

"Municipal commonage administration: Can the new-look municipalities promote emergent farming?"

Anja Benseler

1. Introduction:

The Department of Land Affairs stated that by 2015, 30% of the land is to be redistributed to the previously disadvantaged. Currently, however, only approximately 2% has been reallocated. Land reform is becoming a key part of government policy, especially in the light of land reform pressures in countries like Zimbabwe. It is clear to national and provincial governments that land reform should be speeded up. Municipalities are, therefore, being placed under a lot of political and governmental pressure to increasingly make their commonage land available to emergent farmers.

Additionally, in the light of the re-structuring of municipalities to become more developmentally oriented through the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), emphasis has been placed on effective commonage management and on pro-poor agriculture.

Most municipalities in the Northern Cape and Free State inherited vast tracts of land. This land was purchased from farmers, often as early as the mid-1800s. In addition, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) has provided new farms to the municipalities since 1994.

In the past, the municipalities used to rent out their commonage to commercial farmers on a tender or auction basis. This ensured a regular source of revenue to the municipalities, which in some of the smaller towns in the Northern Cape contributes up to 40% of the total income generated. With the emphasis on promoting the poorest of the poor, this revenue base will diminish significantly.

There are several departments that have an interest in commonage management: the Department of Land Affairs (DLA), the Department of Agriculture (DoA) and the Department for Local Government and Housing (DLGH).

The main policy of DLA is to use the commonage as a nurturing ground on which emergent farmers can be nurtured towards becoming commercially oriented and ultimately acquire their own land through the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. The LRAD programme provides grants through which emergent farmers can acquire their own land.

Commonage thus serves as a stepping-stone for emergent farmers to become more commercial farmers. It must, however, also make provision for low-income households who want to use the land for food security and subsistence farming. This implies that the municipality is now held responsible for agricultural land redistribution at local level as this is one of the very few ways in which emergent farmers can increase their stock.

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This new job-description of the municipalities, has however not been supported by the required institutional, capacity and resource changes to implement these functions effectively.

With the new policy on commonage usage, commonage management suddenly needs much more attention and output in terms of management, administration, facilitation with the emergent farmers committees, negotiation, infrastructure repairs, and monitoring of the land to avoid overgrazing.

This transformation has left municipalities helpless in the face of a new and daunting responsibility.

Additionally, the three government departments, the national Department of Land Affairs (DLA), the provincial Department of Local Government and Housing (DLGH) and the provincial Department of Agriculture, do not have one overarching or coherent policy concerning commonage usage. The lack of departmental policy at provincial level results in lack of conformity across municipalities in the Northern Cape.

The three departments have only recently started to work together. Their main purpose is to build municipal capacity to utilise commonage effectively for the purpose of land reform and pro-poor development.

Lack of departmental policy goes hand in hand with lack of policy at the local level. With the municipal amalgamation process, the information on the commonage in some of the towns in the new municipalities got lost.

The amalgamation process also entailed that different towns, which are now all consolidated into one municipality, have different tariffs, types of contracts, and land management policies. This creates discrepancies within municipalities.

There are positive signs that these issues are now being addressed in the Northern Cape, although there is still a long and uphill way to go.

The study that addresses the above-mentioned problems was conducted in the Northern Cape, in which the status quo situation has been determined in each of the municipalities. Telephonic interviews were conducted with all 26 municipalities in the Northern Cape. Interviews have also been conducted with all the relevant departments and NGOs directly involved in commonage related issues. The current situation on the commonage in general and a brief outline of the policies will be given. This will be followed by the outline of the outcomes from the interviews conducted with the municipalities in the determination of the current status quo in the Northern Cape. Problems and recommendations as well as best practices are discussed.

2. Types of beneficiaries and departmental policies

2.1 Commonage management: the different kinds of beneficiaries.

There are two kinds of commonage: The new commonage, that was acquired after 1994 for emergent farmers use only, falls under the Department of Land Affairs (DLA). In most cases, the old, historical commonage belonged to the municipalities since the inception of the municipality or was bought up until 1994. It falls under the Department of Local Government and Housing (DLGH). Both departments have different policies in terms of land management. Due to this, two committees, the Programme of Cooperative Governance and the Land Use Management Committee have been established that will ensure interdepartmental cooperation on land management and the development of a consistent policy across the different government departments in order to clarify the definitions of emergent farmers and to accommodate the different types of land users.

Out of the interviews conducted, it has been established that there are different kinds of commonage users with different needs for land.

- Firstly, there are subsistence farmers who are people who want to keep a few livestock units for supplementing household food provision. These people are not necessarily interested in expanding their current number of livestock as they are sufficient for own consumption.
- Secondly, there are the 'emerging' farmers who have acquired a few livestock and are intent on expanding their stock but who have not quite reached the level of being self-sufficient in terms of capital and livestock assets yet. Their aim, however, is to increase their stock.
- Thirdly, there are the 'proto-commercialists' who have already accumulated large numbers of stock and are in need of land in order to develop their own farming practice. Current departmental policies, as will be seen below with the dissemination of the different approaches to commonage by the different departments, are in favour of the 'emergent' farmer and the 'proto-commercialist' farmer who are striving towards commercialisation of their farming practices.

Most of the emergent farmers classify as indigents or fall into the lower income groups. Their stock serves as a safety net, either in terms of a food safety net or as an extra income for pensioners. There are a few emergent farmers who have enough livestock to classify as proto-commercialists who are, often to the disadvantage of others, using the commonage as well. Additionally there are some users who have alternative stable incomes such as civil services officials, undertakers and municipal officials. These would classify into middle-income groups. The question again arises as to who should have preference to the commonage lands: the poorest of the poor or those who have established themselves already?

The commercial farmers, fall into the higher income categories.

Within the departmental policies, very little or no provision is made for farmers who are operating on a subsistence level. A suggestion made by the Department of Agriculture in this respect was that the new commonage could be used by the farmers with the commercial outlook and function as a stepping-stone towards

commercialisation and application for the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme (LRAD). The programme, which is led by the DLA, provides a grant for previously disadvantaged individuals and groups in order to acquire their own land for farming purposes (See text box below on page 4).

The old, historical commonage in turn could be used by the subsistence farmers. This would be useful in that the historical commonage would not be overgrazed because the number of animals grazing will not really be increased beyond the immediate need of the users for food security production.

One of the important issues that came to the fore from the interviews is the lack of understanding of a definition of an emergent farmer and who qualifies for the land. Although the different departments are promoting the use of the land by commercially oriented users, it excludes those who are interested in subsistence farming only.

3. Current features of municipal commonage

3.1 Camps and sizes of the commonage of the municipalities:

Due to the ecological composition of the land in the Northern Cape, the municipalities in the province possess huge tracts of land. The approximate total of all the commonage in the Northern Cape results in over 1 640 000 ha of land. The average size depends on the municipality and the grazing/farming capacity of the land in the region. In Richtersveld, for example, the total commonage land available is 526 700 ha whereas in Renosterberg, this amount is only 7151 ha.

The table below shows the respective municipalities with their commonage sizes. Appendix A sets out the different municipalities as they exist under the new amalgamation and the respective towns within the municipalities.

Table 1. Size of commonage according to Municipality.

Town/Camps/Fields	Size
Dikgatlong	
Barkley West	3615
Delpoortshoop	2585
Windsorton	3054
Rooibult farm	887
Total	10 141
Emthanjeni	
De Aar	2807 ha
Hanover	8323ha
Britstown	9290ha
Total	20 420
Gamagara	
Deben	1 170 ha
Kathu	119,4 ha
Dingleton	170 ha
Total	1 459
Ga-Segonyana	
C	401
D	540
E	479

F	543
G	469
H	
I	539
J	57
K	
L	60
M	91
Gemeenskaps Kamp 1	464
Gemeenskaps Kamp 2	663
Gemeenskaps Kamp 3	692
Total	4998
Hantam	
Nieuwoudtsville	521
Louriesfontein	19 722
Brandvlei	19 311
Calvinia	1000
Total	40 554
KallGariep	
Keimoes: 27 camps	8218
Kehart: 5 farms	Approx 15 000
Total	23 218
Kamiesberg	
Kamieskroon	563
Leliefontein	224 627
Garies	7485
Soebatsfontein	15 069
Total	247 744
Kareeberg	
Carnarvon: 25	9226
Vanwyksvlei: 7	5009
Vosburg: 19	6949
Total	21 184
Karoo Hoogland	
Sutherland	22 490 ha
Williston	23 278 ha
Fraserburg	40 032 ha
Total	85 800
IKheis	
Deurshoek (Brandboom)	3800 ha
Dassiekop (Groblersshoop)	3000 ha
Opkomende boere (Groblersshoop)	600 ha
Topline	4500 ha
Wegdraai	391 ha
Total	12 291
Kgatelopele	
21 camps	9874
Total	9874
Khai Ma	
29 camps	17 888
Total	17 888
Khara Hals	
Hondejag: 20 camps	5500 ha
Olyfenhoudtsdrift: 6 camps	7476 ha
Commonage	Unknown
Total	12 976
Kimberley	
Richie	Approx 280

Commonage around Kly	Approx 630
Farm at Riverton: Langleg	980
Farm at Winserton	850
Farm bordering on Kly	Approx 600
Total	Approx 3340
Mier	
About 165 camps	75 269
Total	75 269
Nama Khoi	
32	432 121
Total	432 121
Renosterberg	
Petrusville: 6	5902
Philipstown: 2	1249
Total	7151
Richtersveld	
Old Act 9	338 000
State lands	186 000
Port Nolloth	2700
Total	526 700
Siya Themba	
Prieska: Oranjesig and Geduld	Approx: 4000
Marydale: Marydale commonage and Marydale trust land	Approx 11 584
Niekerkshoop: Mooipoort	Approx 4000
Total	19 584
Siyancuma	
Douglas: 4	+6000 ha
Griquastad: 10	+7300 ha
Campbell: 14	+7000 ha
Total	20 300
Thembellhle	
Hopetown :pre-amalgamation: 4	9000
Strydenburg: pre-amalgamation: 11	11 000
Total	20 000
Tsantsabane	
8 camps	Approx 7000
Total	7000
Ubuntu	
Loxton	10 522
Victoria West	5 808
Richmond	3 620
Total	19 950
Umsobomvu	
34 camps	9689
Total	9689
Vaalharts Morobeng	
No answer	
Warrenton	
2 farms	No answer
TOTAL	
1 641 433 ha	

3.2 Cadastral positions:

Most municipalities are in possession of the cadastral positions of their commonage. Six out of 26 (or 23 %) municipalities do not have any cadastral indications of their commonage. Most of the municipalities have maps and a few have aerial photos.

One of the major problems is that with the municipal amalgamation process, the information on the commonage of some of the towns in the new municipalities got lost. For example in Phokwane or the old Vaalharts-Morobeng municipality, the information on Pampierstad's commonage is not available. Similarly in several other towns details on the commonage of the satellite towns was not located in the central municipality. Only with the completion of the questionnaire for this project, did a lot of the municipalities, for the first time, get all the information of their satellite commonages together.

3.3 Acquisition of the commonage:

Most of the municipalities own land that can be referred to as the 'old commonage', which has been in the possession of the municipality since its inception. Several tracts of land, however, have also been acquired post 1994 by the DLA with the specific focus on making this land available to emergent farmers only. In the Northern Cape, the DLA acquired land in 16 of the municipalities. In the remaining ten, no land has been acquired yet and the old commonage is used for the development of the emergent farmers.

Most of the land was acquired from commercial farmers by the DLA.

Table 2. Acquisition of commonage

Municipality	Acquisition of commonage pre-1994	Acquired from	Acquisition of commonage post-1994 by DLA	Acquired from
Dikgatlong	Unknown	NA	1999 and 2001	Commercial farmers
Emthanjeni	With the inception of the municipality in 1960s	Unknown	2000 (2 farms)	Commercial farmers
Gamagara	1960s and 70s	IsCOR and the church	None	NA
Ga-Segonyana	With the inception of the municipality: 1887	Unknown	None	NA
Hantam	With the inception of the municipality	Unknown	None	NA
Kai-Garlep	With the inception of the municipality: 1894	NA	None	NA
Kamiesberg	Unknown	Unknown	Btw 1998 and 2001	Commercial farmers and De Beers
Kareeberg	Unknown	Unknown	None	NA
Karoo Hoogland	Sutherland 1971 and with	By NG church in Fraserburg	2001 and 2002	-

	the inception of Fraserburg			
!Kheis	None	NA	1996-2000	Private/ commercial farmers
Kgatelopele	Unknown	State	Yes	-
Khai Ma	-	NA	1999	Private farmers
Khara Hais	Unknown, the other: 2000	One is unknown, the other: commercial farmer	None	NA
Kimberley	1960s till early 1980s	Commercial farmers	Yes	Commercial farmer
Mier	Since 1986	-	Yes	-
Nama Khoi	None	NA	1999-2000	Commercial farmers.
Renosterberg	With the inception of the municipality	Church	None but is busy negotiating that DLA buys the mun commonage	NA
Richtersveld	Old state land and old Act 9 land; time unknown	Unknown	2000	Commercial farmers
Siya Themba	With the inception of the municipality.	Unknown	Yes	Commercial farmers
Siyancuma	With the inception of the municipality	Unknown	1999	Commercial farmer
Thembelihle	With the inception of the municipality and after 1950s	Most: donated by the church	Yes	-
Tsantsabane	With the inception of the municipality	Unknown	None	NA
Ubuntu	With the inception of the municipality	From the farmers at that time	None	NA
Umsobomvu	None	NA	1999	Commercial farmers
Vaalharts-Morobeng	-	Part of the township establishment	None	NA
Warrenton	Unknown	Unknown	2000	Commercial farmer

3. 4 Beneficiary groups

In most municipalities, commonage is still used by a combination of commercial and emergent farmers. There is, however, a trend to increasingly phase out the commercial farmers and increasingly make the land available to the emergent farmers. Most of this is new commonage that was acquired by DLA, but increasingly the old commonage is being transferred to the emergent farmers.

In most cases, the emergent farmers are surpassing the commercial farmers in terms of numbers but in terms of amount of land, the commercial farmers still have the larger number of hectares per livestock unit. This means that there are more emergent farmers using the land but the land portions are smaller in comparison with the commercial farmers.

This raises the question whether the emergent farmers are farming on economically viable units. For a tract of land in the Bo Karoo region to be economically viable, it needs to be between 3000 and 5000 ha in size. As the emergent farmers usually farm in collectively, the land portion of each participant is much smaller proportionally to that what the commercial farmers have access to.

Interestingly, only the Karoo Hoogland municipality has included the distinction of the different types of commonage in their land management policy. With the help of SPP they have identified three types of commonage:

A. The first type, the historical commonage, is that which was granted/donated by previous governments: In this case the municipality must offer the land for the usage by inhabitants and can only be rented out against the amount that it costs to maintain the land. This type of land is used by commercial farmers although the issue has been raised to transfer parts of it to the emergent farmers.

B. The second type is the land that was bought by the municipality: This land is private land and the municipality can rent it out against market related prices. Ordinance 74 prescribes that this has to be done through a public tendering process. The only land that is available under this policy is in Williston.

C. The third type is new commonage that has been acquired through the current land redistribution program. In this case the Department of Land Affairs buys the land for the municipality for emergent farmers. If the Council wants to sell this land or wants to change the usage of the land, permission from the premier has to be granted first. This kind of commonage is solely used by emergent farmers as prescribed in the notarial deed.

Table 3. Usage of the commonage.

Municipality	Commercial farmers	Township residents/ emergent farmers
Dikgatlong	Yes	Yes
Emthanjeni	Approx 85 % of the land	Approx 14% of the land.
Gamagara	Yes	Yes (majority of the land)
Ga-Segonyana	None	Yes
Hantam	Yes	Yes
Kai-Gariep	Kiemoes : None	Keimoos: Yes
Kamiesberg	None	Yes
Kareeberg	Yes	Yes
Karoo Hoogland	Yes: historical commonage	Yes: new commonage
!Kheis	None	Yes
Kgatelopele	Yes	Yes
Khai Ma	None	Yes
//Khara Hais	None	Yes
Kimberley	Yes	Yes
Mier	None	Yes

Nama Khoi	None	Yes
Renosterberg	Yes	Yes
Richtersveld	None	Yes
Siya Themba	Only 2 commercial farmers left; withdrawal	Mostly emergent farmers
Siyancuma	Yes (to a lesser extent)	Yes (majority of the land)
Thembelihle	Yes	Yes (majority of the land)
Tsantsabane	Yes (majority of the land)	Yes (tendency towards emergent farmers)
Ubuntu	Yes	Yes
Umsobomvu	Yes	Yes
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Yes	Not known
Warrenton	None	Yes

3.5 Commonage use by commercial farmers in the past:

In most cases, the commonage was used by commercial farmers in the past: The old commonage used to be rented out to the commercial farmers who contributed to a secure revenue base of the municipality. Minimal involvement of the municipalities was necessary; after the tendering process was concluded and the contracts signed, the land was looked after by the commercial farmers and the municipality was minimally involved except for infrastructure maintenance where stipulated in the contracts.

With the land reform policy of the DLA and the consequent acquisition of land after 1994, the notarial deed that is closed with the municipality, stipulates that only emergent farmers are allowed to use that land. In some cases this limits commercial farmers involvement with emergent farmers as the commercial farmers are not allowed to use the new commonage at all. For example, in Siyathemba, a part of the new commonage is irrigation land. As the emergent farmers do not have the necessary skills, the agricultural extension officer has identified a commercial farmer who is willing to collectively use the land with the emergent farmers and train and mentor them in irrigation farming. He would then withdraw gradually until after a certain time period the land would be in the sole possession of the emergent farmers. This initiative is not possible, however, due to the limiting clause in the notarial deed.

Due to the pressure place on the municipalities by the department in terms of land reform, the old commonage is also increasingly being transferred to emergent farmers. With the contracts of the commercial farmers expiring, the land is being increasingly leased out at minimal rates to the emergent farmers.

3.6 Types of stock grazed on the commonage

Due to the nature of the grazing in the Northern Cape area, the main type of stock used is Dorper sheep and goats. To a small extent cattle are also grazed, as well as donkeys and horses ("trekdiere"). Pigs are also kept in some of the commonages, but not to a large extent.

Animal welfare is one of the issues that need to be addressed. In two of the commonages that were visited in the Bo Karoo, the pigs lived in unacceptable conditions; perched in small cages, with no food or water, disease ridden and starved to the bone to the extent that they could not feed their young. The problem arises that

pigs live off the same food as humans do, and when the people do not have much to eat themselves, the pigs do not get any food either.

Due to the ecology, most of the Northern Cape is best suited for sheep farming. Some simple calculations have determined that it is much more viable to keep dorpers in terms of input costs (feeding and veterinary expenses) and returns than pigs. The calculated profits to be made from both animals, shows that farming with sheep is a better option.

Some of the other initiatives on the commonage include poultry farming as well as communal vegetable patches which serve as a food safety net and as an additional source of income.

3.7 Infrastructure on the commonage

From the table below one can see that most of the commonage is equipped with appropriate infrastructure. As will be seen below, however, there are problems with the lack of quality of the infrastructure, problems with theft and vandalism as well as lack of accountability and responsibility in maintaining the infrastructure

Table 4. Commonage infrastructure

Municipality	Infrastructure
Dikgatlong	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Emthanjeni	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Gamagara	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Ga-Segonyana	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Hantam	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Kai-Gariep	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Kamiesberg	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Kareeberg	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Karoo Hoogland	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
!Kheis	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Kgatelopele	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Khai Ma	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, watertanks, houses, dipping tanks and kraals
//Khara Hais	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures: problems of vandalism and theft
Kimberley	2 of the farms are only fenced and water holes; the rest has full infrastructure.
Mier	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs
Nama Khoi	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures: inadequate
Renosterberg	Fences, dams, windmills, enclosures; not known in Philipstown
Richtersveld	Fences, dams, windmills, enclosures; troughs on the new farms.
Siya Themba	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Siyancuma	Only windmills; enclosures and troughs built by users. Water needs to be driven to the sites.
Thembelihle	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Tsantsabane	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Ubuntu	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Umsobomvu	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures; infrastructure not known in Pampierstad.
Warrenton	Fences, dams, windmills, troughs, enclosures

34.6%% (9) of all the municipalities infrastructure is in a bad condition while 38.5% (10) is in a good condition and 27% (7) is in a partially in a good/bad condition. An interesting figure here is the 27%, which shows that in 7 municipalities the commonage infrastructure differs from being in a good condition to being in a bad condition. This is due to the amalgamation process and the accumulation of different towns into one municipality. Commonage that was well-kept and commonage that was badly maintained has been accumulated within the same municipalities. The potential disputes arising from this are clear: The one group of users have access to well-kept commonage while others do not. This issue of lack of consistency within municipalities will have to be addressed.

In most cases the users are responsible for the repairs and payment for repairs to the commonage. In only a few cases do the municipalities recognise their responsibility as the managerial and administrative supervisors of the commonage to see to the repairs done the land. This demonstrates the lack of sense of ownership experienced from the side of the municipality in terms of the new land placed under their supervision by the DLA. The municipality, in most cases, wants as little as possible to do with the commonage use.

In some cases such as Tsantsabane and Ubuntu, a 50/50 agreement exists between the users and the municipalities in which the municipality provides the finances/materials and the users provide the labour. For example, in Ubuntu, in the case of major repairs the municipality provides the materials, while the farmers provide the labour. This encourages the repairing of infrastructure as it then lies in the hands of the users to fix the problems. In the case of Tsantsabane, the user repairs the damages and sends the invoice to the municipality. The municipality then refunds the user by subtracting the invoice amount from the following month's rent. This kind of cooperation can lead to increased collaboration and understanding from both sides and it also decreases the municipalities' burden of involvement in the commonage. The disadvantage of this kind of arrangement, however, is the mutual dependency and possible frustrations that can arise from this kind of cooperation.

Municipalities increasingly want to clear themselves of the burden of having to deal with infrastructure management issues. In the past, when the commonage was rented out to the commercial farmers, the municipality had very little involvement in the commonage due to the commercial farmers maintaining the infrastructure themselves, as they had the financial means to do so. In the case of major repairs, the municipal foreman was sent out to tend to the problem. With the new policy of giving access to emergent farmers, municipal involvement has increased due to the lack of technical expertise and also the financial constraints of the emergent farmers to do minor repairs.

In Emthanjeni, for example, the municipality is trying to move away from maintaining the infrastructure itself. It is phasing out of the clause in the commonage contracts, which stipulates that the municipality is responsible for repairs and payment thereof. This has several advantages: firstly, it takes the burden off from the municipality. Secondly, it nurtures a sense of ownership with the emergent farmers who are forced to feel responsible for the proper maintenance of the infrastructure. Thirdly, this eliminates the mutual dependency and the corresponding frustrations that both parties may feel. In Siyathemba, this policy of handing over the responsibility of infrastructure maintenance to the users of the land has had the positive effect of the emergent farmers taking charge and there has been a definite improvement of the commonage infrastructure.

Table 5. Infrastructure condition, party responsible for the repairs and payment to the infrastructure

Municipality	Condition of infrastructure	Party responsible for repairs	Party responsible for payment of repairs
Dikgatlong	Good condition	Municipality	Municipality
Emthanjeni	Partially: some of the commonage is in a good condition while others are not	Depending on the contracts the lessees or the municipality are responsible for repairs. Commercial farmers are self-sustained while the municipality helps the emergent farmers.	Depending on the contracts the lessees or the municipality.
Gamagara	Good condition	Users	Users
Ga-Segonyana	Poor condition: fencing is being stolen to the extent that the municipal insurance is refusing to pay	The municipality and the users: the municipal engineer does the actual repairs.	The municipality and the users on a 50/50 basis: costs are carried by both parties and then the municipality's engineer does the repairs
Hantam	Good condition	Depending on the town either the lessee or the lessor or both	Depending on the town either the lessee or the lessor or both
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: In a poor condition Kenhardt: good condition	Keimoes: Users Kenhardt: users and municipality	Keimoes: Users Kenhardt: users and municipality
Kamiesberg	Poor condition	Users: pay a monthly tariff to the municipality, which is used to repair the commonage.	Users
Kareeberg	Good condition	Users for normal maintenance	Municipality for big repairs and maintenance
Karoo Hoogland	Fair to good condition	Municipality	Municipality
!Kheis	Poor condition	Users due to lack of formal contracts	Users
Kgatelopele	Poor condition	Users	Existing facilities by users; new upgradings by municipality.
Khai Ma	Fairly good condition	Users	Users
//Khara Hais	Partially: some of the commonage is, while others are not.	Users/emergent farmers	In some cases the emergent farmers; in other cases repair costs are levied against the rent.
Kimberley	Good condition except for Riverton where fencing is in bad condition	Municipality. Fences: fixed on a 50/50 basis between municipality and users.	Municipality: Commercial farmers are self-sustained; emergent farmers are helped by municipality. Lack of finances, however.
Mier	Good condition on the new commonage	Municipality	Municipality
Nama Khoi	Poor condition.	Municipality	Users- payment does not occur

Renosterberg	Poor condition.	The users: the contracts state that the emergent farmers are responsible for the repairs. Currently the municipality is doing repairs.	The emergent farmers are supposed to pay but the municipality helps them.
Richtersveld	Poor condition	Mostly the users do repairs themselves but municipality helps them	Municipality
Siya Themba	Good condition in Niekerkshoop and Marydale but not in Prieska	Lessees are responsible for repairs. New contracts have been implemented which stipulate this.	Lessees are responsible for payments.
Siyancuma	Poor condition	Municipality on condition that the accounts are paid.	Municipality on condition that the accounts are paid.
Thembelihle	Good condition	User is responsible for maintenance of infrastructure once it has been put in place by the municipality.	Lessees are responsible but problem with emergent farmers not paying. Municipality then intervenes and helps them.
Tsantsabane	Condition was bad but has improved	User repairs the damages and the municipality refunds him/her by subtracting amount from monthly rental.	Lessee repairs and municipality remunerates for the costs accrued.
Ubuntu	Fairly good	Municipality provides the material and the user provides the labour. Minor problems are to be fixed by the user.	Municipality. Users are supposed to maintain the equipment but if major problem then municipality pays.
Umsobomvu	Good condition	The users and the municipality	The users and the municipality.
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Good condition	Users	Users
Warrenton	Poor condition as most of the infrastructure is very old.	Municipality as it's the owner	Municipality (commonage revenue is used for repairs)

4. Municipal Management

4.1 Organising beneficiaries

In most cases the emergent farmers are organised into representative bodies ranging from Emergent Farmers Committees, Small Farmers Associations, Upcoming Farmers Associations to Community Property Associations. In only one case (Ga-Segonyana), it was reported that there is no formal organisational structure for emergent farmers. There is usually one committee per town, which represents the interests of the emergent farmer in that specific town.

Several problems have been identified.

Firstly, the committees that are formed lack legality in most cases: an informally and loosely formed committee does not form a legal organisation. It is thus suggested that the committees register as, for example, trusts. This would increase their legality in voicing their demands and also give them more bargaining power with the municipalities and government departments.

Secondly, there is that of lack of representation: the case studies showed that the emergent farmers unions are not all inclusive in terms of interest group (eg some people want to farm with chickens, while others want to farm with goats and others again want to plant vegetable gardens), in terms of gender and youth (very little representation of women and youth was observed) and even race (one group of coloured emergent farmers had separated themselves from the Xhosa emergent farmers).

Thirdly, the above highlights a further problem of splinter emergent farmers unions/committees and the fragmentation of the groups: especially in Siyathemba there are several emergent farmers groups in Prieska: the 'Besproeing Sonskyn' group are for irrigation farming, the 'Gariap Opkomende Boere' want to buy their own farm for communal use, the 'Siya Themba Opkomende Boere' and the 'Prieska Kleinboere' are using the commonage. The groups have different farming interests but with an interest in obtaining the same tract of land.

FARM Africa stated that it would be best if they amalgamated into one committee in order to improve their bargaining power. On the one hand, this has the advantage of increasing bargaining power with the municipality and the departments due to its inclusiveness and representativeness of all the different interest groups involved. This also makes interaction with the municipality, NGOs and departments easier as they have to deal only with one group. On the other hand, having one representative group for all emergent farmers can endanger representation in terms of race, gender and interest group. For example, the dominant group within the committee could promote its own interest, which could be, for example, male dominated sheep farmers. Other interest groups such as poultry, vegetable, pig or cattle farmers would get neglected in such a structure.

4.2 Gaining access to the land

In most cases, the emergent farmers gained access to the land through a period of negotiations between the emergent farmers and the municipalities. With the pressure placed on the municipalities towards land reform, a lot of the municipalities advertised the land available and called for written applications from the emergent farmers who had to undergo certain criteria for selection to use the land.

In the rest of the cases, the land was put out on a tender basis in which the emergent farmers had to compete with the commercial farmers. In several cases, however, preference was given to the emergent farmers, although their tender was lower than that of the commercial farmer.

4.3 Contracts

In most cases there are contracts that have been signed with the users of the commonage. The extent of their enforcement, however, is questionable.

With the pressure placed on the municipalities towards land reform, the municipalities often just handed the land over to the emergent farmers without drafting contracts. These would be developed at a later stage. This, however, entailed that payment rates were not enforceable due to the lack of contractual binding and made the later enforcement of contracts on the users difficult.

Another issue to be addressed is the neglect of the satellite towns of the municipalities in terms of infrastructure maintenance, general communication and contracts. With the amalgamation several towns have been accumulated into one municipal area. The municipality is usually dominated by a larger town with several smaller satellite towns surrounding it. In most of the cases the satellite towns have been reduced to merely being payment points of municipal fees. For example, in the case of Britstown (in Emthanjeni) the contracts of the emergent farmers have expired but the municipality has not taken any corrective steps yet. Therefore, the emergent farmers have stopped paying their rentals as there is no legally binding contract that determines the legal obligations of the usage of the land.

Additionally, interaction and communication with the emergent farmers in the satellite towns and the central municipality is lacking. For example, in Emthanjeni there is much more interaction between the De Aar municipality and the De Aar emergent farmers than with the Britstown emergent farmers.

An example of potentially good commonage management is that of Siyancuma, where the municipality wants to develop a feasibility study, in cooperation with the DoA. Such a study will assess the individual emergent farmer and his/her potential in becoming a successful farmer. Once this study on individual potential has been completed, the contracts will be renewed and the commonage policy taken from there. However, this survey has not been implemented.

Table 6. Existence of signed and enforced contracts

Municipality	Existence of contracts: Yes/No	Reinforcement of contracts
Dikgatlong	No	NA
Emthanjeni	Contracts have either expired or have not been signed yet.	NA
Gamagara	Yes	Yes
Ga-Segonyana	Yes	Yes
Hantam	Except for in Calvinia the contracts are signed.	Yes; except for in Calvinia
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: No, Kenhardt: Yes	Keimoes: No Kenhardt: Yes
Kamiesberg	Yes: on the new commonage; No: on the old commonage.	No

Kareeberg	Yes	Yes
Karoo Hoogland	Yes	Yes
!Kheis	At the time of the interview no contracts had been signed but the process was rolling and contracts were supposed to be signed on 01 July 2002	NA
Kgatelopele	Yes	-
Khai Ma	Yes	-
//Khara Hais	Yes	Partially
Kimberley	Yes	Yes
Mier	Yes	Yes
Nama Khoi	Yes	No
Renosterberg	No	NA
Richtersveld	No; in the process of developing contracts	NA
Siya Themba	Yes	Yes
Siyancuma	Yes but have expired. Renewed contracts have not yet been developed.	NA
Thembelihle	Yes	Yes
Tsantsabane	Yes	Yes
Ubuntu	Some contracts have been developed but does not cover all emergent farmer. Interviewee not entirely sure	Yes
Umsobomvu	Yes	-
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Yes	-
Warrenton	Not known	NA

4.4 Supervision of the commonage

In almost all cases additional staff with additional time is needed to attend to the commonage. Currently, commonage is part of the job-description of officials who have other work to do as well, which limits the time that they can spend on commonage related issues. Mostly, it's the head of the technical department (for example, in Thembelihle, Warrenton and !Kheis) who is responsible for the commonage, in particular the infrastructure that needs to be repaired.

In several other cases (Richtersveld, //Khara Hais, Khai Ma, Kamiesberg, Karoo Hoogland and Kai-Gariep), supervision is done by the commonage committee. This is useful as it's usually representative of all the interest groups in land management. In towns where there is a strong DoA agricultural extension officer as in Siyathemba, the commonage is supervised by him/her. This is also very useful as he/she is in close cooperation with the municipality, the emergent farmers and the commercial farmers and has the necessary agricultural background and expertise to deal with these issues.

Supervision is also done by non-municipal officials such as the mayor in Renosterberg, the councillors in Kareeberg and the farmers union in Richtersveld. In Ga-Segonyana the person responsible for the nature reserve is supervising the commonage usage.

Except for two cases (Umsobomvu and Kareeberg), all the municipalities stated that additional capacity was needed for effective land management. One or two additional officials are needed with the necessary agricultural background to tend to the commonage on a full-time basis. In their current capacity, the municipal officials who are responsible for commonage related issues, do not have the agricultural

background to deal with them. They also do not have the time to facilitate and mediate between the different stakeholders and thus to build a working relationship.

From the table below one can see that commonage supervision is characterised by irregular check-ups in most cases and in four cases there is no supervision of the land.

Table 7. Capacity to supervise the use of the commonage

Municipality	Supervision of the commonage	Municipal capacity to supervise the commonage lto staff, time and skills
Dikgatlong	Random inspections	-
Emthanjeni	Irregular inspections	Inspections done by the Agricultural Extension officer and an official from Land Affairs who make the municipality aware of any problems on the commonage. The municipality its self does not have an official who can see to all these things.
Gamagara	No supervision	Lack of staff and skill to tend to this
Ga-Segonyana	Supervision is done	Supervision done by the municipality: the person responsible for the nature reserve also supervises the commonage: has the skills but not the time: need an additional capacity on full-time basis.
Hantam	In three of the four towns there is no supervision except for in Calvinia	-
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: supervision will be done Kenhardt: irregular basis	Supervision will be done by the commonage committee and council officials. Kenhardt: lack of staff
Kamiesberg	Supervision is done	Supervision done by the commonage committee. In the municipality there is a lack of staff to manage the commonage properly.
Kareeberg	Regular sporadic spot checks	Check-ups done by a council official with farming background
Karoo Hoogland	'Veld wagters' and the commonage committee	-
IKheis	Sporadic monitoring exercises	Monitoring is done by the technical official, but more staff is needed: 2-3 full time officials dealing with commonage and infrastructure would be needed.
Kgatelopele	Visual inspections	Does not have sufficient staff for this.
Khai Ma	Supervision is done	Supervision done by the commonage committee
//Khara Hais	Supervision is done.	Supervision done by the municipality, but there is no official whose specific task it is. There is only the commonage committee.
Kimberley	No supervision	Check ups are initiated when problems are brought forward by the emergent farmers.
Mier	No supervision	Lack of staff.
Nama Khoi	No supervision	Lack of staff.
Renosterberg	Occasional and irregular visits	Visits done by the mayor, who is a farmer and consults with the farmers. He takes queries to the municipality where meetings are held to sort out the problem. There is no staff, except for the mayor who fulfils this function.
Richtersveld	Supervisory trips	Checks done by the Farmers Union and the commonage committee. Municipality is busy establishing someone who will accompany them

		so that the municipality is represented.
Siya Themba	Bi-monthly check up	Checks done by the Agricultural Extension Officer and an assistant. Ideally a senior municipal official plus assistants would be needed.
Siyancuma	Spot checks	Checks done by an official from the Infrastructure and Development department. A full-time official to oversee the land would be necessary
Thembelihle	3-monthly inspections; more often in summer	Inspections done by the Technical dept of the municipality. An additional person for the supervision of the commonage in each of the towns would be better.
Tsantsabane	3-monthly inspections	Inspections done by the municipality who address the lessees if there is a problem. The municipality is understaffed, though.
Ubuntu	6-monthly survey on the land to determine number of animals on the land	Survey done by municipality. Other than that no real supervision. Lack of staff and time to deal with commonage related issues.
Umsobomvu	Supervision is done	The municipality does have sufficient staff, skills and time to supervise the land.
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Ad hoc inspections	-
Warrenton	Regular supervision	Supervision done by the head of Public Works, who is tasked with this by the council. He reports to council. Problem of lack time: someone is needed who has more time to attend to these issues.

4.5 Reporting of the users of the commonage to the Municipality

In only seven of the cases do formal reporting mechanisms exist. Monthly or quarterly reports are submitted to the municipality. In most of the other cases reporting is demand-driven: when there is a complaint then it has to be submitted in written form.

In most of the cases, however, there is not formal reporting mechanism. This shows the lack of interaction between the emergent farmers and the municipality and also the lack of interest from both sides to inform one another of the developments on the commonage. Developing an effective reporting mechanism could enhance communication and collaboration between the parties involved.

Different kinds of reporting mechanisms are used in the municipalities:

An interesting approach to reporting is that of the land committee in Warrenton: The minutes of the commonage committee meetings are handed to the Land Committee of the Council, which refines them and sifts out the important issues, which then get forwarded to council. There is therefore not a standard report, but rather a demand driven report. It is based on the needs of the time, which is then put forward to council as the need arises.

Another reporting mechanism is the commonage committee, which consists of members of council and small farmers/emergent farmers. The commonage committee is more representative and is responsible for day to day matters concerning the commonage. The commonage committee is accountable to the Land committee which is councils standing committee on land. This committee again reports to the whole of council when there are issues that need to be addressed.

This system of mutual checks and balances enhances cooperation between the different stakeholders and role-players.

Table 8. Reporting mechanisms to the commonage

Municipality	Reporting mechanism	Follow-up by municipalities
Dikgatlong	Reporting is done in some of the towns only.	-
Emthanjeni	The DLA reports in written form to the municipality	The letters are referred to the relevant departments or the Agricultural Extension Officer
Gamagara	None	NA
Ga-Segonyana	All complaints have to be submitted in written form	The written complaints are reported to council and diverted to the relevant department
Hantam	None; reporting is informal	NA
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: quarterly reports will be given by the users Kenhardt: None; only by demand	NA as the users are not using the land yet. Kenhardt: NA
Kamiesberg	Quarterly reports by the commonage committees	The issues are taken up with council
Kareeberg	None	NA
Karoo Hoogland	Monthly reports	-
IKheis	Monthly informal reports by the emerging farmers committees in a meeting with the mayor.	-
Kgatelopele	None	NA
Khai Ma	Minutes are given of the commonage committees.	Councillors are part of the commonage committee.
//Khara Hals	No regular reports	NA
Kimberley	Irregular ad hoc reporting based on complaints	If a complaint comes in then its referred to the technical dept or the council when it's a bigger, more serious problem.
Mier	Quarterly reports by emergent farmers.	-
Nama Khoi	Commonage Committees submit monthly minutes and reports to council. Complaints are also submitted.	Council takes up the issues.
Renosterberg	None	NA
Richtersveld	Monthly meetings of commonage committee and emergent farmers; quarterly meetings of the commonage committees and reports of the meetings submitted to the municipality.	The municipality follows up on the issues that were raised by the committee but in many cases it cannot take corrective steps.
Siya Themba	No reporting mechanism currently but are busy initiating it with the formation of the new contracts	NA
Siyancuma	No formal reporting mechanism has been established yet. Currently complaints only.	Problems are taken to the municipality which are followed up with action by the relevant official.
Thembelihle	No reporting mechanism at this stage. The quarterly monitoring of the commonage is combined into an internal report by the municipality.	NA

Tsantsabane	None	NA
Ubuntu	No formal reporting mechanism, rather complaints based	If problems arise then the issues can be brought to council but mostly the committees must sort it out themselves.
Umsobomvu	Daily reports	-
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Informal reports by letter: complaints driven?	Yes: followed up by municipal action.
Warrenton	Minutes of the commonage committee meetings and commonage issues are reflected in the report of the Public Works official. Thus no standard report but based on the needs of the time.	The minutes of the commonage committee meetings are processed and refined and issues are raised at council level.

4.6 Council oversight

In eight of the municipalities, no commonage related issues were discussed at council level, which shows a lack of involvement of the council and municipality in commonage related issues.

Where councils did discuss commonage, issues such as land management, contracts, infrastructure repairs and overgrazing were discussed. Due to the fact that council members are also part of the commonage committees (where they have been established), they are able to bring forward to council the issues that arise within the commonage committee. It is thus an effective way in which the municipality can be involved and be made aware of problems on the ground.

In two of the interviews interesting and innovative ideas came to the fore: In Kamiesberg the Council, in cooperation with SPP, discussed issues concerning land management and the possibility of employing an additional official who will be responsible for the management of the commonage. This is important as this option has been put to the fore due to the lack of commonage management capacity within the municipality. The officials who are currently responsible for the commonage often do not have the time or skills to tend to the issues that arise.

Another innovative idea comes from Ga-Segonyana where the Council discussed the development of sliding scale tariffs: tariffs are lowered for the lower income groups which means that indigents pay less to use the commonage than do those who earn above the indigents cut-off amount. See below under the financial section for more details on this policy.

Table 9. Discussion of commonage related issues in council in the past year

Municipality	Commonage related issues discussed in council in the past year
Dikgatlong	Only in Barkley West
Emthanjeni	Council discussed commonage related issues at various occasions such as applications of emergent farmers for land, the contracts etc.
Gamagara	None
Ga-Segonyana	Council discussed the sliding scale tariffs for the small scale farmers: tariffs were lowered for the lower income groups.
Hantam	In Calvinia empowerment of the emergent farmers and buying additional land was discussed; in the rest of the towns: none
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: Council discussed issues related to the application of the commonage according to the rules as prescribed by the DoA.

	Kenhardt: None
Kamiesberg	Council held a workshop in cooperation with SPP to discuss possible options around the management of the commonage such as grazing regulations and the employment of an official to manage the commonage!!
Kareeberg	None
Karoo Hoogland	-
!Kheis	Council discussed the overgrazing of the commonage.
Kgatelopele	None
Khai Ma	Council discussed rental issues and additional sources of funding and maintenance
//Khara Hais	Council discussed issues such as payments, repairs, distribution of water, planting of trees and metering of water.
Kimberley	None
Mier	None
Nama Khoi	Council discussed issues such as budgeting, improvement of infrastructure, enforcement of levy payments, administrative capacity and appointment of staff.
Renosterberg	Council discussed the development of contracts and the repairs of the fencing.
Richtersveld	Council discussed the Grazing Regulations what that were developed, the development of contracts and business plans.
Siya Themba	Council discussed the contracts as well as further usage of fields and irrigation possibilities.
Siyancuma	Council met twice this year specially to discuss commonage related issues and the feasibility study of the DoA
Thembelihle	Council discussed the occupation of the commonage in Strydenburg.
Tsantsabane	None
Ubuntu	Issues regarding commonage have not really been discussed at council level.
Umsobomvu	Yes
Vaalharts-Morobeng	None
Warrenton	Council discussed issues such as the under-utilisation of the cattle fattening facilities, cattle diseases were also discussed.

4.7 Financial management:

The table below shows that only in two municipalities do the users of the commonage not receive any accounts. For the rest of the municipalities the users do receive accounts; mostly on a monthly basis or on a six monthly basis. The commercial farmers pay according to the rate determined in their tender, whereas for the emergent farmers the rates levied differ greatly.

An interesting finding is the large discrepancy of tariffs levied not only between municipalities but also within municipalities for the emergent farmers. For example, in the case of Richtersveld, 25c is levied per small livestock unit whereas in Siyancuma R10-12 per ha per month is levied.

There are also discrepancies within municipalities. An example of internal tariff structure discrepancies within a municipality is De Aar where the emergent farmers in Britstown pay R 20/small stock unit/year, whereas in Hanover its R20 000 per year for a camp of 971 ha and in De Aar the tariff will be 35c per ha. A further example is that of Renosterberg, where in Philipstown the emergent farmers pay R600/year whereas in Petrusville its R 200/month.

These internal discrepancies are surely the result of the amalgamation process but will have to be addressed in order to reach conformity. Ideally, a uniform tariff should be determined provincially which should be based on the grazing capacity of the land and the number of livestock grazed on it, i.e. Rand amount/small or large stock unit per month.

Under the current determination of levels of rentals, the number of livestock grazing on the land are often not brought into consideration. For example, in Siyathemba the amount of R 60/month is levied irrespective of the number of animals grazed on the land. Additionally, two parts of the commonage are grazed for free for three years due to a decision taken by the previous council taken in 2000. Not only has this led to conflict between the emergent farmers groups as the one group can use the commonage for free while others have to pay, but the levy of R 60/month irrespective of amount of animals on the land, encourages overgrazing. Another example is that of !Kheis where R5/farmer/month is levied irrespective of the amount of animals grazing the land.

A suggestion towards the determination of tariffs is the example of Ga-Segonyana, where a sliding scale tariff determination practice is used. The split tariff structure is determined by the income earned: people who earn below R 1000/ month pay R 5 per large livestock unit, R 1 per small livestock unit and R 0.50 per pig. People who earn above R 1000/month pay, pay R 12.71c per head of big livestock, R 2,86 per head of small livestock and 50c per pig. This allows for the differentiation between the subsistence farmer or the indigent and those who earn above that level and thus accommodates both kinds of farmers on the commonage.

Table 10. Levels of rentals levied and levels to which accounts are received.

Municipality	Level to which commonage users receive accounts for their rentals	Levels of rentals levied
Dikgatlong	None	NA
Emthanjeni	Where the contracts are in place accounts are sent out	No uniform pricing strategy: Varies from R20 /small stock unit/year in Britstown, R20 000/year in Hanover and 35c/ha in De Aar.
Gamagara	Do receive accounts	Low levels for emergent farmers; the rest (commercial farmers) pay according to the tender.
Ga-Segonyana	Accounts are sent out on a monthly basis	Some lessees pay according to the amount stipulated in the tender document while the emergent farmers pay according to head of livestock. Tariffs are determined on a sliding scale: those who earn below a certain income pay less rent for the commonage. (see below)
Hantam	The users do not receive accounts in Calvinia but they pay on a quarterly basis	According to lease contract or R 1.50/ha/year; R 3/ha/year or R 20/ha/year.
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: The users will receive accounts. Kenhardt: 6 monthly accounts	Keimoes: R50/month/lessee Kenhardt: -
Kamiesberg	Do receive accounts	Small stock: R 0.50/head/month and large stock: R 3/head/month.
Kareeberg	No accounts are received	The lessees pay according to the lease contract which were determined via public

		tender.
Karoo Hoogland	Historical commonage: yes; new commonage: no.	-
!Kheis	Do receive accounts.	R5/farmer/month irrespective of the amount of animals grazing
Kgatelopele	Do receive accounts	As determined in the tender.
Khai Ma	Do receive accounts	R 1000 p.a. + 14% VAT/ commonage
//Khara Hais	Do receive accounts	-
Kimberley	Do receive accounts on a monthly basis	R 600/month as a once off amount. Levies for the commercial farmers are according to their lease contracts.
Mier	Do receive accounts	About R0.50/ha
Nama Khoi	Do receive accounts	They are billed with monthly service accounts.
Renosterberg	Do receive accounts	Depending on the town: R 600/year or R 200 /month for the emergent farmers.
Richtersveld	Do receive accounts	25c/small stock unit and R2.60/ large stock unit
Siya Themba	Do receive accounts on a monthly basis	R 60/month: irrespective of the amount of animals grazed on the land. Two parts of the commonage are grazed for free.
Siyancuma	Do receive accounts on a monthly basis	R 10-R12/ha/month.
Thembelihle	Do receive accounts on a monthly basis	R 600/month for the emergent farmers, commercial farmers pay per ha on an annual basis.
Tsantsabane	Do receive accounts on a 6-monthly basis.	Levels of rent differ fro camp to camp: better land is rented out at R 28/ha whereas less good quality land is rented out at R 12/ha.
Ubuntu	Do receive accounts although the contracts state that accounts aren't necessary.	Emergent farmers: about R 1/month/livestock unit
Umsobomvu	Do receive accounts.	-
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Do receive accounts	-
Warrenton	No accounts are sent out as the emergent farmers pay on an annual basis.	Payment on an annual basis

4.8 Payment rate and revenue collection

The table below shows that the payment rate in 11 of the municipalities can be regarded as adequate. In eight of the cases, the payment rate varies within the municipality: whereas the payment rate is good in some towns/on some tracts of the commonage land, its bad in other towns/other tracts of commonage land.

In seven of the municipalities there is a very low and irregular payment rate. One example of this is !Kheis, where 70% of the users do not pay regularly. In the case of Richtersveld, the revenue that is supposed to accrue from the commonage users is R 93 000 whereas the municipality only receives R476 in this financial year. A further example is that of Griquaastad in Siyancuma, where the commonage users payments are in arrears since 1996.

The commonage users mostly pay directly to the municipality. In some cases, however, payment is channelled through the users' committees. This has the advantage of relieving the municipality of the burden of having to collect the money from the emergent farmers themselves. The disadvantage, however, is that in most cases the emergent farmers are loosely grouped as committees and thus have no legal standing as a legal entity. This means that the municipality cannot hold them responsible in the case of non-payment. If the contracts are signed with individuals instead, it is legally binding. The same problem arises when the municipality signs the contract with the emergent farmer group and not the individual. The former, in most cases, lacks legality and cannot therefore be held accountable.

Table 11. Commonage payment rate

Municipality	Regular payment/payment culture of the commonage users (emergent farmers)	Payment to the municipality or to the users' committee
Dikgatlong	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	-
Emthanjeni	Irregular payment rate	Users' committees collect the money.
Gamagara	Regular payment	-
Ga-Segonyana	Regular payment	-
Hantam	Regular payment except for in Calvinia	Directly to the municipality
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: Not applicable yet, as the emergent farmers are not on the land yet. Kenhardt: yes	NA Kenhardt: yes
Kamiesberg	Regular payment	-
Kareeberg	Regular payment	-
Karoo Hoogland	Regular payment	-
IKheis	Very irregular payment	
Kgatelopele	Regular payment	-
Khai Ma	Regular payment	-
//Khara Hais	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	
Kimberley	Irregular payment rate	Users' committees collect the money.
Mier	Irregular payment	-
Nama Khoi	Irregular payment	-
Renosterberg	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	Directly to the municipality.
Richtersveld	Irregular and non-payment.	Directly to the municipality.
Siya Themba	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	-
Siyancuma	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	-
Thembelihle	Irregular payment	-
Tsantsabane	Regular payment	Directly to the municipality.
Ubuntu	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	Users' committees collect the money.
Umsobomvu	Depends on the tract of commonage/town.	-
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Regular payment	-
Warrenton	Regular payment	-

The table below shows that in most cases legal steps are taken in some form or other in the case of non-payment.

It is not clear, however, to what extent the legal steps are followed up on and in how many cases the users are really evicted. Some of the municipalities admit that

although legal steps are taken in terms of letters of warning, they are not enforced through action.

Most of the municipalities use coercive methods of dealing with non-payment. This means that they react to non-payment through legal steps taken such as sending out letters of warning and taking control of the stock in cases of continued non-payment. In only one case, in Richtersveld, does the municipality resort to non-coercive steps and engages with the community. The emergent farmers have to pay rental for the first time in this year (2002) for the usage of the commonage. Although the revenues that are supposed to be generated are R 93 000 and the municipality has only received R 476 in this financial year, the municipality is nevertheless not using coercive means to promote payment. This is due to the fact that the users have only started paying this year. Additionally the municipality states that it rather wants to promote a payment culture through education and awareness-raising before resorting to coercive measures.

Table 12. Response to non-payment

Municipality	How does the municipality deal with non-payment
Dikgatlong	Credit control policy
Emthanjeni	Legal action is taken and the animals kept in security by the municipality until payment occurs.
Gamagara	Legal action is taken according to the contracts.
Ga-Segonyana	Legal action is taken: the lessees are warned; if there is no reaction then the users have 90 days to remove their animals. If this does not happen then the municipality removes them.
Hantam	Depending on town: no action taken or letter of warning sent out or negotiations with lessees
Kai-Gariep	NA
Kamiesberg	Camps have to be vacated if no payment is received
Kareeberg	The contract is cancelled according to rental conditions.
Karoo Hoogland	Written warning are sent out
IKheis	Due to lack of formal contracts the municipality does nothing.
Kgatelopele	A notice of demand is issued and if the users fail to pay then eviction.
Khai Ma	Credit control and Debt collection policy
//Khara Hais	No steps taken as yet concerning non-payment
Kimberley	Legal action is taken in most cases but there aren't any outcomes
Mier	No legal action taken as yet.
Nama Khoi	Nothing is done as yet.
Renosterberg	Letter of warning is sent out; however, no action is taken against defaulters.
Richtersveld	With the absence of grazing rights the municipality cannot do anything. The municipality does not want to use coercive means to promote payment
Siya Themba	NA as lack of contracts
Siyancuma	Legal steps are taken
Thembelihle	No action is taken in the case of non-payment
Tsantsabane	Warning, which is followed up by a summons.
Ubuntu	Legal action is taken
Umsobomvu	Stop hiring
Vaalharts-Morobeng	NA
Warrenton	There's no problem with non-payment therefore no legal steps need to be taken.

Within the new terms of reference of having to be a developmentally oriented municipality within the framework of the IDPs, one of the issues confronted by municipalities is whether revenue generated by commonage should be "ring-fenced" to be used purely for commonage-related developments. In the past the income generated flowed back into the central coffers and cross-subsidised other municipal rates and taxes. Ideally, however, the money should flow into a separate account and should be used for infrastructure maintenance as well as training and education of the emergent farmers.

The table below demonstrates that in only eight cases does the income generated by the commonage usage, flow into a separate account. In the rest of the cases, the money flows back into the central municipal coffers and acts as a means to cross-subsidise other municipal rates and taxes. Municipalities argue that if the commonage income was reduced, it would place a heavier burden on the tax-payer as the commonage was acting as a relief-mechanism for tax-payers.

Allocating commonage revenue to the central coffers could, however, be advantageous as well as disadvantageous: if the income generated from the commonage is lower than the repair costs then cross-subsidisation from the central coffer would be necessary. If the income from the commonage, however, is lower than the repairs needed then this can limit the infrastructure maintenance.

One of the main arguments against the transferral of historical commonage to emergent farmers is the fear of the municipality in losing a fixed revenue base that used to be collected on a regular basis from the commercial farmers. In the case of Hanover in Emthanjeni municipality, approximately 15 % of the total income comes from the commonage. Due to the culture of non-payment in terms of rates and taxes of the town residents, however, the percentage that the commonage contributes gets inflated relatively to the income that is received by the municipality. If this is taken into account then the percentage resulting from the commonage income amounts to 40-50%.

In Emthanjeni, the income generated from the commonage does not flow back into commonage management but is used to cross-subsidise other expenses and relieves the residential tax payers of the towns. The table below shows the income from the commonage in Emthanjeni, as well as the budgeted amount and the spent amount up until the end of August 2002:

Income from the commonage in 2000/2001	Amount budgeted for commonage expenditure for 2002	Capital expenses for 2002 on commonage till end of August
R 269 192	R 14 500	R 5115.60

The above shows that the income from the commonage exceeds the expenditure on the commonage by far. The amount of R 5115.60 also only includes the capital expenses and does not take into consideration the time, petrol and salaries of those who had to deliver the services.

Another example is that of Kareeberg, where the overall revenue generated by the municipality amounts to R 7.7million. The income from the commonage is R 285 000 and the expenditure for the commonage is R 48 000. The income from the commonage thus only comprises about 3.7% of the total budget. Hence it is not really a valid argument to state that the municipalities are dependant on the income

generated from the commonage, as within the municipality, the percentage is negligible.

For municipalities to become purely developmental the different income generating functions such as commonage will have to become cost centres of their own: the income generated must flow back into commonage development. An additional suggestion is to treat the separate towns as cost centres: As mentioned above commonage contributes 40-50% of Hanover's income. The money, however, goes back to De Aar where it is used to cross-subsidise the whole municipality. The money generated in Hanover should flow back into the development of Hanover.

There is a question of whether this is viable: does Hanover generate enough income to cover its own costs or is cross subsidisation from De Aar necessary for its survival?

Table 13. Commonage revenue: is it being ring-fenced or not.

Municipality	Is revenue ring-fenced
Dikgatlong	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Emthanjeni	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Gamagara	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Ga-Segonyana	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Hantam	A small amount is used for commonage maintenance; the rest goes back into central municipal coffers.
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: the money will be used to cover the costs of the Council that accrued in terms of the commonage Kenhardt: Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Kamiesberg	The money is used specifically for the improvements and repairs to the commonage
Kareeberg	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Karoo Hoogland	Part of revenue goes to infrastructure maintenance; rest goes into maintenance budget
!Kheis	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Kgatelopele	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Khai Ma	Council has reduced the rental to allow farmers the opportunity the additional funds in order to maintain the infrastructure.
//Khara Hais	The money flows into a separate bank account: its ring-fenced.
Kimberley	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Mier	The money flows into a separate bank account
Nama Khoi	Rentals received are used to maintain the infrastructure although the revenue is inadequate.
Renosterberg	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Richtersveld	The money flows into a separate bank account: its ring-fenced
Siya Themba	The money flows into a separate bank account: its ring-fenced.
Siyancuma	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Thembelihle	The money flows into a separate bank account: its ring-fenced.
Tsantsabane	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Ubuntu	Money flows back into the central municipal coffers
Umsobomvu	-
Vaalharts-Morobeng	-
Warrenton	The money flows into separate bank accounts: its ring-fenced.

5. Support Systems

5.1 Technical or financial assistance from external agencies (Government Departments, NGOs, farmers)

18 of the 26 municipalities, or 69 %, have attained support from external agencies. This does not include the support given by the agricultural extension officers as their support is an obligation and duty towards the emergent farmers. The table below shows the extent to which emergent farmers have received assistance from external agencies such as Government Departments, NGOs, farming cooperatives, farmers unions or donor agencies

Table 14. Assistance provided by external agencies

Municipality	Support from external agencies
Dikgatlong	Partially
Emthanjeni	DBSA: implementation of a Spatially Integrated Management Information System
Gamagara	None
Ga-Segonyana	DWAF
Hantam	None
Kai-Gariep	None
Kamiesberg	DLA: 'Land Care' project and provision of training
Kareeberg	Commercial Farmers Union and DoA
Karoo Hoogland	Historical commonage: none; new commonage technical assistance by DoA
!Kheis	DoA, Landbank and Farmers unions provide technical assistance
Kgatelopele	None
Khai Ma	Dept Animal Health
//Khara Hais	DoA
Kimberley	None
Mier	DoA
Nama Khoi	None
Renosterberg	None
Richtersveld	DLA and SPP
Siya Themba	DLA, Farm Africa and DoA
Siyancuma	DoA, Land Reform and Environmental Health
Thembelihle	Financial assistance from Landbank and LED funds
Tsantsabane	DoA
Ubuntu	DoA: technical and financial assistance
Umsobomvu	Government Departments
Vaalharts-Morobeng	None
Warrenton	Dept of Labour

5.2 Department of Local Government and Housing

The historical commonage falls under the DLGH. In most cases this land was acquired with the development of the town at the turn of the century. Traditionally the land was available to the town-residents and was later rented out to commercial farmers as an income source for the municipality. With the land redistribution programme the DLA has acquired extra land post-1994 whose beneficiaries are specifically the previously disadvantaged communities. Whereas the new

commonage falls within the policy sphere of the DLA, the historical commonage falls in the policy area of the DLGH. The department currently, however, has no specific policy towards the historical commonage.

The department along with the DLA and the DoA have, therefore, developed a task-team, the Committee for Cooperative Governance, to address the lack of policy. More detail towards this policy is to be found below.

5.3 Department of Land Affairs

As mentioned above there are two kinds of commonage and the new commonage, that was acquired after 1994 falls in the policy sphere of the DLA. The DLA cooperates with the DoA and DWAF on new commonage issues and with the Programme of Cooperative Governance and the Land Use Management Committee increased interaction is also taking place with the DLGH.

Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)¹:

One of the current DLA policies, that builds on commonage use, is the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. Commonage that is provided by the DLA is supposed to act as a stepping-stone for emergent farmers towards land ownership through LRAD.

LRAD is a sub-programme of the land reform programme. To qualify for LRAD funds the applicants need to be from previously disadvantaged communities with the focus on becoming farmers in order to improve their income and their living standards. 'Absentee owners' are not allowed: the applicants are to work the land on a daily basis. The focus is on farming for self-sustainability and also development towards becoming commercial farmers by selling their produce. The objectives of LRAD are to enable men as well as women to become farmers, to provide opportunities for youth in the rural areas, stimulation of agricultural production and environmental sustainability in the farming practice.

The responsibility lies with the applicant to identify the land that he/she wants to buy. R 20 000 is allocated per applicant. There are several criteria for application: People who qualify for the grant are to be non-white and previously disadvantaged. They are not to be employed by civil service providers (police, municipality, SANDF etc), not hold political posts and they are not be members of the Land Bank.

The applicant can increase his/her share of the grant through contributions in labour (he/she and other identified labour sources who work on the land) with the value of R 5000, kind (capital assets such as tractors, livestock etc) and cash (which requires the existence of a bank account). The maximum subsidy is R 100 000. The applicants will be required to undergo training in farming practices. Those who have applied for larger grants will be trained in management issues as well.

The DLA and DoA assist the applicant with the purchase of the land and also offer advice in terms of viable farming operations. Once the applicant has attained his/her land, the agricultural extension officers will provide them with advice and support.

¹ The information was taken from the DLA information pamphlet 'The way to a better life on your own agricultural land'.

The LRAD programme is a joint venture between the DoA and the DLA. The DoA funds the operating costs in that it offers 'sunrise packages' which are development support packages. Their function is to help the applicants to develop the land by providing, for example seed and machinery. The DoA programme will be initiated in the 2003 financial year.

The focus of LRAD is specifically on commercialisation: Commonage is seen as a stepping-stone towards commercialisation and applies to previously disadvantaged people. The minimum lease for commonage should be 5 years and over this period the emergent farmer should have increased his/her stock and move off the commonage by having acquired his/her own land with the aid of LRAD and thus making place for other emergent farmers.

Most of the emergent farmers have not acquired their own land yet, although there is a great interest in most cases in doing so. The LRAD policy is useful in this respect as it enables emergent farmers to gain access to funds in order to buy their own tract of land. The ceiling on the amount of R 100 000, however, is low and raises the question as to if the land that one could buy with it would amount to a viable economic unit.

In some of the cases the emergent farmers have acquired their own land. For example, in IKheis, the emergent farmers bought a farm for R 1.8 million where three of the emergent farmers are now farming on their own. Other emergent farmers are acquiring land through the LRAD scheme and are applying for funds from the Landbank. Generally there has, however, not been a lot of initiative concerning the acquisition of own land; mostly due to ignorance of procedures to be taken to gain access to LRAD.

Different responses were given to the question as to if commonage users 'privatise' the land that they use, meaning that they develop a sense of ownership and the corresponding responsibility for the land. Most municipalities stated that the users are aware that the land that they are using is communal land. For example in the case of Tsantsabane, Richtersveld and Ubuntu it was stated that all the users realise that the land is public domain and belongs to the municipality. There are, however, also cases where the users do identify with the land and develop a sense of ownership and responsibility of the land. This is especially prevalent amongst the emergent farmers who treat the land as if it was their own. This is the case in Renosterberg, Thembelihle, Kareeberg, Siya Themba, Siyancuma and Ga Segonyana. Especially in Kareeberg, one can notice a certain pride of being able to tend to ones 'own' land and in Ga Segonyana it was stated that due to the sense of ownership, the land it tended to well.

Commercial farmers are also very protective about the commonage land that they are renting. In the case of Emthanjeni, for example, one needs to attain permission to enter the premises. The land is looked after very well.

'Privatisation' of the land by emergent farmers not only cultivates a sense of ownership by the emergent farmers but also shows the need and desire to own ones own land.

The DLA's approach to commonage use is a very commercial one: the commonage land that has been bought by the DLA for the different municipalities is to function as a stepping-stone for becoming commercial farmers.

The responsibility of the DLA lies with the acquisition and the expansion of the commonage. The Department works in cooperation with the municipalities who are responsible for the management and administration of the land via a notarial deed on behalf of the DLA. The DLA provides the municipalities with guidelines and determines the conditions to ensure that the land is distributed to the correct beneficiaries. The title deed and notarial deed prohibits the municipalities to make the land available via auctions or tenders and to people other than the previously disadvantaged.

Before land is acquired for the municipalities, their financial statements are scrutinised to see if the municipalities are financially healthy in order to contribute to the acquisition of the land. In most cases they cannot contribute financially and therefore they have to contribute in terms of management and administration.

The DLA prescribes the formation of a commonage committee in each of the municipalities. It is comprised of members from the DoA (i.e. the agricultural extension officer), the municipal council, members of the emergent farmers union and members of other NGOs such as farmers unions. The committee is responsible for the management of the land and for the identification and selection of the users of the land as the DLA does not have any guidelines on who the beneficiaries of the purchased farms should be, except that they should be from the previously disadvantaged community. The commonage committee also has to develop a business plan, which determines issues such as rotational grazing for the land.

A small group of users is then selected who will be able to use the land. The reason for this is that only those emergent farmers who want to become commercial farmers and have the necessary capital in terms of livestock to do so, can qualify for the land. The commonage committee, whose decision is final and unalterable, is responsible for this selection process. Contracts are drafted per individual at a nominal rental tariff and on a minimum 5 year base. The rental of the emergent farmers must be less than that of the commercial farmers.

One of the problems that has emerged when the municipalities sign contracts with the emergent farmers committees is that they do not hold legality, i.e. are not legally binding entities. In several cases the municipalities signed contracts with the committees and when disputes arose the municipality could not take legal steps against the committee. It is thus recommendable that contracts are rather signed with individuals from the commonage committees or alternatively with the committees if they hold legality in form of a trust.

One of the shortfalls is that the DLA only provides the land: it acquires it and place it under the managerial and administrative responsibility of the municipalities. No additional funds for 'after-care', maintenance or training are provided to the municipalities. The funds for this, therefore have to be drawn from the municipal coffers and in most cases the municipalities do not have the financial nor technical expertise to deal with these issues effectively. For example, the municipal officials who deal with commonage management do not, in the majority of the cases, have the necessary agricultural background, nor the skills nor the time to deal with these issues effectively.

There is a large discrepancy between the old and the new commonage as they fall under different departments and there is no overarching policy for the commonage from DLA and DLGH. These policy ambiguities have lead to the inconsistencies across regions, apathy at the municipal level and disillusionment on the part of the

emergent farmers. The Programme of Cooperative Governance and the Land Use Management Committee will be addressing this issue in order to establish a clear cut policy and to promote interdepartmental interaction.

The DLA is only responsible for the acquisition of the land. The municipality is responsible for the management and administration of the land. Additionally the municipality is responsible for the 'after care', which is the post-transfer maintenance and monitoring of the land. In most cases the municipalities feel that it's not their responsibility and they do not have the capacity to manage these complex issues related to commonage. They therefore need more support, assistance and policy guidelines which could possibly be in the form of a DLA official or developmental official which agricultural background who deals with these issues and takes the burden off the other municipal officials.

Another problem is that at local level there is a lack of legality and representativeness of gender and race, who are denied access, within the emergent farmers unions. Under the current system it is easy for local power brokers with access to the commonage committee to monopolise DLA owned land and to co-opt the weak institutions that govern the use of commonage. In De Aar for example, DLA has provided the municipality with loose conditions for the use of the 2 farms (440 ha). The Department has, however, not followed through on the process as they feel that this is not their line function. No decision can be reached as to who the beneficiaries should be as the land cannot accommodate everyone. The policy of the DLA, that prescribes that the commonage committee selects a small group of beneficiaries for the limited land, demands the fragmentation of the community. The selection of beneficiaries will be at the expense of aspirant beneficiaries who will not be given access. This has two implications: Firstly, the community seems to be unprepared to sacrifice its solidarity, which serves it in other ways such as social security, networks etc. The problem could be solved if the community were allowed to devise their own criteria for selection. This mutual understanding within the community would enable that those, who have not gained access this time around, will be given access at a later stage.

Secondly, the policy by the DLA that the commonage committee should select the beneficiaries assumes that they can come to a coherent consensus, which is questionable in the light of the diversity of the users in terms of stock, race and gender.

5.4 Department of Agriculture:

The involvement of the Department of Agriculture (DoA) via the Agricultural Extension Officers in local government is to assist the municipalities in issues of land management such as preventing that the land is overgrazed and overstocked. They also provide technical assistance and training to the emergent farmers such as education regarding dips, veld management, disease control and compliance to carrying capacity. Extension officers' responsibilities are thus post-settlement support and after-care.

The function of the Agricultural Extension Officer is to act as a mentor to the municipalities and provide support in terms of strategic developmental and land management skills to the municipalities and the emergent farmers. Extension officers are to offer a support-base to the municipalities as they are not sufficiently capacitated to deal with commonage issues themselves. The extension officer is therefore required to act as a mentor towards the municipality and provides advice to all the stakeholders including the emergent farmers, the municipal council and

commercial farmers. The extension officers are therefore responsible for the post-transfer "aftercare" of the land.

The officers provide municipalities with guidance on commonage management such as grazing capacity, land management and erosion. The ultimate aim is for the municipalities to take over this function and to run their own commonage effectively. An agricultural extension officer, however, stated that the municipalities will probably not achieve the point where they are independent and can function without the help of the extension officers.

Ideally cooperation from all interest groups must be gained: from commercial farmers, to farmers unions, emergent farmers unions and the Free State Agricultural Union.

The extension officers are also providing training to emergent farmers in terms of technical, financial and management skills in order to develop a business sense, how to reinvest in the land and think commercially.

In several cases do the extension officers provide sufficient support to the parties involved. For example in Emthanjeni and in Siyathemba, the extension officers provide the municipalities and the emergent and commercial commonage users with sufficient support and act as mentors, mediators and facilitators. In other municipalities, there is very little interaction between the different stakeholders. For example in Kareeberg, the municipality is not aware that there is in fact an agricultural extension officer who is helping the emergent farmers. The municipality was under the impression that there is no agricultural extension officer in the region and that due to the amalgamation process no one had been allocated to their municipality yet.

One of the problems that were identified during the interviews by the team is that the geographical boundaries within which the extension officers operate do not comply with the boundaries of the newly amalgamated municipalities. This means that in some cases one extension officer oversees one town while, the other towns within the same municipality are monitored by a different extension officer. The DoA stated that they are aware of this discrepancy and will be considering aligning departmental boundaries with municipal jurisdiction. There is also a lack of staff on the ground, which makes efficient coverage of all the areas difficult. The ideal situation would be to have one extension officer per local municipality.

In six of the municipalities the interviewees stated that there had been no support from the DoA or other government departments.

In most of the other cases, the most assistance was provided by the DoA through the Agricultural Extension Officer, who is responsible for the aftercare of the land after it has been transferred from the DLA.

The Agricultural Extension officers are supposed to cover the whole Northern Cape area and provide post-transfer after-care to the municipality and the emergent farmers. Despite this, many of the municipalities stated that they didn't get any support from the DoA. This could be due to 2 reasons:

The first is genuine lack of involvement of the extension officers with the municipalities, emergent farmers and general lack of communication between the two. This, however, is the less likely scenario.

The second is that the municipalities are not aware of the existence of an agricultural extension officer, as is the case in Kareeberg: there the municipality was unaware of the help that the emergent farmers were receiving and the interaction between the extension officer and the commercial farmers. In addition to this no commonage committee had been established yet. Apparently, however, the extension officer is very much involved with the emergent farmers. This example demonstrates the lack of communication and collaboration between the different parties. It must be added, however, that Kareeberg is one of the cases where commonage usage by emergent farmers has been very successful.

The table below shows that in a limited number of cases the DLA also provided assistance, which is atypical as they are only responsible for the provision of the land and the municipality is burdened with the administration and management of the land with the support of the DoA.

Limited support has also been given by the Department Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). It is mostly responsible for weed-control and the elimination of Prosopis trees. Additional support has been given by the Department of Health (due to the animals causing a health hazard when they live in the townships), the Department of Animal Health due to the abysmal conditions under which some of the animals reside and the Department of Environmental Health which is responsible for the supervision of the land in order to prevent overgrazing.

Table 15. Support from DoA and other departments

Municipality	Technical assistance received from DoA/ any other departments
Dikgatlong	-
Emthanjeni	DBSA: implementation of a Spatially Integrated Management Information System
Gamagara	None
Ga-Segonyana	DWAF: weed control. Otherwise no support from any of the Departments.
Hantam	Only in Calvinia; in the rest of the towns: no
Kai-Gariep	Kelmoes: DoA, Kenhardt: None
Kamiesberg	Yes: through the Land Care projects.
Kareeberg	DoA
Karoo Hoogland	Yes: technical assistance from DoA
!Kheis	DoA (Agricultural Extension officer)
Kgatelopele	None
Khai Ma	Dept Animal Health
//Khara Hais	DoA
Kimberley	None (not that the interviewee knows of)
Mier	DoA
Nama Khoi	None
Renosterberg	None
Richtersveld	DLA
Siya Themba	DLA, DoA (technical support)
Siyancuma	DoA, Land Reform and Environmental Health
Thembelihle	None
Tsantsabane	DoA: once a year inspection of commonage and determination and evaluation of carrying capacity and need for rehabilitation of the land.
Ubuntu	DoA: Technical and financial assistance: usage of land and land management.
Umsobomvu	DoA
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Hartswater: DoA Jan Kempdorp: None
Warrenton	DLA and DoA; however no ongoing assistance although they should be

seen as part of the team and their facilities accessed more often.
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One of the problems that is perpetuating non-cooperation, misconceptions and mistrust in the municipalities is the lack of communication between the different stake-holders. An external facilitator is needed to act as a mediator between the different parties. To the suggestion of using the extension officers as facilitators and mediators, the DoA stated that preferably an independent NGO should be employed instead of using the Department in order to ensure impartiality and avoid potential problems between the stakeholders. The extension officer needs to cooperate with all parties involved and therefore cannot allow to be partial and risk his/her trust with either group.

According to the DoA, the definition of an emergent farmer could be summarised as someone coming from the previously disadvantaged communities and someone with the intention to develop as a commercial farmer. These people need to have primary access to the land. This does not include subsistence farmers, however. The commercially oriented users are therefore to use the new commonage bought by DLA, and the historical commonage is to be used by the subsistence farmers in order to accommodate both kinds of beneficiaries. Commonage must be seen as a 'kweek grond', a nurturing ground on which emergent farmers can be nurtured towards becoming commercially oriented. It must serve as a stepping stone, but must also make provision for users who want to use the land for food security and subsistence farming.

There is a strong interdepartmental cooperation with the DLA which is the DoA's sister department in the land reform process. Recently the Land Use Management Committee was founded, which consists of DLA, DoA and DLGH and addresses the policy inconsistency across the different departments. As this process is still in its beginning phase funding has not been made available yet, although finances will probably be mobilised for this cause. The Programme of Cooperative Governance, which has also recently been established, ensures interdepartmental coordination: Funds are used from the various departments but one department drives the process. These processes are discussed in more detail below.

DoA is also playing a role within the LRAD policy as it supplies the 'Sunrise Packages'. These are meant for emerging commercial farmers as production and development support, which includes inputs such as livestock, ploughs, implements, seeds and fertilisers. Additionally the DoA provides Agricultural Potential Reports, which are evaluation reports compiled for the LRAD committees. These reports are developed by the agricultural extension officers who evaluate the farms that have been identified for the LRAD programme. They determine the existing infrastructure, grazing capacity, water supply, the veld type, the amount of arable land, the soil type and traces of salination.

DoA has also made provision for the involvement of commercial farmers in the LRAD initiative: In Vaalharts a commercial farmer has been identified by the extension officer and has been appointed as a mentor. He is being paid by DoA and is assisting LRAD beneficiaries with technical issues. Involving commercial farmers in land reform initiatives is of utter importance to improve the relationship between the different social groups and to decrease the ignorance and mistrust that was engrained during the Apartheid era. Involvement of commercial farmers is thus encouraged not only on the commonage, but also after the emergent farmers have acquired their own land.

Some of the problems, that have been identified by the department include lack of management of the commonage committees, lack of municipal capacity, lack of support from the municipalities towards the emergent farmers in terms of infrastructure maintenance, cross-subsidisation of income from the commonage towards other areas and environmental degradation due to overstocking and subsequent overgrazing.

In the case of environmental degradation, the municipality is responsible for the rehabilitation of the land. The DoA only offers advice and may enforce the law; the municipality, however must rectify the situation and rehabilitate the land. In the case of overgrazing the excess livestock needs to be sold off

From the above one can thus see that the primary emphasis of the DoA is thus on developing commercial farmers and on household food security.

5.5 FARM (Food and Agriculture Research Management) Africa

Food and Agriculture Research Management (FARM) Africa is an international United Kingdom based NGO which focuses on agricultural development and 'sustainable natural resource management'². The organisation operates mainly in East African countries and has established South African branches in the Eastern and Northern Cape as the Northern Cape invited FARM Africa to support them with land redistribution. The organisation has been active in South Africa since 1995 and is currently involved with six communities in the Northern Cape, of which three are commonage related. The organisation's focus is on 'land reform projects in the post transfer stage of development', which includes land restitution and land redistribution.

Their aim is the empowerment of land reform communities and capacitation towards management of own natural resources and own developmental agendas.

Post land transfer support is the key as the communities are in most cases incapacitated to run the land in a sustainable way. The organisation works in close collaboration with the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights, DLA and DoA and has worked together with other role-players such as other provincial and national departments, local and district municipalities as well as parastatals such as ESKOM and NGOs such as ANCRA and SPP.

The organisations main offices are located in Kimberley and is comprised of eight staff members which include two programme managers, two agricultural development officers, one accountant who also provides the financial training, one researcher, a secretary who also provides training on community level and one project coordinator. The organisation is funded by DIFD and the EU and thus attains all its funding from foreign donors.

Identified projects undergo a strict selection process in which FARM Africa identified its existing projects which include land restitution claims concerning the #Khomani San, the Dirisanang- and the Witbank communities and land redistribution claims which include the Strydenburg, Pofadder and Siyathemba commonage.

The organisation offers support in terms of

² Information taken from the FARM Africa information leaflet

- 'Capacity Building of Trust/Communal Property Associations and sub-structures of such legal entities
- Financial and Administrative Training
- Training in Technical Agricultural activities
- Other Technical Training
- Development facilitation support
- Legal Support
- Micro financing for income generating projects
- Research
- Revolving funds'.³

FARM Africa carries all the expenses for the training offered.

The focus of the organisation lies with helping the poorest of the poor. Several research procedures are followed to determine these people.

One of the initiatives are Revolving Funds or Community Banks. The community bank is stocked with R 250 000 per community, which serves as a bank for the community. Livestock banks have been introduced through the Community Banks in all 6 projects. The banks are run by the Revolving Fund Sub-Committee and the communities have full ownership and control of the banks. The livestock banks are communal projects for the first 18 months. After this livestock loans are made to community members individually as an income generating tool. Ten ewes will be able to be loaned per household, which will benefit at least sixty households.⁴ For example the poorest of the poor are addressed and five people, who are selected by the community, make a loan of forty ewes and one ram. The rest of the animals can be sold. Monthly monitoring and evaluation takes place by FARM Africa and the budgets of the communities are monitored.

Within the communities planning subcommittees are selected from the community which are trained by FARM Africa to understand their natural resources base and to plan their land use from there. From within each community, 25 members are selected who are responsible for the community bank and are represented in the planning subcommittee.

Conditions include the inclusion of youth, gender representation and direct involvement in the projects.

In the Bo Karoo FARM Africa supports the Siyathemba municipality and provides assistance to Prieska, Marydale and Niekerkshoop with its stock bank initiative. The organisation works with the Siyathemba Emergent Farmers Association and their Commonage Management Committee has attained training from the organisation on a group and individual basis. FARM Africa is also helping them to set up their own offices and are providing them with computer and faxing equipment.

Another initiative is the 'Food for Work' scheme that provides 3 meals a day and a food hamper at the end of the week in exchange for labour. R 25 000 per community is made available for labour creation. Labour includes issues such as repairs of the infrastructure on the land, planting of feed for the animals (lucerne) etc. This creates jobs for approximately 20 community members.

³ Information taken from the FARM Africa information leaflet

⁴ Information taken from the "Progress Report to the Northern Government, January – August 2002"

A further initiative is that of "Wagon Wheel' home garden micro irrigation systems"⁵. FARM Africa has developed a model of effective vegetable gardening in the community members private gardens, which is also water efficient. The cost per vegetable garden is R 300, which the community bank supplies and the organisation will help them to set the garden up.

A further project arm is the financial and administrative initiative in which 4 members of the community are selected who are paid R200 per month for six months to entice them to hold monthly meetings, which will also be attended by FARM Africa members. The reason for this is that there is a lack of administrative efficiency in most of the communities due to lack of funds, leadership and management, office infrastructure and meetings.⁶ An office will be established as well as newsletters published. Meetings with farmers and the community will be held once in 3 months. This initiative will start on 01.10.2002.

There are also several irrigation projects that the organisation is running including lucerne and wheat projects.

FARM Africa is aware of the problems that the commonages are facing in the Northern Cape but have not developed a broad training programme yet. They are planning to develop a commonage management plan under their Participatory Land Use Programme (PLUP) model, which is a land planning model for land reform communities. The commonage management plan will be based on FARM Africas experiences in Prieska, Pofadder and Strydenburg. The process will be strongly community based and hopefully extended to the whole of the Northern Cape area.

One of the exercises that have proven as very successful in the determination of who gets what in the battle for land, is a mapping exercise with the different representatives of the different interest groups of the commonage, eg the poultry-, pig-, cattle-, and small stock groups. A map of the area is projected on a wall and the emergent farmers themselves determine the grazing camps and the allocation of the land to the different parties. The community can relate to this and it is thus recommended as a powerful tool for representation of commonage users.

FARM Africa also promotes the involvement of commercial farmers on the land. From the 01.01.2003 onwards, the community will select 2 people from the community at Witbank, Dirisanang and at the #Kumanisan who will be paid by the organisation. Additionally an ex-commercial farmer will be employed who will be mentoring the emergent farmers on land and farm management and taking them through the steps of taking charge of the land. The two community representatives, who have been selected by the community will be managing the land.

FARM Africa suggests that one needs to decrease the stress on developing emergent farmers into commercial farmers and increase the emphasis on promoting also those who are just subsistence farmers. Due to there being two different kinds of users, two different kinds of models are needed. Especially the departments are strongly focusing on the commercial farmers and not on subsistence farmers.

Future initiatives of FARM Africa include the support and cooperation with government initiatives concerning rural development and empowerment of emerging farmers. Additionally, as mentioned above, a Land Reform Guide will be developed for the stakeholders and commonage users.

⁵ Information taken from the "Progress Report to the Northern Government, January – August 2002"

⁶ Information taken from the "Progress Report to the Northern Government, January – August 2002"

5.6 The Surplus People's Project (SPP)

The SPP are active in the Northern Cape, and although not interviewed by the research team there was evidence of their assistance with the development of communal resource institutions. Given the institutional deficit in the region their contribution is extremely valuable.

Although there are fewer capable civil society institutions functional in the Northern Cape than in many other provinces the presence of FARM Africa and SPP and other, smaller NGOs is potentially valuable in the development of the commonage. It is envisaged that the Development Officer would be responsible for involving appropriate civil society and private sector initiatives in the commonage development.

5.7 Farmers: The role of mentoring

Another means by which emergent farmers can be helped is through interaction with commercial farmers. Most of the commercial farmers are willing to help emergent farmers but lack to initiative to take the first step. The case study of De Aar is illustrative of this.

Commercial farmers in De Aar have voiced strong interest in providing technical assistance towards the emergent farmers and taking on a mentoring function. In one case commercial farmers suggested a kind of sharecropping agreement between a small group of emergent farmers and the commercial farmers. The emergent farmers would have 51% of the shares in the form of stock and the commercial farmer 49%. As a result both parties would be interested in maintaining a working relationship. The commercial farmer would act as a mentor and work together with the emergent farmers. He/she would slowly withdraw from the land with each year and after five years give the emergent farmers the option to buy up his/her stock and to continue on their own. The outcome would be that the commercial farmer in the end monitors the land once a month.

This kind of initiative has been supported by the various government departments involved in commonage management. The process of commercial farmers supporting emergent farmers, however, has only been initiated by the stakeholders involved in very limited cases. This is due to two problems: Firstly, the lack of mediation between the stakeholders: the commercial farmers and the emergent farmers fail to voice their willingness to help one another. This is partially due to fear of change and initiating new ideas. The commercial farmers in de Aar stated that they were willing to provide assistance to emergent farmers if there were several other commercial farmers who were also willing to participate in the process.

Secondly, the institutional and organisational structures for such initiatives are lacking. There is no one who can act as a mediator or facilitator and there are no institutions through which interaction can take place. Municipalities do not have the sufficient capacity in terms of staff, time and resources to deal with these issues. This means that the initiative has to come from the stakeholders side to make the relationship work. The lack of a formal support structure, however, renders this working relationship very fragile.

One example of effective linkages between the commercial farmers and the emergent farmers is that of Kareeberg (see the case study). Also in Prieska, interaction between the commercial and emergent farmers is being encouraged. DoA is initiating interaction between the two groups.

Lack of interaction between commercial and emergent farmers can be generalised to lack of communication between all the stakeholders in commonage management, especially in de Aar where there is a lack of communication between the municipality, the agricultural extension officer, the commercial farmers, the commonage committee and the emergent farmers unions. The different stakeholders lack knowledge of each others interests and needs which entails the stalling of the process of commonage management, land redistribution (the emergent farmers in de Aar still do not have access to the land that the DLA has acquired for them due to quarrels about the content of the contract drafted by the municipality. Subsequently the emergent farmers engaged a lawyer to sort out the problem, which only deepened the mistrust from both parties sides.), and interaction between the commercial and emergent farmers.

Currently the departmental policies are limiting the intervention of commercial farmers on the land. The Notarial Deed of Perpetual Servitude prescribes that the commonage should only be used by the poor who earn less than R 2200 a month. Commercial farmers are not be allowed to use the land that the DLA acquired for the emergent farmers. This is not always a viable solution as in many cases the commercial farmers can provide the emergent farmers with support and technical assistance. For example in Prieska, irrigation land has been made available at the Oranjesig farm. The emergent farmers, however, do not have the capacity, nor the skills for irrigation farming. The municipality along with the agricultural extension officer, want to rent the land out to a white commercial farmer, who specialises in irrigation farming in order to help the emergent farmers over a 3-4 year period to get themselves established on the land. Initially the commercial farmer will rent 80% of the land and the emergent farmers will use 20%. He will provide training and support to the emergent farmers and the municipality will provide the materials. Over the time period the commercial farmer will withdraw and the emergent farmers will gain access to more and more land. The contract, for which a willing commercial farmer has been identified already and who has complied to help the emergent farmers, stipulates that the commercial farmer will move off the land after the training period.

5.8 Attempts at interdepartmental cooperation

Due to the above mentioned lack of policy consistency between the different departments, the DLGH along with the DLA and the DoA have developed a task-team, the Committee for Cooperative Governance, to address the lack of policy. The reason for this is that the departments are realising that commonage management needs a clear policy in order to guide the usage of the historical commonage and the new commonage and to ensure that the appropriate people benefit from the commonage as a tool for land redistribution. One of the problems that have led to the realisation that the commonage issue must be addressed is that that the commonage is seen by the departments as an elitist tool: the current users, irrespective of race, monopolise ownership of the land to which they have access at a reasonable price. Institutional guidelines will have to be drawn up to prevent this kind of monopolisation of power and ensure that the right beneficiaries gain access to the land. Additionally the Committee will be addressing problems such as overgrazing which occurs on the land due to lack of training and education. It will also address the development of a standardised contract for the emergent farmers across the province. The aim is determining the capacity and expertise of local government and the subsequent capacity building of the local authorities.

The task team will be addressing issues such as the current usage of the land, who are to be the beneficiaries, and commonage management on the local level. An initial audit of the commonage use in the Northern Cape will determine the status-quo from

which policy implications will be drawn. The task-team will promote interdepartmental cooperation and all the stakeholders concerned that have to do with commonage issues will be able to contribute to the land use management policy. The Land Administration Bill, which deals with provincial state land will be linked to the commonage audit. Although the DLGH does not have a budget yet, the available state land will be addressed as well as future housing and commonage possibilities.

6. Commonage and Development

6.1 Using IDPs to boost commonage

The table below shows that commonage is included in most IDPs but that the issues addressed are rather issues such as status quo determination, rather than specific projects. In several cases projects have been identified such as the increase of land for commonage users, the improvement of the infrastructure and the promotion of the emergent farmers.

Table 16. Commonage as featuring in the IDPs

Municipality	Are commonage related issues included in the IDP?	If so what are the proposals in terms of development of the commonage?
Dikgatlong	Yes	Empower the potential farmers on farming and business issues.
Emthanjeni	Yes	Status quo determined in the IDP; no real projects set out
Gamagara	Yes	Acquisition of more land.
Ga-Segonyana	No	NA
Hantam	Yes/no depending on town	Only included in Calvinia
Kai-Gariep	No	NA
Kamiesberg	Yes	Capacity building and training sessions in cooperation with mentor farmers, lucern planting, establishment of feeding lots, pool for renting farming equipment, olive farming, establishment of a mill for corn, development of an abattoir.
Kareeberg	No	NA
Karoo Hoogland	Yes	Several projects such as wool industry, vegetable farming, tulip industry, expansion of chicken farming, commercial and emergent farmers interaction, infrastructure maintenance
!Kheis	Yes	Stock take of the current commonage land, training of emergent farmers as well as capacity building, provision of more land to the emergent farmers and development towards commercial agricultural farming practices, better cooperation between commercial farmers and emergent farmers as well as road maintenance in the area.
Kgatelopele	No but provisions will be made in the revision	NA
Khai Ma	Yes	Sustainable development in order to create socio-

		economic upliftment
//Khara Hais	Yes	Only the principles dealing with land availability.
Kimberley	No	NA
Mier	Yes	Infrastructure maintenance.
Nama Khoi	Yes	Upgrade infrastructure and train/educate farmers to use the land for their own upliftment.
Renosterberg	Yes	Development of a goat farming initiative in the region, infrastructure repairs and maintenance
Richtersveld	Yes	No specific projects have been developed; in the first year of the IDP implementation no projects will be implemented. Projects have been developed concerning the development of the emergent farmer as well as irrigation farming.
Siya Themba	Yes	National Field Ram project to determine the most adaptable breed for the commonage, Stock bank, Middle East goat production project.
Siyancuma	Yes	Planting lucern and vegetables, promotion of irrigation crops, tourism and the exploitation of diamonds
Thembelihle	Yes	Want to employ an economist who will investigate the sustainability of possible projects for the commonage development.
Tsantsabane	Yes	The commonage is included as a status quo but there are no projects set out for the development of the commonage.
Ubuntu	Yes	Not very development oriented; only increased land provision for commonage users.
Umsobomvu	Yes	-
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Yes	-
Warrenton	Yes	Crop farming, manufacturing pest control chemicals, Economic Integrated Development Study to determine economic development potential for the farms.

6.2 Using commonage to boost LED

The table below demonstrates that the ideas for commonage development in terms of LED is similar to the projects set out in the IDPs. They address land reform programmes and training of emergent farmers. Some interesting ideas are the involvement of emergent farmers in the local abattoirs, feeding lots, commercial goat and cattle farming based on a public private partnership.

One example is that of Siyathemba where there are two income generating projects:

The first is the Middle East goat production project: The Middle East used to have a contract with Australia for export of goat carcasses. With the depreciation of the Rand, they have turned to the SA, which is actually the origin of boerbokke. The Middle East's demand is approximately 17 000 carcasses per month which exceeds the capacity of the emergent farmers. The project has been confirmed and 700 farmers have been identified already to produce the animals in the Northern Cape. This also includes utilising the surrounding infrastructure of abattoirs, tanneries and a offal cleaning sites.

The second initiative is the 'stock bank' led by FARM Africa. Farmers borrow the animals and use them for reproduction and then give the animals back after a certain period. The farmers are also supposed to give the users a kind of 'sheep interest', i.e. give the bank offspring as a means of interest.

Table 17. Commonage featuring in LED policies

Municipality	Commonage as part of LED: ideas
Dikgatong	Empower the potential farmers on farming and business issues.
Emthanjeni	Emergent farmer empowerment and sustainability.
Gamagara	In order to help the community sustain itself.
Ga-Segonyana	Commonage as economically viable for cattle farming based on a PPP.
Hantam	Depending on town: none but also ideas about chicken and vegetable farming
Kai-Gariep	NA; Kenhardt: commonage as an income generating tool for the mun.
Kamiesberg	Use of feeding lots for the emergent farmers so that they stock can gain a better condition. Another idea is the olive project.
Kareeberg	None
Karoo Hoogland	Making parts of the historical commonage available for emergent farmers.
IKheis	Use the production of meat from the commonage for the abattoir which would include emergent farmers as they could see their animals there. Another initiative: lucern planting.
Kgatelopele	NA
Khai Ma	Land reform programmes and financial assistance from financial institutions.
//Khara Hais	-
Kimberley	None- the commonage will be transformed into residential areas in the future (the commonage around KLY)
Mier	Give guidance for the users on who to farm
Nama Khoi	To reallocate certain farms to farmers who intend on farming on a commercial basis.
Renosterberg	None, except for goat farming initiative of the IDP
Richtersveld	Same as in IDP
Siya Themba	Stock bank sponsored by the DLA
Siyancuma	None: see IDP
Thembelihle	Vegetable project, growing of Pecan Nuts
Tsantsabane	Marketing of animals and chicken projects; other than that none.
Ubuntu	None
Umsobomvu	Small farming
Vaalharts-Morobeng	-
Warrenton	Same as in IDP

6.3 Sustainable Environmental Management

Most of the municipalities have experienced problems with overgrazing and erosion. This is mostly due to the lack of a land management plan which sets out the grazing guidelines. Ideally a provincial land management plan should be developed as well as individually tailored grazing plans for each of the municipalities.

Another reason for overgrazing is that the emergent farmers are not sufficiently informed about grazing capacities and should receive more training in this respect. In most of the cases remedial steps have been taken with the help of the Agricultural Extension officer who has determined the carrying capacity of the land and has taken remedial steps for the recovery of the land. Very little support, has however been received from the Department of Environmental Affairs. It seems as though the DoA is more responsible for the maintenance of the land than the DLA.

Table 18. Commonage use and environmental degradation

Municipality	Has commonage use led to the degradation of the natural environment?	Have steps been taken to remedy this?	Has any assistance come forward from the Dept of Environmental Affairs?
Dikgatlong	No	The project team is responsible	No
Emthanjeni	Overgrazing and erosion is a problem	The DoA discussed this with the emergent farmers	No
Gamagara	Overgrazing	Camps have been rested	No
Ga-Segonyana	Only problem with deforestation	Deforestation clause with support from DWAF	No
Hantam	No	NA (stock numbers are limited)	Yes: in two of the towns and No in two of the towns
Kai-Gariep	Keimoes: NA Kenhardt: Partially	Keimoes: NA Kenhardt: No	Keimoes: NA Kenhardt: No
Kamiesberg	Overgrazing and veld has been trampled	Decrease the number of donkeys in the camps, awareness promotion, grazing management programmes and Grazing and Sowing land regulations	No
Kareeberg	No	NA	No
Karoo Hoogland	-	-	-
IKhels	Danger of overgrazing but not dangerous yet; deforestation	DWAF and council is aware of the potential problem and want to thus control the land	Yes: liaison and exchange of information but no formal assistance.
Kgatelopele	No	NA	No
Khai Ma	No	NA	Yes
///Khara Hais	Yes: illegal overgrazing	Use of the municipal pound	No
Kimberley	Yes: overgrazing and erosion.	Municipality has tried to approach the emergent farmers committee but no positive outcome	No
Mier	Yes: due to drought	Commonage was divided up into camps	No
Nama Khoi	Overgrazing	Setting a limit to the stock totals of every farmer	Yes: determined the grazing capacity of the farms.
Renosterberg	High degree of overgrazing and erosion on the commonage	None	No
Richtersveld	Overgrazing	Business plan will limit the number of animals allowed on the land	No

Siya Themba	Overgrazing and erosion	Education and training by an NGO, Dept of Labour: developed a business plan and offer training to combat this.	No
Siyancuma	Yes: Griquastad: problem with overgrazing	The Dept of Environmental Affairs was called in and conducted a study and determined the lands carrying capacity	Yes
Thembelihle	Occasional overgrazing, erosion, invador plants and trees	DoA as been a approached to determine the grazing cap, as well as DWAF for the invading plants	No
Tsantsabane	A little bit of overgrazing	DoA investigates and evaluates the land once a year	No
Ubuntu	Serious case of overgrazing	DoA was called in which decreased the amount of animals in the camps of the emergent farmers and withdrew the animals until the land had recovered	No
Umsobomvu	Overgrazing, erosion, proliferation of noxious weeds and salination of the soil.	Yes/No	No
Vaalharts-Morobeng	No	NA	Yes
Warrenton	Initial problems with overgrazing	Some of the user were reallocated to new commonage	No

7. Conclusion

With the orientation of government departments of using municipal commonage as a means to promote land reform, municipalities have been given the responsibility of ensuring agricultural land redistribution at local level. Within this context, therefore, the initial question of this paper was, whether the municipalities within their new terms of reference can be developmentally oriented.

The transformation has left municipalities helpless in the face of a new and daunting responsibility. In most instances, the officials who deal with commonage related issues do not have the time, agricultural background nor budgetary resources to effectively deal with commonage management. In most of the cases the municipalities stated that they needed additional capacity in terms of personnel and skills in order to deal with land management effectively.

This new job-description of municipalities being land reform implementation agencies, has, therefore, not been supported by the required institutional, capacity and resource changes to implement these functions effectively.

With this new policy of commonage usage, commonage management suddenly needs much more attention and output in terms of management, administration, facilitation with the emergent farmers committees, negotiation, infrastructure repairs, and monitoring of the land to avoid overgrazing.

Another indicator of land mismanagement is the environmental degradation taking place on the commonage. In 15 of the 26 municipalities, cases of serious overgrazing and erosion has been reported.

Additionally, in terms of financial management, ideally the income generated from the commonage should be ring-fenced and used for infrastructure maintenance as well as training and education of the emergent farmers. This undermines long-term development of infrastructure on the commonage.

Despite their extensive commonage holdings, most municipalities have not realised the importance of commonage development. This is shown by the poor attention paid to commonage in the municipal integrated development plans (IDPs). In very few instances, have viable commonage projects been identified.

Concerning departmental policies, there is currently no overarching policy concerning commonage and land management between the departments. The lack of departmental policy results in a lack of conformity across municipalities in the Northern Cape. For example, there is no uniformity regarding tariffs or contractual contents. Hopefully the departments will be able to reach consistent policy within the Programme of Cooperative Governance and the Land Use Management Committee.

Also in terms of the amalgamation process, and the resulting differences between tariff structures, contracts and land management policies within the municipalities will have to be addressed. Consistent land management plans will have to be developed provincially and locally which determine appropriate tariffs per livestock unit per ha per month, according to the grazing capacity.

One of the great pitfalls that have been identified is the lack of communication and cooperation between the municipalities and the emergent farmers. The employment

of a neutral facilitator between the groups would be the ideal as this would avoid misunderstandings and problems that arise from lack of communication. Also from the emergent farmers unions side more institutional stability will need to be attained: legal entities will have to be established in order to ensure legitimacy.

A further suggestion is increased cooperation between commercial farmers who can act as mentors for the emergent farmers. There are already a few examples of successful mentoring of emergent farmers by established commercial farmers.

As can be seen above the municipalities still have a long way to go before they can act as developmental entities and play an effective role in agricultural reform. For this to happen, strong organisational restructuring will have to take place within the municipalities in order to accommodate their new terms of reference. Furthermore, a much more effective system of support by national and provincial Departments will need to be created. There are positive signs that this issue is now being addressed in the Northern Cape, although there is still a long and uphill way to go.

Appendix

Municipalities post amalgamation and their towns.

Municipality	Towns
Dikgatlong	Barkley West Delporthshoop
Emthanjeni	De Aar Hanover Britstown
Karoo Hoogland	Williston Sutherland Fraserburg
Gamagara	Deben Kathu Dingleton
Ga-Segonyana	Kuruman Mothibstad Wrenchville
Hantam	Calvinia Brandvlei Louriesfontein Nieuwoudtville
Kai-Gariep	Kakamas Keimoes Kenhardt
Kamiesberg	Garles Kamieskroon Lellefontein
Kareeberg	Carnarvon Van Wyksvlei Vosburg
IKheis	Groblersshoop Brandboom
Kgatelopele	Danielskuil
Khai Ma	Pofadder Pella Onsiepkans Witbank Aggeneis
//Khara Hais	Upington
Kimberley	Kimberley Ritchie
Mier	Mier
Nama Khoi	Springbok Komaggas O'Kiep Concordia Steinkopf
Renosterberg	Van der Kloof Phillipstown Petrusville
Richtersveld	Richtersveld Port Nolloth
Siya Themba	Prieska Marydale Niekerkshoop
Siyancuma	Douglas

	Griekwastad Campbell
Thembelihle	Hopetown Strydenburg
Tsantsabane	Olifantshoek Postmasburg
Ubuntu	Victoria West Loxton Richmond
Umsobomvu	Colesberg Noupoort
Vaalharts-Morobeng	Hartswater Jan Kempdorp Pampierstad
Warrenton	Windsorton