EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JO'BURG CITY SAFETY STRATEGY (JCSS)

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Compiled by the Democracy and Governance Programme, Human Sciences Research Council for the Jo'burg City Safety Programme Office

GLOSSARY

JCSS Johannesburg City Safety Strategy

JCSP Johannesburg City Safety Programme

GFA Geographic Focus Area

EMS Emergency Management Services

JMPD Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department

CPTED Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

NCPS National Crime Prevention Strategy

Evaluation of the Implementation of the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy (JCSS)

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The Jo'burg City Safety Strategy Programme (JCSP) office commissioned the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy (JCSS). This report is the product of this evaluation.

According to the terms of reference outlined by the Jo'burg City Safety Programme office:

The City must now re-evaluate its Safety Strategy to assess whether the document still provides a clear statement of how the City should address issues of safety and security, especially in light of the 2040 Growth and Development Strategy focus on community safety. It is necessary to analyse and document:

- the strategic impetus for the JCSS i.e. why there was a need for the strategy;
- the process that was undertaken in the development of the strategy;
- the rationale for the approach that was adopted; and
- its key components and programmes.

The review must analyse the implementation of the strategy to date with a focus on drawing out the key lessons that will inform any updates to the Strategy.

The review must also:

Gauge the views of the multi-stakeholder role-players involved in the implementation; and
Assess the approach and methodology used in the GFAs.

METHODOLOGY

This evaluation has sought to take into account the complex and challenging environment in which all new strategies have to be implemented in the South African context in its assessment of the implementation of the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy (JCSS). The study has therefore adopted a qualitative approach to assessment which combines interviews with key stakeholders, focus groups with implementing agents, documentary evidence provided by the JCSP Office and a literature review. The HSRC conducted a total of 15 interviews with a range of stakeholders involved in the implementation of the JCSS who were identified by the Jo'burg City Safety programme office. In addition two focus groups were held with Strategy implementers in specific geographical focus areas (GFAs), namely Norwood/Orange Grove and Moroka in Soweto, in order to understand the implementation of the strategy at a local level. These focus groups provided useful insights that were integrated into a broader analysis of the approach and methodology used in the GFAs, as specified in the terms of reference. In addition, the focus groups as well as interviews contributed to the section of the report on cross-cutting themes. Every effort was made to systematically incorporate a range of stakeholders who might be able to shed light on the implementation of the Strategy[1]. The HSRC also studied the background documentary material and records provided by the Jo'burg City programme office in order to inform and complement the qualitative interviews.

All interviews were both recorded and transcribed, or detailed notes were taken by the interviewer. In order to maintain confidentiality in this report only organisational affiliation is used to reference interviews, rather than names or specific positions. The transcripts and notes of interviews were analysed to draw out recurrent themes and issues that emerged from the discussions. These themes are discussed in detail in the body of the report. The comments of stakeholders were contextualised with documentary evidence from the Jo'burg City Safety programme office as well as discussions with the Programme Manager and Geographic Focus Area Coordinator and analysis of relevant literature.

Structure of the report

The successes and challenges relating to the implementation of the JCSS cannot be examined in isolation but are critically located within a broader institutional framework within the City, which either creates an

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[1] A point to note is that when compiling the interview list it was found that many of the original implementers had either left the City or moved to other positions, which indicates some of the challenges around maintaining institutional memory reflected in consistency and continuity of strategy and policy implementation.

enabling or disabling environment for the implementation of the Strategy. Therefore, Section 1 of this report provides an overview of the background to the development of the Strategy, Section 2 of the report focuses on a detailed analysis of the programmes of the JCSS and their implementation within the GFAs. Section 3 of the report investigates the cross-cutting factors that created the context in which the Strategy could be successfully implemented or which posed challenges to implementation. Section 4 gives an overview of perceptions of crime and crime statistics in order to assess the current crime challenges in the City. Section 5 of the report looks at the new policy and strategic environment as it relates to the JCSS and assesses the alignment of the JCSS with the current Growth and Development Strategy for the City, Jo'burg 2040.

SECTION ONE

1.1. Strategic impetus for the strategy and the rationale for the approach that was adopted

The Johannesburg City Safety Strategy was initially formulated in response to the key development strategy for Johannesburg, namely, the Johannesburg 2030 Economic Development Strategy, which was launched in 2000. The Johannesburg Economic Development Strategy strongly emphasised the negative impact that crime was having on business investment decisions in the City. Of six explanatory variables used in investment decision making in the City, crime and fear of crime was found to be the most significant. A quantitative study found that 61% of business decisions whether or not to invest in the City were being determined by crime (Jo'burg 2030: 22).

As a result the Johannesburg Economic Development Strategy identified crime, fear of crime and perceptions around crime as key strategic factors that needed to be addressed in order to enhance the economic performance of the City. It was assumed that improving the economic performance of the City would lead to an improvement in other social problems in the City such as unemployment and lack of housing. The Development Strategy therefore stated that, "[a]ll other considerations (such as poverty alleviation, distribution of income and so on) flow from this (economic growth) as a necessary condition" (Jo'burg 2030: 8).

The Johannesburg City Safety Strategy (JCSS) was subsequently drafted in response to the Economic Development Strategy's focus on crime and was adopted by the Jo'burg Council in 2003. The strategy stated that it sought "to define a common approach to dealing with crime, violence and safety and security in Johannesburg" (JCSS: 4.). The objective of the strategy in line with the Economic Development Strategy was to, "improve business confidence and reduce the impact of crime on business investment decision-making" (JCSS: 4.).

According to the JCSS, tackling the tangible and the non-tangible effects of crime using a single strategy emphasised that the City's development is critically dependent on the prioritisation of safety as an integral part of the City's governance. The Strategy thus took into consideration spatial, temporal, economic, and all other material conditions when grappling with the problem of safety in the City, with the ultimate objective of encouraging a holistic understanding of the notion of public safety. At the same time, the Strategy also sought to implement a focused approach to crime reduction through a number of

specific programmes which introduced novel approaches to the reduction of crime and creation of a safe environment. These approaches are covered in more detail in the body of the report.

1.2. The process that was undertaken in the development of the Strategy

The formulation of the JCSS was the result of a range of processes including consultation with a range of relevant stakeholders, a review of relevant legislation, an analysis of crime statistics, a victim survey for specific areas in Johannesburg, and a review of international best practice. Some of the substantive issues related to these processes are detailed below.

Consultation

The JCSS was the result of consultation with a range of City stakeholders. During the process of conceptualising the JCSS, several consultative forums were held with stakeholders who were to be involved in both the crafting and implementation of the JCSS. Records of workshops with various stakeholders show that Business Against Crime, the Provincial department of Safety and Liaison, the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD), the SAPS, as well as Community Policing Forums (CPFs) in each of the Geographic Focus Areas (GFAs), the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), Emergency Management (EMS), Human Development and Infrastructure Development were all engaged with during the consultation process. A draft version of the Strategy was also presented to senior leadership in the City including the Mayor, the Provincial Commissioner and the MEC Safety and Liaison. The JCSS implementation plan explains the consultation process that took place around the development of the strategy,

> The EDU [Economic Development Unit] commissioned the development of a framework for the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy envisaged by Jo'burg 2030. The Strategy was developed in consultation with key role players in the City, including the JMPD, the SAPS, the City's social service and infrastructure departments and agencies and the Provincial Government, including the provincial social services. Once the Strategy received the necessary approval from the City Council, the implementation plan for the JCSS was developed through a participative process. The process was managed by the Economic Development Unit and overseen by the Steering Committee, which consisted of senior representatives of the major role players (JCSS, Implementation Plan: 12).

Four working groups were then established, which included subject matter experts from relevant research organizations, NGO's and both Provincial and City Departments, to engage in consultation and develop action plans around the key programme areas of the Strategy

The action plans that were developed by the consultative working groups were interrogated by the JCSS Steering Committee, before being finalized in an implementation plan. The plan was presented to the Mayoral Committee and Council for final approval.

1.3. Legislative and policy environment

The development of the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy was informed by key national policy and legislation, most significantly by the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) which together introduced a new paradigm for addressing crime and safety in South Africa. This framework proposed an integrated and holistic approach to crime prevention and safety and emphasised the role of local government in creating a safe environment. This required a combined multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach between local government agencies and civil society in order to, not only combat crime, but to systematically create a safe and inclusive environment for all city residents. The NCPS therefore argued that "Crime prevention cannot be tackled by government alone, or by one sector of government alone. It requires an integrated, multi-agency approach where all relevant departments view crime prevention as a shared responsibility and collective priority" (NCPS 1996). The JCSS also noted that the White Paper similarly argued "that cities and towns should be encouraged to establish strategies for crime prevention using a multi-agency approach and focusing on delivery at the local level" (JCSS: 48).

The White Paper specified that local government was expected to play a role in crime prevention by performing the following functions:

• Initiate, coordinate and participate in targeted social crime prevention;
• Work with the local police to set joint local safety priorities and possible areas for local government intervention;
• Align municipal resources and objectives with a crime prevention framework to ensure that developmental projects take account of crime prevention;
• Effective enforcement of municipal by-laws;

• Assist victims of crime through the provision of information regarding available support services in the municipal area. (Newham, 2005)

The White Paper not only stipulated the role and function of local government in crime prevention, but went further to provide specific strategic areas for consideration including:

• Designing out crime;
• Education;
• Promoting local cohesion;
• Supporting youth, families and groups at risk;
• Breaking cycles of violence;
• Promoting individual responsibility;
• Socio-economic interventions to undercut causes of crime.

The JCSS was fundamentally informed by the White Paper's emphasis on the role of local government in initiating and coordinating crime prevention by working with local actors to jointly identify objectives, align local development with crime prevention priorities and focus on effective by-law enforcement. It also took up a number of areas of strategic focus identified in the White Paper such as designing out crime and supporting youth, families and groups at risk.

The JCSS foresaw that city leadership would play a critical role in realising a localised approach to crime prevention, "The City must adopt a leadership role in driving this process [the JCSS] if it hopes to communicate its vision and encourage external agencies to prioritise its objectives above or together with their own. Johannesburg's Council and Mayor bear the most direct responsibility, and have the most direct interest, in making Johannesburg safe and secure" (JCSS: 71).

This approach is in line with international "best practice" where city driven initiatives have led to significant reductions in crime and violence, in cities with similar socio-economic challenges and high levels of violence as Johannesburg, such as Sao Paulo in Brazil and the Colombian cities of Medellin and Bogota.

However, critical to the success of many of these initiatives in Latin America has been considerable delegation of powers to municipalities, as a result of democratic reform and policies of decentralisation.

Mayors have played a key role, using innovative approaches to urban governance that apply a comprehensive range of safety policies, including police reform, conflict resolution, urban regeneration and social development. Cities such as Bogota and Medellin in Colombia have experienced spectacular reductions in their homicide rates through a range of municipal programmes that have helped to break down the geographical and social barriers between sectors and inhabitants of the city (Shaw and Carli, 2011: 39). Critically the success of these City level interventions were significantly impacted on, particularly in Bogota, by prior processes of decentralisation which gave the City financial autonomy, as well as direct control over most major governance functions including policing. Thus, "a series of laws passed between 1987 and 1993 empowered local authorities to provide public services (such as water and sanitation), schools, local health services, recreational facilities, roads, co-financing of low-cost housing, transport management, public order and support to vulnerable groups, amongst others" (Skinner, 2004).

Therefore city driven initiatives have proved extremely effective in combating crime and creating a safe environment in a variety of environments across the world, from the city of Bogota, which was characterised by high levels of inequality as well as violent crime, to cities such as Boston, which have much lower rates of violent crime and inequality and where disadvantage is concentrated in deprived urban neighbourhoods.

While the NCPS was informed by key international best practice, Rauch (2002), for example identified a number of problems with its implementation that speak to some of the challenges experienced in the implementation of the JCSS when it attempted to implement a multi-agency approach to crime prevention at city-level. Rauch argues that the NCPS was based on an important assumption that the cross-cutting national programmes it proposed would spontaneously lead to inter-departmental cooperation. However, the financial and performance incentives in government act against integration and cooperation. Moreover, the project management skills and information systems to support this approach were not available. In addition, the NCPS did not allocate dedicated government funding towards its implementation but rather encouraged departments to rationalise and allocate existing resources to the national programmes, which would clearly be a disincentive for departments to take resources from their core functions to address issues of crime prevention. Consequently Rauch argues, "To develop and maintain co-operation therefore required a great deal of effort, leadership, the maintenance of project management disciplines and a management information system…The success of the NCPS is therefore completely dependent on the quality of co-operation, agreed and improved focus on joint priorities, and

the sharing of information." All these issues have remained significant obstacles at a local level in the implementation of the JCSS as will be explored in the body of this report.

While the approach of the NCPS, when transferred to the South African context, raised immediate difficulties in relation to implementation within local governance structures, it has been widely acknowledged that after the formulation of the NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security, the concept of crime prevention was increasingly displaced at a national level by a focus on law enforcement and the re-design of the criminal justice system in the light of political and public pressure on the national government to be seen to be responding to high levels of violent crime in the country(Rauch, Pelser, Newham, Palmery). The consequence of this was that elements of the NCPS and the White Paper which were perceived as "soft developmental approaches to crime" were, "either entirely ignored or adapted to fit the tough enforcement agenda" (Rauch, 2002). In March of 2000, the SAPS's high profile National Crime Combating Strategy was adopted, which effectively ignored the NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security and instead focused on law enforcement interventions in geographically defined crime "hotspots".

At the same time, while crime prevention at a national level was increasingly displaced by new policy priorities after 2000, crime prevention initiatives continued at a local level, and in fact, as Palmery (2002) points out, city-level crime prevention efforts pre-dated the NCPS and the White Paper. In particular the UN-HABITAT South African Safer Cities initiatives in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban were precursors to the crime prevention approach articulated in national policy.

While the demise of the NCPS has been perceived as the loss of a coherent crime prevention approach Palmery argues that this is in line with what has been the overall international trend for the following reasons:

• The large-scale failure on the part of national governments to successfully prevent crime or reduce the fear of crime.
• An increased recognition on the side of government officials of the importance of understanding the dynamics of the particular geographical location in which interventions are planned.
• The multi-disciplinary approach needed for successful crime prevention initiatives requires the cooperation of non-governmental and other civil society groups which in many cases are locally rather than nationally based.

SECTION TWO

2.1. Key components and programmes

The Jo'burg City Safety Strategy identified seven key operational programmes to address the priority crimes that had been identified as a result of the crime analysis undertaken during the development of JCSS. The priority crimes which were identified were those that were believed to have the most significant impact on business confidence and investment decision-making, and the tourism market. These included:

- Serious violent interpersonal crimes (such as murder, rape and assault GBH)
- Serious violent property crimes (such as hijacking and armed robbery)
- Fraud and corruption
- Crimes affecting tourists
- Crime and grime
- Hijacking and theft of freight and cargo

Seven Key Programmes were therefore identified to address these crimes. The programmes were:

- Programme 1: Focused surveillance, including patrols, CCTV and other tools.
- Programme 2: Winning Back the Streets - Residential and Economic Development.
- Programme 3: Creating the orderly city – Better buildings, by-law enforcement and traffic policing.
- Programmes 4, 5 and 6: Guns, Organized Crime and Youth.
- Programme 7: Armed Robbery.

The philosophy underlying the development of the Strategy was that the City must adopt a focused approach to specific crime issues. Each of the programs addresses one or more of the elements of crime, through a combination of law enforcement, social development, and situational crime prevention (also called crime prevention through environmental design or CPTED).

The diagram below depicts the integrated framework for the JCSS. This framework was agreed on and finalised by the key role players in the City:

The JCSS Toolkit, drawing on this framework, later identified the following as the key operational programmes to be implemented in the Geographic Focus Areas where the JCSS was implemented. These programmes focused both on managing perceptions of crime as well as reducing crime and creating a safer urban environment (see interlocking circles in diagram below).

Diagram 2: Key programs of the Jo'burg safety strategy.
Source: JCSS Toolkit: 9

2.2. Geographical Focus Areas

One of the key innovations that the JCSS introduced was a geographically focused approach to addressing crime in Johannesburg. The GFA approach highlighted the need to, "devolve accountability down to managers at every level, including policing sector managers, police station commanders and the managers of city agencies, including the JMPD and service delivery departments" (JCSS: 13) i.e. to implement a localised approach to crime management in order to "win back the streets" in these areas. The JCSS therefore identified a range of intervention programmes which could be implemented in an integrated fashion in each GFA in order to create a safe environment. The number of programmes implemented and the way in which they were integrated, would depend on an assessment of local conditions and the key challenges to safety in a particular GFA.

The geographically focused approach (GFA) was therefore based on consolidating crime reduction in a small number of target areas and gradually widening the boundaries of each area. In order to achieve critical mass, it was proposed that geographical areas were identified that were important for the economic development of Johannesburg, either because they were business areas or because they played

an important role in forming investor and business perceptions (JCSS: 12). The GFAs which were initially identified included Norwood/Orange Grove, Moroka in Soweto, Newtown and the Inner City and Ellis Park precinct.

Within each GFA a specific geographically-focused problem solving methodology was implemented that included the development of crime prevention strategies and the implementation of specific crime-prevention activities. This over-arching methodology is characterized by the following six steps:

- Identify and define the problem(s);

- Analyse the causes of the identified problems;

- Develop a plan containing interventions to address the problems;

- Implement the plan;

- Analyse the impact of the interventions;

- Make the necessary changes to the plan and repeat from step 4 in an ongoing cycle.

The first three steps are related to the development of crime prevention strategies, while the second three phases refer to the implementation processes of specific crime-prevention actions.

A typical example of how the programmes interrelated and would typically feature in targeted areas is shown in the diagram below:

Source: Jo'burg City Safety Strategy (Executive Summary)

The following six programmes were therefore implemented in the GFAs in various combinations, depending on the specific crime and urban management challenges in each area.

Programme 1: Drivers of Crime

Programme 2: Vulnerable groups

Programme 3: Leverage visible policing and surveillance

Programme 4: Creating the orderly city through improved urban management

Programme 5: Safer environmental design

Programme 6: Communications and perception management (JCSS Toolkit)

Each programme was then broken down into specific focus areas.

Programme 1 identified the following drivers of crime and developed specific programmes to address each.

- Liquor
- Use of Firearms
- Involvement of young men in crime
- Organized crime
- Breakdown in moral values

Programme 2 identified the following vulnerable groups and developed specific approaches to each group.

- Youth
- Women and the Elderly
- Homeless People
- Migrants

Programme 3 focused on leveraging visible policing through targeted visible patrols and surveillance, particularly the roll out of CCTV in the City.

Programme 4: Creating the orderly city through improved urban management focused on a programme of by-law enforcement in the City in order to create an orderly urban environment by addressing issues such as illegal dumping and littering as well as illegal land and building invasions.

Programme 5 on Safer Environmental Design focused on introducing the principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) to the City with a specific programme around creating safe public spaces in conjunction with City Parks.

Programme 6 focused on the development of a communication strategy that would publicise the JCSS to internal and external stakeholders as well as addressing public perceptions that the City was unsafe.

Introduction

It was in the context of the implementation of these programmes in the GFAs that most of the substantive ground-level work to build safety through the methodology and approach proposed in the JCSS, took place. Inevitably, there were both success and challenges in implementation. The identification and implementation of a range of programmes in the GFAs that were oriented towards addressing safety as a holistic challenge, rather than as a problem simply relating to crime and law enforcement, was critically important in establishing a broader understanding of safety in these GFAs and ultimately in the City as a whole, as well as establishing the need to adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach to respond to this broader conception of safety.

It is also evident that many of the issues that became the focus of JCSP work in the GFAs were correctly identified as the key challenges relating to safety, and remain a critical part of the approach to safety in the City's new Growth and Development Strategy, Jo'burg 2040, although these approaches are not explicitly referenced as being drawn from the JCSS.

Below is an overview of some of the key successes and challenges of the various programmes as they were implemented in the GFAs. This assessment of the various programmes takes into account their relationship to the current priorities around safety as articulated in the City's current Growth and Development Strategy, Jo'burg 2040.

PROGRAMME 1: DRIVERS OF CRIME

Liquor

A significant amount of work in the GFAS was oriented towards addressing the problem of liquor, which has been shown to have a significant impact on social fabric crimes. A variety of multi-agency initiatives and operations were facilitated by the JCSP in order to address a range of safety issues relating to liquor consumption, for example by ensuring compliance to by-laws relating to the sale of liquor in order to prevent liquor outlets being established in areas close to schools and places of recreation. Efforts were also made to try and ensure that patrons of these establishments themselves were not endangered through unsafe or unhygienic conditions. Therefore the JCSP mobilised actors from, for example, JMPD by-law enforcement, EMS and Environmental Health to engage in multi-agency initiatives that sought to address the range of challenges posed by unregulated liquor outlets and the abuse of alcohol in a co-ordinated and efficient manner.

Challenges encountered in relation to the JCSP's efforts relating to liquor included difficulties maintaining effective co-operation with the Gauteng Liquor Board, which operates at a provincial level and therefore

does not always appear to have been informed by City concerns when issuing liquor licences. Another challenge related to cooperation with the City Planning Department on land use infringements i.e. when liquor outlets were established on land not zoned for this use (JCSP interview). Both of these challenges were significantly related to the difficulties of establishing effective multi-agency cooperation around the question of safety.

Alcohol abuse remains a significant problem in the City of Johannesburg, particularly in creating the context in which violent interpersonal crime occurs and for this reason it continues to be an important focus in Jo'burg 2040 under the theme, "Shifting patterns of alcohol abuse and use". Critically Jo'burg 2040 acknowledges some of the challenges encountered in relation to addressing the problem of alcohol abuse, which were identified during the implementation of the JCSS, in particular the need for an improved relationship between the Provincial and City governments regarding the issuing of liquor licenses. The Jo'burg 2040 Strategy therefore explicitly states that the City makes a commitment to work more closely with the Gauteng Provincial Government to ensure that the issuing of licenses does not undermine safety in the City.

In assessing the liquor programme as a whole, an interviewee from the JCSP Office argued that it was difficult to determine whether liquor focused operations have led to the reduction of street crimes associated with liquor abuse. This is partly the result of the lack of adequate data collection systems in the City, which would make it possible to assess the outcome of the liquor programme objectively and empirically. In the future an evidence-based assessment will need to be made around the impact of the liquor programme on crimes related to alcohol abuse. In addition, it will also be important for the City to assess the extent to which this programme, which focused significantly on the management of liquor outlets, is still the most effective approach to address alcohol abuse and related violence or whether a multi-pronged strategy that addresses a range of issues related to alcohol abuse might be a more effective way forward.

Firearms

In relation to firearms, which were identified as a major contributor to the prevalence of inter-personal violence and lethal crime in South Africa, the JCSP developed a firearm action plan to address the proliferation of firearms in the City and worked with the SAPS to focus on retrieving unlicensed firearms and seeking to tighten the control of licensed firearms. The JCSP was also successful in mainstreaming a focus on firearms in the work of City entities, particularly in the SAPS and JMPD during routine operations such as roadblocks and searches of night clubs. Roadblocks on major routes in and out of GFA's were regarded as particularly successful in clamping down on illegal firearms.

Challenges faced in relation to the programme on firearms primarily concerned the regulatory difficulties relating to declaring Gun Free Zones, which the JSCP had initially envisaged as part of the effort to address firearm related violence. The City aimed to negotiate with the Minister for Safety and Security and the National Commissioner of the SAPS to declare certain areas as Gun Free Zones (GFZs) in terms of the Firearms Control Act. The logistics surrounding implementing such an approach proved more challenging than initially envisioned and this has not yet been implemented.

Firearms do not appear as a specific focus area in Jo'burg 2040, which is problematic as international experience in environments such as Bogota in Colombia indicate that reducing the easy availability of firearms is an important component of creating a safe environment, particularly in contexts that have been previously characterised by violent conflict and where firearms are widely available, as in South Africa. A significant number of homicides and attempted homicides in South Africa are committed with firearms. Latest figures on the cause of fatal injuries in Gauteng compiled in 2010, based on the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) found that of the non-natural deaths recorded in Gauteng during 2010, the leading external cause of death (35%) was firearms. Males between 25 and 29 were the largest proportion of victims in these cases. These figures are in line with both national and international trends relating to homicide.

It is evident therefore, as the JCSS identified, that firearm related violence tends to be concentrated among young men. Consequently it will be necessary for the City to develop a range of strategies related to firearm violence that focus not only on the recovery of illegal firearms but also on the various contextual factors that make young men particularly prone to becoming both victims and perpetrators of firearm related violence. This is to a certain extent addressed in Jo'burg 2040's focus on the youth, however, it may be necessary to develop specific programmes related to firearm violence among young men.

The City will also need to look at a range of holistic and creative strategies, including international best practice, to address the broader culture of violence in the City, which firearm use is indicative of. For example the city of Bogota's disarmament campaign not only included measures to restrict the carrying of firearms on weekends and during December, but also promoted a "citizen culture" which emphasised that, "to be a citizen means to be unarmed and...to delegate to the State the use of force and the administration of justice" (Mockus, 2002). The promotion of such a culture clearly has to be combined with efforts to improve the trust of citizens in the City agencies that are legally mandated to use force for the protection of citizens. Currently national data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) indicates declining levels of confidence in the SAPS (South African Social Attitudes Survey, 2012). It will

be necessary for the City to acquire more information about citizen trust in the City's law enforcement agencies in order to identify exactly what the challenges and achievements are in this regard and to develop responses where trust in City law enforcement agencies is low. This will be critical if City residents are to begin to trust the City's institutions to assist them to resolve both private and public conflicts, rather than turning to various forms of violence.

Organised crime

The Jo'burg City Safety Strategy also focused on organized crime which was regarded as a key driver for a range of violent and financial crimes in Johannesburg. Organized syndicate motivated crimes identified included motor vehicle hijackings and cell phone thefts, drug trafficking, prostitution, bank robberies and cash-in transit heists. Part of the Strategy's focus on organised crime related to compliance inspections of institutions that potentially trade in the proceeds of organised crime such as panel beaters and spray painters/chop shops, second hand goods dealers, including pawn shops, cell phone dealers, scrap metal dealers and used spares dealers. Many operations were carried out in the GFAs to target these institutions through the enforcement of relevant by-laws. Operations were conducted with multiple stakeholders including, among others, EMS, City Power and Jo'burg Water (JCSP interview).

Cell phone theft

The JCSP focused particularly on addressing the problem of cell phone theft as a major form of street crime, often perpetrated by organised crime groups. The JCSP Office therefore signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the SAPS to focus on organized crime groups which drive vehicle and cell phone theft crimes in Johannesburg's business areas. In addition, JCSP supported an initiative by Business Against Crime (BAC) to blacklist cell phones in the City after an MOU was signed between the SAPS and cellular phone networks to blacklist stolen and lost phones. However, this MOU did not provide any mechanisms for monitoring the success of this initiative. As a result JCSP partnered with BAC to commission the Monitor Group to develop a draft framework for the monitoring of the impact of this MOU on cell phone theft. However, Monitor Group found that most stakeholders, including the SAPS, the insurance companies and the cell phone networks were either not willing or unable to provide the data to make it possible to effectively monitor the implementation of the MOU on blacklisting of phones. At the same time the report concluded that the cell phone theft monitoring project had led to two potentially positive outputs, namely the creation of a draft framework for monitoring the MOU between SAPS and cellular phone networks and the amendments to the form which SAPS currently uses to record information around cell phone thefts (Jo'burg, 2005).

PROGRAMME 2: VULNERABLE GROUPS

Youth

Under Programme 2, which addresses vulnerable groups, the JCSS identified youth, women and the elderly, homeless people and migrants as the key groups of people in the City who were vulnerable. The most significant work that the JCSP conducted in relation to these vulnerable groups related to three youth diversion and youth at risk programme implemented each year until 2009-2010 in Alexandra, Soweto and Westbury. JCSP contracted NICRO and KHULISA as service providers to implement these programmes. An evaluation conducted in 2007 found that the programmes had been very successful in terms of their content, design and implementation. Figures provided show that a total of 561 individuals identified by courts, schools and police stations successfully completed the youth diversion programme which is significantly more than the target which was initially set (JCSP interview). It was also reported that 91 learners successfully completed the youth at risk programme (Taback, 2007: 5). JCSS role players reflected very positively on the youth diversion programme.

However, the evaluation also found that the effectiveness of the programme had been undermined by the severe lack of resources and infrastructure for young people in the areas where the programme was implemented as well as a need to strengthen cooperation between role players:

> The City's youth diversion programme cannot operate in isolation. It is rather the responsibility of the City as a whole to ensure that social services, recreational and sporting facilities, and skills development opportunities are accessible and attractive to youth. In order for this to be achieved the City's Department of Community Development which integrates Social Services, Arts and Culture, Sports and Recreation, need to work together in an attempt to decrease anti-social and deviant behaviour in the youth in the City. (Taback, 2007: 5)

Budget constraints led to the end of the programme in 2010. In 2012 the JCSP renewed its focus on the youth by organising a workshop, in collaboration with the World Bank Social Development Department/Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Team and the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP) aimed at sharing lessons learned and best practices - from international, national, provincial, and local levels - on social crime prevention strategies targeted at youth violence. The workshop was attended by relevant officials from City departments, especially from its Social and Human Development Cluster, such as the Emergency Management Service (EMS), the Department of Health and the Department of Community Development. The workshop determined common objectives related to

young people in the City and identified possible gaps for targeted initiatives focused on preventing youth violence in Johannesburg.

It is clear that the focus on the youth remains relevant. Jo'burg 2040 continues to emphasize the importance of addressing the needs of the youth in the City and talks about the development of an overarching strategy to address these needs based on the collection and analysis of comprehensive data about the experience of youth. The 2012 National School Violence Study for example, recently found that in Gauteng, "the number of assaults and robberies at schools had increased, while threats, sexual assaults and thefts had decreased" (CJCP, 2012: 20). These type of findings will need to be interrogated and disaggregated down to City level in order to develop a targeted strategy and policy that addresses the entirety of challenges facing the youth in the City. The JCSP focus on youth diversion was appropriate to address the question of youth involvement in crime specifically, but it is clear that going forward, more integrated and extensive policy and strategies to address the needs of the youth will have to be developed by the City as a whole. As outlined in the evaluation report, which the JCSS commissioned, this will require a multi-agency approach driven by the City, which draws on the resources of various departments to meet the multiple needs of young people in Johannesburg.

Migrants

Another important group of residents who were identified by the JCSS as being vulnerable to becoming both perpetrators and victims of crime, were migrants in the City. In order to help address the needs of recently arrived migrants to the City, the JCSP supported the establishment of an immigrant's desk where information was provided on the availability of shelters, applicable by-laws of the City and advice on refugee and asylum seeking processes (JCSP interview). This immigration desk is still functioning with the Department of Home Affairs as a major stakeholder and is well utilized due to the large influx of immigrants to the city (JCSP interview).

Immigrants were not only regarded as vulnerable to becoming victims of crime, but also susceptible to becoming involved in committing crime due to the lack of employment opportunities for them on arrival in the City. As a result the JCSP supported an operational focus on the inspection of businesses owned by immigrants to ensure that they were brought within the ambit of City regulations and to ensure compliance with relevant legislation (JCSP interview).

Migrants are identified as a significant focus in Jo'burg 2040, which notes both the opportunity and challenges that the steady flow of migrants to the City brings. It also notes that policy developments lag far behind the social reality in terms of addressing the needs and challenges relating to migrants. It is

evident that going forward, the City will need to develop more sophisticated responses to the question of migration as a social phenomenon that is an irreversible part of the modern urban landscape. Migration will have to be addressed through flexible and creative strategies that manage migration, while mitigating some of the potential negative consequences of migration as new arrivals in the City, without access to resources and networks in their new environment may turn to crime to survive. The challenge then is how to integrate these new arrivals effectively in an inclusive City. The JCSP in identifying migrants as a vulnerable group, made an important start in beginning to grapple with the challenges and opportunities presented by migrants in a manner that was inclusive rather than punitive. However, it is also evident that a decade on it will now be the responsibility of the City as a whole to formulate strategies and policies that are appropriate to the current challenges of migration and which address the issue of safety within this context.

Going forward, the question of vulnerability within the context of the City will need to be systematically engaged with. Jo'burg 2040 focuses on the challenges which vulnerable groups face in relation to accessing a variety of forms of safety protection. It will be necessary for the City to specify in more depth whom it identifies as vulnerable, how it defines vulnerability and to formulate specific responses to different forms of vulnerability.

Women

Another key question which the City will need to systematically engage with relates to gender based violence and violence against children. These are key public concerns. While Jo'burg 2040 repeatedly refers to the importance of gender equality, it does not engage with the extent to which the possibility of gender equality is undermined by violence against women or lack of safety for women. The recent Victims of Crime Survey conducted by StatsSA indicates that women in Gauteng are particularly fearful of violence in their environments, with the majority feeling unsafe to walk alone in their areas at night or even during the day (National Victims of Crime Survey, 2012). Clearly if women do not have freedom of movement in the City, it is unlikely that they will be able to realise their full potential as citizens. During the development of the JCSS, some focus groups were held with women in the City in order to identify what they felt to be their key vulnerabilities. However, going forward, a much more systematic, multi-agency approach will need to be adopted to address the multiple challenges that women face in relation to safety, including the systematic collection of information about these challenges. In addition, violence against children will need to be dealt with separately as a problem in its own right.

PROGRAMME 3: LEVERAGE VISIBLE POLICING AND SURVEILLANCE

Visible policing and focused surveillance were seen by the JCSS as key strategies to create "defensible

space" in the GFAs with the aim of winning back the streets so that the public would feel safe on the streets and in cars. The objective of this programme was to give the public the confidence to travel freely in business, commercial and industrial areas and to secure the access routes into these areas against hijacking, mugging and robbery (JCSS: 89).

CCTV

The key area that JCSP focused on with regards to this programme related to the roll-out of CCTV in key public places and on key access routes in the City. The JCSP leveraged on the impact the CCTV network could have and subsequently assisted with the roll-out strategy and plan for installation of the new cameras. A network of 260+ (and still growing) cameras was rolled out to areas identified by the JCSS based upon analysis of crime statistics from the SAPS (JCSP interview). Ingress and out routes, parks as well as transport nodes received high priority. The work of the JCSP related to the CCTV network in Johannesburg assisted to bolster efforts to create a safe City. However, a recent evaluation report conducted by the JCSP indicates that the information from the CCTV cameras that have been installed across the City, are not being optimally used by relevant role players as a result of challenges relating to the collection of accurate and useable data and the analysis of data from CCTV cameras.

The JCSP originally intended to analyze CoJ control room incidents-data to establish safety patterns and trends in the Johannesburg Inner City. However, the inconsistent way in which data is currently being captured in the CCTV control room, means that it is very difficult to use this data. An evaluation report on the impact of the CCTV system between 2008 and 2012 revealed that, "the CCTV Control Room incidents-related data is unreliable, inconsistent and inaccurate … the poor quality of the CCTV data pertains both to the process and the format used to capture the information. Furthermore, it seems that there is a lack of understanding of the basic principles to categorize and define crime and disorder issues by the Control Room personnel" (JCSP, 2012: 52).

According to a respondent from JCSP there have been financial, resource and capacity challenges for the JMPD who owns the CCTV system. A private company was contracted to operate and monitor the CCTV system, however, the interviewee from JCSP argued that this was problematic as this had led to slow response times to the crimes committed on CCTV, allegedly as a result of the fact that civilians, rather than the JMPD or SAPS are monitoring incidents occurring on CCTV.

The JCSP report argues that the analysis of CCTV data, if recorded and analysed properly, would assist in better understanding the spatial distribution and temporal characteristics of crime, traffic accidents, urban management/disorder issues and emergency incidents in the Johannesburg Inner City. This

information would enhance City departments' decision making processes, related to crime prevention and safety promotions, from a strategic, operational and tactical level.

Furthermore, CCTV data analysis could be utilized to monitor and evaluate the outcomes of various City projects such as the impact on violent crimes of the installation of public lights in a park. CCTV data analysis could also be an important tool for urban planners and developers as it would provide a number of important indicators for consideration when planning urban regeneration projects in areas in the city.

However, the JCSP evaluation report concluded that, "the CoJ CCTV System was not entirely effective in the reduction of contact crime rates, in making people feel safer in the Inner City, and in the decrease of disorder/urban management issues in the CCTV area of coverage" (JCSP, 2012: 51). While the implementation of CCTV did appear to have a deterrent effect on property related crime, in particular vehicle theft, it did not have a significant effect on reducing contact crime in the Inner City or in reducing people's feelings of insecurity. In terms of the impact of CCTV on general problems of urban disorder the report found that "the Surveillance System has not been fully utilized by City departments to enhance service delivery/urban management and restore order in the Inner City" (JSCP, 2012: 52) as many of these departments do not appear to be aware of the value of CCTV as an urban management tool.

Therefore, while CCTV can potentially be an effective urban management tool in conjunction with a range of other interventions, the lack of integrity of data collected meant that CCTV data could not be used effectively. On the other hand, according to the evaluation report, a number of role players did not appear to invest in using this data as an urban management tool. In addition, the roll out of CCTV was characterized, as in many international contexts, by the assumption that CCTV could act as a "magic bullet" to reduce crime in areas facing a range of severe socio-economic and urban challenges, rather than seeing it as part of an integrated approach to improving the urban environment and reducing crime.

The evaluation report concludes, "The CCTV System cannot achieve by itself the concurrent reduction of crime, especially violent crime, increase feelings of safety, and reduction of disorder issues in the Johannesburg Inner City without the full commitment and support of law enforcement agencies, City departments and private organizations such as security companies. It seems that this commitment, from some role-players, has dwindled in the last period" (JCSP, 2012: 52).

Therefore the JCSP has made an important intervention in terms of assisting in the further roll-out of the CCTV in a more strategic manner to achieve a wider crime prevention focus. However, as the evaluation report above outlines, until other City stakeholders invest in ensuring that data from the CCTV is

professionally collected, monitored and analysed, much of the potential of the CCTV system that has been installed will be lost. This needs to be urgently addressed.

PROGRAMME 4: CREATING THE ORDERLY CITY THROUGH IMPROVED URBAN MANAGEMENT

The JCSS argues that both the lived reality and perceptions of public safety are strongly influenced by a breakdown in civic order such as petty crime, by a general ethic of lawlessness and by non-compliance with City by-laws.

The Jo'burg City Safety Strategy aimed to tackle these issues by creating the "Orderly City" — a place which is clean and free of grime, where there is a general culture of compliance with the law and where traffic policing and by-law enforcement are prioritized (JCSS Toolkit: 15).

Effective By-law enforcement

The major focus of the JCSP with regards to this programme was on effective by-law enforcement. This became a significant aspect of JCSP work in each of the GFAs with GFA coordinators centrally involved in coordinating multi-agency operations related to by-law enforcement with regard to a number of issues of urban governance including liquor, firearms and compliance to regulations relating to the occupation of buildings. The extent of involvement of the GFA coordinators in multi-agency operations to enforce by-laws is indicated, for example, by the fourth quarter report of the JCSP to the Section 79 oversight committee for safety and security in 2010, which reported that in the Moroka GFA alone during one quarter,

> A total of Thirty Six (36) Joint Operations with the SAPS, JMPD, and EMS was conducted which resulted in the inspection of 85 Panel beaters & Spray painters. A total of 56 follow-up inspections were conducted. A total of 70 Liquor Outlets were inspected; these include Shebeens, Taverns, Night Clubs and Bottle Stores. Eighty Five percent (85%) of outlets were found to be non-compliant to CoJ Fire safety by-laws and land usage by-laws as many shebeens and taverns are operating from residential properties.

The quarterly reports of the JCSP from 2005 to date, confirm that regular and extensive joint operations were conducted in all the GFAs over a number of years, although these tended to fluctuate depending on ability of the JCSP Office to allocate a full time GFA coordinator to each GFA and whether resources were available resources from the relevant departments depending on their priorities.

This focus on the enforcement of by-laws and enforcement against petty crime was informed by New York City's strategies of zero tolerance and "fixing broken windows", which the JCSS argued, "together with the Compstat process to upgrade policing, were the essential building blocks of New York City's turnaround from crime and disorder" (JCSS: 100).

The JCSS therefore focused on the implementation of by-laws, which were identified as important to focus on implementing in the GFAs. These included regulations applying to:

• Informal trading and keeping roadways and pavements open for pedestrians and traffic
• Taxi ranks
• Dumping and littering
• Illegal power connections
• Illegal land and building invasions
• Buildings (focus on 'bad buildings' that harbour crime)

Inner City

The JCSP was centrally involved, in conjunction with the Region F Department of Urban Planning and Management, in the development of an Integrated Inner City safety plan in order to co-ordinate a response to the variety of urban management problems encountered in the area. A baseline profile of the area identified a range of problems, which needed to be addressed in an integrated fashion and the JCSP was involved in the process of facilitating the development of an integrated strategy to address these challenges. JCSP has continued to monitor the implementation of the inner City safety plan to date and has recently made recommendations for improved monitoring of the plan. The JCSP has therefore worked closely with the Inner City Regeneration Task Force, which addressed the issues of slumlords, informal trade, traffic and taxi management in the inner City. In particular, the JCSP worked closely with the various inner City agencies to address the problem of "Bad Buildings", which were identified as one of the key challenges in the inner City. These bad buildings were seen as a concern from a range of safety perspectives. Criminal syndicates involved in street crime, drug trafficking and prostitution operate from a number of these buildings. The buildings are also hazardous to their residents as there is often a lack of water and sewerage, creating health hazards as well as illegal electricity connections that pose a major fire risk. Waste generated within these buildings that is not collected spills out onto the street, creating a general environment of disorder.

The JCSP worked with the Inner City Regeneration Task Team to facilitate multi-agency cooperation around "Bad Buildings", for example working with other agencies such as SAPS to respond to buildings

which had been "hijacked". This posed a particular problem for the SAPS as there is no crime category to prosecute or hold offenders accountable for this activity. The JCSP office therefore worked with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and inner City legal team to secure their cooperation in addressing hijacked buildings. As a result of the establishment of a joint forum and relationships between different role players, the problem of hijacked buildings has significantly improved and when problems arise there is a much quicker and coordinated response from affected role players (JSCP interview).

Extensive work was done in relation to by-law enforcement related to a number of areas of non-compliance in the GFAs. As outlined above a significant proportion of this work involved GFA coordinators organising and initiating multi-agency operations to address a range of contraventions of by-laws. However, while a lot of time and effort was expended on these operations, it is unclear to what extent their impact was monitored and evaluated or whether lessons learnt from these operations were compiled in order to inform more effective operations in the future. While reports on these operations were provided at regular intervals in the JCSP quarterly reports and in some instances indicated significant successes, it will be important to develop a much more systematic and comprehensive understanding of the impact of these operations over the period of JCSS implementation. Specifically processes will need to be put in place to ensure that a monitoring and evaluation process takes place subsequent to each operation among the role players involved in order to ensure that lessons learned are shared and any identified problems escalated.

Overall, it will be necessary to assess the extent to which the focus on multi-agency operations to enforce by-laws made a significant impact on urban disorder in the GFAs where they were conducted. This assessment could be linked to the Physical and Social Disorder Audits that JCSP has recently piloted, which would provide an innovative tool for assessing the impact of operations. It appears, as is explored in more detail under the section on cross-cutting issues, that these operations were important in mainstreaming a multi-agency approach to addressing problems of urban management and crime in the areas where they occurred and that this methodology increasingly influenced City practice more broadly. In the future it will be important to ensure that this approach to by-law enforcement continues to be mainstreamed throughout the City and carries on being driven by City stakeholders.

Finally Jo'burg 2040 indicates the need for a re-assessment of by-laws in order to ensure that they are consonant with the protection of the rights of the City's residents and do not stifle economic or social innovation. The JCSS focus on by-laws therefore will need to ensure that this is aligned to these objectives.

PROGRAMME 5: SAFER ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)

A central focus of the JCSS was to introduce the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) into the City of Jo'burg in line with the principles of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. CPTED is premised on the assertion that the environment can be made less conducive to crime through improved environmental design and planning. The JCSP has undertaken numerous initiatives in order to mainstream CPTED principles into various aspects of City governance. On the one hand JCSP has been extensively involved in conducting CPTED audits in various parts of the City to describe, identify, analyse and address problems in the urban environment that impact negatively on safety and security. It has also monitored, documented and reported on the implementation of CPTED recommendations in a number of areas in the City. In addition the JCSP worked closely with the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) to mainstream CPTED principles into JDA's work on urban regeneration over the last ten years. The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) was established in 2001 as a City agency to stimulate and support area-based economic development initiatives throughout the Johannesburg metropolitan area. JCSP also worked with the Department of Urban Management to produce CPTED awareness material for private developers as well as the City in order to mainstream the concept into the design of both public and private property. This work culminated in the development of a CPTED booklet for distribution to developers and homeowners through the Planning department.

Most recently the JCSP has pioneered innovative approaches to CPTED by introducing Physical/Social Disorder Issues (PSDI) Analysis, which facilitate a new level of analysis of urban disorder issues through the geo-coding of a range of physical, social, and land-use related disorder issues using the Geographical Information System (GIS) hand-held device called Trimble. The objective of these audits is to analyse the level of physical/social disorder issues in the GFAs and to establish the correlation between identified environmental problems (e.g. liquor outlets) and violent crime. This information is intended to provide strategic, operational and tactical guidance to the GFA Coordinator, City departments and law enforcement agencies for the development of effective crime prevention activities in the City. To date JCSP has worked with the JDA in two areas targeted for urban upgrading in order to provide a detailed understanding of the crime and disorder hot spots and geographical patterns. This information was utilized to draft two CPTED reports, which aimed at guiding the design, implementation and management of the JDA urban regeneration projects to create a safer and more secure urban environment.

Parks Safety Initiatives

As part of the focus on CPTED, the JCSS included a specific focus on the maintenance of public space. According the JCSS, "Much research has shown that if public spaces and venues (e.g. parks) are safe and well maintained, and are thus used regularly by the public, this has a significant positive effect on the psyche of citizens, especially in terms of their fear of crime". The JCSP therefore worked with Jo'burg City Parks, JMPD and the SAPS on a park safety initiative with the Department of Community Safety of the Gauteng Province. JCSP subsequently worked with Jo'burg City Parks (JCP) in order to consolidate a Park Safety Plan (PSP) to jointly address safety and security issues in parks. The project identified 27 problematic parks.

The identified parks were profiled by the JCSP in conjunction with JCP and, based on the findings of the inspections conducted and the crime statistics presented by the SAPS/Park Safety Unit, crime prevention plans were developed. Patrol plans were also developed which concentrated on police visibility and law enforcement at parks during problematic times. Regular patrols have resulted in various arrests for a range of offences.

A particular problem which City Parks continues to face relates to homeless people using parks as a refuge, many of whom are also recent migrants to the City. JCP has recently agreed to collaborate and strengthen its partnership with the CoJ Human Development Department who manages the various shelters, which provide assistance and shelter for the homeless.

The 2012 annual report of JCSP notes that, "City Parks has a solid understanding of the relationship between "crime and grime". However, more needs to be done to mainstream Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) theory and principles into the JCP decision making process."

It is clear therefore that, as Palmery noted, a significant area of success in relation to crime prevention initiatives at a local level, has been the focus on crime prevention through environmental design. It appears that the JCSP has been successful in mainstreaming CPTED principles into City planning, particularly with regards to urban regeneration projects undertaken by JDA. However, as some of the JCSP evaluations of the implementation of CPTED design principles, note, on-going work needs to be undertaken by City agencies in order to ensure that the gains achieved through the implementation of CPTED principles in urban design are not reversed through the neglect of City functions such as monitoring lighting, littering, vagrancy and other factors that undermine the maintenance of safe space for residents.

PROGRAMME 6: COMMUNICATIONS AND PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

The JCSS implementation plan recognized that, "If the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy is to be effective, it must be communicated to all those who have to implement it, and to investors and the public" (JCSS implementation plan: 18).

Critically also the implementation plan argued for the need for a communication strategy to address the perception of Johannesburg as a high crime area.

The JCSS Toolkit also emphasised the importance of working closely with what was then the City's Department of Public Liaison to develop a focus on safety and security. In addition, it advocated the need to develop a strategic communication plan with input from the JMPD and all key role-players in order to publicise the efforts that the City was making to eliminate crime, as well as to develop a set of protocols on how to communicate issues related to safety and security.

While early quarterly reports of the JCSP indicate that communication of the Strategy to internal and external stakeholders was recognised as critical to the successful implementation of the Strategy, this focus appeared to be displaced over time as the JCSP focused on implementing various programmes and mainstreaming them within City agencies through on-going training of City role players. Communication is dealt with in more detail below as one of the cross-cutting success factors related to the implementation of the Strategy.

SECTION THREE

3.1. Cross cutting issues in the implementation of the Strategy

Crime prevention in context

Before engaging with the specifics relating to the implementation of the JCSS, it is necessary to contextualise some of the complexities of strategy and policy transfer, which have been alluded to earlier in this report. The JCSS, like similar local crime prevention strategies in other parts of the country, was profoundly influenced and shaped by international best practice as encapsulated in key national and international strategy, policy and practice, for example the NCPS, the White Paper on Safety and Security, the Safer Cities approach etc. However, the difficulties and unpredictability of transferring many of these "models" of crime prevention to contexts outside the environments in which they were initially formulated are increasingly being noted (Louw, Pelser, Steinberg, Shearing, Pfigu). Steinberg, Brogden and Shearing note the way in which after 1994, South Africa became an enormously desirable context for a range of actors to "market" international (generally Western) models of crime prevention and community policing.

Brogden and Shearing (1993:95) explain:

> [D]emocratic policing is being marketed as one commodity among others in an international technological supermarket. The approach being adopted is consistent with the marketing of other products where what is on offer is a result of research and development that has taken place elsewhere in the industrialised world.

This "'Best practice'…was therefore being defined and generated by a burgeoning international industry of police reform" (Steinberg, 2011). However, as Steinberg notes, "the results of policy transfer, especially to societies in the process of a major transition, are often unknowable" (Steinberg, 2011). In this context, Pfigu uses the concept of "travelling models" to understand how global ideas such a community policing and crime prevention are re-contextualised and re-appropriated by a variety of actors at local and national levels, including by the communities in which these ideas are propagated, as well as by various other local actors, mediators and knowledge brokers. Communities interpret these "new" ideas in terms of their own normative and cognitive frameworks, drawing on their own experience and local histories of, for example, "community policing", to interpret and redefine imported Western conceptions of community policing. Travelling models are therefore subject to processes of local and

national "translation", which may fundamentally transform the meaning and practice of these models in the local context. Looking at these processes of translation can "[shed] new light on implementation, or how policy moves from policy formation to 'front line practice' and vice-versa" (Lendvai cited in Pfigu). These processes of translation are on-going, continually shifting meaning and practice around core concepts such as crime prevention. These factors need to be taken into account in understanding how the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy was actually implemented in practice.

Introduction

As noted above policy and strategy implementation is subject to constant translation and reinterpretation by a variety of local actors. Complex and shifting political priorities, departmental agendas, leadership tensions, resource constraints and organisational cultures resistant to change, all create the environment in which the JCSS was implemented. The implementation of the JCSS has therefore been subject to shifts as local processes of interpretation, co-option or resistance to the Strategy, has led to different phases of implementation. This can be partially tied to the fluid and changing environment in which the Strategy has had to be implemented, which characterises the governance environment as a whole in South Africa. In particular the implementation of the JCSS was affected by changing political and institutional leadership, from the lower level of station commanders to senior leadership such as City Managers and heads of departments who may have diverse understandings of what the JCSS means for the City and for their departments.

Fluctuating levels of cooperation with the JCSP office also appears to have influenced implementation, in particular with regards to information sharing, which is critical to the JCSS approach, and which, according to the Jo'burg City Safety programme office, declined over time, for example in relation to the sharing of crime statistics. A third factor relates to changing priorities and strategic focus in various departments relevant to the implementation of the Strategy. While the JCSS may have initially been a key focus in many departments in the City after its launch, over time this focus shifted to other departmental priorities which both staff and leadership were required to turn their attention to and for which they would also be held accountable.

The JCSS therefore appears to have gone through three key phases in terms of implementation:

(a) The first phase involved a focused period of developing and launching the Strategy and beginning to embed it in the work of various City agencies.

(b) The second phase involved a period of focused implementation, when the JCSP Office was at full capacity. During this period a variety of stakeholders agreed that the Strategy made a significant difference to crime prevention in the City, in particular in the GFAs where integrated implementation took place. This lasted until about 2010.

(c) During the last phase of implementation, the Jo'burg City Safety programme office appears to have been significantly impacted on by the fact that it is located within the line department of the JMPD and is dependent on this organisation for its funding. An increasing lack of ownership of the JCSS by the JMPD, which is explored in more detail below, appeared to manifest itself in the failure to replace staff members who left the Jo'burg City Safety programme office, eventually reducing the office to the programme manager and one GFA coordinator. In this context, the JCSP has continued to seek to introduce innovative approaches to safety. During the 2011/2012 financial year, the Programme conducted an analysis of the crime situation in Johannesburg based on the official crime statistics released by the South African Police Service (SAPS) using a descriptive statistical method to establish the overall level of crime in Johannesburg, combined with the analysis of data from Geographical Information System (GIS) software, which had been used to geo-code crime levels throughout the City.

The office also introduced a novel approach of collecting and analysing data about urban governance and safety issues through the Physical and Social Disorder Issues (PSDI) Audits. Other analyses that the JCSP Office has recently undertaken include an Evaluation of the Impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on Crime Levels in the Johannesburg Inner City and An Evaluation on the Effectiveness of the CoJ CCTV Surveillance System on Crime, Fear of Crime and Disorder in the Johannesburg Inner City.

However, the lack of staff and in particular GFA coordinators appears to have impacted on the ground-level work in GFAs. Focus group respondents in Norwood/Orange Grove argued that role players were "enthusiastically participating" in the Strategy during the period that the GFA coordinator was working in the area until about 2009, but that the number of joint operations organised by the JCSP office declined after this. The fact that focus group participants assumed that it was in fact JCSP's role to organise joint operations and that these declined significantly when JCSP was not driving them, speaks to the question of sustainability in the GFAs as role-players in these areas did not maintain multi-agency operations with the same rigour as when the JCSP was actively driving these operations.

SUSTAINABILITY IN THE GFA'S

It appeared that two key factors coincided to reduce the sustainability of the JCSS in the most recent period of implementation. On the one hand, after several years of focus in four GFAs namely, the Inner

City, Norwood/Orange Grove, Ellis Park and Moroka, the Section 79 oversight committee for public safety decided that it was important that the implementation of the Strategy be expanded to the whole of the police clusters in which these original stations were located. While it is obviously important that the GFAs are expanded beyond the initial areas in which the Strategy was implemented as originally envisaged in the JCSS, it appears that in some areas such as Moroka, this expansion created significant problems of sustainability related to the need to distribute resources and focus at a time when the JCSP office was already overstretched and under capacitated. Some stakeholders argued that the question of resources had not been taken into account in the decision to expand the focus of the Strategy implementation. Ironically the desire to expand the JCSS was also a result of its success in certain areas such as Moroka. As respondents from the focus group in Moroka argued,

> The JCSS did not deteriorate or slip over time but when the programme was expanded to cover the whole cluster, the concentration of efforts in Moroka declined due to a lack of resources and need to expand the focus. The GFA coordinator would only come back to Moroka once every few months instead of weekly. Now the continuous concentration in Moroka gone. This bigger area being covered (7 stations) made it more difficult to observe the impact of operations because resources were spread more thinly. New police stations took time to adapt to the strategy and the expansion to other clusters may have happened too soon. Teams had to run on their own after JCSS handed responsibilities over.

It appears that role players at Moroka police station did not feel entirely confident to drive the implementation of the Strategy in their area, without the assistance of a GFA coordinator, despite the work that had been done at the police station over a number of years. This was in part a result of the fact that changes in the station commander meant that the Strategy was no longer being driven from the most senior level at the station. Such changes in leadership, specifically at station commander level in GFAs, led to challenges in institutionalising the Strategy as new leadership had to be repeatedly "won over" to the methodology and benefits of the Strategy.

Urban Management

Another factor that appeared to impact on the implementation of the JCSS in the GFAs in the latter period concerned, paradoxically an attempt to implement the principles of the JCSS through the establishment of the urban management structures by the Department of Planning and Urban Management (DPUM) in the seven regions of the City of Johannesburg. These urban management structures were intended to enhance cooperation between City agencies in order to improve the urban

environment. A key component of these structures was the appointment of Law Enforcement Managers in each of the City's seven regions to coordinate joint planning and to implement multi-agency operations and cooperation between different stakeholders (JCSS Toolkit, 2008). This multi-agency approach was directly in line with the JCSS and provided an opportunity to mainstream this way of working throughout the City.

According to the JCSP office, it was centrally involved in the initial establishment of the Urban Management Department and the conceptualisation of its role. The JCSP Office developed a toolkit on the Strategy in order to be able to empower and train the Law Enforcement Managers appointed in each of the seven regions of Johannesburg. The intention was to try and multiply the impact of GFA coordinators that had been appointed in four areas in Johannesburg. The JCSP Office ran workshops in each of the regions with multi-agency teams and Law Enforcement Managers in each region. It also helped with the development of community profiles for some regions as well as assisting with the development of safety plans for particular regions, such as the Inner City and for Region E. Urban Management also conducted operations with GFA coordinators. At this point, according to the JCSP office, the role of the City Safety Strategy was well articulated in what Urban Management wanted to do.

However, over time problems emerged, which appeared to be centrally linked to unclear definition of roles and mandates of Urban Management and the JCSP office respectively. Originally the JCSP office asked that every region develop a regional safety plan using the guidelines provided in the JCSS toolkit. There was initial agreement that this would happen but according to the JCSP office, only three regional directors asked JCSP to assist in the development of safety plans. According to the JCSP office it appeared that Urban Management was reluctant to take ownership of the Strategy. Another problem arose in relation to the job descriptions of Law Enforcement Managers who felt that their job descriptions conflicted with the methodology which the JCSS approach required them to implement.

According to focus group participants in Moroka:

> The establishment of Urban Management units had negative implications for resources – utility departments fell under urban management. At some point in time, too few resources caused Urban Management to refuse to work with JCSP…The problem at the outset was that job descriptions for urban management were not done properly therefore there ended up being a lot of duplication.

Mainstreaming the JCSS

When the JCSS was formulated, it argued that the strategic priorities, budgets and the MTEF (Medium Term Expenditure Framework) of role players in the City should be aligned to the JCSS; however it is evident that this type of close alignment between departmental priorities and budgets and the JCSS occurred to a limited degree. The first evaluation report on the Strategy found in 2006 that,

> The budget allocations for the JMPD have not taken the focus of the strategy into account. It will be necessary for agencies to start including dedicated budget allocations focused on their role in safety and security issues, in line with the focus of the City's safety strategy. This may include capital expenditure for infrastructure, as well as repairs and maintenance and upgraded urban management capacity, since the JCSP does not itself have a budget (Fanaroff, 2006: 11).

As already noted the lack of dedicated funding for crime prevention has been a significant obstacle to the implementation of crime prevention approaches, which require multi-agency cooperation. As Pelser and Louw note, budgets are determined by individual departments and allocated to specific line functions within these departments. These line functions and their whole departments report individually on activities and expenditure. Thus, while crime prevention policy advocates an integrated approach, the way in which government operates inhibits the implementation of joint activities (Louw and Pelser, 2002).

The JCSP also suffered from the lack of a dedicated crime prevention budget which it could use to facilitate integrated interdepartmental work at its own discretion. Instead the JCSP was allocated funding through the JMPD, rather than being independently funded. This, over time, had a significant effect on the sustainability of the JCSP, in particular in terms of making available funds to replace staff that had left the programme.

COMMUNICATION AND TRAINING

In the absence of the formal alignment of the priorities of various departments and City agencies with the JCSS, the JCSP office engaged in on-going training of various role players in the City, in an attempt to disseminate the methodology of the JCSS and empower stakeholders to implement it within their line departments and as a collective endeavour with other departments. A key aspect of the attempt to disseminate the JCSS approach also involved the development of a toolkit, which was finalised in 2008, in order to "consolidate the good practices and lessons learnt by the JCSP team. The Toolkit includes a comprehensive set of tools and resources to assist City agencies to develop and implement safety plans in each of the City's Seven Regions using the methodology of the Jo'burg City Safety Programme" (JCSP Annual Report 2007/8). In addition, the JCSP developed a train the trainer manual to facilitate the

dissemination of the JCSS methodology by equipping role players in departments to conduct training themselves. At the end of 2012, the JCSP reported that it had trained six regional JMPD teams and one hundred and thirty nine (139) JMPD officials, including senior officials and academy educators on the use of JCSP toolkit and methodology over the previous year. However, despite the training that the JCSP office conducted, as a Regional Director interviewed by the HSRC astutely pointed out, training and dissemination efforts are unlikely to succeed in the absence of an enabling institutional environment, which makes it possible for those trained to actually utilise the methodology in their work, "training per se doesn't have an impact. However, when you institutionalise a strategy or programme you have undertakings and agreements with departments, you don't just train and then not institutionalise...when you institutionalise something, this is how we understand your mandate, this is how it is linked to the Safety Strategy".

It would have been impossible for the JCSP office to train the whole staff complement of any City department, nor was it desirable that they would play this role, even if the Jo'burg City Safety programme office had unlimited resources, as until the Strategy was driven from within departments themselves, it was highly unlikely that any training efforts by the JCSP office would have meaningful and sustained impact.

While training was one method to "mainstream" the JCSS within the City environment, as the JCSS implementation plan recognised, in order for the JCSS to be successfully implemented it was critical that it was effectively communicated to both the public and City agency role players. However, the interviews conducted by the HSRC appear to indicate that in general there is a significant gap between the work done by the JCSP office in implementing the Strategy as outlined in the Key Components and Programme Section of this document and the perception of key stakeholders interviewed who are *currently* responsible for the implementation of critical aspects of the Strategy. Only some of these stakeholders seem to have an in-depth understanding of the Strategy, the work that has been done to implement it, or a detailed understanding of their role or that of their department or organisation in the implementation of the Strategy. While in some instances this may be the result of the fact that these interviewees were recent appointments to the City, this does not alone explain the gap between these role players understanding of the Strategy and the work done by the JCSP Office. Instead it speaks to the complexities around the dissemination and internalisation of new ideas within an environment that was not always amenable to new approaches that would require shifts from well-established practices. Thus Strategies such as the JCSS and the ideas that it articulates interact with pre-existing organisational cultures that seek to resist, shape and appropriate the approaches that its originators intended.

Therefore some interviewees expressed active resistance to the Strategy, implying that the Strategy had been implemented in a hierarchical manner and that the participation of their Department in the implementation of the Strategy was contingent on the JCSP outlining the "objectives and benefits for all stakeholders" (EMS interview). Other interviewees argued that communication of the Strategy had largely focused at a high profile level and that it needed to be simplified for ordinary officers and City employees. However, it is evident that this lack of dissemination to "lower level" employees spoke more to the fact that the JCSS had not been integrated into the daily working practices, targets and indicators of various departments than a failure to "communicate" the Strategy effectively. Knowledge of the Strategy in an institutional vacuum would be substantively meaningless to most employees. As one respondent pointed out, an "ordinary" officer on the ground does not necessarily need to have a strategic or analytical understanding of the Strategy but its key tenants need to be mainstreamed into his or her daily work, through strategic leadership at a higher organisational level. At the moment aspects of the Strategy are institutionalised in this way, for example JMPD officers are evaluated in terms of the number of firearms and drugs they recover so that they are not simply stopping cars for traffic infringements but to enhance crime prevention. JMPD has therefore increasingly incorporated the pillars of the Strategy dealing with crime reduction and by-laws directly into their work, particularly through its business plans.

In general, it is the establishment of working relationships between different role players and with the JCSP office in an enabling institutional environment, which is likely to be the most effective way of mainstreaming the Strategy within City agencies as role players learn through experience what the Strategy means and what it can offer them. A member of EMS, for example, described how he had initially been sceptical that EMS had a role in the Safety Strategy but through his work with the JCSP in one of the GFAs, he had begun to understand the Strategy itself and the role of EMS in it.

The other aspect of communication of the Strategy related to its public profile in the City of Johannesburg. In the early stages of the implementation of the Strategy, the profile of the Strategy was kept deliberately low, however in 2006 an external evaluation report advocated that, "there is now sufficient progress to justify stepping up the profile and communication to the public. This is now essential to get public buy-in and cooperation. Active support of the public must also be sought. Many GFA issues require a change in public attitudes" (Fanaroff, 2006: 37). An effective communication strategy would have had an important effect in creating awareness within City departments themselves as well as broader awareness in the city among the public, community and civic organisations, which should all play a critical role in the implementation of the Strategy. International research indicates that creating awareness around Safety Strategies is critical for effective implementation and in fact reduces fear of

crime because it creates the belief among the public that crime is being effectively addressed by government.

After the recommendation by the external evaluation report of 2006 regarding the need to communicate the JCSS more effectively, a communication strategy was drawn up in 2007. The initial intention, as a result of the fact that there wasn't a dedicated publicist in the City Safety office, was that JCSP would work with the City's Central Communication Unit to raise awareness about safety and the JCSS. A dedicated person was assigned to this task, but was faced with multiple competing pressures to publicise other events and developments in the City. As a result the Communication Unit became dependent on the JCSP office to provide them with information to utilise rather than being able to take a proactive approach on behalf of the Strategy. Again the implementation of the Strategy was undermined by the lack of an enabling institutional environment, particularly the allocation of necessary resources and skills to ensure the Strategy and the City's approach to safety and crime prevention, could be effectively publicised.

A review of the City Safety Strategy in Sydney, Australia revealed that the higher the awareness of the City Safety Strategy initiatives, the more likely the city was to be perceived as "safer now" (Coumarelos, 2008). While the JCSS expressed concern that raising awareness around crime could lead to increased fear among members of the public, in fact it appears that if increased awareness is related to actions that the City is taking to increase safety, this in fact reassures members of the public. The evaluation in Sydney indicated that the Strategy was effective in increasing the perceived safety of the city and in reducing fear of crime in the city.

In the same vein it is important for the next phase of the JCSS to consider evaluating public perceptions of safety especially within the context of Johannesburg residents' awareness of the Strategy and how this can create confidence in the city's levels of safety as a whole. Initially at the roll out phase of the Strategy, a victim survey was conducted in parts of Johannesburg in 2003. It will be critical to compare these results to the results of the recent National Victimisation Study conducted by Stats SA (2012), disaggregated to City level as well as potentially conducting site specific perception surveys.

INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP

As already argued, the key challenge which the Strategy faced in terms of its implementation, was less about a failure to train enough City role players or communicate the Strategy effectively, than about an institutional environment and institutional actors that interacted in unpredictable ways with the Strategy, sometimes appropriating and implementing particular elements of it, sometimes resisting it all together,

sometimes embracing and implementing it to the degree possible within a range of environmental constraints. Therefore one of the key challenges in terms of the institutionalisation of the Strategy, concerns the question of "ownership". It is only when there is individual or collective ownership of policy and the strategy to implement it, that it is likely that policies and strategies will be actively driven or led. International examples from Bogota in Colombia to New York in the United States, where crime rates have been effectively reduced have shown the crucial importance of policy and strategy that is owned and driven by City Mayors in particular. In Johannesburg the Strategy was approved under the leadership of the previous Mayor and the City appointed an MMC responsible for Public Safety. However, over the period that the Strategy was implemented there were five different MMCs, each of whom interacted differently with the Strategy and prioritised different projects and programmes over time. This meant that different demands had to be met by both the Department of Safety and the City Safety programme office to respond to these shifting priorities, which impacted on implementation.

The concept of "ownership" is a term used loosely in policy environments but is not always easy to define. Boughton and Lourmouras (2002) argue that what policy ownership requires and which is equally applicable to strategy ownership is, "for the owner to appreciate the benefits of the policies and accept responsibility for them". The International Monetary Fund provides the following definition of ownership,

> Ownership is a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies, by officials…who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country's own interest. (cited in Boughton and Lourmouras, 2002)

However, as Boughton and Lourmouras point out, it is difficult to make the concept of ownership "operational" as ownership is not directly observable.

> A judgement about the extent to which ownership is present is a judgement about the state of mind and degree of internal commitment on the part of the country's officials. If a government does not carry out a policy despite making commitment to do so, weak ownership is only one of several possible causes. Circumstances might have changed and made a different policy preferable, key agencies may have lacked the administrative or technical capacity to implement the policy, or political conflicts may have arisen that prevented government from acting.

Importantly also ownership is dynamic and changing, individuals committed to a particular policy may move on or change their minds. Boughton and Lourmouras therefore argue that, "An operational approach to ownership must include an analysis of processes of dialogue, negotiation, and signalling that

could strengthen ownership over time". They also note the tensions that can arise as a result of a lack of clarity regarding who the "owner" of a policy is as "there are many potential owners".

In the context of the implementation of the JCSS it is clear that there have been a number of challenges of ownership relating to the Strategy. While the JCSS was initially formulated and developed in the Department of Finance and Economic Development, after the Strategy was accepted by the City Council, a Jo'burg City Safety programme office for the Strategy was established under the auspices of the JMPD who were designated as the lead agency for the implementation of the Strategy. An official in JMPD argued that this was problematic as, this respondent argued, JMPD is primarily an operational rather than strategic institution. Apart from this, it appears that the location of the Jo'burg City Safety programme office as key driver of the Strategy in the JMPD meant that it was widely perceived by City agencies as being "owned" by JMPD. As one respondent stated, "There is a wrong perception around the strategy, a bit of disownership of the strategy, it is supposed to be like part of the furniture, but other departments see it as a JMPD thing" (Public Safety interview). This lack of ownership was reflected in interviews that the HSRC held where senior role players would identify challenges with regard to implementation of the Strategy, but it did not appear to occur to them that it could be their role to address or respond creatively to these challenges. A respondent from Public Safety therefore argued, "You need to make departments own the process, then you can hammer on them to deliver…you need specific interaction with departments. The departments should be absorbing it and cascading it down to staff."

Paradoxically, while many City agencies perceive the JCSS to be "owned" by the JMPD, it appears that JMPD has an ambiguous relationship with the Strategy itself. This is reflected in the lack of resources directed towards the implementation of the Strategy, whether this is in the form of budget allocation for the Strategy as noted above or failing to replace staff that have left the JCSP office. An interviewee from Public Safety emphasised, "if you don't buy into the idea then there isn't a budget. It starts at the top". This interviewee therefore argued that,

> The office of the chief (of JMPD) needs to own up to the strategy. The City Manager needs to have some role in the Strategy, for example to receive progress reports, so the chief of JMPD feels accountable to the City Manager…

Two interviewees from JMPD therefore concluded that the result of these challenges around ownership of the Strategy meant that, "Currently it's unclear who the owner of the strategy is".

ACCOUNTABILITY

Closely linked to the issue of ownership is the question of accountability. While ideally, a belief in a policy or strategy's value alone could drive effective implementation, the reality is more pragmatic and in a world of multiple and competing priorities and needs, unless ownership is linked to concrete forms of accountability, it is unlikely that implementation will be sustained.

Pelser and Louw (2002) point out some of the particular challenges relating to accountability in relation to crime prevention in the South African context. Unlike local-level crime prevention policy in developed countries, where South Africa's crime prevention policy originated, which is premised on direct local accountability, in South Africa elected local officials have no formal oversight of the national police service or a variety of provincial departments such as Home Affairs, Health and Education, which are all critical to multi-agency crime prevention.

Therefore the JCSS document and implementation plan both recognised the need to establish various forms of local accountability to ensure the implementation of the Strategy. The JCSS therefore advocated the need to include deliverables relating to the Strategy in the scorecards of senior officials. It also defined a range of indicators that would enable to the City to measure progress on the implementation of the Strategy and signed MOUs with key institutions such as JMPD and SAPS. However, interviews conducted by the HSRC indicate that the forms of accountability originally envisaged, were to a large extent not put into place or appear to have had little effect in instilling a sense of accountability among different stakeholders about their role in the implementation of the Strategy. The 2006 evaluation report on the JCSS noted then that, "Although various JCSS goals have now been incorporated into the scorecards of some senior officials, this is not the case for all who have a role to play in JCSS implementation (Fanaroff, 2006:29). It appears that this state of affairs has not significantly changed. An interviewee from the Public Safety argued therefore, "There needs to be an expression of accountability, so it is no longer discretionary whether to support the strategy…"

Respondents from JMPD outlined the impact that this lack of formal accountability is having on the implementation of the Strategy in various City agencies, "a problem in terms of the institutionalisation of the Strategy is the fact that City agencies are not being evaluated in terms of the implementation of the strategy, therefore ownership is lost and there is little incentive for agencies to take the Strategy seriously in their planning and implementation". A senior role player in Public Safety did not appear to be aware of the MOUs that had been signed in relation to the JCSS. However, he and other respondents

emphasized the need for more concrete agreements with departments in the form of Service Level Agreements. One respondent from Public Safety asserted that, "Each department should have had a Service Level Agreement with the programme office, then it would have been possible to assess progress, and be clear what part each department should play...Each department must account for their role in the City Safety Strategy".

While SLAs may be important to formally define and specify the role of each department in relation to the JCSS, SLAs signed in an institutional vacuum will have little effect. These would need to be signed within the context of clear lines of accountability in relation to the implementation of the Strategy. For example, it would be essential to decide whether these SLAs would take place between the JCSP office and departments or be elevated to a senior administrative level and be signed with, for example, the City Manager, who could provide senior oversight. It is also important not to see SLAs, MOUs or other formal agreements as a panacea to the challenges of implementation including role definition and accountability. Nevertheless they could be an important tool to support other forms of relationship building by helping to define and support implementation. A study on the role of SLAs in the IT industry found that both relationship building and formal contracts are important, "formal contracts [such as SLAs] and relational governance function as complements rather than substitutes" (2009:119). "Formal controls [such as SLAs] are the written contractual and management initiated mechanisms designed to guide behavior toward desired objectives, whereas relational governance is unwritten, worker-based mechanisms designed to influence interorganizational behavior (Macneil cited in Goo et al, 2009: 120).

Location of the Jo'burg City Safety Programme Office

A number of interviewees raised the question of the location of the Jo'burg City Safety programme office under JMPD as problematic in terms of holding departments accountable for non-performance in relation to the Strategy and for creating the impression that the Strategy was not a City wide initiative but a JMPD programme. On the other hand, a respondent from the JCSP office itself pointed out that it is the question of accountability, which is critically important, rather than the formal location of the office. This respondent pointed out that other programmes had been moved to the Office of the City Manager, as advocated by a number of interviewees to the HSRC, however this had not increased accountability in relation to the programme. Again, as for SLAs, moving the Jo'burg City Safety programme office location cannot be assumed to be the sole solution to the problems of accountability that the JCSS has faced. It will only have value if a range of other mechanisms to strengthen accountability and the implementation of the JCSS are put into place. Nevertheless it is important to take into account the views of interviewees

who felt strongly that the Jo'burg City Safety programme office needed to change location. For example, a respondent from JMPD argued that as a result of the Jo'burg City Safety programme office location, the JCSS is not taken into account at a senior City level and lacks authority and power with regard to its ability to negotiate with other City agencies to ensure they work collectively to implement the Strategy.

Another interviewee argued that the programme office's location had caused difficulties in relationships with departments with provincial and national accountability, "The SAPS is not 100% supportive of the City Strategy…if the Strategy was presented at a provincial level and it got support and was given instructions from that level, then SAPS members would forget about their ranks relative to JMPD. At the moment however, the chief of JMPD can't give instructions to senior police because he is seen as at a lower rank".

While it was initially envisaged that the Jo'burg City Safety programme office would play a strategic rather than operational role, over time it became evident that the lines between its operational and strategic roles of the Jo'burg City Safety Jo'burg City Safety programme office became blurred. Three interviewees, one from JMPD, one from EMS and from the Office of the MMC Public Safety appeared to think that the location of the Jo'burg City Safety programme office had undermined its ability to play a strategic and City-wide role and had led the office to become "bogged down" in operational issues, in particular those relating to JMPD. These interviewees also argued that the Jo'burg City Safety programme office needed to be moved to the City Manager's office, in order to "elevate it politically" and ensure political buy in to the Strategy. As a respondent from Public Safety argued, "The strategy should be in the City Manager's office to drive it across the City. Now it is just a unit and is not capacitated". While the JCSS implementation plan specified the strategic rather than operational role of the Jo'burg City Safety programme office at the time the Strategy was launched, it appears that a lack of clarity about the role of the Jo'burg City Safety programme office has emerged over time, possibly as a result of its location as well as a result of the ongoing operational assistance the office has been required to provide in the GFAs as a result of struggle of some GFAs to fully sustain the Strategy without the operational assistance of the JCSP office. It was initially envisaged that the JCSP would only play this operational role in the early stages of the implementation of the Strategy.

MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH

As outlined earlier in this document, one of the key innovations and critical components of the JCSS was its focus on a multi-agency approach to reducing crime and improving urban management. As the JCSS outlines,

Neither the JMPD nor the SAPS has sufficient powers or resources to achieve the necessary reduction of crime in the City in isolation. In addition to this, the issue of 'crime and grime' in the City must be tackled, particularly in relation to the impact which it has on negative perceptions which form a key part of business investment decision-making. To deal effectively with 'crime and grime' issues, it is necessary to bring in other agencies which are mandated to tackle specific issues, such as Pikitup, City Power and City Parks. Political support for the process will also be imperative at the local, provincial and national levels (JCSS: 112).

However, actually implementing a multi-agency approach has proved a challenge in organizational environments around the world, including those with significantly higher levels of resources and more stable governance structures than South Africa. As Rauch, Newham, Pelser and Louw have all pointed out there are particular challenges to implementing a multi-agency approach in the South African context. At the same time as the NCPS was, "calling for a focus on integration and coordination across departments, these very departments were struggling to define and deliver on their core mandates within the new democratic government system" (Rauch, 2002).This led Pelser and Louw to argue that, "crime prevention strategies should focus initially on strengthening basic service delivery in the government departments that are central to crime prevention…Once a satisfactory level of service from these departments has been achieved, attention could shift towards the co-ordination of interdepartmental activities" (Pelser and Louw, 2002). Therefore, as some respondents who were interviewed by the HSRC indicated, the critical issue must be to ensure that departments such as health, education and social development deliver effectively on their mandates and this would then have an effect on addressing the underlying causes of crime, which crime prevention approaches seek to take into account. While it cannot be assumed that better health and education will lead to an automatic reduction in crime, the challenges and potential dangers of incorporating a whole range of areas of governance into the ambit of "crime prevention" have led analysts such as Steinberg to argue that, "in any urban context characterised by meagre security and endemic disorder the police ought to establish its authority by confining itself to two functions: effectively investigating violent crime and providing rapid and fair interventions whenever citizens call for help in emergencies" (Steinberg, 2011a).

Pelser (2002) also emphasises the danger of drawing in too many issues into crime prevention and the need for a clear focus and prioritisation of issues for implementation. After analysing various crime prevention partnerships in South Africa, Pelser argued that the most common fault that occurred when establishing these partnerships was that the process of consultation prior to the establishment of a multi-agency crime prevention initiative was not targeted enough and could become an end in itself. He argued

that as a result of the fact that consultation and consensus was sought with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible this led to the creation of long lists of issues to address rather than focusing on one or two strategic priorities (Pelser cited in Newham, 2005). In this vein the JCSS developed seven programmes to address a range of issues identified as relevant to crime prevention, ranging from youth involvement in crime to crime prevention through environmental design. This made it difficult for the JCSP to address all of these issues with equal effectiveness. As a result the efforts of the programme were dispersed over a number of areas of focus, which meant that instead of a visible impact being made on one or two strategic priorities, it was often difficult for the public as well as internal and external stakeholders to understand the impact that the programme was having.

Another potential pitfall of multi-agency approaches is that they can lead to the establishment of inappropriate partnerships or designation of inappropriate roles during the consultation phase before an adequate assessment of the ability of the role-players to contribute to the project has been taken. Pelser (2002) states that, "crime prevention partnerships are meant to be strategic alliances, founded and developed on the value each partner adds towards meeting the overall purpose of the programme or project." In this vein, a role player from the JMPD interviewed by the HSRC argued that the operational rather than strategic nature of JMPD as an organisation had not been engaged with in the initial phases of consultation for the development of the Strategy, which lead to the designation of the JMPD as the lead agency for the implementation of the Strategy despite the limitations of it strategic capacity.

A review of the implementation of the Safer Cities programme in the United Kingdom, although not directly comparable to the Jo'burg Safer Cities programme, provides a useful international comparative understanding of the challenges of implementing a multi-agency approach even in a highly resourced environment, with substantial funding from national government and stable, well-established governance institutions. The review noted that tensions between various partners were often about issues of autonomy: autonomy of the local authority from central government, the perceptions by the police of crime prevention and community safety as secondary to their primary mandate; and resistance by the local authority to a move towards greater emphasis on probation services. Challenges were mitigated, for example, through the appointment of local staff to the Safer Cities project offices established in each city, to help alleviate fears and suspicions and ensure sufficient local buy-in to projects (Tilly, 1992:12). Local steering committees consisting of members from public, private and civil society sectors, also assisted in achieving a locally-driven approach. Some of the projects did however experience further challenges which affected the progress of the projects (Tilley 1992, 14). These included:

1) High levels of suspicion within the local authority;

2) Low levels of commitment within the local authority to the alternative approaches of the Safer Cities programmes;

3) Manifest sexism in cases where the Safer Cities team members were female;

4) Lack of sufficient senior representatives on the steering committee, which undermined confidence and commitment to the project;

5) Local authority exercising tight budgetary control and funding existing work rather than new activities proposed in the Safer City strategy;

6) Political controversy; and

7) Skills levels among the Safer City staff.

According to Tilley, these challenges revealed the crucial importance of City leadership. Without sufficient commitment from above, "new initiatives would struggle to find traction, while on-going strategies may not be sustainable". The success of multi-agency partnerships with the community was significantly premised on continued funding from the Safer Cities programme. Tilly concluded that, "Commitment within the local authority and within the police, as well as cooperation between these actors and the Safer Cities personnel, is… essential for the long-term success of the Programme" (Tilley 1992, 18).

The skills of the local Safer Cities staff were critical in overcoming problems of implementation and joint-operations. Staff worked hard at expanding networks while building relationships with those in key positions in major agencies. They deliberately cultivated contacts where they could dissolve mistrust through emphasising how the project could complement and promote the work of potential partners. Tilley describes what this relationship management involved:

> (Safer City staff) have stimulated applications for schemes which involve staff in new multi-agency initiatives. They have made use of the steering group to disseminate information about the project and to raise consciousness about the opportunities created by the project. They have used the local media to publicise early achievements and tried thereby to create local interest and confidence in the project. They have carefully avoided appearing to endorse the mission of one agency where this might jar with that of those in other agencies. Considerable personal skills involving tact, sensitivity, and an ability quickly to develop rapport with a wide range of personnel have been needed and, indeed, have been shown by many working in Safer Cities (Tilley, 1992: 20).

A number of lessons can be drawn from this UK example. On the one hand it is clear that a multi-agency approach requires on-going full time work, dedicated to building and strengthening relationships in support of co-operative approaches. This work has to be on-going as policy, strategic and organisational environments are inevitably fluid and continuous efforts need to be made to maintain and establish relationships within this context, so that there is a continuity of programme implementation. Ownership of the process from City leadership and funding are both critical to support this work. Importantly, multi-agency work inevitably poses a variety of challenges around questions of autonomy, mandate, independence and authority. Many agencies are resistant to change and to subordinating their organisational priorities to a larger City-wide imperative, which they may perceive as potentially undermining the profile of their particular organisation or department. These tensions need to be managed as an integral part of multi-agency work.

In Johannesburg while almost all interviewees agreed that a multi-agency approach is desirable in principal, most acknowledged that departments don't generally "talk to each other" or work together. Some of the challenges to multi-agency cooperation in relation to the JCSS include:

- *Lack of accountability for the implementation of the Safety Strategy, which would compel multi-agency work.*

- *Failure of departments to deliver on their core mandates due to a lack of capacity and resources, which affects the ability of departments to collectively deliver on crime prevention and safety.* The interdependencies between departments in meeting particular objectives such as that of safety, are a critical factor in some of the struggles to make the multi-agency approach work. For example, while Emergency Management Services (EMS) might want to institute a proactive approach to prevent flooding, they are dependent on Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) to fix and install storm water drains in areas where there is a danger of flooding. As an interviewee from JMPD stated, many of the departments critical to the delivery of safety in the City suffer from problems of efficiency and delivery, which impacts on the successful implementation of the Strategy. According to this interviewee, "departments must do what they are supposed to do". Another respondent from Public Safety concurred, "part of the chaos is dominated by us because departments are not playing their part-e.g. Pickitup, don't monitor dumping. It is necessary to clarify roles between departments in the City".

- *A belief that crime prevention and safety are the sole responsibility of JMPD and/or SAPS.* Entrenched understandings that crime prevention is the responsibility of the JMPD, rather than the City as a whole means that City agencies tend to see the JCSS as something which is additional to

their core mandate and therefore can be dispensed with when they are faced with competing pressures.

- *Departmental competitiveness, which includes:*
  - Resistance to subordinating departmental priorities to an over-arching goal, for which departments are not accountable.
    A key obstacle to the implementation of the JCSS has remained the difficulties around getting different departments to work together as a collective that prioritises an overarching goal or vision, rather than pursuing individual departmental interests, particularly when this is what departments will be held accountable for and for which they have been allocated budgets.
  - Leadership that is resistant to sharing merit for achievements with other departments.
    An interviewee pointed out that new leadership in the City want to "make their mark", which leads to the setting up of new forums and processes. When work is undertaken collectively the key focus is who is "going to shine" rather than emphasizing teamwork for a larger goal (JMPD interview).
  - Organisational culture that is hierarchical and resistant to collective approaches.
    An interviewee from JMPD argued that the organisational culture in many City institutions militates against a collective approach to City problems. This respondent argues that creating joint accountability is a challenge in a hierarchical environment, when most employees are looking upward with the hope of promotion rather than prioritising the needs of the City as a whole.
  - Competition for resources between departments.
    A respondent from EMS argued that part of the reason for lack of cooperation is competition for resources between departments. According to this interviewee departments are "competing for scarce resources, which creates challenges for cooperation ... it is important to emphasize the benefits of collaboration in resource scarce times but it is important for each role player to keep their status. The concept of cooperation needs to be sold".
- *Resource issues including:*
  - Expansion of multi-agency approaches without sufficient organizational or resource support.
  - Lack of financial support for City agents to work outside their direct mandate, for example over-time pay for joint operations.

Some departments would not work after hours without overtime pay, which their organisations would not grant them. This undermined, for example, the ability to conduct joint operations relating to bad buildings as building inspectors would not be present at raids on these buildings if they occurred after hours, when other problems related to the bad building operation, such as drug dealing, were most likely to be occurring.

- *Leadership change and instability at local level.*
  A number of role-players pointed out that the leadership role of station commanders in relation to the Strategy is significantly undermined by the high turnover of these station commanders. Both the Moroka and Norwood geographic focus areas were negatively impacted by changes in station commanders, which meant that station commanders who understood and were invested in the implementation of the Strategy, moved elsewhere, leaving a leadership vacuum at station level and compelling the Jo'burg City Safety programme office to reinitiate a process of "winning over" another station commander to the value and benefit of the programme.

- *Unclear mandates between different City role-players in relation to the Strategy.*
  Problems around cooperation in the City in relation to safety also appear to pivot around a specific problem related to the mandates of two key role players in the City Safety strategy, namely JMPD, which was established in 2001 with a specific local City mandate and the SAPS, which has a national competency but which has a constitutional obligation to combat crime at a local, provincial and national levels. According to an interviewee from Public Safety, "At the moment there is tension and rank pulling between JMPD and SAPS. There is a problem with way the way they engage…It is the constitutional duty of SAPS to maintain order, however they sometimes say the metro started this therefore it is not our problem". The primary source of contention appears to be these agencies respective roles in crime prevention. An interviewee from the SAPS argued in this vein that many of the present problems related to crime prevention and City safety do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SAPS, including lack of service delivery, slum lords, littering, illegal buildings and structures, which do not involve criminal offences. On the other hand, an interviewee from JMPD argued that the organisation, "was told to do things that was not in their formal mandate such as liquor compliance". It is evident therefore there is a lack of clarity among role players from the JMPD and SAPS regarding their respective roles in the City, which will need to be clarified in the future.

- *Unclear definition of the mandates of provincial and national role-players in relation to City role players in the implementation of the Strategy.*

The difficulties of working with the Gauteng Liquor Board, which has a provincial mandate, was noted by a number of interviewees, particularly those working at a local level. There also appear to difficulties in working with the department of Home Affairs to deal proactively with the question of illegal migration in the City as the department has a provincial and national, rather than local mandate. Challenges relating to these organisations' role in the City appear to arise mainly as a result of a lack of engagement with local role players about issues that impact on the mandates of these provincial departments at a City level.

Alcohol-a case study of the challenges of a multi-agency approach

The problems around dealing with alcohol abuse are illustrative of some of the challenges relating to the implementation of an effective multi-agency approach in the City. Alcohol abuse is identified as a key driver of violent crime in Johannesburg in the JCSS. Despite numerous raids on illegal liquor outlets in Norwood/Orange Grove, Alexandra and other areas in Johannesburg, respondents argued that little impact has been made. There are several reasons for this. On the one hand there is apparently little consultation between the provincial liquor board and local stakeholders, including the SAPS, as well as other community members regarding the issuing of liquor licenses. The Gauteng liquor board issues licenses in the absence of information regarding whether particular premises have been zoned for commercial purposes, and also does not consult the SAPS regarding crime levels in areas where licenses are to be issued. Therefore there has been an uncontrolled proliferation of licenses granted to premises located either close to each other or close to community resources such as schools and churches. A Regional Director therefore pointed out that the issue that needs to addressed at root concerns illegal land use, as tavern owners apply for licenses to trade on land that is not zoned for this use. A focus group participant from Environmental Health pointed out therefore that you can have a "thousand operations" but if town planning doesn't address the root cause, other departments will continue dealing with symptoms. It appears that while all the role players recognize the interdependencies between their departments in addressing the problem of alcohol abuse, they are currently unable or unwilling to work together to address this challenge collectively.

Instead a reactive approach is adopted after taverns have already been illegally established. Numerous fines will be issued by different City role players, sometimes during joint operations, all of which are generally ignored as a result of circuitous legal processes involved in the enforcement of consequences for any of these violations. Therefore fines will be issued by EMS for fire hazards, by JMPD for failing to adhere to by-laws, by the Building control unit for violations of building by-laws etc. Despite all this effort, little impact is made either in terms of closing down liquor outlets, or preventing new outlets

being opened up in inappropriate venues. In Moroka, a creative response was adopted by the local GFA coordinator who first "educated" tavern owners about the by-laws that they needed to adhere to and then allowed them time to comply. After this period, operations were conducted to penalise those who had not voluntarily complied.

The problems around controlling the abuse of alcohol which exacerbates violent crime, is only one example of many similar struggles to implement a multi-agency approach. There have been similar difficulties relating to coordination around the City-wide challenge of informal trading. While the Department of Economic Development is responsible for the allocation of stalls to hawkers, according to an interviewee from Public Safety, Economic Development "don't think about how illegal trading impacts on other departments, as a result of by-law infringements, selling of illegal goods etc." Whether or not this is an accurate reflection of the work of the department of Economic Development, the continued proliferation of illegal hawking in the City is indicative of the fact that multi-agency cooperation to address this challenge has not yet taken effect.

The 2010 World Cup and the GFAs-case study of the successes of a multi-agency approach

On the other hand, one outstanding example of the power of collective action and planning between departments was the preparation for the 2010 World Cup where rivalries and competitiveness were put aside for a brief period in pursuit of an overarching goal that all stakeholders felt personally invested in and, importantly, were accountable for. As a respondent from the SAPS commented, "The JCSS role in City level safety coordination in preparation for the 2010 World cup, led to the development of good relations between different role players". However, after the World Cup it appears that most agencies went back to operating in silos as they had before the event and the institutional memory of working in an integrated fashion was lost as role players pursued a variety of competing short-term interests and departmental priorities.

Another example of more sustained success around a multi-agency approach to the implementation of the JCSS relates to multi-agency work that took place in various GFAs, which demonstrated the value of this approach when successfully implemented. In Moroka focus group participants recounted how the JCSS started as a, "big project, many role players were involved…The strategy used crime figures from Moroka to guide the areas targeted with operations… the idea was to look at root causes of crime, because every department was given its responsibility, the strategy was sold to role players, [they] had meetings once every two weeks". According to Moroka implementing agents, "The community was supportive of operations – this led to a better relationship between SAPS and the community. Moroka

became an example to other police stations; the community were coming to the station to say that we were working well, visitors came from overseas, and members of parliament. Other stations in the province were coming to copy Moroka, the CPF was also improving. Good team work supported the impact of operations. The teamwork was because of this project [JCSS]. SAPS has been committed, we never had problems with role players in Moroka".

Thus City agencies that had never worked together previously, were brought together for the first time and relationships were established that could be drawn on as problems arose. According to participants in the focus group "Everybody at SAPS bought into the JCSS idea. Networking from the JCSS team assisted with the creation of working relationships between different role players – this did not happen before". They went further to explain that, "It was now possible to escalate problems that are out of your jurisdiction. [The GFA coordinator] created something special, created a channel, we started to decide together what needed to be addressed, we started joining hands. SAPS also started to invite other role players to [their] meetings – this did also not happen before. The team met during the festive season (2012) despite the absence of the JCSS representatives – which reflects commitment of stakeholders to the Strategy and its structures".

However, the ethos of collaborative work has yet to be internalised in most departments as a part of daily practice. Moreover as illustrated above, the challenges of multi-agency work in a complex and fluid environment, marked by multiple social challenges that must be addressed simultaneously, makes multi-agency work a far more serious challenge than would be the case in more stable, relatively regulated and well-resourced environments.

It is evident that there will need to be active management of relationships in order to make a multi-agency approach a reality in Johannesburg as occurred, for example in Moroka. The positive impact of such management of relations is evident from the work of GFA coordinators. It will be necessary to convince various role players and stakeholders of the benefits that will accrue to them as a result of working in a multi-agency fashion.

SECTION FOUR

4.1. Crime and perceptions of crime

In order to assess the way forward in terms of the JCSS, this section of the report first examines crime rates in Gauteng and Johannesburg as well as perceptions of crime. Where data is available for the City of Johannesburg specifically, this has been utilized in the analysis. However, indicative of some of the problems relating to access to information for the City, City specific statistics were only available in some instances. In general the analysis had to rely on national surveys that only disaggregate date down to provincial level. While not ideal, some trends can be extrapolated from the province of Gatueng to Johannesburg.

The second component of the section on the way forward looks at the changing policy and strategic environment in the City, and the way in which this impacts on an evaluation of the role of the JCSS in the future.

Crime in Gauteng in 2013

While the JCSS is not limited to addressing crime in isolation but rather looks at safety within the broader challenge of urban management at a City level, it is nevertheless important to understand both crime trends and perceptions of safety, as part of the methodology for assessing the impact of the Strategy. On the other hand it also has to be noted that showing a causal link between any one programme or strategy and a reduction of crime, has proved extremely difficult internationally as a variety of factors can impact on either an increase or decrease in crime.

Nevertheless research which has been conducted in the City since the JCSS was launched indicates that while crime and violence have decreased in the City, residents continue to experience various forms of insecurity, which will need to be addressed going forward. As the JCSS points out perceptions of crime and feelings of insecurity are as important to address as the empirical reality of crime and violence.

PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME IN GAUTENG

The most recent Quality of Life Survey conducted by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) found that while Gauteng had one of the highest Quality of Living standards in the country, one of the key issues which continued to undermine citizens perceived quality of life included threats to their safety. When Gauteng residents were asked "what is the main problem affecting your community", they identified crime above a range of other problems such as unemployment and HIV/AIDS. While this

concern about crime has declined from the previous Gauteng Quality of Life Survey in 2009 (46% to 35%), this indicates that residents in Gauteng see the question of crime as one of the critical challenges they face.

At the same time there do appear to be positive trends in terms of residents perception that crime is declining in Gauteng. The National Victims of Crime Survey (VOC) released in 2012 indicated that in Gauteng 49, 1% of residents felt that violent crime had *declined*. Gauteng was one among only three provinces in the country to express the view that violent crime had declined. 47% of residents in Gauteng also felt that property crime had decreased. However, the VOC survey also found that about two-thirds (65,6%) of households in Gauteng indicated that they took physical protection measures to protect their homes, indicating high levels of feelings of insecurity. Only a small proportion of households, however, use a weapon (6,3%) as physical protection.

When Gauteng residents were asked what they thought motivated property crime, residents in the province cited drug related needs as a significant factor (71%). The second most cited motivation was "real need (such as hunger)".

The Victims of Crime Survey found that in Gauteng 41-50% of residents in Gauteng felt very unsafe walking at night. Unsurprisingly these feelings of safety about walking in the street are strongly differentiated according to gender. In Gauteng, 73% of male-headed households said that they felt safe walking in their area during the day, while only 27% of female-headed households felt the same way.

This indicates that women in Gauteng do not feel safe walking in their own neighbourhoods even during the day. This gendered discrepancy becomes even more apparent when looking at feelings of safety around walking at night. Men in Gauteng express relatively high levels of confidence about walking at night, with the highest percentage in the country (74,2%) of male-headed households stating that they felt safe walking alone when it was dark. However, this is in stark contrast to the perspective of women in Gauteng who are the most fearful in the country of walking alone at night, with only 25, 8% of female-headed households who said that they felt safe walking alone in their area when it was dark.

Clearly Gauteng has a significant challenge in terms of addressing women's perceptions of safety both during the day, when they are likely to be travelling to and from work and school and even more so at night. Women obviously have to feel free to move around the areas in which they live and in the City as a whole. Therefore it will be important for the City to evaluate the extent of the fear that women in Johannesburg experience as well as the actual incidents of violence that they are vulnerable to in public environments. Detailed strategies and concrete responses will need to be developed to respond

comprehensively to this challenge. Research of this nature was done during the development of the JCSS on a small scale but will clearly have to be undertaken in a much more systematic and detailed fashion, if the City intends to maximise its liveability for more than half its population, who are female.

The results of the VOC Survey also seem to indicate underlying potential for inter-group conflict in the province with a higher proportion of households in Gauteng identifying the "outsider" as the source of crime in the province than in other provinces in the country. Households in Gauteng (41,9%) were the most likely to feel that *property* crime in their area was more likely to be committed by people from other areas in South Africa and 14% believed that crime was committed by people from outside South Africa. A relatively high percentage of residents in Gauteng also thought that *violent* crime was committed by people from other areas in South Africa (44%) and from outside the country (15, 5%). No doubt this is a reflection of the high levels of migration into Gauteng from both other South African provinces and the continent as a whole.

To understand how South Africans feel that government should combat crime, the VOC Survey found that,

> 66% of households in 2010 and 2011 were of the view that social and/or economic development was the more effective way of reducing crime and that this should be the focus area for money to be spent on. About 20% of households indicated that more money should be spent on law enforcement in order to combat crime. Slightly more than 13% felt that money should be spent on the judiciary/courts in order to effectively reduce crime.

Importantly, it seems that the SAPS remains South African residents' first port of call (59,4% of households) if they feel themselves to be in danger of becoming a victim of crime. A relatively high number of Gauteng residents are likely to report housebreaking to the police (61-70%). Residents in Gauteng are relatively satisfied (65, 3%) with the police in their area. It will be important to build on this social capital. In Gauteng some of the significant reasons residents gave for why they were dissatisfied with the police included the following-don't respond on time (67%), corrupt (63, 8%), lazy (62, 2%), co-operate with criminals (53%). The smallest percentage of residents (34, 2%) identified lack of resources as the source of their dissatisfaction with the police. It is clear therefore that perceptions of the police could be significantly improved simply by improving response times, and working to address the conduct of officers in a way that makes it explicit to the public that they are hardworking and committed professionals. On the other hand it appears that Gauteng experiences relatively high levels of corruption as reported in the VOC survey. Households were asked if any government or public official asked for money, favours or a present for a service that he/she was legally required to perform. The highest

proportion of such incidents was reported in Gauteng (10,1%). Half of those who were victims of corruption were asked to pay a bribe to a traffic officer. This was also most common in Gauteng (58,4%). The second highest service was policing, where 29,5% of victims in Gauteng paid bribes to police officers. This would correlate with Gauteng residents' response that one of the key reasons for dissatisfaction with the police was corruption. Clearly both the perception and the incidence of corruption among Gauteng's law enforcement agencies need to be urgently addressed if trust in these institutions is to be restored as the lead departments in the implementation of the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy.

## CRIME TRENDS BETWEEN 2004 AND 2011[2]

This section provides a comparative overview of how crime patterns have changed between the years 2004, soon after JCSS was launched and 2011, the latest date for which accurate statistics were available to HSRC. While, as already noted, it is difficult if not impossible to draw causal links between a particular Strategy and crime rates, as a variety of exogenous factors may also have an impact on either increasing or reducing crime rates, nevertheless in formulating a Safety Strategy going forward it will be important to understand the current patterns of crime in the City and the extent to which these have changed. Data was sourced with the assistance of ISS Crime Hub and is based on officially released SAPS statistics. This analysis and research by JCSP indicate that crime levels in the City have in fact declined over the past decade. The following analysis provides a more detailed picture of these trends.

Violent Crime

At the launch of the JCSS in 2004, crime statistics indicated that the City of Johannesburg was characterised by a significant problem of violent crime, more specifically robbery with aggravating circumstances, which constituted 25% of violent crime, followed by common assault (22%), assault GBH (18%), and malicious damage to property (16%). (See Figure 1).

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[2] The year 2011 was selected for comparative purposes due to incomplete data for 2012

Figure 1

Violent Crime 2004

Legend:
- Murder
- Total sexual crimes
- Attempted murder
- Assault gbh
- Assault com
- Robbery com
- Robbery aggrevated
- Arson
- Malious damage to property

N=101 974

Source: ISS Crime Hub

However, as shown in Figure 2, by 2011 the violent crime picture in the City has changed significantly with robbery with aggravating circumstances now constituting 19% of violent crime. The most important categories of violent crime in the City of Johannesburg are now common assault (26%), assault GBH (20%), and malicious damage to property (18%). Therefore common assault has slightly increased from 22% of all incidents of violent crime in 2004 to 26% of all incidents of violent crime in 2011. Incidents of malicious damage to property have also slightly increased in 2011 by 2%. (See Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 2

Violent Crime 2011

N=73 664

Source: ISS Crime Hub

Aggravated Robbery

In 2004 incidents of car hijacking (52%), robbery at residential premises (29%), and robbery at business premises (18%) were the most important categories of robbery with aggravating circumstances in the City of Johannesburg (See Figure 3). In 2011, it appears that car hijacking has declined significantly to 30% of aggravated robbery, while it has been overtaken by an increase in robbery at residential premises (39%). Robbery of business premises has increased even more significantly from 18 to 29% of robbery with aggravating circumstances in the City of Johannesburg (See Figure 4).

Figure 3

Aggravated Robbery 2004

- Car hijacking
- Truck hijacking
- Robbery residential
- Robbery business

52%
1%
29%
18%

N=7 953

Source: ISS Crime Hub

Figure 4

Aggravated Roberry 2011

- Car hijacking
- Truck hijacking
- Robbery residential
- Robbery business

30%
2%
39%
29%

N=7 662

Source: ISS Crime Hub

Property related crimes

In 2004 incidences of residential burglary (41%) and theft out of motor vehicles (29%) were the most important categories of property related crimes (See Figure 5).

In 2011 incidences of residential burglary (42%) and theft out of motor vehicles (25%) remain the most important categories of property related crimes (See Figure 6)

Significantly fewer (26%) property related crimes were committed in 2011 when compared with 2004. Relatively little change is observable in the proportions that each of the property related crime categories occupies. However, what is notable is the increase in business burglaries which went up from 7% to 10% of the total number of property related crimes between 2004 and 2011.

Figure 5

N=74 799

Source: ISS Crime Hub

Residential burglaries and theft of motor vehicles remained fairly consistent in terms of the proportion of property crimes between 2004 and 2011 whereas theft out of motor vehicles decreased from 29 to 25% as a proportion of the total number of property crimes.

Figure 6

Property related crime 2011

0%

10%

25%

23%

42%

- Business burglary
- Residential burglary
- Theft of motorvehicle
- Theft out of motorvehicle
- Stock theft

N=55 344

Source: ISS Crime Hub

Other serious crimes (Figures 7 & 8)

There was a reduction of 7% in "other serious crime" between 2004 and 2011. In 2004 incidences of "all other theft" (69%), commercial crime (11%) and shoplifting (7%) were the most important categories of "other serious crimes" (See Figure 7). In 2011 incidences of "all other theft" (46%), commercial crime (15%) and driving under the influence of alcohol (14%) were the most important categories of "other serious crimes" (See Figure 8). The illegal possession of firearms and ammunition remained the same (2%) of "other serious crimes" between 2004 and 2011.

Crime categories which increased significantly as a proportion of all "other serious crimes" include drug related crime (4% to 7%), driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs (2% to 14%), shoplifting (7% to 10%) and commercial crime (11% to 15%). However, many of these are crimes which are dependent on police action for detection and may in fact indicate improved law enforcement.

Figure 7

Other serious crimes 2004

- Illega possession fire arms/ammunition
- Drug related crime
- Driving under influence of alcohol/drugs
- All other theft
- Commercial crime
- Shoplifting
- Culpable homicide
- Public violence
- Crimen injuria
- Neglect or ill treatment of children
- Kidnapping

N=108 763

Source: ISS Crime Hub

Figure 8

Other serious crimes 2011

Legend:
- Illega possession fire arms/ammunition
- Drug related crime
- Driving under influence of alcohol/drugs
- All other theft
- Commercial crime
- Shoplifting
- Culpable homicide
- Public violence
- Crimen injuria
- Neglect or ill treatment of children
- Kidnapping

N=101 433

Source: ISS Crime Hub

This brief overview of crime statistics reveals that while the JCSS was at least partially developed to reduce the impact of crime on business investment confidence, that businesses are increasingly the target of violent and general property crime. More research will need to be done to ascertain, which types of business are most vulnerable to crime, particularly violent crime and to assess the extent to which this is impacting on business investment decisions in the City. One important improvement appears to be a significant reduction in car hijackings. However, this reduction has in some way been overtaken by an increase in aggravated robberies at homes, which was identified as a critical problem in the JCSS in 2004 and initially formed one of the key pillars of the Strategy to be implemented City-wide. In addition to this common assault and assault GBH have overtaken aggravated robbery as the most frequently occurring violent crime in Johannesburg. More research will need to be undertaken to understand the nature and circumstances of these violent crimes, if they are to be effectively combated. The results of the VOC Survey for Gauteng appear to indicate that there is a significant challenge in terms of making the City feel safe for women and this will also need to be addressed both in terms of women's perceptions of

crime and in terms of the actual incidence of crime they are exposed to in both public and private spaces.

SECTION FIVE

5.1. New policy and strategic environment

Jo'burg 10 plus

The current Mayor in his inaugural State of the City speech outlined the vision of the City in relation to safety, which, echoed the JCSS's intention to "win back the streets", by articulating a vision to; "take back the streets" in Johannesburg. In order to do this and to effectively address the multiple social challenges the City faces at a local level, the Mayor announced the launch of a ward based programme of urban governance, named Jo'burg 10 plus. This programme will seek to create cooperative governance teams in each municipal ward in order to address the range of social challenges each ward faces, including crime and challenges to safety, through a comprehensive plan for visible, ward-based policing that will involve the deployment of 10 JMPD officers to each ward. The intention is that these teams of JMPD officers will work with other departments and agencies in a multi-agency approach to counter crime and other social ills, such as illegal dumping, vandalism of infrastructure, urban decay and by-law infringements.

Jo'burg 10 plus is therefore essentially an operational programme to guide the implementation of a multi-agency approach at ward level. Although it has not yet been formalised into a single programme document, Jo'burg 10 plus draws on the strategic vision for the City outlined in the City's most recent Growth and Development Strategy, Jo'burg 2040 as well as the methodology the JCSS pioneered in the GFAs and is currently being implemented throughout the City.

Jo'burg 10 plus therefore utilises the JCSS methodology for working in local environments, which involves systematically identifying problems and developing collective solutions. As a result the JCSP has already assisted some regions in the City to implement the collective problem solving methodology advocated by Jo'burg 10 plus, using the JCSS toolkit and guidelines for the implementation of the GFA methodology in local areas.

The Mayor outlined his key priorities in relation to safety in his first State of the City speech:

> We will build a safe, secure and resilient City that protects, serves, and empowers communities … we will create safer communities. In partnership with communities and various stakeholders, we want to reclaim our streets, parks and squares. We will ensure that our children are safe on the streets.

Through the JMPD we will deploy at least 10 Police Officers per ward throughout the City. They will work with community policing forums, street patrollers, neighbourhood watches and all security sector people based at ward level including security companies contracted to households. This is to ensure crime prevention is achieved and to develop creative ways of taking back the streets in our City. We will continue to partner with the South African Police Services.

New insights into crime prevention by way of urban design and management will be investigated and finalised for implementation.

Intergovernmental relations and integration with other role players that contribute to safer environments will also be addressed.

Jo'burg 2040 Growth and Development Strategy

It is evident that the way forward in terms of the JCSS will have to take into account a range of changes that have taken place in the past decade as well as balancing this against the crime challenges, which as outlined above, have not significantly reduced. Changes, which have taken place relate to shifting urban social conditions in the City, which create new challenges relating to safety, including new crime patterns and perceptions of crime, as already noted. In addition, the changing policy, political and strategic environment at local, national and global levels, will need to inform the Strategy in the decade to come.

The most immediately relevant strategic shift in relation to the JCSS is the new Growth and Development Strategy for the City, Jo'burg 2040, which was launched in 2011. JCSS was originally formulated in response to Jo'burg 2030, the City's previous Growth and Development Strategy. Jo'burg 2040 is intended as an integrated strategic framework covering the full range of governance activities in the City of Jo'burg, including its approach to safety. While JCSS is not specifically referred to in the Jo'burg 2040 document, many of its key ideas and tenants around safety have been incorporated into Jo'burg 2040. This is explored in more detail below.

The national policy environment has also changed significantly since the JCSS was first developed. The National Development Plan Vision 2030, produced by the Presidency, has become the guiding document for government endeavors and new economic strategies such as the New Growth Path, shape new approaches to the economy. All these factors will need to be taken into account in realigning the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy to contemporary challenges of safety while taking into account local realities.

As Jo'burg 2040 states:

> The national context has changed significantly since 2006…the challenge remains at an implementation level – with continued work required to translate important national policy imperatives into action – while also ensuring appropriate translation at a local level. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011:20)

In terms of the social environment, the City of Johannesburg has changed significantly over the past ten years - in particular rapid urbanisation and migration have notably impacted on the demographics and density of the city. Informal settlements with little infrastructure or government regulation have grown to meet the needs of many new urban arrivals who also crowd into dilapidated buildings in the City itself. Migration and urbanisation present not only physical challenges around infrastructure but also create a socially fluid environment in which the law itself may be contested. This exacerbates problems around citizen compliance to the law, law enforcement and social regulation.

COMPARING JO'BURG 2030 AND JO'BURG 2040

In order to evaluate the role of the JCSS in the future, it is necessary to understand the shifts in orientation between Jo'burg 2030, which motivated the original development of the JCSS and the current Growth and Development Strategy for Johannesburg, Jo'burg 2040. Jo'burg 2040 reflects a significant change in orientation from the Jo'burg 2030 Growth and Development Strategy, although it commits itself to building on some of the critical principles embedded in the 2030 Strategy. It will be crucial to take into account these conceptual shifts, in reassessing how the question of safety will be tackled in the City going forward and how the JCSS fits into this vision. It is notable that the Jo'burg 2040, while covering a range of issues relating to safety which are reflected in the JCSS and despite the fact that the JCSP Office was involved in facilitating consultative processes for the discussion of safety included in Jo'burg 2040, does not in fact mention the JCSS at all. On the other hand it is clear that the Jo'burg 2040 Strategy is significantly influenced by a number of ideas posited in the JCSS, including the importance of multi-agency cooperation, the concept of urban design to create liveable and safe spaces for communities, the significance of urban governance and management to a safe City, as well as community involvement in creating a safe City.

Jo'burg 2030 focused significantly on economic growth as the bedrock for change in the City, and was formulated at a time when thinking about the increasing significance of the City in the context of globalization and decentralization was relatively new. However Jo'burg 2040 is able to draw on a decade of research and experience of the City in the new millennium to forge a direction for

Johannesburg that is in tune with international and contemporary local developments. Whereas Jo'burg 2030 disaggregated its economic Strategy for the City from its Human Development Strategy, Jo'burg 2040 has integrated these two aspects, seeing them as part of integrated whole in order to make the City liveable for all its residents, including the poorest, while establishing new principles for growth going forward. The Jo'burg 2040 approach to economic growth is therefore located firmly within an integrated developmental paradigm, in line with the national government's commitment to a developmental or capable state and is focused on the principles of resilience, liveability and sustainability.

Jo'burg 2030 to large extent assumed that economic growth in the City would inevitably benefit all its citizens. However, the past ten years of experience both locally and globally has shown that economic growth can actually exacerbate existing inequalities if specific interventions are not made to address the social imbalances that underpin inequality, particularly in a context such as South Africa. Jo'burg 2040 states therefore that, "Growing inequality represents a major challenge to the social and economic sustainability of cities" (Jo'burg 2040: 8).

The process of formulating Jo'burg 2040 speaks to some of the shifts in its orientation. While Jo'burg 2030 was largely the result of documentary research and some consultation, the formulation of Jo'burg 2040 was the result of an extensive public consultation process. Jo'burg 2040 argues that this, "defines a new era in strategy making for the City of Johannesburg" (Jo'burg 2040: 10) which sought to include the views of a wide range of stakeholders in the formulation of the document, ranging from ordinary citizens of the City, to civil society groups, business, church leaders and others who could contribute to shaping the vision for the City. This emphasis on community participation in democratic and developmental processes is a strong focus in Jo'burg 2040 as a way of strengthening participatory and accessible forms of governance. It also includes a focus on community involvement in issues of safety.

In terms of community safety a range of high level findings emerged from the consultation process:

- Community engagement, collaboration and partnerships are critical in the broader context of community safety.
- Re-evaluate relevance, practicability and awareness of by-laws, with 2040 focus in mind.
- Disaster management should be integrated into all aspects of long-term and short term planning.
- Invest in prevention; build a more resilient infrastructure, storm water drains, transport systems, building codes; stress test against disasters. Invest now to save later. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 108)

Strategy in an uncertain environment

One of the significant shifts in orientation in Jo'burg 2040 is that the Strategy places change and uncertainty at the heart of its approach in a way that recognizes the fundamental fluidity of the global and local environment in the context of globalization. This approach will need to inform the City's response to challenges relating to safety in the future. Jo'burg 2040 concludes that, "The changing paradigm means that the City of Johannesburg has no choice but to embrace uncertainty. To cope with these drivers of change, the City must build its adaptive capacity, ensuring it is more resilient to change and more adept at seizing opportunities as they arise" (Jo'burg 2040: 8).

Jo'burg 2040 points out in relation to contemporary processes of globalization, "There are benefits and risks associated with an interconnected world… This interconnectedness simultaneously promotes growth and opportunity, while making cities vulnerable to global change" (Jo'burg 2040: 6). Therefore instead of envisioning inflexible blueprints for growth, which have historically characterised Strategies for growth around the world, Jo'burg 2040 draws on global and local developments over the past decade to focus significantly on the characteristics that will enable the City to thrive and flourish in a rapidly changing and fluid local and global environment.

> Worldwide, cities are confronted by an ever-increasing complexity of challenges. With the future of cities becoming more unpredictable and uncertain, the development paradigm in relation to cities has changed. In this context, city strategies must navigate the uncomfortable tension between defining a chosen development growth path, and accommodating uncertainty. The current context reinforces the notion that city development is not a linear process – and that change itself is never linear. (Jo'burg 2040: 6)

Jo'burg 2040 identifies what it understands to be the key drivers of uncertainty in Johannesburg. The Strategy argues, "These drivers of uncertainty are hard to plan for and equally hard to predict". For example, the question of increasing migration, "While a global phenomenon, South Africa – and Johannesburg in particular – continues to attract migrants seeking economic opportunity, access to services, political asylum and refuge…. Migration brings cultural, political and social plurality, creating opportunities and challenges as migrants articulate diverse ways of being in the city, with more people attempting to access an already-stretched resource pool". (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 22). As a senior City representative noted, this diversity creates particular challenges in relation to residents' relation to the law, "you get people who have a different perception of the law, in addition many are here illegally, they are effectively outside the law…they don't know what the law says."

While migrants have become a fundamental reality of the urban landscape, in particular in Johannesburg, Jo'burg 2040 argues that, "policy responses lag behind these transformations. Migrants – both from within South Africa and beyond – are testing the efficacy of local democratic participatory processes, with intervention into the creation of a different mindset necessary, if Johannesburg is to fully benefit from the unique blend of its people. This is likely to remain an important dynamic well into the future" (Jo'burg 2040: 22).

Creating resilience, sustainability and liveability in the City

In response to this changing and unpredictable environment Jo'burg 2040 identifies three key concepts, i.e. resilience, sustainability and liveability, which define the intended end-state for 2040. These concepts have informed a paradigm shift in thinking about cities around the globe.

> These are recognised as the characteristics we would like to see in a future city. It is only through strengthening the capacity of Johannesburg's people to manage change that we can build resilience in communities, and effectively pursue sustainable development. This requires a new way of managing the City – and opens up a platform for further engagement. (Jo'burg 2040: 23).

Jo'burg 2040 describes these concepts in the following way. *Resilience* is the, "capacity of a system to continually change and adapt, yet remain within critical thresholds" (Jo'burg 2040: 23) even when confronted with the unexpected and to withstand any shocks that may arise. While change is generally slow and adaptive there are also times of sudden disruption. Jo'burg 2040 acknowledges that Johannesburg has been particularly subject to such disruptions, for example, "71 percent of the xenophobic attacks since 1994 took place in Johannesburg. The city has also been most prone to service delivery protests. With the financial downturn, Johannesburg lost 90 000 jobs in 2009, contracting the labour supply by six percent and contracting the economy by one percent of GDP" (Jo'burg 2040: 24).

Sustainability, according to Jo'burg 2040, "represents an ideal, where human and economic development will not destroy the natural ecological carrying capacity of the cities, regions, nations and interconnected global environment within which it occurs, and will not destroy the wider capacity of all to endure" (Jo'burg 2040: 24).

The third concept of *liveability* refers to:

> an array of different issues, underpinned by a common set of guiding principles that give substance to liveability: accessibility; equity; dignity; conviviality; participation and empowerment. The quality of life that citizens experience when living in a city is tied to their ability to access key infrastructure (e.g. transportation, water, sanitation and means of communication), food, clean air,

affordable housing, meaningful employment, and green parks and spaces. The experience of differentiated access to infrastructure and amenities by assorted groups of people who live in a city highlights questions of current equity. The liveability of a city is also determined by the access that its residents have to decision-making processes focused on addressing their needs. (Jo'burg 2040: 24)

While resilience, sustainability and liveability represent the ideal state towards which the City will be working, Jo'burg 2040 identifies four key drivers to achieve this type of City, namely good governance, economic growth, human and social development, and environment and services – to achieve resilience, sustainability and liveability. (Jo'burg 2040: 90)

Safety and Jo'burg 2040

Jo'burg 2040 therefore links the issue of safety to a City characterised by resilience, sustainability and liveability. In terms of safety Jo'burg 2040 places emphasis on a multi-agency, collaborative approach as well as significant community involvement in achieving a secure and safe city. It also emphasises equal access to police services and safety support for all the City's residents and finally a significantly reduced crime rate. Jo'burg 2040 states that:

By 2040, formal collaboration – and partnerships established with members who include the beneficiaries themselves, will work in collective ways to achieve safety objectives. The city will work towards a more collaborative and community-based policing approach to safety. This will involve sustained community consultation, education and engagement. By 2040, communities will be mobilised for and engaged in issues relating to their own safety – and that of the community. A mindset of collective responsibility will be engendered. In support of this, the capacity of community members to come together to develop responses to community safety will be enhanced – while collaboration (e.g. working alongside the South African Police Services, to build their own resilience and confidence with regards to tackling crime) will be encouraged.

By 2040, the City of Johannesburg will have significantly reduced the crime rate, and everyone in the city will have equal access to quality police services and safety support, irrespective of where they live. A risk management orientation and a focus on overall community safety will also be encouraged, with mechanisms like effective early warning systems significantly reducing the threat and impact of possible disasters. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 93)

Jo'burg 2040, like the JCSS does not focus solely on the threat posed by crime but instead seeks to frame the question of safety within a wider framework which addresses a range of potential harms and insecurity faced by residents of the City, particularly those who experience poverty and exclusion. The Strategy states, "Community safety is not just about crime. It is about a multitude of factors at the level of the individual and the community that contribute to the well-being of the city's people – for example: traffic safety; hazards such as fire, weather-related, and environmental factors; crowding and conditions of deprivation; family systems; and community networks"(Jo'burg 2040, 2011:77). Jo'burg 2040 argues that insufficient attention has been given to these latter hazards and that as a result problems such a flooding and fires in informal settlements have led to worsening human injury and infrastructural damage.

Jo'burg 2040 sees crime as a *symptom* of a range of other social ills, "The citizens of Johannesburg suffer from high levels of insecurity, with historical geographical, social and economic engineering and inequities, together with current stresses and poor economic opportunities, impacting significantly on the quality of life experienced – and *manifesting* in high levels of crime, violence and other forms of harm" (Jo'burg 2040: 78 my emphasis). Therefore in Jo'burg 2040, challenges related to safety are seen as integrally linked to a range of other social challenges:

> Safety issues cannot be separated from other necessary social conditions for community well-being, such as health and poverty alleviation, education and skills development, an economy that is responsive to available skills and capacities, safe and reliable transport, food security and effective management of natural resources. Recent trends in urban safety highlight that systemic challenges, such as those associated with sanitation and waste disposal, are contributing substantively to poor levels of public safety. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 78)

Jo'burg 2040 therefore locates the problem of high levels of violence associated with both property crime and interpersonal conflict, within the context of a range of social challenges that the City needs to address:

> The social dynamics that underpin violence include widespread poverty, unemployment and income inequality; patriarchal notions of masculinity that valorise or reward 'toughness', risk-taking and the defence of honour; exposure to abuse in childhood and weak parenting; access to firearms; widespread alcohol misuse; and weaknesses in law enforcement. All of these issues

require dedicated focus if the City is to address the community safety issues and challenges it faces. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 79)

The Strategy therefore places a particular emphasis on meeting the safety needs of the most vulnerable in society as did the JCSS. Jo'burg 2040 states:

> Making Johannesburg a safer city, especially for its more vulnerable residents such as women, children, people with disabilities and those living in informal settlements, is a priority – and one that requires creative thinking and ideas in order to find effective long-term solutions. If Johannesburg is going to fulfil its vision of being the country's leading centre for business and industry, and a truly world-class African city that offers opportunities for prosperity and a better quality of life, then all its residents must be able to live and work in a safe, clean environment that they can be proud of.

The City also sees itself as having particular responsibilities in terms of specific constituencies that face extreme forms of exclusion and violence, "the City will work closely with communities to minimise urban conflict arising from intolerance, prejudice and discrimination – as evidenced in recent xenophobic attacks and crimes such as 'corrective rape'" (Jo'burg 2040, 2011).

In this context, the City appears to see itself a primarily responsible for creating the conditions for safety within the City in its broadest sense, rather than focusing directly on crime:

> The City of Johannesburg's role in community safety is limited, but the City interprets its mandate to include an array of areas: investment in public safety through community development; urban design and management; the protection of vulnerable groups; infrastructure upgrades; improvements to by-law compliance and enforcement; and responding to emergency and disaster situations. (Jo'burg 2040: 78)

At the same time Jo'burg 2040 recognises the need for a strong and accountable criminal justice system and City governance institutions, if a safe environment is to be created in the City:

> Conversations about safety cannot ignore the need for trusted and accountable policing and improved respect for the rule of law. Restoration of faith – in the delivery of criminal and social

justice – and trust in service providers, such as the City – will only take place through actions and delivery. (Jobug 2040, 2011: 77)

Jo'burg 2040 therefore identifies a number of proposals in respect of community safety.

Proposals for community safety in Jo'burg 2040

Build trust and active engagement of all

Like the JCSS, Jo'burg 2040 emphasises a multi-agency approach to safety:

> One of the mechanisms through which community safety may be improved is through active collaboration, engagement and communication between service providers such as the JMPD, and individuals, community members and other interested parties... Effective partnerships such as these are critical in ensuring the City and its stakeholders are able to find effective solutions to improve the safety of all our communities. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011:79)

Jo'burg 2040 argues that in order to build trust among residents of Johannesburg it will be critical to improve the respect of the public for the Metro Police and Emergency Services. The City's role in this regard will be to ensure clear role definitions for these institutions, transparency and accountability as well as imposing consequences for negligence and corruption. The Strategy also emphasises the importance of engaging both civil society and communities themselves if a sustainable basis for safety and a shared vision of safe neighbourhoods, is to be achieved. Jo'burg 2040 argues that community and neighbourhood policing are critical to this objective, as are the creation of platforms and forums where the public can engage effectively around issues of safety.

Creating sound spaces that promote community safety

This proposal draws on the JCSS approach which focused on crime prevention through urban design. In Jo'burg 2040 the emphasis is less directly on targeting crime per se through urban design but on creating cleaner, safer spaces which enhance communities pride and well-being at the same time as deterring crime. The Strategy outlines the importance of collaboration with architects, town planners, academics and others in conceptualising and implementing safe spaces, at the same time as emphasising the importance of community ownership in order to make these improved spaces sustainable.

Like the JCSS, the 2040 Strategy also focuses on the importance of effective by-law enforcement as a critical aspect of creating "sound spaces". Jo'burg 2040 argues for a re-evaluation and re-thinking

around the by-law regime in the City, to bring it into line with current thinking around City development. Therefore, while emphasising the importance of by-law enforcement, the Strategy also acknowledges the potential tension between by-law enforcement and the rights of residents, such as the right to housing versus the City's desire to get rid of bad buildings. There is also the potential for rigid enforcement of by-laws to undermine the ability of residents to fully pursue economic opportunities (Jo'burg 2040, 2011:32). The urban poor are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Jo'burg 2040 therefore argues for the need to make, "allowances for the poor in terms of the regulation and management of the built environment and the use of public space – e.g. through developing more innovative, supportive regulatory approaches for the management of informal trading, spaza shops and backyard dwellings" (Jo'burg 2040, 2011:33).

Jo'burg 2040 states that:

> Expert input suggests that present by-law regimes impose an artificial set of values on informal trading, which capture official preferences, rather than preventing harm to consumers. This sets inappropriate barriers to entry and creates the opportunity for corruption on the part of those tasked with enforcement. It is noted, however, that certain segments of the informal economy clearly do present dangers that must be policed. Informal crèches which fail to meet basic safety standards present a clear danger to the well-being of the children who attend them; abandoned buildings managed by slumlords as a form on informal rental may meet market demand for low-cost rental, but do so under extremely hazardous conditions which too often link in with criminal enterprises. The City's challenge is to police these negative segments while promoting genuine paths of opportunity (Jo'burg 2040, 2011:43)

Shift alcohol use and abuse patterns – building a different society

Like the JCSS, the Jo'burg 2040 Strategy, through its consultative process also identified alcohol abuse as a key obstacle to safety in the City. Responses to the problem that are included in Jo'burg 2040 include changing the culture and behaviour of residents, taking a stand against alcohol advertising and critically, as identified in interviews with JCSS stakeholders, the importance of proper oversight of zoning for alcohol sales as well as community involvement in this process to ensure its effectiveness and sustainability. The 2040 Strategy notes that the issuing of liquor licenses is a provincial responsibility and the City makes a commitment in the Strategy to work more closely with the Gauteng Provincial Government to ensure that the issuing of licenses does not undermine safety in the City. This is significant acknowledgment

of responsibility by the City as numerous interviewees involved in the implementation of JCSS noted the lack of cooperation between the City and province in terms of the issuing of liquor licenses.

Focusing on the youth

As in the JCSS, Jo'burg 2040 also identifies the need to focus on the youth in the City. In line with international trends young men in the City are both the primary perpetrators and victims of violence. Jo'burg 2040 therefore identifies the need to develop a comprehensive Strategy that will "build the asset value of youth". This strategy will need to take into account that youth often engage in risky behaviour and will seek to find ways of promoting pro-social behaviour through addressing the needs of young people for skills as well as sufficient recreational opportunities. The 2040 Strategy notes the importance of gathering adequate data about young people and their experiences, which will be critical if their needs are to be effectively addressed, as well as the importance of direct engagement with young people. However, this focus on youth, will need to take into account some of the lessons that emerged from the evaluation of the JCSP youth diversion programme, which encountered significant obstacles in terms of implementing a multi-agency approach as well as difficulty effectively implementing the programme in a context where there is in some instances an almost complete absence of resources and infrastructure for young people.

Addressing the needs of the vulnerable

As in the JCSS, Jo'burg 2040 focuses on the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly the challenges they face in terms of access to safety services. In the light of the growth of informal settlements in the City, the 2040 Strategy focuses in particular on the growing challenges to safety in the City as a result of the expanding number of these settlements, "Every socio-economic challenge the city faces is epitomised by these areas, which nonetheless differ strongly from one to another. The majority of the city's informal settlements do not comply with even the minimum humanitarian standards set for refugee camps in terms of access to water, shelter and sanitation. There is therefore significant risk to inhabitants in terms of exposure to environmental hazards, communicable diseases and, particularly during the winter months, the risk of fire" (Jo'burg 2040: 46).

Addressing other issues of harm – fire, floods, environmental hazards

As noted above, Jo'burg 2040 locates the concept of safety within a broader context that does not only focus on crime but also on other environmental challenges to safety. In this regard the 2040 Strategy argues that, "To address safety issues relating to traffic, fire, other environmental factors and those associated with overcrowding, the City will need to actively engage in education campaigns, by-law enforcement, community awareness activities, the implementation of further risk management mechanisms, and the encouragement of active citizenry" (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 81).

Monitoring and Evaluation-Outcomes for Safety

As part of a monitoring and evaluation framework for the implementation of Jo'burg 2040, the Strategy document identifies four key outcomes that will assist to achieve the drivers of change it has identified and address the challenges outlined. Safety is included under *Outcome 1: Improved quality of life and development-driven resilience for all*. Safety constitutes a key component of an improved quality of life for Jo'burg residents.

> The City envisages a future that presents significantly improved human and social development realities, through targeted focus on poverty reduction, food security, development initiatives that enable self-sustainability, improved health and life expectancy, and real social inclusivity. By 2040, the City aims to achieve substantially enhanced quality of life for all, with this outcome supported by the establishment of development-driven resilience. (Jo'burg 2040: 92)

The primary tool to measure progress towards this outcome in relation to safety specifically, will be a Public Safety Index.

6. CONCLUSION

It is evident that the JCSS has informed and shaped much of the current thinking around the challenge of safety in the City of Johannesburg, and this is reflected in both Jo'burg 10 plus as well as in terms of a number of aspects of the City's current Development Strategy, Jo'burg 2040. However, it is also clear, as was inevitable after 10 years since its initial formulation that the JCSS, will need to be re-aligned to a rapidly changing urban environment, new approaches to City governance as well as a changing national and global context. On the other hand the fact that a large proportion of the key focus areas of the JCSS are reiterated either explicitly or implicitly in current strategies, points to the endurance of some of these urban challenges which continue to undermine safety in the City. While the City may be changing, many of the challenges which JCSS identified remain. It will be important that the experience and knowledge that has been built up through the JCSS in addressing some of the challenges, is drawn on going forward.

It appears that this is occurring as, for example the methodology developed for the implementation of the JCSS in GFAs has now become part of the methodology of Jo'burg 10 plus. Jo'burg 2040 articulates a number of areas of challenge to safety and approaches to address them that are central to the JCSS. Perhaps most significantly the multi-agency approach that was critical to the JCSS is now incorporated and rearticulated in Jo'burg 2040 in terms of an emphasis and on cooperation and partnerships between the City and various role players. Some of the challenges of implementing a multi-agency approache are outlined in this evaluation, and should help to inform efforts to foster multi-agency cooperation going forward. Other areas that show continuity with the JCSS include the focus on environmental and urban design, as well as the importance of urban management through by-law enforcement and the need to address alcohol abuse.

The approach in Jo'burg 2040 however, indicates subtle shifts in orientation in relation to these areas. For example in relation to environmental design, the focus now includes crime prevention as one aspect of urban design that promotes sustainable and liveable communities. Current thinking around urban management appears to have shifted from a pure emphasis on enforcement of by-laws to an approach that grapples with the tensions between residents' rights and economic opportunities and the need for a well-managed urban environment, through the implementation of by-laws. Other aspects such as a focus on the youth, the vulnerable and community participation in creating a safe environment are included in the JCSS strategy but are given a particular emphasis in the City's current Growth and Development Strategy, Jo'burg 2040. Community consultation and engagement in order to facilitate meaningful forms of participatory democracy are critical to the approach to all aspects of governance in the City, which is

articulated in Jo'burg 2040 and will impacts on the way in which the City sees safety being tackled in future. A notable difference between the JCSS and Jo'burg 2040's approach to safety relates to the question of firearms and gun control. While this was a key focus of JCSS, it is not mentioned in Jo'burg 2040. This review indicates that there were significant obstacles in creating "gun free zones" as initially envisaged in the JCSS, however there were successes in relation to other efforts to reduce the number of illegal firearms in the City. As Johannesburg remains a city characterized by high levels of violence, it may be important to retain the focus on guns in order to address the problem of armed violence in the City.

Other issues that remain to be clarified include the specific role of the City itself in creating a safe environment and in crime prevention. As a senior City respondent asked, "What does crime prevention mean in the municipal context?". While the JCSS envisaged City leadership and in particular the Mayor and City Manager as playing a central role in driving safety initiatives, Jo'burg 2040 argues that the City has a "limited" direct role in community safety but instead sees its "investment in public safety" as essentially relating to creating a liveable urban environment for the City residents, which it implies, will lead to a reduction in crime and fear of crime. Rather the City emphasizes its role in providing equal access to security protection for all residents of Johannesburg and protecting them from a range of harms, including crime but also fire, floods and other hazards born out of poor living conditions. It appears that in some ways, as argued by a variety of analysts referred to in this report, that the City is focusing attention on how effective delivery on the core mandates of City departments, will lead to improvements in urban safety along with addressing a range of other social challenges. Further discussions will need to be held going forward in terms of the role of the City leadership in creating a safe environment as challenges of political and administrative "buy-in" and lack of ownership of the JCSS were at the heart of some of the obstacles that the Strategy faced in its implementation.

What is clear is that the City now seeks to tackle the question of safety holistically, as a challenge which incorporates a number of issues including, but not limited, to crime. In line with the shift from two separate strategies for economic development and human and social development to one integrated strategy that addresses all challenges in the City, crime is now located in direct relation to the social challenges that the City faces and to a large extent is seen as a manifestation of those challenges. While it may be self-evident that crime in contexts such as Johannesburg is inevitably related to social conditions, international examples indicate that crime and violence can be successfully addressed even during an economic downturn, as occurred in Bogota Colombia, through the implementation of a range of innovative approaches to improving safety in the City.

In looking back at the work that has been done over the last ten years in the development and implementation of the JCSS, it is clear that the Strategy has made an important contribution to thinking and conceptualization around the challenges of safety in the City and ways of responding to those challenges, that have now become embedded in current strategy and policy. The JCSS has encouraged a variety of role players to think about safety as a collective problem impacting on multiple City agencies and to learn to work together. Where role players have been convinced of the value of this collaborative approach and effectively implemented it, significant successes have been achieved, particularly at local level. The principles of urban design which seeks to prevent crime have been mainstreamed into the work of City agencies such as the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), town planning and City Parks. While challenges remain in implementation and sustainability, important ground work has been laid in this regard. The JCSS also helped establish the importance of effective urban management and by-law regulation in order to create environments which are safe and useable for all residents. Significant groundwork has been laid in all the programme areas identified by JCSS, many of which are now reflected in Jo'burg 2040.

However, there is no doubt that the JCSS faced significant obstacles in terms of implementation and these challenges will need to be addressed if any responses to safety are to succeed in the City. It will be critical as a starting point to explicitly clarify the relationship between Jo'burg 2040, the JCSS and Jo'burg 10 plus. While these strategies and programmes do implicitly build on each other, interviews conducted by the HSRC indicate that role players in the City responsible for addressing safety challenges, are themselves not clear of the relationship between these strategies and Jo'burg 10 plus. A clear, well-articulated approach to safety will need to be outlined and documented, which speaks to the current challenges to safety and approaches to these challenges as outlined in Jo'burg 2040, as well as specifying the methodologies for the implementation of this vision as articulated in the JCSS and Jo'burg 10 plus.

One of the critical challenges faced in the implementation of the JCSS revolved around a lack of clear ownership of the Strategy, starting from the highest levels of the City to station commander level. If any Safety Strategy is to succeed going forward it will be critical that it is not only "owned" by City leadership but that this ownership will need to be supported with meaningful forms of accountability as well as incentives that actually ensure that the Strategy is effectively implemented.

While there has been a lack of ownership of the JCSS, another significant obstacle to the achievement of the JCSS objectives, was an absence of openness and transparency between agencies regarding information in general and crime statistics in particular. Jo'burg 2040 envisages a "smart city" in which

information and technology are critical. No modern urban management system can function effectively without systematic collection and analysis of data relating to all aspects of its work. At the moment there is no such central information collection system, which makes it impossible to empirically assess the extent of challenges which the City faces or to develop evidence based solutions. Moreover, it makes it very difficult to evaluate the progress of the City in meeting the challenges it faces in relation to safety and a range of other areas.

This evaluation report has also outlined some of the challenges in making a multi-agency approach work and pointed out that this is not unique to South Africa. However what international examples do show is that dedicated attention to relationship building and adequate resources are necessary to successfully address challenges of safety using a cooperative approach, as tensions and conflicts between the mandates of different City agencies are an inevitable part of the terrain to be negotiated in trying to embed this type of approach to City governance. This evaluation makes explicit the limitations imposed on the implementation of the JCSS by the increasingly meager resources that were allocated to it. The effective implementation of any Safety Strategy will require a dedicated budget defined according to a thorough knowledge and definition of the role of any implementing agency or program office and the scope of the work which it will be expected to carry out. Lastly an effective communication strategy will need to be put in place to create awareness both internally and publicly about the City's efforts to address the challenge of safety. Any training that the City undertakes around its Safety Strategy will need to be seen as integrated into and supported by adequate institutional arrangements and systems of accountability if this training is to have any meaningful impact.

The challenges which the JCSS has faced are not unique but speak to the complex task of governance in an environment characterized by multiple social challenges, significant economic constraints, a relatively new system of democratic governance as well as a still developing culture of respect for law and the values of the democratic constitution. As Yunus Carrim, Deputy Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, cited in Jo'burg 2040 states,

> governance…even in the most stable of countries in the most prosperous of times, is about managing tensions that flow from the different needs, interests and aims of a variety of groups and constituencies. There are also tensions between now and the future; between what's possible and what's desirable; between ideas and practice. And there are tensions too between government and governance" (2011: 1).

Governance forms the mechanism through which to manage the many tensions that challenge cities. (Jo'burg 2040, 2011: 83). It is with this in mind, that the task of aligning and integrating the City's approach to safety, must be undertaken.

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