THE IMPORTANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF HISTORICAL FACTORS CAUSING AND INHIBITING PAST MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

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

1995.

INTRODUCTION

The term migration include a range of spatial and temporal patterns of movement spanning from short-term, short-distance changes of residence through to long-distance, long term contract labour over several years to permanent moves (Kok 1989:41). A distinction can also be made between two major types of migration: internal and international. Internal migration occurs when a person move from one part of a country to another. In contrast, international migration occurs when a person move from one country to another.

In South Africa's case, two very distinct types of migration are evident within the categories of internal and international migration: cross-border migration and urbanisation. Urbanisation (internal migration) refers to the increase of population in urban areas due to natural population growth (fertility) and importantly, the relocation of people from other urban and rural areas. Cross-border migration (international migration) on the other hand refers to the movement of people across national borders to and from neighbouring countries.

Nevertheless, migration is more than just a range of spatial and temporal patterns of movement. It also involves a complex process that includes decision-making at the micro-level (i.e. individual and family), at the meso- or community level (i.e. village, suburb or town) and the macro level (i.e. county and region). The history of migration in the whole Southern Africa region is closely linked to a number of factors, of which the political, economic and social are among those playing an important role.

Since the political, economic and social factors are integral to research on migration, this paper will deal with these issues separately. The findings of both the initial and main survey on internal migration conducted by the HSRC between 2000 and 2002 will also be discussed. Reference will also be made to a HSRC study on cross-border migration concluded in 2000.

POLITICAL FACTORS

Forced removals

The Southern African region has had a long experience with the phenomenon of forced migration. Forcible population displacement is known to have taken place in the region even in pre-colonial and colonial times. In South Africa nothing has symbolised the oppressive nature of apartheid and aroused international condemnation more than the forced removals of people that occurred since the early 1960s (Lemon 1987).

Legislation providing for the displacement and herding around of people does not date from 1948, but was sharpened and amplified after the National Party came to power Before 1948, mass removals were carried out following such policy guidelines as the 1913 Native Land Act, the 1923 Stallard Commission and its resulting legislation, and the 1936 land Act that set the limits upon land that was to constitute the reserves. But with the application of the policy of apartheid after 1948, and especially the rigorous enforcement of legislation in the 1960s, removals took on a more systematic nature. Legislation like the Group Areas Act of 1950 and 1957, the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954, the Native Trust and Land Amendment Act of 1965 and 1970 have provided the authority and the machinery for the mass removals. At the same time, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act f 1959, the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of

1971, and the Bantu Affairs Administration Act of 1973 established the institutional framework for Separate Development (Baldwin 1974).

Mass forced removals of the 1960s

Forced removals on a large scale have been a reality of the past century, but they reached their most concentrated and colossal from between the early 1960s and 1970s. These years saw, the Surplus People Project (SPP) claims, the forcible removal of over 3.5 million people, including those moved more than once (Platzky & Walker 985). However Lemon shows that this figure was disputed by the government which regarded the true figure as just under 2 million, and officially admitted to "encouraging', "persuading" and "convincing" people to move rather than forcing them to do so. The vast majority of relocated people were Africans, but a large number of people of other population groups have had to move in terms of the Group Areas Act (Omond 1985).

Categories of removals

Mare (1980) refers to nine forms of African relocation during the apartheid era. These were:

(a) Clearance of "black spots",
(b) Relocation due to the abolition of the labour tenant system and "squatting" on white-owned farms,
(c) Relocation through the operation of influx control legislation,
(d) The various stages and forms of urban relocation,
(e) Relocation due to the institution of "betterment schemes",
(f) Relocation for strategic or infrastructural schemes,
(g) Relocation as resistance,
(h) Homeland consolidation, and
(i) Other forms of relocation.

Some of these forms of relocation (e.g. relocation for "strategic or infrastructural schemes") did not cease to be applied when apartheid ended, and many of these, e.g. "urban relocation", did not apply to the African population only.

Policies and practices that necessitated forced removals

Prior to the democratic government taking power, South Africa was infamous throughout the world for its racialised policies and seemingly limitless measures of social control. The government promulgated a battery of laws designed to fulfil its broad aims of racial segregation and simultaneously to strike a blow against the radical opposition movements (Nieftagodien 1996), with similar origins as the notorious pass laws, as a cornerstone of the previous government's policy of influx control, which were enforced against black people as a means of controlling domestic migrant labour.

Pass control and racial domination

The pass system was not only an important instrument in the political subjugation of the African people, but also operated as an essential mechanism for the proletarianisation and incorporation of Africans into wage labour. The pass system thus served to supply mines, farms and towns with the required labour, and where labour shortages occurred, it functioned to channel labour to sectors and areas where needed (Muthien 1994).

The pass system served to regulate three sets of competition: between capitalists for African labour, between white and white workers and between sections of black workers e.g. migrants and "permanents", and rural and urban workers (Muthien 1994). Although the pass laws were extended to women in 1952, they were only strictly applied to women after the early 1960s (Gelderblom & kok 1994).

Regulation that required black people to carry identification documents, producible on demand and which permitted them to move from one area to the other met with various forms of resistance generated throughout the country during the 1950s and 1960s. Muthien (1994) argues that organised resistance was seen as both a response to the state's assault on black civil liberties and as a challenge to the legitimacy of the South African state. For example, the Women's Anti-Pass Campaign, was launched at the beginning of 1950 and took the form of anti-pass conferences, mass rallies, marches and petitions against the extension of passes to women. These events culminated in the historic national demonstration of more than 20 000 women at the Union Buildings on 9 August 1956, with thousands of petitions presented to Prime Minister (Muthien 1994). On 21 March 1960, a protest march in Sharpville to defy pass laws resulted in the police killing sixty-nine (69) protesters, and wounding one hundred and eighty (180) protesters in what came to be known as The Sharpeville Massacre.

Separate Development

According to Baldwin (1974) the forced mass removal of people stems from the attempt to apply the theory of Separate Development to the reality of a situation of communities that make up the South African population. The migratory labour system was being systematically extended because it enabled the theory of Separate Development to be practiced without destroying the economic interdependence of the different communities. Baldwin (1974) arges that the migratory labour was thus the reverse flow of the mass removals: workers, who, with their families, were pushed out of the towns for a variety of reasons, were often allowed to come back to urban areas when work was available as contracted migrants, they could not bring their families with them. Thus family life was being destroyed by legislative and administrative action as an inescapable consequence of the system of forcing the majority of urban workers to become migrants.

Separate Development, Baldwin (1974) maintains, was designed to meet the two dominant needs of the policy of the Government: an ideological demand for race separation to maintain the status quo of white supremacy and an economic demand for rapid industrial expansion with its supposed consequence of future political stability. Such industrial expansion depends largely on the use of cheap and plentiful black labour that has been the basis of the country's considerable economic growth over the past century. This policy depended for its success on providing Africans with their own political institutions within the self-governing Homelands, entirely outside the white political system. The crucial aspect of this whole policy was the turning of the black labour force into rightless, powerless migrants, an attempt to reverse the historic trend in which migrancy give way to permanent urbanisation (Baldwin 1974).

The Groups Areas Act: the principle of racial segregation

The Groups Areas Act that had been originally written into law in 1950 and eventually repealed in June 1990 was one of the cornerstones on racial segregation. The essence of this piece of legislation was that people of different racial groups were not allowed to live in

the same residential area (Gelderblom & Kok 1994). To reiterate, Nieftagodien (1996) mentions that the Group Areas Act was pivotal in the government's plan to enforce racial segregation.

The implementation of this Act resulted in the forcible removal of hundreds of thousands of blacks from their homes and their relocation into racially exclusive areas. However the promulgation of the Group Areas Act in 1950 has not been followed by immediate success in its implementation. Between 1950 and 1957, the government faced numerous obstacles to and inadequacies in its own plans. Nieftagodien (1996) argues that the Group Areas Act was in fact quite weak in its exposition of practical plans of implementation. Six years after its promulgation only five groups had been declared. Various administrative shortcomings and opposition from political organisations, local authorities and black urban population retarded the implementation of this Act.

Although the restrictions were often effectively evaded, apartheid inevitably curtailed the freedom with which most black people could settle. Despite the fact that the last of these restrictions were lifted during the late 1980s and early 1990s, their legacy is visible in the settlement profiles of the provinces and particularly of the urban areas.

Influx control: The principle of temporariness

Gelderblom and Kok (1994) point out that the involvement of Africans in labour migration resulted in them becoming temporary residents of the towns. The principle of temporariness was embodied in the system of influx control. The influx control, abolished in July 1986, originated as a means of preventing the African population from settling permanently in areas outside the former homelands i.e. the urban and metropolitan areas under white control. The main reasons behind the origin of influx control relate to the demand for state regulation of the African labour market by employers and the unwillingness to grant political rights to Africans in the common area.

The principle of temporariness was also reflected in the physical accommodation of African urbanisation (Gelderblom & Kok 1994). Although African townships were originally the responsibility of the white local governments in whose area of jurisdiction they were located, very little money was available for development of the townships. In areas where Africans were initially permitted to own land such as in areas like Sophiatown, Alexandra and Newclare in Johannesburg and Lady Selbourne in Pretoria, an amendment to the Native (urban Areas) Act in 1937 made it illegal for Africans to purchase land in the urban areas. Furthermore, the government also made very little land available for township development, and this led to huge the levels of overcrowding and squatter movement. The areas where Africans could own land were bulldozed during the 1950s and their inhabitants were moved elsewhere, with the result that they lost the security of land ownership. However, Gelderblom & Kok (1994) show that the removals were accompanied by one of the biggest housing actions ever undertaken in South Africa where new townships like Soweto near Johannesburg and Atteridgeville and Mamelodi near Pretoria were established. The houses built in these townships were for rent and not for sale and their existence was therefore in line with the policy of temporariness.

To what extent the Group Areas Act, influx control and forced resettlements contributed to the relatively low urbanisation levels of Africans is difficult to estimate, but it is clear that government actions slowed the urbanisation of Africans, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.

Resistance to force removals

State imposition of racial domination was fiercely contested by the struggles of the oppressed. Muthien (1994) points out that few studies have, however, placed the struggles of the black majority centrally on the agenda of an understanding of state formation as well as the ways in which black people evaded, resisted and struggled on a daily and organised level against state control over their lives.

The political demands of the past were frustrated by the sheer impossibility of achieving an effective reduction in size of the black population in the designated white areas (Baldwin 1974). The frequency with which the intentions to exercise control over the mobility of Africans, was thwarted by practical circumstances. Protests against the pass laws, resistance due to worsening conditions and overcrowding in the townships, consumer boycotts, ignorance of labour bureau controls and increased number of Africans, particularly women, in towns made the implementation of state policies difficult.

Gelderblom & Kok (1994) it therefore became increasingly obvious during the 1970s, that the attempt to do away with a permanently settled African population in the common area was not successful and could never be successful. It also became clear that the growth of the urban African population could not be stopped by the decision not to expand townships. Gelderblom & Kok (1994) argue that the natural increase (births minus deaths) of this population was clearly not taken into account in the government's calculations, and further in-migration did indeed take place. The additional population was accommodated through increased densities in the township houses as well as by extensive backyard squatting.

Owing to fierce resistance, population removals also became increasingly embarrassing to the government and difficult to carry out (Gelderblom & Kok 1994). For examples, plans to move urban African population to the homelands were dropped when certain areas were reprieved. It also became difficult to control the growth of informal settlements in urban areas, as new settlements started to mushroom.

There were other indications that the settlement system that the state tried to build was unsustainable and impractical. One of the results of the population removals was that African people had to commute further and further to work, seeing that the areas where they were removed to, especially in the homelands, were far from the centres of employment. The longer commuting distances imposed heavy costs on the African population in terms of both time and money. Price increases were resisted since people emphasised that they did not choose to live far from work. Bus boycotts were common. This meant that mass transport had to be subsidised by the state, which imposed an increasing economic burden on the country's fiscus (Gelderblom & Kok 1994).

Findings of the survey regarding forced migration

The results of the HSRC initial survey show that less than one-fifth (18%) of the reported moves were forced with job transfers and other employer-related "forced" moves dominating, followed by evictions by farmers and other land -owners. Forced resettlements by government and evictions by dwelling owners comprised the third level of forced moves.

The picture in respect of blacks (covering not only Africans but also "coloureds" and Indians/Asians) shows that farm/land evictions dominate, with government actions, job transfers and evictions from dwellings at the second level.

The distribution of "forced" moves by population group shows that whites (23%) had experienced proportionally more "forced" moves than blacks (17%). However, not all these reported forced moves in fact have been *forced* in the true sense of the word but rather *imposed* (e.g. by employers, as in job transfers) or even *preference-dominated* (e.g. in the case of within-household decisions, for example where decisions had been taken by husbands or parents).

ECONOMIC FACTORS

International migration

Contract migration: Mine workers

The history of contract mine labour in South Africa has been particularly well documented. Migrants form Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe came to work in sugar cane fields of Natal (1840) and later (1867) on the diamond mines of Kimberly. The discovery of gold in 1880 led to large demand for cheap male labour. By 1920 a total of 100 000 migrant workers from nine African countries were employed at gold mines. This number peaked at 265 000 workers in 1970. According to Crush (in McDonald 2000.) the patterns of contract migration changed markedly in the 1970's and 1980's when South Africans started to replace most of the foreign workforce. By 1980 foreign mine workers accounted only for 40% of the total workforce in the gold mine industry. Despite retrenchments during the late 1980's and early 1990's, the total number of migrant workers increased by 22 000 from 1980 to 1995. This increase brought the ratio South African to migrant workers to about 50/50.

The above shows that mining in South Africa has played a very significant role in attracting migrant labour from nine Africa countries for more than a century. This trend is likely to continue despite the scaling down of gold mining activities in South Africa. It is expected that the explosive growth of the platinum mining industry in the Northwest Province will continue to attract migrant mine workers despite not having the same foreign labour agreements in place than those of the gold mine industry.

Farm workers

Although not as well documented as mine contract migration, it is well known that considerable numbers of migrant workers from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho has been working on South African farms in border situated areas.

The first record of foreign labour on South African farms is that of workers on Natal sugar plantations in the 19th century. Some sources (Bosman, Wentzel, Marais, Mabitsela, Viljoen & Nkau 2000) also report that Zimbabwean farm workers have been employed on farms in the Limpopo Valley for more than 40 to 50 years. Currently between 7000 and 8000 Zimbabwean's are employed on farms in the Messina region.

The demand for foreign workers in Mpumulanga on the other hand seem to stem from a large resident population of Mozambicans that moved to the area during the Mozambican war in the 1980's (Crush, 2000). Estimates for the number of Mozambican farm workers on farms in Mpumulanga were at 20 000 in 1996 (Minaar & Hough 1996).

Lesotho and South Africa has a bilateral labour treaty which allows employers and recruiters to hire Basotho legally on contract through labour offices in Lesotho. In 1992, fewer than 1500 migrant workers were employed on farms in the Free State. This number has grown to the present 7000 that are recruited on a seasonal basis by asparagus farms.

Generally, the number of foreign farm workers in South Africa depends on the growth of labour intensive farming in border areas. A factor that might have an impact on these numbers is the implementation of a minimum wage of between R650 and R800 per month by the Department of Labour. It is expected that the demand for unskilled farming labour will be reduced considerably due to the relatively higher cost of labour.

Clandestine or undocumented migration

Clandestine or undocumented migration (ignoring refugees) only became a concern to authorities after the April 1994 elections when South Africa opened up politically and economically to the rest of the world. According to Minaar & Hough (1996) the number of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans increased significantly in contrast to expectations. In Bosman et al (2000) it is reported that better relations and slackened border control after 1994 resulted in easier access for documented and undocumented job-seeking migrants to South Africa. According to reports, the main reason behind this trend was a lack of employment opportunities and the threat of starvation and hunger in neighbouring countries.

A survey by South African Migration Project (McDonald 1999) also showed that the single most important reason for migrants entering South Africa is 'looking for work'. Economic related reasons added up to nearly 50%. Other reasons were of social, safety and educational nature.

Internal Migration

Urbanisation

The economic development in South Africa also brought about patterns of internal migration. This phenomenon started off with the finding of diamonds and gold during the 19th century and accelerated in the 1950's due to industrial development.

An estimated 21 to 22 million people lived in large town, cities and metropolitan areas in 1996 (Maninger 2000). This accounted for roughly 60% of the countries population. Currently, the South African urban population is growing by approximately one million people per annum that are significantly higher than the estimated 750 000 predicted in 1989. Reportedly, South Africa's cities are some of the fastest growing urban centres in the world. Cities such as Durban for instance doubled its size between 1970 and 1980 and grew a further 77% until 1985 (Maninger 2000). Gauteng's population is also predicted to double from seven million to fourteen million between 1997 and 2011. This shows that South African cities have been growing at unparalleled rates during the last three decades.

In the HSRC's internal migration survey, the majority of respondents indicated that they will move to an urban area (76%) when the likelihood of moving arise. This shows that migratory moves will most likely be to urban areas.

It should nevertheless be noted that although urbanisation may be viewed as largely result of industrial development, a variety of other complex social and political factors also have

an influence on urbanisation in South Africa. This is underscored by the HSRC survey that provide evidence that factors such as education opportunities, housing and social issues such as marriage and divorce also play a significant role in motivating migratory moves.

Rural to rural movements

In terms of contemporary migration, there are a body of researchers that believe that rural-to-rural migration has become the dominant form of migration and that social links between urban migrants and their areas of origin are being served, and that return migration is minimal (Van der Berg, Burger, Leibbrandt & Mlatsheni 2002). However, other studies do not support this argument. One example is that of Van der Berg et al. (2002) that maintain that 1996 census figures do not bear testimony to a predominately rural-to-rural flow of people. This study focused mainly on inter-provincial moves that are predominately from rural provinces such as the Eastern Cape to more urbanised provinces such as the Western Cape. Short distance moves for rural to other rural areas might therefore not be easily picked up due to the scope of the analysis and the fact that census data doesn't easily lend itself to a very detailed analysis of migration patterns. The census questionnaire only records information on a last move that imply that any other moves will not have been recorded. This might render some conclusions on migration from census data less reliable.

Economic factors inhibiting migration

A fair amount of emphasis in this paper has been placed on economic factors that cause migration. However, despite the fact that economic factors have to a significant extent shaped the distribution of people across the face of South Africa as we know it today, it has at a different level in some instances inhibited the movement of people whether to international or other local destinations. Poverty, which remains wide spread in South and Southern Africa has in some instances deprived people of the option to migrate to another area in order to better their living conditions and income generating prospects.

In an HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) study on cross-border migration, it was reported that negative perceptions on the availability of employment opportunities in South Africa also acted as a disincentive to some migrants to come to South Africa (Bosman et al 2000).

HSRC research on the causes of migration in South Africa

A number of relatively recent studies have been conducted by the HSRC which highlights current internal and cross-border migration trends.

Cross-border migration

A study titled 'The causes of cross-border migration between South Africa and respectively Mozambique and Zimbabwe' highlighted a number of issues in terms of economic factors that play a role in either encouraging or deterring cross-border migration to South Africa. Factors associated with the area of origin showed that poor economic circumstances in migrant's country of origin were of importance in motivating people to move to South Africa. These factors included a lack of employment opportunities, low wages and low value of currencies when compared with the South African Rand. The study also revealed that strong perceptions exist that South Africa is a country with many economic opportunities. Perceptions that money was more freely available in South Africa than in

their own countries induced some migrants to enter the informal sector, in particular as hawkers selling handicrafts from their own countries or retailing consumer goods bought in bulk.

According to the study results, the familiarity of migrants with work in particular niche sectors such as agriculture and mining played a significant role in motivating people to move across borders in search of employment in those sectors. (Bosman et al 2000)

Internal migration

A study on the 'Causes of internal migration in S.A.' by the HSRC (2000-2002) reveals the importance of economic factors as reason for people moving internally. Nearly 43% of respondents indicated economic reasons (employment and income related) as their main reason for moving. However, a larger percentage of male respondents indicated economic reasons for moving than females. Social reasons such as getting married, separated or moving in with a partner accounted for 13.1% of all moves by females.

Interestingly, when comparing different economic reasons for moving, better educated people tend to move because of seeking better employment opportunities as opposed to the less educated that motivated the single most important reason for their moves as 'looking for employment'. This seem to indicate that people with lower educational qualifications are more likely to be unemployed and therefore also more likely to move as the result of 'looking for employment'.

An investigation of how age relate to the reasons for movement revealed that young people (18-24 years) will move more readily due to employment opportunities than older people (25-44 years). Nevertheless, interestingly, young people indicated to a lesser extent than older people that they moved because of 'looking for employment'. Young people often flagged (13.1%) education of self as the main reason for moving. People in the age category 55-69 years on the other hand offered mostly social reasons for moving.

SOCIAL REASONS

Micro-level factors causing or inhibiting migration

People chose to move (i.e. migrate) to where they can be most productive, given their skills; but before they can capture the higher wages associated with greater labour productivity, they must undertake certain investments such as the material costs of travelling, the costs of maintenance while moving and looking for work, the effort involved in learning a new language and culture, the difficulty experienced in adapting to a new labour market, and the psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1993:434).

Whether to migrate or not thus involves decision making at various micro-levels, for example as an individual or within the household. It therefore stands to reason that the relative household status should be seen as important for migration decisions, underlying that these decisions are usually not made by isolated individual actors, but by larger units of related people, typically families or households Massey et al. (1993). Massey and his co-workers (1993:439) go so far as to say that families, households or other culturally defined units of production and consumption constitute the appropriate units of analysis for migration research, and not the autonomous individual. The family or household is seen as

acting collectively, deciding on who should or should not migrate. These decisions are taken not only to maximise expected income, but also to minimise risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, apart from those in the labour market (Massey et al 1993).

Unlike individuals, households are in a position to control risks to their economic well being by diversifying the allocation of household resources, such as family labour. While some family members can be assigned economic activities in the local economy, others may be sent to work in foreign labour markets where wages and employment conditions are better than those in the local labour market. In the event that local economic conditions deteriorate and activities fail to bring in sufficient income, the household can rely on migrant remittances for support (Massey et al 1993). Migration therefore offers a mechanism by which farm families for example can self-insure against income risks arising from crop price fluctuations or crop failure due to drought or other natural disasters. It is therefore imperative to look at micro-level issues such as the individual and family which include family and household characteristics; years spend in the community, social networks, family influences and kinship obligations when engaging in migration research (HSRC 2002:2).

Rural poverty and migration decision-making

South African poverty has a strong rural bias (Van der Berg et al 2002). Rural poverty however is strongly influenced by the nature of urban-rural interactions. One finds that for example, the main sources of the rural homeland population are often wages (usually earned in urban areas), social transfers and remittances. The poorest rural households are those who have neither access to social pensions nor links to the urban labour market through own employment or migrant remittances. These are also often the households who cannot afford to send some of their members to urban centres in order to look for work as they do not have the social or the economic means (i.e. social capital) to risk the costs involved in such a venture. These households typically do not form part of migrant networks[1] as they do not have anything to offer or contribute towards such networks (Gelderblom, 2000).

Reciprocal exchange forms the basis of migrant networks. Reciprocal exchange involves trust that the beneficiary at one stage will reciprocate at a later stage. This implies that an individual will be helped to migrate with the understanding that he or she will be able to help his or her benefactor at some later stage or will facilitate or help to facilitate the migration of other people. The poorest of the poor are often excluded from networks because they cannot reciprocate. Networks though resources for poor people may therefore not be accessible to the poorest of the poor (Gelderblom, 2000).

In fact many of the rural unemployed are forced to attach themselves to pensioner households in order to survive and this often puts them in deep rural areas far away from jobs. This has a particularly negative effect and further hinders their chances of finding jobs in urban labour markets (Van der Berg et al 2002:18).Dinkelman and Pirouz (2001 in Van der Berg et al 2002) agree. They reiterate that the costs of job search and the lack of access to especially urban labour market networks and thus information regarding possible jobs are important impediments to finding employment. It would appear that these

[1] Migration networks are types of social networks based on mutual trust between people with pre-existing ties of kinship, friendship and a shared community (Gelderblom, 2000).

desperate rural survival strategies are making it so much harder for the rural unemployed to stay in touch with the (urban) labour market. This shows that 'long-distance migration and the rural poverty associated with it are more complex in their origins, more uneven in their development, both spatially and over time, and marked by a more elusive interrelationship than the first accounts of them suggests' (Jeeves 1995:195-196). Understanding rural poverty therefore requires an understanding of rural to urban migration (Van der Berg et al 2002:2).

The role of social networks in migration decision-making

One may describe migrant networks as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey, et al 1993:448). These networks increase the likelihood of international (as well as rural to urban) movement because they lower the cost and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration. Network connections constitute a form of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign or urban employment. Once the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the expansion of networks reduces the costs and risks of movement, which causes the probability of migration to rise; this causes additional movement, which further expands the network and so on. Over time migratory behaviour spreads outward to encompass broader segments of the sending society (Massey et al 1993:449).

Declining costs

The first migrants who leave for a new destination have no social ties to draw upon, and for them migration is costly, particularly if it involves entering another country without documents. After the first migrants have left, however, the potential costs of migration are substantially lowered for friends and relatives left behind. Because of the nature of kinship and friendship structures, each new migrant creates a set of people with social ties to the destination area (Massey et al 1993:449).

Declining risks

These social networks also make international and rural to urban migration extremely attractive as a strategy for risk diversification. When migrant networks are well developed, they put a destination job within easy reach of most community members and make emigration or urbanisation a reliable and secure source of income. (Massey et al 1993).
The extent to which the network facilitates migration in any given case depends on the resources of the network as well as the willingness of network members to support that particular migrant (Gelderblom, 2000). Resources include power, status and money as well as the amount of information at the disposal of network members. A well-resourced network has more information and more money at its disposal and is thus better able to assist in terms of accommodation and employment (Gelderblom, 2000). Network connections assist potential migrants at all stages of their move. They make migration easier because they firstly provide information about accommodation and possible job opportunities in destination areas. Information dissemination is the result of the social interaction that takes place between network members. When migrants leave home they continue to circulate between the origin and destination areas, carrying information, money and goods between the two (Gelderblom, 2000). The stronger the ties between network members, the more information they share. The information dissemination function can be so effective at times that some potential migrants found jobs even before they left the area of origin (Gelderblom, 2000).

There is however less positive consequences to such strong ties as migrants with strong ties often only interact with people who belong to the same group as they. Their resultant inability or unwillingness to interact with people outside the network often hinder their assimilation into the wider community and may result in them taking a long time to learn the new language or adapt to the dominant culture(s) in the destination area.

The intensity of ties between network members also varies. The strength of network ties is measured by the intensity of the interaction between members as well as the intensity of their emotional involvement (Gelderblom, 2000). Strong network ties require vast amounts of investment, whether tangible (i.e. money, accommodation) or intangible (e.g. time, emotional support) Weak ties are often limited to only the dissemination of information about possible job opportunities (Gelderblom, 2000).

The ties between network members however do not automatically remain constant and or strong. According to Gelderblom (2000) once a network member becomes successful, the incentive to remain part of the network is reduced. While networks offer good ways for poor people to accumulate capital through mutual savings clubs (e.g. stokvels) this is only true as long as everybody is more or less on the same economic level. When members vary economically, those who are better off may experience the claims of others on the resources they have accumulated as a strain rather than a source of security. Gelderblom goes on to say that people only remain part of the network as long as they feel they are likely to gain as much as they contribute to the network.

Migrant networks are not only important determinants for moving but also for staying (ties that bind), and particularly when explaining past moves, attention should be paid not only to those who decided to migrate, but also to those who decided not to migrate (HSRC 2002). Strong ties with social networks in the area of origin, could reduce the incentive to migrate as the potential migrant can call on the help of many others in time of need. This type of network thus increases the economic security of the potential migrant in the area of origin (Gelderblom, 2000). The presence of many close friends and relatives also serve as a factor that binds him or her emotionally to the area of origin (Gelderblom, 2000). For the purposes of this paper however, the focus will solely be on those who migrated and the social capital and social networks they accessed in both the areas of origin and destination, if any.

The culture of migration

As migration grows in prevalence within a community, it changes values and cultural perceptions in ways that increase the probability of future migration. At the community level for example, migration tends to become deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people's behaviours, and values associated with migration often become part of the community's values. For young men, and in many settings young women as well, migration becomes a rite of passage, and those who do not attempt to elevate their status through international or rural to urban movement are considered lazy, unenterprising, and undesirable. Eventually, knowledge about foreign locations and jobs becomes widely diffused, and values, sentiments, and behaviours characteristic of the core society spread widely within the sending region (Massey et al 1993:453).

The changing patterns of migration

Migration research seems to suggest that migration patterns are changing. The post-apartheid political, social and economic changes of the 1990s in particular has brought about some changes in mobility patterns in South Africa. These changes took place in an environment of declining employment opportunities. Despite economic reasons, i.e. job seeking or job opportunities being the main reason for most migratory decisions, economic factors do not explain all migration outcomes, and some of the answers have to be sought elsewhere. It is therefore imperative that closer attention be paid to social reasons or factors that either prohibit or enhance changes in migration patterns. One factor for example points to low levels of out-migration from districts with high unemployment rates, due to the inability of those already marginalized by social structures and low education levels to migrate. Again stressing the fact that non-migration is as much a policy and research issue as migration (HSRC 2002).

Migration used to be mostly a male phenomenon, and was mainly fluctuating (Van der Berg 2002:4). Thus migration became almost synonymous with the phenomenon of 'men of two worlds', where the area of origin (usually rural) remained home to migrants (Simkins, 1983 in Van der Berg 2002:4). Migration is still influenced by gender with age and education also playing important roles. Van der Berg et al. (2002) describe migration flows as small, but still predominantly rural to urban. Their study also confirm that migration is highly age-selective, with young adults moving from the rural to the urban centres in search of employment. Despite the fact that migration is now less gender sensitive than in the past, older and less educated women are considerably less likely to migrate when they are contrasted with their male counterparts, whilst younger, educated women's probability of migrating is not far below that of men (Van der Berg 2002:32-33).

The changing role of social networks in migration decision-making

Whereas migrants, especially mine workers used to revere the rural home and considered their urban environment a temporary home, recent studies, for example, Cross and Webb (1999 in Van der Berg 2002:4) suggest that social links between urban migrants and their areas of origin are being severed, and that return migration seems minimal. Bekker (2000:10-11, in Van der Berg et al., 2002) confirms this. He adds that male migrant workers, even after the abolition of influx control, used to prefer leaving their families behind in the rural area as they perceived urban infrastructure and services, for example urban schooling for blacks and housing to be inadequate. Urban crime and violence were also considered detrimental to moving the family to the city. Jeeves (1995) also refer to research by for example, Moodie (1983) that confirm the fierce commitment mine workers exhibited to rural family life.

These mine workers cherished the rural society and values that they knew and wanted to preserve this way of life. Mine workers accepted the hazards and meagre wages with their eyes open as the necessary means to the achievement of their rural ends and as an acceptable price to pay for future independence (Jeeves 1995:202). Now, however, migrants seem to be bringing their families with them to the urban area, perhaps confirming the belief that people are migrating with no or little intention to return to the place of origin (Van der Berg 2002:5). Of all persons who moved residence in 1996, 78% now reside in urban areas (in Van der Berg 2002). The census evidence supports the contention of both Cross & Webb (1999) and Bekker (2000) that return migration is becoming less common, even though almost half of all black migrants in for example the Western Cape who come from the Eastern Cape expressed their intention of returning (Van der Berg 2002:5).

According to Jeeves (1995) the rural order had become socially and economically diminished by the 1950s and 1960s. By then, the rural household was a shadow of its former self both in the number of family members it supported and in productive output. As population pressed against South Africa's restrictive land policies, soil fertility declined and erosion spread across the countryside, making eking out a living on the land almost impossible, resulting in many of the most fit to abandoned rural life for the urban labour market – thus contributing to the exodus from rural areas. Despite the fact that most people seem to be making their permanent home within urban areas, the social ties with the rural area often remains intact. Many urban families still maintain strong ties with the rural home, for example returning to the rural home for holidays or important ceremonies. Many are also still sending money and other goods to the rural home and others plan on retiring in the rural home.

According to Massey et al. (1993:461) one ought to be able to detect within households, the effect of social capital on individual migration behaviour. In general, members of households in which someone has already migrated (abroad) should display higher probability of movement than those from households that lack migratory experience (Massey et al 1993:461). Coupled with this is the belief that those most likely to migrate have a strong social network and support base within the community of origin as well as the future place of residence. This however is not always the case. Many migratory decisions are made at the individual level. Research by for example Sinclair (1998) suggests that the decision to migrate among especially young male migrants from north and West Africa is usually an individual choice and these migrants may not have ready access to strong social networks in their destination area. When they do form a social group, it is often not build around the traditional family or social structure, but mostly formed for protection in a hostile and xenophobic environment and for the sharing of resources, which may include accommodation and food.

Most of the literature on the role of social capital on migration, focused on international and cross border migration. It however stands to reason that even rural to urban migration requires a strong social network both in the community of origin (i.e. the rural area) as well as the future place of residence (i.e. the urban area). Following thus is an analysis of some of the results from the initial survey on the causes of internal migration in South Africa. This survey was conducted in 2000. These particular results will be used to compare the access respondents, in this case migrants, had to social capital and social networks both in their previous as well as their current communities. The following variables taken from Question 3.11, 'Social networks/Social capital: Previous location' (p.26) and Question 4.3, 'Social networks/Social capital: Current location', were looked at more closely:

- Large circle of friends
- Supportive friends/neighbours/others
- Regarded highly by members of that community
- Other social/economic support by relatives/friends/organisations

Table 1: Comparing social capital for migrants in the previous and current places of residence

Current location / Previous location	Large circle of friends	Supportive friends, neighbours, others	High level of involvement in welfare and related organisations	High involvement in religious act ivies	Regarded highly in community	High involvement in women's or other support groups	Other social/economic support from relatives/friends/organisations	Row Total (%)
Large circle of friends	76.5%	7.4%	29.5%	36.4%	47.0%	20.0%	39.0%	77.2%
Supportive friends, neighbours, others	36.7%	27.0%	18.9%	48.8%	36.1%	37.2%	12.4%	4.9%
High level of involvement in welfare and related organisations	58.2%	15.4%			71.7%		59.8%	26.4%
High involvement in religious act ivies	45.8&	9.0%			42.1%		26.4%	55.3%
Regarded highly in community	60.3%	8.5%	31.3%	54.3%	61.0%	24.2%	47.9%	52.5%
High involvement in women's or other support groups	57.2%	16.5%			69.9%		44.4%	32.8%
Other social/economic support from relatives/friends/organisations	73.7%	10.5%	39.7%	41.2%	65.8%	29.3%	79.5%	35.4%

Discussion of results

A majority (77.2%) of the respondents interviewed, indicated that they had a large circle of friends in their previous community. This figure decreased when they moved to their current place of residence. Now only 76.5% of the original 77.2% of respondents have a large circle of friends. What this means is that slightly more than 20% of those who migrated did not establish a large circle of friends in their new community. Of all the respondents interviewed, only about 5% (4.9%) indicated that they enjoyed the support of friends, neighbours and other community members or structures in their previous community. Of this very insignificant number of people, only 27% now enjoy the support of friends, neighbours or other community members in the current place of residence. What this means is that of the few people who used to have a strong support base in their previous community, 73% do not have that support base in the new community.

Only about half (52.5%) of all respondents indicated that they were highly regarded in their previous community. Of these only 61% see themselves as highly regarded in their current community. This means that 39% of those who were highly regarded in their old community do not enjoy the same status in the new community. Of all the respondents, only 35.4% indicated that they received other social or economic support from relatives, friends or organisations. After they moved, only 79.5% of them received similar support from relatives, neighbours or organisations in the current community. About 20% of these people thus lost access to this type of support after they moved to the new community.

Although one cannot establish from the above results whether these respondents had access to social networks in the area of destination, prior to their move there, it is clear that that most did in fact have access to a large circle of friends in their previous location. What is also clear is that at least 20% of those who had a large group of friends in the previous location were unable to establish a similar circle of friends in the current location. What is also interesting to note was that although the majority of respondents indicated a large circle of friends in the previous location only an insignificant number of people (5% of respondents) indicated that they perceived their friends, neighbours and other community members in the previous place as being supportive. The figures are even more dismal for the current place of residence - only 27% of the original 5% percent who indicated that they had supportive friends and neighbours, now say that their friends, neighbours and other community members in the current place are supportive. The fact that only 35.4% of respondents indicated that they received other forms of social or economic support from relatives, friends or organisations, confirms that they did not seem to have a very strong and supportive social network in the previous place of residence. The fact that only 79.5% of this small number are now receiving similar forms of support in the current area, also confirms that they do not have strong social networks in the current area either.

It is unfortunate that the results do not indicate whether these respondents still maintain their social ties with members of their original location. What is

however clear is that it does not appear as if social ties whether in the previous or current location, played a major role in respondents' decision to move.

CONCLUSION

Historically political, economic and social factors have played a major role in patterns of migration in South Africa. This was particularly the case with government-induced resettlements and farm evictions resulting from racial segregation based policies. Mining followed by industrialisation in particular, had a big stake in the distribution patterns of people in South Africa as we know it today and will continue to be a significant factor driving internal and international migration trends.

The role and importance of social factors in South African migration trends must also be underscored. The family or household often collectively decide who should or should not migrate in order to maximise net income and minimise the social and economic costs and risks involved in moving and seeking employment in a distant place. Migrant and social networks in the place of destination often minimise these risks and costs. Those who have access to these networks are more likely to move than those who do not have access to such networks.

One can therefore conclude that migration is a complex process involving a variety of factors. When investigating the history of migration in South Africa, political, economic and social issues in particular stand out. It is therefore imperative that any research on migration should address these issues. This paper attempted to do just that.

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