils like clay pots, dishes, spoons and mugs. The items were also meant for export to international markets.[24]

The candles component became a dismal failure because the Kwena candles produced were out-competed by the candles circulating in Lesotho freely under SACU arrangements. The production of the candles was thus discontinued. The pottery component was found to be continuing, although the market was said to be poor due to the fact that most Basotho did not purchase the pottery. Moreover, the international market had declined with a shift of foreign tourists from Lesotho to democratic South Africa.

Loti Brick (Pty) Ltd started in 1980 and used clay soil to produce baked bricks for building and paving. The production capacity of the firm was found to be 20 million bricks per year. Like the other rural industries, Loti Brick (Pty) Ltd was meant to reduce Lesotho's dependence on imported bricks from South Africa.

The study found that Loti Brick (Pty) Ltd had a good market in Lesotho, especially in the construction activities of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the middle class in the towns. However, the firm was also found to have competition from bricks imported from South Africa, especially by the elite and petit bourgeoisie in the urban areas of Lesotho. This damaged the financial profitability and sustainability of the firm. Loti Brick (Pty) Ltd was privatised in 1999.

Highland Ceramics (Pty) Ltd started in 1995 in Mafeteng. The industry used clay soil from Tsita's Nek in Mafeteng to produce ceramic floor and wall tiles which were sold mainly to urban based users. The site for the industry was leased by the LNDC to a French company, which produced the tiles. The costs of operations, combined with financial mismanagement, led the industry to close down in March 1998. It had been liquidated and its assets were pending auction by the High Court of Lesotho at the time of interview.

## Conclusions
Analysis of data collected on the state of the eight rural industries discussed in this paper leads to a number of conclusions about the sustainability of rural industrialisation in Lesotho.

Firstly, the industries had poor linkages in the rural regional economies. Some had backward linkages in the economy and no forward linkages; whilst others had neither forward nor backward linkages in the rural economies. In order to become sus-

tainable and promote sustainable rural development, they needed to develop strong linkages, which are necessary to generate multiplier effects within the rural space economy.

Another observation made by the study was that in the majority of cases financial and managerial sustainability were hampered by the weak governance on the part of top management, who were usually seconded from the civil service. The study concluded that good governance typified by innovative, transparent, uncorrupted and accountable management was necessary to ensure the sustainability of rural industrialisation in the country.

In terms of the objectives of the industries, the study noted that all of them were meant to satisfy national political objectives of reduction of dependence on imports from South Africa, national self-reliance and the promotion of regional trade diversification among independent countries in southern Africa. Thus all the industries were import substitution oriented and some were also export-oriented. The sustainability of the goods and services geared for import substitution was hampered by the free flow and circulation of goods and services from South Africa, due to the weak Lesotho government protection as stipulated by the SACU arrangements. More recently, the inclusion of democratic South Africa under SADC has further weakened government protection. Lesotho's export-oriented industrial products also lost the southern African export market to democratic South Africa.

The study concluded that Lesotho needed to produce industrial products

in which it had a competitive advantage such as sand stone cutting and chipping for export to the southern African regional and international markets in order to slice into today's highly competitive national, regional and international markets. It further noted and concurred with Maharaj that, while globalisation may have many benefits and advantages, in southern Africa special efforts have to be devised by governments to minimise the new imperialism promoted by the monopoly of transnational corporations from South Africa on the weak local economies in the region, of which Lesotho is one of the most vulnerable.[25] In order to minimise the negative impacts of transnational corporations from South Africa, southern African countries, including Lesotho, need to give priority to the development of their indigenous private entrepreneurs. Moreover, they should negotiate with South Africa for special agreements on productive and smart partnership ventures.

The sustainability of the rural industries investigated was also found to be hampered by Lesotho's adoption of structural adjustment policies (SAPs), as enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank since 1988. These SAPs have required the government of Lesotho to remove subsidies and incentives for companies and privatise parastatals. However, the removal or reduction of government incentives and subsidies for the industries investigated by this study was found to have resulted in the escalation of production costs and poor financial sustainability, which prompted the retrenchment of labour

and in some cases closure or privatisation of the industries. The study noted that while in theory the removal of subsidies and incentives and privatisation of the industries were meant to improve their producer efficiency, in reality the outcome was the opposite. The industries encountered production difficulties, which hampered their chances of continued sustainability. The study concluded that the implementation of structural adjustment policies needs to be done with greater caution in order to promote sustainable rural industrialisation in countries like Lesotho. Since SAPs have negative impacts on rural industrialisation, they should be discontinued by the government in the area of rural industries. In those cases where this is not possible, the state should devise a policy of privatisation "with a human face", which entails built-in mechanisms that commit the private entrepreneurs to ensure that the rural enterprises they acquire attract enough capital for their sustainability, generate employment and offer social security.

Lastly, the sustainability of the rural public enterprises in the survey was hampered by their dependency syndrome. Some of the enterprises were found to be dependent on inputs imported from South Africa, while virtually all of them were donor-driven. The current down-scaling of donor assistance to Lesotho due to donor fatigue caused by, inter alia, capital flight and lack of good governance, is likely to precipitate the financial unsustainability of the rural public enterprises and promote their closure or "successful" privatisation in the future. ◎

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Photo: Guy Stubbs

# Employment creation in SA townships

## An Emfuleni case study

BY WIM PELUPESSY AND TIELMAN JC SLABBERT

S outh African townships in general lack the capacity to generate adequate income and employment for their citizens, whose purchasing power remains low. Post-apartheid development trends do not necessarily reduce the segmentation of factor and product markets and social services.

The situation might deteriorate further with the restructuring of large urban industries caused by the need to operate on global markets. As a structural inheritance from apartheid, location specific labour market segmentation is not going to disappear automatically with the introduction of market oriented changes in government policies.

The historical background of townships is one of disadvantage in terms of both productive structure and human resources.[1] Even in the case of a highly industrialised area such as Emfuleni – formed by the former Eastern and Western Vaal Metropolitan Areas – townships lack the capacity to generate income and employment for their citizens.

The foundation of towns in the Vaal Triangle economic region, which also includes the Free State's Sasolburg municipality, was related to the exploitation of coal and the establishment of iron and steel works by USCO and ISCOR. At the end of the 19th century large coal deposits were discovered near Vereeniging, which became the location of the first African smelting industry for scrap metals. New iron and steel plants gave birth to nearby Vanderbijlpark and Meyerton, while the chemical giant SASOL led to the development of Sasolburg in the 1950s.

The increase of gold mining and commerce in the Witwatersrand also stimulated the economy of Emfuleni. The region is part of Gauteng, which is economically the strongest province in South Africa. The Vaal Triangle's share in the provincial GGP increased steadily to 9.1% in 1980, but has declined since then to about 8%, which is the level of the early 1970s. However, the industries of the area have maintained an important role as suppliers of intermediate inputs to the rest of Gauteng. The past economic development had been accompanied by the creation of corresponding black labour force reservoirs on the urban boundaries. The oldest township, Evaton, was created in 1904, Sharpeville in 1941, Sebokeng in 1965, Bophelong and Boipatong in 1955, while Zamdela and Refenkgotso appeared near Sasolburg in the 1970s. Extensive road systems link the central economic areas of Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Sasolburg and Meyerton with the sources of labour and other inputs, as well as the markets in and around Johannesburg.

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## TABLE 1: LABOUR FORCE IN EMFULENI 1993-98

| Category | Numbers | | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1993 | 1998 | |
| Population | 823 809 | 881 545 | +7.0% |
| **Economically Active Population** | **341 057** | **364 960** | **+7.0%** |
| | | | |
| Employed in area (formal sector) | 158 937 | 135 860 | -14.5% |
| Informal/part-time | 41 190 | 44 077 | +7.0% |
| Employed outside area | 35 424 | 31 736 | -10.5% |
| **Total employed** | **235 551** | **211 673** | **-10.1%** |
| | | | |
| Unemployed | 105 506 | 153 287 | +45.3% |
| Unemployed (% EAP) | 31% | 42% | |
| | | | |
| **Unemployment in townships** | | | **% EAP** |
| Evaton (incl. Evaton North) | | 41 300 | 52.8% |
| Sharpeville | | 14 700 | 56.5% |
| Boipatong | | 4 600 | 53.5% |
| Bophelong | | 2 000 | 38.6% |
| Sebokeng | | 76 100 | 55.9% |
| **Total 5 townships** | | **138 700** | **54.6%** |
| Total 3 towns (Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Meyerton) | | 6 900 | 10% |

Source: *Economic, Land Use and Transport Plan,* Vereeniging: Vaalmet, 1994; Lekoa Vaal Metropolitan Council, *Economic Business Plan.* Pretoria: Booz, Allan & Hamilton, 1997.

Influx control through the Urban Areas Act, Group Areas Act, controls on small businesses and other regulations not only converted townships and towns into racially segmented residential areas, but created structurally segmented urban labour markets.[2] The restrictions on labour force mobility, education and training led to compartmentalisation of these markets into noncompeting segments.[3] Township dwellers suffered from unequal access to formal employment and education opportunities, and unequal payment for jobs.

Compared to the towns, they also had unequal access to social services such as electricity, water, sewerage and health care. But segmentation also caused distorted relative factor prices in the formal sector which encouraged mechanisation and capital intensive production.[4]

Townships also provided cheap unskilled urban labour; apartheid laws prevented competition for white labour, stimulating increased white wages and giving security to the white towns and centres of production.[5]

All these characteristics and developments have made townships quite different from the usual urban suburbs. But it has also been demonstrated that segmentation became coun-terproductive for South African capitalist development and has to be abandoned.[6] This article intends to investigate this for townships in Emfuleni. It examines to what extent the deregulation of urban apartheid, initiated at the end of the 1980s and accelerated after 1994, has eliminated or reduced the location specific segmentation of labour markets in Emfuleni.

The effects of the restructuring of large industries, dictated by the need to operate on a global scale, are also considered, and it is assessed whether government policies are enhancing the possibilities for a more equitable development of towns and townships in the region.

## Employment and Unemployment in the Post Apartheid Era

After the inauguration of the new democratic government in 1994, real growth rates in South Africa recovered to 23% per annum. However, it is doubtful whether economic growth in the Vaal has provided sufficient employment opportunities for its township citizens. The development of an economically active population (EAP) is shown in Table 1. The EAP (those potentially active or employed,

less those who are unable or do not want to work) increased by 7% in the period 1993-98, while the number of employed decreased by more than 14%. Employment for those residing in Emfuleni, but working outside the Vaal region, decreased by some 10%. The general economic development and industrial restructuring have had unfavourable effects on employment, which seems to be worse in Emfuleni compared to the rest of Gauteng province.

As a consequence, involuntary unemployment rose by 45% in the area, assuming that informal and part time employment increases at the same rate as population growth rate. If the informal sector had grown more, unemployment growth would be less. However, since workers in the informal sector are predominantly survivalists, differences from the unemployed may be small.[7] According to Paul Streeten, the informal sector is characterised by ease of entry, family ownership of the activity, small scale, indigenous resources use and non-formal educational skills.[8] However, the informal sector in the townships of Emfuleni differs in character from these traits. Family ownership of activities is not common; indigenous resources are almost non-existent; and non-formal educational skills are also scarce.

The second part of table 1 shows an estimate of the distribution of the unemployed. There are about 41 300

unemployed in Evaton, 76 100 in Sebokeng and 14 700 in Sharpeville, which accounts for about 86% of the regional unemployed, assuming that unemployment in the towns is 10% of the EAP. An average unemployment percentage for the five townships of 54.6% is unacceptable. These shocking numbers give an indication of the seriousness of the problem and a more precise registration of the jobless in the individual towns and townships may be a necessary first step in the search for solutions.

Table 2 shows data on the geographic distribution of employment, which could be compared with the location of the formal economic activities and job opportunities. Formal businesses are those registered at the Finance Department of the Emfuleni Metropolitan Council and therefore accountable for local taxes. Unregistered ones belong to the informal sector.

Table 2 gives an idea of the relative concentration of jobs in the three towns and of the (insufficient) numbers of people from the townships employed in the towns and outside the Vaal, including those in the informal sector. However, the disequilibrium becomes grotesque when the distribution of the formal economic activities in the area is considered. The generation of turnover and wages is highly concentrated in the three towns. From about 115 000 employed

residing in the five townships a minimum of 28 000 (24%) are working in the informal sector, 17 000 (15%) at the most are working outside Emfuleni and some 70 000 or slightly more than a quarter of the EAP in the townships have jobs in the formal sector. Supposing that formal job losses since 1993 have been at the same rate as the average job losses in the area, a maximum of only 6 600 or 2.6% of the EAP will be employed in the same townships and the remaining 63 400 in the three towns.

In 1998 formal job opportunities were almost absent in the townships, where the great majority of the (black) population lives. It could also be observed that the number of jobs in the five townships has a share of only 3.7% of the formal employment in the area, while their collective formal wage share is no more than 0.5%. This means that wage rates are significantly lower than in the towns. Productivity is also much lower than in the towns, while the number of workers per formal establishment in the township is below the average in the area. We may have somewhat underestimated those employed in the informal sector, but this does not affect the results.

The growth of this sector and corresponding jobs may be related to activities in the formal sector. This relationship may work through productive or income generation linkages. The absence of formal businesses and other economic activities and thus of employment opportunities within the townships of Emfuleni and their persistently high and increasing unemployment ratios mean that location-specific segmentation has not been reduced in the post-apartheid period.

## Profile of the Productive Structure

Analysis of the productive structure may give important determinants of present and future employment opportunities and the possible impact on segmentation. In 1998 a total of 8 530 formally registered companies and public institutions were operating in the area. About 11% are manufacturing companies which generate 60% of the local output. More than 40% of the output is produced by less than 500 metal companies which can be considered the productive nucleus

TABLE 2: LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF EAP, EMPLOYMENT, TURNOVER AND EARNINGS IN 1998

| Location | EAP (%) | Employed (%) | Formal businesses in area (%) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Number | Turnover | Wages |
| Vereeniging | 10.6 | 17.3 | 50.3 | 41.4 | 47.6 |
| Meyerton | 1.7 | 2.0 | 9.9 | 11.6 | 6.9 |
| Vanderbijlpark | 9.0 | 14.8 | 32.2 | 46.6 | 45.0 |
| 3 Towns | 21.3 | 35.0 | 92.4 | 99.6 | 99.5 |
| | | | | | |
| Evaton | 24.2 | 20.8 | 1.9 | 0.12 | 0.20 |
| Sharpeville | 8.0 | 6.4 | 1.1 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Boipatong | 2.7 | 2.2 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.01 |
| Bophelong | 1.6 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Sebokeng | 42.2 | 33.8 | 3.6 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| 5 Townships | 78.7 | 65.0 | 7.6 | 0.40 | 0.50 |
| | | | | | |
| Absolute numbers (in millions of Rand) | 323 294 | 177 686 | 7 878 | 22 364 | 5 048 |

Source: T.J.C Slabbert, *The Vaal Triangle Metropolitan Economy: An overview*, Research Report no 1, Vanderbijlpark: Vaal Research Group, 1999; Lekoa Vaal Metropolitan Council, *Database 1998: Turnover and wages*, Vereeniging Unpublished, 1998

of Emfuleni. Other important sectors are more than 3 300 trade and 3 100 private service businesses. It is also worthwhile to note that within the trade sector 550 garages and sparepart dealers have generated more than 6% of the area's turnover.

In the 1990s little changed in the relative weights of the different economic sectors. The share of manufacturing declined somewhat in favour of private services and finance. Most sectors grew until 1996, but since then growth has been limited. When formal economic activities in the different urban locations are considered, some changes can be observed in the 1990s. In the towns the share of Vanderbijlpark decreased from 51 to 45%, Meyerton and Vereeniging increased from 8.5 to 11% and from 40 to 44% respectively of the total regional turnover. Because of economic decline, Vanderbijlpark lost in real terms, while the two other towns have grown. However, the majority of townships saw their very small share in turnover continuously decline. In the 1993-98 period the total participation of townships almost halved from 0.81% to 0.44%. In the new South Africa there has been a considerable decline in registered or formal productive activities of the townships of Emfuleni, which is another indication of the presence of persistent segmentation.

Most townships were in 1998 worse off than in 1993, with the exception of the Indian community Roshnee, where turnover increased 2% above the inflation rate. The strongest declines could be observed in Evaton, Sharpeville and Sebokeng, with the highest concentrations of the unemployed. This makes it difficult to expect that formal activities could have been substituted by informal unregistered economic employment. When we look at the predominantly trade and service type of activities in the townships, we cannot be optimistic about the generation of formal employment. Productive primary and secondary economic activities are practically nonexistent in townships. As could be expected primary sector businesses are absent, except one stagnating farm in Sebokeng. Eighteen small to very small manufacturing companies are located in Evaton North and Sebokeng. About 60 very small construction businesses are spread over almost all townships. About 75% of all registered output in the townships comes from 380 small trading businesses. The second biggest sector is services. Finally, practically all government institutions are located outside the townships, so neither employment creation nor indirect productive effects may be expected from this source.

In table 3 formal sectoral employment in the Emfuleni area in 1998 is compared with 1993. The negative trends are now more obvious: more than 46 000 jobs have been lost in this period, 28% of the total 1993 formal employment within the area. The formal job losses are now twice as much as estimated in table 1, and the decrease occurred in practically all economic sectors. In absolute numbers manufacturing and trade lost together almost 33 000 jobs – 70% of the total loss. Manufacturing and trade, however, have kept their role as major job providers in Emfuleni, despite their joint share decrease from 60 to 57% of total employment.

> With the predominantly trade and service type of activities in the townships, we cannot be optimistic about the generation of formal employment

## TABLE 3: FORMAL SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE EMFULENI AREA 1993-1998

| Sector | Absolute | | Relative (%) | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1993 | 1998 | 1993 | 1998 | Absolute | % |
| Agriculture | 3 594 | 2 946 | 2,2 | 2,5 | -648 | -18,0 |
| Mining | 289 | 432 | 0,2 | 0,4 | 143 | 49,5 |
| Manufacturing | 60 425 | 40 082 | 36,4 | 33,5 | -20 343 | -33,7 |
| Energy | 2 711 | 1 363 | 1,6 | 1,1 | -1 348 | -49,7 |
| Construction | 10 407 | 9 008 | 6,3 | 7,5 | -1 399 | -13,4 |
| Trade | 40 536 | 28 202 | 24,4 | 23,6 | -12 334 | -30,4 |
| Transport | 5 753 | 5 118 | 3,5 | 4,2 | -635 | -11,0 |
| Finances | 7 025 | 5 404 | 4,2 | 4,5 | -1 621 | -23,1 |
| Services | 35 269 | 27 157 | 21,2 | 22,7 | -8 112 | -23,0 |
| Total | 166 009 | 119 712 | 100 | 100 | -46 297 | -27,9 |

Source: Vaalmet 1994, vol 1, p 29; Slabbert 1998, p 20.

Looking at total business turnover in real terms of the period, one may observe that there was a 7.2% decline, which is far less than either the 14.5% in table 1 or the 28% decrease in formal employment. This means that for both cases output elasticity in Emfuleni was higher than the average of 0.7 at the national level.[9] The only sectoral increase of output in real terms could be found in Finance and Services. But the declines in employment figures, which also occurred in these two sectors, indicate the presence of labour substitution in both.

Average employment by business decreased by 50% in Emfuleni from 28.1 persons in 1993 to 14.1 persons in 1998. This is the result of structural changes where on the one hand small enterprise sectors like trade and (private) services have grown more or decreased less than the others. Township businesses where trade and services are over-represented have had a below average employment generating capacity. On the other hand, sectors with bigger companies in terms of labour, such as mining, energy and manufacturing, became much less labour intensive on average. However, manufacturing and energy together maintained their joint high share in regional turnover and wages. Decreasing formal employment figures in Emfuleni may be occasioned by the economic downturn and the substitution of labour for capital. The latter could be a consequence of industrial restructuring and segmented labour markets in the region. It seems that both temporal and structural problems of productive employment creation in the region should be addressed.

The labour market segmentation between towns and townships in Emfuleni has not disappeared within a decade. Although the population of the towns is becoming increasingly multi-ethnic, townships are still racially divided. It is also clear that educational, skill and other quality of life inequities need time to disappear and the same may be said of the provision of social and other services. How do we overcome the structural nature of this segmentation?

## Functional Specialisation in Emfuleni: The Potential for Job Creation

Ten giant enterprises dominate the economy of Emfuleni, generating more than 40% of turnover and 30% of the total earnings in the area. They also have a lower labour intensity in comparison with smaller companies. The base metal giant ISCOR, located in Vanderbijlpark and Vereeniging, accounts for a quarter of the total turnover in the area. The second biggest, SAMANCOR, is much smaller with 4.5% of the total. Seven out of the ten are manufacturing companies (including energy). The others are ABSA Bank and the two trading companies VANTIM and Shoprite Checkers. The local tax generating capacity of the top ten is also high. In fact the shares of the giants may be bigger since the smaller subsidiaries were not counted.

The two-digit market share of nine of the companies varies between 40 and 100%, indicating their important market power vis-à-vis local competi-tors. One exception is the metal products company, Consolidated Wire, which controls only 12% of the local market.

The magnitude of linkages in the different sectors of an economy gives an indication of development potential and constraints in this economy. An analysis of the backward and forward linkages, as well as the employment and income multipliers of each of the different sectors may show the key sectors to be developed for sustainable employment creation. For this purpose we have used regional input-output information which is not always reliable and the results should be interpreted carefully. Obviously the linkages refer to possibilities for the region as a whole, which may be relevant or not for the townships. A sectoral assessment gives the following image.

The small agricultural sector gets most of its inputs from outside the region and therefore has relatively limited backward linkages within Emfuleni. The forward linkages, however, indicate that 72.8% of the Vaal region's agricultural output is supplied to manufacturing enterprises in the region. The agricultural sector of the Vaal has a relatively high employment multiplier, indicating that for an increase of R1 million in final demand,

> **Although the population of the towns is becoming increasingly multi-ethnic, townships are still racially divided**

59 new jobs can be created. However, if urban agriculture in and around the townships of Emfuleni could be stimulated, a larger number of employment opportunities could be created at a relatively lower cost than is the case with commercial agriculture in general. One of the conditions could be that the artificial lake next to the Vereeniging-Potchefstroom road surrounded by vacant land, should be adapted to provide the water needed for this activity.

A larger percentage of inputs can be manufactured locally in the case of urban agriculture than in conventional commercial farming. The types of implements and other inputs required by small urban farmers are of such a nature that they can be manufactured by SMMEs in the regions, while those of the commercial farmers need to be imported. Spatial urban and rural planning in the Vaal should exploit the agricultural potential for the benefit of employment creation and income generation for households.

The (coal) mines in the Vaal economy sell 90% of their output to local big industries and local backward linkages are small, which is why the employment multiplier is relatively low. This sector is not considered an important sector for employment and income generation in the townships.

Manufacturing has strong backward linkages, mainly within the same sector and with mining and agriculture. An increase in manufacturing production will therefore lead to a growth in employment opportunities, not only in the manufacturing sector, but also in the local sectors supplying inputs to manufacturing.

The local forward linkages of the manufacturing sector are weak, because of the magnitude of outputs being exported to places outside Emfuleni. In this regard, there is much scope for value-added production and employment possibilities in Emfuleni. Strong forward linkages could be developed with new local industries, if for example the manufacturing of more final steel and chemical products

### TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF MULTIPLIERS OF THE VAAL ECONOMY

| Sector of the Economy | Multipliers | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Output (Leontief Inverse) | Employment* | Household Income § | Total Household Income O |
| 1. Agriculture | 3.9071 | 5.8794 | 0.6990 | 6.3327 |
| 2. Mining | 4.1357 | 3.8108 | 0.9297 | 2.8081 |
| 3. Manufacturing | 5.2078 | 4.2664 | 1.0599 | 4.8715 |
| 4. Elec., Gas, Water | 3.6358 | 3.1433 | 0.9519 | 1.9779 |
| 5. Construction | 5.5219 | 4.8551 | 1.1632 | 4.3434 |
| 6. Wholesale, retail | 5.1906 | 6.6248 | 1.2246 | 3.1021 |
| 7. Transport | 4.5099 | 5.2614 | 1.1244 | 2.4433 |
| 8. Financing | 3.6146 | 3.3862 | 0.8612 | 2.3941 |
| 9. Services | 5.1061 | 5.1923 | 1.0888 | 4.1171 |

Notes: * Increase per R 100,000 in the final demand.
§ Increase per R1.00 final demand
O increase per R1.00 expenditure on wages
Source: TJC Slabbert, *Poverty amongst Black Households in the Vaal Triangle Metropolitan Area: A Micro Analysis*, Vanderbijlpark: Vista University, 1997, p 182; Vaalmet 1994, vol 1.

could be stimulated. The importance of the manufacturing sector in employment creation and income generation will also be greater when the possibility of import substitution is considered.

With this in mind, the manufacturing sector can be regarded as a key sector for employment and income generation in the townships. Taking into account that smaller industries have the potential to create relatively more employment opportunities than large ones, the development of SMMEs should be stimulated. A type of co-operative organisation that can help the small manufacturer in increasing access to inputs on the one hand, and to markets for final products on the other hand, will be useful. Also, providing credit and mentorship assistance will enhance the establishment of healthy SMMEs in the manufacturing sector in Emfuleni. A good welder, for example, producing quality tools, is not necessarily skilled in finding markets, obtaining inputs at the best prices, and running a business on sound financial principles. Mentorship in this regard can provide potential entrepreneurs with the necessary skills.

Construction has strong backward and forward linkages in the region. This sector also has a high employment multiplier. According to this analysis, the present RDP housing programme in the townships of Emfuleni should have stimulated the creation of numerous employment opportunities in the local economy during the period of construction. Emphasis on using local contractors should increase employment creation as well as household income in the townships of Emfuleni.

The trade sector has strong backward and forward linkages in the region. For this reason this sector has the highest employment multiplier in Emfuleni. The trade sector could be of great importance to the townships, although currently most of the trade turnover occurs in the towns. Stimulating trade in the townships could lead to increases in employment



Photo: Guy Stubbs

opportunities as well as household income in the townships. The trade sector could be a key sector for employment and income generation in the townships. Existing SMMEs in the trade sector of the townships should be assisted to supply products to households in the townships in a manner that would attract households to buy locally.

Although the Vaal Triangle contributes almost half of the GGP contribution of water and electricity in the Gauteng province, weak backward linkages exist to other sectors of the local economy. Forward linkages are stronger. With regard to the townships, this sector is not considered a key sector for employment and income generation, although forward linkages could create interesting opportunities. In townships opportunities are available in high multiplier sectors of trade, services and manufacturing. In the latter sector one should especially consider the possibilities of outsourcing, subcontracting and other types of decentralisation of the existing giant enterprises. It is important, then, to ask whether recent government policies have stimulated the utilisation of these opportunities.

## National and local job-creating policies

A number of policies have been designed to stimulate the creation of new jobs at macro economic, local and sectoral levels. The main national policies may be found in the GEAR programme, the 1998 Mbeki report and Department of Labour report on creating jobs [10] Only a small number of measures have the capacity to target unemployment in the townships. Most instruments are apparently not specific enough. A considerable number of measures are aimed at win-win situations, combining for instance stimulation of efficiency with job creation, while daily practice gives trade-offs and sometimes inconsistencies between policies.

The structural segmentation of the labour market and the entry-barriers of formal employment for township citizens are insufficiently recognised. Self-employment and informal sector expansions are no alternatives, but may be complementary to formal employment growth. Therefore, specific instruments should target the establishment of formal businesses in the townships and the strengthening of economic linkages between formal

economic activities in the towns and, where existent, the informal ones in townships.

At the local level there are additional investment incentives to promote economic development and employment. These could range from infrastructural upgrading of local areas to the provision of economic support to large and small businesses. The corresponding White Paper gives a good overview of the history and current situation of the local unequal settlement structure.[11] The need and tools for a developmental role of local governments are clearly elaborated and there seems to be ample legal space to stimulate township development. However, the economic and financial space for local government is more restricted because of increased service responsibilities, administrative costs and salary pressures, while operating funds and experienced personnel have been reduced.[12]

For Emfuleni, possible instruments include the funds of the Gauteng provincial Vusani Amadolobha and Gauruds programmes for urban regeneration, which could finance a wide range of non-productive and productive projects.[13] Local councils also offer a limited number of incentives. The Emfuleni Metropolitan Council has a budget to foster economic development on a project basis. The former Eastern Vaal Metropolitan Council gives reduced electricity rates and land prices, and can postpone rates and taxes for a certain period.[14] The former Western Vaal Metropolitan Local Council reduces different percentages on building plan fees, rates and taxes, water and sanitation fees. The interesting point of this scheme is that it is to be granted to investors in townships for industrial purposes.[15]

There were three local projects in 1998 related to revitalisation of townships which are worth mentioning, two conducted by the local government and one by the private sector. The first, a Vusani Amadolobha project carried out in zone 14 of Sebokeng, tried to regenerate the area around the municipal

theatre. The second project aims to develop the Sharpeville Memorial Site, which is not yet in the implementation stage. The third and most developed involves the creation of the Boipatong Development Company, an initiative led by the big enterprise Cape Gate near the township. Stakeholders, representatives from the township community, labour unions, local government and business are participating. A small trade centre, consisting of small service and commerce businesses, was established. But the sustainability of the centre is not yet guaranteed because the businesses are very small, while customers, financial resources, and economic linkages to nearby industries are lacking. The exclusive concentration on trade and service activities is an additional weakness of the project.

In summary, there seems to be a diversity of windows to stimulate broadly defined local development in the area. Nevertheless, the practice of local economic development is still very much behind the evolving policies.[16] But even at this level one cannot distinguish job creation in townships as a priority target. Administrative goals seem to be more important for municipalities. Since most formal small businesses are located outside the townships under white ownership, general SMME support programmes may not necessarily develop in townships. Despite the disappearance of formal redlining policies of private banking, it will still be difficult, if not impossible to get finance to start or extend productive businesses in Emfuleni townships. Increasing crime rates may generally even cause the closure of small businesses in these locations.[17] The economic impact of violence might be bigger in the (black) townships than in the rural areas, despite extensive publicity around attacks on (white) farmers.

Overlooking both national and local policy measures, some methodological points should be raised.[18] Firstly, growth accelerating policies will

not necessarily increase employment and less so in townships. Policies could enhance efficiency or equity and only sometimes both. In a number of cases trade-offs may exist. Secondly, in designing policies one must evaluate which goals can be reached by certain instruments and in which period. Some goals may only be reached in the long run and in an indirect way, like changes in social structures, crime rates, interest in developing certain skills, etc. Policies operate within certain constraints, such as many internationally determined variables like changing speculative capital movements and international prices. Traditions, ecological and climatic conditions are internal constraints that may affect policy results considerably. Finally, it is recommended to specify the distribution of the costs and benefits of policy measures among involved parties.

For example, the stimulation of construction in the townships, making use of formal contractors who are employing only a limited number of township dwellers, will weaken the multiplier effects in the township and the multiplier will further be weakened by income leakages to the formal areas. Not only are productive activities limited to the formal towns, but also the major part of groceries and other consumption expenses of township citizens are spent outside the townships.[19]

## Conclusions and Recommendations

Location-specific labour market segmentation remains a formidable obstacle to equitable development in Emfuleni. High unemployment rates, the virtual absence of formal employment opportunities and low incomes in the black townships show no tendency to disappear.

The impossibility of finding a clear relationship between concentrated unemployment and the location of formal employment opportunities could be attributed to an under-estimation of the specific nature of townships.[20]

These certainly do not belong to the same category of urban areas as traditional city centres, residential suburbs and the like. This is a specific South African problem which needs more than the adoption of either

> Unemployment, the absence of formal employment opportunities and low incomes show no sign of disappearing

western free market models of local economic development or developing countries' self-reliance strategies.[21]

Among the structural factors underlying segmentation one could mention those related to the characteristics of the EAP in townships and the spatial differentiation of productive businesses.

The creation of sustainable jobs in the townships is a first necessity to put an end to economic apartheid in Emfuleni. The growth of a few very profitable big enterprises in the area is not compatible with sharply increasing unemployment rates, which today amount to more than 50% of the labour force in Emfuleni. As demonstrated elsewhere, poverty of township dwellers is intimately related to unemployment.[22] One cannot expect the informal sector to create sufficient demand for labour at prices which guarantee appropriate living and working conditions for a majority. An adequate and reliable local registration system in the different urban settlements is a first condition for the correct design of policies. This should refer not only to direct information about unemployment and employment, but also of productive activities and business plans for the future.

Incentives and regulations should be based on knowledge of the specialised productive structure of the area. Earlier we referred to a number

of key sectors for employment and income generation in the townships. There are opportunities for basic metal related and metal products SMMEs, construction and urban agriculture activities. Therefore, townships should not only specialise in small trade and services. Further integration of townships through productive linkages, outsourcing, establishment of township industries and other formal economic activities should have priority. Based on the local input-output table it is estimated that if only 4% of the imported manufacturing inputs could be produced locally, enough employment opportunities could be generated to accommodate a significant part of the unemployed in the Vaal.

With regard to the construction sector, local authorities should take care that, as far as possible, township firms and labourers are used in the planning and construction of residential, commercial and governmental buildings and infrastructure in Emfuleni. Policies should be designed to ensure that the leakage of income from Emfuleni is limited, especially where contracts are issued by the Emfuleni Metropolitan Council.

The trade sector has the highest employment multiplier of all sectors of the Vaal economy. Job creation, however, must be related to key sectors or enterprises, otherwise it may not be

sustainable. In this regard the public sector (services) could play an important role.

Since 80% of the population lives in the townships, delivery of public services could be located nearer to the consumer, which may lower transaction costs and stimulate a more equitable provision of social services. The establishment of public offices within the townships could attract private businesses to these locations on the one hand, and foster social and economic integration of the towns with the townships on the other. Infrastructure, public security, training facilities and social conditions should be improved to stimulate the productive incorporation of relatively cheap labour in these areas.

A better regulated public transport system may be one of the infrastructural improvements which is much needed to reduce the existing strong segmentation of labour markets between the Emfuleni townships and towns. This reduction can have a positive redistributive effect.

The strategy of providing social housing to the unemployed in places far removed from possible employment opportunities increases labour market segmentation and should be reconsidered.

To give the South African citizens in the townships a real future, policies should aim at simultaneously introducing to these locations public institutions and private productive capital. Linkages with outside key enterprises in the region should be strengthened and labour market mobility of the economically active should be increased.◐

> The establishment of public offices could attract private businesses and foster social and economic integration

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# Democratic Republic of Congo:
# How can we end the war?

BY GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA

What is the nature of the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? Is it a civil war, as the international media persists in portraying it, or is it a case of external aggression, as the authorities in Kinshasa would have it? In spite of the flaws of the regime set up in the DRC by Laurent-Desiré Kabila, we need to acknowledge that its position in this regard may be correct, as the rebel groupings were only established after the invasion of the country by Rwanda and Uganda on 2 August 1998. Thus, to better explore the questions posed above, we need to understand why the war has continued since 1998, even 1996. What disturbed the peace in the DRC? How did

it happen that a country of continental proportions was invaded, occupied and pillaged by Lilliputian states such as Rwanda and Uganda? In sum, the answer to the central question asked above needs to also answer all of these secondary questions.

Consequently, we need to return to the far-off origins and causes of the war in the Great Lakes region to provide perspectives on peace in the DRC. But before examining these, we need to analyse the factors which led to the current crisis. There are three of these: the collapse of the state under the weight of the corruption of Mobutu's regime, the Rwandan genocide and its repercussions in the region, and the expansionist vision of Rwanda and Uganda.

## The collapse of the state under Mobutu

Between 24 November 1965 and 24 April 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko (previously Joseph-Désiré) held the reins of power in Congo-Kinshasa. His centralised power was characterised not only by corruption and poor management, but also by the manipulation of power to his own advantage, including accelerating the privatisation of the state and its resources. Drawing on the example of King Leopold, under whom the entire country as well as its abundant wealth were the private property of the sovereign king, Mobutu was quick to claim the same prerogatives for himself. His royalist pretensions became manifest in various forms, including:

- His inauguration, in 1970, as president for life under the regime of the one party-state;
- His unilateral renaming of the Congo with the insulting name of "Zaire", a Portuguese corruption of a local name for the river, which, to Mobutu, was more authentic than the name of an illustrious ancient kingdom in pre-colonial central Africa;
- His selling off of the national heritage to a few favourites, under the guise of "gifts of the President of the Republic";[1]

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- His subordination, and even betrayal, of the national interest in opportunistic alliances with counter-revolutionary forces in east Africa, including representatives of international financial crime which supported the insurrection of Jonas Savimbi in Angola.

Following the example of their master, the Mobutist *nomenklatura* emulated the behaviour of the president at their own levels of responsibility, combining the misappropriation of public funds, used to enlarge the private fortunes of various patrons and dignitaries, with the creation of a new form of clientelism. This system would result in the commercialisation of all human relations within the state apparatus, and later in the collapse of the latter. Instead of constituting a body of impartial institutions working in the general interest, the privatised state became the monopoly of the president and his entourage. Lacking the means to act, i.e. the human and material resources necessary for its functioning, the state grew progressively less capable of fulfilling even the most basic functions.

Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (right) meets Sir Ketumile Masire, Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and former President of Botswana, in Kinshasa, in April 2001.

Photo: Blaise Musau/AP Photo

This decline grew in intensity as the regime lost legitimacy, both internally and externally. The culmination of this crisis of legitimacy is represented by the National Sovereign Conference (CNS) of 1991-1992. While this attempt on the part of the government to recover its popular sovereignty and re-establish the rule of law did not succeed in installing democracy and social progress in the Congo, it did provide the Congolese people with some significant democratic gains, especially relating to the awakening of a national consciousness and the affirmation of the right to resist an illegal government.[2]

## The Rwandan genocide and its repercussions in the region

The history of the Rwandan genocide is well known, so this paper will limit its discussion to demonstrating the link between its repercussions in the region and the Congolese crisis. Faced with popular resistance to Mobutu's refusal to allow the institutions emerging from the CNS to begin to work for a democratic transition, the illegitimate and diminished state was no longer capable of either stopping the genocide or reacting in an effective manner to its spill-over effects in the Congo.

In the 1970s, the Congolese state had undertaken an ambitious programme to train and equip an army capable of maintaining peace and security within the country and of participating effectively in peacekeeping operations in central Africa.

Fearing the loss of power to young officers trained in the best military academies in the world, Mobutu and his old companions in the *Force publique* (the colonial army), whose rank as colonel or general had little relation to their competence, launched a witch hunt aiming to control the armed forces by a clique of officers who were close to Marshall Mobutu. This clique was notable for its corruption and lack of patriotism, which has been well described in the autopsy of the Mobutu regime written by his relative and collaborator, Honoré Ngbanda.[3]

The misappropriation of funds, the sale of military supplies and the involvement of officers and their superiors in all manner of illicit activities are among the major causes of the collapse of Mobutu's army.

The Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi, took advantage of the situation. First, they used the weakness and complicity of the army to move onto Congolese soil with all of the military equipment that the French soldiers in Operation Turquoise allowed them to take out of Rwanda. As a result, the soldiers of the previous government army as well as the *interahamwe* – extremist Hutu militias – infiltrated refugee camps with the full knowledge of the Mobutu regime and the international community. This had dire consequences for the security of the new regime in Kigali.

Two months after the outbreak of war in October 1996, the Patriotic Rwandan Army of Paul Kagame began to test Mobutu's army's ability to respond by launching attacks on the refugee camps.[4] Having established that they were faced with a paper tiger and nothing more, the Tutsi army launched a massive-scale operation on 6 October, which also

involved Uganda's Yoweri Museveni for reasons which will become clear.

To disguise the expansionist aims of their two states, Museveni and Kagame revived the career of an old Congolese guerrilla fighter turned smuggler, to head a political grouping created entirely in the two weeks after the start of hostilities, on 18 October at Lemera in South Kivu.

The current war, which broke out on 2 August 1998, is nothing other than a settling of accounts between old allies, with Museveni and Kagame having decided to get rid of Laurent-Désiré Kabila following their failure to transform him into a true puppet.

## The expansionist vision of Rwanda and Uganda

After the 12 April 2001 publication of the United Nations expert report on the shameless and criminal pillaging of the Congo's resources, can there still be a reason to doubt the principal cause of the conflict in the Great Lakes region?[5] Whatever the flaws of the report, it is undeniable that Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi are more interested in pillaging the Congo's riches than in pursuing the "negative forces" at large in the Congo.

These three countries have simply annexed vast zones of the Congo, where they are busy systematically pillaging the natural resources of the country, including rare minerals such as coltan.[6]

The conclusions of the UN report constitute a victory for Congolese civil society which has, since 1998, been saying that it is an exaggeration to speak of a civil war in eastern DRC, as it is clear that the rebels of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) are no more than puppets. While Jean-Pierre Bemba does enjoy a certain amount of popularity due to his roots in the region, at the same time he is indebted to Museveni, his political patron, and his moneylenders, which include some of the old generals of Mobutu.

The visit of the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to Kampala on 26 and 27 May 2001, during which he rejected any attack linking Uncle Sam's new African pets to the deaths of more than 2 million people in the Congo, shows to what extent foreign states, including the major powers,

are complicit in the pillaging of the natural resources of the country in crisis. These foreign powers are the main destinations of rare metals such as coltan, and, as receivers of stolen goods, are just as guilty under western law as the thieves themselves.

It is evident that even in its transformations in the context of globalisation, from star wars to the missile shield, imperialism is still seeking regional allies, to better ensure its economic and strategic interests, including access to the resources indispensable to maintaining its hegemony. Unfortunately for the DRC, coltan and other resources found in its soil are necessary for the manufacture and maintenance of the aeronautical and space engines which this hegemony requires.

The Congolese political class having demonstrated its incapacity to serve as a viable intermediary, the country is being conquered, or at least divided up between its neighbours, who are able to extract and transport the resources needed by the aeronautical and space industries to markets in the North. While rebuilding their own national treasuries and allowing military officials to get rich, the client states of the region are carrying out their obligations to their American ally very well indeed.

In this regard, the silence of the USA and Europe towards crimes committed in the DRC and their refusal to impose sanctions against Rwanda and Uganda, even when their behaviour is far worse than that condemned in states such as Zimbabwe, is sufficient proof of the hypocrisy of western discourse on human rights, which is in fact subordinated to economic and strategic interests whenever circumstances dictate. On the other hand, the "new type of African leaders" who are bringing "African solutions to African problems" in the Great Lakes region and whose qualities are highly appreciated in Washington, belong in truth to the well-known category of the guard dogs of imperialism.

## How can we end the war in the DRC?

It is now clear that certain prerequisites are absolutely necessary for the peace process. Because the current crisis is to a large extent due to the collapse of the Congolese state and its

army, the reconstruction of the state and army is indispensable for a lasting peace in the DRC. Secondly, while the war continues because of the illegal exploitation of the Congo's resources by its neighbours, the international community has the duty, according to the UN Charter, to take all necessary measures to put an end to this illicit exploitation. Of these two possible scenarios, the one which offers the best chances for ending the war is evidently the former. A united and well-organised DRC can succeed in pushing the occupying troops back to Kigali, Kampala and Bujumbura. What is uncertain is whether the DRC's leaders have the political maturity and patriotism required to create a happy ending for this scenario, in which a common front against external threats is needed.

One of the great tragedies of the DRC is that Laurent-Désiré Kabila was unable, after two attempts, to show what he could do to unite the country. In May 1997, with his self-proclamation as President of the Republic, he still enjoyed considerable political capital, which he could have used to initiate the reconstruction of the country. Because of his own weaknesses and given the Rwandan hold over his regime, he was unwilling to accept any form of dialogue with the democratic forces which had grown out of the CNS.

As I indicated in a study published in 1998, his first year in power was an ideal opportunity to marry the revolutionary legitimacy which emerged after the fall of Mobutu with the democratic legitimacy of the CNS.[7]

The second auspicious opportunity for the late Kabila to unite the nation arose in August 1998, following the invasion of the country by Rwanda and Uganda. Instead of gathering together all of the patriotic and enthusiastic forces in the country to fight against the invaders and their local allies, the president opted to appeal to foreign troops to shore up his personal power.

It is strange that the man who is often represented by official propaganda as an indefatigable freedom fighter would have preferred foreign professional armies in place of a patriotic war of the country's own sons and daughters. As researchers in the International Crisis Group emphasised

in their report of 20 December 2000, Mzee Kabila "prefers sharing the country to sharing power".[8] In fact, it was precisely to prevent sharing power that he stubbornly continued to block the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

Can we expect anything different from his son? Since his accession to power, Joseph Kabila has multiplied efforts to reassure his foreign supporters of his willingness to move forward with the peace process. He has differentiated himself from his father by the ease with which he deals with the western authorities, his acceptance of Sir Ketumile Masire as the recognised facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and his authorisation of the deployment of the UN's observer mission, MONUC, in the areas controlled by Kinshasa.

However, little has changed within the country, especially with regard to the democratisation process and improvements in the quality of life of the ordinary people. Although he has put an end to the influence of organised warlords in government, certain of his father's local bosses remain powerful. For instance, it does not give a good impression to keep Mwenze Kongolo in power but, in spite of accusations from the UN that he is selling off national resources, he remains number two on the list of ministers.

Apart from that, it is essential that the government shows that it is sincerely committed to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by taking all measures necessary to revive the political climate of the country. The failure of the dialogue will only serve to prolong the crisis and pillaging of the country's resources by its neighbours.

The solution to the crisis of democratic transition, which has continued since 1990, demands that the Congolese people work together, but, at least in the short term, stopping the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources by the countries involved in the conflict will require intervention by the international community. The conflict in the Great Lakes region is a war of resources, initiated by militaristic regimes looking for buffer zones for security, territorial expansion and economic exploitation in a country with fabulous riches but no state or army worthy of the name. Taking these underlying factors into account, this type of war is exposing the victim of external aggression to foreign penetration and control.

This can clearly be seen at the level of international financial crime, whose partners include governments, mafias, banks, transnational companies and arms and drug traffickers.[9] To better entrench their control of the mining, forestry and agricultural exploitation zones, these partners have turned to local allies, through whom they support armed opposition groups. Immeasurably ambitious, the heads of these groups and the drivers of the Congolese war have no scruples about entering into partnership with international criminal networks, whose aim is to promote foreign economic and strategic interests, at the cost of the Congolese nation and people.

The weapons of war are relatively easy to obtain, given their abundance on an international small arms market which is dominated by the major powers and sellers with experience from eastern Europe. But, while the role of external factors is hardly negligible, the primary responsibility still lies with the local actors, who are prepared to act as the straw men of the foreign forces. The vast majority of Congolese do not identify with a rebel movement which is unfamiliar to them, and even consider the heads of this movement to be traitors to the nation.

It is time that the international community abandons its double standards in responding to crimes against humanity and war crimes. If it is just to prevent and to punish ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, then why are the same measures not applied to combat genocide and other atrocities in the Congo and in Africa more generally?

However, the international community will only be able to act in the interests of the Congolese people when they sit down for serious dialogue in the DRC. For such a dialogue to succeed in halting the current crisis and putting an end to foreign interference, it must constitute a responsible and legitimate government, i.e. a government with which the people identify and which they consider to express their aspirations and defend their interests the best.

Such a government will only be acceptable to the extent that it is made up of patriotic men and women, who have the interests of the people at heart and enjoy their confidence. After all the betrayals which the DRC has undergone, from Moise Tshombe to Mobutu to today's rebel leaders, these men and women will need to be above reproach, nationalists who will defend their country at all costs and promote the higher interest of the Congolese nation no matter what. ○

# Notes & references

1   A clamour of applause greeted my denunciation of this "high treason" at the tribunal of the National Sovereign Conference on 14 May 1992 at the People's Palace in Kinshasa. See 'Déclaration de politique générale du professeur Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, invité de la Conférence nationale souveraine (Personnalité scientifique)', which was published in various newspapers in Kinshasa and sold on video in Brussels.

2   See my forthcoming book, *Resistance and Repression in the Congo: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Democracy Movement*, London: Zed Books (2002), in which I devote a large part of the chapter on the struggle for multiparty democracy to an analysis of the nature, functioning and gains of the National Sovereign Conference of the DRC.

3   H Ngbanda Nzambo-ku-Atumba, *Ainsi sonne le glas! Les derniers jours du maréchal Mobutu*, Paris: Editions Gideppe, 1998.

4   E Kennes, 'La guerre au Congo', in F Reytjens and S Marysse (eds), *L'Afrique des grands lacs: Annuaire 1997-1998*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998, p 238.

5   UN, *Rapport du groupe d'experts sur l'exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles et autres richesses de la République démocratique du Congo*, New York: UN Security Council, 12 April 2001.

6   Abbreviation of colombo-tantalite, a natural oxide of iron and manganese which contains niobium and tantale.

7   G Nzongola-Ntalaja, *From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Current African Issues no 20, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1998.

8   International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Nairobi and Brussels: ICG Report no 26, 2000, p 40.

9   See 'Dans l'archipel planétaire de la criminalité financière', *Le Monde diplomatique*, April 2000.

# Swedish relations and policies towards Africa

BY LENNART WOHLGEMUTH

## Early Contact

Not until after the great voyages of discovery in the 15th and 16th centuries did the first Swedes begin to make their presence felt in Africa. During this time Sweden went through a process in many ways reminiscent of what the young states of Africa are going through today.

During the 17th century the Swedish family, de Geer, of industrialists, merchants and financiers, started trade with West Africa. They were involved in the formation of the Swedish Africa Company in 1649 and first anchored their ships at Cabo Corso in April 1650. A treaty was signed with King Bredewa of Futu for a Swedish colony to be built. The Swedes at Carlsborg built a fort, but in 1663 it was overtaken by the Futu and sold to the Dutch. The Castle is still there and is on Unesco's World Heritage List.[1]

Many Swedes travelled on Dutch ships during this time. One of the first European explorers to Southern Africa was Olof Bergh, who served with the Dutch East India Company. He arrived in the Cape Colony in 1676. After many expeditions he eventually took a seat on the judiciary. When he retired, a wealthy man, he purchased the Cape's first vineyard, which was named "Groot Constantia", and is now a museum. His son, Martinus Bergh, became the first Governor of Swellendam.

To obtain safe conduct for Swedish shipping in the Mediterranean and along the West coast of Africa, treaties were signed with Algeria (1729), Tunisia (1736) and Morocco (1763). In 1731 the Swedish East Asia Company was set up,

and in 1773 one of their captains, Carl Gustaf Ekeberg, became the first to chart False Bay while Elias Giers became the first European to explore the Cape Peninsula by land as far as Cape Point.[2]

During the 18th century, the great Swedish botanist, Carl von Linné, sent a number of students on expeditions to Africa. One of the most well-known, Peter Forsskål, went to Egypt while Anders Sparrman and Carl Peter Thunberg travelled to the interior after arriving in the Cape. Thunberg later became the father of Cape Botany, and Sparrman, after sailing with Captain James Cook, returned to the Cape in 1775 and mounted new expeditions into the interior. He wrote the first scientific description of South Africa's fauna and made significant contributions to the geography of the Cape territory. When he returned to Africa in 1787, he brought with him plans for a Swedish colony in West Africa. Together with another Swede, Wadström, he became an active campaigner against the slave trade. On their return to Sweden via London they made statements to Parliament about their experiences and their opinions against the slave trade. Their actions turned out to be one of the factors turning the British public against the slave-trade. Wadström stayed in London and worked devotedly for the anti-slavery campaign throughout Europe.[3]

By the early 19th century, then, a number of Swedes had become firmly established in South Africa. One of them, Anders Stockenström, was known for his liberal ideas. In a

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report to the British government, he wrote that coloureds should have the same rights as whites. After disapproval from the British government and the colonists, he was forced to return to Sweden. He was however, later appointed Deputy Governor of the Eastern province in the British Cape Colony. He signed a number of treaties with the Africans, causing disgust to the colonists, and, eventually, was forced to retire to London. His efforts were later rewarded and he received a knighthood for his achievements in the Cape.

During the late 19th century many Swedes in South Africa became divided between the Dutch and the British and consequently during the Boer Wars, they were to be found on both sides. The Scandinavian volunteer corps who fought on the Boer side suffered very heavy losses at Magersfontein in 1899.

## The Missionaries

From the mid 19th century, a different category of Swedes – missionaries – dedicated their lives to Africa. In addition to preaching, they were also concerned with practical issues such as building schools, hospitals and churches, while engaging in agriculture and small-scale industries. The official church in Sweden, through the Church of Sweden, dominates the picture since up to 90% of the population was born into it. However, the religious history of the last 150 years in Sweden also encompasses the emergence of new revival movements. This diversity is mirrored in the activities of Swedish mission.[4]

The National Missionary Society of Stockholm sent their first missionary to Massaua (present-day Eritrea) in 1866, with the first Missionary Station being set up in Monkullo in 1871. These early links led to Ethiopia becoming one of the first countries to receive Swedish international development aid, in the 1960s.

The Church of Sweden has also had long-standing relations with Southern Africa. Through a unique act of parliament, the Swedish Mission Board was founded in 1874 to spread the gospel to non-Christian peoples. Two years later the Church of Sweden sent its first missionaries to Zululand in South Africa. In 1903 their work was extended to Zimbabwe. The signifi-

cance of the early presence of the Church of Sweden in Southern Africa for the Swedish support of the liberation movements cannot be underestimated.

In addition to the Church of Sweden, several free churches – including the Baptist Missionary, the Swedish Missionary Society, the Örebro Missionary Society and the Swedish Pentecostal Movement – embarked upon missionary work in Africa at an early stage. By 1959, there were around 1 000 Swedish missionaries on the continent. Outside South Africa and Ethiopia, the main areas of concentration were the two Congos, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition, because of the strong connection between the Belgian and Swedish royal families, campaigns were organised to attract Swedes to Congo. The Swedes became the third biggest European nationality in Congo during the late 19th century, after the British and Belgians.[5]

During the first half of the 20th century, the two world wars slowed down the attractiveness of and interest in Africa, but after World War II Swedish attention was drawn to Kenya, and many Swedes established plantations and ranches there. One famous Kenyan-Swede was Baron Bror Blixen, whose Danish wife, Karen, wrote the famous book *Out of Africa*.

After World War II, before official Swedish Aid was launched, Swedish co-operation targeted Ethiopia. The Swedes provided help in developing the Ethiopian air force, as well as the legal, telecommunication and education systems. Swedish doctors, nurses, lawyers, police officers, teachers, and pilots migrated to Ethiopia. The first bilateral assistance agreement was signed in 1954 for a building technology institute in Addis Ababa. Between 1955 and 1962, semi-official aid continued to increase and more countries became involved. In 1962, the first government agency, *Nämnden för Bistånd* (NIB), was created for administering foreign assistance.

Swedish enterprises also began to take an interest in Africa and in 1955 two partners, Swedish Gränges and American Bethlehem Steel, made a huge investment in the iron-mining business, the LAMCO consortium, in

Liberia. In addition to the construction of the mine, roads, railways, a harbour and a town were also built. Mining activities continued until 1989 when the civil war hampered further production. However, this successful investment persuaded other Swedish individuals and enterprises to invest in Africa.

## Political support to the liberation struggle in Africa

Without a colonial past, Sweden remained politically distant from Africa until after World War II. The historical links with Africa – established by emigrants, explorers, scientists, missionaries and businessmen – were, however, significant, and in the early 1960s a growing concern for the struggles for democracy and national independence in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique emerged.[6]

Swedish intellectuals and students started to raise their voices against the South African apartheid regime in the 1950s. A fund-raising campaign in support of the victims of apartheid was launched. After the beginning of the 1960s, this campaign and other initiatives led, with support of the student and youth movements as well as by church representatives, to the formation of a national anti-apartheid committee. Broad-based boycott campaigns against South Africa soon thereafter gave birth to active local solidarity committees and to an involvement with the entire Southern African region. The emerging solidarity movement was assisted by a number of books and articles on Southern Africa by Swedish writers and journalists, as well as by translations into Swedish of texts by prominent Southern African nationalists. Some of the leading national newspapers – such as the liberal *Expressen* and the social democratic *Aftonbladet* and *Arbetet* – joined the solidarity efforts, organising fund-raising campaigns for the liberation movements of Angola and Namibia.

One of the first initiatives by the emerging anti-apartheid movement was to offer study opportunities in Sweden to black students from Southern Africa. Many of these students represented nationalist organisations in their home countries. The relations established proved valuable

when Southern African liberation movements in the mid-1960s intensified their diplomatic contacts with Sweden.

Though it was mainly individuals and political organisations in the liberal political centre first being active against apartheid, humanitarian concerns soon found an echo in the ruling Social Democratic government. As part of Sweden's aid policy, the government in 1964 decided to extend educational assistance to African – mainly Southern African – refugee youth.

The constituent parts of Swedish solidarity with Southern Africa were largely in place by the mid-1960s. A first generation of local anti-apartheid committees, extending their activities to Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, had been formed and the initial reactive humanitarian views had been replaced by a more pro-active and militant approach.

In May 1965, the solidarity movement defined as one of its main objectives to "convince the Swedish government, parliament and public of support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa". The demand for an officially declared boycott against South Africa was at the same time gaining increasing support.

The issue of direct official support to the liberation movements never became divisive in Sweden. The four Prime Ministers, representing different political parties, heading the government for more than twenty years (1969-1991) were all for active Swedish involvement in Southern Africa, as all had become concerned with Southern Africa in the 1950s or in the early 1960s. In 1988, the ANC leader Oliver Tambo characterised the links between Sweden and Southern Africa as "a natural system of relations ... from people to people ... which is not based on the policies of any party that might be in power in Sweden at any particular time, but on ... a common outlook and impulse".

In addition, the exiled leaders of Southern African liberation movements started to visit Sweden and were received at the highest level of government from the beginning of the 1960s. Often invited by the ruling Social Democratic Party, many addressed the traditional Labour Day

demonstrations. The ANC's Oliver Tambo visited Sweden for the first time in 1961. In the case of South Africa, there was thus a difference of some twenty-five years between the first Swedish contacts with the ANC at the highest level of government and corresponding contacts between the ANC and the Soviet Union, France, the UK or the USA, all permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The often very personal relations between Swedish politicians and opinion makers and Southern African leaders facilitated a deeper understanding of the nationalist core of the liberation struggles.

Significantly, the movements with which Sweden first established contacts eventually became victorious in their respective countries (ANC in South Africa, MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe). In the case of Namibia, SWANU initially played a prominent role, but from 1966 SWAPO was seen as the genuine nationalist representative. Direct official Swedish support was never channelled to competing organisations.

It was only through the armed struggle that the liberation movements were drawn closer to the Soviet Union and/or China. Against that background, it is relevant to note that the political relations established in Sweden in practically all cases preceded military operations. Neither the transition to armed struggle nor the links with the Communist countries, however, eroded Swedish support for the Southern African nationalist movements.

Although the nationalist organisations enjoyed increasing support in the mid-1960s, the Swedish government primarily saw them as protest movements against racial oppression and denial of civil rights. With Palme's dramatic entry into the foreign policy arena in 1965, a new generation of Social Democrats would lead the ruling party towards more independent international positions. In March 1966, Palme chaired the International Conference on South West Africa in Oxford. With regard to Southern Africa, it was, however, the developments at the congress of the Socialist International (SI) in Stockholm two months later that decisively marked the beginning of the reorientation.

The break with the cautious past was at the level of policy formulation reflected in a number of articles by the younger generation of Social Democrats. In the era of Vietnam, the foreign policy reorientation introduced by Palme in the Swedish labour movement had a parallel in the liberal movement and encompassed all parties but the conservatives. Pushed by an active public opinion and carried forward by a new generation of political leaders, Sweden was the first Western country to launch a policy of pro-active support to the movements struggling for democracy and self-determination in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique.[7]

Based on that decision, Swedish support to the African liberation movements gained momentum and became a major part of aid from there onwards until 1994 when South Africa became independent. Apart from the other Nordic countries that followed suit (in particular Norway) such consistent support was far from a trend in other parts of the Western world. Thus between 1969 and 1994, Sweden granted SEK 4 billion or US $700 million in official humanitarian assistance to the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Of this amount SEK 1.7 billion went to direct support to the liberation movements. In several areas, the Swedish contributions represented almost half of their non-military expenditures.[8] In addition, the Frontline States in Southern Africa became priority countries for Swedish Aid and received a substantial part of all assistance granted on a bilateral basis.[9]

The scope of assistance to the liberation movements was, however, kept confidential all through the period due to its special nature. As a result, little documentation is available on this exceptional North-South co-operation. To overcome this lack of information, the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala launched a documentation project on the subject. This research has aimed to trace the background to the relationships, presenting the actors and the factors behind the support and addressing the question why Sweden established close relations with the very movements that eventually assumed state power in their

respective countries. Attention has also been paid to the role of Finland and Norway, and interviews have been carried out with around 80 representatives of these movements as well as Swedish and other opinion makers, administrators and politicians.[10]

## Swedish-African relations on the eve of the 21st century

After more than 100 years of missionary work, more than 40 years of development contacts, as well as immigration from Africa, there are now thousands of Swedes who have either personal experience from different parts of Africa or who have personal African contacts.[11] In a study commissioned by the Nordic African Institute in 1998 it was estimated that some 23 100 Swedes had lived and worked in Africa for a period of more than six months between 1960 and 1998. Adding accompanying spouses and children, the total is closer to 50 000.[12] Thus after having only very few relations in 1960 as development aid was introduced in Sweden, today a substantial group of the Swedish population is familiar with Africa and its present development.

### Swedish Development Assistance

Official Swedish Development assistance was initiated in 1962 in a bill to Parliament, which still forms the backbone of the present aid policies. The policies are presently being reviewed for the third time. The overall goals for Swedish development co-operation have for almost 40 years been to raise the standard of living of poorer groups of people in the world. The following six specific objectives have been adopted to achieve this overall goal:
- Economic growth
- Economic and political independence
- Economic and social equality
- Democratic development in society
- The long term, sustainable management of natural resources and the protection of the environment
- Equality between men and women.

With no colonial past or other political or economic objectives Sweden has to a large extent been able to channel its support to the poorest countries and to strengthen the multilateral system. Solidarity has been the ultimate reason for aid, allowing for relatively high allocations and low tying of the aid to Swedish goods and services. In annual assessments made by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Sweden has therefore been one of the most successful countries in fulfilling the overall commitments to the UN and other international fora.[13]

Swedish aid to Africa has aimed at supporting the liberation struggles, the poorest countries, and providing humanitarian assistance. Moreover, regional co-operation between countries in Africa has been substantially supported.

In 1968 Sweden decided to set aside 1% of its GDP for aid, a goal reached in 1975/76. During the second half of the 1990s Swedish aid decreased to 0.7% of GDP, a level maintained since that time, with a slight increase. The total disbursement of Swedish aid was SEK 13.316 billion in 1999 (0.705%) of which 30% went to multilateral aid, 6% to NGOs, 12% to humanitarian aid and SEK 2.945 billion to development aid in Africa (38% of bilateral support).[14]

Sida (the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency) is the government agency dealing with bilateral international development co-operation, including a major part of co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe. The parliament and government of Sweden determine the economic framework, i.e. the countries with which co-operation will be undertaken and the emphasis of that co-operation. Presently, Sida supports activities in almost 120 different countries. The majority of resources are allocated to the 20 or so countries with which Sida implements more long-term and extensive co-operation – most of which are in Africa.

Sida's support is based on plans made by the co-operating partner countries themselves, to which the countries are prepared to give considerable emphasis and to dedicate resources. Sida's task is to carefully consider the plans, select activities with potential for successful results and then provide expertise and capital. Each input is carefully monitored and evaluated. Sida's financing of any project ceases as soon as it operates independently. Less successful projects should be brought to an end as soon as possible rather than being redesigned.

Sida operates via approximately 1 500 co-operating partners, most of them Swedish. These partners consist of companies, popular movements and NGOs, organisations, colleges or universities, and government authorities who possess the expertise to make Swedish development co-operation successful.[15]

In the long run, Swedish development co-operation aims at wider economic and social co-operation, which is mutually beneficial to all parties involved.

Every year almost 300 Swedish NGOs receive support for development projects according to the "80/20 principle", i.e. if the organisation finances 20% of the project, Sida will contribute the remaining 80%. The major part of Swedish humanitarian assistance is also channelled via NGOs. (Sida does not require any financial contribution from the organisations for these activities.) Projects are implemented in close co-operation with local partners and are generally based on local popular participation – from planning to implementation.[16]

Approximately one third of Sweden's development co-operation is channelled, via the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), to a number of multilateral organisations – primarily the various UN agencies, the World Bank group, the regional development banks and the EU. Support is provided both as core contributions to regular operations and as support to special activities. Through its membership of the EU, Sweden contributes to extensive development co-operation activities administered by the EU Commission. Approximately half of EU development support is allocated to 71 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries) within the framework of the Lomé Convention.

### Trade

In 1950 the African region's share of total Swedish exports was about 3.6%. Due mainly to official interventions as a consequence of the struggle for liberation and against apartheid in Southern Africa this share fell to just

under 1% in the first half of the 1990s, and the flow of private direct investments ceased almost entirely. Since the mid-1990s, with the abolition of sanctions against South Africa, exports to the region have started to increase again.[18]

The value of exports from Sweden to Africa in the 1990s averaged some SEK 3 billion a year, while imports averaged about one billion. During the last few years of the 90s exports increased rapidly while imports remained unchanged. If Nigeria (oil) and Liberia (shipping) are excluded, South Africa is by far the major recipient of Swedish exports while South Africa and Kenya account for the largest imports to Sweden from Africa.[19]

Sweden imports raw materials, mainly food and minerals, from Africa and exports processed products to Africa. Swedish companies with an interest in Africa include some of the biggest and most internationally active companies, such as Ericsson, ABB, Skanska, Volvo and Scania. Medium-sized and small Swedish companies have, with few exceptions, not engaged in the African markets – and if they have, it has been through deliberate efforts through special forms of aid. Consultancy firms have been especially connected to aid. The reason for Swedish companies' limited trade with Africa is partly due to the sluggish economic developments in Africa in the past two decades and to the limited size of the markets, but also to factors such as red tape, over-regulation and political instability. This in turn has led to increased difficulties in attracting finance and credit guarantees for covering exports, investments, etc.[20]

Tourism, on the other hand, has been increasing all through the 1990s. At present some 30 000 Swedes visit sub-Saharan Africa each year. The number of Swedes visiting some of the traditional tourist resorts in North Africa is even higher. At present, however, any further expansion seem unlikely.

### Other contacts between Sweden and Africa

In connection with the government investigation "Partnership Africa", the total contacts between the different sectors in Swedish society and Africa

were studied in detail.[21] These studies include the number of official contacts (which seem to have increased substantially during the 1990s); the NGO activities (160 Swedish NGOs operate in 40 of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries); trade unions with all their contacts in most African countries; cultural exchange and sports, which has also increased in the 1990s; and friendship and immigrant organisations. There are approximately 35 000 first generation immigrants and refugees from Africa in Sweden today, most of whom come from Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia, Uganda and the Gambia.

The personal relations created by development assistance, trade, voluntary co-operation and immigration have drawn Africa much closer to Sweden than only some decades ago. It is important to emphasise that these contacts have had a great impact on Sweden as a country as well as on individuals who have had the opportunity to work and live in different African countries. There are endless accounts of people who, after some time in Africa, develop new views and perspectives on life and work. Having been exposed to a completely different working environment enhances these people's abilities to work and live in Sweden. This experience should be highly valued and be put to use.

### In Search of a New Partnership for African Development
#### Preparation of a new policy

In October 1996, the Swedish government gave a working group in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assignment of drawing up proposals for "a new Swedish policy towards Africa". The expectation was that the report would serve as a basis for a new, more grounded and relevant policy, which would represent a departure from previous efforts at co-operation.

The Swedish government's decision to revisit its Africa policy was based on two major underlying factors. First, up until the formal end of apartheid in South Africa, a central feature of Sweden's Africa policy had been its strong commitment to the liberation of the continent from colonisation and institutionalised racism. The liberation of South Africa was, from this point of view, both a success for Sweden's consistent and principled stand against

white minority rule and colonial domination as well as the end of an era in its policy towards Africa. A pressing need for the country to develop a new basis for its relations with Africa emerged, given the formal end of colonial rule and apartheid on the continent.

The second important background consideration was the fact that the period from the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s had witnessed growing concerns as to the effectiveness of development co-operation between countries of the North and South. This concern has covered a wide range of areas from the conceptualisation of development co-operation to its content and practice. At the root of the increasing critique of the methods of co-operation is the widely shared view that it has failed to deliver meaningful and sustainable development. Indeed, as the scope and volume of development co-operation increased, its effectiveness tended to decline.

Problems such as increasing aid dependence in the recipient countries, the failure of co-operation to foster the development of relevant local technical skills, the tendency towards the almost total erosion of local initiative, and the reality of aid flows tending to reinforce local power relations obstructive of democratic accountability, are just a few of the concerns that emerged.[22]

Increasing dissatisfaction in the donor countries with the poor results of several decades of co-operation was matched by an equally deeply felt sense of frustration in the recipient countries. The time for a thorough re-evaluation of the entire basis of development co-operation had clearly come, a task made more urgent by the lacklustre performance of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 90s.[23]

The working group, therefore, had the task of developing a working document that would help to form a new basis for Sweden's relations with post-apartheid, post-liberation Africa whilst simultaneously overcoming the main problems weakening development co-operation as an effective vehicle for encouraging change on the continent.

One principal idea of the working group was to realise its objectives by employing an interactive methodology based on dialogue between Swedish

officials and a cross-section of Africans from all walks of life. The aim was to better understand the African development debate, the contemporary developmental aspirations of Africans and the African perception of the experience of Swedish development intervention on the continent. The investigative assignment of the working group thereby became a project in itself, and in time was dubbed "Partnership Africa", to emphasise the aspiration for a new Swedish relationship with the African continent, grounded in mutual respect, transparency of purposes, a clear understanding of shared and divergent values and an equality of responsibilities in the conceptualisation, design, implementation and assessment of cooperation projects and programmes.

The working group confined its work to sub-Saharan Africa, addressing itself broadly to Africa's development problems, and in particular four basic themes:

- Africa's democratic culture, including gender equality, security and conflict management. This includes the state's role and opportunities to boost public-sector accountability in Africa.
- Africa in the international economy. This theme includes economic reforms, trade policy, debt issues and poverty-reducing measures. In particular, experience of and opportunities for regional collaboration should be elucidated. Africa's relations with the EU are another important area.
- Africa's aid dependency and prospects for changed relations between Africa and other countries.
- Relations between Sweden and Africa – the current situation and future potential.[24]

To elicit ideas and experience from Africa itself, the working group arranged two conferences, attended mainly by African delegates. The first took place in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in January 1997 under the auspices of the African Development Bank and the Nordic Africa Institute and it dealt with the African development debate. The second took place in Saltsjöbaden, east of Stockholm, in June 1997 and dealt with examples of African reform work, as related to the

possible contents of a Swedish policy. The proceedings of the Abidjan and Saltsjöbaden meetings have been published under the titles *A New Partnership for African Development: Issues and Parameters* and *Towards a New Partnership with Africa: Challenges and Opportunities.*[25]

## A genuine partnership

Based on these conferences and substantial and comprehensive consultations among relevant and interested parties in Sweden the working group published a report in August 1997, which in turn was worked into a government white paper approved in June 1998.[26] The overall objective of Sweden's Africa policy, it was argued, should be "to support processes of change under African control that involve sustainable improvements in welfare for the majority of citizens and consolidation of their democratic influence". Additional aims are "to strengthen the long-tem contacts between Sweden and African nations and societies" and "to promote a strong African role in the international community".[27]

These objectives contain both a qualitative aspect based on value judgements and a more practical side requiring a number of concrete actions. The qualitative aspect is illustrated by the following quotation:

If Africans are again to become the subjects of their destiny, and not the object of somebody else's design, and if we are ever to approach equality in the still unequal relations between Africa and the world, then it is the capacity of African societies, their governments and people, to analyse, choose and shape that must be strengthened.

African societies are acutely aware of the choices they face. But is the outside world listening and responding? Now that many countries are again showing substantial economic growth, what is required to sustain and increase that growth, make it really change the life opportunities of the poor and relink emerging African private business with the international economy? How can aid dependency be broken, the structural adjustment programmes be super-

seded, and sustainable modes of cooperation be shaped?

Africa's partners have not yet provided a coherent response on the positive changes unfolding on the continent.... This time around, the response cannot come from them alone. This time, the response must intrinsically build on the actions taken and answers given by African societies. More than ever, Africa's friends need to listen and reflect on what is actually said and done in Africa.

Everybody speaks about *partnership,* but what does it mean? In my view there are both qualitative and methodological aspects to it. First of all, look at the qualitative aspects of partnership. I believe the following five aspects are crucial.

1. A subject-to-subject attitude. There is need for a real change of attitude. No partnership can thrive or survive without respect for the other. That full respect, rooted in racist and colonialist history, is still lacking.
2. Being explicit about values. You cannot engage in a partnership without sharing values. And only sincerity will reveal them.
3. Transparency in interests. Even if interests diverge – and they may for no bad reason – common ground can be found and deals made. That requires openness.
4. Clear contractual standards. New contractual relationships should focus on the critical factors for success and avoid the plethora of conditionalities that today bedevils cooperation. But then there should be no back-tracking by either party. African civil society tells us clearly that indulging reluctant or corruption-afflicted governments is just another form of paternalism. "Never expect less of an African partner than what you expect of yourself," insists Angela Ofori-Atta, a Ghanaian academic, critically.
5. Equality of capacity. In entering into a fair contract, both par-

ties need to be in equal command of all the issues that go into the contract. The aid relationship may be inherently unequal – one has money, the other doesn't – but you can have and essentially must have equality in the capacity to analyse the terms of a contract. In a development partnership, that capacity has to be exercised broadly in society.[28]

In addition to these qualitative aspects of partnership, Mats Karlsson also added the following necessary changes to be made to partnership modalities:

1. Country leadership, for example, holding consultative meetings to co-ordinate donors in the capitals of recipient partners.
2. Outreach and respect for the local democratic process. There must be respect for open political debate, the role of parliament, consultation with private enterprise and civil society.
3. Transparency of principles. Allow the code of conduct for partnership quality to be translated into local terms.
4. Aid pooling and sectoral approaches. It must be possible to cut administrative overheads. Financial control, follow-up and evaluation procedures must be

acceptable and valid for all donors.
5. Success incentives. Good recipient performance must be rewarded. There has been too much acceptance of bad policies and slack implementation. Rewards according to objective and transparent criteria are in everybody's interests, in particular of the many who do not happen to be in positions of power.
6. National capacity. Using local consultants is part of good donor practice and of course builds more capacity for the future. Many other ways of simultaneously using and building capacity are possible in a genuine partnership.
7. Coherence. Behind this term are hidden scores of issues with tremendous long-term implications. It is not just the well-known trade and debt issues, but much else that relates to everything from peace and security, to environment, migration and the many issues that enable economic integration globally.

Donor governments may well be serious in accepting much of the above reasoning around partnership, but the real proof of their intent is whether they can handle coherence in their own poli-

cies. That is why the issues of global governance, and in particular global economic governance, are crucial. Stronger political dialogue and leadership, better coherence of policies, the adequate and sustained financing of the emerging global public sector's institutions and operations are intrinsically linked to workable partnerships. If these new partnership ideas fail to catch on and fuel virtuous circles, it may well be not just because the Africans are not up to it, as will be presumed by so many in the North, but because the political courage in that very North is lacking.[29]

Ideas of this kind have been advocated by many Africans. They inspired Sweden to reassess its overall Africa policy. That policy was to be based, not on another set of consultancy reports, but on an intense listening exercise with African policy makers, academics and civil society.

### Suggestions for concrete action
On a practical level, partnership implies a Swedish-Africa policy that is guided by a long-term vision of a stronger Africa in which various sectors of Swedish society collaborate with African partners "in the arts, research, trade, societies, and associa-

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tions, the environment, etc. in roughly the same way as collaboration with European or American opposite parties takes place today. One may refer to alliances between Swedish and foreign stakeholders at all levels." [*] This is then elaborated upon in the White Paper, presenting a long-term basis on promoting 'alliance forging' cooperation, in order to strengthen contacts between Swedish and African societies.

Special emphasis is placed on the promotion of trade and investments

between Sweden and Africa, tourism, cultural exchange, exchange between churches and popular movements, trade unions and voluntary organisations, all reflecting the focus on a reciprocal relationship that is a crucial element of partnership. [*] But in the end, the most important aspect of partnership lies in the creation of a different and less unequal aid relationship – a factor that the White Paper dwells on in detail.

This is the first comprehensive policy statement on Africa by a Swedish

government, which is an important indication of the increased importance of Africa in Swedish domestic as well as foreign policy. Will Sweden act in line with the important message conveyed in the White Paper and in all the reports leading up to that document? I hope so and at least the people in Sweden who requested the report are sincere in their quest for change. But, unfortunately, when such a policy has to compete with other interests, it is often too easy to forget even the best of intentions. [32] ◉

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# The Anti-Terrorism Campaign and Democracy in Africa

## BY ROTIMI SANKORE

The surprisingly quick collapse of the Taliban has seriously embarrassed Western political commentators, military analysts, ex-Russian soldiers defeated by the Mojahedin and the Taliban who were all united in their warnings of tough battles ahead and about Afghanistan being "the graveyard of foreign invaders"

Three key factors contributed to the retreat of the Taliban and the victories of the Northern Alliance. Firstly and most importantly, the end of the Cold War meant that the US Air Force had a free hand to utilise superior air power to its full advantage and drop almost everything except tactical nuclear weapons on the Taliban. In the days of the Cold War, the US Army, Navy or Air Force could never have moved into any country or territory bordering the Soviet Union without risking a serious military confrontation, and plunging the world into potential nuclear annihilation.

All this is underlined by the fact that while Kabul fell, Russian President Vladimir Putin was a guest of President George W. Bush in Texas. The circumstances were so unreal to many Americans that President Bush found it necessary to repeatedly explain to confounded Texans fed on Cold War propaganda – by Ronald Reagan and Bush Senior amongst others – that Russia was no longer the "evil empire". That role, he implied, has now been taken over by Osama bin Laden and Al Queda. Putin, the former KGB colonel, played along by informing sceptical Texans that "they" had always known in Russia that Texas, not Washington, "is the most important place in America".

Putin's co-operation is not without benefits. The US government attacks on Afghanistan have done the dirty work for the Russian government of destroying the training bases of Chechen separatists. Putin also has a "free hand" to crush Chechen rebels and other internal dissent without worrying about any serious Western objections.

This means that, unlike during the Soviet invasion when the US government supported the Afghan and Arab fighters with over $300m a year over ten years and CIA and military training, the Taliban have nowhere to turn for support. Even Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, that had previously provided financial and strategic support, have now turned against them, leaving them isolated.

The second and no less important factor contributing to the collapse of the Taliban, is the fact that most Afghans had suffered enough of Taliban extremism. Imprisonments and punishments for listening to non-Taliban music or watching television, no cinemas, no libraries, no schools or jobs especially for women, forced growing of long beards for men, dehumanisation of women, arbitrary executions and sustained human rights violations have all exhausted the Taliban's political capital. All governments based on fear and intimidation lose their moral authority and will sooner or later become overripe fruits ready to fall at the slightest gust of wind. Twenty years of war and drought had already created a refugee crisis before September 11, and also meant that millions starving to death welcomed any change – even if it is the Northern Alliance, that massacred an estimated 50 000 civilians during its four-year rule which was characterised by factional fighting and was ended by the Taliban. At the time, the Taliban were also similarly welcomed as "liberators".

The third factor, which the Taliban did not consider, was that the US government would bypass the public relations tragedy of engaging the Taliban directly with American troops. By utilising the Northern Alliance as a first wave following the massive bombing campaign, the US military was able to sidestep the most potentially potent weapon of the Taliban – the sight of US troops on international news attacking and occupying a Moslem country. If this had happened, not only would it have generated massive protests which would have destabilised the mostly undemocratic governments of the Middle East, any serious American casualties would have also strengthened the anti-war movement in the US and Europe.

The second and third factors have made it easier for some key local warlords to switch sides without blinking and transfer loyalties from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance overnight.

## The Undeclared Wars on Human Rights

It is not only in Chechnya that human rights have been sacrificed in order to build and sustain the "anti-terror coalition" As regards rights violations, the major difference between the Saudi regime and the Taliban is GDP and per capita income. For instance, although Saudi women are better educated than Taliban women, they are still subject to a similar level of restrictions and are segregated in public institutions such as banks, schools and restaurants and are not permitted to drive. Also, every Friday, "convicted criminals" are beheaded and amputated in what has been described as "Chop Chop Square". Alleged vices of western materialism such as cinemas are banned and the religious police roam the streets searching for offenders just as in

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Afghanistan. More importantly, democratic opposition to the Saudi ruling family's autocratic rule is virtually a criminal offence. But as a Western ally, the fact that no elections are held and that democratic opposition is not tolerated does not attract Western condemnation, just as human rights violations in Afghanistan were condoned when the Taliban and Mujahedin were on the 'right' side of the Cold War.

In Pakistan, the fact that General Musharraf heads a military regime that ousted an elected government has been buried by the 'strategic' need to win over the Pakistani government. Musharraf in turn has opportunistically become 'civilised' and sacrificed his Taliban friends for Western support, which will bolster his consolidation of power. It is almost impossible to believe that this is a regime that was only recently suspended from the Commonwealth.

Tony Blair and Colin Powell's visits to Pakistan, and Powell's talk of "strengthening relationships" and "long term co-operation" all but restore credibility and recognition to the regime. There is little doubt that in the short and long term, any democratic opposition to Musharraf will be ruthlessly crushed in the "war against terrorism" and will be sacrificed by the "international community" as the regime's reward. If this happens, what will be the long-term implications for democracy, and how will the UK and US governments be perceived by civil society in Pakistan? Muslim fundamentalists will no doubt again tap into any resentment of apparent western support for a military dictatorship.

In China, Chinese Foreign ministry officials have linked "Chinese support for the global campaign against terrorism to US support for China's campaign against those advocating independence for Tibet and the Muslim province of Xinjiang". Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu Bangzao has been quoted as stating, "The United States has asked China to provide assistance against terrorism. China, by the same token, has reasons to ask the United States to give its support and understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists." President Bush's surprise visit to China, which was unthinkable prior to September 11, appears to provide this 'understanding'. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have for a while now been highlighting the Chinese government campaign called "Strike Hard", aimed at people suspected of supporting independence in these two ethnic minority regions. The campaign has led to many arbitrary arrests and summary executions, with little or no due process.

## Anti-Terror Legislation and Democracy in Africa

The new wave of anti-terror legislation across the world threatens to undermine democracy especially in Africa where in the past, proxy wars resulting from Cold War rivalry between the East and West led to full support and recognition of all sorts of dictatorships for decades. Now it appears that all any corrupt, undemocratic or insecure government needs to do to ensure the support of the West is sign up to the anti-terror war and introduce "anti-terrorist" legislation – which is sure to be used to suppress or undermine democratic opposition and humans rights. At best, even if not put to immediate use against civil society, such laws are likely to be a sword of Damocles dangling over

the neck of anyone keen on exercising democratic rights even in the most peaceful and law abiding way possible.

For instance, journalists, lawyers, trade unionists and human rights organisations in Nigeria are alarmed at recent statements by representatives of the Nigerian Police about "the need to revive" the Anti-Terrorist Squad set up by the late dictator General Sani Abacha. In all its years of existence, not a single terrorist was arrested or prosecuted. Instead, it was used to terrorise the media, human rights community, the pro-democracy movement and other real and imagined enemies.

In Uganda, critics of the government have stated that the Anti-Terrorism Bill seeks to lower the standard of proof on which one can be held and convicted on a terrorism charge. If passed in its present form, the Minister of Internal Affairs will be given powers to add any organisation to the terrorist list. "By the stroke of a pen, the minister can add all opposition parties to the terrorist list, and its leaders will be rounded up and thrown in jail", say critics.

In South Africa, the government is currently preparing a terrorism bill to comply with calls for a clampdown on terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks in the United States. The bill, which was originally drafted to replace the draconian apartheid anti-terror act, which was used to suppress opposition to white minority rule, may now be fast-tracked and become law by mid 2002. Many South Africans are alarmed that the proposed bill contains clauses allowing for detention without trial for interrogation purposes. The recent memories of Apartheid and the persecution of "freedom fighters" as terrorists means that in South Africa at least any anti-terror laws are likely to meet stiff resistance if they are perceived as anti-democratic. Many lawyers have stated that they would oppose "any detention for the purpose of interrogation".

In countries such as Zimbabwe where regardless of any merits for the argument for land distribution, Robert Mugabe has wielded the entire matter like a cudgel against all opposition, any accusations of terrorism are sure to be accompanied by very severe repercussions. For instance, the Zimbabwean government has recently accused journalists of being "agents of terrorism" which is no small misdemeanour considering the local political climate.

This trend will no doubt be spurred on by the introduction of anti-terrorist legislation in the US, UK, Italy and other Western countries which more or less give governments "dictatorial" powers to detain people (foreigners or not) indefinitely on mere suspicion and without charge or any publicly stated reason. In some cases, even the detained persons will not be told of the reasons for their detention and if charged, will have lawyers chosen for them or be tried by military tribunals. The well-publicised statements of the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi likening anti-globalisation protesters to terrorists or boasting about the alleged superiority of western civilisation over other civilisations will not comfort those that fear these laws will be abused.

Considering that the United States government is likely to push for African governments to "demonstrate full commitment to tackling evil" and "make it impossible for terrorists to operate within their borders", it is no exaggeration to caution that democracy on the African continent

may be in for a rough ride. The number of Muslims in countries in Africa and Asia that indicated their opposition to the attacks on Afghanistan on religious grounds will not have escaped the attention of the US government and such countries may come under pressure to "act swiftly against terrorists"

As can be seen with the case of Pakistan, the terrorist atrocities in the US have been clearly seized as an opportunity for an undemocratic government to reintegrate itself into the respectable ranks of 'the international community" and address the United Nations General Assembly after being suspended from the Commonwealth.

No matter how unpopular it may seem, the point must be made that it will be a serious mistake to sacrifice democracy in Africa on the altar of "eradicating Bin Laden and Al Queda" The 'rise' of the likes of Saddam and Bin Laden also shows clearly that short 'termism' in foreign policy is, to put it crudely, a ticking bomb. The only way to defeat and keep terrorism and its sympathisers out of Africa and by doing so reduce their potential bases, is to ensure more, not less democracy.

Africans must make it clear that while they condemn terrorism, the fight against it cannot be used as an excuse to create more Mobutus on the continent. The tragedy of these latest developments is that by introducing legislation in their countries which would previously have been unthinkable, the governments of the US, UK other Western countries may have robbed themselves of the moral right to speak up when similar laws are introduced and used to undermine democracy in Africa and strengthen governments which may in the long run turn out to be eventual enemies of "civilised values" ❂

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# The 30th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights:
## Observations of a Student

### BY KOBINA E DANIELS

The 30th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights was held in Banjul from 10 to 27 October. This was the first session since the entry into force of the African Union (AU). My first clear impression during my attendance of this session, influenced no doubt by the considerable optimism that has characterised the birth of the Union, was that the Commission is yet to embrace the ideals of the AU.

The African Union seeks to merge the destinies of all African countries and it came into force with the 36th ratification of the Constitutive Act by Nigeria. Since then at least eight more ratifications have been received and in July 2001, the processes necessary for its operation were set in motion at the Lusaka Assembly of Heads of State and Government. In light of these developments and in light of the fact that the protection of human rights is a universal concern that has usually transcended political and other considerations, it has been expected by NGOs and members of civil society that the African Commission will provide leadership as far as co-operation and mutual accommodation are concerned.

The reality, however, is quite different. The African Commission represents, in microcosm, the rivalries that have characterised relations between the sub-regions, linguistic groupings and religious blocs of the continent. Relations between commissioners are uneasy and sometimes even hostile.

The first hint of difficulties within the corridors of the Commission was furnished when in his welcoming address and overview of the Commission's activities, Prof Dankwa – the chairman – made mention of logistical problems the Commissioners had encountered while carrying out their duties. A generous portion of the blame was put at the door of Mr Baricako, the Secretary to the Commission, who was to all intents and purposes described as incompetent.

Further insights were provided after the election of the new chairperson, Rezak Bara. South Africa's Barney Pityana, who enjoys considerable support from the NGO community, had been largely tipped to win. This did not happen, however, with Dankwa cast the deciding vote in favour of the eventual winner when the election became deadlocked.

Some Commissioners were furious and declared Dankwa to be a "sell out" – a sentiment that was subsequently mirrored in the seating arrangements for the Commissioners. When asked what had motivated his vote, Dankwa explained that Rezak Bara had been a very able deputy and that the new chairman is accommodating of conflicting views.

In the hallways, bars and lounges of the Kairaba and Senegambia Hotels where most NGO representatives congregated, filled each other in on their activities, pledged support for each other's causes, planned strategy and exchanged gossip, the rift between the Commissioners was given anecdotal context. It is to the credit of the Commissioners, however, that sub-regional blocs and cultural suspicions notwithstanding, the business of the 30th Ordinary session proceeded with little or no acrimony and with good organisation.

## The Activities of the African Commission
The agenda for the 30th Session was extensive and was organised to fit all open sessions within a week, with the private or closed sessions thereafter. This was to allow NGOs to finish their business quickly and easily.

The main public sessions started on 15 October with statements from government delegates on the human rights situation in Africa.

Among the governments represented was Mauritania, which submitted a report on its forthcoming elections. What is remarkable about these elections is that the opposition will be participating in national elections for the first time.

Ethiopia took the opportunity to berate Eritrea for the latter's mass expulsions of Ethiopian nationals, while Burkina Faso informed the Commission that national reconciliation had been initiated by the government following the assassination of Norbert Zongo. Representatives of Cameroon, Tunisia and Namibia gave details of their efforts to secure respect for human rights, and pledged fidelity to the ideals of the Commission.

Reports from Lesotho and Togo were postponed to the next session because the representatives of the two countries either did not arrive in Banjul at all, or arrived much later than the time scheduled.

National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and NGOs were also given an opportunity to comment in general terms on the human rights situation in Africa. The NHRIs of Niger, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Rwanda presented statements. Among the NGOs, notable ones included the Centre for Democracy and Development and Human Rights Watch.

The Commission also considered how co-operation between the Commission, human rights NGOs and NHRIs could be enhanced. One of the means being explored is the creation of a continental secretariat for NHRIs so as to facilitate communication and co-ordinate activities. The NGOs used this opportunity to express fears about the deteriorating human rights situations in Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Liberia, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

Commissioners also gave reports on promotional activities undertaken during the 'inter-session'. With the exception of one or two, each had engaged in considerable travel and represented the Commission at conferences the world over. Three Commissioners (Dankwa, Pityana and Chigovera) had put in an appearance at the 7th All African Human Rights Moot Court Competition which is organised by the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria each year.

The reports of the Special Rapporteurs on Prisons and on the Rights of Women were then considered. Other areas of human rights in which the Commission led discussions with NGOs and NHRIs were the development of guidelines on fair trial rights, the situation of African refugees and displaced persons, the situations of people with disabilities, the peculiar difficulties of indigenous persons and the achievements – if any – of the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR).

Members of the Commission admitted openly that they did not know if the WCAR had been a success or a failure and so further study needed to be undertaken on what had happened in Durban.

On the question of the status of the African Commission within the AU, it was noted that discussions had started with the OAU transitional Secretariat to determine what measures had to be put in place to ensure co-ordination between the Commission and the rest of the AU's institutions, as well as with the forthcoming African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the AU's African Court of Justice.

## The Contribution of NGOs

Over 30 NGOs were represented at the session, including the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, the Centre for Democracy and Development, Interights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Movement for Mauritanian Refugees in Senegal for the Defense of Human Rights.

The African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies had, in the two days prior to the commencement of the session, been responsible for organising an NGO conference on the relationship between the Commission and NGOs.

From this conference a communiqué emerged addressing several issues including the neglect by African countries of socio-economic rights, the challenges of globalisation and HIV/AIDS, the persisting problems of civil conflicts, impunity for perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and the widespread lack of respect by incumbent governments of electoral processes.

Human Rights Watch gave scathing reports of the human rights situations in Rwanda and Ethiopia (among other countries) which saw the representatives from these countries scrambling to repair the obvious damage done to them. They all denied the accusations against them, but either evaded facts presented to them or addressed them in the vaguest of terms.

Interights had conducted research on the development of African minimum standards for fair trials and regularly received expressions of appreciation from the Commissioners.

They also informed the Commission of a new initiative to bring government representatives, scholars and experts together to devise minimum standards of compliance with treaty obligations relating to socio-economic rights. Interights also acted as counsel for Pan African Movement, Citizen for Peace and Inter Africa Group in communication against the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

## Hope for the Future?

In the immediate future, the Commission plans to set up a website to facilitate communication and interaction between the Commission, NGOs and NHRIs. They also plan to work more closely with various UN human rights offices and departments.

A priority item is the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders to facilitate responses to the harassment and abuse of such persons.

In the long-term perspective, there is indeed hope. There are NGOs that have staked their very lives on their faith in the Commission. The African Commission has come a long way from its humble beginnings in 1985 and several Commissioners – in spite of occasional disagreements – have a genuine commitment to the enhancement of the African human rights regime.

The Commission is only one of the means of protecting human rights on the continent – and we thus all need to take responsibility for the protection of human rights in our various countries. ❂

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# BOOK REVIEWS

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *South Africa: Transformation for Human Development, 2000,* Cape Town: Creda Communications, 2000, p 232.

## BY PIERRE BOTHA (Senior Researcher: AISA)

The UNDP has gained international fame since 1990 with the publication of its annual Human Development Reports (HDRs) which cover the world and contribute facts, figures and analysis to the discourse on people-centred approaches to development. These reports are sought after by development economists, in particular, and social scientists in general the world over as basic research texts. Incidentally, it is one of the basic sources used by the Africa Institute of South Africa in compiling its concise, complete reference manual, *Africa at a Glance*.

*South Africa: Transformation for Human Development, 2000* is the second book by the UNDP dealing specifically with South Africa. The first, *Human Development Report on South Africa,* focused on HIV/AIDS and its potential to reverse recent gains in human development.

This volume deals more with political and economic issues in South Africa since the 1994 democratic elections that brought the African National Congress (ANC) to power. The book includes chapters on the political economy of transformation and human development, the state of human development in South Africa, key indicators of development and transformation, institutional change, transforming the public sector, transforming processes for human development and a concluding call for "our shared responsibility" in transformation.

The report notes that when the ANC came to power there was a dearth of appropriate development models in the world. The three main development models that had held sway for most of the century had all but collapsed. Here, reference is made to the Soviet model (referred to as "Real Socialism" and applied in the "World Socialist System"), the welfarist model (applied in the USA and Western Europe at times) and the developmentalist model, as applied in experiments in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This phenomenon, the report notes, severely disarmed the ANC: "... the government's attempts to implement a development path that would be responsive to poverty, social inequality and economic growth have been disjointed ... (and thus) .. South Africa has travelled a path of incremental change within a dominant market economic system".

In a Technical Note in this book, the concept and measurement of human development is discussed. The major themes that have characterised the development debate over the past 50 years are briefly dealt with, and it is noted that the first paradigm – Economic Growth – was prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s among development economists. The UNDP's 1992 HDR, however, does not posit an automatic link between income, growth and human

progress. During the late 1960s and 1970s the realisation that the fruits of development had been unevenly distributed led to the growing appeal of the Neo-Marxist "Redistribution with Growth" analysis of development. Next, in the late 1970s and early 1980s came the "Basic Needs" development paradigm. The "Human Development" paradigm that developed in the 1990s has evolved from these earlier approaches, whioe building on them in various ways.

Since its inception and popularisation through the UNDP's Human Development Report of 1990, "Sustainable Development" has moved to the centre of the development debate. The essential elements of sustainable development are longevity (health), knowledge (education) and acceptable living standards (income). These indicators form the basis of the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), which makes inter-country comparisons possible. As a value given to countries, the HDI ranges between 0 and 1

*South Africa: Transformation for Human Development,* in keeping with the HDI approach, includes some very interesting statistics and ratings. South Africa is considered to have a medium human development ranking, with the value of 0.697 for 1998 placing it in 103rd place on the world ranking. Based on this ranking, South Africa compares well with other African countries – it ranks fourth in Africa behind the Seychelles, Mauritius and Tunisia. South Africa's estimated ranking is considerably higher than the average HDI of 0.464 for Sub-Saharan Africa.

The HDI for South Africa's different provinces is also given, and these vary from the Western Cape and Gauteng rating above 0.7, to the Northern Province at 0.531. This disparity is ascribed partly to the links between infrastructural development, the resource and asset base and the potential to be self-sustaining. There is also a strong correlation between HDI values and rural areas. There is, furthermore, a clear relationship between former homelands and HDI values: the Northern Province and Eastern Cape account for 32% and 29% respectively of the population living in former homelands and have the lowest HDI rankings. HDI also correlates with high levels of poverty and inequality. In a section on "HIV and the Declining HDI", the volume calculates the HDI for two scenarios: one without AIDS and one with an AIDS epidemic. The latter reflects a significant decrease in HDI from 0.626 in 1996 to 0.542 in 2010. This implies that the HIV epidemic could reverse the gains made through other policy initiatives related to basic needs and governance.

In conclusion, it is warned that "Remarkable though South Africa's road to transformation has been, all the indicators reveal the need for an acceleration of the pace of development for the poorest if the gains achieved through political and institutional transformation are to transcend the legacy of apartheid" (pp 70-71).

This UNDP country development report ought to be on the bookshelf of all those interested in human development in South Africa and on the rest of the continent. ❂

> The library of the Africa Institute of South Africa has over 65 000 books and periodicals on its shelves, covering every African country from 1960 to the present. The library is open to the public, and can be visited during office hours at the Africa Institute's offices in Pretoria. We review some of the newest acquisitions.

# BOOK REVIEWS

Hope, Kempe Ronald Sr. and Bornwell C. Chikulo (eds),
*Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from
Country Case Studies,* New York: Palgrave, 2000, 316
pages + xiv.

## BY YANYI K DJAMBA (Southeastern Louisiana University)

This book comes at a time when the future of the African continent needs to be reshaped, redesigned, in order to bring back the dream of development, democracy, and social justice that was lost at the period of independence (p 119) or even repeatedly in the last decade (such as in Nigeria where corruption has become endemic; see page 76). Written by several scholars in the field, this book provides insiders' views of one of the main obstacles to development today: corruption. Even South Africa, which is considered by many observers as a successful and model of democratic transition in Africa, is experiencing various forms of unethical behaviour, particularly in the public sector. As the editors note, corruption is wide-spread and systemic in the majority of the countries in Africa, but efforts to combat it are still limited and usually inefficient.

With its 15 chapters, this book offers an excellent account of the bases, practices, and conditions of corruption in Africa. The first part focuses on theoretical and analytical perspectives on corruption and its relation to socio-economic development. An interesting and powerful analysis of the causes of corruption by Kempe Ronald Hope indicates that many such factors are strongly linked to the lack of democracy, which puts the control of nations in the hands of a few patrimonial state leaders, as well as socio-cultural norms characterised by excessive loyalties towards one's family, tribe, and friends (p 22). Such practices are incompatible with the rule of law, a central element in the democratic system of governance.

There are, nonetheless, a few examples of relatively better governance cited in Botswana and Uganda, for instance, but for most nations the issues of bribes, nepo-tism, favouritism and other unethical practices are so wide-spread that efforts to combat them require far more profound changes in behaviour and ideology. The last two chapters in Part One provide some avenues for controlling or at least reducing the expansion of corruption in Africa. Although not yet well defined, international and foreign institutions are also involved in this battle.

The second part of the book features country case studies on the state of corruption. The discussions bear on Zambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Botswana. There are important similarities and sharp contrasts in the levels and nature of corruption in these countries. For example, whereas more unethical behavior is observed now in Zambia under the Third Republic, which is characterised by several political parties, the level of corruption was lower under President Kaunda's regime of monopartism during the Second Republic (pp 179-180). So, too, probably because of its strong democratic basis, South Africa is still able to denounce, control, and on occasion punish unethical behaviour in its public sector (pp 218-232).

All those interested in the socio-economic development of Africa should read this book. It sheds light on numerous questions that are commonly asked about the future of African nations in the 21st century. There are, however, two points that would greatly enhance the content of this important text, but which were unfortunately omitted. First, the book does not contain a case study on Francophone Africa (apart from Cameroon, which is questionable due to its dual Franco-Anglo heritage). Hence, a case study on such major Francophone countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal or Central African Republic would give more insight to the discussions and comparability of the levels of corruption, as well as the impact of the colonial legacy, if any. Second, although mentioned at some points in the text (e.g. p 201), the link between corruption and undemocratic politics is not well explored. It is unrealistic to believe that dictatorial regimes, especially self-proclaimed presidents, would consider battle against corruption a top priority of their political agenda. ☉

M Berdal and DM Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance:
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars,* Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000.

## BY THEO NEETHLING (Centre for Military Studies, and AISA Research Associate)

Theories of conflict and war have been compelled to provide explanations for armed conflicts that have become intractable and protracted. The study of 'war economies' is a recent development which attempts to provide an understanding of the political economy of armed conflicts that are predominantly inter-state in nature. Sagaren Naidoo of the Institute for Global Dialogue puts it as follows:

> A central objective of this study is to determine the ability of warring actors in developing countries, and in particular those in Africa, to raise the required revenue to sustain a conflict following the decline of Cold War mil-itary and financial support. Subsequently, explanations for the sustainability of conflicts have begun to focus increasingly on the exploitation and expropriation of a country's natural resources by the warring parties to finance and maintain their war efforts.[1]

It should be said, however, that the presence of economic motives and commercial agendas in wars is not really a new phenomenon in the history of warfare. Some argue that many of Napoleon's more celebrated marshals - Massena, Soult and Brune - displayed as much skill in the art of private plundering and the accumulation of personal wealth as they did in the art of war.

In a more contemporary African context, it has been experienced in certain cases (particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone) that conflicts may have been originally motivated by security concerns, but have assumed the profiles of self-financing and self-sustaining conflicts – largely for economic gain.

**61**

The harsh reality of economic motives and commercial agendas in conflicts – particularly in Africa - has been given special prominence by the November 2001 report of the UN panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC. The panel "confirmed a pattern of continued exploitation carried out by numerous state and non-state actors, including rebel forces and armed groups, conducted behind various facades in order to conceal the true nature of the activities" Importantly, from a Southern African point of view, Zimbabwe was reported to be "the most active" of the countries, while Angola and Namibia have also specifically been mentioned. Furthermore, concerning the "uninvited forces", i.e. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the panel reported that commercial networks put in place "had allowed them to continue their exploitation activities despite the withdrawal of a significant number of troops"

The recent literature on conflict and, even more so in the activities of international and non-governmental organisations, has given relatively little attention to the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary civil conflicts. Against this background, this eleven-chapter volume, put together by Berdal and Malone, is intended to provide the reader with a better understanding in this area. It also explores how economic considerations often shape the calculations and behaviour of the parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular 'war economy' and lending a distinctive dynamism to the conflict. The point here is obvious: understanding the sources of violence requires an understanding of the 'economics' underpinning it.

The contents of the volume are presented in a meaningful and coherent manner. It is divided into two parts, each consisting of a number of chapters by senior scholars. The first part focuses broadly on approaches to the political economy of civil wars while the second part deals with economic agendas in civil wars and measures to confront this. Generally speaking, the volume identifies the economic and social factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The contributors consider the economic rationale of conflict for belligerents, some economic strategies that elites use to sustain their positions, and focus furthermore on the situations in which elites find war to be more profitable than peace. Moreover, the editors and contributing authors strive consistently for policy relevance in both their analyses and their suggestions.

The basic message of the book is that the persistence of war and conflict are often linked to economic interests. This implies that much of the violence with which international organisations have been concerned in the post-Cold War era has been driven not by a Clausewitzian logic of forwarding a set of political aims, but rather by powerful economic motives and agendas. Of course, the extent to which the economic agendas of belligerents actually shape the course of a conflict varies from case to case.

Importantly, much of the focus of the book is on African conflicts and some interesting facts are documented in the volume. For instance, in Liberia, Charles Taylor is estimated to have made more than US $400 million per year from the war in the years between 1992 and 1996. Likwise, the war in the DRC has enabled neighbouring countries such as Rwanda to become major exporters of raw materials, such

as gold and cobalt, which they do not naturally possess.

In Angola, to mention another example, the national Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has since 1992 controlled some 70% of the country's diamond production, which has allowed it to continue the war while creating the conditions for local traders, middlemen and regional commanders to accumulate considerable fortunes. On the government side, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 'business elite' has also benefited by selectively granting attractive foreign exchange and import licenses, as well as by selling weapons to UNITA.

In addition to the economic opportunities generated by war itself, the growing efforts of international agencies to contain and alleviate the worst effects of civil conflict have created another set of economic opportunities for local actors.

Practically speaking, relief aid made available during conflicts in order to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of fighting has often been diverted, stolen or even taxed by warring parties. In this vein, the book effectively makes the point that the failure to note the presence of economic agendas in conflicts has at times seriously undermined international efforts to achieve durable peace.

Generally speaking, the editors and contributing authors succeed in:

- giving the reader an understanding of the political economy of civil wars through a focused analysis of the economic agendas of competing factions in civil wars;
- examining how globalisation creates new opportunities for the elites of competing factions to pursue their economic agendas through trade, investment and migration ties, both legal and illegal, to neighbouring states and to more distant, industrialised economies;
- assessing the possible policy responses available to external actors, including governments and non-governmental role-players, to shift the economic agendas of elites in civil wars from war towards peace.

The value of the work lies in the recurring message that civil wars are never entirely internal in character and that the persistence of conflict and, in particular, the crystallisation of war economies within 'weak' states can only be understood within a broader global context.

Few other works so doggedly unpack the harsh realities as to how current trends and modalities of war economies reflect transnational economic linkages which are heavily reliant on the smuggling of states' natural resources for the supplying of weapons and the sustaining of wars. In the final analysis, the work underscores the point that a rather narrow state-centric approach to assessing conflicts, is both of limited analytical value and policy relevance. At the same time, the book is no attempt to nullify the notion of 'civil war' or to claim that contemporary civil wars can all be reduced to 'economic' explanations.

The volume is recommended for students who have a general interest in 'war economies', while those who search for a better understanding of African conflicts in particular will likewise benefit from it. It is also good reading for students interested in contemporary African affairs, as well as for those involved in peace studies and conflict resolution. ❂

1   S Naidoo, 'The role of natural resources in conflict', Presentation at the International Ministerial Diamond Conference, Pretoria, 20 September 2000

# BOOK REVIEWS

Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, *The Food Chain in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Paris: Éditions du Tricorne, 2000, 182 pp.

## BY LS MNYANDU (Defence Research Centre)

In the next 20-25 years, the cities of Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be home to more than 50-60 % of the total (world) population compared to 20-30% today (p v)

... Africa is a sleeping giant waiting to be awakened. The potential is there, but, to exploit it, we must invest today in research, extension, infrastructure, transportation, general education and health care (p 2)

Anxieties about food in Sub-Saharan Africa are no different from those faced by authorities of the ancient cities, although they may be unprecedented in scale and in the speed with which they rush to us, and as in the past authorities have concluded that the state had to control this unruly beast called the market, if they were to feed their citizens and avoid the unrest that might threaten them politically.. (pp 87, 94)

A market is not an abstraction in which a demand curve spontaneously intersects a supply curve. (Rather) a market is an institution, which needs rules and customs in order to operate. A market economy does not grow up all by itself (p 101)

Liberalisation rarely causes markets to spring into action. Outside guidance from the public sector is instrumental in establishing the legal background, training programmes and infrastructure and in fostering the emergence and development of a competitive private sector (p 178)

(Thus) liberalisation does not imply getting rid of government. It implies a changing role for the government (p 107) from interventionist practices to enabling and facilitating...

These are the words that open and conclude this book which has as its objective the exploration of measures for improving sub-Saharan food security by addressing some of the main factors that will have to be taken into consideration in order to ensure a smooth, regular and affordable supply of food to the increasingly poor and exponentially growing populations of the cities.

Compiled from papers presented at the Centre for Applied Studies in International Studies Workshop of the Food Chain in Sub-Saharan Africa in Mali, the book consists of twelve chapters but this review concentrates on the seven chapters written in English. The rest are in French.

In the Foreword, Jean Freymond notes that with increased urbanisation, the sub-Saharan food chain will be greatly lengthened and the resultant challenges will include linking the ever-shrinking productive land mass to markets, as well as optimising food processing, packaging and marketing (p. v). The volume deals chiefly with the topics of rural transport infrastructure, the location of food processing facilities, the need for improving agricultural input markets, and the debate on the degree and role of the (non)-involvement of government in the agricultural sector.

These topics are aimed at answering a challenge posed by Norman E. Borlang: 'How these non-food-producing con-

sumers (the largely urban based) will be assured of plentiful, safe, and affordable food supplies is one of the greatest developmental challenges we face" (p 1).

Outlining the several key aspects of agriculture (contribution to GDP, resource potential and performance, policy reform, and constraints to growth) in Ethiopia, Mengistu Hulluka's chapter is not only the only one to address the role of livestock but also the only one to highlight the crucial role of land tenure arrangements in empowering farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. While encouraging private ownership of land, the Rural Land Administration Proclamation of 1997 holds that land is a common property which farmers have the right to occupy and are protected from evictions (p 48).

The next chapter, by Graeme Donovan, deals with the feeding of African cities. Donovan's primary assertion is that most food supply problems facing contemporary African cities are similar to those experienced by biblical and medieval cities (p 87). This is because, as in the past, guaranteeing food supply is a necessary condition for social stability and all governments have a desire to control the "unruly" market in the interests of stability (pp 89, 94). However, this chapter is not filled with purposeless religious or historic nostalgia. It provides invaluable insights into the role of infrastructure in agriculture as well as a brilliant explanation of the devious nature of markets.

Quoting some very interesting figures of how cheap it is to import food into certain African cities rather than transport it from the hinterland, Donovan cogently explains how investing in infrastructure improves governance, lowers transportation and marketing costs and ultimately increases the elasticity of food supply, thus enhancing agricultural growth linkages (p 96).

He goes further, describing the three critical myths associated with the markets as we know them: (a) we assume that with decreased public involvement comes increased market activity; (b) we assume that markets have a universal appeal; and (c) we conveniently forget that not all entrepreneurs value the benevolent attributes of the market (e.g. competition, absence of monopoly, and absence of governmental intervention) (p 97). This author's theoretical acumen is further revealed by his persuasive use of the writings of Karl Polanyi (*The Great Transformation*, 1944), CB Macpherson (*The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, 1962) and Fernand Braudel (*Civilisation and Capitalism*, 1982).

The author goes further to delineate the four phases of thinking on agricultural growth in the past 40 years. These range from centralisation and public control of production aimed at self-sufficiency and import substitution in the 1960s – 1970s to making the public sector more effective through monetary and fiscal stabilisation and the reduction of subsidies in the 1980s.

The third phase entails government attempts to decentralise control and engage in privatisation. The last phase was an attempt to firmly establish a legal and regulatory system that facilitates private sector activity (p 100). Noting the crucial role played by guaranteed protection of person and property in a market economy and rightly asserting that safety nets are necessary to protect the poor when implementing reforms, Donovan comes to a conclusion that is not in line with earlier assertions – that "the public sector needs to be guided by what the private sector really needs" and

that "the best way is to contract with the private sector to design and develop the desired institutional changes" that will enhance agricultural performance (pp 103-105).

Donovan's chapter is followed by a very insightful chapter on the management and financial framework for the use of rural transport infrastructure as a tool for alleviating poverty. George Banjo's central argument is that we need to reduce the "drudgery and time associated with travel and transport in order to help the poor to free their greatest asset – their labour – for more productive usage" (p 112).

Banjo notes that 80% of all household trips in rural sub-Saharan Africa are by foot on tracks and paths that are given scant attention by planners and administrators who have a bias in favour of grandiose construction schemes (p 111). Outlining the prerequisites for the success of managing rural infrastructure (appropriate objectives, clear division of responsibility, material and human resources and monitoring / evaluative system), the chapter proposes several models for the management of the development and maintenance of rural transport infrastructure.

It correctly concludes that no single model fits all situations and that what is needed is a locally relevant solution that is responsive to local priorities, is cost effective, simple to administer and is backed by the necessary political will (pp 113, 116-119).

However, Banjo avers that for any model to work it has to strengthen intergovernmental fiscal transfers, mobilise and broaden the local resource base and explore off-budget sources of finance (pp 119-121).

Another contribution on rural transport comes in the form of a seemingly misplaced chapter by Mohammed Chowdhury on the role of local governments and community-based organisations in Bangladesh. Complementing Banjo's contribution, this chapter correlates the role of rural infrastructure in relation to economic development but also typifies the modes of transportation that are used in rural areas (pp 129, 130).

The issue of agricultural input markets (mainly fertilisers) is raised in a chapter written by four researchers from the International Fertilizer Development Center of the USA. Observing that food production in sub-Saharan Africa has grown by 2.1 % annually over the last three decades, they highlight the fact that this growth has fallen short in relation to population growth, and that this has led to cases of malnutrition, hunger and poverty (p 133).

The solution, they argue, is to develop an efficient and effective agricultural input supply system that is based on a holistic approach which recognises the driving forces (profit, risk, and non-farm income) and constraints (lack of credit, thin markets, resistance to change by vested interests, and lack of trust) behind such a system.

Thereafter, the chapter delves into policy implications that include phasing out input subsidies, privatising parastatals, reforming the rural financial system, formulating and enforcing appropriate legislation, and establishing training as well as research and development initiatives.

Moving away from infrastructure and agricultural inputs, the chapter by Kwame Nyanteng explores prospects and conditions for locating food processing of market crops in rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa.

Food processing is a value adding capacity that "converts the raw food commodity into a desirable form that facilitates matching demand and supply ... (by) enhancing preservation or the shelf life of normally perishable raw food" while also "increasing the value-to-volume ratio of bulky unprocessed food commodities and thus lowering the costs of distribution" (pp 161-162). Nyanteng's prime proposition is that food processing facilities should be located nearer to the farming communities in order to limit the effect of bad rural transport infrastructure and thus reduce the possibility of raw food perishing before it reaches the market, while also reducing distribution costs since processing reduces volume while simultaneously increasing value.

The location of food processing facilities in rural areas also has the added advantage of reducing off-season rural unemployment and thus also potentially reducing rural-urban migration.

Another advantage cited by Nyanteng is that the waste material produced by food processing can be easily and appropriately disposed of in the form of manure instead of the urban litter it normally becomes in facilities located in cities. Nyanteng's proposition is backed by a discussion of the technical and socio-economic factors that influence decisions on this matter.

In this volume, the authors perceptively address various aspects related to the improvement of food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. What is worrying, however, is the absence of an opposing view amongst the participants and the question should be asked whether this is because of the superiority of the views proposed or because the alternative views are discredited and unpopular?

The views presented in most of the chapters subscribe to a school of thought that stipulates that the relationship between population growth and the world's capability to sustain this growth (through food production) is inversely proportional i.e. as population growth increases, food output decreases.

Labeled 'Malthusianism' after the 18th century economist, Thomas Malthus, this approach has bean criticised for blaming food shortages on a singular factor – population growth – while ignoring other factors like drought, floods, soil quality, and technological breakthroughs. The alternative view on the world's capability to sustain an ever-growing population, as explicated by Amartya Sen, is referred to as "entitlement".

Its basic premise is that, in contrast to Malthusianism, food production should be placed within a network of ownership relationships that determine the people's ability to command sufficient food through legal means.[1] While not discounting population growth, the entitlement approach "directs attention to the constellation of economic, political, social and cultural relations determining the acquirement of food by individuals" and should form the basis of all future analysis of food security.[2]

Overall, this book is a great reader that is instructive to developmental scholars and practitioners alike. It also has the potential to answer a wide range of questions on the issue of food security and should thus be read by planners, administrators and donor officials. ✪

1 AK Sen, Poverty and Famine. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp 1, 45, 158.
2 J Dréze, A Sen and A Hussain, The Political Economy of Hunger, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp 3, 15.

# INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Contributions to Africa Insight from academics and others with specialist knowledge of African affairs are welcomed. Articles dealing with African countries other than South Africa will be preferred. Articles may be submitted in English or French, but will be published in English. Manuscripts can either be submitted in hard copy, with a diskette, or by email. All inquiries and submissions should be directed to:

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### Chapter in an edited volume:
- E Clay and E Benson, "Triangular transactions, local purchases and exchange agreements in food aid: A provisional review with special reference to sub-Saharan Africa", in E Clay and O Stokke, *Food aid reconsidered*, London: Frank Cass, 1991, p 147.

### Article in a journal:
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- H Singer, J Wood and T Jennings, *Food aid: The challenge and the opportunity*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p 6.

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- *Africa Report* (New York), vol 23, no 1, January-February 1978, p 41.
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