

**Draft** paper for HSRC-CNRS workshop on democracy and governance:

Bordeaux, September 2001

Stephen Rule, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria

**Abstract**

Theories published in 1953 by Karl Deutsch about the succession of political power appear to add value to an analysis of recent patterns of voting behaviour and the growth potential for particular political parties in South Africa. Using seven indicators of socio-political development, Deutsch traced the succession of power from the politically dominant German sector in parts of central Europe under the mid-nineteenth century Hapsburg Empire to the Czech electorate as a consequence of their social and political mobilisation a century later. Hudson utilised the same technique to elucidate the rise of Arab nationalism. This paper explores correlations between socio-economic development and socio-political mobilisation in South Africa during the period of transition from a race-based oligarchy to a universal franchise democracy.

The politically mobilised and dominant sector of the South African electorate was white males until the early twentieth century. Mobilisation across the gender divide resulted in the extension of the franchise to women in the 1920s. Anti-apartheid forces pressurised the successive white regimes and especially the National Party from the 1970s onwards to implement full democratic rights to the other races of the country. This led to the partial enfranchisement of coloured and Indian voters in 1983 and the advent of universal adult enfranchisement in 1994.

The techniques developed by Deutsch will be applied to South African data to assess their applicability in explaining the political mobilisation of the majority population. They will additionally be used to attempt to predict future mobilisations amongst sectors of the newly enfranchised as levels of socio-economic development and political awareness consolidate. New data from public opinion surveys will be extrapolated to determine the potential long-term growth or decline of existing political parties and alliances. The data relate to feelings of closeness to specific parties and intentions to vote for those parties. Analysis in terms of the linguistic, racial, age and socio-economic status levels of survey respondents will be interrogated.

**Deutsch's analysis of political mobilisation in central Europe**

Deutsch (1953; 1979) analysed the process of national development and social mobilisation in the areas of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, situated approximately in what are today the Czech Republic and part of south-western Poland (Castello-Cortes, 1994). He noted that in the mid-nineteenth century, the culturally and politically dominant population in the area was German. By 1900, although Germans remained politically dominant under the Hapsburg Empire (Taylor, 1985), the Czech population outnumbered them amongst what Deutsch labelled the "mobilised" population. Czechoslovakia emerged as an independent state in 1918 and Czechs rapidly assumed political dominance, mobilising the undeveloped section of the Czech population and

eventually forcibly repatriating most of the German population to German territory (Muir, 1975).

Deutsch developed a set of concepts and techniques by means of which he was able to depict the above processes systematically (Muir, 1975) such that they could be applied in other socio-political contexts. He differentiated between components of a population in relation to their varying levels of social and political development, determined largely by access to mass forms of communication. Thus he identified the "mobilised" population (M) as those being mobilised for mass communication. This component coincided largely with those who lived in urban settlements and had received a minimum level of education. The remainder of the population was termed the "underlying" population (U), these being mainly rural and relatively uneducated. At a different level, the people who spoke the area's predominant language were called the "assimilated" population (A) and those who did not were the "differentiated" population (D).

When superimposed upon each other, these two categorisations of the population did not coincide. In other words, not all mobilised people were assimilated to the predominant language. Conversely, not all of the underlying population was differentiated from the lingua franca. Deutsch postulated that people who were both mobilised for mass communication and assimilated to the predominant language or culture would be the "most active carriers of nationality" (N). In contrast, those who were mobilised yet differentiated, termed the nationally heterodox (H), were most likely to experience conflict with the active nationalists. The ratio H:P could be interpreted as an index of the potential for some form of national conflict.

In the words of Muir (1975, p.116), "When conflict develops within M between A and H, two additional groups may become significant: firstly, the underlying assimilated population, assimilated to the predominant language and culture but not mobilised for social communication and with no immediate occasion to participate in national conflict. If and when members of this group do become mobilised, they enter on the side of N, of which they then become a part. Members belong to the quiescent population reserves of the dominant language or culture, and this is designated Q. The ration Q:P provides the crudest expression of the long-run strength of the dominant language or culture of the area. The other group consists of the underlying differentiated elements in the population (R), a potential reserve for a national irridenta who may join H providing that mobilisation proceeds faster than assimilation. An extremely rapid mobilisation of R at a rate faster than the mobilisation of Q could produce a situation in which one dominant language and culture is replaced by another."

Applied to the European case study, the largely underlying Czech population of 1840 was subject to domination by a mobilised German minority (Figure 1). Sixty years later, although the mobilised component of the Czech population exceeded that of the Germans, it remained politically powerless owing to the hegemony of the German Hapsburg Empire over most of northern and central eastern Europe (Taylor, 1985). Political independence in 1918 and the subsequent rapid mobilisation of the underlying Czech population displaced the Germans and heralded Czech socio-political dominance over the greater Czechoslovakia until 1993 and over the

more compact Czech Republic since its separation from Slovakia.

**Figure 1: Deutsch's conceptualisation of the change in the balance of political power in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, 1840-1950.**

*(Source: Muir, 1975, p.116).*

#### **Application of the technique to South Africa 1910-2000**

Is the technique of any utility in elucidating the dynamics of political change in South Africa during the course of the twentieth century? The next section of this paper will very briefly sketch the major political developments since the formation of the Union of South Africa and how the Deutsch's concepts might be applied for purposes of analysis.

A National Convention of the governments of the four south African territories (Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape Colony and Natal) was convened in Durban in 1908, during which it was agreed to form a political union. Each territory became a province of the Union of South Africa and elected its own provincial council. A Convention was convened in Bloemfontein in 1909 in reaction to the proposed exclusion of the black population from the proposed Union system of government. Nevertheless, apart from limited non-racial franchise in the Cape, the Union was essentially a white male British-Boer arrangement, with little cognisance being taken of black political aspirations. The first election was won by the South African Party (SAP) (66 seats) under the leadership of Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. The only substantial parliamentary opposition in the first parliament came from the Unionist Party, which won 36 seats in parliamentary constituencies inhabited primarily by English-speaking white voters. They were situated mainly in the larger

cities (Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Kimberley, Johannesburg and Durban) with a few in the rural areas of Natal and the eastern part of the Cape Province (Weide & Weide, 1987). Its supporters were primarily of English origin and not inclined towards political collaboration with the Afrikaans-speaking majority of voters.

In terms of Deutsch's concepts thus, British political hegemony over South Africa since the Anglo-Boer war was displaced by the formation of the Union. Franchise for only white and some coloured males permitted the numerical dominance of Afrikaans-speakers to displace British colonial rule. This facilitated the institution of indigenous white Afrikaner political control beyond the confines of the former Boer republics to include the two former British colonies as well. However, the English-speaking component retained control of the economy and influence in the SAP government, much to the disdain of many Afrikaners. Precisely at the time of Union, the Afrikaans language was being promoted as a local alternative to Dutch as the second official language of the country. The largely rural white Afrikaner population had minimal formal education and was mobilised in the following decade behind General Hertzog's National Party in its desire to shake off the social and economic domination of English-speakers. Within the mobilised section of the population thus, deep divisions based on historical ethnic animosities persisted (Rule, 2000). In a virtually mutually exclusive parallel process, the South African National Native Congress (SANNC), later renamed the African National Congress (ANC) was founded under the leadership of John Dube was formed in 1912. The small mobilised section of the black population attempted from those early stages to politically conscientise the massive quiescent sector of the population.


A surrogate measure for the relative mobilisation of different sections of the population at the time of Union is level of education. In the national population census of 1911, the proportions of adults who could read and write differed significantly by race (Table 1). Whereas 53% of white adults had passed a minimum of the equivalent of standard five level, this was the case with only 9% of black African and coloured adults. The mobilised population (in the sense of being literate) in 1911 thus comprised more than half of the whites and one-tenth of the rest of the population. In absolute terms, almost three-quarters (73%) of the mobilised population were white and one quarter, black or coloured. Looked at more narrowly, the proportion of the adult population that was both enfranchised (but not necessarily literate) and assimilated to the dominant political-cultural group, namely white male Afrikaners, was only about 6%. In terms of the 80% unmobilised population, the vast majority comprised black African or coloured people.

**Table 1: Mobilisation levels amongst South African adults, 1911**

	All adults	Assimilated (European / white)	Differentiated (Mixed, African)
Adult population	2 833 917	660 149	2 173 768
Mobilised (Literate)	539 611 (19%)	351 720 (53%)	187 891 (9%)
Enfranchised	304 349 (11%)	283 349 (43%)	21 000 (1%)
Afrikaans-speaking white males	6%	30%	0%

Sources: *Union of South Africa, Census 1911; Education of the people; Rapport van de Delimitatie Kommissie onder de Zuid-Afrika Wet, 1909*

**South African Adults 1911**



U Underlying population  
 M Mobilised population  
 B Black (Incl. Coloured)  
 W White

**Figure 2: Socio-political mobilisation in South Africa, 1911**


The franchise was extended to white females in 1923<sup>1</sup> and in 1924, the National Party (NP) won sufficient support to win an election and it held onto power until 1938. White Afrikaners thus shook off the remnants of English political dominance that had been exercised indirectly through the SAP government, thereby consolidating their control over the M group. In 1938 the NP split ranks over the issue of sending South African troops to support Britain and its allies against Germany in the Second World War. A reformed NP regained power in the 1948 election and grew in popularity amongst the white electorate under Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd and Vorster. During this period the social segregation practices were formalised into a political doctrine of apartheid. Recognising the danger of totally ignoring the political aspirations of the large disenfranchised component of the population, a process involving the “*national development of the different black ethnic groups as segregated political entities*”

(Giliomee, 1993, p.116) was envisioned.

However, black political organisations, namely the ANC and PAC adopted a more high profile and confrontational strategy when the NP government failed to countenance their demands for an integrated non-racial democratic system. These movements were led by the small sector of the black population that had achieved the mobilisation stage of Deutsch's model. The organisations were banned in 1960 and leaders, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were either imprisoned or exiled (Houston, 1999). Military wings (Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo) were formed to continue the struggle underground.

At that stage, the overall relative proportions of mobilised versus underlying amongst the adult population had not changed much since Union. The 1960 census revealed that most (88%) white adults had achieved at least the equivalent of standard five level education. Severely limited national resource and educational budgetary allocations to the other groups had resulted in equivalent figures of only 28% for Indians, 21% for coloureds and 9% for black Africans. About three-quarters of the mobilised population was thus white. The remaining M comprised the literate black, coloured and Indian segments of the population that were effectively the quiescent (Q) sector and potentially the greatest threat to white political hegemony in South Africa.

### South African Adults 1960




U	Underlying population
M	Mobilised population
B	Black
W	White
C	Coloured
I	Indian

Figure 3: Socio-political mobilisation in South Africa, 1960

Ten years later in 1970, mobilised whites had declined marginally to about two-thirds, the Q sector having increased to one-third of the total M.

## South African Adults 1970



U	Underlying population
M	Mobilised population
B	Black
W	White
C	Coloured
I	Indian

Figure 4: Socio-political mobilisation in South Africa, 1970

The implementation of the apartheid policy entailed the creation of Bantustans for each of nine black ethnic groups. Amongst the mobilised component of the black African population, it emerged that not all could be classified as Q. A segment opted to collaborate with the NP government. Thus between 1976 and 1981, the leadership of four Bantustans (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei) chose political independence from the South African central government. The other six (Gazankulu, Lebowa, Kwandebele, Kangwane, Qwaqwa and KwaZulu) gained varying degrees of autonomy and self-government but chose to remain part of South Africa. During this period a new civil servant and Bantustan government cadre grew. This development contributed to public civic awareness and political conscientisation in a more passive sense than did the covert but active mobilisation of the liberation movements. Politically, all black South Africans were deemed to be citizens of the Bantustans and expected to exercise their political rights in those contexts.

On the more active liberation front, there was an upsurge of opposition to the apartheid government, as a youthful, politically conscientised and mobilised component of the underlying population began to express its aspirations more overtly.

School riots in Soweto began on the 16<sup>th</sup> June 1976 in reaction to attempts to enforce instruction in Afrikaans for certain school subjects. This appeared to constitute an ill-conceived effort by the NP to assimilate part of the underlying population as a potential future political ally. In addition to resistance in the educational sector, popular uprisings took the form of rent and bus boycotts. In 1979 the ANC adopted a "*people's war revolutionary strategy*", based on the Leninist-Gramscian concept of a united front. This entailed the "*building of a united front of anti-apartheid community organisations*" (Houston, 1999, pp.61-2) to win the support of the diversity of extra-parliamentary opposition groups within South Africa. In 1983, 575 organisations were represented at the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town. These included political, women's, community, civic, trade union, student, youth, sport, religious and professional organisations from throughout the country. The UDF renounced violence to avoid the fate of other liberation organisations, although its principles of non-racial democracy broadly reflected those of the ANC's Freedom Charter. The broad-based organisation incorporated not only the mobilised component of the disenfranchised but also the politically left progressive segment of the white electorate.

The political accommodation of the coloured and Indian sections of the population remained on the NP's agenda and became the source of disagreements within the ruling party. P.W. Botha's government frantically hatched plans to extend the franchise to coloured and Indian voters in a tricameral parliamentary system. Not accepting the medium term implications of this strategy, the NP's Transvaal leader, Andries Treurnicht and a group of verkrampte NP Members of Parliament resigned to form the Conservative Party (CP) in 1982. The CP managed to win increasing numbers of seats in parliament in the 1987 and 1989 elections. The tricameral system backfired on the NP to some extent, when even the (assimilated) (Coloured) House of Representatives (HoR) and (Indian) House of Delegates (HoD) refused to pass a series of bills related to land affairs and the segregatory Group Areas Act (Boulle, 1993). Allan Hendrikse, leader of the majority Labour Party in the HoR was a member of Botha's Cabinet until 1987 when he was dismissed for failure to comply with Botha's dictates (Olivier, 1993). The UDF encouraged further mass mobilisation to isolate the government and to pressurise its collaborators in local government and the tricameral parliament to withdraw.

The growing political cleavage amongst white Afrikaans-speakers meant that by 1987, only 59% of this group supported the NP and almost one-third, the right wing Conservative Party (CP). Simultaneously, however, the NP had consolidated its support amongst more than two out of five (43%) English-speaking white voters, who apparently perceived a more liberal approach by the ruling party. Left of centre, 35% of English-speakers and only 4% of Afrikaners were (liberal) PFP supporters (Schlemmer, 1987). In contrast to the historical language and region-based cleavages, it appeared that class had become a factor in determining white voter allegiances. Constituencies with the highest percentages of voters in mining, production and tradesmen occupations returned CP members of parliament. Those with relative concentrations of professional, administrative or clerical workers tended to support the NP if they were Afrikaans-speakers and the PFP if they were English-speakers (Rule, 1989). However, in the 1989 election, the NP lost support to both right (CP)



and left (DP) amidst internal and international pressure to implement a non-racial democratic system. For the first time, substantial numbers of white Afrikaans voters supported a party to the left of the NP, indicative of a liberalisation of thought amongst the wealthier component of this group (Table 2). In the two parliamentary houses created for coloured and Indian voters, the rate of voter turnout was generally less than 30%, indicative of the minimal support for the tricameral system. This trend was encouraged by the UDF's efforts to conscientise the electorate about the exclusion of the black majority.

**Table 2: Party support patterns in SA elections under white rule, 1910-89**

Election	SAP	Unionist	NP	Labour	UP/ NRP	PFP/ DP	CP	Other	Total
1910	66	36	-	3	-	-	-	16	121
1915	54	40	27	4	-	-	-	5	130
1920	41	25	44	21	-	-	-	3	134
1921	79	-	43	9	-	-	-	1	132
1924	52	-	63	18	-	-	-	2	135
1929	61	-	77	8	-	-	-	1	157
1933	61	-	75	4	-	-	-	10	150
1938	-	-	27	3	111	-	-	9	150
1943	-	-	43	9	89	-	-	9	150
1948	-	-	70	6	65	-	-	9	150
1953	-	-	89	5	57	-	-	0	150
1958	-	-	97	0	53	-	-	0	150
1961	-	-	99	-	49	1	-	0	150
1966	-	-	120	-	39	1	-	0	162
1970	-	-	111	-	47	1	-	0	159
1974	-	-	117	-	41	6	-	0	164
1977	-	-	132	-	10	15	-	3	160
1981	-	-	131	-	8	26	-	0	165
1987	-	-	123	-	1	19	22	1	166
1989	-	-	93	-	-	34	39	0	166

*Source: Weide & Weide, 1987, Welsh, 1989.*

Political action amongst the Q group became increasingly aggressive. During the final decade of the minority regime, there were in the region of 94 000 incidents of violence as a result of which 12 000 people died and a further 24 000 sustained injuries (Olivier, 1991; 1999). Incidents peaked in October 1985, at which point the government declared a state of emergency that lasted four years. Peaceful protest was illegal in terms of the legislation at the time and only in 1993 did de Klerk's government pass the Regulation and Gatherings Act (205 of 1993) that introduced a legal means of protest.

#### **Political transformation**

Shortly after succeeding Botha as President, F.W. de Klerk announced dramatic changes to the NP political strategy. The liberation movements were unbanned and their leaders were released from prison. Even the NP recognised that the continued


domination of the South African polity by a minority component was untenable. Apartheid laws were unbanned and in 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together 26 political parties of all persuasions from far right to far left. Lengthy deliberations began about the way forward and the nature of a new Constitution. In 1992, de Klerk held a referendum of white voters to test their sentiments about his reforms and was rewarded with a 69% "yes" vote (*The Star*, 19.3.92). The NP and other white parties attempted to persuade their disenfranchised compatriots of the need for special political arrangements to protect the white minority. They were partially successful in extracting some concessions from the underlying population who had almost exclusive rights to any claim of the moral upper hand.

In a highly publicised open letter published in the *Beeld* several years later, Chris Louw launched an attack on the influential newspaper editor and verligte thinker Willem de Klerk of the NP. Louw accused de Klerk of changing the thrust of his influence over national policies during the course of the 1980s without any effective consultation with the white electorate. From initial support for grand apartheid he had moved to a more critical stance that encouraged limited reforms of aspects of the policy and ultimately to total rejection of apartheid in favour of nonracial democratic values. Louw (2000, p.243) quoted de Klerk as saying in hindsight, that apartheid had been a childish and superficial form of absolutism and myopia that predisposed its exponents to intolerance and unbalanced views. Louw (2000, p.21) encapsulated the frustration and confusion of white Afrikaans men who are now aged between thirty and fifty. He held that "in a single lifetime we were transformed from 'shut up, stand at attention, do what your Oom tells you' to 'middle-aged white Afrikaner men suffering from a loss of power syndrome'" (my translation).

The first democratic elections held in South Africa took place on the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> April 1994, thereby changing the political landscape of the previous three centuries. Unsurprisingly, the ANC won an overwhelming majority in parliament with 12 237 655 votes (63%), almost exclusively from first time voters who had until then been disenfranchised. The party was in alliance with country's largest labour movement (Cosatu) and the SA Communist Party. The other major liberation movement (PAC) was totally eclipsed by the ANC, winning little more than one percent of votes cast. The NP garnered 20% of votes cast, on the basis of support from the white and perhaps surprisingly, the coloured constituencies. The latter support could be explained in terms of the semi-privileged status of coloured people in relation to black Africans, especially during the last decade of the NP government. Many members of this group appeared to identify more strongly with their former oppressors than with the black African majority. Similarities in culture and language were clearly stronger centripetal forces than any distaste for the tainted history of the NP. NP efforts to attract coloured votes had thus been highly successful. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi dominated in northern KwaZulu-Natal and emerged as the third largest party (11%). The IFP had consolidated its power base during the apartheid era when Buthelezi had been chief minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan. The largely rural, poverty-stricken and poorly educated electorate of the territory had had limited exposure to any other party and it thus registered continued faith in a movement that had propagated its interests in the preceding decades.

The 1996 census revealed that during this period of political turmoil and transformation, the mobilised sector of the black African population had increased dramatically from about 15% in 1970 to almost 60%. This group of the Q sector was transformed into the majority amongst the M sector. The white component declined in relative and absolute terms to only 20% of M. The previously highly mobilised white electorate was suddenly on the un-assimilated side of the equation and had been re-constituted as a mobilised national heterodox group. It had competed for coloured and Indian allies, significant portions of whom voted for historically white parties (NNP and DP) rather than the ANC.

### South African Adults - 1996



U	Underlying population
M	Mobilised population
B	Black
W	White
C	Coloured
I	Indian

**Figure 5: Socio-political mobilisation in South Africa, 1996**

In the 1994 and 1999 elections, political parties recognised the need for subtleties in attracting votes and endeavoured, using politically correct terminology, to encapsulate the needs and priorities of their perceived constituencies. The parties also made concerted efforts to attract votes from beyond the bounds of their race or ethnic support bases. Thus the ANC emphasised non-racialism in order to attract whites and the DP stressed the importance of merit-based good quality governance without regard to race. Similarly the NNP made frequent reference to the racial diversity of its support base, as did the IFP and UDM to inter-ethnic co-operation. The ACDP stressed the importance of morality and Christian family values irrespective of race.

Not surprisingly, the election manifestos of the six main political parties reflected a broad consensus about the importance of building a strong and united nation. Policies that favoured the poor and disadvantaged components of the population dominated the goals of most parties. Only after careful study was the reader able to discern policy differences in relation to tackling the national priority issues of job creation and crime prevention.

Use of data from a national survey of public opinion in September 2000 (HSRC, 2001) reveals the current configurations of the M and U groups from a different perspective. Responses to four modules of questions were used to compute indices of Communication (CI), Civic Knowledge (CKI), Electoral Participation (EPI) and Liberal Democracy (LDI) amongst the various groups (Rule, 2001). In terms of access to means of mass communication, including telephones, newspapers and radio, the average score amongst the white group was higher than those of the other three groups. Similar patterns emerged in terms of basic knowledge about civic issues and attitudes towards various tenets of liberal democracy. Counter intuitively, however, participation in the last election was higher amongst the black group than any of the other three groups (Table 3).

**Table 3: Average indices of Communication, Civic Knowledge, Electoral Participation and Liberal Democracy, by race group**

	CI	CKI	EPI	LDI
Black African	1,44	2,07	0,91	2,38
White	3,44	2,91	0,85	4,17
Coloured	2,25	2,25	0,85	3,50
Indian	2,73	2,74	0,90	2,88
Total	1,81	2,22	0,90	2,73

The mobilised black African component of the South African adult population thus constituted approximately one third of the total in terms of communication, civic knowledge and liberal democratic values. In terms of participation in the last election, however, this group comprised 69% of the total. Of greater pertinence to future socio-political projections is that whereas 91% of black Africans were mobilised in terms of their voting behaviour, this was only the case with 50% in terms of having adopted liberal democratic attitudes and only 43% in relation to access to communications or levels of civic knowledge. The quiescent black population in regard to the latter three criteria is thus sizeable and conducive to potentially significant changes in political dynamics as the magnitude of the CI, CKI and LDI values increase in the future (Table 4). The appeal of the various political parties may well depend on how they respond to improvements in access to communications, civic knowledge and attitudes towards the internationally accepted tenets of liberal democracy in future years.

**Table 4: Mobilised and Underlying populations in terms of Communications, Civic Knowledge, Electoral Participation and Liberal Democracy**

CI CKI EPI LDI M U M U M U M U Black African 32,8 42,7 32,6 43,0 69,0 6,5

38,0 37,5 White 12,2 0,7 8,5 4,5 11,0 2,0 11,1 1,8 Coloured 6,4 2,1 3,8 4,7 7,2 1,3  
6,2 2,3 Indian 2,5 0,6 1,8 1,2 2,7 0,3 1,9 1,1 Total 53,9 46,1 46,6 53,4 90,0 10,0 57,3  
42,7

### **Future prospects**

Given the dynamics described above, it is appropriate to speculate on the growth potential for the different political parties or preferences in the country. The growth of a black middle class into the dominant socio-political group has already occurred. The extent to which this growth can be translated into socio-economic growth for the majority marginalised, underlying black electorate is the challenge that the country now faces. The current political environment is largely based on racially defined party support bases. The Democratic Alliance (successor to the merged DP and NNP) holds little appeal for the black majority and appears unlikely to make gains in that constituency. Similarly, the IFP seems destined to remain a rural Zulu-based party. The UDM has attempted at fostering nonracial values but failed to make much headway beyond Umtata. The ACDP attracts votes from all races on the basis of Christian values. Its popularity amongst the under 30 age group signals some growth potential.

Realistically, however, the only prospect for a diversification of voting patterns is if the ANC support bases were to fracture. One scenario is that the black middle class leadership of the ANC will become increasingly alienated from the poor majority. A new political cleavage will emerge that supersedes the current race-based bloc voting pattern for the ANC. Signals of such a possibility can be observed in the divergence of viewpoints amongst ANC-alliance partners about economic and fiscal policy issues.

In neighbouring Zimbabwe and Zambia, the fracture of the respective liberation movements (Zanu-PF and UNIP) into trade union based political parties (MDC and MMD) are relevant regional precedents. In these cases it was primarily the rural poor sector with strong historical links to the ruling parties that continued to support the liberation parties. The breakaway groups comprised alliances of workers, urbanites and alienated middle class groups. In Zimbabwe the latter included many members of the remaining white community. It is not inconceivable that a development of this nature will occur in South Africa within the next decade as increasing levels of mobilisation in the variety of senses articulated in this paper are reached.

### **References**

Boulle, L. (1993), The head of government and the Constitution, in Schrire, R. (ed.), *Malan to De Klerk*, Hurst & Company, London, Chapter 1, pp.7-36.

Castello-Cortes, Ian (ed.), 1994, *World Reference Atlas*, London, Dorling Kindersley.

Deutsch, Karl W., 1953, The growth of nations, *World Politics*, 5.

Deutsch, Karl W., 1979, Social Mobilization and Political Development, in Karl W. Deutsch, *Tides Among Nations*, New York, Free Press.

Giliomee, H., 1993, The leader and the citizenry in Schrire, R. (ed.), *Malan to De*

Klerk, Hurst & Company, London, Chapter 4, pp. 102-134.

Houston, Gregory F., 1999, *The national liberation struggle in South Africa: a case study of the United Democratic Front 1983-1987*, Ashgate, Aldershot.

Hudson, M.C., 1981, Social mobilization theory and Arab politics, ch. 2 in R.L. Merritt & B.W. Russett, B.W. (eds), *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in honor of Karl W. Deutsch*, London, George Allen & Unwin.

Human Sciences Research Council, 2001. Unpublished data from September 2000 national survey of public opinion.

Louw, Chris, 2001, *Boetman en die swanesang van die verligtes*, Cape Town, Human and Rousseau.

Muir, Richard, 1975, *Modern Political Geography*, London, Macmillan.

Olivier, Johan L., 1991, State repression and collective action in South Africa: 1970 to 1984, *South African Journal of Sociology* vol. 22, pp.109-117.

Olivier, Johan L., 1999, Towards peaceful protest: managing collective action in South Africa, Paper read at American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 2-5 September.

Olivier, N., 1993, The Head of Government and the Party, in Schrire, R. (ed.), *Malan to De Klerk*, Hurst & Company, London, pp.80-101.

Rule, Stephen P., 1989, Language, occupation and regionalism as determinants of white political allegiances in South Africa, *South African Geographical Journal* vol. 71 (2), 94-101.

Rule, Stephen, 2000, *Electoral territoriality in southern Africa*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Rule, Stephen, 2001, Access to information and development: core-periphery differentials in southern Africa, Paper for conference of the Society of South African Geographers at Goudini, Western Cape.

Schlemmer, Lawrence, 1987, Assessment: The 1987 election in the South African political process, in van Vuuren, D.J., Schlemmer, L., Marais, H.C. & Latakgomo, J., *South African Election 1987*, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, pp.319-328.

Taylor, A.J.P., 1985, *Bismarck: the man and the statesman*, London, Hamish Hamilton.

*The Star*, Johannesburg.

South Africa, (Union of) 1912, *Census 1911*, Part 3: Education of the People, Pretoria, Government Printing and Stationery Office.

South Africa, (Republic of) 1965, *Census 1960*, Pretoria, Central Statistical Services.

South Africa, (Republic of) 1976, *Census 1970*, Pretoria, Central Statistical Services.

South Africa, (Republic of) 1999, *Census 1996*, Pretoria, Statistics South Africa.

Weide, Rob & Weide, Suzanne, 1987, *Die volledige verkiesingsuitslae van Suid-Afrika, 1910-1986*, Pretoria, Shadow Dot.

Welsh, David, 1999, The Democratic Party, in Reynolds, Andrew (ed.), *Election '99 South Africa From Mandela to Mbeki*, David Philip, Cape Town, Chapter 5, pp.88-100,

Zuid-Afrika, 1910, *Rapport van de Delimitatie Kommissie onder de Zuid-Afrika Wet, 1909*, Goevernementsdrukkerij, Pretoria.

<sup>1</sup> But withdrawn from the few coloured males who did have the vote by new laws passed by the NP in 1953